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THE PROPHECY OF MALACHI.

THE HEBREW PROPHETS.

THE prophets of Israel belong to all time. They speak to all human hearts. They constitute a grand succession of faithful witnesses for the one living and true God. Their prophecies illuminate the times in which they were spoken, and lift them out of the shadows of obscurity into a clear and permanent historic light. The mists of uncertainty cover the religious history of the centuries that follow the close of Old Testament prophecy.

A combination of unique considerations invests with undying interest the study of their character, their mission and their oracles. They were the unquailing preachers of truth and righteousness, in times of the greatest moral degeneracy. They were the chosen messengers of Jehovah, by whom He made known His will. They proclaimed the coming judgments of God against the nations that rejected His claims. "They cheered and animated the people of Israel in times of deepest depression, by inspiring predictions of a coming reign of righteousness, when a Redeemer should arise to turn away ungodliness from Jacob. They rose so high above the priests in character and influence, that those minor orbs are largely lost to sight in the blaze of their superior brightness. In the Jewish theocracy they were the lights and touchstones of the national

conscience, blending earnest calls to repentance and obedience with wonderful predictions of coming events that were to affect the destiny of nations." <sup>1</sup> Why do we study their writings? Because they contain the great ethical and religious principles that are the foundations of faith and duty for all generations, and reveal Him before whose eye the future was an open book. The Christian Church, St. Paul declares, is "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus Himself being the chief corner-stone." Throughout the New Testament it is constantly assumed that the teaching of the prophets was supernaturally revealed and possessed divine authority.

#### MODERN CRITICAL STUDY OF THE PROPHETS.

A new and intense interest in these prophetic writings has been evoked in recent times, by the extent to which they have become subjects of close and learned critical study. If the large cairns of stones piled over the bones of those who fell on famous battle fields show where the fight raged most fiercely, and what points were deemed most important, the numerous volumes and articles in periodicals, discussing the prophets of Israel, bear testimony to the interest with which the learned world regards these ancient oracles. The indirect and incidental references to contemporary events, or the silence respecting such events—the style and mental idiosyncrasies of the writers—linguistic peculiarities which are thought to be characteristic of the language at some stage in its history—the way in which the ideas harmonize with the supposed condition of religious progress at certain times—the disintombed records of a forgotten civilization—all have been keenly questioned to give evidence respecting the dates, the authorship, and the purpose of these records of writers, who claim to speak as revealers of God's will to His ancient people.

It would be beyond the range of these introductory remarks to state what I deem the outcome of these microscopic, analytic criticisms of the Old Testament. But a brief reference to these results may be permitted.

It may be freely conceded that this critical study of the

<sup>1</sup> Jesus the Messiah.

times and occasions of the prophecies, and of the condition of the people to whom they were originally addressed, has invested them with a far greater living interest than they have when read as isolated statements. To take an illustration from the New Testament. The tender sympathy which breathes through St. Paul's epistle to the Philippians is far better understood, when the epistle is read in the light of the peculiar circumstances of suffering and deliverance, under which that Church was founded by Paul and Silas. But this personal element does not lessen the truth and value of the teaching, which do not depend upon the local associations. But just because the occasion of a prophecy or psalm enhances its interest, many invent imaginary settings that have no historic foundation. Against this we must guard. It is also safe to believe that the keen and exhaustive criticism to which these books have been subjected, though for a time it may disturb the faith of many, will ultimately tend to promote a more unfaltering confidence in revealed truths that have been tested by the severest scrutiny.

But though frankly recognizing the advantages accruing from modern critical study, it must be admitted that many conclusions have been set forth as the results of scientific methods of research, which do not appear to rest on anything more solid than conjecture; and which, to say the least, it is very difficult to harmonize with the Scriptural and historic conception of the prophets, which regards them as holy men, who "spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost." It is important to remember that these conclusions are, for the most part, not new facts discovered by modern research, but inferences drawn, by a freer style of speculative criticism, from facts that have been long familiar to all intelligent students of the Bible.

#### TWO CURRENT VIEWS OF PROPHECY.

Speaking broadly, there are two current views of Hebrew prophecy, which are dividing theologians into opposing camps. One view is that these prophetic oracles were special and extraordinary revelations of God's will and purposes, made known by Him to those whom He had chosen to be prophets. The

other view is that these prophecies were the outcome of the evolution of Hebrew religious thought and life, under the ordinary operations of the Spirit on the minds of gifted and pious men. Those who hold the first named position maintain that the predictions of the prophets evince superhuman knowledge, such as none but God could reveal. Those who take the second view either eliminate prediction, or reduce it to a vanishing point. Archdeacon Farrar may fitly represent this school. He says: "And though the wisdom which can see the future in the germs of the present is so naturally an endowment of the illuminated soul, that definite prediction—almost always of events already on the horizon—is not excluded from the sphere of the prophet's work," etc.<sup>1</sup> That is, after trying to show that the prophet is simply a preacher, he admits that the prophet is not excluded from inferring near future events from the present state of things; because this is the natural endowment of all illuminated souls. That the prophets were preachers of righteousness, which has always been fully held in the Church, is in no way inconsistent with their being chosen of God to reveal the future doom of nations and the coming of the Messiah. Prediction and fulfilment are a divine method of religious teaching, by which God made known His character; as He says by Isaiah: "I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done." (Isa. xlv. 9, 10.)

It may be admitted that some whose theories appear to ignore the supernatural, admit in words a divine inspiration, for which their system has logically no place.

#### THE APPEAL SHOULD BE TO THE BIBLE.

In deciding between these two views of prophecy, it is neither improper nor unscientific to go to the Bible itself for an answer. What have the prophets to say on this point? There can scarcely be any question that the testimony of the sacred writers, as to the way in which they received what they gave forth in prophecy, strongly supports the historic view.

<sup>1</sup> The Minor Prophets.

Professor Sanday, of Oxford, himself a liberal critic, on this point says: "The central phenomenon of the Old Testament is prophecy. The leading prophets all tell us under what circumstances they came to assume their office, and how they came to regard themselves as exponents of the Divine will. . . . The process is always extremely different from what it would be, if the prophet arrived at his insight into spiritual things by the tentative efforts of his own genius. There is something sharp and sudden about it. He can lay his finger, so to speak, upon the moment when it came. And it always comes in the form of an overwhelming force from without, against which he struggles but in vain."<sup>1</sup>

An appeal to the sacred Scriptures themselves amply confirms these statements. We have the full account of the call of Moses to the prophet's office, and of his efforts to escape from the responsibility it imposed upon him. The prophet Isaiah describes the sublime circumstances connected with his call to the prophet's work. Jeremiah tells with equal explicitness how he was inducted into his prophetic ministry, and how God's words were given him to speak. Ezekiel records the time and place when he received his commission as a watchman, to whom God said: "Hear the word at my mouth and give them warning from me." St. Paul similarly declares of the Gospel which he preached, "I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ."

This testimony is clear and explicit. I confess I am disposed to distrust any theory which assumes that the critics know better than the prophets themselves the nature of the revelations contained in their prophecies. If we reject the conception which the prophets cherished of their office and of the manner in which God made known His will to them, and substitute some theory of evolutionary development, their testimony is discredited; their oracles are no longer divinely-revealed messages; their writings are simply literary remains, which we accept or reject as they agree with modern theories.

Professor Marcus Dods, who is distinguished alike for his

<sup>1</sup> *The Oracles of God*, p. 53.

liberal views and his biblical scholarship, says: "What we mean by revelation is, that certain men come to have thoughts about God and divine things, not only new in the world and more significant than other men have had, but also such as they themselves could not have conceived or arrived at without the extraordinary aid and suggestion of God Himself. Even when the thoughts may seem to grow up in their mind as other thoughts do, they are not their own thoughts, but God's. Though the revelation is made within the prophet's mind, and by a process which he may not always be able to distinguish from his ordinary habit of thinking, the matter conveyed to his mind is as truly a revelation from God as if it were uttered by a voice from heaven, or written with a supernatural finger. This is what is essential in revelation, that it be God's utterance to us—God not waiting for men to find Him out, but Himself coming and giving us sure knowledge of Himself."<sup>1</sup>

Principal Cave, of England, says: "The prophet, then—according to the Old Testament view of his function—interpreted to man revelations he personally received from God. Prophecy was not divination but revelation. Soothsaying rested upon human presentiment; prophecy followed upon Divine inspiration. The prophet was conscious of being an organ of Divine communications. The words he spake he knew to be Divine words. In a word, prophecy was revelation, Divine knowledge divinely imparted. At least, such is the conception everywhere current in the Old Testament."<sup>2</sup>

I am free to admit that the question whether the prophets were chosen messengers of God, through whom He made a revelation of His will and purposes, in the sense in which they themselves evidently believed, seems of much greater importance than whether everything in the narratives copied from ancient documents is infallibly inerrant. It is not wise to indulge in speculations as to the mode in which the prophets received their revelations, or to adopt theories of inspiration

<sup>1</sup> *The Post-Exilian Prophets*, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Inspiration of the Old Testament*, p. 382.

not based on the Scripture records. On these points, we can know nothing but what we learn from the sacred writers themselves. They plainly declared that the religious truths they taught, and the events they foretold, were especially revealed; and therefore they were not a natural evolution of the religious thought of the nation. If we reject their testimony on this point as untrue, we cannot trust it in regard to other things.

#### THE AUTHOR AND TIME OF THIS PROPHECY.

Nothing is known of the personal history of Malachi. He was too intensely occupied with his "burden" to Israel to leave any record of his parentage, time, or birthplace. Like the Baptist whom he foretold, he was "the voice of one crying in the wilderness, make straight the way of the Lord." From the fact that the name means "my angel" or messenger, and that it is repeated in this book, it has been questioned whether Malachi is a proper name. This has mainly arisen from the fact that in the Septuagint it is translated in the first verse, "his messenger," although the name Malachi appears as the title of the book. The most competent scholars hold that Malachi is a proper name. As the names of most of the prophets have significant meanings, there is no sufficient reason why the meaning of the word Malachi should be taken as evidence that it was not the prophet's proper name. In this prophet we have a striking illustration of the way in which the godly zeal and faithful testimony of a brave spirit survive in perennial freshness and power, when everything relating to his personal career has been forgotten for ages.

Respecting the time and circumstances in which Malachi exercised his ministry, the internal evidence is very strong. It is almost universally admitted that he was the last of the great Hebrew prophets. Some of the radical critics, with whom late dates for psalms and prophecies have become a mania, are disposed to place Joel still later; but a numerous array of eminent German and English scholars consider the grounds for this conclusion very slight.

The reference to the temple service shows that Malachi lived some time after Zechariah and Haggai; and the sins he rebukes,



and the condition of the people to whom he speaks, furnish strong evidence that he was a contemporary of Nehemiah. Malachi says: "Ye have corrupted the covenant of Levi, saith the Lord of Hosts." Nehemiah complains in similar words: "They have defiled the priesthood and the covenant of the priesthood and of the Levites." Nehemiah earnestly labored to reform what he called "the great evil" of marrying strange wives. In Malachi, Jehovah denounces those who had "dealt treacherously against the wives of their youth," and of their covenant, and "married the daughters of a strange god." In Malachi the people are exhorted to "bring all the tithes into the storehouse." In Nehemiah's reformation the people bring "the tithe of the corn and the new wine and the oil unto the treasuries." In Malachi, God says: "Ye are gone away from mine ordinances and have not kept them." Nehemiah asks: "Why is the house of God forsaken?" Malachi speaks to a poverty-stricken and destitute people. Soon after this the people came to Nehemiah, saying: "We have mortgaged our lands, vineyards and houses, that we might buy corn because of the dearth." No other undated writing in the Old Testament furnishes such strong proof of the time of its production.

It is the general opinion that these prophecies were delivered during the absence of Nehemiah, after his first governorship in Jerusalem. There is the strongest probability that as Haggai and Zechariah co-operated with Zerubbabel in his work, Malachi co-operated with Nehemiah; and that he represents the inner and spiritual side of the reformation, which was achieved under this godly and patriotic governor, after his second return to Jerusalem. Every genuine reformation has its root in a change wrought in the hearts and lives of the people, rather than in any external exercise of legislative or political authority.

The circumstances of the people to whom Malachi delivered his message give special point to its rebukes and warnings. When the foundation of the second temple was laid, some "wept with a loud voice, and many shouted aloud for joy." When it was finished, we are told that they "kept the dedication of this house of God with joy." Ezra re-established the ancient worship, and later Nehemiah built the wall and administered the govern-

ment for twelve years. After this Nehemiah returned to the Court of Persia, and Ezra disappears from the scene. Then came a sad decline that crushed the hopes that had been kindled by the restoration from the exile. Eliashib, the High Priest, who was not in sympathy with the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah, appears to have become the chief director of affairs, and great religious degeneracy followed. A spurious liberality, partly caused by contact with Babylonian ideas, became the chief characteristic of the time. The influx of the heathen population was encouraged. Mixed marriages with the heathen women were allowed. Divorces for this purpose became common. As the Levites were the chief opposers of this wickedness, their tithes were withheld, so that they were compelled to engage in secular labor. The Sabbath was desecrated. Idolatrous worship, if not actually practised, was not regarded with disfavor. Canon Rawlinson thus portrays the condition of things at this juncture: "Meanwhile they allowed the house of God to be 'forsaken,' the choral service to be discontinued, the treasuries to become empty, and the once crowded courts to remain without ministers or worshippers." This was the condition of faithless recreancy and wickedness, against which the last of the great prophets of Israel exercised his faithful and fearless ministry.

"The burden of the word of the Lord to Israel by Malachi" is in a most emphatic sense "preaching for the times." The sins of priests and people are portrayed and condemned. God's displeasure, and the consequences of their sins, in preventing blessings and bringing judgment and punishment upon them, are scathingly proclaimed. The transgressors are urged to repentance and obedience by dark threatenings, and by glowing promises of blessing which are conditional upon their turning from their evil ways. The prophecy closes with a prophetic announcement of the forerunner of the day of the Lord. We can only briefly notice some of the more salient points in this pointed and practical message to an erring and backslidden people.

## THE SINS OF PRIESTS AND PEOPLE.

The most prominent characteristic of this period, and that with which the warnings and expostulations of the prophet are most largely occupied, is the neglect of the law of Moses, and the imperfect and formal performance of such services as they still rendered. Where sacrifices and offerings were not entirely withheld, they selfishly offered the blind, the lame and the sick, what is called by the prophet a "polluted" offering.

One of the difficulties of this prophecy, which is apt to perplex a thoughtful reader, arises out of these references to offerings. The prominence given to the payment of tithes and the observance of the Levitical law, as conditions of receiving the Divine favor, seems to be inconsistent with the essential importance of the moral and spiritual elements in religion, which is so fully recognized by the earlier prophets and also in this prophecy.

But it is not the formal outward acts, but the spiritual principles and faith that they represent and express, which give these duties their value and significance. An external act considered in itself may have no special import, and yet may be related to vital results. The lowering of a flag on a vessel is a mere mechanical act; but it may mean defeat and enslavement. The due payment of the offerings enjoined in the law may seem a small thing; but the testimony borne for God and righteousness by maintaining his worship and service is not an insignificant thing. When God says, "bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse," we are not to regard this merely as a command to pay the priests' portion of the corn and oil, but a demand for the living faith and loving obedience of the heart. Christ condemned the Pharisees who paid tithes of mint and anise and cummin, but "omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith," thereby teaching us that the law was something far deeper and broader than a code of outward observances. St. Paul, the great vindicator of justification by faith, says: "Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just and good." (Rom. vii. 12.)

We have seen in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah that one

of the most glaring sins of priests and people was the putting away of their lawful Jewish wives, and the marrying of heathen women. This evil, which overwhelmed Ezra with piercing sorrow, calls forth some of the severest condemnation in this prophecy. The reference to this great wrong is one of the most striking passages in this book :

“ Yet ye say, Wherefore ? Because the Lord has been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt treacherously, though she is thy companion and the wife of thy covenant. And did He not make one ? Yet had He the residue of the spirit. And wherefore one ? That He might seek a godly seed. Therefore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth. For the Lord, the God of Israel, saith that He hateth putting away ” (ch. ii. 14, 15, 16).

The reasons for this condemnation are evident. It was a union with idolaters, that would hardly fail, as in Solomon's case, to turn away their hearts from the God of their fathers. Such marriages were also a treacherous violation of a solemn covenant, and a cruel abandonment of those to whom they owed faithful love. It is clearly intimated that it was contrary to the Divine purpose in the institution of marriage. He made one, because He sought a godly seed. There is something very graphic and suggestive in the thought that the altar of the Lord was covered “ with tears, with weeping and crying out, insomuch that He regarded not the offering any more.” The idea is that the altar was covered with the tears of the women who had been basely cast off ; and therefore the prayers of the transgressors were disregarded ; “ because the Lord of the altar has been witness of the unfaithfulness consummated by divorce, of which they have been guilty towards the wives to whom they were bound by the tender recollections of youthful love, by the intimate companionship of married life, and by the solemn covenant which united them to each other ” (Perowne). The thoughts here respecting the sacredness of marriage and the wickedness of divorce are almost identical with the words of our Lord on this subject, in reply to the Pharisees. By Malachi, Jehovah declares that He hates divorce. We have no reason to believe that it is more pleasing in His sight now.

Because the priests, the religious teachers and guides of the people, were also guilty of this faithless ingratitude and disobedience, made it the more heinous and inexcusable in God's sight. Those who stood as watchmen and shepherds of the people, not only neglected their duty, but went with the multitude to do evil; therefore, their prayers were not accepted, and the threatening is pronounced, that if they do not hearken to the divine commandment to reform, He would curse their blessings. It is suggestive that in the prophetic announcements of the great reforms to be wrought by the manifestation of the Angel of the Covenant, it is said: "He shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver; and they shall offer unto the Lord offerings in righteousness"—indicating that judgment would begin at the house of God. This is not the only place in which the priests are blamed for the sins of the people. Jeremiah represents God as saying, "My people hath been lost sheep; their shepherds have caused them to go astray." In all periods of the history of the Church, unfaithfulness in doctrine and life, on the part of the ministry, has been accompanied by a low religious condition of the people.

#### THE CHARACTER OF TRUE MINISTERS DESCRIBED.

In striking contrast to the faithless and corrupt priests who had polluted the sacrificial service, and by their false teaching "caused many to stumble in the law," there is a characterization of the true priest, which presents a beautiful picture of what the faithful ambassador of God and teacher of the people should be. Speaking of a time when the priests and Levites did what was right in His sight, it is said:

"My covenant was with him of life and peace; and I gave them to him for the fear wherewith he feared me, and was afraid before my name. The law of truth was in his mouth, and iniquity was not found in his lips: he walked with me in peace and equity, and did turn many away from iniquity. For the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth: for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts" (ch. ii. 5, 6, 7).

Here it is declared that, in the time when the priests lived in the fear of the Lord and faithfully declared his statutes, God fulfilled His covenant and gave them "life and peace," and

made their ministry a blessing to others. In this comprehensive reference to a former state of things, a flash of divine light is thrown upon the lives of a class of faithful witnesses of whom nothing is known. In these far-off times, there were among the priests and Levites brave and saintly souls, unknown to earthly fame, who "served their generation by the will of God," and whose unrecorded labors "turned many away from iniquity." This teaches us that it is not right to base large conclusions on the silence of brief and fragmentary records of distant ages.

There is in these words a lesson for all times. The true minister of Christ is to walk with God in the uprightness of a holy life, and to teach the people, not his own thoughts, but "the law of truth," in which God has made known His will concerning the children of men. Only where these features characterize the ministry of the Word will the result be "to turn many away from iniquity." There is something eminently instructive in the thought that the teacher of the people should be what is here described, because "he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts." The thought here suggests the words of St. Paul to the Corinthians: "Therefore, seeing we have this ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not; but have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor handling the Word of God deceitfully, but by manifestation of the truth, commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God" (2 Cor. iv. 1, 2). This implies, not merely that the messenger of the Lord should be a good man, but that his character and testimony should be so blended that the truths he preaches to others shall be minted in the experience of his own heart. This was the secret of the power of the early Methodist preachers, and of all who have preached with spiritual power. What they preached was not abstract theological dogmas, but the living truths of a personal experience. It has been well said: "Doctrine incarnated in character is the most effective way of teaching."

## REPLIES TO THE CAVILS OF UNBELIEF.

A striking feature of this book is the way in which the prophet voices and replies to the unbelieving questionings, by which a disobedient and gainsaying people sought to justify their departure from the ways of righteousness. In these searching replies they "are rebuked for a skepticism that questioned moral distinctions and scoffed at the threatenings of judgment." The light of truth from heaven lays bare their sin and sweeps away the refuges of lies. Denying the goodness of Jehovah, they ask, "Wherein hast thou loved us?" The evidence of this love is shown in the contrast between their condition and that of a kindred nation, and in the way in which they had been crowned with lovingkindness and tender mercy. Resenting the charges of the prophet, they ask, "Wherein have we despised thy name?" The answer is, that they have withheld what was due, and polluted the altar by offering what had defects and blemishes. Instead of the long-suffering of God leading them to repentance, "because sentence against an evil work was not executed speedily," they ask, "Where is the God of judgment?" Jehovah points to a coming day when the Angel of the Covenant, even the Lord whom they professed to seek, would come in judgment to fulfil what He had spoken; and He declares that it is not because of His unfaithfulness, but because of His unchanging love that they were not consumed.

When charged with speaking against God, they say, "Wherein have we spoken so much against thee?" The answer shows how greatly their disbelief had dishonored God. They had declared that it was vain to serve God or keep His ordinances; and that the proud and wicked were happy and blest, rather than those who served Jehovah. The reply to this bold blasphemy is exceedingly suggestive. They are told, though their sin had so blinded them that they could not discern between the obedient and the transgressor, yet there was among them a people who "feared the Lord and thought upon His name"; and who strengthened each other's faith by frequent religious fellowship, in which they talked together of the things of God. And so far from there being no difference between the servants

of the Most High and the disobedient, there is an assurance given that those loyal souls, who in times of degeneracy had "kept the faith," were registered in God's "book of remembrance," and should be His peculiar treasure in the great coming day of trial; and that He "shall spare them as a man spareth his own son that serveth him." And then, even those who had denied that there was any advantage in God's service, shall "discern between the righteous and the wicked, between him that serveth God and him that serveth Him not."

In this reply a great admonitory truth is set forth, which is adapted to our day as well as to that time. Sin blunts and blinds the moral perceptions of its slaves. Persons and things appear different in the eye of Heaven from the way they appear to the children of this world. The false judgments, formed in the fogs of unbelief, shall be reversed in the chancery of heaven. They shall shrivel into deformity in the light that flashes from the throne of purity and love. In the day when, as St. Paul expresses it, "the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is," there shall be terrible awakenings; for those who have not known the awakening of faith must know the awakening of despair.

#### THE CONVERSION OF THE GENTILES FORETOLD.

In a cursory reading of the prophets, we are apt to think that their outlook was too narrowly confined to Israel, that the brotherhood of man was not recognized, and that the choice of one people, to be the depositories of the divine law and counsels, was partial and exclusive. But it should not be forgotten that this election of Israel was not merely for their sakes, but that they should be witnesses and disseminators of revealed truth in the world. "The selection and training of a nation to be a divine agency to make known to the world the knowledge of God, and His glorious purpose for the redemption of humanity by Christ, is a more wonderful and sublime conception than can be found anywhere outside of the Bible."<sup>1</sup> The same principle is seen in God's dealings with men. The gifts He bestows upon individuals or communities are not partial favors

<sup>1</sup> Jesus the Messiah.



given for purposes of selfish gratification, but to qualify for service in lifting humanity up into the light and liberty of God.

The prophecies, however, are not all from this narrow, national standpoint. Isaiah and other prophets obtain glimpses of a time when the forces of the Gentiles shall come in. The local and temporary reference of the Hebrew prophets often becomes the height from which they behold a broader vision of universal blessing. But Malachi is the first who clearly portrays the rejection of the Jews, and the ingathering of believing Gentiles in their stead. Jehovah declares that, because of their wickedness, He had no pleasure in them, and that He would not accept their offering. Then follows this remarkable prophecy: "For from the rising of the sun even to the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense shall be offered to my name and a pure offering: for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts." (Mal. i. 11.)

This cannot mean that the idolatrous heathen worship was acceptable to God. It is a prediction of the results of the all-embracing love that would characterize the Messianic Kingdom. It is the same event of which Christ spoke to the woman of Samaria, when He declared that true worship was no longer confined to sacred places; but that they who would worship the Father "must worship Him in spirit and truth." Of this prophecy the late Professor Franz Delitzsch says: "Even this one prophetic word makes Malachi one of the greatest prophets."

#### THE MORAL TEACHING OF THIS PROPHECY.

It is not uncommon to hear disparagement of the moral teaching of the Old Testament, as if it conformed to a low ethical standard. Others sneer at revealed religion as something made up of pious feeling and hopes of heaven. An unprejudiced study of Malachi's theology would correct these false assumptions. There is no approval here of a religion that consists in outward observances, which do not affect the character and life. In common with the earlier prophets, the kind of religion here demanded is eminently practical. It deals with the duties of

the relations of men to God and to their fellowmen. If it points towards heaven, earthly duties are not forgotten. There is a passage in the third chapter in which the duties of man towards man are presented with wonderful vividness and power. God says: "And I will come near to you to judgment; and I will be a swift witness against the sorcerers, and against the adulterers, and against false swearers, and against those that oppress the hireling in his wages, the widow and the fatherless, and that turn aside the stranger from his right, and fear not me, saith the Lord of Hosts." (Ch. iii. 5, 6.)

From the sins that are here the objects of divine condemnation and threatened punishment, we may learn what is the conduct which God approves and requires. What are the opposites of these forms of sin? Intelligent faith, chastity, truthfulness, just and upright dealing by masters towards servants, and kindness towards all who are friendless and needy. All this is to be rendered in the fear of the Lord. That is, with a constant recognition that we are acting under the eye of our Father in heaven, to whom the rights and interests of His lowliest children are dear. It is often said that the Church shall never have the influence with the toiling masses which it ought to have, until all Christians manifest greater practical sympathy with the rights and interests of that class. Those who maintain this idea may find here a religion that strongly emphasizes this duty. It is instructive to note how all through the Old Testament Jehovah represents himself as the friend and helper of the oppressed.

These lessons for the conduct of life are unchangingly adapted to the people of all times and nations, because the sinners of Malachi's day are types of sinners that have existed in all ages. In those who questioned and disbelieved the divine faithfulness, and those who rested in outward rites that had lost their spiritual significance, we see the beginnings of the full-blown skepticism and formalism of the Sadducees and Pharisees of our Lord's day. And still, questioning disbelievers who repudiate God's claims on their homage and service, and nominal Christians who substitute outward conformity for the faith and love of the heart, like the poor, we have always with us.

The grounds on which these duties towards God and men are based, like the duties themselves, are of universal application. In the opening words of the prophecy, Jehovah reminds Israel of the great love wherewith He had loved them, as shown in His dealings with them. This has been fitly called the keynote of the book. Even His chastisements were prompted by His loving interest in their welfare. It is said in Amos, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth, therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities." This exhaustless, all-embracing love of God for His creatures claims grateful love in return; and heightens the guilt of the sins that are committed against such infinite fatherly goodness.

Another ground of God's claim to obedience, presented by the prophet, is His relationship to them as Father and Master. They had withheld the honor due to Him as a Father, and the fear and obedience due to Him as Master. In this appeal the great truth is suggested, that all moral obligations arise out of the relations of being. Not only does duty to God spring from our relations to Him, but that we have all one Father is given as a reason for brotherly kindness and justice between men. The denial of the divine fatherhood dissolves the bonds and obligations of human brotherhood to those who accept such denial. One class of theologians represent God almost solely as a sovereign Ruler; and it is sometimes falsely said, that this is the only conception of God presented in the Old Testament. Another class speak of the loving fatherhood of God, in a way that virtually excludes the idea of justice and moral government. In this prophecy both these attributes are clearly set forth; and any theology that does not fully recognize both is gravely defective.

#### THE COMING OF THE MESSIAH FORETOLD.

I can only refer very briefly to that part of Malachi's prophecy which has attracted the greatest attention, and is most prominent in the thoughts of Christians, when Malachi is named. I mean the sublime prophecy of the coming of the Lord, to be preceded by the coming of Elijah the prophet, who is to prepare the way before Him. No doubt, one reason

why this closing prophecy of the Old Testament has awakened so much interest is, because the angel who spoke to Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, and our Lord Himself, distinctly intimate that this prediction respecting Elijah was fulfilled by the ministry of John.

In studying this prophecy, we may feel at first that the intimations of the coming One and the work of judgment assigned to Him, do not completely agree with our ideas of the character of the Prince of Peace, or the actual fulfilment by Christ. The words, "who may abide the day of His coming?" sound more like wrath than mercy.

This difficulty arises mainly from the blending of the human and divine in the sacred writings. Some prophecies are definite and explicit in their statements respecting coming events. In other cases, the main idea or truth is divinely revealed and firmly grasped by the prophet; but the form of imagery, by which it is expressed by him, has a local coloring, taken from his time and circumstances. We do not believe that the prophet was a mere instrument, through which God spoke words which to him had no meaning; but the way in which God in His providence fulfilled the prophecy is often far higher than the prophet's conception of his message. We make difficulties by giving more prominence in our thought to the Oriental imagery or form, than to the essential reality predicted. This was substantially the mistake of the Jews of our Lord's time. Elijah the prophet did not come as the forerunner; but John came "in the spirit and power of Elijah," and prepared the way of the Lord. There is reason to think that the greatness of John's preparatory work has not been estimated by the Church at its full value.

A close study of the New Testament will show a profounder agreement between this prophecy and the fulfilment than a superficial view would detect. Malachi speaks of the coming of the Lord as bringing blessing or punishment to different classes according to their character. St. Paul declares that the heralds of the Gospel were to one class "the savour of death unto death," and to another "the savour of life unto life;" and our Lord himself said, "For judgment I am come

into this world." John the Baptist seems to have direct reference to the prophecy of Malachi, when he says of Christ, "Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire." (Matt. iii. 12.)

In the concluding chapter, there is this remarkable injunction: "Remember ye the law of Moses my servant, which I commanded him in Horeb for all Israel, with the statutes and judgments." This explicit reference to the giving of the law by Moses is an important historic testimony. Archdeacon Perowne pertinently says: "A statement like this, put by an inspired prophet into the mouth of God Himself, has an important bearing on the historical character and date of composition of the Pentateuch."<sup>1</sup>

If my observations in this lecture have partaken somewhat of the character of preaching, my apology is this: Malachi is so pre-eminently a preacher of righteousness, that to make his prophecy mainly the basis of speculative disquisitions, would be out of harmony with the spirit and character of oracles, that are mainly earnest calls to repentance. The notable decline in the character of the Hebrew writings of the times succeeding Malachi, like that which characterizes the Christian literature in the age succeeding the Apostles, is an indirect testimony to the divine inspiration of the prophetic writings. It also furnishes an argument against the theory that the Holy Scriptures are the product of a gradual naturalistic evolution.

#### NO SIGNS OF PROPHETIC DECLINE.

I have not spoken of the style of the prophet. It is concise and practical, direct and forcible. He uses pointed interrogation with striking effect. There is no toning down, by the use of euphuistic language, of the stern message he has to deliver. We cannot agree with the school who regard the prophets chiefly as poets, and say that "the language is prosaic, and manifests the decaying spirit of prophecy." As Dr. Pusey says: "The poetic form was but an accident." The

<sup>1</sup> Notes on Malachi, p. 38.

ability to write poetry is a natural gift. It is in the style that the human element is seen. If the office of the prophet is to convey God's message faithfully to the people, his rank among his fellow-prophets does not depend upon poetic forms of speech; but upon the greatness of the spiritual truths and divine purposes, of which he has been made the revealer and messenger.

Judged by this standard, this last of the Hebrew prophets presents no symptoms of decline. The lofty conceptions of the Divine character presented in this prophecy—the profoundly spiritual ideal of the worship and service which God requires—the insight and power with which the excuses for prevailing sins are unmasked—the magnificent prediction of the establishment of Christ's kingdom among the Gentiles—the unflinching courage with which wicked men in high places are rebuked—the wonderful adaptation of the moral teaching of this prophecy to all times—the comprehensive conception of religion as a principle governing all the relations of life—the broad prophetic light shed upon the coming of the Messianic King of Righteousness—all vindicate for Malachi a high and enduring place in "the goodly fellowship of the prophets," by whom God has made known His will to the children of men.

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#### AGNOSTICISM: ITS ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES.

A VALID defence of Christianity must be a defence of knowledge as knowledge. At bottom of all belief or disbelief, there lies a *theory* of knowledge. A philosophy of sensation will lead to atheism, but only because it will lead to universal unbelief. The physicist is as much interested in retaining and conserving the *a priori* elements of knowledge as is the theologian. Because a sensational philosophy which gives us only the phenomenal or the objective, but which undertakes, because it is a philosophy of sensation, to eliminate God from the category of being, is a philosophy of unmitigated absurdity.

It is with such a philosophy that we have to deal. It tells us that our beliefs in intelligent cause, substance and moral obligation are only generalized experiences, which have been reached by heredity, in the long process of evolution. This philosophy destroys our primary beliefs, intuitions, and all *a priori* elements of knowledge. And the very foundation of knowledge, which is the free, finite, perdurable, personal self, and this self, as capable of knowing realities, is either destroyed or explained away.

Agnosticism discredits the trustworthiness of the human intellect as being incompetent to attain knowledge; therefore knowledge (implying a subject knowing, and a reality known, objective or subjective) is impossible to man.

"Agnosticism,"<sup>1</sup> says Dr. Harris, "is a denial that the human intellect is trustworthy; it is the consequent denial that man is competent to attain knowledge within the range of his faculties, and in the normal exercise of all his powers. He may have necessary beliefs in accordance with which he must think; but he can never have confidence that his necessary belief is trustworthy, or that by any intuition, or any reasoning, he attains knowledge of reality. It follows that a partial agnosticism necessarily involves complete agnosticism, and is therefore self-contradictory and untenable. If at one point the intellect is found to be false and untrustworthy, that is the discovery at that point of a falsity and untrustworthiness which discredit the intellect at every point and invalidate all that is called knowledge. . . . The agnostic may assert a partial agnosticism, while admitting the reality of knowledge in other particulars; but it is only because he has not thought far enough to see the reach of his denial. The partial necessitates the complete agnosticism."

But absolute agnosticism involves intellectual suicide, and is therefore an absurdity. We begin with the question: "Is it possible for man to know anything? Is there any intellectual certainty with which he can begin?" "For," says Dr. Mark

<sup>1</sup>The Philosophical Basis of Theism. By S. Harris, D.D., LL.D., p. 11. No better work in defence of theism has been written. I cannot express my obligations to Dr. Harris.

Hopkins, "if a man is to have the right to begin at all he must begin with certainty. For if he were to say, 'I am not certain that I exist, I doubt it,' he might be asked, 'Are you sure that you doubt?' If he were to say, 'Yes,' that would be to begin with certainty. If he were to say, 'No,' we should ask him what right he has to be troubling people with his doubts before he is certain he has them. We should certainly require him to keep on doubting till he should be certain of his doubts, or to hold his peace. Except on the assumption and implied assertion that a man exists, he cannot think, or feel, or act. He cannot say, 'I.' It is so involved in all that he does, that he can have no right to do anything without it. We are thus compelled to assume that we exist. It is not a matter of choice, or of will. If we claim to doubt or deny it, the doubt or denial assumes it."<sup>1</sup>

It is doubtful if there is anything gained to clear thought by saying that we know our existence by consciousness or self-evidence. The certainty of our being, which we must have to start with, is not helped by the use of either of these terms. I prefer to say simply, I know my own existence in the act of knowing: that is, that the power of knowing, and of knowing myself as knowing, is a primitive, original power of my mind, of which no account can be given except that it is. Thus we do by a subjective necessity know being, and also the existence of a being that knows itself to be. Does anyone deny this in regard to himself? We cannot prove it to him, but it will matter little to us whether he exist or not, since, as we have seen, he commits logical suicide, and we have only to bury him decently and pass on.

Belief in the reality of self is a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape.

"Thus in every act of knowledge, man's knowledge of himself as knowing is an essential element, and without this there can be no knowledge. Thus his whole conscious activity in experience is a continuous revelation of the man to himself. It is the same with the object known. In every moment of consciousness man finds himself knowing something that is not himself. The existence of an outward object is a datum in all

<sup>1</sup>Scriptural Idea of Man. By M. Hopkins, D.D. Pr. 27, 28.



his consciousness; and his whole conscious experience is a continuous revelation to him of the outward reality; and if this is not real, all knowledge vanishes. H. Spencer says, 'The co-existence of the subject and object is a deliverance of consciousness which, taking precedence of all analytic examination, is a truth transcending all others in certainty.'"<sup>1</sup>

"The reality of man's knowledge of the first principles which are regulative of all thought, is a primitive datum of consciousness. Man finds himself unable to think in contradiction of them. They overarch and encompass his thinking like a luminous firmament, which enlightens, but cannot be transcended or escaped. It is the knowledge of these principles underlying and conditioning all thinking, which makes it possible from any process of thought to conclude by inference in knowledge. Thus in the experience of life all thinking is a continuous revelation of these truths, and of the reality of our knowledge of them."

Therefore, I not only know myself as existing, but as existing in relation to an external world. Now, while I have a primitive datum of consciousness of my own existence, and of the existence of the eternal world, I hold that "the reality of our knowledge of God is also a primitive datum of consciousness. Man being rational, is so constituted that in the presence of God, and of His various manifestations of Himself, he will know Him; and he will know that he knows God in the act of knowing Him. In thinking of himself and the beings about him, he comes in view of the absolute Being. In knowing the universal principles and laws of reason, which are regulative of all human thinking and doing, he comes to the knowledge of absolute Reason, in which they are eternal in the fulness of wisdom and love. The development of man's consciousness of himself in relation to the world, is the development of his consciousness of God. As in the experience of life, the unfolding consciousness of man is a continuous revealing to him of himself, and of the outward objects of knowledge, so also it is a continuous revelation to him of God."

Now, agnosticism, while postulating a first cause, an ultimate reality, as a necessity of thought, says, there remains one abso-

<sup>1</sup>Phil. Basis. P. 12, f.

lute certainty, namely, that we are ever in the "presence of an infinite and eternal energy, from which all things proceed;" yet that this infinite and eternal energy is the unknowable. And the agnostic, while being continually prompted to imagine some solution of this great enigma, knows at the same time that it cannot be solved. It is as Mr. Fred. Harrison puts it, "An ever-present conundrum, to be everlastingly given up." If we ask Mr. Spencer why, he will say, "because he remembers that the very notions, beginning and end, cause and purpose, are relative notions belonging to human thought, which are probably irrelevant to the ultimate reality transcending human thought."

Observe, it is here asserted that man exists in the presence of an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed. And Mr. Spencer tells us, the sentence as originally written ran, "An infinite and eternal energy, by which all things are created and sustained;" yet, in the same breath, he tells us we can know nothing of this eternal energy; and the reason given is, that it "becomes a consciousness which transcends the forms of distinct thought, though it forever remains a consciousness!"

"It must be noticed that the absolute" (or the ultimate reality, the ground and cause of all phenomena), "the existence of which is declared by the agnostics to be known, carries in it the idea of being. Existence implies a being that exists. The power in which it manifests itself cannot be separated from the being; it is the phenomenon in which the being appears. Therefore the assertion of the existence of absolute being carries in it the assertion of positive knowledge of what the absolute being is. Being implies at least power that persists in unity and identity; so much of positive knowledge of the absolute being is implied in the assertion that it is known to exist."<sup>1</sup>

If, however, the ultimate reality is the unknowable, as Mr. Spencer declares it to be, how comes it that he is able to write so much about its unknowableness? This surely is an "inscrutable" mystery. But is a thing unknowable by simply calling it so? And can anything be affirmed to be unknowable, without first having at least the knowledge of its existence? And is not such a knowledge quite sufficient to lift it out of the

<sup>1</sup>The Self-Revelation of God. By S. Harris, D.D. P. 178.

category of the unknowable and to place it among things known?

"The very fact that the absolute manifests itself in the universe implies that it is not unknowable in itself." And that the absolute is manifested in the universe, is admitted by Mr. Spencer, for he says, "The final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man, is that the power manifested throughout the universe, distinguished as material, is the same power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness."

How then is it unknowable? Let Dr. Harris reply: "It is unknowable only so far as it has not revealed itself, or as our minds are not great enough to take in all the facts and significance of the revelation. If the absolute being is manifested in all the ongoing of the universe, then with every enlargement of knowledge and capacity the finite mind, so long as it exists, may continue to advance in the knowledge of God. It is only the absurd, it is only that which contradicts the necessary principles of reason, which is unknowable in itself and constitutes an absolute bar to knowledge. If the absolute exists and manifests itself in the finite, then it cannot be unknowable in itself, but must be essentially intelligible. Also, there can be no contradiction between the absolute and the finite. The finite is the medium originating from and ever dependent on the absolute, through which the absolute is forever manifesting or revealing itself."<sup>1</sup>

"As to the remark that we cannot affirm that anything is unknowable without first having, at least, the knowledge of its existence, we would call special attention to it, as it seems to us, and in reality is, the turning point of the whole question. That question, it must be borne in mind, is not the *conceivableness* of the ultimate reality or first cause; that is to say, we are not inquiring whether we have the power to form an adequate and accurate conception or mental image or representation of it; but whether we can know it, form an acquaintance with it, have any knowledge of it."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Self-Revelation. P. 173.

<sup>2</sup>The *Scottish Review*, Jan., 1887. P. 44.

Now, it is a rule in logic, that we cannot affirm, without also in effect denying something. In a complex universe the predicate you assert is certain to exclude some other quality, and this you may be fairly taken to deny. Nothing in the world can ever be denied except on the strength of positive knowledge. If then the "unknowable" were really the unknown, and unknowable, we should know nothing about it, and should be totally unable to affirm or deny anything respecting it. It would never enter into our thoughts; we should not even dream about it, much less should we be conscious of it; while to write some hundred and twenty pages in order to prove that it is unknowable, as Mr. Spencer has done, would be little short of a miracle. On the other hand, the fact that we can deny it, proves that we are at least conscious of it, or have some acquaintance with, or knowledge of it.

Mr. Spencer is in the habit of using certain terms to designate the first cause, *e.g.*, sometimes he speaks of the unconditioned and absolute, sometimes of the ultimate reality, or the ultimate cause. Now, are the terms used synonymous? Does, for instance, the Ultimate Cause, or Reality, and the Absolute or Unconditioned mean the same thing? What are we to understand by these terms? For evidently the point here is the definition. Grant to Mr. Spencer that the "absolute" and "unconditioned" are what he defines them to be, and contradictions without number can easily be manufactured by a pen less dexterous than his.

The absolute has been defined as that which exists out of all relations. And closely allied to this is the conception of the absolute, as the thing in itself, out of all relation to our rational faculties. In attempting to deduce from this idea what the absolute is, it is found to be in itself unintelligible and unthinkable, a mere symbol of the cessation of thought, and any revelation of it to a rational mind is therefore impossible.

If we demur to the definition, and with Ulrici, say that "the absolute is not conditioned by anything else, and so far is the unconditioned, but yet only because it is itself the positive condition of everything else," then the contradictions vanish into thin air. Along with them vanish the tribe of imbecilities and

powerlessnesses of the human mind of which so much has been made. It is easy to make contradictions when our definitions are arranged with a view to bring about that result. Our definitions must, however, correspond to what is real, and a real basis for our conception of the absolute is found when we regard it as the positive condition of all else. This view relieves the conception of all difficulty, and will be found, on examination, to satisfy all the uses made of the word in common and scientific speech. The absolute implies relation, and is itself the ground of relation, without which the conception of relation were inconceivable. As property implies substance, as predicate implies subject, and as action implies agent, so relation implies the absolute. The strength of the argumentation now in view lies in the assumption of the unrelatedness of the absolute—an assumption not justified either by the use of language or by the laws of thinking.

“When it is gravely argued on the footing of such an assumption, and on the ground of such a definition of the absolute, that a true knowledge of God is impossible, because knowledge is only of the relative, this only raises a fictitious difficulty, and overlooks the real problem of knowledge. The distinction between absolute and relative, between infinite and finite, does not mark the boundaries between true and valid knowledge and knowledge which is only seeming. The true problem of knowledge is raised long before we come to such distinctions and definitions. The real problem is, ‘Can we know real things, things which have existence?’ If we can know these, then the question as to the extent of the object known, whether it be absolute or relative, finite or infinite, is quite irrelevant. The mystery of knowledge is one, whether our knowledge be the ‘flower in the crannied wall,’ in which there is no question of the absolute and infinite in the quantitative sense of the term, or of the living God, the Maker of heaven and earth. If knowledge is possible, then the question of what we know has other boundaries and distinctions than those which artificially separate the infinite from the finite.”<sup>1</sup>

But, is not the distinction made by the agnostic school of

<sup>1</sup>Is God Knowable. By Rev. J. Iverach, M.A. Pp. 59, 60.

thinkers, between knowledge of things in their relations and knowledge of things "in themselves," a distinction without meaning? "It affirms that there are certain ultimate entities in nature to which all phenomena are due, and yet which can be thought of as having no relation to these phenomena, or to ourselves, or to any other existence whatever. Now, as the very idea of knowledge consists in the perception of relations, this affirmation is, in the purest sense of the word, nonsense—that is to say, it is a series of words which have either no meaning at all, or a meaning which is self-contradictory. It belongs to the class of propositions which throw just discredit on metaphysics—mere verbal propositions, pretending to deal with conceptions which are no conceptions at all, but empty sounds. The 'unconditioned,' we are told, 'is unthinkable;' but words that are unthinkable had better be also unspeakable, or at least, unspoken. It is altogether untrue that we are compelled to believe in the existence of anything which is 'unconditioned'—in matter with no qualities—in minds with no character, in a God with no attributes. Even the metaphysicians who dwell on this distinction between the relative and the unconditioned, admit that it is one to which no idea can be attached."<sup>1</sup>

If the objections brought by Mr. Spencer against the knowableness of the ultimate reality or the first cause were valid, they would forbid us to apply the term knowable to anything, even to ourselves. His first objection is, that it is unknowable because we cannot know "the thing in itself." But, press the demand that we must know the thing in itself before we can predicate knowableness of it, and the term *know* with all its derivatives and equivalents, must be blotted out of the language of the whole human race.

Again, he says the ultimate reality is unknowable because we can only know its appearances or manifestations. But admitting that our knowledge of it can only be the knowledge of its appearances or manifestations, in what way does our knowledge of it differ from our knowledge of anything else? Is not all

<sup>1</sup>The Unity of Nature. By the Duke of Argyle. *Contemporary Review*, December, 1880.

our knowledge, even our most scientific, a knowledge of appearances or manifestations, or of things as they manifest themselves to us? That we can know things only so far as they manifest themselves to us, is a truth which all will admit. But our contention is, that it is *the things* which manifest themselves unto us that we know. An appearance without anything appearing is inconceivable, is an impossibility. Even a cloud appearing has something, is something; it is moisture in a vaporous state. A shadow even is something; it implies a dense body obstructing the light, and keeping it from falling on a defined surface.

"We know," says Dr. Harris, "by rational intuition, that every quality, attribute or phenomenon is a quality, attribute or phenomenon of a being. There can be no thought without a thinker, no action without an agent, no motion without something that moves, no beginning or change without a cause, no phenomenon without a being that appears in it as well as a being to whom it appears, no truth without a mind to know it."

"Conversely, we know by rational intuition that every being exists in some attributes or properties. And this is only saying that being ex-ists (that is, it stands out in view). There can be no being without attributes; there can be no being without power of some kind; and this is only saying, there cannot be a being that does not exist. If we attempt to think of being without attributes, a substance stripped of all properties, we have nothing left. Not only is nothing left, but our thought issues in contradiction that being is the same as nothing. And this is the 'thing in itself' out of all relation to our faculties. It is not an unknowable which we may sometime come to know; it is not nothing, as the mere denial of being; it is the symbol of a hopeless contradiction at the root of all knowledge."<sup>1</sup>

It will be seen that attributes are not things stuck into the substance in an external manner, like pins in a pin-cushion. On the contrary, attributes express the ways of the activity of the thing. A thing and its properties are one. The unity of properties makes the thing.

While Mr. Spencer asserts that our belief in an omnipresent,

<sup>1</sup>Phil. Basis of Theism. P. 156.

eternal cause of the universe, has a higher warrant than any other belief, that is, that the existence of such a cause is the most certain of all certainties, he also declares that we can assign to it no attributes whatever, that it is unknown and unknowable. It will be observed that, in his very statement of its existence, he assigns to the Ultimate Cause four attributes, viz., being, causal energy, omnipresence and eternity. And he repeatedly expresses his faith that the cosmos is obedient to law, and that this law is of beneficent result, which is an implicit ascription of wisdom and love, or goodness, to the Ultimate Cause.

Now, we take it that the six attributes named are known, and known as attributes of personality. Yet Mr. Spencer speaks quite sharply of those who predicate personality of the First Cause, and asks, whether there may not be a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion. The Ultimate Cause, he says, cannot be conceived by us, because it is in every respect greater than we can conceive. Therefore, he concludes, we must refrain from assigning to it any attribute whatever, because any attribute conceivable by us would degrade and limit the Ultimate Cause. But this position is inconsistent with the fundamental postulate of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, viz., that our idea of the infinite involves a positive side, an affirmation of existence. Compliance, therefore, with the commandment that we must not assign any attribute whatever to the First Cause, is simply impossible. I know beings only through their attributes; I recognize their being only through the recognition of their attributes; and cannot, therefore, recognize the existence of the Ultimate Cause except by his attributes.

"After," says Ex-President Hill,<sup>1</sup> "reading this impossible and self-contradictory demand of Spencer, we can bear with equanimity the pitying and condescending tone in which he informs us that our culture has probably not been sufficient to enable us to accept the great truth which he has revealed. His doctrine of the unknowable, his doctrine of the nature of the

<sup>1</sup>The Natural Sources of Theology. By Thomas Hill, D.D., LL.D.



ego, and of volition, all contradict what he himself calls the universal postulate. Any belief that invariably exists in the mind, that you cannot by any effort of the imagination, even for a moment suppose to be false, that belief is true. This is Spencer's universal postulate. And he not only admits, but strongly maintains, that the existence of the ultimate cause is avouched to us by this canon. Yet he says that we must assign to this cause no attribute whatever. But this is impossible; we cannot, by any act of the imagination, even for one moment, conceive of the existence of a being except by conceiving it with attributes. You cannot for one instant divest yourself of the belief that the ultimate cause of the universe is a cause; and that is the assigning to it of the attribute of power of causal energy."

But what does this imply? It seems to me to imply and logically warrant the following propositions:—

"1. The causative principle of all reality must itself be *real*, that is, it must be a self-manifesting and self-conscious power, for there can be no reality without consciousness. Being which is not known to itself, and cannot manifest itself, is as though it were not."

"2. The causative principle of all efficiency must itself be *power*, pluri-efficiency, it must be self-determined and self-moved, and perfectly adequate to the production of being, motion, change, life, and intelligence objective to itself; in a word, it must be adequate to the realization of all the ideals which reason supplies.

"3. The causative principle of all personality must itself be *personal*, that is, it must be self-conceived, self-determined purpose; must freely choose and wisely adapt the means to realize that purpose; above all, it must have a worthy motive, a best and highest reason for both purpose and act, and must make all conform to and result in a moral order in harmony with the blessedness and worthy the approbation of the All-perfect One. Intuition and choice, affection and conscience—these are the grand momenta of personality.

"4. The necessary demand of reason is that the first and originative cause of all finite personality shall be himself a

person. Consciousness cannot arise out of unconsciousness; reason cannot be generated from unreason; personality cannot have its birth from impersonality, no more than something can be born of nothing. There must be intelligence answering to our intelligence, freedom answering to our freedom, feeling responding to our feeling, and moral sentiment unisonant with our moral sentiment; in short, personality correlated with our personality, in the cause and author of finite, responsible being. That perfection which is mirrored in our finite personality exists in all its fulness in the unconditionally perfect Being, the perfect personality' whose name is LOVE."<sup>1</sup>

This most certainly is involved in our very conception of all efficient cause, and an efficient cause is the only one which satisfies the idea of real causation; therefore, all the effects, or, in other words, the phenomena, which exist in the universe must exist either actively or potentially in its first cause, that is, in God. If, therefore, intelligence be one of the phenomena of the universe, then intelligence must exist in God. If another of its phenomena is the moral nature of man, and the principles of morality founded on the moral law, then we conclude that the first cause, God, must be a moral being. Freedom in man implies freedom in God. Volition in man implies volition in God. If the forces of the universe act in accordance with invariable law, from which action the order of the universe springs, then we conclude that invariable law must be an expression of the divine will, and the love of order must exist in God.

We find, then, that the absolute Being reveals Himself in the universe as its first cause, the original source of all its powers or phenomena. In the words of Mr. Spencer, we have attained "the absolute certainty that we are in the presence of an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed." And the powers acting in the universe reveal Him, and help us to form some idea of that power which is forever immeasurable. "The invisible things of him since the creation of the world are

<sup>1</sup>The Theistic Conception of the World. By B. F. Cocker, D.D., LL.D. Pp. 44, 45.

clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity."<sup>1</sup>

What are, and what must be, the ethical and religious tendencies of a system of philosophy which, while asserting its belief in the existence of a first cause as a necessity of thought, yet tells us that from the limitation, if not the untrustworthiness, of the human intellect, this First Cause, or God, must remain forever unknown to man? We take it that the God of this system—while the assumption of His existence satisfies an intellectual necessity—is precisely the same for all moral purposes as if He existed not. For anything that we can know, He is incapable of caring for us, or regarding our conduct, or interposing in our behalf, or affording us any relief, though our need may be extreme and our cry urgent and piteous. And in like manner we may both live and die without any regard for Him.

As men conceive God, or the supreme object of belief, so will they conceive duty, obligation. Of this the history of religion is but an illustration and proof. The moral law of Mosaism implied the God of Moses—only expressed a circle of duties springing necessarily from His nature and relation to man and men. Our Christian virtues flow from our idea of Christ. Find out the highest conception of any religion, and you will also find out its moral ideals, its motives, the duties it regards as divine commands, the virtues it conceives as pleasing to God.

1. Agnosticism is destructive of the reality of duty and moral obligation. Ethics, Mr. Spencer regards and defines as the science of conduct, and conduct means nothing more than the adaptation of man to his environment. Conduct is acts adjusted to ends. Conduct is good when it accomplishes its ends. Conduct is morally good when it promotes the greatest happiness.

Therefore to each phase of evolution there is a corresponding morality, that is to say, a particular line of conduct, which consists simply in adaptation to given conditions. In the phase of savage life, man's morality is of the same nature as that of the wolf, for violence is alone adapted to the then conditions of his

<sup>1</sup>Romans i. 20. (R. V.)

<sup>2</sup>For proof of this see "A Study of Origins." By Pressensé, Bk. IV., p. 377.

existence. In a higher stage, morality, or the rule of conduct, changes with the changed conditions; the inextricable entanglement of interests in a civilized state of society, suggests the idea of solidarity or co-operation, and altruism is the only principle suited to this highest social state. The idea of good and evil changes from age to age, following, as it is bound to do, all the fluctuations of evolution. But as the root idea of all moral government is the idea of personality, and personality cannot be attributed to the First Cause, therefore there can be no absolute standard of right, no supreme authority in agnosticism. Thus the reality of duty and of obligation is destroyed.

2. Agnosticism also denies the freedom of the will. Regarding, as Mr. Spencer does, the ego as merely "the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which exists" at the moment; or as, "at each moment nothing else than the state of consciousness, simple or compound, passing at that moment." With such a psychology as this, freedom is as impossible to man as it would be to a hot day at any particular moment.

Mr. Spencer further says: "Physical changes either conform to law, or they do not. If they do not, this work<sup>1</sup> . . . is sheer nonsense; no science of psychology is possible. If they do, there cannot be any such thing as free will." He says again: "The freedom of the will, did it exist, would be at variance with the beneficent necessity displayed in the evolution of the correspondence between the organism and its environment. . . . That gradual moulding of inner relations to outer relations . . . that ever-extending adaptation of the cohesions of physical states to the connections between the answering phenomena, which, we have seen, results from the accumulation of experiences, would be hindered did there exist anything which otherwise caused their cohesions."

So, also, Prof. Huxley<sup>2</sup>: "Scientifically speaking, it is the acme of absurdity to talk of a man defying the law of gravitation when he lifts his arm. The general store of energy in the

<sup>1</sup>Psychology. By H. Spencer, Vol. I., pp. 500-503. The "law" to which Mr. S. refers is mechanical law, or an invariable sequence of natural phenomena.

<sup>2</sup>*Nineteenth Century*, February, 1887. P. 199.

universe working through terrestrial matter is doubtless tending to bring the man's arm down, but the particular fraction of that energy which is working through certain of his nervous and muscular organs, is tending to drive it up; and more energy being expended on the arm in the upward than in the downward direction, the arm goes up accordingly."

If this is the whole, this is a very simple explanation of the matter. But is it the whole? Is the energy working through the wonderfully complicated machinery of man's organic apparatus, the same as the law of gravitation which pulls his body to the ground? And how comes it that when man needs to lift, or wishes to lift his arm, there should happen to be a larger particular fraction of energy working through his nervous and muscular organs? We can only account for it by saying that the nature of the particular energy is not the same. The one we take it is a constant and purely physical force; the other is an intermittent, voluntary and purely mental action of the human will. Again we call attention to the fact that agnosticism denies to man freedom, moral agency or responsibility.

3. Again, Agnosticism can take no account of sin, and therefore, can take no account of the fact of redemption, as revealed in the Person and work of our Lord Jesus Christ. If *mechanical* evolution be the true explanation of the phenomena of the moral as of the physical world, then all the wickedness of man must be the result solely of the necessary and normal action of nature. There can be no sin, for "sin is lawlessness," that is, a want of reverence for authority, an impatience of restraint, the temper of revolt. But agnostic evolution, with its blind and ceaseless grind of "change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations," can know nothing about the dark and terrible revolt which has taken place in the moral and spiritual realm. It is true Mr. Spencer is a firm believer in progress, and a grand progress which is bearing humanity onwards to a higher intelligence and a nobler character. But he takes no account of the fact—though science ought to find a place for the fact—that man by his wickedness of every kind, has effected a great "retardation" of all good, and

of the progress to higher intelligence and nobler character. And Mr. Spencer admits that this would be effected if man were free.

If, therefore, agnosticism can take no account of evil in the universe, as the action of finite, free agents transgressing the law of love, it can take no account of the idea of God's moral government over finite, free agents, and therefore of human moral probation. The conception, to the Christian, which is most fundamental in human history, is God's continuous action redeeming men from sin. Of this conception, the agnostic philosophy knows nothing.

As already intimated, evolution (I mean the agnostic's conception of evolution) proclaims that a law of progress is in the constitution of the material universe; that in the sphere of unintelligent matter and force, in which of necessity the stronger force must always overpower the weaker, it is necessary that there be continuous evolution from lower to higher, and that the future must always be better than the past. But materialism injects itself into this theory, annuls the promise, and transforms it into a prophecy of despair. It forces the conclusion that the evolution in which the universe has hitherto been progressing, with no power beyond itself to replenish its force, will presently be exhausted of its finite store of force; that it will gradually retrograde into a lifeless, silent, motionless mass, and so remain forever.

It will be seen, I think, from what has been said, that agnosticism, with its proposed substitute for God, cannot develop a religion in its distinctive significance, or meet man's religious needs, or subserve the great ends of religion in man's progress and well-being.

Mr. Fred. Harrison, and others, have given grand descriptions of what religion, if it is to exist, must be. It must harmonize with and support our largest knowledge and deepest convictions. It must give the philosophy of human life on which to believe, to feel, to hope, to act; in a word, to live and die. It must quicken us to our most unselfish and noblest actions. It must be the vitalizing principle of the purification and progress of society.

But can this be secured by a religion based on the Unknown and Unknowable? Does it even supply a *possible* basis for

religion? Can the spirit, emotions, virtues, necessary to it, live by faith in the Unknowable? Dr. A. M. Fairbairn says: "No." "Observe,"<sup>1</sup> he says, "the proposed object of worship is, as has been well said, but 'the apotheosis of ignorance,' and reverence for it only reverence for the creations and abstractions of our own brain. This is not only a bad sort of idolatry, a kind of fetishism in logic, but it is the idolatry of a symbol as nearly as possible emptied of all rational significance, and utterly void of moral power. Religion is at once a rich and complex state and relation of the spirit, and involves, among other elements, these: (1) Conscious dependence on the Power that caused our being and sustains it; (2) admiration for the character and attributes of this Power as revealed in our nature, and the system that surrounds and comprehends it; (3) reverence for the Being on whom we depend, not simply as possessing the majesty of might, but the infinitely more excellent majesty of moral and intellectual perfection; (4) the inspiration that comes from faith in an order that expresses a beneficent reason and realizes a righteous will; (5) fellowship with a Nature akin to our own, who can be to us a conscious speaker and hearer, as we can to Him; (6) respect and obedience to His authority wherever manifested, in conscience, or nature, or man, making us every moment conscious of a law that transcends and commands our will, that we have no power to make or unmake, that we may disregard, but ought always to obey. These are elements analysis may discover in even the lowest and grossest religions; but they are, with the doubtful exception of the first, utterly evaporated in the one that has been formulated for the enlightened ignorance, or rather ignorant enlightenment of our age. We cannot reverence, or love, or obey, or worship the Unknown; these imply that we know the object, and are known to it; that it possesses the moral qualities that can awaken our reverence and love, and command our obedience and worship. We cannot be humbled before the Unknown without transmuting it into the Known, and arraying it in attributes that at once annihilate our ignorance and touch us with awe. Yet, while we deal with it as unknown we are inherently and invincibly con-

<sup>1</sup> *Contemporary Review*, July, 1881.

scious that we are dealing with a subjective deficiency, not an objective efficiency, the creation of a strenuously reasoned doctrine of mental impotence, not the Power that is at once the Sufficient Reason of the world and its living order. And how is it possible that the symbol of our mental impotence should, on the one hand, be awful as a god, and, on the other, create in us the humility that begets the joy of love and the inspiration of obedience.

But let this transfigured religion of omniscient Agnosticism be tried by a simpler test—is it capable of realization, of practical embodiment? Can this deification of mental impotence, this worship of mental abstractions, teach men to live justly, to order their lives nobly, to be patient in sorrow, passionate against wrong, dutiful to humanity, hopeful amid the confusions and losses of our troubled and changeful time? Of what sort are its moral energies? Has it any? Can it reform the bad, inspire the feeble and fallible with enthusiasm for virtue, make the stern tender, the harsh gentle, the ignorant and false magnanimous and true? David Strauss, speaking of Julián's attempt to restore heathenism, has well said: "Only a book scholar (the cloistered student, victim of his own fancies), could imagine that a phantom woven of poverty, philosophy and superstition could occupy the place of real religion. And is not the saying as true of the modern Agnostic as of the Neo-Platonist? I confess to a secret regard for the religion of humanity. It has moral passion and purpose in it, is capable of creating and directing enthusiasm for the rights and liberties, and against the wrongs and oppressions of man. But this religion of Agnosticism, this humiliation of reason before a blank abstraction, created by thought to paralyze thought, is but an insult to the spirit, an insolent yet feeble mockery of the hopes, the loves, the ideals, the inspiration, the consolations and reverences that have been at once symbolized for our race and realized in it by the grand old thing named religion."

Agnosticism has well been designated a doctrine of despair, as it is without God and without hope in the world.

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## PSYCHOLOGY.

THE liberal transfer of Greek terms to the vocabulary of mental science has retarded rather than aided in the solution of its problems. We do not deny that Plato and Aristotle attained unto a profound insight into the human mind—an insight which has rarely been equalled even in modern times—but, after all, Greek terms do not now express exactly what we mean, and it is not easy to divorce a Greek word from a Greek idea. The use of Saxon, or fully Anglicized terms, each one of which has a specific and limited meaning, to be used invariably in one and the same sense, is necessary to a correct presentation of the facts of psychology. *Psyche*, the Greek word for soul, may signify both too much and too little. If we include in it the whole mind, it means too much, for the Greeks used the word *pneuma* to designate man's higher intellectual and moral powers. If we confine the meaning of the term to feeling or emotion, then it does not signify soul as substance, and falls short of the Greek idea. By the term *phucia*, the Greeks referred more particularly to the vital part of things, including the life of plants and animals, but unfortunately we have come to use the term *life* to designate either the soul or a class of mere phenomena of unknown cause or origin called vitality. Some of our philosophers confound mind and life, others regard life as an occult property of matter. St. Paul uses the term *pneuma* to designate spiritual life, and even the Holy Spirit; consequently he puts into the word an exalted meaning never thought of by the Greek philosophers.

By the use of terms, which, in their signification, are so indefinite and fluctuating, it is impossible to convey a clear and intelligible meaning of anything. The word *soul*, in common discourse, is convenient and harmless, but in science, where absolute precision is necessary to clearness, it should be wholly discarded. Fortunately in the term *Mind*, a pure Saxon word, we have exactly what science demands. Its ample signification embraces all that the Greeks implied by the terms *nous*, *pneuma*, *phucia*, and *psyche*, and its meaning is so definite and

fixed that it cannot be misunderstood. We have also terms by which the various and distinct powers of the mind are designated with equal precision. We therefore dispense with the terms soul and spirit in science, as all they signify is expressed in the word mind; as the term psychology refers in a general way to the mind, and never specifically to any part, we have no objection to retaining it.

St. Augustine had a proper conception of mind when he said: "The mind knows itself only by knowing that it lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, and judges." That is, it is conscious that it acts, and that its acts are its own. In this experience is embraced the fact of self-consciousness. Descartes said, "cogito," that is, I am. Sir Wm. Hamilton correctly says: "Since Descartes limited psychology to the domain of consciousness, the term mind has been rigidly employed for the self-knowing principle alone. Mind, therefore, is to be understood as the subject of the various internal phenomena of which we are conscious, or that subject of which consciousness is the general phenomenon." Hamilton has well said: "Man is not an organism, but an intelligence served by organs." Regarding consciousness as an intellectual act, and conscience as a moral feeling, the terms intellect, volition, and feeling will together be used as embracing the whole mind or man. We regard it as improper in science to say man has a mind, or soul, or spirit, for all that is embraced in the terms man, soul, spirit, is included in the word mind. The man is a mind—a spirit in essence—and nothing more. We may properly say mind has a body, but mind *per se* is no part of anything it possesses.

The profound mystery of being hangs over mind as fully as over all other things. We know, however, as much of the mental essence as we do of the essence, that is, the nature, of carbon, nitrogen, chlorine, or of any one of the sixty-five known kinds of matter. In the constitution of this world there is no substantive entity of any kind or of any order that is placed within the reach of any of our sense organs. The atoms of gold, silver, iron, oxygen, etc., are so inconceivably small that a million of them placed side by side would not form a line more than one inch in length. Probably it is not because of the

smallness of the mind that it is invisible, but because it does not possess the material property of extension, and is incapable of reflecting light. The fact that it is invisible does not afford a feather's weight of proof that it is not substance of the spirit order.

It is a question whether the various powers of the mind do not indicate the existence of distinct faculties in which they are rooted, and it has become *fashionable* to answer in the negative. We favor the idea of the existence of faculties, each having a function of its own, but it is not essential that the question be settled here. A single reason for our opinion may be given. We are compelled to regard the mental essence as being either of uniform sameness, or as possessing distinctions of parts of some sort. By sameness we mean that it is a substance having no modifications whatever—that any one part is an exact duplicate of every other part—as a drop of water taken from a bucket is like every drop that is left. Any atom taken from a bar of pure gold would be exactly like any other atom of the mass, for it is of universal sameness of essence. Could I take from the bucket or the mass of gold parts which were not alike, that fact would prove that modification of parts characterized the substances. Now, at the same moment, mind may be engaged in deep and protracted thought, maintain a steady, unflinching will, and suffer more or less of sorrow. How can mind, if it be an unmodified substance, act in these three separate and distinct and different ways at the same moment? Such diversity of action of the mind at the same moment seems to be not only incomprehensible but impossible. The case is still further complicated when we consider that consciousness, conscience, hope and fear, love and hate, may at the same time become enlisted in what is going on. Can we conceive it possible that a simple, unmodified unit can act in a dozen ways at once? is the question to be answered. Can a good reason be assigned why an affirmative answer is demanded? We know of none, except to be in the fashion. On the other hand, mind seems to measure up far more fully to what we should conceive it to be as a high intelligence of the Spirit order if invested with different faculties analogous to

God's attributes as the source of its different powers. But we do not urge this theory as any part of our psychological creed, a recognition of different mental powers being all we need.

The student of psychology should keep before him as a head-light a proper conception of man as an individual intelligence of the Spirit order. Who could make anything of him, if he undertook to work out Prof. B. P. Bowne's idea of his structure? He says:

"Hence we view man as we find him, as a dual being—body and soul. . . . By the mind we mean the *soul* in its *mental activities*. The true man is the soul, but the soul is connected with an organism which conditions the mental life."

A more crude, undigested and incoherent conception of man we have not met in a long time. It is a marked specimen of the absurdities a man will fall into in writing, when his views are obscure, unsettled and undefined. In one breath we are told that man is a "*dual being—body and soul*"; and the next that "*the soul is the true man.*" The author evidently would have the two sentences pass as having the same meaning, or the one as a slight shading of the other; and yet they are flatly contradictory, the one to the other. If either of the statements is true, the other is false. If man is a dual being, composed of body and soul, when these are separated, as in death, where is the man? There is none. The parts, as scattered fragments, cannot properly be called a man or men. The theory of the decomposition of man logically implies his annihilation. So argues the profound Bishop Butler. Practically, as his writings show, Prof. Bowne adheres to the theory of a compound man, and makes it the governing principle of his psychology.

He logically leads us into materialism till metaphysics takes up the problem, when matter disappears in idealism, and we are conducted into the slough of a sort of infinite pantheism. He says further, "By the mind, we mean the soul in its mental activities." Mind, then, is the soul acting mentally; if so, then there is no mind, *per se*—none except when the soul is acting in a certain way. But, as "the soul is connected with an organism, which conditions the mental life," the action of

the soul, as well as the existence of mind, are dependent upon the uncertain conditions of organized matter. So far as any meaning whatever can be wrung from the above quoted sentence, it leads to contradictions and absurdities.

If man *per se* is anything but a transient appearance, he must be a unitary substance, an entity of persistent identity. Such substance cannot be the body, for every part of the body is in a state of constant change. No human body ever continued an hour or a minute the same, but the mind of the man at eighty retains a consciousness of the thoughts and feelings he had in childhood. The same mind spans the intervening years and touches both extremes. The mind is the man, whether in or out of the body. "God is the God of the living and not of the dead," and hence He is "the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob," because they are still living, though their bodies have long since returned to dust.

A proper conception of man is so important, and yet so unusual that we will reproduce a quotation Hamilton makes from Arnould: "I turn my attention on my being, and find that I have organs, and I have thoughts. My body is the complement of my organs; am I then my body, or any part of my body? This I cannot be. The matter of my body, in all its points, is in a perpetual flux—in a perpetual process of renewal. I—I do not pass away. I am not renewed. No one probably of the molecules which constituted my organs some years ago form any part of the material system I now call mine. It has been made up anew, but I am still what I was of old. These organs may be mutilated, one or two or more members of them may be removed, but not the less do I continue to be what I was, one and entire. It is not impossible to conceive me existing deprived of every organ. I, therefore, who have these organs or this body, am neither an organ nor a body. Neither am I identical with my thoughts, for they are manifold and various; I, on the contrary, am one and the same. Each moment they change and succeed each other; this change and succession take place in my body, but I neither change nor succeed myself. Each moment I am aware or am conscious of the existence of change in my thoughts; this change is some-

times determined by me, sometimes by something different from me, but I always can distinguish myself from them. I am a permanent being, an enduring subject of whose existence these thoughts are only so many modes, appearances or phenomena"—or, more properly, acts. "I, who possess organs, and thoughts, am, therefore, neither these organs nor these thoughts. . . . I am, therefore, essentially, a thinking—a conscious—being, and my true character is that of an intelligence served by organs."

All this is but an exposition of Bishop Butler's conception of man as an uncompounded, indivisible, indiscerptible self, conscious of itself, and that this consciousness is one as the self is one.

That this conception of mind may be complete and of practical value, we must regard it as a self-centred, self-active and a self-directive being. Contrary to Prof. Bowne, we hold that the "conditions" of the mind's existence and activity are in itself and not in an organism, or in anything external to it. Locke, Hume, Coudillac, and the French infidels of the eighteenth century, held that mental activity was the result of sensations, and what is known as the "Sensational philosophy," held for a generation a most disastrous sway in the world of speculative thought. It took on many forms of infidelity, the principal of which were materialism, idealism, and pantheism. These were shattered by the Scotch philosophers, led by Reid. Then Kant threw all philosophy into a state of confusion. German thinkers entered the arena, building up and tearing down till Comte appeared with his Positive Philosophy. The outcome of this school has been materialistic sensationalism, its ablest advocate being Prof. Alexander Bain, a Scotchman. Here we encounter the mortifying consideration that some of our leading Christian philosophers have been drawn into this vortex of infidel philosophy. Dr. McCush concedes that life is a property of matter, and that what water is to the water-wheel, sensations are to the mind. Bishop R. S. Foster teaches that "thought implies an object; that the object must in some way impinge upon the mind to become an object of thought, and not before;" . . . .

that "they can be thought—but to be thought, they must in some way pass into the mind, or impinge upon it; in no other way can it think them."

This philosophy makes both mental activity and thought the effects of agencies external to mind—mind being a sort of drum-head responding to the strokes of drumsticks. The expressions, "pass into the mind," "impinge upon the mind," and all others the bishop uses in this connection are materialistic. He seems to be able to think of mind only in terms of matter. All such notions must be dissipated before mind can be thought of as mind. What an immense amount of thought mind has given to the world in the form of science, philosophy, poetry, invention, art, mechanism, trade, commerce, and the details of civilized life. To do this vast aggregate of work, mind, in the exercise of its endowment of personal strength, of self-action, must have resolutely labored, toiled early and late, and persistently pushed things, regardless of the impingement of things from without. How vast the field of thought which mathematics opens up before the mind, and will our pseudo-philosophers explain to us how the elements of this science have "impinged upon the mind," or acted upon it as water acts upon a turbine wheel. In the vast and successful studies which have been bestowed upon astronomy was mind self-active, or did the laws of attraction and gravitation, as well as sun and stars, impinge upon it?

All this false reasoning, resulting in absurdities and in the distortion of the most important truths, arises from the conception of man, as a compound, or a mixture, a part spirit and a part dirt, or, as Prof. Bowne says, "A dual being, soul and body." The trouble in part comes from the impossibility of the analyses of this sort of a man so as to ascribe to mind its due, and to matter its due, to the compound its due, and to that which impinges its due. These philosophers are compelled to confound feeling and sensation, a most absurd performance, and ascribe both to the "dual being" composed of "soul and body."

We call special attention to the importance of forming, at start, in the study of psychology, a proper conception of man,

for all that we may think or say will be characterized by this general idea. A psychology written from the standpoint of materialism has nothing but dirt to deal with from first to last, and it can properly avail itself of nothing but the properties and forces of some twelve kinds of matter. A psychology written from the standpoint of idealism has in hand a supposititious "infinite," whatever it or that may be, and its "activities." Between its outcome, and a psychology written from the standpoint of pantheism, there can be but unimportant shades of difference. The first battle that is fought on the field of psychology that is productive of positive results will be in answer to the question, What is man? When conceived as he is, the analysis of his being in the light of its phenomena will be an easy matter.

Mind and body, as two distinct substances are mysteriously, but intimately associated together, and, as a consequence, they act and reach upon each other. In this fact we have positive proof that there are two substances in the field, separate, distinct, and wholly unlike each other. Hence, the importance, when we study their relations of preserving intact their phenomena. The study of matter, chemistry, physiology, and anatomy affords not a ray of light in regard to the nature and properties of mind, and the study of mind is equally barren of results, so far as the constitution of matter is concerned.

The two sciences, physiology and psychology, are so radically different, *per se*, that though intimately associated locally, they can render each other no assistance whatever—each must be examined in the light of its own facts and phenomena. During the past quarter of a century the most persistent efforts have been made to produce a physiological psychology, but the results have been simply a perversion of both sciences. Not a new fact has been added to our knowledge of either. We have often met the expression, "physiology of the mind," and it had about as much meaning as the expressions, "the square part of a circle," or "the round side of a square."

The science of psychology, as it stands to-day, is a mongrel, an abhorrent cross between matter and mind. Mental, vital and physical powers are so blended and compounded that the



proper functions of each are obscured, perverted and unknown. The intelligence which cognizes a sensation and its purport, is often ascribed to the sense organ itself. By all writers, as far as we know, feelings such as love and hate, joy and sorrow, etc., which arise in the mind are confounded with sensations—taste, smell, hunger, cold, the toothache, etc.—which are rooted in the body. We would expect materialists to refer feeling and sensation to the same root; their theory will not permit them to do otherwise, but it is passing strange that Christian authors have walked into the snare that was set for them.

Though much has been written on the science of psychology that is good—very good—we refer especially to Hamilton, Mansell and Mill; yet the good is so interwoven with the exceptional, as Hamilton's "Unconditioned," Mansell's "Absolute," and Mill's "Possibility of Sensations," that we must regard it as yet in its rudimentary state. The things and facts of the science have not yet been determined except in part, and such as have been determined have not been isolated and classified. Psychology is really a science of facts known to consciousness, and we trust the time is not far off when these will be taken beyond the lines of speculation and arranged in their logical order.

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### THE WITNESS OF THE SPIRIT.

THE statement, "I believe in the Holy Ghost," appears in the Apostles' Creed, the oldest doctrinal expression of uninspired origin, and the briefest compendium now in use in evangelical Christendom.

In all ages of the Christian Church, the doctrine of the Personality, Deity, and work of the Holy Ghost has been discussed; it is declared at each administration of the ordinance of baptism, and assumed at each formal dismissal of assemblies of Christian worshippers; it finds a place in all evangelical creeds; nevertheless, it may with safety be asserted that this doctrine, which, equally with that of justification through faith in the

atonement of Christ, may be regarded as the article of a standing or falling church, is, to a great extent, ignored by numerous representatives of modern theology. In spite of the fact that the literature of the Church has, in recent years, been enriched by valuable volumes upon this subject, it is, as the author of one of them has asserted, "impossible to divest the mind of the impression that, even among those who take religion in earnest, a disposition exists, in no small measure, to pass over the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit, and to speak and write upon religious truth as if the gracious intervention of the Son of God came more impressively home to man's business and bosom when disencumbered of any reference to another Person as the great Applier of redemption."<sup>1</sup>

Upon no one point relating to the work of the Holy Spirit is more reticence shown in general pulpit statement than on that of the witness of the Spirit to the believer's adoption into the family of God. Among those who, beyond the limit of our own section of the Church of Christ, accept in general the words of prophets and apostles and the sayings of our Lord in relation to the work of the Spirit, various views obtain upon this point. Take, by way of illustration, the sermons recently preached in City Road Chapel, London, by two leading Non-conformist ministers of England, during the services commemorative of Wesley's death. Dr. John Clifford, the able and eloquent occupant of the pulpit of one of the most aggressive of London Baptist churches, after having asserted that "Wesley founded individual religion on the present manifestation of the living God to the personal soul," objected in Wesley's old pulpit to the use of the term, "Witness of the Spirit," as one of the "phrases which throbbed with life at the end of the last century," but which "fail to touch the soul of this generation," and are even "a puzzle or worse" to the young minds in Methodism to-day. The feature, on the other hand, of the marvellous sermon by Dr. R. W. Dale, of Birmingham, several years since chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, was his emphatic insistence—not for the first time

<sup>1</sup>"The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit," by Geo. Smeaton, D.D. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

in Dr. Dale's long ministry—upon the preaching of the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit—preaching both by life and word—as at once the duty and strength of modern Methodism.

Is there not reason to fear that we, who know that the one grand secret of Wesley's success lay in the fact that he urged believers not to rest without joy in God from receiving the atonement, and who accept without question, and even in the light of a compliment, Dr. Dale's strong declaration that God raised up Methodism to bear testimony to the doctrine of the Divine Witness—that we are less outspoken upon it than our fathers were, less persistent in preaching it than we ought to be? The question is a serious one, for through silence upon this doctrine, one of the grand provisions of the Gospel for meeting the wants of mankind is held in the background, and one of the strongest correctives of that spirit of worldliness which, in great measure, accounts for the Church's lack of aggressiveness, is allowed to fall into disuse.

The Holy Spirit, as has been well said, "is not *something*, and something human; He is *some One*." As recorded in the Scriptures, He is "a Being, real, living, personal, one of the three Persons of the Trinity, a Being who consequently possesses all the perfections of God, and all the Divine life, and is the agent in communicating to man the Divine nature." His relation to the Father and the Son was clearly revealed by Christ to His disciples in His later conversations with them, as recorded by John. The full revelation of His person and work is one of the peculiar glories of the New Testament dispensation. While we have no right to conclude that all good men who, before Christ's coming, received the law were slaves, and not sons, it may with safety be asserted that in general, under the old dispensation, the Holy Spirit wrought upon believers rather than dwelt in them. He appeared unto man; He did not in the same measure as at present incarnate Himself in man. His action was intermittent; His presence was not permanent. "To the ancient prophet," a living writer has remarked, "the Holy Spirit was an occasional visitant, mighty in His operations and glorious in His manifestations. Suddenly He came upon him, and as suddenly departed, sometimes

returning at different periods, and in other cases, probably, only realized once in the whole lifetime of the man of God."<sup>1</sup> Hence the evangelist wrote, respecting Christ's prediction of the abundance and perpetuity of Gospel blessings then about to be received, that "the Holy Ghost was not yet given because that Jesus was not yet glorified." To the incarnate Son of God belonged the mission of heralding the approach of the Holy Ghost as an abiding presence, of teaching the world respecting His special work, and, in conjunction with the Father, of sending Him forth upon His glorious mission. On the other hand, it is the Holy Spirit who glorifies Christ in the hearts of believers; who causes the person of Christ so to dwell in them that they acquire the right to say, with Paul, "I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." At the same time assured of sonship—"heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ"—through the same Divine agency, they are enabled to cry, "Abba, Father."

I. Let us outline Bible teaching respecting this doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit.

According to the Divine Word, the evidence of our adoption into the family of God is twofold. Such adoption is that act of God by which we, who once were alienated and enemies and disinherited, are made sons of God and heirs of His eternal glory. John thus writes: "As many as received Him, to them gave He power (*Rev. Ver.*, the right) to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name."<sup>2</sup> The evidence of this adoption consists of a direct testimony by the Holy Spirit, who bears witness by an inward impression on the soul that we are children of God, and are reconciled to Him; and of an indirect testimony, sometimes described as the testimony of our own spirit, arising from our personal consciousness of the work of the Spirit in our hearts, and His influence upon our lives. Between these there is an evident distinction. The first is the direct attestation of the Holy Spirit, and therefore all-commanding; the second an inference, and only confirmatory. The first is the word of the Spirit, and

<sup>1</sup>S. R. Dunn, "Mission of the Spirit." P. 48.

<sup>2</sup>John i. 12.

therefore antecedent; the second is based upon the work of the Spirit, and is therefore consequent; the one is instantaneous, the other gradual; the one a comfort to the individual who experiences it, the other a satisfaction, and in some measure an evidence to others.

The agent and the persons acted upon in the direct witness are most clearly described in certain well-known passages in the letters of Paul to the members of the little Christian church in Rome, and of the churches of Galatia. To the former it was written: "Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God, and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ."<sup>1</sup> To the Christians of Galatia, the apostle wrote in similar terms: "Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Wherefore" (making the application of his teaching the more personal by the use of the pronoun singular) "thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an heir of God through Christ."<sup>2</sup> The agent said to be sent forth into our hearts, and to be bearing direct witness to our filial relation to God and our heirship with Christ, is not the "personified spirit or genius of the Gospel," as some would have it, but the Holy Spirit of God, hence called "the Spirit itself," or Himself, and "the Spirit of His Son." The recipients of the assurance of sonship, as indicated by "us" and "ye" and "our," were the preachers who caught up their message from Christ Himself, or by direct revelation, as in one case, and the men and women—and even the children—who listened to that message in the love thereof, and in those days of death-dealing persecution, were not likely to be satisfied with an assurance not "doubly sure." Of those at Rome, it was stated to their faces: "Ye were the servants of sin. . . . Ye have yielded your members servants unto uncleanness, and to iniquity unto iniquity. . . . But now being made free from sin, and become servants unto God, ye have your fruit unto holi-

<sup>1</sup>Romans viii. 15-17; <sup>2</sup>Gal. iv. 6, 7.

ness, and the end everlasting life." Concerning the former life of the Galatian Christians, Paul wrote with his own hand unto themselves: "When ye knew not God, ye did service to them which, by nature, are no gods," and were in subjection to "weak and beggarly elements." Of their renewed life, he wrote as if of a position where each was no longer a servant of God, in the sense of bondage, but a son and an heir of God through Christ: and that assigned position, it should be noted, was no matter of mere adjudication on the part of the apostle; it was based on an appeal to their own personal consciousness. Certainly language so explicit must be conclusive as to the possibility and the privilege of the believer in Christ getting and keeping and carrying about with him a direct assurance of his forgiveness and his adoption as a child of God. It certainly sustains the correctness of the oft-quoted definition of Wesley "By the testimony of the Spirit, I mean an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me and given Himself for me; that all my sins are blotted out, and that I, even I, am reconciled to God."

The nature and value of the testimony thus borne by the Holy Spirit has been well set forth by one of the Puritan preachers. "Sometimes," John Owen has said, "the soul, because it has somewhat remaining in it of the principle that it had in its old condition, is put to question whether it be a child of God or not; and therefore, as in a thing of the greatest importance, puts in its claim with all the evidences it hath to make good its title. . . . Satan, in the meantime, opposes with all his might; many flaws are found in its evidences; the truth of them all is questioned, and the soul hangs in suspense as to the issue. In the midst of this contest the Comforter comes, and overpowers the heart with a comfortable persuasion, and bears down all objections, that His plea is good, and that He is a child of God. When our spirits are pleading their right and title, He comes in and bears witness on our side, at the same time enabling us to put forth acts of filial obedience, crying, Abba, Father."

This term, "Witness of the Spirit," is a more satisfactory

one than another frequently-used term, "Assurance of faith." With the latter, though its use may seem to be warranted by the apostolic expressions, "full assurance of faith" and "full assurance of hope," a Calvinistic shade of meaning has become associated. When he who speaks of the "assurance of faith" aims to teach that the knowledge of salvation comes by the exercise of faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, his use of the phrase is in some degree correct; but that use is misleading when, as is often the case, it may be understood to imply a mere belief that one is saved, which is less than absolute certainty of the fact. Such absolute certainty must, in itself, include an assurance that we have fulfilled, in sufficient measure, the conditions of repentance and faith, upon which only pardon is promised. Repentance and faith are indispensable pre-requisites to pardon, but in no part of the Word of God is the precise degree of each necessary to our justification before God pointed out. Thus, unauthorized to judge when these graces have been exercised in the proper degree, we cannot reason out, or conclude upon, our justification; and as the justification of a sinner is an act of God which passes in His own mind, and is declared by no outward sign, our salvation, in the absence of any direct attestation to it as a fact, must be a matter of mere inference. One may argue that, having repentance and faith, he is forgiven in view of these evidences of pardon. But these are conditions of pardon, and cannot be quoted as evidences of it. Pardon is promised to all who repent and believe, but neither repentance nor faith is pardon—they are only pre-requisites; neither is pardon itself, nor can either be considered as satisfactory evidence.<sup>1</sup> He who argues thus must ever remain in doubt and uncertainty as to the genuineness or the required degree of his repentance or faith—an uncertainty quite destructive of all real comfort, and preventive of any high attainments in Christian service—or he must secure an attestation of forgiveness and acceptance into Divine favor of a distinct kind from a higher source than his own reason. No repentant offender wishes to be left in uncertainty as to pardon; no prodigal son, having come to himself,

<sup>1</sup>Wakefield's Theology.

can be satisfied with a merely argued-out, hoped-for reconciliation with the Father, against whom he has sinned; and no believer in the Lord Jesus Christ, as set forth in the Divine Word, can rest content with the unannounced pardon of a hidden God. He who cries :

“ Assure my conscience of its part  
In the Redeemer's blood,  
And bear Thy witness with my heart  
That I am born of God,”

utters a prayer in harmony with the whole spirit and teaching of the New Testament. There, in a precious group of chapters—the 15th, 16th, and 17th of the Gospel according to John—the Great Teacher reveals the Holy Ghost as the Comforter, removing fear, dispelling doubt and inspiring confidence; and there, in a remarkable series of inspired letters, the human theologians of the early Church, so far from constituting believers authorized judges in relation to their own satisfactory compliance with the simple conditions of salvation, or of justification, as having taken place in the mind of God, assign the duty of attestation on these points solely to the Holy Spirit, making, meanwhile, all inferential conclusions of secondary, though of highly important value. Hence New Testament language is ever the language of certainty derived from such an experience of a supernatural work of grace as led to the repeated utterance of the full, round, declarative, “We know,” “I know,” “Hereby know we that He abideth in us by the Spirit which He hath given us.”

How clearly the firmness and courage begotten of certainty are illustrated in the life of Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles. Life for him had uncertainties in a special sense, but he asserts: “I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him unto that day.” “In deaths oft,” to use an expression of his own, he sees the prospect of death under the light of heaven, and, smiling at the poised dart, declares: “We are always confident;” “We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord.”



"For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." The same confidence is seen in an exultant degree in the marvellous question and the triumphant response which conclude that magnificent eighth chapter of his letter to the Romans. Such words are never uttered in the hesitation and fear which naturally arise from uncertainty, but are readily adopted as personal, undiscounted utterances by the man who can run his finger up the page, and read with the appreciation of experience the precious words: "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God; and, if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified together."

Questions are sometimes asked respecting the range of the witness-bearing of the Holy Spirit. The point specially attested to is our sonship with God, including, of course, the justification and regeneration that always accompany it. He who bears witness is the "Spirit of adoption." "Because ye are sons," is the ground on which the testimony is received. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God," is the humble boast of him in whom the Spirit dwells. The Spirit declares not so much the process as the result. He attests our filial relation. It is not necessary, it has been well said, that He should catalogue every influence He exerts, and every impression He makes, so as to detail to our consciousness all His movements and methods in a way to enable us to receive and label every distinct blessing, and mark all its relations and results. By insisting that He does this, some have been betrayed into harmful extravagances, and others, discouraged, have been hindered from accepting the testimony that God gives. There is no reason to deny that some eminent saint may receive a divine assurance that he shall finally gain heaven. O: must believe that God sometimes directly assures His people that their intercessions are heard as truly as were those of Abraham and Moses. Nor need one for a moment question the correctness of any who may affirm that the Spirit has testified to their own souls of their entire sanctification. We do not, however, understand any of these

things by the witness of the Spirit as taught by the apostle. Nevertheless, through the presence of the Holy Spirit assuring us of our adoption, the blindness of our hearts must pass away, much of the mystery of the Divine procedure be made plain, and with the peace of God keeping our hearts, there can be no reason for stumbling because all lines of distinction drawn in theology are not traceable in our souls. In fact, upon the strong foundation of a divine assurance of our adoption into the family of God, "an enlightened understanding will safely build the superstructure of assurances with reference to all the processes of the great work of deliverance from the guilt, the death, the power and the pollution of sin."<sup>1</sup> "We shall know the things that are freely given unto us of God," as one by one they are given.

The Divine method of assurance is direct, not mediate. The witness is not imparted by a voice from heaven, as at Christ's baptism, nor is it attended by supernatural visions or outward manifestations; it is a direct and immediate impression upon the soul. It may be felt in hearing the Word, as on the day of Pentecost, or in the study of the Word, as in the case of the Ethiopian traveller; it may reach one in busy hours, or during public or private prayer, or even in thoughts and visions of the night. If to certain minds the Spirit's direct and personal testimony of forgiveness and heirship seems to find expression in language, such expression is given in no one human tongue, but "in words which the Holy Ghost teacheth." Such was the language of Pentecost. At Babel, language was confounded, but Pentecost brought in one spiritual language which all could understand. The strangers gathered at Jerusalem from various countries, ask in amazement, "Are not all these which speak, Galileans, and how hear we every man in our own tongue, wherein we were born?" In the language of the Holy Ghost, through their own several tongues, they heard the wonderful words of God. And thus, to the children of God, born again, the Holy Ghost may everywhere announce the fact as in human language. To each

"The Spirit answers to the blood,  
And tells me I am born of God."

<sup>1</sup>Bishop Merrill's "Aspects of Christian Experience."

Immediate effects attend such an attestation. Peace diffuses itself through the soul, "joy in the Holy Ghost" takes the place of fear, and he who before was in doubt, cries out in confidence. Peter's "joy unspeakable and full of glory" receives varied illustration. In one case the "mouth is filled with laughter and the tongue with singing;" by another is felt

"The speechless one that dares not move,  
And all the silent heaven of love."

The calm Wesley felt his heart "strangely warmed;" the emotional Cowper, at a similar period, found his "eyes filled with tears," and his "voice choked with transport," and could only look up to heaven in silent fear, overwhelmed with love and wonder. An Indian chief, rescued from paganism by our Canadian missionaries, to become a successful fellow-worker, wrote, after he had felt, child of the forest that he was, like a stricken deer: "I looked around, and the trees and the fields were so green, the lake so blue, the sun shone so bright, the sky was so glad! O, that was a handsome day on which God, for Christ's sake, forgave my sins!"

Let it, however, be understood that no man's exact measure is here being supplied. There is diversity in the operations of the Spirit; there are differences in the character, temperament and circumstances of men, and to these, so far as they are free from sinful taint or tendency, the Holy Spirit, in His work, largely accommodates Himself. Many considerations may serve to explain the difference in degree of assurance in different believers, and the absence of a uniform standard in the effects of the Spirit's attestation; but in all ordinary cases, where no physical hindrances interfere with the enjoyment of the soul, all sense of condemnation will pass away, and a precious consciousness of filial relationship to God be felt.<sup>1</sup>

From him who is no longer a servant, but is now a son, goes forth the cry, "Abba, Father." "Though," as Dr. Pope remarks, "it is our own spirit regenerate that, as it were, naturally says, 'Father,' it is the Holy Spirit in our spirit. The distinction between the regenerate spirit and the Holy Spirit is nearly lost

<sup>1</sup>Jobson's "Full Assurance for the Children of God."

in the New Testament. 'The Spirit itself beareth witness with our Spirit.' He mingles His life and breath with ours; we cry, 'Father,' yet not we, but the Spirit in us and with us." A comparison of a previously-quoted passage from the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and the parallel passage found in the Epistle to the Galatians, is, at least, suggestive. "Ye have received," says Paul, in the first, "the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father;" in the second, he reminds the Galatian believers that, "Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying (the Spirit crying), Abba, Father." In the one statement, the cry of confidence is regarded as the voice of the believing human heart; in the other, the same cry is assumed to be the voice of the Divine Spirit. The point here reached by the believer marks an era to him in power as well as in happiness. "I have often found," says John Bunyan, "that when I can say but this word, 'Father,' it does me more good than when I call Him by any other Scripture name."

Fear of the danger of enthusiasm has led some to question the possibility of the direct witness of the Holy Spirit. Such danger, however, is carefully guarded against by the fact that, in Scripture teaching, there are always connected with this highest and best testimony certain other incidental and confirmatory evidences. Chief among them is the indirect testimony, the evidence of our own consciousness and life, the "testimony of our own conscience"—2 Cor. i. 12. The new-born life revealed becomes matter of self-consciousness—upspringing life confirms it. "How am I assured," says Wesley, "that I do not mistake the voice of the Spirit? Even by the testimony of my own spirit, by 'the answer of a good conscience toward God.'" "The immediate fruits of the Spirit ruling in the heart, are 'love, joy, peace, bowels of mercies, humbleness of mind, meekness, gentleness, long-suffering;' and the outward fruits are the doing of good to all men, and a uniform obedience to all the commands of God." In close connection with the mention of the assurance of the Holy Spirit, one ever finds the "appeal to the resulting and never-absent evidences of devotion, obedience and charity." Says our leading English

theologian: "God, the Holy Ghost, does not in His testimony supersede conscience. He honors that ancient representative of the Divine voice within the nature of man, and never disjoins His evidence from that of the subjective moral consciousness which condemns or approves—in this case approves—according to the standard of law written on the heart. . . . He is, indeed, 'greater than our heart'—or conscience—'and knoweth all things.' He knoweth the mystery of the atonement, and may silence the condemning heart. But if He assures of pardon, He commits the assurance to the conscience as its guardian; so that 'if our hearts condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God.'"<sup>1</sup> Thus

"Both the witnesses are joined,  
The Holy Spirit and ours."

Further light may be thrown upon this doctrine as we  
II. Consider certain objections.

1. Those who regard all religious consciousness whatever as a sort of "hysterical pietism" will, of course, ignore the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit as folly, or denounce it as formalism. Not a few professed Christians seem to regard faith and knowledge as opposed to each other, as if faith were a synonym of doubt, and knowledge were presumption; when the truth is that faith, which is the basis of all knowledge of divine things, has failed of its work if it does not lead us on to knowledge. The Master assuredly never meant His disciples to be in doubt about any of the truths He came down from heaven to give the world. Those who claim that He did so, cannot escape the difficulty of finding some new and violent interpretation of numerous passages which assure the disciple of certainty. Christ's own words are: "He that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."—John vii. 12. "If ye continue in My word, then are ye My disciples, indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."—John viii. 31, 32. These promises, with a cluster of similar statements recorded in the fourteenth chapter of John's Gospel, the direct application of which to the individual cannot

<sup>1</sup>Pope's Theology. Vol. III, p. 121.

be denied, cannot receive any possible fulfilment apart from the conscious knowledge of the Christian man or woman. Over and over says John, "We know;" and again and again Paul deals in similar assertions. Nor was it only by the testimony of the senses that they had acquired this confidence. John asserts that he knows by the Spirit which the Lord had given. Paul distinctly affirms that though he had known Christ after the flesh, yet he had ceased to rest alone on such testimony. The testimony which served to bear him on to a martyr's death and a martyr's crown was that of the Holy Spirit. "Now we have received the Spirit . . . which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given us of God."—1 Cor. ii. 12. "The Spirit Himself beareth witness," etc.—Rom. viii. 16.

If uninspired human voices can have any weight with anyone disposed here to cavil or doubt, let a few of them speak. Charles Kingsley has written: "As for the impossibility of such a direct assurance, it is an assertion too silly to be seriously answered in this nineteenth century, which is revealing weekly wonders in the natural world which would have seemed impossible to our fathers. Shall the natural world at every step transcend our boldest dreams, and shall the spiritual world be limited by us to the merest common-places of everyday experience, especially when these common-places are, as yet, utterly unexplained and miraculous? When will men open their eyes to the plain axiom that nothing is impossible with God, save that He should transgress His own nature by being unjust and unloving?" In the fascinating biography of F. D. Maurice, we hear his earnest soul crying out: "I ask for a demonstration of the Spirit with power to my spirit. I believe it as real a demonstration as any which comes to my intellect from the propositions in Euclid. In both cases truth reveals itself to an organ which has been formed to entertain it."<sup>1</sup> Even the venerable James Martineau, whom none will suspect of superstition, when pleading strongly for the converse of the Divine with the human, has said: "The wonder would surely be were it otherwise. How should related spirits, joined by a common creative aim, intent on whatsoever things are pure

<sup>1</sup>Life of F. D. Maurice. Vol. II., p. 511.

and good, live in presence of each other, the one the bestower, the other the recipient of a sacred trust, and exchange no thought and give no sign of the love which subsists between them? Outwardly there may be 'no speech nor language,' but when religious experience affirms that in the silent colloquies of the heart it is not all soliloquy, but that Divine words also flow in and break the monotony, who will say that such belief is unnatural or even mystical?"<sup>1</sup>

Does anyone, nevertheless, ask, "How can these things be?" The question of Nicodemus is best answered by the response of Jesus: "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is everyone that is born of the Spirit." Yet everyday life furnishes illustrative incident. I meet a friend; I tell him something of importance in his business. His face suddenly lights up with interest; I speak words which fall upon his ear, but by what mysterious process do words spoken in the air so affect his whole being? I am in a crowd and in danger; I glance suddenly around, and silently appeal to someone for aid. No word has been spoken; I have merely looked at a stranger, and his glance assuring me of sympathy, I have mentally appealed to him. A modern preacher has well said: "The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the doctrine of the interworking of the Spirit of God upon the souls of men. I have no philosophy about it. All I say is this: that God knows what is the secret way in which mind reaches mind. I do not; you do not. I do not know why words on my tongue wake up thoughts corresponding to the words in you. I do not know why the soul of man, like a complex instrument of wondrous scope, is played upon by words, so that there are worked up in it notes along the whole scale of being. I do not understand why these things are so, but unquestionably they are so. I do not know how the mother pours her affection on the child's heart, but she does. Two stars never shone into each other as two loving hearts shine into each other. I know it is so, but I do not know why it is so. I do not know how soul touches soul, how thought touches thought,

<sup>1</sup>"A Study of Religion." Vol. II., p. 48.

or how feeling touches feeling, but I know it does."<sup>1</sup> In the Holy Spirit's assurance to the soul of forgiveness, there is little more of mystery than in Christ's assurance by His human voice through the outward ear of the man ill with the palsy: "Man, thy sins are forgiven thee." Granting that there were much more, is it not, nevertheless, true, as Phillips Brooks recently remarked, that "the supernatural is in a higher sense the natural; it is the atmosphere in which we confess ourselves the children of God. . . . The supernatural is the believer's home." Christians generally grant that

"The Spirit of God,  
From heaven descending, dwells in domes of clay,  
In mode far passing human thought He guides,  
Impels, instructs . . . ."

Why, then, should it be thought a thing incredible that He should assure the believer in the Redeemer of sonship with the Father and heirship with Christ?

2. By some it is claimed, in opposition to the doctrine of the direct witness, that the testimony of the written Word of God and the witness of our own spirit are all-sufficient. A few words in refutation of this claim may be added to those which occur on a previous page. Such objectors must admit that forgiveness and heirship must precede the testimony of the Word or of our own conscience. The change that makes us meet for heaven, it must also be conceded, is wrought through the atonement of Christ and by the agency of the Holy Spirit. Is it not, therefore, reasonable to presume that the Holy Spirit, present to work in the soul of the believer the work of faith with power, would make the soul conscious of that work, even as He makes the soul conscious of sin and wrath to come, although there were no declaration to that effect upon the face of Scripture? But a more definite answer awaits those who plead the all-sufficiency of the testimony of the Word and the self-consciousness of the individual. The fruits of the Spirit, to the presence of which our own spirit must testify, are enumerated by Paul (Gal. v. 22, 23). From a glance at the list, it is clear

<sup>1</sup>Henry Ward Beecher.



that the very first of these fruits must follow manifested pardon, and therefore cannot themselves manifest pardon. "If we 'love' God, it is because we know Him as God reconciled. If we have 'joy' in God, it is because we 'have received the atonement.' If we have 'peace,' it is because we are 'justified by faith.' God, conceived of as angry, cannot be the object of filial love. Pardon unfelt supposes guilt and fear still to burden the mind, in which case 'joy' and 'peace' cannot exist. But by the argument of those who make these fruits of the Spirit the *media* of ascertaining the fact of our forgiveness and adoption, we must be supposed to love God, while yet we are not assured that His 'anger is turned away.' If this be not possible, 'then the ground of our love, peace, and joy is pardon revealed and witnessed directly and immediately by the Spirit of adoption.'"<sup>1</sup>

3. Two classes of persons—the superficial class of persons on the one hand, and a sincere, but weak and timid, section of believers on the other—sometimes urge the objection that the laying claim to such an assurance by them to-day would be an act of presumption.

The right to claim and experience an assurance of the Divine pardon was, we learn from the New Testament, regarded as the common privilege of believers in the first century. When speaking of the experience, the apostles almost invariably join themselves with the body of believers. The passages quoted more than once from the apostolic letters to Christians at Rome and in Galatia are in point. Not less to the purpose is Paul's remark to the Thessalonian believers: "Our Gospel came not unto you in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance." Of the same assurance Peter writes to the strangers scattered abroad; and the epistles of the beloved John are full of it. Without the witness, this privilege and power to cry *Abba, Father*, the letters to these primitive Christians must have been altogether unintelligible.<sup>2</sup>

Nor was it a gift for the apostolic age only. Inspiration has not claimed assurance among the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, but has set it forth as a general experience under

<sup>1</sup>Wakefield's Theology.

<sup>2</sup>Dunn's "Mission of the Spirit."

the New Testament dispensation. The early fathers of the Christian Church taught and professed it. Protestants of the Reformation period held the doctrine; and such was its influence against the dogma of priestly intervention and absolution that the Council of Trent formally condemned it. Bishops and other eminent expounders in the Church of England, and Puritans and Presbyterians, in numerous instances, have taught it. Bunyan, in his immortal allegory, shows the third of the three shining ones giving Pilgrim at the cross a roll with a seal upon it, which roll or inward assurance Christian lost in the "pleasant arbor," where, in unwatchfulness, he slept at noonday. The leaders of the English revival of the eighteenth century set forth freely and fully the doctrine of the Spirit's witness, and their preaching was attended by unexampled success.

As this gift of the Spirit is for all ages, so is it for all men. The Scriptures give no intimation of favoritism in the family of God. That numbers have an assurance of pardon and heirship affords proof that the Holy Spirit yet witnesses with the human spirit; that great numbers have not this blessing gives no evidence that they might not have enjoyed it, for no reference to classification appears in sacred teaching. In my boyhood I have asked the reason for the insertion of that long list of names of believers near the end of the Epistle to the Romans. May not the names of these Christian men and women, who had not "received the spirit of bondage again to fear," but had "received the Spirit of adoption," have been preserved in order to remind the followers of Christ in all ages that in this glad experience there is no distinction between the chief standard-bearer and the humblest believer in Jesus? Does anyone speak of a profession of such experience as presumption? As well might it be regarded presumption in a child to be certain of a parent's love; as well deemed wisdom to hold some loved friend in doubt and fear, when doubt and fear might in all reason give place to love, pure and joyous. "Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but ye have received the Spirit of adoption," was a message to a church, and not to selected individuals.

III. Notice the relation of Methodism to the teaching of this doctrine.

General reference has been made to the proclamation of this doctrine in successive centuries. In relation to the doctrine and the personal experience it sets forth, John Wesley has said: "I apprehend that the whole Christian Church in the first centuries enjoyed it. For though we have few points of doctrine explicitly taught in the small remains of the Ante-Nicene fathers, yet I think that none that carefully read Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Polycarp, Origen, or any other of them, can doubt whether the writer himself possessed it, or all whom he mentions as real Christians. And I really conceive both from the *Harmonia Confessionum*, and whatever else I have occasionally read, that reformed churches in Europe did once believe that every true Christian has the direct evidence of his being in favor with God."<sup>1</sup> Of the views of the Reformers there can be no doubt. Luther, in his notes on Gal. iv. 6, writes: "Let us assure ourselves that God sendeth the Holy Spirit into our hearts. This I say to confute that pernicious doctrine of the Papists, which taught that no man certainly knows whether he is in the favor of God or no." His friend, Melancthon, the theologian of the movement of the period, asserts that "Assurance is the dividing line between Christianity and heathenism;" he also asserts that the Holy Spirit "witnesses, bears testimony within us that we are received into favor." On the same subject the martyrs of England, among them such men as Cranmer, Hooper, Ridley, Latimer, give testimony quite in accord with that of their earlier fellow-sufferer, William Tyndale: "The Spirit, through faith, certifieth my conscience that my sins are forgiven, and I received under grace and made the son of God and beloved of God. And then, naturally, my heart breaketh out into the love of God." Scarcely less clear was the teaching of several celebrated expounders of the Gospel in the Reformed Church of England in the seventeenth century, and of several Puritan and Non-conformist divines of the same period.

When, therefore, in the earlier part of the eighteenth century,

<sup>1</sup>"History of the Religious Movement." Vol. II., p. 415, etc.

Samuel Wesley said, on his death-bed, to his sons, "The inward witness, sons, the inward witness is the proof—the strongest proof—of Christianity;" and when John Wesley, brushing aside the dust that had well-nigh hidden the great central truth of Christianity, preached boldly the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and with it the truth of the Holy Spirit's attestation to the believer's heirship with Christ; and Charles Wesley sang in two of his most glowing stanzas,

" His Spirit which He gave  
Now dwells in us, we know,  
The witness in ourselves we have,  
And all its fruits we show.

" Our nature's turned, our mind  
Transformed in all its powers,  
And both the witnesses are joined,  
'The Spirit of God and ours,'"

they only called attention to an old doctrine which was then being preached by the few, and by that few, with rare exceptions, with a lack of clearness both as to its fulness and its universal application to believers. It was not strange, then, that the earlier Methodists were compelled to defend this doctrine with great frequency and vigor. "It had been derided, indeed," according to John Fletcher, "by fellow-churchmen, and denied by Laodicean Dissenters, when it was gloriously revived by Mr. Wesley and the ministers connected with him." Then, as in subsequent years, men who expressed no doubt respecting the possibility of salvation through the death of Christ, hesitated to affirm the possibility of the knowledge of salvation as a fact by the saved individual, and some even contemptuously denied it, as though such denial did not involve a tacit charge of cruelty upon God. Through their own lack of faith, they charged others with excess of faith. In all human longings, yearnings, strivings after certainty, they recognized nothing more than human instinct; they could not discern the workings of the Divine Spirit.

Than John Wesley, no man has written more clearly upon this doctrine, though others have written more voluminously. With him it was a pre-eminently important subject, as tending

to preserve religion, on the one hand, from degenerating into formality, and, on the other, from running into wild enthusiasm. It was regarded by him as a grand part of the testimony to be borne to the world by the people whom he had been instrumental in raising up. That the Holy "Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God," he taught them to "sing in their hymns, pray in their prayers, preach in their pulpits, speak of in their social meetings and in private life as a thing of personal experience." To familiarize the world with this great doctrine as a matter of practicable experience, has thus been, in no small measure, the mission of Methodism. She has thus been leavening the religious life of Anglo-Saxon Christendom for a century and a half, and has done much to restore the primitive spiritual life of Christianity—the life of clear spiritual vision, of confident and joyous assurance. If, at the present day, a great number in other branches of Christ's Church are able to say, as did Robert Murray McCheyne, of the last generation, that the "whole Bible declares that we may receive, and know that we have received, the forgiveness of sins;" or with Henry Martyn, "I felt the Spirit of adoption drawing me very near to God, and giving me the full assurance of His love;" is not this fact a pleasing result, in great measure, of the prominence given to it through the Methodist revival? This agency in the restoration of the peace and confident gladness of the early Christian life should be prized by Methodism as a special honor, and at the beginning of a second century since the death of Wesley, her ministry should require no fraternal counsel from Dr. R. W. Dale and other men like-minded, beyond her limits, to lead them to place special emphasis upon the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit.

IV. Notice the relation of this doctrine to the Christian life.

One dare not say that the possession of the Holy Spirit's witness is absolutely necessary to salvation, or is an ever-present mark of Christian experience. As Culverwell has remarked: "A man may be a true child of God and certainly saved, though he have not assurance;" but, as has been said by the same writer, "'Tis required to the *bene esse*, not to the *esse*, of a

believer." It is a privilege open to all, but there are Christians without it. To the well-being of a Christian, it is indispensable. To the individual it is necessary :

1. For the enjoyment of a real peace. Such peace cannot exist where there is ever-recurring doubt. Uncertainty respecting the road over which he is driving for the first time, would leave any brother in the ministry little disposition for pleasant or profitable meditation by the way. Suspicion as to the validity of the title by which he holds his acres, would take from the farmer much of that power which erstwhile made labor a delight. In like manner thousands of sincere souls have no heart to serve God in seeking to save others, simply because they are occupied in the solution of doubts respecting their own personal safety, which are new every morning. They have the seal of Church and creed, but the soul cries out for the seal of the Divine Spirit. "Let none rest," said Wesley, "in any supposed fruit of the Spirit without the witness." None can rest without it, he might have said. To many who do not thus attempt to rest, the spiritual life is a perpetual oscillation between hope and fear, and their Christian song is ever on the minor key.

2. For thorough usefulness. The world is sometimes perplexed by the ambiguous language and intermittent service of Christian professors. Christian speech should ever be characterized by modesty, but not marked by doubt. The constant recollection that salvation is "not by works, lest any man should boast," but is "by grace through faith," and the unmerited gift of God will be sufficient to prevent spiritual pride. On the other hand, confidence is one important condition of true usefulness, whether a man sail the sea, or work the farm, or care for the health of the body, or declare the great salvation. Wesley only began his marvellous career, and the Methodist movement received its first great impulse, when his heart became "strangely warmed," and he became certain of the certainty of salvation. To be able to say, "I know whom I have believed," is the secret of successful labor in the case of preacher, class-leader, Sunday School teacher, or any worker in any department of Christ's service.

3. For holy boldness in the work of the Lord. In that strong utterance, the "I know" of Paul, you have the key to his fearless course—the secret of his power to look at the whole catalogue of perils from which men naturally flinch, and to say in face of all, "None of these things move me." Aptly did good Latimer, a martyr of a later age, say to his fellow-sufferer, Ridley: "When I live in a steadfast and settled assurance about the state of my soul, methinks I am bold as a lion, I can laugh at all trouble, no affliction daunts me; but when I am eclipsed in my comforts, I am of so fearful a spirit that I could crawl into a very mousehole." Wisely did good Samuel Rutherford say in one of those marvellous letters which have immortalized his name: "Make meikle of assurance, for it keepeth your anchor fast."

4. For peace in death. No Methodist can but be impressed as he reads the "Life and Correspondence" of the celebrated Hannah More; by the craving for the witness of the Spirit expressed by that excellent woman upon her death-bed, and her reiterated and intensely earnest cry: "Say unto my soul, Thou art my salvation." He who enters upon life's final conflict with that prayer previously answered, can say, "O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory!" He conquers in being conquered, and all because, to use the words of Thomas à Kempis, he has at some time in life's busy day "shut the door of his senses in order to be able to hear the Spirit's voice within," and then he has heard God say, "I am thy salvation."

To the Church at large this doctrine is of the highest importance. The present is a lukewarm and speculative age. The worldly desire a religion which shall afford a compromise between Christ and the world; the speculative decline to be held to the old moorings; the advocates of a priestly power prefer a system in which a mere tactual succession shall be held to warrant certain men in assuming responsibilities for them for which the Most High has made each man answerable directly and alone to Himself; and all these must needs be arrayed against this bulwark of a heart religion—the doctrine of the Holy Spirit's power to assure the repenting and believing

sinner of his sonship with God the Father, and joint-heirship with Christ the Son. Against it Rome has ever set herself in array. Not once nor twice has she denounced assurance in the most unmeasured terms, the Council of Trent having declared a "believer's assurance of the pardon of his sins" to be a "vain and ungodly confidence," and Cardinal Bellarmine having pronounced it the prime error of heretics. To ground scarcely less tenable must the High Church theorist of the present day be driven by his dogma of apostolical succession.

Against all assailing influences have the ambassadors of the cross, preaching the doctrine of the new birth attested by the Holy Spirit, been successful. Early in the Christian era, they performed the feat of laying the Roman Empire before Christ's throne; at the period of the Reformation, Luther and his contemporaries wielded the sword of the Spirit with an effect which papal Rome in vain sought to overcome; two centuries later the Wesleys and Whitfield, and their co-laborers, with this truth changed the spiritual aspect of Britain, and even of the world, and to-day vast masses of heathenism are feeling the beneficent influence of the same truth.

It should be taught with special emphasis to-day, if we would avoid the instability and unfruitfulness of certain periods in the past, not as an incidental, but as a fundamental truth in experimental theology. Upon the individual it should be urged as the secret of personal happiness and true power, and the attainment of life's highest honor. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God."

*Halifax.*

T. WATSON SMITH.



## THE NATURE OF CHRIST'S ATONEMENT.

A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE FORMULATION OF A  
CONSISTENT ARMINIAN THEORY.

## III. ATTRIBUTES OF DEITY.

No doctrine of atonement can have a Scriptural basis which does not harmonize with the attributes of Deity as revealed therein. That God is just while He is at the same time benevolent, is a fact few men have hardihood enough to deny. It is not needful to occupy space with argument to prove that the atonement of Christ manifests to men the boundless benevolence of our Father in heaven. Bethlehem and Nazareth, Gethsemane and Calvary furnish adequate demonstrations of Divine love for all who have eyes to see or hearts to feel; but so diverse are man's conceptions of atonement that a fuller discussion of His justice in relation thereto seems essential. And yet to discuss this subject at length and in all its bearings is no part of our present purpose; that would simply be to retravel the ground covered in the first and second articles, expressing the same thought in somewhat modified phraseology, for the justice of God is the regulative principle of every phase of His relation to His intelligent creatures, and especially of the moral government He exercises over them. "Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good."<sup>1</sup> There are, however, some aspects of the justice of God which must be discussed here as supplementary to, and substantiative of, the views expressed or implied in the previous articles.

Studied from one standpoint, the justice of God lies at the root of the Scripture doctrine of atonement; or, to state the same thought in another form, our conceptions of justice will regulate and determine our conceptions of atonement. The justice of God is an essential part of His holiness, and indicates His attitude toward men as subjects of His divine government. Holiness is subjective, because it designates the personal disposition of the Almighty—it is the inclination of the Divine

<sup>1</sup>Rom. vii. 12.

will. Justice is objective—the expression of the Divine holiness in acts of righteous government. As a Divine attribute, therefore, justice may be defined as God's prescription of righteous laws as the Supreme Governor of the universe, and His dispensation of righteous rewards and punishments as Supreme Judge, according as His creatures conform to or break the laws laid down for the regulation of their lives. Rev. J. Gilbert defines justice as a personal attribute of the Deity to be "That rectitude of the Divine nature by which His judgments and acts are ever in harmony with the relation of things, as well morally as intellectually."<sup>1</sup>

Though we ardently admire the exceedingly able book of the writer just quoted, we cannot agree with his adoption and defence of the definition of Leibnitz, that "Justice is a modification of benevolence."<sup>2</sup> That they are intimately connected, and even mutually regulative, may be readily admitted. All God's manifestations of justice are in harmony with the dictates and tendencies of His essential nature, which is love; but however intimately connected or mutually regulative, that they are essentially different is evident from the fact that justice appeals to the conscience, benevolence to the heart. This distinction will be still more apparent if we keep before our minds the fact that an act may be perfectly just which is not benevolent, and benevolent when it is not just. When a person pays a debt he has contracted, he performs an act which is perfectly just, but in no wise benevolent; but when he gives to a suffering human brother that which belongs to another, his act is benevolent, but it is not just. These simple illustrations are sufficient to show the fallacy in Mr. Gilbert's reasoning, when he says justice "is goodness exercised under the control of wisdom, prescribing what, in the entire view of things, is fittest and most conducive to the highest ends."<sup>3</sup> This is to make utility the standard of justice, whereas the indestructible ideas of right and wrong are wrapt up in the very word justice, and inseparable from it, while they have no necessary connection

<sup>1</sup>"*The Christian Atonement*," p. 134.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.* See also Leibnitz' "*Theodicæe*," p. ii., s. 151.     <sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

with mere benevolence. Though God's benevolence and justice are distinct, it must not be forgotten, however, that all His acts are equally wise, and just, and good. "When we are contemplating the nature of God, we consider it, after the analogy of human beings, as different according to the different *objects* about which it is employed. On this common mode of conception the common use of language is built, and in conformity with this usage we must make a distinction between the goodness, holiness and justice of God, especially as the Scriptures follow this common usage. Now, the object of the holiness of God is *general, universal good*; of His justice and benevolence, *the welfare of His creatures*. We here see how closely connected these ideas are, and what induced Leibnitz to define them as he did. But following the general usage, we make the following distinction in the employment of these terms: One is called *good* or *benevolent* who is inclined to benefit another, *qui bene cupit, vult*; one is called holy, in respect to the purity and blamelessness of his *disposition*—one who loves what is good and hates what is evil, *qui recte, sentit, sanctus est*; *just*, who acts according to this disposition, *qui recte agit*, and who therefore *actively exhibits* his pleasure in what is good, and displeasure at what is evil. But since God has no other end but to promote the welfare of His creatures, He acts, even when He proceeds with *justice*, at the same time *benevolently*; and even in those things which we call *evils* and *punishments*, from the manner in which they affect us, are only so many results and proofs of the Divine goodness."<sup>1</sup>

In this discussion we are not much concerned with the technical distinctions of systematic theologians, save so far as they are essential to a comparison of theories, for we conceive justice in God to be a unit at its roots, modified in its manifestations by the diversified relations of moral beings. "As an attribute of God, it is united with His holiness as being essential to His nature; it is legislative or rectoral, as He is the righteous Governor of all His creatures, and it is administrative or judicial, as He is the just Dispenser of rewards and punishment. Under these three heads may be distributed all that

<sup>1</sup>Knapp's "*Theology*," p. 113.

Scripture teaches us on this most important subject."<sup>1</sup> Adopting this generally admitted classification, it seems essential that any adequate theory of atonement must combine the rectoral and retributive aspects of the Divine justice, and work out its details in perfect harmony with both. Atonement is often defined as a "satisfaction offered to Divine justice for the sins of mankind." Now, as these words are used by men who hold theories as widely diverse as the poles, it may help us to something like clear thought if we ask, "How does the atonement offered by Christ satisfy Divine justice for the sins of mankind?" In proposing this question, we have not forgotten the caution of Dr. Crawford.<sup>2</sup> We are not conscious, however, of any desire to pry into the "secret things which belong unto the Lord." We are not animated by any irreverent curiosity, but by a passionate desire, to know the truth. We are as ready as Dr. Crawford himself, according to our ability, to contend that Scripture teaches that Christ has made satisfaction to Divine justice for the sins of mankind, but we do not regard it as sacrilegious to ask, "In what way?"

If we apprehend aright, retributive justice is that aspect of this Divine attribute which impels Him to punish the transgression of His righteous laws according to the exact demerit of each individual transgressor; but God's administrative justice, while it punishes the transgressor, does not so much regard the wrongdoer's personal demerit, as it does the conservation of God's authority as the righteous Governor of the moral universe,

<sup>1</sup>Pope's "Compendium of Christian Theology," Vol. I., p. 335. The following remarks of Knapp are worthy of note: "God exhibits to man His complacency in what is good and useful, and His disapprobation of what is evil and injurious, in two ways—(1) By laws and various institutes, which are intended to teach us, on the one hand, what is good and salutary, and, on the other, what is evil and injurious, in order that we may know how to regulate our feelings and our conduct. This is called *legislative justice* (*justitia legislativa*, sive *antecedens*, sive *dispositiva*). (2) By actions, in which He manifests His approbation of what is good, and of those who practise it, and His disapprobation of what is evil, and of those who live wickedly. This is called *retributive justice* (*justitia retributiva*, *judiciaria*, *rectoria*, *distributiva*, *compensatrix*, *consequens*).—"Theology," pp. 117, 118.

<sup>2</sup>"The Scripture Doctrine of the Atonement," pp. 183, 184.

the maintenance of His law, and the protection of the interests of His obedient subjects; or, to put the matter more briefly, the retributive justice of God has special regard to the personal deserts of His moral subjects, while the administrative justice of God is employed in furthering the ends of good government throughout the wide domain over which He rules. These distinctions, properly apprehended and expounded, divest this whole subject of the dense fog in which it is, alas, too often enveloped. If the retributive justice of God deals with individual transgressors according to their personal demerit, then it is seen that the satisfaction made by Christ was not, and could not be, made to God's justice in this particular aspect of it, for its very nature precludes the possibility of substitution. Whatever views the followers of Augustine or Calvin may adopt on this subject, it appears to us that consistency compels all genuine Arminians to adopt this view, for the following reasons: If Christ's atonement (as every Arminian contends) is to be regarded as offered for every man, and that atonement consisted in the satisfaction of God's retributive justice, it would follow that no man could be justly punished for his sins. If Christ bore the penalty due to the guilt of the race, it would, as we have already seen in a former article, be flagrantly unjust for the race, or any individual member of it, to bear it over again. Hence all Calvinists proclaim, consistently enough with their theory of atonement, the certain salvation of all for whom Christ died; He having satisfied Divine justice by bearing the penalty due to the sins of the elect, this salvation follows as a matter of right. Logically, the system is faultless. Admit the premises, and the conclusion inevitably follows. But we deny the premises. The mere fact that an atonement has been made does not cancel the guilt of a single wrongdoer. Notwithstanding the stupendous facts of the incarnation and sacrifice of the Son of God, each transgressor of Divine law is, by reason of his personal demerit, as obnoxious to the retributive justice of God as though Christ had never assumed our nature or died upon the cross. Retributive justice having a regard only to what is due the sinner, we conclude that Christ has not, and could not, give satisfac-

tion on his behalf. If we were shut up to this view of satisfaction, there would be no hope for a single one of the human race. The remarks of Gilbert on this subject are wise and far-reaching. He says, "Not unfrequently justice is defined to be that attribute which awards to each precisely his due, whether considered in relation to debt, or to the alternatives of moral character. Were this latter a correct representation of its requisition as a binding power, it seems impossible that mercy could be extended to any delinquent without, at the same time, committing a violation of justice, and the mode of reasoning not unfrequently adopted on this subject, though inconsistent with their subsequent admissions, would lead to the inference that such is the conception entertained by many minds."

"Having accepted the definition just stated as apparently very simple, they push their argument to show that God cannot pardon sin; but speedily turn round and announce that He does pardon it. Retributive justice is in such reasonings represented as binding to the execution of penalties, as fully as to the granting of rewards either explicitly promised, or in some way the object of equitable expectation. It is obvious, however, that a vigorous adherence to this notion can never consist with the escape of a transgressor on any terms. Justice, to be consistent with the definition, would so have required the proportional suffering, as to be really violated by its remission. There would have been no room for either atonement or mediation."

"The sufferings of Christ, however expiatory, can never be really the punishment of the offender who receives pardon through His name. If God, therefore, be essentially a Being of retributive justice, and if that justice binds Him to inflict suffering on an offender, as it does to reward obedience, one inference only remains—that there can be no deliverance."<sup>1</sup>

But with God's administrative justice the case is quite different. Let us bear in mind that this aspect of Divine justice is occupied in the maintenance of His righteous government. It will be readily seen how, in this aspect of it, the justice of God

<sup>1</sup>"*The Christian Atonement*," pp. 134, 135.

is satisfiable—admits of substitution.<sup>1</sup> Any method which secures this end, as well as the punishment of the offender would have done, the All-wise and All-merciful Ruler was at perfect liberty to accept in its stead. Here is the root of the doctrine of substitution as taught in the Holy Scriptures. The atonement of Christ does, we claim, secure these ends most effectually. Supposing that man had been visited with all the bitter fruits of his personal transgression of Divine law, what would have been the influence thereof on the intelligent universe? Would it not have been a spectacle calculated

<sup>1</sup>We are pleased to add to the text the following remarks of Rev. Leonard Woods, D.D.: "When we say that justice as an attribute of God, as a principle of His government, is satisfied, we *personify* justice; we speak of it as though it were a person. This figure of speech is very common. I have no objection to it. But we shall do well to remember that it is a figure of speech. We come then to the question, *Is Divine justice satisfied with Christ crucified as a propitiation for sin?* To determine this, consider a little what is the object of Divine justice, what it aims at, what it seeks to do. Exercised according to the common, regular course of moral government, justice seeks the punishment of offenders. *This is its proximate end.* But what is its *ultimate* end? What does justice ultimately aim to accomplish by punishment? The end aimed at in punishment is, manifestly, to display the moral character of God, to express His mind as to the goodness of His law and the evil of sin, to support His government, and to secure the highest welfare of His kingdom. We know this is the end aimed at, because it is the end actually accomplished. Now, all thinking men who hold to the doctrine of atonement, believe that the vicarious sufferings of Christ answered all the great, ultimate ends which Divine justice sought in the merited punishment of transgressors—all the ends which would have been answered had that punishment been fully executed upon them. If, then, all the important ends which justice sought, and which it would have accomplished by the punishment of sinners, are accomplished by the death of Christ, how can it be otherwise than that justice is satisfied? It seems evident that Divine justice must be as well satisfied with the sufferings of Christ as with the punishment of sinners, if those sufferings perfectly answered the ends which it aims at. If Christ's sufferings manifest the righteousness of God, and honor His character as much as the punishment of sinners could have done; if they do as much to discountenance sin, to give influence to law and to promote order and happiness among intelligent beings, what more can justice ask? This is all that the case calls for. Justice seeing the good it aimed at fully accomplished, says, *it is enough.*"—"Works" of Rev. L. Wood, D.D. Vol. II., pp. 468, 469.

to deter others from committing a similar offence? And would it not have impressed them with the fact that no being might transgress God's law with impunity? Looking at Jesus Christ as man's substitute, in the humility of His incarnation, the agony of His passion, and the mystery of His death, it may be confidently affirmed that the punishment of the transgressor could not have furnished us with more impressive views of the evil of sin or of the majesty of Divine law. Hard is the heart and senseless the soul that can look upon Gethsemane and Calvary, and go away and deliberately sin again. Then the suffering of the original transgressor would not have furnished an opportunity for the manifestation of God's mercy toward the sinful. The suffering of Christ stamps sin as an abominable thing, exhibits the inviolability of the Divine law in a way that makes one tremble as we contemplate it, while it secures the exercise of mercy toward the sinful. With these facts before us, we confidently affirm that the satisfaction made by Christ answers the ends of moral government as well, if not better, than the punishment of the actual offender would have done. The infinite love of our Divine Father having furnished the substitute, He, as Supreme Ruler, is satisfied with the substitution.

This view commends itself to us as the true one, because it is in thorough harmony with the nature of God as unfolded to us in Scripture. If the retributive justice of God had demanded of the sinner's substitute the penalty due to the sinner's demerit, there would be ground for the charge that His attributes were in conflict with one another. In God's gift of Christ as the substitute for sinful man, he has opened a wider rift in the clouds which hang over His infinite perfections than we find anywhere else. Perfections of the Divine nature which, when studied separately, seem to be in conflict with each other, are here found to be in perfect and sublime harmony. If we look at the joys of heaven, we shall be constrained to magnify God's goodness; if, at the pains of hell, His justice; but the cross of Christ magnifies both the justice and mercy of God in a more remarkable manner than heaven or hell magnifies either. Men talk about Divine love triumphing over



Divine justice, a form of speech which is far more sentimental than Scriptural, for where, on all the pages of the blessed and Heaven-inspired Book, is there a single intimation that any perfection of the Divine nature was in any way opposed to the sinner's salvation? Where, in all this bright record of hope for humanity, is one attribute of the infinitely perfect God represented as in conflict with another;<sup>1</sup> or where is any man warranted in speaking of love as the darling attribute of Deity, save in the rapture of poetic license? As God is one, His perfections are a unit. Redemption exhibits them to our minds in their harmony, and when we understand it, they are seen co-operating in procuring the salvation of man. As love is the fountain whence atonement takes its rise, so justice is the regulative principle alike of all its processes, as well as of the method of its bestowal.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>"If vindictive justice be the securing of public right and order, or a constant regard to the object of enlarged benevolence, even though it demanded the execution of suffering upon individuals, there is no opposition to mercy, when mercy can be administered in consistency with the general safety; while, at the same time, there is a necessity, when mercy is exercised, for atonement or satisfaction, if otherwise pardon cannot be safely conceded. Such vindictive justice is an essential attribute of the Divine nature, and not dependent upon merely free volition, and thence we may accurately enforce the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ without placing the Divine attributes in conflicting opposition. Christ has satisfied the claims of this vindictive justice by securing public order, while yet dispensing pardon."—Gilbert's "*Christian Atonement*," p. 367. In the above note, which is in answer to Stapfer, it will be observed that Gilbert uses the phrase "vindictive justice" in exactly the same sense as we have used the phrase "administrative justice" throughout this article.

<sup>2</sup>"It is important to remember that Holy Scripture never makes such a distinction between the love and holiness of God as theology thinks it necessary to establish. The mercy that provides and the justice that requires the atonement are one in the recesses of the Divine nature. Their union or identity is lost to us in the thick dark of the light which we cannot approach. The cross of Christ, or rather the whole mediation of the Redeemer, equally and at once reveals both. *Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son the propitiation for our sins.* In our infirmity, we find it needful to correct our estimate of one attribute by appealing to another. The Scriptures scarcely condescend to that infirmity. It speaks of the Divine *agape* as ordering the whole

Further, this view commends itself to our reason as the true one, because it not only justifies the Bible doctrine of eternal punishment as the merited portion of impenitent men, but brings out its perfect harmony and consistency with the whole of God's redemptive scheme. It is contrary to the soul's intuitive sense of justice for Christ to bear the penalty of a man's transgressions, and then for the man to bear the penalty a second time himself. But if Christ's sufferings made satisfaction to God's administrative justice, so that the ends of moral government were answered, as well as the punishment of the offender would have answered those ends, though the actual guilt of the sinner has not been cancelled, nor his liability to penalty removed by the mere fact of Christ having made satisfaction to Divine justice; yet, upon his appropriation of Christ as his personal Saviour, his transgressions may be pardoned and his iniquities forgiven in perfect consistency with the character of God and the principles of His moral government. If, however, the sinner refuses or neglects to make such an appropriation of Christ, the penalty due to his sins is still in full force against him; it neither has nor could be abrogated, it is simply delayed in virtue of mediatorial grace. Should the sinner neglect or refuse to make such an appropriation of Christ down to the end of his probationary life, the penalty may be inflicted upon him in perfect justice, without any such anomaly as that which is implied in the theory that makes Christ to bear the penalty of the sins of mankind, while it also makes the impenitent to bear the penalty of their own sin, an anomaly from which the moral nature must shrink with horror and abhorrence as unworthy of God or man.<sup>1</sup>

economy of what is nevertheless an *hilasmus* or propitiation, and of the Divine *eudokia* as ordering the whole economy of what is nevertheless a *katallage*."—Pope's "*Compendium of Christian Theology*," Vol II., pp. 278, 279.

<sup>1</sup>This theory requires as its natural sequence a limited atonement, and the absolute certainty of the salvation of all for whom that atonement was offered. To us, this, itself, is evidence that the premises which lead to such conclusions must be radically erroneous. "The Divine justice is conceived of by 'hem [its advocates] as, by a necessity of the Divine nature, awarding eternal misery to sin and eternal blessedness to righteousness,

It is said, however, that it is manifestly unjust for the innocent to suffer for the guilty. We leave the advocates of the notion that Christ's sufferings were penal to answer this objection as best they can. To our minds, the objections made to this theory by the older Socinians, as well by the advocates of the modern moral influence theories of atonement, have never been answered—are, indeed, on such principles, unanswerable. If "sin can be pardoned in consistency with the Divine justice only on the ground of a forensic penal satisfaction;"<sup>1</sup> if "to the pardon of sin consistently with the purity of God, the punishment must fall on the sinner's substitute;"<sup>2</sup> we are ready to ask, in the words of Martineau, "Of what man, of what angel, could such a thing be reported, without raising a cry of indignant shame from the universal human heart?"<sup>3</sup> But no such objection as this has any force against the doctrine of satisfaction we are advocating. We are aware that Martineau Jowett and others have caricatured it, and then denounced it as strongly as they have done the idea of penal satisfaction. The former of these writers speaks of it as being "only a show-off for impression's sake;"<sup>4</sup> the latter as "a painful fiction" interposed between man and God.<sup>5</sup> The man who has so far misconceived the sublime fact of the incarnation and the awful spectacle of Calvary as to speak of it thus, has put himself in a position in which he is either incapable or unworthy of being reasoned with. We do not regard these momentous

That the sinner may be saved from this misery and partake in this blessedness, he must, in the person of Christ, endure the misery due to sin, and fulfil the righteousness of which this blessedness is the due reward. But the correlative position is that, having thus, in the person of Christ, endured the punishment of sin, he cannot, in justice, be eventually punished himself; and that having, in like manner, fulfilled all righteousness, he must, in justice, receive the reward of that righteousness."—Dr. McLeod Campbell's "*The Nature of the Atonement*," p. 47.

<sup>1</sup>Dr. A. A. Hodge, "*Systematic Theology*," Vol. II., p. 488.

<sup>2</sup>"*Symington on Atonement*," p. 50.

<sup>3</sup>"*Studies of Christianity*," p. 188.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid*, p. 161.

<sup>5</sup>"*Epistles of St. Paul*," Vol. II., p. 473.

events as mere spectacular displays, much less as fictions, but as glorious facts on which depend our own welfare and that of the world's. Account for them as we may, the unparalleled sufferings and death of the only begotten Son of God are facts of history. Grant for a moment that they had no relation to human sin, were not, in any such sense as we have indicated, an atonement for sinners; what then? The mystery, the wonderful condescension, the tortures of His body, the unspeakable agony of His soul, stand still as facts in the history of Jesus Christ—facts unalterable by any theorizing concerning them. Standing in the presence of these facts, the question arises, and we neither ought nor can suppress it, Why were they endured? If it be answered, as an exhibition of God's love to man, or as an example of self-sacrifice, to show man how he ought to live. Now, for the moment assume either or both of these answers to be correct. Another question arises: if it was unjust that Christ should suffer as an atoning sacrifice for man, was it a whit less unjust for Him to endure these sufferings as an example for man, or to manifest the love of God to man? This question the intelligent reader will know how to answer. It will be seen that this objection bears with equal force against the whole of God's providential government, as Butler has so clearly shown.<sup>1</sup> "No generalizing of expression,

<sup>1</sup> "When, in the daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of that appointment of Christianity which is objected against, does not hinder, but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural providence than against Christianity, because, under the former, we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others, whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The world's being under the righteous government of God does, indeed, imply that finally, and upon the whole, everyone shall receive according to his personal deserts, and the general doctrine of Scripture is that this shall be the completion of Divine government. But during the progress, and for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit and absolutely necessary."—"Analogu," Bohn's Ed., part II., ch. V., pp. 254, 255.

no slurring over the fact by vague abstractions, by loose and ambiguous forms of speech, can prevent the discerning mind from having a palpable perception of the truth, however mysterious, that substitution is part of the scheme of that moral government under which we live; a scheme which, without question, includes essentially the suffering of one who was innocent, for the relief and benefit of others who are guilty. State this fact as indeterminately as you please, vigorously adhere to the coldest and most undefining forms of language, allow only that the innocent suffered for the advantage of the guilty, what possible abatement of the charge of injustice do you supply? The difficulty, if any—the mystery—the awful mystery—remains in full proportion behind the flimsy cloud; that mystery is, the innocent, the virtuous, the perfect One has borne tremendous agony. This is the point of startling wonder—whatever the result—of wonder to be diminished only by the exigency, the mighty good accruing not otherwise to be attained.”<sup>1</sup>

It is said, however, that there is no conceivable sense in which the sufferings of Christ were a satisfaction to Divine justice unless they were penal. Professor Crawford states this position thus: “It is not the ‘retributive justice’ of God that is satisfied by them, but what is called His ‘rectoral or public justice.’ Or rather, to speak plainly, it is not ‘the justice of God,’ in any sense, that can be attached to that expression, or *anything in the Divine mind* that is satisfied by them, but only *something in the outward exigencies of the Divine government that is supplied*, to the effect of providing that safely, honorably and without prejudice to the interests of practical godliness, God’s mercy may be freely extended to transgressors, without such penal satisfaction as His justice requires.”<sup>2</sup> Dr. Shedd states the same position when he says: “Law has no option. Justice has but one function. The law itself is under law; that is, it is under the necessity of its own nature, and, therefore, the only possible way whereby a transgressor can escape the penalty of the law is for a substitute to endure it

<sup>1</sup>“*The Christian Atonement*,” Rev. J. Gilbert. P. 67.

<sup>2</sup>“*The Scripture Doctrine of Atonement*,” p. 381.

for him."<sup>11</sup> It will be seen how that iron necessity which obliges God to punish sin underlies the views of Divine justice as understood by these writers. We refer our readers to the article in the April number of this review, as to God's obligations to punish sin, and submit that in the administration of moral law justice has not exhausted itself, not compassed the whole of its office, when it has exacted the penalty transgressors may have incurred. Moral law must be administered on principles that secure the cordial approbation of those who are governed by it. If love to God as the root principle of all morality is to dominate the life of man, there must be no hesitation as to the principles of the administration under which he is placed, no misgivings concerning the character of the Administrator.

No, "retributive justice" has not been satisfied by the sufferings and death of Christ, for He is the substitute of sinners, and retributive justice regards only the intrinsic demerit of the personal transgressor of Divine law. Retributive justice does not admit of substitution. As personal guilt is the sole object of retributive justice, if Jesus Christ had satisfied that aspect of Divine justice, we are shut up to the awful conclusion that He must have become personally guilty of the sins of those for whom He laid down His life, a conception as repulsive to us as it is a violation of every principle of righteousness. "In truth, and in deed, the sinner is just as guilty after the atonement as he was before, and he is just as obnoxious to the inflictions of the retributive justice of God. He may be most justly punished, for as the claims of retributive justice have not been satisfied, so they may be demanded of him without being a second time exacted. He really deserves the wrath of God on account of his sins, although administrative justice has been satisfied; and hence, when he truly repents and believes, all his sins are freely and graciously remitted."<sup>12</sup> It is surely as poor logic as it is unsafe theology to conclude that no satisfaction has been offered to Divine justice because satisfaction to God's retributive justice has been shown to be impossible.

<sup>11</sup>*Theological Essays*, p. 287.

<sup>12</sup>*Theodicy*, Bledsoe. P. 281.

"The office of justice is the maintenance of moral government in the highest attainable excellence. The aim is the prevention or restraint of sin, the protection of rights, the defence of innocence against injury or wrong, the vindication of government and the honor of the Divine Ruler."<sup>1</sup> It is a most vicious form of reasoning that fastens the mind on one of the offices of justice and ignores the rest, and one which is sure to land us in error. Dr. Crawford intimates that there is no room for any distinction between retributive and rectoral justice.<sup>2</sup> We ask if it is any the less Divine justice when it is directed to the protection and conservation of the rights of the loyal against the lawless, to the maintenance of the majesty of law and and honor of the Administrator, than when it is employed in the infliction of deserved penalty on the obstinate transgressor? We have already said that Divine justice is a unit, but men have found it needful to qualify it as it works toward different ends. In enforcing the penalties attached to the transgression of Divine law, we call it "retributive;" in conserving the rights of the ruled and the Ruler, we call it "rectoral" or "public justice;" but whether engaged in the one way or the other, it is equally Divine justice. In the former case it is expressed toward an individual personally blameworthy; in the latter it contemplates the greatest good of the greatest number of moral beings over whom God rules. Christ's sacrifice of Himself had an important bearing on the justice of God in its relation to penalty attached to transgression, and was satisfaction thereto by accomplishing the rectoral ends penalty was designed to serve in God's moral administration.<sup>3</sup> In the discussion of this subject it would materially

<sup>1</sup>"*Systematic Theology.*" Miley, Vol. I., p. 202.

<sup>2</sup>"*The Scripture Doctrine of Atonement,*" p. 385.

<sup>3</sup>"As in the satisfaction theory, so in the rectoral, the sufferings of Christ are an atonement for sin only as in some sense they take the place of penalty. But they do not replace penalty in the same sense in the schemes. In the one they take its place as a penal substitute, thus realizing the office of justice in the actual punishment of sin; in the other they take its place in the fulfilment of its office as concerned with the interests of moral government. It is the office of justice to maintain these interests through the means of penalty. Therefore atonement in the

help us if we were to distinguish between what justice absolutely requires and what it admits. Justice might have required the better and eternal condemnation of every transgressor of Divine law; the fact that this has not been done is patent to all. Forgiveness is within the reach of all through the mediation of Jesus Christ, but every impenitent man is in imminent peril every hour of being visited with the utmost rigor his transgressions have merited. With the human facts, and the Divinely provided propitiation before us, we discern a marvellous difference between *may* and *must* we shall do well to ponder with care. Again, we imagine mistakes on this subject would be less frequent if the distinction between compensation and satisfaction were kept clearly before the mind. Bishop Stellingfleet has set this matter before us with the clearness of noonday. It will be observed how the good Bishop goes to the root of this matter when he says, "If we can clearly show a considerable difference between the notion of debts and punishments, if the right of punishment doth not depend upon mere dominion, and that satisfaction by way of punishment is not primarily intended for compensation, but for other ends, we shall make not only the state of the controversy much clearer, but offer something considerable toward the resolution of it"<sup>1</sup>

mediation of Christ must so take the place of penalty as to fulfil this same office while the penalty is remitted."—"Atonement in Christ," Miley, pp. 217, 218. "Now, this universal justice in God is that whereby He not only punishes obstinate and impenitent sinners, but He takes care of preserving the honor of His laws. And, therefore, although Almighty God, out of His great mercy, were willing that penitent sinners should be forgiven, yet it was most agreeable thereto that it should be done in such a manner as to discourage mankind from the practice of sin by the same way by which He offers forgiveness, and for this end it pleased God, in His infinite wisdom and goodness, to send His Son to become a sacrifice of propitiation for the sins of mankind, which, being freely undertaken by Him, there was no breach in the measures of punitive justice with respect to Him; and so, by His death, He offered up Himself as a 'full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of mankind.' And this is that doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ which we own and defend.—"*Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction*," Bishop Stellingfleet, pp. xxxi. and xxxii.

<sup>1</sup>"*The Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction*," p. 19.



“The reason of debts is dominion and property, and the obligation of them depends upon voluntary contracts between parties; but the reason of punishments is justice and government, and depends not upon mere contracts, but the relation the person stands in to that authority to which he is accountable for his actions.”<sup>1</sup> Again, the Bishop says, “In case of debts, every man is bound to pay whether he be called upon or no; but in case of punishments, no man is bound to betray or accuse himself. For the obligation to payment in case of debt ariseth from the injury sustained by that particular person, if another detains what is his own from him; but the obligation to punishment arises from the injury the public sustains by the impunity of crimes, of which the magistrates are to take care, who, by the dispensing of punishments, to show that to be true which Grotius asserts, that if there be any creditor to be assigned in punishment, it is the public good, which appears by this that all punishments are proportioned according to the influence the offences have upon the public interest; for the reason of punishment is not because a law is broken, but because the breach of a law tends to dissolve the community by infringing the authority of the laws and the honor of those who are to take care of them.”<sup>2</sup> The Bishop then goes on to show that these principles are as applicable to the administration of Divine as of human laws. “When God gives laws according to which He will reward and punish, He so far restrains the exercise of His dominion to a subserviency to the ends of government. If we should suppose that God governs the world merely by His dominion, we would take away all rewards and punishments, for then the actions of men would be the mere effects of irresistible power, and so not capable of rewards and punishments. . . . But if God doth not exercise His full dominion over rational creatures, it is apparent that He doth govern them under another notion than as mere Lord, and the reason of punishment is not to be taken from an absolute right which God doth not make use of, but from the ends and designs of government, which are His own honor, the authority of His laws, and the good of those whom He doth

<sup>1</sup> “*The Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction*,” p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.

govern."<sup>1</sup> With these passages of Bishop Stellingfleet before his mind, we do not wonder that Rev. J. Gilbert should say, "It is quite refreshing to escape from the fogs with which divines generally surround this subject, by not sufficiently keeping in view the distinctive nature of moral government, and the peculiar relations of *justice*."<sup>2</sup> God's great mercy is here prominently exhibited in waiving His personal right, and His justice is equally prominent in not forgiving the transgressor without securing the ends penalty was intended to serve in the administration of Divine law. Here then is the true sense in which atonement is satisfaction offered to Divine justice. Satisfaction to God as the injured party renders substitution absolutely impossible.<sup>3</sup>

Again, it is contended that the doctrine advocated in this article makes the rectoral ends of justice the only motive to the punishment of sin. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. The section in a former article on the ground and end of penalty is a sufficient answer to this objection. Sin is to be punished according to its demerit, but penalty subserves great public ends as well as the punishment of the wrongdoer. The redemptive economy combines both elements. Christ's great work satisfies the rectoral ends of justice as well as the punishment of the transgressor would have done, while, at the same time, the just penalty of his sin awaits the impenitent soul. "While Divine penalty falls only upon sin, the supreme reason for its infliction is in the rectoral ends with which moral government is concerned."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*The Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction*, pp. 26, 27.

<sup>2</sup>"*The Christian Atonement*," p. 363.

<sup>3</sup>Bishop Stellingfleet's work quoted above is a mine of wealth clear in thought, and will repay any attentive reader's most careful perusal.

<sup>4</sup>"*Atonement in Christ*." Miley, p. 226.

## "THE LAND SHALL NOT BE SOLD FOREVER."

LEVITICUS XXV. 23.

Was this injunction the declaration of some eternal principle, resting on a basis of justice, obligatory on all ages or conditions of society, or was it only a temporary expedient, applicable merely to a certain peculiar condition of the Jewish people?

The question resolves itself into this: Can land be justly treated as an article of commerce, to be bought and sold, just as food, clothing, shelter, or any product of labor, or does land differ from other things, so that justice forbids its sale?

Between the land, the gift of the Creator, and commodities, the product of the laborer, the Mosaic economy made the widest distinction. No restriction whatever was placed on the sale of the products of industry, but the sale of land was strictly forbidden. No one could do more with the land than to give a lease till the Jubilee year.

This method has been spoken of as an entail, resembling the entail common in Britain. But these two entails differed as widely as two things could differ. The Jewish entail secured land to everyone, the British entail secures it to particular heirs only, and excludes all others. The one entail ensured equality, the other perpetuates and intensifies inequality.

To determine the rightness or wrongness of selling land, we must examine what selling means. How does anyone acquire a right to sell? Evidently a man can sell only what is his, and nothing more than is his. That which he owns absolutely, evidently he can sell absolutely, and that which he owns only limitedly, he can sell only limitedly.

When one man catches fish and another catches game, and they exchange their product, this constitutes buying and selling. The one sells fish and buys game, the other sells game and buys fish. We call this selling fish or selling game; in reality it is exchanging services. Each renders a service; each confers a benefit; each is enriched only on condition that he enriches.

After a man has toiled to catch fish or game, to raise a crop

or build a house, on what condition can I justly demand any of these commodities from him? Should I attempt to take them without offering some equivalent product or service, would he not immediately and intuitively recognize that I was subjecting him to an injustice, and would he not feel that he was quite justified in resisting my efforts? Undoubtedly he would. It requires no demonstration to prove to a man that he is defrauded when he is compelled to render or surrender service without receiving an equivalent service in return.

Are we not quite safe in assuming this as one of the basal principles of ethics, that honesty demands that services should be reciprocal—service for service, product for product, benefit for benefit? Suppose we deny this doctrine, and assert that one part of humanity has the right to claim service without rendering service, do we not at once proclaim the doctrine of slavery, fraud and theft?

When a man toils, raises a crop, provides a house, cures a disease, elucidates a philosophy, invents a machine, organizes an industry, or charms our souls with the beauties of song or oratory, then he establishes a right to charge his fellowman, a right to sell. The right to make a charge rests on a service rendered or a product furnished. Can anyone, on any other condition, justly claim the right to demand product or service from his fellowman? Unquestionably he can not.

Can any man, any combination of men, any government, furnish land? Is land a product of industry? Do land speculators carry on factories for the production of town lots? Did the landlords of Ireland furnish that island to their tenants? These questions at once call the attention to the essential distinction between land, which no man furnishes, and the products of labor, which men do furnish.

#### WHO ARE THE OWNERS OF THE EARTH?

It cannot be the exclusive possession of one generation, or of any one portion of any generation. "In the beginning God made the heavens and the earth," and "the earth hath He given to the children of men." The only doctrine as to the ownership of the earth consistent with the teachings of Christianity, with

the teaching that all are equally the children of God, is that the earth was made equally for all. The denial of this doctrine at once smites at the foundation of the doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Proclaim to any body of men that God created this earth to be the exclusive possession of one portion of humanity, and that the rest are here on sufferance only, tenants at will of the "owners" of the earth, that these "owners" have the right, the unquestionable moral right, to exclude the "non-owners" from the gift of the Creator, and we at once proclaim a doctrine diametrically opposed to the spirit of Christianity, and which reduces the expression, "Our Father," to a meaningless platitude.

If the land belongs just as much to the child as to the parent, then the latter certainly can have no moral right to sell that which belongs to another. For one generation to sell out the right of the next generation, is evidently in morals what, in law, would be deemed *ultra vires*. One generation is not the "owner" of the earth; it belongs to all generations—to the last generation just as much as to the first, to every one of every generation as much as it belongs to any one of any generation.

#### THE TWO USES OF LAND.

The farmer uses the land as an agent of production. He is a laborer, a producer. In the growing abundance of his product he rejoices, and is always seeking, by every expedient, to render his production more abundant. Only after he has produced, does he claim the right to clothing, hardware and other products. His selling is the exchange of product for product, or service for service. He offers abundance for abundance. His right to sell the product of his industry cannot, for one moment, be questioned. The value that he offers in the market, the charge that he claims the right to make, is simply the payment, or the reward, he demands for his industry. He has made a sacrifice, has rendered a service, has conferred a benefit, and now he claims a product, a benefit, in return. And has not his industry given him an unimpeachable title to that reward?

In the same way the carpenter, the builder and the clothier all rejoice in the abundance of their products, and they claim a

share of the abundance only after they have contributed their quota of service to the production of that abundance.

But when we investigate the claim of the land speculator or collector of ground rent to reward, then we find a marked contrast. His claim is exactly opposite in character to that of the farmer, the builder and the clothier. He rejoices in scarcity, for as scarcity of land increases, as population becomes more and more congested, as people are compelled more and more to economize space, so grows more and more his fortune. While busy industry seeks the factory, the farm, or the shop, that it may add to the abundance of its production, and while it brings forth wealth in lavish richness, the speculator adds not one iota to the world's wealth, but lays on industry a heavy hand, and compels it to surrender an extortionate tribute. The farmer uses land for production; the speculator uses land for extortion.

The Creator furnishes the raw material; industry comes with its magic touch, and converts that raw material into the finished article. Industry comes to the ore, to the soil, to the clay, thence spring the machinery, the food, the building. The contact of industry with the soil is one of beneficence, bringing forth sustenance for the maintenance of men. The contact of speculation with the soil is one of maleficence. Let industry have access to the original sources of wealth, and it enriches; let speculation come, and it impoverishes. The hand that begets the abundance goes away with scarcity, for it is despoiled; the hand that begets nothing goes away overflowing, empowered by law to despoil. God's law would reward each according to his work, man's law reverses this order. It curses ten-hours-a-day with a poor home, poor surroundings, poor education, and allows no-hours-a-day to "reap where it has not sown, and gather where it has not straved."

Is this honest? If it is honest, then we must abandon all proper ideas of religion. "Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil, that put darkness for light and light for darkness, that put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter!"

## THE EVERLASTING TRIBUTE.

For centuries the command, "The land shall not be sold forever," has been regarded as a dead letter, hardly even worthy of investigation. We have treated the gift of God as though it were a product of toil. Under forms of law, we have taken the heritage of humanity, and given it to be the exclusive ownership of one portion of the people.

It is reported that the site of New York city was once sold for twenty-five dollars, and it is also reported that one piece of land in that city has since been sold at the rate of upwards of twenty million dollars per acre. The value of the site of that city has been estimated at \$2,000,000,000. When settlers came there first, they had to pay but little for the occupation of land, but with every increase of population, with every additional railroad line or steamship line centring in that city, the people have had to pay more; they have had to surrender more of the product of their industry. For centuries, the industry of the country has paid for the privilege of doing business on the land of New York. Year after year have the toilers paid this tribute, and in spite of this long-continued payment, their obligation is now greater than ever. It is the toil of Sisyphus. The task is no nearer completion than it was a century ago. Where at one time industry had to surrender a dollar, to-day it surrenders a thousand. Fifty years hence the obligation will be still greater. In the whole range of economic science, no fact is better established than this: Our present land laws inevitably force one part of society into everlasting indebtedness to another part of society. These laws subject them to never-ending tribute, to an obligation that is continually growing, to a debt so great, so increasing, that by no possible effort of industry, by no possible improvement in mechanical devices, co-operative agencies, or profit-sharing, can it ever be cancelled. It is a debt increasing, everlasting and irredeemable. The only escape from this endless tribute can come through a change in our laws.

#### SALE OF LAND VERSUS SALE OF GOODS.

One man raises food, another makes clothing. They exchange. They are mutually enriched, mutually benefited. No one is necessarily defrauded, no one necessarily injured, no one necessarily plunged in debt.

But, suppose I am the owner of a valuable town lot, from which I have been drawing rental simply for the land—a ground rent. I propose to sell it to my neighbor, Mr. Smith. What do we exchange in this case? Is it land I am selling, or land plus something else? I am possessed of a power called a ground rent, to appropriate from some third parties their production, and I propose to transfer to Mr. Smith that power. For a certain consideration, I propose to transfer to him the power to subject third parties to an everlasting tribute. May not these third parties very properly question the justice of this transaction so far as they are concerned? The trade in goods bears all the marks of honesty and harmony, because it brings mutual benefit; the trade in land bears all the mark of injustice—an everlasting spoliation.

#### THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE MOSAIC LAWS.

Travelling through a wilderness, at the head of a band of escaped slaves, coming from a country in which despotism reached its highest pitch, in which superstition sunk to the most grovelling depths, Moses wrote the decalogue. All the philosophy of the ages fails to point out a flaw in the correctness of the principles therein proclaimed, or to detect a trace of superstitious idolatry in their statement. The bulk of their message relates to duty, and so imperatively do they command the acquiescence of the moral judgments, that we never think of questioning their correctness.

But no more remarkable than the decalogue is the economic system of Moses. Its *methods* may be impossible of application in this generation, but its *principles* are fundamental, applicable to all ages, and modern statesmanship will have to sit at the feet of an economic philosopher, who wrote ages before the author of the "Wealth of Nations," or of "Progress and



Poverty." The system of Moses recognized clearly between the gifts of the Creator, the original endowment given for the equal enjoyment of everyone in every generation, and the products of industry produced by each for his exclusive possession, to consume, bestow, or sell, as his best judgment dictated. By that system, to each one was secured free access to the original source of wealth, so that no man was under the necessity of going with his hat in his hand looking for a job. There was thus secured to every man freedom to produce.

The land speculator tries to forestall the industrious man, not that he may furnish him a home, a crop, a quantity of clothing, but that he may extort, that he may get a lien on the products of industry, that he may obtain produce without producing. The Mosaic economy prevented this so far, at any rate, as the rural districts were concerned. It thus secured to every man the freedom to enjoy the product of his industry, free from the exactions of a non-producing class of landlords and land speculators.

If there is one thing that the State should under no consideration interfere with, unless under the most extraordinary exigencies, it is the exercise by the individual of his common sense. When a man seeks oil, coal, food, clothing, surely he has a right to say where he shall obtain these as his best judgment dictates, and laws imposed to drive people from fertility, that make it a crime to resort to abundance, should never find a place on the statute-book of a nation. And this condition the Mosaic economy strictly observed. No line of pickets surrounded Palestine to prevent the Jew going to Egypt for corn, or to Phœnicia for cedar.

According to the teachings of Manver, Main and Lavelleye, there prevailed throughout the world a system of village communities in which the land belonged to the community, and each person in this community enjoyed an equal right to the land. It has been asserted that this was the system prevailing at the time of Moses, and that, therefore, we are not to attach so much importance to the Mosaic economy as being in any way unique, or that much is to be learned from it for our guidance.

The investigations of Coulanges, published in a book entitled "Origin of Property in Land," throws doubt on the correctness of the theory of village communities. Coulanges maintains that the so-called communal system was not a system of free communities, with ownership of land, but a system of manors, with a baronial landlord and his servile tenants.

To the Mosaic system we are indebted for a picture perhaps unparalleled in history for its purely democratic character, its absence of those vicious extremes only too manifest in other countries, an aristocracy revelling in excessive, unmerited wealth at one end, and its natural complement, a mass of degraded toilers, steeped in unmerited poverty at the other end—the baron and the villain, the millionaire and the tramp.

Plato drew on his imagination for his "Republic," in which he still deemed slavery an essential factor. More saw his "Utopia" only in his "mind's eye." To Moses alone is reserved the honor of founding a nation on laws that stand unparalleled in the history of the world for their complete recognition of the rights of the citizen, and the principles of justice. Where else can we find the clear recognition of the right of every child of God to the gift of God—the land? Where else the distinction between the gifts of God, the natural wealth, and the products of labor, the labor-produced wealth? Where else do we see the proper limitation imposed that prevented the sale of that which was given by the Creator for division and not for sale? What other nation has ever enjoyed laws that secured to the citizen his right to produce, his right to exchange that produce whenever his best judgment dictated, and his right to enjoy the produce of his industry, free from the exactions of landlords and land speculators?

Some day we will also discover that no one generation has any right to plunge another generation into debt, that our great national debts are great national blunders, if not crimes. The year of Jubilee placed a limit beyond which indebtedness could not extend. The parent could not leave to his child a legacy of burdensome obligations. In that country could not be witnessed as we can in this country, the monstrosity of one child born under a crushing debt to another child.

There are evil symptoms everywhere that call on us to give our best energies to the investigation of these problems. When some men acquire so many millions that they can buy up legislators, dictate policies, organize private police, reduce popular government to a sham; when millions of men see that honest toil brings but a pittance; when the best energies of the manhood of the majority must be devoted simply to satisfying the animal wants; when strikes, boycotts, lock-outs, black-lists are daily occurrences; when a mere handful of men control all the fuel output of a continent, to preach to men the brotherhood of man becomes the saddest of burlesques.

"The Gospel will cure all this," say a host of respondents. Yes, my brother, the Gospel will do it, when we learn correctly how to interpret and how to apply the Gospel. But to rattle over some platitudes, and to use the Gospel as a charm, will never do it; never, till the end of doom. The gospel of happy feeling and other worldliness has had its day. We now want the gospel of justice, "to every man his due." We are still "tithing the anise and cummin," and neglecting the weightier matters of the law, devoting a world of energy to mere details of organization, and scarcely a modicum of energy to studying the ethics of society.

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## ENGLISH BIBLE STUDIES.

### THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.

OUR studies of the Acts of the Apostles in the October number ended with the first great encounter of St. Paul with the circumcision party at the assembly of the Apostles and elders at Jerusalem. The decisions of this council were of importance not only to the Church at Antioch, but also to all the Churches of the Gentiles recently planted by St. Paul. The crisis, therefore, called for a second journey in which these Churches might be visited and the new decisions laid before them. This Paul at once decides to do, and so enters upon

### SECTION III.—THE SECOND MISSIONARY JOURNEY.

#### CHAPTER XV. 36 ; xviii. 22.

This great journey constitutes the very heart of St. Paul's

apostolic work, and may be subdivided into the following important sub-sections :

- (1) The preliminary events and work in Asia. Chap. xv. 36; xvi. 5.
- (2) The work at Philippi. Chap. xvi. 6-40.
- (3) The work at Thessalonica and Berea. Chap. xvii. 1-15.
- (4) The work in Athens and Corinth. Chaps. xvii. 16; xviii. 22.

#### 1.—THE PRELIMINARY EVENTS AND WORK IN ASIA.

(a) Paul proposes to Barnabas to visit the Churches previously founded. Barnabas suggests John Mark as companion. Paul objects because of his previous desertion. They consequently separate. Barnabas and Mark go to Cyprus, Paul and Silas to Syria, Cilicia and Asia Minor.

Questions :

1. Was Paul right in his objection to Mark ?
2. Was not the milder judgment of Barnabas confirmed by subsequent events ? (See Col. iv. 10, 11.)
3. On the other hand, was not the judgment of Paul confirmed by the sympathy of the Church ? (See verse 40.)

(b) The journey through Syria, Cilicia and Asia Minor is noted. To these Churches Paul delivers the decisions of the Church at Jerusalem on the circumcision question. The Churches are strengthened in faith and numbers. Paul finds Timothy, the son of a pious and believing Jewess, and of a Greek, a young man of rare grace, gifts and reputation (see second epistle to Timothy), and selects him for his companion with Silas. Note the fact that he circumcised him to avoid Jewish prejudice.

Questions :

1. Why did Paul discriminate between Timothy and Titus in the matter of circumcision ?
2. What rule may we deduce from this to govern our conduct in such matters ?

#### 2.—THE CALL AND MISSION TO MACEDONIA, BEGINNING WITH PHILIPPI.

(a) We have first a most condensed outline of work which must have occupied these men some considerable time, and was

followed by important results. The regions named, vv. 6-8, extended 400 miles east and west, 200 miles north and south. At least one of the four provinces (Galatia), and that the largest, was probably thoroughly evangelized. From two afterwards christianized, (Asia by Paul's labors, Bithynia perhaps by Peter), they are at present prevented by divine intimation. At Troas they receive a distinct divine call to Macedonia in Europe.

(b) Verse 12 introduces the first person, indicating that at Troas they were joined by Luke. Note from this point the full details. Troas, Samothracia, Neapolis are the waymarks of their journey. Philippi, a city, the capital of the district, a Roman colony, is their first abiding place. They open their mission at a place of prayer, and Lydia is the first convert, and takes the missionaries to her home.

(c) The place of prayer has now become the place of daily resort for preaching. On the way thither they meet the maid having the spirit of divination, who recognizes their divine mission, and proclaims it until Paul at last drives the demon from her.

(d) This leads to the arrest of Paul and Silas, their accusation before the magistrates, and their punishment with stripes and imprisonment.

(e) Their occupation at the midnight hour in the prison, followed by their miraculous release through an earthquake.

(f) The jailer's agitation, and the submission of his heart.

(g) Paul's direction, and his conversion.

(h) Their release by the magistrates, in which they assert their rights and dignity as Roman citizens.

(i) Their farewell to the brethren at Philippi.

Questions :

1. What is implied in verses 6-10 as to the immediate divine direction of Paul's work? What conclusions may we draw from the various passages in the life of Paul, beginning with his conversion where such direction is referred to?

2. What were the peculiar privileges of a Roman colony?

3. What was Paul's rule as to the place of beginning his ministry? Why?

4. Compare the conversion of Lydia and that of the Philippian jailer with those previously described. What are the essential points of unity and what the personal differences?

5. Compare the case of the Philippian maid with the demoniacs of the gospels.

6. Was an earthquake a sufficient natural cause for the release effected? Compare this release with that of Peter.

7. What was the reason for Paul's assertion of his Roman citizenship at this late hour?

### 3.—THE WORK AT THESSALONICA AND BEREÆ.

(a) Paul at Thessalonica opens his commission in the synagogue. He makes the Scripture his basis, and spends three weeks with the Jews and devout Greeks, setting forth (1) a suffering Messiah; (2) His resurrection from the dead; (3) that Jesus is the Messiah.

(b) A number of converts are gathered; some Jews, a great many devout Greeks, and many women of the upper class.

(c) A persecution is raised by the unbelieving Jews, but results only in the magistrates taking security from the leading men who favored Christianity. These men accordingly sent Paul and Silas out of the city by night.

(d) They make their way to Berea repeating their work in the synagogue there.

(e) They meet with more candid minds and honest investigation of Scripture on the part of Jews as well as Greeks, resulting in many conversions.

(f) They are followed by the Jews from Thessalonica, who stir up the mob and compel Paul again to leave.

#### Notes and questions;

1. Observe from 1 Thess. iii. 1, etc., Paul's interest in the Church at Thessalonica, and from his second epistle his method of work there. Was there not a peculiar divine power accompanying the word there?

2. Note the basis of Paul's work in these two cities. He works from the synagogue, and from the religious foundation laid by the synagogue among devout Greeks. Why were these better prepared than the Jews themselves to receive the truth? To what class did the Jews appeal in opposition to Paul? To what class did Paul's truth appeal? Why?

## 4.—PAUL'S WORK AT ATHENS AND CORINTH.

## I. At Athens.

(a) Paul is greatly moved by the surrounding idolatry, of which Athens was at this time full.

(b) He therefore cannot wait for his companions, but opens his commission as usual to Jews and devout Greeks in the synagogue. Of his success here nothing is said, and we have no information that he was able to found a Church.

(c) But he further begins a new line of work, following the method of the Greek philosophers by addressing all comers in the market-place. Here he meets the two prevailing philosophers of the day, who are disposed to ridicule his doctrines. He is accordingly taken to the Areopagus and called to expound his teaching before the judges.

(d) He builds here, not from Scripture, but from the truth which he saw that his hearers acknowledged.

(1) Their religious spirit, pointing out that this religious spirit was reaching after an unknown God.

(2) The great cosmological truth which lay at the basis of the best Greek philosophy, and which had been so nobly expounded by Socrates.

(3) The deeper truth discerned by the intuition of the poets, pointing to the relation of man to the divine.

From this appeal to reason, intuition and religious feeling, he develops an application to conscience convincing them of wrong in their present ways of worship, and calling them to look to the bar of a final judgment in which Christ is to be the judge. He finally appeals to the fact of the resurrection as the basis of this new truth, which belongs not to reason but to revelation.

This passage to the region of revealed truth leads the majority of his audience beyond their depth. Some mocked, others were curious but weary, a few understood and believed.

## Questions :

1. Note the tokens of severe distress in the brief history. Paul is separated from his companions, and men who understand the country hasten away with Paul. They make for the sea, but do not leave him till he reaches Athens, and then return to send forward his companions. Why?

Was it impossible for all to escape together? Did they go forth not knowing whither they went?

2. Why was there so little success in the synagogue at Athens?

3. Note Paul's quickness in discerning the need and opportunity for new methods. What may we learn from this?

4. Compare the three foundation principles of Paul's address with the best religious philosophy of to-day. Both build upon reason, conscience and religious faith. Explain these.

## II. At Corinth.

(a) Paul makes his way hither alone, perhaps obliged by the Council of Areopagus to leave Athens. Here he finds two congenial spirits working at the same trade, and seeking the same truth, and established with them he begins his mission at Corinth from the synagogue. Note the means by which they were brought here.

(b) When his companions arrive he takes higher ground, and gives his full time to the Word, and brings the Jews to a critical point of decision. They refuse, and so he turns to the devout Gentiles.

(c) The result is very encouraging, and Paul is still further strengthened in his work by a divine vision, and prolongs his work for a year and a half.

(d) The Jews make a demonstration against Paul, but their influence is not great, and they fail, and their own ruler is beaten by the rabble.

(e) Meantime, having made a vow, he sets out for Jerusalem, being accompanied as far as Ephesus by Aquila and Priscilla. The brief stay, perhaps, of the vessel at Ephesus is improved, but he makes no stay till he fulfils his mission, and thence returns to Antioch.

### Questions :

1. How many facts of special providence may we legitimately find in the first three verses of chap. xviii.? Did Paul preach at Corinth under a special Divine unction?

2. Compare the power and success of his preaching at Philippi, Thessalonica, Berea, Athens and Corinth. Why the difference?

3. The house of Titus became the meeting place of the Church in Corinth. Does this mean that Paul and Crispus were both excluded from



the synagogue, and Sosthenes, an opponent of Christianity, was made ruler instead of Crispus?

4. Compare the various occasions in which St. Paul receives special intimations through a dream. What does this teach as to the method of divine revelation?

5. What was the nature and significance of the vow as undertaken by Paul?

6. Note Paul's return to Antioch as the mother Church from which he had been sent forth.

#### SECTION IV.—THE THIRD MISSIONARY JOURNEY.

This section contains :

1. Two preliminary episodes, one carrying Paul through a tour of Phrygia and Galatia in order, the other bringing Apollos over from Alexandria, and sending him forward to Corinth. Chapter xviii. 23-28.

2. A remarkable account of Paul's work in Ephesus. Chapter xix. 1-22.

3. The memorable riot by which the work was violently terminated. Chapter xix. 23-41.

4. Paul's journey through Macedonia to Corinth and return. Chapter xx. 1-16.

5. His farewell to the Church at Ephesus. Chapter xx. 17-38.

##### 1.—PRELIMINARY EVENTS.

(a) Paul makes once more a visit to the Churches already founded, not going as far east as in the first journey, but covering the new ground of the second journey.

(b) His work in this tour is said to be establishing the disciples.

(c) Paul had left Aquila and Priscilla at Ephesus. Apollos, an eloquent man, or a reasoner, from Alexandria, instructed in the principles of John the Baptist, comes to Ephesus.

(d) Priscilla and Aquila give him fuller instructions in the new truth.

(e) They commend him to the Church at Corinth, where he becomes a mighty preacher of the gospel.

Questions:

1. Compare Paul's revisiting tour in the second missionary journey with the present.
2. What is included in this stablishing of the Churches?
3. How far, as we may gather from the gospels, would John's preaching lead towards true faith in Christ?
4. Does this case indicate a widespread religious movement beginning with John?

2.—THE WORK IN EPHESUS.

(a) Paul, passing through the upper country, *i.e.*, the highlands of Phrygia and Galatia, comes down to Ephesus.

(b) He meets there certain disciples like Apollos instructed in the teaching of John the Baptist.

(c) They are without the experience of the gift of the Holy Ghost, knowing from John's teaching that it was promised, but not knowing that it had been given.

(d) Paul instructs them in their full privilege, and then through baptism and the laying on of hands they receive the full and varied gifts of the Spirit.

(e) Paul from this opens his commission once more in the synagogue.

(f) Here he prosecutes his work for three months, making disciples, but also arousing opposition.

(g) He then separates the Church, adopting the schoolroom of Tyrannus as the place of meeting. Here the work continues for over two years.

(h) The work extends throughout the whole Roman province of Asia, founding what were afterwards known as the Churches of Asia.

(i) It was accompanied by special miracles, and attempts to imitate them were signally rebuked.

(k) It was accompanied by a great reformation of the people, forsaking their superstitious practices, and burning their books of black art.

(l) At this time Paul undertook the enterprise of visiting Macedonia and Achaia to make a collection for the poor saints at Jerusalem, sending Timothy and Erastus before to begin the work, and also writing an epistle. (See I Cor. xvi.) Mean-

time he himself tarries in Ephesus till near the end of the third year, because "a great and effectual door was opened there."

Questions :

- 1 Compare preceding passages as to the essential elements of the baptism of the Holy Ghost, and its importance in Christianity.
2. How did John anticipate this wonderful gift ?
3. What Churches were founded as the result of this three years' ministry of Paul at Ephesus ?
4. Compare these miracles of St. Paul with preceding apostolic miracles.
5. Note the large extent to which the inhabitants of Asia were addicted to black arts.
6. Note the complete sacrifice which they made of their costly instruments of superstition.
7. Note the new channel into which Paul seeks to turn their wealth. Religion should not cost less than sin.

### 3.—THE GREAT EPHESIAN UPROAR.

#### CHAPTER XIX. 23-41.

(a) Mark the title here used of the gospel—"The Way." Compare the *Didache*.

(b) The leader of the uproar is Demetrius; his motive is gain, and he appeals to his fellow-craftsmen.

(c) He bears incidental testimony to the great success of St. Paul's work, and also to the opposition of that work to idolatry, especially the corrupt idolatry of Ephesus, the abominations of which are alluded to in the Epistle to the Ephesians.

(d) The tumult assumes the usual unreasoning form of an oriental mob ready for any act of violence. They seize Gaius and Aristarchus, and when Paul would have followed his friends into the theatre, he is prevented by the disciples and by the chief officers of the province—literally Asiarchs, the men who during the month of May presided over the games in honor of Diana.

(e) An attempt at a defence on behalf of the Jews is made by one Alexander, but the demonstration on behalf of the great Ephesian idolatry is only intensified.

(f) At last a chief officer of the city, through whom com-

munications were made to and from the city, quiets the people, points out to them that their course is unreasonable and illegal, and may bring them into difficulty with the supreme authority of Rome, and by these arguments he succeeds in dismissing the people.

Questions :

1. What Churches founded by Paul are embraced in this phrase—all Asia ?
2. What information have we of the magnificence of the worship of Diana ?
3. What was the object of the Jews in putting forward Alexander ? Is he the man mentioned in 2 Tim. iv. 14 ?
4. Note the incidental testimony to the absence of violent speech on the part of Paul and his companions.

#### 4.—PAUL'S JOURNEY THROUGH MACEDONIA TO CORINTH AND RETURN.

##### CHAPTER XX. 1-16.

(a) Paul stays with the Church till quiet is restored, when he calls them together and gives them his parting greetings.

(b) Paul then sets out on a lengthy journey, embracing all Macedonia and perhaps Illyricum (Romans xv. 19).

(c) As preparatory to this journey, he sends Timothy with the messengers sent from Corinth to Ephesus with a letter to Corinth. (1 Cor. xvi.)

(d) After the work in Macedonia had occupied Paul for a year or more (2 Cor. ix. 2), during which he wrote to the Corinthians a second epistle (2 Cor. ix. 1-5, and vii. 5), and received a visit from Titus, bringing tidings from Corinth. Paul finally reaches Corinth, where he tarries three months.

(e) Here he again meets opposition and persecution from the Jews so inveterate that he is obliged to return through Macedonia, and to divide his company, which consisted of at least five eminent and faithful disciples who awaited his coming at Troas.

(f) Here Paul preached till midnight, breaking bread with the disciples on the first day of the week, and brought Eutychus alive.

(g) Paul next makes the journey from Troas to Assos by

land, while his companions sail around the cape. The land journey was about twenty miles.

(h) Mitylene, Chios, Samos, and Miletus are the following points of their journey, bringing them over against Ephesus, which Paul determines not to visit as he is anxious to reach Jerusalem by the day of Pentecost.

Notes :

1. Make special study of the miracle of the raising of Eutychus. Compare with Acts ix. 36, etc.

2. What may we learn from the mention of the first day of the week here? It is used for religious services. Paul does not commence his journey till next day.

3. Note the deadly and increasing enmity of the Jews. What reason lay behind it?

5.—PAUL'S FAREWELL MEETING WITH THE ELDERS  
OF EPHESUS.

CHAPTER XX. 17-38.

(a) The call to the elders, of whom there were evidently a number of persons in charge of the Christian societies in Ephesus and, perhaps, the surrounding country. The shortness of time scarcely permits us to include all Asia.

(b) Paul's address, in which he sets forth (1) the spirit of his work, the trials of his work, the thoroughness, the subject matter of his preaching, repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, the same for Jew and Greek; (2) The future which now looms up before him, bonds and imprisonment. (3) The constancy of his consecration, and his appeal to them as witnesses of the fidelity of his work. (4) His farewell advice and exhortation to these elders, whom he designates as bishops or overseers, warning them against impending dangers, finally commending them to God, and appealing once more to his own holy and faithful example, closing with words of Christ not elsewhere recorded.

(c) After this wonderful address, with prayer and affectionate tears and greeting, they bid each other a final farewell.

NOTE.—Read after this the Epistle to the Ephesians, written one or two years later, probably from prison.

Questions :

1. What were the difficulties which might have tempted Paul to withhold some part of the truth ?
2. What measure and what limits of prophetic foresight are implied in verses 22, 23 and 25 ?
3. Was there any bishop as distinguished from or above the presbyter in Ephesus at this time ?
4. What was this "word of grace" on which Paul relies for the future edification and perfection of this Church ?
5. How were the words of Christ, which Paul here quotes, preserved ?

SECTION V.—THE FINAL JOURNEY TO JERUSALEM.

CHAPTER XXI. 1-26.

This consists of two sub-sections :

1. The incidents of the journey. Verses 1-16.
2. Paul's conciliatory course towards the Jewish nation on his arrival. Verses 17-26.

1.—THE INCIDENTS OF THE JOURNEY.

(a) The points passed are noted by Luke in the first person as Paul's travelling companion. They are Coos, Rhodes, Patara, Cyprus, Tyre. (b) There a rest and visit of seven days is had while the ship was unladen. This is passed in prophetic warnings and devout prayers. (c) Thence by ship they make their way to Ptolemais with one day's rest, and thence to Cæsarea, the end of the voyage, where Paul was entertained at the house of Philip the Evangelist. (d) Here he meets a company of prophetic men and women, who again warn him of that which lies before him. But Paul with heroic courage moves onward to his fate, and the Church, recognizing the divine order, submits.

Questions :

1. Had these prophetic intimations their natural foundations in a general and malignant anti-Pauline movement among the Jews at this time ?
2. Was not Paul himself, as well as the entire Church, aware of this movement, as well as of its intimate connection with the gospel which he preached ?
3. Note.—Make an inductive study of the prophetic gift as it appears in the New Testament.

## 2.—PAUL'S ARRIVAL AT JERUSALEM AND HIS CONCILIATORY CONDUCT THERE.

(a) Philip the Evangelist and his four daughters are in the church at Cæsarea. They, with other members of the church, are so anxious for Paul's safety that they send with him an escort to Jerusalem, and there accompanies them an old disciple of Cyprus, who makes Paul and his companions his guests in his home at Jerusalem.

(b) Paul's reception by the Church at Jerusalem was cordial. On the day after his arrival he visits James who is evidently in a formal way attended by all the elders. To these he makes a full report of his work, for which they glorify the Lord.

(c) Still they recognize the wide breach which exists between Paul and the Jews, who are zealous for the law, thousands of whom are nevertheless believers in Christ. This breach they define in three particulars, that Paul teaches the Jews to forsake Moses, to neglect circumcision, and to neglect the legal observances. Note that they do not object to Paul's universal presentation of the gospel for the Gentile world; that had been previously settled. They are only anxious that the Jews should still remain Jews.

(d) Hence to avoid a tumultuous assembly, they advise that Paul, by a practical example in his own person, should prove that he recognized the obligations of the law upon a Jew. This he should do by joining with and paying the expenses of four of his poor brethren who had a vow.

(e) At the same time the Church at Jerusalem reasserts the perfect freedom of all the Gentiles from any such obligations.

(f) To this practical expedient Paul assents, and proceeds at once to carry it into effect, entering upon the customary seven days' ceremonies.

### Questions:

1. What may we learn from this history as to the state of affairs between Paul and even the professedly Christian Jews at this juncture?
2. What may we learn as to the light in which the apostles and elders at Jerusalem viewed the work of St. Paul?

3. What may we learn as to the widening difference between the Church of the Jews with its Judaizing elements still in the fold, and the Churches of the Gentiles planted by St. Paul?

4. Note that prior to the writing of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Apccalypse, this state of affairs was greatly changed, and the Judaizers largely separated from the truly Christian Jewish Church, probably by means of persecution.

These events bring us to the great crisis of Paul's work as recorded in this book. In the five sections just completed we have the record and outcome of ten years of missionary toil from Antioch as a centre. During these years he had written two epistles to the Thessalonians, two to the Corinthians, one to the Galatians, and one to the Romans, the last four deeply impressed with the traces of the conflict which is now reaching its climax. In the sections of the book yet remaining, we cover a period of four years at Jerusalem, Cæsarea and Rome, filled in with trial and imprisonment, during which Paul delivers several important addresses recorded in the Acts, and writes the Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians and Philippians and Philemon. Probably two later years unrecorded filled out the measure of his life, and gave us the three pastoral epistles.



**Editorial Reviews and Notices of Books.**

*Christ and Criticism. Thoughts Concerning the Relation of Christian Faith to Biblical Criticism.* By CHARLES MARSH MEAD, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Hartford Theological Seminary. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 182 Fifth Avenue. 16mo, pp. 186.

The object of this book, as explained by the author, is "to aid in the general work of getting at the truth as regards the Bible, by setting forth how far the authority of Jesus Christ should be properly allowed to modify or regulate the process of biblical criticism." It is not an attack upon the higher criticism, as such, which is described as "entirely legitimate and very useful"; but it is intended to expose what is conceived to be some of its wrong methods and unwarrantable conclusions. The first in the process is the ascertainment of the ground of certainty in matters of religious belief. After examining in detail the various methods which have been pursued in order to this, the conclusion which he comes to is, that this can only be found in Christ. But for what we know of Him we are indebted to the New Testament Scriptures. It is true that Christ is brought before us, as a rule, first of all by tradition; the truth of the tradition is confirmed by religious experience; but in addition to these, Christianity rests upon a solid basis of historic fact. This is the bed-rock upon which our faith in Christ ultimately rests.

Dr. Mead has no faith in the theory which has been propounded by some in our day, that so long as we have faith in Christ it is a matter of no moment what becomes of the authority of the Christian Scriptures. "How do we come to know that Christ is a person worthy of implicit faith?" "If these writings are authentic they contain the substance of what is to be believed about Christ; if they are not authentic, then we are left wholly to vague conjecture when we try to determine who and what Christ was." "Those Scriptures cannot be discredited without destroying the foundation of Christianity. Christian faith must involve faith in the general trustworthiness of the New Testament. In other words, the historicity, at least, of these sacred books must be preserved, if the foundation of the faith is to be kept secure. This, however, does not necessarily include the idea of inspiration and inerrancy."

How far, then, is criticism limited by faith? Faith is inconsistent with general doubt or denial. It "forbids in general the adoption of purely subjective canons of criticism"; does not permit one to draw his information wholly or preponderantly from one part of the New Testament to the exclusion or neglect of other parts; and, of course, is inconsistent with a general doubt or denial of the supernatural in the endowment and the work of Christ. There is involved in a true Christian faith the recognition of Christ as "an altogether unique being endowed with superhuman powers." In a word, the position of Dr. Mead appears to be this, that criticism, in order to be Christian, that is, consistent with a genuine Christian faith, must be free from anti-Christian prejudices and presuppositions.

Then, Christian faith has its relation to the criticism of the Old Testament as well as to the New. The testimony of the Lord Jesus Christ must not be overlooked in forming a critical judgment in respect to those ancient writings. This makes it necessary not only to examine this testimony, but to weigh it. In other words, we have to determine how far it serves to settle disputed questions for us. This raises the question: Was Christ

omniscient ; or did the Second Person in the Godhead in assuming our nature subject himself to the conditions and limitations of humanity? Assuming the reality of the incarnation, which of course is not to be questioned, did that stupendous transaction mean, so far as the earthly life of the Redeemer was concerned, a humiliation or an exaltation—did the Divine come down to the human, or was the human lifted up to the Divine? In any case, the respect with which the Lord Jesus always spoke of the Scriptures is a fact too significant to be passed over without the weightiest consideration. And had He expressed any distinct judgment upon the questions which modern criticism has raised, that, beyond question, would have been to devout Christian students an end to controversy respecting them.

One shrinks from pursuing too closely or too far an inquiry of this kind. The words of the Rev. Richard Watson come to one's mind, when dealing with a question of this kind, "A truce to these reasonings! They bring me irreverently too near to God ; I would not break through and gaze." Dr. Mead takes safe ground in claiming for our Lord that He was an altogether unique person, that His knowledge was exceptional, that He was an infallible religious teacher, and that we have no right to conclude that His mind was not as capable of dealing with other subjects as with religion. From the testimony of the Lord Jesus respecting the Hebrew Scriptures, he infers : 1. That Christian faith requires us to hold that the history of the Israelites and their ancestors as given in the Old Testament is substantially true. 2. That it is inconsistent with Christian faith to hold that deceit and fraud played an important part in the formation of the Old Testament Canon. 3. That the conclusions reached by Wellhausen and others in respect to the authorship of certain parts of the Old Testament and the mode of their composition is not consistent with Christian faith.

It will be seen from this rapid and imperfect outline that though this is a small book it covers a wide field. It will be seen, too, that it deals with one of the living issues of the time. To this it may be added that it is written with clearness and vigor. There is not a dull page in it ; and, whether the reader can agree with everything contained in it or not, he is in no danger of going asleep over its pages. It is a really able presentation of the conservative side of this controversy, and even those who hold more "advanced" views will find it well worthy of a careful perusal.

*Christian Handbook of Evidences.* By ALEXANDER STEWART, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Aberdeen. New York : Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. ; Edinburgh : Adam and Charles Black. 1892. 32mo, pp. 94.

*The New Testament and its Writers.* By the REV. J. A. McCLYMONT, Aberdeen. New York : Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. ; Edinburgh : Adam and Charles Black. 1892. 32mo, pp. 155.

*Life and Conduct.* By CAMERON LEES, D.D., LL.D., Edinburgh. New York : Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. ; Edinburgh : Adam and Charles Black. 1892. 32mo, pp. 114.

*The Church of Scotland, A Sketch of its History.* By the REV. PEARSON McADAM MUIR, Minister of Morningside, Edinburgh. New York : Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. ; Edinburgh : Adam and Charles Black. 32mo, pp. 96.

1. The first of this series of little books is worth the price of the whole quartette. It would be difficult to find in the entire range of Christian literature a more comprehensive and lucid statement of the evidences of the Christian religion in the same space.

2. The second of these volumes gives, in the most compact form and in the most perspicuous style, just the information which every reader of the New Testament requires. It contains in fact a comprehensive and valuable popular introduction to the Christian Scriptures.

3. The little work on "Life and Conduct," written, as we learn, at the request of the Life and Work Committee of the Church of Scotland, is one of a series of volumes which it is at present issuing for the use of young men's guilds and Bible classes. It deals with such questions as "Character," "Success in Life," "Personal Influence," "Friends," "Money," "Time," "Courage," "Health," "Earnestness," "Manners," "Temper," "Recreation," "Books," "Family Life," "Church," "Citizenship." All these topics are treated in a wise and wholesome manner. And at the close is a list of the best one hundred books, by Prof. Blackie, Edinburgh, which is itself worth more than the price of the volume.

4. The fourth book, the last of the series, is just such an historical summary of its history as every Church should put in the hands of each of its members. This sketch of the history of the Church of Scotland is of course of special interest to the members of that communion and its numerous offshoots; but it will be read with interest and profit by thousands who are neither Scotchmen nor Presbyterians. It is *multum in parvo*. Beginning with the story of St. Ninian, the first Christian bishop in Scotland, who was born 360 and entered upon his episcopate about the beginning of the fifth century, it traces down the history to the present day.

The Church of Scotland deserves the warmest commendation for the publication of this admirable series of little books; and Messrs. Randolph & Co. are entitled to the thanks of the Christian public here for republishing them on this side of the Atlantic. They bring within the reach of people of limited means a vast amount of information of just that kind which is likely to be most helpful in the formation of the character of intelligent and useful Christians.

*Natural Theology.* The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1891. By PROFESSOR SIR G. G. STOKES, Bart., M.P. New York: Macmillan & Co., 112 Fourth Avenue. London and Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. 12mo, pp, 272. \$1.50.

The view entertained by Lord Gifford, the founder of the lectureship which bears his name, evidently was that the being, the nature and the attributes of God, and a complete system of rules for the regulation of the conduct of mankind might be established by a purely rational process analogous to that by which the physical sciences have been built up. It is evident, however, that this opinion is not fully shared by the author of these lectures. But, notwithstanding his misgivings in respect to the feasibility of such an undertaking, he has felt it to be his duty, in the execution of his task, to keep that end in view. Of the two methods of scientific investigation, that of deducing results from ascertained principles, and that of framing hypotheses, suggested, no matter how, "and trying whether they will so link together observed phenomena as to force on us a conviction of their truth," he selects the latter, and substitutes the doctrine of revealed religion for the hypotheses of the scientific investigation, and endeavors to ascertain how far they are in harmony with the facts of human life and consciousness, with what exists and is taking place in the external world around us, and with the discoveries and established principles of science.

Such, roughly stated, is the method of this book. It illustrates in a striking way the harmony and essential unity of those disclosures of Him-

self, His nature, His attributes and His will, which the Supreme Being has made to mankind in His works and in His word, and the advantage of studying these together. If Nature and Revelation have proceeded from the same source, God being the author of both, when properly understood they must speak the same language. God cannot be divided against Himself. The more thoroughly we are acquainted with the world within us and around us, the better are we prepared to understand the Bible, and in the study of the volume of nature, we find ourselves confronted, ever and anon, with mysteries which can only be explained, if at all, in the light of revealed truth. The works of God illustrate His word, and the word interprets the works; and the more carefully and thoroughly these are studied together the more apparent will it become that they are but different parts of the same whole, and that they are the products of the same MIND.

These are old and familiar truths, but they find new expression and illustration in these lectures. The special value of the book lies in the application of these principles to the living issues of our time. To many who have not thought deeply upon the subject, it has appeared as if the progress of science in our day has swept away the very foundation of natural theology. A candid perusal of this book will go far toward removing this wrong impression. It is characterized throughout by freshness and vigor, both of thought and expression. And though the author is neither a Butler nor a Paley, and what he has written will not take the place of the writings of those great men, he has produced a book of positive merit and one that theological students everywhere would do well to read.

*The Early Religion of Israel as set forth by Biblical Writers and by Modern Critical Historians. The Baird Lecture for 1889.* By JAMES ROBERTSON, D.D., Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow. Second Edition. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph Co. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 12mo, pp. 524.

This book, though not in form, is in fact apologetic. Its object is to establish the historicity of the books of the Old Testament, including those upon which modern criticism has cast the most doubt. This it does by meeting the critics on their own ground, and discussing the question from their own point of view. It is not an attack upon the higher criticism, for it is higher criticism itself; but it is the application of this method of investigation in a way that, if it has not been wholly overlooked, has certainly not received the degree of attention that it deserves. It is, in fact, the Baconian method applied to the documents in question, in the ascertainment of their historical trustworthiness, arguing from the known to the unknown, or from those that are best known, and concerning which there is no reasonable ground of doubt, to those which are involved in greater obscurity and concerning which doubts have been raised.

In pursuance of this method the Professor has avoided all controversy about the authorship of the sacred books and the mode of their composition; and he has refused to discuss the question of the inspiration or the so-called "inerrancy" of Scripture, holding it to be "vain to talk of the inspiration and authority of books till we are sure that they are credible and honest compositions, giving us a firm historical basis on which to rest." Fortunately for Dr. Robertson and for the cause of truth, even the most destructive of the critics have not called in question the genuineness and the historical credibility of the most material of the productions of the prophetic age that have come down to us. The latter half of the ninth, and the former half of the eighth century B.C., is the period to which this observa-

tion is most strictly applicable. On this period, and the admitted facts which belong to it, Dr. Robertson takes his stand beside the critics; and on the books of this period he rests his case.

Of course it is impossible in a brief notice of this kind to present even the barest outline of the argument. Two or three points only can be indicated, and that in the briefest manner. The test of any theory is its sufficiency to account for the facts of the case to which it refers. And where, as in this case, there are conflicting theories, that which gives the most reasonable account of the facts is the one which is to be preferred. Therefore, if the old-fashioned biblical theory—that which is commonly accepted by students of the English Bible, for example—best meets these conditions, the preference must be given to it, however learned and ingenious that which modern criticism has opposed to it may seem to be.

The two theories are set side by side; and the account which they give of the admitted facts of the period extending from 850 to 750 B.C., are impartially compared. The critical theory is that a number of wandering Hebrew tribes came from the desert and formed a settlement in Canaan; that, like the neighboring races around them, they had their national god, Jehovah, which was to them very much like what the fetishes of the other peoples around them were to them; and that, from this humble and rude beginning, by a process of natural evolution their intellectual and religious life was developed. The biblical theory differs from this, not in denying a process of development, but that the starting-point in it was not animism or fetishism, but a belief in a moral Deity, the one Ruler of the world, and a law divinely given; that these truths, often obscured but never wholly lost sight of, constituted the germ from which, by a peculiar providential discipline, all that pertained to the religious life of this remarkable people was evolved.

These, in the rough, are the theories; and the following are some of the facts to be accounted for: 1. The state of intellectual development which existed in Israel at the period referred to. This is evinced in the language and style of the earliest writings of the prophets that have come down to us. The Hebrew language never reached a higher degree of perfection, or was used with more consummate skill or grace than by Amos, the herdsman of Tekoa. 2. These writings are not more remarkable as literary, than they are as religious products. They are certainly not the productions of men who appear to be just struggling up by their own unaided powers from those rudimentary forms of religion which are found among the primitive peoples of the world. Neither are their utterances such as would naturally be addressed to such as were in that condition. On the contrary they clearly imply, both on the part of the writer and the reader, a very considerable degree of religious intelligence and education. 3. And, of course, to this must be added, the allusions which the books of this period contain to the earlier history of Israel, contained in the books of the Old Testament which are commonly regarded as historical.

The intelligent general reader, and especially the Bible student, will readily perceive the interest and importance which attaches to this field of discussion; and it only needs to be added that it is conducted throughout in a manner which evinces the author's complete mastery of the subject. The following sentences from the concluding chapter of the book may appropriately close this notice which is already too long: "My whole argument has been to show that, examined by the light that they themselves furnish, these books are trustworthy documents; that the compositions which are undoubted and accepted give their testimony to those that are questioned or rejected; that the books as they lie before us, so far as

they can be tested by the only tests in our possession, and making all allowance for ordinary conditions of human composition and transmission of books, give us a fair and credible account of what took place in the history and religious development of Israel. If that point is allowed to be in a fair way established, I leave the argument of inspiration and authority to take care of itself. The picture which the books present, if it is admitted to be in any sense an adequate representation of facts, will probably be sufficient to convince ordinary Christian people that in ancient Israel there was a divine control of events, a divine guidance of the best spirits of the nation, a divine plan in the unfolding of the history, which we may sum up by saying there was a divinely guided development, or, as it has been expressed, that the history itself is inspired."

*The Preacher's Complete Homiletical Commentary on the Old Testament, on an Original Plan. With Critical and Explanatory Notes, Indices, etc., etc.* By various authors. XX. Vols, including a Vol. of Indices. New York and Toronto: Funk & Wagnalls Company.

This great work has been so fully noticed in a late number of the QUARTERLY that little more remains to be done than to announce its completion. All that was said of the first volume is true of those that have succeeded it. Indeed it grows in our estimation in proportion to the thoroughness with which we have been able to examine it. Of course such a work cannot be read by the reviewer. All that can be done by him is to dip into it here and there, and to carefully examine its treatment of particular passages. From this sort of examination we conclude that its preparation is the most important homiletical enterprise that has hitherto been undertaken; and that the work now completed will form a most valuable addition to the library of any minister who may be fortunate enough to possess it.

The "Critical Notes," though brief, are very full, in the sense that they pass over no word, phrase, or allusion that needs particular explanation; and in them is embodied in concise form the results of the best scholarship down to date. Then "The Main Homiletics" of each paragraph is treated, usually with judgment and skill. This is especially valuable as an assistance to the preacher in getting at the entire scope of the passage and the lesson which it was intended to teach. Then comes a "Suggestive Commentary on the Verses," which will be found specially helpful to the studious and thoughtful minister in suggesting themes and in otherwise assisting him in the work of preparation for the pulpit. To this is added a department of "Illustration," consisting of striking passages from great preachers and authors bearing directly on the subject under consideration.

The work is well printed on good paper, neatly bound, and makes a very respectable appearance on the library shelves. In this respect it combines ornament with use. But above all it is orthodox and evangelical, and is pervaded, as far as we can judge, by a devout and earnest religious spirit. It will no doubt have the effect of calling the attention of the rising ministry to homiletic wealth of the Hebrew Scriptures; and judiciously used it cannot but be of great assistance to the class for whom it is specially intended.

*The Acts of the Apostles.* By the REV. G. T. STOKES, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Dublin, and Vicar of All Saints, Blackrock. Vol. II. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Toronto: Willard Tract Society. Royal 8vo, pp. 478.

This volume brings Dr. Stokes' Survey and Exposition of the Acts of the Apostles to a close; and those who have had the pleasure of reading the former volume will not willingly do without this. It is seldom that one

meets with an expository work on any of the books of Scripture which is so admirably written, or that sheds such a steady light upon the main features of the text. Of course those who read merely for the purpose of finding the echo of their own opinions will possibly experience a feeling of disappointment now and then in reading this volume. We have ourselves met with something here and there in respect to which we could not see precisely along the same lines with the author. These points, however, were merely, as a rule, ecclesiastical, not theological or religious. The spirit of the work is broad and catholic, and its fidelity to the great cardinal doctrines of the Gospel seems to be unquestionable, while the style is simply admirable. It is a literary education to study such a work.

*Six Song Services, with Connective Readings, for Christian Entertainments.*

By PHILIP PHILLIPS and his Son. New York and Toronto: Funk & Wagnalls Company.

The title of this little book explains its character; and the name of Philip Phillips is a sufficient guarantee for its excellence. Our young people's societies who provide such entertainments will do well to examine it.

*Americanized Delsarte Culture.* By EMILY M. BISHOP. Cloth, \$1.00.

The Author: Washington, D.C.

Having taken a short course in Americanized Delsarte Culture from Mrs. Bishop, we can speak not only in the highest terms of the system but of the little book that now puts it within the reach of all. This system of culture seeks relaxation, rest, reposefulness, husbanding of vital energy, nerve and brain reinforcement, health, symmetrical bodily development, gracefulness, self-control, natural expression. Nervousness, insomnia, St. Vitus' dance, stage fright and "society fright" have been overcome by this training. It teaches how to walk, rise, sit, kneel, bow, go up and down stairs, naturally, with economy of force and pleasing effect.

Some of the exercises are particularly adapted to the development of the chest, neck and shoulders; to the strengthening of abdominal muscles, and to overcoming and preventing corpulency.

The teaching and exercises of this system of vital economy for the conservation of nerve-force are all given in this book, the using of which ladies, especially, would find a most healthful and rejuvenating amusement. As light gymnastics it is excellently adapted for use with children, which any mother might adopt, no apparatus being required.

*New Testament Word Lists.* Greek—English; containing all words occurring ten times and over. By CHAS. F. BRADLEY, D.D., and CHAS. HORSWELL, B.D., Garrett Biblical Institute. Second edition. Paper 35 cents. The Authors: Evanston, Ill.

This is a most useful pocket manual for the Greek New Testament student. The lists are arranged according to the parts of speech and the number of times occurring. The words can thus be easily committed with their English equivalents.

*Hand-book of Methodism for Probationers.* By REV. J. G. A. MARTIN, of West Nebraska Conference.

*Helps for the Instruction of the Baptized Children of the Methodist Church.* By B. F. BEAZELL, D.D. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis.

These two pamphlets are very well adapted for the purpose for which designed, and may be used in families or in children's and young people's classes.

*Spiritual Development of St. Paul.* By REV. GEORGE MATHESON, M.A., D.D., F.R.S.E., Minister of the Parish of St. Bernard, Edinburgh. Third edition. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.; Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1893. 12mo, pp. 324.

Of all the books that have been written in recent times about St. Paul, this, beyond question, is the most remarkable. It deals exclusively with the spiritual experiences of the great Apostle. The facts of his external history are rarely mentioned, and then only incidentally. Its sources are not found in the Acts of the Apostles but in the Pauline Epistles. It is an attempt to construct the history of Paul's inner life out of the autobiographical reminiscences which are found scattered through his writings. The sources are his thirteen epistles.

From these, when studied in their chronological order, Dr. Matheson finds that the history of this individual soul is substantially the history of the Church during the first century of its existence. And in the former, as in the latter case, the progress is the result of conflict and struggle. The three main stages in the spiritual development of the Apostle are connected with three great struggles, as Dr. Matheson conceives, in which he besought the Lord to remove from him the "thorn in the flesh." The first of these was his Arabian experience, in which, like Luther at a later day, through his agony to obtain a legal justification, he was enabled to grasp the pre-Mosaic, the Abrahamic doctrine of justification by faith. The second is the Antiochian experience, by which he was enabled to grasp, in something like their full significance, the spirituality and the universality of the Christian religion, its independence of Judaism, and the incongruity of insisting upon circumcision as the gate of admission to its privileges and blessings. The third, and final, conflict was that in which his apostleship was called in question, when his foes became those of his own household, and when he found himself confronted, not by a hostile world alone, but by his brethren in the Church. It was here that he attained to that consciousness of complete union with Christ and fellowship with his sufferings which enabled him to glory in his infirmity, and to recognize in the "thorn" the symbol of his participation in the suffering of his Master, and the sign of his apostleship.

Such in brief is the outline of a work which, whether every one of its positions will bear the scrutiny of critical and thorough examination or not—a point upon which we do not feel ourselves called upon to pronounce a judgment offhand, seeing our examination of it has been necessarily hurried and not as thorough as we should have liked—is one of the freshest and most stimulating books that we have read for many a day. We agree with what has been said of it by a contemporary: "The book ought to be read by everyone who is interested in Paul. It is a remarkable contribution to biblical theology and to the psychological study of biblical character. No more striking and intensely interesting book has appeared in many years."

*Seed—Number One Hard. Six Speeches.* By JOHN G. WOOLLEY. Introduction by Frances E. Willard and Lady Henry Somerset. New York, London and Toronto: Funk & Wagnalls. 12mo, pp. 157. \$1.00.

The people who have met with John G. Woolley, especially if they have heard his eloquent and soul-stirring addresses, need no introduction to this book. All such will desire to have these six speeches. Every friend of temperance will do well to read them; and having read them, they will be glad to do what they can to give them the widest possible circulation. Give it wings; let it fly; for, go where it will, it is sure to do good.



This admirable book is the gift of its publishers to Rest Island Mission, Rest Island, Minnesota, a "sanctuary" established by the author for the restoration of men fallen through drink. All profit arising from the sale will be donated to the Mission, no charge being made for advertising the volume.

**Criminology.** By ARTHUR MACDONALD, Specialist in Education as related to the Abnormal and Weakling Classes, U. S. Bureau of Education; Member of the Medico-Legal Society, New York, and the Anthropological Society, Washington, D. C., and United States Delegate to the International Society of Criminal Anthropology at Brussels, 1892. With an Introduction by DR. CESARE LOMBROSO, Professor of Legal Medicine at the University of Turin, Italy. New York and Toronto: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 12mo, pp. 416.

The title of this book will doubtless be strangely unfamiliar to most of our readers. If there be a science of crime it has scarcely yet come into general recognition among us. But why should not this as well as any other of the phenomena of human nature and human society be systematically studied, and the natural laws which are involved in it be explored. The existence of a great and, probably, a growing class of habitual criminals is unfortunately a fact too palpable to be ignored; and before it can be effectually dealt with, its causes must, if possible, be ascertained. And this cannot be accomplished by any course of *a priori* reasoning, but by induction from known facts. And as a preliminary step in this process, all sorts of facts relating to this class of unfortunates must be carefully observed, collected, compared and classified.

This is the stage in the development of the new science which has been reached already. This book is valuable, among other things, for the light which it sheds upon the direction that this enquiry is taking, the sort of facts which it has brought to light, and the conclusions to which they seem to point. There seems to be a growing opinion among the scientific men who have made a special study of this subject, that criminals form a distinct type, or, perhaps, more properly, distinct types of humanity, and that they can be best studied in the type. But before this doctrine of type can be established, and so understood and defined as to become really valuable, a vast amount of preliminary work will have to be done. And this book is valuable as indicating the nature of this work and the lines upon which it is to be carried on.

Criminals will have to be studied physiologically in order to ascertain the part that is played by organicity in the production of the dangerous classes. And this will naturally lead farther back still to the doctrine of heredity and other causes to which physical idiosyncrasy and the organic peculiarities favorable to the development of crime are to be traced. Then, how far constitutional tendencies may be modified or aggravated by environment can only be learned by studying the subject sociologically; and this includes, in the broadest sense, the question of education—the education of the home, of the school, of the street, and that comes from contact with general society. Before criminals can be properly understood, they must be studied psychologically, in order to ascertain how far their criminality results from defective sensibility, from the absence of right sentiments, from weakness of will, from vanity which is generally inordinate in the criminal class, and vengeance which is the natural outcome of this weakness.

These, of course, are only some of the lines upon which this curious and painfully interesting investigation has to be carried on. The religion of

criminals, absurd as it may seem to associate criminality and religion, must not be overlooked. The relation of hypnotism to crime is also an interesting study, showing the degree in which the weak may be made the victims of stronger natures.

Of course the importance of all this, and indeed of all that pertains to criminology, lies in the light which it sheds upon the question of the multiplication of criminals; and secondly, upon what is to be done with those who have already graduated in this evil school. The conclusion to which the author of this book comes in respect to the latter class is, first, that it is a mistake to discharge from prison criminals when there is a reasonable probability of their returning to their criminal courses; and secondly, that indeterminate sentence is the best method of affording the prisoner an opportunity to reform, without exposing society to unnecessary dangers. On these and other points of great interest, the reader will find much in this volume that will amply repay a careful reading, though the subject is too large and many-sided to present it in all its phases in a single volume.

*Prisoners and Paupers: A Study of the Abnormal Increase of Criminals and the Public Burden of Pauperism in the United States; the Causes and Remedies.* By HENRY M. BOIES, M.A., member of the Board of Public Charities, and of the Committee on Lunacy: of the National Prison Association, etc. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. Williamson & Co., Toronto. 12mo, pp. 315.

This book has already attracted a good deal of attention, and called forth a good deal of comment and discussion; but it may be doubted whether its contents have yet received anything like the degree of consideration which they really deserve. The state of facts which it reveals is startling if not appalling, and if anything can arouse the people of this continent to the serious consideration of the potency of the evil influences which are at work in the New World, the unvarnished tale that is told in this book ought to have that effect. The facts which it describes relate in the main to the United States, and are therefore of special interest to the people of that country. But the relations of the two countries are too intimate and the intercourse between them too constant for anything that affects our neighbors to not be a matter of interest to ourselves. Besides, the same causes are at work on both sides of the international boundary, and unless prevented by the timely use of counteracting influences, the same effects may be expected here that have been produced there.

The crowded state of our pages precludes the possibility of as full a review of this interesting volume as we should like to have given. Two or three of its facts however are so startling, and, from our point of view, so appalling that we are constrained to make room for them. It appears that, phenomenal as is the increase of the population of the United States, the increase of the criminal class is as nearly as possible in the proportion of two to one to that of the general population. The increase from 1850 to 1892 was from 1 in 3,500 to 1 in 786 of the entire population. In other words, while the increase of the population was 170 per cent., that of the criminal class was 445 per cent. In the last decade the increase of the population has been 24½ per cent., but the increase of the inmates of penitentiaries, reformatories and jails has been 45.2 per cent.

And at the same time that there has been such an alarming rate of increase in the dangerous class, there has been a corresponding increase in the ranks of the unfortunate. The extent to which the volume of pauperism has been swollen may be inferred from the fact that the expendi-

ture of the State of Pennsylvania, through its Poor Boards and Directors, amounted to no less than \$16,444,000 during the last ten years. The total amount paid out of the public purse for the support of charitable institutions of all kinds, including almshouses, asylums, hospitals and miscellaneous charitable objects, amounted in the decade to \$23,383,224. At the same time the Legislature appropriated \$10,091,762 to be expended on penitentiaries, reformatories, houses of refuge and their inmates. Thus, the two classes, the dangerous and the unfortunate, cost the key-stone State in ten years no less than \$33,474,986.

Surely, such facts as these reveal a state of things which calls loudly for careful and thorough investigation. And it is to the causes of this growing mass of depravity and suffering, and the remedies which should be applied to it that this volume is devoted. We bespeak for it a wide circulation and a careful perusal. The facts which it furnishes are alone worth many times the cost of the book, and without committing ourselves to all the theories propounded in it, it is only fair to say that the practical suggestions made by Mr. Boies are such as are entitled to the most respectful and careful consideration.

*Outlines of the History of Dogma.* By Dr. ADOLPH HARNACK, Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin. Translated by EDWIN KNOX MITCHELL, M.A., Professor of Græco-Roman and Eastern Church History in Hartford Theological Seminary. Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York, London and Toronto. Octavo, pp. 567.

This is a book which may be confidently recommended to the theologian and the theological student. To such especially as have not either the leisure or learning to study the original sources of this most interesting branch of Christian history, it would seem to be almost indispensable. Perhaps nowhere else in our language can be found within the same space such a comprehensive statement of the material facts connected with the origin and development of ecclesiastical dogma as it exists in the Latin and the Greek Church, and has been, in the greater part, accepted by the Churches of the Reformation. In it the reader will find luminously described the various stages in that evolutionary process in which the Christian opinion, which existed during the first century of Christian history in a comparatively nebulous condition, was gradually reduced to definite shape, and finally crystallized into what has since been known as Dogmatic Christianity.

It will be seen at a glance that this book opens up an inviting field for the reviewer, but one which for various reasons we cannot enter at present. One of these reasons is that we prefer that our readers should read the book itself than any opinions of our own, or summary of its contents. Besides, it is in the hands of the most competent member of our staff, and he will probably have something to say about it in our next issue. In the meantime we very cordially recommend it to our readers.

*Evolution and Man's Place in Nature.* By HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL.D., F.R.S.E., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Edinburgh. Macmillan & Co., London and New York. 12mo, pp. 349.

Dr. Calderwood's book would doubtless have had a greater number of eager and interested readers if it had appeared ten or fifteen years sooner. The discussion of evolution has lost a good deal of its interest. The minds of the bulk of thoughtful and intelligent men are made up concerning it. So far as they are concerned the discussion is virtually closed. The restatement of the argument in favor of the Darwinian theory, however able and

interesting in the manner of its execution, has not now the interest for the well-informed reader that it would have once had. This, however, forms but a small part of this volume.

The special interest of the book lies in the attempt which Dr. Calderwood has made to determine more clearly than has hitherto been done man's place in nature. Assuming the unity and continuity of life on this globe, and assuming that evolution gives the most satisfactory account of which we know anything of all that part of his nature which man possesses in common with the brute, the question remains to be answered, Is it sufficient to account for his higher nature? This is the question to which the principal part of the book is devoted.

If we have rightly apprehended the author's view, it is that there is nothing in the nature of animals even of the highest grade below man that can be regarded as forming a basis for the evolution of the peculiar powers of the human soul. Admitting that animals, especially the higher mammals, possess intelligence, Dr. Calderwood contends that it differs from that of man in kind as well as in degree. This argument he has drawn out with skill, and presented with rhetorical as well as with logical force. He finds in man alone a self-directing intelligence; and he says the essential characteristics of this sort of intelligence are, "application of laws of thought, self-criticism of thought, use of prior inductions and accumulation of knowledge sustained by a living interest, practical, literary, scientific or philosophical." And he adds that "the powers we are agreed in assigning to the higher animals, even on the highest computations of them that have been made, offer no traces of the rudiments of such rational exercises."

Admitting that the life of man, in one of its aspects, is a merely animal life, it possesses even in its lowest forms, an element which is altogether peculiar to itself, a characteristic which is not shared by that of any other animal. However debased and degraded, it is nevertheless distinctively human. It is a life controlled and regulated by knowledge, by consideration, by reason. And to man alone is given the power to know, to consider, to make experiments and to form plans in respect to the future. But these belong to him even in his lowest estate. And just in proportion as he rises in the scale of human development, these powers become more apparent and more wonderful in their manifestation, and the gulf which separates this from all other forms of life on this planet becomes wider and deeper. And, of course, when from the merely rational life we rise to the moral, the spiritual, the insufficiency of the theory of evolution from the dog or the monkey to account for the peculiar powers and properties of man is evident. The animal part of human nature with the element of intelligence, even in its highest form, superadded, would not make a man; in order to complete the work, God himself must breathe into him the breath of life and constitute him a living soul.

*The Oxford Bible for Teachers.* Containing the Holy Scriptures, together with a new revised and illustrated edition of the Oxford Helps to the Study of the Bible. London: Henry Froude, Oxford University Press Warehouse, Amen Corner; Toronto: Wm. Briggs, Methodist Book and Publishing House.

Since writing our notice of the Cambridge Bible, this new and magnificent volume has been placed in our hands. It fully maintains the reputation of the Oxford University Press for the most perfect workmanship, and that of the eminent scholars of that university for philological and historical scholarships. The introductions are written in a more conservative spirit than those of the Cambridge Bible, maintaining the traditional ground as

to the Pentateuch and even Isaiah. A special feature of this edition is the introduction of sixty-four full-page plates, fac-similes of important historical records, illustrating the Scripture. The indices, glossaries and antiquities are very full, and in fact we have here a perfect treasury of everything needed for the exact study of the English Bible. The pronunciation of proper names is a specially valuable feature. It is a happy fact for the Church that the two greatest universities in the English-speaking world are thus devoting all their learning and resources to the production of a volume meeting the most advanced needs of the faithful Sabbath School teacher. Their rivalry in this work is a battle of the giants, and the choice between these two books will be determined chiefly by the theological bias of the reader. The conservative will prefer the Oxford, and will find it exceedingly full of very rich material. The progressive will prefer the Cambridge, and will find there a very complete work. Both must be supplemented by the revised version or the *Variorum*.

*Christ in the New Testament.* By THOMAS A. TIDBALL, D.D., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Camden, N.J., with an introduction by S. D. McConnell, D.D. New York: Thos. Whittaker. 12mo, pp. 357. Price \$1.25.

This neat volume contains part of a series of lectures delivered before the Church-Woman's Institute of Philadelphia. It embodies in interesting form much of the material found in "Introductions" to the books of the New Testament. It deals with the characteristics of the respective books, and the special circumstances and purposes of the various authors, and thence proceeds to unfold the doctrine of Christ running through them all. Along with the delivery of these lectures was associated the study of Archdeacon Farrar's "Messages of the Books." The work is not intended so much for specialists as for the general public, but all may derive from its pages much help and profit in the study of the New Testament. The author quotes largely from the latest writers.

"*Ave*," an ode for the Shelley Centenary. By CHARLES D. ROBERTS. The Williamson Book Co., Toronto.

Amongst the flood of poetry which marked the Shelley commemoration, there were published on this side of the water at least two pieces worthy of being preserved, both by Canadian poets, one by Bliss Carman in *The Independent*, and the other by Professor Roberts, of Nova Scotia, which we now have under review. Concerning Shelley himself, it is not needful that we should say much. Defects many and glaring there were in his life, yet the genius of his poetry commands our attention. Solace and consolation we can never find in his works, and here he lacks in one element of the true poet. He stimulates us; he delights us by the enchanting music of his verses; he uplifts our spirits into an ideal region of beauty and lovely forms, and glorious creations of imagination. But he can never console us in our sorrow. He has no balm for hurt minds, no gospel for sick hearts. The lovely forms of nature, for which he had such exquisite feeling, never spoke to him of the great Source of comfort to the human soul, and he did not listen to the voice within that spoke to him of God. Professor Roberts begins this ode with a reference to the "tranquil meadows of Tantramar," with the mystic river flowing through them, with its sudden storms and sudden calms; and in beautifully wrought-out imagery compares them with their surroundings to the soul of Shelley and his life-work, then he calls on all the groves and fields and far-famed rivers and poets of Italy to mourn the death of Shelley, and concludes with a wonderful

burst of song, the burden of which is that the wild passionate heart of Shelley is now face to face with its Maker, and that as Tom Hood said of another, we must "leave with meekness his sins to his Saviour." This ode is a magnificent piece of workmanship; it has the true poetic ring, and a wonderful command of harmony. We recommend our readers to buy it, if only as a sample of Canadian poetry at its best.

*Thrilling Scenes in the Persian Kingdom, or the Glory of a Scribe.* By EDWIN MACMINN. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranstons & Curts. \$1.00.

Since "Ben Hur" proved to be the success of the year in which it was written, of the making of many books like unto it there has been scarcely any cessation; and the mere perusal of their titles has been in many cases a weariness of the flesh. We willingly make an exception, however, of the book now under review. It deals in an interesting manner with that portion of biblical history that we have been studying for some time past in connection with the International Sunday School Lessons. The opening chapter introduces us to Ahban the Scribe, who, immediately after the feast of Purim, goes with some other youths, his chosen friends, for a walk, when they meet with Mordecai, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Abarah. The youths at once ask these aged men for an account of the many heart-stirring scenes in which they were leading actors. The following quotation will best indicate the thread of the story:

"We would know," said Ahban, "how much our fathers associated with the nations surrounding them, how they were brought into relations with the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Phœnicians. We would know how the Samaritans became so filled with enmity to us, and why the Persians, who came so near destroying us, at last became such good friends."

"Thou hast mapped out a long series of discourses," replied Ezra, "some of which it is not necessary for us to tell, because you can find it in our sacred writings. But there are some things not in our writings thou mayest learn. Abarah is best acquainted with the story of the Greeks, and we will look to him for this. Nehemiah can tell of many things recorded in the annals of the Persian kings; Mordecai can give an inside view of royal life in Shushan, and I can inform you of my work. Ahban, thou ready writer, thou canst record our words, that they may be given to future generations."

Thus Mr. McMinn makes each of these historical personages tell in chronological order the story of the past, and in this way he gives us a vivid picture of the great Persian empire and the contemporary history of its times. We are greatly pleased with the fulness and accuracy with which these are set forth, and the way in which the author has woven graphic description and historical exactness together, and thus produced a life-like picture full of human interest. We recommend this work heartily as one to be placed in all our Sunday School libraries, and upon the private book-shelves of our teacher.

*Prevailing Prayer, or The Secret of Soul-Winning.* By REV. E. WIGLE. Sixth thousand. Press of the Dean Printing and Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich.

This book consists of a series of twenty-eight lectures on Prevailing Prayer. They were delivered by the author in the course of his work as evangelist, and are a full and generally correct exposition of a very important theme.

## The Trend of the Magazines and Reviews.

Among the many excellent articles in *The Chautauquan* for June is "The Social Condition of Labor," by Dr. E. R. L. Gould, a Canadian boy, and Victoria graduate, now at the head of the Labor Bureau of the United States Government. We give here a synopsis of the article: More attention is paid to the working environment of the industrial laborer abroad than on this side, with the exception of one or two of our more advanced States. Factory legislation permits a better protection of the worker. The hours of labor in England are shorter, but on the Continent longer than in this country. The age at which children may be employed varies considerably; in England it commences at ten (on half time), in Germany thirteen; in Belgium, twelve; and in Switzerland, fourteen. France has similar regulations to England. It is only fair to add that legislation governing the employment of children and youths is much better enforced in Europe than in the United States, and that more enlightened regulations for the factory labor of women also exist. In Switzerland the limit of the working day is eleven hours; in France, Germany and Belgium, from eleven to twelve; in England it is in practice from fifty-four to fifty-six and one-half hours per week. In Germany and Switzerland female labor is limited to eleven hours a day; in Belgium, to twelve, with proper intervals for rest. In all the principal European industrial countries, male minors and women are prohibited from working at night. Complete Sunday rest is also secured them. In the payment of wages no such abuses as irregularity or the "truck" system exists in England, as one finds too often in the United States. In some instances, also, as in the case of cotton operatives in the Oldham and Bolton districts of England, a participation in the benefits received from the introduction of better machinery, varying from one-half to two-thirds, is given to the workingman. Taking all in all, there can be no doubt that the American workingman is better off than his European fellows. With higher aspirations, broader ambitions, and, on the whole, better conditions of life, he works harder to satisfy his wants. In so doing, he both returns much to his employer and makes himself of greater social utility.

*The Preacher's Magazine* for June, edited by Revs. Mark Guy Pearse and Arthur E. Gregory, is received. This is the sixth number of the third volume of this magazine, which is intended more particularly for the preacher, but will be found of great aid to teachers and Bible students. Dr. T. Bowman Stephenson contributes a sermon of great power, entitled "The Social Panacea," to this number. There is also a most excellent paper by Prof. Henry Drummond on "Joy, Rest and Faith." It is written in his charming style, and is sure to attract great attention. The Rev. Dr. Robert A. Watson continues his able series of articles on the "Apostolic Churches," and takes up in this number their doctrine and fellowship. The Rev. W. A. Labrum also continues his articles on "Exploring the Bible." The Homiletical department is full and complete, and many excellent outlines and sketches of sermons are given by prominent divines. The "Notes and Illustrations," the "International Sunday School Lessons," and one of the most popular features of this magazine, "Outline Addresses on the Golden Text" are full and complete. This magazine is growing in value from month to month, and is one of the best of the homiletical magazines. It is highly recommended by prominent clergymen of all evangelical denominations.

There are a great many good things in the July number of the *Atlantic Monthly*, among them some to be especially looked at; for instance, Isabel Hapgood's paper on "Passports, Police, and Post Office in Russia," "Problems of Presumptive Proof," a protest against the sentimental sympathy shown to criminals convicted on what is loosely termed "merely circumstantial evidence," showing that circumstantial evidence is sometimes the only evidence available, and that there are grave perils in direct evidence. It is written by James W. Clarke. Edward S. Morse discusses the question, "If Public Libraries, why not Public Museums?" Sir Edward Strachey has a delightful paper on "An English General Election," and Mrs. Catherwood, a story called "The Chase of Saint-Castin." Miss Edith Thomas's paper, interspersed with poetry, called "In the Heart of the Summer," is graceful and charming, as whatever is written by this writer is sure to be. The papers on Petrarch and on Governor Morton and the Sons of Liberty must not be forgotten.

The recent discussion about the annexation of Hawaii to the United States renders especially timely the leading article in *The Missionary Review of the World* for July, on "The Islands of the Sea," a resume of the missionary enterprise in the Pacific Islands, which have been in many cases so marvellously successful. The author is the Rev. Samuel McFarlane, LL.D., F.R.G.S. Another article in the same number on the "Evangelization of the Islands of the Pacific," written by Rev. Eugene Dunlap, is of special interest. Another article in the same number, which will be read with general interest during this hot weather, is the leading article in the department of Monthly Concert of Missions, entitled "Circumpolar Evangelization, or the Moravian Missions in Greenland, Labrador and Alaska," by the Rev. J. Taylor Hamilton, D.D. All the departments, as usual, are full of interesting and timely articles.

*The Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church South* presents the following excellent table of contents: 1. Produce of the Vineyards of the East; 2. The Hebrew Symmetry of the Greek Sentences of St. Paul; 3. The Theology of Dr. Girardeau; 4. The Colonial Church in Virginia; 5. High Steeple and its Official Class; 6. Robert G. Ingersoll; 7. Writing and Writers of South Carolina; 8. The Presbyterian Church Government; 9. George Ticknor and a Glimpse of Boston Society in 1854; 10. Rev. R. Abby, Author, Philosopher, Theologian; 11. Our Theology and our Science; 12. Editor's Table. A good number.

*The Atlantic Monthly* (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston) for April, May, June and July, is on our table, and fully sustains the high reputation which this publication has long enjoyed as one of the foremost magazines of the day. Those who buy periodicals of this kind for the sake of looking at the pictures in them will, of course, have no use for the *Atlantic*, but those who are in pursuit of literature of a high order will not be disappointed in subscribing for it.

*The American Catholic Quarterly Review* for April, 1893. Philadelphia: Hardy & Mahoney. As usual this review contains a number of very valuable articles, written, of course, from the Roman Catholic standpoint, and yet worthy of study by Protestant thinkers.

*The A. M. E. Church Review* for April, 1893. The number of articles is not quite so large as formerly, but the tone and general appearance of the *Review* are much improved by a more careful selection and larger print.



## The Church at Work.

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### THE BROTHERHOOD OF ANDREW AND PHILIP.

WHAT another organization! Yes. Oh, we are being organized to death! Are we? Is organization an evidence of death? Is not death the result of dis-organization? Is not every form of life characterized by organization? Do we not find the most complex and perfect organization in the highest forms of life? Are not the achievements of machinery wrought out by organization? Is not business success contingent upon organized method? Do not greater results follow when a number of persons combine and concentrate their efforts upon a given object? Is not more accomplished by the united organized power of many than by the disintegrated, unmethodical force of individuals?

We believe that each of these questions must be answered in the affirmative. And that true Christianity, being a real form of life, can best effect its purpose by the most perfect organization. Also, that as the life of Christianity advances towards perfection in its development, we may look for its organization to be more complex and specific. The spiritual being the highest form of life, we may expect the organizations to be more numerous and the functions more varied. As the Christian Church realizes the ideal Christianity lived and taught by the Man of Nazareth, her life force will be manifested in multitudinous activities touching the various needs of humanity. If we confine our thought to historical experience, the past justifies us in saying that every spiritual uplift has been characterized by some new phase of organized Christian effort. Methodism is itself a standing illustration of this fact. Aside from spiritual life, denominational success will be measured by the kind and character of organization. A writer in the July number of *The Charitarquan*, in accounting for the fact that "The growth of Congregationalism on this continent has been by no means commensurate with its opportunities," replies, "It is in part due, beyond a doubt, to

its inherent weakness of organization." He then enforces his admission by saying, "Presbyterianism is a stronger force in building up churches than Congregationalism and Episcopacy, as manifested in the Church of England and the Methodist Church, and especially in such a military organization as the Salvation Army, or such a despotism as the Church of Rome, is the strongest of all." It is admitted that Wesley's greater success as compared with Whitfield's was in the fact that he was a better organizer.

In the Methodist Church, then, there should not be an outcry against organization, but we should rather modify and develop our Church organization to meet the new phases and circumstances of our aggressive civilization. As in the industrial world, so in Christian work, co-operation is the order of the day, and in order to prevent friction, waste of energy or dissipation of force, it is necessary to assign specific work to special organizations. Though separate societies in one congregation may seem to multiply and render complex the machinery of a church, yet it should be remembered that there must be "wheels within wheels" to secure the greatest efficiency, and do the largest amount of work. The need for and ability of various co-operating agencies in Christian work justifies their efficiency. What we are advocating is not organization *outside* of nor even *inside* of the Church, but organization of the Church itself for definite lines of work. Steam idly floating in the air is powerless, but place it in an organized body through which to act, and it becomes a controlling power of our day. So the love of God manifested in Christ and shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, when directed through properly organized effort, becomes the greatest of human uplifting powers. Here we have the fundamental need of organization, and whether another "wheel" should be added to the machinery depends entirely upon the fact whether there is some specific work required to be done. The principle is, if a demand exists, a supply should be provided. As we think of the throng of young men who never enter our churches, and of the numbers that come and go from public services without being brought into actual Christian fellowship, is there not a felt need for

specific work? Yea, is there not a demand for definite organized effort to reach this great class in our cities and towns? Can not young men best be reached by young men? The young are naturally in sympathy with each other, and are influenced by each other. Boys and young men adopt the tobacco, drink, and other habits, not because old men, but young men, do these things. So they will attend church and pray when they see young men doing so.

On account of these and other reasons, we argue for a young men's organization in our churches. But inasmuch as the question is sometimes asked, Why have a young men's organization? it may be well to simply mention a few facts. First of all, there are no mixed organizations in the Church which engage the activities of young men to any large extent. The Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor and Epworth League has done most along this line, but even these societies do not include within their membership any large proportion of young men. Second, the desperate need of special effort on the part of the local churches or congregations in behalf of young men. The largest proportion of non-church-goers—those not Christian—is found among young men. It is estimated that but five per cent. of the young men of the United States, between the ages of sixteen and forty—and they constitute one-sixth of the population—are church members, fifteen out of twenty-five attend church with any degree of regularity, and seventy-five out of every one hundred never attend church at all.

This estimate may not be correct as to Canada, yet the young man is conspicuous by his absence from church. On the other hand, the world's temples are filled. The saloon, billiard-room, concert-halls and other worse places are supported almost entirely by the young men. Our land teems with secular orders, clubs and societies whose tendency is to draw their members away from religious influences, and to unfit them for Christian work. The changed conditions of modern life have changed the relations and social positions of young men most of all. Thousands of young men are on the move; they have no home life; they are strangers, standing in special need of personal touch and

sympathy. Then there are the special dangers and temptations of young men in the formative and crucial period of their lives. Third, the facts go to prove that an exclusively young men's organization is best able to interest and reach the men. The success of numerous secular orders, composed as they are exclusively of men; the success of the Young Men's Christian Association as a united enterprise outside of the Church; the success of such parochial organizations as the Young Men's Guild of the Church of Scotland; the Brotherhood of St. Andrew of the Church of England, and similar organizations in this country, attest the truth that there is marked power in this form of organization.

There is a fundamental principle in human nature in accord with this plan of Church activity. The young man's social nature craves the companionship of his fellows. He is susceptible, most of all, to the influences for good or ill from young men of his age, tastes and work in life. The peculiar work to be done to reach him can best be done by his fellows. The young men are clannish, are gregarious, and herd in kind.

A general organization of the young men would aid in utilizing this social factor for the progress of the local church, as well as the Church at large. Through the regular meetings it would cultivate fraternal unity, lay hold of the young man's social nature, and remove the danger of selfish localism, and the disintegration, indifference and discouragement incident to a purely individual Christian life. As a method of Christian training and ingathering of the unsaved, such an organization would have points of advantage over the Young Men's Christian Association. The Y. M. C. A. necessarily disregards the lines of churches and denominations. It has all the advantages that come from undenominational and unchurchly work, but it suffers from all the disadvantages of this position as the outpost of the Church, and, as it were, outside of the Church. On the other hand, such a young men's society would have all the advantages of an organization within the Church line and under the influence and control of the Church itself. It secures the co-operation not of a few volunteers, but of the larger number of men in the congregation. It would engage first in work

within the bounds of the congregation. It has its limits, and it can hope to cover its field and do its work fairly well. It engages in evangelistic work outside the Church, but always from the Church as a centre, and it brings its fruits home to the Church. It brings the young men of the congregation under the guidance and instruction of their natural leaders, the pastor and officials. This is an incalculable advantage. In addition, it could be, as it were, the missing link between the work of the Young Men's Christian Association and the local congregations, in that it can bring the young men reached through the Association under the influence of the divinely instituted means of grace in the Church.

Among the societies organized to do such special work among young men, we wish to call attention to the *Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip*. An idea of the Society can be formed from the following quotations from its Manual:

ARTICLE I. *Name*.—This organization shall be called the "Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip," being so called from the accounts given in John i. 41-48; xii. 20-22, and the statement of James v. 16, 19, 20.

ARTICLE II. SECTION 1.—*Object and Rules*.—The sole object of the Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip is the spread of Christ's kingdom among young men.

SECTION 2.—Every man desiring to become a member must pledge himself to obey the rules of the Brotherhood so long as he shall be a member. These rules are two: The Rule of Prayer and the Rule of Service. The Rule of Prayer is to pray daily for the spread of Christ's kingdom among young men, and for God's blessing upon the labors of the Brotherhood. The Rule of Service is to make an earnest effort each week to bring at least one young man within hearing of the Gospel of Jesus Christ as set forth in the services of the Church, young people's prayer-meetings, and young men's Bible classes.

The Brotherhood develops the unused and often unsuspected spiritual power latent in Christian young men, and increases that power by combination and co-operation in pursuit of a definite object. It places under the pastor's hand an agency by which he can reach many young men whom he cannot

reach personally. It utilizes for Christ and salvation that peculiar comradeship of young men, which is often—the more's the pity—the chain by which they are dragged to sin and destruction.

PERSONAL WORK UNDER THE TWO RULES.

The scope of the work which the Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip proposes is found in the light of Andrew and Philip's example. Andrew brings his own brother Simon to the Saviour (first, our kindred and our spiritual brothers who may have been negligent or indifferent or have lapsed, or perhaps may never have come at all). Philip bringeth his friend Nathanael (second, our friends and companions, those with whom we associate, are to be invited and brought to Christ and into His Church). Andrew and Philip together introduced the Greeks—the strangers—to the Saviour (third, we are to pray for and bring all within hearing of the Gospel). And because of the largeness of the field ("the field is the world") and the importance of using all our resources, as Andrew and Philip did, when Jesus fed the multitude, we are to reckon up the work that must be done, go to the Master for counsel, call in the boys to the Master's service, and then depend upon the Master's blessing and help for the result.

Thus, in calling itself by the name, "Andrew and Philip," the Order answers beforehand all questions about methods of work. Every enterprise that Chapters or men may engage in is to be judged in the light of their example. Is it personal work? Does it really consist in the application of man to man and life to life? The organization lays no stress on meetings or committees, although it has both. Its work is personal. It is organized for the direction and development of life. It believes that "organization does not create life, but that life creates organization; and if a vitalized Christianity is to arouse the members of Christ to new and personal activity, there must be system, mutual understanding and co-operation." Personal work is the distinguishing characteristic of this Order. At the regular meetings reports on personal work are called for, and assignment of work is made by the pastor or president.

Work along personal lines is Scriptural and Apostolic; and the Brotherhood, by pledging members to the Rule of Prayer and the Rule of Service, is simply helping men by the force of individual and associated habit to do as the early Christians did, who "went everywhere preaching the Word."

The first Rule of the Brotherhood is the Rule of Prayer. It is realized that the man who prays well will work well. In the Christian life nothing can be substituted for this daily recourse to the source of life and strength. The Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip is a praying band.

The second Rule of the Brotherhood is the Rule of Service. This forms the habit of making at least one conscious and conscientious effort of word or deed in behalf of some one young man each week. This means sharpshooting, taking aim. It means fishing with hook and line, catching fish one by one. The Rule of Service is best fulfilled by first observing the Rule of Prayer. Streams depend upon fountains, not fountains upon streams. The Brotherhood, by the Constitution, recognizes that men can only become forceful and helpful as they resolutely and habitually visit the holy fountain of prayer, so that the streams of service may be pure, self-sacrificing, and acceptable to God.

The faithful fulfilment of these two rules cannot but make happy personal workers, men who rise into the freedom of the sons of God. For, be it ever remembered that the formulation of a rule is grounded in the highest wisdom, and that experience has shown that the best results in Christian character and service can be secured only when Christian activity is so regulated and concentrated.

#### METHODS OF WORK.

A ratification of the Constitution of the Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip means a Chapter organized for work. The Chapter organization is a general one in reference to four points—the name, the two rules, the convention, the approval of the minister.

Every word of the name is significant, and will repay earnest study.

The Rule of Prayer is to be mainly observed in private devotions. It is all-important for Christian living and earnest effort, as well as associated work.

The Rule of Service means personal work on the part of each member. It exalts the regular services of the Church, and enforces constant, personal attendance, as well as responsibility for the attendance of others. It defines the least outward and visible sign of a true brother. It is not impracticable anywhere. There is room for its exercise in country and city, when we understand by it any word or act said or done with the sincere purpose to bring a young man nearer the Church, or the Church nearer the man, or to bring about a personal relationship between the brother and the man which will enable the former to exert a personal influence for good. In short, it is the honest effort to concentrate one's powers and influence to bring young men unto Christ and into His kingdom. Obeying the Rule of Service is to obey the Master's voice, "Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men." The use of Report Cards in connection with this rule will be found helpful.

It is wise to have as few by-laws as possible, and these of a simple, practical nature. It should be remembered that everything must be done under the direction or with the approval of the minister of the congregation. Keeping this in mind will save much trouble and unnecessary friction.

Methods of work will vary according to the opportunities and abilities of Chapters, and the peculiar circumstances of congregation and locality.

All work should develop along the lines of aggressive effort, and the teaching and training of the members for service. Ingathering and upbuilding is the twofold work. The organic law of the Brotherhood lays stress not upon meetings or committees, but upon individual responsibility and effort. Let this be fundamental. Let this be the primary and chief aim of Chapters, and let all else be subordinate.

#### THE BIBLE CLASS.

This should be a leading feature of all Chapters. It should meet in connection with the Sunday School, although it may



be held at some other time. It should be conducted by the minister, or by one who will be able to teach the Scriptures, and to deal in a helpful manner with all questions of the day, with the doubts and difficulties of young men, etc.

All members of the Brotherhood should invite others to the class, and should have cards of invitation to be handed to strangers.

A special series of Bible studies and topics would be a good thing for the class. May the time soon come when the members of the Brotherhood shall study the Bible in the light of the marvellous evidences of Christianity and helps of this nineteenth century!

#### THE DEVOTIONAL MEETING.

A number of Chapters maintain a weekly devotional or prayer meeting. In some cases it is open to both sexes. It is held generally on Sunday. In congregations where there are not many services this meeting would materially assist in banding the young men together, and in developing their social and religious life.

#### AN INVITATION OR VISITING COMMITTEE

will find work to do, especially in towns and cities. Cards of invitation could be placed regularly in hotels, and in places where young men can be reached. A card system will be found useful. On one side of the card, suggestions signed by the minister, president or chairman, with space for giving name and address of some young man to be visited. This card is given to some member of the committee, who writes a report of his visit on the other side. These cards should be kept on file by the chairman, and shown to the minister periodically. This committee can also visit the sick, or another committee on Sick Visitation can be appointed for the purpose.

#### THE HOSPITALITY COMMITTEE

finds its work at the Church services. Several should be chosen as ushers, even though they serve only at special times; the others should sit in various parts of the church. Hymn books,

etc., should be supplied to strangers, and, in general, this Committee should welcome young men and contribute to the sociability of members at the Church services.

#### A SOCIAL COMMITTEE

could in various ways emphasize the social side of the Brotherhood. They could hold monthly or quarterly socials or entertainments, and occasional receptions to the young men of the city or neighborhood.

#### COMMITTEE ON CORRESPONDENCE.

or by whatever name known should be charged with the duty of looking after the members or young men of the congregation who move away, or are travelling. The Secretary should be Chairman of this Committee. Cards of introduction and letters of commendation should be furnished all such; and the Chapters of the place to which they move should be notified of the member's removal, with his name and address.

Other committees can be appointed as follows: Music, Sunday School, Literature, Relief Committee, etc.

"The Brotherhood idea is not new; the purpose of the organization is as old as Christianity. It seeks to emphasize the duties which are common to every Christian. It does not impose new duties, but aims to bring men together, that by association and mutual encouragement they may strengthen each other in performing their Christian obligations. It is not a society working parallel with the Church; not an organization in the Church, but an organization of *The Church* endeavoring to educate (or help to educate) part of her constituency for the service of discipleship. When the children of Israel had come as far as Kadesh-barnea, in the wilderness of Paran, they were commanded to march forward into Canaan and drive out the heathen; but they refused to attack the Canaanites, fearing the sons of Anak, *because they were not organized*, and it took Moses thirty-eight years to develop that horde of slaves into a united, organic nation. We have abundant material in our Christian Churches, but we lack faith and organization for effective service."

In giving such an extended explanation of the Brotherhood, it is not our proposal that it should be adopted by our Church as a new department, but rather used as an illustration of how work among young men may be done, and also to show how the Brotherhood idea may be carried out through our present organizations. If Methodism would modernize and utilize her present machinery, with perhaps a few additional wheels and a little more lubrication, she can accomplish her mission to young men with existing organizations. The Methodist class-meeting, if adapted to the circumstances and exigencies of the times, can be made a mighty force in the Church to accomplish the work of many of those recent organizations. Our idea is that a class-meeting should not only be for experience and testimony, but for systematic Christian work. Let the Young Men's Class become a Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip, assume the name if need be, take the pledge of obedience to the Rules of Prayer and Service, and carry out the Brotherhood idea of work for and by young men. Where there is not a Young Men's Class, let there be a Brotherhood Committee in connection with the Young People's Society, whose members are pledged to the two Rules and shall give special attention to this branch of the work. At least one of the devotional meetings per quarter should be under the direction of this Committee, be especially for young men, to which outside young men should be invited, and led by a young man, a suitable topic being previously selected. Occasionally the Brotherhood might hold independent meetings for social and literary purposes, receiving reports of work and discussing plans; or a Young Men's Club might be conducted by this Committee, to meet weekly, as a means for acquaintance, discussing national problems, considering how the Church can be built up, the masses reached, politics purified, and young men saved. A young men's weekly prayer-meeting might also be held by them. The Church must not only make much of the young man, but also of the young woman. We would therefore suggest the same line of action for young women. Utilize the Young Women's Class as a Sisterhood of Andrew and Philip, or have a Sisterhood Committee in the Young People's Society, adopting the vows of prayer and service, but for young

women, and the same methods as far as applicable. It might be a good plan to get all the young men of a Society to join the Brotherhood Committee, and all the young ladies the Sisterhood, so that that kind of work which can best be done by each might be accomplished.

The great purpose of such a proposed organization is to emphasize personal responsibility and to cultivate the habit of personal work upon the principle of "a committee of one." Individuality was the characteristic of Andrew and Philip, whose example was followed by John. They simply went and told their experience; not argument but testimony was the method. "We have found the Messiah." The Lord's own plan for reaching the masses is by committees of one; by house-to-house, hand-to-hand, heart-to-heart contact of Andrew with his brother and Philip with his friend. Hugh Price Hughes says, "When God wanted His people delivered from Egypt, He did not send a committee, He sent a man." The world is to be brought to Christ by ones through personal work, and the aim of the organization above suggested is not to remove responsibility but to arouse every Christian young man and woman to individual action.

## Read the Manager's Notes.

"Nearly \$1,600 due on subscriptions to the end of 1893" was the report at the Annual Meeting, and we are depending upon the payment of these to meet the liabilities up to the same date, over \$1,500. Are you one whose subscription is not paid? Will you please attend to it at once, either by cash to the Business Manager, or by having it transferred to your Book Room account?

The QUARTERLY was published in good faith that those who received it would pay for it, and the Business Manager became personally liable with that understanding and belief.

The QUARTERLY was sent you under instructions that when you did not wish it you would return it or notify the Business Manager. Having no intimation to the contrary, he has continued to send it to you in confidence that you wanted it and would pay for it.

The Annual Meeting ordered the immediate collection of all arrears, and if you are on the list you are respectfully requested to respond forthwith. Please note our position and see how necessary it is that every dollar should be paid.

The "Bible Study Union" Examinations were a success, every candidate passing creditably, and a beautiful certificate is awarded to each. An examination on Acts xv. 35 to xxviii. 31, the ground covered by the Sunday School lessons for the next six months, will be held about January 15th, 1894. The material suggested as helpful, though not absolutely necessary, for candidates, is Burwash's Analytical Studies in the QUARTERLY for July and October (50 cents), with Farrar's or Stalker's Life of Paul, and the Cambridge Bible on Acts (large, \$1.35, or abridged, 35 cents). The examination fee is only 25 cents, to pay for examination papers and certificates. We should have candidates in every Young People's Society and Sunday School in Canadian Methodism. Can you not take the matter in hand and become an instructor to a class? We ought to, as a Church, take an interest in this work. The Presbyterians in Canada had over one thousand candidates for a similar examination last year. Address all communications to A. M. Phillips, 29 Euclid Avenue, Toronto.

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