

## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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This is the first week of a new year, a time for resolution, retrospection, and speculation.

As for the first, I gave up making New Years' resolutions many years ago, deciding about 1923 that I shouldn't add to my burden of resolutions until I had succeeded in disposing of some of those solemnly taken previously. I am still trying to do that, but it may be that by 1960, say, I can conscientiously feel that the Statute of Limitations has come into operation, and that my inability to carry out old resolves should not prevent me from making and breaking new ones.

So far as retrospection is concerned, as I look back on 1953, my personal prayer is that never again will there be a year when I have to carry out the duties of Foreign Minister, as well as those of President of the United Nations Assembly, and also engage in the somewhat feverish activities that flow from participation in a Canadian general election.

Though 1953 was, for me, a little too crowded for comfort, it was one which, in international affairs, gave cause for some sober satisfaction, if none for jubilation or complacency.

It has been said recently that 1953 was a year of transition. Of course it was. Every year is a year of transition from the preceding one to the next one; in this case from 1952 to 1954. But in a serious and important sense, there may be something in this description. The general feeling during the year seemed to be one of waiting and wondering; waiting for some concrete move which would ease international tensions, and lighten the awful shadow of approaching atomic destruction; wondering whether Russian words and gestures really meant that such a move was coming and whether changes were taking place in the ruling circles of the U.S.S.R., that tight little group of autocrats, which would effect it.

The New Year, if I may move now into speculation, may clear up some of these wonderings. But let us not count too much on this; or expect too much from any particular meeting, at Berlin or Bermuda or Panmunjom; or read too much into plausible answers from the Kremlin to selected questions.

Very far-reaching developments may be taking place behind the iron curtain. If so, we should keep an open mind and a clear head about them. These developments may make it possible to advance the policy of peaceful co-operation between states to which we of the free world are committed.

On the other hand, words of peace and goodwill which come now from the Communist camp may represent merely an orthodox and normal shift in party tactics, designed to disarm and deceive us.

We had better wait and make sure, before we draw cheerful conclusions and alter present policies; wait with as much calmness as is possible when exposed to all the weapons of mass propaganda which have now reached such an amazing state of technical efficiency. So many and powerful are they, in fact, that it is at times difficult to decide what actually is going on; to separate facts from fancies, the important from the inconsequential. No wonder that public opinion, while ultimately right, is sometimes immediately wrong. That is itself a strong argument against hasty action on many international problems. Yet public opinion, spurred on by propagandists and pundits, often demands just that; quick and clean-cut solutions for international problems which are not susceptible to this treatment.

It may, therefore, from the point of view of good international relations and healthy domestic morale, not be amiss to sound a note of caution as we enter a year which could be filled with conferences and discussions from which we may expect too much. It would be a mistake to pitch our hopes too high for a speedy and satisfactory solution at these conferences of all the cold-war problems which plague us. Many of these problems arise not so much for particular situations, as from the very nature of the relationship between Communism and the free world; a relationship which is likely to be with us as long as we live.

We would also be wise, I think, not to get unduly exercised over the meaning of every Kremlin word or gesture. We might recall the good advice of Harold Nicholson when, in discussing the practice of diplomacy, he said: ". . . it is better to concentrate upon rendering your own attitude as clear as possible, rather than to fiddle with the psychology of others". Nicholson then quoted the words of an experienced diplomat, and they seem particularly apt at this time, "Don't worry so much about what is at the back of their minds; make quite sure that they realize what is at the back of yours".

I hope that, as we enter 1954, we keep at the back, and in the front of our minds, the necessity of following patiently, steadily and persistently the policy that we have now laid down; of building up and maintaining the collective strength and unity of the free world, to be used not to provoke or threaten others, but as the solid foundation for diplomatic negotiation and political settlement. This involves the search for solutions for specific international problems, one by one, so that in so far as we can bring it about the cold war will have begun to disappear by the end of 1954 without having become a hot one.

We must assume, however, that this unity and strength, especially under NATO, is bound to be the object of increasing attack in the coming year from the Communists, within and without our gates; not so much, I feel, from direct frontal assault as from the insidious pressure of enticing double-talk and bewildering blandishment.

There never was much doubt that the really serious strain on the Western coalition would begin when the menace of immediate aggression seemed to recede. We are in that period now, with new problems and difficulties - and also new possibilities.

This is certainly no time to weaken the common front by dissension or doubts or indifference. It is no time to lower our guard; or start wrangling among ourselves.

In meeting these problems, in negotiating with the Communist states and keeping the coalition together in the face of what may seem, or be made to seem, diminishing dangers, diplomacy should, I think, play a greater part than in recent years. By diplomacy I mean something more than monologues at international gatherings, or public press conferences, or calculated leaks to frighten potential adversaries, or to "put the heat on" reluctant friends; or even political quiz programmes before the microphone or camera. There should be more room for and greater reliance on quite and confidential negotiation, as I am sure you, as public relations experts, will agree. If Moscow, by the crudity of Communist diplomatic methods, and by its incessant and direct appeal to peoples over the heads of governments, makes this procedure difficult or even impossible, we should keep on trying to restore it. In any event, we need not follow these Communist tactics of propaganda diplomacy in conferences and negotiations between friends.

There are, of course, important situations in which the most effective instruments of diplomacy are open conferences with a maximum of publicity. The General Assembly of the United Nations, and the Economic and Social Council, have accomplished a great deal through the opportunities they provide in public sessions for the clarification and mobilization of international public opinion. The Security Council, too, has often found its ability to bring to bear in public the pressure of world opinion on particular issues, a strong instrument for peace.

But there are also situations - and they are sometimes the most difficult and most important ones - where highly publicized meetings offer the least promising method of negotiating. An atmosphere of drama is inevitably generated when the eyes of the world are focussed on a single meeting. Too much drama is not always good for discussion or decision. It may neutralize the value of talks and even doom them in advance to futility. Where public expectations are over-stimulated, deliberation is apt to be confused with dullness and compromise with capitulation. The purpose of negotiation is, necessarily, to seek agreement through mutual adjustments. But adjustments are not made easier,

and may well be made impossible, when the negotiators fear that any concession, or compromise is, within the hour, going to be printed, pictured or broadcast as a capitulation.

There is another difficulty which you will appreciate. Quiet and constructive achievement often has no one to write or speak its praise. But conflict is its own publicity agent. A clash looks more exciting than a slow edging towards compromise. It is, therefore, more likely to get the front page.

But when it reaches the front page, the honour and pride of politicians and peoples become engaged. Headlines harden convictions, without clarifying them. As I have said more than once, there is nothing more difficult for a political negotiator to retreat from than a bold, black headline!

Please do not misunderstand me. I do not advocate secret deals around green baize tables in a dim light with all curtains drawn. No genuinely democratic state can or should countenance commitments secretly entered into; or adopt policies or make engagements without the people knowing about them and parliament passing on them.

But full publicity for objectives and policies and results, does not mean, or at least should not mean that negotiation must always be conducted, step by step, in public. Certainly no private business, not even a public relations business, could be operated successfully by such methods. And government is the most important business of all.

Diplomacy is simply the agency for the conduct of that business with other states. As such it involves the application of intelligent public relations procedures to the conduct of foreign affairs.

There are times when I think we might be well advised to leave more of it to the diplomats. They are trained for the job and they are usually happy to conduct a negotiation without issuing a progress report after each 20 minute period.

I hope that I won't be considered as disloyal to my Trade Union of political negotiators if I suggest that there are certain things that ambassadors and officials can do better than foreign or other ministers, especially in the early stages of negotiation.

If governments fail to reach agreement through official diplomatic channels, they can go on trying or, at worst, fail without fury. But when Foreign Ministers or, even more, when heads of governments meet, with their inevitable retinue of press, radio, and television companions, with experts, advisors and advisors to advisors, things become more complicated and often more difficult.

There is always the danger that if agreement cannot be reached at meetings on which so much public hope and expectation have been centred, this will inevitably be interpreted as conclusive evidence that

agreement never will be possible. The reaction to this may become, in its turn, unnecessarily despairing and pessimistic. Consequently, there is the strong temptation to conceal or deny the fact of disagreement or to concentrate on blaming the other person or persons for it. In this latter technique the Communists are past masters. Their participation at international conferences is, in fact, often for propaganda purposes only. Their tactics to this end are worked out long before the conference opens, and their exploitation of failure by attributing it to others, continues long after the conference ends.

One reason why there is a reluctance to revert more often to normal methods of diplomacy, using what we call "official channels" rather than political conferences, is that diplomacy as a profession still has a somewhat dubious reputation. This is a 'hang-over' from the days when professional diplomats were the agents of autocratic rulers, in carrying out policies that had little or nothing to do with the welfare of people, or little concern for their interests.

In its origin and in its practice until recent years diplomacy has tended to remain aloof and exclusive. Its spirit and its appeal has often been more dynastic than democratic.

With a faint aura of wickedness still about it, this calling is considered by many to be full of trickery and skull-duggery, practiced by sinister, if distinguished looking gentlemen, who have replaced the knee breeches of the 18th century by the striped pants of today.

This is, of course, unwarranted and unfair. No doubt it could be corrected if a good public relations firm was retained to convince the public that the striped pants are really overalls. Striped pants, in any event, are not a garment but a state of mind. That state of mind, I hope and believe, does not exist in the Canadian External Affairs Department or in its Foreign Service. Striped pants and bow ties do not go well together!

Unfortunately, also, the failures of diplomacy have often been charged with responsibility for resulting wars which men have had to fight long after the diplomat has asked for his passports. Diplomatic failures - as is the case with other failures - linger in memory and persist in history long after successes and achievements are forgotten.

In the past diplomacy has suffered from bad public relations - or - even worse, you will admit - from no public relations at all. It is important to alter this in the future because the public relations aspect of international politics, and hence diplomacy, is now so important as at times to be decisive. The main reason for this is, of course, the inescapable necessity, in a democracy of basing foreign policy, and its conduct, on public opinion, which is now determined by all, not merely a few of the citizens. It is essential, therefore, that public opinion should be kept fully and honestly informed; not, as I have argued, of every step in negotiation, but of every principle of policy, which is something different. Public opinion must, however, be convinced that, even if its representatives in

government are to be given - as I think they should - room to manoeuvre in negotiation, they will not abandon any principle that has been laid down to guide such negotiation.

This is no easy task, especially in dealing with Communist states. Our fear of Communism is understandably so great that if in negotiation we make a concession on any point of detail, and this becomes public as it nearly always does, we may be accused of deserting a principle or of being "soft". This, in fact, can be carried to such a point that fear, both of the Communist and the critic, can freeze diplomacy completely so that no progress of any kind can be made. I hope that we can avoid this purely static position in the coming year just as I hope we can avoid clutching at every proposal as promising peace.

The other difficulty is that any concession or compromise of any kind can be and often is interpreted by a Communist opponent as a sign of weakness generally, and will, therefore, encourage him to be more intransigent than ever.

We have plenty of examples of both these difficulties in contemporary negotiations with Communist governments, especially over Korea and Germany.

The best way, as I see it, to deal with this situation - negotiating with Communist Governments - is to decide in advance what the points and principles are on which you will stand fast and then not to budge from them. At the same time, it is necessary to be flexible on non-essential matters, without worrying too much about the misinterpretation which may be given to a conciliatory attitude on these matters. There are other useful rules to follow. We should not permit the Communists to drag us down to their level of debate and dialectic. In discussion we should not mistake villification for vigour, or sound and fury for sense and firmness.

We would be wise, I think, to follow the advice of a distinguished United States delegate to the United Nations, Senator Warren Austin when he said; "Always leave your enemy room to retreat". That seems to me to make sense, if not in war, at least in negotiation, even with Communists. Equally good advice would be not to allow yourself to be manoeuvred into a blind alley.

Finally, we should resist the Anglo-Saxon failing of making a moral issue of every separate political problem. There are some problems that can be dealt with on the basis of political expediency; others only on the basis of moral principle. It is desirable, though often difficult, to recognize the distinction.

To the Communists, of course, there is no such difficulty, because there is no such thing as a moral issue. This may seem to give them a short-run advantage. But in the long-run a foreign policy which has a sound moral basis will prevail over one which has not, providing we build on that base a structure of strength with freedom.

There is, however, one definite advantage which Communists have in negotiation. They speak with one voice. But in a coalition of free states, large and small, powerful and weak, each has its own voice, each has its own pride, prejudice and public opinion. For this reason we hear too often the "voices" rather than the "voice" of freedom.

There may be no more imperative necessity facing us in 1954 than that of working out the applying satisfactory and effective methods of consultation and cooperation within the coalition, so that we can negotiate with the Kremlin - and Peking - as a well-knit and cohesive group.

The United States, the United Kingdom and France have the main responsibility for this but Canada too has a part to play. Our reputation as a people is good, our strength and stature is envied, our objectivity and good faith is recognized. In short, Canada's international public relations are healthy, which is another way of saying that our position and prestige is high.

This gives us justifiable reason for pride. But it also imposes on us obligations and responsibilities.

We have general obligations as a member of the United Nations and NATO. We also have a special responsibility - which involves a special problem in international public relations - in respect of our relations with the United States. That responsibility is, however, reciprocal - for friendship and mutual understanding require two-way effort.

These relations with the United States are becoming more and more important to both countries; and more varied and complicated. It is not surprising, therefore, that problems are increasing. We must meet and solve them with a minimum of bickering and a maximum of that good will that has been characteristic in this century of the relations between our two countries. Any other approach - or any other result - would be unthinkable. If Canada and the United States cannot grow closer together in good neighbourhood and friendship - and in the mutual respect and understanding on which friendship must rest - what chance is there for peace and stability in the world.

I want to end on this note and in doing so I beg your forgiveness if I repeat as my concluding words something I said in New York a few weeks ago. "We Canadians claim the special privilege, as a close neighbour and a candid friend, of grouching about our big, our overwhelming partner, and of complaining at some of the

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If we can make real progress during 1954 towards that good objective - peace and free existence - then indeed it will be a year for thanksgiving.