

b(557737 (E).

5

November/December 1982

in Canada
\$2.75
other countries \$3.25

doc
CA1
EA
I56
ENG
Nov/Dec
1982

International Perspectives

The Canadian journal on world affairs

Foreign policy and leadership

Failure at UNSSOD II

Canada's IDRC

Miracle in Korea

Soviet policy and nuclear war

International Perspectives

Contents

November/December 1982

Canadian Foreign Policy: bias to business <i>by Cranford Pratt</i>	3
Trudeau's foreign policy speeches <i>by David Cox</i>	7
Trudeau on summitry <i>by Michel Vastel</i>	10
IDRC at twelve <i>by Grant Manuge</i>	13
Nuclear war and Soviet policy <i>by David R. Jones</i>	17
Water for all <i>by Thomas Land</i>	21
Miracle in Korea <i>by Robert Bedeski</i>	23
Failure at UNSSOD II <i>by William Epstein</i>	26

Book Reviews	29
--------------	----

International Canada

Centre supplement reference material on Canada's foreign relations presented by the Department of External Affairs.

International Perspectives

International Perspectives is published in Canada six times a year by International Perspectives, (95312 Canada Inc.), 302-150 Wellington St., Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A4. Telephone: (613) 238-2628

Second Class Mail
Registration Number 4929

Publisher:
Alex Inglis

Editor:
Gordon Cullingham

Editorial Associate
Maureen Cullingham

Design and Production:
Edie Wawrychuk,
Anita Bergmann

Editorial Assistant:
David Mac Neill

Subscription rates:

In Canada:

- Single issue — \$2.75
- One year (six issues) — \$15
- Two years (12 issues) — \$27
- Three years (18 issues) — \$38

Other countries:

- Single issue — \$3.25
- One year (six issues) — \$18
- Two years (12 issues) — \$33
- Three years (18 issues) — \$47

Subscription address:
P.O. Box 949, Station B,
Ottawa, Canada
K1P 5P9

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on world affairs. It takes no editorial position. The opinions expressed by authors are their own and, unless otherwise stated, are not to be taken as presenting the official views of any organization with which the author is associated.

ISSN 0381-4874
© 1982

Editor's Note:

Foreign policy is making and doing. Prime Ministers engage in both. Sometimes it's fun; sometimes it isn't — especially if the rhetoric of the "making" is barely visible in the agony of the "doing." Two articles in this issue treat these themes as experienced by Pierre Elliot Trudeau. David Cox of Queen's University takes a look back at some recent noble utterances on the world scene by Mr. Trudeau, and wonders what went wrong. Journalist Michel Vastel observes some of what went wrong in his examination of the Prime Minister's dissatisfactions with summitry. Behind it all lies the early determination of the directions the country will take. That is what sets the limits within which any Prime Minister must think and utter his cosmic solutions. And this is a murky area where the mood and needs of the nation are divined by processes seldom unveiled. Political Scientist Cranford Pratt examines some of those sources of invited and uninvited influence, and finds the corporate sector doing very well.

Two other articles have Canadian themes, both of them paying attention to under-noted institutions: one, the performance of the world and of Canada at the second UN Disarmament Conference; the other, the International Development Research Centre. The latter is a Canadian organization of high birth, now well into its second President and thirteenth year. Student Grant Manuge's finding is one of a strong constitution not immune to the infirmities of age and isolation. William Epstein continues his disarmament vigil in a review of the dismal under-achievements of the recent UN conference.

Three more articles round out the issue. David Jones of Dalhousie University shares his revealing findings about the views and intentions of Soviet leaders in relation to nuclear war. Robert Bedeski of Carleton University sees in today's South Korea a nation on the move — and quickly — from developing to developed. And Thomas Land is excited about a new method of water desalination which involves some Canadian resources. Then there are the book reviews.

International Perspectives

The Canadian journal on world affairs

Enter my order for _____ subscription(s) to International Perspectives as follows:

In Canada:

- Three years (18 issues) for \$38
 - Two years (12 issues) for \$27
 - One year (6 issues) for \$15
- Single copy price \$2.75

Other countries:

- Three years (18 issues) for \$47
 - Two years (12 issues) for \$33
 - One year (six issues) for \$18
- Single copy price \$3.25

Name _____

Address _____

Inter Bank No. 4 digit no. above your name on card () Payment enclosed

Charge Card No. Charge to my () Visa

Credit Card Signature _____ Expiration Date () Mastercharge

Canadian foreign policy: bias to business

by Cranford Pratt

Officials of the Department of External Affairs do not much like taking advice. Denis Stairs of Dalhousie University wrote recently in *International Journal* that they regard it as inconvenient, mischievous and destructive. For the period from 1945 to the early 1960s, it seems likely that not much critical advice on major issues was in fact offered to them. Most Canadians shared a common worldview with both their political leaders and with government officials. The Department of External Affairs thus had a wide mandate in foreign policy matters. It was also able, with comparative ease, to generate a broad, informed consensus whenever such an expression of support seemed desirable.

This has changed significantly in the last ten or more years. Officials of the Department of External Affairs have had to adjust to receiving much more advice on major issues than had been the case. Two developments help to explain this. The first is the great increase in the importance of economic matters in foreign policy issues. As a result, other departments had to be consulted much more frequently for many new issues directly related to their portfolios and they alone in government had the relevant expertise. There were also practical and political reasons that required a more frequent involvement of senior people from outside government — from business and industry. Canadian positions needed to be defined on trade, industry and resource issues of such complexity that it was unavoidable that government officials should look to the business sector for advice as it prepared itself for negotiations relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the UNCTAD Conferences, the Law of the Sea, Conferences and the various components of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO negotiations include the eighteen possible commodity agreements, the codes for transnational enterprises and for the transfer of technology, to indicate some of the most important. Needless to say these also were issues on which the relevant sectors of the corporate world were anxious to be listened to attentively by government officials.

Cosmopolitan values replace Pearsonian internationalism

The second development which has generated a flow of representations to the Department of External Affairs is of a quite different character. There had been, in the uncritical years of Pearsonian internationalism, a wide measure of agreement between our foreign policy decision-makers and our various humanitarian and internationally-

minded citizens groups. It was shallowly based, resting as it did on inadequately examined premises about international communism, Canadian beneficence and American leadership.

This is now gone. Increasingly in the last decade or two, the underlying premises of Canadian foreign policy are undergoing severe scrutiny. There is, for example, a widening acknowledgment of a human obligation to act internationally against widespread starvation, systematic torture and extensive detentions without trial. There are the imperatives, presented by the Brandt Commission, to be far more responsive to longer-term mutual interests which we share with the Third World, and to what the Commission called the obligations of global solidarity. Finally, and at this time the most important of the challenges to official policy makers, is the international network of peace and disarmament movements.

This concern for basic human rights, for international equity and for disarmament, constitute an upsurge in our societies of cosmopolitan values, that is, values which entail obligations which extend beyond our borders, and are in part at least moral in character. There are now articulate bodies of informed opinion that want significant changes in our foreign policy in order that it will be more responsive to these cosmopolitan values.

It will be the argument of this article that these two sets of representations — from the corporate sector and from internationally-oriented public interest groups — have been handled in quite different ways by the Department of External Affairs and that this suggests an important bias in Canadian policy-making circles toward the interests of the corporate sector.

Reception of these representations

1. From the corporate sector

The point has been made that economic issues began to intrude markedly into interstate relations in the 1970s

Cranford Pratt is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, where he teaches courses on Canada and the Third World, the Political Economy of Development, and Canadian Foreign Policy. This article is drawn from a longer paper presented to a recent conference on Domestic Groups and Foreign Policy conducted by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs of Carleton University in Ottawa.

Interest groups and policy

and that, as a result, the Department of External Affairs was led to consult much more extensively with other government departments and with the corporate sector. More was involved in this consultation than a search for expert advice. Many of the government departments that began to play a greater role, and in particular, Industry, Trade and Commerce and Energy, Mines and Resources, had had long, close and intimate links with the sectors of the economy that paralleled their portfolios. These sectors were the departments' "clients" and the departments were their spokesmen within government. The literature on Canadian interest groups is unanimous that the relationship between these groups and these departments is, to quote Robert Presthus, in his *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics*, "continuous, functionally specific and crucial."

This intimate relationship could not be set aside by these departments when they became involved in the discussion of international economic questions. "It would be unthinkable," one official of Energy, Mines and Resources said to me in an interview, "to take a position at an international conference affecting an industry without close prior consultation with it." That quickly became the pattern. Industry representatives, sometimes from Canadian firms and sometimes from foreign multinationals, were regularly consulted on industry-specific and on more general international economic issues. Often these representatives would accompany the Canadian delegation to the international negotiations, as for example did a senior official of Noranda to the negotiations about an international copper agreement and an official of INCO to many meetings of the Law of the Sea Conferences. "Every statement we made," said one official who had been a Canadian representative at one of these major negotiating conferences, "was talked through beforehand with the industry representatives."

Structures were also developed to permit systematic confidential consultations on wider issues that were generally of concern to the business community. In 1973 the Canadian Business Group on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, a small high level working party, was created on the instigation of government to work closely with the officials who were developing the Canadian positions for the 1975 GATT meetings. Some five years ago, under direct stimulus from the Department of External Affairs, the Canadian Business and Industry International Advisory Committee (CBIAC) was established. This was no mean accomplishment. That the government should desire an authoritative organization of business and industry with which it could consult was itself a reason for some caution amongst already existing organizations which feared they might lose some of the access to government which they then enjoyed. To overcome this, CBIAC was, in effect, established by six of these organizations, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Council, International Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Committee of the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the Canadian Association for Latin America and the Canadian Export Association, each of them equally represented in CBIAC itself. Moreover the numerous committees and steering groups of CBIAC were each initially the particular responsibility of one or other of these six participating organizations.

These committees or groups cover all the obvious areas of international policy which are of interest to business and industry — to list but a third of them, environ-

ment, trade, energy and raw materials, investment disputes, multinational enterprises, development aid and international investments. Each committee strives to meet regularly with the senior government officials who deal with the issues that are its concern. In addition, the full CBIAC meets several times a year with senior government officials. Together these meetings constitute an elaborate and systematic network of interaction, all the more impressive as it is in addition to the vast network of ad hoc individual business pressure group contacts with government officials and the intimate top-level interaction between senior political leaders and the leaders of the business community.

2. From internationally-oriented public interest groups

The irritation which Denis Stairs reported in official attitudes to interest groups is most likely to be felt toward the groups which advocate a greater responsiveness to what I earlier called cosmopolitan values. One External Affairs document, a policy paper originally prepared for the education of Flora Macdonald and later made public, expressed delicately but clearly its sense of their irrelevance:

Current Canadian public attitudes toward the Third World tend to down-play its economic importance to Canada Many Canadian attitudes date back to the early postwar period when Canada was a leader in establishing new cooperative mechanisms such as the World Bank, the Colombo Plan and the UN specialized agencies. We saw the Third World as an area of poverty which stirred our national humanitarian conscience

What many Canadians have not fully appreciated today is just how much the Third World has changed in the past twenty-five years This tends to conceal the dramatic economic changes that have occurred and . . . the opportunities offered to Canada for economic partnership.

It is, however, not so much that the Third World has changed as that the official attitudes have grown less responsive to cosmopolitan values. The poor are still there, but External Affairs is now emphasizing instead the economic opportunities for Canada in the middle-income countries. Yet the government cannot entirely ignore the articulate domestic groups which criticize the increasingly narrow economic focus of Canadian policies towards the Third World or which call for a major Canadian role in regard to nuclear disarmament. Some of these groups are themselves too respectable and too substantial to be given no hearing. Others have an undeniable expertise which it is, even politically, perhaps unwise to ignore. And in any case a Department of External Affairs and a Liberal government that have inherited the traditions of Pearsonian internationalism will not want it to appear that well-informed and morally-sensitive, concerned Canadians are substantially in opposition to their policies.

Five types of consultation

In this situation there has been a surprisingly wide range of techniques which the government and the Department have used to manage their relations with these critics. These techniques lack entirely the "continuous, intimate and crucial" qualities of government's consultations with business and industry. They are instead part of a careful

effort by the government to defuse and limit the impact of informed domestic criticism. These techniques can be grouped into five categories.

1. Pro-forma consultations

Many organizations are accorded interviews by External Affairs officials or the Minister. The delegates are received politely and a reply is given, without however, either set of participants having high expectations that the delegates' input will be significant. These meetings are brief, formal and, for each individual group, infrequent.

How difficult it is to overcome these severe restraints on effective interchange was revealed by a recent effort to that end by the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility. For over a six-month period in 1980-81 it had sought an interview jointly with the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce in order to present the coordinated reflections of its member churches and religious organizations. The meeting took place on July 15, 1981. The Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce was, in fact, not present, and the meeting lasted three-quarters of an hour. Needless to say, most of the issues raised in the brief were not covered. However, the officials promised a detailed reply in writing to the Task Force's brief. That reply was not received until over a year later.

2. Consultations via the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence

Representation before the Standing Committee is one of the more important of the forms of consultation that are used by major public interest groups. It can provide publicity for their viewpoint and, if endorsed by the Committee, may in turn be of some influence.

Nevertheless there are major limitations to the significance of this. For one thing, part of the government's motivation in supporting the work of the Committee was — according to Mitchell Sharp — to provide a comparatively harmless outlet for groups that wished to have an input into the discussion of foreign policy issues. The most important limitation, however, lies in the government's reception of the Committee's reports. Where they have been critical and effective documents, as for example, was the report of its Task Force on North-South Relations, the government has done its best to minimize their impact. Indeed, it is fair to say that the small band of all-party activists with an international commitment who have played an active role in this Committee have become somewhat isolated and now themselves almost constitute an interest group. Being given an opportunity to make representations to the Committee is, therefore, more likely to provide public interest groups with an impression of being of influence than it is actually to provide them with an input into the policy-making process.

3. Diluted consultation

Another technique being used is to engineer into existence a consultation at which the critics will be but a minority of the participants. Typically these are organized on External Affairs' stimulus by private organizations that are part of or close to the Department's broader "establishment." Typically at these consultations the main presentation is made by someone from the Department. In these ways the Department is able very largely to control the proceedings. Consultations of this sort are likely much

more to serve the Department's purposes by building up its constituency and giving an appearance of consultations, than to provide critics with a chance for significant input into policy formation.

4. Government-sponsored non-governmental organizations

A major and unattractive recent development is the indirect sponsorship by government of new national organizations that are to be concerned with major international issues. These are appearing in regard to questions about which the government clearly ought to consult domestic groups but on which it knows it will face severe challenge. By taking the initiative to launch a new national body, the government is able to influence both the choice of its board, and the choice of the executive director. The result is a body to which the more forthright groups can be invited but whose proceedings are unlikely to be upsetting to the government. Such structures now exist in regard to human rights, disarmament, immigration policy and international development.

The recent consultation or Conference on Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy organized by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation illustrates my point. The Board of the Foundation is eminently respectable. The Conference was totally "safe." The Minister of State for External Relations was the guest speaker and the major invited foreign guest was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the US State Department. The working paper prepared for the Conference by the Executive Director was a careful exposition of the many obstacles to a more vigorous Canadian foreign policy in regard to human rights. Finally, although invitations were sent out quite widely, the Foundation did not pay any fares to Ottawa so that the churches and other anti-consensual human rights groups, already very skeptical, by and large could not justify the cost of sending delegates. The result was a good illustration of a government-sponsored NGO fulfilling its intended purpose.

Sometimes, however, the effort fails. The government has long felt a need for a national organization concerned with international development whom it might consult. It was instrumental in seeing to the establishment of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation. By securing active participation in it of a number of major international service and welfare organizations such as UNICEF and Save the Children Fund, which are largely non-political, the government at first had a forum it felt it could handle. It also largely financed the North-South Institute. However, neither seemed adequately to meet the political need for a seemingly-independent body which would however not challenge significantly official views. As a result, last year the government launched the Futures Secretariat and ensured the appointment to its Board of persons who would certainly not challenge its policies from an internationalist direction. However, to give it wider credibility, it made the mistake of appointing an independent-minded Director, David MacDonald. The Futures Secretariat is now without Mr. MacDonald and without a future — or even a past.

5. Consensual but controlled and severely unrepresentative "consultation"

This can hardly be regarded by anyone as very satisfactory. It involves private official consultations with a limited number of groups, all of them entirely within the ruling

Interest groups and policy

consensus. Thus the government gets only limited feedback and has the opportunity of explaining its policies to very few people who are themselves not at all representative of the community of people who are interested and well informed about the issues.

It is flattering for those involved in the process, but they should not feel that they are having any influence on policy. Typically, the agenda for such "consultations" is controlled by officials of External Affairs, any background papers are prepared by them and they make the major presentations. At best, therefore, consultation of this sort is a trial run, before groups that are part of the dominant class, for policies that have already been developed by the Department.

An example may illustrate the limited significance of this sort of consultation. In 1979 and 1980, at the highest levels in the Department of External Affairs, there was developed a fresh and significant theme which was intended to help shape Canadian foreign policy. This theme was given the title "bilateralism." It involved assigning a high priority to the cultivation of close and continuous relationships with states that have not been our traditional allies but with whom Canada might hope to be able to develop expanding economic links. Many of these states would be newly-industrializing states in the Third World with rapidly expanding economies. As a policy, bilateralism has real implications for our aid policies, for aid is one of the instruments that can be used to expand our relationships with these states. It also has major significance for our human rights policies, for some of the most obvious candidates for a concentrated bilateral endeavor by Canada are highly repressive regimes.

Neither before it was finalized nor after, was the policy of bilateralism ever presented and discussed with public interest groups concerned with human rights or with international development. It was, I believe, first presented publicly after it had been approved by Cabinet in a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Empire Club in Toronto on January 22, 1981. It had earlier been alluded to without its being identified in a number of public speeches. It was also presented to one or possibly several carefully chosen and controlled consultations with business and industry including, in particular, CBIAC. These took place, however, after the policy had been approved by Cabinet. At the most, CBIAC was asked to make suggestions from the floor of the meeting of what countries might be included on the list of those with whom Canada would concentrate its bilateral relations. The discussion was brief and there was no follow-up or counter-presentation by CBIAC.

There was also a presentation of the policy at a consultation in June 1981 with the members of the National Council of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. It was the only, or at least one of the very few, consultations with a public interest group. It illustrates well the point being made. The National Council of the CIA can be said, without intended derogation or flattery, to be very much a

part of that section of the opinion-forming elite that is closest to External Affairs (though perhaps in its earlier Pearsonian image). The meeting received a four-page background paper that reads like an edited version of an earlier Cabinet paper. It was addressed by two senior officials. There was then a discussion. All of this took place four months after the policy had been announced. It clearly occurred as part of a limited exercise to explain the policy to circles whom External Affairs regarded as being friendly. My identification of this category of "consultation," as consensual but controlled and severely unrepresentative, does seem accurate.

Interpreting the imbalance

How is one to explain the fundamental difference in the nature of the relationship which government has with many public interest groups in contrast with its relations with business and industry groups? It is not to be explained as an unavoidable consequence of the different ways in which it is possible for a government to deal with economic interest groups in contrast to public interest groups. The government has a close identification with business and industry and has developed elaborate machinery to ensure close cooperation with them. There are other economic interest groups, consumer organizations for example and trade unions with whom it does not have close identification. It deals with these domestic economic interest groups quite differently and much less intimately. Similarly, I would argue, the government also does not deal with critical internationally-oriented public interest groups in the same way as it deals with business and industry because it neither attaches the same importance to the issues they raise nor is it seriously concerned to incorporate them into the government-led consensus.

There is in fact a pervasive bias in Canadian public life which gives to the corporate sector an access and an influence that no other sector of our society enjoys. Corporate interest groups bring to their interactions with government a primary interest in issues that are directly related to the returns to capital in their sector. One has only to examine the personal and financial linkages between the corporate sector and the two major parties, at the personal links of the senior civil service and the corporate sector, at the policies themselves and at the ideology that underlies much of those policies, to see evidence of the corporate bias.

A government that was differently oriented, and with a different political base, would deliberately involve public interest groups actively in policy-oriented consultations, in order to counterbalance the thrust of the advice it was receiving from business and industry. It would, for example, accept that human rights issues have a legitimate place in discussions of major policies towards Latin America, and that international equity considerations must be a factor in shaping Canadian policies toward NIEO issues. Because of that acceptance, it would give to the domestic groups that advocate such concerns a role equally important to that now reserved for the spokesmen of the corporate sector. □

Trudeau's foreign policy speeches

by David Cox

When Pierre Elliot Trudeau returned to office in February 1980, it was said that foreign policy was second only to constitutional matters in his personal interests. The suggestion was that, given his unexpected reprise and the knowledge that there were no more campaigns to come, he would assume the role of statesman, putting aside the normal preoccupations of day-to-day foreign policy, and reaching instead for the global issues which would not only educate Canadians to the need for a response on a global basis, but also lead them to a sense of the role that Canada might play in overcoming some of these apparently intractable situations.

The tenor of Trudeau's speeches on foreign policy, and the contrast between his role and that of former Secretary of State Mark MacGuigan, bear out this view. The Prime Minister has made major public statements on foreign policy only occasionally, but when he has done so the themes have been philosophical and global — North-South relations and the arms race — rather than policy specific. Mr. MacGuigan, on the other hand, seldom strayed beyond the specific, and then it had been to set the direction of Canada's foreign policy in such a way as to emphasize the primacy of economic interests. (His speeches on the policy of bilateralism are the clearest example of this.)

This division of function is not surprising. The tendency for the Prime Minister to become the prime actor in foreign policy is now well-noted, as is the somewhat anomalous situation in which it places the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The latter tends to become responsible for the everyday, and for ongoing matters of multilateral diplomacy. He finds, on the other hand, that at the moments of greatest public exposure not infrequently the Prime Minister has preempted his role and commandeered his senior officials. It is the Prime Minister who attends summit meetings with other leaders, addresses UN Special Sessions, and is brought into bilateral meetings whenever their value requires it.

Since returning to office, Mr. Trudeau has not been short of such opportunities. During 1981 his chairmanship of the Economic Summit in Ottawa, the Cancun meeting of North-South states, and the Commonwealth Conference gave him a series of opportunities in which to address North-South issues and set down a course for Canada to follow. In the current year UNSSOD II and the ongoing debate about NATO's policy on theatre nuclear weapons have provided him with a similar opportunity to translate a generalized interest in disarmament and arms control into

a program of action. As the Liberal administration enters the last half of its elected span, therefore, it is an appropriate time to examine the Prime Minister's speeches in these two areas, both of which he has identified as ones of particular concern, and to look at the direction of Canadian policy under his guidance.

North-South relations

To begin with North-South relations, it must be recognized that the Trudeau administration made a major decision on regaining office in February 1980 to restore foreign aid allocations and to reaffirm their commitment to the target of 0.5% of Gross National Product. The Conservative government had decided to hold Official Development Assistance (ODA) for the 1980 fiscal year at a level in real dollars equivalent to that of 1979 (around 0.46% of GNP). With considerable sentiment in favor of reducing ODA still further, the Clark government's decision was designed so as not to preempt the outcome of the aid review that was planned, but in part it also reflected the severe financial difficulties of the federal government. Under strong pressures from the United States and West Germany to increase defence expenditures, the Government could find no other place to control foreign policy expenditures except in ODA. It has not been clear where the money comes from in the Trudeau change of course, but it is obvious that the increase in aid expenditures removed some of the immediate need to reassess the priorities of the aid program.

The restoration of the aid budget points to the most consistent belief and practice of the Prime Minister throughout his tenure. In his much admired Mansion House speech of March 1975, Trudeau spoke passionately of the need for freedom from want, suggesting that a global struggle against poverty would require "institutions of immense dimensions and novel attributes." The echo was still there in the parliamentary debate of June 1981: "The best tool with which to help the poorest is outright aid It is a ghastly cynicism which pretends that international cooperation cannot bring these lives closer to minimum standards of human dignity."

It might also be argued that the Prime Minister played a major role in 1981, if not in advancing the cause of the Third World, at least in preventing a debacle of the Summit

David Cox is Professor of Political Science at Queen's University in Kingston.

Rhetoric and performance in foreign policy

Conferences. In Ottawa, for example, the unsympathetic approach of the Reagan administration to non-aligned Third World countries, and their disinclination to talk at all about North-South issues, was in part overcome, in no small measure due to the influence of Trudeau as Chairman. And similarly, if nothing tangible emerged from the Cancun meeting, the Prime Minister played his part in keeping the notion of a global dialogue in being, thereby enhancing his own and Canada's stature in the Third World.

Performance versus promise

The value of this performance, however, is unlikely to be great if the Prime Minister now allows time to pass without further involvement and initiatives in the development of Canadian policy. With financial survival now replacing development as the immediate concern of the developed states, the international prospects for multi-material initiatives are bleak. It is logical, therefore, to look for evidence of the Prime Minister's intent in the independent initiatives which Canada might take in its relations with Third World countries, but it is precisely in this area that the Prime Minister seems to avoid involvement.

He has made very little effort, for example, to respond to the extremely active debate on North-South issues in the Parliamentary Committee, which has become the focus of public debate on Canada's foreign policy, particularly toward Central America, in the past year. (See "Foreign policy formulation — a preliminary breakthrough," by J.B. Walker in this journal for May/June 1982.) It is true that the Department of External Affairs responded formally to the Committee report on North-South relations, but it is difficult to see Prime Ministerial involvement in that response, which was in any case quite unhelpful. In the present economic circumstances it may be asking too much of the Liberal government to reduce restrictions on imports from developing countries, but that hardly justifies the External reply which suggested that the problems were insignificant. Nor was there much illumination in the government's response to a task force recommendation that there be a public inquiry into the problems of Canadian industry facing developing country competition. That published reply told us

The Government will be making decisions shortly. When the decisions are announced the Government will be in a position to make known the factors leading to the positions adopted.

And perhaps the repeated recommendations that the aid program be more concentrated and better coordinated with other aspects of foreign policy is too detailed an issue to engage the attention of the Prime Minister, but somewhere in all this one looks for initiatives which will translate the philosophic discourses and international reputation of the Prime Minister into hard policy choices on North-South relations.

Mixed up in the Caribbean and Latin America

Opportunities are not lacking. The inquiries of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee into Canada's relations with the Caribbean and Latin America, for example, clearly reveal the ferment of the hemisphere and the importance of Canadian policy. President Reagan's Caribbean

Basin initiative, whether one likes it or not, spells out an overall American strategy for the region which rests on quite clear preferences for private sector development, and assumptions linking political instability to external, Soviet-inspired intervention. By contrast Canadian policy is quite uncoordinated. The aid program to the Caribbean is large, and so far resists the political ties preferred by the Reagan government, but it is unrelated to any broad conception of Canadian policy in the region. The policy of bilateralism, *inter alia*, indicates a concentration of commercial effort in selected Latin American countries, but these are precisely the countries in which human rights issues are the most troublesome. Even the Conservative foreign policy critic John Crosbie, for example, not previously known to have a keen interest in human rights issues, is reported to have returned from a Committee inquiry in Chile horrified at the plight of individuals and groups oppressed by the Chilean government. The relationship of development to stability in the Caribbean and Central America, particularly the relationship between external intervention, internal political change and fundamental economic rights, is unaddressed by the Canadian Government, no doubt for fear of raising yet another conflict with Washington, but in stark contrast to the high-minded rhetoric of the Mansion House speech.

Is it therefore too much to ask that the Prime Minister involve himself more closely in such a case by way of furthering his general interest in development? It is true that External Affairs is notoriously weak in personnel knowledgeable about Latin America. It may be that the tangle of interests and competing bureaucracies allow no more than incremental adjustments to existing policies. But however well-crafted, there is no room for more speeches by Mr. Trudeau of a general nature. What is now required in this particular case is a Canadian Caribbean policy which would embody some of the general declarations of North-South policy which Mr. Trudeau has stated so eloquently.

Arms control

Mr. Trudeau's equivalent of the Mansion House speech in the security area was his speech to UNSSOD I in May 1978. In a forceful review of disarmament issues, the Prime Minister caught the imagination of many both inside and outside Canada with his argument for "a strategy of suffocation by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds." As he acknowledged recently, the elements of that strategy were not new — a comprehensive test ban, an end to the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, a prohibition on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and an agreement to progressively limit military expenditure — but the combination appeared to offer a direction and a focus for arms control, with some hope of measuring progress in the strangulation process.

Four years later, in a speech to the Notre Dame University Convocation in May 1982, Mr. Trudeau spoke of the response to that strategy: "In the absence of a positive response from any quarter, the Canadian Government subsequently endorsed NATO's two-track approach — seeking to improve our defensive position by preparing to introduce new intermediate range weapons in Europe, while at the same time pursuing arms reductions negotiations." It was in this context, he said, that Canada had

Rhetoric and performance in foreign policy

reluctantly agreed to allow the testing of the Cruise missile. The problem with this observation is that regardless of whether one approves of the Cruise missile, there is no evidence of a serious debate about the abandonment of the strategy of suffocation which was involved in the decision to allow the testing of the Cruise. One suspects, therefore, that the suffocation strategy was untended by the Prime Minister and gradually lost any prominence it had in Canadian foreign policy, and that a forceful initiative would be required again to place arms control measures in the forefront of foreign policy concerns.

If such is the case, it is unlikely to come from the latest pronouncements of Mr. Trudeau, particularly his speech to UNSSOD II this year. Here Mr. Trudeau repeated his earlier argument for a strategy of suffocation, though in a less compelling way, and suggested that it be "enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization." This more general policy, he said, has two components: the strategy of suffocation, and "our current negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels."

Not necessarily breathless

The Prime Minister has logic on his side in this enlargement of the suffocation strategy — it makes sense to control weapons in being as well as to prevent new weapons systems from development — but in reality it appears that he has accepted the orthodoxy of the alliance position. One week earlier, in the NATO meeting in Bonn on June 10, Mr. Trudeau had emphasized the value of the range of negotiating fora now developed in East-West diplomacy. President Reagan's offer to begin strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union at the end of June, he argued, effectively rounded out the arms control framework of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate range nuclear weapons, the Vienna meetings on mutual and balanced force reductions, and the continuing effort to strengthen the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In this speech the Prime Minister emphasized arms control efforts even while allowing the need to match the Soviet buildup in Europe, apparently content to stress within the counsels of the alliance the need to take any reasonable opportunity to bring about arms reductions, but not making specific proposals, and implicitly accepting the two-track approach as he had done at Notre Dame.


Nobody can say that serious initiatives come easily in the disarmament field. It is not, therefore, quite fair to criticize the Prime Minister for failing to offer any original proposals in the debate. But it is reasonable to note that precisely the same pattern emerges in the arms control field as in North-South issues: there is little or no translation of general purpose and declaration into specific policies, and no fruitful confrontation of the difficulties and costs which independent initiatives would pose. In both cases the outcome is that the Prime Minister alienates the domestic groups most anxious to pursue and develop the broad statements of purpose which the Prime Minister himself sets out.

In the disarmament field, this is easily illustrated by his latest UN speech in which he referred at the very outset to the proposal for a declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. In Canada this controversial proposal has been espoused by the MPs who submitted a Minority Report in

the Committee inquiry into security and disarmament. They made four recommendations: a freeze on nuclear weapons, a reversal of the decision to allow testing of the Cruise, acceptance of the no-first-use doctrine, and measures to increase public awareness of disarmament issues. Mr. Trudeau replied in his UN speech by arguing that the Charter already bound the signatories to the principle of no-first-use of force — any force — so to limit the obligation to nuclear weapons would be to detract from the generality of the Charter.

This legalistic response seems almost calculated to put off those most anxious to pursue disarmament issues: not only does it ignore the immediate issue — the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe — but it essentially contradicts many of Mr. Trudeau's own arguments, including some in the same speech, which have emphasized the need to deal first with the problem of nuclear weapons.

Bob Cooper — PMO



Prime Minister addressing Notre Dame convocation

Along with his failure to respond to the call for a freeze on nuclear weapons production — an essential element in the strategy of suffocation — it is bound to frustrate those domestic groups which have placed high value on the pursuit and development of the suffocation strategy.

This is not to suggest that the Prime Minister is at fault merely because he does not accept the proposals of the Minority Report. But it does indicate again a gap between rhetoric and commitment in the Prime Minister's foreign policy performance, which leads to some broad conclusions.

First, the Prime Minister has not succeeded, assuming this to be his intention, in focussing the energies of his various administrations on the grand themes that he has quite persuasively identified in his foreign policy speeches. *Second*, he has been unable or unwilling to engage the continuing support of those domestic groups most interested in the ideas that he has put forward. Symptomatically, perhaps, not one of his major foreign policy speeches has been to a domestic audience — an understandable situation in the light of the occasions most appropriate to such speeches, but an omission which is not lost on activist groups within Canada. *Third*, his speeches reveal that the Prime Minister has moved far away from his concern in the early seventies with the notion of national interest, emphasizing instead the themes of international community and responsibility. With time running out on him, however, he has not developed policies to give substance to those themes, nor has he evoked public support for his distinctive version of an enlightened foreign policy. A characteristically "Trudeauvian" foreign policy, on a par with the internationalism of the Pearson era, may be difficult to achieve in modern times, but is surely part of the ambition of a Prime Minister whose leadership will soon span close to a generation in Canadian foreign policy. □

Trudeau on summitry

by Michel Vastel

May 26, 1982: *Well, they went in there and they were disagreeing on many things, but each has moved a little bit on something . . .*

June 10, 1982: *When you get sixteen heads of State and Government together, and they travel for many thousands of miles to meet on such an important subject as the North Atlantic Alliance, I think they should be expected to be more than rubber stamping a Communiqué which has been cooked, pre-cooked, and that all their job is to put a stamp on it and say "Okay!"*

There is no exchange, there is no deepening of the consensus within the Alliance, there is no effort at persuading each other . . . and nobody has a chance to say: "Well, why did you say that? And where did you get this idea? And what makes you think that?"

So, that is a bit of a pity.

Pierre Trudeau

Pierre Trudeau, 63, more than fourteen years in power, has a good chance to be doyen at any international summit which Canada attends. It does not hurt, too, to lead a bicultural former colony in the British Empire. Each year Trudeau goes to the NATO and Economic Summits, the UN when he wants to; and in the near future there will be two more international gatherings, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.

Given such opportunities, and the obvious delight Pierre Trudeau gets out of joining other leaders from around the world, why then is he so critical of Summitry?

There are at least two major reasons for his frustration: the format of the meeting which Trudeau — quite properly, I believe — criticized in Bonn last summer; and Trudeau's own problem of being the head of a nation which — by tradition more than by size and power — has no interest in being a leader.

The "Joseph Lunn" formula

Wrapping up the NATO Summit in Bonn last June, a particularly upset Pierre Trudeau stated: "I do not think this type of Summit can be very productive." An under-

statement, as he made clear. Apart from Trudeau's natural aversion to "rubber-stamping cooked and pre-cooked" statements of any kind (he himself works hard on his own major speeches), the Prime Minister of Canada complained about the time-schedule, the format of the Conference and the heavy hand the bureaucracy of an organization like NATO has on the substance of the meeting itself. One can apply such criticisms to other international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, where the permanent staff has a major say in all gatherings of the leaders they serve. This control by the professional bureaucracy has been called the "Joseph Lunn formula," after the domineering Secretary-General of NATO.

As far as the time-schedule is concerned, Trudeau points out that "It cannot be very productive if sixteen heads of state and government have something like four to five hours to talk about [such fundamental issues as] the Alliance." Time constraints impose a very rigid format on large gatherings such as NATO's or the UN's. In fact, each of the participants has time to make one speech, and Trudeau comments, "There is no exchange, there is no effort at persuading each other." Moreover, the party line imposed by the organization's bureaucracies is very strict. "Then," Trudeau says, "they each make speeches which are nothing more than paraphrases of the Communiqué which has been drafted in Brussels — or New York, or Geneva — by people who have been working for years together." At most, some outspoken leader — such as Ronald Reagan — will depart from his text and throw across the table: "I know how to deal with Communists. I turned them out of the Artists' Union in Hollywood!" By the time anybody has a chance to say: "Why did you say that?" President Reagan is back to his prepared text and the dust settles. The bureaucracy likes this formula — no exchange, therefore no chance of discord. But to have Spain and the United Kingdom agreeing on the same text — right in the middle of the Falklands crisis — it has to be very diluted and not very meaningful!

This is not to say that NATO, as an alliance of sixteen democracies, is meaningless. Its strength as a group — especially a military alliance — is not questioned. But it is not an appropriate forum for the deepening of consensus. So, apart from being strongly united against a potential aggressor, what is the purpose of the alliance when faced with such a crisis as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or even with a conflict or political tensions between two of its

Michel Vastel is Ottawa Correspondent for Le Devoir of Montreal. He accompanied Prime Minister Trudeau on his Summit trips in 1982, where the quotations printed here were recorded in open press conferences. He is also Editor of our sister publication, the quarterly Perspectives internationales.

Frustrations of a "Minor Prophet"

members, say Spain and Britain or Greece and Turkey? Trudeau believes deeply in collective and unified reactions to crisis in the world. But at these meetings there never is time to develop the broad consensus needed to settle such issues.

The "Montebello" formula


History will tell what contribution Pierre Trudeau has made to Summit technics but one can say now that he has greatly improved the efficiency of the Economic Summits. Even though this Summit had a smaller size — seven leaders — and no permanent Secretariat, the presence of one or two representatives from the European Economic Communities was bound to lessen its spontaneity. The choice of the Montebello site, as well as the chairmanship Trudeau showed there in 1981 made it a success. Not because it was much more productive than Venice or Bonn or Rambouillet. In fact — at the Economic Summit as well as in the Joseph Lunz formula — the fifteenth version of the Communiqué the seven leaders "rubber-stamped" was not very different from the fourteenth that had been discussed, the night before, by their permanent representatives.

The innovation Trudeau made at Montebello was to

bureaucracy behind the leaders moves reluctantly on the path traced by the leaders — it does take place.

One example of this was the "consensus" among the seven at Montebello to condemn acts of violence in Lebanon in July 1981. Then it took three hours of tough negotiations among diplomats over just two words of the communiqué before it could be released. This illustrates the complexities and the dangers of the "Montebello formula." According to many diplomats, they have great difficulty in keeping track of the progress made by the leaders "in camera." They get debriefings, but have no idea of how the actual consensus was reached. In other terms, bureaucrats complain that they have difficulty in following their leaders.

But one may wonder if the bureaucrats — especially such heavy-handed secretaries as Joseph Lunz — do not complain because they fear to lose their influence. One may also point out that on such technical issues as monetary policies or international trade, "trivial" leaders (without naming any!) may lose themselves in futile discussion of no use to the bureaucracies. One common criticism we hear from the so-called "Economic" Summit is that it is spoiled by diplomats too much involved in the politics of



Bob Cooper — P/MC

Prime Minister at Versailles Summit

keep the agenda and the time-schedule loose enough to allow the participants to "get-along" informally. Breakfasts, dinners and special sessions were devoted to substantive discussions where real exchange was possible. Even the later Cancun meeting — despite the fact that over thirty leaders attended — offered the same opportunity. This was — according to insiders — due to the style of chairmanship adopted by Trudeau and Portillo at the time. As a result, even though the "deepening of consensus" may not be visible in the final communiqué — mainly because the

international problems, and not sufficiently skilled in the technical matters.


The "Guadeloupe" formula

The French, who love politics and find economics rather distasteful, have tried another formula. President Giscard d'Estaing brought together three of his colleagues — the American, the British and the German — in the remote French town of Guadeloupe. Short-sleeves and ananas-cocktails did not produce very much except that the

Frustrations of a "Minor Prophet"

idea behind it was the same as other Summits: to isolate the leaders from their staffs and help them to "get together." Informality was an essential element of that meeting and, judging from what we know of Pierre Trudeau's personality, one may expect that the Guadeloupe formula is his preferred one. Unfortunately Canada is not part of the club of superpowers and Trudeau was not invited.

From Montebello to Guadeloupe, there is one ingre-



dent Trudeau is interested in: the "chemistry." This word, frequently heard in background briefings by officials after the meeting of leaders, is synonymous with success. This "chemistry" means two leaders do understand each other better and can probe beyond their differences. It is that "chemistry" which made Camp David a reality. It took this special ingredient — Begin and Sadat getting along very well — before the drafters could start to work on the accord. This "chemistry" explains too why relations between Pierre Trudeau and Ronald Reagan are much better than the formal relations between the two governments, officials and ministers. This is probably why Pierre Trudeau, who is more at ease in exchanging ideas than in arguing over legal texts, does prefer the Montebello formula. Incidentally, it may also explain why Pierre Trudeau usually obtains better results over an informal lunch at 24 Sussex Drive than in a crowded and public federal-provincial conference.

The "Minor Prophet"

Canada is not a superpower and expresses no interest in playing a major role on the international scene. "We have no influence there," one can hear very often in the

corridors of the Lester B. Pearson building. At times, it means "We have no interest." But for Trudeau, not leading a superpower should not be a handicap. The Prime Minister said recently, in Yugoslavia, that "Canada believes in the importance of ideas and values as influencing the events in the world, rather than in armies and the nuclear forces of the superpowers." This is an assertion that fits Pierre Trudeau more than it does Canada, and it may explain why he is sometimes so frustrated by Summits. The presence of Ronald Reagan — a man who certainly believes in military power more than in the importance of ideas — has not reconciled Pierre Trudeau with international conferences. And the NATO forum is not a place where ideas and values are welcomed.

Thus, there is a question many Canadians ask themselves each time Pierre Trudeau leaves the country for a long tour abroad: "Why are we spending so much time — and money — to participate in conferences where we have — Trudeau admits — so little influence?" There is a sacred principle in diplomacy — which incidentally may explain the success of so many embassy receptions — which is: "It is better to be there than not to be." It is not a matter of influencing others but a matter of gathering information which, in turn, will help Canada to cope with others' actions. Then, there is also some domestic benefit — even political — for Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal Party, to be seen with leaders of the world. To underline this (a contrario) one only need recall the damage Joe Clark suffered by appearing to fail in his first world tour.

At any Summit he attends, Pierre Trudeau tries to show that "ideas and values may influence events in the world." Unfortunately, Pierre Trudeau is seen as a "Minor Prophet" by his colleagues. For example, the day after the Versailles Summit, the international edition of the *Herald Tribune* ran a cartoon with Trudeau as a teddy bear in the hands of Ronald Reagan. This is the way Europeans see Canada: a plaything for the American eagle.

So one concludes that either Pierre Trudeau is leading the wrong country, or Canada is pursuing the wrong policy. For in gatherings where superpowers — and Canada — attend, "armies and nuclear forces" will always overcome "ideas and values."

Last spring, Trudeau praised Yugoslavia for leading "a group of nations which can look objectively, without having political hangups against one side or the other . . ." It is obvious that the position of Yugoslavia is more comfortable than that of Canada. Trudeau — if not Canada — has no "political hangup" either. But Canada is seen as following others while Yugoslavia takes the lead of the non-aligned countries. There is little doubt that in a Summit of non-aligned countries, Trudeau would be seen the way he is among the big nations — as a very respected leader. But is it not his problem that Canada does not want to be a leader? That is, Canada does not want to sit at the appropriate forum. Not willing "to have any influence there," may be seen as a silent complicity by other countries — thus the cartoonist's vision of Reagan's teddy bear. So, unless he can change that fundamental premise of Canada's foreign policy, Trudeau will remain frustrated with Summitry. □

IDRC at twelve

by Grant Manuge

The International Development Research Centre, Canada's most daring and altruistic effort to aid the world's poor nations, appears to have lost the creativity and independence of its early years as a result of political and bureaucratic pressures. While the IDRC was the brainchild of former Prime Minister Lester Pearson and got off to an impressive if quiet start under an agricultural economist, W. David Hopper, it has suffered hardening of the arteries and vulnerability to politics under Ivan Head, a close associate of Pearson's successor, Pierre Trudeau.

Twelve years after the act establishing the Centre passed through Parliament with rare all-party agreement, Canada's IDRC is still largely unknown in its own country. Yet, funded almost exclusively by an annual Parliamentary grant, the Centre has disbursed more than \$220 million to researchers in 100 countries to adapt and apply science and technology to Third World development problems. The bulk of IDRC funding supports individual applied research in developing countries. Instead of doing their own research, Centre employees locate eligible Third World scientists, help them apply for grants and monitor their progress. Among successful projects to date are the launching of an educational magazine on health and planning in West Africa, the breeding of milkfish in captivity for the first time in the Philippines and research into a weed which may kill water snails that spread belharzia, a parasitic disease afflicting millions of Egyptians.

During the 1970s the IDRC cultivated the image of a dedicated, flexible organization fulfilling its mandate with a minimum of bureaucratic rigidities. More important for the Canadian government, this was accomplished without embarrassing scandals involving the misuse of taxpayers' money. "With more than 1,500 projects in 12 years," says former IDRC Secretary and General Counsel Jim Pfeifer, "there have only been about 15 cases where we've closed down a project and pulled out."

Growing pains

But just as every child inevitably faces the trials of puberty, so the IDRC has its own problems as it comes of age. The Centre has become more political, bureaucratic and less sensitive to the needs of developing countries.

The IDRC was established as an uniquely autonomous public corporation in 1970 specifically to escape the bureaucratic environment of other government bodies, such as CIDA. To those who presided over its early years, recent efforts to transform the Centre into a cost-efficient

bureaucracy negate the very rationale for its existence. The Centre's creators intended it to be an improved version of the large, privately-funded Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in the United States, which had been heavily involved in the agricultural research that led to the Green Revolution's dramatic increases in food grain production in many developing countries. "That was the sort of model for everybody," says former External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, who piloted the IDRC Act through Parliament. "Could we have a government-sponsored organization operated like a private foundation, free of interference, with a substantial sum of money and with an international group controlling its activities?"

In 1967 barely two percent of the funds for research in the world was spent in developing countries. Maurice Strong, CIDA's first President, wanted to help correct the imbalance by devoting part of Canada's foreign aid budget to the creation of a development research centre. Caught up in the enthusiasm of centennial year, Prime Minister Pearson was quickly convinced of such a centre's merits. The heads of no fewer than seventeen government departments and agencies were assigned to study the proposal. By the time the committee's recommendations arrived at the Cabinet table, Pearson had resigned, Trudeau had taken over and an election had intervened.

Like an expectant father, Strong followed the progress of the embryonic centre from the Pearson to Trudeau governments. He insisted draft legislation contain provisions to protect it from the political influence of government. Thanks to him the IDRC is not a crown corporation. It is not subject to governmental directives, nor do its activities require direct Parliamentary approval. Unlike CIDA, its allocations to developing countries are not tied to the purchase of Canadian goods and services. "The idea of the IDRC was really to break away from that pattern," says Sharp.

The Centre's mandate — "to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into problems of developing regions of the world and into the means of adapting and applying scientific, technical and other knowledge" — was deliberately kept broad and flexible. Research priorities

Grant Manuge holds an honors degree in Journalism and Political Science from Carleton University in Ottawa. This article was originally done as part of his graduation requirement. Except where otherwise stated, quotations are from personal interviews by Mr. Manuge.

International Development Research Centre

were laid down by the first president, W. David Hopper; its first chairman, former Prime Minister Pearson; and the other nineteen members of the international board of governors, six of whom must be from developing countries, four from other developed countries, and the rest Canadian.

First President

Hopper brought sound scientific credentials and considerable development experience when he returned to his home town to take up the task of building the IDRC. At age forty-three he had already spent the better part of a decade with the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in India. "Hopper was conscious people in the Third World were tired of being told what to do," says Shirley Seward, an IDRC social sciences program officer who wrote a history of the Centre's early years. "He was totally committed to the idea that research should be conducted by developing country people in developing country institutions, and that a Canadian component, if any, would be minor."

The early governors decided to channel the Centre's limited funds into projects aimed at improving rural living standards because rural populations generally benefit last and least from scientific advances. Aware that even relatively inexperienced researchers may stumble across important discoveries, the Centre attempted to balance support for research training and support for the advancement of knowledge. Great emphasis was laid on strengthening Third World research capacity, especially through the new approach of teaming-up untried researchers with older, experienced scientists from the same region. "The issue really was, were we seeking to support research of international standard?" says Hopper, "And the answer was no, we were not. We were seeking to support research that would meet the sensible needs of developing countries."

Four program divisions based on sectoral rather than geographic lines were set up to administer projects: Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Sciences; Health Sciences; Social Sciences; and Information Sciences.

The IDRC's budget grew rapidly from the first million-dollar grant in 1970 to thirty-nine million dollars by 1977 when Hopper left to become Vice President for South Asia of the World Bank in Washington. Ivan Head, Trudeau's foreign policy adviser, became President just in time to witness what he calls the "devil's squeeze" of the late 1970s. Special legislative status and idealistic objectives did not render the Centre immune from the twin evils of inflation and government spending cuts. For the first time the IDRC had to settle for a much smaller increase in its annual grant than requested. Later in 1978 the government froze funding at the same level for 1979-80. As the dollar depreciated and research costs spiralled, grant recipients deluged the Ottawa head office with requests for additional funding. Many grew disheartened. Administrative concerns were beginning to intrude on the research work. Mike McGarry, former associate director of health sciences, says that since leaving the Centre he has met researchers who confided they would not deal with the IDRC again because it exercises such tight control over research budgets and requires an enormous amount of detailed information for project applications.

Another consequence of the financial predicament

was a reduction in the size of new project funding. The average grant dropped by as much as \$60,000 from the earlier average amount of \$200,000, although research costs were soaring. Some supplementary funding was obtained by dipping into Centre investments (the IDRC Act permits it to retain and invest money left unspent at the end of a fiscal year). The rest was made up through a tough package of austerity measures. Liaison offices in London, New Delhi and Washington and the East African office in Nairobi, one of five regional offices, were closed (Nairobi has since been reopened). Travel budgets were slashed and office expenditures trimmed. New hiring was frozen and the number of employees cut back from 355 in 1978 to 338 two years later, not including reductions in locally-hired staff.

The staff cutbacks came in two waves. A self-imposed hiring freeze and gradual elimination of redundant positions had just begun when the Conservatives came to power in the 1979 election. Sinclair Stevens, the new President of the Treasury Board, ordered an additional two percent staff reduction for all government departments and agencies, including the IDRC. Although the Centre is exempt from Treasury Board regulations, Head complied. "We thought that our trimming down . . . would allow us to escape from subsequent Treasury Board concerns about us," he says, "and indeed Treasury Board has no authority over us. Nevertheless, there is a reality to a political scene, and when the President of the Treasury Board says that he wants this done, whether he has authority over us or not, I felt there was no alternative but to acquiesce."

Centre administration was tightened and reorganized. The frequency of management committee meetings increased sharply, new accounting procedures were introduced and regional offices were instructed to report directly to the President's office through the director of planning and evaluation. The process of submitting large grant applications to a projects committee of senior staff members and representatives of other government departments was extended to projects valued at less than \$100,000. Previously the President had approved small projects almost automatically on the advice of the appropriate division director. "It was seen by some as a repressive measure," says Pfeifer, who chaired the committee, "but we had to prove that money was being spent wisely." The austerity measures and the tightening of the bureaucratic screws, like any harsh medicine, had unanticipated side effects. The 1979-80 IDRC report to Parliament records some of the consequences: "These cost reduction measures and results were not achieved without considerable sacrifice and strain on staff morale . . . Most staff members have seen their work load increase significantly."

Waiting on government

Although every organization tends to ossify as it grows larger and older, some evidence suggests the Centre is paralyzed by arteriosclerosis. The only major new initiatives of recent years — a cooperative research program and renewable energy research — originated with the Canadian government rather than within the IDRC. The Centre's autonomy has been eroded. If the IDRC eats everything the government puts on its plate, it appears that it will become fat and lazy and a prisoner of government whims. If the Centre should become merely an instrument of Canadian foreign policy rather than an actor in its own

right, its hard-won image of responsiveness and political detachment would be irreparably damaged in the Third World.

The precedent for growing government involvement in the IDRC came after Hopper's departure in 1977. A selection committee of four governors chose Ivan Head, then the Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser, from among thirty-nine candidates. Head was a lawyer who had once spent several years in Malaysia as a junior Canadian diplomat, but his scientific credentials were nil. "Ivan Head would not have been appointed, although he's a very able person, if he had not been in Mr. Trudeau's office," says Sharp. "He was the Prime Minister's selection." Other recent appointments to the board include former Liberal cabinet minister Donald S. Macdonald, named Chairman in 1980; Maurice LeClair, President of Canadian National Railways, made a governor in 1981; and Gordon Osbaldeston, the new Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, in June 1982. Another top public servant, Marcel Massé, sits on the board as CIDA President.

The Canadian government has not been timid about indicating its priority areas to the IDRC. A Ministry of State for Science and Technology background paper prepared for the 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology in Vienna recommended an infusion of up to one percent of Canada's foreign aid budget to the Centre, to fund joint research ventures between Canadian scientists and their counterparts in the Third World. The new Conservative administration pledged that Canada would implement the recommendation as funds became available. After announcing the initiative in Vienna, the government invited the IDRC to take on the program. After hasty consultation with the board of governors, Centre management readily agreed. Conditionality thus crept in through the back door. Joint research projects had been part of the original mandate but few had been approved. Because the new money is kept in a separate account and cannot be spent unless there is a Canadian component, the IDRC finds itself promoting research opportunities for Canadian scientists much more intensively than before. Observers question whether developing country researchers stand to gain as much as their Canadian colleagues. Carleton University economics professor Ted English, the recipient of an IDRC research fellowship in 1979, says the danger lies in the new program's becoming just another pork barrel for Canadian academics. Roger Young, a senior researcher at the Ottawa-based North-South Institute, says: "My own view is that they're overstating the Canadian capacity to contribute to any of these problems."

Renewable energy

A second instance of government agenda-setting came in August 1981, when Prime Minister Trudeau flew to the Nairobi UN Energy Conference to announce a four-year, ten million dollar grant to the IDRC to fund Third World renewable energy research. The Centre promptly accepted the initiative, although an internal task force report recommending more support for energy research had been disregarded just two years earlier. Head commissioned the report by two senior staff members shortly after his arrival, but the idea of moving into energy in a big way encountered opposition from the four division directors, and the report was shelved without any discussion of its substance. "We felt at that time we did not know enough about the energy

requirements of the developing countries to move into the area," says Head.

However, report co-author David Henry says the findings were vetted by a group of twenty leading energy specialists from seven developing countries (including Brazil and India), the World Bank, the UN and several international research organizations. He says Head chose to avoid the issues addressed in the report to preserve peace among the Centre's senior staff, who were concerned that greater attention to energy might create competition for what was considered a shrinking budget. Shortly after, as it became apparent energy research was a government priority, another study was commissioned and the Centre had its homework done in time for the Prime Minister's trip to Nairobi. "The impetus seems to be coming from government to the IDRC," says Young, "and the original intention was that the IDRC would be a uniquely independent and autonomous body and would make its own mind up about its program emphasis and the focus of its work."

Just as Strong attempted to give the Centre legislative protection from government interference, Hopper tried to deter the buildup of "obsolete talent" that results from an entrenched bureaucracy. "I saw no reason to assure anybody that joined the organization a job for life," says Hopper. "It was clear the mix of needs of developing countries was going to alter, and therefore the IDRC had to maintain a flexibility with regard to its professional staff that would permit it to adjust and reshape that mix of needs." Legislative exemptions from Treasury Board and public service hiring practices allowed the Centre to hire staff from around the world — not just Canadians — on short term contracts, which would not be renewed if fresh ideas were needed. Generous termination benefits were offered. However, experience has shown that staff members generally stayed longer than Hopper anticipated. Many program officers view their work as a lifetime career. Two of the division directors have been there since the beginning and a third for seven years. Their yearly reappointment by the board of governors is considered a formality.

Who knows best?

Under Hopper the keyword was sensitivity to the research priorities of developing country researchers. That orientation has changed as program officers become more familiar with their work. "As professionals we have a much better idea of what the priorities are," says Seward, "so we can afford now to express our own opinions." Head says the IDRC may be more controversial in the future if he decides on principle that certain practices are wrong: "In some of my public statements I'm edging ever closer to that in being critical of agricultural policies in some developing countries." But the Centre may gain nothing from taking a more assertive role in the Third World. Paternalistic preaching should be avoided if the IDRC wants Third World governments to cooperate in the promotion of development research. The Centre deals almost exclusively with scientists and research institutions when it should be paying more attention to ordinary people. "What no one seems to ever spend enough time doing is finding out what it is the target population really wants," says Roger Young.

At least one ambitious IDRC project failed for this reason. Between 1971 and 1977 the Centre funded and

International Development Research Centre

participated in a project by the Colombian Agricultural Institute in Colombia's mountainous Cauca region. New high-yielding varieties of corn were tested with various planting and pest-control methods and new fertilizers. Although researchers designed a technology that could increase farmers' incomes by four times, the higher corn yields could be achieved only through a sevenfold increase in the cost of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. Only 27 of the district's 600 families participated in the scheme in 1974, and by 1977 the number dropped to 25. The one million dollar project was a failure. Rosemary Galli, writing in *Latin American Perspectives*, says: "The failure of the strategy was directly attributable to a lack of communication with peasants about their real needs and the bureaucratic alienating nature of the plan."

On the other hand, the Centre has sometimes been in such a hurry to move on to new projects that the published results of successfully completed research have gathered dust on the shelf. IDRC-sponsored research at Ontario's University of Waterloo produced an inexpensive village hand-pump made of plastic pipe and wood. It proved to be light, rugged and easy to repair during field tests in Malawi in 1977. But the hand-pump research languished on the shelf until the World Bank recently stumbled across it and included it in a multimillion-dollar campaign for the UN International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade. In an effort to correct this problem, the Centre has now begun to sponsor conferences to publicize research results and bring together interested Third World governments and donor agencies, including CIDA.

Head has also appointed a former chairman of the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly, retired Jamaican

diplomat Donald Mills, to ask Third World leaders how the Centre can become more flexible and responsive to their needs.

Sad conclusion

Head is a careful administrator and he is not about to let the IDRC embark on any dramatic new research adventures. His personal goal as IDRC President is to prove to the government and the Canadian public that their money is well spent. "I'm anxious that the Centre prove itself as effective in the long run in the support of developing country research as it has proved itself innovative in the short run," he says.

As one of the original architects of a Canadian foreign policy that attaches great significance to North-South relations, Head can take much of the credit for restoring the IDRC to government favor after the demoralizing financial squeeze of the late '70s. This year's \$59.2 million parliamentary grant reflects a twenty-five percent increase, and the government has accepted a recommendation from the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations to give priority to further funding increases for the Centre. Yet he also has allowed the government to impose its priorities on the Centre and has presided over the Centre's transformation from a loose association of professionals to an entrenched bureaucracy that stifles idealism and innovation.

The IDRC set out to show the development establishment that a government-funded development organization could be creative and flexible. Like so many of yesterday's flower children, it has ended up by embracing the very orthodoxy it once scorned. □

YOUR GIFT PROVIDES SAFER WATER



CARE[®]

Send your gift to — Care Canada
1312 Bank Street Ottawa K1S 5H7

The events of August and September 1982

international canada

Bilateral Relations

USA	2
Other countries (alphabetically)	6

Multilateral Relations

IMF and World Bank	10
United Nations	11
International Terrorism	12
Organization of American States	12
COSPAS/SARSAT Project	13
GATT	13

Policy

Foreign	13
Defence	15
Trade/Economic	16
Aid	16

"International Canada" is a paid supplement to **International Perspectives** sponsored by External Affairs Canada. "International Canada" was founded by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs twenty years ago as a monthly review of Canadian international activities. That ceased with the month of February 1982, following which the Department of External Affairs began sponsoring this bimonthly supplement to **International Perspectives**. Each supplement covers two months and continues the mandate to provide a comprehensive summary of Canadian government statements and of political discussion on Canada's position in international affairs. It also records Canadian adherence to international agreements and participation in international programs. The text is prepared by **International Perspectives**.

Bilateral Relations

USA

Foreign Ministers Meet

External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan met with US Secretary of State George Shultz August 3 in Washington to review the state of the Western alliance and bilateral relations between Canada and the US. Departing for Washington, Mr. MacGuigan told reporters that the West was in "the worst time of disunity we have seen and has the potential to get worse unless we bring things together again." According to Mr. MacGuigan, the biggest problem facing the Western alliance was the US decision to embargo the supplies and technology for the construction of the USSR natural gas pipeline to western Europe. Canada and European countries had been critical of the US extension of the embargo to include construction supplies from foreign subsidiaries of US companies and from foreign companies manufacturing under US licences. Both Britain and France ordered companies operating in those countries to defy the US-imposed orders. Mr. MacGuigan said that the embargo would not have created severe problems if it had not been announced against a backdrop of economic difficulties, high US interest rates, the continuing rift between the US and Europe over steel trade and growing signs of protectionism in the US Congress, the *Globe and Mail* reported August 3.

Although European companies were hardest hit by the US decision, Mr. MacGuigan said that four or five Canadian companies were known to be affected. He said that Canada was prepared to invoke its legislation that orders Canadian companies not to refrain from normal business simply on the orders of another government. But Canada had been critical of the US decision primarily as a matter of principle, protesting the "infringement" of national sovereignty. Mr. MacGuigan also said that he did not agree with Washington's assessment that the Siberian pipeline would leave western Europe dangerously dependent on Soviet-supplied natural gas (*Globe and Mail*, August 3).

After the meeting with Mr. Shultz, Mr. MacGuigan told reporters that he had suggested a meeting of Western foreign ministers "to try to reorient the relationship and to

try to heal some of the wounds," resulting largely from recent actions of the United States. Canada could serve to bridge the sharp differences between the US and European allies over the pipeline action, he said.

There were also "a particularly large number of stresses" in the bilateral relationship between Canada and the US, Mr. MacGuigan said, caused by a shift in US attitudes under President Reagan's Administration. "We haven't changed very much in recent years . . . The greater change has occurred in the US. We can't be expected to change our policies and our fundamental orientation because different perceptions arise here, perceptions which I suppose have been magnified by the economic crisis in which we find ourselves and in which everyone tends to look in many directions for scapegoats . . . We don't think that we're a valid scapegoat for the US. We believe that we're entitled to follow our national interests," Mr. MacGuigan said in Washington (*Globe and Mail*, August 4).

The US Congress had proposed legislation in many areas affecting Canadian concerns. Mr. MacGuigan said that, "the attempts of many US congressmen to legislate a narrow kind of sectoral reciprocity would be the end of any effective trading system in the world" if adopted and extended. While the problems come more from Congress than from the Reagan Administration, Canada fears that some of the legislation could go ahead unopposed by the Administration, the *Globe and Mail* reported (August 3). The operation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency and the National Energy Program were "defended where necessary" by Mr. MacGuigan during the meeting.

Siberian Pipeline Dispute

It was announced August 9 that the "question of whether US Export Administration regulations may be influencing commercial decisions of Canadian companies and adversely affecting Canada's foreign trade had been

referred to the Director of Investigation and Research for evaluation as to whether a formal inquiry should be instituted under the Combines Investigation Act." The reference followed the US decision to extend its regulations concerning oil and gas equipment and technology exports to the Soviet Union to foreign companies. External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan had already characterized the extension of these controls as an "unacceptable infringement of Canadian sovereignty" (External Affairs press release, August 9).

FIRA Criticized

The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) was criticized during August and September as a result of several decisions which were seen as "bizarre" by observers (*Globe and Mail*, August 2 and September 21).

A US publishing company, J.B. Lippincott, sold its operation in Canada to Harper and Row in the US which was not allowed by FIRA to take over the Lippincott of Canada subsidiary. The Canadian operation was closed instead of being sold to a Canadian buyer. This prompted questions in the House of Commons on August 3. John Bosley (PC, Don Valley West) asked Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Herb Gray what "significant benefit" for Canada was achieved through the loss of the twelve jobs involved. Mr. Gray responded that the parent company's decision to close the operation instead of selling to a Canadian company was deplorable. (In September it was announced that the new owner of US-based Random House, Herald Co. of Syracuse, NY, had met FIRA conditions to take over Random House of Canada. One of these conditions was to employ the dozen laid-off workers from Lippincott.)

Both Ambassador Paul Robinson and Richard J. Smith of the US Embassy in Ottawa complained in September about FIRA as well. In a letter to the editor of the *Globe and Mail* published September 8, Mr. Smith cited the Lippincott case as an example of "FIRA abuse." He said, "It is particular aspects of FIRA's operation that concern us, such as delays, the lack of transparency, the unwarranted intrusions into the merger activities of the US parents of Canadian companies." Ambassador Robinson told reporters September 11 that, "When bureaucratic red tape becomes the hallmark [of FIRA], then something has to be really done about it. . . . If it's not done, it'll simply kill off foreign investment in Canada" (*The Citizen*, September 13).

Canada was at the same time critical of US laws, regulations policies and practices regarding foreign investment. At a seminar on Canadian economic nationalism September 8, sponsored by the Canadian government as a "sidelight" to the International Monetary Fund meeting in Toronto, a seventy-two page report on barriers to foreign investment in the US was presented. The FIRA report said that, "US officials, politicians and businessmen claim that the US supports and maintains an open policy toward incoming foreign investment. This report shows that this is hardly the case." On September 29, Herb Gray, although no longer the minister responsible for FIRA, defended the agency before an audience of US businessmen and lawyers in New York City. Mr. Gray repeated the Canadian complaints that there are a variety of instruments in the US

which serve to screen foreign investment (*The Citizen*, October 1).

Ed Lumley was sworn in on the same day as Canada's Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. The new minister responsible for FIRA was "welcomed" by US businessmen, according to newspaper articles about the cabinet shuffle. The *Globe and Mail* October 1 reported that business executives in the US viewed Mr. Lumley as having "no pre-conceived leanings" in the direction of economic nationalism, and as being an enthusiastic supporter of bilateral economic relations with the US, and of US and other foreign investment.

Trucking Regulations

The US Congress passed measures on September 17 which put a two-year moratorium on the issuing of further truck-route licences in the US to Canadian companies. The provisions were part of a bill to reduce regulation of the bus industry in the US. Canada had previously asked President Ronald Reagan to veto such a bill. Mr. Reagan signed the bill into law on September 20. He also issued a memorandum which partially removed the moratorium by permitting the US Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to issue certificates to Canadian trucking firms subject to "certain conditions." The memorandum called upon US Trade Representative William Brock to "seek an understanding with Canada that will ensure the fair and equitable treatment of both Canadian and United States trucking interests on both sides of the border" (*Globe and Mail*, September 22). The waiver gave the ICC two months to determine the public interest and the economic effect of new licences for Canadians on the industry (*The Citizen*, September 24).

The US had had an unofficial moratorium on licences for Canadian truckers since last February. US truckers had received Congressional support for their charges that Canadian regulations discriminated against them, and that Canadians had been gaining access to their markets as a result of deregulation in the US. The new measures were based on these charges, which both Canadian truckers and Canadian ministers responsible denied. International Trade Minister Ed Lumley, in Washington at the time, said that he was "extremely disappointed" with the measures. "From our perspective we operate a non-discriminatory policy," he said (*Globe and Mail*, September 22).

Further reaction came from the Canadian trucking industry. Officials said that they were "confused" by the measures. "Nobody quite knows what the new standards will mean," said one official. The executive director of the Canadian Trucking Association, Kenneth Maclaren, told reporters that Canadian provinces, which regulate the industry, have been generous with US carriers, granting eighty-five to ninety percent of the US requests to serve Canadian points. Mr. Maclaren insisted that there is no discrimination against US trucking in Canada as claimed by that industry (*The Citizen*, September 24).

Federal Transport Minister Jean-Luc Pepin and Trade Minister Lumley responded on behalf of the federal government September 24. An External Affairs press release said that "The Government of Canada, with the full cooperation of the Provinces, has since the introduction of this legislation into Congress in late 1981 repeatedly demonstrated to the US Administration that there is no discriminatory treat-

ment of Americans in Canadian regulatory practice and that the US measures are entirely unjustified. In his announcement the President instructed the US Trade Representative to report back to him in sixty days after discussions with Canada. Mr. Lumley said: "Canada is always ready to have discussions with the US. However, we will not accept as a basis for these discussions either unfounded allegations concerning Canadian regulatory practice or any unilaterally conceived form of reciprocity."

At a Halifax meeting September 23, the Council of Federal and Provincial Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety expressed grave concern over the "unwarranted and unacceptable" US measures. The Ministers agreed to defer any action in response to the US measures until after the sixty-day period in which the ICC will be reviewing Canadian applications. The Council of Ministers "expressed the hope that this crisis will be satisfactorily resolved by the US government and stressed its strong support for the principle of maintaining equitable treatment of all carriers under the respective laws which obtain in each jurisdiction" (External Affairs press release, September 24).

Bombardier Subway Contract

Preliminary findings of the US International Trade Commission (ITC) announced August 3 were that a US industry might suffer economic injury because a Canadian company, Bombardier Inc., won a contract with New York City's Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) to build 825 subway cars for that city. The subway contract has been the subject of several investigations centering on complaints from a US company and a union that a cut-rate loan from Canada's Export Development Corporation to MTA had been unfair to US companies competing for the contract. (See *International Canada*, June and July.)

The preliminary determination by the ITC, according to an August 4 *Globe and Mail* article, meant that the ITC and the US Commerce Department would continue investigations that could result in countervailing duties being imposed on the subway cars.

In an article appearing in the *Globe and Mail* August 20, MTA Chairman Richard Ravitch repeated his company's claims that the Bombardier offer had been superior to competing ones on all counts—quality, price, financing terms and New York State-manufactured content in the cars.

Great Lakes Pollution

A report by the International Joint Commission (IJC), made public in August, pointed out several areas of concern regarding the pollution of the Great Lakes. The IJC is a Canada-US agency which investigates and helps settle boundary, lake and river disputes between the two countries. It was the agency's first report on Great Lakes pollution in four years, and dealt with the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

The report stated that, "The Great Lakes ecosystem suffers from widespread contamination, and the lakes are a major sink for such substances. . . . The surrounding population is exposed to toxic and hazardous substances through a variety of pathways" (*Globe and Mail*, August 17). The IJC said that it is less able to monitor such pollution because of US budget cuts and the increasing political

ties of the US scientific advisers. It asked the Reagan Administration to review its proposed budget cuts so that international obligations to clean up the lakes will not be jeopardized. Both the Canadian and US governments were criticized in the report for their failure to create a priority list of toxic substances on which action should be taken.

Other major concerns cited in the report were the failure of both countries to meet their 1980 goals of setting new phosphorous levels for the lakes, and US unwillingness to designate "limited-use zones" in sensitive areas to restrict industrial municipal sewage (*Globe and Mail*, August 17).

In a letter to the editor published in the *Globe and Mail* September 2, External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan wrote that Canada had brought its concern "in forceful terms to the attention of the Reagan Administration and [had] urged them to ensure that they are able to implement fully their obligations under the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement." Mr. MacGuigan was responding to editorial charges that Canada was waiting for the US to take the lead in action against the pollution. He mentioned the recent Canada-Ontario Agreement (COA) which "requires the two Canadian parties to continue to maintain their clean-up efforts at the high levels attained during the 1970s." The agreement provided for a strengthening of control over "non-point source pollution, an increase in monitoring of toxic substances and completion of an ambitious program of municipal sewage plant construction to control phosphorous pollution," Mr. MacGuigan said.

In an August interview, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator Anne Gorsuch said that a major objective of the Reagan Administration in the environmental field was "to do an even better job with fewer resources," and that market forces and private sector initiatives would enhance government efforts increasingly. A major function of the EPA, she said, was to provide good scientific understanding of the problems (US Embassy text, August 13). This agency had already issued a report in July which claimed that the Love Canal chemical-waste dump in Niagara Falls, NY, had been "contained," and recommended some repopulation of the neighborhood. These findings had been questioned in the House of Commons on July 23. (See *International Canada*, June and July 1982.) On September 7, Environment Canada released a report which said that the US report "does not provide the necessary confidence to conclude one way or the other that contaminants from Love Canal are not migrating through the bedrock aquifer (water table) to the Niagara River now or will not do so in the future." A newspaper article said that the Environment Canada report "makes it clear that the US is not living up to the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, which states that the discharge of toxic chemicals to trans-boundary waterways must be eliminated."

Acid Rain

The head of the US Environmental Protection Agency, Anne Gorsuch, explained to a US reporter in August what that agency was doing to address the problem of acid rain. She said:

The American people are investing an enormous amount of money in trying to come to grips with

what are the causes of the acid rain phenomenon, and how best to deal with those causes. The President has increased acid rain research funding by over seventy percent from fiscal year 1981 to fiscal year 1983—a total of over sixty-four million dollars from fiscal year 1980 through fiscal year 1983—a very strong commitment to finding the answer to this problem. We are also actively working with Canada under the auspices of the US-Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution. The joint US-Canadian work groups formed under the memorandum are completing compilation of technical and scientific data on transboundary air pollution. We know that there's something happening out there. We have very little information as to why it's happening and how it's happening. There are those who would advocate that we go to immediate control on acid rain. I think that's rather like jumping off a three-meter diving board without checking to see if there's any water in the pool. Any additional regulatory control program would require large expenditures of funds that must be borne by the American people. . . .” (US Embassy [Ottawa] text, August 13).

In previous months, Canada had been critical of the Reagan Administration's approach to environmental problems shared between the US and Canada. In a speech to environmentalists at the Vermont Natural Resources Council on September 12, Environment Minister John Roberts again criticized the US Administration for “foot-dragging” in seeking a solution to acid rain problems, saying it was “seriously clouding Canadian-American relations.” He called Anne Gorsuch's call for more acid rain research “incredible.” “Over three thousand scientific studies have already been done and we have already lost many lakes to acid rain and tens of thousands more are in danger.” Because of the US attitude, he said, he has come to question the usefulness of continuing negotiations between the two countries. He said, “Canadians and the people of Vermont are not interested in lip-service and fine statements. We want action before it's too late” (*The Citizen*, September 13).

Electricity Exports

The Canadian Cabinet approved in late August the export of electrical power generated by the Point Lepreau nuclear reactor in New Brunswick to the United States. The August 31 decision allowed for the first time the export of power from a nuclear reactor alone. Cabinet approval followed a National Energy Board approval in April for the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission to sell power from the Candu reactor to three US utilities.

“Selling electrical power to the US will earn foreign exchange and contribute positively to Canada's balance of payments,” Energy Minister Marc Lalonde said (*The Citizen*, September 1). At the same time, the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility and MP Mark Rose (NDP, Mission-Port Moody) condemned the export of nuclear power, claiming that Canadians were taking all of the environmental and financial risks (*The Citizen*, September 1). The Point Lepreau plant had been troubled by controversy since construction began in 1975.

Joint BC and Alberta Natural Gas Exports

The Energy Ministers from British Columbia and Alberta announced September 24 that their provinces had decided to create a joint body to sell natural gas in the US. The committee will act as a sales agent for both provinces and steer gas sales through the US regulatory process. This combined approach was designed to increase natural gas sales to the US and was prompted by the increasing volume of natural gas available in Canada for export, the *Globe and Mail* reported September 25. The announcement also followed a report by the US Economic Regulatory Administration which stated that US consumers will need additional Canadian gas supplies over the next decade (*Calgary Herald*, August 24).

Offshore Injury Claims Bill

A US bill approved August 19 by a US congressional committee would, if passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, prevent Canadians from filing compensation claims in the US for injury or death on US-owned offshore oil rigs operating in Canadian waters. The bill was introduced before the *Ocean Ranger* disaster, in which sixty-seven Canadians were killed, but if passed, would not affect claims arising from the February 1982 sinking of the oil rig. The bill's prime sponsor, New York Democrat Mario Biaggi, had argued that non-Americans often have legal recourse or compensation programs in their own countries or the countries where the rigs are operating. Representative Biaggi asserted that “it is not unfair to require these workers to seek remedies in these other nations before bringing suit in the United States” (*Globe and Mail*, August 20). A Newfoundland MLA had argued against the bill in Washington last February. Also opposed were US seamen's unions, which had said that the bill would encourage the hiring of non-Americans for drilling operations outside US waters (*Globe and Mail*, August 20).

Georges Bank Claims

Canada filed its first written arguments with the International Court of Justice September 27 in the case involving the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area. A dispute between Canada and the United States arose in 1977 when both countries proclaimed two-hundred nautical-mile fishery zones in the area. The US also officially stated its case in a “Memorial” to the International Court September 27, asserting a claim to all of the Georges Bank. In Canada's “Memorial,” it claimed almost half of Georges Bank.

A Government of Canada news release (September 27) stated that, “The basic Canadian argument is that the equi-distance line claimed by Canada represents an equitable solution that takes account of all relevant factors. By agreement between the two countries, however, their respective Memorials and other written pleadings are not to be made public until the opening of the oral proceedings in this case. These proceedings will be held in The Hague, possibly in late 1983 or early 1984. At least one further exchange of written pleadings will take place before that time.”

US Purchase of Aircraft

It was announced September 1 that the Canadian Commercial Corporation, which contracts with foreign gov-

ernments and international agencies on behalf of Canadian companies, had received a contract from the US army for two de Havilland STOL utility aircraft. The sale of the Twin Otters was made under the terms of the Canada/US Defence Production Sharing Agreement (External Affairs press release, September 1).

US Navy Contract

An order consisting of a fifty-two million dollar contract for eighteen "helicopter recovery, assist, secure and traverse" (RAST) systems for the US Navy and a letter of intent for an additional thirteen systems was signed on September 29. The Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) awarded the contract to DAF Indal Ltd. of Mississauga, Ontario. The systems will be procured by the CCC and sold to the US Navy under the US/Canada Defence Production Sharing Arrangement (External Affairs press release, September 29).

Satellite Launch

Canada's fifth commercial communications satellite was launched August 26, after having been delayed a week due to an equipment problem with the US launching vehicle, a Delta rocket. The 24-channel Anik D1 spacecraft went into orbit from Cape Canaveral, Florida (Telesat press release, August 17). The same day it was announced that Canada and the US had agreed on terms which would make possible for the first time satellite telecommunications between the two countries on a widespread commercial basis. The agreement permits large business networks to exchange voice and data information (*Globe and Mail*, August 27).

NASA Contract

The Canadian Commercial Corporation, which contracts with foreign governments and international agencies on behalf of Canadian companies, received a \$5,292,000 contract from the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland. Under the contract, Bristol Aerospace Ltd. of Winnipeg will manufacture and supply forty-three Black Brant Propulsion Systems and Sub-systems, to be used by NASA to launch scientific research instruments in sub-orbit to conduct a wide range of tests related to upper atmospheric conditions (External Affairs press release, September 2).

Space Shuttle

A Canadian could take a place on a US space shuttle as early as 1984, according to the head of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). James Beggs told reporters in Washington September 14 that priority under a plan to involve non-Americans in the project will be given to countries that have helped with the space shuttle. Canada had developed and provided the \$100 million manipulator arm used to position space shuttle cargos in space. Mr. Beggs said that the Canadian will probably be a scientist or an engineer (*Globe and Mail*, September 15). On September 29 the *Globe and Mail* reported that Cabinet would be asked this fall to approve funds for the selection and training of up to five mission-

specialist candidates who would qualify to fly aboard the Spacelab.

Beef and Veal Trade

The federal government concluded an arrangement with the US with respect to beef and veal trade between the two countries for 1982. It was announced September 28 that under the arrangement, Canada's exports to the US would not exceed 121.1 million pounds, and imports from the US will not exceed 21.4 million pounds in 1982. International Trade Minister Ed Lumley said that the US had asked Canada and other principal beef exporters to the US to "voluntarily restrain their exports for the balance of 1982 so as not to trigger import quotas under the US Meat Import Law" (External Affairs press release, September 28).

AUSTRALIA

Senate Study

Five Canadian senators were in Australia from September 1 to 19 to observe the workings of an elected senate and study the appropriateness of such a system for Canada. Australia has a parliamentary system with an elected upper chamber to represent the States (*Globe and Mail*, August 28).

Commonwealth Games: Inuit Protest

The Inuit Committee on National Issues sent a telex to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth in London, England to protest the actions of the government of the State of Queensland in Australia, "in respect of human rights and the aboriginal rights of the aboriginal peoples." Calling the Queensland government an "insensitive and retrograde state government," the Inuit group wanted to draw attention to laws in Queensland and the recent Commonwealth Games Act passed in that State, which was, according to a spokesperson for the group, "designed to suspend planned protests by aboriginal people during the Commonwealth Games." The September 24 telex stated that, "As a people whose political, land and other rights are under negotiation with governments in Canada, we are particularly sensitive to the dangerous precedent being set by Queensland." Peter Jull, Political and Constitutional Adviser to the Inuit Committee on National Issues said that the committee was becoming increasingly sensitive to the issues facing other native groups internationally.

CHINA

Health Care Training Project

Canada announced a contribution September 3, through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), to upgrade the quality of health care training at Sichuan Medical College (SMC) in southwest China. The contribution of \$589,267 will be for upgrading in the areas of science teaching, training in basic clinical science, train-

ing in pharmacy and dentistry, and the development of a medical resource library (CIDA press release, September 3).

The University of Toronto will also be contributing to the five-year project. The university will send sixteen faculty members to SMC for periods ranging from six weeks to three months. The total cost of the joint project will be \$2.4 million. SMC, which is contributing \$350,000, will also send college faculty and graduates to Toronto for advanced training (*Globe and Mail*, September 7).

ISRAEL

Visit of Agriculture Minister to Canada

Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister Simha Erlich and a delegation of Israeli agricultural leaders were in Canada from September 13 to 16 to meet with Canadian counterparts. A series of talks between Mr. Erlich and Agriculture Minister Eugene Whelan resulted in an agreement in principle to undertake the establishment of a jointly-financed fund to develop cooperative agricultural research projects. Details of the agreement were to be worked out during the four following months (Agriculture Canada press release, September 16).

JAPAN

Auto Imports

Following months of negotiations, Canada reached an agreement with Japan August 11 which limits Japanese automobile exports to Canada for 1982. An External Affairs press release that day said that "The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry has forecast that passenger car exports to Canada over the period July 1, 1982, to December 31, 1982, will not exceed 63,000 units. This will result in a calendar year export level of 153,000 units, which represents a decrease of 23.5% from calendar year 1981 exports. As part of the understanding reached, the two Governments are committed to begin discussions in September 1982, with a view to reaching an understanding regarding future cooperation between the Japanese and Canadian automotive industries."

Talking to reporters about the export restraint, Trade Minister Ed Lumley described it as "positive for Canada. It addresses, first of all, the problems faced by our automotive industry. I think it also demonstrates we can work together with Japan to accommodate one another's vital interests" (*Globe and Mail*, August 12). The new limits mean that Japanese cars will represent about twenty-two percent of the Canadian car market in 1982 (*Globe and Mail*, August 12). Negotiations were to begin in September on increased Canadian content in Japanese vehicles sold to Canada.

Reaction to the quotas was mixed. Among those reported "pleased" with the arrangement were the Canadian auto manufacturing industry and auto parts makers. The United Auto Workers Union issued a press release in

which they said that although the quotas were encouraging, they were concerned about "the high percentage of import penetration the agreement appears to legitimate." Strong Canadian content regulations would be the only way to assure "strong guarantees which will be in the best interest of not only the auto and auto parts industry in Canada, but of the Canadian economy," the union stated.

Although truck exports from Japan were not included in the August agreement, Mr. Lumley said that he was confident that Japanese exporters would take account of the depressed state of the Canadian market, and that he would be surprised if Japanese truck exports to Canada were higher than last year. In a critical press release, The Domestic Automobile Dealers, who believed that the restraint agreement would be only of limited assistance to Canadian-made car sales, said that, "The biggest failing of the agreement, however, lies in its omission of any effective restraint on trucks. Japanese truck sales in 1982 are up by about thirty percent over 1981, while domestic sales are down by a similar percentage. Minister Lumley's confidence that Japanese truck exports will be no higher in 1982 than in 1981 is denied by the facts."

The quota arrangement was also criticized by Keith Dixon, president of the Automobile Importers of Canada, who called Canada an "international crybaby," and said that "it is pathetic that Canada has to impose a quota on Canada's second-best customer" (*Globe and Mail*, *The Citizen*, August 12).

Visit of Parliamentarians to Japan

House of Commons Speaker Jeanne Sauvé headed a delegation of Canadian Parliamentarians to Japan from August 28 to September 3. She was accompanied by Government House Leader Yvon Pinard, Opposition House Leader Erik Nielsen and NDP House Leader Ian Deans. The visit was part of an ongoing parliamentary exchange arrangement between Canada and Japan (External Affairs press release, August 23).

MEXICO

Financial Crisis

Canada was among countries to grant emergency loans to Mexico in August. That country was crippled with an estimated eighty billion dollars (US) in foreign debts, and unable to meet its commitments. On August 30 it was announced that the Bank of Canada had agreed to guarantee a \$150 million (US) loan to Mexico in a twelve-country effort to help Mexico forestall bankruptcy while negotiating an International Monetary Fund Loan. Mexico owed Canadian banks an estimated five billion dollars (*Globe and Mail*, August 31). It nationalized its private banks September 1.

MONACO

Death of Princess Grace

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sent condolences to

the Royal Family of Monaco following the death of Princess Grace on September 14. Canada was represented at the funeral on September 18 by Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne and Mrs. Lamontagne, and the Canadian Consul General in Marseille (External Affairs press release, September 17).

SOUTH AFRICA

Boycott of Bata

The president of the International Textile and Garment and Leather Workers Federation, Charles Ford, was in Ottawa recently to urge officials of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and the Canadian government to support his union's attempt to initiate a worldwide boycott of Toronto-based Bata Ltd. The footwear company had been accused of "profiting from apartheid" by allowing one of its subsidiaries in South Africa to suppress union activity, pay substandard wages to blacks and force them to work unpaid overtime, according to a September 29 *Citizen* report. The article said that the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria had investigated, corroborated some of the information and "has so far found nothing to disavow the alarming reports."

Mr. Ford and the CLC want the Canadian government to strengthen its voluntary code of conduct established in 1978 for Canadian firms operating in South Africa. The code, similar to one passed in 1974 by the UN International Labour Organisation, urges firms to promote employment practices in South Africa based on "equal treatment for all its employees" (*The Citizen*, September 28).

SOUTH KOREA

Visit to Canada of President

South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan visited Ottawa from August 28 to 31. It was the first trip to Canada of a South Korean President. South Korea is Canada's seventh largest trading partner — total two-way trade exceeded one billion dollars in 1981 (*Globe and Mail*, August 30). Korea has been a customer of Canadian resource products such as coal, wood pulp, potash and iron ore, and of telecommunications equipment, while Canada has purchased consumer goods such as clothing and textiles from South Korea. Although the growing trade between Canada and South Korea was termed "complimentary" and "cooperative," some tension had been reported regarding trade barriers on both sides (*Globe and Mail*, August 30). Mr. Chun was accompanied by a delegation of South Korean businessmen, Cabinet ministers and officials. The Korean delegates met with their counterparts in Ottawa, and Mr. Chun attended a series of meetings with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.

Canada had previously sold a Candu reactor to South Korea, and the sale of a second nuclear reactor was reportedly discussed during the visit. This drew criticism from NDP energy spokesman Ian Waddell, who compared the South Korean regime's record of human rights violations

with Argentina's record, and called the federal government "irresponsible" in its hopes to sell a second Candu reactor to that country (NDP press release, August 31). Amnesty International, church and other groups had also cited South Korea as a violator of human rights, and groups demonstrated in protest during President Chun's visit. The NDP boycotted a state dinner held for Mr. Chun on August 30. Although Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Chun reportedly did not discuss human rights during the visit, it was reported that Mr. Trudeau had expressed concern over that issue during a visit to Seoul last year (*Globe and Mail*, August 31).

Reference was made to the "friendship bond" between Canada and South Korea, forged during the Korean War of 1950-1953, in which 516 Canadians died. Mr. Chun visited a veterans' hospital August 29 in Ste. Anne de Bellevue, near Montreal, where several veterans of that war are in care (*Globe and Mail*, August 27).

THAILAND

Jail Prisoner Exchange Treaty

A treaty between Canada and Thailand which would allow Canadian prisoners in Thailand to complete their sentences in Canada was initialled in August. An August 13 newspaper article said that the treaty would provide for the return of Canadian prisoners after the lesser of four years or one third of the sentence had been served in Thailand. The legislation must be passed by the Thai Parliament, which does not meet again until next spring (*Globe and Mail*, August 13).

TUNISIA

Bombardier Railway Contract

Bombardier Inc. of Montreal was awarded a twenty-six million dollar contract by the Tunisian national railways corporation. The contract is for twenty-two locomotives and is expected to provide 200,000 person-hours of work for Bombardier's Montreal plant (External Affairs press release, September 27). According to a *Globe and Mail* article September 29, Minister of State (External Relations) Serge Joyal said that the federal government had reminded the Tunisian government of Canada's twenty-year record of aid after Tunisia had almost accepted bids from a US and a Hungarian company. Canada agreed to provide financing through the Export Development Corporation. The Canadian International Development Agency is also contributing some funds within its development cooperation program with Tunisia (External Affairs press release, September 27).

TURKEY

Diplomatic Presentation

On the occasion of the presentation of Letters of Cred-

ence by Turkish Ambassador Ozdemir Benler to the Canadian Governor General, Mr. Schreyer expressed the shock and outrage of Canadians following two recent attacks on Turkish diplomats in Ottawa. The September 7 speech by Mr. Schreyer followed the August 27 assassination of Turkish Colonel Altikat. (See this issue, MULTILATERAL.)

USSR

Visit by Canadian Delegation

A group of three Canadian Members of Parliament and two representatives of the Canadian Jewish Congress visited the Soviet Union from September 7 to 15. The purpose of the visit was to meet with Soviet officials to discuss Canadian-Soviet relations, and primarily to discuss the question of the emigration of Soviet Jews in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act. The Canadian MPs were: David Smith (Lib., Don Valley East); Flora MacDonald (PC, Kingston and the Islands); and Ian Deans (NDP, Hamilton Mountain) (House of Commons press release, September 14).

Upon their return, the MPs told reporters that Soviet officials had been non-committal regarding the requests to ease emigration restrictions for an estimated ten to twenty thousand Soviet Jews who want to go to Israel. The Canadian delegation had told the Soviet officials that one way to make progress in East-West relations would be to loosen the emigration restrictions. The officials "heard us out in great detail," Mr. Smith said. Miss MacDonald said the current tough restrictions on emigration apparently stems from the "overall resumption of the Cold War" (*The Citizen*, September 16). Only about 150 Soviet Jews a month are granted exit visas, while in 1979, about 50,000 Jews were allowed to emigrate, Mr. Deans said.

The two members of the Canadian Jewish Congress with the delegation were assaulted as they went to visit a Jewish man in Leningrad. The two were beaten-up and robbed of lists of names of Soviet Jews they were to visit. A complaint was filed through the US consulate in Leningrad,

and it was reported that the Canadian Embassy in Moscow was also planning to file a complaint with Soviet authorities (*The Citizen*, September 17).

Foreign Ministers Meet

External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on September 30 in New York during the United Nations General Assembly. Following the meeting, Mr. MacEachen told reporters that the talks dealt mainly with the deterioration of East-West relations. Reasons for the deterioration were the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles directed at Western Europe, the failure in a sense by the Soviets to live up to the spirit of the Helsinki Accords, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the military rule of Poland, Mr. MacEachen reportedly told the Soviet Foreign Minister (*The Citizen*, October 1).

WEST GERMANY

Visit to Canada of Economics Minister

West German Economics Minister Otto Count Lambsdorff visited Canada in early August. During a two-day stay in Ottawa, Count Lambsdorff met with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and various Cabinet Ministers to exchange views on the world economy and to discuss closer cooperation between Canada and Germany (Federal Republic of Germany press release, July 30). Count Lambsdorff also addressed the inaugural luncheon of the Canadian German Conference in Ottawa. The newly-formed Canadian German Conference had been established to promote a better understanding between the two countries with a special emphasis on economic, cultural, educational, academic and scientific matters (Canadian German Conference press release, August 4). During Count Lambsdorff's visit, the Department of External Affairs announced a decision to open a new Consulate General in Munich, which will be devoted almost entirely to trade and commercial activities (External Affairs press release, August 6).

Multilateral Relations

IMF AND WORLD BANK

Toronto Conference

Canada played host to the thirty-seventh annual joint meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, held in Toronto from September 6 to 9. The conference was preceded by a convergence of delegations from over 140 countries, in Toronto to attend a series of meetings before the official conference. It was the largest international conference ever held in Canada, with an estimated ten thousand people in attendance, including twelve heads of state, as well as finance ministers and central bankers and five hundred journalists from around the world. The climate surrounding the meetings was of crisis and concern — the World Bank a week earlier had called the first years of the 1980s “the most prolonged period of economic slowdown since the 1930s” with both industrial and developing countries heavily in debt. The announcement in early September that Mexico had nationalized its banks had pointed out the fragility of national economies with rapidly increasing deficits.

The IMF is a Washington-based international organization whose functions include the lending of money to countries who have too low a credit rating to borrow extensively in private money markets to finance balance of payments in emergencies. It also oversees the effective operation and overall health of the international monetary system (*The Star*, August 28). The World Bank has 143 member countries and provides billions of dollars in low-interest development loans for projects in developing countries.

One issue dealt with at the conference was expansion of the quotas allowable to developing countries. The developing countries, represented by the Group of 24, wanted a doubling of quotas, an easing of terms and conditions governing IMF lending and a fresh allocation of special drawing rights (*Globe and Mail*, August 19). Mexico's decision to nationalize its banks under a staggering international debt concerned the developing countries, who wished to negotiate loans, and the bankers, who were encouraged by the IMF not to back out of Mexico (*Globe and Mail*, September 10).

Canada's participation at the conference included the charring of the main policy-making body of the IMF, the Interim Committee, by Finance Minister Allan MacEachen.

On September 6 it was reported that the Interim Committee had agreed to press forward with a program that would provide additional funds for financially-troubled countries. A communiqué from the 22-member committee said that there was “widespread support on the urgent need for substantial increase” in the contributions governments make to the IMF. It had been reported that the majority of finance ministers from large industrial nations were in agreement, but that the US, which exercises crucial voting power in the organization, was not in favor of a substantial raise in the quotas. US Treasury Secretary Donald Regan told a news conference that his country, which is also the largest contributor to the fund, could not provide the same degree of aid as in the past. Canada was among the countries who were willing to increase IMF funding to developing countries by 50 to 100 percent (*Globe and Mail*, September 6 and 7, *The Citizen*, September 7).

Prime Minister Trudeau, who opened the conference on September 6, said that he welcomed the proposal to make more money available to countries such as Mexico, and urged nations to pull together. He said that solving Canada's domestic problems “depends on our people identifying more closely with the common good and less with narrow sectoral interests” (*The Citizen*, September 7). He noted the bad condition of the world economy, and said that fear by countries, banks and corporations of default is drying up the international flow of capital.

Mr. Trudeau also expressed what was called “guarded support” for a US proposal to set up a new international emergency standby fund for countries in trouble (*Globe and Mail*, September 7).

During the week of meetings, some “strong and positive accomplishments” were made, according to Jacques de Larosière, IMF Managing Director. These were reported to be:

- the emergence of a consensus on the need to pursue anti-inflation policies in the industrial countries;
- an acceleration in the timetable for deciding on an expansion of the fund's lending authority or quotas;
- the agreement that the increase in quotas would be a substantial one;
- the initiative from the United States on the establish-

ment of an emergency fund (*Globe and Mail*, September 10).

Not all people gathered in Toronto were there to endorse the principles of the IMF and the World Bank. Critics attended a counter-conference called the Global Impact of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The IMF delegates charged, had broken its own regulations in order to further the political and economic ends of the United States, its largest sponsor. The US was also blamed for influencing an IMF departure from accepted practice in July when the fund decided to make a \$36 million loan to El Salvador. Finance ministers from developing countries were also critical, saying they wanted less stress on the economic difficulties of the industrial countries and more emphasis on their own plight. Speakers at the counter-conference accused the fund of hostility to Nicaragua, which had not met the criteria for an IMF loan. Canadian economists spoke at the counter-conference about the impact of IMF support of tight monetary controls on the Canadian economy and Canadian workers (*Globe and Mail*, September 8 and 9).

UNITED NATIONS

UNESCO Conference

A delegation of Canadians participated in the second world Conference on Cultural Policies (MONDIACULT), convened by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) in Mexico City from July 26 to August 6. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Gérard Pelletier headed the Canadian delegation. The main concerns of MONDIACULT were "to review the basic problems of culture in today's world, to take stock of the latest ideas and thoughts on the prospects for cultural intercourse among nations, to examine the cultural dimension of development and to seek ways to promote the mutual strengthening of cultural identity and interchange" (External Affairs press release, July 23).

Committee on Disarmament

The Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Donald MacPhail, presented Canada's position to the United Nations Committee on Disarmament on August 3 at the start of the Committee's summer session. He told the opening session of the forty-member group that in Canada's view, "the Committee should focus its main attention on three substantive areas — chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban and outer space." These priorities were agreed to by other nations. Mr. MacPhail told reporters, "It was a workman-like opening with unanimity between the East, West and South on practical matters." It was the first time all countries had agreed at the outset of a committee session, according to the *Globe and Mail* article August 4. The article said that Mr. MacPhail believed that the Committee is closer to negotiating treaties on disarmament and arms control than it has been since its establishment in 1979.

UNISPACE Conference

Canada participated in the Second United Nations

Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE), held in Vienna from August 9 to 21. The purposes of the Conference were: to bring developments in space science and technology to the attention of all countries, particularly developing countries; to show how this technology could be applied to problems of national development; and to consider how international cooperation in this area could be strengthened. The Canadian delegation, headed by Science and Technology Minister John Roberts, included representatives from the federal and provincial governments, the space industry and the university community (External Affairs press release, August 6).

Namibian Contact Group

Progress already made by the UN-sponsored "contact group" toward negotiating the independence of Namibia, presently ruled by South Africa, was reported "jeopardized" and "sabotaged" in September as a result of a US demand (*Globe and Mail*, September 17; *The Citizen*, September 24). (The US, along with Canada, Britain, France and West Germany, comprise the group, whose task is to devise a Namibian independence plan acceptable to South Africa, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and other African nations.) The Reagan Administration insisted on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from neighboring Angola at the same time as South Africa relinquishes control of Namibia.

This "linkage" has been opposed by Canada and other members of the contact group, according to newspaper articles. The *Globe and Mail* September 17 reported that the talks might collapse as a result of the US demand. A Canadian official told reporters that Canada "would find it very difficult to justify any outcome whereby the contact group settlement plan broke down because of linkage." The report said that Canadian officials were not optimistic about a US-Angolan agreement.

Canada's position was further explained in a September 24 *Citizen* article. It said, "By allowing the US to take *de facto* control of the negotiations, the contact group countries have left themselves exposed to criticism from black African countries who fear US ties to South Africa. If this round of talks fails, there is a distinct possibility the contact group will collapse and the Namibia issue will finally be resolved by the sword and not by the pen."

A Canadian diplomat told reporters, "The position we have taken is to tell the Americans to get the agreement on the Angolan situation if they can, but it is strictly a bilateral matter. . . . If they can get it on top of the settlement agreement, fine, but what we want is an agreement on Namibia" (*The Citizen*, September 24). According to the *Globe and Mail* article, Canada thinks that "The difficulty is that Washington has to pull off in a matter of weeks an accord that would usually take six to eight months [since] the fragile agreements for the transfer of power from South Africa to Namibia made by the contact group could fall apart if the deal is not sealed shortly."

Complaint to International Labour Organisation

Canada's public sector wage control bill is to be examined by the International Labour Organisation during its November session because the Professional Institute of the Public Service complained to the UN agency that the

bill violates a 1978 UN Convention signed by Canada. The bill limits salary increases of 500,000 federal employees to six and five percent during the next two years, limits collective bargaining, removes the right to strike and eliminates third-party arbitration. If the International Labour Organisation supports the union's complaint, it can only recommend legislative change (*The Citizen*, September 9).

IAEA Conference

Canada's delegation to the annual general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna was among those participants to walk out of the meeting in protest after Israel was effectively excluded from participation. The conference, held from September 20 to 24, was to promote peaceful nuclear energy and prevent its diversion to military use. The exclusion of Israel from the meetings came after a series of votes on an Iraqi amendment to reject Israel's credentials. Other delegations to leave the meetings were from the US, the European Community, Australia and Japan (*Globe and Mail*, September 25).

General Assembly

External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen headed the Canadian delegation to the 37th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, which convened in New York on September 21. Among Canadian delegates was Philippe Kirsch of the External Affairs Department's bureau of Legal Affairs. Mr. Kirsch was elected chairman of the General Assembly's legal committee on September 21. The committee considers international law and treaties and acts as a legal drafting arm for the UN (*The Citizen*, September 22).

Mr. MacEachen addressed the Assembly on September 27. He warned of the present risks facing the multi-lateral system, including the financial difficulties faced by many countries and the resulting tendency to "turn inward economically." He called for a renewed collective approach to these pressures. He also emphasized Canada's firm endorsement of the Security Council's calls for the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and Canada's support for the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," including their right to a homeland. Other subjects touched on by the External Affairs Minister were the situations of conflict in Poland, Afghanistan, Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula. He also reaffirmed Canada's commitment to the "present negotiations in Geneva to limit and reduce the level of nuclear arms," and mentioned Canada's support of the contributions made by the UN in the development of international law. (External Affairs statement, September 27).

Mr. MacEachen also met with UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on September 30, and held bilateral discussions with several other Foreign Ministers (External Affairs press release, September 21).

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Turkish Attaché Assassinated in Ottawa

On August 27, a Turkish embassy military attaché, Col

Atilla Altikat, was shot and killed in Ottawa when his car was ambushed in the city's west end. A group calling itself the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide claimed responsibility for the killing. Another Turkish diplomat, Kani Gungor, had been shot and seriously wounded in Ottawa April 8, with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia claiming responsibility. There had been a series of similar attacks on Turkish diplomats around the world. The terrorists charged Turkey with genocide in a 1915 massacre where they say one and a half million Armenians were killed. Turkey has denied these charges.

Security protection for Turkish embassy officials in Ottawa had been tightened after the shooting of Mr. Gungor, but an RCMP spokesman said that the diplomats had not fully utilized the services (*The Citizen*, August 28).

After the shooting, External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan said that, "We have learned to our sorrow that no country is safe from such outrages. . . . This brutal and senseless crime can only inspire repulsion on the part of all civilized men and women." Prime Minister Trudeau called it a "despicable and cowardly crime that no words can too strongly indict. . . . The deed demands that we strengthen our resolve to end the terrorist blight from which it seems no country is immune" (*The Star*, August 28). Opposition Leader Joe Clark, in a letter to the Turkish ambassador, said that he deplored the violent act.

Investigating police said that the assassination appeared to be the work of "expert killers." Two men were being sought for the crime and all pertinent information was dispatched to the FBI in the US and Interpol in Europe. Armenian terrorists had warned earlier in August, after an attack at an Ankara airport, that they would continue to kill Turks in other nations. Their aim is to create an independent Armenia, which is now divided among Turkey, the Soviet Union and Iran (*The Citizen*, August 28).

The Turkish Embassy in Ottawa commended Canadian security efforts, but said, "Terrorism can always find an open door" (*Globe and Mail*, August 31). On August 31, Mr. MacGuigan issued a personal plea that Turkish diplomats be accompanied by a police officer any time they venture from their homes or the embassy (*The Citizen*, September 1).

Arrangements were made in conjunction with the Department of External Affairs to fly Col. Altikat's body home to Turkey for a state funeral. On August 31, scores of diplomats and military officials from countries around the world paid respect to Col. Altikat at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa. A military ceremony was held at the Ottawa International Airport on September 2 before the body and family of the slain attaché were flown to Turkey. Security at the ceremony was tight, and had also been increased at the Turkish embassy (*The Citizen*, September 3).

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Canadian Membership

Canada should reconsider its long-standing decision not to join the Organization of American States (OAS), External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan told reporters Sep-

tember 9, one of his last days in that position. He said that Canada's observer status had placed "an undue limitation on the possibilities of our involvement" in the past, and that the maturing of Canada's relations with Latin America had led him to believe that Canada should reverse its stand. There are twenty-eight members of the OAS from North, South and Central America. Mr. MacGuigan said that Latin American countries believe Canada would bring distinct values to the organization, which had been criticized for being US-dominated. The House of Commons sub-committee which studies Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean will make its recommendations about Canadian membership in the OAS in its final report, expected in late October (*Globe and Mail*, September 10 and 18).

COSPAS/SARSAT PROJECT

Satellite Agreement

Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne announced August 31 the progress of the COSPAS/SARSAT project, which has as its goal the use of satellites to detect and locate aircraft and ships in distress. Canada, the US, France and the Soviet Union participate in the venture. The first satellite within the framework of the project had been launched by the Soviet Union June 30. A period of joint technical checkout began on September 1 and will last from twelve to eighteen months while the system is evaluated by all four nations for its effectiveness in locating downed aircraft and vessels in distress (National Defence press release, August 31).

On September 18 it was reported that the satellite had assisted in the location of a downed plane in British Columbia, and that three men had been rescued as a result. The satellite, which makes twice-daily sweeps over Canada, provided a reading that was within twenty-two kilometres of the crash site. A search plane had been unable to pick up

signals from the plane's emergency crash transmitter (*Globe and Mail*, September 18).

GATT

Preparation for Ministerial Meeting

Federal and provincial ministers responsible for trade met in September to discuss the ministerial meeting of the signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to be held in Geneva from November 24 to 27. The September 14 meeting was part of a series of consultations between International Trade Minister Ed Lumley and the provinces and various interest groups in the private sector (External Affairs press release, September 13). The ministers discussed the federal government's draft trade policy paper, and were briefed by Canada's ambassador to the GATT in Geneva, Donald MacPhail. Mr. MacPhail had earlier presented to GATT member countries a preparatory document listing world trade problems and possible solutions (*Globe and Mail*, August 2).

In a speech to the Fifth Quadrangular Conference at Georgetown University in Washington, September 20, Mr. Lumley outlined Canada's priorities to be presented at the GATT meeting. These priorities included support for measures which provide for:

- safeguards agreements to require signatories to follow the same rules and to ensure that exports are not acted against frivolously or unnecessarily;
- a dispute settlement system which renews the commitment to enforce GATT rights and obligations;
- contributions from developing countries to the international trading framework and respect for their legitimate interests;
- improved and more balanced agricultural and fish policies;
- the strengthening of existing GATT codes;
- examination of tariff escalation and the tariff structure of resource importing countries.

Policy

FOREIGN

Middle East

Following a two-month period in which Canada and Canadians had increasingly expressed concern over the Israeli offensive against Palestinians in Lebanon and West Beirut, on August 2 Marcel Prud'homme (Lib., Saint Denis), the chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, asked External Affairs Minis-

ter Mark MacGuigan in the House of Commons whether he had lodged a protest with Israeli authorities after the latest bombings in Beirut in which hundreds more West Beirut citizens were reported killed. Mr. MacGuigan replied that he had decided to protest again to Israel, and had also recommended that the Canadian ambassador and embassy staff leave West Beirut "for their own safety and also to safeguard Canadian interests."

The same day, External Affairs issued a press release

stating that the temporary moving of the embassy staff to a Beirut suburb was because, "although a cease-fire prevails at the moment and the area around the chancery has been relatively free from attacks so far, conditions in the city have deteriorated substantially over the past week. The increased danger along with difficult living conditions and increasing interruptions in communications prompted the decision which was taken on the basis of reports from the ambassador and elsewhere."

The ambassador, Théodore Arcand, had been critical of the devastation and large-scale killing by Israeli forces in Lebanon. Mr. MacGuigan told reporters the same day that Mr. Arcand had been doing a great service for his country and to some extent, for the cause of world peace. According to the *Globe and Mail*, "Although the External Affairs minister was cautious when asked whether he would support some of the strong language used by Mr. Arcand to describe the Israeli military campaign against the Palestinians, he carefully did not disavow the conduct of the ambassador."

During the first week of August, Israel had rejected a US call to leave Beirut and re-establish a strict ceasefire. Instead, Israeli forces increased their "fierce onslaught" in West Beirut (*Globe and Mail*, August 5). On August 4, before Parliament recessed for two months, Mr. MacGuigan stated the government's position regarding those recent actions. He told the House of Commons:

Yesterday we made a démarche to the Israeli government protesting the bombardment up to that point of West Beirut and saying that the process should be seen as reflecting a deep and growing concern in the Canadian Parliament and public over the impact upon civilians of the Israeli bombardment of Beirut. I want to say today, having yesterday brought a message of restraint for Israel to the US Secretary of State, and having stated that position publicly there, that the new bombardment today is an extraordinarily unfavourable development for peace. It is hard to understand how the Government of Israel thinks it can advance the cause of peace in this direction, at a time when negotiations appear to be taking hold. We are very disturbed by it. We protest in the strongest way against this resumption of hostilities and we hope it will cease forthwith.

Mr. MacGuigan's statement followed what was described (*Globe and Mail*, August 5) as a "testy exchange in the Commons in which a handful of Liberal backbenchers, from ridings with large Jewish populations, twice refused unanimous consent to motions criticizing the Israeli bombardments of Beirut, even though these motions appeared to have the tacit approval of front benchers." Mr. MacGuigan later told reporters that Canada was "serving notice to the Israeli's and the rest of the world" that the present actions of Israel were incomprehensible for a country in search of peace. He also said that Canada was not considering sanctions against Israel unless they were part of a collective action.

Later in August, Mr. Arcand returned to Canada before taking up his new post as Canadian Ambassador to Hungary. At this time, it was reported that the Israeli Ambassador to Canada, Yeshayahu Anug, had informed the External Affairs Department in Ottawa, that Israel had not been pleased with Mr. Arcand's outspoken comments in Beirut.

Mr. Anug reportedly said that Mr. Arcand had overstepped his mandate in making comments on matters having nothing to do with his role as Canada's representative in Lebanon (*Globe and Mail*, August 14). In various interviews, Mr. Arcand defended his stand to the press. "I felt my job was to call it as I saw it . . . I lived in Beirut, and saw the devastation that was caused by the bombing attacks," he told reporters (*The Citizen*, August 13).

In mid-August, a settlement was reached whereby Palestinian Liberation Organization members would be escorted out of West Beirut by an international peacekeeping force. During the next month, when relative peace in the area was reported, Mr. MacGuigan made a statement to the press about Canada's role in a Middle East settlement. He said Canada did not rule out support for an independent Palestinian state in the West bank and Gaza Strip, but suggested Canada would prefer a more moderate force than the PLO to represent Palestinians. Canada's role in the settlement, he said, would be to insist on secure boundaries for Israel, and at the same time, to insist on the rights of the Palestinian people (*Globe and Mail*, September 10).

Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated on September 14, after the departure of a multilateral peacekeeping force from Beirut. Israeli soldiers remained in Beirut despite international criticism, and had, by extension, taken on some responsibility for the maintenance of peace in that city. The world was shocked when it was reported that over the weekend following Mr. Gemayel's assassination, Lebanese Christian militiamen, said to be from a Falangist group, had entered two Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and massacred hundreds of people there. The outrage against the Lebanese extremists was extended to Israel after that country was widely accused of complicity by not preventing the brutal murders. Allan MacEachen addressed the situation in his first statement since being sworn-in as External Affairs Minister on September 20. He expressed the shock, outrage and revulsion felt by Canadians toward the crimes. In addition, he said, "We deplore Israel's unjustified occupation of West Beirut. Upsetting the carefully worked-out ceasefire agreements could only have a destabilizing effect on an already tense situation."

Further Canadian reaction was reported in the following days. Demonstrations by various groups were held, including one in Toronto September 27 with a reported five thousand Moslems in attendance (*Globe and Mail*, September 27). In Montreal, the Canadian Jewish Congress called for an independent Israeli inquiry into the slaughter. A news release from the group said that, "Canadian Jewry is shocked and deeply grieved by the wanton slaughter of innocents in the Palestinian camps of Shatila and Sabra." A cross-Canada Jewish vigil arranged by another group took place September 27 to show solemn respect for the Palestinian children, women and men who had been massacred.

Canada's position regarding the Middle East crisis was the subject of a speech by the Minister of State (External Relations), to the 14th Congress of the Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales on September 30. Mr. De Bané reviewed recent developments and clarified Canada's position in this context. In the previous weeks, new initiatives had been announced by US President Re-

agan. The External Relations Minister said that Canada was in accord with the main lines of the US initiatives:

- the insistence on security for Israel and on full autonomy and self-government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in the Camp David framework;
- the participation of Jordan and the Palestinians in the autonomy talks, noting the desire of King Hussein of Jordan to work out with the Palestinians a position on the region's future;
- the opposition to Israeli annexation of the territories.

Mr. De Bané continued, "We have a somewhat different approach on some of the US proposals. While we would have no problem with self-governing Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan, we would not rule out the possibility of a Palestinian state." He also gave tentative support to resolutions by the Arab Summit in Fez, if they are judged to assist the peace process, and said that Canada has aimed to maintain a balanced and principled point of view, keeping open channels of communications with the governments involved and the PLO.

Asian Visit Postponed

A two-to-three week visit by Prime Minister Trudeau to the five nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was to take place in mid-September, was called off on August 29. The Prime Minister was to discuss trade relations and economic cooperation during visits to Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The September visit was cancelled to enable the Prime Minister to pursue economic policies domestically, because "it is essential that we become competitive internationally, and this pre-supposes a healthy domestic economy," Mr. Trudeau said in a statement released August 29 (*The Citizen*, August 30). External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan told reporters September 9 that the Asian visit had been rescheduled for January 1983 (*Globe and Mail*, September 10).

Latin America

Members of the parliamentary Sub-committee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean travelled in South America during the last two weeks in August to study further the area before making final foreign policy recommendations. The sub-committee had issued two reports previously, and its final report is expected to be submitted to Parliament when it resumes in late October, and after the recommendations have been considered by the full House Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

The MPs split into two groups: a West Group to visit Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia; and an East Group to go to Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, with both groups meeting in Guyana (*The Citizen*, August 13). The members of the sub-committee were from all three political parties, and represent a wide range of opinions. The sub-committee makes recommendations on Canada's foreign policy based on investigations of human rights, trade and investment, development assistance, immigration and refugees and the search for stability in the region. The issue of membership in the Organization of American States had

been specifically postponed until the final report (*The Citizen*, August 13; *Globe and Mail*, September 18).

Cabinet Shuffles

During September, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau twice shuffled his cabinet, changing ministers in about half of the portfolios. The first change was announced September 10, and involved four key cabinet posts, including that of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mark MacGuigan was moved from External Affairs to Justice, replaced by a former External Affairs Minister, Allan MacEachen, who had most recently been Finance Minister. Energy, Mines and Resources Minister Marc Lalonde was moved to Finance. Justice Minister Jean Chrétien took over as Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.

The second cabinet shuffle was announced September 30 and involved the rearranging of an additional thirteen of the thirty-five cabinet portfolios. Among them, several have an involvement with foreign affairs. International Trade Minister Ed Lumley replaced Herb Gray as Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and Regional Economic Expansion. Mr. Lumley will be responsible for the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA). Mr. Gray was moved to the Treasury Board. Gerald Regan became the new International Trade Minister, attached to the External Affairs Department. Charles Lapointe became Minister of State (External Relations), responsible for francophone nations, also attached to External Affairs, replacing Pierre De Bané, who was moved to Fisheries and Oceans.

The cabinet shuffles were generally viewed by the media (*Globe and Mail*, *The Citizen*, October 1) as a move to generate more confidence in investment in Canada. In particular, Mr. Lumley's appointment to the Industry portfolio was said to have pleased US trade officials and businessmen because Mr. Gray had had the reputation of being an economic nationalist. FIRA had been repeatedly attacked under Mr. Gray. While Mr. Lumley supported FIRA, he said that he was in favor of "streamlining" the agency to eliminate some of its negative image with foreign investors (*Globe and Mail*, October 1).

DEFENCE

Disarmament Support

On September 13, Operation Dismantle, which promotes global referenda on disarmament, issued a press release which stated that MPs from three political parties would participate in a national "yes" campaign associated with the municipal referenda on disarmament. (These votes are now scheduled to be held in more than one hundred Canadian municipalities this year.) The campaign was initiated by the MPs from the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence who, in April, issued the Minority Report on Security and Disarmament. Paul MacRae (Lib., Thunder Bay-Atikokan) had announced this plan in a letter dated September 1 to Operation Dismantle. He had written, "It is hoped that this new approach of a non-partisan team will establish a constructive new direction," and expressed the hope that "a national consensus will emerge through plebiscites which would strengthen Canada's hand in the

United Nations and elsewhere, in reducing the danger of a nuclear holocaust and promoting global disarmament." The press release said that public sessions had been planned to take place from October 14 to November 14 in at least twenty Canadian cities by teams of three MPs, one from each political party.

United Church Arms Resolution

The United Church of Canada passed an anti-nuclear arms resolution in August at a Montreal council session. The Church resolved "to call on the Canadian Government to stop the production of nuclear weapons or components in Canada; to stop the transport of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons across Canadian territory and not allow storage or testing of such weapons in Canada; and to declare Canada a nuclear-weapon-free-zone."

TRADE/ECONOMIC

FIRA Changes

On August 23 the federal government, as promised in the June 28 budget, announced new measures to "clarify the application of the Foreign Investment Review Act and to streamline the internal decision-making procedures and processes involved in its administration." Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Herb Gray said that the initiatives "show that we want to make Canada's policy on foreign investment and its administration as clear and as efficient as possible without straying from the objectives set by Parliament or the commitments made by the Government" (FIRA press release, August 23).

The three measures announced provided for the issuance of interpretation notes covering provisions and expressions of a legal nature used in the act, some of which "experience has shown to be particularly difficult to interpret"; the authorization of the Agency to provide formal opinions to foreign investors on whether they are subject to review under the act; and the introduction of special short application forms for companies eligible to apply for review under the small-business procedure.

At a conference of provincial premiers during the same week, Newfoundland Premier Brian Peckford and B.C. Premier William Bennett demanded the elimination of FIRA, arguing that any foreign money coming to Canada in these difficult economic times should be welcomed. Other premiers had objected to what they claimed was the arbitrary and secretive way the agency operated (*The Citizen*, August 30).

The principle of FIRA was defended by Energy Minister Marc Lalonde at a seminar sponsored by the federal government during the International Monetary Fund conference in Toronto in early September. He said that compared with other countries, Canada's economic nationalism was a "tame animal . . . all too often trotted out by the media as a major cause of Canadian economic ailments."

FIRA had been "the object of mounting criticism in the last few months" (*The Citizen*, August 30), from both inside and outside the country. MP Douglas Fisher, Parliamentary

Secretary to the Minister of Finance, told a Canadian Chamber of Commerce meeting September 21 that the criticisms had been overblown and had created "an emotional smokescreen" that obscured the sound work done by the agency. (See this issue, BILATERAL-US.)

Directory of Canadian Trading Houses

The availability of a Directory of Canadian Trading Houses, compiled by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce was announced August 18. An External Affairs press release that day said: "The directory profiles more than 640 trading houses operating in Canada, their products, methods of operation and markets served . . . Trading Houses are particularly suited for use by small and medium-sized manufacturers who cannot sustain the high initial set-up cost of starting an export division or whose potential sales can not warrant the establishment of such a full-time function."

Dollar

The Canadian dollar was worth 79.96 cents (US) on August 2, and rose briefly above the 81-cent (US) level during August. It rose and fell slightly during September, reaching its highest level since early May on September 22, at 81.55 cents. At the end of September, the dollar registered 80.90 cents (US) (*Globe and Mail*, August, September and October).

Trade Surplus

Figures released by Statistics Canada in August and September revealed that Canada's trade surplus was a record \$2.01 billion (revised) in June and \$1.56 billion in July. In July, the surplus declined because imports rose 10.1% while exports increased only 1.2%. It was reported that if large trade surpluses continue this year, the surplus for 1982 would be \$16.8 billion, almost twice the record surplus of \$8.5 billion in 1980 (*Globe and Mail*, September 4).

Quebec Trade Department

Quebec Premier René Lévesque announced September 9 changes which structurally altered the Quebec cabinet. One new department created was External Commerce, with Bernard Landry, former Minister of Economic Development, as minister. The new department will deal with both interprovincial and foreign commerce (*Globe and Mail*, September 10).

AID

Disaster Relief

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided \$50,000 and \$80,000 in funds to El Salvador and Nicaragua during August. The relief was to finance medical supplies and equipment following a June 19 earthquake in El Salvador, and in Nicaragua, to aid in the purchase of milk, foodstuffs and shelter after floods in May (CIDA press releases, August 20 and 31).

For the Record

(supplied by External Affairs Canada)

I. Bibliography of recent publications on Canadian foreign relations (prepared by the Library Services Division).

1. Books and Reports

- Abella, Irving Martin and Harold Troper.
None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1982.
- Atlantic Council Working Group on the United States.
Canada and the United States: Dependence and Divergence. Willis C. Armstrong, Chairman. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1982.
- Bothwell, Robert and J.L. Granatstein (ed.).
The Gouzenko Transcripts: The Evidence Presented to the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission of 1946. Ottawa: Deneau, 1982.
- Boutillier, James A. (ed.).
The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968. University of British Columbia Press, 1982.
- Canada: Parliament: House of Commons. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.
Report of the Sub-Committee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Ottawa: July 1982.
- Carroll, John E.
Acid Rain: An Issue in Canadian-American Relations. Toronto: Canadian-American Committee, 1982.
- Tupper, Allan.
Public Money in the Private Sector: Industrial Assistance Policy and Canadian Federalism. Kingston, Ont: Institute of Inter-governmental Relations, Queen's University, 1982.
- Working Group of the CIIA. Robert W. Reford, chairman; Iain Johnston, rapporteur.
The Other Road to Security: Canada and Disarmament. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982.
- Frazer, Rowland C.
"Canada-US relations: how not to shoot ourselves in the foot." Delivered to the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Mich., February 22, 1982. In *Vital Speeches* 48:395-398 April 15, 1982.
- Germain, Georges-Hébert.
"Le Tiers-Monde de Marcel Massé." In *L'Actualité* 7:48-52 août 1982.
- Graham, Ron.
"Man with a mission." In *Saturday Night* 97:15-24 August 1982.
- Hawkins, Freda.
"Multiculturalism in two countries: the Canadian and Australian experience." In *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes* 17:64-80 spring/printemps 1982.
- Hay, Keith A.J.
"Canadian trade policy in the 1980s." In *International Perspectives* 16:20 July/August 1982.
- Houndjahoué, Michel.
"Essai sur l'étude de la coopération bilatérale entre le Canada et l'Afrique francophone, 1961-1981." In *Études internationales* 13:263-281 juin 1982.
- McCullum, Hugh.
"Canada and the politics of complicity." In *Canadian Forum* 42:19-20 August 1982.
- Nied, G. David.
"International adjudication: settlement of the United States-Canada maritime boundary dispute — delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1982 E.C.J.3 (Constitution of Chamber of Order of Jan. 20)." In *Harvard International Law Journal* 23:138-143 spring 1982.
- Pratte, André.
"Le Canada au Salvador: ambiguïté ou incohérence." In *Perspective internationale* 15-19 printemps 1982.
- Reford, Robert W.
"The UN Disarmament Conference and Canada." In *International Perspectives* 6-8 July/August 1982.
- Rigaldies, Francis.
"Contribution à l'étude de l'acte juridique unilatéral en droit international public." In *La Revue juridique thémis* 15:417-451 1980-81.
- Rotstein, Abraham.
"Independence when times are hard." In *Policy Options/Options politiques* 3:30-34 September/October 1982.
- Stevenson, Ray.
"Canada as a nuclear weapons free zone." In *Communist Viewpoint* 14:1-7 August 1982.
- Talpis, Jeffrey A.
"La pratique non contentieuse du droit international privé québécois." In *La Revue juridique thémis* 15:453-471 1980-81.

2. Articles

- Brown, Ian.
"Bastions in the Stream." In *Equinox* 1:84-95 September/October 1982.
- "Canadian Policy Towards South Africa." Brief from the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility with an introduction and conclusion by Cranford Pratt. In *Revue canadienne des études africaines/Canadian Journal of African Studies* 16:113-126 1982.
- Roest, Pierre-Gerlier.
"A propos de la Troisième option et de la politique américaine de l'état canadien." In *Études internationales* 13:305-321 juin 1982.

International Canada, August and September, 1982

Wang, Erik B.

"Adjudication of Canada-United States disputes." In *Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international* 158-228, 1981.

II. Recent publications of the Department of External Affairs.

1. Press Releases

- No. 51 (March 30, 1982) High Level Japanese Investment Survey Mission Arrives in Canada.
- No. 52 (March 30, 1982) Leon Rooke Wins Canada/Australia Literary Award for 1981.
- No. 53 (April 1, 1982) Expulsion of Soviet Trade Representative.
- No. 54 (April 1, 1982) International Energy Exposition Knoxville, Tennessee, May 1-October 31, 1982.
- No. 55 (April 2, 1982) France-Canada Economic Commission.
- No. 56 (April 2, 1982) Canadian Automotive Aftermarket Promotion Gaining Strength in Latin America.
- No. 57 (April 13, 1982) Falkland/Malvinas Islands.
- No. 58 (April 14, 1982) Uganda: Commonwealth Military Training Assistance Programme.
- No. 59 (April 15, 1982) Canadian Companies to Construct Vocational Training Centres in Algeria.
- No. 60 (April 19, 1982) Second Session of the Canada-Algeria Joint Commission, Algiers, April 19-21, 1982.
- No. 61 (April 21, 1982) Canada at the Akademie der Künste of Berlin, December 5, 1982—January 30, 1983.
- No. 62 (April 21, 1982) Velan Inc. Wins Contract in Hungary.
- No. 63 (April 21, 1982) Sixth International Tin Agreement.
- No. 64 (April 23, 1982) First Session of Canada-Cameroon Bilateral Commission Yaoundé, April 28-30, 1982.
- No. 65 (April 26, 1982) Canadian Equipment for Highway Construction in Indonesia.
- No. 66 (April 26, 1982) Second Session of Canada-Algeria Joint Commission Algiers, April 19-21, 1982.
- No. 67 (April 28, 1982) Release of Correspondence with the United States on the Northern Gas Pipeline.
- No. 68 (April 28, 1982) Official Visit of the French Minister of External Relations, Mr. Claude Cheysson.
- No. 69 (May 3, 1982) First Joint Session of the Canada-Cameroon Mixed Commission, Yaoundé, April 28-30, 1982.
- No. 70 (May 3, 1982) Ministerial Meeting of the OECD, Paris, May 10-11, 1982.
- No. 71 (May 3, 1982) Agreement Between Canada and Italy on Italian Pilot Training in Canada.
- No. 72 (May 3, 1982) Canadian Offshore Capability Focus of National Exhibit, Houston, May 3-6, 1982.

- No. 73 (May 5, 1982) 145 Canadian Firms Break into South East Asian Markets in 1981.
- No. 74 (May 5, 1982) Heroux Inc. Awarded \$3.5 Million U.S. Air Force Contract.
- No. 75 (May 7, 1982) Canada Reaches Forest Fire Fighting Arrangement with USA.

2. Statements and Speeches

- No. 81/29 Education and world progress: An address by Marcel Masse, President, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to the 1981 Convention of the Canadian Education Association, Saskatoon, September 25, 1981.
- No. 81/30 Canada and the European community: An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Annual Conference of the European Politics Group of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, December 15, 1981.
- No. 81/31 Disarmament a means to international security and stability. A statement by Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Arthur Menzies to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly XXXVI, New York, October 28, 1981.
- No. 81/32 Pacific Economic Community concept: a Canadian view. Excerpts from a Speech by Mr. R.G. Rogers, Chairman, Crown Zellerbach (Canada) and Vice Chairman, Canadian Committee of the Pacific Basin Economic Council, to the Institute for U.S.-Japan Relations, San Francisco, November 10, 1981.
- No. 82/1 Canada and the United States in the 1980s: partnership, conflict or ...?
- No. 82/2 The challenge to Canada and the United States. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, January 29, 1982.
- No. 82/3 Violation of human rights in Poland: An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Fifth Session of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Madrid, Spain, February 9, 1982.
- No. 82/4 Canada prepares for second UN Special Session on Disarmament. Statement by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, February 25, 1982.
- No. 82/5 Canadian policy in Africa. Address by the Honourable Pierre De Bané, Minister of State for External Relations, to the Canadian Institute for African Affairs, Montreal, February 23, 1982.
- No. 82/6 International security and disarmament. A Statement by Ambassador for Disarmament A.R. Menzies, to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, February 3, 1982.
- No. 82/7 The challenge of exportation. Address by the Honourable Pierre De Bané, Minister of State for External Relations, to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce, February 23, 1982.
- No. 82/8 Canada's Concern for Peace in the Middle East. Address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canada-Israel Committee, Ottawa, March 31, 1982.
- No. 82/9 Atlantic Alliance Dedicated to the Preservation of Peace. Address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State

for External Affairs, in his capacity as Honorary President of the North Atlantic Council, to the Opening Session of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, May 17, 1982.

No. 82/10 Technological Momentum: the Fuel that Feeds the Nuclear Arms Race. Address by the Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau, Prime Minister, to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, June 18, 1982.

No. 82/11 Acid Rain: A Serious Bilateral Issue. Address by the Honourable John Roberts, Minister of the Environment, to the Air Pollution Control Association, New Orleans, June 21, 1982.

III. Treaty Information (prepared by the Economic Law and Treaty Division).

1. Bilateral

Asean

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on Economic Cooperation.
New York, September 25, 1981.
In force June 1, 1982.

Bangladesh

Agreement between Canada and the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income.
Dacca, February 15, 1982.

Brazil

Long Term Wheat Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil.
Ottawa, July 20, 1982.
In force July 20, 1982.
With effect from January 1, 1983.

Bulgaria

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria concerning a definitive settlement of certain Bulgarian Bonds.
Ottawa, June 14, 1982.
In force June 14, 1982.

Cameroon

Convention between Canada and the United Republic of Cameroon for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (with related letter).
Ottawa, May 26, 1982.

Egypt

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
Ottawa, May 17, 1982.

Guinea

General Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea on Development Cooperation.
Conakry, June 8, 1982.
In force June 8, 1982.

Indonesia, Republic of

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
Ottawa, July 12, 1982.

India

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of India on Air Services.
New Delhi, July 20, 1982.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of India on the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Airline Income, supplemental to the Air Services Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of India, signed July 20, 1982.
New Delhi, July 20, 1982.
In force July 20, 1982.

Italy

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Italy concerning the training in Canada of personnel of the Italian Air force.
Ottawa, May 3, 1982.
In force May 3, 1982.

Malta, Republic of

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Malta constituting an Agreement relating to Foreign Investment Insurance (with arrangement).
Valletta, May 24, 1982.
In force May 24, 1982.

New Zealand

Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Government of Canada and the Government of New Zealand.
Ottawa, September 25, 1981.
In force January 1, 1982 with the exception of Article IV.

Papua New Guinea

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Papua New Guinea constituting an Agreement relating to Investment Insurance.
Papua New Guinea, May 6 and 31, 1982.
In force June 10, 1982.

Poland

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Polish People's Republic on their Mutual Fisheries Relations.
Ottawa, May 14, 1982.
In force May 15, 1982.

Rwanda

General Agreement for Development Cooperation between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda.
Kigali, October 25, 1981.
In force June 1, 1982.

Sri Lanka

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Sri Lanka constituting an Agreement relating to Investment Insurance.
Colombo, June 17, 1982.
In force June 17, 1982.

International Canada, August and September, 1982

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Colombo, June 23, 1982.

Tunisia

Convention between Canada and the Republic of Tunisia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
Tunis, February 10, 1982.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to further extend the Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed at Ottawa, on February 29, 1956.
Moscow, January 21, 1982.
In force January 21, 1982.

Agreement between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on their Mutual Fisheries Relations.
Moscow, May 19, 1976.
In force May 19, 1976.
Canadian Notice of termination of Agreement dated May 12, 1981, effective May 19, 1982.
Extension of Notice of termination of May 12, 1981, effective September 30, 1982.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning Fisheries Matters of Mutual Concern.
Ottawa, December 22, 1975.
In force December 22, 1975.
Canadian Notice of termination of Agreement dated June 7, 1982, effective December 30, 1982.

United States

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America adding a further annex (Annex V) to the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, brought into force by an Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America at Ottawa, on June 19, 1979.
Ottawa, March 5 and 17, 1982.
In force March 17, 1982.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America together with the annexed Memorandum of Agreement amending the Agreement concerning the application of Tolls for the St-Lawrence Seaway (1959) as amended.
Washington, March 18, 1982.
In force March 18, 1982.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America amending the Agreement Concerning Allocation of Television Channels, dated June 23, 1952.
Washington, February 26 and April 7, 1982.
In force April 7, 1982.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America amending the Agreement of October 24, 1962 concerning the Coordination and Use of Radio Frequencies Above 30 Megacycles per

Second, as amended by the Exchange of Notes of June 25, 1965.
Washington, February 26 and April 7, 1982.
In force April 7, 1982.

Venezuela

Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela.
Ottawa, June 25, 1982.

2. Multilateral

International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC)

Done at Geneva, December 2, 1972.

Entered into force September 6, 1977.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited at London on February 19, 1981.

Entered into force for Canada February 19, 1982.

Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean

Done at Reykjavik, March 2, 1982.

Signed by Canada March 18, 1982.

International Natural Rubber Agreement, 1979

Done at Geneva, October 6, 1979.

Signed by Canada June 30, 1980.

Entered into force provisionally October 23, 1980.

Canada's notification of provisional application of Agreement deposited at Geneva, November 7, 1980.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited at New York, December 15, 1981.

Enters into force definitively, April 15, 1982.

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva, 1979

Done at Geneva, November 19, 1979.

Signed by Canada, subject to approval, November 19, 1979.

Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited at Geneva, April 27, 1982.

The following Reservations by the Government of Canada were deposited April 27, 1982.

Mobile satellites operating in the UHF band: In developing its mobile-satellite systems under Radio Regulation 641 Canada agrees that such systems should be coordinated and notified according to Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14. However, once such satellites are placed in operation, Canada considers that these systems operate with a primary status for the duration of their operational life.

HF broadcasting: Canada considers that the problem of severe congestion of the bands allocated to the broadcasting service at HF below 9 MHz was not resolved by the World Administrative Radi Conference (Geneva, 1979). A proposal by Canada for the addition of 100 kHz of spectrum between 7,300 and 7,400 kHz for this service on a world-wide basis, which would have helped to solve the problem, was rejected at the Conference by a narrow margin. For this reason, Canada reserves the right, in approving the Final Acts, to satisfy certain of its broadcasting requirements in the band segment 7,300-7,400 kHz. Insofar as possible Canada, of course, will respect the rights of administrations operating in accordance with the Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference (Geneva, 1979).

Sixth International Tin Agreement

Concluded at Geneva, June 26, 1981.

Signed by Canada at New York, April 29, 1982.

Canada's notification of provisional application deposited at New York, May 11, 1982.

1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue

Done at Hamburg, April 25, 1979.

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited at London, June 18, 1982.

Canada

Nuclear War and Soviet Policy

by David R. Jones

It is now clear that President Reagan's administration, in spite of the widespread doubts and opposition of many, intends to provide the United States with the theoretical capability to wage a protracted nuclear conflict. Two basic assumptions are used to justify this policy. Firstly, the President and his colleagues claim to believe that the West has become dangerously inferior to the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weaponry. This assessment is at best debatable. But since it has been challenged by numerous eminent specialists at home and abroad, it is not my intention to comment on it here. It is rather the administration's second assumption which I want to examine. This maintains that in Soviet military and political thought, wars — nuclear conflicts included — continue to be considered a rational means (or "viable policy option") for attaining political goals, and that therefore the Kremlin is persisting in efforts to develop superior "nuclear war-fighting and war-winning capabilities" for use in hastening the "inevitable" victory of "socialism-communism" over "capitalism-imperialism." And if this is true, any responsible Western statesman can only support concerted and costly defence programs to convince Soviet leaders that such hopes are illusions.

Politicians arguing this case have drawn support from a phalanx of conservative Kremlinologists, among whom Professor Richard Pipes is the best known. Even so, this interpretation deserves careful scrutiny, if only because it stands in sharp contrast to Soviet statements which insist that an East/West nuclear conflict cannot remain limited, but that it must entail a tragedy of worldwide proportions. During 1980 and 1981 no less a figure than Premier Brezhnev himself issued a number of warnings couched in these terms. On one occasion, for example, he cautioned that any US/Soviet war would have "disastrous consequences . . . for mankind because it inevitably would assume a global nature." On another he told delegates of the Supreme Soviet that if "modern weapons . . . were unleashed, the future of all mankind would hang in the balance." Yet there are some who still suggest that such sentiments are only crafty, propagandistic responses to Washington's newly-found determination to match and negate the supposedly rapid expansion of Soviet military might.

Soviet war fears

Nevertheless, it is hard to dismiss such statements merely as a passing phenomenon or temporary expedient. Soviet spokesmen at all levels have expressed similar views

throughout the 1970s. Indeed, as early as January 12, 1965, an article in *Pravda* argued that even if a nuclear war would bring down capitalism, "the destruction would be so great that this would not speed up the transition to socialism but, on the contrary, it would throw mankind a long way backwards." In a still more dire vein, during the early 1970s Brezhnev worried that a "nuclear war could result in hundreds of millions of deaths, the destruction of entire countries and contamination of the earth's surface and atmosphere." More recently, apart from the growing frequency of such warnings, the USSR's officially-sanctioned vigorous support for groups such as "Physicians Against Nuclear War" can be seen as part of an increasingly frantic desire to convince Western policy-makers that the Politburo regards a nuclear exchange as a catastrophe of unimaginable magnitude.

Given this background, why have many found the views of conservative Kremlinologists so persuasive? To some extent this results from the latter's buttressing of their interpretations by what appear to be official Soviet statements, but what in fact are often only partial quotations taken out of context. For instance, an analyst may cite a section of a quote that speaks of the downfall of capitalism, but simultaneously down-play — or simply ignore — the qualifiers about a nuclear conflict's general, disastrous consequences. Quite apart from such carelessness, however, for a time such experts could justify their conclusions in part by a long-standing and apparent contradiction that was to be found in Moscow's pronouncements on military policy. For in 1915 Lenin had analyzed the teachings of the great German military thinker Karl von Clausewitz. Thanks to this, many of the latter's conclusions on the nature of war were incorporated into Marxist-Leninist military doctrine.

Clausewitzian confusions

For our purposes, the most important consequence was the Soviet's rigid acceptance of the Clausewitzian-Leninist formula that "war is the continuation of politics [or of policy] by other, that is by violent, means." Therefore Soviet theoreticians might reject thermonuclear war as a

David R. Jones is Editor of the Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual at Dalhousie University in Halifax. A shorter version of this article appeared in the Defence Newsletter of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie.

Soviet view of nuclear war

practical tool of policy for the USSR, but they still were forced to insist that *all* wars remained a continuation of the political process. So in this sense, even a nuclear conflict could to some degree seem "rational," especially to desperate "imperialists" who might see it as their only chance of "reversing the tide of history." This last consideration also helps explain, of course, why the Soviet military authorities have gone on implementing measures aimed at raising their damage limitation, war-fighting and war-survival (rather than "war-winning") capabilities. After all, given the fact that a nuclear war was still theoretically possible, any other policy would be irresponsible and risk a repeat of the disasters of 1941 on a mammoth scale.

Even so, some Western specialists predictably saw matters otherwise. They included Pipes, for whom the Soviets' continued adherence to the Clausewitzian-Leninist dictum quite simply signified that they really believed that a nuclear war "is not suicidal, [that] it can be fought and won, and thus [that a] resort to war must not be ruled out." Writing in *Commentary* in July 1977, Pipes argued that this Soviet belief "spells the rejection of the whole basis on which US strategy has come to rest," and that "as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual deterrence does not really exist." For the same reason one obviously can contend that Moscow's expressed fears about the disastrous outcome of a nuclear struggle be taken with a large grain of salt, and that one should prepare to meet the USSR on its own terms. Since this is precisely the position adopted by the Reagan administration, it is no accident that Professor Pipes serves as one of its leading advisers on matters Soviet.

Double guessing in earnest

Yet good grounds exist both for challenging this view's validity and for suggesting that the Kremlin's leaders themselves have redefined their own interpretation of the Clausewitzian principle, perhaps in response to just such critics as Pipes. To begin with, one should stress that they never saw the dictum in question as a recommendation that war, thermonuclear or otherwise, was a beneficial or even necessary means of pursuing policy. For them, rather, Clausewitz and Lenin had merely stated the simple facts that the use of armed force was one of many available means of gaining certain ends, and that when a state went to war, it did so in order to achieve some political goal. And in this sense it is difficult to deny that any armed conflict between nations is not precisely "a continuation of politics" by violent means. In addition, once this formula became part and parcel of Marxism-Leninism, it helped focus study on the origins and political essence of each particular conflict, which in turn became the method for deciding whether or not a struggle could be classified as "just" or "progressive." But as Lieutenant Colonel E. Rybkin pointed out in *Communist of the Armed Forces* in September 1965, just because "war is always the continuation of politics . . . it cannot always serve as its [politics] weapon." In other words, the maxim clearly has *descriptive*, but not necessarily *prescriptive*, merits.

This qualification has special relevance in discussions of nuclear war, a point Soviet military and political writers have had little reticence in making. Until recently the problem was that faculty members of the prestigious Lenin Political-Military Academy — the institutional guardian of

political orthodoxy for the Soviet Armed Forces — have chastised those challenging the Clausewitzian-Leninist formula for "methodological errors," and particularly for not clearly distinguishing between the descriptive and prescriptive aspects just mentioned. Thus in the mid-1960s Rybkin himself and others criticized Major General N.S. Talenskii for arguing that a thermonuclear war could *not* serve as means for achieving political ends. However, by 1973 Rybkin had joined those who insisted that "a total nuclear war is unacceptable as a means of gaining a political goal," since the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons now made "such a war an unfeasible means of policy." Again the time was not ripe for such a seemingly radical revision of Lenin's teachings. This fact perhaps reflected orthodox theorists' concern that such a step would reflect adversely on the "justness," and by inference on the rationality, of the Soviet Union's responding in kind to any nuclear strike launched by an enemy. In any case, those rejecting the revisionists' position in the military press usually coupled their arguments to warnings that if attacked by nuclear weapons, the USSR would not hesitate to return the blow.

War if necessary, but not necessarily war

Signs of a change in this situation appeared in 1979. Then Aleksandr Bovin, a prominent *Izvestia* commentator who also had been attacked widely in 1973 for expressing opinions similar to Rybkin's, took the lead. He twice told listeners to Radio Moscow's domestic service that "while any war, in any age, always has been and always will be the continuation of some particular policy of a particular class or state," a nuclear war could not be considered to be a *rational* means of pursuing political objectives. He therefore insisted that on this issue "the interests of the socialist countries coincide." Significantly, Bovin's remarks provoked no angry reproofs. Instead, support began coming from the very highest levels. By September 1980 B.N. Ponomarev, a Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, was telling an audience in Sophia that "world war as a means of achieving political goals has become impossible. It is senseless to count on such a war to establish, for example, the hegemony of the United States or Peking."

Such sentiments accorded well with those found in other Soviet pronouncements, as well as with the tone of Brezhnev's speeches. Now to the Premier's warnings that "mankind might be totally destroyed" in a conflict (November 1976) was added explicitly the logical conclusion that neither superpower could win a "nuclear duel" (*Pravda*, January 15, 1981). Although other leading spokesmen expressed similar thoughts, Army General A.A. Epishev's indirect confirmation of their validity deserves special note. As head of the Armed Forces' Main Political Administration, he is the high priest of the Marxist orthodoxy of contemporary Soviet military doctrine, for which reason one who might well have been expected to object to these developments. However, the January 16, 1981, issue of *Red Star*, the Ministry of Defence's official newspaper, quoted this officer as calling attention to recent "reckless" American policies that could "push the world into the abyss of a thermonuclear catastrophe."

Although in part these statements may have been intended as an answer to some Western Kremlinologists, none explicitly had met Pipes's criterion by openly and officially rejecting the Clausewitzian formula's applicability to nuclear war as such. True, Bovin's careful

separation of the maxim's descriptive value from his simultaneous rejection of the rationality of using nuclear weapons amounted to the same thing. Even so, the Kremlin may well have been coming to appreciate the utility of a specific pronouncement. An article in the issue of *USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology* for December 1981 seems a move in this direction. In it G.A. Trofimenko, one of Moscow's foremost "Americanologists," attacked "semi-educated theoreticians" in the West who maintain that Soviet adherence to Clausewitz's dictum means the Soviet Union believes it is possible to employ nuclear force for political ends. For clearly, Trofimenko wrote, since a struggle with such weapons "cannot serve any sensible political goal," such a war cannot be seen as a "practical" instrument of policy. So it is an instrument "which cannot be used," and one which can be discussed only "in the realm of theory."

Change made fast

Doubters might, of course, still dismiss this article as being at best a trial balloon that did not reflect an unchanged Soviet doctrine. Yet the last basis for this position disappeared after Konstantin U. Chernenko's highly-publicized speech of April 22, 1981. The occasion — the anniversary of Lenin's death — was a particularly solemn and apt one for the revision of the master's teachings. Similarly, Chernenko himself, as a protégé of Brezhnev, as Secretary of the Central Committee and candidate for the succession, was a figure of considerable stature. And revise Lenin he did. For he proclaimed that any thermonuclear conflict must be considered "a threat to the whole of civilization, or even to life in our world," and branded as "criminal" any attempt to present such a war as "a 'rational,' almost 'legitimate' continuation of policy." Rather, he argued, "any responsible state leader must recognize" that any use of nuclear weapons "places the future of mankind in doubt." As for theorists "on both sides of the Atlantic" who talk of the "limited" use of such systems, Chernenko dismissed their arguments as being dangerous efforts to promote a belief in "the permissibility and acceptability" of a major nuclear confrontation. To counteract such attempts, "the truth about the ruinous consequences of a thermonuclear conflict should be fully realized by all peoples."

In terms of doctrine, then, the Soviet military and political leaders seemed to have met the demands of Pipes and others by clearly rejecting nuclear warfare as a legitimate and rational means of pursuing policy. But this signified that they had ruled out initiating a nuclear conflict as a "policy option" for themselves, not that they will not wage such a struggle if attacked. Brezhnev himself had made this clear in 1979. "We are against the use of nuclear weapons," he wrote, "but extraordinary circumstances and aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear power could force us to resort to this extreme means of self-defence." So while he pledged that the USSR would "do everything it can to prevent a nuclear war," efforts to raise the nation's war-fighting and war-survival capabilities have continued unabated. Indeed, given Moscow's growing nervousness about the Reagan administration, such efforts may well increase in both scope and intensity during the years ahead.

Evidence of this came in the form of Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov's booklet *Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland*, published in March 1982. Since

Ogarkov is Chief of the General Staff, and since his pamphlet appeared as part of the series entitled "Implementing the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress," there is little doubt about its authority. In it the marshal makes the usual calls for increased combat-readiness, higher levels of military, patriotic and general education and for the acquisition of modern weaponry. More significant, however, is his call for a mobilization program that would integrate fully the civilian and economic sectors with that of the military. The practical implications of this need not concern us here beyond noting that Ogarkov justifies all this by observing that the "element of surprise" is "today . . . becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance." Even so, the mere fact that the Soviet Union continues to prepare for waging, if necessary, a thermonuclear war is one that in itself could lead some to question the sincerity, significance and permanence of the doctrinal shift just outlined.

Latest revision

On this issue Ogarkov's booklet is especially helpful. For in justifying the practical measures mentioned, he provides an officially-approved and updated guide to the major tenets of Marxist-Leninist military doctrine as today's Soviet leadership interprets them. This, of course, involves discussing all the general questions already raised on the likelihood, causes and consequences of a major conflict between the superpowers. Even though his comments on these specific matters are spread throughout the marshal's text, and although they frequently are found in contexts that involve more technical military subjects, an internally-consistent statement of Soviet attitudes does emerge that deserves a brief summation.

In the first place, the Chief of the General Staff leaves no doubt that he and his colleagues still consider a nuclear conflict would be a global catastrophe. Thanks to "the enormous qualitative leap forward . . . in the last decades in the development of weaponry," he maintains the latter's use would be "an incalculable calamity for the peoples of the entire world." As for attempts to limit such a disaster, he is extremely pessimistic. Thus, he dismisses suggestions that a nuclear conflict in Europe could occur "without such a war escalating into a world war." For while "one can reason theoretically" about a more limited use of nuclear weapons, Ogarkov clearly states the Soviet leadership's belief "that in practice it is impossible . . . to hold nuclear war within a certain restricted framework." Indeed, he warns that any use of nuclear missiles and "modern weapons" in general "can result in military operations encompassing all the continents of the world from the very outset. Many hundreds of millions of people will inescapably be drawn into the maelstrom of such a war . . ."

Fortunately, in his view, there remains an "absence of a fatal inevitability of war" since the Communist Party, "on the basis of a profound scientific analysis" of the international situation, "has reached the well-substantiated conclusion that it is possible to prevent a world war in today's conditions." Yet this "objective possibility" can only be achieved by "a vigorous and persistent struggle against warmongers of various ilk," chief of which are representatives of the "aggressive imperialism" of the West. This force, under Washington's leadership, today "threatens to unleash a third world war, with the employment of nuclear missile weapons." Against the historical background of imperialism's role in world relations as seen from Moscow,

Soviet view of nuclear war

he then accuses the Reagan administration of having "openly adopted a course of policy aimed at undermining détente, engaging in a massive arms race, and vigorous preparations for nuclear war." These "practical actions" seek to replace the strategic "parity" of the early 1970s by American "military superiority," and eventually by American "world domination," and they are "pushing the peoples of the world toward the abyss of thermonuclear war."

Deterrence — alive and well everywhere

Having identified the threat to peace, at least to his own satisfaction, Ogarkov goes on to define Soviet policies in general as being "aimed at ending the threat of war, deepening détente, holding the arms race in check, and opposing the forces of aggression." This naturally means that the USSR's defence efforts are seen as responses to external dangers since the Party and government have had "realistically" to seek to guarantee "the reliable security of our country" and "readiness to offer a resolute rebuff to aggression." Only in this context does Ogarkov admit that there is any possibility that the Soviet Union would contemplate using its own strategic nuclear forces. For these, he maintains, now "possess the capability, in case the aggressor initiates a war which employs nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, to immediately deliver a crushing strike in response." And in spite of other existing programs for raising his state's war-fighting and war-survival capabilities, he announces it is precisely these strategic systems "which serve as the principal factor restraining the aggressor."

Ogarkov's exposition of current Soviet doctrine, then, contains nothing that contradicts the development outlined

earlier. It is further significant that despite his frequent citing of Lenin's contributions to Marxist military thought, he makes no mention whatsoever of the Clausewitzian dictum on war and politics. Instead he includes a number of passages that stress that a nuclear war will mean worldwide disaster, and in effect thereby underscores the "irrationality" of initiating any such conflict. Of equal interest, his concept of a deterrence based mainly on the ability to launch a devastating retaliatory strike has much in common with Western ideas that peace can be kept if an aggressor fears he will suffer "unacceptable damage." So it seems that the Soviet leaders, at least in terms of their doctrine, are sincere in their fears about thermonuclear catastrophe and in their intention to use the relevant weaponry *only as a response* to an enemy's first strike.

All in all, then, they appear to have met Professor Pipes's demand that they reject the Clausewitzian dictum's applicability to nuclear conflicts. In addition, there are indications that earlier Western efforts to "educate" the Soviet military in our concept of deterrence may have born some fruit. For Ogarkov's views on this matter in many ways seem closer to those of Western strategists of the last decade than they do to those of some leading officials in the Washington of today. Ironically, it is Pipes, Caspar Weinberger and their colleagues who now envisage the possibility of engaging in a drawn-out nuclear struggle. In this way they have adopted as policy for the United States precisely the view of deterrence they once perceived as holding sway in Moscow. If this is true — as a growing body of evidence suggests it is — then Moscow's negotiators now may have to begin "re-educating" their American opposites about the facts of global life and death in the thermonuclear era. □



Throughout the world thousands are imprisoned because of their political and religious beliefs. Many are held without trial, many have been tortured.

At Amnesty International we work to restore to these imprisoned men and women the basic human rights which have been denied them.

You can help.
Contact:

Amnesty International
Canadian Section (English Speaking)
294 Albert St., Suite 204
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6E6
(613) 563-1891



Get involved with UNICEF ...



You'll be in good company.

UNICEF VOLUNTEERS: A Joan Read / Educator, Gouborg B Jean Arnold Tory / Founder UNICEF Canada C Jean Stairs / Homemaker, Fredericton, N.B. D Allen Sapp / Artist, North Battleford E Peter Ustinov / Actor (UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador) F Gertrude Elton / President UNICEF Canada, St. John's, Nfld.



Unicef Canada 

443 Mount Pleasant Road, Toronto, Ont. M4S 2L8
Volunteer Toll Free Number: 1-800-268-6362
(In B.C., 112-800-268-6362) Operator 521.


Water for all

by Thomas Land

Mankind's ancient dream of producing vast quantities of fresh water from the sea is becoming an economic reality. Several large desalination plants based on a new, cost-effective, reverse-osmosis process are either being built or are at their advanced stages of planning in the Americas, the Middle East and elsewhere.

The requisite technology is still expensive, calling for heavy initial capital investment and an operating cost of something like four dollars per thousand gallons of water, limiting the present scope of the process to the needs of the

important agreement of collaboration recently reached between the University of Toronto and the King Saud University of Riyadh. The five-year, multi-million dollar accord calls for joint research, the training of Saudi students in Canada and the dispatch of Canadian professors to Saudi Arabia to develop postgraduate training as well as advanced research. Dean Gordon Slemon of the engineering and applied science faculty of Toronto University says, "This is the most developed relationship I am aware of between the Saudis and any North American university."



Courtesy Korean Embassy

Desalination plant in Saudi Arabia

profitable agro-industries and the big cities of the rich world. But it holds out the realistic promise of unlimited supplies of pollution-free fresh water within the foreseeable future when further technological innovations are likely to make the process economically accessible even to the poorest communities.

Such an achievement could be attained through an

Their joint projects will cover the areas of greatest Saudi concern, such as water, construction, petroleum engineering and transport.

Global research in the reverse-osmosis process is en-

Thomas Land is an author and foreign correspondent who writes on global affairs from London, England.

Ancient dream becomes reality

couraged by its commercial implications, for it has reached the threshold of economic feasibility. It is a timely development, and the United Nations has declared the 1980s as the International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, intended to transform radically the lives of many millions of people. Universal access to clean water and sanitation would reduce substantially the burden of disease in the developing regions where about eighty percent of all illness is blamed on the inadequate water supply. It would stimulate food production and other industrial development and end the drudgery in the lives of women and children who walk several miles daily to fetch water, often unsafe, for their families' needs.

Saudi Arabia already relies considerably on desalinated water. At present, there are twenty operational desalination plants, according to the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, and by the turn of the century their number will be increased by fifty. Some plants are to be built aboard ships which could serve several areas a year as the need arises, leaving behind vast quantities of fresh water stored for consumption while the mobile plants are deployed elsewhere.

Significantly, the process is not limited to sea water. It can be used for the purification of water of salts as well as various other materials dissolved in it. One obvious early application, therefore, is re-purification of water resources in industrially developed regions such as North America where the local ground water supplies have become polluted or inadequate. The traditional approach to desalination is simple distillation involving the boiling and subsequent condensation of water without salt and other unwanted materials. This process requires an economically unacceptable consumption of energy. It is still used on a big scale, but only by the richest of the rich. There appears little prospect of finding a way to reduce the requisite energy input.

Reverse-osmosis

Compare this with the reverse-osmosis process, borrowed from nature and developed by water engineers over the past decade and a half. At present, still at an early stage of development, reverse-osmosis requires about half the investment in energy needed in distillation to produce the same quantity of pure water. And new developments in membrane materials and engineering techniques — which may well emerge from the Toronto-Riyadh project and elsewhere — are expected shortly to reduce the present energy input by half again. Water purification installations based on the new process can be built in something like half the space and two-thirds of the time it takes to erect comparable distillation plants. Reverse-osmosis is a process used by fish. It reverses the usual tendency of liquids filtering through a membrane — as in the case of plants taking up nutrients from the soil — to flow from a dilute solution on the one side to a concentrated one on the other. Modern water treatment plants deploy man-made materials for filters including millions of hair-thin tubes. The sea water molecules are forced through these at pressures of hundreds of kilograms per square centimeter. The dissolved solids in the water, including the salts, are simply left behind.

Such plants are being installed for many purposes, such as one in Algeria to serve a paper mill, one in the Caspian Sea in the Soviet Union as part of an energy


complex and a third in Venezuela, also in connection with energy development. Several in North America are to serve the needs of agriculture and environment modification.

In Saudi Arabia, fresh research is to be carried out mainly at King Saud University's college of engineering which is already a leading regional centre for hydraulic and solar energy development studies. The university was founded in 1957. It has developed considerable modern research resources since the early 1970s when the recurring waves of the global oil "crisis" made the kingdom rich. Its collaboration program with the University of Toronto, which is to be reviewed every six months, is financed by Saudi Arabia. Several other Canadian universities — including McGill and Concordia in Montreal and Guelph in Ontario — have been approached by the Saudi Government seeking to develop further exchange programs in such spheres as agriculture, architecture, medicine, urban planning, communications, education, construction and linguistics.

These exchanges reflect an urgent pace of development throughout the region. During a recent UN debate, an Arabian Gulf spokesman declared: "The world today possesses the scientific and technological capacity to ensure drinking water and sanitation for every society in the world — hence the close link between drinking water supply and sanitation on the one hand and international cooperation on the other."

Given the rapid development of desalination technology and the will of the rich world to satisfy the urgent global need for ample fresh water supplies in the service of agriculture, industry and public health care, the reverse-osmosis process may perhaps become universally available during this decade. □

Canada at Dieppe



by T. Murray Hunter

... with a foreword by C.P. Stacey
and eleven full colour reproductions
of paintings by Charles Comfort,
Lawren P. Harris and six German
war artists.

Available at book stores or
directly from the publisher.

302-150 Wellington Street,
Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A4

1-613-238-2628

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF MAN



Miracle in Korea

by Robert Bedeski

In the 1950s, the Republic of Korea (ROK) seemed a most unlikely candidate for industrialization — devastated by war, divided into two antagonistic halves, and lacking many vital resources. Yet the Koreans in the south have overcome these formidable obstacles to become a member of the small circle of "Newly Industrializing Countries," or NICs. Similar to West Germany, the ROK has emerged as a half-nation performing far better than most countries with superior political and economic resources. But unlike West Germany, Korea's industrial infrastructure was very rudimentary before the war, and much of that was located in the now Communist-ruled north.

Under the rule of President Park Chung-Hee, the country's industrial drive began in earnest. His authoritarian control ended in 1979 with assassination by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. A brief period of civilian rule was followed by military intervention and the imposition of martial law. General Chun Doo Hwan and other military figures took power. Chun was inaugurated President of the new Fifth Republic in March 1981, and the country resumed its drive towards modern industrial growth after over a year of recession and instability.


Korea's economic growth has been sustained in large part by developing its export markets, fostering heavy industry, and continuously improving technology. To support this growth, the country needs political stability and a peaceful external environment.

Economic strategy

The Koreans have been successfully fighting their poverty, colonial heritage and war devastation. Today, their country is on the verge of moving from being classified as "developing" to "developed." This transformation was stalled for a time following the death of Park and the wider world recession. Instability, popular uprisings, notably in the city of Kwangju, and military intervention threatened the economic progress of the 1970s. Poor weather decreased agricultural output by 22%, while large wage increases (averaging 30% per annum) reduced the former price advantages. The gross national product (GNP) registered a decline of 5.7% in 1980, and inflation soared to 44.8%.

Then, in 1981, new policies were formulated to halt the economic decline. The government temporarily cut taxes and bank interest rates to stimulate the economy. Capital gains taxes on the sales of housing units were reduced to aid

the construction industry, while a program of public works aimed at more pump priming and at a reduction of the unemployment rate. Structural reforms gave banks greater autonomy, and the government reduced its equity in several banks. A 1980 devaluation of the Korean *won* helped to boost exports. This year, further measures included



more reduction in interest rates and corporate taxes as well as plans to turn over three commercial banks to private ownership, concessional excise taxes for autos and color TVs, and assistance for up to 3000 small enterprises.

In addition to short-term measures to pull the nation out of recession, the government has decided to reduce its presence in the economy. According to the fifth Five Year Plan (FYP) which began this year, "Excessive government intervention in the private sector has discouraged private initiative and efficiency of investments which are vital to the growth of a market economy." This new direction will not lead to a totally free market. Even by 1986, the last year of the present plan, the state will still be in effective control of the national economy. This control is implemented through the allocation and pricing of credit, tax incentives,


Robert Bedeski is Professor of Political Science at Carleton University in Ottawa. He has lived and lectured in the far east and is the author of a forthcoming study of great power relationships in East Asia.

Korea's Fifth Republic

tariffs, directives on price controls, limits on market shares, licences and even confiscation of assets.

Government's heavy hand gets lighter

Korean enterprises are not administered directly as in socialist countries, but are under the discretionary control of the government. Some believe that such government intervention has protected the economy from domination by a big business oligarchy. As the economy becomes more complex, heavy government control and guidance are increasingly inefficient. Some government megaprojects



Outlet of N. Korean invasion tunnel into S. Korea

have resulted in megawaste and the misuse of precious capital funds. The present government is relinquishing some of its economic functions to the private sector. Direct credit guidance will be abolished, equity shares in national banks will be sold, and indirect supports will replace absolute protection of local industries. Public enterprise comprises ten percent of the GNP, and their bureaucracies are scheduled for reduction. Some may be sold to the private sector, as was Korea Air Lines in 1968.

Under the late President Park, there had been extensive investment in heavy industry. Chun is more a pragmatist, and is seen to pay more attention to advice from businessmen and academics than did Park. Today, Seoul sees competition as an essential part of industrial policy. Large conglomerates had become dependent on government bailouts and protection. Under the new FYP, no more preferential loans will be given — a signal to big companies that they must increase competitiveness in order to survive.

The fifth FYP aims for high economic growth, price stability, and improved welfare of citizens. Lower real growth is planned — 7.5%, down from an average 10% per year in the previous decade. Exports will be the prime force in growth, and are projected to increase by 11.4% annually. Much of previous economic development concentrated on expanding the industrial base. With this infrastructure now in place, the government seeks to move towards more high technology industries, and a higher quality of life for the Korean people.

Social development will be accelerated. The FYP calls for expanded educational opportunities, medical insurance, housing for the urban poor and per capita income. In

late 1981, Korea had a \$60 billion GNP and \$1600 per capita income. In 1986, the government wants these figures to be \$90 billion and \$2170.

To move Korea into the ranks of the developed countries, the government plans to increase research and development in science and technology. There are presently nine major research institutions, and a new "science town" is planned. It will have thirty research institutions by 1991. One obstacle is the current world recession which makes countries and corporations more protectionist, and less willing to share industrial secrets with potential competitors.

To facilitate growth and technology transfer, Korea is lowering restrictions on foreign investment. At present, about half of Korean industry is open to foreign investors, and more than fifty industries allow up to 100% foreign ownership. In 1981, foreign investment was \$146 million, with 85% from the US and Japan.

Similar to Japan, Korea's paucity of natural resources has made export development a major part of industrial policy. Exports doubled in the four years to 1982, with emphasis on heavy industrial and chemical products, and textiles. Manufactured goods were 25% of exports in 1962, in contrast to 90% in 1980. The Korean share of world exports increased from 0.04% in 1962 to 0.95% in 1980. Major exports are textiles (40% of the total), electronic products (13%), and footwear (7%). Two-thirds of Korea's imports consist of raw materials and fuel, so cheaper forms of energy are sought to generate electric power. The expansion of energy production is needed to run industries such as the Pohang Steel Company. It is the world's eleventh largest steel maker, and claimed the largest steel mill in 1981. Low labor costs are a major factor in Pohang's competitive prices, which face increasing foreign protectionism. This government corporation is building a second mill to be in operation in 1985.

Hyundai, Korea's major auto producer, is constructing a new factory at the southeast city of Ulsan. The company plans to penetrate the North American and other markets on a large scale. It is one of the twenty-six enterprises making up the Hyundai Group, whose chairman, Chung Ju-yung, controls the world's fourth largest construction firm. Samsung is another major private conglomerate, with sales amounting to eight percent of Korea's GNP in 1981.

Construction exports continue to be a vital source of foreign currency, earning \$13.7 billion in 37 countries last year. Korea sends out 160,000 laborers annually, mostly to the Mideast.

The Korean "economic miracle" was back on track this year, and the government is proceeding on foundations built in the last decade. It is refining relations between the public and private sectors, and planning for steady growth in an uncertain future.

Politics and foreign relations

Whether the ambitious Five Year Plan can be carried out depends upon continued political stability, upon relations with North Korea, and upon the international environment. Since taking power in late 1979, Chun has consolidated and stabilized the government. He introduced a new constitution and held elections for the National Assembly. During 1982, the repercussions of a crazed policeman on a shooting spree led to a cabinet shakeup, and a scandal touched the government when a

system of illegal loans was linked to relatives of high officials.

President Chun promised to step down after his seven-year term is up. This will help avoid criticisms of his aiming at lifetime power, as Rhee and Park had sought in the past. He is also reportedly grooming ex-General No as a possible successor, in order to prevent the power vacuums of the past, when strong presidents resigned or were removed by assassination.

The military has been a central element in Korean politics in part because the North Korean threat required a large standing army. Various unification proposals have been devised, but Pyongyang demands removal of the present Seoul government as a precondition. Under Kim Il-Song, a highly-regimented society has been created in the North. Kim's personality cult has far surpassed even that of Stalin, and has outlasted that of Mao Tse-tung. Kim has maintained delicate equidistance between his Chinese and Soviet allies, although there are indications of a slight move towards Moscow in recent years. North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) has a foreign debt which is large in proportion to its eighteen million population, and maintains a 782,000 man military force (ROK armed forces total 601,600).

To date, attempts at peaceful reunification have failed. Another approach to reducing tensions in the peninsula would be cross recognition of North Korea by the US, and of the ROK by Peking and Moscow. Seoul would welcome access to Chinese markets and resources, but the ROK's close links with Taiwan, and China's refusal to antagonize Pyongyang by recognizing Seoul, remain formidable obstacles to such a solution.

Today, South Korea's major ally is the United States. In January 1981, Chun visited Washington at the invitation of President Reagan, who cancelled Carter's plan of withdrawing US ground forces. With Seoul's strength estimated at seventy percent of the north, US armed forces are vital for defence. Secretary of Defence Weinberger promised delivery of new F16 fighters, and other weapons were sent to reinforce US and ROK forces. Last spring, at the fourteenth US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, Weinberger signed an agreement for the US to transfer two billion dollars worth of defence materials immediately in event of emergency. The Korean arms industry has increased its capabilities, and now manufactures a number of weapons and military equipment under US licence. Seoul has been seeking to export some weapons, but the US is wary because this could undercut US sales at a time of high unemployment.

Japanese connection

Relations between Japan and Korea remain complex. Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, and a dissatisfied and sizable Korean minority living in Japan, have contributed to uneven relations. Recently a new power elite has emerged in Korea which tends to be more American and European than Japanese in educational background, and less likely to speak Japanese as a second language than was the earlier generation in government.

Tokyo hoped to establish good relations with Seoul by sending Foreign Minister Ito to attend Chun's inauguration. However, Ito angered many Koreans with his remarks that there was no threat from North Korea. More recently,

the revision of Japanese school textbooks has soured relations. Japan's aggression is no longer portrayed as "invasion," but as "advancing," for example. The 1919 movement for Korean independence is described as "demonstrations and riots" in the new texts, much to the dismay of Korean nationalists.

Elsewhere, Korea's diplomatic presence is expanded by trips such as Chun's visit to the ASEAN countries in June 1981. Unlike Japan, Korea has no history of conquest and occupation. The ASEAN nations also have relations with North Korea, so Seoul hopes to enlarge its influence. When Australian Prime Minister Fraser visited Seoul last May, President Chun proposed annual summit talks among the nations of the Pacific basin, in order to pursue peace and prosperity in the region. He stated that the centre of world history has moved to the Pacific, where half of world trade is now carried on.

Canada, meet Korea

Korea's relations with Canada have also expanded. Prime Minister Trudeau became the first Canadian head of government to visit Korea in September 1981. President Chun returned the visit this August, on his return from four nations in Africa.

Today, Korea is Canada's seventh largest trading partner and this country is Korea's eighth largest. Last year's trade totalled nearly \$1.05 billion, with Korean exports at \$608 million and Canadian sales to Korea of over \$446 million.

The visits of Trudeau and Chun included meetings between top business people, who have formed the Canada-Korea, and Korea-Canada, Business Councils. According to the Canadian Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, the most promising prospects for sales to Korea are in the sectors of nuclear power, energy products,

Courtesy Korean Embassy



Seoul's 1988 Olympic site abuilding

telecommunications, grains, aircraft and pulp. The Wolsung CANDU reactor was shipped in 1980, and Ottawa hopes to supply more in the future. Imports from Korea have been concentrated in textiles, footwear, electronics and steel products, and grew 46.1% from 1980 to 1981.

Canada and Korea are middle-range powers with complementary economies and mutual interests. Although very different in culture and history, and separated by language and great distance, both face the problem of dealing with a nearby industrial giant. Both countries will also host the Olympic games in 1988. Following the recent visit of Chun and thirty-two major business leaders, an expanding trade and diplomatic relationship is anticipated.

Failure at UNSSOD II

by William Epstein

The United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) opened under inauspicious circumstances, despite the massive public rallies in Europe and North America in support of peace and disarmament. Hopes held by the public as to what the UN General Assembly might achieve were much higher than those held by governments.

Both the President of the General Assembly, Ismat Kittani of Iraq, and the new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in separate but strikingly similar opening addresses, drew attention to the "sorry record of failure" of the nations of the world to implement the disarmament program that had been adopted by consensus at UNSSOD I in 1978, to the acceleration of the arms race in the intervening four years and the deterioration of international and national security, to the wars raging on several continents, to the dangerous advances in military technology, and to the increasing acceptance in some circles of the insane notions that a nuclear war could be "limited" or, indeed, was "winnable." They considered that the present situation was more dangerous and the need for disarmament greater than at the time of UNSSOD I. They stressed that what was required to assert and reverse the process was political will, boldness and rationality. The two UN leaders also thought that the presence of so many Heads of Government and world leaders was a hopeful sign, as was the great upsurge of public concern and the "impressive" activities of non-governmental organizations.

These remarks were echoed by many of the government leaders who came from their capitals to present their policies and proposals to the Special Session. Some sixty member states made formal proposals and suggestions of one kind or another for halting the arms race, and, in the first place, the nuclear arms race, and for making progress towards disarmament. As was to be expected, the states were divided into three broad groupings: the Soviet group, the Western group and the non-aligned nations. Differences of substance among the three groups were deep and abiding, but differences of approach were also evident within each group — least within the Soviet group where only Romania put forward any independent ideas — and most among the non-aligned (or Third World) countries where there was a spectrum of different ideas and proposals.

As at UNSSOD I, it was agreed that decisions would be taken by consensus, although voting by a two-thirds

majority was not entirely ruled out in case of need. In the result, because of the wide gap between the main groups, no major decision of substance could be reached by consensus, and no decisions were taken by vote because of the lack of agreement among the members of the non-aligned group, which could easily command a two-thirds majority if its members could reach agreement among themselves.

Squaring off

Nineteen Heads of State or Government and forty-four foreign ministers addressed the Special Session. The statement by the Soviet Union attracted most interest. Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko delivered a message from President Leonid Brezhnev which dramatically declared: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This obligation shall become effective immediately." The message called on the other nuclear powers to assume the same obligation, which "would be tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether."

President Reagan, who made his first visit to the UN, delivered the US statement. He provided no new ideas and no surprises but repeated his "deep concern" over Soviet conduct.

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada was the only NATO member to deal with the issue of a freeze of nuclear weapons. He recalled the "strategy of suffocation" of the nuclear arms race that he had proposed at the First Special Session in 1978 (agreement on a comprehensive test ban, on banning flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles, on banning the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons), which he described as a "technological freeze." He proposed that the technological freeze in the development of new weapons systems be "unfolded into a more general policy of stabilization." The policy of stabilization would have two complementary components: the suffocation strategy and the current negotiations aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels. He also

William Epstein, who is a Special Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), was former Director of Disarmament at the United Nations. He was on the Canadian Delegation to both UNSSOD I and II. The views expressed in this article are his own and not necessarily those of the Canadian Delegation.

proposed that an early start be made on a treaty banning all weapons from outer space. He also announced that Canada would allocate more funds for arms control and disarmament initiatives, particularly in the field of verification.

Agenda for disarmament

The First Special Session on Disarmament called for the elaboration by the Geneva Committee on Disarmament of a Comprehensive Program for Disarmament (CPD). The priorities had been listed: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons; and reduction of armed forces. After several years of work, the lengthy document that was submitted by the Committee on Disarmament was studded with brackets around unagreed paragraphs, sentences and even individual words.

The CPD was heralded as the "centrepiece" of UNSSOD II, and renewed and intensive efforts were undertaken during the session in an attempt to achieve agreement on a compromise consensus text. One major area of disagreement was on the question of setting time limits or target dates for the achievement of measures of disarmament. The non-aligned states, with some support from the Socialist states, wanted such time limits or even "indicative dates" and argued for four five-year stages, but the Western countries argued that fixing deadlines would be harmful to the negotiations.

The Western powers took much more rigid and unyielding positions at UNSSOD II than at UNSSOD I and in a few cases would not even accept the language of the Final Document of UNSSOD I. In the absence of any disposition to compromise, it was not possible to reach any consensus and the CPD was referred back to the Committee on Disarmament with the request that a revised draft be re-submitted to the regular session of the General Assembly in 1983. The failure to reach agreement on this centrepiece of its efforts meant that UNSSOD II had failed in its main task.

The other main issue before UNSSOD II was the question of a World Disarmament Campaign. The mobilization of public opinion in favor of disarmament was called for in the Final Document of UNSSOD I, and the General Assembly at its 1981 regular session approved the launching of the campaign. Thus the President announced its formal launching at the opening meeting of UNSSOD II. The campaign is intended to promote public interest in and support for the goals and program set out in the Final Document of UNSSOD I. The non-aligned and Socialist states strongly supported the campaign, while the Western states were lukewarm, fearing that the campaign would be aimed mainly at them but with only limited possibilities of access to the public in the Socialist states.

After a lengthy bargaining process, the Working Group trying to reach a consensus on the guidelines for the campaign reached agreement at the last moment on a text which set out the objectives, the content and the modalities of the campaign. Both the Socialist and Western states, perhaps influenced by the insistent demands of the public and massive demonstrations, made compromises so that an equitable document emerged. The Canadian Delegation played an active and leading role in achieving the consensus agreement on the World Disarmament Campaign.

Thus, the main achievement of UNSSOD II — albeit a modest one — was the World Disarmament Campaign.

New issues

Early in the session two new issues emerged which, although not specifically listed as agenda items, were to receive major attention.

The concept of a nuclear freeze was the chief new development at the session and it quickly became the "hottest" issue. The USSR, Canada, India, Mexico and Sweden referred to the freeze in their main addresses in the general debate.

Foreign Minister Gromyko elaborated somewhat on President Brezhnev's message by the following:

It is likewise very important to securely block all channels for the continuation of the strategic arms race in any form. That means that the development of new types of strategic weapons should be either banned or limited to the extent possible by agreed parameters.

Prime Minister Trudeau proposed marrying the technological freeze envisioned in the "strategy of suffocation" to the current INF and START negotiations in a policy of stabilization. While the Prime Minister's speech did not meet the expectations of many Canadians and some UN Delegations who had hoped he would support a complete nuclear freeze, it was regarded by many observers at the UN as the best statement made by any NATO member.

It was not possible to reach a consensus on any of the freeze proposals but, since it was felt that they deserved further study, it was decided that they should be transmitted to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament and to the next regular session of the General Assembly. Since the Committee on Disarmament also works on the basis of consensus, it is most unlikely that any of the proposals will be approved there. But since the General Assembly takes decisions by a two-thirds majority vote, it is likely that one or more draft resolutions will receive overwhelming approval by that body.

The other major new issue was the Prevention of Nuclear War. While this question had been raised indirectly by the Soviet Union in the general debate, it was formally introduced by Bulgaria in one of the Working Groups. The Bulgarian proposal referred to "the deterioration in the international situation, the growth of nuclear arsenals, the increase in accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of dangerous doctrines of 'limited' or 'winnable' nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred owing to malfunctioning of computers." It proposed, as a first step "the use of nuclear weapons and the waging of nuclear war should be outlawed." It welcomed the declarations of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and called on the nuclear-weapon states which have not assumed that obligation to do so. It also called on the nuclear-weapon states to show restraint and responsibility and to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

Several nations, including West Germany, The Netherlands and Japan presented papers, and India and Mexico submitted draft resolutions on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Because of the opposition of the Western powers, it was not possible to reach any consensus and it was decided to transmit them to the appropriate bodies for further consideration. If the Indian and Mexican draft

Disarmament when!

resolutions are pressed to a vote at the 1982 session of the General Assembly, they will probably be adopted by an overwhelming majority.

Non-Governmental Organizations

One of the noteworthy developments at UNSSOD II was the greatly increased role played by the public and by NGOs and research institutes. The disappointing stalemate and apparent lack of any real sense of urgency inside the UN conference halls stood out in sharp contrast to the fervor, sense of commitment and the impressive mobilization of public concern outside. Not only did three-quarters of a million sober, respectable citizens rally in Central Park in Manhattan on June 12 (the largest in North American history), and another quarter of a million in the streets, but every day during the session there were a number of briefings, meetings, lectures, church gatherings and other activities for the NGOs and the people who had come from all the continents of the earth. Representatives of fifty-three international NGOs and twenty-two research institutes addressed the delegations (as compared to twenty-five and six respectively at the 1978 session).

The obvious anxiety and commitment of the NGOs and of the public impressed the delegates at the special session, but did not of course change any of the predetermined positions of any delegation. Nevertheless, it may have stirred some feelings among them which may be conveyed to their governments, particularly if the members of the public decide to transform themselves into political activists. Certainly the level of their participation and their potential influence has increased markedly.

Conclusion

In the closing days of the session, when it became apparent that no consensus was possible, some of the non-aligned countries began to speak of forcing the issues to a vote in order to register their views. Others opposed this procedure on the ground that this would make the special session no different from any regular session of the General Assembly, and that it was useful to maintain the practice of having special sessions to deal with important matters on the basis of consensus. They argued that in future special sessions, as had occurred at UNSSOD I, the consensus rule could help to push recalcitrant states (mainly the nuclear powers) towards compromises.

Since it was not possible to agree on any comprehensive program for disarmament or on any agreed general declaration, the Chairman of the main committee of the whole, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria, prepared a set of conclusions for the purely procedural report. The conclusions stressed the organic relationship between the colossal waste of resources on military programs and the problems of economic and social development. The prevention of nuclear war was singled out as the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The conclusions also noted the "unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document" of UNSSOD I and their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action. It was also agreed that there should be a third special session on disarmament at a date to be set by the General Assembly at its 1983 session.

It is a sad commentary on the failure of UNSSOD II

that the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document is considered as somewhat of an achievement. The President of the General Assembly in summing up its work stated "this session has not been a success . . . The cause . . . lies in the sad state of the world in which we live . . . Nations cannot repeatedly ignore the rule of law, bypass the United Nations, have continued recourse to the use of force and then expect this institution, which they have weakened and damaged by their actions, to function effectively in solving problems and aid in the creation of a disarmed and tranquil world." He saw some positive developments in the increasing concern manifest in public opinion about the need to relieve humanity of the fear and danger of universal annihilation. He hoped that the World Disarmament Campaign would reinforce that level of public consciousness which the session helped to extend and strengthen. He said "The problem clearly lies in the gap between what people the world over want and need, and what their governments are willing to do."

Why did it fail?

Why was UNSSOD II such a failure while UNSSOD I had been a most successful conference, although its Final Document remained unimplemented?

The main reason, of course, is that the political climate and the timing were wrong. UNSSOD II was held at a time when relations between the US and USSR were under severe strain and the two powers were embarked on the greatest arms race in history, each trying to keep up with what it sees as an attempt by the other to achieve superiority. Although the idea of nuclear superiority is an illusion when each side can utterly destroy the other as a functioning entity, no matter which one is insane enough to launch a nuclear strike first, nevertheless the mere perception by a nation of a threat to its security is enough to prevent it from negotiating any reasonable and genuinely balanced agreement for arms limitation. Since each regards the other with suspicion they both tend to regard the other's proposals as seeking some unfair advantage. It is very difficult to make progress in disarmament, when one of the superpowers — the US — openly proclaims its intention to embark on a huge arms buildup.

The smaller non-aligned countries suspect the motives of both superpowers and their respective allies, but have little room for playing a third-party role when either of the major powers wants no outside interference or compromises. Moreover, the non-aligned countries are not as united as they were in 1978, and some of them have been successfully wooed by one or the other of the superpowers, so that some polarization has set in among them. Hence they cannot wield even the limited influence they have when they stand together.

Another reason is that, despite some of the cold war rhetoric used by the Reagan Administration, the US has pretty well succeeded in preempting the disarmament discussions. The INF and START nuclear negotiations, the Vienna talks on conventional force reductions and the US proposals for confidence-building measures to lessen the risk of war, cover most of the main areas of disarmament. While some countries stated their suspicions of the sincerity and equitable balance of the US proposals, no nation really wanted to see the negotiations aborted or suspended. So, in this respect too, in a situation where the US

does not welcome third party intervention, there is little room for outsiders to play any role.

Very modest achievement

What, then if anything, did the session achieve? First, it was a successful effort in consciousness-raising. The fact that the special session was being held made it the catalyst for and the focus of the mass activities of the public and NGOs. Second, was the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign and the reaching of a consensus agreement on its nature and scope. Many observers credit the agreement to the pressure of public opinion and to the reluctance of delegations to risk the inevitable criticism from the NGOs and the public if they had failed to agree.

While the adoption of the campaign is not in itself a major disarmament achievement, it does have the potential for mobilizing public opinion on behalf of arms control

and disarmament. Since no government or any major power appears to be really interested in disarmament, at least in the sense of putting forward significant or far-reaching proposals that have any chance of acceptance by the other side, massive public pressure is necessary to push governments into meaningful proposals and agreements. Without such public pressure the nuclear powers might never have stopped their testing in the atmosphere. Only the buildup of public pressure can generate the necessary political will of governments to halt and reverse the arms race. If the World Disarmament Campaign is carried out in a proper and adequate manner, it can not only help to inform and educate people and their governments, but it can provide a continuing stimulus for both cooperation and accountability between them, not only in the field of disarmament but also in the closely interrelated fields of international security and development. □

Book Reviews

Surviving Sir Sam

by Sydney F. Wise

A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War by Desmond Morton. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, \$22.50.

"Peculiar" means "particular" or "special" or simply "odd." Both meanings are implied in the title of this excellent book. Desmond Morton's purpose is to trace the manner in which Canada, during the First World War, developed the political and administrative machinery to control her forces overseas. The instrument rough-carpen-tered for the purpose was the Ministry of Overseas Forces, headed by a cabinet minister and located at Argyll House in London. The Ministry was without precedent in Canadian experience; it had no counterpart among the other Dominions. The chief importance of Professor Morton's study is to demonstrate the considerable significance of this peculiar institution in the rapid wartime evolution of Canadian military autonomy, a process which heretofore has been seen as resulting from the exploits of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and from Sir Robert Borden's leadership in demanding a separate voice for the self-governing dominions.

The Overseas Ministry was created towards the end of

1916. It was a direct consequence of the peculiar politics of the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes. Morton treats Hughes's eccentricities with admirable restraint, unobtrusive wit and fine scholarship. The result is that contradiction in terms, administrative history that is gripping and full of interest. His account of how Hughes constructed his overseas satrapy in the early years of the war is the best yet written.

This lamentable and infuriating politician is the anti-hero of the book. It was Hughes's "manic wilfulness," his insistence upon personal control, his haphazard and impromptu creation of instant colonels from among political friends and chance acquaintances, the vague and conflicting mandates he gave them, all calculated to preserve his power and keep him in the heady limelight, that was responsible for the creation of an unexampled administrative mess in England in 1915-16. The situation puzzled the British, though they were able to exploit it, frustrated those commanding Canadian troops in France, who depended upon the England-based organization for support, and brought misery to thousands of Canadian officers and men at the mercy of incompetence and inefficiency while under training. Hughes has customarily been handled with amusement by historians. The consequences of egocentricity, self-delusion and cronyism, however, were so serious that, even at this remove in time, one shares Morton's suppressed anger.

Yet the achievement of military autonomy, in a pecu-

Book Reviews

liar way, also owed much to Hughes. His resistance to and suspicion of British control over Canadian forces is well-known; he was undoubtedly, if inconsistently, a nationalist, but Hughes's role was in part unwitting. Morton shows that the only way for the Canadian government to clean up the shambles Hughes had made, and to assert a proper degree of control over forces overseas, was to take over his English empire and put not a soldier, but a politician vested with the full authority of a minister, at its head. The first Overseas Minister was Sir George Perley, who combined the job with that of High Commissioner. He and his successor, the able businessman Sir Edward Kemp, together with Sir Richard Turner, GOC Canadians, built the organization that established a genuinely autonomous presence for Canada in Britain, and contributed to the achievements of the Canadian Corps on the Western Front in 1918.

Argyll House, in the post-1918 years, had an evil reputation among returned soldiers and with the Canadian public. It was perceived as a haven for "bombproof" officers, as the home of pampered and unfeeling military bureaucrats. Another merit of Professor Morton's history is to show that that reputation was largely undeserved. In law, finance, supply, training, personnel policy and even the difficult and strife-ridden task of demobilization, the Overseas Ministry did a capable if unspectacular job. As builders of military autonomy, Perley, Kemp and Turner were the unsung heroes of Canada's movement towards sovereignty during the First World War.

Sydney Wise is Dean of Graduate Studies and Research at Carleton University in Ottawa. His own field is Canadian military history.

A constellation of governors

by John A. Munro

The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 by J.L. Granatstein. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982, 333 pages, \$24.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

The Ottawa Men, through the effective joining of vignette and policy study, traces the professionalization and, ultimately, the politicization of Canada's civil service during the twenty-two year Liberal ascendancy, 1935-1957. Professor Granatstein is to be commended. This is an important book, long overdue, well written and, I hope, seminal.

What Granatstein does is to fit together provocatively a puzzle, the pieces of which have been familiar in some degree to students of the era. For example, long since has there been a general understanding of the importance of External Affairs' O.D. Skelton and Finance's Clifford Clark to the shaping of modern Canada's public service. Less clear had been the role of Graham Towers, first Governor of the Bank of Canada. That these three constituted a founding triumvirate perhaps will surprise few. One may suggest, however, that most readers will find instructive

Granatstein's detailed examination and assessment of their personal and professional lives, for from this centre spread the web of interlocking relationships to create a Canadian mandarin.

Although Granatstein suggests that his categorization of mandarin civil servants is in some part arbitrary, this reviewer would not quarrel with its representation. Included in addition to the three founders are: Loring Christie, Hume Wrong, L.B. Pearson, Norman Robertson and Escott Reid in External Affairs; W.A. Mackintosh, R.B. Bryce and A.F.W. Plumptre in Finance; Louis Rasminsky at the Bank; Dana Wilgress in Trade and Commerce; Arnold Heene in the PMO/PCO. I have separated from the author's list Mitchell Sharp in Finance and Donald Gordon, Alex Shelton and John Deutsch at the Bank, not because I disagree with their inclusion, but because Granatstein treats them so fleetingly. Jack Pickersgill, whose career in the PMO/PCO is given the detail it deserves, I would further separate because, as usual, he is in a class by himself, even when viewed as a logical, if lamentable, extension of the whole.

O.D. Skelton as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was of the classic mandarin in mold — the often brilliant, generalist, senior civil servant who could demonstrate his worth both to W.L. Mackenzie King and R.B. Bennett. The same might be said for Christie (who had served Borden and Meighen), Wrong, Pearson, Robertson and Wilgress. Clark and Plumptre, although economists, were of the same pattern. To their ranks, as opportunity allowed or circumstance demanded, were recruited the rest, the brightest and the best, the cream of Canada's universities filtered through foreign graduate schools.

These men established the pattern, set the standards which, by the end of the Second World War, had wrought for Canada a civil service, internationally recognized as second to none. Their relative preeminence at United Nations Conferences to create a new international political and economic order not only ensured Canada's voice, but enhanced it, allowing, one might suggest, the myth of middle power to mantle the weaknesses inherent in our domestic economy and political structure. Granatstein is particularly skilled in establishing the relative importance and significance of the economist mandarins, and I, at least, was very impressed by his treatment of Mackintosh and Rasminsky. He is equally adept with Skelton, Wrong and Robertson (the latter, the subject of an earlier Granatstein book).

His insights into Arnold Heene as Clerk of the Privy Council, however, bear closest to what may well prove this volume's most important point. If the civil service mandarins rescued Canada from the democratic chaos of the King government in the early days of World War II, which no doubt they did, this was at the price of creating a bureaucratic structure on which their political masters became increasingly dependent. Mandarin policies gradually became Liberal policies. The political defence of government policies by senior bureaucratic policy advisers followed as the natural (acceptable?) concomitant to the tendering of policy or program advice. The Establishment Party became a reality. Its nemesis was not John Diefenbaker, but Jack Pickersgill, who brought into disrepute that structure so carefully built by the founding mandarins. For Pickersgill could only serve the Liberal Party. His election in Smallwood's Newfoundland fief and entry into the St.

Laurent cabinet confirmed every Conservative suspicion, especially John Diefenbaker's, that under his stewardship the PCO had become a tool of the Liberal Party and that the senior ranks of Canada's civil service were grit to the core. To Granatstein's credit, he portrays Pickersgill in context.

This was a situation that demanded a wholesale civil service housecleaning following the election of 1958 when there was an overwhelming mandate for change in government. But it was already too late. Although suspicions were never put to rest, the period of the first Diefenbaker minority government created new dependencies which mitigated against change and served Canada ill. Had the mandarins been fit to govern, the 1963 Pearson government, which contained so many who had previously served in this capacity, would not have been such a disaster.

Finally, I would quarrel mildly with three of Granatstein's assessments. If one may judge the mind of men by the memoranda they compose, the two most powerful intellects in External Affairs in the period of my research, January 1, 1936 to September 10, 1939, were Christie and Wrong, in that order. I am a bit surprised that the author should have caught the fine edge of Wrong's genius and not of Christie's. Second, I am concerned that Pearson is allowed to appear a little shabby. I recognize the author is intrigued by Pearson's skill in playing the CBC off against External to advance his career, but I remain unconvinced as to the significance of this episode and suggest that Pearson's autobiography is closer to the mark. Finally, I would wonder at the general balance in Granatstein's portrayal of Escott Reid: however, in that Reid is still vigorously able to defend himself, the author may be left to receive such quarter as his subject allows.

John Munro is a student of the Canadian times here considered, and was an active participant in the preparation of the published memoirs of the Right Honourables Lester B. Pearson and John G. Diefenbaker. He is now a senior intergovernmental affairs officer with the Government of Saskatchewan, having recently completed a term as founding Director of the Rt. Hon. J.G. Diefenbaker Centre at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon.

Terror: holy and unholy

by Tom Mitchell

The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications edited by David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982, 377 pages, \$35.00 (US).

Despite the proliferation of books and articles on various aspects of contemporary terrorism in recent years, it is disturbing how shallow our understanding remains both of the phenomenon itself and of some of the basic ethical issues it raises. Unfortunately, much of what is written about terrorism is simplistic and sensationalist and

serves only to perpetuate the confusion and controversy which surround the subject. Though we have learned a great deal about what kinds of weapons and tactics terrorists use, the much more fundamental questions of why groups and individuals resort to actions remain largely unexplored. *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, edited by David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, is an important collection of essays which seek to confront these very questions. Although, as the editors themselves readily admit, this single volume cannot hope to resolve the wide range of moral issues and dilemmas that terrorism raises, it is an encouraging beginning and it does open up some promising avenues of inquiry.

The editors present two intriguing hypotheses. The first is that the resort to terrorism has been a far more pervasive tradition in our historical experience than is commonly thought. Though many consider terrorism to be the step-child of modern technology and trace its origins no further back than the French Revolution, Rapoport and Alexander contend that terrorism has its roots in our fundamental religious experience, particularly in certain Messianic and millenarian movements. They argue that much of the basic doctrine which underlies contemporary terrorism can be seen in the struggle of the Jewish Sicarii and Zealots against the Romans in the First Century A.D. Numerous examples are cited of the other religious movements which have resorted to campaigns of terrorism since then, justifying their actions on the basis of certain moral principles. Rapoport and Alexander's second principal hypothesis is even more provocative. They argue that state and rebel terror are not distinct categories but are in fact closely linked. The two types of terrorism can be viewed merely as dimensions of the same phenomenon, since they share many fundamental assumptions. We cannot understand one type of terrorism, they argue, in isolation from the other.

The volume is organized around these two themes and, although there is some variation in the terminology and approaches used by the individual contributors, the collection as a whole is a coherent and reasonably comprehensive treatment of this complex topic. The fifteen selections that make up this volume are divided into three parts, each of which begins with an introductory essay by the editors.

The first part deals with religious terror. One of the editors, David Rapoport, contributes an interesting essay on the efforts of Jewish terrorists to initiate a revolt against Roman rule through the use of atrocities and other symbolic acts. Rapoport cites some of the lessons learned in this struggle, which were heeded by the Irgun in its efforts to establish a Jewish state following the Second World War. Essays by Vytautas Kavolis and Moshe Amon examine some of the religious and social myths which have been utilized to justify rebellion. In a more contemporary context, John Dugard traces the evolution of the concept of "just war" and the tumultuous debates which have taken place at the United Nations over what kinds of actions this does and does not justify. John R. Pottenger's superb essay on "liberation theology" explores the moral dilemma faced by Catholic clergy in Latin America as to whether violence can be condoned in the struggle against social injustice.

In the second part, which focuses on state terror, Michael Carter provides a capsule history of the Jacobin terror of the French Revolution. The designation "Enemy

Book Reviews

of the People," which the Jacobins attributed to those they considered guilty by virtue of who they were, is a concept that is very much a part of contemporary terrorist doctrine.

The third part, which focuses on rebel terrorism, begins with an interesting essay by Zeev Ivianski on the Russian terrorists of the nineteenth century and the moral dilemmas their conception of terror posed for them. Alfred Louch forcefully argues in a brief selection that there can be no moral basis for indiscriminate terror. In a provocative essay Maurice A.J. Tugwell cites several recent instances in which terrorists have been able to transfer guilt from their actions to those of the government through a skillful use of propaganda. Tugwell, the Director of the University of New Brunswick's Centre for Conflict Studies, suggests that liberal democracies are particularly vulnerable to this sort of manipulation and that they should not let themselves succumb to false guilt which can only serve to paralyze an effective response to terrorist acts. Robert S. Gerstein grapples with the fundamental question of whether terrorists have rights. He examines the somewhat draconian actions that have been taken by democratic governments to combat terrorism but concludes that, whatever the offence, the principles of democracy dictate that terrorists still retain certain basic rights.

It is difficult to imagine a more complex and emotionally-charged topic than contemporary terrorism. Rapoport and Alexander are to be commended for their effort to confront the most fundamental questions of the rationale and justification of this increasingly prevalent form of political action. Although some of the essays in this volume raise as many questions as they answer, one thing is obvious, that until we pay greater attention to the moral calculus which underlies terrorist activity, we cannot begin to understand this phenomenon.

Thomas H. Mitchell is an Ottawa-based political scientist and author of several articles on collective violence and international terrorism.

Canada and the poor countries

by Alexa deWiel

***Perpetuating Poverty: The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid* by Robert Carty, Virginia Smith and LAWG. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1981, 202 pages, \$8.95.**

During the past thirty years, foreign aid has become the most important instrument of Canadian foreign policy applied to the Third World. Canada is the seventh largest aid-giving country in the West and in the bowels of the Canadian International Development Agency lies the key to Ottawa's strategy for international assistance.

This book is a descriptive dissection of CIDA's history, structure, programs and goals. Today, CIDA funds several thousand projects in eighty-nine countries, supports over sixty inter-governmental institutions concerned with development, contributes to several hundred non-governmental

organizations, and covers the bills for shipping tons of supplies and scores of experts to foreign shores.

Ottawa's foreign policymakers tend to equate the size of the aid program with the amount of weight Canada can swing on issues in which the nation has a direct stake, such as Law of the Sea and Multilateral Trade negotiations.

But the effort to keep juggling priorities is one of several factors that prevents CIDA from working out a coherent program for Third World development. The business community exerts constant pressure on the Agency, forcing it to renege on its "development" promises that resources will be concentrated on meeting the basic needs of the most oppressed sectors of the world's poorest countries which require few Canadian inputs. Political objectives, on the other hand, keep administrators from focusing on middle income Third World nations — clients that commercial interests hope to wean from aid to hard export credits.

The book is hard-hitting and absorbing and serves to educate a population largely unaware of Canadian foreign policy.

***Energy Planning for Developing Countries: A Study of Bangladesh* by Russell J. DeLucia and Henry D. Jacoby, et al. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, 298 pages, \$24.00 (US).**

Aimed at practitioners in LDC planning bureaux and their counterparts in the international and bilateral agencies, this book is a guide to conducting investment analysis and planning of the energy sector in the resource-poor, less-developed countries. This is a case study conducted of the Bangladeshi energy sector carried out in 1975 and 1976 under the sponsorship of the UN Development Project and the Asian Development Bank. The consultant study was carried out by a consortium of firms including Montreal Engineering, Canada, which had responsibility for the electrical power, coal and nuclear studies, as well as for the management of the overall group effort.

Heavy on the analytical methodology of the study, the various components of investment planning in the energy sector is discussed with much emphasis on an increasingly-accepted application of systems analysis. All too often previous study designs of this nature have been documented by concern for large-scale physical investment with little interest devoted to rural energy issues.

The message of the book is central to the Brandt Commission's reminder that the various sectors of the global economy are interdependent. In a case such as the village-level economy of Bangladesh, largely dependent on traditional sources of energy such as firewood, charcoal, animal dung and jute sticks, the process of integrating alternatives to the subsector and sector level can help prevent undue focus on investments that may seem attractive to the Western investor at a project level but are less so in a broader context.

Alexa deWiel is a freelance writer in Ottawa.

DOCS

CA1 EA I56 ENG

Nov/Dec 1982

International perspectives. --

32754890

