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


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SYNERGY IN EARLY WARNING Conference Proceedings March 15-18, 1997 Toronto



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Conference Proceedings March 15-18, 1997 Toronto, Canada



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Papers presented at the Synergy in Early Warning Conference Held in Toronto, Canada, March 15-18, 1997 Westin Harbour Castle Hotel

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Synergy in Early Warning Conference¹ An Introduction to the Proceedings

Susanne Schmeidl Coordinator, Prevention/Early Warning Unit

Acknowledgements

The idea of this conference came from participation in previous early warning meetings and workshops. It was developed jointly with Professor Howard Adelman who provided guidance throughout the whole process. In the very early stages of the structure of the conference, I also would like to acknowledge the helpful advice of Professor Ted Robert Gurr.

I received consistent support on organizational issues before, after, and especially during the conference from the graduate students that worked with the Prevention/Early Warning Unit. I would like to thank Donald Mitchell and Alexander Benifand, and especially Govind Rao and Zahra Popatia. In the completion of these proceedings, I would like to thank John Dent, without whose patience and dedication the proceedings would not have been completed in a timely fashion (due to my research leave to the US and Geneva).

Introduction

In June of 1995, the G-7 summit in Halifax called for the exploration of the means by which to improve the analysis of humanitarian disasters and the utilization of conflict-related early warning information, noting that the issue was not the collection of *more* information, but the enhancement of analytical capacity, as well as the process of making analyses available to decision makers. In response to this, and numerous other calls within the UN and outside, the Prevention/Early Warning Unit at the York Centre for International and Security Studies organized a conference on the *Synergy in Early Warning* on March 15-18, 1997. This conference focused on three types of synergies in establishing an early warning network: integrating diverse research methods; combining the organization efforts of academics. states, international agencies and NGOs; and connecting analyses to strategic responses. This linkage of research, organization, and response will contribute to the early detection and prevention or mitigation of deadly conflicts. Due to the persistence and predominance of internal struggle, the focus of this conference was on intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts.

This conference built on a series of workshops held over several years at the Centre for Refugee Studies (1991, 1992, 1993) by Professor Howard Adelman, the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland (1993, 1996) by Professor Robert Ted Gurr and Dr. John Davies, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa (1996), and the Mershon Center for International Security at Ohio State University (1996) by Professor J. Craig Jenkins. These past workshops

¹ We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the John Holmes Fund (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Steelworkers Humanity Fund (United Steelworkers of America/Ontario).

generally focused only on certain parts of early warning analysis, such as quantitative/qualitative mode and data systems, without fully attempting to bridge the quantitative/qualitative gap, the organizational issues and the analyses/response linkages. This conference bridged these gaps.

Initial early warning efforts, particularly in the eighties, focused on humanitarian disasters and concentrated on the collection and analysis of information for the purpose of foreshadowing conflicts with the final of mitigating the humanitarian consequences. Early warning was aimed at collecting information to preadequate emergency relief. The current focus of early warning is on prevention rather than strictly forecasting, on conflict management rather than humanitarian relief, and on analyses and the develop of strategic options rather than just information collection. As such, humanitarian early warning red detailed analysis of three major dimensions: actors, situations, and contexts. Successful early warning also requires a suitable organizational structure and a specific focus on realistic strategic options.

Numerous efforts are underway worldwide to develop early warning models. Some utilize indicators and quantitative models. Others are based simply on sharing field information available from UN agencies and NGOs. Participants in this conference utilized different methodologies and approaches (qualitative and versus quantitative computerized coding) in such areas as humanitarian crises, major armed conflicts, genocide/politicide, refugee migrations, and human rights. Much less developed, however, is research or linking responses to early warning signals. This conference tried to bridge this gap by focussing for two exclusively on the link between research and viable policy options.

Participation

The conference brought together leading academics, policy makers, and representatives of relevant international organizations and NGOs from all over the world. The integration of policy responses analysis was intended to increase the capacity of early warning analysis to be sensitive to the needs of policy makers and provide them with specific tools and options.

Due to geographical reasons of the location of the conference, North American participants (7576, predominated (although there was attendance by Europeans). Budgetary constraints, unfortunately, limited the participation of individuals from soft-currency countries, particularly Africa, since we were unal provide travel assistance.

There were a total of 119 participants from 15 different countries: 40 percent Canadians; 44 percent Americans; 14 percent Europeans; 3 from Africa (Egypt and South Africa); 4 from Russia; and 1 each Australia, Israel, and South Korea. Among the listeners, Canadians predominated, accounting for 67 percent

Academics dominated the conference with 39 percent, but the participants also included 27 percent 20 14 percent government, and 6 percent UN delegates. In addition, student participation was 13 percent, with the majority playing an active role. 71 percent of all participants appeared on the program in the role speaker, chair, discussant or rapporteur. Table 1 and 2 provide a more detailed overview of the divers participation by region and affiliation.

Table 1: Program Participants

es to young	Academic	Student	NGO	UN Org.	Government	OTHER	Total
Canada	8	5	6	0	5	2	26
United States	18	4	9	2	3	0	36
Europe	4	1	4	5	0	I	15
Africa	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Other	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total	38	10	19	7	8	3	85

Table 2: General Attendance

mit isoenen	Academic	Student	NGO	UN Org.	Government	OTHER	Total
Canada	6	4	7	0	4	1	22
United States	1	0	4	0	1	2	8
Europe	0	0	2	0.0	0	0	2
Africa	1	0	0	0	· 0	0	1
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	8	5	13	0	5	3	34

The Panels

On each day, one of the specific issues of concern was addressed. One the first day - "Synergy in Research" - the current split between quantitative and qualitative early warning analyses, was addressed. By bringing together researchers from both methodological spheres, as well as those academics that have already tried to bridge this gap, the best qualities of both types of research can be combined. While quantitative analysis can furnish the necessary comparative breadth needed for understanding similar structural components of crises, qualitative work provides the contextual sensitivity crucial to understanding specific crises. The four panels surveying the different research methodologies concluded with a session that provided examples of merging quantitative indicators with qualitative analysis. The purpose of these sessions was to provide an overview of the existing methodology used for early warning research, but also to initiate linkages among existing research projects.

The second day - "Synergy in Organization" - aimed at the existing fragmentation and inadequacy of early

warning efforts that have been initiated. There was a session each on: governments; NGOs and organizations; early warning, while the fourth session surveyed initiatives that cut across these organizational lines. The purpose of these sessions was to provide an overview of the different organizational approact to early warning as well as spark discussion on potential linkages. The adequacy of each of these organizations to perform early warning was also discussed. In order to incorporate the academic perspective, some of the panels had academicians present papers with UN, NGO and government representation providing critical commentary. This allowed for an intense interaction among the different viewpoint.

On the last day - "Synergy of Analyses and Response" - the important link between early warning analy and policy responses was addressed. Too often, early warning is undertaken without considering the raof possible responses. The absence of well developed policy options makes it difficult for policy makers to act upon the findings of such analyses. The four panels surveyed the problematic of early warning and e response, obstacles to responding to early warning signals, the issue of political will and ways to reach pomakers more efficiently. While each of the components, research/analysis, organization, and response, are component parts of effective early warning, without response any early warning system is useless. The it is of utmost importance that the bridges built during this conference are strengthened and that connectiare pursued.

Finally, there were three special sessions, one on the Media and early warning, one on Zaire, and a gradustication workshop. The media session incorporated journalists (both from print media and television) and academicians who addressed the feasibility of using the media for early warning purposes. The conclusion was that media might be useful, but information is often not detailed enough for response purpose. However, we cannot deny the power of media to ignite political will or change events on the ground.

The special session on Zaire involved participants from NGOs, academia and government who discust the lessons learned from Rwanda and Zaire and if any of the Rwanda lessons were applied to the crisis in Zaire. They also discussed the problems of response on the ground and the necessity for cooperation among different groups.

Finally, the graduate student workshop provided students with a unique opportunity to exchange research projects and meet some of the panellists from academia, NGOs, the UN and government in a more intin session. The session was meant to provide students with a time-frame to make contacts, consider joint-projects and learn more about the work of some of the panellists. It was very well perceived by the students that participated, and there was a high level of volunteer participation from panellists.

A Note on the Proceedings

These conference proceedings sample the papers presented at the "Synergy in Early Warning" confere-Not all sessions required systematic papers, particularly the special sessions on Zaire and the Media, as well as the graduate student workshop. In addition, some participants were not asked to provide a formal pamerely a thought piece/overview/reflection on their own experiences. These were Mary O. McCar William Hyde, Udo Janz, and Kumar Rupesinghe *et. al.* In some cases, a formal presentation was given, but the paper was not yet ready for wider circulation. In these cases, we provided only an abstract Appendix A. In one case, future publication prohibited the inclusion of the paper in these proceedings sum, the proceedings include all the papers that were available to us in an electronic format. The papers are organized in the same manner as the program (see Appendix B for the schedule of proceedings). We performed minor editing on the papers for the purpose of bringing them into a unified format (font etc.)



these proceedings. Certain tables and figures that were incompatible with our word processing program were copied from the originals.

Conclusions

The overall feed-back from conference participants indicated that this conference was the most diverse and complete meeting that had been held on early warning. They appreciated the opportunity for meeting new people (and new ideas), networking, and developing joint projects. The participants also commented on how well the conference had been organized. While it may not have solved all problems on early warning, the conference provided a very fertile ground for improvements and collaboration for years to come

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A. SYNERGY IN EARLY WARNING RESEARCH

Defining Humanitarian Early Warning

Howard Adelman York University

A lot of effort worldwide is underway to create a system of knowledge and programmatic action based on a concept that may be vague and totally ambiguous - namely "early warning". What is humanitarian early warning about? What benefit does it bring, and how is early warning to be accomplished? We can refer to the long association between early warning and traditional intelligence services which were expected to deliver warnings to their political masters in sufficient time for the political leadership of a state to undertake preemptive action to prevent, deter or, at the very least, mitigate the effects of threatened violent action against one's own state. In the last two decades, early warning has been associated with humanitarian actions rather than protecting against threats to one's country's security. I do not propose to rehearse the development of the concept as it started in humanitarian efforts to anticipate food shortages to enable supplies to be put in place to prevent famine, or the extension of the term to anticipating refugee flows in order to have food and medical supplies, and its more latter extension to conflict management to prevent the circumstances which give rise to refugee flows in the first place. Instead, I propose to subject the definition adopted by FEWER, the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, to a critical examination to unpack its meaning.

Introduction

In *The Gorgias*, Socrates asks Gorgias what he professes and teaches. What does the power of his art consist in? The question is relevant to the issue of early warning. For a lot of effort worldwide is underway to create a system of knowledge and programmatic action based on a concept that may be vague and totally ambiguous - namely "early warning".¹ What is humanitarian early warning about? What benefit does it bring, and how is early warning to be accomplished?

We can refer to the long association between early warning and traditional intelligence services which were expected to deliver warnings to their political masters in sufficient time for the political leadership of a state to undertake preemptive action to prevent, deter or, at the very least, mitigate the effects of threatened violent action against one's own state. The key questions about early warning concerned why the early warnings were not available when the United States was attacked at Pearl Harbour or when the Israelis were caught unawares when Egypt attacked in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The presence or absence of an early warning needed discussion. There was a need for an explanation for that presence or absence, but there did not seem to be a need to define the meaning of 'early warning'.

In the last two decades, early warning has been associated with humanitarian actions rather than protecting against threats to one's country's security. I do not propose to rehearse the development of the concept as it started in humanitarian efforts to anticipate food shortages to enable supplies to be put in place to prevent famine, or the extension of the term to anticipating refugee flows in order to have food and medical supplies as well as tents and water in position to mitigate the suffering of the refugees who generally flee with minimal supplies, and its more latter extension to conflict management to prevent the circumstances

which give rise to refugee flows in the first place. Instead, I propose to subject the definition adopted FEWER, the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, to a critical examination to unpack its meaning.

Definition

In the FEWER definition, Early Warning is defined as "the communication of information on a crisis area, analysis of that information, and development of potential strategic responses to respond to the crisis in a timely manner." The term being defined uses the words "early" and "warning", but the definition refionly vaguely to the timeliness of the information and analysis, and the translation of that analysis in... strategic action plans. Presumably, the assumption built into the definition is that the information and analysis, along with the strategic options, will be on time to do something to mitigate or even prevent to crisis. But it could refer to the timing such that the information, analysis and strategic scenarios developed when people are prepared to listen to them. The timeliness is not then related to the crisis itself as much as the readiness of those who might respond to the crisis to act.

Further, the definition says nothing about a warning. It is not a definition that states when an alabell should be set off or who is to set it off or that an alarm need be set off at all. After all, intelligence gathering and analysis and the development of strategic options are undertaken by many academics all t time concerning areas of complex emergencies in the world without anyone assuming the necessity alerting or warning anyone that a crisis is immanent.

Perhaps we are making too much out of a scrap of words. So let us go back to basics. Why and we wants to know anything about a crisis, and how should that knowledge be obtained? Heraclitus in one of the fragments (B123) extant from his writings said, "Nature loves to hide itself." Does a crisis hide itself, or is the immanence of the crisis so loud and clear and well pronounced that only a fool could ignore the immanence of the disaster? As one policy analysis said to me, the issue is not knowing that a conflict is about to break out into open violence, but the willingness to do anything about it. The problem is not in the hiddenness out there, but in the desire of those who can do anything to stay unnoticed and hidden.

But the area of the crisis and of those who can respond need not be considered mutually exclusive realms. After all, it is unlikely that a crisis in one area is disconnected from the politics and policies of those who are in a position to respond and mitigate the crisis. I do not, therefore regard early warning simply as the revelation of the character of the objective political cosmos 'over there'. Rather the quest for definit 'early warning' is an exercise in understanding how what is happening over there comes to be known by us 'over here'. It is not about bringing the sensible knowledge of events to our attention so much as understanding how we attend to those events. The exercise is as much if not more concerned with the min and spirits of those to whom the knowledge of events is being communicated as it is about the events and actions themselves.

The reason for this is simple. In contrast to early warning related to intelligence analyses focuss on threats to the security of our countries, we have little motive to engage in humanitarian early warning. With respect to humanitarian crises and complex emergencies, humanitarian early warning, whatever it is, is not concerned with threats to our security. As the FEWER document spells it out: "early warning is n concerned with a direct threat to the gatherer or analyser of the information or those contemplating response. Rather, it is concerned with protection of, or the provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in which there is an inability or an unwillingness to provide protection by the state wij jurisdiction over the territory, either because the state itself or its agents are the victimizers, or because the breakdown in the state itself. Inherently, early warning is motivated by universal humanitarian rather than national interests, and is focussed on issues concerned with inter-ethnic violence, gross human right violations or genocide."

Quite a mouthful! Put more simply, humanitarian early warning is about human disasters. Since these events have little to do with what Hobbes called "the foresight of (our) own preservation" (Leviatha

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Ch. XII), if the knowledge will do nothing to get ourselves out of the "miserable condition of Warre," but may rather involve risking the lives of the members of our own commonwealth in such wars through the allocation of peace forces, we have little motivation to attend to these crises. Unless, of course, they can be demonstrated to concern our own security.

If humanitarian early warning is not about preparations for security threats, it is about preparation and responses to humanitarian crises. As noted in the FEWER proposals, Sekerez (1996) stated that, "The UN needs to establish an early-warning system which would require intelligence and planning capacities and which would alert the Security Council for appropriate action and similarly, try to avert it from taking wrong steps." In addition to preparation, early warning can alert us as to which types of responses are required, those akin to traditional security threats as in Chapter VII of the UN operations, those akin to Chapter VI UN operations related to UN peacekeeping purposes, or the obscure area between Chapter VI and Chapter VII and the ambiguous normative foundations for responses that are said to reside between traditional UN peacekeeping under Chapter VI and enforcement action under Chapter VII (Urquart 1995, p. 3). Finally, early warning is critical to the effectiveness of the response itself, for advanced intelligence can facilitate compromise and the move towards peace between the parties to the conflict since, "it is only when actors are ill-informed about each other's capabilities or unable to anticipate each other's beliefs that secession or outside intervention may occur" (Cetiyan 1996).

In other words, early warning is relevant for determining whether anything needs to be done, what needs to be done, whether the response required is one appropriate to a threat to security or one appropriate to a humanitarian need (or somewhere in between), and the effectiveness of what is done,

My concern, however, has less to do with the utility functions of early warning in translating warnings into action, than the more basic question of why we want humanitarian early warnings. This second concern with the motivation for early warning has more to do with how we come to know than what we know, for it is not readily evident that we have any significant motivation to know what is happening at all. Why should we care whether the Azeris of Azerbaijan are preparing to counter-attack and recapture the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and the other portions of Azerbaijan"liberated" by the Armenians? Is it our concern for the 400,000 Armenians displaced by the war from Azerbaijan and relocated in the Armenian controlled pocket and its surroundings? Or is it because of our humanitarian concern for the 700,000 Azeris and Kurds who were displaced by the war and now live in miserable conditions of squalor? If the latter, why do the Americans have a policy prohibiting international relief agencies from proffering aid and ameliorating the unimaginable squalor of the displaced persons camps in Azerbaijan?²

And this is but one crisis among dozens around the globe. Few have much to do with "foresight into our own preservation." So why should we give a damn? We need a theory of humanitarian early warning that deals with why we need to know and how we come to know as much if not more than what we need to know. In the literal sense of theory in Greek, we need to link *theoreion* (the place for seeing) with *theorema*, the sight itself.

Towards a Theory of Early Warning

Why do we want to know something about the place for seeing and how do we obtain the sight? These are the prior questions to the utility functions of early warning discussed above. In answering that question, my focus will be on the evidently easier task of preparing for emergency responses rather than the more difficult task of conflict management.

One of the most striking things about Gerard Prunier's book, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (Columbia University Press, 1995) was his revelations about the 'why' question. Why did the French want to launch *Operation Turquoise*? They were afraid of an Anglo-Saxon intervention to stop the genocide from South Africa. (P. 281) It was not humanitarianism, but competitiveness and the desire to preserve French honour and influence. They were not motivated by knowledge of the genocide, for in their

intervention planning the instigators revealed that they had little knowledge, even of where the war centred at the time, and what the likely local and worldwide public reaction would be to their intervent. It was as if France had never left the mind set of Louis XIV when the king said:

To be King is to be the summit of superiority and the elevation of rank is all the more assured when it is supported by unique merit. The great interval which virtue puts between [other men] and him [the king], exposes him in the most beautiful light and with utmost glitter in the eyes of the whole world. All eyes are attached to him alone...everything else crawls, everything else is impotent and sterile.³

The motive for intervention in the Rwandese humanitarian crisis was, for France (according Prunier) not the welfare of the other but competitive display (exaggerated in Louis XIV's case by his propensity to add to self aggrandizement and honour the humiliation of the other so that the other we reduced to a crawling nonentity.) Glory to the elites of France in the twentieth century was the watered do version of glory to the Sun King just over two centuries earlier. One either radiated glory or suffered humiliating shame. Self-infatuation was the primary motive of France, not concern with the other.

I do not write or say this to put down France, but to tease out a basic motive for intervention. In more down-to-earth English phrasing of Thomas Hobbes, "men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity." (Leviathan, part 2, ch. 17) Is this inconsistent with humanitarianism? From the later perspective, the objective world, not pride in oneself, motivates action. The world is one in which individu are oppressed and violence is the order of the day. The suffering of humanity under such a situation contradicts the law of the heart and the compassion which Rousseau recognized to lie in the heart of most humans.

But there is an apparent contradiction. For the least acquaintance with these situations of violence reveal humans engaged in heartless actions of murder and mayhem. If all or most humans are motivated from compassion with the suffering of their fellows, why is it that these situations which give rise to compass seem to exemplify the very opposite of compassion - ruthlessness, hard-heartedness, as if those humans engaged in such atrocities were governed by an external demonic force that had taken possession of them.

The contradiction is only apparent. For it is the very cold-bloodiness of the events that are said arouse the spirit of humanitarianism as those who have faith in compassion undertake to extirpate from me world actions which stand in such contradiction to the law of a heart governed by compassion. In this version, compassionate action is governed, not by pride and a sense of self-aggrandizement, but by " earnestness of high purpose which seeks its pleasure in displaying the *excellence* of its own nature, and in promoting the welfare of mankind."⁴

But if it is not pride and self-aggrandizement, it is the *display* of the excellence of its own nat And is this not but a different content given to that pride, but pride nevertheless? No. For there difference. As in the most exaggerated version of Louis XIV, pride is concerned only with the self, and it is easily connected to the debasement of others. The law of the heart takes pleasure in itself only to degree that the same law is reflected in all others, in the pleasure of all hearts.

But then why is the primary concern of compassion not with those who give of themselves in love for others? Why is the focus on situations which display a cruel alienation from any sense of compassion Because it is only in confronting such situations that compassion can demonstrate its superiority to crue as a force for change. Cruelty is not necessary, but contingent. It can be defeated. To do so requires surrendering oneself, in the ideal, to the power of compassion as a universal force for good. Exercise compassion is, thereby, the very opposite to pride and self-aggrandizement.

Or so it appears. For though there may be agreement over why we act as humanitarians, there is little agreement over which acts are indeed expressions of that compassion. My heartful action is not yo

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Further, what you do is at odds with what my heart dictates. If my intentions are excellent, yours must be detestable for they stand in the way of the realization of my virtue and the relief of the other's suffering. But compassion is supposed to demonstrate the unity of humans, not the differences and pride in each persons vision of expressing that compassion. Compassion when it is translated into action seems to display as much pride and competitiveness as that exemplified by self-love. Certainly this appeared to be the underlying critique of Volume III of the study on the Emergency Response to Rwanda.

Thus, the demand for coherence and coordination among humanitarian agencies and the insistence on "a single body to set priorities, to raise and distribute resources, and to co-ordinate emergency inputs."5 But this a perversion of the law of the heart which each humanitarian agency then opposes. For setting up an overriding institutional system for delivering humanitarian assistance is regarded as a perversion of the essence of compassion and humanitarianism which is said to reside in the heart of each of us and is to be the direct motive for action rather than some bureaucratic rational decision structure. The purveyors of international control and coherence now become the villains, attempting to deform the very essence of compassion. "The heart-throb for the welfare of humanity therefore passes into the ravings of an insane selfconceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself from destruction...It therefore speaks of the universal order as a perversion of the law of the heart and of its happiness, a perversion invented by fanatical priests, gluttonous despots and their minions who compensate themselves for their own degradation by degrading and oppressing others, a perversion which has led to the nameless misery of deluded mankind."6

The humanitarian agencies and NGOs may not go to such extremes in name calling, but the message is the same. The international career coordinators are the cause of suffering rather than the instruments for its relief. If they are not quite fanatical priests of the new world order and gluttonous despots, they are at the very least depicted as self-serving bureaucrats. One almost prefers the honesty of the more colourful language. But as long as each humanitarian organization and individual within each organization claims validity for its and his/her own interpretation of which humanitarian intervention is the most appropriate, then self-righteousness will confront any attempt to express the inner law of the heart by means of an external set of rules and an institutional governing system for humanitarian operations.

But then the law of the heart suggests that it is neither a law, since each individual knows in his own heart what a situation demands, nor an action motivated by compassion, since what we have is a "war of all against all", but one fought in the name of compassion rather than self preservation. What seems to be a principle uniting all humans is, in fact, a cover up, or the universal rule that the public order is indeed a state of war of each against every other. The only distinguishing characteristic of compassionate driven action is that it hides even from itself the true source of its motivation.

In other words, if the motive for engaging in traditional covert intelligence, and the early warning that was expected to follow from such work, was fear for our own safety and pride, and the motive for engaging in humanitarian early warning, and the information, analyses, and scenario creations as a prerequisite thereto, is compassion for the other and pride, the common motive in both cases is pride, the concern with how what we do reflects on who we are and how we appear to others in the world. This does not deny a utility function to humanitarian early warning, but only to insist that motivation is a prior issue to the theoretical understanding of early warning.

How Related to Why

In the spectrum of secret to transparent, early warning information and analysis tends towards the transparency pole in contrast to traditional intelligence analysis which is usually seen to be a matter of very tight secrecy. Recently, I visited the Department of Defence in Ottawa to discuss the early warning plans of FEWER, particularly in reference to West Africa. We were ushered into a space entered through two vault doors. In the glass enclosed security room, the security services shared with me - or rather, gave me a glimpse - of the work they had done in Zaire in collating the variety of information on the movement of

refugees in Zaire and translating that information into maps for use by the planned Canadian peacekee mission into Zaire. It was hard to see why such information was confidential or secret since nothing seemed to relate to security threats against Canadians, yet the pattern of intelligence demanded that I could not obtain copies and that access to the information would have to be "cleared". In contrast, I e-mailed our own early warning analyses of refugee movements which had been put on the internet as had all the IRIN information on the Great Lakes crisis.

Secrecy is a prerequisite when the motive for early warning is to offset threats to one's own sectors. But secrecy seems to have little function in humanitarian early warning, except in those cases where are possible threats to humanitarian and international personnel in the field. That is why humanitarian early warning has so actively and readily jumped on the use of the internet. EWNET uses the internet to coordinate the information on different crisis areas, on the development of early warning knowledge, and on we doing what. The internet is the critical tool for covering the various crisis areas and for sharing such information such as that available on IRIN on the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

The various nets (including RefugeeNet) allow researchers in crisis areas, field workers work with NGOs and INGOs, and policy advisers dealing with that crisis, to share information. Though the custom is to allow a broad list to access information, inputs are controlled, and analysis is usually not available to a wide public. But if the ostensible *raison d'etre* of early warning of man-made crises that result in extenhuman suffering is the desire to be better prepared to alleviate such crises when they occur, or better yet, to prevent them from happening in the first place - that is the utility functions of early warning - how do such preparations relate to the motive of pride which frequently undercuts the ability to perform coordin humanitarian operations?

The internet systems are merely mechanisms for establishing connections. The question of how is answered by noting the way in which 'what' is connected to 'whom'. The easier part, at least theoretic is to define the types of information needed, the sources, and the means for collecting it. Though there may be some practical difficulties in devising ways to gather and collate vital information in crisis areas, there is no theoretical problem in determining what data is needed. In traditional intelligence work, where concern is one's own security and the threat by the other to that security, the emphasis has understandard been on this area because the key information was not readily available⁷, even though numerous studies of intelligence failures have concluded that the real difficulty was not in knowing something was abhappen, but in communicating that information **and analysis** to key decision makers.⁸ However, humanitarian early warning, precisely because the motivation to respond is relatively low in comparison to security threats, and, further, because it is so much more difficult to develop and coordinate an approresponse, much more importance must be placed on developing the analysis of the information.

In fact, one of the most important aspects of humanitarian early warning is developing the op responses which might be effective in responding to the crisis. The collection of information can be seen an educational tool over a long period to convince decision makers that the intelligence analysts know what they are talking about so that policy makers, who are asked today to reallocate scarce resources away current crises to develop preventive capacity-building, develop the assurance that there is a be accumulated knowledge about both the crisis area and proven preventive tools that could be effective i dealing with the crisis.

In other words, the major point of early warning information gathering and analysis is n information and analysis in itself of the crisis area, but the use of that information and analysis to gain th trust of the decision makers and to provide them with effective options. The main issue for human early warning is not to detect what is going on in a crisis area, though country or region-specific an are critical, but to communicate effectively to the decision makers and equip them to enable them convince others and make decisions.

Defining Humanitarian Early Warning -- 7

This means that knowledge of one crisis area is insufficient. The early warning system must have a comparative capacity. From studies of various humanitarian crises, the advantages and disadvantages of a range of individual policy tools useful for prevention must have been distilled based on policy-relevant retrospective studies of the results of preventive responses to crises and their successes and failures. Finally, and what is most difficult, the key information and analysis must focus on the comparative capacities of different agencies and the decision-makers in them and their capacity for undertaking various optional preventive responses. In other words, early warning is more about the responders than about the crises areas, though the analyses of the crisis areas is critical.

An effective early warning system devises appropriate responses. Without an adequate Early Warning system that provides good analysis, proposed responses can be unrealistic due to the lack of any detailed understanding of the issue. Such responses bring humanitarian interventions of any kind into disrepute and undermine all international actions except those based on narrow nation-state interests. Undertaking the latter type of analysis requires a knowledge of the range of means that can address various sources of a crisis, such as ethnic conflicts, gross human rights repression, civil wars, and genocide, and which means are likely to be most effective in given settings. It also requires connecting that knowledge to functioning organizational entities where analysts can assess the applicability of alternative response options to specific situations so that decision-makers can wield their influence and authority to activate preventive measures.

Traditional intelligence was a pre-condition of early warning so that decision makers could make use of the power they had to prevent, deter or mitigate crises. But humanitarian early warning is much more concerned with wielding influence and developing authentic authority in an area than the utilization of power. Hence, different emphases and different tools have to be developed to create an early warning capacity. But like traditional intelligence analyses and early warning, a key ingredient that must be considered is PRIDE. On the one hand, a potential intervenor must be inspired with a sense of pride and responsibility for a leadership role in attending to a humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, that sense of pride must be held in check lest the self-satisfaction in the glory of one's superior knowledge cast such a blazing light that cohorts are blinded, and influence cannot be used to involve partners in what is essentially a humanitarian task.

Early warning is as much about appealing to pride, while keeping that pride in check, as it is about crisis area information and analysis, and creating scenarios for action.



NOTES

1. As the proposal that we wrote for FEWER states, the G-7 meeting of leaders in Halifax in June of 1995 called for exploring the means to improve the analysis and utilization of disaster and conflictrelated early warning information, noting that the issue was not the collection of more information, h the enhancement of the analytical capacity and the process of making that analysis available to decision makers. This G-7 meeting merely echoed the many calls within the UN and outside calling for the creation of a workable early warning system to assist decision makers. Boutros Boutros Ghali in An Agenda for Peace stated that: "Preventative diplomacy needs early warning based on informationgathering and informal or formal fact-finding" (New York, UN 1992, p.13) General Assembly Resolution 46/182 called for: "the systematic pooling, analysis and dissemination of early-warning information." The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in the third chapter of their Helsinki decisions, set out the need: "...to have early warning of situations within the OSCE area which have the potential to develop into crises, including armed conflicts" (in A. Bloed (ed) The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993, Dodrecht, 1993). One recommendation of our (Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke) Report Report on Early Warning and Conflict Management in Rwanda as part of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda was the "Development of an Integrated Humanitarian Early Warning System" (Synthesis Report; Eriksson 1996, p.57).

2. David Rieff, "Case Study in Ethnic Strife," Foreign Affairs. 76:2, March-April, 1997, p. 129.

3. Oeuvres de Louis XIV, Paris: Treutel and Wurtz, 1806, 2: 67-8, requoted from Carol Blum, Roussed and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, Prologue.

4. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, 221.

5. Thomas G. Weiss and Amir Pasic, "Reinventing UNHCR: Enterprising Humanitarians in the Form Yugoslavia, 1991-1995," Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and Humanitarian Organizations, 3:1, Jan.-April 1997, p. 42.

6. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, 226.

7. For example, in the Cuban missile crisis, the deployment of the missiles were marked "top secret" (Cf. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994, p. 84, nt. 122.) All messages about the deployment were sent by hand. Only very late in the implementation phase, were the top brass of the military informed. It was only because the Soviets failed to use the camouflage first invented in World War I for such purposes and mask the construction work Cuba that the air photos of the Americans were able to spot the construction of SAM missile sites as were as the missiles hidden under canvas.

8. As Lebow and Stein (1994, p. 306) state, the key problem was not detecting the threat, but misunderstanding it in both the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Yom Kippur war in 1973.

Intelligence And Early Warning: Lessons From A Case Study

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The paper, using the example of the February 25, 1994 shooting spree by an Israeli doctor in a Muslim Payer hall in the city of Hebron, tries to answer the question if intelligence should be expected to predict violent events with damaging impact on politics in the future. The case resulted in hearings and deliberation that raised certain points of controversy that provide an excellent case study of early warning, and its link to intelligence. This study addresses itself to these points, based on a study of the material available by the Shamgar Commission, as reported in open sources. No particular distinction is made between the main themes in the hearings on the one hand, and the conclusions and recommendations on the others, as there are no major gaps between them. In addition, particular attention is paid to the linkages between intelligence and early warning, which is a natural theme emerging from the proceedings.

On February 25, 1994 an Israeli doctor, Baruch Goldstein, entered the Muslim prayer hall in the Cave of the Patriarchs in the city of Hebron in the West Bank, and using an automatic rifle, fired indiscriminately into the crowd of the Muslim worshipers during the Friday prayer (Friday, of course, is the holy day of Islam, but that particular Friday also happened to be the important Jewish holiday of Purim), killing on the spot thirty people in the horrible massacre, before being himself lynched by the mob of the survivors. The incident provoked an enormous storm of protest in the entire Muslim world, also triggering endless demonstrations and riots in the West Bank, endangering the then fledgling peace process based on the Oslo agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The protests threatened at one point to undermine the credibility of the Israeli government in the peace process and also to delegitimize its continued control over the West Bank at the time. So difficult was the situation for Israel, that the Rabin government agreed to the unprecedented step of an international force being deployed in the city of Hebron, in order to calm down the local population and allow it to feel the partial protection of an impartial force, called TIPH, for Temporary International Presence in Hebron.

In addition, Israeli public opinion was upset to an extent unprecedented since the Christian massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila near Beirut, which had taken place during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. That event led to mass demonstrations, and the pressure of public opinion forced to the established of a judicial commission of inquiry, the Kahan Commission, which in turn forced the resignation of the Israeli Minister of Defense and Chief of Military Intelligence, all this in a controversial judgement involving "personal and ministerial responsibility". This was the second major commission inquiry--following the Agranat Commission of 1974, inquiring into the debacles in the initial stages of the Yom Kippur war--in less than a decade that forced the resignation of the Chief of Military Intelligence, who is the leading figure in the Israeli Intelligence community.

The Hebron massacre was regarded as a horrible disaster not just on account of the terrible hundring price and the ensuing political difficulties for the country, but also on account of the fear that the incident would lead to a religious war between Muslims and Jews, particularly over the prayer rights in the Cave the Patriarchs, which is holy to both Jews and Muslims. Hence, public opinion again was upset and started clamor for the establishment of yet another commission of inquiry, along the model of the two previous or seventually, such a commission was established, despite grave reservations by the Prime Minister at the time (Rabin). The commission (chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and, for the first til including also an Israeli Arab district court judge) held numerous hearings, most of which were carried is on television in Israel, initially attracting enormous attention and public interest.

When the Shamgar Commission² concluded its work and published its findings, there was a feel of anti-climax and disappointment. In contrast to the two previous commissions, this one did not recommthe punishment or removal of any major figures in the political or military establishment, nor did it find a major intelligence failure.³ Its recommendations were mostly of technical nature, and concentrated improving security arrangements on the ground. Yet the hearings and the deliberations of the commissithe vast majority of which were held in public and made easily available in the press, reveal a fascinating insight into the expectations of the consumers of intelligence and the practical ways and means in which intelligence attempts to meet these expectations. In particular, because the commission was established response to a single traumatic event, it attempted to some extent to come to terms with the question whether intelligence can and should be expected to predict such events in the future.

In other words, a form of early warning was very much at the heart of the deliberations. The disat that eventually occurred was both a humanitarian tragedy of major proportions as well as a political catastrophe for the country concerned. When questioned why better preparations were lacking, the vast majority of the officers responsible for the arrangements on the ground blamed the general lack preparedness on the lack of intelligence, or more precisely on the lack of "warning". This raised the issue of early warning for the commission, and while its conclusions were not particularly innovative, yet they are still very important, because they explicitly address the issue of early warning, based on expert testime

The Israeli intelligence community is normally dominated by Military Intelligence, but it has other important organs, such as the MOSSAD, the Israeli civilian agency for intelligence outside the country, the General Security Service, which is the civilian intelligence agency inside the country, the police and of institutions. In the West Bank at the time, the primary agency in charge of intelligence was the General Security Service, (GSS) and most of the accusations for lack of early warning were addressed to it.⁴ Its officials made an enormous effort to defend the agency, both in terms of theoretical arguments about notion of early warning, as well as in terms of proving from documents that they had in fact delivered servia warning that could have been expected at the time.

The main points of controversy that came up during the hearings and deliberations, as well as conclusions of the committee provide an excellent case study of early warning in general, and its linintelligence in particular. This study addresses itself to these points, based on a study of the material made available by the Shamgar Commission, as reported in open sources. No particular distinction is make between the main themes in the hearings on the one hand, and the conclusions and recommendations or other, as there are no major gaps between them.⁵ In addition, particular attention is paid to the linkage between intelligence and early warning, which is a natural theme emerging from the proceedings.

1. Forces in the field expect a form of early warning, and they do so both implicitly, on the local levels, and explicitly, at the higher echelons. Officers in the hearings repeatedly made the point--in various degrees of articulation and explicitness--that it is not possible for forces facing difficult situations to take into account ALL possible dangers and act on them, because this theoretical solution to the problem--expect warning, but be warned against all possible threats and face them with a maximum degree of preparedness at all times⁶--is not feasible, not only on account of the lack of available resources, but also because human

Intelligence and Early Warning -- 11

attention spans and creative energies would be strained in such situations beyond any credible and practical expectation. HENCE A FORM OF EARLY WARNING IS ABSOLUTELY INDISPENSABLE.

2. In order for early warning to be effective, the consumers--when these are forces in the fieldexpect it to be as precise and specific as possible, whereas the intelligence agencies issuing the warnings seem to want to keep them general and diffuse, perhaps simply to cover their lack of certainty, but also to make sure that nothing is missed in the way they articulate the possible dangers. If nothing else, said all too many witnesses, "this will look good to the next commission of inquiry"..⁷.The Israeli General Security Service made a big argument pointing to several sentences in the various reports and directives it had issued prior to 1994 which could be interpreted as forcing the consumer to take into account the possibility of such dangers as the massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs.

3. The consumers, not surprisingly, discounted such attempts as totally inadequate, even ridiculous. Busy commanders faced with endless problems are neither able nor willing to try and figure out oblique and obscure theoretical possibilities within a complex assessment of complicated situations. THAT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A WARNING. They demand an order of priorities in the various possible dangers facing them, and they also expect a more precise identification of the time and place when and where trouble may strike. The intelligence agencies on the other hand argue that this is just not possible, save in exceptional cases where particularly effective human intelligence is fortunately placed. However, this is the exception and not the norm. A more realistic expectation is for the warning to be general and relate to SITUATIONS AND PROCESSES, BUT NOT TO SPECIFIC EVENTS, which are simply impossible to predict.⁸

4. Hence intelligence officials argue that they can depict a general picture of the field, but it is up to the commanders of the forces there to anticipate the specific occurrences that may demand particular attention, in view of the concrete situation on the ground that they are faced with, and that this is something that is not up to intelligence, but rather to those who are in daily touch with the inhabitants in the area in question.⁹ On the other hand, the latter insisted vociferously that in the lack of what they termed "early warning" they were in effect blind, lacking the information to confront the clouds looming on the horizon.¹⁰

5. The events of Hebron, 1994 tend to confirm three major theses about intelligence and early warning which are either known from the literature or at least can be deduced from it. First, we need to be constantly aware of what intelligence can do and cannot do. Intelligence PER SE, even sound and competent intelligence, is neither a panacea nor a DEUS EX MACHINA. It is not the ultimate answer to every national security dilemma that leaders and planners face. It can help shape good strategy, but it cannot substitute for it, nor can it overcome debilitating strategic liabilities when these exist and plague policy making on the national level.

6. Intelligence as a rule lacks the speed necessary to make it truly effective as a sharp weapon in the hands of small units in the field, when these are confronted with rapidly changing political realities. The daily routine in the field supplies an experience for creating and appreciating knowledge for which there is no substitute in the formal intelligence functions. And such knowledge will never be used properly without a proper sensitivity to the transformations that take place from time to time in the political environment, nor will it be gained with any degree of efficiency without awareness to the subtleties and nuances of political change, for which the common sense and the traditional training of military commanders may not be adequate.¹¹

7. Finally, the most important lesson from all this may be that relying on the routine forms of intelligence is more than questionable when the problem is trying to predict atypical and uncharacteristic events. Intelligence is normally good in dealing with more of the same and with a more severe or threatening form of the same. It is well equipped to deal with risks that grow out of known patterns, which have been witnessed in practice and in some sense have already been tested. Intelligence can give early warning with relative ease about the possible or probable events that have proven to be dangerous or catastrophic in the past. On the other hand, it is woefully ill-equipped to warn about events that have not yet occurred, and

therefore stem not from the experience, but the imagination of those in charge of working out prediction. When what is at stake is not the repetition of patterns or escalation of known processes, but he coming the being of new ones that have not been witnessed before, traditional intelligence is likely to fail and hence to be unable to issue early warning with any degree of confidence.

The Hebron massacre was not foreseen by those in charge of early warning in Israeli intelligence because such a thing had never occurred before, and it was not something that the imagination of the intelligence analysts forced them to consider actively. Interestingly and instructively, this was also the mass reason for the lack of foresight on the part of the commanders in the field.¹²

All in all, the Hebron massacre clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of existing links between intelligence and early warning, and it is obvious that traditional forms of intelligence cannot give an adequate system of early warning about uncharacteristic events that may threaten large numbers of people or enpopulations in volatile political situations. It is necessary to think about reforming intelligence agencies, or establish alternative ones, in a way that would put a premium on the attempts to break with the routine dangers facing the system on the daily level. Instead, it may be inescapable to force intelligence to think these specialized forums about the possibility and probability of uncharacteristic and atypical events in a creative and imaginative way. Of course, in the wake of such a step it would be also necessary to think about the need to escape the "wolf crying" symptom, self-fulfilling prophecies and other known intellige fallacies,¹³ as well as to improve the communications with both policy makers and commanders or functionaries in the field.

Yet all this may be too much to ask, and the history of intelligence is just not particular encouraging when it comes to reforms of this magnitude.¹⁴ Hence, much of the responsibility of thinking about the unthinkable or the unimaginable will continue to be that of policy makers and not intelligence officials, or not JUST intelligence officials. After all, intelligence is a function of informing and advispolicy makers, but in the decision making process the imagination, empathy and creativity of the policy makers, who are the consumers of the information and the advice, play a critical role, and will continue play such a role in the face of every conceivable reform in the ways and means of the intelligence commun-Given the added difficulty of even locating the appropriate policy makers in charge of preventing humanitarian catastrophes in the existing institutions of the international community, it may also be necessary to consider establishing international intelligence¹⁵ of a mandate, structure and culture that didrastically from the existing models of intelligence concerned with national security.¹⁶

NOTES

1. The present paper is intended explicitly to study the lessons of a single case to the relationship of intelligence and early linkage. It does not present the case in great detail, but only its most essential features. Nor does it analyze the case within the paradigm of intelligence theory as such, but only as far as the links to early warning go. For a detailed examination of the case, within the paradigm of traditional intelligence studies see Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Hebron Massacre and the Problems of Intelligence", in Benjamin Frankel, (ed.), <u>The Restless Mind</u> (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

2. This commission went down in history under the name of "Shamgar Commission". In later history it would be known as the "first Shamgar Commission", as, ironically and terribly, the second commission by that name, and chaired by the same person, would study the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin (the person who appointed the first commission!). Pundits at times made the connection between the two events, in that Rabin, in their opinion, fell victim to the same right wing, nationalist-religious fanaticism that produced the crimes of Dr. Goldstein.

3. This was to contrast sharply with the findings of the second Shamgar Commission two and a half years, which did find an intelligence failure in the process leading up the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. The commission was about to recommend the dismissal of the Head of the General Security Service, Karmi Gillon, who, however, had decided to resign a few days before the final report of the commission was due.

4. It is to be noted that the GSS had been seen as failed in not having given a warning about the impending outbreak of the INTIFADA (the Palestinian uprising) in the West Bank and Gaza in late 1987. As a result, after that time, its research and analytical capabilities were considerably strengthened.

5. As mentioned before, the conclusions can be--and were--considered as something of an anti-climax. Hence, it is, in many ways, more instructive to study the testimony of the witnesses than the final conclusions themselves. Even so, it is worth noting that there is no major contradiction between the two.

6. This is in general the approach of the pessimistic school of intelligence, which does not believe in the capability of intelligence to avoid surprises at all. For the classic, and most articulate, exposition of this view, see Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable", <u>World Politics</u>, XXXI (October, 1978), pp 61-89. Much of intelligence theory since the writing of this article has been dedicated to debunking it, with only moderate success.

7. The Israel habit, also known in other Western democracies, of establishing commissions of inquiry in the wake of intelligence failures, has already led to a form of immobilization, whereby intelligence officials think more of their ability to argue their innocence in a future inquiry than about the truth of the case to be analyzed.

8. Intelligence officials like the metaphor of a map. According to them, intelligence can depict the map of certain situations, so as to give the contours of the terrain, but the specifics of what to do in the terrain are beyond their capabilities.

9. In other words, the argument is that intelligence is not just a matter of the central and formal organizations charged with it, but also of the units and commanders who are at times presumed to be its consumers. As it were, the boundaries between consumers and producers were increasingly blurred.

10. This is not only a matter of the military arguing for the essential of intelligence. Rather, this is a common feature of all formal organizations charged with complex tasks in unfamiliar societies, which the case also in many, of not most, cases of humanitarian intervention.

11. Again, the parallels with the cases of Non-Governmental Organizations that engage in humanitaria activity are striking. In both cases, in addition to the problems mentioned, there is a lack of political training, skill and experience, which is a particularly debilitating liability under the pressure of quickly accelerating crises.

12. And this again was quoted extensively in the second Shamgar Commission of Inquiry. Nor is this lacking in the study of failures of humanitarian organizations to predict impending catastrophes in several key cases, as in that of Rwanda in the mid-1990's.

13. On these, see Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision", and Ben-Dor, "The Hebron Massacre and the Problems of Intelligence".

14. See the survey in Betts, "Analysis, Warning and Decision".

15. The need to establish an intelligence organ for the international community, or that part of it which is concerned with humanitarian intervention and early warning, seems evident. At least, it should appear evident to those parts of the international community which have a realistic outlook on humanitarian intervention. Such intervention, while motivated by concerns which are by definition the very opposite of the messiness of political machinations and military adventures, nevertheless has to face at times political and strategic necessities that can be escaped only at the cost of abandoning the field to the forces of disruption, confusion and times even genocide. Adopting such a realistic perspective appears to me as one of the primary challenges of developing a true culture of early warning and humanitarian intervention.

16. This is not to say that humanitarian early warning cannot or should not learn from the experience of intelligence. Rather, the argument is that on the one hand, such learning should not be too automatic of reverent, but rather critical and creative. Second, it is possible that many of the points made are also relevant to the possible reform of national security oriented intelligence. Third, it is to be noted that with all the differences between the two, traditional intelligence cannot and should not be considered as all or irrelevant to humanitarian early warning. Most humanitarian catastrophes are the results of intentional acts of human beings and groups which have identifiable strategic intentions and plans--some of these may be easily accessible via open sources, while others need to be pried out as real secrets, just as in traditional intelligence.

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Potential Humanitarian Crises: The Warning Process and Roles for Intelligence

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Warning is a process of communicating judgements about threats early enough for decision makers to take action to deter whatever outcome is threatened; or failing that, to manage events in such a way that the worst consequences are mitigated. So in a sense, then, the term "early warning" is redundant; warning that comes too late for action is not warning at all.

The timing of warning depends very much upon who is being warned:

- For some the warning must come years in advance, e.g., those governments and international agencies or non-governmental organization that must plan strategically, such as those engaged in international development, institution building, and establishing the infrastructure and network of relationships needed to either ro prevent or manage a crisis.
- For some a year or two of warning is appropriate to provide governments and international organization with opportunities to engage in preventive diplomacy, or to establish dialogue, peace talks, confidence-building measures.

Finally, as crises begin to unfold, very near-term tactical warning is needed on, for example, physical threats to aid workers and other innocent civilians, and the likelihood of refugee flows that could create a full blown-humanitarian crisis.

In all cases, however, the late the warning is heeded, the less likely it is that preventive measures will e effective.

It should be made clear here that the act of "heeding the warning" is perhaps the most crucial, and precarious, part of the warning process. Warnings are easily ignored. The art of communicating the warning persuasively is both as science and an art; the communication of warning at each stage of the potential crisis must be configured to the circumstance and the audience, whether that audience is the International

¹ The views expressed here are my own based on my experience with warning from the perspective of both the warner (intelligence) and the warnee (policy).

Committee of the Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, or an individual foreign mini But the issues of how to communicate warning effectively could be an entire conference on its own.

Intelligence plays a role at each stage in the warning process but it is not intelligence in the traditional s of stealing or discovering "secrets" that is relevant here. Rather, the intelligence needed in these cas really information and news. The information may be rather obscure and difficult to obtain, but rarely will the task of diverting or managing a humanitarian crisis depend on discovering secrets.

Still, as crises develop, international organizations and NGOs are likely to continue to turn to governments for what they will call "intelligence" on the situation. This will continue to be true because governments will have the resources devoted to collecting and analysing the array of information available.

Thus, if warning is to be effective, the budding synergy between governments and NGOs will have to blossom as governments and international organizations help provide NGOs with a broad perspective or crisis and NGOs provide governments with ground truths on areas to which their officials do not have access.

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Pattern Recognition of International Crises using Hidden Markov Models⁻

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Event data are one of the most widely used indicators in quantitative early warning research. To date, most of the models using event data have constructed numerical indicators of the likelihood and severity of a crisis based on the characteristics of the events measured in isolation and then aggregated. These techniques are somewhat arbitrary and have yet to gain wide acceptance in the policy community. An alternative approach is to use computerized pattern recognition techniques to match an existing crisis to a set of similar historical cases, and then employ those historical cases to judge the likely severity of the current situation. This approach has much in common with the techniques used by human analysts -- who frequently employ reasoning by historical analogy -- while preserving the advantages of the inexpensive and systematic monitoring that is possible using contemporary methods of automatically generating event data from newswire reports. This paper reports on a project that uses "hidden Markov models" -- a recently developed sequence-comparison technique that is widely used in computational speech recognition -- to measure similarities among international crises. The models are first estimated using the Behavioural Correlates of War data set of historical crises, then applied to an event data set covering political behavior in the contemporary Middle East for the period April 1979 through February 1997.

Introduction

Event sequences are a key part of how humans reason about international events (Bennett & Schrodt, 1987; Schrodt, 1990, 1991). Human analysts "understand" an international situation when they recognize sequences of political activity corresponding to those observed in previous situations. Empirical and anecdotal evidence point to the likelihood that humans carry around in their heads (i.e. have available in long-term associative memory) a set of "templates" for common sequences of actions which can occur in the international system (or in any social setting, for that matter). When part of a sequence is matched, the analyst infers that the remainder of the sequence will be carried out *ceteris paribus*, though often the analysts make the prediction for the express purpose of insuring that the remainder of the sequence is *not* carried out. This process of partial matching allows for short-term prediction. The sequences can be successfully matched by human analysts in the presence of noise and incomplete information, and the same sequences

^{*}This research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation through grant SBR-9410023. The Behavioural Correlates of War data utilized in this paper were originally collected by Russell J. Leng and were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the original collector nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. The computer source code and WEIS-coded Middle East event data set used in this paper can be downloaded from the Kansas Event Data System web site: http://www.ukans.edu/~keds.

can be used to infer events which are not directly observed but which are necessary prerequisites for events which have been observed. This is the process of "precedent-based reasoning" which has been advocated as a key cognitive mechanism in the analysis of international politics by Alker (1987), Mefford (1985, 1991) and others, and is substantially different from the statistical, dynamic and rational choice paradigms which characterize most contemporary quantitative models of international behavior.

In order to use event sequence recognition in problems of early warning, one needs some means of determining the general characteristics of a set of sequences. In Schrodt (1991:186), I posed this problem in the following manner:

The construction of archetypal or "ideal" sequences is [a] problem for which I've yet to find a computational solution. In human pattern recognition, we have a general idea of what a category of event sequences look like--the archetypal war, the archetypal coup, and so forthand probably match to these ideals rather than to clusters of sequences. In a sense, ideal sequences are the centroid of a cluster of sequences, but that centroid is a sequence rather than a point. If a means could be found for constructing such a sequence, the cluster could be represented by the single ideal sequence, which would substantially reduce computing time and provide some theoretical insights as to the distinguishing characteristics of a cluster.

This problem is particularly salient to early warning in the late 20th century because many of contemporary problems do not have exact historical analogs due to changes currently going on in the international system. At the same time, human analysts are clearly capable of making analogies based on some characteristics of those behaviors. For example, because of its unusual historical situation, the current situation in Zaire has a number of unique characteristics, but analysts have pieced together sufficient similarities to a variety of earlier crises in Africa and elsewhere to come to the conclusion that there is a significant likelihood that Zaire is entering a period of rapid political change and possibly dissolution. The key to this analysis, however, to the ability to use general analogies: if one insists on an analogy to a single case--which a human analyst would almost never do, but a computer might--then the Zairian case becomes more difficult to analyze.

If a generalized event sequence is something concrete and objectively describable, as opposed to a warm fuzzy associative-recall feeling of "I'm sure I've seen this before...", it should be possible to find models and algorithms that can characterize those sequences. Such is the motivation of this paper, which demonstrates the use of a sequence recognition technique--hidden Markov models--for differentiating crises in the Behavior Correlates of War (BCOW: Leng 1987) event data set, then applies those models to a contemporary data set on the Middle East. The importance of sequences in determining international political behavior is first discussed in general terms, emphasizing that in a complex system such as international politics, pattern recognition is a more efficient use of human cognitive abilities than deductive approaches.

The paper continues with an analysis using hidden Markov models that demonstrates that these models are usually sufficient to discriminate BCOW crises that involved war from those that did not using the same split-sample design employed in Schrodt (1990, 1991). Those models are then used to study interactions in three dyads in the Levant--Israel>Palestinians, Israel>Lebanon and Syria>Lebanon--using a WEIS-coded event data set covering April 1979 to February 1997. Despite the very substantial differences between the BCOW and Levant data sets in terms of coding procedures, historical time period, and underlying political behavior, the models that were "trained" on the BCOW data show highly significant correlations with the level of conflict in the Levant data, indicating that the hidden Markov models are

attention--but is eventually discarded if it is redundant. Information that is novel is provisionally added to memory. If it is not reinforced, it is eventually discarded as erroneous; if it is reinforced, it is retained. Finally, if behavior appears to match an existing pattern but further experience shows that the match was not reliable in the sense that the pattern predicted one outcome and a different outcome actually occurred, then the individual either changes the matching criterion or seeks additional information which would have distinguished the two patterns.

Humans systematically learn this type of pattern recognition. Basic patterns of human behavior are learned from infancy ("hit your sibling, you'll probably get hit back"). Complex social patterns are initially taught through stories and myths (and nowadays through cartoons, Sesame Street, soaps and prime time entertainment); these are selectively reinforced through social interaction as the individual matures. The complex political patterns recognized by an expert are initially learned through the study of a very large but highly selective set of history; these patterns are occasionally combined into "theories" that generalize from a large number of patterns and identify the most useful conditions, events and sequences the expert should be aware of. Traumatic events provide exceptional patterns that have a disproportionate influence on policy: for example in contemporary US politics, decision-makers seems particularly sensitive to event sequences which might match "Munich", "Pearl Harbor" or "Vietnam"; decision-makers in the era prior to 1938 were sensitive to sequences matching "Sarajevo"; and decision-makers after 1993 are also sensitive to sequences matching "Sarajevo", but now a different "Sarajevo".

Human reasoning by analogies is so common that we are unaware of how difficult the process actually is. Human memory is organized associatively--when one item is recalled, this naturally activates links to other items that have features in common, and these are more likely to be recalled as well (Anderson 1983; Kohonen 1984)--but this is not true of digital computers, where the memory is organized sequentially without regard to content. The problem of simulating associative recall has been one of the major problems confronting artificial intelligence, and several well-explored techniques exist, the best known being neural networks. Neural networks, however, are not designed for the analysis of sequences and have tended to fair poorly when used in that context (see Weigand & Gershenfeld 1994). Conveniently, other computational methods of generalizing from noisy data have been developed in recent years; one of the most promising is the hidden Markov model.

Hidden Markov models

The problem of comparing two sequences of discrete events--in other words, nominally-coded variables occurring over time--is poorly developed compared to the huge literature involving the study of interval-coded time series. Nonetheless, several methods are available, and the problem has received considerable attention in the past three decades because it is important in the problems of studying genetic sequences in DNA, and computer applications involving human speech recognition. Both of these problems have potentially large economic payoffs, which tends to correlate with the expenditure of research efforts. Until fairly recently, one of the most common techniques was the Levenshtein metric (see Kruskal 1983; Sankoff and Kruskall 1983); Schrodt (1991) uses this in a study of the BCOW crises. Other non-linear methods such as neural networks, genetic algorithms, and locating common subsets within the sequences (Bennett and Schrodt 1987; Schrodt 1990) have also been used.

Hidden Markov models (HMM) are a recently developed technique that is now widely used in the classification of noisy sequences into a set of discrete categories (or, equivalently, computing the probability that a given sequence was generated by a known model). While the most common applications of HMMs are found in speech recognition and comparing protein sequences, a recent search of the World Wide Web found applications in fields as divergent as modelling the control of cellular phone networks, the computer recognition of American Sign Language and (of course) the timing of trading in financial markets. The

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standard reference on the topic is Rabiner (1989), which contains a thorough discussion of the estimation techniques used with the models as well as setting forth a standard notation that is used in virtually all contemporary articles on the subject.

A HMM is a variation on the conventional Markov chain, one of the most widely studied stochastic models of discrete events (Bartholomew 1975). Like a conventional Markov chain, a HMM consists of a set of discrete states and a matrix $A = \{a_{ij}\}$ of *transition probabilities* for going between those states. In addition, however, every state has a vector of *observed symbol probabilities*, $B = \{b_j(k)\}$ that corresponds to the probability that the system will produce a symbol of type k when it is in state j. The states of the HMM cannot be directly observed and can only be inferred from the observed symbols, hence the adjective "hidden".²

While the theory of HMM allows any type of transition matrix, the model that I will be testing is called a "left-right model" because it imposes the constraint that the system can only move in one direction, though it can remain in the existing state. The transition matrix is therefore of the form

(a11	1-a11	0	 0	1
0	a <u>22</u>	1-a22	 0	
0	0	a33	 0	
0	0	0	 1-an-1,n-1	
(0)	0	0	 1 /	/

and the individual elements of the model look like those in Figure 1. This model is widely used in speech recognition because the pronunciation of a words move in a single direction: parts of a word may be spoken slowly or quickly but in normal speech the ordering of those parts is never reversed.

Because of the left-right restriction, the final state of the chain is an "absorbing state" that has no exit probability and recurs with a probability of 1. A series of these elements form an HMM such as the 5-state model illustrated in Figure 2.

A Construction of the sequence of a sequence of the second second

² This is in contrast to most other applications of Markov models in international politics (see Schrodt 1985 for a review) where the states directly correspond to observable behaviors.

successfully generalizing at least some of the characteristics of that behavior. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future research and applications of the method to the problem of early warning.

Pattern Recognition and Political Behavior¹

Sequences of international events are useful in understanding international politics because they can be employed as *analogies*. If an historical sequence of events can be found which is similar to a current sequence of events, then that historical sequence may be useful in providing information about the current sequence. Whether or not the analogy is actually valid is an empirical issue: for example in playing games, analogy is highly effective in chess but useless in Lotto. The prevalence of the use of history in teaching international politics (as well as in political argument) is at least *prima facie* evidence that analogy is of some utility in international affairs. Decision-makers will study the politics of the Napoleonic period for guidance on contemporary international affairs; they do not accord the same respect to Napoleonic surgical techniques or gunnery practices.


It is useful to distinguish at this point between two types of knowledge: axiomatic knowledge and pattern recognition. Axiomatic (or deductive) knowledge derives from first principles and is useful in understanding systems where the relationships between variables are relatively simple and information is relatively easy to obtain. Simple physical systems, simple economic relationships and artificial constructs such as mathematics, legal systems and bureaucracies are all susceptible to analysis by axiomatic techniques. Because modern physical science was built on the dual foundations of mathematics and experimentation with simple physical systems, the axiomatic approach has been enshrined as scientific, and most attempts to systematically study political behavior presuppose the axiomatic approach as the ideal for systematic knowledge.

Axiomatic knowledge fails, however, when confronted with a system which is either too complicated to be understood deductively or where critical information is missing. This is true for physical and biological systems as well as social systems. When axiomatic knowledge fails in a problem-solving situation, one usually substitutes a combination of pattern recognition and experimentation: more generally, induction. The cathedral of Notre Dame was built without a theory of gravity; a baseball pitcher can unerringly throw a curve ball without knowledge of parabolas, adenosine triphosphate or Bernoulli's law. Induction and pattern recognition work, ironically, because the world is axiomatically ordered, at least at the physical and biological levels that we experience and which are essential to survival. A campfire exposed to a rainstorm will be likely to go out and be difficult to relight; if one is stung by a particular insect, it is quite likely that insects similar in appearance will also sting. While one might be able to derive axiomatic explanations for both of these phenomena based on complex interactions of physical, chemical and ecological "laws", such axiomatic explanations are not necessary as a guide to purposeful and survival-enhancing behavior: pattern recognition will achieve the same results.

These differences have some very specific and profound implications for decision making about international politics. Axiomatic knowledge, while not completely irrelevant to international behavior, is generally less important than knowledge based in patterns and analogies. In analyzing political behavior using pattern recognition, individuals utilize associative memory to a set of conditions and events to similar conditions and events learned earlier. The similarity criterion includes the possibility of errors, missing values, "best guesses" and so forth (see Kohonen, 1984). An individual learns patterns by observing and classifying them as "I've seen this before" and "I've not seen this before". Information that has been seen before reinforces existing patterns--it provides evidence that the pattern is common and therefore worthy of


¹ Due to inadequate time management on the part of the author, much of this section bears a strong resemblance to a similar discussion in Schrodt (1991).

Figure 1. An element of a left-right hidden Markov model



In empirical applications, the transition matrix and symbol probabilities of a HMM are estimated using an iterative maximum likelihood technique called the Baum-Welch algorithm. This procedure takes a set of observed sequences (for example the word "seven" as pronounced by twenty different speakers, or a set of dyadic interactions from the BCOW crisis set) and finds values for the matrices A and B that locally maximize the probability of observing those sequences. The Baum-Welch algorithm is a nonlinear numerical technique and Rabiner (1989:265) notes "the algorithm leads to a local maxima only and in most problems of interest, the optimization surface is very complex and has many local maxima."

Figure 2. A left-right hidden Markov Model



Once a set of models has been estimated, they can be used to classify an unknown sequence by computing the maximum probability that each of those models generated the observed sequence. This is done using a dynamic programming algorithm that requires a number of calculations on the order of N^2T ,

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where N is the number of states in the model and T is the length of the sequence.³ Once the probability of the sequence matching each of the models is known, the model with the highest probability is chosen as that which best represents the sequence. When matching a sequence of symbols such as those found in daily data on a six-month crisis coded with the 22-category WEIS scheme, these probabilities will be on the order of $10^{-(T+1)}$ -which is to say *extremely* small, even if the sequence was in fact generated by one of the models⁴--but the only important comparison is that of the relative fit of the various models. The measure of fit that is usually reported is the log of the probability of the fit; this statistic is labeled α (alpha).

For example, in a typical speech-recognition application such as the recognition of bank account numbers, the system would have HMMs for the numerals "zero" through "nine". When a speaker pronounces a single digit, the system converts this into a set of discrete sound categories (typically based on frequency), then computes the probability of that sequence being generated by each of the ten HMMs. The HMM that has the highest probability--for example the HMM corresponding to the numeral "three"--gives the best estimate of the number that was spoken.⁵

The application of the HMM to the problem of generalizing the characteristics of international event sequences is straightforward. The symbol set consists of the event codes taken from an event data set such as WEIS or BCOW. The states of the model are unobserved, but have a close theoretical analog in the concept of crisis "phase" has been explicitly coded in data sets such as the Butterworth international dispute resolution dataset (Butterworth 1976), CASCON (Bloomfield & Moulton 1989, 1997) and SHERFACS (Sherman & Neack 1993), and in work on preventive diplomacy such as Lund (1996).⁶ For example, Lund (1996:38-39) outlines a series of crisis phases ranging from "durable peace" to "war" and emphasizes the importance of an "unstable peace" phase. In the HMM, these different phases would be distinguished by different distributions of WEIS events--a "stable peace" would have a preponderance of cooperative events in the WEIS 01-10 range; the escalation phase of the crisis would be characterized by events in the 11-17 range (accusations, protests, denials, and threats), and a phase of active hostilities would show events in the 18-22 range. The length of time that a crisis spends in a particular phase would be proportional to the magnitude of the recurrence probability a_{ij}.

The HMM has several advantages over alternative models for sequence comparison. First, the structure of the model is relatively simple provided N<<M--for example a left-right model with N states and M symbols has 2(N-1) + N*M parameters compared to the M(M+2) parameters of a Levenshtein metric. HMMs can be estimated very quickly, in contrast to neural networks and genetic algorithms. While the

³ Exhaustive enumeration of all of the ways that the model could generate the sequence, in contrast, would require on the order of 2TN^T calculations, which is prohibitively large for sequences of any practical length (Rabiner 1989: 262).

⁴ Assume that each state has ten associated WEIS categories that are equally probable $(b_1(k)=0.10)$. Leaving aside the transition probabilities, each additional symbol will reduce the probability of the complete sequence by a factor of 10^{-1} . The transition probabilities, and the fact that the WEIS codes are not equiprobable, further reduce these probabilities. An insurmountable disadvantage of this computation is that one cannot meaningfully compare the fit of two sequences to a single HMM unless those sequences are equal in length.

⁵ If none of the probabilities are higher than some threshold, the system could request that the speaker repeat the digit or transfer the call to a human operator.

⁶ Sherman & Neack (1993) provide a review of the evolution of these data sets. Schrodt & Gerner (1995, 1996; Schrodt, Huxtable & Gerner 1996) demonstrate that distinct political phases -- defined statistically using clusters of behavior -- are found in event data sets covering the Middle East and West Africa.

resulting matrices are only a local solution--there is no guarantee that a matrix computed from a different random starting point might be quite different--local maximization is also true of most other techniques for analyzing sequences. The HMM model, being stochastic rather than deterministic, is specifically designed to deal with noisy output and with indeterminate time (see Allan 1980); both of these are clearly found in international event sequences.

An important advantage of the HMM, particularly in terms of its possible acceptability in the policy community, is that it can be *trained by example*: a model that characterizes a given set of sequences can be constructed without reference to the underlying rules used to code those sequences. This contrasts with the interval-level aggregative methods using event data scales such as those proposed by Azar & Sloan (1975) or Goldstein (1992). These methods, while of considerable utility, assign weights to individual events in isolation and make no distinction, for example, between an accusation that occurs following a violent event and an accusation that occurs during a meeting.⁷ The HMM, in contrast, dispenses with the aggregation and scaling altogether--using only the original, disaggregated events--and models the relationship between events by using different symbol observation probabilities for different states.

In contrast to most existing work with time series--which usually deals with events aggregated to the level of months or even years--the HMM requires no aggregation or scaling. This is particularly important for early warning problems, where critical periods in the development of a crisis may occur over a week or even a day. Finally, indeterminate time means that the HMM is relatively insensitive to the delineation of the start of a sequence, which is frankly the biggest problem I had in my earlier work on this problem. It is simple to prefix an HMM with a "background" state that simply gives the distribution of events generated by a particular source (e.g. Reuters/WEIS) when no crisis is occurring. Any sequence can simply cycle in this state until something important happens and the chain moves into the states characteristic of crisis behavior.

There is a clear interpretation to each of the parameters of the A and B matrices, which allows them to be interpreted substantively; this contrasts with techniques such as neural networks that have a very diffuse parameter structure. More generally, there is clear probabilistic interpretation of the model that uses familiar structures and concepts such as probability vectors, maximum likelihood estimates and the like. Finally--and not insignificantly--the technique has already been developed and is an active research topic in a number of different fields, in contrast to the parallel sub-sequence approach. The breadth of those applications also would indicate that the method is relatively robust. While there is always a danger in applying the *technique du jour* to whatever data on political behavior happen to be laying around, the HMM appears unusually well suited to the problems of generalizing and classifying event data sequences, a task for which there are at present no particularly satisfactory solutions.

Testing the Model

As is typical with machine learning protocols, the HMM will be evaluated using split-sample testing. Because the knowledge structures of many machine learning systems are quite large, they will frequently achieve 100% discrimination among their test cases,⁸ and can be nontrivially tested only on data other than

⁷ Mindful of these problems, Leng's BCOW coding scheme makes such distinctions, employing an elaborate set of codes and cross-references that place an event in the context of the crisis as a whole. Unfortunately, the sheer complexity of this coding makes the data difficult to analyze using conventional techniques, and as a consequence the information available in the BCOW data has probably not been fully exploited.

⁸ The exception occurs when two cases have different classifications but have identical values for all of the independent variables. In such situations insufficient information exists in the data set to make the discrimination.

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those on which they were trained. In a sense, this is a difference between learning and memorization: if a system can only parrot back the discriminations in its training set, one has only demonstrated that the knowledge structure is sufficient to "memorize" those differences, not that general principles have been learned. In this respect machine learning studies apply a more difficult standard of empirical accuracy than that used in most statistical research. The accuracy of a machine learning algorithm would be best compared to a statistical study which takes half of the data, estimates the model, then fits the model on the remaining half of the data.

Data

The hidden Markov models were first estimated using the BCOW (Leng 1987) sequences studied in Schrodt (1990; 1991). The BCOW events were recoded into WEIS categories (McClelland 1967) according to the equivalence rules listed in the Appendix. The four subsets of crises listed in Table 1 were analyzed.⁹ The short names (e.g. *pastry*) correspond to the BCOW file identifiers. "Training" sequences were used to estimate the HMM matrices for the war and nonwar sequences; the system was tested with the remaining sequences.

In contrast to the design in Schrodt (1990, 1991)--which distinguished, using separate codes, whether events were occurring between the principal actors in the conflict, the principals and outside actors, and so forth--this study looked at simple directed-dyadic sequences involving the principal actors ("Side A" and "Side B") identified in the BCOW data set. This was done to provide comparability with a general event stream such as one generated by Reuters, where the "sides" of a conflict are not necessarily evident. The HMMs are therefore trying to model the general characteristics of "dyads involved in a crisis" rather than making distinctions based on the role of various actors in each crisis.

Compared to many machine learning systems, the left-right HMM involves relatively few parameters and will not necessarily achieve 100% discrimination, but the split-sample protocol is justified as a conservative means of testing the model.

⁹ The BCOW crises not included in the Schrodt (1990, 1991) studies were generally those whose length in events is very long (e.g. Suez or the Cuban Missile Crisis); or those that I could not easily classify into war or nonwar (e.g. Trieste). The HMM method is less sensitive to the length of a crisis than were the earlier methods I studied, so it should be possible to analyze the longer crises in a later test.

		ned. In this respect the light is the light of
BCOW file	Crisis	Date
Crises without war, t	raining set	net prove an queries. This could be cloud
fashod	Fashoda Crisis	1898-1899
lstmor	First Moroccan Crisis	1904-1906
bosnia	Bosnian Crisis	1908-1909
2ndmor	Second Moroccan Crisis (Agadir)	1911
rhine	Rhineland Crisis	1936
Crises without war, to	est set	
pastry	Pastry War Crisis	1838-1839
brprt	British-Portuguese Crisis	1889-1890
anschl	Anschluss Crisis	1937-1938
munich Munich Crisis	1938	
berair	Berlin Blockade	1948-1949
Crises involving war,	training set	ent polor su co besci anonomizit gris su domenica which around the second
schles	Schleswig-Holstein War	1863-1864
spam	Spanish-American War	1897-1898
entam	Second Central American War	1906-1907
chaco	Chaco Dispute and War	1927-1930
talet	Italo-Ethiopian War	1935-1936
Crises involving war, 1	test set	
alkan	Balkan Wars	1912-1913
alest	Palestine War	1947-1948
ash1	First Kashmir War	1947-1949
ash2	Second Kashmir War	1964-1966
angla	Bangladesh War	1971

In order to record the passage of time in the various crises, days where no event occurred were given a "00" non-event code; this is by far the most common "event" in the sequences. Sequences were coded from the beginning date to the ending date of the crisis as reported in the BCOW data set.

When the BCOW data set reported multiple events on a single day, all of these were included. This is consistent with the structure of the hidden Markov model because the events observed on a particular day could occur as multiple observations of a single state of the model. In contrast, some of the other methods I've worked with (for example parallel event sequences and the Levenshtein metric) assume a strict temporal ordering. In those models, the fact that some days have multiple events while other days contain zero or one

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events complicates the estimation of the model. Dyads containing fewer than 20 BCOW events were not included in the analysis. Dyadic sequences typically contained about 30 to 70 actual events, though in a few cases there were over 200 events. When the nonevent days were added, most of the sequences contained between 200 and 300 events.¹⁰

The Levant data were machine-coded using the WEIS system from Reuters lead sentences obtained from the NEXIS data service for the period April 1979 through February 1997. These data were coded using the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) machine-coding program (Gerner et al. 1994; Schrodt, Davis & Weddle 1994).¹¹ KEDS does some simple linguistic parsing of the news reports --for instance, it identifies the political actors, recognizes compound nouns and compound verb phrases, and determines the references of pronouns--and then employs a large set of verb patterns to determine the appropriate event code. Schrodt & Gerner (1994), Huxtable & Pevehouse (1996) and Bond et al. (1996) discuss extensively the reliability and validity of event data generated using Reuters and KEDS. The sequences that were tested did not include any of the WEIS codes that did not occur in the translated BCOW data (see Appendix) and added a **00** nonevent for each day in which no events were recorded. As in the BCOW sequences, multiple events occurring in the same day are kept in the sequence.

Estimation Algorithm

The HMM was implemented by slightly modifying the source code written by Meyers and Whitson (1995). Their C++ code implements a left-right hidden Markov model and the corresponding Baum-Welch maximum likelihood training algorithm using the algorithms described by Rabiner (1989). I translated this code from the Solaris C++ environment to a Macintosh CodeWarrior ANSI C environment,¹² in the process

¹⁰ The shortest sequences used were those in the *pastry* crisis--around 80 events--and the longest sequences were in *chaco*--around 1000.

¹¹ The NEXIS search command used to locate stories to be coded was

(ISRAEL! OR PLO OR PALEST! OR LEBAN! OR JORDAN! OR SYRIA! OR EGYPT!)

AND NOT (SOCCER! OR SPORT! OR OLYMPIC! OR TENNIS OR BASKETBALL)

Only the lead sentences were coded; this produced a total of 83,196 events.

In contrast to the data I have used in earlier papers (e.g. Schrodt & Gerner 1994, Schrodt & Gerner 1995), this data set was generated under the control of a "complexity filter" that did not code sentences if

- * the sentence contained six or more verbs or
- * no actor was found prior to the verb.

Sentences that met these criteria had a greater-than-average likelihood of being incorrectly coded by KEDS, thus by using the filter should result in somewhat less noisy data.

From spot-checking some of the more densely reported dyads (e.g. ISR>PAL and ISR>LEB), this new data set generally results in Goldstein scores that are smaller in magnitude. The bivariate regressions for these two dyads are

ISR>PALG96 = 0.73 G95 - 2.75r = 0.93 N = 192ISR>LEBG96 = 0.71 G95 - 0.66r = 0.88 N = 192

where G96 are the Goldstein scores for the data set used in this paper and G95 are the scores for the data set used in Schrodt & Gerner (1995). The overall patterns in the series are generally very similar between the two data sets.

¹² The choice of C over C++ was purely personal--I'm currently more comfortable working in the former language. The Meyers and Whitson code is clean, well-documented, and survived my translation to run correctly the first time. I would assume that either the C or C++ code would port easily to a DOS/Windows or OS/2 environment for those so inclined.

resulting matrices are only a local solution--there is no guarantee that a matrix computed from a different random starting point might be quite different--local maximization is also true of most other techniques for analyzing sequences. The HMM model, being stochastic rather than deterministic, is specifically designed to deal with noisy output and with indeterminate time (see Allan 1980); both of these are clearly found in international event sequences.

An important advantage of the HMM, particularly in terms of its possible acceptability in the policy community, is that it can be *trained by example*: a model that characterizes a given set of sequences can be constructed without reference to the underlying rules used to code those sequences. This contrasts with the interval-level aggregative methods using event data scales such as those proposed by Azar & Sloan (1975) or Goldstein (1992). These methods, while of considerable utility, assign weights to individual events in isolation and make no distinction, for example, between an accusation that occurs following a violent event and an accusation that occurs during a meeting.⁷ The HMM, in contrast, dispenses with the aggregation and scaling altogether-using only the original, disaggregated events--and models the relationship between events by using different symbol observation probabilities for different states.

In contrast to most existing work with time series--which usually deals with events aggregated to the level of months or even years--the HMM requires no aggregation or scaling. This is particularly important for early warning problems, where critical periods in the development of a crisis may occur over a week or even a day. Finally, indeterminate time means that the HMM is relatively insensitive to the delineation of the start of a sequence, which is frankly the biggest problem I had in my earlier work on this problem. It is simple to prefix an HMM with a "background" state that simply gives the distribution of events generated by a particular source (e.g. Reuters/WEIS) when no crisis is occurring. Any sequence can simply cycle in this state until something important happens and the chain moves into the states characteristic of crisis behavior.

There is a clear interpretation to each of the parameters of the A and B matrices, which allows them to be interpreted substantively; this contrasts with techniques such as neural networks that have a very diffuse parameter structure. More generally, there is clear probabilistic interpretation of the model that uses familiar structures and concepts such as probability vectors, maximum likelihood estimates and the like. Finally--and not insignificantly--the technique has already been developed and is an active research topic in a number of different fields, in contrast to the parallel sub-sequence approach. The breadth of those applications also would indicate that the method is relatively robust. While there is always a danger in applying the *technique du jour* to whatever data on political behavior happen to be laying around, the HMM appears unusually well suited to the problems of generalizing and classifying event data sequences, a task for which there are at present no particularly satisfactory solutions.

Testing the Model

As is typical with machine learning protocols, the HMM will be evaluated using split-sample testing. Because the knowledge structures of many machine learning systems are quite large, they will frequently achieve 100% discrimination among their test cases,⁸ and can be nontrivially tested only on data other than

⁷ Mindful of these problems, Leng's BCOW coding scheme makes such distinctions, employing an elaborate set of codes and cross-references that place an event in the context of the crisis as a whole. Unfortunately, the sheer complexity of this coding makes the data difficult to analyze using conventional techniques, and as a consequence the information available in the BCOW data has probably not been fully exploited.

⁸ The exception occurs when two cases have different classifications but have identical values for all of the independent variables. In such situations insufficient information exists in the data set to make the discrimination.

The war matrix is much cleaner. All six states are used; most have high recurrence probabilities (indicating that the system remains in the state for a period of time) and the one low-probability state, B, focuses the probability on two WEIS categories--"Accuse" and "Reduce Relationship"--that may correspond to triggering events. The sequence of probabilities shows a general pattern of escalation, culminating in a violent event phase in state E, then settling back into a mix of mediation (WEIS "Yield", "Consult" and "Agree") and conflict (WEIS "Reduce Relationship" and "Force")--along with plenty of nonevents--in the absorbing state.

C D Abs B A 0.988 1 0.19 0.985 0.526 probability 0.8 0.98 0 0.65 0 **Events** 00 0 0 0 0 0 01 0 0 0 0.02 02 0.06 0.03 0 0 0.04 0.24 03 0 0.02 0 0.04 0.06 04 0.05 0 0 0.11 0.54 05 0.01 0 0 0 0.06 08 0.03 0 0 0.07 0 09 0.03 0 0.03 0 0.04 12 0.02 1 0.01 0.04 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0.01 22

Table 2. Hidden Markov recurrence probabilities and event matrices

Non-War Crises

Table 2. Hidden	Markov recurrence	probabilities and	event matrices continued
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War Crises

Constitution	Α	В	С	D	E	Abs
probability	0.991	0.139	0.976	0.997	0.675	1
Events 00	0.63	0	0.56	0.93	0.06	0.94
-01	0.01	0	0.01	0	0	0.01
02	0	0	0	0	0	0
03	0.05	0	0	0	0.06	0.01
04	0.02	0	0	0	0	0
05	0.07	0	0.03	0.01	0.25	0
08	0.01	0	0	0	0.06	0.01
09	0.04	0	0.03	0.01	0	0
12	0.04	0.39	0	0.01	0	0
18	0.09	0	0.02	0.01	0.1	0
19	0.01	0.61	0.04	0	0	0.01
21	0	0	0.12	0	0.05	0
22	0.03	0	0.2	0.01	0.42	0.03

Testing the Model


the same the know beings strongenter of energy machine granding strapping are donte large, staly will frequend addresse 1000s discrimination scoreg then test eases " and one he mail will derive enty difficults other the

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Figure 3.

HMM event probabilities, nonwar crises



HMM event probabilities, war crises




Table 4: Alpha values for the test cases War.Test

		nonwar	war	war > nonwar?
.balkan	BUL > TUR	-240.09	-142.57	Y
	TUR > BUL	-172.53	-105.38	Y
	MNT > TUR	-166.92	-113.84	Y
	BKL> TUR	-166.89	-163.80	Y
	TUR > BKL	-153.07	-147.07	Y
	BUL > SER	-139.83	-124.87	Y
.palest	EGY > ISR	-221.29	-147.20	Y
	ARL > ISR	-343.67	-226.02	Y
	ISR > ARL	-297.17	-192.55	Y
.kash1	IND > PAK	-599.50	-541.72	Y
	PAK > IND	-481.09	-436.25	Y
.kash2	IND > PAK	-602.18	-462.32	Y
	PAK > IND	-514.38	-412.38	Y
	IND > PAK	-329.33	-256.82	Y
	PAK > IND	-338.89	-294.58	Y
.bangla	IND > PAK	-500.70	-417.52	Y
C	PAK > IND	-507.16	-448.56	Y
	BNG > PAK	-287.98	-232.44	Y
	PAK > BNG	-304.60	-249.02	Y
Nonwar.Test		nonwar	war	nonwar > war?
.pastry	MEX > FRN	-116.34	-127.93	Y
	FRN > MEX	-106.68	-114.33	Y
.brprt	UK > POR	-159.82	-178.91	Y
	POR > UK	-187.16	-199.16	Y
.anschl	AUS > GER	-184.61	-167.68	N
	GER > AUS	-216.41	-219.25	Y
.munich	CZE > GER	-382.58	-378.88	N
	GER > CZE	-368.13	-345.21	N
	UK > GER	-238.39	-261.71	Y
	GER > UK	-163.35	-200.52	Y
	FRN > GER	-216.42	-228.10	Y
.berair	UK > USR	-251.41	-233.16	N
(Berlin airlift)	USR > UK	-164.27	-148.35	N
	USA > USR	-451.26	-451.26	Y
	USR > USA	-300.91	-284.66	N
	USR > GER	-245.77	-180.09	N

*BNG = Bangladesh; BKL = Balkan League; MNT=Montenegro

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The results of the split-sample testing are reported in Table 3, which gives the α log-likelihood values for the fit of various dyadic sequences against the HMMs estimated using the training cases. Once again, the results of the war model are considerably more consistent with expectations than are the results from the nonwar model. All of the test dyads in the war set are closer to the war model than to the nonwar model; the difference of means is significant at the 0.08 level in a one-tailed test. This is not true of the test set for the nonwar crises: only 9 of the 16 test dyads have a higher probability of fitting the nonwar HMM than the war HMM, a result that differs little from what might be expected by chance. Almost half of these errors occur in just one of the crises--the Berlin airlift--but even if those dyads are eliminated the average distances are not significantly different according to a t-test.

Granting that the nonwar model has considerably less intuitive appeal than the war model, this asymmetry in the success with the test cases is still somewhat puzzling because *both* models are required to make the comparison. Even if the nonwar HMM is primarily a model of the background noise, it is surprising that nonwar test cases fit this with a lower probability than do the war test cases. In Schrodt (1991), where a Levenshtein metric was used to distinguish the test sequences (though not the individual dyads), the nonwar crises in the test set were as well differentiated as the war crisis. This difference could be partly due to a loss in translation between the BCOW and WEIS events, or it could also be due to the 29,584-element Levenshtein matrices used in the earlier study being dramatically larger than the 83-element HMM matrices.

Using the BCOW models to measure conflict in the Middle East

The second set of calculations that I performed was designed to determine whether the HMMs could be used to reveal anything about a contemporary political situation. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the loglikelihood fit of the two models to three of the densest dyads from the Reuters-based Levant data set: ISR>PAL, SYR>LEB and ISR>LEB. The two lines below the X-axis are the alpha values; the line that is mostly above the X-axis is $\alpha_{nonwar} - \alpha_{war}$. The sequences used to generate the fit were selected by going to the last event at the end of each month, then counting back 100 events: this typically covers about two months, though it is shorter in times of intense activity. Because all of the sequences are the same length, their values can be compared over time.

Before discussing the results, it should be noted that this is a fairly audacious exercise: it is comparing two sets of events that have *nothing* in common other than the underlying political activity. The BCOW data deal with a set of crises that occurred as much as a century and a half before the Levant data set; and these were human coded using a complex coding scheme from an assortment of historical documents. In contrast, the Levant dataset was machine-coded using simple source-event-target coding from a single source, Reuters. The political events recorded in the two data sets are themselves quite different, at least in my translation--in particular the translated BCOW is missing entirely some of the most frequent WEIS event categories in the Levant data: the accusations, denials and counter-accusations in WEIS categories 10 to 17. Finally, the only linkage between the two sets of behavior is found in the relatively tenuous HMM matrices.

The first thing that is conspicuous in the figures is that the nonwar and war alpha curves track each other very closely. My guess is that this reflects the effects of the presence or absence of nonevents; these are much prevalent in the BCOW dyads than in these politically-active Levantine dyads. Periods with a high intensity of activity--for example the Palestinian *intifada* and various Syrian and Israeli interventions in Lebanon--consistently show much lower alpha values than periods of low activity. This reduction in alpha

is probably due in large part to the fact that actual events (as distinct from the 00 nonevent) have a low probability (see Table 3) in most of the states of both HMMs.¹⁵

For contrast, Figure 5 shows the alpha curves for a set of random simulated data that has the same marginal event probabilities as the ISR>PAL data set but no autocorrelation.¹⁶ Three things are evident from this figure. First, as one would expect, the two curves are basically just noise--due to the 100-event sequence length, they are significantly autocorrelated at a lag of one month but beyond one month the autocorrelation pattern is consistent with white noise. Second, the war and nonwar alpha curves themselves are highly correlated (r = 0.83; p<.001). Finally, the alpha value for the war model is consistently higher than the value for the nonwar model, which is to be expected because around 20% of the events in this sequence are WEIS "Force" events.

Figure 8 compares the difference in the HMM alpha log-likelihoods with the Goldstein-scaled time series that we have been using for the last several years;¹⁷ those data cover August 1979 to October 1996. Figure 8 shows a relatively close correspondence between this measure--the numerical score that would be used to determine whether the war or nonwar HMMs provide a better fit to a given crisis--and the Goldstein score (which has been divided by 4 to bring the two measures into scale with each other). The correlation is a highly significant 0.48 (N=207; p<0.0001). The correlations between the Goldstein score and the difference between the HMM probabilities is less dramatic for the other two dyads but they are still significant: r=0.19 (p=0.007) for ISR>LEB and r=0.15 (p=0.027) for SYR>LEB.¹⁸

While the alpha-difference and Goldstein scores in Figure 8 generally track each other, particularly on major events such as the invasion of Lebanon and the *intifada*, there are a couple of interesting distinctions. First, the alpha-difference is generally more sensitive in measuring the level of conflict (in the sense of moving away from the nonwar model) than is the Goldstein score: for example this is conspicuous in the period prior to the summer of 1981 where there was considerable conflict between Israel and PLO forces then residing in southern Lebanon. Second, the alpha-difference is exquisitely sensitive to periods

¹⁵ This may also be due in part to the crudeness of the BCOW to WEIS translation. For example BCOW contains a "continuous military conflict" code that I translated into a single WEIS 22 event. In fact, such codes presumably indicate multiple consecutive days of WEIS 22 events. Such sequences are common during the interventions in Lebanon and during the *intifada* but would have no BCOW counterparts given my translation rules

¹⁶ The marginal probabilities are:

00:0.38; **01**:0.005; **02**:0.05; **03**:0.10; **04**:0.01; **05**:0.005; **06**:0.02; **07**:0.01; **08**:0.04; **09**:0.02; **10**:0.01; **11**:0.03; **12**:0.02; **13**:0.01; **14**:0.005; **15**:0.01; **16**:0.005; **17**:0.01; **18**:0.01; **19**:0.03; **20**:0.01; **21**:0.04; **22**:0.19. Multiple events are included in a single a day according to the probability

Prob(n events | not a 00 event) = $(0.5)^{n-1}$


This probability generates multiple events at a level that is actually a bit higher than the distribution found in the actual data.

¹⁷ See Schrodt & Gerner (1994). We converted the individual WEIS events to a monthly net cooperation score using the numerical scale in Goldstein (1992) and totaling these numerical values for each of the directed dyads for each month. The alpha-difference curve has been multiplied by -1 to make it comparable to the Goldstein scale: large negative values are closer to the war model.

¹⁸ In the ISR>LEB and SYR>LEB dyads, there is actually a higher correlation between the alpha values themselves and the Goldstein scores, with an r Å 0.29 for ISR>LEB and r Å 0.24 for SYR>LEB (in both dyads the two alpha series are highly correlated with r > 0.95). As noted above, because the probabilities are going down as the Goldstein values increase in magnitude, this probably just reflects the absence of nonevents during the periods of intense activity that are necessary to produce large Goldstein scores.


of negotiations: the two points above zero in Figure 8 in the second half of the data set correspond to the beginnings of the Madrid and Oslo negotiations; the positive point in Nov/Dec 1981 corresponds to the cease-fire between the PLO (in southern Lebanon) and Israel that was brokered by the United States; and the peak in March-June 1983 appears to correspond to a series of prisoner-exchange negotiations brokered by Austria.¹⁹

Figure 4.




¹⁹ This last peak may be *too* sensitive -- during the period of these negotiations there was continued conflict Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza; generally the Reuters narrative during this period does not support an interpretation of markedly improved relations.

Figure 5.



Alphas for random sequences










Figure 7.









Conclusion

The hidden Markov model is only one step in solving the larger puzzle of learning to deal with international events as sequences. The strength of the approach lies in its inductive nature. There are clearly simpler rules for distinguishing BCOW war and nonwar crises: looking for codes involving military conflict is the most obvious. But to construct those simpler rules, one must first know the characteristic that distinguishes the sequences: in a sense, one must already know the answer. An inductive learning system such as the Baum-Welch algorithm does not need to know the answer; it can find the answer. The system did not know, *a priori*, the importance of the WEIS codes designating military conflict: it discovered them. If machine learning systems can discover those distinctions, they may be capable of discovering things which are not so obvious.

The research that has been reported here establishes the potential utility of using HMMs to characterize sequences of international events, but has not explored these in any detail. The following is an abbreviated list of the tasks that I think are required next:

- 1. The single most important innovation would be to extend the current left-right model to a model that can return to the previous state as well as going on to the next. There are no technical problems in doing this; it is simply a matter of programming. This would provide an HMM that was more consistent with the concept of crisis phase: a crisis can temporarily de-escalate into an earlier phase as well as escalating into the next phase. Such a model would probably provide a better differentiation of crisis states, and in all likelihood would provide a distinct "background" state that a long-running crisis could return to when nothing was happening. The left-right-left configuration makes every state accessible from every other state,²⁰ and I see no reason to make the model any more complicated than this, as a model can readily skip between states if this is necessary to fit a particular sequence.
- 2. In the analysis presented here, no adjustment was made for the difference in event frequencies in the BCOW data versus the Reuters-based WEIS data. These are quite different in many cases. My guess is that the HMMs would provide greater differentiation if a set of random noise corresponding to the frequency of the Reuters/WEIS events were first added to the sequences. Among other things, this would eliminate the disparity between the number of nonevents found in the two data sets.
- 3. By employing the training and test samples that replicated my earlier work, I only used about half of the BCOW crises; it is a simple matter to use all of the BCOW dyads to see how this changes the estimated HMM matrices. More generally, the war/nonwar crisis distinction is quite crude; one alternative would be to use Leng's (1993) typology of bargaining strategies--bullying, reciprocating, appeasement, stonewalling, and trial-and-error--to differentiate between dyadic political activities. This would also allow a more sophisticated vector space to be used to describe real-time situations: rather than classifying these in terms of a traditional cooperation-conflict dimension, they could be classified in terms of bargaining strategies.

More generally, the BCOW data were used because they provided a very difficult test of the ability of an HMM to generalize about types of political behavior.²¹ In the long run, one will probably obtain

²⁰ It may or may not make sense to get rid of the terminal absorbing state by linking it back to the initial state. An absorbing state makes sense in BCOW -- where the coding rules provide a definitive end to the crisis -- but less sense in the context of real-time monitoring, where the end of a crisis simply means going back to the background state.

²¹ And, of course, were readily available...

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cleaner models by working from a single contemporary source--Reuters and WEIS--rather than jumping across time, sources and coding schemes to get exemplars. The WEIS-coded crisis data set currently being collected by Goldstein and Pevehouse (Goldstein 1997), which will cover about a dozen contemporary crises--including the usual suspects such as the Arab-Israeli, Iran-Iraq, Chechnya, former Yugoslavia, and Great Lakes conflicts--is an obvious source for this.

Applications to Early Warning

Two different approaches could be used to apply the HMM technique to early warning, one a quantitative technique that would simply generalize existing metrics such as the Goldstein and Azar-Sloan scales; the other a qualitative method that would have more in common with the reasoning-by-analogy that is used by human political analysts. Both of these presuppose the existence of a large set of event data that is available in real-time, but with contemporary machine coding techniques this would be simple and inexpensive to maintain once initial coding dictionaries had been developed and access had been established to an appropriate news source.

As a quantitative method, the probabilities of the behavior of a dyad fitting a variety of different models (for example the Leng crisis typology) would place it in a vector space defined by those models. This is a straightforward generalization of what is currently done with the Goldstein and Azar-Sloan scales, which place behaviors into a single conflict-cooperation dimension. To the extent that a shift between these models--for example moving from a conciliatory to a bullying bargaining strategy--is a precursor to later changes in the political environment, this would be useful for early warning. In earlier work (Schrodt & Gerner 1996) we have demonstrated that the Goldstein scaled data combined with clustering techniques can be quite effective as an early warning indicator (at least in the Levant).

The ability of the HMM to create matrices by example--in other words, to inductively determine the matrix from a set of cases that have something in common, as opposed to the analyst having to anticipate, deductively, the relative importance of various WEIS categories in the mode of behavior he or she has in mind--would allow the construction of metrics that go beyond those found in the classic conflict-cooperation continuum. Those novel metrics may, in turn, prove more useful in dealing with early warning in new political situations that may be important in the 21st century--for example state breakdowns and widespread ethnic conflict--and which do not fit neatly into the generally Westphalian behaviors observed in the Levant. Alternatively, the most effective use of this new technique may simply be in monitoring the

Alternatively, the most effective use of this new technique may employed these probabilities likelihood of specific types of possible crisis precursors, without attempting to generalize these probabilities into a single quantitative measure. In comparison with earlier techniques--which frequently required a great deal of statistical sophistication and "tweaking" of the resulting models--the HMM is sufficiently robust that it could easily be trained by example by an analyst who would not need to know the underlying mathematical methods. For instance, it would be straightforward to construct a decision-support environment where an analyst would select a set of exemplars--either by giving the beginning and ending dates of the crisis and the actors involved, and even selecting a time period from a graphical display--and then the HMM estimated from those sequences could subsequently by used in real-time monitoring. In this scenario, the output of the monitoring system would be a list of probable matching sequences (with their probabilities) and possibly-assuming the problem of comparability among sequences of different lengths could be worked out--a system where an alert is presented whenever the probability of a real-time situation exceeding one of the HMMs of a precursor exceeds some threshold. This technique is substantially closer to the style of political analysis used in most policy settings, and therefore might be more acceptable than earlier event data efforts that focused on simple quantitative indicators that did not provide specific historical referents.

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Appendix: WEIS equivalents of BCOW codes

The following rules were used to convert the BCOW events to WEIS-coded events:

Physical actions

11212	07	21133	18		12183	19		23131	08
11719	22	21143	19		12173	21		23151	19
11121	07	21211	01		12373	06		23163	21
11131	08	21233	21		12719	02		23171	01
11333	17	21311	07		12223	22		23301	06
11353	18	21333	01		12232	03		23141	19
11413	01	31121	08		12243	19		23211	01
11313	18	31132	06		32111	01		23223	21
11363	22	31133	17		32132	21		23231	01
11443	22				32141	01		23251	01
11433	22	12111	03		32142	21		23261	01
11423	21	12121	03		32163	21		33111	06
11453	18	12521	08		32153	21		33131	06
11513	22	12511	08		32143	21		23719	02
11523	22	12361	01		32151	01			
11533	22	12142	10		32161	01		14113	22
11553	22	12152	06		32173	01		14123	22
11521	22	12223	19		32611	01		14143	22
11663	01	12342	12					14151	03
11673	21	12362	05		13111	03		14153	21
11633	22	12161	19		13121	03		14213	18
11643	22	12631	03		13131	03		14223	18
11621	01	12641	21		13211	03		14251	04
11653	21	12533	19		13551	08		14263	21
21141	06	12363	19		23111	06		14719	02
21111	07	12131	06		23121	08			
21121	07								

Verbal Actions

col. 26 code	col. 29 code	WEIS code
1	1	04
1	2	02
1	3	12
2	any	05
3	any	09

This coding system does not generate WEIS events in the following categories:

06, 07, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20

2-Digit WEIS Categories

01	Yield	11	Reject 20	Expel
02	Comment	12	Accuse 21	Seize
03	Consult	13	Protest 22	Force
04	Approve	14	Deny	
05	Promise	15	Demand	
06	Grant	16	Warn	
07	Reward	17	Threaten	
08	Agree	18	Demonstrate	
09	Request	19	Reduce Relationship	
10	Propose			

Assessing Risks of Ethnorebellion in the Year 2000: Three Empirical Approaches*

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This paper describes three empirical approaches to generating risk assessments of ethnorebellion using 1991-95 data on 264 groups surveyed in the Minorities at Risk project. The results are compared with one another and, in high risk cases, with recent political developments. The approaches are risk profiling (based on a priori specification of risk factors), theoretical modelling, and empirical modelling, the latter two based on analysis of residuals from regression analysis. We distinguish risk assessments from early warnings and forecasts. Rather than estimating precise probabilities of ethnorebellion, we offer three alternative assessments of risks of rebellion in the mid-range future. These assessments are expected to hold only if the variables identified in the risk profiles and models remain constant--which, in a changing political world, is not likely. Our assessments should be useful because they identify key variables and high risk cases that warrant monitoring. Such monitoring CAN provide early warning, thus our assessments provide a foundation for the development of early warning systems of ethnopolitical conflict.

Introduction

There has been a great deal of recent scholarly and policy interest in empirically grounded early warnings of ethnopolitical conflict and humanitarian crises. This interest is manifest in a number of conferences, planning papers and monographs, but precious few early warnings (see Gurr and Harff 1994, 1996a,b; Gurr and Moore 1997; Davies and Gurr 1997). Early warning implies reliable forecasts of impending events. Our research is concerned not with early warnings per se but with empirically-derived risk assessments that identify situations with a high potential for future conflict. Systematic risk assessments precede and complement early warning, in three respects. First, they identify the background and intervening conditions that establish the potential for conflict and crises. Second, they focus monitoring and analytic attention on high-risk situations before they are fully developed. Third, risk assessment models provide a framework for interpreting the results of real-time monitoring (see Harff 1996).

^{*}Note: The authors contributed equally to designing this study. Michael Haxton, formerly minority project coordinator, prepared the dataset used in this paper but his contribution to the analysis and write-up of the research report was limited by the birth of his son, Connor Reed Haxton, which we all agreed took precedence. Moore is listed first because--once the study is published--the marginal impact on Gurr's SSCI count will be negligible. We would like to acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SBR-9321862), the United State Institute of Peace (USIP-044-93F), The Korea Foundation, and the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College Park. Anne Pitsch and Deepa Khosla of CIDCM provided updates of conflict profiles for the high-risk cases listed in Table 1.

Area experts and desk officers are mostly skeptical because they think that substantive knowledge and Verstehen are sufficient for risk assessments and early warnings. Yet these people also use criteria and rules. The difference is that their general criteria are seldom explicitly stated; indeed they may have some difficulty writing them down if asked. The empirical researcher, on the other hand, makes criteria and decision rules explicit and, typically, applies the same criteria and rules to each case. Thus, the data-based assessments in this paper should not be treated as fundamentally distinct from so-called expert judgments. We think that explicit statement of the criteria and decision rules is a virtue (see Gurr's comments in Duffy et al., 1995, for a similar discussion), but emphasize that the main distinction is the transparency and, thus, the replicability of the criteria and decision rules.

We should elaborate on the difference between risk assessments and forecasts. Our assessments use data on the traits and political actions of 264 politically active ethnic groups in 1990-95 to identify the likelihood of major changes in the rebellious behavior of those groups during the late 1990s. They are not predictions in the sense that is usually meant by the terms 'forecast' or 'early warning'. We also do not estimate precise probabilities of rebellion, though it is technically possible to use data-based models to do so (see Esty et al., 1997). One basic reason for avoiding the false precision of probability estimates is that our assessments are based on an assumption that the circumstances do not improve. The assessments are produced by identifying values on the relevant variables, and pertain to the mid-range future. These assessments are expected to hold only if the values of the relevant variables remain (relatively) unchanged. That is, if a given ethnopolitical group is assessed to be at high risk of future ethnorebellion based on its incentives, capacity, and opportunities for action, any decrease in the values of these variables decreases the risks of rebellion. Policy makers, responding to their own assessments of risk, often attempt to manipulate these variables, for example by reducing the incentives or opportunities for ethnorebellion. As we show below, some of the high-risk cases we identify appear to have been managed in precisely this way.

Three Approaches

We compare the results of three approaches to generating risk assessments using the Minorities at Risk data for the 1990s. We begin with a brief description of each approach and then compare the assessments along two dimensions. First, we compare the assessments themselves: Which groups are identified as being at risk and which groups are identified as not at risk? The risk profile approach is used as a baseline against which the results of theoretical regression modelling and empirical regression modelling are compared. Second, we compare all three assessments against actual developments in 19 high-risk cases in 1996-97.

Risk Profiles: This approach identifies a list of factors associated with high risks of ethnorebellion, analogous to the procedure used in preventive medicine to identify people at high risk of heart disease or cancer. The risk factors are based on a general theoretical model of ethnopolitical conflict and the results of empirical research using the Minorities at Risk data from the 1980s and early 1990s. The model includes three general factors, each of them operationalized using current data on 264 groups. The factors and operational measures are summarized in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 about here]

Group Incentives for Collective Action: An ethnopolitical group's incentives for action are high to the extent its members are disadvantaged vis à vis other groups with whom they interact. The greater the group's disadvantages, and the greater its members' resentment about historical loss of autonomy and experience of repression, the greater the potential for its leaders to initiate and to persist in collective action. Four indicators are used for the analysis reported here: measures of active political, economic, and cultural discrimination in 1994-95 and an index of lost political autonomy that takes into account both the extent of autonomy lost and how recently the loss was incurred.

Group Capacity for Collective Action: The greater the sense of shared identity in a collectivity, the greater its potential for joint action in pursuit of collective interests. Identity alone is not sufficient: expression of that identity requires organization. The two indicators used to tap group capacity are strength of group identity (based on extent of cultural differentials vis à vis other groups) and the extent of militant mobilization, using coded information on the number and scope of militant (illegal) parties and movements active on behalf of the group in 1995.

Group Opportunities for Collective Action: Group leaders make strategic decisions about when to initiate, escalate, and terminate collective action in the context of changing political environments that shape the chances of successful rebellion. Two indicators are used. Major changes in the structure of the political regime are assumed to provide a window of opportunity; their recency is indexed using Polity III data on the timing of major, abrupt regime changes (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Second is an indicator based on the extent to which each ethnopolitical group has symbolic and material support from kindred groups in neighboring states.

Theoretical Regression Model: In this approach a theoretical argument is expressed in the form of a multiple equation model, analogous to the models used for economic forecasting. A statistical technique called three-stage least squares is applied to data on ethnopolitical groups to estimate the parameters of a predictive equation for ethnorebellion. Gurr and Moore (1997) applied this approach to 1980s data from the Minorities at Risk project and used the results to identify groups at high risk of rebellion in the early 1990s. The variables in the theoretical explanation of ethnopolitical conflict are identified in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 about here]

In brief, the theory claims that ethnopolitical rebellion is directly driven by the extent of group grievances, mobilization, democratic power, and rebellion in neighboring countries. Mobilization is, in turn, a function of the group's coherence, state repression, and grievances. Grievances are caused by political discrimination, economic discrimination, demographic stress, lost political autonomy, and past state repression. Finally, state repression is a function of democracy and the success of past repression directed at the group.¹

As in all statistical analyses, the theoretical regression model explains some case better than others. Cases not explained well by the theory are known as outliers. There are two broad classes of outliers: those with higher levels of ethnorebellion in 1991-95 than predicted by the statistical model and those with lower than predicted ethnorebellion. In this study, as in our previous one (Gurr and Moore 1997), we are especially interested in the latter: they engaged in little or no rebellion but had relatively high values on the variables identified as relevant in the model. Therefore, we assess them as being at high risk of future rebellion, provided the values of grievances, mobilization, democratic power, and regional rebellion remain the same

¹ The theoretical regression risk assessments are actually produced using a revised and more nuanced theoretical model than the one described above and in Gurr and Moore (1997). The revised theoretical model is quite similar, but we have not yet written a research report describing it. We plan to do so in the very near future.

or increase.² If, however, authorities in the countries in which these groups live grant political concessions that alleviate their grievances, or use repression to restrict mobilization, or if rebellions in nearby states deescalate, we infer a lowered risk of future ethnorebellion.

Empirical Regression Model: We also use a different regression approach, but rather than specify theoretically the variables used, we allow the statistical software package to determine what variables enter the analysis. It is, in other words, an inductive approach very similar to that used in the State Failure project, a data-based study initiated by the Clinton Administration that seeks to identify the conditions which make states vulnerable to severe political crises (Esty et al., 1997).

We began by examining Pearson correlations between the magnitude of 1990-95 ethnopolitical rebellion and a large number of indicators in the Minorities at Risk database. These include the theoretically specified indicators of group discrimination, past repression, and mobilization cited above and many others as well. We selected all variables that correlated |.15| or higher with rebellion and entered them in what is called a stepwise regression--a statistical technique that builds a "best-fit model" by keeping variables that increase the accuracy with which the regression equation predicts (accounts for the variance in) ethnorebellion scores. This is a data-driven exercise in which the statistical program retains independent variables as long as they improve "the fit of the model" while others are discarded.

Not surprisingly, the empirical model identifies a different set of relevant variables than either the risk profile approach or the theoretical modelling approach. They are: state repression, extent of international military support, presence of an organization representing the group that used coercive tactics, the scope of militant organizations, lost political autonomy, whether military support was provided by kin, whether political support was provided by kin, and whether political support was provided by foreign governments.³ The groups that are "at risk" are identified using the same outlier technique employed in the theoretical modelling approach: the high-risk cases are assumed to be the negative outliers, that is, groups that were expected to have relatively high ethnopolitical rebellion scores in 1991-95 but did not.

The empirical regression approach captures the dynamics of protracted communal rebellion. That is, almost all its variables are highest in the most severe ethnorebellions of 1990-95, therefore it is likely to generate risk assessments which imply the short-term persistence of ongoing rebellions. The theoretical model, by contrast, includes the effects of a number of background and intervening variables, and therefore is more likely to identify groups with a potential for future rebellion.

³ The variables that were selected by the stepwise regression technique are what we call protracted rebellion factors. That is, they are especially strong explanatory variables for explaining variance in data sets where cases of protracted rebellion account for a substantial portion of the variance in the dependent variable. Our measure of ethnorebellion is just such a variable. In future work we intend to reconstruct our measure of ethnorebellion in an effort to separate the cases of protracted ethnorebellion from those of new or recent cases of ethnorebellion. Doing so is important not only for constructing and testing theoretical models of ethnopolitical conflict, but especially for risk assessments as we are interested in assessing not the risk of becoming a protracted ethnorebellion, but rather a new or intensified ethnorebellion. This weakness of our ethnorebellion measure affects both of the regression approaches described in this paper, but especially the Empirical Regression approach.

² To be more specific, we calculated the mean and standard deviation of the errors from the ethnorebellion equation. The groups that produced an error score less than one standard deviation below the mean were assessed at high risk to engage in ethnorebellion (if they had not been active during 1990-95) or at high risk to renew or intensify their rebellion (if they were engaged in rebellion during 1990-95). The selection of one standard deviation below the mean is admittedly arbitrary but impresses us as a reasonable choice. The system of equations was estimated with a three stage least squares estimator (using the 3sls command in Shazam!, version 7.0 for Unix).

Comparing Assessments of High Risk Groups

Our comparison of risk assessments begins with the results of risk profiles (Gurr and Harff 1996, Gurr 1996) that are summarized in the first column of Table 1. These studies identify 19 groups at high risk of initiating or intensifying a rebellion between 1996 and 2000. The second and third column show the risks, for these groups only, determined by the theoretical regression approach and the empirical regression approaches, respectively. The last column shows the outcomes as of spring 1997 (i.e., it summarizes the trends in ethnorebellion for the 19 groups during the first 15 months after data collection was completed).

[Table 1 about here]

We should preface a comparison of the assessments by pointing out some commonalities and differences among the approaches used. Regarding commonalities, there should be at least some similarity in results because all are based on observations and coded data from the Minorities at Risk project. If there is bias or error in the information used for some of the 264 groups, it will have similar effects across all three modes of assessment. And, although the project aims to be comprehensive, rebellions may occur among groups that were overlooked in its global survey.

Regarding differences, substantially fewer groups are identified in the risk profile approach than the regression approaches. This is the result of a deliberate strategy, when doing risk profiles, to draw attention to a relatively small set of high-risk cases. A more fundamental difference concerns the treatment of situations in which groups were already in rebellion in 1991-95 and those which were not. The risk profile approach used in Gurr and Harff (1996) and Gurr (1996) includes both kinds of groups: the interpretation is that "high risk" groups already in rebellion are likely to continue and intensify their resistance. In the theoretical modelling approach, however, Gurr and Moore (1997) were concerned only with identifying groups that had no rebellion during the base period but were at risk of future rebellion. In future work we will bridge the gap between these two alternatives by providing risk assessments only for groups with rebellion scores of 3 or less on the 0-to-6 scale used.

Different sampling decisions also affect comparisons across the three studies. To illustrate, the risk profiles approach uses 1995 rebellion scores only whereas the regression analyses are based on the 1990-95 period. The upshot is that a group that was engaged in rebellion during some portion of 1990-94, but not in 1995, is coded differently across the approaches. For example, the Albanians in Kosovo have a positive rebellion score in the 1991-95 regression analyses, but since they were not engaged in open rebellion in 1995, Gurr and Harff (1996) treat them as a case of inactive rebellion. Thus, in the comparisons of Table 1, the risk profile column identifies the Albanians in Kosovo as at risk of renewed rebellion whereas the empirical regression model column identifies them as at risk of intensified rebellion. Both assessments turn out to be correct, however: a clandestine guerrilla group began a campaign of terrorism in winter 1996-97.

To evaluate the similarity across the three approaches we conducted a contingency table analysis which is useful for summarizing the extent to which the three approaches produced the same assessments. Using the data from Table 1 we assigned a value of 1 to groups that were assessed as likely to reduce their level of rebellion; a value of 2 to groups that were assessed as likely to maintain the status quo; and a value of 3 to groups that were assessed as likely to increase their level of rebellion. Since the Risk Profile approach lists all 19 groups in Table 1 as likely to increase their level of rebellion, they are each assigned a value of 3. Only the Theoretical Regression and Empirical Regression approaches produced different assessments in Table 1.

The contingency tables produced by our analysis are reported in Tables 2 and 4. Table 2a compares the Risk Profile approach against the Theoretical Regression approach. Table 2b compares the Risk Profile approach against the Empirical Regression approach (the Theoretical Regression and Empirical Regression approaches are compared across all 264 cases listed in Table 3--see Table 4). An examination of Table 2a

indicates that the Risk Profile and Theoretical Regression approaches produced the same assessment in only four cases (21%): Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza; Timorese in Indonesia; Cabindas in Angola; and Mayans in Guatemala. Yet, as noted above, this outcome is driven largely by the different years used as the baseline for the assessment (1995 for the Risk Profile approach versus 1990-95 for the Theoretical Regression approach). If we take this into account and recode all 'status quo: rebellion' assessments in the Theoretical Regression approach column of Table 1 as 3's, then 14 of the 19 cases (74%) are assessed the same. Only the Hindus in Pakistan; Bakongo in Angola; Zulu in South Africa; Lunda/Yeke in Zaire; and Ndebele in Zimbabwe produce different assessments. Thus, taking into consideration the use of a different base year, there is substantial similarity across the assessments produced by the Risk Profile approach and the Theoretical Regression approach.

[Table 2 About Here]

An examination of Table 2b indicates that there is greater similarity across the Risk Profile approach and the Empirical Regression approach when one ignores the issue of a different baseline year: eight of the 19 cases (42%) produce the same assessment. However, if we recode the `status quo: rebellion' assessments in the Theoretical approach column of Table 1 as 3's, then we add five more cases: 13 of the 19 cases (68%) are assessed the same. Thus, while there is still substantial similarity across the Risk Profile and Empirical Regression approaches, there is more similarity between them than there is between the Risk Profile and Theoretical Regression approaches when we ignore the base year, but slightly less similarity (in comparison with the Risk Profile and Theoretical Regression approaches) when we recode to account for the difference in the base year.

A direct comparison of the Theoretical Regression approach and the Empirical Regression approach is provided in Table 3. While the advantage of a contingency table analysis is not terribly obvious when comparing assessments of only 19 groups (as in Tables 1 and 2). the advantage of conducting one becomes readily apparent when trying to digest the assessments made across 264 groups! Groups assessed as likely to reduce their level of rebellion are assigned a 1; groups assessed as likely to maintain the status quo (whether that means continuing to rebel or refraining from rebellion) are assigned a 2; and groups assessed as likely to increase their level of rebellion (whether that means a new rebellion or intensification of an extant rebellion) are assigned a 3 in the contingency table analysis reported in Table 4.

[Table 3 About Here]

In addition to examining the contingency table in Table 4, a brief look at the distribution of groups across the three assessments is useful. The Theoretical Regression approach identified 30 groups as likely to reduce their level of rebellion whereas the Empirical Regression approach produces 31 (please see Table 3 to identify the groups). Thus, both approaches produce roughly the same number of groups assessed as likely to reduce their level of rebellion. We will see that this is true across all three assessment categories. Yet, before turning to the others it is useful to note that the approaches often identify different groups: 19 of the 30 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Theoretical Regression approach are assessed as status quo by the Empirical Regression approach, and one is assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach and one is assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed as likely to increase rebellion; similarly 19 of the 31 groups assessed as likely to reduce rebellion by the Empirical Regression approach are assessed

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rebellion. Thus, the approaches are assessing similar numbers of groups at risk, but not the same ones.⁴

In addition, the Theoretical Regression approach assesses five groups (out of 30; 17%) that did not engage in rebellion during 1990-95 as likely to reduce their level of rebellion. The Empirical Regression approach only assessed groups that were actively engaged in rebellion during 1990-95 as likely to reduce their level of rebellion. One reasonable criterion for risk assessment is that it should not produce assessments that are nonsensical, and the five cases of reduced rebellion produced by the Theoretical Regression approach fail to meet that criterion. The five are the Ba'hais in Iran, Kadazans in Malaysia, Russians in Kyrgyztan, Tatars in Russia, and Hungarians in Serbia. However, with the possible exception of Russian Tatars, all these groups have strong disincentives for rebellion. Kadazans pursue their interests within a quasidemocratic political system, Russians can continue to leave Kyrgyztan, and Ba'hais and Hungarians are at risk of severe repression for any kind of resistance to state policies.⁵

[Table 4 About Here]

The Theoretical Regression approach produces 200 'status quo' assessments (which include both groups that are engaged in rebellion and groups that have not engaged in rebellion) and the Empirical Regression approach produces 206 'status quo' assessments. Finally, the Theoretical Regression approach produces 34 'at risk of rebellion' assessments and the Empirical Regression approach produces 27 'at risk of rebellion' assessments. Turning to the question of the similarity across the two approaches, 183 of the 264 cases (69%) produced the same assessments (these cases make-up the northwest to southeast diagonal in Table 4). Further, of the 81 groups with divergent assessments (i.e., all those that are off the northwest to southeast diagonal in Table 4), only 3 of the 264 cases (1%) are groups where one approach assessed the group as likely to decrease its level of rebellion and the other approach assessed the group as at risk of rebellion. Pearson's chi-square is a statistic that can be used to test whether the observed distribution of cases along the northwest to southeast diagonal as opposed to those off of the diagonal, in a contingency table, is a chance association. The Pearson's chi-square for Table 4 is 26.2 (with 4 degrees of freedom), and that score allows us to reject the null-hypothesis of no relationship between these two approaches with 99% confidence. Of course, we are not interested in determining whether the approaches are causally related--which is the conventional use of the chi-square statistic--but simply whether there is substantial similarity across the assessments. The contingency table analysis confirms the similarity.

In sum, then, the three approaches produce distinct assessments of risk of rebellion among the world's ethnopolitical groups, but there is sufficient similarity to suggest that the assessments are far from random: distinct criteria (i.e., variables) and decision rules produce distinct, but roughly similar assessments when

⁴ That the approaches identify similar numbers of groups in each category is not surprising given how we have produced these assessments: using the errors from regressions.

⁵ One should also consider a methodological explanation for this outcome: ordinary least squares and three stage least squares regression analysis performs best when the data being analyzed can vary between -infinity and +infinity, yet our data (i.e., Rebellion, 1990-95) can only take values between zero and seven. Regression analysis generally produces expected values that below zero, and the six cases noted above each had an expected value below zero and a score of zero, which is why they are assessed as expecting less rebellion. King (1988) describes a poisson regression procedure for estimating data that cannot take values below zero, but we are not aware of extensions of this procedure that can be used to estimate systems of equations, such as three stage least squares. Since our theoretical approach specifies a system of equations, we have selected so use three stage least squares rather than poisson regression. Each approach has a drawback given the combination of our theoretical argument and the values our data can take.

applied to the Minorities at Risk data. Whether the assessments produced by one of the approaches is better than another is a separate question and, we contend, one that is more difficult to address than first meets the eye.

Should we Choose among Approaches?

What advantages are to be gained by using one approach as compared with the others? At this juncture we contend that it is difficult to select one over the others. As Gupta (1997) explains, there is enormous debate among econometric forecasters about the different possible measures available for assessing the utility of a set of forecasts against the observed outcomes. Thus, an appeal to evaluating these approaches for producing assessments against the (eventual) observed record is not as straight forward as one might believe. Further, if one wishes to use observed outcomes as a benchmark, one must take into account not only the assessment (i.e., the expected value of ethnorebellion), but also the observed values on the other variables specified by each approach for, as we argue above, the assessments are based on the assumption that the values of these variables do not change. We know that they often do, and that is part of why we emphasize the importance of developing assessments as a basis for early warning.

Comparing Risk Assessments with Outcomes

All three approaches use information from the first half of the 1990s, and in no case later than December 1995, to make risk assessments for the second half of the decade. Fifteen months have already elapsed. The last column of table 1 sketches the changes that have occurred in each high-risk group identified in the risk profile approach. The results are intriguing. Two high-risk groups have in fact initiated new campaigns of armed violence in these 15 months: the Kosovar Albanians and the Uighers in China's Xinjiang province. In seven other instances ongoing rebellions have been contained or ended by negotiated settlements. These include Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Chittagong hill peoples, Moros in the Philippines, Tuaregs in Mali and Niger, Zulus in South Africa, and indigenous peoples in Guatemala. This suggests that governments in these countries were well aware of the risks of escalating rebellion and took corrective actions that, in the short run, have dampened rebellions. But this does not mean that risks have necessarily been reduced! Failure to carry through on negotiated settlements is likely to lead to renewed rebellion. In two other cases--the Lhotshampas in Bhutan and Ndebele in Zimbabwe--governments have modified their policies toward minorities in ways that appear to have defused potential resistance. In short, in almost all the high risk cases, a shift toward more coercive government policies or the opening up of political opportunities probably would trigger new rebellions. In only one of the 19 cases is an ethnorebellion intrinsically implausible: the Hindus in Pakistan. Unlike all other groups in Table 1, they are a dispersed minority and thus probably incapable of organized resistance. One possible implication of this observation is that the physical concentration or dispersion of a group should also be included in the variables used for risk assessments.

Gupta (1997) concludes his paper with the advice to forecast early and often. We might quip 'let a field of assessments bloom'. The potential downside to this strategy obtains if too many cases are assessed at risk by different approaches: monitoring resources are scarce and policy-makers' attention spans are limited. If there are too many "false positives" then the assessments may be too easily discounted. However, the results of this paper suggest that, while the three approaches identify somewhat different high-risk groups, there is a great deal of overlap. Further, one might decide to concentrate analytic attention on cases that show up on several (or all) assessment lists.

The main point is that assessments can be used to identify cases that should be closely monitored. Moreover, our approaches each identify variables that need to be monitored (and the Minorities at Risk project provides a set of procedures for doing so). Monitoring thus can produce early warnings by looking for and highlighting evidence of shifts in variables that increase risks of ethnorebellion (or, for that matter,

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that reduce risks of ethnorebellion). We prefer the theoretical approaches offered by the Risk Profile and Theoretical Regression approaches to the inductive Empirical Regression approach, but we also see virtue in a multi-approach (and, thus, multi-assessment) strategy. Thus we think it would be a mistake to be overly concerned with determining which approach produces the `most accurate' assessments. It is more important to monitor high risk cases and to make a long-term effort to compare assessments with outcomes.

This paper presents and compares the risk assessments produced by three different approaches using the Minorities at Risk data. The main contentions in the paper are:

- * Risk assessment is an important foundation for early warning systems.
- * Multiple approaches to risk assessment should be encouraged, and efforts to determine which is most 'accurate' are misplaced.

* Research efforts should be focused on monitoring high risk cases and providing theoretical interpretations for their outcomes, not on determining which approach to risk assessment is most 'accurate.'

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Figure 1. Risk Factors in a Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion

1. Group Incentives for Initiating Collective Action

1.1 Active economic, political, and cultural discrimination against the group in

1994-95 (ECDIS94, POLDIS94, CULRES94)

- 1.2 History of lost political autonomy (AUTLOST)
- 1.3 History of state repression


2. Group Capacity for Sustained Collective Action

- 2.1 Strength of group identity (CULDIFX)
- 2.2 Militant group mobilization in the 1990s (MILMOB9)
- 3. Group Opportunities for Collective Action
- 3.1 Recent major changes in the structure of the political regime (NDUR94)
- 3.2 Support from kindred groups in neighboring countries (Guttman scale index constructed from indicators of protest and rebellion by kindred groups and their provision of political and military support)

4. Conditions that Shape Regime Responses to Collective Action

- 4.1 History of elite reliance on coercion
- 4.2 Duration and strength of democratic experience
- 4.3 Regime's domestic power and resources

Note: Labels in parentheses refer to the indicators from the Minorities at Risk Phase III dataset (Gurr and Haxton 1996) used in the risk assessments summarized in Table 1. The conditions of regime response were not used in the risk assessments.



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Table 1. Risk Assessments of Ethnorehellion in the Late 1990s

Mayans in Guatemala Ndebele in Zimbahwe Southerners in Sudan luarcy in Mali Cabindans in Angola Zulus in South Alrica Indue In Nilicu Bakongo in Angola Moro in Philippines Kurds in Iran unda/Yeke in Zaire Hindus in Pakistan Timorese in Indonesia Papuans in Indonesia Uighers in China in Baugladesh Chittagong Hill peoples Bunk and Gaza Palestinians in West Albanians in Kosuvo hotshampas in Bhutan Groups Risk of renewed rehellion Risk of renewed rebellion Risk of new rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion - Less rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion Risk of mensified rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion Risk of new rebellion Risk of intensifed rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion Risk of intensitied rehellion Risk of intensified rebellion Risk of new rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion **Risk of intensified rebellion** Risk of intensified rebellion **Risk of intensified rebellion Risk of renewed rebellion** Risk of renewed rehellion **Risk Profile** Approach Status quo rebellion (7) **Risk of intensified rebellion** Low risk of rebellion Status quo rebellion (5) Status quo rebellion (6) **Risk of intensified rebellion** Status quo rebellion (5) Status quo rebellion (5) **Risk of intensified rebellion** Luw risk of rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion Status quo rebellion (4) Status quo rebellion (2) Status quo rebellion (3) Status quo rebellion (5) Notebellion No rebuilion Status quo rebellion (1) Theoretical Modelling Approach Risk of intensified rebellion Low nsk of rebellion Risk of new rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion Less rebellion Less rebellion Status quo rebellion (6) Status quo rebellion (4) Less rebellion Status quo rebellion (4) **Risk of intensified rebellion** Risk of new rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion Status quo rebellion (2) Status quo rebellion (5) No rehellion **Risk of intensified rebellion Risk of intensified rebellion** Less rebellion **Empirical Modelling** Approach Constitutional settlement, Peace accord, no rebellion rebellions in both countries No rebellion De facto regional autonomy new international support Rebellion intensified with less rebellion 1995 peace accords ended Status quo rebellion No rebellion implemented Peace accords being No rebellion Status quo rebellion Status quo rebellion Intensified rebellion rebellion declining Negoliations in progress, neace accords slow implementation of Violent protest against Rebellion ended 1994 New rebellion Lowlevel rebellion by exiles Outcomes us of March 1997

from 1 (political banditry, sporadic terrorism) through 4 (small-scale guerrilla activity) to 7 (protracted civil war) deviation of the observed level of rebellion in 1991-95 The number in parenthesis is the observed level in that period on a 0 to 7 scale that ranges Note For sources of the risk assessments see text. "Status quo rebellion" indicates that the residual in regression analysis is within one standard

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Table 2a

Contingency Tables of the Risk Profile and Theoretical Regression Approaches

Theoretical Regression Approach

	Mittagelia	1	2	3	and an no
Risk	a Micricol In	a sinalata		the during	tan gérés
Profile Approach	3	5	10	4	19

Table 2b

Contingency Tables of the Risk Profile and Empirical Regression Approaches

Empirical Regression Approach

	1.454(24)	1	2	3	
Risk				a Circumon and	1
Profile	3	6	5	8	19
Approach	a and the loss			Anna anna	İ

Table 3

	and and a second	Regression Ap	proaches	LaT transactional
COUNTRY ^a	GROUP ^b	REBELLION, 1990-1995 ^c	EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT ^d	THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT
AFRICA, Sub-				
Saharan				
Angola	Bakongo	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
	Cabinda	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
	Ovimbundu	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
Botswana	San (Bushmen)	none	status quo	status quo
Burundi	Hutus	intermediate guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
	Tutsis	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
Cameroon	Bamileke	none	status quo	status quo
	Kirdis	none	status quo	status quo
	Westerners	local rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
Chad	Southerners	none	risk of rebellion	risk of rebellion
Djibouti	Afars	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
Eritrea	Afars	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	less rebellion
Ethiopia	Afars	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	less rebellion
	Amhara	large-scale guerrilla activity	status [,] quo	less rebellion
	Oromo	intermediate guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensifie rebellion
	Somalis	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	less rebellion
	Tigreans	large-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	less rebellion
Ghana	Ashanti	none	status quo	status quo
Unana	Ewe	none	risk of rebellion	status quo

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	Mosi, Dagomba	none	status quo	status quo
Guinea	Fulani (Fulbe)	none	status quo status quo	status quo
Guillea	Malinke	none	101121	status quo
	Susu	none	status quo	status quo risk of rebellion
Kenya	Kalenjins	none	status quo	
Kenya	Kikuyu		status quo risk of rebellion	status quo
		none	risk of rebellion	status quo
	Luhya	none		status quo
	Luo	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
Madaaaaa	Masaai	none	status quo	status quo
Madagascar	Merina	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion
Mali	Tuareg	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
Mauritania	Black Moors	none	status quo	status quo
	Kewri	small-scale	risk of intensified	status quo
		guerrilla activity	rebellion	
Namibia	Basters	none	status quo	status quo
	Europeans	none	status quo	status quo
	San (Bushmen)	none	status quo	status quo
Niger	Tuareg	intermediate guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
Nigeria	Ibo	none	status quo	status quo
	Ogani	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
	Yoruba	none	status quo	status quo
Rwanda	Hutu	small-scale guerrilla activity	risk of intensified rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion
	Tutsi	protracted civil war	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
Senegal	Casamance region	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
Sierra Leone	Creoles	none	status quo	status quo
	Limba	none	status quo	status quo
	Mende	large-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
	Temne	none	status quo	status quo
South Africa	Asians	none	status quo	status quo
	Coloreds	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
- Calif.	Europeans	sporadic	less rebellion	status quo

		1-17A17		
	Xhosa	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Zulus	campaigns of terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	less rebellion
Sudan	Southerners	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
Togo	Ewe	campaigns of terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	less rebellion
	Kabre	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion
Uganda	Acholi	intermediate guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
	Baganda	local rebellion	status quo	status quo
Zaire	Banyarwandans	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
	Luba	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
	Lunda, Yeke	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
Zambia	Bembe	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion
	Lozi (Barotse)	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion
Zimbabwe	Europeans	none	status quo	status quo
	Ndebele	none	status quo	status quo
AFRICA, North/MIDDLE EAST				
Algeria	Berbers	none	status quo	status quo
Egypt	. Copts	none	status quo	status quo
Iran	Arabs	none	status quo	status quo
	Azerbaijanis	none	status quo	status quo
	Ba'hais	none	status quo	less rebellion
	Bakhtiari	none	status quo	status quo
	Baluchis	small-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	less rebellion
	Christians	none	status quo	status quo
	Kurds	intermediate geurrilla activity	status quo	status quo
	Turkmen	none	status quo	status quo
Iraq	Kurds	protracted civil war	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
	Shi'is	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
	Sunnis	none	status quo	status quo
Israel	Arabs	none	status quo	status quo
	Palestinians	campaigns of terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion

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Jordan	Palestinians	none	status quo	risk of rebellion
20160-015	Druze	local rebellion	status quo	status quo
Lebanon	Maronite	large-scale	status quo	status quo
	Christians	guerrilla activity	status quo	Status quo
	Palestinians	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
	Shi'is	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
	Sunnis	none	status quo	status quo
Manage and in	Berbers	none	statu quo	status quo
Могоссо	Saharawis	protracted civil war	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
Saudi Arabia	Shi'is	none	status quo	risk of rebellion
Syria	Alawis	none	status quo	status quo
Turkey	Kurds	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
ASIA				
Afghanistan	Hazaras	protracted civil war	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
	Pushtuns	none	risk of rebellion	risk of rebellion
	Tajiks	protracted civil war	less rebellion	less rebellion
	Uzbeks	none	risk of rebellion	risk of rebellion
Bangladesh	Biharis	none	status quo	status quo
	Chittagong Hill Peoples	intermediate guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
	Hindus	none	status quo	status quo
Bhutan	Lhotshampas	local rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
Burma (Myanmar)	Arakanese	small-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
	Chins (Zomis)	intermediate guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
	Kachins	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
	Karen	large-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion

	Mons	intermediate guerrilla	less rebellion	status quo
oup	Shan	activity intermediate	less rebellion	status quo
	Shan	guerrilla activity		
China	Hui (Muslims)	none	status quo	status quo
	Tibetans	campaigns of terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
	Uighers	none	status quo	status quo
India	Assamese	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
	Bodos	intermediate guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
	Kashmiris	intermediate guerrilla activity	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
	Mizos	none	status quo	status quo
	Muslims	none	status quo	risk of rebellion
	Nagas	intermediate guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
	Scheduled Tribes	small-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	less rebellion
	Sikhs	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	less rebellion
	Tripuras	intermediate guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
Indonesia	Acehenese	intermediate guerrilla activity	status quo	less rebellion
	Chinese	none	status quo	status quo
	East-Timorese	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
	Papauns	small-scale guerrilla activity	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
Kampuchea (Cambodia)	Vietnamese	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
South Korea	HoNamese	none	status quo	status quo

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Laos	Hmong	small-scale guerrilla	status quo	status quo
Partition and Inden	AND DAMAS	activity		
Malaysia	Chinese	none	status quo	status quo
	Dayaks (Sarawak)	none	status quo	status quo
	Indians	none	status quo	status quo
	Kadazans (Sabah)	none	status quo	less rebellion
Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
Pakistan	Ahmadis	none	status quo	status quo
	Baluchis	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Hindus	none	status quo	status quo
	Mohajirs	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Pushtuns (Pathans)	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Sindhis	none	risk of rebellion	risk of rebellion
Philippines	Cordillears (Igorots)	local rebellion	less rebellion	status quo
	Moros (Muslims)	large-scale guerrilla activity	less rebellion	status quo
Singapore	Malays	none	status quo	status quo
Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils	none	status quo	status quo
	Sri Lankan Tamils	large-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	status quo
Taiwan	Aboriginal Chinese	none	status quo	status quo
	Mainlanders	none	status quo	status quo
	Taiwanese	none	status quo	status quo
Thailand	Chinese	none	status quo	status quo
	Malay-Muslims	small-scale guerrilla activity	status quo	less rebellion
	Northern Hill Tribes	none	status quo	status quo
Vietnam	Chinese	none	status quo	status quo
Canada oup and	Montagnards	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
EUROPE, East		terrorism		

EUROPE, East (Ex-Soviet Bloc)

Albania	Greeks	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
Azerbaijan	Armenians	protracted civil	less rebellion	less rebellion
oun ette	is place as a	war	status quo	status quo
	Lezghins	none	status quo	status quo
	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Belarus	Poles	none	status quo	status quo
	Russians	none	status quo	
Bosnia	Croats	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
	Muslims	none	status quo	status quo
	Serbs	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
Bulgaria	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Duiguine	Turks	none	status quo	status quo
Croatia	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
	Serbs	protracted civil war	less rebellion	status quo
Czech Republic	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Cheen Republic	Slovaks	none	status quo	status quo
Estonia	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Georgia	Abkhazians	protracted civl war	less rebellion	less rebellion
	Adzhars	none	status quo	status quo
	Ossetians	large-scale guerrilla	less rebellion	less rebellion
		activity		and the second s
	Russians	protracted civl war	less rebellion	less rebellion
Hungary	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Kazakhstan	Germans	none	status quo	status quo
	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Kyrgyztan	Russians	none	status quo	less rebellion
	Uzbeks	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion
Latvia	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Lithuania	Poles	none	status quo	status quo
	Russians	sporadic terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	risk of intensified rebllion
Macedonia	Albanians	none	status quo	status quo
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
	Serbs	none	status quo	status quo
Moldova	Gagauz	local rebellion	less rebellion	less rebellion
111010010	Slavs	intermediate guerrilla activity	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo

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Romania	Hungarians	none	risk of rebellion	status quo
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Russia	Avars	sporadic terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion
	Buryat	none	status quo	status quo
	Chechens	protracted civil war	status quo	status quo
	Ingush	local rebellion	less rebellion	less rebellion
	Karachays	none	status quo	status quo
	Kumyks	none	status quo	status quo
	Lezghins	none	status quo	status quo
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
	Tatars	none	status quo	less rebellion
	Tuva	none	status quo	status quo
	Yakutia	none	status quo	status quo
Slovakia	Hungarians	none	status quo	status quo
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Tajikistan	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Turkmenistan	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Ukraine	Crimean Russians	none	status quo	status quo
	Crimean Tartars	none	status quo	risk of rebellion
	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Uzbekistan	Russians	none	status quo	status quo
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)	Albanians (Kosovo)	sporadic terrorism	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo
	Croats	none	status quo	status quo
	Hungarians	none	status quo	less rebellion
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
	Sandzak	none	status quo	status quo
EUROPE, West (Western			adaa adaa sanaa aanaa	doute serve dre
Democracies, Japan)				
Australia	Aborigines	none	status quo	status quo
Britain	Afro-Caribbeans	none	status quo	status quo
	Asians	none	status quo	status quo
	Catholics (N. Ireland)	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Scots	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
Canada	French Canadiens	none	status quo	status quo
	Indigenous People	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion

	Quebecois	none	status quo	status quo
France	Afro-Arabs	none	status quo	status quo
Asathkathaan	Basques	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Corsicans	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Germany	Turks	none	status quo	status quo
Greece	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
	Turks (Muslims)	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
Italy	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
boilloi Bacoma oup il	Sardinians	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
Oug S	South Tyroleans	none	status quo	risk of rebellion
Japan	Koreans	none	status quo	status quo
New Zealand	Maoris	none	status quo	status quo
Spain	Basques	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
	Catalans	campaigns of terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Roma (Gypsies)	none	status quo	status quo
Switzerland	Foreign Workers	none	status quo	status quo
	Jurassiens	sporadic terrorism	status quo	risk of intensified rebellion
United States	African- Americans	none	status quo	status quo
	Hispanics	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Indigenous Peoples	none	status quo	status quo
	Native- Hawaiians	none	status quo	status quo
LATIN AMERICA and CARIBBEAN				and marine Cambo
Argentina	Indigenous Peoples	none	status quo	status quo
Bolivia	Indigenous Highland	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
	Indigenous Lowland	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	none	status quo	status quo
or a	Amazon-Indians	local rebellion	status quo	less rebellion
Chile	Indigenous Peoples	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo

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Colombia	Afro-Americans	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Peoples	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo	
Costa Rica	Antillean Blacks	none	status quo	status quo	
Dominican Republic	Haitian-Blacks	none	status quo	status quo	
Ecuador	Afro-Americans	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Highland	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Lowland	none	status quo	status quo	
El Salvador	Indigenous Peoples	none	status quo	status quo	
Guatemala	Indiegnous (Maya)	small-scale guerrilla activity	risk of intensified rebellion	risk of intensified rebellion	
Honduras	Black Karibs	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Peoples	none			
Mexico	Mayans	large-scale guerrilla activity	risk of intensified rebellion	status quo	
	Other Indigenous	none	status quo	status quo	
	Zapotecs	none	status quo	status quo	
Nicaragua	Indigenous Peoples	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo	
Panama	Afro-Caribbeans	none	status quo	status quo	
	Chinese	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Peoples	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo	
Paraguay	Indigenous Peoples	none	status quo	status quo	
Peru	Afro-Americans	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Highland	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Lowland	none	status quo	status quo	
Venezuela	Afro-Americans	none	status quo	status quo	
	Indigenous Peoples	sporadic terrorism	status quo	status quo	

NOTES to Table 3:

*

^a The countries are sorted alphabetically by region.

^b The groups are sorted alphabetically by country.

^c Highest level exhibited during 1990-1995.

^d Scores are based on the erroer term from the regression analysis. Errors that are greater than -1 standard deviation from the mean error score are 'at risk' to rebellion (if there was no rebellion in 1990-95) or intensified rebellion (if there was rebellion in 1990-95). Errors between -1 standard deviation and +1 standard deviation are marked as status quo--they are assessed as likely to continue in their present state. Finally, errors greater than +1 standard deviation are marked 'less rebellion' indicating that these groups may be amenable to cease fires, but are assessed to be likely to decrease their level of rebellion.

Table 4

Contingency Tables of the Theoretical Regression and Empirical Regression Approaches

Empirical Regression Approach

		1	1	2	3	
Theoretical Regression Approach	1		10	19	1	30
	2	+-	19	164	17	200
	3	+-	2	23	9	34
		+-	31	206	27	264

Accessing and Analysing of the E-mail Network Reports Through Database System

Valery Stepanov Russian Academy of Sciences

The presentation aims to discuss an idea hypertext for improving system of query statements to database on ethnic conflict topics. The Centre for the Study of Conflict (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences) co-ordinates a wide-range e-mail early warning network. The Centre accumulates, processes and publishes essential information received from more than 20 geographical areas of the former Soviet Union. For this purpose special database is being developed in the Centre. We describe two main applications for database management. It offers new opportunities for scholars and practitioners in fast overviewing data and generating new ideas.

Hypertext document is one of the common used tools to have emerged in the computer software last years. It is well known that hypertext document is regarded as having succeeded in uniting different types of information into frame of a single folder. However, we believe, it is not the only way to use hypertext idea. Another one positive aspect of hypertext is that it has application to database information-retrieval tool. We use such an idea for improving system of query statements to database on ethnic conflict topics.

In early 1990 the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (IEA) and Conflict Management Group (CMG), Cambridge, Massachusetts, in co-operation with the Negotiations Systems Project, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School and International Laboratory Vega set up a wide-range e-mail early warning network across enormous territory of the former Soviet Union (The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and Russian Academy of Sciences).

The Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences is the leading research centre on ethnicity problems in the Newly Independent States. The main task of established e-mail network is to collect an up-to-date information on regional ethnopolitical

situation. A network, named the "Network for the Ethnological Monitoring", covered ethnic conflict, seen as political, historical, economical and social problems. It aims to select and compare experience internationally, and to develop theory and practice of ethnic conflict prevention.

The IEA has a Centre for the Study of Conflict that co-ordinates the Network. The Centre accumulates, processes and publishes (quarterly) early warning information from over the 20 geographical locations. Here is a list of areas covered by the Network:

Newly Independent States (9)

Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Kirgizstan; Latvia; Moldova; Tajikistan; Ukraine/Republic of Crimea.

Regions of the Russian Federation (12)

Astrakhanskaya Oblast; Orenburgskaya Oblast; Rostovskaya Oblast; Republic of Dagestan; Republic of Bashkortostan; Republic of Buriatia; Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria; Republic of Kalmukia; Republic Of Karelia; Republic of North Osetia; Republic of Tatarstan; Republic of Tuva.

Local trained mediators and experts on ethnic conflicts mailed out their correspondences regularly. The Network seems to be most large-scale information system on ethnicity, conflicts and forced migrations in former Soviet Union.

The problem we intend to discuss is how this Network information can be efficiently used by academic scholars.

During the last five years there has been a dramatic raise of Network information. The volume of electronic news on ethnicity received by the Centre is greater every quarter of the year than before. It means that the considerable number of messages we have to reject as many of them are not published by the Centre or reviewed or even read. Today our electronic archive contains more then 24,000 pages of Network correspondences. The situation is rather paradoxical: the more information we receive the more information we lose .

The database named the "NetBase" is being developed in the Centre as an alternative of the huge electronic archive. Since then, stored information is more accessible.

The main type of our database is table (binary file), since table can organise different kinds of information (narrative, numeric, graphic). This is the best way to store and interlink data. The set of tables related to each other is easy to retrieving and managing. A singular table of our e-mail database usually holds 25 - 30 original texts with total volume 250 - 300 pages (600K), while related system of such tables organises as more as 1,500 texts (20,000 pages, above 40MB). Thus, a numerous connected tables (as they share a common fields) can be eventually used as single large table.

The main software environment, which sustains special applications and binary files, is database management programme Paradox (Borland Inc., USA). For our different purposes we use versions of Paradox for both operational systems - DOS and Windows. All our special applications, running under Paradox, can operate with databases on a local area network. Many users can retrieve and share the documents from NetBase simultaneously.

We have two main applications for NetBase management. One application named the "Email Correspondence Input (ECI)" has been designed for assistance database staff. It aims to move new electronic letter through a standard review and encoding process. With extremely small staff and huge mountain of information it helps us to make that process as speedy and correct as possible. The other application "Catalogue & Order Forms (COF)" is constructed for NetBase users.

Let's outline both of these applications. While "Email Correspondence Input (ECI)" is running, it connects with e-mail software. ECI can recognise (and operate with) both original mail-box file and singular text files (we mean text files exported from e-mail software).

Every additional document is automatically registered on common bases by encoding sections (see list below).

- Date of Check-In date of input of correspondence to database
- Date of Text the date of text creation
- Location country, administrative territory and settlement of correspondent
- E.-mail electronic address of sender
- Size the amount of text-signs in correspondence except e-mail system head-lines

- Author(s) the name of e-mail correspondent
- Authors Subject the record as it appeared in e-mail message in section "Subject:"
- Title of the Text original title of the text if applicable
- Language language of the text
 - Case Territory administrative territory(ies) mentioned in e-mail correspondence
 - Case Nationality nationality(ies) mentioned in e-mail correspondence
 - Text Subject subject(s) that reflects the essential information of the text
 - Text Time Frame period reflected in document (duration context)

Information about author

- Brief CV curriculum vita of the e-mail correspondent
- Fax, Telephone, E-mail
- Mailing Address
- Country of Residence
- Settlement
- Occupation
- Position

The encoding process has three stages. First stage runs in fully automatic mode. ECI encodes every new document by using information from e-mail system headings (such headings usually placed before text). At this step ECI can learn the date of text creation, country and settlement of correspondent, electronic address of sender, language of text, etc.

At the second stage ECI analyses the content of the text. It strives to recognise and to list all geographical areas that are mentioned in text, as well as all names of nationalities and key terms.

The third stage of encoding is manual. An assistant of NetBase has to verify results of previous stages. And specialists should identify main topics of the text using generally accepted topic list.

That is the base structure (not real machine scheme) of stored information. The three-stage process produces a principle cohesive system of codes. Such a system has ensured that every new document has been available to user. To help scholars to find information in base we have constructed the other side of our relational system - the User Catalogue. Let's talk about second important application.

The application "Catalogue & Order Forms (COF)" is a powerful menu-driven system of catalogue browsing and querying from computer local network. This program designed for those who have little experience with database software. Users don't have to type any commands but do selections through the comprehensive relational indexed lists. This means that user is free to concentrate on his topic and not on technical procedure such as multi-bases retrieving, querying by examples, etc. Using the COF you can retrieve as many documents as you need in one query session. It doesn't matter what type of documents you want to find. All query statements are equal. Our experience suggests that only few standard query statements should be preferred in multi-used condition.

Catalogue tables are the lists of major topics that subordinated to entries of another lists and connected with them by special indexes. Thus, the most topics in Catalogue are active. As user, you can go through active links to find more suitable level or set of topics. Then, starting menu system, you might get a statistic summary on relevant documents or query from NetBase the documents itself.

The Catalogue represents cross-hierarchical system. That means that one set of items leads to another subitems and, if required, to the other equal level of different type of subject. In other words, we can slide along one subject tree up and down, then switch to the adjacent tree at the desired level. Our new type of library catalogue system both leaves users free to operate with many groups of topics at a time, and effectively helps to narrow the range of choices. Thus, the user can achieve the specific choice by

cross-examining the system of overlapping subject lists.

Let's look into the principle Catalogue scheme. First, it divided into two parts - a Main Section and a Support Data. Each part comprises subdivisions. There are eight subdivisions in Main Section. If you are professional ethnologist you might pay particular attention to the first subdivision - the Subject Catalogue. This system of databases show you what you will find in the NetBase by using generally accepted topics and terms. The Subject Catalogue lists a selection of main topics on ethnicity and conflict, which are currently generating a great deal of discussion in many different disciplines. The second customary library tool is Alphabet index. The other subdivisions are special lists for making quick location. Those subdivisions are following: Geographical Catalogue in which documentation is organised information by political-administrative groups; Historical Catalogue in which the same data can be overview and found along with duration context; List of documents by sources; List of Registration (documents descending by check-in date); The Shortcut Catalogue (see below); Arrivals - newly added documents to NetBase; Private Catalogue - set of lists (derived from different Catalogue divisions) constructed by users.

The second part of Catalogue system named Support Data aggregates information about authors of correspondence.

It is necessary to say more about Shortcut Catalogue. The Shortcut Catalogue in our NetBase is a frequently updated list of topical problems, which has direct links with essential documents. This catalogue by on-line query dialogue lets users quickly find the required information. The result is the same as going through the routine of Main Catalogue. One of the main Shortcut Catalogue component is a click-sensitive compendium of hotbeds of interethnic tension at the territory of the

former USSR. In the NIS we already have hundreds of various ethnic and political conflicts, so, the principle problem is to keep abreast of the rapidly changing ethnopolitical situation in different regions. Now the major zones of ethnic conflicts have already developed and are eventually shaping an integral and quiet predictable system. This opens up the methodologically easy way to construct some kind of monitoring base, where numerous mosaic of facts comprehensively combines to each other. In attempt to construct hotbeds list we divide all the former USSR territory into several groups, which includes ethnopolitically stable and unstable regions. At this point any additional information, stored in database, is getting broad context markers. For example, the fact of primary education transition in the Northern Caucasus, the most politically unstable regions in Russia, has the more intensive reflections than the similar process in the Urals. We also pay maximum attention to the different insignificant facts if it is known that such information strongly attributed to neighbouring peoples with great ethnocultural distance between (like Ingush-Osetian case).

Thus, the COF application is a very helpful retrieval system. Nevertheless, there is an imperative need to improve data searching technology. That is the common problem for database that holds narrative documents. There are three major difficulties in successful using of such database: underestimation, forgetfullness, weariness.

While many urgently sounded documents do exist in database, users may not retrieve them for years. The frequent reason is underestimation. At first sight of user some documents do not have clear relationship with other stored files. Moreover, a reasonable part of database data simply cannot be used due to forgetfullness. The common rate is that: if we don't view the document in proper time (in a month or two after delivering by e-mail), we don't view it anymore. And the last problem. Despite simple interface of the database software, many users don't agree to spend much time in searching for the necessary information. From our experience we may determine the lack of user's time as a main cause of insufficient database operation.

The obstacles mentioned above are quite serious. Sometime they can destroy even main idea of our database. We mean early warning, prediction and prevention of ethnic conflict. In order to solve the problem we decided to develop special database software named the "System of Summarised Reports (SSR)".

While working with NetBase, you can use traditional indexes and catalogue to find suitable

Accessing and Analysing of the E-Mail Network Reports -- 75

information. Summarised Report as original query form is an alternate tool.

A Summarised Report should make it clear to user why some NetBase documents are worth viewing. It challenges scholars and practitioners to use and compare different data around particular subject. Summarised Report can collect and provide information, identify main topics, involve comparative and backing data. Thus, it offers new opportunities for scholars and practitioners in fast overviewing data and generating new ideas. Let's take a closer look at this new approach.

Every new document, added to NetBase, automatically identified as part of relevant Summarised Report. We decided to have 10 items of Summarised Report, though the particular list of Summarised Reports is a subject to change.

A principle scheme of Summarised Report is based on general conceptualisation of the particular topics. We try to develop each Summarised Report as wide-range discussion of conflict problems. We pay more attention to function and role of such problems in social life, their factors, elements and structure.

First, we have focused upon conflict as a result of social and economic transitions in the former USSR. Second, we have looked into such themes as legislation, unemployment, education, migrancy, crime. Each thematical scheme of Summarised Report is influenced by state of scientific knowledge around conflictology and available documents. So, designing each Summarised Report, we strive to maintain a comprehensive balance between theoretical determination of conflict and empirical data. Items and specific attributes of particular topic may vary as our researches and correspondents change their point of view. Summarised Report is appeared on screen as some kind matrix that eventually associates lists of NetBase documents. It is a formal structured document, usually consists of three sections. First (or basic) section is a double column table that lists subjects, related to one important topic, and total number of documents per every subject. Second section (Additional Information) is aimed to draw user's attention to overlapping subjects. Third section of Summarised Report provides an access to another databases, informing user about valid statistical and graphic data. Here is an example of our Summarised Report.

/Example/

Summarised Report title: "Mass Mobilisation"

Subtitle: "Temporary Movements of People, Acting in Unconventional Ways to Get Some What They Need"

Section 1.(Da	se miormation)
Subject	Number of Documents	
Public Proces	sions	215
Civilian Boyc	otts	10
Strikes		108
Non-violent C	Occupations	14
Other Challen	ges	98

Section 2.(Additional Information)

Subject	Number of Documents	
Arrest		2
Repress		4
Opinion Poll/P	olitical Rating	18
Social Program	nmes	23
Reforms		7
Elections		18

Section 3.(Background	Data from Statistical I	Database)
Subject	Number of Tables	Maps Graphs
terms Charless		
Costs of Living	5	3
Unemployment		4
Property	2	
Crime Rates	1	1
Elections	3	3

Summarised Report provides an important co-ordinating role in bringing together e-mail correspondence, which are connected by topic, geographical distribution, and relevant statistical and graphic data from other databases. At such point of view the Summarised Report becomes a very significant link between users and database. By that user can be effectively informed of what kind of documents are needed to investigate particular topic and what documents are available in NetBase.

The second task of Summarised Report is to serve as a ready-made highly complicated query form. Each row of table in Summarised Report (see example above) is click-sensitive. It has links with lists of NetBase documents and with documents as well. User can work with Summarised Report interactively, viewing one documents after another. This is a hypertext mode. Otherwise, user can switch Summarised Report to query mode, mark listed different subjects and then make an inquiry at NetBase. The result of such action might be a huge set of documents sorted by subjects.

The System of Summarised Reports (SSR) provides an overview of various source of information, and outlines frameworks that can act as starting points for better understanding and prevention of conflict. If such the System is to be fully realised, scholars will get an access to complicated sets of narrative data on inter-ethnic conflict in Russia and the NIS. This obviously no simple task, but we want to develop our System in such way that it can have many scientific and practical implementations.

We would be grateful if anyone who has intention and experience in early warning retrieval system would get in touch with us by e-mail: stepanov@earwarn.tower.rus.ru.

Early Warning: The Case of the Former Soviet Union

Professor Valery Tishkov and Dr. Mara Ustinova Russian Academy of Sciences

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Early warning of conflicts in the former USSR dates its beginning to 1993, when the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict (EAWARN) was formed within the framework of the international project Ethnic Conflict Management in the Former USSR". The project is coordinated by The Institute of Ethnology and Inthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Conflict Management Group, Harvard Law School, in cooperation with the International Laboratory of Mass Communications (VEGA). The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The EAWARN is a network of leading experts in the former Soviet Union, including a number of Russia's republics and administrative regions with multiethnic populations and conflict situations. The Network is designed to monitor ethnopolitics, to collect and process information for early detection of potential conflicts and early preventive action. The Founding Director of the EAWARN is professor Valery Tishkov. Inaugurated on September 1, 1993, the Network includes over 25 local experts now. The goal of this presentation is to share the experience of building the Network and its development. The following issues will be explored: the specific elements of the Network's development stages from initial information sharing to current descriptive analysis of Early Warning model, based on 47 indicators; professional and personal characteristics of the local representatives who gather information and their affect on the type of information; use of information collected

for political recommendations.

Political challenges in the USSR during the mid-80's led to the increasing ethnic tensions and resulted in a number of ethnic clashes including violent conflicts. Already at that time social scientists were faced with a necessity of creating some kind of a network of experts able to collect and process information regarding the ethno-political situation. Such information was and is crucial both for academic research of ethnic issues in the post-totalitarian societies and for policy-oriented analysis of the causes of ethnic tensions as well as for conflict prevention. New generation of policy-makers and of public leaders

needed expert evaluation and advice in time of rapid and deep societal transformations. The purpose of this presentation is to share the experience accumulated by the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning (EAWARN) operating since 1993 on the territory of former

By early warning we mean based on in-depth local/comparative analysis the ability to assess Soviet Union.

socio-cultural and political situation in a multi-ethnic milieu for the purpose to diagnose existing and potential threats for social actors and system and to deliver a proper message for timely response. The idea of creation of such a network in the former USSR was first formulated at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, the Russian Academy of Sciences, during the late 1980s, when political

manifestations of conflicting ethnicity in the Soviet Union were on a rise. Professor Valery Tishkov, the Institute's director, was the initiator and the main ideologue of this idea and of the project itself. The goals of the EAWARN Network was to establish an extensive monitoring of all regions with multiethnic population. This system was designed to assimilate and process information for early detection of potential

ethnic conflict and early preventive action. It is important to point out that at the beginning of the project there were no experience either of the NGO's type of networking or of ethnic conflict management in the USSR. The same was true concerning modern telecommunication technologies such as E-mail and the skills necessary to use them in most of areas, apart Moscow and few other big cities.

By the early 1990's it became clear that to create such a system it was necessary to take some preliminary efforts in order to disseminate the basic idea of conflict management and to acquire proper skills. Albeit some traditional institutions of peace-making could be observed on a community/group level, we could not help recognizing that under the communist regime several generations grew up with the perception that any compromise or negotiation was a sign of weakness. Public mentality and political thinking lacked the notion of a conflict per se as politically incorrect one for a socialist society. Nor did it possess the knowledge of outside experience in conflict management and peace-making.

The first step to introduce professional and international expertise into the area of ethnic conflict management was made when a three-week training seminar has been held in 1992, sponsored by the IEA (Moscow), International Alert (London) and University of United Nations (Tokyo). The seminar had two priorities of educating and training. To reach with training "real actors", leaders of ethnic movements and experts from ethnic autonomies were invited. Often, they represented warring parties or were strongly engaged into one-side position. Among participants were people of varying educational backgrounds and political stance. They belonged different cultural traditions as well. There were participants from the Caucasus where most complex ethnic mosaic coexists strong feelings of group identity; ethnic Russians from the Volga region republics; Russian-Latvian-speaking Jew from Latvia and Tatars advocating for the wellbeing of their republic unlimited sovereignty and succession from Russia.

Six months after the first seminar, we held the second training seminar (April, 1993) within the framework of the joint project "Ethnic Conflict Management in the Former Soviet Union", sponsored by the IEA, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in co-operation with the Negotiations Systems Project, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School and an International Laboratory of telecommunication VEGA. The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and Russian Academy of Sciences. In order to choose the candidates of the Network, the best participants of the first seminar were invited to the second one.

After the seminar, we offered 15 of the participants to become local experts and provided them with technical support (computers, modems, etc.) connecting them with the E-mail network. By the end of the summer of 1993 we had 13 local stations fully equipped and ready to work. Each station was managed by one of the participants who was a graduate of the training seminars on conflict management. At the same time, we encouraged the participants to form groups of professionals, such as ethnologists, sociologists and political activists so that such groups could assist the participants in the coverage of ethno-political situation in their regions.

By September 1993, all the preparations for the work were completed. Telecommunications were established between central offices in Moscow and Boston and all the field stations. The local experts completed training in the use of E-mail. The initial stage of building the Network was completed on November 1, 1993. This date is regarded as a day of the inauguration of the Network. The first circular letter of the founding director of the Network, Professor Valery Tishkov, was mailed out to all users. The letter contained explanations about the objectives, organization and mechanisms of the Network. To develop information-gathering techniques and expertise as well as E-mail communication skills of the local participants, the first circular letter suggested the structure of the monthly reports. It was intended to cover the following issues:

a) important decisions of the local power institutions in the field of inter-ethnic relations;b) declarations and actions of political parties and groups, nationalist organizations and movements;

cases of mass action on nationalist (ethnic) basis;

e) general evaluation of social and economic situation in the region

nd its potential implications for inter-ethnic relations; important developments in cultural and language policies;

g) relevant news on the status of minorities cultures and groups.

According this structure, 11 local respondents were forwarding their messages to the Moscow office of the

The first circular letter was followed by several others with recommendations and corrections to facilitate regular gathering of the information and balanced, not one-sided views. The ethnological Network (1). monitoring is focused on a number of main directions. Among them primary attention is paid to the acute political events related to ethnic relations both all over the post-Soviet space and in the regions. For example, the Network monitored political developments in Tatarstan in 1993-1994 regarding preparation for December 12 elections to the new Russian Parliament and a treaty signed by President Shaimiev and President Yeltsin (February 1994). Network's representative from Tatarstan Rashid Akhmetov prepared a special report on those events (2). From the late 1994 a particular attention was paid to the violent conflict in the Chechen Republic (3). From the very beginning the Network's experts are monitoring the forced migration flows, especially migration and refugees' issues that arise out of open ethnic conflict or as a result

Since 1995, the EAWARN's representatives are providing regular reports on forced migration and refugees' from all over the post-Soviet space. These reports were made available for the UNHCR (4). In a of ethnic tension. research format it was published as a monograph "Migrations and New Diasporas in the post-Soviet states" (1996). New monograph report on "Forced Migrations: Adaptation and Return" will be published in April

At this moment, the Network includes 28 local experts from countries and regions of the former USSR. Starting the winter of 1994, a quarterly Bulletin as well as special reports of the Network on Ethnological Monitoring, covering the activities of local stations, as well as of the central offices in Moscow and Boston are compiled on the basis of the information received through the Network. 12 issues of the Bulletin and 6 special reports were published. All this information is available for experts and for the public. The Bulletin and its special issues are currently published in the Russian language, with the English edited and revised versions. The English version (the printed as well as an electronic one) is available from the Project office at the Conflict Management Group in Cambridge, Massachusetts; the Russian version - from

All information from the EAWARN's members is accumulated in the computer "Data-bank on the Project office in Moscow.

Ethnicity and Conflict" created within the framework of the Project and available via E-mail for authorized users. Both, the Bulletin and the special reports are distributed in Russia among more than 100 addresses, including Presidential administration of the Russian Federation; the Ministry of Nationalities and Federal relations; the Parliament of the Russian Federation (the Federation Council and the State Duma); embassies of the CIS' and Baltic countries; the research centers; local and international NGO's; and the individuals involved in ethnic conflict studies, as well as practitioners working in the area the ethnic conflict

Starting 1994, the Project is conducting annual seminars in order to improve the effectiveness of the Network. At the annual meeting of the Network representatives in the Cyprus (October, 1995), new

development in a quantitative model was introduced by Valery Tishkov who proposed an interactive matrix of indicators for ethnological monitoring. This matrix was based on a system developed by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. This was done primarily for the purpose of developing a global

comparative research on refugees and forced migrants. However, the set of indicators for the Former Soviet Union differs significantly from that of the UNHCR. It consists of 46 indicators divided into 7 categories:

- a) "Environment and Resources";
- b) "Demography and Migrations";
- c) "Power, State and Politics";
- d) "Economy and Social Relations";
- e) "Culture, Education and Media";
- f) "Contacts and Stereotypes", and
- g) "External Conditions"(5).

The interactive matrix of indicators for the model of early warning in the FSU was tested between December, 1995 - March, 1996. By the time of the next annual seminar (Londonderry, October, 1996), the descriptive analysis of the model was presented, marking a starting point for the future measurements of dynamics based on expert estimates by EAWARN members (6). This work will be completed by March 1997, with comparative analysis and policy-oriented recommendations to follow. To conclude the short history of the EAWARN Network's origin and development, I would like to point out that at the present moment the EAWARN is the only Network working on the issues of ethnological monitoring in the post-Soviet states.

From the very beginning, Dr. Mara Ustinova's responsibilities as regards the Network's building included selection of candidates for local field stations as well as the provision of resources adequate to the compilation of competent reports by the participants. In this connection we faced several dilemmas:

- What region was to be chosen as the most important for the ethnological monitoring?
- How to deal with the republics and states that were divided among opposite ethnic groups, especially in cases where the state's independence was already declared?
- Who will be the local expert whose responsibility would be to gather information?
- And last but not least what are the expectations of the Network's candidates for joining the Network? In other words what is a value of being a local expert of the Network for the experts themselves?

During the Network's building, we had to resolve these issues synergistically and do it in a durable fashion.

There was no doubt that the most urgent task was to start with the regions where conflicts already occurred. This included the Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation and new states of the region. It became obvious that the selection of the local representatives was politically sensitive issue. For instance, it was decided to create a local station in North Ossetia. Of course, we had to do the same in Ingushetia due to the conflict between the two ethnic communities. Unless we did that, we would run a risk of being considered Ossetian-oriented. While there was a group of highly qualified experts and necessary technical conditions in North Ossetia and it was quite easy to install the local station in that location, there was a lack of similar conditions in Ingushetia. Despite the fact that the information from the newly-born Ingushetian Republic was very important for ethnological monitoring, and while we had no ethno-political preferences, the conditions for ethnological monitoring in both republics was rather different. The North Ossetian one, due to the absence of the necessary technical conditions for telecommunication (7), was forced to use other means of communications (regular mail etc.) o provide the information for the Network.

We faced an analogous situation in the Georgian-Abkhasian case: while there were many possibilities for telecommunications in the capital of Georgia (Tbilisi), in Sukhumi, the capital of a self-proclaimed Abkhazian state, it will take quite a long time before the local station is installed, due to the

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lack of technical options. In some regions and states the effectiveness of the activities of the Network's representatives, in spite of all their efforts, to a large extent depends on the general political regime (8).

As it was mentioned earlier, the EAWARN Network was designed as a non-governmental organization. The main criteria used for experts' selection was their professional qualification, objectiveness and political independence. In other words, the constant and crucial issue is the question "Who gathers information?" This question is closely linked with the another one - "What type of information do we expect to receive?"

At the initial stage of the Network's building, when the main task was to develop information gathering, information sharing and communication skills, there were political leaders and activists of national movements among the EAWARN representatives. They possessed no professional skills except those acquired at the training seminars. Only about a half of the representatives were professional researchers (ethnologists, sociologists, historians, etc.). At that stage we did expect that a political leader or an activist of national movement, familiar with the local ethno-political situation, might be able to become a good expert in the field. While in some cases this was true, the superiority of professional scholars was nonetheless obvious (9).

At present, the EAWARN Network consists mostly (around 90%) of highly qualified and prominent experts who are professionals in ethno-political issues. Many of them, apart from their scholarly work, play key roles in power structures and advisory boards on ethnic policy and conflict issues in their respective regions. For instance, the representative form Tajikistan Dr. Iskandar Assadulaev is the advisor to the President of Tajikistan; Dr. Venaly Amelin works at the administration of the Orenburg oblast; both, Sergey Popov (Stavropolkrai) and Dr. Victor Victorin (Astrakhan oblast) are heads of the Committee on Ethnic Relations at their regional administrations; Dr. Larissa Hkoperskaya is a head of the Department of Northerm Caucasus, Ministry of Nationalities and Federal Relations, Russian Federation.

EAWARN Network's representatives are not only involved in the monitoring of local ethno-political situation, but also in practical conflict management. For example, Dr. Enver Kisriev, the Network's representative from Dagestan was a member of the Dagestan Governmental official group who visited Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye (villages in Dagestan) during the Chechen terrorist attacks (January, 1996) for negotiations; Dr. Sergey Popov was directly involved in the hostages crisis in Chechnya. He was also a member of the Russian Federation's team at the negotiations with the Chechen terrorist Salman Raduev during the tragic events in Budennovsk (June, 1995).

In fact, the Network's building (from 1992 to 1997) went on two parallel but closely related directions: the recruitment of the Network's representatives whose aim was to achieve a level of professional competence that was adequate to the Network's goals; and the increasing complexity of information collected by the experts, from the information sharing stage to the present complex level of ethnological monitoring. To some extent, the effectiveness of the EAWARN activities depends on personal motivation of its

To some extent, the effectiveness of the EAWARN activities depends on personal monvation or the representatives. The main motivation, common to all the representatives, is a willingness to make a contribution to conflict management according to their professional research interests and their position in the community. The EAWARN Network's building resulted in the re-establishment of ties between scholars in different states, lost after the USSR's breakup. This is quite important in terms of the current situation at the academic institutions in Russia as well as in the post-Soviet space in general. There is a lack of opportunities for communication between former colleagues due to the new borders, the lack of financial resources not only for business trips and expeditions, but also for equipment, etc. In that sense, the participation in the EAWARN Network has a definite value in itself for all of its representatives. Thanks to the Network's activities, a basic knowledge in conflict management and ethnological monitoring was introduced to quite a wide ranging group of researchers, as well as to the public; practical steps in regular monitoring were also made. Starting from a virtual zero point in 1993, the Network's representatives were made familiar with computers and modern telecommunications technologies. At present, some of them are

connected to the Internet and are carrying on regular and intensive international communications. For the local experts, one of the important motives in joining the EAWARN in the opportunity to join the world-wide community of scholars.

Acknowledging the fact that the EAWARN is functioning during the past four years and that its experience is unique, we have to state that the Network's development nonetheless requires additional improvement. Although most of the EAWARN representatives are working in local groups, there is an urgent need to augment their structure to provide regular reports from the regions. Additional organizational efforts have to be taken in order to provide two closely linked information flows: i.e. the regular reports on current local ethno-political situation and on the work on interactive matrix of indicators for early warning of the conflict. It is necessary to encourage strict adherence to the accepted matrix structure, so that all reports on ethno-political situation are amenable to the systematic analysis and incorporation into the computerized data bank "Ethnicity and Conflict". To make the Network optimally manageable, it was decided to limit the number of the local stations to 30.

Notes

1. At that stage of Network's development it included two respondents in Tatarstan, two in Bashkiria, and one from each of North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Rostov-on-Don (major city of Russia closest to Northern Caucasus), city of Omsk in Siberia, Orenburg in the Urals, capitals of Latvia (Riga) and Georgia (Tbilisi).

2. Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict. Special issue N1, February 1994 (in Russian).

3. Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict. Bulletin N4, January 1994 (in Russian).

4. Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict. Bulletin N5, May, 1995 (in Russian).

5. Complete Set of Indicators for the Model of Early Warning of Conflicts in the Former USSR, See: Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict, Bulletin, March 1996. PP. 4-5.

6. This work is continuing as a separate research project under the auspices of the UNESCO program MOST (Management of Social Transformation).

7. There are only few telephone numbers in the capital of Ingushetia (city Nazran') and all of them are used by the Government of the Republic.

8. For instance, while the Network's experts are successfully working at the most of the states of the Central Asia (Kyrgyzia, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan) and Kazakhstan, it is problematic to find proper representative ready to join the Network in Uzbekhistan where the President and the Government of the Republic are keeping under strong control all communication with the outside world and especially the information flow related to internal ethno-political issues. Several proper candidates for the Network refrained to join it being afraid of political repression. In Azerbaijan it was necessary to change several people to find an expert able and ready to work without a censorship.

9. For instance, in order to provide the information from one of the most ethnically mixed republics of Russia Dagestan, we included among the Network's representatives one of Kumiks' national movement's (one of the most influent national movement in Dagestan) leader who graduated several training seminars very successfully and in all sense was rather proper representative. Nevertheless, he was not able to work as an expert due to his ethno-political orientation and disability to cover the ethno-political situation at the republic in general. The same situation was met with the leader of Tatars' national movement, who used the Network just for popularization of the movement's goals. In those cases the representatives were changed.

connected to the Interpet and are carrying on regular and intensive supervisional continuum calicens. For the local expects, one of the respectant motives in joining the EAWARN in the operational to the world-wide community of schemes.

5 Complete Set of Indicators for the Model of Early Warring of Conducts in the Former USSR, Secverwork on Ethnological Aunitority and Early Warring of Conflict, Balletin, March 1996, PP, 4-5.

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 There are only few telephone numbers in the capital of Ingenbetts (city Nazzan') and all of them are used by the Covernatent of the Republic.

8. For meanue, while the Network's appents are subcreakely working at the most of the states of the Central Asia (E.vrgyzia, Tadiikintaa and Turkmeniater) and Karaichskan, it is problematic to find proper representative ready to join the Network in U. seldnaan where the President and the Government of the Republic are beging under strong control all communication where the Interdent and the Government of the information flow related to internal ethno-political issues favored proper candidates for the Network refraced to join it being actual of political repression. In Actual proper candidates for the Network propie to find an expert able and ready to work without a renouvant.

Research of Socio-psychological Factors In a System of Early Warning

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One of major elements of the early warning of ethnic conflicts is the empiric data collecting through quantative research of mass consciousness in regions potentially conflict. The report presents an experience of North-Caucasian Centre of the Institute of Social & Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences in study of socio- and ethnopsycological background of the potential conflicts in a region of Northern Caucasus. The region located in South-West Russia is a specific frontier between Western and Eastern civilisations and due to this fact involved not only in Russian field of geopolitical interests but in those of Turkey, Iran, Trans-Caucasian countries and Muslim world as a whole. The structure of the Chechen conflict was observed as a phenomenon presented by focal events, induced directly by contradiction of values and interests of fighting sides, as well as peripheral events - consequences determined by catalysing influence of open violent conflict in Chechnia upon political, social, ideological and socio-psychological developments in neighbouring republics with their own conflictogeneous potential. Peripheral events could provide favourable conditions for penetrating of 'external' conflict and for genesis of a new one. In an applied quantative research we tested hypothesis about probable types of behavioural reaction in peripheral societies determined by stereotypes of the conflict perception(a specific test on value compatibility and tolerance between different ethnic and social groups). The first type of reaction was indicated by features of consolidation of peripheral society on the base of solidarity with one of fighting sides, which could provoke a conflict with another; the second was indicated by tendencies to fragmentation of the society on the base of differences in conflict perception, which could lead to sharpening of social (interethnic) relations and transform conflictogeneous situation into conflict.

The history of relations between Russian state and Northern Caucasus since the end of 18-th Century has been and will remain a history of a permanent conflict determined by a system of factors: historical, geographical, geopolitical, political, ideological, psychological. The region is a specific frontier between Western and Eastern civilisations and due to this fact involved not only in Russian field of geopolitical interests but in those of Turkey, Iran, Trans-Caucasian countries and Muslim world as a whole. It's also a frontier zone with the unfavourable (from the point of view of the political situation) states of Trans-Caucasus. Collapse of the USSR has resulted in a problem of divided ethnic groups when the ethnic territories of some indigenous peoples appeared to be under the jurisdiction of the different states. Absence

¹ The North-Caucasian Centre of the Institute of Social & Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences conducts regular research (in the region as a whole and in particular subjects of Russian Federation). The most large scaled of them was the project "Chechen Crisis in Mass Consciousness of the Population of Northern Caucasus" funded by the "Foundation for Development of Peoples of Russia" and conducted in spring 1995 (4500 respondents in 10 subject of Russian Federation) in order of a forecast of a probability of mass support of Chechen war party in neighbouring territories. Results of the research are used in report.

of a strict border control between Russia and Trans-Caucasian states is fraught with the danger of involving the North Caucasian subjects of the Federation into ongoing conflicts and spreading those conflicts over the territory of Southern Russia. In the Northern Caucasus perhaps in the most acute manner manifested a general for Russia tendency of alienating the national state units from the federal centre and forming ethnocentric political systems. It forms three conflict axes: between Federal Government trying to preserve a control over the processes within subjects of Russian Federation and ethnocentric republics which are now increasing the level of their sovereignity; between republics and between different ethnic groups within republics. That is the reason the region became the area where in 90-ties some violent conflicts (Ingush-Osetian, Abghaz-Georgian) took place and the one of extreme significance - Chechen War.

A growth of ethnic consciousness as well as juridical institutionalization of ethnic groups called forth a transformation of an object of state identity, so the image of Russia is now replacing by the image of ethnic state. Thus systems of social values and priorities radically change. Most of native ethnic groups of Northern Caucasus have historical consciousness rather complicated by living pictures of Caucasian War of 19 Cent. and mass repressions of Communist period. It constitutes a psychological base of alienation and forms an image of Russia if not as "source of evil" then "the source of something unpredictable". Thus the optimal relations with federal centre are represented in mass consciousness of indigenous peoples of Northern Caucasus both as minimizing of control functions and increasing economic protectionism. This attitude was successfully verbalized by the representative on ethnic elite who once said: "We didn't join Russia voluntary, we will not voluntary leave".

Among other regions of Russia the North Caucasus is characterized by the highest level of the ethnic mosaic and, as a consequence of it, by the richness of interethnic communication. Territorial division of the region, social and cultural characteristics of the population is an objective basis for aggravation of ethnopolitical situation calling forth alienation of ethnic groups, non-represented peoples in bititular republics. In this background development of disintegration processes is going on inside of republics and integrations, still under non-state forms of the peoples' representatives which are living in the different state units.

A conflict development depends not only on economical and political situation but on it's perception and on psychological stereotypes of population which are usually in focus of research projects dealing with notions "ethnic status", "level of tension", "ethnic mobilisation". "socialisation values", "ethnic stereotypes" "social and political orientations and expectations".

An *ethnic status* is considered as a complex of factors which determine a place of a person or of an ethnic group on a scale of a social prestige operationalized as material, cultural and political status. Having presumed that perception of a status is a factor of not less importance for conflict genesis than status' objective indicators, we used as indicators respondents' subjective assessments of a level of satisfaction of their material, cultural and political needs and of those of the ethnic group they belong. The results of surveys present very low level of satisfaction of personal needs and even lower assessments of satisfaction of the needs of their ethnic group.

In a complex of the research goals a special attention usually payed to a system of value orientations of population in politic and ethno-politic spheres and parameters of social self-feeling of the population as a whole and those of a certain ethnic group. It made possible a reconstruction of a stereotyped in mass consciousness perception of an ethnic and social status of contacting ethnic groups and shows a presence(or absence) of the so called "complex of victim", a degree of its dissemination and factors of actualization. Very interesting information for analysis and interpretation of ethnic status are taken from the study of ethnic stereotypes focused both on the character of verbalizing of ethnic image and on measurement of its attributes. It provided a possibility of quantative description and comparative analysis of auto-, hetero-stereotypes and respondents' personal self-assessments.

Assessments of the interethnic tension level are also extremely subjective. Often they are based not

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on the real assessment of the situation but on the personal characteristics, ie., the level of a worry, social feelings which, as a rule, depend on the ethnic belonging of a citizen and on the ethnic group status in the social-political system of a republic. For example, the representatives of the ethnic majority, high status ethnic groups have more optimistic assessments of situation in inter-ethnic relations as well as social expectations. Dissatisfaction of ethnic needs make the aspirations actual for ethnical status growth by means of transformation of bititular or poli-ethnic republic into a system of mono-ethnic ones. Not less than one forth of the representatives of native peoples of Northern Caucasus would prefer to live in ethnic republics. The figures in the table help to estimate a real part of ethnic groups of some Caucasian republics which consider an ethnic state as an optimal condition for developing and reproduction of an ethnic-identity. They are specific indicators of a character of inter-ethnic relations, of a level of tension and shows a presence of background for a conflict and a tendency of it's probable development.

ETHNIC STATE AS OPTIMAL CONDITION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC GROUP

0/

		/0
DAGESTAN		
AVARS	A TOP SANDA	28
LEZGIS	3. N.C	34
DARGINS		24
KUMYKS		36
KARACHAI-CHERKESIA		
CHERKESS		35
KARACHAIS		34
KABARDINO-BALKARIA		
KABARDINS		38
BALKARS		25

Along with ethnocentrism integration process of ethnically related groups being under the jurisdiction of different republics is observed. For example, between the Adygs (Adygeys-Cherkess-Kabardin) presently inhabiting the Adygeia, Karachai-Cherkess and Kabardin-Balkar republics, between the Balkar and Karachai presently inhabiting Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabardin-Balkaria. Integrative tendences are presented in social, cultural and political activity of national movements and ethnopolitical organisations of the region.

In consequence of a risky home policy and, at times, unpredictness of positions of the Federal Centre the skeptical attitudes are intensifying in respect of the Russian state as a guarantor of the social peace and realization of the economic, political and cultural interests of ethnic groups. Tendency of alienating from Russia (still on a mass consciousness level) is partly conditioned by striving for guarding against political "surprises" coming from the Centre. Non-Slavonic population of the North-Caucasus would like to have legal guarantees of secession of a republic from Russian Federation in case of necessity. Results of surveys show dissatisfaction of the North Caucasus population with a status of republics and a style of relations between republics and the Federal Government and a growth of separatist moods in mass consciousness which could be used by political elites to aggravate the situation in this strategically important region of Russia. A table below illustrates a level of popularity of separatist mood among native ethnic groups in North Caucasian republics.

POSITIVE ATTITUDE TO POSSIBLE SECESSION OF A REPUBLIC FROM RUSSIA

		70
CHECHNIA:	CHECHENS	72
ADYGEIA:	ADIGEIS	12
DAGESTAN:	AVARS	09
	LEZGIS	09
	DARGINS	02
	KUMYKS	14
INGUSHETIA:	INGUSHS	27
KARACHAI-CHERKESIA:	CHERKESS	06
	KARACHAIS	15
KABARDINO-BALKARIA:	KABARDINS	24
	BALKARS	08
NORTH-OSSETIA:	OSSETS	05

Separatist moods are based on the original instinct of self-preservation, their growth and manifestations are held by only a reasonable position of the leaders of republics, common sense of the ordinary people and absence of sufficient ideological treatment.

A state of inter-ethnic relations is mainly determined by the system of orientations, aims, behaviour stereotypes of ethnic groups, their predisposition to coexistence, conformity with the value systems of other participants of the ethnic contact. The results of surveys testify strong ontological, ethnocentric preferences of representatives of the Caucasian peoples in the system of socialization values with more expressed attitudes to reproduction of ethnic identity and traditional culture than adoption to the moral and cultural norms common to all mankind. If nature and content of socialization values of Russians considerably depend on the age of a respondent these variables among representatives of the Caucasian peoples are practically independent. It allows to speak of a tendency of further widening gap between different ethnic groups' systems of values and of a probability(or danger) of increasing of the status distances and conversion of a value conflict into the conflict between peoples. Dissatisfaction with its ethnic status, actualization of the ethnic consciousness call forth high ethnic mobilization and protest readiness of population. More than a half of representatives of Caucasian ethnic group are predisposed to strength or may be violent means of problem resolution.

RESPONDENTS WHO ARE READY TO PROTEST ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF THEIR ETHNIC GROUP

	%
CHECHEN	
ADIGEI	79
AVAR	78
LEZGI	66
DARGIN	77
KUMYK	75
INGUSH	90
CHERKESS	80
KARACHAI	80
KABARD	71
BALKAR	48
OSSETS	74
RUSSIANS	46-60 (in different republics of the region)

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The structure of the conflict are usually observed as a phenomenon presented by focal events, induced directly by contradiction of values and interests of fighting sides(in a case of the Chechen War), as well as peripheral events - consequences determined by catalyzing influence of open violent conflict in Chechnia upon political, social, ideological and socio-psychological developments in neighbouring republics with their own conflictogeneous potential. Peripheral events could provide favorable conditions for penetrating of "external" conflict and for genesis of a new one. In an applied quantative research we tested hypothesis about probable types of behavioral reaction in peripheral societies determined by stereotypes of the conflict perception(a specific test on value compatibility and tolerance between different ethnic and social groups). The first type of reaction was indicated by features of consolidation of peripheral society on the base of solidarity with one of fighting sides, which could provoke a conflict with another; the second was indicated by tendencies to fragmentation of the society on the base of differences in conflict perception, which could lead to sharpening of social(interethnic) relations and transform conflictogeneous situation into conflict. Indigenous peoples of Northern Caucasus are very close ethnically and culturally, they have similar features of historical consciousness and behavioral stereotypes. Conflict in one part of the region could easy be spread over the other.

A specificity of a perception of the Chechen developments in public opinion was mostly determined by ethnic characteristics of respondents, and lead societies of the North Caucasian republics (except North Ossetia) to deep differentiation and even to polarisation. As one of indicators of potential conflict in peripheral societies were observed not only the attitudes but a degree of its stereotypisation within one ethnic group that could be interpreted as a level of consolidation, readiness for common action, symptom of conflict potential. The following table shows attitudes of Russians, Ossets and representatives of other Caucasian ethnic groups to a character of solvation of the Chechen crisis.

	Ossets	Other Caucasian peoples*	Russians**
	%	%	%
Chechen crisis could be solved only with a help of military operation	38	15	42
Chechen crisis is a domestic problem of Chechens	50	74	42
Government should take as reality a secession of Chechnia from Russian Federation	48	66	38
Government should retain Checnia in Federation for not to make precedent for other republics	41	27	51
Government should complete military operation in Chechnia	53	15	59
Government should immediately stop the war in Chechnia	47	85	41

* - average figure for native Caucasian population (except Osset)

* - average figure for Russian population

People's attitudes to Chechen crisis are highly complex so a procedure of factor analysis had been used for exposing of typical groups in population of North Caucasian republics and evaluating of a probability of a conflict between them.

The largest group (20%) was presented equally by representatives of different ethnic groups. They didn't support actions of the Federal Government considering them as non adequate to character of political situation in Chechnia. This attitude probably was mostly based not on a specificity of feeling of law and geopolitical values but on subjective evaluation of an expediency of military actions and correlations of their goal and price. The group didn't consider the Chechen crisis as a phenomena of Russian political system but as it was a conflict between two sides.

In the second group (10%) an evaluating approach was predominant. The War was perceived as a part and indicator of a crisis of Federal Power, which began military operation in order to demonstrate force and readiness to use it in the interests of state. It's members were resolutely opposed to all activity of Russian government, on the contrary Chechen regime have been interpreted as legitimate, reflecting needs and interests of Chechen people. This attitude was based not so much on sympathy to Chechen regime but on hostility to federal one. This population assumed a secession of Chechnia.

The third group presented (9%) by native ethnic-groups of Northern Caucasus and characterized by negative attitude to the history of relations between Russia and Northern Caucasus. They consider the War in Chechnia in terms of colonial expansion and national liberation movement and seemed to prefer the secession of their republics.

The forth group were Russian (8%) with very strong pro-state preferences. The Power considered as the only condition and guaranty of human and ethnic rights as a source of "civilising of Caucasians".

Description of the exposed groups through variables of social, demographic status, social activity, protest readiness favoured in working out of recommendation on early warning of conflicts in republics of Northern Caucasus.

Dynamic Data for Conflict Early Warning¹

John L. Davies and Barbara Harff, with Anne L. Speca University of Maryland

This paper first examines the need to supplement field monitoring and expert analysis with systematic model-based early warning systems, supported by both dynamic and structural data systems for filtering the enormous information flows available to analysts. We outline the development of a dynamic data system (the Global Event-Data System or GEDS) for tracking and analytically coding the daily interactions of the states and major non-state communities and organizations from on-line news sources, suitable for use in early warning applications. Secondly, the paper describes a preliminary set of dynamic "accelerator" event categories proposed by Barbara Harff (1994, 1996, this volume; Gurr 1994) for use in a sequential early warning model for ethnopolitical conflicts; and reports results of preliminary tests of their efficacy in providing early warning of recent ethnic wars in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and in Georgia, Rwanda and Burundi.

Requirements for Conflict Early Warning

Early warning efforts as currently practiced usually consist of monitoring field reports (from diplomats or local representatives of government or UN agencies, NGO's) and/or news reports from public sources (CNN, the wire services). The main difficulties with this approach are that analysts acknowledge that they are regularly flooded with more information than they can digest, and that they typically lack systematic means for filtering and interpreting that information other than the "presuppositions and policy orientations of the bureaucratic and political contexts in which they work" (Gurr and Harff, 1996 p. 9).

Past attempts to provide such systematic filtering through indicator-based early warning have not been well received for two reasons. First, while indicators systematically filter the information flow, they have not been rich enough or supported with adequate tools to allow analysts to interpret and use the information in relation to their own shifting priorities and concerns (e.g., Laurance, 1990). Second, early indicators did not take account of the tendency of conflicts to evolve through different phases, with often rapid transitions between them.

We suggest that both of these problems can be remedied. The latter problem points to the need for explicit conceptual frameworks or models for early warning that distinguish between remote, structural

¹ This is a revised and updated version of a paper first presented at the Workshop on Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, at the University of Maryland, College Park, 14-16 November 1996, prepared for the conference on Synergy in Early Warning, at York University, Canada, 15-18 March, 1997. This paper will appear in an edited volume of papers from the November 1996 workshop (J.L. Davies and T.R. Gurr (eds): Crisis Early Warning Systems.) Reference to "this volume" when citing other papers from that workshop refers to this book. We are indebted to Steve Kurth for permission to re-code some of his data on Yugoslavia in this paper. DRAFT ONLY

background conditions and more immediate dynamic conditions that lead to crises. Such multi-phase or sequential models, as well as being specific to what is being warned about (ethnopolitical violence, genocide, state collapse and refugee flows all require separate models), should specify what combination of remote and proximate factors or event sequences are likely precursors of that type of crisis.

To support such models, there has been a broad effort to develop richer data systems, of two main types (Merritt, Muncaster and Zinnes, 1993):

1. "Structural" data sources reflecting institutional conditions and long-term background processes (such as regime characteristics, minority group grievances and capacity for mobilization) that set the context for the flow of reported events, and provide the basis for long-term risk assessments (see, e.g., papers by Gurr, and by Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Surko and Unger, in this volume); and 2. "Dynamic" event-data sources that track day-to-day developments, including events that may catalyze or accelerate a risky situation into one of escalating violence (see, e.g., Harff, this volume). In large part, the Global Event-Data System (GEDS) project (see next section) is an attempt to meet the need for a much richer and better supported event-data stream than has been available in the past. Ultimately, in addition to partially automated data generation and analysis (which can be selectively applied near-real time to high risk countries), we aim to have a fully automated pre-coding capability which can be applied globally near-real time, and, in collaboration with user organizations, used with restricted as well as public data sources.

A third type of data source which may be useful in supplementing model-based early warnings based on structural and dynamic data sources, are the "episodic" data sources, describing the characteristics of previous conflicts and crises, and the phases through which they developed (e.g., Wilkenfeld and Brecher's, 1988, International Crisis Behavior data). These data may lend themselves to a pattern-matching approach for evaluating potential and emerging crises, as well as providing information on what types of intervention may or may not be effective, based on outcomes in similar past episodes. This latter function may be critical in translating even reliable early warning signals into appropriate early responses by those in a position to act.

The GEDS Project

The Global Event-Data System (GEDS) Project was established with National Science Foundation support as part of the Data Development for International Research (DDIR-II) Project (Merritt, Muncaster and Zinnes, 1993), with the aim of providing a basis for resolving the more critical problems associated with existing event data sets such as Azar's (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) and McClelland et al.'s (1971) World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS).

GEDS improves on these data sets in several significant ways (Davies and McDaniel, 1994), including:

* shifting from newspaper sources to the much denser and more even coverage of on-line newswire sources such as Reuters World Service (and supplementary sources as needed);

* re-defining events as tied to event reports and providing full source referencing;

* acknowledging and tracking major non-state communities (including all 270+ of Gurr's, 1993a, "minorities at risk") and organizations as actors along with the states;

* providing detailed narrative summaries of each event in standard format, sufficient to provide a basis for other analysts or data projects to add additional analytical codes without going back to the original source;

* providing additional analytical data such as casualties, continuity, agency, other parties affected, location and institutional context;

* providing greater coding flexibility, by allowing, for example, for multi-party (non-dyadic) events, multiple-issue events, and by allowing for additional specialized or user- generated codes (such as Harff's accelerators--see below);

* shifting to a relational data-base software environment (MS Access) which allows much greater accessibility and manipulability by non-expert users and ready interface with other data sets and standard statistical and graphics software packages; and

statistical and graphics software packages, and * adding specialized GEDS user software which allows for graphic representation of analytical data with point-and-click access to the narrative summaries of events represented in the graph, encouraging greater complementarity and integration between qualitative and quantitative analyses.

Complementarity and integration between quantative and quarts 15- point conflict-cooperation scales and GEDS also retains the original COPDAB codings (Azar's 15- point conflict-cooperation scales and issue types), so that reasonable continuity from the original COPDAB data (1948 through 1978, or for some African countries, 1981) can be achieved, with GEDS data being generated from 1979 (when newswire reports began to be archived on-line). This emphasis on explicit scaling of degree of conflict and cooperation, which distinguishes COPDAB from WEIS-based data (the latter explicitly built around categories not considered appropriate for conflict scaling), allows ready aggregation of time-series data representing changing levels of conflict and cooperation within any given set of actors and/or issue areas. This feature adapts easily to the task of providing dynamic conflict early warning indicators, based on the proposition that increasing monthly levels of conflict short of war, at least in the absence of comparable levels of cooperation reflecting efforts to contain the conflict, are an important indicator of impending war (Kurth, 1996).

To date, GEDS data have been generated for the interactions of over 100 state, and many non-state, actors covering at least a three-year period from 1990, and in some cases the entire period from 1979 through 1994. At our current level of development and support, we are capable of providing near-real-time event data for a limited number of actors only, given constraints on the time and effort involved in human coding.² The data, once edited, is being made available via FTP, CD-ROM or floppy disks direct to interested users. Providing support for other event data projects is another primary goal. Currently, for example, we

Providing support for other event data projects is another printing gour contempty and project, are collaborating with David Davis and Will Moore's (1995) Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) Project, which has been using GEDS software and a modified version of the COPDAB domestic conflict- cooperation scale to generate data for many third world countries, following slightly different coding rules and making use of supplementary regional sources. This type of coordination can greatly increase the breadth of combined coverage achievable using human coding.

Automated "Pre-coding" of GEDS Events

Global near-real-time coverage using sources as dense as those currently used for GEDS, however, will only be achievable through automated coding. There are several reasons why automated coding cannot fully replace human coding, however. Copyright (and in some cases, security) restrictions prevent the automated capture and redistribution of narrative text along with analytical data, for example, so that the ability to preserve the connection between quantitative and narrative data is severely undercut. The complexity and subtlety of language used in event reports ensures that accuracy of coding will be

² Currently the cost of providing GEDS data is around \$2.50 to \$3.00 per event, depending o whether accelerator coding is included and assuming some flexibility on turnaround time. For a medium sized country (e.g. Kenya, Zaire) this would translate into about \$1,000 per ear of intranational and international event-data based on Reuters World Service wire as the primary source (less for earlier years, as coverage is more sparse; more in times of major upheaval, as coverage is more dense).

compromised in any form of automated coding achievable within the limits of our current (or foreseeable) knowledge, particularly for complex events, categories or scales, and for events which are not fully described in the first sentence or two of a given news report.

Nevertheless, the advantages of automated coding are such that it provides an invaluable addition to human coding efforts. With editing and regular dictionary updating (as currently done by the PANDA and KEDS Projects--see Bond, and Schrodt and Gerner, this volume), it is possible to generate useful near-real-time data on a global scale. In areas or for purposes where greater accuracy and narrative detail are needed, automated coding can be treated as "pre-coding," to be edited and expanded on by human coders with less effort than is required in the absence of pre- coding. Additionally, existing GEDS event summaries can be efficiently re-coded using automated procedures taking advantage of the standard sentence structures used by GEDS, in order to apply or evaluate alternative or modified analytical models.

Some features of GEDS coding are already automated, allowing significant reduction of human error in assigning dates and source references, and in editing analytical codes. Automated pre-coding of the state and non-state participants in each event report is currently being added. This is based on a comprehensive dictionary of several thousand actors (states, communities and international organizations) and their agents, a copy of which will shortly be accessible via the Center's home page (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm).

The next stage of automation will involve a first effort at pre-coding of issue types and conflict/cooperation scale values. We have identified a set of about a thousand action and issue categories that map the interrelationships among different coding schemes currently in use, including COPDAB, and Harff's accelerator categories, as well as IPI, WEIS, PANDA, Leng and Singer's (1988) BCOW, and Taylor and Jodice's (1983) World Handbook categories for domestic conflict. In collaboration with Bond (this volume), we will map the dictionaries developed for automated coding within the PANDA and FRED projects directly to the GEDS/COPDAB issue type categories and conflict/cooperation scale values, without being constrained by the WEIS-based PANDA categories.

This approach contrasts with past attempts to develop conflict/cooperation scaling using the WEIS categories (Goldstein, 1992). The problems with such a strategy are apparent from our analysis of the one-word action descriptions employed in Azar's original COPDAB data set, which showed that many of the same words that were used by McClelland et al. to define different WEIS categories (e.g., "consult," "attack," "request," "promise") were in fact assigned COPDAB conflict or cooperation scale values across virtually the entire 15-point spectrum, depending on the context in which they occurred. For example, a "promise" could be one for massive aid, or for military retaliation; an "attack" might be verbal or military, or an attack on a shared problem, reflecting vastly different levels of conflict or cooperation. This problem can be partially alleviated through further elaboration of WEIS sub-categories (Bond, this volume), but still raises serious doubt as to the usefulness of WEIS-based "scaling" in tracking cooperation and conflict intensity over time. It is important that we look more closely at the adequacy of the categories we have been using and elaborating on, before extending their use beyond what was originally intended, and before committing ourselves to strategies for automated coding based on them.

Harff's Accelerators for Early Warning of Ethnopolitical Conflict

Barbara Harff (1993, 1996) has developed a sequential model for early warning of genocides and politicides, which distinguishes ten international and internal "background conditions" such as shifting alliances and degree of democratic experience; four "intervening conditions" such as the presence of charismatic leadership and differential economic hardship; and eight "accelerators"--defined by Harff (1993, p.28) as "the immediate events that lead to escalation...feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions," such as aggressive actions by, or clashes with, the opposition group, or empty threats of external involvement against elites.

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Accelerator events, on the other hand, may be distinguished from "triggers," or events which, in the

presence of background and intervening conditions and accelerators, precipitate the final stage of a crisis nocide). Triggers, which may range from violent coup attempts or assassinations to stone-throwing, nonstrations or arrests, and are far more context-sensitive and difficult to specify than accelerators, may thus be likened to a match dropped on to a combustible pile, with background and intervening conditions the logs, and accelerators as the gasoline (Harff, this volume). For early warning purposes, the

Preliminary results (1996; this volume) from retrospective analyses using dynamic data on celerators are thus the appropriate level on which to focus. ccelerators generated in collaboration with the GEDS project, indicate that the model was effective in

evealing an escalating probability of genocide in Rwanda in early 1994 (in contrast with neighbouring, similarly unstable and ethnically divided Burundi), and in Bosnia in mid- 1991 (in contrast with another turbulent and divided province attempting to secede from a post-communist state, Abkhazia). Whereas in all four cases, background and intervening conditions indicated high levels of risk of genocide or humanitarian crisis, accelerators were useful in providing early warning indices of which cases were sliding

A similar multi-phase model has been proposed for ethnopolitical conflicts by Gurr (1993b, 1996, toward genocide and when.

this volume). Gurr's work has focused on generating risk assessments from structural data sources reflecting "background" and "intervening" or "response" conditions (including legacies of historical antagonism, discriminatory treatment, group cohesion, degree of democracy and regime durability). However, with the addition of a tentative set of dynamic accelerator categories for ethnic conflict, early warning of imminent conflict based on dynamic data generated for high risk cases also becomes possible. Gurr (1993b: 24) used Harff's accelerators to show that there exists a possible relationship between accelerators of genocides and

The accelerators suggested by Harff are not proposed as a closed or final set: rather, the recommendation is that they be evaluated and adapted or added to based on specific conditions in each politicides, and accelerators of ethnic conflict.

high-risk situation. Although originally divided by Harff and Gurr into two general groups--those seen as direct accelerators of communal challenges (CC), and those seen as accelerators of regime insecurity (RI)--Harff does not use this division in her test of the model of geno/politicide. For this effort we resurrected the original distinction. The accelerators for communal conflict were slightly revised and operationalized based on Harff's (1996) coding categories of accelerators for geno/politicide, as follows:

CC 1. Attacks by or clashes with communal rivals, spontaneous or provoked (including attacks by Accelerators for Communal Challenges: government supported groups; ranging from verbal attacks, threats of physical action, demonstrations, to

CC 2. New regime policies that threaten a group's status (by removing privileges, imposing new restrictions, threats, expropriations, revoking citizenship, destroying property, mass arrests or detentions, riots, destruction of property or physical injury);

CC 3. Contention between moderate and militant factions within the group (including disagreements on forcible resettlement, torture, execution of leaders, mass executions);

CC 4. Formation of paramilitary units by the communal group, or acquisition of arms from domestic or leadership or policy or strategy); CC 5. Instances of political action by kindred groups in nearby countries (including guerilla activity between kindred and rival groups, unrest generating refugees or displaced persons, destruction of property,

foreign sources;

riots, demonstrations, threats of physical action, declarations against the government.

Accelerators of Regime Insecurity:

RI 1. Formation of coalition among regime opponents (including any increase in size or cohesion of opposition group, emergence of uncontested leadership, agreements between opposition factions, significant new members joining opposition movement);

RI 2. Clashes between regime supporters and communal groups (including attacks by either side--details as for CC 1);

RI 3. Increase in external support for communal groups, ranging from symbolic support by sympathizers to transfer of arms (including statements or reports supporting the group or against the government, dispatching peacekeepers, transfer of aid or arms);

RI 4. *Empty threats of external involvement*, ranging from warnings to threats of sanctions or arms transfers or military intervention (threats must be against the government and not apparently backed by action);

Note that there is some overlap also between the CC and RI accelerators. In particular, both CC 4 and RI 3 include acquisition of foreign arms, and CC 1 and RI 2 are essentially identical, reflecting the view that clashes equally and directly exacerbate both communal dissatisfaction and regime insecurity. RI 4 is included here as an accelerator of regime insecurity in that even empty threats imply a loss of international standing; but without credible commitment to backing up the threat with action, the regime may be motivated to act quickly to pre-empt any firming of international resolve to take preventive action.

The RI accelerators are proposed as more directly relevant to geno/politicide, and the CC accelerators as more relevant to communal conflicts. Two of the CC accelerators--CC 3 (contention between moderate and militant factions) and CC 4 (formation of paramilitary units by the group or acquisition of arms)--were not included in Harff's (1996) accelerators for geno/politicide at all (except where CC 4 overlaps with RI 3 as above). However, while it is expected that all types of CC accelerators would appear more frequently than RI accelerators in the months prior to outbreak of ethnic wars (and the RI accelerators more frequently before genocides or politicides), both types of accelerators are seen as relevant to both types of crisis. Just as growing instances of communal challenge may help to precipitate an insecure regime into genocidal--or more likely, politicidal--behavior, so growing threats to regime security may help to motivate either party to a communal conflict to begin an ethnic war.

Early Warning of Ethnic Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Rwanda and Burundi

A preliminary evaluation of the usefulness of these categories was carried out first, in the same four locations as in Harff's (1996) study on genocide and politicide--Bosnia, Abkhazia. Rwanda and Burundi. This was then expanded to cover the remaining secessionist republics of the former Yugoslavia-- Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and the Kosovo autonomous region, with the latter two serving as control cases where risk was also assessed as high but ethnic war has not occurred. Kosovo was considered particularly high risk when war broke out in Slovenia and Croatia; Macedonia when war broke out in Bosnia. Rwanda and Burundi also serve as control cases for each other, with ethnic war breaking out at different times during a period when both were considered high risk.

"Kindred groups" for purposes of CC 5 events were identified as follows:

Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi; Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia; Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo; and Catholics in Croatia and Slovenia.

In light of Harff's research, the following predictions were made: 1. That the number of accelerator events per month reported during the three months immediately preceding each outbreak of ethnic war would be greater than in the rest of the preceding year for that country. The three-month period reflects the expectation that "spikes" of accelerators clustered within a single month will be less likely to lead to outbreak of ethnic war than if numbers of accelerators tend to escalate or remain high over two or more consecutive months (see Kurth, 1996). Outbreak of ethnic war is defined as occurring with

the first event codable at the highest level of the COPDAB conflict scale (internal war); and 2. That the number of accelerators per month as a proportion of the total events reported for the same month would be higher during the three months prior to outbreak of war than in the rest of the preceding year. The proportional evaluation acknowledges that many non-accelerator events are in effect "decelerators" of conflict; that is, escalating levels of conflict will only lead to war in the absence of correspondingly intense efforts to settle the conflict. Future work is planned to identify and define such decelerators more

3. That the proportion of RI to CC accelerators in the three months before outbreak of ethnic war would be higher for those conflicts which became genocidal (Bosnia and Rwanda), reflecting the greater relevance of regime insecurity in genocides, and of communal challenges to ethnic war not involving genocide. After a preliminary analysis of results for the first four (of eight) republics, an additional, subsidiary

4. That exclusion (or reduced weighting) of CC 5 accelerators (political action by kindred groups in neighbouring countries) from the model for months when there are relatively few or no internal accelerators will improve the model. It is expected that the CC 5 accelerators are significant only in combination with accelerators occurring within the country, reflecting internal instability susceptible to further inflammation or diffusion from outside conflict. For this study, a cutoff point of 10% was adopted, so that CC 5 events

are ignored if other accelerators do not make up at least 10% of the total for that month. No weights have as yet been assigned to different accelerator categories or sub-categories--the

graphed data simply reflect the number of accelerators reported in each category each month. Hence, for hypothesis 4, relevant accelerators were excluded rather than given reduced weighting at this stage. Nor is any event counted twice: the correspondence between CC 1 and RI 2 is reflected in the graphs through the same shading being applied to both categories. RI accelerators are included and equally weighted with the CC's in our predictions, based on the recognition that ethnopolitical wars may be initiated as well by insecure regimes as by dissatisfied communal challengers; but with the intention to evaluate whether the RI accelerators do provide significant additional useful information for conflict early warning, and more

particularly for those conflicts which become genocidal. Data were derived from Reuters World Service newswire reports, following standard GEDS criteria

for codable events (not restricted to headlined events only), for all reported interactions involving the parties to each conflict over a period of one year up to the outbreak of ethnic war (defined as above). The relevant dates are, for Slovenia--July 2, 1991; for Croatia-- July 10, 1991; for Bosnia--March 27, 1992; for Abkhazia--August 14, 1992; for Burundi--October 22, 1993; and for Rwanda--April 6, 1994. Data for Kosovo are examined in relation to the same dates as for Slovenia and Croatia, and those for Macedonia in relation to the same date as for Bosnia, reflecting the fact that Kosovo was commonly thought to be the likely site for the initial eruption of hostilities in Yugoslavia, and that Macedonia was commonly perceived as

Taking the findings for each of these countries in the same order as they escalated into ethnic warfare, being particularly at risk along with Bosnia in 1992.

we begin with Slovenia. As shown in figure 1, results are much as predicted, with average number of accelerators per month increasing from 9.6 to 28.7 during the final three months, and the proportion of accelerators increasing from 60% to 72%. If the CC 5 accelerators for the two months where no internal accelerators were present are excluded, the contrast between these proportions increases to 55% to 72%,

consistent with hypothesis 4.

The dominant accelerators here are CC 5 (actions by kindred groups--in this case Croats, for whom tensions were also rising) and CC 1 / RI 2 (physical or verbal clashes, attacks). There were also several instances of CC 2 (new regime policies threatening the group), and two each of CC 3 (contention between moderates and militants), RI 1 (coalescing of regime opponents) and RI 3 (external support for the group), all represented more strongly on average in the final three months (75 CC compared to 25 RI accelerators), indicating the relevance of most of the accelerator categories to this conflict, but pointing to the predominance of the CC over the RI categories as predictors of ethnic warfare, consistent with hypothesis 3.

The fighting in Slovenia was brief; after 8 days the war shifted to Croatia. Figure 2 again reflects the predicted pattern, with average number of accelerators per month increasing from 10.4 to 30.7 in the final three months, and the proportion of accelerators increasing from 54% to 73%. No CC 5's need to be excluded here, as there are no months when they are not accompanied by internal accelerators.

The distribution of accelerator categories is generally similar to that in Slovenia, except that CC 5's are less prominent than the CC 1 / RI 2 clashes. CC accelerators in the last three months were still predominant (85 CC to 59 RI) as predicted in hypothesis 3, though the contrast is less marked than for Slovenia. The escalation period for Croatia was also longer, spread over a total of seven months in this case.

In contrast, in the autonomous region of *Kosovo*, where tensions had been high since 1989, but war did not break out, the average number of accelerators per month over the same period moved from 5.7 to only 2.0 per month in the three months prior to war in Slovenia and Croatia (see figure 3), with proportions also dropping from 45% to 14%. The reduced number of accelerators from October 1990 reflects the effectiveness of the Yugoslav (Serb-dominated) government's strategy of imposing central government control on the region, following a one-month spike with high numbers of accelerators in September. There was massive suppression of the Albanian population and widespread human rights violations, but no outbreak of civil war. Interestingly, shortly after the suppression of Kosovo, from December 1990 the number of accelerators begins to increase in Croatia and Slovenia.

Eliminating the sole CC 5 event not accompanied by other accelerators makes virtually no difference to the accelerator proportions in Kosovo during the comparison year with Croatia and Slovenia; but the relevance of hypothesis 4 becomes apparent if we look at the extension of this series into early 1992, when conflict was escalating in Bosnia. The high numbers of CC 5's appearing in March and April 1992 can be discounted as accelerators for Kosovo, as there are virtually no internal accelerators being reported at that time, again consistent with hypothesis 4.

Following a relatively stable cease-fire in Croatia in late November 1991, the number of accelerators per month in neighbouring *Bosnia* began to increase (figure 4). As predicted, the number of accelerators per month increased during the final three months before outbreak of war in March 1992, from 1.9 to 13.3 per month. (Harff's earlier test of accelerators in Bosnia evaluated the months prior to the later outbreak of genocide in May 1992.) Correspondingly, the proportion of accelerators during the final three months also increased from 59% to 65%, consistent with hypothesis 2, and there is virtually no change in these proportions when the single CC 5 for May 1991 is eliminated.

The modest size of the increase in proportion of accelerators in this case reflects the many reported statements and meetings concerning Bosnia taking place outside Yugoslavia and involving the UN and other states during the final three months. There was much less evidence of cooperative efforts within Bosnia to resolve the conflict however, and it may be that as we look closer into the issue of defining conflict decelerators, that cooperative activity outside the country may need to be weighted less in the absence of corresponding cooperative efforts within the country--a mirror image of the principle tested in hypothesis 4.

The most prominent of the accelerator categories here were CC 1 / RI 2 (clashes); followed by RI 3 (increased external support), CC 2 (new regime policies threatening the group) and CC 5. As expected (hypothesis 3), the proportion of RI to CC accelerators in the last three months leading up to the genocidal

Bosnia conflict was higher (29 RI to 34 CC) than for either Slovenia or Croatia, which did not become genocidal.

In contrast, in the republic of *Macedonia*, average number of accelerators per month remained low, at 2.4 and 3.3 before and during the final three months before war in Bosnia (figure 5). Significantly, the proportion of accelerators dropped from 32% to 20% over the same period (with no CC 5's excludable under hypothesis 3), reflecting Macedonia's cooperative efforts and success in reaching a settlement in February with the Yugoslav government, leading to withdrawal of Yugoslav army forces and subsequent recognition of its independence without any reported incidents of violence. This unique outcome was later consolidated with the introduction of UN peacekeeping troops in 1993; but in March 1992 allowed the Yugoslav forces to focus their attention on the rapidly escalating conflict in Bosnia.

The accelerators that do occur from September 1991 through January 1992 reflect Macedonia's relatively non-confrontational approach to its claim for independence (the CC 1 clashes are typically verbal not physical), and widespread expressions of support and recognition (RI 3's) from other countries (with the notable exception of Greece).

The data for *Abkhazia*, a secessionist region of Georgia (figure 6), indicate as predicted, an increase in both the number and proportion of accelerators during the three months prior to outbreak of civil war in August 1992, though at a lower level of intensity overall. Average number of accelerators per month increased from 1.0 to 3.3, and proportionally from 7% to 26%; or from 4% to 16% if CC 5's are eliminated for those months where they were not accompanied by internal accelerators.

The low number of reported accelerators in this case points to a difficulty in relying on news sources for events occurring in hard-to-access areas like Abkhazia, and to the need to use public-source-based early warning indicators in conjunction with field reports rather than on their own. The relatively low proportions of accelerators reflects media and government pre- occupation with the ongoing civil conflict surrounding the ouster of, and resistance by, President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and with the secessionist rebellion in South Ossetia. Interestingly, as happened in Yugoslavia, the settlement of the South Ossetian conflict was immediately followed by the outbreak of war in Abkhazia: the CC 5 accelerators (successful action by kindred groups--the South Ossetians) for May through July include not only conflictive actions but also successful cooperative actions to end their conflict on favorable terms. Note also that the accelerators occurring early (late 1991 and especially in the single month of September) were not specific to the Abkhazians, but at least equally directed to the South Ossetians. Again, it is important not to evaluate the analytical data without reference to the narrative information available.

The most prominent categories in this case are again CC 5, CC 1 (clashes), and RI 3 (external support for the group), with one CC 2 (new policy threatening group's status) occurring early on. Proportion of RI to CC accelerators was low (3 RI to 10 CC) again as expected (see hypothesis 3).

In *Rwanda* (figure 7), there is again an increase in the number of conflict accelerators in the final three months before the outbreak of conflict (and genocide) in April 1994, following the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana in a rocket attack on his plane. The number of accelerators increased as predicted, from an average of 5.9 to 14.3 per month, and proportionally from 46% to 83% in the final three months. The peak of accelerators in October 1993 is almost entirely composed of CC 5's (actions by kindred groups), in this case reflecting the outbreak of war in neighbouring Burundi at that time. Excluding these sharpens the contrast to 33% and 83%, consistent with hypothesis 3, that CC 5's alone should be taken as significant only when accompanied by accelerator events within the country.

The same accelerator categories are prominent as in Abkhazia, but with more RI 3's and instances also of RI 1 (coalition among regime opponents) and RI 4 (empty threats of external involvement) in the weeks preceding outbreak of war. Given the immediately genocidal nature of this conflict, it is not surprising to find evidence of more RI accelerators in proportion to CC accelerators (21 RI to 29 CC) than in the other conflicts studied (hypothesis 3); and without them in this case, it would have been more difficult

to predict the outbreak of war at the time it happened.

Finally, the data for *Burund*i (figure 8) are more ambiguous. Although there is virtually no change in volume of accelerators in the last 3 months before outbreak of conflict in late October 1993 following the Tutsi-dominated army coup and assassination of elected Hutu President Ndadaye (from 2.9 per month to 3.0) there is a modest increase in the proportion of accelerators: from 60% to 75%. Moreover, given the equally risky assessments for both Rwanda and Burundi at this time, it is interesting to compare the proportion of accelerators in the three months prior to the October outbreak in Burundi with that for the same period in Rwanda, where it is only 36%. This is much less than the 75% in Burundi, and an indicator that conflict in Burundi was then the more imminent of the two, and more in need of attention.

Moreover, the lack of clear increase in number of accelerators largely reflects the predominance of CC 5 accelerators (actions by kindred groups--in this case in Rwanda with the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front seriously challenging the Hutu government of President Habyarimana). If CC 5's for January, February, May and August are excluded because of the absence of internal accelerators in accordance with hypothesis 3, the contrast in both number and proportion of accelerators sharpens as predicted: from 1.4 to 2.7 per month and proportionally from 41% to 70%.

Nevertheless, since most of the accelerators in the last three months fell on the final day before war broke out (reflecting the actions of army coup plotters and international reactions to the coup attempt) these results provide a caution that in some cases dynamic escalation to communal war will be abrupt and difficult to anticipate using any early warning model. Clearly there was much Tutsi dissatisfaction following the unexpected election of the first ever Hutu president in June, and his growing practice of replacing Tutsis in prominent administration positions with Hutus; but the planning of a coup is by nature unlikely to be reported, and its execution may provide all that is needed to set off a reactive cycle of extreme ethnic violence in the context of high levels of existing ethnic tension. The high proportion of RI to CC accelerators in this case (6 RI to 6 CC), despite the lack of genocide (hypothesis 3) is also not surprising, given that in this case conflict erupted reactively as the immediate result of a coup attempt, and thus does not reflect the usual dynamics of ethnic wars.

Overall, these results are encouraging. Even relying on a single newswire source, with unweighted accelerators, and without differentiating decelerators specifically from other non- accelerator events, it is possible to distinguish which of several high-risk neighbouring regions was sliding toward ethnic war in the coming weeks or months (hypotheses 1 and 2), indicating where preparation and planning for early response might be most warranted. Confirmation of hypothesis 4 points to the need to assign less weight to political actions by neighbouring groups when internal accelerators are not also present. More importantly, the support for hypothesis 3 suggests it is possible to also anticipate from the different accelerator patterns to some extent what form an impending crisis will take, with CC accelerators associated more with ethnic war, RI more with genocide.

All accelerators suggested by Harff were observed at least occasionally, with the exception of CC 4 (formation of paramilitary units or acquisition of arms). This suggests one area where public news sources could be supplemented by other data, in this case focusing on arms flows (see Hilterman chapter, this volume). On the other hand, the most prominent accelerators were international support for ethnopolitical groups (RI 3), political action by kindred groups (CC 5), verbal or physical clashes or confrontations with regime supporters (CC 1 / RI 2), and new regime policies threatening a group's status (CC 2). All of these appeared regularly during the escalation period to each outbreak of war. Empty threats of external involvement (RI 4) may also have been a critical factor in the Rwandan genocide; contention between moderate and militant factions (CC 3) in the non-genocidal Slovenian and Croatian conflicts; and formation of coalitions among regime opponents (RI 1) in Rwanda, Slovenia and Croatia.

A preliminary examination of the data for evidence of other potentially significant dynamic factors outside the categories so far proposed by Harff did turn up one interesting variable. Consistent with Harff's

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contention that upheaval, i.e., massive uprooting of peoples and institutions, typically precedes genocide, Helen Fein (1994) has proposed that "war with other states or within states" might be considered as a dynamic indicator of genocide. As the background and intervening conditions in Gurr's model for ethnopolitical conflict also include legacies of violent conflict and reliance on coercion to maintain power, war with other states or within states might also apply as an accelerator for ethnic conflict; on the other hand, Peter Brecke (1996; see also this volume) has suggested that separate challenges to a regime might serve as distractions and lessen the danger of war with a specific domestic group. Harff's CC 5 accelerator covers some of these instances: for example, ethnic rebellions in Slovenia and Croatia were wars within the Yugoslav state, also coded as CC 5's; and South Ossetian rebellion within Georgia qualified as CC 5 for Abkhazia- -in both cases they appeared to be important factors in precipitating ethnic war.

Looking at instances of war or regime challenge outside the CC 5 category, we found 157 in the case of Bosnia (due primarily to fighting in Croatia and Slovenia); 15 for Croatia; and 54 for Abkhazia (due to the civil war between Gamsakhurdia and the current regime which ousted him). There was no pattern in these cases where these events tended to simply increase or decrease during the months preceding outbreak of ethnic war; however, there was a common, more complex pattern, where cessation of another internal war often preceded by days or weeks the outbreak of a new war with a different ethnic group. Thus the Serbdominated Yugoslav government withdrew after only brief hostilities in Slovenia and immediately engaged in war with Croatian separatists in July 1991; then following a cease-fire with Croatia in late November, began to escalate its conflict with Bosnia, with war beginning in March 1992, not long after the February agreement to withdraw its troops from Macedonia. Similarly, the Georgian cease-fire with South Ossetians in July 1992 was quickly followed by war with Abkhazia in August.

Thus, there is some support for Brecke's contention that other conflicts serve as distractors, and indications that settlement or suspension of such other conflicts might be added as another accelerator. Whether Fein's position that other ongoing conflicts add to the risk of genocide specifically would need to be evaluated separately--though it is interesting that there is considerable overlap (over 75%) between Harff's accelerators for genocide and those for ethnopolitical conflict, with the more frequently occurring accelerators being those that are common to both models.

A comparison of the findings of this study with a separate analysis by Steve Kurth (1996) of the Yugoslav conflicts, indicates that even without the use of accelerator categories, it is possible to anticipate ethnic wars by tracking monthly conflict and cooperation scores derived from the 15-point COPDAB scale. In each case, there was a significant increase in monthly conflict levels sustained over at least two months before outbreak of war, and without any comparable increase in cooperation levels. In contrast, there were single month spikes only in Kosovo, and an increase in cooperation levels over conflict levels in Macedonia in early 1992, where no war broke out. The introduction of accelerator coding, though, does add to the clarity of the pre-war build-up, particularly in places like Slovenia where CC 5's figured prominently in the accelerator mix. The development of decelerator categories should equally improve the power of the model beyond what can be achieved by just looking at single monthly cooperation scores, or in the case of the model tested in this study, total number of non-accelerator events.

The findings thus confirm that dynamic analytical data on conflict should not be interpreted in isolation. Quantitative conflict data should be read in conjunction with data on cooperative interactions, and with specific narrative event reports (such as those provided in GEDS data, or in field reports). They should also be understood in the context of longer term risk assessment data as described in Gurr's model for ethnopolitical conflicts, and along with data for other conflicts in which the parties or their kindred may be involved. The evolving sequential models proposed by Gurr and Harff, used in conjunction with dynamic and structural data sources (such as GEDS and Gurr's Minorities at Risk) provide a systematic means for coordinating what may otherwise be a confusing array of information, and a reference point to complement the evaluations of expert analysts.

Summary and Conclusions

We have argued that there is a need to supplement field monitoring and expert analysis with systematic model-based early warning systems, supported by both dynamic and structural data systems for filtering the enormous information flows available to analysts. In particular, we have outlined the development of the Global Event-Data System (GEDS) for tracking and analytically coding the dynamic interactions of the states and major non-state communities and organizations from on-line sources, suitable for use in early warning applications. GEDS incorporates Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) scales for conflict and cooperation, along with detailed narrative summaries and analytical data on issue and event type, participants, casualties etc. While GEDS relies on partially automated human coding, ongoing development of a supplemental capacity for fully automated "pre-coding" of events was discussed. This is designed to combine our current capacity to provide detailed near-real- time data for a limited number of actors with a capacity to also monitor global trends and to test a wider variety of alternative coding schemes.

Secondly, we introduced a preliminary set of dynamic "accelerator" event categories proposed by Barbara Harff for use in a sequential early warning model for ethnopolitical conflicts; and reported results of preliminary tests of their efficacy in providing early warning of recent ethnic wars in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and in Georgia, Rwanda and Burundi. While GEDS data on monthly intensity of conflict and cooperation appear to provide a useful basis for anticipating the outbreak of ethnic wars (Kurth, 1996), more precise analysis of GEDS data in terms of Harff's suggested "accelerators" of ethnic conflict appear to provide an improved dynamic early warning model. The model shows promise in anticipating which ethnic groups were about to erupt into civil war, and which into genocide (confirming and extending Harff's earlier findings on genocide alone), allowing more timely allocation of resources for preventive action and relief efforts. Some limitations and potential refinements of the approach were discussed.

Our next step in developing this early warning model will be to identify specific categories of "decelerator" events that tend to moderate the impact of accelerators in precipitating ethnic conflicts in high risk locations. We will then be able to test the model in an expanded number of locations, and begin to refine the category definitions and provide more precise weightings for both accelerators and decelerators.

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
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
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
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


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










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
RI 1: Regime Insecurity 1 - Formation of coalition among regime opponents



RI 2: Regime Insecurity 2 - Clashes between regime supporters and communal groups

Formation of coalition among regime opponents

Regime Insecurity




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Early Warning and Deterrence Strategies: States versus Institutions

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There is no definitive evidence on when and under what conditions third parties should intervene in a coercive way to prevent ethnic tensions from escalating out of control, or how to manage crises when they do. Nor do we clearly understand the conditions under which deterrent and compellent threats (or any form of coercive diplomacy, for that matter) will succeed or fail, or how credibility and resolve are influenced by (a) the "type of intervener", (b) "the type of conflict", or (c) the "stage" at which the intervention takes place. Even more disturbing is the fact that answers to these questions are becoming crucial at a time when international relations theory is being criticised for its lack of cummulativeness, or, even worse, relevance. With respect to deterrence theory, the most widely researched form of coercive diplomacy and the focus of our study, there are no clear and consistent findings. Without an empirical base to evaluate the conditions under which coercive diplomacy is likely to succeed, answers to pressing questions about the onset, escalation and resolution of ethnic conflict and violence will remain elusive.

Our paper has three interrelated objectives: 1) to explore the nature of ethnic conflict de-escalation in the context of deterrence theory, 2) to produce policy relevant information on the success rates of different types of third party interventions, 3) to assess the impact of "crisis profiles" (ethnic / non-ethnic; interstate / intrastate) on the probability of success, and 4) to examine the larger implications for early warning and preventive diplomacy. Two propositions are tested against crisis data: 1) multistate coalitions are more likely than unilateral interveners, and unilateral interveners more likely than IOs, to control hostilities in both ethnic and non-ethnic crises; 2) multistate coalitions more likely than unilateral interveners, and unilateral interveners are more likely than IOs, to control hostilities in both interstate and intrastate crises.

Ethnic conflict, is the most common form of armed strife in this decade. There is no question that 1. Introduction ethnic strife is the dominant security challenge of the 1990s. As Michael Ignatieff argued in 1993, "huge sections of the world's population have won the right of self determination on the cruellest possible terms: they have been simply left to fend for themselves. Not surprisingly, their nation-states are collapsing" (1993: 8). Robert Kaplan's highly influential 1994 Atlantic Monthly article on the "The Coming Anarchy" offers a more bleak assessment of state failure in Africa. In this neo-Malthusian perspective - the world - especially the South - is beset by increasing conflict and crises generated by fast-growing populations, demographic

changes and weakening state capacity to regulate conflict where it is most needed. State development and ethnic conflict go hand in hand. Between 1945 and 1980, there was a gradual increase in ethnic rebellion and non-violent protest among ethnic groups. As new, institutionally weak and

divided states emerged on the geopolitical map in the 1960s the upward trend in violent ethnic conflict began. The trend is most closely associated with decolonisation and contention for state power in Africa and

Asia. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and all other European communist states has since provided the basis for ethnic rebellions in these transitional states. As a consequence, overall levels of ethnic violence in the international system reached their highest levels in the 1990s.

By 1993, there were at least 48 existing or potentially violent ethnic conflicts in progress. These included Romania, Mauritania, Rwanda-Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Algeria, Fiji, Egypt, China, Bhutan, Brazil, Mexico, India, Kosovo, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, East Timor, the Republic of Macedonia and Tadjikistan.

By 1996, the total number of ongoing very serious conflicts (those with 1000 battle-field fatalities or more) had leveled off, either because of military defeat, government concessions, or some form of concerted third party intervention. Some long-standing conflicts were either settled or at least achieved a truce during which the ethnic cleansing and bombing campaigns were interrupted. Among the most notable settlements were those in Bosnia, Northern Ireland and the Philippines. These successes contrast with failed attempts of governments to end internal wars in the Sudan, Burma, India, Iraq and Sri Lanka.

Ironically, these tensions arose at a time when barriers to third party intervention by major powers and multi-state coalitions (e.g., NATO, UN) appeared to be falling. It remains unclear, however, whether this new environment improves the capacity of third parties to manage ethnic disputes, or whether it exacerbates ethnic divisions and violence. The outlook is not promising, to say the least. Evidence from the most recent cases of protracted ethnic violence in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda confirm suspicions that, international organizations and multi-state coalitions are not well suited to handle these newly developing threats. Collectively, the findings on third party involvement indicate that:

- as the number of fatalities increase, the likelihood that non-coercive third party intervention will be successful is reduced;

- disputes involving interstate territorial or conventional security issues are far more amenable to successful third party intervention than are intrastate ethnic issues;

- third party intervention is most successful when the parties to a conflict possess a "legal" personality (states as opposed to non-state actors);

- multi-group conflicts are less amenable to de-escalation due to agency and constituency problems;

- strategic barriers to conflict reduction, such as intransigence, are due to a weak response from the international community and the gains expected from continued fighting.

With these points in mind, this paper has three interrelated objectives: The first is to assess current problems in conflict prevention and management in the context of intrastate and ethnic strife. A second goal is to relate this knowledge to preventive strategies for third-party interventions that promote early and rapid deescalation in tensions. Third, and perhaps most challenging, is the search for conditions under which proactive operations are likely to succeed.

The paper unfolds in six sections. In the first section, we discuss constraints on prevention and deterrence. In the second we develop a model of deterrence. In the third part of the paper we derive propositions from the model and place them in the context of intrastate and ethnic conflict. In the fourth and fifth parts of the paper we explain our methodology and test the propositions against the evidence. The sixth part draws some conclusions and identifies areas for further research in the context of early warning.

2. Deterrence, Third Party Intervention and Ethnic Crisis Management

Why are insights about both basic processes and policies related to ethnic and intrastate conflict so urgently needed? Even a brief, four-point review of contemporary global politics is sufficient to answer that question. First, technological change sustains the trend toward more rapid escalation of international crises.

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Decision makers are pressured to make critical decisions in progressively shorter time intervals and that is especially problematic when underlying conflicts concern explosive issues connected to ethnic identity.

Second, international organizations and individual states experience a great deal of pressure to manage and even resolve ethnic conflicts. This perceived responsibility for action to preserve human rights and political stability is unlikely to go away.

Third, a possible long-term decline in the utility of unilateral coercive diplomacy towards cost effective multilateral preventive strategies, creates the need to coordinate military actions with diplomatic communications, information and analysis. This kind of cooperation is made difficult by a limited ability to demonstrate clear resolve and identify limited objectives, especially when the number of actors involved expands beyond a very few.

Fourth, and finally, the size and diversity of the modern world creates problems for civilian control over military forces stationed abroad. These complications may even outpace improvements in communications and transportation, which makes multilateral militarized options a more risky and potentially unattractive venture with the passing of time.

It is clear that the UN, the world's leading international organization, is not equal to the challenges created by the preceding four factors. Adelman and Suhrke have suggested that one of the greatest problems in UN intervention is policy incoherence (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). Adelman suggests that within multilateral situations "...assignation of roles encourages waffling because a decision must be made and responsibilities accepted" (Adelman 1996: 34). The commensurate bureaucratic pulling and hauling within and between institutions stifles immediate response and leads to ambiguous half-measures.

Today, the pace of events is faster than ever before, pressure exists for help in multiple regions, coordination of diplomatic and military strategies is crucial and ethnic conflict occurs in a larger and more diverse international system. The demands on the UN's abilities to manage and resolve ethnic conflict seem overwhelming when juxtaposed with the difficulties that the organization currently faces. Debates occur within the ranks of the UN over division of labour and burden sharing. The UN is still recovering financially from a recent phase of activity and must deal with the problem of unpaid dues from its members. Perhaps most important of all is the intense conflict with the US, by far the most important member of the organization, over a wide range of important issue.

Despite these shortcomings, UN-based deterrence strategies are potentially useful for two kinds of tasks: preventing an internal conflict from becoming violent as in the Golan Heights (Mandell 1996) or spreading into an adjacent territory as in Macedonia (Kaufman 1997). However, apart from the presence of consent - an important precondition for any peacekeeping operation - preventive deployment is generally not thought to be consistent with current thinking on UN peacekeeping operations. Given the ambitious goals of preventive deployment, which is essentially a form of limited deterrence, it can be effective only if both sides to a conflict agree to and cooperate with the mission. Thus, success is more likely if adversaries also recognize the limitations in using violence to resolve differences and are open to the conditions for peace presented to them. If such acceptance and commitments are lacking are UN-based deterrence operations likely to be effective?

There is no definitive evidence on when and under what conditions third parties should intervene in order to prevent ethnic tensions from escalating out of control, or how to manage crises when they do. Nor do we clearly understand the conditions under which deterrent and compellent threats (or any form of coercive diplomacy, for that matter) will succeed or fail, or how credibility and resolve are influenced by (a) the *type of intervener*, (b) *the type of conflict*, or (c) the *stage* at which the intervention takes place. Even more disturbing is the fact that answers to these questions are becoming crucial at a time when theory and policy on early warning are being criticised for their lack of cumulation and their inability to overcome analytical gaps. With respect to deterrence theory and strategy, the most widely researched form of coercive diplomacy and the subject of our paper, there are no clear and consistent findings. Without an empirical base

to evaluate the conditions under which coercive diplomatic strategies are likely to succeed, answers to pressing questions about the onset, escalation and prevention of ethnic conflict and violence will remain elusive. Our paper provides some preliminary evidence on: 1) the success rate of different types of interventions, and 2) the impact of different types of conflict on the probability of successful intervention. The model is presented in the next section, followed by a discussion of assumptions and specification of propositions. We argue that:

1. States are better equipped to respond to and prevent certain conflicts;

2. Deterrence is crucial, but rarely is there a collective political will to act prior to the outbreak of violence:

3. Early warnings are often ignored, simply because leaders are convinced that they can not satisfy some or all of the prerequisites for successful deterrence.

3. A Model of Deterrence

John Ruggie (1993) developed a theory to clarify the strategic dimensions of third party military intervention. Addressing the issue within the context of UN activity, Ruggie argues that there is a need to fill the 'doctrinal void' between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Missions which involve goals clearly beyond those of traditional peacekeeping, such as seeking to neutralize local forces and to push belligerent parties towards the negotiating table, require different strategies. Ruggie proposes that international forces be given the means and mandate to "deter, dissuade and deny" (D³) the use of force by local protagonists (Ruggie 1993). If deterrence of violence fails, Ruggie argues, deployed forces attempt to dissuade parties from continuing military activities. Failure on this level necessitates the use of force to deny any one side military victory in a conflict.

Using the same theoretical insights as Ruggie, Harvey (1997) examines third party intervention in the former Yugoslavia through the prism of deterrence theory. Harvey argues that, in almost every major encounter with the Bosnian Serbs between April 1993 and April 1994, US and European (NATO) officials failed to satisfy even the most basic strategic requirements of deterrence. Instead, external powers either diluted or intentionally qualified most of their retaliatory threats. As failures mounted, Bosnian officials simply ignored subsequent efforts to control hostilities. In contrast, satisfaction of all three prerequisites for effective deterrence ultimately re-established credibility and enabled the US and NATO to control fighting and obtain cooperation on key demands. Eventually, NATO/UNPROFOR did create the incentive for the Serbs to sign the Dayton Peace Accord by making it costly for the Serbs to persist in rejecting demands. Consistent with Ruggie and Harvey's assessments, NATO eventually escalated its involvement in 1995 through a week-long series of selective airstrikes against Serb positions after Serb forces laid siege to Sarajevo. The attacks were intended to force the Serbs to remove their artillery aimed at UN designated safe areas.

Whether the lead role is played by a multilateral or state actor, deterrence theory stipulates that a retaliatory threat will succeed if (A) leaders define the unacceptable behavior and communicate to challengers a commitment to punish violations, (B) the threatened punishment is severe enough to deny the challenger the objectives sought, (C) the deterring state possess the means (capability) to do so, and (D_{1-3}) leaders demonstrate the resolve to carry through with the threat (Lebow and Stein 1989: 53-55).

Resolve is most effectively demonstrated through costly signals -- i.e., any action, statement or condition that increases the political, economic or military costs associated with the status quo, while lowering the costs of responding to a challenger's probes. Resolve is enhanced in one or more of the following ways: D1) actions (e.g., deployment of air, sea or ground forces; evacuation of peacekeepers from safe-havens, thus allowing a more decisive air-strike response to probes); D₂.) statements (e.g., public announcements (promises) of impending retaliation: using explicit ultimatums and deadlines;

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public displays of unity among coalition members in support of response); D_3) domestic support for retaliation (e.g., public opinion; positive domestic and international press coverage). If these conditions (**A**-**D**₁₋₃) are satisfied, the expected net costs of the threatened sanction (to the challenger) should be greater than the expected net gain of non-compliance, because the punishment (if carried out) would prevent the challenger from achieving intended goals. If these requirements are met, but the behavior still occurs, that would constitute a case of failure -- both in theory and strategy. On the other hand, if one or more of the conditions are not satisfied, the theory predicts failure in most cases. In other words, even clear and credible threats will fail if the challenger believes the challenge is worth the risks and political, military or economic costs incurred by triggering the threatened response.

With this in mind, we address two key questions in this paper: 1) are some third-party interveners more capable than others of satisfying these prerequisites (i.e., deterring challenges)? 2) are some third-party interveners more capable than others of controlling violence and achieving key objectives if and when deterrence fails? Our model builds on Regan's (1996) study of utility estimates of challengers faced with a threat of third party intervention. According to Regan, when contemplating a challenge, a typical challenger's preference ordering is:

Us > Ubd > Ui.

Where:

Ubd	= utility (payoff) to challenger for backing down in the face of 3rd party threat. ¹
Z	= probability that the third party intervener will intervene if challenge takes place.
Ui	= utility (payoff) to challenger if intervention takes place. ²
Us	= utility for a successful challenge (with no intervention)

If Ubd > z(Ui) + (1-z)(Us) then the challenger is expected to back down and deterrence succeeds. Based on this preference order, Regan (1996: 14) argues that the critical risk for the challenger is z>Us-Ubd/Us-Ui --"...when the right hand side of the inequality is greater than z, the challenger will not be deterred by the threat (that is, violence will escalate); when the right hand side of the inequality is smaller than z, the challenger will succumb to the threat (deterrence succeeds). By implication, the intervener can manipulate the challenger's critical risk on two dimensions: by increasing the utility to the challenger of backing down in the face of a threat (Ubd), thus decreasing the value of the numerator in the equation; or by decreasing the utility to the challenger of the intervention (Ui), thus increasing the value of the denominator.³

We make two interrelated arguments in this context. First, the challenger's utility estimates are directly related to the *type of third party intervener* (state versus international organization) and the *type of conflict* (intrastate versus interstate, ethnic versus non-ethnic)). Both of these factors have an impact on the challenger's utility estimates (and critical risk), because the prerequisites for successful deterrence are more or less present depending on the type of intervener and dispute in question. Second, in line with conventional wisdom, crises occur through phases (Kriesberg 1997, Dixon 1996, Lund 1996). While Regan's model is very useful for understanding a challenger's decision calculus during the onset phase (that is, before intervention takes place), a slightly different set of utility (and critical risk) estimates are likely to be made by the challenger once an intervention takes place, during the peak or crisis phase of the conflict. The revised preference order for the challenger, then, is:

Usi >Us>Ubd>Ui>Ubdi.

Where:

Ubdi	= utility to challenger for backing down in the face of 3rd party intervention
Us	= utility to challenger of a successful challenge without intervention
Ui	= utility to challenger of not backing down following third-party intervention
psi	= probability that 3rd party will succeed in preventing escalation
Usi	= utility to challenger of successfully challenging 3rd party
Uui	= utility to challenger of unsuccessful challenge

The challenger will back down during the peak or crisis phase when Ubdi > psi(Uui) + (1-psi)(Usi).⁴ The revised critical risk for the challenger following intervention (based on above preference order) is z>Usi-Ubdi/Usi-Uui. Once again, there are two ways to improve the chances of deterrence success at this stage of the crisis: (a) by increasing the numerator (that is, the utility of backing down after intervention), and/or (b) by decreasing the denominator (that is, decrease the utility of an unsuccessful challenge).⁵ As deterrence theory stipulates, both of these can be accomplished if the third-party intervener satisfies the four key prerequisites for successful deterrence, as described above. However, the ability to satisfy these conditions varies with the dispute profile -- the *type of conflict* and *type of intervener*.⁶ The next section outlines key assumptions and propositions derived from the model.

4. Assumptions and Propositions

According to Carment and Rowlands (1996):

By presenting a **credible** military threat, a third party force seeks to convince all conflictual parties that violence will not succeed. International force is brought to bear not to defeat but to neutralize the local forces and to reduce the expected gains of continued fighting. The political objective is to prevent local force from becoming the successful arbiter of disputes and to persuade combatants that they have no viable alternative but to reach a third party assisted negotiatedsettlement. The intended effect is to deny victory to any one group in order to create the military stalemate on which negotiated settlements often depend. To ensure credible effectiveness, coalition forces must not only decide whether to escalate their intervention, but also must consider the degree of coercion to apply.

In order to compare the success rates of third-party state versus international organization intervention into ethnic conflict, we begin with the following assumptions:

1: the probability of successful third-party intervention depends on the ability of the thirdparty to satisfy all four prerequisites for successful deterrence, as stipulated above: communication, commitment, capability and resolve.

2: states are more capable than international organizations of satisfying more of these prerequisites, more often.

Successful intervention is measured with reference to levels of violence and outcome. With respect to controlling violence, Regan (1996a: 17) makes a compelling case for why violence is an appropriate indication of success or failure: stopping the violence usually is a key motivating factor for most interveners; decisions to intervene are often based on some perceived political need for immediate results; most declarations and public statements tend to focus on stopping the violence, so we can assume that this is a common goal; and the cessation of hostilities is usually required in order to "initiate meaningful dialogue in an effort to resolve dispute." Regardless of the variety of motivations, Regan argues, a single underlying goal is present: the implementation of a strategy that will bring an end to hostilities: "[t]he key to any intervention strategy is to alter the calculations by which the antagonists arrive at particular outcomes...[t]he goal is to make it too costly for the combatants to continue fighting" (Regan 1996: 341). Based on these assumptions, and the basic tenets of deterrence theory, the following propositions about the effectiveness of third-party intervention are tested:

Proposition 1:

ethnic crises are more likely than non-ethnic crises to be violent (Carment 1993, 1997 Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997).

Proposition 2:

Intrastate crises are more likely than interstate crises to be violent (Regan 1996, Dixon 1996).

Proposition 3a/b:	states are more likely than IOs to control hostilities in both ethnic and non-ethnic
Sing y style lives in the li	crises. states are more likely that IOs to achieve key objectives in both <i>ethnic</i> and <i>non</i> -
Proposition 4a/b:	ethnic crises.
Proposition 5a/b:	states are more likely than IOs to control hostilities in both <i>intra-</i> and <i>interstate</i>
Proposition 6a/b:	states are more likely than IOs to achieve key objectives in both <i>intra-</i> and
and all all and and and	interstate crises.

This list of propositions is not intended to be exhaustive. They serve only as a preliminary list of expectations derived from deterrence theory and the model outlined above. Moreover, the evidence is intended to be suggestive rather than definitive. For example, empirical support for these propositions can help to estimate the probability of successful intervention across different conflict profiles. The following typology is used to illustrate one possible rank ordering of conflict scenarios that could be produced through these tests. They are listed in order of probability of success.

Deterrence Typology Hypothesised Probability of Success

State intervention into interstate non-ethnic conflict State intervention into intrastate non-ethnic conflict, IO intervention into interstate non-ethnic conflict, IO intervention into intrastate non-ethnic conflict, State intervention into interstate ethnic conflict, State intervention into intrastate ethnic conflict, IO intervention into interstate ethnic conflict, IO intervention into interstate ethnic conflict, IO intervention into interstate ethnic conflict, IO intervention into intrastate ethnic conflict ----- highest success

----- lowest success

It should be noted that a fair test of these propositions requires that we compare the relative effectiveness of different interveners (state vs. IO, the independent variable) when one and/or the other is highly involved in the crisis. If we don't control for "high" intervention, it would be difficult to know whether the variation on the dependent variable (violence or outcome, operationalized below) is the result of the intervener or the intervention (low, medium, high). By selecting only those cases in which the intervener is highly involved, it is much easier to make straightforward comparisons without having to deal with issues related to intensity. We return to this issue later in the paper.⁷

A few examples will illustrate the logic associated with this particular rank ordering. If the conflict is interstate and, for example, based on territory, we would expect greater success, because there are clearly defined rules and procedures in place to help states negotiate these kinds of settlements – that is, states are recognized actors with legal personality (Dixon 1996). Somalia illustrates the problem of managing nonterritorial issues in the context of intrastate conflicts. Ethnic conflicts (in this case clan-based) are more difficult than non-ethnic conflicts to manage, especially for IOs, given their inability to satisfy the capability and communication prerequisites for deterrence (Regan 1996). In an intrastate conflict, any measure of success is highly dependent on the characteristics of the adversaries, the nature of the dispute and its level of intensity. Bercovitch has argued that when vital interests are at stake in a conflict, third parties are unlikely to very effective in peacefully settling the conflict. The identity and characteristics of the adversaries are also important factors that can influence the effectiveness of the third party. Disunity and lack of cohesion within the ranks of the adversaries makes it difficult for the adversaries and the third party to engage in any

meaningful form of conflict settlement, because the leader's lack the power or authority to take decisions or make concessions.

Consider the similarities between Bosnia and Somalia. Both conflicts emerged out of civil wars and eventual state collapse. Somalia's implosion was a lingering 10 year struggle between Barre's clan and its rivals; struggles deeply rooted in that country's 30 year irredentist confrontation with Ethiopia. In contrast, Bosnia's collapse was abrupt, predictable and almost entirely due to Yugoslavia's disintegration; events that emerged in only the last few years of Yugoslavia's existence. Both conflicts have their origins in identity-based territorial claims.

The characteristics of the adversaries and the nature of the disputes are also similar. According to Gurr the two conflicts exemplify "communal contenders for state power". These are violent disputes consisting of "heterogenous assemblages of contending ethnopolitical groups; political power at the centre is based on intergroup coalitions. Institutional change opens up opportunities by which communal groups could more openly pursue their objectives" (1994:321). An important feature of both conflicts is the fragmented nature of political and military power. In both cases military disruption was a response to the escalation of social conflict. In general, ethnic wars are a function of low levels of institutionalisation, narrow and ethnically defined elite bases of political support and high levels of ethnic consciousness due to regime repression, civil unrest and loss of civil liberties. Such societies are unlikely to develop civic cultures conducive to policies that manage or reduce ethnic conflict.

5. Methodology and Operationalization of Variables

This inquiry relies on data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1991, 1997). ICB data provide a wide range of cases and variables (1945-1994). This permits more nuanced evaluation than a data set that focuses exclusively on violent events, most notably war. Indeed, many crises are managed successfully without recourse to violence. Among other important indicators, the data also provide the number of states involved, the nature of the threat, and issues over which the crisis arose. Such information is vital in determining whether the conflict is ethnically based. Furthermore, many of the cases are intrastate ethnic conflicts with spillover effects (i.e., Bosnia, Congo).

Conflicts of either the ethnic or non-ethnic variety and inter or intrastate variety that have yet to produce international crises are not included in the analysis. The ICB collection is large enough, with sufficiently diverse spatial and temporal characteristics, to justify its use. Furthermore, given ICB's selection rules and procedures for identifying cases, it is very improbable that any intense ethnic conflict would be overlooked during data assembly. This time frame covers the history of the UN from its inception to the transition phase into the post-Cold War era.

A two-stage content analysis took place for each crisis.⁸ Each crisis was coded as either intra or interstate respectively and ethnic or non-ethnic respectively. In each crises the case must include a foreign policy crisis for at least one state (see Carment & James 1997, for coding procedure). The ICB Project's definition refers to "a situation with three individually and collectively sufficient conditions, deriving from changes in a state's internal or external environment. All three perceptions are held by the highest-level decision-makers of the actor concerned: a threat to basic values, awareness of finite time for response to the value threat and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities" (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1991).

The independent variable, **type of intervener**,⁹ is identified by whether the highest crisis management technique was implemented by a state or by an institution.¹⁰Well-suited to assess the institution's role in a crisis are the ICB variables that focus on global organization and regional involvement. These variables identify the **content** of UN or Regional Organizational involvement during the course of an international crisis.¹¹ A similar coding was utilised in identifying state involvement. The range of techniques are identified in Table 2.

With respect to the dependent variable (success/failure), most studies have equated deterrence

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failure with the outbreak of war and other forms of violence. While this is crucial for tests of deterrence, a greater role should be reserved for the achievement or denial of the intervener's and challenger's policy interests and objectives (Kugler 1984; Huth 1990; Huth and Russett 1990). Clearly, if third-parties manage to control violence by threatening intervention, but fail to (a) obtain policy objectives in that process, or (b) prevent the challenger from obtaining its goals, deterrence cannot be regarded as completely successful. As Huth and Russett (1990) argued, cases of successful deterrence should include instances in which the challenger did not resort to military force and did not coerce the third-party intervener into capitulating to its demands. Similarly, deterrence failures should include cases in which the challenger either attained its policy goals or resorted to the sustained use of force. In sum, it is not only the costs of 'violence' that are considered in a decision maker's utility calculus, but the costs associated with overall 'victory' and 'defeat'. Therefore, although the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of war and major hostilities is an important indicator, valid testing requires a research design which specifies a range of dependent variables, including goal achievement, in order to determine whether interactions among states confirm the logic derived from the theory (Harvey 1995).

We use two indicators of success, *violence* and *outcome*, both operationalized using ordinal variables from ICB. Violence is assessed in terms of the intensity (or severity) from no or low clashes to full scale war. For the purposes of this analysis we have dichtomized the severity of violence in order to identify those crises which managed to avoid sever violence and those that did not. With respect to outcome (i.e., achievement or non-achievement of goals and/or objectives in the crisis), 'perceptual' measures are utilized. The intervener's level of satisfaction, upon termination of the crisis, is used to represent whether the disputants were either all or partially satisfied. Again the variable is dichotomized.

6. Analysis of Data and Preliminary Findings

We begin by comparing results from the zero-order correlation between type of intervener and violence avoidance (Table 1) and outcome (Table 2) with the results produced when intervening variables ("ethnicity" and "type of conflict") are introduced. For these preliminary runs we rely on **gamma** and **tau** statistics, both commonly used inferential statistics for ordinal variables. For purposes of simplicity we assess intrastate and interstate conflicts independent of whether they are ethnic or non-ethnic, although the relationship between success and intervener should still hold as identified in the elbaorated typology noted above.

In the first of the two tables, Gamma statistics are strong AND in the right direction (negative). Negative because of the way the value labels were assigned for the IV and DV. If our assumptions and propositions are correct, we should expect to find higher values on the independent variable (3.00, corresponding to high state AND IO involvement, that is, a stronger/more credible deterrent threat) to be associated with lower values on the dependent variable (0.00, corresponding to "no violence"). That explains the negative values.

Almost all of the Gamma stats are pretty strong, implying that the "type of intervener" (IV) is related to success, although the numbers are more impressive for "violence" than they are for "outcome." With respect to the control variables, it appears that the relationship between type of intervener and success (violence) is affected by the conflict setting (ethnicity and inter(ra)stateness), although the effects are not uniformly strong. In fact Table 1 suggests that the relationship is the reverse from that hypothesised in the case of non-ethnic and interstate cases. States appear to be less succesful than IOs in reducing levels of violence in these situations but more succesful in reducing violence in ethnic and intrastate conflicts. These differences are presented, graphically in Figure 1 which identifies the percentage of crises avoiding severe violence by the type of intervener.

[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 Here]

We see that non-ethnic cases present the greatest chance for reduction of violence compared to all other types of conflict. Thus, with respect to controlling violence across conflict types (ethnic/non-ethnic categories), the results appear to confirm our expectations: ethnic conflicts are more difficult to control than non-ethnic conflicts. This interpretation is based on Somers' D and Gamma statistics, both of which measure the proportion (percentage) of errors we can reduce when predicting values on the dependent variable, violence, given information on the independent variable -- a Gamma of .3423 means we can reduce about 34% of the error when predicting values on the dependent variable. In the context of our study, for example, a Gamma of 1.00 (or -1.00) means we would always be correct when predicting violence levels in a crisis if we new the type of intervener.

zero order	Somers' D =20697	Gamma =39221
non-ethnic	Somers' D =19548	Gamma =37358
ethnic	Somers' D =15292	Gamma =33005

As we move from non-ethnic to ethnic conflicts, our ability to predict violence levels based on type of intervener decreases, because the negative relationship between type of intervener and violence is weaker. If our assumptions are accurate, deterrence is more likely to work as expected in non-ethnic conflicts better than in ethnic conflicts and within these types of conflicts, state AND IO intervention is more likely than state-only intervention to control hostilities. Of course, our predictions do not improve by significant amounts.

With respect to comparing interstate and intrastate conflict and violence avoidance, the results appear to confirm our expectations: interstate crises are easier than intrastate crises to control:

zero order	Somers' D =20697	Gamma =39221
Interstate	Somers' D =19334	Gamma =36440
Intrastate	Somers' D =23957	Gamma =48357

As we move from interstate to intrastate crisis, our ability to predict violence levels based on the type of intervener increases, because the relationship between type of intervener and success (reduced violence levels) is stronger. Deterrence is more likely to work as expected in interstate conflicts and within these types of conflicts, state AND IO intervention is more likely than state-only intervention to control hostilities.

In summary non-ethnic and interstate conflicts are more likely to managed peacefully compared against both ethnic and intrstate conflicts. However, mixed strategies, those involving both IOs and states appear to be most capable of conflict reduction within each type. IOs by themselves seem to be least effective in ethnic and intrastate conflicts.

[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 Here]

This finding does not appear to transfer over to measurements on the dependent variable "outcome" in which we find lower levels of satisfaction when IOs are involved as compared to cases where either IOs and states are involved together or states alone are involved. This finding is true save for intrastate conflicts in which IO involvement records high levels of satisfaction (Figure 2). In general however, the findings in Table 2 are uniformly weak and insignificant. There is a less apparent relationship between type of intervener and success measured in terms of satisfaction levels. However, there are two problems with defining success with reference to satisfaction levels. First, ALL SATISFIED is difficult to achieve under the best of circumstances, even when deterrence succeeds or when third party intervention works. Second, SOME DISSATISFIED almost always occurs when third party intervention succeeds or when deterrence works. Therefore, the weak results do not necessarily disconfirm our propositions.

zero order	Somers' D =00087	Gamma =00217
non-ethnic	Somers' $D =02733$	Gamma =07182
ethnic	Somers' $D = .00363$	Gamma = .00844

However, we can still use the direction of the results to make some observations. Although the findings are very weak, the negative results for ethnic crises suggest that coercive diplomacy works as expected in this context. The positive results for ethnic crises suggest, once again, that outcomes of ethnic crises are more difficult to predict with reference to deterrence theory.

zero order	Somers' D =00087	Gamma =00217
Interstate	Somers' $D = .00894$	Gamma = .02184
Intrastate	Somers' D =02476	Gamma =06461

7. Conclusions: Deterrence, Third-Party Intervention and Early Warning

Clearlyour mixed results suggest that we need to revise both our assumptions about deterrence and our procedures for testing its effectiveness. The next phase would be to link deterrence stratgies to early warning. Early warning research is at a cross-roads. There is already a burgeoning and widely accepted body of research on indicators, accelerators and underlying causes that have proved themselves capable of providing accurate and timely information and analysis. Even though there was some initial resistance among policy-makers to the utilization of systematic approaches to conflict prevention, their place, at least for now, in the analysis of emerging conflicts seems assured. Yet, these and other diagnostic tools are at risk of being slowly engulfed by a bigger rift between policy and theory. Lund (1996) has characterised this problem as information overload; Jentleson (1995) identifies the issue as being the difference between solving problems and breaking secrets. Others have suggested that early warning in the absence of interest is simply news. Risk assessment, they argue, pertains not only to those trapped in an unfolding conflict but also to those faced with the difficult decision of how and when to respond (Carment, 1997).¹² Governments still carry the heavy burden of having to choose to act in a timely and responsible fashion in response to a perceived threat. As Bruce Jentleson has argued: "taking available early warning seriously always carries with it the high penalty of deciding what to do about it". Our findings, while certainly not conclusive, would suggest that more work needs to be done in linking analysis to action. To convince themselves that action is necessary, decision makers must have exact knowledge about the costs of not being involved coupled with the likelihood that a conflict will escalate. Therefore, early warning is necessary only if decision makers can be persuaded that accurate information is useful to finding an appropriate fit between strategy, the problem at hand and resources available. Decision makers can then develop an active and effective response to the specific conflict based on a combination of factors. These would include the salience of the conflict, the potential for a larger regional conflict, the resources available and the available alternatives (which might include doing nothing).

Therefore to be policy relevant (re: of interest to states) early warning must take on three distinct qualities (George, 1991). It must be diagnostic, whereby emphasis is on describing how and why things work as they do. It must also take the form of a conditional generalization -- that is, in situation X, if one does Y, one should expect Z. Finally, policy-relevant early warning must be prescriptive, offering explicit recommendations to policy makers faced with certain kinds of problems. It is this third area of early warning research that is most in need of attention (Lund 1996).

To this end we propose the following:

First, analysis must focus not only on awareness of the problems at hand but also on the tools at our disposal and the linkages between the two. Assessments of various strategies, including the work by Lund (1996), Dixon (1996) and Diehl (1996) and Kriesberg (1997) suggest that particular third party strategies are suited to relatively narrow time frames within the phases of a conflict. Deterrence is no exception.

Second, third party interventions into ethnic conflicts succeed and fail for reasons that can be linked to the central tenets of deterrence theory. Ethnic and intrastate conflicts leading to crises call for superior leverage and leadership that is capable of directing, containing and reducing the level of violence and spillover. Only a few states possess these characteristics.

Third, does it really matter whether we enhance early warning capabilities if managing ethnic conflict depends on who ultimately intervenes? Howard Adelman has suggested that early warning is about anticipation and responding to prevent likely events from occurring (Adelman, 1996: 32). Adelman argues that humanitarian realism is the appropriate frame of reference for developing and enhancing response to early warning. Presumably, this perspective means that equal weighting be given to both state values and state interests in the formation of preventive policies. In the short run, more effective strategies may mean that international organizations will need to behave more like states.¹³

Fourth, major powers are not likely to become heavily involved in preventing ethnic conflicts until it is clear that substantial political, military or humanitarian benefits will be gained from the intervention. This finding is consistent with George's argument that the essence of statecraft is to develop and manage relationships with other states in ways that will protect and enhance one's own security and welfare. Lund has argued that a state will act in a way that favours its own particular interests and often a state may be unable to act until has secured the support of its public and or political elite (Lund 1996). State interests may not always coincide expeditiously nor they may be self-evident in every instance. It may be the role of the academic to illuminate linkages, identify common ground and locate associated opportunity structures.

Fifth, rare is the direct proof that preventive efforts are responsible for accomplishing anything significant. Even if they have, leaders are confronted with a particularly difficult task when trying to mount large scale preventive efforts. The dilemma deterrence theorists face when trying to identify successes (that is, proving that a retaliatory threat prevented a challenge) applies equally well to preventive action; it succeeds when nothing happens. The problem is obvious -- if there is no war to stop, or, for that matter, any other concrete measure of preventive success, leaders are not likely to make the first (often essential) move, even if early involvement is cost effective over the long run. Thus, proposals on conflict prevention are often more farsighted than current circumstances permit. This is because the thinking of interested governments has yet to move sufficiently far to reshape their approach to the many ways in which peace is sustained. In other words, to effectively anticipate and address impending conflicts the international community needs not only to consider revising the existing provisions and mechanisms for maintaining peace, but changing the attitudes of its users and publics.

Sixth, compounding this issue is the fact that most ethnically-based civil wars, are local affairs attracting little interest from extra-regional actors. The particularities of ethnic conflicts tend to make them self-limiting as a basis for undermining the sovereignty of other states. In the post-Cold War era, claims that give rise to ethnic violence have expanded across borders in so far as there are kindred groups who might be interested in providing support. In essence this means that most conflicts do not spread like "wild-fire". Even neighbouring states who might have every reason to undermine a rival have generally shown surprising restraint in expressing unconditional support for secessionist claims.¹⁴

Finally, when society allocates resources, three questions must be answered: who should decide; whose values count; and who should pay? Perfectly rational individuals have difficulty making decisions under uncertainty. Present to an ordinary tax paying citizen a choice between committing resources to either a humanitarian mission which has a number of tangible and measurable (if not always successful) results or a preventive forward looking policy designed to deter conflicts which constitute no present danger to his/her interests and the choice is clear. In turn, elected officials will respond to dilemmas of this form by simply behaving like their supporters.

Since the first choice is more inviting and since at the domestic level, risk spreading is desirable, it will always be the first choice among elected officials. This matter of fact, creates a very large need for background analysis and research. Academics and analysts can provide a much needed long term assessment of conflicts where the payoffs may not be very high. In sum, "analysis in the absence of threat", political forecasting and trend assessment are all crucial to the long term management of Western security interests. These are areas where academics and governments need to focus in partnership.

Notes

1. This is usually very low, unless there never was an intention to challenge, but this is a difficult thing to determine. It could be high if political leaders have a preference for demonstrating the military's weakness in an effort to purge the military of rogue leaders and regain control over foreign policy (as in Chechnya). This too is also difficult to isolate, since "no action" may or may not be interpreted as backing down, while and some "actions" may or may not represent a decision to back down, depending on the provocation or the demands outlined in the third-party ultimatum.

2. This may be high or low, depending on challenger's objectives, intentions and capabilities. Bosnian Serb leaders actually preferred certain kinds of interventions by NATO, as long as they were limited. This gave them an opportunity to demonstrate successes against an international coalition of forces sponsored by NATO and UN. The point is that Ui often depends on the type of intervention that is to take place, which is directly related to propositions regarding the relative success of state versus international organization intervention.

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4. If the challenger backs down, the intervener receives a greater net benefit than had they initially intervened high. The problem is that the challenger is aware of this gap between credibility and capability and will attempt to force the issue by testing the third-party's commitment. The net result is that there is a gradual escalation of the conflict until that point when the belligerent has more to lose by continuing to fight. We are concerned with identifying conditions that facilitate this transfer point. The speed at which this occurs depends on the capacity of the intervener to increase the costs of a challenge. Once again, this varies depending on the profile of the intervener and the type of conflict. Moreover, for the multilateral to intervene high at the outset requires an estimation of the opponent's willingness to continue fighting. There are instances where that willingness might be low (low expected gains) and some where it might be quite high. That willingness is a function of not only the capabilities of the intervener but the other ethnic group (ie Serbs vs Bosnian Muslims / Croatians). b) therefore the capability of the belligerent determines its willingness to back down in addition to expected gains from continued fighting. There may be instances where low capability plus low gains mean that a multilateral is effective in a low intensity intervention(Rwanda). The utility function of the challenger needs to include these factors. If the unilateral is even more likely to control escalation (prevent a challenge) than a multilateral under the same "low capability / low gains" situation, then our expectations regarding the relative capacity of unilaterals and multilaterals to satisfy coercive diplomatic requirements would be supported. In any case, the utility function of the challenger (as noted above) does include these factors in the form of Ui and Ubd.

5. If we combine the utility estimates from each phase, that is, if we assume that a challenger's overall utility for backing down at the onset of the crisis is based on evaluation of both pre- and post-intervention scenarios -- then the new expected utility model for the challenger's decision to back down during the onset stage is Ubd > (z(Ui) + (1-z)(Us)).

6. Events in Bosnia identify the central problem for a third party in managing intrastate conflicts: The benefit of a negotiated outcome decreases for both actors when one of them decides to escalate (Diehl 1993). The further apart the two sides are on a negotiated settlement, the higher the costs associated with disagreement (or the higher the value of a negotiated settlement). An actor concedes, as did the Bosnian-Serbs in late 1995, if the costs of enduring further escalation outweigh the benefits of giving in to the opponent. Knowing this, a third party force may therefore seek to raise the costs borne by one or more of the combatants by engaging in more aggressive operations. These operations, however, also impose a cost on the intervenor (MacKinlay 1993b). Theoretically, depending on the objective at hand and resistance met, third parties do have an incentive to escalate. As Schelling (1960) points out, escalation motivates actors to make concessions at the bargaining table. In any intrastate conflict a third party coalition can, in theory, assist in guaranteeing agreements between disputants. The task is made easier if the groups have reached their own self-imposed "hurting stalemate". Then the purpose of the intervention is exclusively to separate the forces and keep the peace. At this stage a viable low intensity mission requires territorial demarcation as well as some minimal agreement between enemies.

7. There are other ways to tap into the four pre-requisites more directly as a way of testing deterrence theory. Two variables coded in ICB are particularly helpful in this regard: COMLEV, which identifies the method of communication used in the dispute, can help to establish whether the "communication" prerequisite (A) was satisfied; similarly, GLOBFAVR, which identifies the extent to which the actions of the global organization in the dispute were viewed favourably, can be used to establish whether certain dimensions of the "resolve" prerequisite (D) were satisfied.

8. Initially, each crisis is coded on the basis of whether ethnicity is deemed to be a salient factor in the conflict. A second coding, completed on the remaining cases, utilizes the criteria for an interstate ethnic crisis (as provided below). Three categories emerge: (a) crises not considered to be ethnic conflicts. When in doubt concerning the 'face validity' of the coding, the crisis is designated as non-ethnic.

9. Crises with IO involvement almost always have state involvement as well, but we separate interventions into the following three categories. But we are interested only in whether the IO or a state had the highest level of involvement. If we were unable to determine whether the IO or the state had the highest level of involvement we coded it as ambiguous and put it into category three:

3. IO with state involvement -mixed (UN peacekeeping AND US/NATO air strikes later on)

2. no IO, only third party state involvement (Chechnya)

1. no state, only IO involvement

10. Esman (1995) defines UN intervention in ethnic conflict to include good offices, mediation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance and stigmatization of rogue governments. By Esman's standards calls for condemnation by the General Assembly would fall under the rubric of intervention even though the UN need not take any follow-up action.

11. UN minor activity includes the following ICB categories: Security Council discussion without resolution, resolution without action, resolution with authorized members active, and General Assembly discussion only. Major UN activity includes fact-finding mission, good offices resolution, mediation, sanctions, observer force, and emergency military force.

12. Despite their high profile, ethnic conflicts have only a limited ability to affect the lives of ordinary Canadians here at home. For the average Canadian, ethnic struggles and terrorists acts constitute lurking risks that reside alongside fear of nuclear war, the chance that the Earth will be hit by an asteroid and new viruses that may emerge from shrinking rain forests. However, extensive media coverage leads people to overestimate the risk of international violence and to give undue importance to human generated catastrophes. From the standpoint of the average Canadian, even though the odds of their occurrence may be identical, the death of 350 people in an airplane crash or bomb explosion is more horrific and receives much more publicity than the separate deaths of 350 individuals. Analysts call this the problem of optimal risk. The idea of optimal risk may seem like a strange notion in the context of a terrorist bombing in a country where the chances of being personally affected are small. The problem of optimal risk arises because lay people disagree with experts in given areas about where the greater risk to their lives lies. For example, scientific experts, believe that societies in general have an irrational fear of new technologies. Nuclear power, for instance, certainly is risky but pollution from fossil-fuel power is also risky especially given the threat of global warming. Usually, when citizen's lives are at risk, experts know, with uncanny accuracy, the threat levels associated with that risk, even when the perception of threat is taken out of a proportion by an excited public The problem of optimal risk arises because both experts and ordinary citizens continue to disagree about the extent to which international events will affect their daily lives.

13. Other possibilities would be to shift responsibilities to coalitions of the willing or possibly the development of dedicated and capable rapid reaction force capable of responding quickly and efficiently. Finally there is a need to build regional capacity whereby a hub of states, presumably those with the most at stake, would take a lead in responding.

14. Several policy and theoretical questions need to be addressed in future research. For example, does intervention frequency and success vary depending on historical circumstance? In other words, are the prerequisites for deterrence success more or less difficult to satisfy pre- or post-Cold War -- as per Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Somalia. Are some prerequisites more or less important (relevant) than others when controlling escalation of ethnic conflict? There are also questions about the relationship between why an intervention takes place (an issue we do not address in the paper) and why interventions are challenged. Another objective is to extend the work on phases (Kriesberg 1997, Fisher 1995, Lund 1996). Is the timing of intervention related to the probability of success? Perhaps less intense interventions are more likely to succeed if they take place during the onset phase, while larger interventions are more likely to succeed during the escalation or crisis phase. Weak interventions during the crisis escalation (or peak) phase, for example, may actually provoke violent responses, because challengers take advantage of the opportunity to demonstrate their superiority (Harvey 1996, 1997). The Bosnian Serb refusal to comply with weak UN threats, and subsequently escalate attacks on UN declared safe havens within hours of the passage of several UN resolutions, serve well to illustrate the point.

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Table 1

Organization Involvement and Percentage of Crises Avoiding Severe Violence

Ethnic, Non-ethnic, Interstate and Intrastate Crises 1946-1994

Property Julie	Organiz	ation Most Ir	nvolved:	Batane Vol. 25
Type of Crisis	International Organization	States	Equal or Ambiguous	All
All	47.4 (9)	36.8 (186)	63.1 (70)	41.7 (265)
Ethnic	22.2	29.3	46.7	31
	(2)	(67)	(14)	(83)
Non-Ethnic	70	43.1	69.1	49.6
	(7)	(119)	(56)	(182)
Interstate	61.5	38.9	65.1	44.2
	(8)	(149)	(56)	(213)
Intrastate	16.7	30.3	56	34
	(1)	(37)	(14)	(52)

Notes:

1. Numbers in parentheses are frequencies showing the number of crises


in each category.

2. Differences in total sample sizes are due to missing data.

3. SEVVIO (severity of violence) was the ICB variable used for the analysis

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Avoidance of Severe Violence and Organization Involvement



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Table 2

Organization Involvement and Unanimous Satisfaction with Crisis Outcome Ethnic, Non-ethnic, Interstate and Intrastate Crises

	Organiz	ation Most II	nvolved:	
Type of Crisis	International Organization	States	Equal or Ambiguous	All
All	22.2 (4)	29 (143)	27.8 (30)	28.6 (177)
Ethnic	22.2 (2)	34.5 (77)	29.6 (14)	33.6 (83)
Non-Ethnic	22.2 (2)	24.4 (66)	27.2 (22)	25 (270)
Interstate	16.7 (2)	31.2 (118)	27.7 (23)	30.2 (143)
Intrastate	33.3 (2)	21.7 (90)	28 (18)	23.3 (112)

Notes:


1. Numbers in parentheses are frequencies showing the number of crises

in each category.

2. Differences in total sample sizes are due to missing data.

3. OUTEVL (outcome evaluation) was the ICB variable used for the analysis

Participants' Satisfaction with Crisis Outcomes and Organization Involvement



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The Systemic-Evolutionary Extended Signal Approach^{© Dr. Andrea K. Riemer}:

Theoretical Considerations and its Application in the area of Minority Issues

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The period after 1989 has been the most turbulent and erratic one since World War II. All areas of our society show far reaching signs of transformation. We are living in an "Age of Discontinuity". To analyze and assess discontinuities (global level) and crises (regional level) which may rise from changes in the areas demography, economy, ecology, technology and politics/religion. the following approach is presented and applied to the question: "Are ethnic minorities being not sufficiently integrated in a state a potential for crisis?".

The Kurds have been one of the largest minorities in the world for years. "Kurds" is a term comprising several group of clans living in a split area. By far the largest number of Kurdish clans live in Turkey. The "Turkish Kurds" have been showing a high potential for crisis for about 15 years. The fights between the PKK and the Turkish government and the Army show several features of a civil war costing lifes of people being dragged into with having any interest. Moreover the fights cost a lot of international reputation for Turkey and a lot of money (about 6 to 7 Million US-\$ per year).

The Times - they are a changing: An Introduction

""May you live in interesting times," says an ancient Chinese curse. There have never been more "interesting times" than the closing years of the twentieth century. ... Predicting the future can only get into trouble. The task is to manage what there is and to work to create what could and should be. ... To manage in turbulent times, therefore, means to face up to the new realities. It means starting out with the question: What is the world really like? Rather than with assertions and assumptions that made sense only a few years ago.¹"

We have to accept the fact that history has surprise inherent. Historically based explanation usually makes clear - even if we have knowledge of all factors for our explanations, why change was possible and probable. Rarely we can say that and why change was necessary. In a world of probablities unlikely things happen - at least sometimes. That fact shows us the limits of historical explanations und historical forecasts of foresights. It admonishes us of humbleness.

Sometimes the system "world" seems to be out of control. The current development is something like a surging billow. We are confronted with "divides".² They come over us like a surge and we are in an apperently helpless position. All of us where caught by surprise in 19989/1990 when the Berlin Wall toppled, the Soviet Union broke down and iron curtains where torn down. The period after 1989 has been the most turbulent and erratic one since World War II. All areas of our society show far reaching signs of transformation. We are living in an "Age of Discontinuity".³

How to handle the new situation, a discontinuity and a crisis? - This is the question which occuppies all of our attention - nevertheless we are scientist or politician. We are confronted with "concurrent non-simultanious breakups" in the development of society and its subsystems.

On the other hand we know that events usually do not happen "over night". There are signals, signs or "mini-events" which take place in a kind of prephase. Sometimes it is difficult for us to understand what may come - we can not put all those signals and events in one of "our old but convenient boxes". We have two options:

1. Ignore them

2. Face them and take them as a chance.

Keeping it short: Leave 'em or love 'em.

The period after 1956 has been the must unbased and entate one since would war II. All areas at out society abow far reaching signs of musilumnation We are hving in an Age of Discontinuity To analytic and assess discontinuities (global level) and crusts (regional tend) which may use from changes in the areas demography, commun. ecology, termology and politics(religiou the following approach is presented and applied to the question. Are these musicities being and without without an asteries and and crist?".


action parts and the standing of the fight of the

"May you live in interacting times," says an ancient Chenere sweet, there have never been more interacting times? than the causing years of its termitch commits. "Freelesting the fature can only get into trouble. The task is to manuse what there is and in with its results what could and sheald be ... To manage in turbulent times, throughne, maters to itse up to the laws realities. It means surving out with the quattion. What is the work react with the fater to and the set

We have to proceed the hard that history has surprass solutent. Measured the end, a tryinmetern usually makes olegi - even if we have knowledge of all measure the out capital former way change was possible and probable. Narely we can say that and why harge was measured, in a would of probablicute subjective things happen - at least sometimes. That not surpress is the limits of measured evolutions and historical foreness of forcesting is administry as of measures as the limits of measured. The Systemic-Evolutionary Extended Signal Approach -- 139


The Systemic-Evolutionary Extended Signal Approach^{© Dr. Andrea K. Riemer:} A new Perspective in the Area of Early Warning?

In the following, the Systemic-Evolutionary Extended Signal Approach[©] Dr. Andrea K. Riemer is introduced. The approach comprises the following sub systems:



- Dicontinuous evolutions do not come overnight but they show signals of what may come.
- A signal is a piece of information or a bulk of information which can be designated to an event or process in the grid of trigger areas.
- To be able to perceive a signal, one needs a status of minimum knowledge. The status of minimum knowledge refers to eg. history, groups of power etc. The status of minimum knowledge is essential for the point of time when a piece of information is recognized as a signal.
- The intensity of perception is therefore determined by the individual status of minimum knowledge.
- The nearer a signal can be found at the point of transformation the more concrete it is. On the other hand the time budget for reaction is decreasing in the same way.
- Time is the crucial variable.

The Working Principle



Theoretical Basics

Basic Research Terms

(Space-Time and events, process and structure; the social sy stem ,society' and its charateristics; stability and balance; discontinuity and crisis)

Practical Tools

Grid for discontinuities, potentials for discontinuities and for potentials for crisis

<u>Trigger Areas</u> are fields where crises - based on experience- may arise. We drew up a matrix which differs between the global and the local-regional level.. It is not intended to create a "complete" record of triggers but to keep the catalog open for "new challenges". This will help to keep the level of surprise at a minimum. We combined the two key level to keep the whole problem in mind.

Trigger Areas	Potentials for Discontinuities	∣⇒	Potentials for Crisis
Demography	 Improvement in medical treatment Improvement in food logistics 	0 0 0 0	Uneven rise in population Coming up of a "New Poverty" Polarization because of migration Shortage of resources
Politics	 Vanishing of old patterns of order - new patterns are still under development 	1 1 1	new Pluralism Coming up of "power gap" - filled by terrorist groups new nationalism and at the same time regionalism "Ethno-Nationalism" (religion and culture as a
Ecology	 Excessive use of the environment because of political and economic pressure 	1 1 1	"niche" for solving problems) Conflicts for resources Shortage of living areas Migration because of environmental damages
Economics	 OVERLAYER: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY Vanishing of the principle of internationality - coming up of transnationality as prime principle Globalization of markets ("the world is a village") Coming up of a "Knowledge Society" 	0 0 0	Pooling of knowledge leads to a concentration of power in the hands of few people Knowledge as competition factor Knowledge as a base for coming up of new potentials for challenge
<i>Fechnology</i>	 Development of new technologies and new field of application for existing technologies 	1 1	Global networking New technologies are used for putting pressure on other countries Emergence of new potentials for power, e.g. by nuclear proliferation

Action-Reaction Matrices

The background of the Matrices is to find out whether a basic connection between variables exists. Moreover the tool helps one to fix direction and intensity of the connex. We take two different directions in our question into account:

- 1. horizontal direction: eg. How strong and how fast is the impact coming from the variable "new medical knowledge" on "food logistics"?
- 2. vertical direction: eg. How strong and how fast is the impact coming from the variable "food logistics" on "new medical knowledge"?

Taking both directions we are able to cover "effect" and "provokation" of a variable. We cannot automatically assume only one direction of effect in one pair of variables.

To come to this matrices we used the Delphi-Method and expert questionings.

Formalizing Tool

Evaluation Grid

As an intervening part system we introduced an evaluation grid. On one hand it supports the process of putting concrete events or chains of events in the grid of the trigger areas ("thematically integration"). On the other hand it helps to fix the intensity level (in the grid of signals). Generally speaking it is a tool to evaluate information and to categorize it. The grid has a kind of bridging function between the first step of registration of information or data and the step of coming to concrete signals. It eases our contents analysis and makes it operational. Moreover it helps to structure under the aspect of time and space.

Degrees of distinciton in	Degree of coherence	Degree of intensity	degree of networking	Degree of permanence	Degree of finalization
tructure	(refers to a basic connection)	(refers to the strength/ intensity of connection)	(refers to the kind of connection)	(refers to the number of events)	(refers to the period of evolution)
Type of Events	V anit most gen Manual gen	Tals for Giscon 100 factor off misco factor		HERENRE SO	medical know many
Processes (=creeping	high	low	medium	high	low
development)	a lot of small steps	no special event	moderate connection	permanent small steps	final phase cannot be seen
Chains of key	high	high	high	high	low
events	on top event which provokes a number of following events	at one top event	strong connex between the top event and the following events	permanent events	final is open - de facto not to be seen
Events related	high	medium	high	high	low
to a certain period a analysis	no top event but a number of interconnected events	chain of events showing a medium intensity in connex	strong dependence between the events	during the period of observation permanent events	clear start - clear end
Single event	low	low	low	low	low
	not existing	one single event	everything is possible	everything possible	everything possible

Concritizing Tools

Indicator Matrices

The matrix helps us to make signals for the first time concrete. It is a tools which guides us to keep the general overview of the situation. Moreover we can use it to come to general networking effects between the trigger areas.

Attributes	Indicator	Degree of distinction 1	Degree o f distinction 2	Degree o f distinction 3	Degree o f distinction 4
Time	Degree ofdurability	ultra short	short	medium	lang
Range of coverage	Degree of coverage	one part system covered	one to trhee part systems covered	four part systems covered	all five part systems covered
Intensity	Degree of Intensity	fade	weak	strong	hyper
Perception	subjective degree of perception	nearly no deviation from normal conditions	weak deviation from normal conditions	strong deviation from normal conditions	total deviation from normal conditions
	objective degree of perception	nearly no deviation from normal conditions	weak deviation from normal conditions	strong deviation from normal conditions	total deviation from normal conditions
Area	degree of distance	very close	within a country	outside a country	putside the continent
Potential	degree of change in the system	nearly no deviation from normal conditions	weak deviation from normal conditions	strong deviation from normal conditions	total deviation from normal conditions
decision performance	individuel degree of change	nearly no deviation from normal conditions	weak	strong deviation from normal conditions	total deviatio from normal conditions

Signal Grid

The <u>Grid of signals</u> presents the dimension of intensity in the approach. The basis is the following network of hypotheses:

We assume four levels of signals. They represent four different levels on the escalation to crisis.⁴

- Hyper Signals are signals which are recognized right before the breakout of a crisis. Time to react is very short, sometimes it may not be available in sufficient dimensions. Potential for action is available in very restricted dimensions and at a very low level. Information is nearly completed, structured and clear. This category of signals can be recognized by the man in the street.
- **Strong Signals** can be recognized by a generally informed person with a good historical and political background knowledge. Potential for action is available in sufficient dimensions. They still allow for some reaction time. Information is relatively complete and well structured.
- Weak Signals are fragmented, vague pieces of information. Time to react is available in large scale , potential for action, too. Consequences may be recognized by a person with specific prescience.
- Fade Signals are not structured, highly incomplete and diffuse. They show a long time for reaction. They may only be recognized by an expert with excellent prescience. Potential for action is available in large scale, but it is difficult to use it. Moreover it is often not clear what to respond to.

Intensity level	and the second se	Fade Signals	Weak Signals	Strong Signals
Features	AT THE REAL PROPERTY OF A DESCRIPTION OF A			
Time to react	long (5 to 10 years)	×	1	- Louise
and the second se	middle (2 to 4 years)			×
	short (1 year and less)			
Degree of Structure	unstructured, no connex	×		a series
us silve a vice of the	poorly structured, tendencies can be assessed by experts			×
	good structure, tendencies can be assessed by layman			
Completeness ·	puzzled, fragments	×		X
and a state of the second seco	poorly complete,		and a feature	
	almost complete - development options can be seen		See 19	
Status of Knowledge	specific	×	Sec.	×
and a state of the	general		102204203	
	like a lavman		-	

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Evalution Tools

Stability Profile

Stability levels		10			very high	high	middle	low	Very
Stability areas	Indicators	Level of indicators	indicator	S					
Political Stability									F
	relative life span of government	high In	middle	low					-
9	relative stability of the composition of the government								
and the second se	relative number of acts of violence								+
	relative dependence of super powers								1
and all by and all a	integration in international organisations								1
	competition with regional powers								
	relative life span of the constitution	11 CU24							+
	relative level of democracy						T		T
Ethnic and religious Stability	tability								
and the following of the	degree of differenciation of ethnic groups								-
	degree of differenciation of religious groups								
	fundamentalist religious groups								
	constitutional coverage of minority rights								
Economic Stability									T
	rate of unempoyed people								
Larth Re- and read in the	rate of inflation								
	budget deficit								
	increase in GDP								
Demographic and social Stability	ial Stability								
and of amil a	local migration								
	increase in population								
and some file succession and the second s	land flight								
	partition of population (urban - country)								
	local concentration of minorities							ľ	T

Alternatives for action	5 need to act at once	4 current observation; compare changes, eventual planning of alternatives to act, assessment of consequences	3 observe several times per year and f compare changes - make out potentials f for action	2 1 annual abservations potential for crisis and comparision of exists - spot-check changes
local potentials for crisis				
		940 940 90 90		10 10 10 10
		ないない		
regional potentials for crisis showing networking effects with the country under analysis	9	ute obje inom i berratio	ta inan a of an Moss of Tasy fail for	e i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
	TIL	13.4	1	
	hanesens vidgid a	Kurds are and M	canoita for about? ir and sum y data is worn out of t the largest mours	a attantat pines

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The Issue of Kurds

The still unsolved problem of a sufficient integration of the Kurdish minority in the Turkish State is an excellent example for a complex problem which can be registered and analyzed by using the Approach presented.

Basic information:

We face two main groups of problems:

Problems presented by the Kurdish tribs

- 1. No homogenious area of living splitted between several countries no geographic demarcation.
- 2. Muddled assessment concerning the number of Kurds.
- 3. Clans different views on how to organize itself.
- 4. No common language no integration power
- 5. Heterogenity from a religious point of view.

Problems presented by the Turkish State

- 1. Disappointed hopes for the Kurds after Atatürk from a highly assessed group in the Osman Empire to a tumbled minority.
- 2. The Turkish Constitution: Minorities are only religious groups, esp. Non-muslim groups in Turkey (according to the Agreement from Lausanne). Kurds are assessed a Muslims no minority no additional cultural and democratic rights.

Grid for discontinuities, potentials for discontinuities and for potentials for crisis

Trigger Area Demography

1. Expulsion from Kurdish people living in South East Anatolia for about 20 years: Due to bad living conditions and to actions carried out by government and Army.

Concentration in the West and Southwest: Most of the refugees live in one of the five large cities in the West and the Southwest of the country. They represent the largest minority in those cities and moreover - they are the largest social potential for crisis.

Trigger Area Economy:

- 1. Bad economic basis in South East Anatolia which is the origional place of living. We face a pronounced feudal system. 5 % of the families living there own about 65 % of land. 70 % of the people have to have enough with 10 % of land.
- 2. Insufficient water supply: The Great Anatolia Project which is one of the world's hugest project for irrigation is still in the pipeline. It's dead line is still unclear. One of the key targest is to South East Anatolia a "green bottom" and to resettle Kurds. It is more a dream than reality.

·*

1. PKK has being trying to fill a "gap of power" for about 13 years. PKK is a left-wing group (lenin.-marx.) fighting for the idea of an autonomous Kurdish State. All other politics groups acting to realize Kurdish ideas are not part of the Turkish Parliament. The Turkish government and the Army do not differ between PKK and other Kurds. We have far reaching doubts that PKK is the only solution for the Kurdish Problem in Turkey.

and parties and parties founds for the security persecution of ethnic/religious minorities declaration of autonomy Kurds by ethnic minorities by ethnic minorities by ethnic minorities for the security guard system Streamling of ethnic/religious minorities Alewits for the security for the securi	signal level Hyper Signals Strong Signals
	ban of opposition groups and parties
PKK guard system Kurds Alewits	persecution of ethnic/ religious minorities declaration of autonom by ethnic minorities
c/ Kurds Alewits	establishment guards
	Stre relig
Ecevit-Party PKK basically against opposition	1
Ecevit-Party PKK basically against opposition • ban of parties • ban of	
tionalism Ecevit-Party PKK Iternationally basically against inority rights opposition democratic • ban of parties • ban of newspapers • arrest of opposition	

Signals "Politics"

C Dr. Andrea K. Riemer

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signal level	generell example	signal Turkey	degree of	degree of existence	signal Kurds	degree c	degree of existence
Mask Cimale			existing	less existing		existing	less existing
Weak Signals							
rational Sama Paterson Vactorson Sata 2010	migration in a country land flight ecologicalmigratio 	strong migration from South East to West	×	stren to and h headent	primarliy Kurds	×	<u>116 31 8</u>
	Coming up of agglomeration centres	esp. in the West	×		primarliy Kurds	×	
11 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0			Signals "economics"	nomics"			
signal level	generell example	signal Turkey	degree of existence	tence	signal Kurds	degree of existence	stence
			existing	less existing		existing	less existing
Strong Signals							
	unemployment	for about 10 years - esp. in the large cities			esp. young people (<30yrs) and migrants	×	
12	State of the second		Signals "ec	"ecology"			
signal level	generell example	signal Turkey	degree of existence	tence	signal Kurds	degree of existence	stence
			existing	less existing		existing	less existing
Weak Signals							I
ion\$}\$	ecologogy as pressure	compulsory transactions		×	esp. from Southeast Anatolia because of GAP	×	

1	Drucker, P.: Managing in Turbulent Times, New York 1980, reprinted edition 1993, pp. 3 - 5.
	see also Drucker, Peter: The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society, New York 1968, reprinted edition New York 1992, p. XXVI.
)	see Drucker, Peter: The New Realities. In Government and Politics. in Economy and Business, in Society and World View. New York 1989.
	Drucker, Peter: The Post-capitalist Society, New York 1993.
	Drucker, Peter: The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society, New York 1968, reprinted edition New York 1992.
	Drucker, Peter: Managing in Turbulent Times, New York 1980, reprinted edition 1993.
	compare: Drucker, Peter: The Age of Discontinuity: guidelines to Our Changing Society, New York 1968, reprinted edition New York 1992.
	Drucker, Peter: New Realities. In Government and Politics, in Economy and Business, in Society and World View, New York 1989.
	compare: Vetschera, Heinz/Smutek-Riemer, Andrea: Early Warning - the Case of Yugoslavia, Lecturing, 16th World congress of International Political Science Association, 21st - 25th August 1994, Berlin.

Notes

B. SYNERGY IN ORGANIZATION

How to Establish an Early Warning System: Concept and First Steps in Switzerland

Andreas V. Kohlschütter & Günther Baechler Swiss Peace Foundation

The authors introduce a pilot project on a general conflict warning system mainly designed to serve the Swiss Foreign Ministry. Especially after the Rwanda disaster the administration (backed by the Foreign Committee of the Parliament) underlines the need for a computerized system that builds the ground for early recognition and, thus, enhances the "institutionalized" pressure to (re)act in a stage of a conflict as early as possible. Questions arise on the state of the art as well as on the interface between early warning on one hand and decision making and early action on the other.

In this presentation we introduce the framework and initial outline of a pilot project on an early warning system ("FAST") designed to serve the Swiss Foreign Ministry. After the disaster of Rwanda (which affected a strongpoint of Swiss Development Cooperation) the Swiss Foreign Ministry, backed by the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, underlined the need for an early warning system.

- In view of disposing of an instrument for effective preventive diplomacy, enabling the Swiss administration to recognize and act upon a crisis as early as possible and at the same time enhancing the "institutionalized pressure" for such early decision making:
- in view also of the fact that in Switzerland as well as other OECD-states an ever increasing part of the available development aid is being consumed by disaster and costly post-conflict emergency requirements which could be considerably reduced by early preventive action, three different sections of the Swiss Foreign Ministry (General Secretariat, Peace Policies and OSCE, Development Cooperation) are interested in an early warning system, that focuses on monitoring, analysis, planning and policy options in the framework of preventive diplomacy. It is thus understood that the interface between early warning and early action and policial decision making is as crucial as the overall design of an early warning system itself.
- The mandate the Swiss Peace Foundation received for drafting the pilot project contains the following major requests:
- to "explore the pre-conditions, the efficiency and the costs of FAST (German abbreviation for: "Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Finding") as an instrument to prepare decisions in preventive diplomacy";
- to provide an overview of existing capacities and services in the field of early warning;
- to explore possible cooperation with existing institutions in this field;
- to formulate proposals concerning an adequate set of early warning indicators;
- to evaluate software packages, networks, WWW-based systems, etc. for the purpose of structuring an early warning system;
- to design a minimal capacity concept for FAST in the framework of an early warning system;
- to define the necessary manpower and financial requirements, like profile of staff members, size of

permanent staff, annual costs (minimal requests) and other institutional aspects.

An effective early warning system is a part of and a precondition for effective preventive diplomacy, defined in the narrower sense of crisis avoidance or pre-conflict prevention rather than in the more general terms of in-conflict or post-conflict crisis management. Any attempt to set-up and implement an early warning mechanism for the Swiss Foreign Ministry has therefore to take into account the inherent impediments that tend to slow down or exclude preventive diplomatic action.

At the UN -Conference on "Preventive Diplomacy: The Therapeutics of Mediation" (23-24 April 1996, New York) some of the major problems concerning effective crisis prevention were addressed:

- 1. Lack of political will a crisis that has not yet erupted is not generating neither the pressures nor the eventual rewards politicians normally need before taking decisions and action. The absence of actual crisis visibility via media and TV ("CNN-factor") tends to reduce the sense of urgency needed for political decision-makers. A still hidden crisis weakens the incentive for politicians and executive agencies to engage substantial financial, economic or even military resources in crisis avoidance. Last but not least it hampers the political will for either unilateral or multilateral action in preventive diplomacy, which in addition and as a rule demands more patience than politicians are able to mobilize.
- 2. The sovereignty dilemma preventive diplomacy to avoid the outbreak of an intra-state crisis often leads to intervention for and international solidarity with people in need. As such it can easily get into conflict with the principle of state sovereignty, which the international community is also bound to respect and protect. This tension between two conflicting goals in international affairs is an additional factor to considerably slow-down effective preventive action; as UN-Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in his address at the above mentioned UN-Conference:

"Failure to take effective preventive action is only rarely due to lack of early warning; the symptoms are usually there for all to see. What is too often lacking at present is a predisposition by the parties to accept third party assistance in resolving their dispute. Ways have to be found to persuade them, without infringing their sovereignty or other rights, that it is in their own interest to accept the help of the UN and other international players, rather than to allow their dispute to turn into armed conflict."

- The limits of traditional diplomacy traditional diplomacy tends to secretice procedures, to problem and tension avoidance, to business as usual, to keep smiling and appeasement. It concentrates not only on quiet but also on silent diplomacy. Effective preventive diplomacy on the other hand can never be silent; it must address the critical issues directly, go to the roots of the conflict, use confidentiality as well as transparency and publicity to sound such credible alarm as to make crisis prevention work. Effective prevention has to do with leverage and deterrence; it is usually an edgy, not a smooth operation; it is the very opposite of appeasement.
- There are rare cases like the one 1995 in Burundi, where the US ambassador had the exceptional courage to personally organize a preventive press conference in order to make public some of the most barbarous atrocities that were going on in that country day by day and for which he blamed the Burundi government to be responsible.
- 3. The bureaucracy block effective preventive diplomacy requires a balanced concept of incentives and disincentives in view of appealing to the enlightened self-interest of the parties involved and encourage them to refrain from violent conflict. What is needed is a well coordinated and fine tuned mix of political, economic, social, developmental and eventually military measures to avoid conflict eruption and facilitate crisis management. Such a mix however requires mental readiness to accept division of labour, interdependence and crossfeeding between very often competing ministries and departments in national administrations as well as between different governments, international organizations and INGO's. Deblocking bureaucratic obstinacies and rivalries or just streamlining overcomplicated administrative

procedures is therefore one of the major challenges which preventive diplomacy and its early warning instruments have to cope with.

Any effective early warning system has to be directed to mobilize the political will for early action; that is for early decisions on concrete effective steps to get preventive diplomacy moving. Early warning systems must hence consider the practical problems and dilemmas of preventive diplomacy in view of overcoming them and facilitating the task of the executive agencies and governmental decision makers.

These considerations have been very much on our mind regarding outline and leading criteria of our early warning project (FAST) for the Swiss MFA. The following elements for establishing an early warning system as mandated by the Swiss MFA seem crucial to us:

- FAST has to be a system which can be turned functional and operational on a rather short term basis; at the same time a system based on (computerized) early warning models and indicator clusters which lend themselves to constant refinement and adjustments; FAST is meant to be a scientifically developed instrument to be of immediate use to political practitioners and decision-makers, not an academic exercise for professorial experimenting and speculation.
- FAST has to be a system of multi-departmental, multi-purpose and multi-directional nature; the data and
 information to be monitored and the geographical areas to be covered have to satisfy the early warning
 requirements of different agencies in the MFA: on the one hand the more globally oriented political
 department, looking after Swiss interests worldwide (trade, investments, migration, terrorism,
 proliferation, etc.) and concentrating on the 53 OSCE states, especially the transition of ex-communist
 countries to democratic civil societies; on the other hand the more narrow and third world focused
 development cooperation agency, concentrating on some 16 focal countries with major foreign aid
 projects.
- FAST has to be an early warning chain-system going all the way from monitoring, collection and dissemination of information, up to analysis, evaluation, risk-assessment and finally presentation of policy options and scenarios credible enough to convince policy-makers about the need for early action; it should be conceived as a bridge between crisis theatre and crisis management: it should be elaborated as a "pipeline"- or "flow chart"-system, in order to enhance institutionalized" pressures, channel political decision-making and thus prepare the ground for early preventive action.
- FAST has to be anchored and established outside the executive and administrative structures of the Foreign Ministry; it has to work and function though in close collaboration and feedback-relation with authorized persons and staff from within the Ministry; the Swiss Peace Foundation, which has been mandated to work out the pilot project, could eventually very well be entrusted with the actual implementation, organization and daily management of the FAST-early warning system.
- FAST should be structured and equipped so as to monitor and collect different levels and types of data, based on the fact, that crisis and violence breeding conflicts are dynamic processes, rooted in history and evolving in escalating or de-escalating phases: (1) background conditions of a crisis (historical, economic and social roots of the conflict, power and ethnic structures, cultural/civilizational particularities etc); (2) intervening conditions (power struggle within the political leadership, increasing discrimination of certain social strata etc); (3) so called "accelerators" (repressive measures by the regime, violent incidents, sanctions, threats of international intervention etc) that change the nature of the crisis and propel it into a new, more or less violent phase.

We would like to list here some of the practical questions, which we are facing in our layout for the FASTearly warning pilot project on behalf of the Swiss Foreign Ministry. For some of these questions the academic and research community might have at least partial answers already available; others will have to wait for the trial and error test of practical experience:

Should FAST be built on global data base or should it be more focus oriented, that is restricted to focal
points and countries of interest? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each one of these two

approaches?

- What models do already exist to satisfy the multi-departmental and multi-directional needs of FAST, which has to provide three different sections of the Swiss MFA with an early warning instrument?
- Should FAST in its static part provide data (on-line) on a permanent basis or will periodical reporting be enough? Can the two concepts be mixed?
- Should FAST be totally or overwhelmingly Swiss and self-made or should it plug into existing early warning networks that also work for other governmental customers? To what extent can non-Swiss early warning capacities be explored and utilized?
- Should FAST be open to all sources of information or should the early warning source material be collected on a selective basis? How and by which criteria should this selection be implemented?
- How should the out-of-government early warning center of FAST connect with the in-government structures of the Foreign Ministry? Is a special institutional link required or will case by case contacts do?
- What are the manpower requirements of such an out-of-government early warning center? What kind of specialists are needed for FAST on a permanent or a temporary basis?
- How much ground in the direction of political decision making should FAST cover without overloading and overcommitting itself? Should for instance the presentation of policy options in a given crisis be part of the early warning chain of FAST?

The setting-up of an early warning system like FAST provides fascinating insight into the interdependent worlds of international politics on the one hand and international science and research on the other. Doers and thinkers blend in intimate interaction. They are bound to coordinate and integrate their efforts, since early warning efforts without the thinkers will develop no roots and without the doers will bear no fruits.

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Early (and Late) Warning by the UN Secretary-General: Article 99 Revisited*

A. Walter Dorn University of Toronto

The only independent political role that is explicitly given to the UN Secretary-General in the UN Charter is that of warning. (Under Article 99, he/she may warn the Security Council about any matter which may threaten the peace.) But is warning, especially early warning, by the UN Secretary-General likely, or even possible? By digging into the mines of UN history, I have sought to identify instances of early (and late) warning. For over 100 conflicts in which the Secretary-General intervened, only a very few (e.g., East Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971, Macedonia 1992) can be classified as early warning. There have been three explicit invocations of Article 99 in the Security Council (Congo 1960, Iran 1979 and Lebanon 1989) and about a dozen implied invocations, but most of these were late warnings or statements of support for warnings already provided by a member state. Given that there was no warning in most cases, one might rightfully ask why early warning is so infrequent and so difficult?

This paper summarizes the Secretary-General's constraints and opportunities for early warning in each of its three stages (information gathering, analysis and dissemination) and makes suggestions about how some obstacles can be overcome. For technical and political reasons, the UN Secretary-General is now in a better position to do early warning than ever before but certain improvements are called for: better targeting of desired information, increased intelligence-sharing, tighter confidentiality systems, easier access for on-site observation, a stronger analytical capacity (including scenario building), quicker feedback at headquarters and a more proactive approach in issuing warnings and undertaking response measures. This may be a tall order, but the goal of early warning for conflict prevention is a worthy of all such efforts.

I. Historical Review

Even in the depths of World War II, some nations and people were seriously contemplating how to build durable peace and a stronger international organization after the War. There was widespread agreement among them that the international civil service, introduced by the League, needed to be retained and strengthened. Lamenting that states had always sounded the alarm too late, in 1943 Lord Viscount Cranborne of Great Britain proposed that this vital job be given to the "chief permanent official" of the new organization.

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[He] should be empowered to bring before members on his own initiative, any potentially dangerous development at an early stages before an aggressor has time to gird himself for war ... If the Earl, Lord Perth [Sir Eric Drummond, the League's first Secretary-General], had enjoyed this power as Secretary-General of the League, the history of the League might have been a very different one.¹

He reasoned that

it is always embarrassing...for a nation, and especially a small nation, to attribute aggressive intentions to a neighbouring country with whom it is ostensibly in friendly relations. Consequently the tendency ... was for Member States of the League to raise a question of this kind when the situation was already so acute that there was no way of averting armed conflict ... [T]he chief permanent official... will be an international official and therefore not open to the same embarrassment as Ministers of individual states.

In fact, the need for a warning role for the League Secretary-General had been identified by the League Assembly in its earliest days, but the notion was never enshrined in the League's Covenant, nor actively implemented.²

In June 1945, the fifty nations which had gathered in San Francisco to prepare and sign UN Charter decided to include a novel provision which gave the UN Secretary-General, who was accountable to no nation in particular but to the organization as a whole, a right that heretofore had only been conferred upon states: the ability to convoke a meeting of the Security Council on his own initiative in order to issue a warning. In Article 99, the Charter states:

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

- Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-General of the League, commented on this new provision: The Secretary-General of the League could only act through and at the request of a Member of the League; the Secretary-General of the UN can act on his own initiative. In view of this difference in functioning, the method of approach of the two officers is or was necessarily of a different character.
- The Preparatory Commission in San Francisco itself commented on the new Article 99 as follows: Under Article 99 of the Charter, moreover, he [the Secretary-General] has been given a special right which goes beyond any power previously accorded to the head of an international organization, viz, to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter (not merely any dispute or situation) which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. It is impossible to foresee how this Article will be applied; but the responsibility it confers upon the Secretary-General will require the exercise of the highest qualities of political judgement, tact and integrity ...³

As it turns out, Article 99 has been invoked very infrequently. The major explicit and implicit invocations of Article 99 are described in **Table 1** (which covers the period 1946-90). The only ones that qualify as rigorous invocations are those dealing with the crises in the Congo (1960), in Iran (1979) and in Lebanon (1989).⁴ The first and third instances constituted "late" warning but are nonetheless significant cases of warning. In the Iranian hostage case (1979), Article 99 served merely as a means to address the Security Council on a crisis that was already in the spotlight but which the Council had not taken up formally. In all other cases in Table 1, the matter had already been placed on the agenda of the Council by one or more Member States before the Secretary-General addressed it (though he may have been the first to speak to the issue at the meeting). A closer look at these invocations, however, gives clear indications about the practical and political constraints on early warning by the Secretary-General.

The first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, did not explicitly invoke Article 99 before the Security Council, which became a platform for Cold War oratory, non-cooperation and rivalry almost immediately

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after the UN was created. Still, Lie set a precedent by asserting his right to speak on his own initiative during Security Council debates, acting in the spirit of Article 99, even if he was not warning of new threats to the peace.⁵ In 1950, Lie did sound the alarm about a threat to the peace: the invasion of South Korea. He was the first to speak in the Council at the crucial meeting of June 25, 1950, shortly after the North Korean attack, but since the Korea item was placed on the Council's agenda by the US, which had called the urgent meeting, it was not a clear cut case of Article 99 invocation (i.e., the matter was brought to the attention of the Council by the US). In any case, Lie's address was hardly even a "warning." The massive invasion had begun over 12 hours earlier. Furthermore, Lie had learned about the attack from the US, through a midnight call on June 24 from the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization. After receiving confirmation from UN field observers, the Secretary-General did at least validate the allegations of aggression (an useful contribution in itself) and implored the Council to take action (which it did because the Soviet Union was absent and therefore unable to use its veto right).

It was only with the arrival of the proactive Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold that Article 99 was applied vigorously and rigorously. The most important case was in the Congo. In January 1960, Hammarskiold made a tour of many African states, especially the newly emerging states. He personally found that the Congo, due to receive its independence from Belgium a few months later, was ill-prepared for self-government.6 Furthermore, the UN's Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations raised serious doubts about "the future of the new republic as an integrated nation."7 Demonstrating his ability to "meet trouble half way," he sent his very capable Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Ralph J. Bunche, to represent the UN at the Congolese independence ceremonies on June 30. Using intentionally vague wording, Hammarskjold gave Bunche a mandate to "be available to the [Congolese government] for consultations and discussions on matters relating to the United Nations interest ... [and] to report directly to me, with such recommendations as you may consider suitable."8 When Bunche cabled back his first-hand observations of the outbreak of violence-he himself had been held at gun point-and described his frequent discussions with the new government leaders, Hammarskjold had an excellent source of on-site information.9 On July 12, when the Congolese leaders requested Hammarskjold to intervene, he was already quite familiar with the situation. He called an urgent meeting of the Security Council for July 13, where he described the situation and presented his proposal (after receiving informal approval beforehand from the most important members of the Council). At the meeting, he said: "I believe the UN may be able to save this situation, chaotic as it is rapidly becoming."¹⁰ The danger had broad, global implications since the superpowers supported opposing factions in the Congo, which could have become a flash point. At Hammarskiold's recommendation, the Security Council created a peace-keeping force, called ONUC (Force de l'Organization des Nations Unies au Congo) which played a difficult but stabilizing role over the next four years.

Secretary-General U Thant was a strong proponent and practitioner of "quiet diplomacy" and he never invoked Article 99 explicitly. At times he was urged to do so by various governments and outside observers (e.g., by newspaper editors concerning the Biafran/Nigeria conflict 1967-70), but he resisted because he felt that matters should only be brought before the Council if agreement on action was likely to be achieved, something which was not easy in the polarized Security Council of the Cold War. He insisted that "nothing could be more divisive or useless than for the Secretary-General to invoke Article 99 in a situation where there is no real possibility of the Security Council agreeing on any useful positive role."¹¹ Nevertheless, his patience reached its limits in the East Pakistan/Bangladesh conflict of 1971. In the first part of the year, the Secretary-General found himself limited to a humanitarian role as millions of refugees fled to India from East Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakistan (supported by the USSR and the US, respectively) wanted the UN to intervene politically, and considered the matter an "internal affair." But U Thant recognized the serious potential for international armed conflict and on July 20, in a written memorandum, privately urged the Council to intervene, despite the slim chances that the Council would act.

Pakistan—differences which gave rise to open warfare only six years ago. ... [A] major conflict in the subcontinent could all too easily expand ... [T]he present situation [is] a potential threat to peace and security ... It is for these reasons that I am taking the unusual step of reporting to the President of the Security Council on an question which has not been inscribed on the Council's agenda."¹² A few weeks later, U Thant made his memorandum public after the Council ignored it, to further prod it. But the Council (led by the superpowers) continued to avoid the seriousness of the situation right up to the beginning of war at the beginning of December 1971.

Perhaps the greatest failure and the greatest success in early warning took place during the tenure of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Before the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, many signals went unheeded by the UN and important avenues were left uninvestigated, leading to the UN's general helplessness in the face of an unprecedented escalation of conflict and a genocide that led to approximately a million deaths. Some of ignored signals in Rwanda are described later in this paper.

By contrast, the signals of potential decline in Macedonia were not ignored. Here, the main credit for sounding the alarm goes to the Republic's President, Kiro Gligorov. He raised the issue with the Secretary-General in the fall of 1992 and lobbied the Council's leading members to promote an active response. The new state, born in September 1991 out the break up of the former Yugoslavia, found itself faced immediately with enormous internal and external threats. The country possessed a diverse ethnic mixture: three-fifths Macedonian, one-fifth Albanian, and the rest Turks, Gypsies, Serbs, Vlachs, Muslim Slavs and Bulgarians. The land-locked state of 2 million is "surrounded by countries with a historical claim to the territory, a political claim to protect an ethnic minority, or, in the case of Greece, a diplomatic claim to the very name Macedonia. Should one intervene, others likely would follow, leading to a European war that could bring in NATO partners Greece and Turkey on opposite sides."¹³ The deployment of UN monitors along the Macedonian border served as a deterrent to aggression from the outside and a stabilizer internally. It was an early warning system in itself. The monitors could detect probing missions that would suggest preparations for a frontal attack, and would help the UN Secretary-General to sound the alarm, either through Article 99 or in a less dramatic fashion at an early stage by passing information to influential member states.¹⁴

Though there have been few formal invocations of Article 99 before the Council, it is regularly used as the legislative justification for a host of independent activities by the Secretary-General. Some of these activities are quite relevant to warning, such as monitoring and fact-finding. For instance, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar justified his independent investigations of Iraqi chemical weapons use in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war using the Article 99 legislative authority. (He preferred not to use the contentious General Assembly resolution 37/98 because the vote on that resolution was far from unanimous.) Other activities are justified, in part, by Article 99 but are only indirectly related (e.g., "good offices" functions such as mediation). Dag Hammarskjold asserted that the "necessary implication" of Article 99 is "a broad discretion to conduct inquiries and to engage in informal diplomatic activity in regard to matters which 'may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."¹¹⁵

Over the past fifty years, a succession of UN Secretaries-General have applied Article 99 to enhance the powers, stature and authority of their office. Thus, its value in practice has gone far beyond warning. However, its original intent remains: to alert the Council to emerging threats to the peace. At the end of the Cold War, this role has again become the focus of much attention on the part of governments and academics, under the name of early warning, a term adopted from the humanitarian and disaster management fields.

II. Early Warning Defined and the Typology of Conflict Management

The definition of early warning is the subject of some debate among academics and practitioners. For the purpose of this paper, the following definition is proposed:

Early warning is the act of alerting a recognized authority (e.g., the UN Security Council)

to the threat of a new (or renewed) armed conflict at a sufficiently early stage for that authority to attempt to take preventive action.

By this definition, early warning by the Secretary-General need not necessarily involve interventions before the Security Council. Warnings can also be made before other bodies such as the General Assembly or one of the UN's committees or commissions, or even to selected governments in private or public. In this work, however, we consider only those warnings which are made in writing in an official UN document (though not necessarily a public one).

The above definition limits "early warning" to armed conflicts. It could be broadened to include any political threats (not just threats of armed conflict) and, even further, to natural disasters. This paper, however, is concerned only with the potential for armed conflict.

What constitutes "early"? The practical answer derived from the definition is: in time to make an effort at conflict prevention. If there is not sufficient time to take potentially preventive action, then the term "late warning" is appropriate. If the conflict is rapidly escalating, the term "warning" may not even be applicable at all. For conflict prevention and preparedness, early warning should be done as far in advance as possible. However, it is harder to make accurate predictions over the long range and unless the threat is real states are unlikely to respond to an early warning. Thus a balance point has to be reached in practice, which will depend largely on the nature of the threat. A desirable early warning period for most conflicts would be one to six months.

In spite of the logical link between early warning and preventive action, it is not necessary that a conflict be successfully prevented for early warning to have been achieved. Early warning can take place even if preventive action was not taken. It is only important that the warning be made early enough that prevention action *could have been attempted*.

Early warning can best be illustrated in relation to a generalized conflict, with its escalation, crisis peak(s) and descending phases (see Figure 1). Usually, the Secretary-general intervenes in a conflict only after it has escalated, and after lives have been lost. In current thinking (if not current efforts) more emphasis is being placed on preventive action and early warning has taken on new importance. Early warning is an activity which is done in advance of the steep incline of conflict curve.

Even if early warning fails to produce a response and the conflict escalates, the effort at early information gathering should help the Secretary-General (and his staff) be more effective in handling with the conflict in the later stages. A conceptual framework for the array of roles is illustrated in Figure 1. In relation to the three stages of conflict, six roles for the Secretary-General are identified: preventive diplomacy/deployment, early warning, crisis management, conflict resolution, peace-building and peace enforcement. Before a conflict begins or escalates, the UN could and should exercise its powers of prevention, through preventive diplomacy or preventive deployment. If escalation is probable, the Secretary-General or another UN body has a duty to issue an early warning. In the second stage, as the conflict is raging, the UN takes on the crisis/conflict management role. When parties are ready to reach a negotiated settlement, then the UN works for conflict resolution. In certain circumstances, usually after an act of aggression has occurred and the Security Council has imposed sanctions, the Secretary-General may play a role in monitoring or supervision. For example, he was tasked with helping the UN Special Commission in its monitoring of the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the UN often maintains humanitarian and development aid in a peace-building effort aimed a maintaining the infrastructures (e.g., educational, economic, and social) that are necessary to maintain peace.

A list of conflicts in which the Secretary-General has intervened has been prepared¹⁶ and his roles analyzed with the above framework. This review shows that in the first fifty years of the UN, the number of early warning cases is fewer than five percent of conflicts handled. In addition to the examples of the Congo (1960) and East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971) mentioned above, there are the cases of Bahrain (1970) and Macedonia (1992). In both these latter cases, as it turns out, effective preventive action was also taken.

The record shows that early warning is not a frequent activity of the UN Secretary-General, despite his Charter mandate. It is therefore natural to identify the difficulties associated with early warning and to explore the possibilities for improvements. Especially after the Cold War, one would expect that potential for an expanded role in this area should be both desirable and possible.

III. Old Constraints and New Opportunities

The dilemma faced by a Secretary-General before warning of a new threat to the peace is much like that faced by a person wondering whether to pull a fire alarm. As the signs of fire appear, a number of people are usually in a position to sound the alarm. In the UN, member states also have the right to bring threats to the peace to the attention of the Council.¹⁷ To sound the alarm, the Secretary-General must either have new and unique information on the danger or, once the danger is seen by several actors, he must be bold enough to choose to raise the issue. The two main reasons for the dearth of warnings from the Secretary-General are pinpointed in this analogy. He rarely has more information than the most powerful members of the UN (or states closest to the conflict) and, when a conflict becomes obvious, he often prefers that states take the initiative in sounding the alarm because they will then be more motivated to mount a response. This does not mean that his early warning role is unimportant, but rather it shows that it can be difficult to implement.

The difficulties in obtaining pivotal information and fostering political will can, again, be illustrated by historical cases. In Korea (1950), the Secretary-General received the initial information about the invasion from the US, and so from the beginning was behind on knowledge about events. Even the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK), stationed in Korea, drew most of its information from US diplomatic and military staff in the country. When originally informed of the invasion, the Secretary-General did offer to invoke Article 99, apparently feeling confident enough about the authenticity of the US information, but he was told that the US itself was planning to call an urgent Council meeting. While little new information was provided by UNCOK, its confirmation of the attack was itself quite useful, because it was considered a neutral international observer.

In the East Pakistan/Bangladesh conflict (1971), the Secretary-General, after waiting months for states to raise the issue in the Council, sent an memorandum to try to push the Council into deliberation. He did not want to call a formal meeting of the Council but rather sought to "nudge" the Council towards deliberations and action. But there was no political will in the Council to initiative discussions until the war broke out some five months later. In the Korea case, the Secretary-General was limited by a lack of information. In the East Pakistan/Bangladesh case, it was the lack of political will (both on his part and on that of the Council) that prevented the Secretary-General from invoking Article 99.

Knowing that the keys to early warning are good information and strong political helps identify various means to improve the UN's early warning system. It is apparent that the information should be clear and convincing in identifying an emerging threat. This entails not only the gathering of information from the field but also a substantial means for analysis. Within the UN there must also be a consultation process to consider the results of such analysis and a means to move critical information quickly "up the ladder" to the Secretary-General. In addition to bringing the information to the attention of Council members, it may also be necessary to disseminate further in order to promote action.

1. Information Gathering

Where does the Secretary-General obtain his information about emerging crises? The main sources are members states, UN agencies/personnel, the media and non-governmental organizations. Some of the advantages and disadvantages of each of these sources are summarized in Table 2. Again, selected historical incidents can illustrate the practical problems and opportunities. Here, we focus on the dramatic moments when the Secretary-General first learned about major conflicts.

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Governments sometimes submit reports to the Secretary-General on their own actions (in justification), but more often they provide information on the actions of others (usually in condemnation). In 1948, Trygve Lie learned about the Arab attack on Israel (on 15 May 1948) through a cablegram from Egyptian government to the Security Council President¹⁸. He heard about the North Korean invasion (on 25 June 1950) in a mid-night call from a US official¹⁹. Dag Hammarskjold received allegations of a Vietnamese attack on Laos in a cable from the Laotian foreign minister (on 4 September 1959), who apparently magnified the threat. U Thant was informed by a US State Department official about the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba (on 20 Oct 1962) two days before Kennedy's public announcement of the threat²⁰. Perez de Cuellar learned of the US-led attack on Iraq in call from President Bush a hour or so before the attack began (January 1991).

attack began (January 1991). UN officials in the field can supply important and dramatic news quickly to headquarters. They are often the most objective sources, though they are often very limited in what they can observe (and often the most objective sources, though they are often very limited in what they can observe (and anticipate). The arrival of the Six-Day War (5 Jun 1967) was conveyed to headquarters at 3 am (prompting anticipate). The arrival of the Six-Day War (5 Jun 1967) was conveyed to headquarters at 3 am (prompting Ralph Bunche to disturb U Thant at home) by the commander of UN peace-keeping force in the region (UNEF)²¹. Similarly, UN observers stationed near the Suez Canal informed Kurt Walheim (6 Oct 1973) of the start of the Yom Kippur War²².

the start of the Yom Kippur War. The news media is sometimes ahead of diplomatic and internal channels. Lie learned of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia (22 Feb 1948) in a newscast on his car radio²³. U Thant learned of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (20 Aug 1968) on a radio newscast carrying the Soviet Government's announcement of such.²⁴ U Thant learned of the proclamation of independence of Bangladesh, and the ensuing violence (26 March 1971), in a report of the Indian News Agency (monitored by the Office of Public Information) which, in turn, cited the Voice of the Free Bangladesh Radio.

Information) which, in turn, once the excerpts or summaries of local press reports to headquarters but these UN field offices routinely send excerpts or summaries of local press reports to headquarters but these usually focus on how the UN itself is being covered. Realizing that UN personnel who work in over one hundred countries at UN Information Centres (UNICs) and UN Development Programme offices are an untapped source of early warning information, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar requested "the heads of the UN agencies and field offices throughout the world to inform him, on an urgent basis, of any situation that could give rise to a major humanitarian crisis."²⁵ The Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning mandate during its five-year existence from 1987-Information (ORCI), which maintained an early warning is to be based on "official documents and 'political developments' in the region they cover." Information is to be based on "official documents and 'political developments' in the region they cover." Early of the could of the Cold Ware there are new possibilities.

comments, press analyses, and report at a possibilities With the advent of the "information age" and the end of the Cold War, there are new possibilities for information gathering which can are just beginning to be explored by the UN. Most of these arise from the rapid progress in technological innovation.

the rapid progress in technological innovation. An increasing number of states and private companies are gaining reconnaissance satellites, which operate above the boundaries of national sovereignty and which can potentially observe all countries of the world. The images obtained from advanced reconnaissance satellites are good enough to count people in an open market place even at night (using radar) and even to spot snipers. At present, however, the UN does not have automatic access to such images. A major priority should be to obtain regular, if not continuous, not have automatic access to such images. A major priority should be to obtain regular, if not continuous, not have automatic access to such images of the automatic transfer of satellite information (or any information for that present, any agreements for the automatic transfer of satellite information (or any information for that matter) to the UN and only vague responsibilities are recognized by Member States. These responsibilities should be formalized in one or more information-sharing agreements to help the UN better anticipate

conflicts. Aerial reconnaissance can also provide important information. Perhaps it is time in reexamine President Dwight Eisenhower's 1960 proposal for a "UN aerial reconnaissance capability ... to detect

preparations for attack" to operate "in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection."²⁷ The US President had generously offered to provide planes and equipment, as well as to accept observation on US territory. Such openness and magnanimity towards the UN is unlikely from the US today, but it might be possible for some group of nations to commit themselves to developing such a global "confidence-building regime." With the new technologies that are now available for aerial reconnaissance, the potential effectiveness of such observation is greatly increased. When the UN is patrolling one side of a border (e.g., as in Macedonia), aerial reconnaissance can permit a view at least 30-40 km into the opposing territory, which is helpful to identify any threatening troop concentrations.

Ground-based observation technologies can assist the UN in its field missions. In addition to satellite input, UN forces would benefit from night vision devices (which allow peace-keepers to patrol better at night) and various types of sensors and detectors (such a ground sensors and radar to spot moving vehicles and persons). The NATO forces which took over from the UN in the former Yugoslavia had these, illustrating how, by NATO standards, the UN is mal-equipped. Historically, in many of the UN's field operations, the most advanced observation device employed was the human eyeball, sometimes aided by binoculars.

Even still, information gained by advanced observation technologies (satellite, aerial or on-site) may not be enough to reveal the hidden intentions of leaders. Often the only people to know about a planned escalation of conflict are the plotters and their associates. In the past, some "insiders" have sought to warn the UN, placing themselves at great risk. For instance, in Rwanda in early 1994, several months before the world witnessed the worst case of genocide since World War II, the UN peace-keeping force stationed there (UNAMIR) received information from a Rwandan military officer that a group of high-ranking Hutus within the government were planning the mass slaughter of Tutsis. The UN Force Commander, Romeo Dallaire of Canada, requested permission from UN headquarters to provide asylum to the informer. Having no system to handle asylum seekers, headquarters turned down the request. The macabre plot was not uncovered until well after the systematic killings had escalated beyond control. A key element in the extremists' plot was to force Belgian peace-keepers to leave the country at the outset of the slaughter, since they were the best equipped peace-keepers in the country and the only ones remotely capable of putting a stop to the spread of genocide. So Rwandan government forces confronted a group of Belgian paratroopers and requested them to lay down their arms. Not knowing of the plot, the peace-keepers innocently complied, only to be slaughtered. An outraged Belgium withdrew the rest of its peace-keepers shortly thereafter, just as the coup plotters had desired. During the subsequent fighting, the unprepared UN Force Commander complained about being "deaf and blind" in the field. This story shows that more and better information is necessary at an early stage and that a mechanism should be developed to grant rapid asylum to those who put their lives at risk when they have vital information relating to keeping the peace.

Obtaining information directly from locals who observe or are affected by menacing developments is a key to early warning. Electronic mail, available through the Internet, has the potential for easier, cheaper, more rapid and widespread communication between individuals and the UN. The UN has already established a 24-hour human rights "fax hotline" in Geneva to receive complaints from individuals. By providing an e-mail address for receipt of similar information, the UN should receive even more warnings and vital information. While e-mail (and, indeed, long distance calling/faxing) may not yet be available to many potential "warners" in third world countries, it's influence is bound to grow in coming years. With both the Internet and the telephone, however, there remains the challenge of securing confidentiality during transmission and after reception.

The Internet currently provides wide-ranging background information, which can be useful in exploring the nature of conflicts, current and emerging. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs has already established excellent sites for information-sharing on areas of conflict.²⁸ ReliefWeb is an excellent example. This publicly-available database covers countries where disasters (natural or manmade) are

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actually occurring.²⁹ Because it uses media reports, it has the advantage that information that could not normally be provided by the UN (e.g., not fully substantiated or embarrassing information) is included on the UN site. The countries covered by ReliefWeb are only those for which a consolidated UN appeal has been made. This requires a request from the state itself and therefore rules out many countries which might be targeted for early warning. In Africa, for example, the conflict-ridden countries currently covered by ReliefWeb are Angola, the Great Lakes countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan.³⁰ Nigeria, a country with no current humanitarian emergency but with significant potential for such disaster, would not be covered.³¹

Human rights abuses can be important indicators of emerging or escalating conflict. Several UN human rights agencies can provide useful information. The UN Commission on Human Rights has a mandate for global monitoring of human rights. Its special rapporteurs conduct in-depth investigations of human rights abuses. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has among his/her functions "prevention and early warning." In 1994 the 24-hour hot line was established to "allow the United Nations Centre for Human Rights in Geneva to monitor and react rapidly to human rights emergencies, such as the 1994 crisis in Rwanda."³² Input is solicited from victims, their relatives and NGOs to initiate "urgent, potentially life-saving contact" with the Special Procedures Branch of the Centre. The hotline and database are designed to improve the "timely flow of information from and to special rapporteurs from anywhere in the world", and form the basis of an electronic network linking the globe³³.

2. Analysis of Information

In order to do early warning, the UN also needs a much better, more sophisticated analytical capacity. Thorough analysis of incoming information is necessary to spot trends, to corroborate alarming reports and to identify further information that must be sought. This later is an important part of the feedback loop. Early warning is achieved when specific information is targeted and deliberately sought out, based usually on "leads" provided in the general information-gathering process. Those who plot an escalation of violence usually try to hide their plans and preparations. Hence, it may require some keen "detective work" to uncover even the general nature of such plots. Two important indicators are the importation of armaments (usually done secretly or illegally) and the control over resources (e.g., mining activities or the drug trade). The UN has a poor monitoring system for such indicators, perhaps reflecting its fear of infringing on "internal affairs." It is also important to identify the vested interests economically within the country as well as outside. For example, in Katanga in 1960-62 it was vital for the UN to know the policies of the mining firms which backed Katangan succession.

In order to do early warning and contingency planning, the UN needs to constantly develop scenarios for potential outcomes of situations in the short and long-term. Most armies have contingency plans for all kinds of threats, from conventional wars to nuclear holocaust, so it is only reasonable that the UN should develop contingency plans to respond to armed conflicts. Unfortunately, the UN has not yet developed a system for scenario-building. Now that the need for greater emphasis on conflict prevention is recognized by nations (at least on paper), the time has come to develop realistic mechanisms. Analysis is needed not only to spot negative developments but also to identify positive developments which are to be reinforced.

The strongest analytical capacity, of the type needed for early warning, exists in the Information and Research (I&R) Unit of the Situation Centre, which is part of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO). Though small, with only four officers, it has the greatest "reach" in terms of information gathering and analysis because these officers are "connected" to national intelligence systems, having been seconded from them. Created in 1994 with only a US intelligence officer, the unit now has officers from each of the permanent five members of the Security Council except China.³⁴ The officers are not limited to peace-keeping operations and regularly provide assistance to other departments and the Office of the Secretary-General. The have produced important information/intelligence reports which have gone well beyond the

scope of regular UN reports. They have included information on arms flows and other covert assistance from States. They have evaluated the motivations of parties, prepared threat assessments and other forecasts. Unfortunately, the I&R unit does not have a specific mandate for early warning and so it does early warning only in an ad hoc fashion.

3. Shared Responsibilities and Consultations

Before information reaches the Secretary-General, it is usually received and "processed" to some extent by personnel in the Secretariat, including his Executive Office. Though the Secretary-General is sometimes informed by government representatives directly, the general flow of information on new developments is from the desk officer (who usually specializes in several countries in a given region) to the division head to the Under-Secretary-General and to the Secretary-General.

Several departments within the Secretariat have responsibilities for early warning, as do the various human rights bodies mentioned above. Currently, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has "primary responsibility" within the UN Secretariat for preventive action and peacemaking³⁵. This includes a mandate "to identify potential or actual conflicts in whose resolution the United Nations could play a useful role." The six regional divisions within DPA are each charged with identifying "potential crisis areas and providing *early warning* to the Secretary-General on developments and situations affecting peace and security."³⁶

The most ambitious and focused early warning system for conflict yet established in the UN is the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). It currently involves some 3-4 professional staff and a significant computerized capacity. The system incorporates a multitude of indicators and information sources (statistical and textual) to allow monitoring of deterioration in over 100 nations. However, the system has yet to produce a single "early warning," though it has been operational since July 1995. The efforts in the initial stages were deficient in that too much reliance was placed on statistics, computer databases and automated computations for pattern recognition and neural networks. In colloquial terms, the first efforts relied too much on a "black box" approach rather than a "hands on", proactive approach.

It is generally recognized that, traditionally, different sections of the UN, as with many bureaucracies, lacked coordination and an effective information flow.³⁷ In order to address this problem within the Secretariat, a DHA/DPA/DPKO Framework for Coordination was developed after the creation of DHA in 1992. One goal is "joint analysis of early warning of a looming crisis, within a broader framework for the coordination of operational planning and implementation among the three departments." This includes "early warning information gathering and analysis, planning of preventive action, fact-finding, etc." Desk officers are to exchange "early warning signals, staff reports, internal meeting notes, maps, assessments, agency situation reports, etc."³⁸ An Interdepartmental committee meets regularly to facilitate this. It has also been stated that there is "agreement as to the responsibility and criteria for 'sounding the alarm' in impending crises."

On the larger, inter-agency level, an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) has held Consultations since 1992 on "Early Warning of New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons." The Consultations are held every month or two; they are organized and chaired by DHA and include many UN agencies (FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, WHO, WFP, IOM), UN Secretariat sections (e.g., DPA and the Centre for Human Rights Affairs), as well as the ICRC as an observer. Consensual reports from the meetings are prepared for the executive heads of the agencies and offices represented, as well as the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. In these reports, short lists of cases of urgent situations that might give rise to new flows are presented along with possible preventive/preparative measures to be taken by the Secretary-General or other high officials. Recently, the cases have been classified in terms of both the timing of the expected crisis and the estimated size of the displacement. The ad hoc committee also collaborates with the newly created Inter-Agency Standing

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Committee (IASC), which also has been given an early warning role.³⁹

The IASC is composed of the executive heads of the UN humanitarian organizations as well as ICRC, the International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, and the non-governmental consortia International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Interaction and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. The IASC usually develops the terms of reference for inter-agency appeals for international support in response to a natural or man-made disaster. So far, it has confined itself to disasters that have already occurred, not ones that are forecast.

4. Dissemination and the Political Will of Member States

Even the most progressive of the group of early warners, the ACC ad hoc committee, complains that warnings that are not acted upon or even not considered:

The effectiveness of the Ad Hoc Working Group's access to the executive level has, regrettably, remained a serious concern of every participant. While the reports of the Consultations on Early Warning reach the offices of executive heads, there is uncertainty as to whether the message contained in these brief alerts is received and acted upon. Everybody is aware of the information-overload problem of senior managers and of the self-evident need of senior officials to attend to the pressing issues of the moment. Still, if the costs in human lives and resources of today's megacrises are to be lowered markedly, the current neglect of early warnings for preventive purposes must be reversed.⁴⁰

The Secretaries-General, similarly, have complained about the lack of interest on the part of member states in receiving early warnings.

In principle, governments are in support of early warning by the Secretary-General. The Security Council and the General Assembly have passed several resolutions to promote early warning and have encouraged the Secretary-General to employ Article 99. They did so in relation to the Secretary-General's 1992 Agenda for Peace⁴¹. The General Assembly did so in its resolutions on the "Protection and Security of Small States"⁴², and through various declarations it has approved.⁴³ In the 1992 Declaration on UN Fact-finding, the General Assembly endorsed an even expanded mandate:

28. The Secretary-General should monitor the state of international peace and security *regularly and systematically* in order to provide early warning of disputes or situations which might threaten international peace and security. The Secretary-General may bring relevant information to the attention of the Security Council and, where appropriate, of the General Assembly. [emphasis added]

Unfortunately, a regular and systematic forecasting system, producing periodic reports on potential or actual threats to the peace, has not been created within the Secretariat.

The crux of the problem for early warning and Article 99 invocations has been that the major powers will themselves alert the Security Council to threats to the peace if and when they see the need; if they do not bring such matters up, it usually means that they do not want it brought up. If the Secretary-General "forces" the matter on the agenda of the Council by invoking Article 99, he risks raising the ire of one or more members of the Council. He may be dissuaded by them in advance or may simply fear that there will be little chance of action, since the Council members have already decided not to handle the matter. The only case where the Secretary-General can claim to have special privilege is when he possesses unique information, not available to the major powers, which will galvanize the Council to action. But it is rare that the Secretary-General will know about a new dispute before the major powers.

The "solution" of this political problem is to develop a new norm for early warning, in which the Secretary-General regularly draws attention to potential conflict at an early stage in spite of the reluctance of some members of the Council. This would be a natural exercise of Article 99 and has been requested by nations (e.g., in the 1992 UN Fact-Finding Declaration). Such early warning entails a more proactive

approach on the part of the Secretary-General, even when a UN response is not immediately possible. It also requires that the current early warning system be augmented, so that better information and analysis is available to the Secretary-General. A number of possible means of improvement are included in the next (recommendations) section.

Some of the "old constraints and new opportunities" for early warning in the UN are summarized in **Table 3**. Recent breakthroughs in information gathering, analysis and dissemination have been possible, thanks mostly to the rapid increase in computing power and the availability of the Internet. Still, this increase in information collection and handling has not resulted in a functioning early warning (EW) system. No unit within the UN, including the office of the Secretary-General, has yet produced a series of early warnings. While the UN is not expected to match the major powers in the ability to gather and process information about impending threats, in order to do early warning, its capabilities need to be substantially increased.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations: Towards an Effective UN Early Warning System

In the past few years, the constraints on developing early warning systems have been financial and managerial, as well as political and technical. The recent past has been characterized by deep financial cuts, loss of posts and institutional retrenchment. Still, with the UN reform process under way, there is reason to hope that a strengthened early warning system, as a vital component of effective conflict prevention and preparedness, can yet become a part of the UN Secretariat. Some recommendations are made here.

* A single body should be designated with overall responsibility for the function of early warning (EW). This EW unit should be accountable for failures at early warning.

Comment: Currently, the responsibility for early warning is spread out among several departments. In such a case, it is easy for each body to ignore the early warning responsibility, and evade the risks to be taken by issuing early warnings. It is proposed that one unit be held accountable for any lapses. While early warning can continue to be included in the mandates of several departments, one person (e.g., the unit chief) should be given the primary and coordinating role and made accountable. This will put the onus on that person/unit to produce early warnings. It should be accountable for both missed opportunities and for false alarms.

* A learning mechanism should be part of the early warning system (EWS).

Comment: Failures to issue early warnings, which might be expected to be frequent, should be reviewed in order to determine if there are deficiencies in the system, improvements to be made and, more generally, lessons to be learned. In this way, the early warning system and individuals involved should "learn from experience" over time.

* The EW unit should be provided with sufficient analytical skills to carry out its mandate.

Comment: None of the bodies currently tasked with early warning have a sufficient analytical capacity. For the ambitious mandate of early warning, much information must be analysed and corroborated, leads must be followed and new information requirements identified. Formulations of potential scenarios and their continual modification, after checks against reality, are necessary. The Information and Research (I&R) Unit of the DPKO Situation Centre has demonstrated the capacity for this. This positive experience should be useful to the proposed EW unit.

* Required information and potential information sources should be actively identified.

Comment: Currently, the UN EW systems work in a passive information collection mode, which is only the first stage. As part of the feedback loop in the information system, analysis of incoming information should result in the identification of further information requirements. Often, these are crucial facts which must be

"sought out." It is important to follow up leads and "hunches" in the second stage. Of course, the EW unit should be aware of limits imposed by international law and UN policies on its information-gathering activities.

* The EW unit should be able to draw upon national information and intelligence agencies.

Comment: National agencies sometimes have the most crucial information (e.g., on current troop positions, obtained by satellite and illicit arms imports, obtained from assets). The Information and Research (I&R) Unit of the DPKO Situation Centre maintains very useful links with national intelligence services. HEWS, which is currently tasked with an ambitious EW mandate, lacks any such contacts. It is vital that the proposed EW unit be in communication with such bodies, since they often have crucial information necessary for early warning. Of course, it may be necessary to corroborate reports from several agencies and sources to avoid inaccuracies and national biases.

* Bring UN human rights agencies into close contact with the early warning unit.

Comment: Human rights violations are important indicators of potential conflict. It is desirable to maintain an on-going dialogue with the UN's human rights and refugee agencies (which are mostly based in Geneva).

* Develop partnerships with NGOs, especially those engaged in early warning.

Comment: Similarly, there will be great benefit to working more closely with groups that can provide some of this much needed information gathering and analysis capability. NGOs often have people in the field able to observe situations first hand and with many local contacts. They are often more than willing to provide warnings to the UN because of the risk to the safety of their staff in the event of an escalation of conflict. In addition, there are several NGO groups which are now forming with the mandate for early warning (e.g., the Forum on Early Warning and Response, of which the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs is already associated), with whom the EW unit should be in close contact.

* Monitor early warnings issued by other organizations.

The some cases, early warnings will already have been sounded, often from sources within the country in question and sometimes from outside groups. The EW unit should keep track of such warnings in order to keep watch of situations and to further investigate the situation and potentially to corroborate the information.

* Hold special meetings devoted to early warning of the DPA/DHA/DPKO framework committee regularly and invite UN human rights agencies to attend. To provide information, selected NGOs should also be invited to attend at least some or part of these meetings.

* Explore the possibilities for new information-gathering agreements and norms.

There have been significant advances in on-site inspection standards for arms control and peace-keeping. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for the most intrusive system of inspection of any treaty yet, based on an "any site, anytime" approach, qualified by managed access provisions.⁴⁴ In the not so distant future, similar "challenge inspection" provisions could be considered for incorporation a global on-site inspection system favoring transparency in military affairs. Eisenhower's proposal of 1960 for a UN aerial reconnaissance system (made five years after his first open skies proposal), described earlier, could be re-examine by governments and others. This should be done in relation to the current Open Skies Treaty in Europe and the capacity of reconnaissance satellites. In addition, the UN should consider developing the capacity for aerial surveillance in its peace-keeping and other missions.

* Explore the possibilities for technology.

Comment: The UN has traditionally been technophobic, both in the field and at headquarters. As mentioned, there are many technological possibilities still waiting to be explored, from remote sensing technologies (such as aerial and satellite monitoring) to ground sensing. While there has been an expressed interest in technology within certain quarters of the UN (e.g., in the Peace-keeping Committee and in UN expert reports on verification) there has not been even a detailed study about how technology can have a positive impact on peace and security and play a role in UN's tasks, including early warning.

* The officer in charge of early warning should not be responsible for proposing response options. This responsibility should be held by a different body.

Comment: A requirement that the early warning coordinator or unit also recommend potential responses to the threat will slow down, or make impossible, the early warning process. While such recommendations can be attached to the warning, the "early warners" should be unencumbered from that obligation. Their warning should, however, provide an analysis of the threat with as much information as possible that could be useful in the consideration of responses.

* More broadly, the UN should consider the creation a Civilian/Military Information Centre (CMIC) with a responsibility for handling information at all stages of the conflict, from prior to escalation (leading to early warnings) to the post-conflict peace-building stage. The EW unit could be part of such a body.

Comment: This integrated approach has much to commend it. It would allow for information gathering through the life cycle of a conflict and across the military/civilian divide. This will help smooth the transition between early warning and peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. There is a strong need for a body within the Secretariat which is dedicated to information gathering and analysis. In the past, a number of large peace-keeping operations (PKOs) included a distinct military information branch (MIB) in the field. Various UN operations (from the Congo⁴⁵ to the former Yugoslavia) have shown the utility of dedicated information bodies (MIBs) in the field. The need for strengthened informational procedures, both at headquarters and in the field, has been recognized. Both the Secretary-General and the Council have stressed the need for improved information capacity.⁴⁶ The current capacity of the Information and Research Unit of the DPKO Situation Centre already assists considerably in many non-peace-keeping tasks, including early warning. In a CMIC, the capacity for analysis could be used in the spectrum of UN roles (including, early warning, peace-keeping, and humanitarian assistance, as well as possibly arms control verification).

* Issuing reports on early warning should become a regular activity both within the Secretariat (i.e., reports to the Secretary General) and to the Member States (i.e., reports from the Secretary General). Comment: To establish a new "early warning" norm, which will help to make the UN a more proactive body, reporting should be regular, even if there are no early warnings to make. One possibility would be to include a section on potential threats to the peace in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General. In addition, regular EW reports should be made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, both in the formal and the informal sessions. This is the essence of the responsibility imposed on him by Article 99 and as part of the UN's overall responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The early warning function should becomes a regular part of his service.

The UN Secretary-General is now positioned better than ever before to do early warning. There are early warning mandates from the Security Council and the General Assembly. The UN possesses better information systems than ever before. In addition, there appear to be progressive movers within the UN's international civil service and a new Secretary-General who is thoroughly familiar and experienced with the

UN's role in peace-keeping. A lot will now depend on his progressive, proactive nature and the receptivity of UN member states.

Will the UN maintain its habitual pattern of *reacting* to conflicts instead being *proactive* in an attempt to warn and preempting them? If the new Secretary-General sees a new era, ripe for an expanded UN mandate, then there is every possibility for hope. Then Article 99 will be not merely a theoretical possibility, seldom used, but a living provision of the UN Charter and an additional tool to save the world from much misery and suffering. UN early warning is surely an idea whose time has come.

Table 1.

The Secretary-General Alerts the Security Council

Walter Dom

This table describes most of the important instances in which the Secretary-General has alerted the Security Council to dispute which in his opinion may pose a threat to international peace and security. In most of these cases to Secretary-General exercised the substance of the responsibilities conferred upon him by Article 99 [1] of the UN Charter. However, by a strict application of Article 99 [2], formal invocation of the Article has occurred only three times: Congo.

Tuquia L:	Meeting Dat	e Situation	Description		
Tygvie Lie (1946-53)	25 Jun 1950	North Korea attacks South Korea. US notifies SG of attack. SG obtains independent confirmation and details of attack from the UN Commission on Korea.	At an emergency SC meeting, requested by the US (a boycotted by the Soviet Union), SG speaks first, stati that "military actions have been undertaken by North Kc forces" which were a "direct violation" of General Asset resolution 293 (IV) and of the UN Charter. He said to the situation was "a threat to international peace I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to ta steps necessary to re-establish peace in the security to re-		
Des Harris	for heading iss	of a short at still a spice of a	SC passes resolutions condeming attack as breach of the peace. On June 27, SC calls upon UN Members to furni assistance to repel the attack. [Lie, 1954, pp.323-333]		
Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-61)	7 Sep 1959	Laos alleges Vietnamese aggression and requests SG to send an emergency UN force.	SG asks SC President to "convene urgently" a SC meetin which President does under his own authority. US desire to introduce a draft resolution to establish a fact-finding body as a procedural matter, and thus avoid Soviet veto. At meeting, SG states he is not invoking Article 99, which would cause matter to be considered substantial, but is only reporting to SC on agenda item introduced by SC President. He states that he has insufficient knowledge to make judgement as to the face.		
			carried, over Soviet objections and fact-finding Committee is established. Committee reports indicate that Lao allegations are over stated. No UN force is sent. [UNYB 1959, pp.62-65]		
	13 Jul 1960	Congolese government cables SG with a request for UN military assistance to protect against Belgian paratroops. These had been dispatched to protect Belgian interests (including inhabitants) in the former colony. The country is in chaos.	SG requests urgent meeting of the SC for that evening of "a matter which, in my opinion, may threaten international peace and security." At meeting, he recommeds a UN force be sent to Congo, so that Belgian forces could be withdrawn and to prevent others (esp. Soviet Union) from sending troops. SC authorizes him to send the UN force. ONUC, which at its peak numbers about 20,000 troops, is established to help keep law and order. [Cordier & Foote, vol. V, pp.16-27; UN Doc S/4381, 13 July 1960; S/PV.873 meeting, 13 July.]		
	22 Jul 1961	Fighting intensifies around Bizerta, Tunisia, between French forces, which occupy the city, and Tunisian soldiers and civilians. Tunisia had blockaded the French naval base at Bizerta. SC meets for second time to continue its contentious discussion of situation.	At the second SC meeting dealing with the Bizerta question, SG makes speaks to SC: "News reaching us from Tunisia indicates that the serious and threatening development which the Council took up for consideration yesterday continues, with risks of irreparable damage to international peace and security." In view of the "obligations of the Secretary-General acting under Article 99", he appeals to SC to make an immediate call for a cease-fire and return of all armed forces to original positions. SC adopts a resolution with these provisions by vote of 10-0, with France sections		
Thant (1962-71)	29 Apr 1963	Yemen's Imam is deposed in a coup d'état by republicans. UAR recognizes new regime, while Saudi Arabia supports Imam. Fighting breaks out. UAR sends troops.	[Cordier & Foote, vol. V, pp.526-530] SG informs SC of his initiatives to ensure against "any development in the situation which might threaten the peace in the area." Explains that the three parties have agreed to the stationing of a UN observer mission (UNYOM) and will pay for it. UNYOM is established to observe disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces. including supervision of a DMZ. At 11 June 1963 meeting Thant warns that "disengagement may be jeopardized if the United Nations observation personnel are not on the spot. I earnestly hope, therefore, that the Council will find it possible to achieve prompt agreement on this matter." SC passed resolution approving observation force, which conducted operations until 4 Sep 1964.		

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	20 Јш 1971	Awami League declares the independence of East Pakistan in March 1971. Pakistani President Yahya Khan requests army to supress independence activities, resulting in bloodshed. U Thant maintains almost daily contact with India and Pakistan but refrains from calling SC meeting because both sides consider the conflict an internal matter.	SG distributes a confidential memorandum to SC members, "warning them that the conflict could all too easily expand, erupting the entire subcontinent in fratricidal strife. and that the United Nations must now attempt to mitigate the tragedy." The memorandum was made public in August. SG describes it as "an implied invocation of Article 99." Yet SC does not meet in emergency session until the Indo-Pakistan War begins on December 3, four months after SG's warning. SC is unable to decide on action. SG confines himself to the humanitarian aspects of the problem, including the organization of international aid for refugees in India. [Thant, p. 423]
Kurt Waldheim (1972-81)	16 Јш 1974	Cyprus crisis is ignited when Greek Cypriot National Guard stage a coup d'état on 15 July against President Makarios, who flees from the Island	SG requests SC President to convene an emergency meeting, in view of the seriousness of the matter in relation to international peace and security and in view of the UN involvement in Cyprus. The permanent representative of Cyprus also requests meeting. SC endorsed continued UN peace-keeping efforts and authorized SG to attempt to mediate dispute (?). However, it was only on 20 July, the day of the Turkish intervention that the Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire.
	30 Mar 1976 & 16 Mar 1978	Lebanon	In both cases, SG brings to the attention of the Security Council the gravity of the situation in Lebanon, transmits the communications that he has received, and offers his good offices.
	4 Dec 1979	US Embassy in Tehran is invaded by revolutionary students on 4 Nov 1979, with support of Iran's new new government. On 9 Nov, after consulations, SC President calls for the release of the hostages	SG writes to SC President on 25 Nov 1979 drawing attention to the continuing crisis and requesting SC meeting, saying that it was his opinion that the crisis posed a threat to international peace and security. SC meets formally on 27 Nov. SG speaks first, calling upon US and Iran to exercice maximum restraint. In resolution of 4 Dec SC calls for release of hostages, restoration of diplomatic immunities and authorizes SG to "take all appropriate measures" to implement the resolution. On 31 December 1979 he travels to Tehran. The Iranian government paints his visit as a fact-finding mission to examine crueities of the Shah's regime. SG's four-point proposal is rejected and he returns empty handed.[UNYB 1979,pp.307-311; S/13646.25 Nov1979]
	26 Sep 1980	From mid-May to mid-Sep SG receives accusations from both Iran & Iraq, indicating a detenorating situation. Iraq invades Iran on 22 Sep, beginning the Iran-Iraq war. SG appeals to both parties on 22&23 Sep for restraint and a negotiated settlement.	SG states in letter to SC Pres (23? Sep), that fighting had intensified and that the situation undoubtedly threatened international peace & security. SG suggests SC consultations. Mexico and Norway request formal meeting of SC. At meeting on 26 Sep. SG summarizes developments leading to the meeting. SC adopts resolution 479(1980) calling for a cease-fire and urging parties to accept mediation or conciliation. [UNYB 1980, pp.312-314]
avier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-91)	Aug 1989	Fighting in Lebanon escalates especially in and around Beirut. There is danger of even further involvement of outside parties	In a letter to the SC President, the SG notes that violence in and around Beirut "had escalated to a level unprecedented in fourteen years of conflict." He states his belief that an effective cease-fire is imperative"; in his my opinion, "the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security. Accordingly, in the exercise of my responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, I ask that the Security Council be convened urgently" [S/20789]

1

1 Article 99 states: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international

2 In preparing this table the following critereon, broader than those conventionally used to classify an explicit invocation of Article 99, were used: (1) the Secretary-General must be the first to address the issue formally in the Council or be the first to call for a meeting (but not necessarily both) and (2) he must announce the existence of a threat to the peace. The criterion in a formal invocation of Article 99 are given in the text.

Table 2. UN information sources and their advantages/disadvantages for UN early warning and confl management.


Information Source	Advantages	Disadvantages		
Governments	 UN Member States have a duty to provide UN with information no financial cost to receive such information specific information may not be available elsewhere important to know and understand government policies and assumptions for UN policy development, contingency planning and action 	 national bias and self-interest dominance of Western intelligence capabilities incomplete and selective info. provided (on a "national interest" and "need to know" basis) often only analyses are provided without raw data and vice-versa restrictions may be placed on use and dissemination of information provided (e.g., to avoid compromising intelligence sources) 		
The Media	 wide-ranging minimum costs non-intrusive for UN usually up-to-date 	 media bias; sensationalistic approach danger that information is factually incorrect (due to rush deadlines and dependence on oral interviews) Western (US) media dominance 		
UN Personnel on-site (UN Agencies, Information Centres and verification/peace- keeping missions)	 first-hand observation, physical proximity generally, more objective than above sources, but usually more cautious direct communications with locals possibility of meeting directly with all protagonists 	 may overextend capacity of the UN agencies/centres may displease host state, which might accuse UN of spying may compromise other functions (e.g., development work, UN publicity role) is dependent on consent and cooperation of the host state and local authorities requires caution to avoid accepting staged events may be dangerous 		
NGOs and Individuals (e.g., humanitarian aid organizations)	 generally less biased inside sources and contacts possible less sensitive to criticism 	 members states may protest to UN (re. role of non-state actors in UN) danger of lack of professionalism and accountability 		
Observation technologies (e.g., aerial/satellite and ground-based systems)	 mechanized/computerized systems reduce requirements for on-site personnel and increase efficiency and scope of surveillance aerial/satellite: possibility for both wide-scan of territory and target-specific information less intrusive than humans (esp. satellites) less risk to human life than on-site observers 	 expensive, with limited choice of providers (mostly Western nations) aerial/ground sensors: permission required to enter national airspace or territory (though not for satellites) susceptible to deception and destruction aerial/satellite: difficulty to see inside buildings or underground; dependent on weather conditions regular machine maintenance may be required need for professional image/information interpretation and analysis 		

Table 3.	Old	Constraints	and	New	Opportunities	in	Early V	Varning
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	Constraints	Opportunities
Information- Gathering	 questionable accuracy and usual biases of many information sources (e.g., governments, media, NGOs) on-site presence requires consent of host state need to avoid undue infringement on internal affairs threats to safety of observers (e.g., apprehension, physical security) the "darkest" plans are kept secret information overload limited budgets to explore and expand new UN capabilities 	 Internet resources increase accessibility, scope and depth of information; less costly, faster retrieval better observation technologies (e.g., aerial reconnaissance, commercial satellites with resolution better than 5 metres, ground sensors) new and improved communications technologies (e.g., e-mail) allow more information to be sent faster and easier computerized databases used for better information storage/management greater willingness of intelligence agencies to share information with UN
Analysis	 time consuming, mentally intensive intentions are hard to guess hazards of predictions: risk of errors (e.g., "crying wolf") and being proven wrong need to follow leads, and to find corroborating information 	 computer forecasting, graphics for visualization better communications technologies (testing ideas, soliciting views, gaining feedback) greater willingness of intelligence agencies to share analysis with UN
Dissemination	 risks of breaching confidentiality of sensitive information (e.g., revealing and compromising information providers) creates pressure, often unwanted, on states to react to new threats may cause international embarrassment if no response is forthcoming, i.e., if the prediction becomes reality then UN is seen to have failed at response stage if preventive action is successful, the accuracy of the predicted threat may be questioned 	 new means of dissemination to the public (e.g., through Internet) new and expanded roles of SG at end of Cold War (e.g., good offices, multidimensional peace-keeping) brings new authority for proactive work, new response, especially possibilities for preventive deployment Security Council response more likely than during Cold War greater awareness of need for early warning opportunity to set a new norm for "regular and systematic" early warning

Figure 1.

Figure 1 A schematic view of the Secretary-General's roles in the field of peace and security, as they relate to the stages of generalized conflict.



Notes

1. Lord Viscount Cranborne, House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 5th Series, vol. cxxvii, 15 April 1943.

2. On 10 December 1920 the League Assembly adopted a resolution stating: "[i]t shall be the duty of the Secretary-General to call to the attention of the Council to any facts which in his opinion show that a member of the League has become a Covenant-breaking State within the Meaning of Article 16. Upon receiving such an intimation, the Council shall, on the request of any of its members, hold a meeting with the least possible delay to consider it..." Records of First Assembly, Plenary, 1920, 400.

3. as quoted in Rovine, Arthur W., "The First Fifty Years: The Secretary-General in World Politics, 1920-1970", A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1970, p.205.

4. The rigorous application of Article 99 entails a declaration to the Council that there may exist a new (not currently considered) threat to the peace. In UN procedural terms, this means adding a new item to the agenda of the Security Council. The Provisional Rules of Procedure (Rule 2) of the Council further state that "[t]he President shall call a meeting of the Security Council ... if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99."

5. This right to provide input to the Council debate was enshrined in rule 22 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council which states: "The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning *any question* under consideration by it" [italics added].

6. Urquart, Brian, "Hammarskjold," Knopf, New York, 1973, p.389.

7. Ona B. Forest, Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations "Belgian Congo: Summary and Outlook," (Draft Report) June 1960, UN Archives, Dag-1/2.2.1.35.

8. "Letter of Designation, Secretary-General to RJB," 20 June 1960, UN Archives, Dag-1/2.2.1-35.

9. For instance, on July 9, Bunche cabled the warning: "Powder keg here. But full explosion may be avoided." Urquhart, Brain, "Ralph Bunche: An American Life," W.W. Norton, New York, pp.308-9. 10. ibid, p.311.

11. Cordier, Andrew W. and Harrelson, Max, "Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations," Volume VIII (U Thant, 1968-1971), Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, p. 386.

12. "Text of Memorandum to the President of the Security Council, 20 July 1970" in Cordier and Harrelson, Public Papers (ibid), Volume VIII (U Thant, 1968-1971), p. 563-66.

13. "U.S. troops in Macedonia seen as positive foreign policy step", The Washington Post, 11/12/93.

14. The mission, however, lacks the means and skills to gather and analyse data about intentions (political intelligence).

15. Hammarskjold, Dag, "The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact: Lecture Delivered in Congregation at Oxford University, May 30, 1961", in Cordier, Andrew and Foote, Wilder, "The Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume IV (1958-1961), Columbia University Press, New York, p.477.

16. The list is to be published in the near future.

17. Article 35 of the UN Charter states: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly."

18. Lie, Trygve, "In the Cause of Peace," MacMillan Co, New York, 1954, p.178

19. Lie, ibid, p.327.

20. U Thant, "View from the UN," Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1978, p.155. A State Department official informed U Thant through his military adviser, Indar Jit Rikhye.

21. U Thant, ibid, p.253.

22. Urquart, Brian, "A Life in Peace and War," p.237.

23. Lie, ibid, p.231.

24. U Thant, ibid, p.382.

25. Bourloyannis, Christiane, "Fact-Finding by the Secretary-General of the United Nations", Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 22(4), Summer 1990, pp.641-669.

26. "Review of United Nations Public Information Networks: Note by the Secretary-General", U.N. Doc. A/44/329, 1989.

27. Furthermore Eisenhower pledged that "the United States is prepared not only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance." Documents on Disarmament 1960, "Events incident to the Summit Conference (May 16, 1960)," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p.226.

28. Examples of this are ReliefWeb and the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), the first one having been established for the Great Lakes.

29. As of 28 February 1997 Reliefweb (http://www.reliefweb.int) provided information about on-going emergencies and crises in the following states/regions: Afghanistan, Angola, Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), Russian Fed./Chechnya, Great Lakes (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire), Iraq, DPR Korea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan. In addition to these 19 states, there is information on (short-duration) natural disasters.

30. ReliefWeb provided information about on-going emergencies and crises in the following states/regions (as of 28 February 1997): Afghanistan, Angola, Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), Russian Fed./Chechnya, Great Lakes (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire), Iraq, DPR Korea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan. In addition to these 19 states, there is information for (short-duration) natural disasters events such as (in February 1997): floods in Bolivia, Mozambique, Malawi; mudslides in Peru; droughts in Ecuador and Kenya; an earthquake in Iran; and a typhoon in Viet Nam.

31. However, a section of ReliefWeb is now being created for West Africa. At present, it only points to other Internet sites. The establishment of an Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) for West Africa, modelled after the IRIN for the Great Lakes, is also being considered.

32. The Hot Line fax number in Geneva, Switzerland is 41-22-917-0092.

33. Mr. Ayala Lasso, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, quoted in UN Doc. DPI/1550/HR of September 1994.

34. The composition of the I&R unit, consisting only of seconded nationals from the permanent five members of the Security Council, does create the potential problem that incoming information may be biased towards the interests of the UN's most powerful states. In practice, however, such natural biases can be taken into account and found acceptable because more information is generally better than less.

35. This is stated by the Secretary-General in his "50th Anniversary Report on the Work of the Organization", United Nations, 1996 (UN Sales No. E.96.I.19) in the section entitled "preventive diplomacy and peacemaking", p. 193. DPA was created in March 1992, and officially given responsibilities for preventive diplomacy and peace-making one year later. Prior to that, such functions were performed by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. (See General Assembly resolution A/47/120 for the mandate of the Department of Political Affairs.) A good summary of DPA responsibilities is provided in "DPA overview" ("http://www.un.org/smlogo.gif"):

"The DPA has five main responsibilities in support of preventive action and peacemaking. First, it must monitor, analyze and assess political developments throughout the world. Next, the Department identifies potential or actual conflicts in whose control and resolution the United Nations can play a useful role. It then prepares recommendations to the Secretary-General about appropriate actions in such cases. Fourth, the Department executes the approved policy when it is of a diplomatic nature. Finally, it assists the Secretary-General in carrying out political activities decided by him and/or mandated by the General Assembly and the Security Council in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building, including arms control and disarmament."

36. UN Secretariat, "Department of Political Affairs Overview" at http://www.un.org/smlogo.gif (as of March 1997). Italics added.

37. In fact, the previous Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wrote in his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", submitted to the General Assembly on 3 January 1995, that "in an international bureaucracy interdepartmental cooperation and coordination come even less naturally than they do in a national environment."

38. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "The DHA/DPA/DPKO Framework for Coordination", DHA, July 1996 (includes flow chart).

39. The IASC was created by the General Assembly in resolution 46/182.

40. "Consultations on Early Warning of New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons: Report of the ad hoc Working Group," UN Doc. ACC/1995/24 of 9 November 1995.

41. In Resolution 47/120 of 18 December 1992, the General Assembly "4. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, to bring to the attention of the Security Council, at his discretion, any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, together with his recommendations thereon."

42. In several resolutions on the "Protection and security of small States", the General Assembly "4. Urges the Secretary-General to pay special attention to monitoring the security situation of small States and to consider making use of the provisions of Article 99 of the Charter. " (Resolutions 44/51 of 8 December 1989, 46/43 of 9 December 1991 and 49/31 of 30 January 1995.)

43. The 1982 Manila "Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes" (approved in resolution 37/10 of 15 November 1982) provides that "6. [t]he Secretary-General should make full use of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the responsibilities entrusted to him." The 1987 "Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations" (approved in resolution 42/22 of 18 November 1987) states: "31. States should encourage the Secretary-General to exercise fully his functions with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the Charter, including those under Articles 98 and 99, and fully cooperate with him in this respect." The 1988 "Declaration on the Role of the United Nations in this Field" (approved in resolution 43/51 of 1988) states: "23. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to consider using, at as early a stage as he deems appropriate, the right that is accorded to him under Article 99 of the Charter."

44. The UN Special Commission has also gained much experience from its inspections in Iraq. In Cambodian, the UN peace-keeping force (UNTAC) was given unprecedented powers of inspection (e.g., extending to inspection of files and documents in the offices of the political parties).

45. For a description of the first such body, the Military Information Branch in the Congo operation, see Dorn, A. Walter and Bell, David H., "Intelligence and Peace-keeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp.11-33.

46. The Council President stated on 22 February 1995: "The Security Council strongly support's the Secretary-General's conclusion that peace-keeping operations need an effective information capacity, and his intention to address this requirement in future PKOs from the planning stage."

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Early Warning of Violent Conflict: The Role of Multi-functional Observer Missions

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Fact-finding missions and military observers have been deployed by the United Nations and by regional organizations. They have relied heavily on military personnel, and have often been deployed after it is evident that violent conflict is likely or is in progress. The information they provide, at considerable personal risk, may add little to the international community's ability to respond to or prevent violent conflict. If they are structured, trained and deployed to address the many dimensions of incipient violence, they can be sued to help galvanize international response. Adding police, judicial, socio-economic political and media analysis elements to observer missions would increase their capacity to observe non-military dimensions of growing conflict. High-level liaison officers from the mission to international bodies might allow the international community to respond more effectively, and lend added credibility to the mission's activities. In conjunction with international bodies, a mission media cell could help shape the international view of an emerging crisis, to elicit early response. The next generation of observer missions should have multi-functional headquarters with analysis and assessment units, liaison to international bodies, effective team preparation and realistic media strategies.

Introduction

United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) Missions and civilian fact-finding missions have been deployed by the United Nations and by regional organizations for a variety of purposes at various stages in the escalation and de-escalation of tensions. Are they effective components of an early warning system? Can they enhance early warning and response to incipient violent conflict?

This paper begins with some limitations of the current concept of military observer missions. It advocates expanding the concept for the employment of observer missions to make them more effective components in a responsive early warning system, for the detection, prevention and control of violence.

From the starting point of historical and contemporary experience of observer missions, some of their strengths and weaknesses are explored. Assuming that observer missions are to be used to improve our knowledge of potential violence and our ability to respond to it, the paper goes on to examine the types of information required and the ways in which it can be collected. This leads to conclusions about the way multi-functional missions might be structured to collect and analyse information, and the way that information might be moved and used by media strategies and high-level liaison. This is essentially a normative argument, drawing on experience and current practice rather than documentary evidence. The focus is on internal, rather than international conflicts, because of their prevalence.

Fact-finding and Military Observers

More than forty missions since 1947 have included military observers or expert fact-finding teams.

Observer missions have typically been composed of military officers, usually unarmed, made up of multinational teams and deployed for six months to a year at a time. Fact-finding missions have usually been made up of civilian experts who visit an area for no longer than is necessary to answer specific questions within their mandate--a matter of days or weeks. Both military observers and civilian fact-finders have the status of experts on mission.¹ Fact-finding missions have often been sent to areas of rising tension to investigate allegations and provide the necessary background information for diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute. They are a basic tool of preventive diplomacy and routinely employed in the resolution of disputes between states.² Observer missions have typically been deployed after a cease-fire . When the cease-fire is unstable, they may find themselves in the midst of a conflict of uncertain duration and intensity. The information individual military observers provide to their headquarters, perhaps at considerable personal risk, often adds little to the international community's ability to respond to or prevent violent conflict. Understanding some of the ways in fact-finding and military observer missions have been used in the past gives an impression of their utility and limitations.

The United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB)

The first example of UN-sponsored fact-finding was the mission sent to the Balkans in 1947 at the request of the Greek government. Its mandate was to investigate the Greek government's claim that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were supporting insurgents in Greece. The commission consisted of representatives (most government officials or diplomats) of eleven members of the Security Council. It worked between January and April 1947, visiting the countries in question, and reported that the majority of its members had found some evidence of support for the insurgency, and that Greek territorial claims in Macedonia and Thrace were aggravating the situation. Due to the objections of the USSR, the Security Council was unable to adopt the recommended resolutions, and removed the item from its agenda to allow the General Assembly to deal with the matter. The General Assembly called on all parties for restraint and established the UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB). UNSCOB was formed against the opposition of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, and worked without their cooperation. It remained in existence until 1951, submitting regular reports on the growing refugee problems, arms trafficking, and the abduction of children across international frontiers. UNSCOB was ineffective in pursuit of its mandate, largely due to lack of cooperation of the parties. It was disbanded in 1951 and replaced by the UN Peace Observation Commission which maintained a subcommission in the Balkans until 1954 when it too was disbanded.³

Several factors contributed to the problems of UNSCOB and its successor. It did not have the cooperation of the parties to the conflict, nor the support of a Security Council still paralysed by the Cold War. Both the first mission and UNSCOB consisted of high-level government officials who acted on behalf of their governments, rather than as individuals on mission for the UN. UNSCOB was deployed in a manner which could verify Greece's accusations, but not its neighbours' denials. It seldom had a local physical presence on the frontiers or areas in question, relying on the aggrieved party to direct it to evidence.⁴

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

The conflict in Abkhazia began with social unrest and secessionist pressures. Efforts by the government of Georgia to protect a railway and other communications links in the summer of 1992 escalated into armed confrontations, resulting in about 200 deaths in mid-August 1992. A cease-fire was brokered in Moscow on 3 September with a Russian-Abkhaz-Georgian Monitoring and Inspection Commission to oversee its implementation. The agreement included an appeal to the UN and CSCE (now OSCE) to assist in implementation. The situation on the ground remained tense, and fighting resumed in June 1993. In July 1993 the Secretary General recommended an observer mission despite the risks to personnel. An advance team of 9 military observers and 8 civilian support staff arrived on 8 August and began patrols in liaison with the tripartite Georgian-Abkhaz-Russian interim monitoring groups. A joint commission was established on

5 August.

UNOMIG was established by Security Council Resolution 858 (1993) on 24 August. In the early stages of its deployment, the cease-fire broke down under Abkhaz attacks supported from outside Abkhazia. Both patrols and further deployments were suspended. A revised mandate for UNOMIG was considered, while the observers in place remained in Sukhumi. A fact-finding mission to Abkhazia investigated the human rights situation from 22 to 30 October, and noted serious violations by both sides, accompanied by almost complete devastation of large areas and massive displacement of population. UNOMIG's mandate was extended to January 1994 with its existing strength of four observers. In January, the Secretary General recommended augmentation to 55 observers, and presented two options for an international force--a UN mission of 2,500 troops or a multi-national force acting under UN authority, whose actions would be monitored by UNOMIG. Security Council Resolution 896 (1994) extended the UNOMIG mandate and increased its numbers to 55, but took no action on an international force.

No progress was made at further talks in Geneva, and fighting broke out again in February 1994. In April 1994 a Declaration and Quadripartite Agreement were signed in Moscow, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) expressed willingness to send a peacekeeping force, and the Secretary General recommended that UNOMIG's mandate be extended to monitor its operation. Security Council Resolution 937 (1994) expanded the mandate of UNOMIG to include tasks to: monitor and verify implementation of the Agreement; observe the operation of the CIS force; verify that troops do not remain in or re-enter the security zone; monitor storage areas; monitor withdrawal of Georgian troops; patrol specified areas; and investigate alleged violations of the agreement. The mission was increased to 136 military observers and the mandate extended to January 1995. Differences between the parties remained, and political negotiations continued.⁵

Fact-finding, Observer Missions and "Early Warning"

Fact-finding missions have often been composed of experts and senior officials who have had both wide-ranging access to a crisis area, and the skills and background knowledge to identify problems likely to lead to violent conflict. Their mandates have sometimes constrained them in the exercise of these advantages. They have often been limited to flying visits, during which it has not been possible to collect or analyse all the information necessary, nor discern the subtle changes over time which indicate incipient violence. The gradual accumulation of local knowledge is also important for evaluating the risks and benefits of intervention, and the suitability of solutions devised elsewhere. Negotiators outside the region of conflict are often unaware of local conditions, and sensitive only to high-level pressures, not those generated from the grass-roots. They need both the expertise of fact-finding missions and the longevity and perspective of multi-functional observer missions.

It would not be fair to say that UNSCOB, UNOMIG or any of the other fact-finding or military observer missions were ineffective. They did have obvious limitations from which we can learn. They were not able to provide comprehensive and timely information about the evolving threat of violent conflict, nor to get that information in usable form to decision-makers and the international community. UNSCOB needed more balanced distribution and better cooperation by the parties. UNOMIG might have been deployed earlier, with a more diverse make-up and more comprehensive mandate. The fact that it was followed by a human-rights fact-finding mission illustrates the limitations of military observers, particularly in small numbers. The lessons from military observer and fact-finding missions in general can be summarized succinctly: get the mission to where it is needed early; get the mandate right; get the composition of the mission right (more diverse make-up is likely to be better); and prepare it for a complex task. Easier said than done, and previous missions cannot be faulted.

Information Required for Early Warning

With appropriate knowledge about how conflicts escalate and spread, we can link multi-functional observer missions more effectively to other means of early warning. This knowledge begins with the idea of stages in the escalation of a conflict, which is well-established. There is nothing inevitable about the progression of a conflict through stages. Protracted social conflicts like those in Lebanon, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere show repeated crises and remissions, sometimes erupting in war, and sometimes stopping well short of violence. Stages are simply a way of describing the nature and intensity of violence in order to indicate the appropriateness of different responses.

The UN's programme on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief operations (MCDA Field Manual) lists four stages in the progression of vulnerability to humanitarian disasters. Underlying causes include poverty, limited access to resources, flawed economic system, and ideology. Dynamic pressures compound these underlying factors. They include the lack of institutions, education, training, appropriate skills, investment, markets and press freedom, and macro level forces such as population increase, urbanization, and environmental degradation. The third stage is entered with unsafe conditions and a fragile local economy. Finally, trigger events include war or civil conflict and natural disasters.⁶ In a similar vein, Jean-H. Guilmette identifies five stages in the evolution of a conflict, during which different forms of intervention are appropriate. Guilmette suggests that effective development initiatives during malaise, crisis and denied conflict might forestall the violence of "open conflict". During open conflict and war, diplomatic and military action strives to control and resolve the conflict, while humanitarian aid takes the place of development aid. With settlement comes a period of reconciliation and reconstruction and a return to development activities.⁷ From a more sociological perspective, Acheson describes three stages in the breakdown of social order which leads to the threat of genocide. In the first stage, there are isolated individual threats, attacks and prejudice. The second stage is characterized by sporadic, often cyclical outbursts of unplanned violence. Shop-smashing, looting, arson and riots are typical incidents. The third stage is entered with the active participation of the state, the leadership of individual politicians, the use of police, armed forces and possibly the misuse of social welfare records to identify groups.8

Each of these stages suggests indicators of rising violence, turning points in the early warning process, and increasing risks for the first-hand observers and analysts in-country. What these descriptive schemes do not do, however, is indicate the proximate and underlying causes of escalating violence. It is one thing for observers to describe the shift to increasing violence (assuming they are not caught in its midst and made ineffective, as UNOMIG and other observer missions have been); it is another to identify the probability of increasing violence before it happens, with sufficient certainty to elicit an international response. Observation missions charged with providing early warning therefore need to collect credible information on the proximate and underlying causes of violent conflict, and trace these causes to the changing pattern of violence which they are reporting. This is the first step towards useful early warning from the field.

Identifying the proximate and underlying causes of violent internal conflict yields a checklist of the sort of information early-warning observer missions need to collect. Michael Brown's comprehensive work lists four sets of relevant factors: structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual. These are summarized in Table 1.

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Factors	Underlying Causes	Proximate Causes		
Structural	weak states intra-state security concerns ethnic geography	Collapsing states Changing intra-state military balances Changing demographic patterns		
Political	Discriminatory political institutions Exclusionary national ideologies Inter-group politics Elite politics	Political transitions Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies Growing inter-group competitions Intensifying leadership struggles		
Economic/Social	Economic problems Discriminatory economic systems Economic development and modernization	Mounting economic problems Growing economic inequities Fast-paced development and modernization		
Cultural/Perceptual Patterns of cultural discrimination Problematic group histories		Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination Ethnic bashing and propagandizing		

Few of these causes fall within the sphere of specifically military competence. Nor can many of them be observed effectively on a short fact-finding visit. Changing ethnic geography in the hinterland, the rise of exclusionary ideology, and perceived economic inequities all characterized the tensions between Muslims and Serbs in northwest Bosnia between November 1990 (the release of the census) and April 1992 (the Referendum result). Speaking in 1996 to Muslims and Serbs in Banja Luka, Prijedor and Sanski Most who lived through these events, it was clear there was no shortage of danger signs. However even by reading specialized news reports and corresponding with friends in Belgrade in 1990 and 1991, I had no indication of the problems on the horizon. This is not to say that these factors cannot be assessed from a distance. It is clear to me, however, that first-hand knowledge at a local level is certain to provide a more comprehensive and accurate picture of risk. The secondary effect of visible international observation might be to reinforce restraint and undermine extremists. There is therefore a need to structure and organize missions inside a country at risk to monitor these factors more effectively. Military observer missions or short-term fact-finding missions alone are inadequate.

Early warning missions should also be sensitive to the factors which are linked to severity of a conflict. External affinities which produce apprehension in identity-groups, powerful emotive group juxtapositions and stereotypes, historical experience of ethnic domination, and ethnically based parties are often evident in the most severe cases of inter-ethnic conflict. Competition for power within ethnic groups may also exacerbate friction between ethnic groups, as leaders attempt to mobilize followers or consolidate power.¹⁰ This sort of information might be used to help analyse the information collected on each of the factors Michael Brown identifies. Two examples of the information collection before and after a violent conflict indicate the ways in which an early warning mission might function in practice.

Examples from Bosnia

A mission in Bosnia in 1990-1991, with the approval of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, might have had a regional office in Banja Luka or Bihać responsible for the north-west. If constituted like the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers deployed later on, it might have provided information of impending violence as early as 1990,¹¹ and certainly would have yielded a much more accurate picture of events by 1991.

Interviews at local level would have revealed that the economic downturn in the late 1980s had led to attempts by several groups, not all ethnically based, to gain control of worker-owned ("dichonic") factories. Factory committees controlled housing and job allocation, and discrimination on ethnic grounds was evident as early as 1990, although the victims and perpetrators varied from factory to factory. Talking to local politicians and analysing local radio and newspapers would have yielded a clear picture of the formation and expansion of nationalist parties: first Izetbegović's Muslim SDA (though not initially identified as a Muslim party) then the Croatian HDZ and finally the Serb SDS in November 1990. People travelling in the area as early as 1990 might have noted the appearance of nationalist symbols on police uniforms (Lilies for Muslims, and chequered shields for Croats, neither worn by Serbs on the same police force). The Serbian take-over of Radio Prijedor in March 1992 would have been a clear watershed. A police component to the early-warning team might have been able to discern the isolation and expulsion of non-Serbs from the local police forces, culminating in early 1992 as Serbs expelled from Croatian police forces in Sisak and Zagreb came to towns like Prijedor and Nova Gradiška and were given police jobs there. The municipal defence departments charged with civil defence in cities like Prijedor, Banja Luka and Nova Gradiška had taken on a more militant character by November 1991, and played an active role in the municipal coups of April-May 1992. Military observers might have noted this changing role, as well as the decreasing control of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the military reaction to defeat in Croatia.¹² Much of this information might have come too late to constitute "early warning" but might still have led to more effective international intervention at an earlier stage in the conflict, using all the means at the disposal of the international community.

Between 1990 and 1992, none of the means of observation was effectively deployed at local level; these warning signs, or cues for action, were not available. Now, in the aftermath of a settlement, such instruments are available. They can be used both to adjust international assistance to settlement and reintegration processes, and warn of impending renewal of violence.

The political and social information network now in Bosnia includes the Office of the High Representative and his regional offices, the UN Civil Affairs officers distributed to regional level, OSCE human rights monitors, and the EC Monitors, who continue to perform both economic and political monitoring and collection tasks. The International Police Task Force monitors police and the judicial system with the help of UN Civil Affairs, and is linked to political pressure through the Office of the High Representative. Military civil affairs, psychological operations, and media (information campaign) elements cooperate closely with the civil components of the mission. Economic analysis and assessment is performed by the International Management Group (IMG), which has local offices in regional centres in Bosnia, and also from a greater distance by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by the International Monetary Fund, both of which deploy field inspection teams periodically, supported by the local offices of the IMG. Military information is provided by the presence of a sophisticated international force with well-staffed headquarters and well-distributed units which have liaison officers down to local battalion level. Joint Military Commissions chaired by officers of the international force (normally held at Brigade level and higher) provide for close coordination between the international force and the parties to the regime. The transparency regime and information measures provided for by Annex 1B of the Dayton accord are supervised by OSCE inspections in which the parties to the agreement participate.

The comprehensive implementation regime now in place in Bosnia is probably too invasive to be considered as a model for an early warning regime. It is unlikely that any sovereign state would consent to such a mission. The contrast between international involvement in 1992 and in 1996 illustrates several aspects of the gap in information collection. We need much more effective collection and analysis of political, social, economic, military, and perceptual information. The situation within Bosnia must also be seen in its proper regional context, and different means for collecting this sort of information should be part of an early warning system.

Collecting Information on the Regional Environment

Any internal conflict can be positively or negatively affected by the involvement of outside players. There are a variety of reasons for international involvement in domestic conflict, stemming from various degrees of altruism and self-interest. Hegemonic ambition, a desire to restore or preserve regional stability, ethnic sympathy with the oppressed, a sense of national or international responsibility, and humanitarian concern are some of the reasons identified by Cooper and Berdal.¹³ The European Community, in addition to its network of diplomatic contacts, deployed EC Monitors to countries bordering on the Yugoslav conflict. The further from the centre of the conflict, the more important are high-level contacts with decision-makers, and the less significant local observation will be. An exception to this might be regions of ethnic affiliation and border regions, where significant incidents might translate rapidly into policy changes.¹⁴

Collecting Political and Social Information

The example from Bosnia, and the rapid escalation to violence, illustrates the need to look carefully at accelerators and decelerators of incipient violence. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse describe these in terms of domestic, regional and international implications of domestic social and political conflict.¹⁵ In practical terms, this means that observers must be able to talk to local politicians, understand local politics and social pressures, and have the trust and confidence of a sufficiently broad spectrum of local personalities to collect information about the changing dynamics of domestic tensions at the local level.

In my experience, it is often difficult to interpret the things which you are being told by a local politician; the difficulty increases with translation, lack of familiarity with the local context and the complexity of the problems political leaders are dealing with. After several months in a community, some things which appeared clear are beginning to seem less certain, and much of the information previously gathered begins to take on new meaning as knowledge is gained of personalities, personal backgrounds, and local agendas.

To understand regional and international dynamics, the same is true on a higher level. The diplomatic community is probably best placed to do this, with one caveat. National diplomats naturally tend to preserve the confidentiality of their sources and relationships, and reserve the benefits of those relations for their own countries. Consortia of diplomats, like the Z-4 in Zagreb in 1995, may find a common cause, but there is still a need for missions from organizations like the OSCE and the UN, which share information more freely. The changing balance of political interests affects the rational calculation of costs and benefits of war, and this is a calculus in which military analysts should be involved.¹⁶

The OSCE code of conduct forms a basis for expanding the concept of early warning and conflict prevention, by providing a means of measuring deviation from accepted norms.¹⁷ In practice, this means either international observation at local level, or alliances with local groups dedicated to monitoring the standards of free-speech, media access, electoral fairness, human rights, and minority protection which are included in the OSCE code. The dilemma is that local groups may be the target of reprisals and restrictions at precisely the time when their information is most needed for early warning. International observers may be restricted or expelled, but this in itself constitutes a warning signal which might not come with the tightening of access to local groups.

At the regional and international level, the OSCE has five mechanisms which can be related both to collection of political and social information for early warning purposes, and to early response to problem areas. These are: (1) intensive political consultation; (2) implementation debates within the OSCE framework; (3) Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and their continuation through, for example, inspections and verification; (4) the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities; and (5) the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human rights.¹⁸ Because each of these mechanisms creates its own flow of information and contacts, an early warning mechanism needs some access to them. In the case of the ECMM, informal links between the mission headquarters and the Centre for the Prevention

of Conflict in Vienna helped in this regard. But the higher level mechanisms also need detailed information about regions of concern. Thus it was that EC monitors were commissioned to provide information on specific political, economic and social questions from time to time. The most useful reports were often those which provided specific examples of a general problem, such as treatment of minorities.¹⁹ The implication is that observers at field level need to be familiar with the mechanisms which might be used to take action. For example, the Vienna Mechanism on Military Developments, the Moscow Mechanism on Human Dimension Developments, and the Berlin Mechanism on Serious Emergency Situations, are not always understood by those who are collecting information from local mayors, chiefs of police and garrison commanders.²⁰

My own experience with "comprehensive fact-finding missions" is that they have a limited capacity to set up interviews with the right people on short visits into a confused theatre. They must rely on those already in place. Several European delegations had to rely on UNPF to set up meetings and interviews for their visits to Croatia. Since the visitors do not who is there to speak to, and those in place do not know in advance what questions are to be asked, getting the right answers may be a matter of serendipity.

Systematically collecting political and social information, and using it effectively for early warning requires expertise and carefully cultivated contacts at local, national and regional/international level. It also requires understanding at each level of the capabilities and requirements of the "early warning system" at higher and lower levels. This suggests a need for liaison, familiarization visits, and direct communications. Training and preparing teams to work together would also be useful.

Collecting Economic Information

The relative deprivation hypothesis linking economic hardship to violent conflict is widely accepted, though not well-supported with empirical data.²¹ It is likely that the impact of macro-economic indicators on inter-ethnic conflict is ambiguous, but probably marginal.²² Micro-economic indicators and distributional issues are more likely to be related to the sort of inter-communal violence seen in the Balkans and former Soviet Union. The problem for early warning missions is that neither macro- nor micro-economic indicators are likely to be readily available. The figures available at a distance are probably unreliable (as were IMF and world bank figures for Yugoslavia in 1991). Figures on inter- and intra-ethnic distribution may have surprisingly convoluted implications. Esman describes how Israeli hegemony has benefited the lowest economic class of Palestinians, who have taken menial employment in Israel; landed Palestinian gentry, a traditionally privileged group, have lost status and power; middle classes excluded from the new prosperity have become radicalized. Thus the impact of economic change has varied by socio-economic group, and the resultant impact on the likelihood of violent conflict can only be assessed by understanding the resulting intra-ethnic dynamics.²³ This suggests that collecting and analysing economic information might be better done in-country than at a distance. It is by observing the daily effects of economic inequity, mounting economic problems, development and modernization, and discriminatory economic practices that their implications for violence can be best understood.

If distribution is a key element in early warning, then observers should understand factors affecting distributive politics in ethnically diverse countries. These include ethnic patterns, regime type, and institutional context. Regime strategies for accommodating the economic power of ethnic minorities also need to be assessed.²⁴ In practice, this means understanding how local authorities respond to shortages, how distribution networks function, and how this affects individuals. Collective response to frustration and inequity may be rioting and violence in some circumstances and meek acceptance in others. This level of detail is difficult to judge from a distance.

Measuring return to normalcy after a conflict is part of the process of providing early warning of impending breakdown. We have good examples of this process from the on-going mission Bosnia. Setting and measuring objectives may include: measuring housing reconstruction in particular areas to assess

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repatriation and resettlement; examining food security and food prices in particular areas; comparing morbidity and mortality rates to historic examples; and assessing the restoration of markets and economic activity.²⁵ "Normality indicators" collected by the US Army Civil Affairs Teams in Bosnia in 1996 included such indicators as the price of bread, oranges, and underwear, and the frequency of truck and bus transport on particular routes. Aggregated at regional level, these indicators gave a rough impression of the return to normalcy, measured against events in the country as a whole. Collecting them, however, was time-consuming and manpower intensive.

Collecting Media Information

As with economic factors, the relationship between public information and violence is not precise. Domestic media may have more or less influence in on local actions, depending on the society, its predispositions, and other sources of information. Choices will have to be made about the types of media to monitor, and the effort to devote to each. Domestic media in the local language has the greatest impact on the evolving conflict. Examining the international media's influence on decision-makers, Nik Gowing has concluded that the CNN factor is only suggestive rather than directive, and is often seen by leaders as trite and crude.²⁶ The international media, however, might be a useful vehicle to shape international response.

Several types of information about the media are relevant to early warning. The degree of public and special-interest access to the media can be assessed by asking groups that seek access. Impartiality of access may vary from station to station and newspaper to newspaper, or it may be set by national policy. If set by central policies, this may actually help to prevent incitement to violence by keeping fringe groups out of the public media. A second problem is assessing the sort of material which is being broadcast. Sampling is an option, but material on local stations and in local newspapers may be more virulent than the central services which are easily monitored in capital cities. In most countries, translation will be an issue, and the quality and speed of translation will influence the degree to which local media is transparent to observer missions. Contact with independent journalists and international networks might work in low-risk environments, but may no longer be viable as the situation deteriorates. Even the ability of an observer mission to use local help may be undermined by pressure on translators or their families.

There are non-governmental groups with expertise in monitoring and assessing media. OMRI, the Soros Foundation and Broadcasters Without Borders are examples of organizations which might be able to assist with some aspects of media monitoring, if connected appropriately to an early warning mission. Their main contribution might be in the form of theatre-familiarization and education for the observers, to ensure that the right sorts of information about the media are collected.

Collecting Military Information

While monitoring open media in most societies is uncontroversial, military observers on an early warning mission may have to tread a fine line between information gathering and activities perceived as hostile spying. The risk of collection increases as the risk of violent conflict intensifies, because of the demands of operational security. If "confessional affiliation" is a principle for selecting the observers, then each community might reasonably expect non-affiliated observers to be biased against its interests.²⁷

The key to monitoring effectively without being accused of spying is liaison. This is well expressed by Colonel Peter Williams, a Chief Military Observer for UNPF, who argues that liaison is one of the essential functions of observation.²⁸ By maintaining open and honest communications with military units, by building trust and confidence between commanders, and by assuring the prospective parties to a conflict that information revealed to the observer will be treated in confidence, military observers can collect military information effectively. This implies restrictions on the behaviour of observers, such as not carrying marked maps or making notes on patrol. It should not imply any restrictions on their freedom of movement, which

should be negotiated at the highest level and exercised vigorously.

The types of information collected by a military observer mission vary, but should include evidence of armed movement, irregular troops, clandestine arming or training, changing intra-state military balances, mobilization of reservists, new restrictions on movement near bases or training areas, para-military activity by the police or plain-clothes units, and so on. All of these might be useful indicators of rising tensions or preparation for armed conflict.

After a conflict, military observers might be deployed to provide early warning of likely breakdown of cease-fire arrangements. Cease-fires are normally stable when one side is completely defeated, when the parties have effective governments which have agreed to the cease-fire and can control all the elements under their authority, and when there are few advantages and some costs to violating the cease-fire. An integrated military approach might include establishing a buffer zone, limiting forces in a particular area, and enforcing or monitoring air exclusion zones.²⁹ These factors might be used as indicators for a post-conflict early warning regime.

As a situation deteriorates, military observers in particular may find their activities increasingly restricted, increasingly risky, or both. In the case of the restrictions, it may be appropriate to exert political influence at various levels to retain free access to military information. This can be done if there is a close relationship between the officials involved in collecting and analysing political and social information and the military observer mission. In the case of increasing risk, an assessment should be made about the value of the additional information provided by the observer mission. In some cases it might not justify the personal risks taken to collect it. Revision to the posture or mandate of the observers would result. This is not limited to military observers, but in principle should apply to any observer in a potentially dangerous situation. One of the factors which might justify risk is the ability of the mission to mobilize international action in response to an impending crisis. If the information is not going to be acted on, then it makes little sense to expend lives to collect it.

Summary: the Information Requirement

If an early warning mission is to collect information on all the indicators which might be related to the onset of violent conflict, it cannot be limited to a short-term fact-finding mission, nor to a military observer mission. A combination of military, economic, political and media expertise is required. Many of the indicators cannot be collected or assessed effectively at a distance. A mission should expect to remain in-country for some time--certainly long enough to secure the trust and confidence of local leaders, and collect information effectively at first hand. Alliances with local groups, such as human rights groups, might be an alternative, but these may have crippling limitations as tensions increase. Free movement and free communications with local people are essential for collecting all of the sorts of information required. Communications between those collecting information at the lowest and highest levels are also necessary, if the right questions are to be asked.

Establishing an Early Warning Mission

Given the types of expertise required, what would an early warning mission look like? The first concern of an early warning mission is the collection and analysis of information. Beyond that, the mission must be structured to ensure that the information is effectively used. A third consideration is the preventive role which an early warning mission might serve without the addition of any further resources.

The Alternatives

The UN has seven main instruments to influence conflicts. Fact-finding missions, traditional peacekeeping missions (including both forces and observers), multi-functional peacekeeping missions (such as UNTAG in Namibia and UNTAC in Cambodia), and humanitarian assistance.³⁰ These four instruments

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are authorized under Chapter Six of the UN Charter and their effective use hinges on the consent of the parties. Sanctions and embargoes, judicial enforcement and military force are imposed on parties to a conflict, and have repercussions for use of the first four instruments. In the past, fact-finding missions have typically made a single report, (often behind closed doors), then dissolved. They have not been well placed to influence decision-making or build a constituency for preventive action. Recent examples include the Special Envoys to Burundi in 1993 and 1995, the Special Mission and Good Offices Missions to Afghanistan in 1994, and a mission to Rwanda in February 1995.³¹ Yet Special Envoys and Fact-finding missions have far greater access to decision-makers during the brief span of their reporting period than do observer missions. They are impeded not by their duration, but by their limited ability to collect the sorts of information mentioned above, and their limited ability to get this information to international decision-makers.

Some conclusions about the effective management of multinational military interventions are relevant to multi-functional observation missions. General Andrew Goodpaster concludes that the UN has three basic alternatives for organizing missions: under UN command; under the control of regional organizations, or with *ad hoc* arrangements. Common doctrine within the framework of a regional organization (perhaps only NATO) affords the greatest coherence to a military mission. Command and control arrangements form the vital link between forming a mission and employing it effectively. Intelligence about the disposition and intent of parties to the conflict must be used to guide the mission, and comprehensive contingency plans should be prepared to respond to sudden changes in the mission's environment.³²

Adding Dimensions to Observer Missions

The limitations of purely military observer missions have been mentioned. The ECMM represents a different sort of observer mission. EC Monitors lost some credibility early in the Balkan conflict for several reasons. Their "ice-cream man" appearance did not appeal to military men, although many monitors were serving or retired officers. Their unarmed status, armoured vehicles, excellent equipment and satellite communications should have allowed them to continue to operate during the worst of the fighting, but they were pulled back from risky situations early in the conflict.³³ Despite this, the EC Monitoring Mission had many of the characteristics desirable in an early warning mission.

EC Monitors were geographically dispersed in teams with responsibility for defined political boundaries. They had diplomatic status, and represented a range of military and civilian skills and backgrounds. They had a broad mandate to talk to local authorities, police, community leaders, in fact just about anyone within their area. They lived in local communities, paid for good quality translators, and were readily accessible to locals. The willingness of some teams to help individuals opened the door to sources of information and insight at the local level. Teams reported daily via secure satellite links. Their consolidated reports were on desks in the foreign offices of European capitals the following morning. Regional offices provided summaries and assessments based on multiple reports, and the headquarters in Zagreb included a sophisticated analysis and Assessment Unit attached to UNPF Headquarters. The mission was responsive to questions asked at higher levels to support the development of plans; monitors received direction to address specific issues (opportunities for micro-investment to employ demobilizing soldiers in May 1996, for example). All of these characteristics make the ECMM a useful model for an early warning mission. But the mission was not without its drawbacks.

Collecting Information

Although a high proportion of EC monitors were serving or retired military officers, their mandate was primarily political and social. As the situation stabilized with the introduction of IFOR, economic

information was increasingly important. Many teams were ill-prepared to seek out the types of political, economic and social information which might be required for a typical early warning mission. Teams also had to cover very large areas. Typically, a two-person team covered four or five major municipalities, in an area which might take an entire day to drive across. Five municipal governments, five police forces, perhaps a dozen major economic enterprises and public utilities, minority communities, non-governmental organizations and so on. Given the constraints of travel time and poor telecommunications, collecting detailed information could be a slow process.

With the arrival of the OSCE Human Rights Monitors, Centre for Human Rights, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and UN Civil Affairs, much closer monitoring of the police, judicial and minorities situation became possible. Without the assistance of other organizations, police monitors could not observe the whole judicial process. Police monitors can effectively supervise community policing, investigations, arrest and detention. Human rights and civil affairs monitors were more effective at monitoring the passage of cases through the judicial system and the handling of judicial rulings, such as the right to establish commercial radio stations, complaints about property rights, and so on. These are all valid indicators for an early warning system. The experiences of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia, and of IFOR and related missions in Bosnia are good guides for the structure of an early warning mission. The system worked best when there was systematic cooperation between all the components of the monitoring organizations at local and at regional level.

In the Bosnian example, information was shared at local level and passed up separate information "stove-pipes" to each of the mission headquarters. The experience of some participants was that information was less effectively shared at higher levels, while others argue that only at higher levels was the information properly fused. The advantage of having numerous separate organizations involved in collecting early warning information is that it spreads the risks for the international community. An entire branch of the system can be deprived of resources or lose the confidence of participants, and other organizations can pick up its functions. The Centre for Human Rights, for example, did not have the resources to execute its mandate at regional level in Bosnia in the Spring of 1996, and the OSCE was able to fill in.³⁴ The disadvantage is that, taking all components into consideration, the mission may absorb far more resources than necessary, and may expend a lot of unnecessary energy coordinating the activities of its disparate parts.

Analysing Information

Information is not collected for its own sake. There is already a great deal of information available without launching expensive monitoring missions to collect more. Ideally, having observers like the EC Monitors or the OSCE human rights monitors at local level allows the focused collecting of information for specific purposes. The information is analysed, and action taken as a result. One example illustrates how this might work in practice for an early warning mission.

Changing demographic patterns can be a source of conflict. After the Dayton Agreement, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line became a focus for inter-communal tension, as Otis suggests is commonplace in divided societies.³⁵ As settlement of the final boundary-line approached, tensions increased around the town of Otoka in north-west Bosnia. A physical confrontation between Muslim and Serb crowds occurred on 19 April with little warning, and deaths were narrowly averted. It was clear from the 19 April incident that further mass demonstrations were likely in two volatile corridors in north-west Bosnia: at Otoka and between Prijedor and Sanski Most.³⁶ A concerted effort was launched to identify the timing and location of the next disturbance, and reduce the risk of violence which might derail the fragile progress towards return of refugees. UNHCR contacts with refugee leaders identified organizers. On about 6 May, British troops on the Federation side of the IEBL received information that the demonstrations were scheduled for 12 May, with the participation of up to eight bus-loads of Bosnian refugees residing in Germany. US Information Teams distributing the *Herald of Peace* heard of the involvement of a German NGO called "Society for the

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Preservation of Threatened Peoples". Its agenda was to expose the continued presence of war criminals in Prijedor and their role in preventing return of refugees. In meetings, Muslim refugee leaders revealed a strategy of highlighting Serb obstruction, by storming the IEBL with large numbers.³⁷ Civilian Police and EC monitors identified preparations on the Serb side of the IEBL for a violent reception, including piles of rocks along the anticipated route. The local Serb and Muslim radio stations in Prijedor and Sanski Most were used to inflame public sentiment on the issue of return throughout April and May.

Putting this information together from diverse sources, and interpreting it to allow a clear picture of upcoming events was a challenge for all concerned. Authorities on both sides had some interests vested in a confrontation. They were apprehensive, but also reluctant to cooperate in de-escalating tensions because of fear that the other party would thereby gain an advantage. A series of meetings at local and regional level, under the chairmanship of IFOR and UNHCR, were the fora in which the information was first interpreted and then acted upon. In the context of the IFOR mission, the G2 or intelligence cell was the focus for "assembling" a coherent picture of likely events. EC Monitors and particular UNHCR field officers had a clearer idea of likely events, because of their privileged communications with refugees and local authorities.

Although demonstrations occurred on both sides of the IEBL on 12 and 18 May 1996, direct confrontations were avoided. This was achieved through a series of escalating meetings with officials and police on both sides, and with Muslim refugee leaders. After the inflammatory role it played in the 12 May event, pressure was successfully exerted in Europe to prevent the German NGO from participating in the 18 May event. These modest tactical successes illustrate some of the complexity of collecting the right sorts of information to permit short-term action to head off incipient violence. In the larger picture, there are situations which are the aggregate of many small incidents like this, and there are larger events which originate in the strategic designs of the parties to the conflict, or players outside the affected country. One of the most important roles for systematic analysis is to attempt to identify chains of causality, trends and actions which might lead to violence, and which are susceptible to external influence.

Linking Information to Action

Alexander George and June Holl make the case that marshalling timely and effective responses to warning of violent conflict requires an integrated strategy that develops potential responses with anticipated warnings. "The need to do so will only increase as publics grow increasingly expectant that their governments will do something to deal with the crises that they surely see coming."³⁸

Drawing an analogy from perception experiments, George and Holl list the three factors likely to influence ability to distinguish a warning in a stream of other information. These are: the strength of the signal relative to the strength of confusing or distracting background stimuli; the expectations of observers evaluating signals; and the costs and rewards associated with recognizing and correctly appraising the signal.³⁹ If the analogy is correct, then early warning missions might be more effective if they can achieve two things. First, they might attempt to screen out confusing signals and shape information available to the public and to decision makers. Without accurate analysis, there is a risk that attempting to screen and shape information will add to confusion or result in erroneous actions. Second, they need access to decision-makers or their advisors who have expectations and interests about potential conflicts. Early warning missions might therefore be concerned with two sorts of information or messages: comparatively simple public messages conveyed through the international media; and sophisticated private messages and information conveyed to key decision-makers and their advisors.

Direct personal liaison by trusted colleagues is the most effective way of passing relevant information between large and complex organizations. There are many examples. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) had an ambassador to UNPF in Zagreb. Starting in 1993 NATO attached high-ranking liaison officers to UNPROFOR in Zagreb and Sarajevo. Ambassador Holbrook placed a liaison officer in UNPF headquarters in Zagreb in October 1995 to help coordinate his

initiatives with UN actions, and to keep him informed of developments. Choosing the right people for these posts, and ensuring that the "target" organization has sufficient confidence in the contact to use the information and advice is essential if an early warning mission is to use this vehicle to influence decision-makers or their advisors. Since key high-level people are not always available, the calibre of representation might be increased with the urgency of the situation.

Gowing's conclusions about the fickle nature of the international media have been mentioned. International mass media, however, remain the most effective way of reaching large audiences with a simple message. The practice of joint, multi-agency press conferences ("speaking with one voice") in Sarajevo prevents discord or contradiction in the mission from becoming the story. An early warning mission needs to have an accurate assessment of current media presence and media coverage (host-nation, regional, and international) and should be prepared to adjust its information strategy to use available information effectively. IFOR, for example, ran an information campaign on at least three different levels. The affected population was one target audience. Local media were a related target audience. International audiences were reached through both the international media and coordinated press releases from contributing nations' national media outlets. Readily available video imagery, satellite hook-ups and secure transport help to attract the international media, but they are not natural allies.

If early warning missions are appropriately structured, they may go a long way towards overcoming the natural inertia of the international system in responding to incipient violent conflict. The most important barrier is decision-makers, who might be reached directly or through liaison with their advisors. A second vehicle is the pressure of public opinion, mobilized through the international media, guided by a careful information programme. Our experience in Bosnia should lead us to be cautious about both. The parties to the conflict will have their own interests at stake, and will use the same means to influence *their* international environment. The international community was often unable to match the sophistication or the resources deployed by Milošević, Izetbegović and Tudjman to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad.

In the effort to instigate action, participants in a mission should also beware the *hubris* of assuming that they know what is best. There seems to be a natural tension between headquarters at different levels--"those who think they know what is going on are annoying to those of us who do". What is perceived by a lower (or higher) headquarters as inertia may be a different perception of the costs and benefits of action.

Early Warning Mission as Precursor to Action

The Balkan experience, though not an early warning mission, has been used to provide examples of ways in which one might function. This may extend to taking direct action within the scope of the mission to help forestall violence or mitigate its impact. Providing warning, taking direct action, and acting as a vanguard may be related functions which an early warning mission should be prepared to undertake as the situation changes.

Direct action might take a number of forms. Economic action might include identifying development opportunities, assisting worthwhile causes to secure international funding, helping to prepare proposals, and acting as project officers for programmes run by development agencies. This sort of activity is likely to increase the stature of the mission and the cooperation of local authorities, making it easier to gain access and information. Direct action on political and social matters is more likely to be perceived as meddling in internal affairs, particularly once officials have become involved in discrimination or oppression. Observing at a distance without offering any hope of assistance, however, may make information collection difficult. People will be reluctant to expose themselves to official retribution for the benefit of "voyeuristic" observers who report to some distant centre, with no evidence of any action or result.⁴⁰ There is even scope for direct military and police action in the early warning stages. Sending each faction's officers out of country for training and professional development, holding seminars and workshops

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in-country, and building professional relationships would all be useful steps on which to build later. In each case, one of the functions of the early warning mission is to bring greater resources from outside the mission to bear at an early stage and in places where they will have a positive impact. This argues for a mission with many organizational links.

Should it be necessary to escalate from an early warning mission to one which deploys more resources, a carefully used early warning mission might help in the smooth deployment and efficient start-up of a larger and more complex mission. In military terms, observers can function as liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties.⁴¹ The same functions are required for political, economic and social aspects of a mission. One of the most important functions is simply preserving and transferring information. Many wheels were reinvented by IFOR, the High Representative's Office, and UNMIBH, having been lost without a trace in the ashes of UNPF and UNPROFOR.

Conclusion: Observer Missions and Effective Early Warning

There are three steps to using observer missions to provide effective early warning. The first is to get the missions into the right place at the right time, with appropriate mandates and freedom of action. The second is to ensure that they are appropriately structured and prepared to detect vital signs, interpret them correctly, and communicate that information. The third is to ensure that they are linked into the international community in such a way as to maximize the impact of the warning they can provide. This might include a media strategy, liaison to international and regional organizations, and personal links to key decision-makers.

Neither short-lived fact-finding mission nor traditional military observer missions can be expected to provide early warning linked to effective action. Multi-functional observer missions might.

Notes

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2.Office of Legal Affairs, Codification Division, *Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States*, (New York: United Nations, 1992), multiple entries deal with different applications of fact-finding by the various bodies charged with the resolution of disputes.

3.Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, Bjørn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future*, A Study Sponsored by the International Peace Academy with the Support of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, (London: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 143-145.

4. Rikhye, Harbottle and Egge, pp. 144, 147.

5. United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and the Situation in Georgia*, Reference Paper, April 1995.

6. United Nations, The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief Operations: MCDA Field Manual, Draft Version 3, November 16, 1995, pp. 1-2 to 1-8.

7.Jean-H. Guilmette, "Beyond Emergency Assistance: Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Decision-Making," A discussion paper, July 1995 (CIDA/ACDI), pp. 18-19.

8.Donald Acheson, "Preventing Genocide: Episodes must be Exposed, Documented and Published," British Medical Journal, Vol 313, 7 December 1996. Other descriptions of the process are found in Cynthia Brown and Farhad Karim (editors) Playing the Communal Card: Communal Violence and Human Rights, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995) and Edward L. Nyankauzi, Genocide: Rwanda and Burundi, (New York: AAIC International, 1994).

9. Michael E. Brown, "the Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, editor (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 577.

10.Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, edited by Joseph V. Montville, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 455-6.

11. The stories collected by Zdenko Lešić (editor) Children of Atlantis: Voiced from the Former Yugoslavia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995) include several which reflect the sudden turn to ethnic identity and militant support for ethnic parties after the summer of 1990.

12.Interviews conducted in Prijedor, Banja Luka, Sanski Most, and Novi Grad from January to July 1996.

13.Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Michael E. Brown, Editor, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 197-198.

14.Discussions with European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) analysts and Head of Analysis and Assessment Unit in Zagreb, Croatia, November 1995.

15.Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 91-92.

16.Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International* Security, Michael E. Brown, Editor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-121.

17. Michael R. Lucal, "The OSCE Code of Conduct and Its Relevance in contemporary Europe," Aussenpolitick 111/96, pp. 223-235.

18.Dr. Wilhelm Höynck, "CSCE Capabilities for Contributing to conflict Prevention and Crisis Management," Speech at the NATO Seminar on Crisis Management, Brussels, 7 March 1994, in From CSCE to OSCE: Statements and Speeches of Dr. Wilhelm Höynck, Secretary General of the OSCE, 1993-1996 (Vienna: Secretariat of the OSCE, 1996), pp. 102-104.

19.Discussions with EC Monitors in Mission Headquarters, Zagreb in August 1995, and in Team Bravo headquarters in Banja Luka in April-May 1996.

20.Höynck, pp. 104-106. "One of the operational advantages of the mechanisms is comprehensive, impartial, on-the-spot fact-finding. This leads relatively easily to concrete recommendations for specific CSCE involvement, including the application of other CSCE instruments. The fact-finding mission to Kosovo in 1992, undertaken in the context of the unusual-military-activities mechanism, prepared the ground for a further CSCE involvement, which resulted in the decision to establish CSCE missions of long-duration in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak." (p. 106).

21.Stephen G. Brush, "Dynamics of theory change in the social sciences: Relative deprivation and collective violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40:4 (December 1996), pp. 523-545.

22.Milton J. Esman, "Economic Performance and Ethnic Conflict," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, edited by Joseph V. Montville, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 481-489.

23.Esman, pp. 485-486.

24.Peter Lewis, "Ethnic Accommodation, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: the Cases of Indonesia and Nigeria," Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996, p. 25.

25. Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," *Parameters*, XXVI:2 (Summer 1996), pp. 61-62.

26.Nik Gowing, "Media Coverage: Help or hindrance for conflict prevention?" A Diagnostic paper for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Unpublished draft, 3 November 1996.

27.Confessional affiliation was devised for UNPROFOR to balance Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim contingents. In reality, the policy never did more than provoke the mistrust of non-affiliated groups.

28.Colonel P.G. Williams, OBE, "Liaison - A Capability Gap in Current Peacekeeping Doctrine: A Lesson Learned from Operation in the Former Yugoslavia," unpublished paper. Williams lists twelve components or characteristics of a monitoring and liaison mission.

29.E.D. Doyle, "Verification in the Sinai - An Integrated Approach," *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 1, Number 3, (Winter 1994), pp. 336-348.

30. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions* of Internal Conflict, Michael E. Brown, editor (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 489-90.

31.de Jonge Oudraat, pp. 528-531.

32.Andrew J. Goodpaster, "When Diplomacy is not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions," A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1996.

33.UNHCR, UNMO, and UNPROFOR staff who served in Serb-held areas in 1993 and 1994 were not impressed by the caution displayed by ECMM. Some who returned with IFOR in 1996 were unjustifiably reluctant to take the monitors seriously, and lost access to a valuable resource.

34.In some cases, human rights observers from the Centre for Human Rights transferred to the UN Civil Affairs at local level, and none of the local expertise was lost.

35.Pauletta Otis, "Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict," Paper presented at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 28-31 August, 1996.

36. This reflects a Canadian perspective. The British Multi-National Division South West was concerned about IEBL crossings at Ključ, Mrkonić Grad and other sites as well as Otoka and Sanski Most. In the other divisional areas, there were similar flash-points. What follows is a simplified description of a complex sequence of events; others in possession of different information would perceive it differently. It is provided here as an illustration, not a historic picture of events.

37.Meetings with Adem Šahinović at Otoka on 20 April 1996, and with Sead Čirkin in Sanski Most, 27 May 1996, and near Koprivna on 28 May 1996. In reality, individual traffic across the IEBL continued during this period.

38.Alexander George and June Holl, "The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy," Paper presented to the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Association of Political Scientists, to be published by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996, p. 36.

39.George and Holl, p. 7.

40. This was the feeling some minorities expressed about the Centre for Human Rights observers in northwest Bosnia in spring 1996, after they repeatedly emphasized that they could only report but could take no action. The OSCE Human Rights monitors, taking a more assertive approach with local authorities, received more reports because there was some hope that something would come of the information, and it was worth the risk.

41."Cooperation between Units and Observers," News From The Front! (The Centre for Army Lessons Learned, September/October 1994), pp. 1-2,5,7. Also published in Peacekeeping and International Relations.

Averting Famine Through Linking Early Warning With Response Mechanisms

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FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) has been assigned the mandate of constantly monitoring the global food supply and demand situation and alerting the international community to countries or regions threatened by serious food shortages or which have exceptional surpluses of food requiring donor assistance for disposal. In a by serious food shoring to a complexity of food emergencies has been growing, GIEWS continues to provide policy makers and relief agencies throughout the world with the most up-to-date and accurate information available. Yet having an effective early warning system is no guarantee that timely and adequate interventions will follow. Emergency an effective carry mobilised in sufficient volume, or it arrives too late to avert famines and save lives. However objective early warning information continues to play a crucial role in ensuring that timely and appropriate action can be taken to avoid human suffering and loss of life. This paper outlines the experience of GIEWS in linking early warning with response mechanisms in recent food emergencies. It shows how effective early warning, rapid warning with response the and adequate international support have resulted in successful relief efforts which averted threats of famine and saved many lives.

1.Introduction

Hunger and famine are not new afflictions but are an endemic part of man's history. In today's modern world, however, enormous expansion of productive power should mean that no man, woman or child need go hungry, let alone die of starvation, though sadly this is not the case. Although, world per caput supplies of food for direct human consumption are today some 18 percent above what they were 30 years ago, this impressive progress has unfortunately bypassed a large number of countries and population groups. As a result, today over 800 million people suffer from chronic undernutrition. Most of these affected people live in 82 countries, classified as being low-income and food-deficit countries (LIFDCs)¹. These countries are caught in a trap: unable to produce sufficient food to feed their people while many of them are too poor to purchase food commercially on the world market. While the main thrust in mankind's battle against hunger and malnutrition must clearly focus on this group of countries, concerted action is required to achieve food security for present and future populations in all parts of the globe. Fortunately, there are signs of optimism. The 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action lays the foundation for diverse paths to a common objective - food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels. It entails a pledge of political will and common and national commitment on the part of Heads of State and Government to achieving food security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of

Includes all food deficit countries with per caput income below the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (i.e. U.S.\$ 1 395 in 1994), which in accordance with the guidelines 1 and criteria agreed to by the CFA should be given priority in the allocations of food aid.

undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015².

At present, there are 26 countries facing food emergencies of varying intensity with millions of people affected by acute food shortages or threatened by famine due to man-made and/or natural disasters. Famine may be defined (in simpler terms) as a situation when a population group's normal access to food collapses completely and mass starvation starts. Its causes are complex. However the assumption that if food production is affected by adverse weather, people will inevitably starve, is a misleading simplification. Nevertheless, crop failures could be a major contributory factor to famine. What distinguishes famine from endemic hunger is that famine is an acute breakdown of society with political repercussions while hunger remains the permanent lot of millions. It is not the intention of this paper to analyse the genesis of famine or its socio-economic and political implications but to briefly illustrate GIEWS experience of how relief operations have responded to early warnings in some recent food emergencies, to head off threats of acute food shortages and famines caused by natural disasters.

2. Early warning and response linkages

Food supply difficulties and problems arise from different sources and with different speeds. Difficulties could be the result of natural or man made factors, they could be abrupt or gradual or indeed, predictable or unpredictable. An appreciation of these different facets of food supply problems, however, is important in determining the nature of the overall problem and what appropriate interventions need to be put in place. From an early warning perspective the focus of systems like GIEWS is to raise awareness of problems in time, hopefully, to prevent or minimize the ultimate scale of future devastation. The ultimate merit of the System, therefore, is its ability to provide information in a timely and effective way to prompt action. Our experience and assessments also show that immediate/abrupt food problems may sometimes only compound more gradual long-standing and underlying problems. By alerting the international community of this distinction, GIEWS aims to ensure that appropriate and meaningful responses are made not only to address the immediate problem but also to draw attention to food supply difficulties in the medium and long term. A recent example of this is GIEWS assessments of the food supply problems in Korea DPR, as outlined below.

Increasingly, we are seeing that it is important to focus on sections of the population that are most vulnerable to food shortages or famine. We know that extreme food supply difficulties can persist in the midst of plenty and that specific vulnerable groups are constantly under threat of starvation or malnutrition. In addition to more 'traditional' examples of this type of vulnerability, in Africa and Asia, there are now emerging groups in transitional economies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). GIEWS is continually involved in developing methods and systems to address the issue of vulnerability. The task is not easy as there are a host of complex and multicorrelated factors that affect the ability of any one individual or a group to access food. On the whole, therefore, knowledge of the communities vulnerable to food insecurity and their behavioural response, when threatened by acute shortages, are important ingredients in an effective early warning system.

Unfortunately, in many instances, early warning does not necessarily mean early response, or indeed any response at all. Examples of this include areas where civil strife or war hamper relief distributions, or where political factors prevent intervention. Added to this is the factor of donor fatigue due to resource constraints. This brings us to the point therefore that early warning is an essential but not necessarily a sufficient component to prompt response. Nevertheless there is an increasing recognition that early warning

² World Food Summit: Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, 13-17 November 1996, Rome, Italy.

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aimed in preventing disasters, or at least limiting their effects, is far more cost effective than actually having to deal with the effects of the disaster. Recent examples where this has occurred include Somalia and the Great Lakes Region, where prevention measures would have been much more cost effective, and saved many lives, than the expense of billions of dollars in post disaster interventions.

3. Case Studies on Effective Early Warning and Responses

There are numerous examples where early warnings provided by GIEWS have prompted effective responses leading to successful relief operations. In this connection, two recent case studies dealing with Southern Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are outlined below:

3.1 Southern Africa

Southern Africa comprises 12 countries with an estimated total population of 125 millions in 1996. The sub-region shows a marked diversity in economic conditions with per caput GNP ranging from less than US\$ 250 in the poorer countries (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique) to over US\$.2,500 in relatively affluent countries (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa). Although in recent years the sub-region has achieved a remarkable degree of peace and political stability, two countries affected by past civil strife, Angola and Mozambique, are still faced with serious problems. Prolonged civil strife has dealt a heavy blow to these economies and resulted in massive displacement of population. Major challenges to revitalize the economy include the settlement of millions of demobilized soldiers and returnees, implementation of comprehensive demining programmes, rehabilitation of infrastructure and the restoration of service sectors. Nevertheless, with the strengthening peace process, the situation is gradually improving.

Southern Africa possesses a tremendous agricultural potential. Although the sub-region contains some 20 per cent of total population of sub-Saharan Africa, it accounts for 27 per cent of the total cereal production. Per caput cereal output in the sub-region, estimated at 196 kg is significantly higher than 146 kg for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. With some two-fifths of the very limited irrigated land of sub-Saharan Africa located in Southern Africa (mainly Madagascar and South Africa), yields in sub-region were some 50 per cent higher than the rest of the region in 1996. In normal production years, the sub-region is selfsufficient in coarse grains (with South Africa and Zimbabwe as traditional exporters) but imports small quantities of wheat and rice. However, serious weather anomalies frequently result in substantial drop in production necessitating large increases in cereal imports, including food aid.

3.1.2 Drought-Induced Food Emergencies

The sub-region has periodically been hit by droughts. The 1991/92 drought, the worst for many decades, devastated the subregion's agricultural production and resulted in unprecedented import requirements. As a result of the drought, cereal production in the subregion dropped 50 percent from average and the cereal import requirements more than doubled (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Some 18 million people faced the prospect of starvation. Fortunately, early warnings, rapid regional coordination and adequate international support resulted in a successful relief effort which effectively overcame widespread food shortages and the threat of famine. The sub-region was again gripped by drought in 1994/95 which seriously reduced food production. The impact of this drought, though serious, was much less devastating than in 1991/92 (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

The rainy season started on time (in October 1991), but subsequent precipitation was below normal, seriously retarding crop development in several countries. Until early January 1992, crop conditions were still good in most parts. However, prolonged hot and dry conditions in January and February during the crucial

pollination stage severely affected crop growth throughout the subregion except in Angola, causing widespread crop failures or seriously reducing yield potential. Rains in March came too late to save crops in most countries as, although they did benefit pastures and limit the drought's impact on the livestock sector in some countries, irreversible damage to food crops and livestock had already occurred in most areas. The effect of drought on cereal production and import requirements of individual countries is shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. The chronology of the evolution of the 1991/92 drought emergency and response is described below.

1991/92 Drought

1991/92 Droug	nt	
DATES	EARLY WARNING AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES	ACTION TAKEN
Oct. 1991	Rains and crop season start	Normal regular monitoring
Dec. 1991	FAO and REWU gave initial early warning of impending drought following below normal rainfall	Close monitoring starts: GIEWS, NEWU/REWU
Jan/Feb 1992	Drought situation confirmed, widespread crop failures, severe food and water shortages, low levels of food stocks, poor state of livestock and population movements reported.	Contingency planning initiated by countries of the region
March/April	FAO/WFP Missions fielded to the sub-region	Emergency Operations approved jointly by FAO and WFP to cover urgent relief needs
April 1992	Special Alert issued by FAO/GIEWS to international community on need for massive assistance requirements in food and other items.;	Regional Task force set up by SADC countries to coordinate relief efforts, including procurement, allocation and transport of food imports Regional Logistic Advisory Centre established with assistance from WFP and donors
June 1992		 1992 UN/SADC Consolidated Appeal based on FAO/WFP missions findings issued, requesting: 4.1 million tons of food aid; 1.8 million tons of targeted food aid (82% covered by donors); 2.3 million tons of programme food aid (89% covered by donors); US \$ 223 million for non-food assistance (water, health care, agriculture and livestock inputs) received less
		attention logistics of the state

attention; logistics: more than double of requirements covered by pledges; concessional loans from World Bank allowed commercial imports

The 1994/95 cropping season in Southern Africa was characterized by delayed and below normal This resulted in reduced plantings and necessitated replantings in several parts. Cereal fields and uction were seriously reduced (see Table 3 and Figure 3). However, cereal import requirements and the

general impact of the drought was much less severe than the previous one.

TES

1994

n. 1995

Dec. 1994

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EARLY	ARNING AND ING ACTIVITIES	
MONITOR	INGACI	

Start of rains and crop season

Special alert issued by GIEWS indicating delayed and below average rains in several countries and its likely effect on crops

Follow-up Special Alert issued by GIEWS confirming the onset of drought and impending food difficulties in most countries of the sub-region

FAO/WFP Missions fielded to sub-region provided quantitative estimates of food production cereal import and food aid needs.

SADC appeal to international community issued

ACTION TAKEN

Normal monitoring starts

Intensified monitoring initiated by GIEWS in collaboration with SADC REWU

Contingency plans initiated by the governments of affected countries (control of crop losses by pests and diseases and management of cereal stocks held in sub-region)

FAO and WFP took initiative of approval of advance Emergency Operations for seriously affected countries to avoid delays in distribution of relief assistance

Donor pledges for 1 million tons of food aid received. Provision of agricultural inputs (quality seeds and tools) by FAO and other donors to farmers in affected countries to rehabilitate agricultural production.

Close monitoring by GIEWS in collaboration with REWU alerted the governments in the affected countries and the international community to an impending major food crisis. Effective coordination among countries of the sub-region and the UN system as well as positive response by donors averted the threat of famine in 1991/92. As a result of the experience of the 1991/92 crisis, the impact of the 1994/95 drought Results

emergency, while serious, was much less devastating than the previous one. GIEWS positive role in the drought induced food emergencies in the sub-region was commended by the international community. More recently, at the October 1996 session of FAO Council, a major donor

delegation appreciated the System's contribution in the following words: "In our view, the most important delegation approximation of the second state o done excellent work over the years. Perhaps the best example was the Southern African drought when FAO done excertent work over the years of the output the best example was the Southern Arrican drought when FAO was able to alert the world at a sufficient notice so that large quantities of food were moved in time to avoid was able to alert the world at a sentence for the arge quantities of food were moved in time to avoid starvation in Southern Africa. In our view, many lives were saved because of this very skilful handling of

what could have been a major humanitarian catastrophe."

June 95

March/April 1995

3.2 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

3.2.1 Background

Korea DPR is presently in the midst of an economic crisis, principally brought on by its difficulty in adapting to a changing world economy and the loss of traditional markets. The disintegration of the USSR, and much of its traditional barter trade, and the rapid pace of economic liberalization in China and much of the "eastern bloc" has effectively led to the cessation of privileged economic ties with these countries, on which the economy depended heavily in the past. In spite of this deterioration in trade, however, the country has resolutely followed an economic policy based on self-reliance. This, in turn, has reinforced its economic isolation and has meant that modernisation of the productive sector has failed to keep pace with that of main competitors in the region.

These economic problems have manifest themselves in falling productivity and output in the agriculture sector, as domestic production of fertilizers and imports of essential chemical and other inputs, like fuel and spare parts, have fallen appreciably in recent years. In addition to these, food production is constrained by geography, land availability and climate, which have resulted in a system of agriculture which is characterised by short fallow periods, high plant densities, high doses of chemicals and very limited crop rotations. Inevitably such a system has led to decliming soil fertility and precarious situation where more fertilisers and chemicals are needed to maintain output, but less are available because the country cannot afford imports. As a result yields have declined. The fine balance in agriculture, therefore, can easily be upset by natural calamities such as floods in 1995 and 1996, ecological damage and declining fertility.

Prevailing input and land constraints mean that the country can simply not produce enough food grains to meet demand and has growing dependence on imports. The capacity to import food commercially, however, is highly constrained by an extremely weak economy, the consequent lack of foreign exchange and large international debts. These factors together have meant that Korea DPR has had to resort to fairly desperate measures such as the use of barter trade to counter food supply problems over the last year. The terms of trade against such transactions, however, mean that it is costly in resource terms, whilst its unpredictability and lack of sustainability mean that it does not offer a long term solution.

Flood-Induced Food Emergency in 1995 and 1996

Even in normal weather years, food production and supply in Korea DPR are insufficient for its population given the state of its economy and agriculture. Against this back-drop, a serious food emergency developed in 1995, when widespread floods destroyed large crop areas and vital agricultural structures. Again in July 1996 a re-occurrence of extensive flooding reduced domestic food production further and exacerbated the ongoing emergency situation. In the circumstances, the country has had little recourse other than to appeal for international assistance. Through-out the emergency, FAO has played an important role in not only alerting the international community of the extent of the problem but also in promoting response. This has been all the more important as prior to 1995, when the first FAO/WFP mission was mounted to assess the food situation, little was known about the country. A brief background to the emergency and the sequence of early warning and response is outlined below.

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EARLY WARNING AND MONITORING

BACKGROUND/RESPONSE

Background: During 1990s economic slowdown and reduced import capacity result in large drawn of food stocks to almost zero.

Aug/Sept 95

DATE

Extensive floods destroy hundreds of thousands of hectares of crop land in addition to agricultural structures. GIEWS intensifies its monitoring of the situation.

UN interagency mission with FAO participation mounted to Korea DPR

GIEWS through its periodic publication Food Crops and Shortages warns of a tight food situation developing.

Dec 95/Jan 96

FAO WFP Crop Assessment Mission to Korea DPR - findings highlight serious food supply difficulties, exacerbated by floods and economic difficulties. Special Alert issued by GIEWS 24 December advocating urgent international emergency and programme food assistance.

GIEWS makes statement to the US Congressional House Committee on International Relations (Sub-Committee on Asia) on the Food and Agricultural situation in Korea DPR.

In view of deteriorating food situation, FAO/WFP fields Assessment Mission to Korea DPR - Special Alert issued May 1996 warning that pace of emergency assistance had been very slow and that nutritional standards were falling fast.

Re-occurrence of floods affects some 300,000 hectares in key agricultural areas in the south

FAO/WFP Damage Assessment Mission evaluates 1996 flood damage. GIEWS Special Report issued Sept 1996.

Emergency Operation (EMOP) jointly approved by FAO & WFP for 8.8 million dollars for food and vegetable oil for 500,000 worst affected people for 3 months.

In the absence of response by donors, WFP provides 5 000 tons of rice from own resources. WFP establish office in Pyongyang

Country receives additional Programme food assistance through bilateral channels, though overall pace of assistance still inadequate.

During the course of the hearing, indication given that the US had pledged \$ 2 million assistance on the basis of the FAO assessment.

Launch in June 1996 of UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Flood Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Korea DPR., including 70 000 tons in food assistance and agricultural rehabilitation package.

Extensive international media interest and coverage

Oct/Nov 95

Feb/March 96

May/June 96

July/Aug 96

Nov 96/Jan 97

FAO/WFP mission to evaluate 1996 Floods and overall food supply situation. Special Report issued Dec 1996 -

FAO WFP Briefing on the food situation in Korea DPR at a donor meeting held at FAO Headquarters and appeal for the supply of seed and fertilizers. Second, emergency Appeal for 100 000 tons of food assistance jointly approved by FAO and WFP.


Results

In responding to the emergency situation in Korea DPR, GIEWS filled an important information gap in alerting the world of the agricultural and overall food situation in the country, especially as very little was known hitherto. As GIEWS assessments have been recognised as being objective and impartial in alerting the international community of the gravity of the food situation there has been considerable response. This includes, 70,000 tons in emergency food assistance and 400,000 tons in programme food assistance since the first alert in 1995. In addition the country has already received donor pledges to cover approximately 43 percent of the second emergency appeal issued in February 1997 for 100,000 tons. Donor have also pledged resources for 5,500 tons of barley seed, 2,000 tons of fertilizer and \$107,000 for the purchase of pesticides for the introduction of a double crop of barley to promote greater food security.

3. Conclusion

Through technological break-through this century, the world can now potentially produce enough food to feed its population. Unfortunately, this has not happened, indicating that supply alone is not a sufficient measure to eradicate acute food shortages and the curse of famine. Added to this are periodic occurrences of calamities either man-made or natural that can take affected countries from relative calm and stability into catastrophe. In addressing these issues, there is, therefore, a moral and humanitarian obligation to reduce human suffering. In doing so there need to be two vital ingredients, early information that brings the nature and gravity of the problem to the attention of the world and effective action that mobilises collective resources to reduce suffering.

GIEWS has endeavoured for over twenty years to address the vital early warning ingredient to alert the international community to impending food crisis. The System's strong conviction is that in providing early warning information, the international community has a rational basis on which to act on time. Added to this, is the System's reputation for being independent and objective. However, even though GIEWS is continuously striving to improve the speed, quality and overall effectiveness of information delivery, the System in itself cannot guarantee that timely and adequate response will ensue to avert severe food shortages or famine. This responsibility, has a much wider dimension, but as shown in the paper, early warning information has undoubtedly a crucial role to play in avoiding major food crises.



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Source: FAO





Figure 2. SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1991/92 Drought

a)

CEREAL PRODUCTION


b) CEREAL IMPORTS

Percentage change 1992/93 over 1991/92 500 400 300 200 100 0 -100 Madagascar Botswana Mauritius Namibia Swaziland Zimbabwe Lesotho Angola South Africa Malawi Zambia Mozambique



CEREAL IMPORTS b)

Percentage change 1995/96 over 1994/95



Zimbabwe Mauritius Swaziland Namibia Mozambique Lesotho Angola Malawi South Africa Zambia

Table 1. SOUTHERN AFRICA: CEREAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS REQUIREMENTS (million tons)

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97
Production (rice in paddy terms)	20.3	19.6	9.8	23.4	25.2	. 15.4	25.9
Import requirements	3.7	5.1	11.7	3.9	4.1	5.1	2.7
Food aid requirements	1.3	1.4	3.8	1.2	1.5	1.0	0.5
Closing stocks	3.4	2.8	2.3	4.7	5.0	1.9	2.2

Source: FAO

Table 2. SOUTHERN AFRICA: CEREAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS ('000 TONS)

AND THE ADDRESS OF THE	Production			Imports			
	1992	1991	1992 over 1991 (%)	1992/93	1991/92	1992/93 ove 1991/92 (%)	
Angola	465	386	20	214	350	- 3	
Botswana	15	50	- 70	281	161	7	
Lesotho	94	67	40	250	233		
Madagascar	2 591	2 509	3	106	122	- 1:	
Malawi	644	1 680	- 62	428	227	8	
Mauritius	2	2	- 6	163	175	a shaka ya maka	
Mozambique	239	546	- 56	1 160	289	30	
Namibia	33	114	- 71	181	74	145	
South Africa	4 616	10 810	- 57	5 582	1 193	368	
Swaziland	58	142	- 60	111	34	226	
Zambia	613	1 225	- 50	1 037	311	233	
Zimbabwe	481	2 060	- 77	2 229	440	407	
Total	9 850	19 592	- 50	11 742	3 609	225	

Source: FAO

Table 3. SOUTHERN AFRICA: CEREAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS ('000 TONS)

	Production			Imports			
	1995	1994	1995 over 1994 (%)	1995/96	1994/95	1995/96 over 1995/94 (%)	
Angola	296	275	8	494	468	(
Botswana	46	51	- 9	255	181	41	
Lesotho	82	258	- 68	249	171	46	
Madagascar	2 712	2 5 1 9	8	146	181	- 15	
Malawi	1 778	1 110	60	242	480	- 50	
Mauritius	2	2	0	172	170		
Mozambique	1 127	819	38	457	309	48	
Namibia	57	119	- 52	138	85	62	
South Africa	7 443	15 967	- 53	2 202	1 387	59	
Swaziland	79	103	- 23	78	76	3	
Zambia	881	1 168	- 25	311	379	- 18	
Zimbabwe	980	2 773	- 65	311	200	56	
Total	15 483	25 164	- 38	5 055	4 087	24	

Source: FAO

Eyes and Ears? Limits of NGO Information for Early Warning

William DeMars The American University in Cairo

Complex humanitarian emergencies generate human rights abuse, famine, disease and displacement on a massive scale, and they are almost invariably rooted in civil wars. The link between civil war and humanitarian catastrophe was a common factor in Biafra, Cambodia, Ethiopia and other Cold War disasters, and it remains a feature of post-Cold War emergencies as exemplified by events in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Policy responses to internal conflicts have passed through several phases since 1989. First, the withdrawal of superpower sponsorship from proxies failed to passed inforgin sectors provides random being and provides random being from provides random being from provides random being and being from provides random a degree of desperation borne of growing isolationism in public opinion--policymakers in governments, the UN and a degree of despendences, the orvand NGOs have turned to "early warning and conflict prevention" as a rationale for global internationalism at a discount price. The body of the paper consists of three sections. It first examines the limits of NGO information on internal conflicts, and several means to overcome those limitations. The next section describes recent initiatives to share intelligence for early warning in policy networks that include NGOs and elements of the U.S. national security bureaucracy. The third section addresses specific cases and issues of such policy networks.

What is Early Warning and Conflict Prevention?

Complex humanitarian emergencies generate human rights abuse, famine, disease and displacement on a massive scale, and they are almost invariably rooted in civil wars. The link between civil war and humanitarian catastrophe was a common factor in Biafra, Cambodia. Ethiopia and other Cold War disasters, and it remains a feature of post-Cold War emergencies as exemplified by events in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Policy responses to internal conflicts have passed through several phases since 1989. First, the withdrawal of superpower sponsorship from proxies failed to eliminate all civil wars. Next, muscular military humanitarianism stumbled in Somalia and Bosnia. Finally--and with a degree of desperation borne of growing isolationism in public opinion--policymakers in governments, the UN and NGOs have turned to "early warning and conflict prevention" as a rationale for global internationalism at a discount price."

As a consequence of its roots in the battle against budget cutting isolationists, the policy practice of early warning and conflict prevention straddles a contradiction. The imperative to act early, and to avoid the price in blood and treasure of a Somalia operation, is invoked to justify truly early responses like "preventive development" advocated by the UN Development Program. The rhetoric of early warning notwithstanding, foreign assistance on a scale sufficient to stabilize national economies and governments is not the wave of the future. With a few well-placed exceptions, the Third World authoritarian welfare state is hot me replaced by either the democratic privatizing state or the collapsing state.

¹ For the theory and policy of early warning and conflict prevention, see Leatherman et al. 1996, Lund 1996, DeMars 1995, Sahnoun 1994, Gurr and Harff 1994, Rupesinghe and Kuroda 1992.

International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played crucial roles in all three forms of the Third World state, under conditions of both peace and war. In the authoritarian welfare state, whose mainstays were superpower military assistance and both bilateral and multilateral economic aid, international development NGOs patched the holes in the state welfare blanket by sustaining the poorest populations. By supplementing the state's welfare functions, and legitimating its promises of upward mobility, development NGOs acted as *auxiliaries of an expanding state* (Murphy 1994). Civil wars in this context tended to pit against each other a small number of adversaries, each with an external state sponsor and each representing a competing model of authoritarian welfare state. International relief NGOs (often development NGOs switching gears) succored victims on one or more sides of the war. Human rights NGOs lagged behind relief and development NGOs in the evolution of their involvement in civil wars (see next section).

In the democratic privatizing state, a form now hegemonic in Latin America and perhaps emerging in Asia, governments shed both welfare and productive functions in order to compete for foreign investment. Popular sectors in Latin America give up welfare in return for minimal human rights protections and democratic citizenship. In this context, international development NGOs both legitimate and mitigate the retrenchment of government welfare functions. By privatizing the government welfare bureaucracy, development NGOs act as *replacements for a shrinking state*. Human rights NGOs, along with emerging NGO sectors dealing with women, environment, and indigenous peoples, play a growing role in expanding democratic space. The Chiapas rebellion may represent the characteristic form of civil war in the democratic privatizing state. Its crucial battles are fought in the arena of international media (including the computer internet) rather than on the ground, and cross-border NGO coalitions are central actors.

In the collapsing state, not only welfare and production, but state security functions as well are "privatized" into the hands of warlords, privateers, transnational criminal organizations and mercenaries (Reno 1995; Keen 1994; Macrae and Zwi 1994). The phenomenon of ethnic conflict, particularly in Africa, is sometimes little more than an ideological veneer for violence that serves private economic gain. In other cases, particularly the least successful transitions from communism in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, ethnic conflict may represent an intermediate form of authoritarian welfare state in the process of collapse.

NGO roles in collapsing states are analyzed in the body of this paper. At this point it is important to note that the collapsing state, with its privatized violence and protection. is the context for much of the policy practice that goes by the name of early warning and conflict prevention. In the Great Lakes region of Africa, for example, intensive, self-conscious international conflict prevention has been underway for several years. Its focus, however, is not to prevent a fragile peace from sliding into open violence. Violence has been endemic for decades in Rwanda and Burundi. Instead, prevention is designed to forestall and mitigate the next episode of increasingly massive violence in an ongoing "permanent emergency" (Duffield 1994).

In the former Yugoslavia before the Dayton peace accords, a self-conscious policy of conflict prevention focused on Macedonia (Leatherman et al. 1996). There, poverty and political tension had not yet escalated into the "Four Modern Horsemen" of complex humanitarian emergencies--War, Disease, Famine, and Displacement (Väyrynen 1996; Green 1994). This conflict prevention initiative may be conceptualized as truly early, but only by viewing Macedonia in isolation from the region in which the Four Horsemen were already on the march. The alternative conceptualization, which I prefer, views the prevention effort in Macedonia as designed to contain the horizontal escalation of a regional complex humanitarian emergency.

The point is that there is a large gap between the discourse and the actual policy practice of early warning and conflict prevention. The "early" in early warning takes on a bitterly ironic meaning for the victims of internal conflict, and a hidden meaning for the major power governments that design the diplomatic and humanitarian responses to conflict. In practice, conflict prevention is early enough if it meets three priorities of cost containment. In descending order of importance, the first priority is to contain internal

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conflict from escalating to international conflict, the second is to contain the outflow of refugees (within the country of origin, within the region, or at least outside of Western Europe and North America), and the third is to contain the financial and political cost of humanitarian programs. By these criteria, conflict prevention has been successful in both the Great Lakes region of Africa and the former Yugoslavia. Neither humanitarian assistance nor human rights protection are on this list for their own sake. Humanitarian values may be proclaimed as the official objectives of multilateral operations, but they are pursued selectively only when they overlap with at least one of the three goals of cost containment.

If the policy practice of early warning and conflict prevention straddles this contradiction, how should scholars deal with it? One legitimate alternative is to use the contradiction as a lever to lift policy practice so that it more closely matches the high ideals of policy discourse. Some scholars analyze the economic and political "root causes" of conflicts at a very early stage, and design policy tools that could be used to address these in a comprehensive system of conflict prevention.² Others direct attention to designing and assessing policy tools for what might be called "just in time" conflict prevention in the current hot spots. My own preference is to observe the political interaction among the several kinds of actors thrown together in contemporary internal conflicts: the warring parties, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, major power governments, regional governments, and sometimes soldiers under a multilateral mandate. Each of these actors pursues explicit goals, but it is often the inadvertent consequences of their interactions that is the most important.

The body of the paper consists of three sections. The first examines the limits of NGO information on internal conflicts, and several means to overcome those limitations. The next section describes recent initiatives to share intelligence for early warning in policy networks that include NGOs and elements of the U.S. national security bureaucracy. The third section addresses specific cases and issues of such policy networks.

NGO Information and Action in Civil Wars

International NGOs together with operational UN agencies and major donor governments constitute a loose, decentralized global humanitarian network (Minear and Weiss 1995; Macrae and Zwi 1994). NGOs that work in conflict situations have evolved historically in five distinct sectors, addressing human rights, refugee and migration issues, relief and development, victims of war (the International Red Cross), and conflict resolution (Henkin 1995; Best 1994; Cahill 1993; Loescher 1993; Forsythe 1991). Both the mandates and the operational styles of NGOs in all sectors are currently undergoing rapid change. Most important, NGOs from all five sectors of humanitarian action now routinely operate side-by-side within most countries undergoing civil wars, and respond to the same populations (DeMars 1996a). In recent years, NGOs dealing with women's issues and environmental issues, and non-profit groups and educational institutions supporting the International War Crimes Tribunals, have also played significant roles responding to selected conflict situations.

As part of routine operations, all NGOs collect and analyze information about the people they seek to serve and the societies in which they operate. NGOs from different humanitarian sectors may work with the same population, but are interested in different aspects of their lives. Famine relief organizations may measure children's upper arm circumference to assess nutritional status. Refugee organizations may interview their parents to learn from whence they have been displaced. And human rights organizations may seek information on acts of violence they have suffered or witnessed along the journey. Some NGOs have highly sophisticated analytical capacities for determining the political and economic causes of human

² This is the general direction of an ongoing research project on "The Political Economy of Humanitarian Emergencies" cosponsored by UNU/WIDER, Helsinki and Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

suffering. The general point is that different NGOs look for and value different things in their information gathering.

NGO information, in addition to being <u>narrowly focused</u>, is also <u>fragmented</u> geographically and demographically because each of perhaps more than 100 NGOs operating in one country is working with a somewhat different population. Despite constant talk about the need for coordination, no single actor has a complete overview. (This is more a strength than a weakness as I will discuss later.) A third characteristic of NGO information is that, for most NGOs most of the time, it is <u>politically superficial</u>. Such superficiality of analysis is not simply a weakness that can be remedied by more training or funding; rather it is a concomitant to the political neutrality that many NGOs cultivate and claim in explaining themselves to sponsoring constituencies at home and political authorities in the field.

All three generic limitations of NGO information can be exacerbated in the highly politicized context of a civil war. International actors can only gain access to the population in a civil war by a process of explicit or implicit negotiation with one or more of the warring parties. Hence, all information is produced and filtered in a political process. The information is an artifact of the negotiations by particular international actors with local political elites for access to sensitive areas and populations.

Humanitarian action in a civil war also exacerbates a fourth generic limitation on NGO information, which constrains the opportunities for sharing information with other actors. All NGOs convey some of their information, both within and beyond the organization itself, using <u>discrete channels</u> rather than open channels. The incentive to be discrete is greater in a highly politicized environment like a civil war.

Adding together these four characteristics of NGO information produces a fifth. Looking to the NGO community for information about any conflict or emergency is likely to yield a highly <u>contentious</u> body of opinions. NGOs operating in the same emergency often disagree intensely with one another concerning the priority needs of the population, the political roots and solutions of the emergency, and the programs that should be funded and supported to ameliorate the situation (DeMars Forthcoming 1997).

Considering that NGO information about conflicts and humanitarian emergencies is often narrowly focused, geographically and demographically fragmented, politically superficial, contentious, and unavailable except through discrete channels, it would seem that NGO information would be generally useless and in low demand. In practice, precisely the opposite is the case.

In a contemporary civil war, accurate and timely information is extremely scarce. Even under the best circumstances, information on social, economic and political conditions in a Third World country may be less than comprehensive, precise and reliable. Combine this with the disorganization that accompanies any disaster, the general fog of war, and active efforts by warring parties to hide or distort information for political purposes and it is not difficult to appreciate the value of any bits of reliable information. In addition, NGOs possess certain inherent advantages as information sources that offset their limitations. NGOs have people on the ground to make direct observations in rural and hard-to-reach areas, and they maintain active communication channels. For example, a relief or development NGO of moderate means maintains radio, phone or fax communication from the field, to the country director in the capital, to the country desk officer at NGO headquarters, to the executive director, who has an array of options for sharing information openly or discretely with governments or other organizations. In current practice, only the largest five or ten NGOs have well-developed contacts at high levels in major power governments and the UN (Natsios 1996).

The greatest utility of NGO information, either for understanding the causes of an ongoing conflict or anticipating the escalation of an incipient one, lies in the opportunity to analyze backward from humanitarian consequences to their political and military causes. During most of the quarter century from Biafra to Bosnia, NGOs contributed to this process of political analysis reluctantly and inadvertently, if at all. The Horn of Africa during the 1980s was a crucible of protracted civil wars and dense, contentious international humanitarian action within which this inadvertent process evolved into a purposeful program. The very contentiousness of NGO interaction became a positive resource to overcome the fragmentation and political superficiality of NGO information.

NGOs operating the Horn of Africa argued for years about the real causes of famine in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. The arguments can be understood as a clash between three different narratives of famine, each of which builds on the one before and adds political complexity (DeMars 1995). In the first narrative there are only victims, and NGO information addresses only their numbers, location and raw physical condition (e.g.: "A hundred thousand starving people are migrating from rural Tigray into eastern Sudan"). The second narrative portrays both perpetrators and victims, and NGO information adds political content by holding the perpetrators responsible for violence (e.g.: "The Ethiopian government denies the existence of the migration while attacking their routes.") The third narrative introduces the warring parties as strategists who manipulate the perpetrators and victims for political purposes (e.g.: "The migration is directed by Tigrayan rebels in response to Ethiopian counter-population warfare.")

In the Ethiopian case during the 1980s, it took more than five years of humanitarian contention and sustained partnerships between particular NGOs, scholars and research institutes to generate a fine-grained analysis of the deep political economy of violence and famine in the conflict. Sudan has followed a similar time-frame, while the debate over the Somalia case developed more quickly and sharply in the early 1990s (Macrae and Zwi 1994; Keen 1994; Duffield 1992; de Waal 1991, 1989).

What was inadvertent and reluctant in the 1980s is becoming deliberate policy in the 1990s, at the initiative of both major power governments and some NGOs. Nevertheless, there are inherent limitations on the quality and availability of information on conflict situations produced by the NGO "community." The policy trick is to overcome each limitation by utilizing another feature of NGOs or the larger international community. Generalities on how to accomplish this are more metaphor than method; more exhortation than instruction. The narrow focus and fragmentation of NGO information can be overcome by an actor who collects reports from a variety of NGOs and <u>assembles a mosaic</u> for a broad geographical area and all humanitarian mandates. Political superficiality can be overcome by interdisciplinary analysis that <u>peels the onion</u> of the political economy of violence in the conflict.

NGO plurality and contention actually works as a positive resource for assembling the mosaic and peeling the onion. The necessity to negotiate with the warring parties for access to internal conflicts ensures that all information is produced and filtered in a political process. Any radical centralization of the humanitarian network that acts in civil wars and "complex emergencies" would reduce the cumulative quality and depth of international information about the political economy of the conflict. Hence, in pursuit of more rational and coordinated humanitarian action, such centralization would effectively degrade the rationality of international policy by making it less well-informed.

To overcome the unavailability of much NGO information except through discrete channels is difficult to accomplish in a systematic way. During the Cold War, and especially after Vietnam, many large American NGOs maintained a careful distance from the U.S. government in operational choices and public ideology, while retaining the capacity to exchange sensitive information. This could be done quite directly through consultations with USAID which funded most American NGOs. In addition, certain persons in the NGO community and on U.S. embassy staffs were well-placed to act as discrete mediators. Since 1991, collaboration between humanitarian NGOs and the U.S. national security bureaucracy (including the State Department, National Security Council, and intelligence community) has become more transparent and cooperative for selected countries (see next section).

A quite different attempt to institutionalize the previously haphazard process of analysis is the challenge accepted by several European NGOs to design their periodic assessments of needs and conditions in order to uncover the hidden economy and power structures that perpetuate violence and humanitarian crisis. A "food economy assessment model" has reportedly been applied in southern Sudan by Operation Lifeline Sudan and Save the Children Fund-UK.

In addition to providing information about violent internal conflicts and their humanitarian consequences, NGOs are being asked to influence the course of conflicts by helping to head them off or resolve them. There are indications, particularly since 1993, of a new eagerness within the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the United Nations for partnership with NGOs across a spectrum of issues. NGOs are attractive operational partners from the point of view of reducing financial costs and enhancing public support for U.S. international engagement.

An impressive outpouring of NGO tactical innovation across all humanitarian sectors during the 1980s set the stage for the current wave of change. <u>Relief and development NGOs</u> were structured operationally and normatively to work in conditions of peace, with the cooperation of the recognized government. Governments fighting civil wars took advantage of this partiality to deny international relief and development aid to their rebel opponents. Already in Biafra, some NGOs challenged this one-sidedness, but not until the Ethiopia/Eritrea war in the 1980s did the organizational infrastructure develop for NGOs to cooperate legitimately with anti-government movements on a large-scale (DeMars Forthcoming 1997). Thus, NGOs in the Horn of Africa pioneered the new neutrality based on the imperative to deliver relief assistance on all sides of internal conflicts. The United Nations followed suit in Sudan, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and the new neutrality has become standard humanitarian practice. A recent permutation, in conditions of collapsed states such as Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and Afghanistan, has NGOs or UN agencies delivering relief assistance with the consent of no central authority (whether rebel or government) and actively constructing a local government apparatus to speak for the people. It is astonishing that the roles of international NGOs in some civil wars have evolved over two decades from bolstering government sovereignty, to contesting it, to replacing it.

In the <u>human rights NGO sector</u>, Amnesty International set the global pattern of monitoring government violations of a relatively narrow range of issues. Americas Watch during the 1980s pioneered reporting on a broader range of violations by both governments and rebels in Central American conflicts. Global monitoring of internal wars did not become institutionalized until the late 1980s when Human Rights Watch created continental watch groups for Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Amnesty International officially expanded its general mandate in 1991 to address abuses by non-governmental entities such as insurgent groups. Today, unlike during the Cold War, Human Rights Watch seeks to provide information in a rapid time frame that can inform and influence U.S. government policy as it develops. The same organization conducts research on political and military factors, particularly the arms trade, that drive human rights abuses.

<u>Refugee advocacy NGOs</u> and institutes, such as Refugee Policy Group and U.S. Committee for Refugees, have invested considerable energy since the early 1980s in promoting the idea that "internally displaced persons," who have been forced to leave their homes but do not qualify for refugee status because they have not crossed an international border, should receive greater international protection and assistance. The issue is on the agenda of major power governments, and both the UN human rights institutions in Geneva and the UN Security Council in New York have taken strong positions, particularly on the former Yugoslavia. However, implementation is highly selective according to the political salience of a particular crisis. More serious is the emerging pattern of major powers expecting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to prevent refugee flows by funnelling material assistance--but not effective international protection--to internally displaced persons caught in civil wars. The UN "safe havens" in Bosnia became almost Orwellian in their distortion of the meaning of "protection." Refugee advocacy NGOs vigorously called attention to this irresponsibility.

The <u>International Committee of the Red Cross</u>, based in Geneva, Switzerland, is neither an NGO nor an intergovernmental organization, although it shares some features of each. The ICRC promotes the development of International Humanitarian Law and also takes direct action on behalf of "victims of war" and prisoners in armed conflicts of all kinds. The ICRC practices a wider array of specific humanitarian

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tactics than any other single NGO or UN agency. During the 1980s in Africa, the ICRC became deeply involved in delivering emergency assistance to famine victims and displaced persons. The ICRC worked alongside NGO and UN relief organizations that served many of the same population groups, but the ICRC conducted its assistance activities in a unique manner that incorporated elements of protection. When the UN became active in providing assistance on all side of civil wars in the late 1980s, ICRC leaders intended to withdraw from big relief operations. However, the ICRC took on a major relief role in Somalia when the UN was unable to mount a response.

A small number of established NGOs, such as Mennonite Central Committee and American Friends Service Committee, have long defined their mandates in terms of conflict resolution. These are joined by a relatively new generation of <u>conflict resolution NGOs</u> that have developed techniques to promote nonviolent conflict management. Search for Common Ground is an NGO innovator in this sector. In Macedonia, for example, Search has brought together a team of journalists from different ethnic communities to conduct a joint investigative reporting project, the articles from which were published by each reporter's newspaper. Such tactics target societal leaders and give them an opportunity to act outside of an ethnic definition of threats and rights. Conflict resolution NGOs, and other NGOs when they incorporate a mild conflict resolution mandate, find themselves advocating that unstable or transitional societies adopt inclusive, civic definitions of citizenship rather than ethnic definitions. It is more than ironic that they do so when many European countries and the United States are restricting immigration using increasingly exclusive and even ethnic nationalist definitions of citizenships.

NGOs and Intelligence for Early Warning: Whose Eyes and Ears?

There is broad agreement that United Nations efforts to establish a system for early warning and preventive diplomacy have failed (Adelman and Schmeidl 1995: 9; Dedring 1994; Frelick 1993: 6). Consequently, many observers look to NGOs to be the "eyes and ears of the international community." International NGOs embody a global network of information and capacity to act, even if flows of information are unpredictable and action is rarely coordinated. The U.S. national security bureaucracy commands a similar operational scope, a condition that creates opportunities to pool information and coordinate policy with international NGOs. The search for cheap, global reach to manage civil wars is spurring new forms of collaboration between these two realms.

At the same time, the two realms retain significant differences of structure and mission that militate against collaboration. The U.S. security apparatus is organized in a hierarchical structure under the President. International NGOs interact as a fluid and decentralized mix of thousands of independent organizations (Weiss and Gordenker 1996). Organizational mission is an even more important basis for differentiation. International NGOs define their missions as serving universal human interests based in a global civil society (Lipschutz 1992). The mission of the U.S. national security apparatus is to pursue the American national interest in an "international society" of states (Bull 1977). Even when relaxed in practice, these remain constituent features of their respective institutional realms.

From these divergent starting points, the NGO community is interested in discovering the military and political causes of humanitarian crises, while the security community is interested in predicting the humanitarian consequences of civil wars. Hence, the two groups are experiencing a *convergence of attention* toward analyzing the causal linkages between war and humanitarian crisis. Moreover, this phenomenon is not a passing fad dependent on a particular political party or administration. The convergence of attention toward internal conflicts is likely to persist in both humanitarian and security policy arenas as long as civil wars fuel humanitarian disasters, governments prefer cheap policy options, and NGOs invent innovative tactics.

The humanitarian side of the convergence of attention has already been described in a previous section of this paper. NGOs addressing human rights, refugee and migration issues, relief and development,

victims of war, and conflict resolution now work side-by-side in internal conflicts. Acting without central coordination, and often inadvertently, the aggregate NGO community can analyze the political-economic causes of humanitarian emergencies. The other side of the convergence can be discerned in the recent evolution of American security priorities. Intelligence analysis aims at understanding the causal processes at work in situations that may threaten American interests (McCarthy 1994). In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. leaders have increasingly perceived "transnational" social processes as security threats. The Bush administration responded with military action to problems of drug trafficking in Panama, mass migration in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, and famine in Somalia (Damrosch 1993). The Clinton administration expanded the National Intelligence Council by adding a National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multilateral Issues to address such issues as humanitarian emergencies, refugees and environmental problems (Nye 1994: 86). The State Department launched an Early Warning and Preventive Actions Initiative in 1994 to identify one crisis-prone country each month, and evaluate alternative policy responses (Fleming 1994).

The convergence of attention on civil wars by humanitarian organizations and U.S. security agencies can be understood by considering the changing relationship between humanitarian information and intelligence. In the current debate on intelligence reform, the very definition of intelligence is contested, between the view that it includes all information for decision makers (Sims 1995), and the view that it comprises only secrets for competition between states (Shulsky 1995). An alternate definition, particularly appropriate to situations of civil wars, counts as intelligence any information that gives outside actors leverage over *who rules*.³ To prevent others from gaining such leverage is the reason governments and insurgents keep secrets. The information that humanitarian organizations gather and analyze offers leverage over *who lives*. Humanitarian actors may use this information to deliver aid to starving people, monitor human rights abuses, or prevent migration. *The crux of the convergence of attention is that information about who lives and who rules is increasingly the same information*. Particularly in regions with the weakest state structures, low technology mass violence is often the tactic of choice for elites seeking or holding power. For these regions, understanding the strategies of competing elites is tantamount to understanding the roots of humanitarian crisis.

Two independent appraisals of U.S. intelligence completed in early 1996 give short shrift to broad extensions of the concept of security to include transnational threats such as environmental decay. In this context, it is significant that both appraisals recognize the utility of sharing U.S. intelligence information with United Nations agencies (Commission 1996: xv, 130-131; Independent Task Force 1996: 13, 15). Prior to 1995, U.S. law placed no limits on intelligence-sharing with the United Nations. However, Congress appears to be implementing some restrictions on such activities and tighter congressional oversight.

The evolving relationship between U.S. intelligence and international organizations raises policy challenges that extend well beyond the frame of current debate in Congress or the published literature. These challenges include incorporating a variety of NGO actors in addition to the UN; international organizations acting as sources of intelligence information as well as consumers; collaboration of intelligence and humanitarian communities for analysis as well as collection; and coordination for policy action as well as monitoring events.

International organizations have traditionally undertaken as one of their primary tasks the collection and dissemination of specialized information (Murphy 1994). The capacity for learning by intergovernmental organizations on the United Nations model differs according to issue-area, however. The potential for learning is high only for issues on which there is technical consensus concerning facts and

³ Under this definition, intelligence information is conceptualized as more closely linked to policy action than under traditional definitions.

causal links, and also value consensus among dominant decisionmakers, NGOs and experts. Human rights and collective security, particularly with regard to civil wars, are categorized among the issue-areas *least* amenable to learning of this kind (Haas and Haas 1995: 258).

Collaboration between the international nonprofit sector and American security agencies has a long and convoluted history, which can only be briefly sketched here. During World War II the Office of Strategic Services incorporated hundreds of academics to quickly build up an intelligence capability, and the intimate relationship between "cloak and gown" continued through the 1950s (Winks 1987). For two decades after its founding in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency maintained links with an array of American professions, including business, labor, churches, news media and charitable organizations. Some of these links consisted of covert funding for selected foundations that in turn supported nonprofit organizations. The international activities of these professionals and organizations provided sources of intelligence information, and also constituted part of the "infrastructure" of persons who might be recruited for covert action (Godson 1995: 165). Revelations beginning in the late 1960s exposed these activities, and American intelligence severed most of these relationships by the mid-1970s (Turner 1985: 40; Ross 1976: 103).

Since the 1970s, it is safe to assume that American intelligence agencies could gain access to any information reported by NGOs through routine channels to the U.S. government. For example, American relief and development NGOs report to, and work closely with, officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development. In addition, when U.S. embassy officials debrief NGO staff who have returned from remote areas or war zones, this information can find its way into the diplomatic cables that flow constantly to Washington. In regions that combined humanitarian crisis with special American security interests, such as Southeast Asia in the 1970s and Afghanistan in the 1980s, certain NGOs established intimate working relationships with American security bureaucracies (Chester 1995; Baitenmann 1990).

As a consequence of this complex history, any cooperation between the international nonprofit sector and the intelligence and security bureaucracies of the U.S. government raises questions of legitimacy in some quarters. In spite of this history of mutual mistrust, NGOs with a range of humanitarian mandates are collaborating in new ways with elements of the U.S. Department of State, National Security Council, and Intelligence Community. This collaboration has several innovative variations, including policy networks that pool information, analyze the causal dynamics of particular conflicts, and guide international policy to steer the adversaries toward peace.

The propensity of international actors committed to preventing internal conflicts or mitigating their consequences to form complex policy networks can be understood as an attempt to facilitate political learning and increase effectiveness. Policy networks are self-selected clusters of governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental actors that share information through dense interactions, and in which each member modifies its own policies in light of that information. In the field of conflict prevention, policy networks are sources of power in two respects. Networks channel information to overcome the partiality of each actor's monitoring of the conflict, and they provide a forum for decentralized coordination of each actor's policies with those of others. Hence, policy networks enhance the possibility of learning the causes of conflict in time to counter them, and the possibility of coordinating interventions to create mutually reinforcing pressures for peace. Forming policy networks is often a spontaneous process, but recent examples such as the cases described earlier illustrate an increasingly self-conscious effort to strengthen the inherent advantages of the network organizational form (Ronfeldt and Thorup 1995).

Recent cases of policy networks involving both NGOs and elements of the U.S. national security bureaucracy can be analyzed on four dimensions. First, the degree and form of public *transparency* for the information exchanged between NGO and security actors. Second, whether actors coordinate *policy action* in addition to information exchange, and the terms of the coordination. Third, whether and how *intermediaries* act as links between NGO and government security actors. Finally, whether NGO and

security actors employ a *division of labor* that allows cooperation while maintaining the independence of each actor. A division of labor, in this sense, can be negated by either a distant relationship of isolation or hostility between NGO and U.S. security actors, or a relationship that is so tight that one actor is subsumed under the agenda of the other.

As a preliminary argument to be tested in further research, I would suggest that recent policy practice for managing civil wars tends toward combining all four of these features, and that avenues for improving conflict prevention may be found by analyzing the compatibilities and incompatibilities between the four elements under particular case conditions. In contrast to Cold War relations between NGOs and the U.S. security bureaucracy, recent cases of collaboration display greater transparency of information flows and enhanced cooperation between actors using intermediaries and divisions of labor. These features increase the potential for institutionalizing these policy innovations more widely.

Cases and Issues in Policy Networks

It should be clarified which humanitarian NGOs do, or do not, want a closer relationship with the U.S. security community. The "market" may be quite limited. An executive of a large, American relief NGO has articulated privately the need for NGOs working in conflict situations such as Somalia to have a discrete means to share information about local warlords and political realities. In contrast, Human Rights Watch as a general policy does not seek information from U.S. intelligence sources, and does not provide special information other than what it releases to the public.⁴ Several smaller relief NGOs such as Mennonite Central Committee have distanced themselves from the U.S. government for ideological and historical reasons. It is not clear how an NGO based in Europe might share information on early warning with the American government. In the NGO world of multiple issue-areas, thousands of independent organizations, and incentives to differentiate organizational mandates, it is realistic to expect a wide variety of positions on whether and how to cooperate more closely with the U.S. intelligence community, even among those NGOs that pledge a rhetorical commitment to early warning and preventive action.

National Intelligence Estimates on Global Humanitarian Emergencies

The U.S. National Intelligence Council has produced national intelligence estimates of impending Global Humanitarian Emergencies, most of which are linked with civil wars, for each year since 1994 (National Intelligence Council 1995; 1996). The estimate is classified, but news reports suggest it is largely based on "open source information" such as interviews and published reports from humanitarian organizations (Smith 1994). Information flows from humanitarian organizations to the intelligence community, but it is analyzed beyond the reach of the organizations that supplied it.

A partial corrective was organized in September 1994, when the responsible national intelligence officer provided an unclassified draft of the 1995 estimate to a group of NGO representatives in Washington and invited their comment in a conference format.⁵ Refugee Policy Group, the research and advocacy NGO that co-sponsored the conference, intended to publish the proceedings to maximize the transparency of the process, but had not yet done so more than a year later. Nor was an NGO conference repeated in the preparation of the 1996 estimate.

This case illustrates recent trends. It displays a clear division of labor between NGO and government actors, and the process is semi-transparent. However, the roles of intermediaries in channelling information are not revealed. Indeed, it is not clear how the intelligence community collected the NGO information, and

⁴ Interview with senior executive of Human Rights Watch.

⁵ Interview with Enid C. B. Schoettle, National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multilateral Affairs, Washington, DC, September 28, 1995.

what sort of information it received.

In reality, for most NGOs, transparency is a matter of tactical choice rather than inflexible principle. NGO public statements are often less revealing and timely than "trip reports" by consultants who travel into remote areas, and "sitreps" (situation reports) faxed periodically from the country director to the desk officer at headquarters of operational NGOs. These communications constitute a "furtive literature" that is normally not available to journalists, scholars and other organizations. In short, this is not "open source information" in the strict sense. Furthermore, it is not available from any central collection point, it is fully intelligible only to persons immersed in the immediate context, and it is rapidly dated.

These considerations suggest that recent National Intelligence Estimates on Global Humanitarian Emergencies are either compilations of relatively superficial NGO open source information, or deep analyses based on NGO furtive literature and "gray source" interviews with large numbers of NGO personnel. The former possibility is much more likely. Either way, however, several questions arise: What is the value added by the intelligence community to NGO information? Is NGO information obtained directly, or through intermediaries? Is the intelligence community (CIA headquarters?) the optimum location for collecting and analyzing NGO information?

These issues can be understood more deeply through the concepts of intelligence collection and analysis. In many efforts directed toward early warning of escalating internal conflicts, humanitarian NGOs have more information, and have it sooner, than government intelligence services. Therefore, the policy challenge of *collection* involves identifying relevant NGO information, conveying it to the intelligence community, and choosing what part of the process to make transparent to the general public. At the same time, neither individual NGOs nor the central organizations of the U.S. intelligence community possess the knowledge, range of contacts, and security to conduct effective *analysis* of intelligence information for early warning of escalating civil conflict. The optimum location for analysis may be an intermediary actor, such as a humanitarian officer in an American embassy, or the relatively new organizational form of a policy information network of NGO and government officials in Washington.

For decades, the American intelligence community has had several well-institutionalized, but rarely acknowledged, means to obtain information from humanitarian organizations through intermediaries. Any American NGO that accepts U.S. government support reports regularly to its donor agency both through the U.S. embassy in the field and in Washington. All this information is potentially available to American intelligence agencies. In addition, several large, American relief NGOs have traditionally recruited executives from the ranks of former U.S. foreign service officers, whose personal contacts in the State Department are useful for monitoring the currents of American national security interests, and for fine-tuning NGO strategy to both insulate it from U.S. government influence and harmonize operations with those interests. The president of an NGO has access to all the internal communication and analysis generated by field and headquarters staff. In special circumstances he could make selected information available to contacts in the U.S. government, especially if sharing information would both inform the government and protect the position of the NGO in a sensitive region. Alternately, he could discreetly receive information from government sources to adjust organizational tactics in a fast-changing conflict situation. In this case he would be acting as an intermediary from a position within the NGO world. There is no public evidence of such information-sharing, but the potential for it is built into the structure of NGO-government relations and career paths.

In particularly critical regions that combine humanitarian crisis with intense American political interests, the Refugee Bureau of the State Department deploys special refugee coordinators. Currently eight

or nine "ref coords" are in place at any one time.⁶ They facilitate humanitarian aid to particular populations of refugee or internally displaced persons by bringing to bear expertise, money and political influence. Refugee coordinators can also act as intermediaries by collecting and analyzing information from an array of humanitarian organizations about the conflict that is spawning the refugee crisis. Conveyed through diplomatic cables to the CIA and other intelligence agencies, this information can provide the U.S. government with its clearest window into a conflict and its humanitarian consequences.⁷ This is distinct from raw, open source data collected directly from NGOs and sent to CIA headquarters. Nor does embassy cable traffic contain information quoted from, or directly attributed to, NGO sources.⁸ Instead, it combines both open source and human intelligence or gray sources, and the information is both collected and analyzed in the field by the refugee coordinator, who conveys conclusions to the intelligence community. More broadly, there is a current emphasis based in the Refugee and Human Rights thematic bureaus of the State Department to train all U.S. foreign service officers to be more alert to collecting and reporting information on refugee flows and human rights violations.⁹

Frederick Cuny in Chechnya

Frederick Cuny was a veteran disaster relief specialist who designed humanitarian operations for a quarter century in civil wars and other disasters from Biafra to Bosnia. Cuny became well-known in the 1990s for rebuilding the city water system of Sarajevo under siege. Early in 1995 he set off for a humanitarian assessment mission to Chechnya, where the Russian army was fighting a war against Chechen nationalists. Cuny traveled extensively, talking with humanitarian officials and military commanders on both sides of the conflict. With an understanding of the war gain by this on-the-ground research, he decided to put into practice the routine exhortations for "early warning and conflict prevention." Cuny published a brilliant analysis of the war in the *New York Review of Books*, describing in detail how the military strategies of both adversaries would lead to a series of predictable humanitarian disasters if the war were allowed to rage along its logical course (Cuny 1995). He castigated the Russians in particular. by revealing that most of the civilians killed in Grozny by Russian shelling were Russian nationals, and by accusing the general staff in Moscow of scuttling a cease-fire that had been initiated by field commanders on both sides in Chechnya.

Cuny was traveling in Chechnya when the article appeared April 6, 1995. He disappeared two days later. An extensive search and high-level inquiries by the U.S. government failed to find Cuny's body or reveal firm evidence of his fate. After several months, family members accused Russian intelligence of spreading rumors that Cuny was anti-Islamic and that members of his entourage were spies in order to set him up for assassination by the Chechen rebels (Shawcross 1995). Another theory suggests that Cuny discovered nuclear materials that the Chechens had bought or stolen from Russian sources (Anderson 1996). Most accounts agree that Russian intelligence took sufficient interest in Cuny to spread at least mild

⁹ Interviews with Charles Sykes and Judith Mayotte; and with Nancy Ely-Raphel, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, (Washington, DC, October 4, 1995).

⁶ Interview with Charles Sykes and Judith Mayotte, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State, (Washington, DC, October 3, 1995).

⁷ Interview with Frank Moss, former Refugee Coordinator and Cross-Border Relief Officer in Khartoum, Sudan 1985-1987, (Washington, DC, October 3, 1995).

⁸ Interview with MacArthur Deshazer, Director of African Affairs, National Security Council, Washington, DC (October 4, 1995).

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disinformation about his mission, and that Chechen counterintelligence units probably held him for some period. For whatever reason, Cuny provoked a reaction from the counterintelligence apparatus of both adversaries. Taking into account the uncertainty of the available evidence, it is reasonable to arrive at the tentative conclusion that Cuny's analysis of humanitarian information concerning who lives in Chechnya impinged on information that could influence who rules.

Fred Cuny's role in Chechnya is remarkable for the extent to which he combined multiple tasks. Cuny collected field information first hand on a range of humanitarian and military realities, analyzed it, published his conclusions, lobbied U.S. government officials in Washington on the depravity of Russian military tactics, ignored tactical advice from staff in the Soros Foundation with whom he was working, and went back into the conflict attempting to change its course by acting as a peace mediator. By centralizing all these tasks in himself, Cuny chose to forego the modicum of protection that derives from fragmenting them among multiple actors. Several months before Cuny disappeared, Andrew Natsios advocated the clear separation of several distinct NGO roles in conflicts: prevention, relief and rehabilitation, human rights monitoring, and mediation.¹⁰ Cuny combined these roles and others in one person, not just one organization. He gained integration and effectiveness, but lost political protection. One of the ways that separating roles imparts political protection is by allowing intermediaries to channel information between actors who have no direct contact.

Genocide and Mass Migration in Rwanda

The genocide of perhaps one million ethnic Tutsies in Rwanda from April through July 1994 was reported as it occurred by human rights NGOs with sources in Rwanda and with access to the UN Security Council in New York and the U.S. National Security Council in Washington. There was ample and current information on which to base a case for international intervention. However, a combination of circumstances and lack of political will allowed the opportunity to pass (Burkhalter 1995).

When the rebel Tutsie army captured the capital of Rwanda in July, the genocide became a refugee flow as the former Rwandan government--including the architects of the genocide--fled to refugee camps in Zaire with up to one million ethnic Hutu refugees as a human shield from international punishment. The U.S. government chose to respond to the refugee flow, though it had passively accepted the genocide, with a massive airlift of supplies to camps in Zaire. In the process, an unusual NGO-government information link developed. The Washington based NGO Refugees International (RI) sent a representative to Goma, Zaire to report on the first flows of refugees by fax to RI offices in Washington, which re-faxed the reports to hundreds of NGO and government offices.¹¹

One of the receivers in this faxnet was the Director of African Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, who reciprocated by providing Refugees International with U.S. intelligence assessments of the scale and direction of mass migrations of internally displaced persons within the boundaries of Rwanda. These assessments, based on analysis of satellite images, were also provided to UN consumers through other channels.¹²

The genocide and subsequent refugee flow from Rwanda were occasions for the development of

¹⁰ Andrew Natsios, Panel on "NGO Burdens and Needs as Conflict Managers" (November 30, 1994), at "Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the 21st Century," conference sponsored by United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

¹¹ Interview with Maria D'Albert, Refugees International, Washington, DC (September 29, 1995).

¹² Interview with MacArthur Deshazer, Director of African Affairs, National Security Council, Washington, DC (October 4, 1995).

innovative information linkages between humanitarian NGOs and the U.S. national security bureaucracy, including the intelligence community. In addition, the prelude to the genocide in January 1994 involved a pivotal failure by the United Nations and member governments to act on UN intelligence predicting the scale and method of the killing (Lynch 1996). Details of precisely who knew what and when they knew it are continuing to emerge.

Burundi Policy Forum

The Burundi Policy Forum represents a relatively institutionalized form of network collaboration between humanitarian and security actors. Sponsored by four NGOs, the Forum has met monthly in Washington, DC since January 1995 to share information and brainstorm policy options for ameliorating the multiple disasters of the Burundi/Rwanda region.¹³ It attracts about 100 people, from the State Department, USAID, Pentagon, and intelligence community; as well as from NGOs specializing in human rights, relief assistance, refugee advocacy, democratization, and conflict resolution. A parallel forum based in London draws European NGO and government representatives. The Forum cultivates a high degree of cooperation, is well institutionalized, and fosters transparency as a tool to encourage horizontal flows of information in both directions between NGO and government sectors.

This transparency has certain limits. A Burundi <u>Security</u> Forum, with a smaller and restricted attendance, meets every two weeks to deal with sensitive security topics such as how to monitor and impede arms flows to Rwandan refugees in Zaire, and how to focus sanctions on extremist leaders in Burundi. The more restricted Burundi Security Forum is regularly attended by officials from several bureaus of the State Department, USAID, the Pentagon, the CIA, and NGOs including Search for Common Ground, Refugees International, and Human Rights Watch.¹⁴ The Burundi Security Forum reflects the carefully calibrated degree of *semi-transparency* achieved by the forum model. Freely revealed are the existence of the Security Forum, the dates of meetings, topics discussed, and organizations that regularly send representatives. However, certain dimensions remain confidential, including the identities of the government officials who attend (the NGO representatives are relatively open about their attendance), the actual interchanges, and any policy changes that result from the interaction.

The Burundi Security Forum probably could not exist, at least with this degree of transparency, without its link to the more transparent and open Burundi Policy Forum. The larger Policy Forum legitimates other contacts between humanitarian and security officials that take place between meetings, including the existence of the Security Forum.

War Crimes in Bosnia

The documentation of war crimes and genocide in Bosnia has involved a complex interaction between NGOs, news reporters, U.S. intelligence, and the UN War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Reporters and NGOs were the first to uncover the reality of ethnic cleansing in the region. U.S. intelligence became part of the public story in March, 1995 when three separate American officials simultaneously leaked to the *New York Times* the contents of a highly classified CIA assessment of atrocities in Bosnia. The CIA assessment reportedly concluded that "90 percent of the acts of 'ethnic cleansing were carried out by Serbs and that leading Serbian politicians almost certainly played a role in the crimes." (Cohen 1995).

In mid-August of 1995, the Clinton administration launched a coordinated public relations campaign

¹³ The Burundi Policy Forum is sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, Search for Common Ground, Refugees International, and the African-American Institute.

¹⁴ Interviews with various officials in Washington, DC, Sept. 27 to Oct. 5, 1995.

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to accuse the Bosnian Serbs of primary responsibility for the most egregious human rights violations in Bosnia. Madeleine Albright presented satellite intelligence photos to the UN Security Council to confirm refugee reports that the Bosnian Serbs had massacred hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of Muslims after overrunning the so-called safe haven of Srebrenica. U-2 spy plane photos of "possible mass graves" near Srebrenica were released to the news media. And a CIA official told a Senate hearing that "American intelligence has found a clear pattern of 'ethnic cleansing' by the Bosnian Serbs since 1992." (Schmitt 1995; Crossette 1995). This public relations campaign against the Bosnian Serbs was timed to gain international and domestic support for a new American peace initiative for the Balkans. The selective disclosure of American intelligence information also served as a prelude to, and political justification for, the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb military targets a few weeks later.

American policy has appeared ambiguous and shifting on the question of how much intelligence information the U.S. will share with the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Clinton administration has pledged to turn over "all appropriate information" but has withheld some intelligence (including signals intelligence of radio conversations between Bosnian Serb commanders) requested by the Tribunal on grounds of national security (Sciolino 1995). After much hand wringing about "mission creep," American troops will provide security for UN war crimes investigators exhuming suspected mass graves in Bosnia (Burns 1996).

Three distinct processes are running in parallel for analyzing human rights information on the former Yugoslavia--traditional human rights NGOs, the War Crimes Tribunal, and American intelligence. Between them there are competing agendas, disparate analytical procedures, and a shortage of institutionalized relationships. Traditional, on-the-ground monitoring set the agenda for U.S. intelligence analysis of the Srebrenica massacres in mid-1995. American officials did not foresee the Serb attack on the enclave, and they agree in hindsight that "their best information came from human rights groups, the United Nations and the press, not from spies, satellites of eavesdropping." (Engelberg and Weiner 1995). The riveting satellite photos of mass graves at Srebrenica were only discovered amid thousands of recorded images after John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, was led to interview refugees from the massacre in Bosnia. The reports do not say who led Shattuck to the refugees. I would hypothesize that the key linking actor may have been a humanitarian NGO.

Policy Networks as Shifting Coalitions

The humanitarian community and the U.S. national security bureaucracy are not always on the same side in responding to areas of potential conflict. Consequently, the alliance of NGOs, UN actors and western governments for principled conflict resolution and prevention is a shifting coalition. Western intelligence services, in particular, are still capable of conducting dirty tricks and maintaining seedy liaisons in the Third World; activities with which most humanitarian organizations would be reluctant to be associated. For example, since 1990 the United States has withheld \$3 million in promised military aid from the Guatemalan military due to its involvement in human rights abuses; meanwhile the CIA continued to channel \$10 million in covert assistance to the Guatemalan intelligence and military (Weiner 1995). During the same period, when the CIA was asked to produce a report on human rights abuses in Guatemala, the agency utilized its sources in the Guatemalan military and submitted a report that one Senator described as "deliberately designed to mislead" the U.S. Congress (Krauss and Weiner 1995). When the CIA is funnelling disinformation to Congress on human rights in a country, it is an unreliable partner for humanitarian organizations. There is also emerging evidence that the U.S. intelligence community has covertly undermined democracy in Haiti in contravention of official American policy (Reding 1996; Nairn 1996).

Humanitarian Covert Action?

When and where the U.S. intelligence community acts against the principles of human rights and

welfare on which humanitarian action is based, NGOs can easily revert to a Cold War repertoire of familiar responses ranging from quiet distancing to public condemnation of U.S. government policies. More challenging for the humanitarian community may be situations where Western governments use covert means to pursue principled ends. In such cases, humanitarian organizations may be asked to assist the operation by providing either public legitimacy or quiet cooperation.

When President Clinton threatened and initiated a military invasion of Haiti to accomplish the lofty goals of restoring democracy and checking the flow of refugees, many humanitarian observers supported the initiative. However, if the United States had used covert or special forces action to overthrow the Haitian military regime--an option the Clinton administration refused to rule out--the humanitarian community would have faced the choice of whether to lend its legitimacy to the operation.¹⁵

Whether, or under what conditions, to lend a humanitarian rationale to covert operations is a genuine dilemma for the humanitarian community. The secrecy inherent in covert operations would seem to preclude the accountability necessary for a humanitarian endorsement. On the other hand, if countering a crisis of migration, human rights abuse or starvation is a high priority according to humanitarian principles, it is not clear that humanitarian legitimacy should be withheld from covert policy options. Covert operations may be the most effective and feasible alternative for achieving a particular humanitarian objective, even if it is difficult to imagine a UN Security Council resolution authorizing such action. In the future, as U.S. presidents seek low-cost tools for responding to internal conflicts and humanitarian crises, they are likely to reach for the option of covert operations. When some of these operations become public, it is also likely that administrations will seek allies among humanitarian NGOs to legitimize their policies.¹⁶

Confronting Counterintelligence

When humanitarian organizations, acting autonomously in pursuit of their principled mandates, collect and analyze information in internal conflicts, they increasingly impinge on the security interests of the warring parties. The information they gather in order to understand and influence the humanitarian reality of *who lives* may also reveal and open to outside control the security reality of *who rules*. The warring parties may view such humanitarian investigations as probing into areas that they want to remain secret: as intelligence. A critical variable in the success of such humanitarian missions the existence and efficiency of the counterintelligence capacity of the warring parties under scrutiny.

In other cases, warring parties are out of reach of the usual international diplomatic incentives and pressures and so make little attempt to conceal their methods and goals. This is increasingly the situation in collapsing states of Africa and Asia. The former Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR), which fled to refugee camps in Goma, Zaire with several hundred thousand Hutu refugees after leading the genocide against Rwandan Tutsies, has rearmed with help from the governments of Zaire, South Africa, France and China. Human Rights Watch sent an investigator into the region for several months to learn the scale and sources of the rearmament (Human Rights Watch 1995). Rather than concealing their goals and methods, ex-FAR leaders boast of them in the belief that they will not be stopped by the international community.

¹⁶ Since there is no comprehensive list of covert operations available in the public realm, it is impossible to calculate the percentage that are exposed. On the basis of press reports alone, however, one might be forgiven for drawing the impressionistic conclusion that exposure is relatively frequent. For example, U.S.-led international policy toward Kurds in northern Iraq since the Gulf War has included a humanitarian operation to prevent migration, a military no-fly zone to protect the population from the Iraqi military (Stromseth 1993), and a recently exposed CIA covert operation to help one faction gain control over the Kurdish regional government (Hoagland 1996).

¹⁵ Such an operation would have been deeply ironic given the history of CIA links to the Haitian generals.

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They may be correct in this judgment, given the involvement of major power governments in the rearmament and the low-grade political will in the United States to act for conflict prevention in Africa. The ex-FAR have not needed a counterintelligence capacity. However, they could develop one quickly if the political will of the "international community" ever rose to the point of considering decisive action against them. The lesson for actors attempting to do serious early warning of escalating conflicts: Take into account the counterintelligence capability of any warring party whose goals and methods you scrutinize. From their point of view, you are gathering intelligence.

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NGOs And Early Warning: The Case of Rwanda

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The authors analyze the role of NGOs in providing early warning of the genocide in Rwanda in order to shed light on the authors analyze the fole of NGOs in providing carry warning of the genocide in Rwanda in order to shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs as ringers of warning bells generally. The authors begin by arguing that on the e strengths and weakliesses of NGOS as imports of warning bens generally. The authors begin by arguing that on the isis of obvious structural virtues as organizations, NGOs should have some specific advantages in the capacity to Isis of obvious structural virtues as organizations, reges should have some specific advantages in the capacity to provide early warning. However, the authors conclude that the Rwanda experience does not indicate that such capacities provide early warning. However, are autors conclude that the Rwanda experience does not indicate that such capacities are in fact being employed. In order to capitalize on crucial assets NGOs possess in general and, and in fact did possess are in fact being employed. In order to capitalize on crucial assets iNGOS possess in general and, and in fact did possess a Rwanda, the NGO community would have had to: 1) maintain and deepen its connection with local communities a Rwanda, the 1960 community would have had to. 1) manually and deepen its connection with local communities hroughout an emergency which sapped NGOs energies and preoccupied its leadership; and 2) understand at both policy hroughout an emergency which support 1,000 charges and proceedpied its leadership; and 2) understand at both policy and operating levels the high value of the assets it had and the importance of applying them to international processes

of early warning.

The frequency and ferocity of civil wars are deeply troubling for the international community and its international institutions, but particularly troubling for non-governmental organizations. Mandated to Its international institutions, our particularly troubling for non-governmental organizations. Mandated to promote economic and social development, human rights and democratic development, and conflict promote economic and social development, name rights and democratic development, and conflict resolution, NGOs are in the field early and actively. The stylized versions of NGOs and large international resolution, NGOS are in the field carry and activity. The stylized versions of NGOS and large international institutions are in sharp contrast: the first, lithe, flexible, quick, with a strong presence on the ground in institutions are in sharp contrast, the first, finte, ficture, quick, with a strong presence on the ground in comparison to headquarters, capable of rapid adjustment as conditions change, and with deep connections

to local society; the second, large, slow, with complex resolutions change, and with deep connections to local society, the second, large, olor, that connectsome ourcaderactes, requiring elaborately mandates before any action is possible, and with complex procedures for deployment and action. These stylized versions, admittedly abstractions which mask exaggerate differences, nevertheless suggest very different implications for the capacity of each of these organizational types to provide early

Large international organizations tend to have fewer personnel in areas outside capital cities, and

have less well established networks which can pick up signs of disturbance. warning.

- Even when they do receive critical pieces of information, the diagnosticity of the information is Finally, the anticipated difficulty of a collective organizational response leads to a systematic often lost as it is sent up and through multiple levels of command. tendency to discount the kind of information which, if taken seriously, would require a response.
- Non-governmental organizations seem to have the virtues which are vices in large international

organizations.

¹ Alexander L. George and Jane Hall, "The Warning-Response Nexus," the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Violence.

- Personnel are stationed in local communities, outside the capital, where they develop extensive connections and become part of established networks. They may pick up important information which large organizations might miss. Although NGOs cannot and should not supplant the intelligence capabilities of larger organizations, what they do find can be a critical piece of the larger estimate.
- When NGO personnel do receive information, their relationship with their headquarters is usually direct, if not personal, and their capacity to communicate information is quick and effective.
 - NGO personnel are not systematically discouraged by the political or organizational complexities of crafting a response to warning. On the contrary, they see as part of their responsibilities the warning of catastrophe or violence. Among NGOs, the warning-response nexus is far less complicated than it is among large international organizations.

In this paper, we examine the role of NGOs in Rwanda in providing early warning of the genocide which ultimately occurred. Rwanda is in many ways a critical case to examine: as we shall show, NGOs were present in considerable strength for years before the genocide began. It can be argued, however, that because the genocide was a planned and organized conspiracy, no organization of any kind could have penetrated the conspirators and gained access to information that would have warned of an impending genocide. We shall show as well that this is an overly pessimistic judgment. Nevertheless, to be fair, we use the criterion of a warning of a likelihood of a major escalation of violence, rather than a specific warning of genocide, which may have beyond the capacity of any organization to imagine.

Analysis of the role of NGOs in Rwanda in providing early warning should shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the international NGO communities as ringers of the clarion bell. We examine not only whether NGOs succeeded or failed in providing early warning, but if they failed, why they failed, and how their capacity can be improved.

We also review the record of NGO engagement in conflict prevention when it became apparent that the Arusha Accords were at risk. Again, the expectation is that the more flexible and responsive NGO community should be better positioned and more capable of engaging in attempts at conflict resolution than more highly structured, more distant, and more politicized international institutions. Was the international NGO community, working with their local counterparts, positioned to engage in preventive diplomacy? Did they have the capacity to do so? Did they engage? If not, why not?

II. The Prelude to a Genocide: A Brief History of the Rwandan Civil Crisis

1. The Civil War

A history of the Rwandan emergency might begin with 1 October 1990, when an armed refugee movement, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda from southern Uganda. The invasion was itself the culmination of previous strife of a type frequently seen in Africa, and elsewhere: victims or losers in a conflict seek refuge in a neighboring country, which then becomes a base for invading their homeland. In this case, large numbers of Rwanda's Tutsi minority, who had been the losers in a violent struggle for political control in Rwanda during the decolonization process, fled to surrounding countries. The largest concentration of Tutsi refugees was in southern Uganda. Repeated efforts by the refugees to return had been of no avail until a generation of Rwandans born in exile launched a new invasion in 1990. The objective was to permit full and free settlement in Rwanda - a demand consistently denied by Rwanda's President Habyarimana - and to force the regime to accept power sharing arrangements that would give Tutsis significant political representation in the government. The attack was propitiously timed to take advantage of support from Uganda's President Museveni and a decline in the political and economic fortunes of the Habyarimana regime.

Invasion was quickly met with intervention. On October 5, France sent roughly 150 paratroopers from bases in nearby Central African Republic to bolster the Habyarimana regime. These troops did not engage the RPF, as some believe, but rather backstopped the Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR) in Kigali, securing the airport and other major sites. Zaire also sent troops to Rwanda, and these did engage the RPF, notably in Gabiro where their presence was insufficient to stop the first major RPF victory of the war. Zaire's troops were recalled shortly after that defeat.

The fortunes of the RPF underwent a sharp but temporary decline after the capture of Gabiro. Their commander, Major-General Fred Rwigyema, had been killed on the first day of fighting. Shortly after Gabiro was captured, two more senior commanders were killed in a FAR ambush. Disoriented by the loss of leadership, the RPF retreated, splitting into two groups, one which melted into the forests and swamps of the Akagera National Park in the east, and one which stole along the Rwanda-Uganda border to the Virunga National Park in the northwest.

In Virunga, the RPF regrouped under Major Paul Kagame, a charismatic Tutsi in his thirties who had earned his leadership position through years of tough fighting: first with the Tanzanians against Idi Amin, then with Museveni against Milton Obote, and finally as Museveni's Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence. Recalled from a training program at Fort Levenworth, Kagame provided the RPF with the necessary leadership to sustain the rigours of life in the high altitudes and cold weather of the Virunga mountains. From this vantage point they launched a series of guerrilla attacks in northern Rwanda which succeeded, by mid-1991, in making the northern part of the country a region where the FAR could not travel except at high risk. In November 1991, the FAR launched a strong attack on the RPF's position in the Virungas. When that attack failed, the RPF consolidated its position in the north, creating a de facto RPF-held zone extending along almost the whole Uganda-Rwanda border by early 1992.

2. The Negotiations

While the fighters fought, the talkers talked. Notwithstanding the somewhat peripheral nature of Rwanda to major western powers, the October 1990 invasion quickly triggered a series of regional and international peacemaking efforts. Just two weeks after the invasion, Tanzania called a regional meeting of the Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire to discuss the situation, and, fearing further refugee flows, remained actively involved and became host as well as "facilitator" for the subsequent peace talks. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Secretariat was also active in recognition of the organization's principle that African states have a primary responsibility to address regional conflicts. Other actors were soon informed or engaged - the (informal) Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL), the European Union and, more peripherally, the UN. Additionally the governments of Belgium, France and the United States at various times helped to move the process forward. The Belgian government became actively involved within days of the invasion, pushing forward a regional mediation process which achieved a cease-fire within four months.

At the organizational and the state level, warning of an escalation of violence and an increase in refugee flows did trigger a response. That the response was ineffective and insufficient should not mask the evidence that the fighting did serve as a warning and the warning did trigger a response by African leaders. All this activity was ineffective; the initial success of regional diplomacy was short-lived. A formal cease-fire signed at N'Sele, Zaire on 29 March 1991 lasted only to mid-April, when fighting resumed. The limits of regional diplomacy were revealed when a second cease-fire broke down in early 1992. It required a push from France - supported by more limited but parallel diplomatic suasion by the US Under Secretary of State, Herman Cohen - to get the conflicting parties back to the negotiation table. The European Union, Canada, Switzerland, the Vatican and others also counseled peace talks. The result was the Arusha peace process, launched in the summer of 1992, which concluded in a comprehensive settlement signed in August 1993.

3. The Arusha Period (June 92 - August 93)

The Arusha process brought together the RPF, the ruling party, and Rwandese opposition parties which had grown up during the civil war. Supporting the negotiations were international organizations which had a stake or a role in Rwanda, including the OAU, western donor countries, and the UN. The Tanzanian government formally acted as a "facilitator", and undertook a sustained and skillful mediating effort that was critical in bringing about an agreement.

From the start of the Arusha process in June of 1992 until February 1993, an uneasy cease-fire curtailed RPF activities. The Arusha negotiations began to outline the course of a peaceful transition of power from the Habyarimana regime to a broad based regime. However, by January 1993 the Arusha negotiations were stuck over the details of power-sharing arrangements. A government massacre of Tutsis in the north of the country at the end of January signaled the unwillingness of Kigali hard-liners to agree to proposed compromises. Frustrated by the lack of progress and enraged by the killings, the RPF launched an offensive in February 1993.

The RPF offensive was a major success. Thousands of the FAR's troops fled in the face of the advancing enemy, many of them deserting the army altogether. The offensive shocked Kigali and threw the government forces into disarray. With the FAR scattering in front of them, the RPF fought to within 23 miles of Kigali, stopping only in the face of French reinforcements and international pressure. RPF, French and Tanzanian military sources agree that had the RPF chosen at this moment to continue to fight, the French reinforcements would have been insufficient to prevent total FAR defeat.

In New York, the UN system responded to the disruption of the peace process. In March, the Secretary-General sent a team to Rwanda which helped bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The Security Council also approved a military observer mission to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border, designed to stop Ugandan supplies flowing to the RPF. *Again, the largest international organization, acting on warnings of further escalation, did respond.* Again, the response was inadequate to the scope of the challenge.

As the negotiations neared completion, the role of the peacekeepers was extended. The Accords called for the deployment of a Neutral International Force to oversee the implementation of the agreement, the principal feature of which was the creation of a transitional broad based regime leading to democratic elections scheduled to be held 22 months after the signing. A new national army composed of units from both sides in the civil war was to be formed; the rest would be demobilized. Invoking Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council voted to deploy a UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to oversee the installation of the transitional government and other parts of the peace agreement, in particular, to assist in disarming and demobilizing the two armies.

4. Building and Subverting the Peace

The signing of a peace agreement in August 1993 and the deployment of UNAMIR two months later - i.e. the initial success of what may be characterized as *preventive diplomacy* - did nothing to halt the rapid deterioration of the political situation in Kigali in the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994. As peacemakers and peacekeepers attempted to put the Arusha structures in place, their opponents - hard-line forces in Kigali who lost out in the Arusha process - worked to knock them down. As the pro-Arusha forces attempted to establish the institutions and mechanisms of power-sharing, the extremists laid the ground work and then set in motion a radical alternative to the Arusha power-sharing plan: a mass genocide against the Tutsi population and a return to war against the RPF.

Their efforts were bolstered by the assassination of President Ndadaye in Burundi in October 1993, and the mass killings which followed. In that month, a five month old experiment in democratic powersharing in Burundi collapsed when the Tutsi-dominated army launched what turned out to be an abortive coup which nevertheless undermined the nascent democratic system. This in turn generated a week of mass

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killings, Hutus forces took their revenge on Tutsi civilians and the Burundian army retaliated with bloody force. Later estimates would place the dead at between 35,000 and 50,000 split equally between the two ethnic groups, but at the time in the region the killing spree was widely reported to be far larger - as high as 150,000 to 200,000. The reality was bad enough, and sent tens of thousands of Burundians fleeing from the country.

The killings in Burundi helped push Rwanda faster down the slope into collapse and genocide. Since February 1993, it had been moving steadily down that slope, but until October 1993 there was still a reasonable hope that the course could be reversed. After the killings in Burundi, the course was firmly set. Among other things, the October 1993 killings in Burundi sharply increased the fears of the Rwandan population. To western ears, the Habyarimana regime's propaganda that the RPF were returning to Rwanda to re-impose slavery and other evils on the Hutu, rang shallow and cynical; yet across the border in Rwanda's sister country, a Tutsi military was executing Hutus in their masses (the stories of Hutus massacring Tutsis did not make into the extremist propaganda.) Moreover, the killings had come only months after Burundi had attempted a democratic experiment similar to that now being proposed for Rwanda.

What is more, the UN peacekeeping force being sent to Rwanda to protect the populations from such a breakdown (this was not UNAMIR's mandate, but it was very much how it was perceived in Rwanda), was late arriving: UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire and his advance mission had the misfortune to arrive in Rwanda on the same day as the assassination in Burundi. Not only was UNAMIR immediately required to divert some of its (not over large) force to the Burundi border region, but the stark contrast between the late, partial arrival of UNAMIR and the killings in Burundi meant that UNAMIR started life in Rwanda under a cloud of Rwandan skepticism (which turned out to be well-justified.)

5. Descent into Genocide

The deployment of UNAMIR in Rwanda did little or nothing to slow Rwanda's disintegration. By February 1994, the program of assassination and disruption reached a fevered pitch with the killing of leading opposition member, and key moderate, Felicien Gatabazi. On February 23, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) special representative Michel Moussali warned that Rwanda faced "a bloodbath of unparalleled proportions" unless action was taken to restore stability. In the end, it was precisely when action was taken to restore stability - when Tanzania and the OAU convened an emergency session of the Arusha principals on April 5 - that the bloodbath was unleashed. The plane carrying Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira from that meeting was shot down on April 6, and genocide begun in Rwanda.

The genocide was planned and to a large extent controlled by a tightly organized group of extremists from within the Habyarimana power structure: members of the ruling *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND) party, leaders of the Presidential Guard, the *interahamwe* and *impuzamugambi* militias, and members of the hard-line political grouping, the *Coalition pour le défense de la République* (CDR). In the first days of the killings, this group massacred the Tutsi population of Kigali and wiped out the ranks of moderate politicians and civil society leaders, most of them Hutu. Over the next three months, unchecked by any international force, the extremists systematically slaughtered Tutsi populations across the country, killing hundreds of thousands of people before the RPF's victory on 17 July 1994 drove them into final retreat.

The central motive for the genocide was to retain political power and the economic rewards that went with it. Given the history and ethnic structure of Rwanda, the political contest over who would control the state machinery had developed along a deepening majority-minority divide. Members of the Hutu majority community which planned, organized, and directed the genocide stood to lose power as a result of the powersharing arrangements negotiated in Arusha. Additionally, some feared that the RPF would use its legitimized entry into national politics and foothold in the new national army to engineer a coup. In either case, the Tutsi were perceived as the winners. The fear which this prospect generated among the Hutu population - and

which took extreme forms among some of the power-holders and their followers - must be understood against the historical memory of Tutsi overlordship before and during the colonial period, and the practice of treating power transfer as totalistic, within a context of eliminationist psychology. As the direction of civil war became clear, and power-sharing was on the horizon, Hutu extremist ideologues deliberately exploited this history to whip up ethnic fears to create space for their program of mass killing. They were aided in this by the repeated displacement many Hutus experienced as a result of the civil war, and by events in Burundi, which lent credence to their radical portrayal of the 'Tutsi devils' of the RPF.

It is critical to be clear that the genocide was not spontaneous, not an eruption of ancient tribal hatreds, as it was quickly portrayed by the western media. Rather, this was a planned, coordinated, directed, controlled attack by a small core, with the support of the senior elements of the state machinery, and arguably as many as 100,000 but possibly as few as 25,000 'henchmen' - a large number of people, especially at the larger estimate, but virtually all under the direct control of central authorities.

All sources estimate deaths in the Rwandan genocide between 500,000 and 1 million, with the bulk of estimates falling at the larger end of the spectrum. Analysis of pre-genocide census data, counts of refugee populations, and estimates of deaths, lead to an informed estimate of 800-900,000 deaths, the figure chosen by Studies II and III of the Joint Evaluation, as well as by Gérard Prunier, in his *The Rwanda Crisis* (1995). The rate of killing in Rwanda, roughly 75,000 victims per week sustained over a twelve week period, exceeds that of Cambodia, and equals the industrialised Nazi death machine at its most active point.

III. Prelude to an Emergency: NGO Involvement in Rwanda

1. NGOs before the Genocide

Rwanda, politically marginal in the international community, had long been the site of significant NGO involvement. A number of international NGOs had a long-standing presence in Rwanda: OXFAM and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) since the late 1960s, CARE and others since the early 1980s. NGO work in the country was broad but fairly conventional. Seed distribution, provision of agricultural tools and implements, irrigation: these were the staples of NGO efforts to alleviate poverty in what was then (and is still) one of the world's poorest countries. OXFAM, CARE, and MSF were the three largest international NGOs. Other major humanitarian agencies included Belgian Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN humanitarian agencies.

The onset of the civil war in 1990 was not, for most NGOs, a source of major disruption. Some NGOs concentrated their work in the southwest of the country where average land holdings were smallest (ca. 0.25 hectares, compared to ca. 2.0 hectares in the northeast, the breadbasket of the country.) The southwest was largely unaffected by the civil war, which was confined until 1993 to a zone along the northern border with Uganda and a zone along the northeastern border with Tanzania. Other NGOs, including CARE, which had programs in Byumba province in the northeast, experienced some disruption when the initial invasion occurred in that region. However, FAR reverses of RPF advances soon saw the fighting disperse towards Virunga National Forest in the northwest and the Akagera National Park in the east, neither of which were areas with particularly intensive NGO activity. For the most part, from the first invasion in October 1990 until the February 1993 offensive, NGOs continued to work in Rwanda in traditional development modes of operation.

2. Efforts to Forestall an Escalation of the Crisis

In the years since the Rwanda crisis, many have asked whether development and relief NGOs could not play a more substantial role in *preventing* humanitarian emergencies, rather than simply responding to them. For the most part, international NGOs in Rwanda from 1990 to early 1993 did not play any active role in conflict resolution or in attempting to prevent potential escalation. There are two important and one

minor exceptions.

First, Catholic Relief Services apparently used its position in Kigali, a quite influential position which came through its strong connection to the Catholic church, to support broader church efforts to deal with the question of ethnicity and to promote acceptance of the idea of sharing power within the Habyarimana regime. Few details of this process have been made public, and CRS' efforts were for the most part bound up in efforts by such figures as the Papal Nuncio to have the church play a constructive role in the Rwandan peace negotiations. That these broader efforts were ultimately a failure does not necessarily mean that CRS's efforts were wasted or misguided. What little evidence of these efforts exists suggests that CRS's work was a small part of a broader process and had little either positive or negative impact. In any case, CRS is something of a case apart for NGOs, given its strong ties to the Catholic church, which gives it political weight, but may deny it impartiality.

The lessons of the second exception are more widely applicable to international development and relief NGOs. In 1992, OXFAM launched a program to tackle the violence and conflict in Rwandan society. OXFAM was, according to diplomatic sources, one of the few agencies in Rwanda with "power in Kigali;" the others were Caritas/CRS, and the ICRC. It's influence came not through its high level connections among official circles in Kigali - indeed, OXFAM staff may be surprised to learn that they were considered to have power in Kigali - but through its important role as a the major funding agency for 'civil society' groups. OXFAM used its position to attempt to diminish the recourse to violence in Rwanda society. Most visible among their efforts was a program called Education for Non-Violence and Democracy (ENVD), run under the broader umbrella of a Catholic Church program called 'Justice et Paix'. The experience illustrates many of the challenges that face NGO efforts to engage in this sort of political programming.

The ENVD program was advertised through local parishes and brought people together to raise their awareness of issues such as ethnic relations, which were rarely discussed in Rwandan society, democratic process, and human rights. Its strength was that the issues addressed were those raised by participants. The program had some success, at least in that OXFAM received calls from participants for more opportunities to engage in this type of dialogue. However, the program was limited in scope - never, for example, attempted in Kigali, the power centre of Rwandan society. In 1993, as the crisis in Rwanda began to deepen, the ENVD was in hiatus, in a period of adjustment as the lessons of the early round were absorbed.

In hindsight it is clear that the program suffered from major weaknesses: these weaknesses are clearly recognized by OXFAM staff who dealt with the program, either in Kigali or Oxford. Most important is the question of having run the program through the Catholic Church. Anne Macintosh, the country director responsible for the program, later argued that OXFAM might have done well to have involved the Protestant churches. OXFAM did attempt to involve Rwandan human rights organizations, but without success.² The Catholic Church itself was grappling with the thorny issue of ethnicity in its own ranks. Indeed, as has now become clear, many of the church's leading figures, up to and including the Catholic Bishop of Kigali, Msr. Vincent Nsengyumva, were deeply implicated in the planning and later the commission of the genocide. Moreover, several of the people who OXFAM had worked with and put through the ENVD, themselves turned out to be accomplices in the execution of the genocide. It is important to note, however, that other members of the Church were actively, and passionately involved in the search for non-violent solutions to Rwanda's political crisis, including Jean-Pierre Goding, one the ENVD's principal animators.

Finally, one other international NGO attempted to play a role in the peace process. London staff of Christian Aid who had ties to Uganda's President Museveni, held secret meetings in Bujumbura with the RPF and the government of Rwanda. However, no one - including the RPF - believed that the Christian Aid

³ As many observers of the Rwandan human rights scene have noted, Rwandan human rights NGOs by 1991-92, were engaged in intensive infighting, and many were increasingly associated with particular political parties.

initiative had any relevance. Kigali-based diplomats of the period dismissed Christian Aid's initiative as "trivial."

3. Shifting to Emergency Programming

By early 1993, NGO's development work in Rwanda was seriously jeopardized by the consequences of the February 1993 RPF offensive. In retrospect, this is a critical turning point both in the NGO's experience and in the crisis itself, and is explored at some length below. The offensive produced large numbers of displaced persons, and forced NGOs onto an emergency footing.

This process was furthered in October 1993 when political violence in Burundi produced large numbers of refugees (JEval, III, 29). At least 375,000 refugees crossed into southern Rwanda, and another 250,000 fled to Tanzania. A further 300,000 were displaced inside Burundi and some tens of thousands also crossed into Zaire. Because the NGOs in Rwanda were already on an emergency footing, they were quickly able to divert some of their capacity to dealing with Burundian refugees in the southern province of Butare, where they were concentrated. By the time this process was fully in place, NGOs in Rwanda were completely on an emergency footing, and so remained until April 1994, when the genocide was launched.

In the first chaotic days after the assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, NGOs scrambled not to respond but to escape. This was not a panicked reaction or an irresponsible one, but a response to attacks on local NGO staff and serious threats to the security of all NGO personnel. NGO country directors (CDs) claim, with justification, that there was no time in the first week to attempt to focus on what was happening around them; getting their staff to safety was an absolute and consuming priority. Efforts to secure local staff were far from successful; every major international NGO lost local staff to the genocide. Local NGOs often fared far worse; many human rights organizations were wiped out in the first days. Having supported efforts to loosen the regime's grip on power through promotion of human rights and democratic process was the equivalent of a death warrant.

What staff could, fled. Many international personnel were evacuated out of Kigali by air, while others crossed by land to neighbouring countries. Agency staff were dispersed throughout the countries of the region, and it was some time before they were able to regroup and consider their responses. Many local staff were unable to escape at this stage: many parts of the city were under fire: some international NGO staff being evacuated by Belgian, French, and UN military convoys were told not to bring local staff along, for fear that having Rwandans in evacuation convoys would endanger all in the convoy. Many international NGO staff now recall leaving their Rwandan colleagues behind as one of the most traumatic elements of the entire period. Some international NGO staff were able to use their authority - and real bravery - to save the lives of local staff threatened by militias and organize their escape from Rwanda. Many more were killed than saved.

IV. Early Warning of the Genocide: A Missed Opportunity

The genocide took the international NGO community by surprise. Many had been tracking the political situation, and knew that the Arusha peace was unstable. But no NGO saw what was coming in either its scale, its swiftness, or its brutality.

This was not because there were no signals of what was brewing. With the benefit of hindsight, signals can be pieced together to form an alarming pattern: rampantly extremist propaganda in various media sources, notoriously Radio et Television Libre Milles Colines (RTLM), distribution of parish lists to central military committees, orders sent to local administrators to provide standby transport and logistical facilities for "national security purpose", the open training of militias, the arming of civilian groups. In hindsight, these and other activities signaled a major escalation of violence, if not a genocide. At the time, however, nobody in the international community, NGOs included, accurately estimated the form and scale of the

coming escalation of violence. How might this failure have been averted? What opportunities, if any, were missed?

If there was an opportunity, a period during which NGOs might have been able to hear and process the signals of the momentum to genocide, it was in the summer and fall of 1993. Growing extremism in Rwanda was most concretely evident in an increase in the number of 'small' massacres of Tutsis in various parts of the country - two or three hundred killed every time a concrete step towards power-sharing was taken. The pattern was there. It was precisely such a massacre, moreover, that prompted the February 1993 RPF offensive. The humanitarian consequences of that offensive produced a quantitative increase in NGO involvement in Rwanda. It also produced, however, a corresponding *qualitative shift in the nature of that involvement, one which diminished NGO sensitivity and intelligence capacity precisely when these were needed most.*

On February 8th, 1993, the RPF broke out from their front lines a few kilometers south of their headquarters at Mulindi. Mulindi is at the northern end of the highway which leads from Kigali, through the major northern city of Byumba, to the Ugandan border at Gatuna. The RPF advanced southward along this route, as well as striking southwest towards Ruhengiri, which they quickly captured. Within days the RPF had tripled the area under their control. As noted above, the FAR's resistance was decidedly weak, and by February 22nd, the RPF had moved to within 23 kilometers of the capital, Kigali. France rushed two waves of reinforcements to the country.

The RPF offensive produced a wave of roughly 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Almost 500,000 people had previously been displaced from northern Rwanda by fighting during the civil war. They had been temporarily housed in camps in Byumba Prefecture and elsewhere, and although some had returned to their homes with the signing of the July 1992 cease-fire, many remained in these camps. The total IDP population in Rwanda now swelled to almost 900,000. As Anne Macintosh, OXFAM U.K.'s country representative, later noted, this was the first of a series of disaster records that Rwanda was to set: the flood of IDPs in February 1993 was the largest, fastest displacement the humanitarian agencies had ever seen.

The efforts of international NGOs to support sustainable economic and social development in Rwanda - as well as those efforts, such as they were, to build up the capacity of Rwandan society to resist an escalation of violence - were then put on hold to meet the desperate needs of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. All the international agencies scrambled to respond to these needs.

The international community's response to the IDP crisis was somewhat slow to get off the ground, but once moving was coordinated and effective. MSF was characteristically first on the scene, providing emergency health and sanitation services to several camps just north of Kigali. MSF asked OXFAM to provide water in three camps which held 95,000 people in total, not 15 kilometers from Kigali. OXFAM fulfilled its specialty niche: John Howard, a water engineer, flew out to Kigali to provide portable water systems and get them running; once operational, they were handed over to MSF and CARE. During the process of setting up water systems in these three main camps, the NGOs were informed of the existence of other camps near Murambi. In the end, NGOs collaborated on servicing a total of eleven camps.

From an operational perspective, the international NGO community successfully moved from development to emergency relief modes of operation. Response time was perhaps not what it might have been, but it was sufficient to the task. The needs of the IDPs were ably met, especially when the numbers eased somewhat at the end of March, with the signing of the Kinihara Cease-fire and the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ), which covered the RPF's territorial advances. The cease-fire and establishment of a DMZ allowed many IDPs to return home. This did not entirely end their reliance on humanitarian assistance, however, and CARE and other NGOs began work on providing the returnees with seeds, agricultural implements, and other necessary materials to regenerate economic activity in the area. In general terms, the NGO response to the IDPs was considered technically highly successful.

Why Did Early Warning Fail?

The technical excellence of the international NGO community in responding to the humanitarian emergency ironically diminished its focus on the signals which now began to grow about the plan for a genocide. The 'quantity' of NGO engagement with Rwandan society grew during this period, but - from a political perspective - the 'quality' declined.

The impact of the IDP crisis was to shift attention and resources away from traditional development activities. More innovative programs tackling issues that were likely to escalate the conflict - such as OXFAM's ENVD - were largely displaced by relief activities. Development programs did not stop, but no longer did these have the full attention of the NGO's staff, whose energies, especially at the country director level, were increasingly geared to the management of the emergency operations. Although most agencies ran separate emergency teams, these nevertheless in most cases reported to the same country representative. These were among the most experienced people, whose attention might otherwise have been focused on the worsening political climate.

This diversion of energy and focus to emergency operations had a paradoxical impact. Most agencies began to loose track of the political situation in Rwanda at this critical time. This shift in attention away from the political context was tragic and paradoxical, paradoxical because emergency operations brought three things which should have enhanced NGOs' capacity to track and analyze political events - money, access to information, and a wider scope of movement within Rwanda - though that movement was sometimes curtailed when the regime imposed travel restrictions in areas where political violence was manifest. Instead, the emergency shifted NGOs into a mode of operations which, while it did not prevent them from 'hearing' what was going on in the populations with whom they were working with, focused their energies on other elements of their work, particularly the delivery of large volumes of relief supplies.

Before the IDP crisis, most international NGOs in Rwanda had fairly limited movement in Rwanda. This was not a function of insecurity, although in the north of the country insecurity was something of an issue. For the most part, NGOs restricted their own movements in the sense that few traveled outside the areas where they had specific programs. Their familiarity with conditions in the country was generally dominated by the settings of their development projects. Caritas was exceptional, with projects across the country.

The sudden onset of emergency conditions in February 1993 began to change these conditions. Suddenly, NGOs who had projects in just one region of the country were now responding in a much wider territory, and traversed the entire country in fulfillment of operational demands. Their access to RPF held territory was also at this time considerably enhanced, with reseeding and other programs getting underway in the zone. Moreover, NGOs suddenly found themselves with large budgets and good access to UN and diplomatic sources of information. Whereas in 1992, money for basic equipment was scarce, by March 1993 funding for even such expensive items as cars and trucks was no longer a problem. Even more important, from a mapping and intelligence perspective, NGO country directors (CDs) began to find themselves included in the first circles of information sharing. One CD who had previously had access, only occasionally, to second-secretary level diplomats and low level UN staff, now had access to the UN heads of agencies and the first-secretaries of the various chanceries, both key political analysts and information conduits.

Yet the combination of money, information, and physical access to the country did not result in an enhancement of NGOs' political analysis or monitoring of the likelihood of escalation. First, NGO personnel simply lacked time and energy. The management of emergency programs sapped time and focus away from both development programming and political analysis not only for those directly involved in delivering relief, but equally for the rest of the development community. According to CDs in Kigali at the time, and the managers to whom they reported in headquarters in the west, NGOs' knowledge of pre-1993 Rwanda was 'displaced' in the race to respond quickly to crisis conditions.

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The second reason for this loss of 'intelligence' was that in virtually all NGOs, emergency operations are run by expatriates flown in on short notice to meet relief needs. Expatriates coordinate with other expatriates to provide specialist services in water supply, distribution, health, and social services. These expatriates certainly hire large numbers of local staff, often from within the communities they are servicing. In contrast to development programs, however, these local staff are for the most part used in technical capacities, implementing programs designed by international experts. Local staff become less central in the development of programming. Little in the style of emergency response by most NGOs promotes sustained dialogue with the local community whose needs are being met. Relief programmes are usually pre-conceived and pre-packaged, often literally so. These standard operating procedures allow relief agencies to respond quickly and efficiently to crisis which break at undetermined times in unspecified places, and clearly help save many lives. They do, however, tend to distance the NGOs from the lives and politics of the communities in which they are operating. 1993 saw a substantial growth in the expatriate population of Kigali and a commensurate decline in the meaningful contact between NGOs and local partners and peoples. This phenomenon was less pronounced for NGOs which used their development staff in country to run their emergency operations, CARE among them, and most strikingly pronounced for those NGOs which relied on separate emergency teams flown in for the purpose.

This shift from development programming to emergency relief, with its important but unintended consequences, started with the IDP crisis and escalated when refugees from Burundi fled mass killings in that country in October 1993. Many of these went to southern Rwanda, and the shift to emergency footing in Rwanda was complete. Not only did the NGOs already present in Rwanda augment their emergency operations to deal with the influx, more NGOs arrived in the country to lend a hand, most with no experience in the region, let alone Rwanda. The transformation of the NGO presence in Rwanda from one largely doing development work, with substantial contact with the local population, to one dominated by large international relief programmes run by expatriates, was now complete. According to many Rwandans, and a number of seasoned international observers, this shift had the character of "an invasion of the kids" - a reference to the youth and inexperience of many emergency staff.

The loss of sensitivity to the local situation that the shift to emergency mode occasioned could not have come at a worse time. The months following the IDP crisis (March through October of 1993) were arguably the decisive moment in the struggle between those forces in Rwanda who sought to contain violence through negotiation and institution building, and those who sought to undermine the institutions and processes of peace with a massive escalation of violence. It was at this stage that extremist forces in Kigali began to realize that they were on a losing course, both on the battlefield and around the negotiating table, and started to pay serious attention to developing a radical alternative. The groundwork for a genocide was laid at this time, right under the noses of NGOs and other international actors.

Ironically, many of the young men who later joined the forces of genocide - recruited into extremist youth militias - came from the camps which NGOs were providing with emergency relief. The experience of repeated displacement (aid workers estimated that some Rwandans had been displaced 4 or 5 times before April 1994) created deep reserves of fear and ill will among this population, as did revenge atrocities which the RPF committed at this time (Ndiaye 1993, Prunier 1995). Looking back on the experience of responding to the IDPs, a senior ICRC official lamented the lost opportunity to see into this window on what was happening in Rwanda. One can only speculate on what might have been done differently had a more sensitive ear been attuned to this population in 1993.

V. Conclusion

1. The Failure of Early Warning

The story of early warning of the Rwandan genocide from international development and relief NGOs is easy to tell: there was none. This is not to say that NGOs were unaware of a generalized decline in order and security in Kigali, or were unaware of escalating atrocities in the countryside during 1992 and 1993. It is to say, however, that no NGO, international or local, development or human rights, foresaw the escalation of what was in fact a low-level civil war into one of the most intense killing episodes of the century.

NGOs were not alone in their failure to anticipate the genocide. No institution of the international community accurately predicted the unfolding of events in Rwanda. Some particularly prescient individual analysts, whose full-time job it was to interpret political developments, did better: Steve Browning of the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania correctly argued as early as 1993 that the Arusha Accords would meet large scale violent resistance in Kigali; Michel Moussali of the UNHCR predicted a bloodbath; and a CIA officer produced a desk-analysis which drew a worst case scenario of over half a million dead. Most importantly, General Romeo Dallaire of UNAMIR relayed evidence of plans for a genocide to the UN in New York in January 1994. Unfortunately, this cable had little impact in the office of the Secretary General. But as institutions whose function it is to assess the likelihood of political change and escalation to violence, neither the CIA, nor the State Department, nor any branch of the UN anticipated what was to come.

We began by arguing that NGOs should have some specific advantages in the capacity to provide early warning. Whereas the UN and diplomatic communities are remote from the situation on the ground, girded in capital cities and talking only to government sources, NGOs are in the field and talking to local actors, interacting with the communities most directly affected by the likelihood of violence. Most important, NGOs can communicate with local actors in their own language, and to a certain extent from within their own culture, through links to local actors in civil society. These structural features, it is argued, should allow NGOs to 'hear' early warning signals which would not reach the ears of diplomats or UN agencies.

The Rwanda experience does not support this argument. In Rwanda, a number of local actors and community groups spoke 'good words' to NGOs in French, and simultaneously participated in the planning of the genocide in Kinyarwanda.³ Despite the fact that they were in touch and collaborating with Rwandans throughout the society, NGOs gleaned no insights which gave them any form of early warning of potential or actual escalation. Moreover, NGOs delivered relief supplies to tens of thousands of men who would later participate in the genocide militias, without learning anything about the development of that movement.

We argued that the failure is explained in large part by the shift to emergency operations, with its attendant increased role for expatriates and its 'off-the-shelf' nature. If this shift is one of the explanatory variables, it has important consequences. Crises rarely arise without prior tension and violence; they build up in stages and as these stages escalate, NGOs increasingly shift into emergency operations, reducing their sensitivity to local political conditions. *The NGO experience in Rwanda suggests that as the in-country situation becomes more intense, the likelihood of NGOs being able to capture early warnings diminishes, just when this capacity is most needed.*

2. The Counterfactual Arguments

We have argued that the shift from development programming to emergency relief helped to blind those seasoned NGO personnel and reduced the likelihood of early warning of escalation in violence. This argument runs up against two important caveats. First, if this argument is correct, it is useful for policy only

³ Kinyarwanda speakers among the NGO community were (and are) few and far between.

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if the NGOs in Rwanda could have refrained from switching their focus to emergency relief once the number of displaced persons began to climb, or if they could have retained at least some focus on the political context in which emergency relief was being delivered. The first is highly unlikely; NGOs would not refuse to provide emergency assistance to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.

The second is more likely, but would require explicit changes in standard operating procedures. NGOs, deeply engaged in emergency relief, working under intense time pressure, would nevertheless have to commit to monitor closely the local political context, share that information and analysis with other NGOs in the field, and communicate their analyses back to headquarters. Despite the real difficulties in dividing attention - and resources - this way, it is overwhelmingly in the interest of the NGO community to do so. NGOs in Rwanda were affected quickly, adversely, and dramatically by the escalation of mass violence and by the genocide. It is essential that NGOs engaged in emergency relief retain some of their connection to the local communities they have served in more placid times. It is that connection to local communities, familiarity with local culture, and proficiency in local languages that is the most important asset of the NGO community for all the different kinds of work it does. This asset is also a vital resource for effective early warning.

Second, our argument implies that had the NGOs continued to do largely development work, they would have enhanced their capacity to provide early warning of the likelihood of mass violence. While this counterfactual is in and of itself not difficult to sustain, the critical question is whether this enhanced capacity would have been sufficient? On this point, the evidence is at best ambiguous; indeed, one can be deeply skeptical of this counterfactual. The contact development workers had with the local population had not bridged the communication gap which had existed before the RPF invasion. Not enough NGO staff, as we have seen, were proficient in local languages, and not enough were sensitive to local cultures and the importance of oral traditions. To be effective as early warners, NGOs in Rwanda would have had to be truer to the stylized version of an NGO we presented at the beginning: rooted in local cultures, connected to local communities, and sensitive to traditions.

The evidence Rwanda allows only a tentative and speculative argument about the capacity of NGOs to provide early warning. The NGO community would have had to:

- maintain and deepen its connection with local communities throughout the emergency which sapped its energies and preoccupied its leadership; and
- to understand the importance of early warning, the high value of the assets they had, and their capacity to contribute to international processes of early warning.

Had all these conditions held, paradoxically, the greater resources that poured in in 1993 for emergency relief could have been used in part to monitor the changing political context at least as intensively as in 1992. In other words, the switch to emergency relief need not necessarily have involved a reduction in attention to the political context which, after all, would be critical to the work of the NGO community. Under these conditions, it is possible, but far from certain, that more of what was happening in Rwandan society may have filtered through to NGOs; a partially deaf ear tuned to a signal is better than no ear at all. The large international institutions had almost no ear at all.

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Early Warning and Information: The Role of ReliefWeb

Sharon Rusu¹ United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

Where is the Life we have lost in living? Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

T. S. Eliot The Rock

If the current humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes has taught us anything, it is that we do not have an effective international system for intervention in humanitarian emergencies. Following the previous crisis in Rwanda in 1994, lessons learned stressed the need for an early warning system whose warnings would result in the initiation of appropriate responses on behalf of those displaced by conflict and coercion. How do the current policy-oriented appropriate top warning support or hinder the humanitarian community in transcending what has been described as the dilemma of humanitarism in the 90's? This paper will comment on several current approaches with a view to as the difference of ReliefWeb, a global information system developed and maintained by UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs as part of its efforts in early warning.

Introduction

The current debate in respect of models and approaches to early warning, conflictanagement, conflict prevention and resolution is as many-sided as the emergencies against which it attempts to define and evaluate itself. This debate is only part of the complex equation of humanitarianism in the 90s in which the key issues derive from the changing context of humanitarian action. Legal aspects notwithstanding, the major issues today relate to "impartiality, reconciling humanitarianism and human rights, possible prolongation of wars, accountability of humanitarian organizations, humanitarian problems of international economic sanctions, humanitarian assistance and development assistance as rivals, armed protection of humanitarian workers, and legal protection for peacekeeping forces and humanitarian workers".²

¹ Sharon Rusu is Head, Information Services and Dissemination Section, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva. The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the United Nations.

² A. Roberts, "Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in a policy vacuum", Adelphi Paper 305, Oxford University Press, 1996, 51. Roberts examines "key issues" in relation to one of his central arguments that "... The adoption by states and international bodies of the banner of humanitarian action was associated with a policy vacuum, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda being the prime examples... Faced with complex conflicts... (h)umanitarian action may continue, sadly, to be a substitute for long-term policies and difficult strategic

The situation in Eastern Zaire exemplifies all these key issues. For many relief agencies today, the ethical and political dimensions of the delivery of relief are increasingly problematic. In this regard, the roles and mandates of relief organizations are up for public and private scrutiny. The charges are wide-ranging: some claim that relief is big business without which many relief agencies would lose their growing profit base, while others hold that relief is equally abused by the perpetrators of conflict as well as those unwilling to risk involvement in the sovereign affairs of states where conflicts are raging or waiting to implode. One outcome of this complex situation is that relief agencies are now in a position to make judgements and influence outcomes in ways far beyond their traditional roles.³

In the face of criticism, many relief agencies have expressed their concern that "humanitarianism is the scapegoat for failed political solutions. . .particularly so where there is a lack of political will to find solutions on the part of the international community and the governments concerned"⁴ The politicization of humanitarian effort is one of the major issues facing the international community today. The dilemma for relief agencies is how to assist those at risk without compounding the crisis and finding themselves scapegoats of conflicting and rival prerogatives.. Commenting on this phenomenon in the case of Somalia, Gérard Prunier makes the point that

[e]conomic aid should be channelled to criteria of internal performance, with a premium going to those areas where political leaders arrive at some form of agreement, even if very imperfect, and aid should be withheld from fighting areas. By providing help to the refugees at some distance from the disturbed areas, it would be possible to assist those in need, while avoiding a return to the appalling exploitation of the UN by the militias during 1992-1994.⁵

Unfortunately, we are unable to live and work in retrospect. If this were possible, we might be in different circumstances than those in which we find ourselves in Eastern Zaire. Today, the conflict continues, complicated by shifting alliances, regional culpability and instability. The humanitarian community must balance the delivery of assistance, within zones of conflict, to a mixed group of belligerents and civilians, refugees and IDPs, against the need to reintegrate nearly one million persons in Rwanda while avoiding manipulation by one side or the other. In this regard, history offers little solace as it readily reminds us that this area of Eastern Zaire has had its share of protracted conflicts, with devastating regional implications, that continue to this day.

Early Warning: The Debate

If the current humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes has taught us anything, it is that we do not have an effective international system for intervention in humanitarian emergencies. Following the previous

decisions."(80)

³ A. de Waal, *Humanitarianism Unbound*, as quoted in "Understanding the Great Lakes Crisis", a report on the conference convened by ACTIONAID in Nairobi, Kenya, 1996.

⁴ ACTIONAID, "Understanding the Great Lakes Crisis", a report on the International Conference convened by ACTIONAID, Nairobi, December 1996, 31.

⁵ G. Prunier, "Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal (1990-1995)", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol 15, No.1, Oxford University Press, 1996, 85.

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crisis in Rwanda in 1994, lessons learned exercises stressed the need for an early warning system whose warnings would result in the initiation of appropriate responses on behalf of those displaced by conflict and coercion.⁶ Most observers and practitioners even agree on the role of such a system; that it should be designed around objectives which are the result of cooperation and coordinated action among a range of actors. Most also agree that the coordinated short term action strategies that have characterized international intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda are not enough to support the new challenges resulting from ever-increasingly complex emergencies.

The question of whether it is simply early warning that is needed or the political will to initiate political action at the highest levels within the UN and among states, is equally relevant here. Despite the work being done in the UN, national governments and at the regional level to develop mechanisms for early warning of conflicts, prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflicts, we still lack real consensus on how to get broader participation in global-scale decision-making.⁷ One solution, suggested by Andrew Cottey, relies on the development of "approaches which are less dependent on the short-term attention and narrow interests of particular states and governments". He further adds that "strengthened international organizations, whose action does not always depend on the active support of governments, are one way forward".⁸

Others would conclude that as a result of recent developments in the UN system and at regional levels "a humanitarian early warning system [for the delivery of emergency aid] is in place, but a conflict management one is not".⁹ And still others would add that "the debate on early warning has not yet moved forward to deal with the issue of the process link between early warning analysis and effective preventive action".¹⁰ Or that preventive action must be an integral part of early warning, "to address the issue of preventing large-scale conflicts and bloodshed....[by way of] a quick and effective procedure for bringing impending violent situations to the attention of the security council".¹¹

⁶ H. Adelman, and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management". Study 2. *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen, 1996, 80. Adelman and Suhrke posit that early warning was less critical in Rwanda than the willingness to respond. The failure to respond adequately, however, was influenced by poor and unsystematized systems for the collection and analysis of available data that resulted in a failure to translate what was available into effective and strategic plans for action."Information and analysis [are] critical, the authors argue, not only in anticipating a crisis, but in determining the appropriate response in a particular situation".

⁷ P. Brecke, "What Stirs Concern is What Might Need to be Done," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 39, Supplement 2, October, 1995, 321-3.

⁸ A. Cottey, "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention," *Refuge*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Toronto, 1995, 12.

⁹ H. Adelman, "Difficulties in Early Warning Networking and Conflict Management", Revised version of a paper prepared for the Symposium on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Clingendael, The Netherlands, November, 1996, 56.

¹⁰ J. Cockell, "Draft Early Warning Analysis Framework", Peacebuilding and Democratic Division, Globlal Issues Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, August, 1996, 1.

¹¹ K. Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda, eds., "Introduction", *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1992. Rupesinghe views preventive action as integral to early warning and links the two with preventive diplomacy. He further takes the view that preventive action needs to be based on "comprehensive"

How do the current approaches in early warning support or hinder broader participation in humanitarian action, especially conflict prevention and management? This paper comments on some of these issues with a view to setting the context for an assessment of the role of ReliefWeb and early warning. ReliefWeb is a global information system developed and maintained by UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs as part of its efforts in early warning and emergency response.

Early Warning Approaches

As Adam Roberts points out, "an early warning system is only relevant if there is also an early action system."¹² The problem is that early action is contingent upon transcending the limitations imposed by overlapping UN agency mandates; conflicting agency cultures; political pressures; sovereign interests; the capacity of an already overburdened system to respond and the constraints against early action are but some of the most obvious. From where, one asks, can such action emanate?¹³

Albeit not a direct response to the question, one option is to develop approaches that strengthen the international capacity to respond. In this regard, strengthening international organizations and regional organizations is surely relevant, and several recent attempts have already been made within the UN system and new initiatives are in process. The Department of Political Affairs, for example, works closely with UNDHA (the UN agency mandated to provide early warnings to the UN system) in preparing analyses of "hot spots" for the Office of the Secretary-General. In addition, alerts on impending disasters are regularly issued from many other areas within the UN system. International organizations like the ICRC and the IFRC and a number of NGOs including Amnesty International, International Alert in London and the International Crisis Group in Washington also issue regular country reports and alerts.

In Europe, the Office of the High Commissioner for Minorities is mandated to collect information about the situation of national minorities, discuss relevant issues concerning minorities with interested parties and, where appropriate, promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between them. His mandate includes the issuance of early warnings to the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE.¹⁴ Over time, the High Commissioner has begun to make significant interventions which have had a direct impact on the prevention of potential or escalating ethnic conflicts and encouraged standard-setting in respect of human rights and the protection of minorities.

As part of the development of early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms in Africa, the OAU is developing regional strategies which place emphasis on the importance of empowering NGOs and civil societies in the work of conflict prevention, resolution and peace building. Still, such efforts as those of the

contingency plans for entire regions of conflict" and that regional bodies "may prove better equipped [than States or the UN] to deal with [the prevention of conflicts] at an early stage"(xvii).

¹² Roberts, above note 2, 77. Roberts posits that early warning is "a key element in any organisation's response to challenges. . . [especially when] it can assist efforts to prevent crises, for example through diplomatic initiatives. . .However, early warning also has a role in the prompt and efficient delivery of humanitarian relief. Furthermore, an efficient system of warning has a crucial role to play in the perceived fairness of any system of relief".

¹³ G. Ramcharan, "Early Warning in the United Nations Grand Strategy", Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, Kuroda and Rupesinghe, eds., St Martin's Press, New York, 1992, 188.

¹⁴ G. Gilbert, "Prevention: The Best Early Warning", *International Journal of Refugee Law*, No 9 (forthcoming in 1997). Gilbert offers an examination of the early warning and conflict prevention aspects of the mandate of the High Commissioner for Minorities and linkages with early warning and prevention mechanisms elsewhere.

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OSCE and OAU must be seen against the backdrop of certain realities. Again, there are limits to such efforts, similar to those posed by efforts over years in the area of preventive diplomacy. Strengthening international organizations alone is not enough. The challenge lies in successfully preventing conflict or its escalation with countries in the throes of economic and political instability, or on the verge of or already engulfed in conflict. One option lies in what Kumar Rupesinghe and John Cockell view as the need to link early warning approaches with options for preventive action. Howard Adelman takes this one step further in suggesting that "early warning [should be] concerned with prevention, mitigation, [and] management of the conflicts that produce. . .humanitarian emergencies".¹⁵

Obviously, at the level of the UN having an arrangement in place that would allow for the systematic

review by, for example, the Security Council of information provided by a more global effort through the Office of the Secretary-General would go a long way to overcoming some of the shortcomings of the current arrangement. In this regard, a recent initiative, dubbed the "Somovia Formula", after Ambassador Juan Somovia of Chile, has resulted in a first-ever consultation with NGOs and the Security Council on the current crisis in the Great Lakes. According to Global Policy Forum, the hope is that such an initiative will enable NGOs who are active in conflict areas to regularly brief the Security Council.¹⁶

Another positive option emerged as a result of the "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, and calls upon the UN Security Council to establish a Humanitarian Sub-Committee 'to inform fully the Security Council of developments and concerns regarding the humanitarian dimensions of complex

More than part of the answer lies in the mobilization of the ideas and resources of all having an emergencies'."17 interest--the UN, States, NGOs and international organizations--to engage in a complementarity of planning and implementation of progressive approaches. Such approaches would be based on strengthening policy and implementation of sublightering policy and practice in early warning, conflict prevention, management and resolution. In this regard, why not have a forum within the UN system for early warning as there is now for peacekeeping and human rights? As G. Ramcharan states:

One of the problems in the development of an integrated early warning system is that there is still no central forum where the constituency for early warning can marshall its resources and stimulate policies and strategies. In the case of peacekeeping for example, there is the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and the Special Political Committed of the United Nations General Assembly. . . [for] human rights, there is a Commission on Human Rights, varying human rights organs and the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. While there are some specialized fora that deal with specific aspects of early warning, there is no general forum where the efforts of member states, non-governmental organizations and the Secretariat can come together in a creative manner for the nurturing of early warning and preventive arrangements. . . .[Additionally], until the Security Council develops some arrangements for reviewing the global situation systematically, and for acting on information

¹⁵ Adelman, above note 8, 3.

¹⁶ J. Paul, "Historic Security Council Consultation with Humanitarian NGOs", Global Policy Forum, (WWW.globalpolicy.org) 12 February 1997.

¹⁷ Roberts, above note 2, 61.

presented it by the Secretary-General, the Security Council would really not be in a position to offer much for the time being in the form of early warning and preventive action.¹⁸

Interestingly, Ramcharan's statement predates the now UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs which has the mandate for early warning of complex emergencies. Who should lead on such initiatives is an open question. Despite various attempts within the UN, there is still no single agency or identifiable mechanism for the systematic reporting of alerts to the variety of actors required to mobilize a global response. Further, the nature and extent of the range of approaches just discussed speaks to the lack of a systemic approach and the reluctance of decision makers in relevant fora, including the United Nations, to pay more than lip service to early warning initiatives.¹⁹ Indeed, the reaction on the diplomatic side to the recent consultation of NGOs with the Security Council mentioned earlier was that "no concrete action would be envisaged [on the basis of the NGO recommendations] until France and the United States decide to move."²⁰ How, we ask, can this continue in the light of recent and continuing humanitarian emergencies?

The answer, in part, lies in what the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda report identified as a system that does not know what its objectives are. In this regard, a number of contributing factors were identified, including the lack of specialized information units in the field; the need for methods of priorizing by human rights monitors in order to bring significant attention and resources to bear on important cases; the necessity to link early warning with contingency preparedness; and the fact that the UN system effectively lost its capacity to analyse early warning information when it disbanded the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Other units tasked to take on the role formerly played by ORCI are too operational in focus to act as the central repository for the kind of "soft intelligence" needed to generate early warning signals for contingency planning in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. Add to all this, the cloak of secrecy and self-interest that continues to permeate national and international fora in respect of humanitarian assistance and response, and you begin to understand why there has been little significant progress in relating early warning to early action.²¹

Information and Early Warning

No discussion on early warning approaches from policy and practice through methodologies (historical analysis through quantitative modelling and econometrics) is complete without reference to the central role played by information. This discussion on early warning approaches and the early warning to early action dilemma leads to two suppositions: new, integrated global approaches are required to link early warning with early action; and, no single organization has the capacity or resources to collect, analyse and disseminate the information required to serve this purpose in today's complex emergencies. To this may be added a third. Information without analysis is, as the popular advertisement goes, "like an orange without sunshine." Still, analysis alone is not enough. Truly informing the decision making process requires the

¹⁸ G. Ramcharan, above note 13, 188.

¹⁹ S. Rusu, "Early Warning: Much Ado About Nothing"? *Refuge*, Vol.15, No. 4, Refugee Studies Centre, York University, Toronto, 1996, 9.

²⁰ Paul, above note 16.

²¹ D. Millwood, ed., "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience," Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Standberg Grafisk, Odense, 1995.

formulation of strategic options directed at preventive action. Though active intervention is not guaranteed thereafter, the options for it are at least more clearly articulated. This development alone has the potential to encourage standard-setting, transparency, information exchange and, confidence in the sources and analysis of the information. Most importantly, it permits all-important challenge; still a novel idea in most decision making today.²²

Thus, what is needed on the information side, is a network for the collection and exchange of information which is the basis for analysis and the formulation of strategic options. Such a network derives from and is linked to various preventive action mechanisms at the grassroots, regional, national and international levels.²³ Inter-independent networks could provide the base and framework for the provision of a system of alerts linked to the development of strategic policy options for decision makers resulting in a *de facto* potential for galvanizing response. Recent writing and discussions led by Kumar Rupesinghe, Director, International Alert, have focussed on conflict prevention, intervention and resolution under "multi-track" approaches in which information collection and analysis play an integral role.

To move the analysis forward, a working definition of early warning in the context of an interindependent network approach is required. And here, early warning may be defined as the ability to collect and analyse information in the interests of providing strategic options for preventive action or, as may be required, informed response.²⁴

This definition relates directly to the structure and function essential to an effective information system for early warning. Additional features include those elements that today's information practitioners and networkers regard as standards for efficient information management: standardization of existing networks and exchange mechanisms; reliable, verifiable, and timely analysis of political and domestic situations; major actors and vulnerable groups; use of information technology for rapid dissemination; frequent updates and linkages with field operations; and informed analysis that provides policy options to a wide range of influential decision makers. Obviously, the principles informing such a structure are those related to the production of alerts of the highest quality and verifiability.

Why are such standards important? They are essential to accuracy, quick access, timeliness, verifiability, credibility and communication. Without these no system can gain the authority required and confidence of those which it should inform. For those with the experience of meeting the challenges involved in mass relief programmes, the need for standards that ensure the dissemination of accurate information is vital. Having access to information in a standard format plays a major role in the verification of events. Such standards inform and direct information networking, exchange and development thereby acting as the base

²³ Adelman, above note 9, 49. The author argues that the development of a systematic approach to networking for the exchange of information central to an early warning alert system is perhaps more important than attempts to derive an authoritative base of information from any single set of indicators or signals.

²⁴ Adelman, above note 9, 54. In a lengthy endnote, the author explores various definitions of early warning from the "most simplistic" through detection, information sharing, situation monitoring and communication of an alert; analysis and communication, to the view of K. Rupesinghe that "preventive action is an integral part of early warning" and, finally, to the view of G. Ramcharan, "who continues to distinguish early warning from preventive diplomacy". The author's view is that "information sharing, analysis, and developing strategic options are the three necessary ingredients and that early warning is neither a mechanical alarm system on the analog of a smoke detection system for fires, nor at the other extreme, does it entail the response itself." For further definitions of early warning as it relates to the development of indicators and timely responses regarding movements of persons, Cf L.Gordenker (1992, Kuroda and Rupesinghe, eds., 2) and J. Dedring (1992, Ibid., 200).

²² S. Rusu, "The Role of The Collector in Early Warning", International Journal of Refugee Law, Special Issue — September, 1990, Oxford University Press, 69.

for early warning structures that support active prevention activities as well as those related to conflict resolution and rehabilitation.²⁵

Putting such standards into practice has long been the challenge for information networks that cover a wide range of humanitarian assistance and response activities, such as refugee protection, human rights monitoring, relief assistance and development. These networks see clearly the link between early warning and early action in their development of effective information tools and exchange mechanisms. In fact, it was out of a clear desire to mobilize the efforts of all such information gathering activities within the UN, and among NGOs and governments that brought together a group of UN, government, NGO and academics in the autumn of 1994 to look at ways of developing a decentralized, public access, global information management system that met the emergency preparedness and response information needs of the international humanitarian assistance community. In other words, what this group saw as necessary was an information system that would respond to relief in a larger and more comprehensive manner than in the past. After several discussions, the group asked the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs to undertake the development of such a system, and ReliefWeb is the result.

ReliefWeb and Early Warning

ReliefWeb is not in itself an early warning system. Rather, it is a tool to enhance information management and access to reliable information. Its purpose is to strengthen the response capacity of the humanitarian relief community through the timely provision of reliable information on prevention, preparedness and disaster response. Its importance lies in effective information management which features twice daily publishing of reliable information in standard formats. Strongly supportive of the principle of information-sharing, ReliefWeb management actively promotes networking to ensure renewal of its repository of emergency-related information. This repository is continuously updated with systematically transmitted reports from relevant sources. In addition, ReliefWeb offers links to a range of related sources without the user having to leave the site.

As the "newest kid on the block", it joins other such systems which include: for agriculture, the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food (GIEWS); for atomic radiation, the WMO/IAEA Convention of Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents; for the environment, the UN System-wide Earthwatch; for disasters, HazardNet; for geophysical concerns, the International Tsunami Warning System (ITWS) and the Global Volcanism Network; for health, the Epidemiological Early Warning System (EEWS); for humanitarian problems, the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS); for meteorological issues, the World Weather Watch (WWW) Programme; for refugees and mass population movements, the Global Early Warning System (GEWS) for Displaced Persons and EAWarn, the ethnological monitoring network in the former Soviet Union. There are other initiatives, of course, including many currently on the Internet like UNHCR's REFWORLD and the databases of the ICRC, IFRC, and WHO as well as countless interest groups who share ideas and information.²⁶

Given the plethora of other efforts, what need is served by yet another online information system? And how, if it does not issue alerts *per se*, is ReliefWeb even remotely connected to early warning? To paraphrase two old adages:

²⁵ S. Rusu, above note 19, 69.

²⁶ S. Rusu, "Migration and Refugees: Who's Afraid of Information? The Challenge of the Nineties", paper prepared for the 'Conference on Immigration and the European Union: Building on a Comprehensive Approach', organized by the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM) with the support of the European Commission, Athens, 26-29 June 1994, 13.

The early bird catches the worm, ...and... The spider which spins its web at night will catch the fly in the morning

To prevent complex humanitarian emergencies or, if impossible, to respond rapidly, requires a carefully planned and executed global effort. Such efforts comprise many elements not the least of which is a comprehensive capacity in the field of information management and dissemination. No single system can achieve this alone. Again, we return to the notion of the need for an inter-independent network of information resources. The development of such resources ensures that pertinent and corroborated information and analysis are available when required; like the web constructed by the industrious spider.

Here, information systems are called for that support prevention, preparedness and response mechanisms. Information about root causes is critical background for planning preventive actions and for more effective responses if and when movements and displacement occur. In addition, information for the resolution of pre- and post-conflict situations is crucial to addressing long-term solutions and ensuring remedies for the dispossessed. Only information that is reliable and timely will provide the sufficient, solid base for informed decision-making. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of early warning.²⁷

Advantages of ReliefWeb

ReliefWeb's policies and practice are based on the principles of reliability, credibility, timeliness, corroboration and challenge. Full source citation is required for all information and analysis hosted by ReliefWeb. This permits the user to judge the reliability of the document and the credibility of the source. ReliefWeb actively recruits information partners and supports information networks and networking practices. This practice builds relationships and supports dialogue between information partners. The result is a rich base for the cross-fertilization of ideas and interactive planning. With its twice daily publishing capacity on the Internet and links to relevant sources from the UN family, NGOs, governments, academic institutions and the media, ReliefWeb serves as central focus for such an information network; a sort of clearinghouse for information on natural disasters and complex emergencies.²⁸ Its achievements since it was first fully operational in October 1996 include: information exchange agreements with 170 humanitarian agencies; growing multi-lingual capacity; in excess of 20,000 documents in full text; daily updates of current emergencies or natural disasters; access to a central repository of consolidated and organized information from a wide range of sources including geo-referenced maps, graphs of assistance and contributions to appeals; and a developing background section that will soon permit more in-depth research capabilities.

ReliefWeb offers links to other sites on the Internet. These linkages are increasingly not just simply to the central menu of another site, but deep inside the site. Effectively, they link document to relevant document, thereby opening the way to enhanced research potential. Also, linking concept and analysis allows for all-important comparison and contrast. Soon ReliefWeb will host the alerts and reports that will issue from a new initiative in early warning known as Forum on Early Warning and Emergency Response (FEWER). This initiative will act as the conduit through which the field research efforts of its member organizations are made available. In contrast to other efforts, FEWER reports will feature policy options for preventive action.

²⁷ S. Rusu, above note 26, 1.

²⁸ D. King, "ReliefWeb A New Information Management Tool for the International Humanitarian Community", article for a *Workshop on Risk Assessment and Early Warning*, University of Maryland, November, 1996, 4. King, currently ReliefWeb Information Manager, UNDHA, New York reviews the functionality and capacity of ReliefWeb as an information management tool for risk assessment and early warning.

Limitations

As stated earlier, ReliefWeb is not in itself an early warning system or a solution to information needs for early warning. Rather, it is part of a rapidly growing toolbox of systems and approaches that, if appropriately nurtured and networked, should yield us an encyclopaedic base of knowledge for planning and response. But is this not the problem? In "lessons learned" exercises following recent crises, the lament has been either, "there is too much information available" or, "the important documents providing situation updates are not available when needed". Still others believe that the fault is not so much at the level of information management, but in the lack of an "analytical framework" that would provide decision makers with interpretations of events and issues, thereby enhancing reflection on policy options.²⁹ The answer, in short, is there are no perfect systems.

That ReliefWeb is a nexus to publicly accessible sources where discrete information and analysis needs are increasingly met, is itself so compelling a notion that is not easily discounted. ReliefWeb apart, to do early warning requires access to an integrated network of well-managed resources for which there is wide and transparent access. Making information publicly available and holding agencies accountable for the information they provide, as ReliefWeb does, collapses the phenomenon of sole sources and reliance on secret or secured "intelligence" networks of the past. Such efforts can provide impetus for the highest political levels to take appropriate early action in the prevention and mitigation of disasters. It was as a result of the explosive growth of the Internet and the subsequent recognition of the limitations of single system approaches that ReliefWeb and other online initiatives were born. All this, despite the fact that the UN, major agencies and governments will continue to maintain and develop their own internal systems. Again, no single system can provide the information required to galvanize global effort to combat today's emergencies. But it is in all our best interests to recognize and work collectively to transcend current limitations.

Another of ReliefWeb's limitations lies in its lack of direct linkages to field operations. Internet connectivity is increasingly becoming available in regions where operational linkages are essential, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Azerbaijan, to name a few. The reality is it will be sometime before such links are operational (including technology and costs) in ways that will allow locals and field operations full access to the World Wide Web. The issue too has an ethical dimension. Many feel that the Internet is a Northern and Western construct that is simply being imposed, without dialogue and agreement, on the South. The question is, what options are available to ensure the development of effective interim systems while allowing for dialogue concerning future directions? The answer lies in using what is available. In Africa, where access to Internet is limited, information is exchanged and disseminated by e-mail networks like FIDONET, MANGO and PADISNET. Moreover, field operations are recognizing the need to make use of HF radio protocols for cheap and efficient communications. Harnessing these existing links is one way to address both equity and connectivity issues. Connectivity is a functional problem. The substantive challenge lies in collecting the information and establishing analytical capacity for rendering it useful. In this regard, active encouragement of the growth and development of information capacity at the regional level is essential. This can be partly achieved through promoting and resourcing regional institutions in information management techniques and new technologies in support of their work in conflict prevention, monitoring, developing civil societies and reconciliation.

Some Preliminary Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to review early warning approaches in the context of current events in humanitarian emergencies to evaluate the role of ReliefWeb. Clearly, the review of efforts to date concurs

²⁹ T. Gurr, "An Early Warning System for the United Nations: Internet or Not? A Conceptual Framework for Screening and Interpreting Information is Required", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 39, Supplement 2, October, 1995, 318-319.

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with the view that a functioning early warning system requires an early action capability. Relative to such capacity, new and integrated global approaches are required to link warning and action. When alarms are sounded, designated actors, *inter alia* governments and the UN system, must move quickly to respond in an agreed and coordinated manner. Further, no single organization has the capacity or resources to support the information requirements of the humanitarian community in early warning, prevention, preparedness and response. To mobilize relevant sectors at the international level requires the capacity to formulate strategic options directed at preventive action.

The development of information systems to support early warning, prevention, preparedness and rapid response requires an integrated approach that supports coordinated information networks. To ensure the systematic and rapid exchange of information between networks, standard formats and shared policy and practice approaches are requisite. How to achieve this in the context of diverse and competitive agency cultures is a major challenge.

Though not an early warning system, ReliefWeb is an integral part of new information approaches for early warning. Its clearinghouse role is vital to the growth of responsive networking. Its twice daily publishing capacity, public access to updates on ongoing emergencies and alerts to "hot spots"; as well as its requirement of full source citation for all its documents, make it a reliable foundation for the daily work both for desk officers and the more discrete needs of the academic. Though it does not in itself offer an analytic framework for the interpretation of situations and events, it does offer a point of departure for comparison with other points of view and linkages to the analysis of field-based networks like IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Network) in the Great Lakes. In this regard, ReliefWeb should be viewed as a central node in a growing network of information systems. Within this context, there is a great need to encourage the development of an inter-independent capacity within this network of systems. Such a network would then have the capacity to provide a solid information base that would allow for the cross-fertilization of knowledge and the exchange of information so vital to the evolution of early warning policy and practice.

Another challenge lies in galvanizing cooperation in the UN system. What is needed here is cooperation to support a forum for the exchange of early warning expertise and practice from various fora in both early warning and conflict prevention areas. At the same time, study and support of efforts that consolidate "lessons learned" from past endeavour are integral to the pursuit of new approaches to complex problems. Multi-track approaches to conflict prevention, intervention, reconciliation and rehabilitation are also required to ensure that regional bodies are appropriately resourced and sustained in ways consonant with good governance and solutions.

No single system is capable of achieving an information capacity of the magnitude required to support early warning efforts and the attendant needs that characterize the scope of today's humanitarian concerns. In the end, the problem is a human one. It is about people: about contributing in positive ways to the conditions that will permit every woman, man and child to live their lives in dignity and security. Unless we start now to forge a common purpose, we cannot begin to set the stage for the prevention of complex emergencies. Without cooperation and coordination of effort across the spectrum of potential responses, we will lose the moment and early warning will not be necessary.

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C. SYNERGY OF ANALYSES AND RESPONSES

The Paradox of Prevention: Successful Prevention Erases the Proof of its Success A Case for a New Ethic of Evaluation

Jean-H. Guilmette Office for Central and Eastern Europe Initiatives

Populations tend to become increasingly more conservative and risk adverse when it concerns the usage of tax revenues. The level of acceptable risk premium may vary from society to society of course, but there is always a measure of "non rational" decision taking. A critical question is: "how risk adverse is the general population when it judges the performance of its government, of its administration and its civil servant?" And conversely, "how deep a risk aversion runs in the bureaucracy? In the Government?" Consequently "How much of a risk premium is Parliament and the Administration ready to charge the taxpayers to avoid any possibility of errors leading to political embarrassment?" Or "how irrational has its behaviour become? The purpose of the following reflections is to attempt to decipher the specific "system of rationality" that has come to govern Foreign Affairs and Aid decisions in the recent past. Especially as they influence the decision taking for complex problems such as, for example, conflict prevention in Africa. I will first attempt to explain why prevention is difficult to undertake. I will show why managers refrain from taking high risk decisions after they have been subject to critical comments by evaluators and how they learn to cope in very specific manners: their selection of choices become increasingly more irrational. This is, of course, the contrary reaction expected by the evaluators whose primary intentions are to increase rationality in decision making. Among solutions that could be envisaged, one should spend some time assessing the impact and role that evaluation plays in the build-up of such increasing risk premiums. A new dimension must be added to the ethical code of evaluators which would take into consideration the direct effect of the evaluator's own behaviour."

In time of war, the stakes are so high that populations generally are willing to give great discretionary powers to governments and armies, allowing thus for risk taking, leading to both successes and losses. But in times of peace, populations tend to become increasingly more conservative and risk adverse' when it concerns the usage of tax revenues. The level of acceptable risk premium may vary from society to society of course, but there is always a measure of "non rational" decision taking.

A critical question is: "how risk adverse is the general population when it judges the

Definition of risk adverse and risk premium:

A group of people is offered two choices: choice one: each will receive \$100. or, choice two, at the draw of a coin each will get \$200 for head or nothing if its tail. Individual who choose the first alternative are defined as "risk adverse people". Subsequently, we measure the depth of risk aversion by introducing a risk premium i.e. the cost each risk adverse individual is prepared to pay to avoid risk. Each will be offered \$75. vs a 50/50 chance of earning either \$200 or \$0.00. In this case the risk premium is valued at \$25. Mathematically, the first test will yield equal results on the long term. In that sense it is equivalent; however, paying a risk premium is not an optimal choice. It is not then define as a "rational decision"; unrelated, emotional factors come to play in what should remain essentially a measurable dilemma.

performance of its government, of its administration and its civil servant?" And conversely, "how deep a risk aversion runs in the bureaucracy? In the Government?" Consequently "How much of a risk premium is Parliament and the Administration ready to charge the taxpayers to avoid any possibility of errors leading to political embarrassment?" Or "how irrational has its behaviour become?

This is not a moot point in conflict prevention or in any long term preventive activity, as it constrains the capacity of any government to deal with anticipated problems and crisis.

In today's context, decision taking in the Federal Government is increasingly biased in favour of risk adverse decisions, and the risk premium which is considered acceptable can be very high at times. In that sense, we cannot characterize the decision making process as "rational". Fears of public criticism, when factored in, may lead to the search of "ultimate error and risk free" decisions as rare an entity as the Unicorn.

The purpose of the following reflections is to attempt to decipher the specific "system of rationality" that has come to govern Foreign Affairs and Aid decisions in the recent past. Especially as they influence the decision taking for complex problems such as, for example, conflict prevention in Africa.

I will first attempt to explain why prevention is difficult to undertake. I will show why managers refrain from taking high risk decisions after they have been subject to critical comments by evaluators and how they learn to cope in very specific manners: their selection of choices become increasingly more irrational. This is, of course, the contrary reaction expected by the evaluators whose primary intentions are to increase rationality in decision making.

Among solutions that could be envisaged, one should spend some time assessing the impact and role that evaluation plays in the build-up of such increasing risk premiums. Game analysts would suggest we move out of what is now a very bad "prisoner dilemma" toward the somewhat more efficient "rational pigs"² A new dimension must be added to the ethical code of evaluators which would take into consideration the direct effect of the evaluator's own behaviour.

Why?

It is generally believed that it is better to prevent than to cure. By extension, it is assumed that governments will apply such basic rules of conduct in managing State affairs. However many demands, concurrently imposed by the taxpayer, are perceived as more pressing and definite. The sum of those conflicting demands, makes it difficult to act in a preventive and efficient manner, to take the subtle decisions that are needed to prevent and to survive as a Government or as an Official.

A) A typology of African conflicts

Current Foreign Policy emphasizes the need for "Diplomatic Prevention of Conflicts". This is a good case to analyse and demonstrate the very real difficulties of acting wisely in a complex situation.

Conflict prevention is generally confused with "diplomatic prevention of conflicts". An implicit assumption follows. It assumes therefore that managing conflicts is confined to the art of diplomacy. Conflict management will make use only of the tools designed for such functions. Such an approach leaves aid agencies (read development assistance institutions) boxed out of any attempt to prevent conflicts in the making. The financial resources of ODA thus becomes a mere convenience to provide increased resources and assets in the hands of diplomats and diplomatic institutions. It reduces the ability and the role of development assistance in the long term prevention of human disasters.

² Game and strategy aficionados will find those models of decision making well described in: John McMillan, Games, strategies & managers, Oxford university Press. London, 1992. chapter 2.

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To help clarify the roles played by the various institutions, we have charted³ a theoretical sequence of events leading to a major catastrophe. Five phases or periods are identified and correspond to various evolutions from a "malaise" to a "war". Put simply, a typical conflict will start with a "malaise" **moment 1**, progressively evolving toward a "crisis", **moment 2**. The etymology of crisis comes from the Greek word for decision or, more specifically, "time for a decision". If no decision is taken, we move toward **moment** 3, a "conflict". As is often the case internal conflicts are denied. For obvious reasons related to the sovereignty of nations, diplomats can hardly intervene during such periods. In **moment 4**, however, the conflict degenerates into the open and usually moves across boundaries. It is then the moment when diplomatic activities may take place, in an attempt to prevent further aggravation toward a full civil war or a Genocide. Those diplomatic activities are generally complemented by Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Keeping Operations. In a symmetrical manner, when a conflict mutates into open military activities, development activities become increasingly irrelevant. Moment 5 will happen after truce and reconciliation have taken place, and time has come to reconstruct the country. ODA goes back then to its fundamental origins rooted in the Marshall and Colombo Plans.

Those definitions, as simple as they are, help clarify the different fields for research and for policy making related to "conflict prevention". Clearly Development Assistance's role is in the long term actions, those most difficult to link to a distant outcome.

What happened before a malaise grew into a war? What could have been done at that moment by each society? What, then, can Aid Agencies do to assist those groups in dealing with difficult situations? When is the time for them to act preventively? Should it be when a conflict is still localized and the separation of actors into enemy camp is not completed? When existing conflict resolving mechanisms are still at play? In the absence of models, those are fundamentally most difficult questions. Those are however, the only real and worthwhile questions for an Aid Agency, and for its staff.

B) Ignorance is the first impediment for action

During the first decades of African independence, Aid Agencies (Multilateral, Bilateral and NGO's) undertook an extraordinary array of projects. Infrastructures were built, schools and universities were inaugurated, vaccination programs, as well as many other health and social activities, were launched etc. Some economic growth ensued, some benefits was shared, but it is generally accepted that the results are mixed when measured from an economic point of view.

But what of the impact of all those actions from the perspective of the security of African Nations? What can be truthfully concluded today? What conclusions should be drawn from the absence of civil war in countries like Mali or Ghana? Should it be argued that aid reduced the probability of conflicts where Aid was significant? Could it be that, like Monsieur Jourdain who wrote prose unknowingly, ODA help prevent conflicts when attending to its ordinary business? Or, is it true, as many analysts and journalists believe, that Aid had a neutral effect at best, and some of the time it played into the nascent conflicts and augmented them? How?

The first factor which impedes conflict-preventive action, is the general ignorance of its root causes and the subtle mechanism that have been at play for centuries. Many people hold opinions about such questions, but there is little solid evidence. The community interested in those matters has collected little data and undertaken too few researches to document the causalities at play. The first and almost only way to overcome this "knowledge gap" is to be found in the regular and dedicated attention to impact

³ Jean-H. Guilmette, "Beyond emergency assistance: early warning, conflict prevention and decision taking", in proceedings of International Francophone Meeting, conflict prevention: African perspective, Ottawa, 19 to 22 September 1995, Gov. of Canada, p.79 (reproduce in annex I)

evaluations. Building up the knowledge base about what works and what doesn't. agglomerating data and analysis until some causal relationships become clearer.

The fascination for "input" evaluations, and for measuring compliance toward policies and procedures has created a single-mindedness⁴. This single-mindedness, reinforced by rewards and sanctions, has obscured for the managers the need to build a real knowledge base. For the time being, development doctrine remains overly dependent on ideologies and anecdotal wisdom as opposed to the rigorous, incremental pursuit of conclusions drawn from accumulated empirical evidence. The mass media prefers anecdotes to analysis as they are easier to use and can be charged with essential "entertainment value". In due time, even the most hardy, scientifically-trained managers can't resist the trend: they will start believing anecdotal evidence and disregard the search for facts.

C) Reading into the past

When dealing with new problems, an institution cannot apply existing procedures. Each crisis in Africa is "new". It has been observed by the evaluating team which assessed the donors response to the Rwanda Genocide⁵, that actors saw the crisis through the lens of the earlier Somalia crisis. What obscured the UN response in the months preceding the eruption was the "shadow" of the Somalia crisis. It is feared by the author that the International Community is again repeating the same error, as it seems to be viewing the Burundi drama as a repeat of the Rwanda situation.

This tendency to fight the last war is predominant; managers, conscious that they are being observed in their compliance to systems and procedures, will tend to ensure that whatever comes out of the previous evaluation will be replicated in the design for the following project. This is especially pronounced when moving between phases.

<u>The evaluation process should be extra-sensitive and underscore the inherent dangers of applying "lessons learned" mechanically.</u>

D) The Mikado strategy

Generally, Government policy analysts search for standard responses, for systems and procedures to deal in advance with predictable events. It may be true that conflicts are going to happen in Africa over the next few years, and in that sense they are "predictable events". However, their nature is very specific and their characteristics are highly fragmented. Each conflict has its system of roots, its own context and very specific rules of engagement. Various African societies respond differently to stimuli and conflict resolution mechanisms are very diversified in the way they function.

In bridge, or in chess, analysts have studied various responses that can be planned in advance depending on the various moves of the adversary. But African conflict prevention has no similarity to such games. It is maybe analogous to the Mikado game, where one drops various colored sticks on the ground and

⁴ The recent evaluation on the Rwanda Genocide was a first of its kind. The DAC members should be complimented on such an initiative and encouraged to increase efforts to gather intelligence from those collective endeavour. It should be noted however, that the Development Assistance in the years prior to 1990 is still to be assessed in term of its impact (\$3,5 billions remains unnoticed...?!). It is commonly claimed that Agencies invested millions in helping along South Africa ease into democracy: did it really have such an impact as we all want to believe, or was it neutral? Rigorously speaking, the satisfaction derived from the electoral process remains unsubstantiated.

⁵ Howard Adelman, "Early warning and conflict management", in Joint evaluation of emergency assistance to Rwanda, study 2, p.70.

picks up as many as one can without moving any other sticks. Points vary according to the color of each stick; the winner is the one who adds most points. In such case there is no precise action that can be preplanned. A priori, no activity is more commendable than any other. The player must assess the way the sticks interlock, start with the obvious moves, and proceed from one successful action to another.

The only significant factor to consider in Mikado strategy is "relevance". To remain relevant, one needs to look at the specific situation, use experience, know-how, knowledge, rigorous and disciplined analysis, and a real measure of intuition to design and tailor an adequate and appropriate course of action. However, over the years, domestic based policies have progressively reduced the area reserved for relevance. In some countries, the regulatory environment has been increased by the introduction of laws such as the environmental impact assessment, and by policies and priorities. However, nothing a priori suggests that the combination of such laws, policies and priorities constitute the mix that is required to prevent future conflicts in Africa.

E) The ambiguous role of Policy accountability

Policies deal with generalities and with generic situations. As such, policies can become the worst enemy of relevance: specific actions deal with specific problems, and compliance to policies and program priorities may not provide the answer.

This raises a major problem within risk-adverse societies. Relevance, specificity, and intuition are all concepts fraught with risks. Errors may happen. Individuals may chose actions whose appropriateness is difficult to demonstrate unless one shares the same background of experience and the same body of knowledge. The need for trial and error is more often than not perceived as a luxury. A crisis of confidence may result from abandoning standard procedures and approved.

Most analysts of government behavior, from the Auditor General to journalists and academics, wish to measure compliance to approved policies. They demand facts, figures and dollars figures, that will clearly demonstrate that the government acts precisely in line with its avowed policies. This propensity to tie governments to generic behavior and pre-set policy responses, compounded with the propensity to avoid risks, reduces the ability of aid agencies to deal early with potential conflicts.

Clearly, political correctness, which is one particular form of policy compliance, further limits the capacity to analyze and to act appropriately.

However, one can hardly miss seeing how much damage has been done to the Government machinery through the mediatization of the post facto search for "value for money". The general public has been led to believe there exists, as in bridge, an "objective optimal game strategy leading to correct decisions"; this injects into the public service a risk-minimizer mentality and an acceptance of ever increasing risk premium. This adds to costs and reduces, rather than increases, the probability of success.

Preventing conflicts or taking long-term action rests on a sophisticated and subtle analysis intertwined with risk appreciation. The Mikado analogy demonstrates the limit to the predictability of any single action or of any series of actions. As a corollary, it suggests the futility of trying to reconstruct single events and link them to any final outcome. Coaches review critically significant moments of past games to improve the technique of players. However such an evaluative learning process stops short of creating a winning scenario, as changing one single event changes the rest of the game, maybe for the better, maybe for the worse. Most significantly, the general public is never invited to those "locker room" evaluation cum training sessions.

Proclaiming to an entainment concious media, the existence of "value for money" may not be the best way to induce thriftiness and strategic behavior.

F) The democratization of Foreign Affairs

Until the late sixties, many analysts of International Affairs considered that Foreign Policy partially escaped the democratic process. Decisions were taken by an elite of Officials, in concert with a select group

of interested parties (journalists, academics, interests groups and business). The issues were generally considered to be of little interest to the taxpayer or the electorate as the media did not dwell on those complex and generally uninteresting issues. Domestic affairs were the center of the democratic debate. The Seventies have opened up all our democracies to the World, and in the Eighties subjects that were ignored previously, attracted the attention of electronic media.

What to do about conflicts in remote countries is currently discussed openly, forcing Governments to take public stands on all matters. In the context discussed previously, this obligation to take decisions in uncertain circumstances, and to be seen as pleasing the public, limits seriously the decision making.

In the years that preceded the last election in South Africa, the Canadian Government (CIDA, External Affairs, in conjunction with Canadian interested parties, IDRC, NGO's and many experts), created a committee to define the aid that could be extended to South Africans to foster the process of democratization and to enable the black majority to quickly acquire the knowledge and the skills associated with running a democratic state. The most common desire of the members of this group was to attract as little attention as possible from the press: they preferred to work efficiently, yet secretly, rather than reap the glory of the media attention.

There is, therefore, an apparent conflict between democracy and quality decision.

G) The Nasa dilemma

In 1986, the Challenger space shuttle, carrying six astronauts and commissions worth hundreds of millions of dollars, exploded. It was shown that the accident was predictable, therefore, avoidable. The cause of the tragedy was the O-ring, and the defect had been identified by NASA employees, but no preventive measures had been taken. The authorities decided that the launch should not be delayed. The dilemma seemed insoluble: If NASA delayed the launch to replace the defective joints, everyone would know exactly how much the delay cost, but it would be impossible to prove how much money would have been saved because the precaution would have destroyed the proof that there had been cause for worry.

Considering the above, to anticipate and abort a conflict is a process which. to the extent that it is successful, will usually obscure that proof of its own success. It becomes extremely difficult to overcome this quandary in the recently introduced notion of "result based management". Such an approach is most useful to measure "measurable activities", pardon the tautology. One needs to prove that one action leads to one precise result. In long term crisis prevention, such a clear linkage is generally impossible to demonstrate. Furthermore, other incidents may happen as a direct and visible consequence of the preventive action, obscuring further the raison d'etre of the decision.

One can view the export of management, decision-making and control systems as transplants: the body will either accept or reject them, often after a considerable amount of struggle and suffering. Every value system carries with it an intrinsic bias, a natural drifting force. When exported and integrated into another cultural milieu, it will interact with local values. Depending on the tendencies inherent in the two systems, the exported system may amplify and exacerbate the defects of the recipient system.

One might be tempted to believe that what protected the long lasting excellence of the most famous Mayo Clinic is that for 140 years it has remained concerned with results. Follow-up practices mean that teams ask such questions as "Did our work help cure the patient?" At another level, the same team will ask: "Are current operating procedures the best available? How can they be improved?" And, thirdly, the team must analyze the tools used: "Should they be re-evaluated to produce better results, or simply to be more efficient and less costly?" This is the proper way to deal with results.

The new principle called "results-based management," however, has made its way to Canada from

the major American schools. It consists, in part, of another fashionable technique aimed at providing technocrats with jobs and prestige. Jourdain has always written prose without knowing it. Those described by Pamela Pitcher⁶ as craftsmen (and *a fortiori*, the visionaries) have always been extremely conscientious about attaining results. Posing the question again today may initiate a very intelligent and productive deliberation, but what we see in the end is merely the superficial and mechanical application of a new slogan. The time will come when this "transplant" is replaced by another. Measurement of results certainly constitutes an important criterion, but is not in itself sufficient to maintain excellence. An analysis of natural drift tendencies will show why.

The American system has historically done everything possible to avoid any type of discretionary power. The "contract" that binds the government and its principals, or the State and a supplier, must be free of all subjective judgment. Accordingly, the target is to establish "honest contracts."⁷ However, this system will easily fall prey to procedural and legal drift, because the goal of objectivity will be pursued past the stage of realism; the result is a very specific manner of procrastinating. It is the American sense of risk that regularly helps correct the excesses of legalism and the exaggerated concern with short-term, measurable results. As market forces are allowed to operate fairly freely in the United States, bankruptcies, mergers and takeovers make it possible on a regular basis to eliminate the victims of "rampant proceduritis."

In the absence of this natural counterbalance—i.e., risk tolerance—we may see the agonizing spectacle of an institution goings round in circles, the prisoner of a logic it cannot understand, incapable of finding answers within its natural environment to the problems plaguing it. This is often what occurs in the Canadian Public Service, when consultants are used as intermediaries to directly import unadapted organizational models designed for private enterprise in the United States.

The results-based doctrine thus provides an ideal alibi for avoiding any kind of risk-taking: results must be tangible, measurable and predictable. The theory makes it possible to divide any human activity into distinct little steps, and to preserve the privilege of recanting in the face of the slightest changes in policy. New approaches and long-term commitments are thus totally marginalized, leaving the way open for only that which is familiar and capable of providing immediate gratification.

NASA's dilemma is related to the difficulties involved in demonstrating a cause-and-effect link between preventive action and the absence of a disaster. The analysis tools provided by "results-based management", in particular its emphasis on short term and clearly identifiable causal relationships are not well suited to this type of endeavour.

Clearly, we are deeply into the dysfunctionalities of the prisoner's dilemma. What is good for the community, or for the long run, is contradicted by what is good for the individual, or for the short term.

Thus, over the years, layer after layer of well intentioned improvements have been introduced in the management of the Aid business in Canada and in most other OECD member countries. The net result is that it is now virtually impossible to attempt to prevent conflict. In sum, ideas intended to foster a rational and accountable system may lead to irrational behavior on the part of aid managers and Government

⁶ See Artists, Craftsmen and Technocrats by Pamela Pitcher, HEC Press, Montreal, 1994. This remarkable study of the evolution of a great Canadian financial institution divides senior management into three groups: artists, who have a vision and build up the enterprise; craftsmen, who know how to make things, and technocrats, who deal with processes. Unfortunately, experience shows that the latter have a huge destructive capacity. More gregarious than the other two groups, they are efficient predators. They will hunt down the artists because they do not understand how they think, and enslave the craftsmen. In the end, having destroyed these two groups, they have no other choice but to destroy the company as well.

⁷ See P. D'Iribarne, "L'enracinement culturel de la gestion des entreprises," in L'Esprit d'entreprise, actes des journées scientifiques de l'UREF, Ottawa, Sept. 19-20, 1991. Paris: J. Libbey, 1993.

officials. This may also contravene declared policy.

The response to the NASA dilemma

The lesson learned by the auditors from the NASA crisis is that three key strategic elements had been lost over the years, thus depriving this institution, of the needed elements to take good decisions in uncertain circumstances: hands on knowledge, excellence, and leadership.

Over the years NASA, (and so it is for some aid agencies), abandoned progressively all its hands-on capacity to become instead "process managers". The knowledge acquired was passed on and desegregated to various suppliers and consultants. But nothing can replace intuition, based on systematic usage of sound scientific traditions, and practical experience to take decisions in uncertain and untested circumstances. Furthermore, an institution needs a critical mass of people who share related and common experiences to arrive at a solid "intuitive" consensus of what is to be done.

In the 70's, following experts advice on sound management practices. NASA abandoned the recruitment of "excellent" people as it seemed to reduce its financial viability. All those "Nobel prizes" were relegated to universities and research centers. Their absence was cruelly felt, as their credibility and their acute sense of analysis was not available at the time of most critical decisions. Their high sense of self confidence and self esteem would have been essential to read through the many paradoxes and false savings typical in such complex problems. Deprived of their overpowering presence, how can NASA explain to a demanding, yet ignorant American public, the subtleties of risk assessments and of costly decisions in rocket launching?

Lastly, for each industrial sector of industry there must exist a lighthouse industry. It sets the pace and the standards, it exercises leadership, and placates the general public. Without such leadership, doubts and fears arise. In the confidence gap thus created, anybody who claims expertise may attract the attention of the media and pretend they know the true way of doing things. Bombarded by these know-it-alls, inundated by their contradictions, the general public does not know whom to trust and is suspicious of any decisions. Having lost its leadership over the Industry, NASA could not take the right decision and hope to survive.

What can evaluators do for their part?

To renew the current code of ethics

The following considerations are premised on the conviction that ethical behavior is measured not solely on its pure intentions, but also on the adaptation of one's action to its consequences. Once known, remedial action must replace ineffective behavior.

A new ethic of evaluation must be developed. It must define standards as well as clarify the limits and limitations of post facto judgments. It must then move outward and contribute, if not inspire, to the drafting of professional codes of ethics for all professions which deal with evaluations: I refer to auditors and evaluators, of course, but to academics and media as well when they play the role of evaluators.

Some points for consideration for the confrontation between "real-evaluation" and evaluation theory:

a) The difference between Audits and Evaluations is subtle but very real. It happens all too frequently that this border is blurred, intentionally or inadvertently, leading to disastrous effects.

The more advanced views on "performance assessment" consider that all those activities form part of an integrated panoply of instruments useful to the managers. Endowed with a variety of good information, no doubt that the responsible manager will take rational decisions. This doctrine finds abundant use in small, privately owned and managed corporations. The eyes of the owner are omniscient, and its personnel interests

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generally correspond to those of his firm. Profits at year end are there to ensure integrity and lucidity in appraising business practices. Unfortunately, this does not deal adequately with the bureaucratic environment where a profound cleavage exists between individual interests and those of the Administration. Furthermore, a very different rapport exists between the obligation to comply to rules, and the bottom line. In the private sector, the bottom line generally comes first, while in the Public service, obedience is praised more highly than the free interpretation of rules and regulations.

Audits verify compliance to rules and regulations. As such, individual accountability is at the center of auditors preoccupation. Managers know it and expect it: when signing a document with a clear audit trail, most managers will ensure respect for delegations of powers, compliance with Government regulations and laws. Those are the accepted rules of the game. On the other hand, evaluation deals with corporate accountability. As long as good faith is not challenged, evaluators deal with questions about the state of the art, the corporate behavior, the corporation choice of personnel, the training it provides its employees, the knowledge it renders accessible, the routine it encourages, etc. Ultimately, evaluation measures the practices and wisdom of a ministry, of the Government and of the Parliament.

Any ambiguity between those two contexts of performance assessment breeds instant fear, and provokes recoil into managers. Evaluation conclusions will be doctored if individual blame may result from its publication (internal or external). In such circumstances, evaluations will be rigorously neutered. This will tend to compromise the evaluation process and substitute cynicism for probity. Faced with outside criticism, scapegoats are often sacrificed: eventually the "clever goats" build the necessary safeguard. It should come as no surprise to the sagacious observer that objectives are fuzzy, milestones as flexible as rubber bands, and budgets increased by the additions of redundant studies and padded with innumerable contingency funds.

Years of adaptation on the part of managers as well as ample evidence that evaluation is still not truly part of the learning process suggests those two activities must be kept absolutely air tight from each other, contrary to theory and logic.

b) Care must be taken to avoid giving the impression, to the media, to the general public and to managers, even inadvertently, that complex problems can be resolved simply and error free.

The risk premium costs that ensues can tax resources and reduce quality decisions to the extreme. In some OECD countries, taxpayers have been led to expect unrealistic achievements. As a result, a wave of charlatans and "ambulance chasers" prospect for jobs as "Counsellors of the Impossible" and "Makers-of-rain". Management gurus, who claim that the application of recipes such as "result base management" will resolve all uncertainties and eliminate risks in the decision process, are misleading the public and, in my view, acting unethically. Moreover, the gradual effect of those assaults on the credibility of Governments are reducing its' leadership role. In many instances, today's questioning does not only relate to the size of the State, but to the rationality of its existence. This breeds irrationality and poor decisions.

c) Goals and Objectives form the basis of evaluations and project management...in theory.

In practice, however, these goals and objectives are written under a cloud of ambiguity. Many things happen to them on their way to the market!

First, the planning stages have increasingly become the responsibility of head offices. Away from the field reality, where a multitude of actors freely interact and conflicting interests are at play, projects are aseptic as they are almost test-tube generated. The process is increasingly lengthy, divorced from field reality but immersed in headquarters' preoccupations and dictates. To secure project approval, managers must kowtow and blend into current policy agendas, fads, whims, imbedded with power struggles and restricted definitions of "political correctness". At the end of this obstacle course, project objectives have acquired many meanings, some of them "unspoken". When, eventually, the financial resources of the project become

available to the implementers, the slant seldom fits with reality. It must be changed, most often without proper documentation.

Does that constitute, as it is often argued, an obstacle to evaluation? How do we recreate, in the midst of layer after layer of confusing documentation, the true and authentic goals and objectives of a project or of a program?

If for no other reason than that, it should be recognized that evaluation is first and foremost an art, of the most sophisticated form indeed. The first activity is to "reconstruct" reality, as Sherlock Holmes did. It shares very few attributes with scientific endeavor. As such, it should be practiced only by the very best individuals, endowed with rich professional experience, recognized for the quality of judgment, intuition, perspicacity and, most of all, for their love of the subject matter and for its practitioners. The pedagogical role of evaluators is such that it should be reserved for the very best of us. As a consequence, fewer evaluations may possibly be undertaken; however, the result should be increased quality and higher standards of the resulting evaluations.

d) Increasingly the Aid recipient has been unempowered, first from the design, then from the implementation, and eventually from the evaluation processes.

This is certainly more true in Africa and less so in Asia and in Latin America. It varies considerably as an outcome of administrative procedures, especially the obligation to report to the recipient as is the case in International Organisations. It may be explained by the desire to secure "objective assessors". It may be the result from tied purchasing policies. Whichever; but it demonstrates a lack of confidence in the recipient's capacity to deal with its own development needs. Moreover, it breeds apathy on its part in those crucial matters.

The result is reduced pertinence and relevance, both of the projects and of the evaluations. The emphasis centers on what pleases headquarters, as opposed to the results as defined and needed by the end user. Methodologies are invented in the West, reflecting values and priorities which are characteristics of its systems, its environment, and sense of priorities. <u>Scientifically</u>. this reduces the range of methodologies available to assess and define true results. A gender and a cultural bias has invariably resulted from such systematic abuse of dominant methodologies

e) To replace the current fascination surrounding base line studies with supporting countries data bases.

Base line surveys have become the darling of evaluators. Nevertheless, aid donors agencies have given minimal support to the creation of indigenous data bases, and management information systems. Poor countries need more than any other a sound base upon which to make strategic decisions and choose investments strategies. The amount of money earmarked for base line evaluation may be put to better use. Collectively we should tried to bolster programs that support indigenous data bases and information systems. It would serve also as a mean to further empower aid recipients.

Finally, by way of conclusion, some pertinent observations by former Nobel prize winner, Francois Jacob (medecine, 1965).

"A première vue la science parait moins ambitieuse que le mythe par les questions qu'elle pose et les réponses qu'elle cherche. De fait les débuts de la science moderne datent du moment où aux questions générales se sont substituées des questions limitées; où, au lieu de se demander. "comment l'Univers a-t-il été créé? De quoi est faite la matière? Qu'elle est l'essence de la vie? On a commencé à se demander: "comment tombe une pierre? Comment l'eau coule-t-elle dans un tube? Quel est le cours du sang dans un corps? Ce changement a eu un résultat

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
surprenant. Alors que les questions générales ne recevaient que des réponses limitées, les questions limitées se trouvèrent à conduire à des réponses de plus en plus générales⁸.

To foster development, experts and decision makers need answers to many simple and "limited" questions rather than large ideologically based statements and doctrines. For example we may start our quest for relevant information with questions like:

"How does rural electrification affects fertility rates? Does it work the same way in urban slum areas? How is social peace related to infrastructure? Does a well structured and maintained communication system enhance or reduces inequalities? How and why does agrarian reform and the establishment of clear property ownership generally allows for sustained periods of economic growth? What are the social effects of irrigation schemes?"

⁸ François Jacob, Le jeu des possibles, Essai sur la diversité du vivant, Fayard 1981.

Annex 1.



Evolution over time

Quantitative Approaches to Sovereign Risk Analysis: Implications for IMF Responses

Dane Rowlands Carleton University

Increased financial integration has been accompanied by greater volatility of capital flows. For many less developed countries (LDCs) this volatility can have serious economic repercussions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been assigned an important role in dealing with the problem through emergency lending and enhanced surveillance duties. Predicting these crises, however, is difficult. The paper begins by outlining the task which the IMF has been directed to undertake, and why 'early warning' is essential to fulfilling the mandate. A brief review of the literature on the use of early warning models to predict financial crises is then provided. The paper then provides some preliminary evidence on the relative value of systemic and country-specific analyses in managing IMF resources.

1. Introduction

The Mexican peso crisis in 1994 provides stark evidence of the volatility of international capital flows, and the potential consequences of this volatility for less developed countries (LDCs). In this example the United States led the international effort to stabilize the crisis by creating a sixty billion dollar (U.S.) package to bail out the new government of Mexican President Zedillo. A large part of this money (roughly one-third) was from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the international financial institution (IFI) with primary responsibility for short-term stabilization. In this instance, however, the IMF was a follower of the U.S. lead rather than an equal. Furthermore, the assistance provided to Mexico was reactive rather than preemptive. By allowing the crisis to develop, the international financial community contributed to the severe economic hardships which followed. While the Mexican population bore the brunt of this hardship, several other Latin American nations were also adversely affected.

In the wake of the crisis, the IMF's role as the guardian of international financial stability was expanded. Two new policy recommendations emerged: the creation of a rapid-disbursement facility, and enhanced surveillance.¹ The first policy requires an augmentation of IMF resources as well as an adjustment in lending procedures to speed up administrative processes. Implicit in resource augmentation, however, is the need to manage finances more carefully and with greater forethought. The deployment of the rapid disbursement facility will ease the hardship of countries which suffer from rapid capital flight, and preserve the IMF's preeminence in financial stabilization.

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¹ J. Williamson (1995).

Enhanced surveillance is designed to prevent crises from developing by keeping the market informed of key economic developments in IMF member states. With timely information, the reaction (or overreaction) to new data will tend to be less dramatic. In addition, this surveillance is a prerequisite for the management of the IMF's own resources. The IMF's failure to predict the number and magnitude of future economic disruptions may result in the use of IMF funds for less deserving cases, leaving it unable to respond adequately to new crises. Alternatively, the risk of having too few resources may cause the IMF to become too parsimonious in its normal activities in order to conserve funds for potential future crises. Thus it is important for the Fund to have an accurate model for predicting crises.

This paper examines the problem of forecasting economic crises and IMF resource use. The next section provides a review of past IMF disbursements and outlines the arguments regarding the IMF's need for enhanced 'early warning' models. Section three then reviews the literature on predicting financial crises and IMF credit disbursements. The subsequent section provides some preliminary empirical evidence on the use of systemic aggregate data as a predictive tool versus the use of country-specific data. Section five presents the conclusions, extensions and policy implications arising from the analysis.

2. Resource Disbursements by the IMF

The IMF was created at the end of the Second World War in an attempt by the victorious powers to restore international financial stability and avoid the crises which characterized the interwar period. Although many of the IMF's original functions have changed, for example it no longer seeks to manage an international fixed exchange rate system, its primary *raison d'etre* of promoting a smoothly operating global financial system remains.

Since its inception, the IMF has come to rely more heavily on its provision of temporary financial assistance to member countries as a means of avoiding or ameliorating international payments problems. This emphasis on lending has become particularly pronounced since the demise of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. In essence the IMF assists its member states by providing them with the hard currency they require to overcome their balance of payments problems. In economic terms, the provision of this short-term liquidity theoretically allows a country to maintain imports of consumer and capital goods in the face of a temporary shock, thereby removing the necessity of imposing severe restructuring requirements on the economy. In political terms, IMF financing allows a government to maintain the provision of certain goods and services to its public. In practice, however, countries generally turn to the IMF in the face of longer-term structural problems. In these cases the money provided by the IMF is supposed to ease the transition to a more realistic economic structure. Whether the difficulties are self-inflicted (eg. excessive government intervention or expenditure) or the result of forces beyond the country's control (eg. adverse terms-of-trade or interest rate shocks), it has become commonplace to turn to the IMF for financial assistance and technical advice whenever an economic crisis strikes.

The assistance provided by the IMF is not free. Borrowers are expected to repay loans with interest (though this rate can sometimes be concessional relative to that charged to the country by the market) and is generally associated with policy conditions which the borrower must fulfil. These policy conditions have been a major irritant in IMF-LDC relations, as they typically entail restrictive fiscal and monetary policy and require the state to minimize its role in the economy. The stress on narrowly defined economic efficiency at the expense of distributional concerns has led many countries to avoid the IMF as long as possible. The IMF's profile and lending portfolio, therefore, are generally larger during periods of intense international economic crisis.

Members acquire IMF resources in two ways. The first is the traditional method in which a country applies to borrow some portion or multiple of its quota in the form of a hard currency. This method is called a 'purchase' in IMF parlance (a repayment is called a 'repurchase'), and accounts for over 86% of outstanding IMF credit. The second method is referred to as a more traditional loan, and typically refers to the

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concessional financing provided under the Structural Adjustment Fund (SAF) or Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fund (ESAF). These loans are targeted towards the poorest members of the IMF.

The IMF has three primary means of financing its activities. The first is the subscriptions ("quotas") paid to it by its member states. Only a portion of these subscriptions is usable, however, as the majority of a nation's subscription is paid in the form of its own domestic currency. These currencies are generally not desired by countries unless they are 'hard' convertible currencies of the type issued by developed market countries. The quotas paid in the form of hard currencies make up the bulk of the IMF's usable resources. While periodically revised, quota changes are subject to negotiations between Fund members. Increasing quotas to meet the immediate financing requirements of a crisis, therefore, is not possible.

The IMF's second means of acquiring resources is to simply increase the issue of its own currency, the Special Drawing Right (SDR). As a mechanism for short-term financing, however, SDR allocations are inadequate. Negotiating an SDR increases is a long and arduous process which makes it unsuitable as a means of generating resources to meet the needs of an immediate or imminent crisis. In recognition of the recent heavy demands on its resources, however, the IMF is currently pursuing these negotiations with its member states.

The third method of increasing its resources is through the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB). This method greatly increases the ability of the IMF to deal with the extraordinary financing requirements of a major crisis. This agreement currently allows the IMF to borrow up to 17 billion SDRs² from major industrialized countries. A similar agreement commits Saudi Arabia to make available a further 1.5 billion SDRs. In times of intense need, therefore, the IMF can call on these countries to provide additional resources. The GAB was first negotiated in the early 1960s, and was motivated by the realization that the Fund did not have sufficient resources to meet the borrowing needs of its wealthier industrialized members. These states, however, have not borrowed from the IMF since the mid-1970s, and so the GAB has essentially become available for use by LDCs. In 1996, for the first time since the mid-1970s, the IMF has paid back its debts incurred under GAB provisions.

Since 1976, IMF loans have been made primarily to LDCs. In terms of current SDRs, the total credit and loans outstanding have grown from just over one billion SDRs in 1973 to over forty-one billion SDRs in 1995. The pattern of outstanding IMF credit is illustrated in figure 1. The oil shock in 1973 led to first big 'crisis' which demanded IMF attention. Net IMF credit outstanding rose from one billion SDRs in 1973 to thirteen billion SDRs in 1977. This level declined slowly until the second oil shock in 1979, which led to a new round of net borrowing in 1980. In the early 1980s, the tail end of the oil price increase coincided with the adoption of strict monetary policy in the United States. The latter led to high interest rates and a high dollar, the primary unit of account for international debt. As a consequence of the conjunction of these unfortunate circumstances, many LDCs were forced into default on their foreign debt. Reliance on the IMF as the key supervising IFI overseeing the debt rescheduling process also meant greater pressure on IMF resources. The total credit outstanding owed to the IMF rose from 9.3 billion SDRs in 1979 to 37.7 billion SDRs in 1984. This level declined gradually until 1990. Credit outstanding started to increase gradually again in 1991, reflecting in part the need for financing by the post-communist economies in transition as well as continuing LDC financial problems arising from the recession in the developed economy markets. The gradual increase became a dramatic rise from 30.3 billion SDRs in 1994 to 41.6 billion SDRs in 1995. The primary cause of this rapid acceleration in lending was the Mexican peso crisis, though a new lending program for Russia was a contributing factor.

Figure 1 clearly demonstrates the volatility of IMF resource use. Predicting the events which account for this volatility represents a challenge for forecasters: none of these events were clearly foreseen.


² Currently, 1 SDR is approximately equal to \$1.50 U.S..

The IMF's procedures and structure do permit a high degree of adaptability, however, and so they have been able to respond to crises with an expansion of credit. There are three facets of the IMF which are particularly useful in meeting the challenges of an increasingly volatile international financial system. The first is the early warning approach which is built in to the IMF's Article IV consultations with each member country. Secondly, the IMF can increase resources on short notice through the provisions of the GAB. Finally, there is considerable discretion exercised by the Fund with respect to which countries are allowed to borrow, and how much credit they may be offered. In this regard the use of conditionality can be used as a means of rationing credit.

Total Fund Credit and Loar standin

Figure 1

Despite these instruments, however, the IMF frequently expresses concerns over its resource constraints. Recently the Fund has calculated an index of its 'liquidity', i.e. the level of usable cash balances relative to short-term liabilities. Figure 2 illustrates how this liquidity ratio has fluctuated from 1982-1996. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the ease of acquiring IMF credit varies over time (Bird 1994), and is more difficult to obtain during periods of crisis (Rowlands 1994). Such variance suggests that despite its flexibility, the IMF's ability to carry out its mandate of financing balance of payments difficulties is being compromised by inadequate resources.



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Figure 2

The three sources of flexibility have proved unequal to the task of managing funds in a forwardlooking manner. The Article IV consultations, and the periodic reviews of country performance by the IMF's Executive Board,³ do provide valuable information on developments in the world economy. The resulting reports on country performance, however, have rarely predicted the crises which have precipitated a high demand for IMF credit. In the 1994 report on Mexico prior to the 1994 peso crisis, for example, the concern expressed over the current account deficit was relatively mild, and overall the report was optimistic in light of the government's fiscal position (IMF Annual Report 1994).

The provisions of the GAB have been frequently used to augment IMF resources. It should be noted, however, that the current borrowing arrangements amount to only 18.5 billion SDRs, which is roughly the increase in outstanding credit from 1990-1995, and is only slightly higher than the IMF's commitment of resources to the financial package put together for Mexico after 1994. Finally, GAB resources are costly to the IMF, and there may be a reluctance to use them in order to avoid these costs.

The final means of influencing credit, the severity of rationing, is also problematic. While the evidence that conditionality is an effective rationing tool is mixed (Williamson 1982, Bird 1994), there are other means by which the Fund can limit credit. The variability of credit availability is undesirable, as it reinforces the cyclical processes of the international economy. Access to credit should not be tightened during those periods when more countries need it to finance adjustment. The terms of IMF credit need to

³ These Executive Board reviews were recently increased in frequency in response to the Mexican peso crisis (IMF Annual Report 1996).

be relatively constant if it is to fulfil its role as a stabilizing influence on the global monetary system.

In order to provide credit in a more consistent fashion, therefore, the IMF needs to supplement its inherent flexibility with a forward-looking resource management process. Specifically, the IMF needs a reliable means of predicting those crises which have led to significant changes in resource use in the past. The following section examines the literature on predicting these crises.

3. Literature Review

The debt crisis in the 1980s provided a strong motivation for the development of models which could predict financial crises. The relatively small literature which existed prior to 1982 became quite extensive by the end of the 1980s. Two other literatures also developed which are relevant to this paper: models for predicting which countries receive IMF credit, and models for estimating IMF resource use by countries. A brief review of these literatures is provided here.

Sovereign debt theory is still an area of considerable debate.⁴ Despite these theoretical problems, work has proceeded on the empirical analysis of international lending to less developed countries (LDCs). Several early papers explore the factors which contribute to debt servicing difficulties, and are reviewed by Saini and Bates (1984), while Bhatt (1991) provides a later review of the literature. As Saini and Bates point out, commercial banks were the first to construct lists of indicators to assess country risk, which "were often used as an early warning system in conjunction with qualitative country evaluation" (Saini and Bates 1984: 343).

Frank and Cline (1971) started off the more formal statistical approaches to sovereign risk assessment by applying discriminant analysis to cases of debt rescheduling. Debt reschedulings became the dependent variable of choice for the literature that followed, with important contributions being made by Feder and Just (1977), Mayo and Barrett (1977), and Feder, Just and Ross (1981). The contribution of Mayo and Barrett is particularly noteworthy in its attempt to explain debt servicing difficulty five years into the future.

After 1982, more effort was put into statistical analyses of debt financing problems. Important postdebt crisis contributions to the 'country risk' literature were made by Edwards (1984), Schmidt (1984), McFadden, Eckaus, Feder, Hajivassiliou, and O'Connell (1985). Hajivassiliou (1987), Taffler and Abassi (1987), Nunnenkampt and Picht (1989), Kutty (1990), Brewer and Rivoli (1990). and Savvides (1991). These papers vary widely in their samples and estimation techniques. Not surprisingly, their main conclusions suggest that variables such as debt-service ratios, foreign reserves-to-imports ratios, per capita GDP, export growth rates, GDP growth rates and other financial variables were all helpful in explaining instances of financial difficulty such as rescheduling of debt. Brewer and Rivoli (1990) deserve mention for their focus on political determinants of country creditworthiness as measured by investment reports.

Although considerable insight may be gained from the preceding literature, the question of IMF resource use is only indirectly addressed. The focus on reschedulings, while clearly correlated with IMF involvement institutionally and statistically (Rowlands 1994), does not provide a direct measurement of the demand for IMF resources. Secondly the focus of these studies is to estimate the behaviour of individual countries, not aggregate behaviour. Finally, only a small number of the studies explicitly attempt an early warning approach, the majority of studies being focused instead on simply identifying the factors associated with financial difficulties.

The second strand of literature is much smaller, and deals with the identification of IMF agreement recipients. Contributions to this literature include Joyce (1986), Rowlands (1994), Conway (1994) and Knight and Santaella (1994). The last three are the most extensive papers, using larger samples and more

⁴ Rowlands (1993) provides a review of some of the theoretical issues.

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sophisticated techniques to draw inferences on a number of issues. The use of a binary dependent variable to indicate the presence or absence of an IMF agreement in a particular country, however, limits the applicability of these papers in terms of examining IMF resource use in aggregate. Nonetheless, the elements of this approach can be adapted to provide an early warning model of IMF credit demand.

The final literature does examine directly the issue of IMF resource use, though again the focus is on explaining country-specific, rather than aggregate, demand. Bird and Orme (1981), Cornelius (1987), and Bird and Bedford (1992) examine the amount of IMF credit drawn by countries. Bird and Orme (1981) and Cornelius (1987) both deal with rather limited samples, however. Bird and Bedford (1992) uses a more comprehensive data set, but they conclude that the results are rather disappointing: their model explains only 23% of the variance in borrowing from the IMF. In addition, many countries draw on the IMF for assistance when faced with natural diasters (such as droughts, hurricanes, earthquakes and floods) which are inherently difficult to predict (Killick and Malik 1992).

The three research areas identified in the previous literature are only indirectly related to the question of predicting aggregate IMF resource use. Nonetheless they point to three different approaches to the problem. In the first instance, estimates of which countries will face rescheduling or other financial difficulties can be used in conjunction with country size to generate a country-specific estimate of the likelihood and magnitude of financial problems. These measures can then be aggregated across countries to come up with a measure of potential financing needs, which in turn can form the basis of an estimate for IMF resource use. The second approach uses an identical aggregation method, but is based on predictions of IMF agreements rather than reschedulings. The third approach estimates each country's use of IMF resources directly, and then aggregates over all countries.

These first three approaches all require the aggregation of country-specific estimates. This paper also uses a fourth method of estimating the demand for IMF resources. The fourth model focuses on the aggregate level of analysis only, and attempts to explain IMF resource use by referring only to global factors which may be contributing to subsequent credit use. The next section presents a preliminary comparison of the results based on these different approaches.

4. Early Warning and IMF Resource Use: Alternative Quantitative Approaches

In order to establish a basis for comparison across the techniques, all four approaches are used the to predict measures of IMF resource use for one, two, and three years into the future. While the lags used here are not as stringent as in some of the early warning models used by commercial banks, IMF lending portfolios are of considerably shorter maturity than private lenders. Most IMF credit agreements have a one-year duration, and repayment periods begin shortly thereafter, so the IMF can modify its resource use fairly substantially in the space of short period of time, at least in comparison with some other lenders.

The first model presented here uses a large panel data set to estimate the cross-country pattern of reschedulings and arrears. The dependent variable in the underlying model is binary, so probit estimations are used. The independent variables in the model include both economic and political factors.⁵ The predicted probabilities of debt repayment difficulties are then multiplied by the IMF quotas for each country, and added across countries for each year. The result is a 'prediction' about the annual demand for IMF resources. This basic model is used to construct these predictions on the basis of data which are lagged by one, two, and three years. Thus there are three sets of predictions generated by the model. These predictions are then used as the explanatory variable for actual IMF resource use in a simple OLS regression.

The second model replicates the process used in the first. The only difference is that instead of estimating debt payment difficulties, the probit estimations are used to predict actual IMF credit agreements.

⁵ The original model is a slight variant of the one discussed in Rowlands (1994).

This model is also used to construct three different sets of predictions using different lag structures. Finally, the predicted values are used as the independent variable in a simple OLS regression with actual IMF resource use measures as the dependent variable.

The third model replicates the work of Bird and Orme (1981) by estimating the use of IMF resources directly on a country-by-country basis. The underlying estimation used here is a simple OLS regression⁶ using similar explanatory variables as the first two models. The OLS estimates are then taken as predictions using the same one, two, and three year lags in the explanatory variables. Again these predictions are used in a regression on actual resource use.

These first three models roughly correspond to the approaches discussed in the previous section's review of the literature. The final model uses OLS regressions on aggregate IMF resource use. Since the number of observations is much smaller for this model, only three explanatory variables are used: the average reserves-to-imports ratio for all LDCs, the average world real economic growth rate, and the aggregate current account balance of payments for all LDCs. Although a formal model of the expected relationship is not provided here, intuition clearly indicates that all three variables should be negatively related to the total demand for IMF resources. As before, these independent variables are lagged to come up with equivalent predictions based on information available one, two, and three years earlier.

The predictions and regressions based on these four models are used to explain three different measures of IMF resource use. There are three different dependent variables used at the final stage of the regression. These variables are: total IMF credit outstanding (a stock), the change in total IMF credit outstanding (a flow), and gross new credit issues in a given year (a flow). The estimations are all run using a constant in addition to the other explanatory variable or, in the case of model 4, variables. Furthermore, for the dependent variables which are flows (net changes and new loans) the first difference of the explanatory variables is used. The simple R-squareds for the final stage regressions are presented in Table 1. Although using R-squareds to compare model performance is crude, the procedure serves the purposes of this paper due to the focus on explaining as much variance as possible and comparing the relative 'explanatory' capacities of each approach. It should also be noted that the R-squareds over-estimate the 'predictive' capacity of the model, since the expected values generated by the model are being compared to within-sample actual values, not out-of-sample values.

The results at this preliminary stage of the research are intriguing. Despite its relative lack of sophistication, model 4 (using only three explanatory variables) performs relatively well. The within sample estimates have a higher explanatory power than any of the first three models in five out of the nine cases presented. In only one case is the reported R-squared extremely low (0.02, the next lowest being 0.29), and this is the only case where it has the lowest R-squared of to all the models for a particular cell. Furthermore, in three of the four cases where model 1 outperforms it, model 4 has only marginally lower R-squareds, and is a close second-best. Thus model 4, the systemic approach, does quite well relative to the models which use a country-specific approach, at least according to the simple standards adopted here.

As for the three country-specific models, model 1 dominates the other two approaches in all nine cases. Model 1 uses a probit procedure to estimate the probabilities of a country having repayment problems (arrears or reschedulings).⁷ The superiority of this model is unexpected since, being based on a probit

⁶ Clearly the use of a TOBIT estimation procedure would be preferable. However, distilling the predicted values from a TOBIT model is computationally difficult. Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper, a continuous variable approach to the estimation may be preferable due to the need to measure total resource demand, not just resource demand above a certain threshold.

⁷ It should be noted that there were preliminary estimations which did not use first differences of the explanatory variables in the prediction of the dependent variables which were flows. In these cases, the model

estimation of difficulties, it does not have actual IMF behaviour directly reflected in the initial dependent variable. Figures 3-6 present the actual and estimated values for total resource use and changes in total resource use for the two best models: model 1 and model 4.

[INSERT FIGURES 3-6]

In terms of the other patterns of the R-squareds, the effects of different lag structures for predictive purposes followed the anticipated pattern: the longer the lag, the lower the variance of IMF resource use explained by the models. Furthermore, all the models had higher R-squared statistics when estimating the total IMF resource use as opposed to changes in resource use or new IMF credits. Given that total resource use is a less volatile series than the other two measures of IMF resource flows, this result is not surprising. In terms of the two flow variables, models 2, 3 and 4 performed better when estimating the change in total IMF resource use than when estimating new credits issued. Model 1, however, was more accurate when new loans were being estimated.

Although these preliminary results are not overwhelming, there are grounds for some optimism. In some cases the amount of variance explained in the model with the two year lag is not much less than in the regressions based on information with a one year lag. Thus there is some evidence that information on IMF resource use is present in data two years prior to the credit actually being extended, a useful feature for early warning. Secondly, the explanatory power of the model based on aggregate resource use (model 4) is generally superior to the other models in explaining the flow variables measuring IMF resource use (change in credit outstanding and gross new loans). This model used only three simple explanatory variables which are chosen without reference to a formal theoretical model. By constructing a more rigorous foundation, this last model may have room for considerable improvement.

5. Conclusions and extensions

This paper has attempted to motivate the need for early warning techniques to be applied by international financial institutions in order to manage their resources. The IMF is a prime candidate in this regard, as it is frequently called upon in times of economic crisis to make large quantities of money available on short notice. While the IMF obviously does make projections on resource use, the measures which currently give it flexibility have proven insufficient in terms of maintaining stable access to its resources in a manner consistent with the promotion of global financial stability.

The preliminary empirical results presented in the paper provide some basis for optimism in predicting IMF resource use. The two approaches used were to predict the demand for IMF credit for each country and then aggregate, and explaining directly the aggregate resource use. The aggregated approach of model 4 performed quite well relative to the models based on country-specific approaches. The implications of this result are potentially very important: economic problems may not be country-specific events, but may instead be manifestations of aggregate international economic disequilibrium.

The evidence also suggests that it may be possible to use basic international data to predict IMF resource two years in the future with some degree of reliability. There is considerable room for refining all of the models used, which may lead to improvements in the capacity of each model to make predictions. In all of the models there has been insufficient theoretical work to guide the structure of the estimating equations. Thus there is a need for the theoretical foundations to be developed. Furthermore, there is ample


based on estimating actual IMF resource use on a country-by-country basis - model 3 - actually had better results than model 1 in the two and three year lagged estimations of changes in total IMF resource use. Theory suggests, however, that the first difference approach is the most appropriate for estimating the flow, however, so these unusual (though encouraging) results were rejected.

scope for modifying both the selection of independent variables as well as the deployment of more sophisticated estimation techniques in order to better capture the nuances of the data. One of the complications which clearly needs to be addressed is the potential bias introduced by the use of realized IMF credit use as the final stage dependent variable. Presumably this level is biased due to the fact that the IMF may be attempting to either expand or contract the use of resources depending on its own liquidity (Williamson 1982, Rowlands 1994).

In the end, however, the real need for the IFIs is to be able to predict the episodes of dramatic demand increase. Recent examples of these episodes have been the oil shocks, the debt crisis, and the peso crisis. The early warning approaches used in this preliminary investigation have been calibrated to fit the smaller variations in IMF resource use as well. A more explicit focus on the dramatic crises may, in the end, prove a more useful direction for future inquiry. Until these periodic crises can be explained, the IMF and other key actors in the international financial system will have to rely on *ex post* crisis management rather than *ex ante* preemptive intervention.


D				
		R-squareds		
MODEL/deper	ident variable	1 year lag	2 year lag	3 year lag
Model 1	total	.89	.81	.76
predicted financial	∆ total	.44	.19	.19
difficulties	gross loans	.61	.30	.27
Model 2	total	.78	.69	.41
predicted IMF agreements	∆ total	.13	.04	.00
	gross loans	.16	.06	.03
Model 3	total	.71	.63	.61
predicted IMF credit	△ total	.16	.02	.05
use	gross loans	.05	.01	.01
Model 4 predicted aggregate credit use	total	.85	.84	.72
	△ total	.81	.49	.35
	gross loans	.72	.29	.02

TABLE 1



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Towards Response-Oriented Early Warning Analysis: Policy and Operational Considerations

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The connection between conflict early warning and early response is here explored as a problem of policy-relevant analysis. The paper argues that while many advocates and researchers in the early warning field decry the absence of "political will", the fact remains that much of what currently exists as early warning is not adequately presented to policy-makers. This involves both clear analysis of critical trigger factors, and better targeting of these analyses such that they are readily utilised by policy end-users. The paper argues that current conflict early warning practices are not effective in presenting dynamic analysis that prioritises factors and presents practicable options for preventive peacebuilding. To illustrate this argument, a framework for early warning analysis is outlined in brief. Based on ongoing research in the Canadian foreign ministry, this framework focuses on seven political early warning categories: status of governance/political process; polarisation/potential for conflict; structural/societal tension; human rights violations; military/arms supply; external support; and context-specific considerations. Improvements in policy response-oriented analysis will demand better interaction between early warning researchers, field monitors, and policy analysts in governments, aid agencies, and regional and international organisations. The paper concludes with some observations in this regard, and a brief review of some existing initiatives which perhaps embody this sort of interaction. Written from the perspective of a conflict analyst in the Canadian foreign ministry, the paper is informed by current policy and operational requirements for "early response" and preventive peacebuilding.

Early warning researchers and advocates increasingly seek to influence policy-makers more effectively so that preventive action is taken to de-escalate intrastate conflict situations. In this endeavour they must seek to answer four basic questions: 1) what are the actors/organisations that are responsible for acting on early warning analysis, and have the capacity to implement rapid responses?; 2) what are the policy frameworks and bureaucratic mandates by which such decisions are made?; 3) what are the operational mechanisms, and their resource constraints, which correspond to each organisation's policy frameworks and mandates?; 4) by what processes, and in what format, should early warning be disseminated to these operational actors? This does not address, of course, the issue of what elements must be combined to constitute an effective preventive engagement operation, but such an understanding must inform this specific strategic targeting of actors. Let it suffice to note here that preventive peace operations, and particularly preventive peacebuilding, are understood to be much wider in scope than the perhaps outdated concept of "preventive diplomacy" suggests.1 Inter-agency coordination between governmental foreign and defence ministries, intelligence units, development aid agencies, the UN system and its specialised agencies and funds, regional organisations, and NGOs in both donor countries and (most significantly) in conflict zones is the new operational reality for preventive peace operations. This complex and evolving policy environment demands a higher degree of routinised interaction between "early warners" and operational actors, and this paper seeks to outline some preliminary considerations which arise from the four questions

posed above. While governments have an important role to play in facilitating and deploying responses, early warning must also be made more *response-oriented* - in other words, more fundamentally informed and structured by existing policy and operational realities.

I. Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Policy

While there are a number of sources (including academic/research, non-governmental, and media) of early warning information on internal conflicts, such information is rarely presented in a format relevant to policy-makers. As the 1996 joint donor evaluation of the Rwanda conflict found, what is needed in not so much information but policy-oriented analysis that will suggest logical operational responses. One could add, by stating the issue more sharply, that the debate on early warning has not yet moved forward to deal with the issue of the *process link* between early warning analysis and effective preventive action. This may be because existing early warning praxis is not effective in producing analysis (as distinct from reporting or monitoring) that clearly presents options for effective preventive action and rapid engagement policy.

"Political will" to act on early warning analysis is, no doubt, at least as important as the analysis itself. The Rwanda evaluation is only the most recent of a number of studies which have charged the international community and the UN with failing to confront conflict escalation with both political resolve as well as significant resources to make a credible impact on conflict dynamics.² But this handy phrase, most frequently employed by non-governmental advocates to simultaneously blast governments and the UN while uncritically absolving themselves of any "downstream" role, obscures complex realities at the policy and operations levels. Policy-makers must work within program frameworks and criteria, adjust operational recommendations according to resource availability, balance operational options against (where relevant) potential competing policy priorities, and provide their political patrons with demonstrable results, sometimes referred to as "deliverables". Rather than decrying these realities, proponents of conflict early warning would do best to examine their underlying detail, as the opening four questions propose. They may also take note of the rapid transitions in international policy development, such as the extent to which the Northern donor community is beginning to identify violent conflict as perhaps the most damaging impediment to sustainable development programs. Early warners concerned with responses could highlight the added value in OECD development agencies stressing to their governments the attendant need for serious progress on preventive action policy mechanisms at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.

One may also add here that as early warning begins to focus more on response-oriented analysis, this will help enable policy-makers to present their political constituencies with specific options for concrete preventive action. But this can only happen where analyses are targeted for the end-user, the policy community. For early warning to be effective in bridging the current gap between warning and action, it must indeed target those governments, IOs, regional organisations, and NGOs that will be implementing specific conflict prevention programs. In short, know your audience. This will require greater information-sharing concerning the existing capacities and options for rapid responses. Where capacity-building is required at the policy level, this must be reconciled with macro policy priorities and political considerations. In countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, Britain, and Norway, where individual ministers have evinced interest in conflict prevention and peacebuilding priorities, new conflict policy mechanisms and units have been mandated. The trend towards regional arrangements for conflict prevention and early warning (by regional organisations such as the OAU and IGAD as well as regional NGOs) will also hopefully make such cooperative targeting easier.³ The point here is that knowing the specifics of what is *possible* in terms of preventive action will help in framing policy recommendations that will both be user-friendly and facilitate mobilising political commitment for rapid, comprehensive responses.

Given this gap between policy-oriented analysis of root causes and preventive responses, there is growing recognition that an action-oriented approach is urgently required.⁴ In terms of how to craft appropriate analyses, however, the focus should not be "whether" a conflict is escalating into war. This

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merely has the effect of ringing an alarm - policy analysts are alerted to the problem but are not given any concrete ideas on how to respond at the operational level. The analytical focus should rather be on how and why there is a potential for escalation. Providing this type of analysis is the first step to identifying priority areas for preventive engagement.⁵ This then raises the second broad aspect of response-oriented analysis, apart from strategic targeting: the *process link*.

What is meant by this process link in analysis? Two elements are important here: 1) analysis should be able to provide dynamic conflict profiles which explain indicators of political instability in relation to existing priority focal points (i.e. thematic sectors such as human rights, political participation, humane governance, democratic development) in conflict prevention policy mechanisms; 2) such profiles should be suggestive of logical operational responses, along various interacting sectors, which could form the basis of an integrated program for preventive peacebuilding. There should therefore be an interactive "meshing" of the analytical framework with the operational response policy-making mechanism. This clearly demands a higher level of coordination between early warning analysts and governmental/IO officers responsible for conflict prevention programs. Some discussions of this are starting to unfold within certain foreign ministries, and considerable advances are being made at the UN Secretariat in linking the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) into the interdepartmental decision-making structure.⁶ But where analysis and operations are carried out at different levels by different actors (either in the classic division between governmental intelligence and foreign policy departments, or analysis by NGOs rather than governments), such processual coordination becomes more difficult. In this way, then, strategic targeting and process link in analysis are really interdependent.

In the Canadian policy context, we are currently proceeding in the reverse order, due to the paucity of response-oriented conflict early warning analysis. Operational priority issues are highlighted for specific situations, and options for peacebuilding support are framed accordingly. This involves a very time-consuming process of "joint" analysis of current conflict zones between functional divisions in the DFAIT Global and Human Issues Bureau (which are concerned with thematic policy development), and DFAIT and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) geographic divisions responsible for bilateral relations and country programs. This process, largely reactive in nature. itself represents a major step forward in (at a minimum), taking a systematic look at peacebuilding priorities and response options on a global scale. The dilemma referred to above, classic for any foreign ministry or aid agency around the world, is exacerbated by the deficit in analysis. The challenge now is to front-load better dynamic, response-oriented analysis into the nascent operational mechanism of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative.

Conflict is a dynamic process in which stages of escalation may be identified.⁷ The *dynamic interaction* of factors which cause escalation from one phase to the next demands that priority factors for preventive action (the areas of greatest near-term danger in the interaction dynamic) be identified. Analysis must avoid the tendency to simply provide a shopping list of the usual suspect causal factors. Specific measures at the policy/project level should be related to the key early warning categories that track conflict escalation. In other words, there should be an effort to link a conflict indicator with a focused preventive policy response, keeping in mind that these factors are interrelated and interact. This then demands an *integrated and systematic approach* to conflict prevention based on early warning analyses that recommend such integrated options for policy-makers. There is also a need to differentiate between types of conflict. One could suggest that early warning should be oriented towards the factors which produce *protracted* identity-based (e.g. ethnic) conflicts over core values such as identity and group security. A structured analytical framework that looks for patterns of deprivation and discrimination will go some way towards such differentiation, separating out non-protracted conflicts and violence such as riots. An exclusive focus on cases of "state failure", which has animated some recent academic research projects, is too narrow and seems to presuppose late-phase intervention.

Some recent studies on early warning have argued that the UN should stand at the centre of any

global early warning network.8 The desirability of having an effective political early warning system (PEWS) located in the UN Secretariat is without question, even given the serious resource and political constraints the organisation currently faces. Like-minded countries should continue to push for this. The fact remains, however, that there is vigorous opposition from the G-77 to any PEWS capability within the UN, and that is not likely to change in the near future. As a result, conflict analysis for early warning purposes will continue to be a decentralised, ad hoc, desk-level exercise within the political departments of DPA and DPKO. The Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) in DHA has some elements of political early warning, but the orienting purpose of the HEWS database remains humanitarian intervention rather than a focused and standardised tracking of political instability. There has also been some recent effort to improve the early warning capacity of the DPKO Situation Centre, but here again the operational goal (support to ongoing peacekeeping operations, or perhaps preventive deployment) is limited and linked to later phases of conflict escalation. Early warning advocates are thus left with having to consider alternative approaches, and the regional organisation option would appear to hold significant promise, particularly where this can be coupled with cooperative project delivery by regional and local NGOs, backed up with international technical expertise and ODA. Such a proliferation of regional early warning approaches would appear to be more likely at this time than a single comprehensive and authoritative system.

II. Towards an Early Warning Analytical Framework

In the absence of a systematic conflict early warning capacity in the UN Secretariat, and in view of the long period that would precede the actual implementation of early warning centres in regional organisations, it may be proposed that government foreign ministries and development aid agencies evolve internal frameworks for standardised early warning analysis. Such frameworks can help structure the usual reporting from desk officers and field personnel, and can more precisely identify and prioritise options for operational responses. Such internal initiatives will also help to orient thinking on early warning towards the crucial process link between warning and response, as this connection is easiest to make if both functions are carried out within the same bureaucracy. This does not presume, of course, that early warning analysis should remain the sole preserve of governmental and intergovernmental bodies. The non-governmental sector, particularly the large humanitarian relief NGOs with field operations in conflict-prone regions, can provide valuable independent information on political instability and governance crises, as can some academic networks. This inter-agency coordination on early warning is an important issue, and recent initiatives such as the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) hold much promise in this regard.

A response-oriented early warning framework must strike a balance between a number of difficult choices. There must be a measure of *flexibility* so that officers will not feel constrained in their analyses, yet enough structure in the indicator categories to provide effective analytical guidance. In other words, a balance between a general "model", and detailed context/case specificity. As noted above, there is a need for early warning to be more than simple reporting, but generic models are unlikely to offer real insight into actual conflict dynamics on the ground. So a balance approach is necessary, and there will be much need here for countries to share views on what form this balance should take for maximum effectiveness. It may also be argued that conflict typology varies from region to region to such an extent that it may not be possible to come up with an effective early warning framework that applies as well to Central Africa as it does to Central America. It may be preferable to devise region-specific analytical frameworks in concert with regional capacity-building for preventive action. Such regional capacity-building, widely understood to be among the best options for conflict prevention, should be targeted as an important area for ODA programming.

Another difficult issue is how to provide a concise, clear framework that does not overburden officers with too many categories to track, yet covers the dynamic "trigger factors". A long, unwieldy listing

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of indicators that are not set into an analytical framework, or that are too general to be of real use (e.g. poverty, infant mortality, dictatorship), is not going to be used by officers that are burdened with competing demands for their attention. Thus, an effective early warning system will focus on near-term trigger factors rather than the broader structural/background factors that may contribute to societal tension. One might also add, however, that such structural indicators (see C below) can be incorporated with parsimony if they are viewed as factors which must interact and overlap with other trigger indicator categories to be relevant for early warning. Abandoning reference to structural tensions altogether risks losing important contextual elements, such as unresolved inter-group disputes over land ownership, which is common in sub-Saharan Africa, for example.

Human rights monitoring and reporting is already one area in which diplomats and development agency field personnel work cooperatively to share information. This should be extended to conflict analysis for early warning. Development agency, UNDP, UN Centre for Human Rights, and UNHCR personnel, in particular, are often based in more remote/rural areas than diplomats, and thus have the advantage of closer proximity to emerging causes of internal conflict. This field proximity should be used to full advantage, while keeping in mind that development/relief workers will perhaps be concerned that this will jeopardise their neutrality. The insight that comes only from sustained contact with local communities in conflict zones is a critical component of effective early warning, and development aid personnel are an excellent source for this. The need then is to produce a systematic, rather than unstructured and ad hoc, approach to early warning analysis by desk and field officers.

The following categories of early warning indicators are proposed as a example of what such a balanced analytical framework could look like.⁹ What must be stressed in such an approach is that it is the "overlap" or concurrent interaction of two or more of these categories that creates the conditions for imminent protracted violence - the greater the severity, frequency, and number of categories in combination, the greater the potential for conflict. The presence of only one category of indicators will not, in most cases, herald the onset of *protracted* conflict. What is important for the officer to discern is the *dynamic interaction* of these categories, where present. In particular, the presence of the first (A) category, which focuses on the trigger factor of paralysis in the political process, is almost always associated with an escalation in internal violence and conflict. As well, it must be noted that these indicator categories may be present over the country as a whole (increasing possibility of total state collapse) or confined to certain regions only, where the threat of insurgency is greater. Finally, the reference to specific examples of indicators in each category is meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

*A) Status of Governance / Political Process

This category addresses the medium- and near-term breakdown of legitimate avenues for dialogue and non-violent dispute resolution. Is the government representative of a legitimate and participatory political process? What is the internal political environment like for ethnic and religious minorities? Are there laws which limit or prohibit minority language use, or minority community, religious, or political organisations? Are there constitutional provisions (e.g. official language and/or religion) which clearly put certain identity groups at a disadvantage, which are discriminatory? Are there constitutional provisions or laws which prohibit the access to and representation in governing institutions (e.g. parliament) by minority nationalist parties?

Paralysis and closure of the political process (democratic or non-democratic alike) can also be indicated by the onset of specific immediate events: e.g. imposition of special emergency/internal security laws in minority and/or frontier areas, electoral/plebiscite results declared void by the state, removal/dissolution of local or regional governments in minority areas, banning of minority and ethnic nationalist political parties and associations, arrest of minority and nationalist political leaders, attacks on and arrests of press reporters, banning of independent and minority media outlets, and the use of state-

controlled/official media to promote nationalist and xenophobic intolerance of identifiable minority (ethnic, religious) groups. Such events can indicate the presence of a deep disagreement between groups over the very political structures and identity of the state itself, the closure of avenues for dialogue, and the final preparation for violent oppression and resistance.

B) Polarisation / Potential for Conflict

This category includes the longer-term, historical conditions which provide the fertile soil for intergroup hostility and conflict. In terms of the political mobilisation of marginalised groups, common indicators are: strong ethnic group cohesion/solidarity and ethnic nationalist leadership, politicisation of ethnic collective identity (e.g. clan, tribe) by nationalist elites, the proliferation/fragmentation of such elites and allied militant organisations. In many cases there is a history of violent inter-group conflict, and collective group memories of victories and defeats, which will be invoked by elites to accelerate polarisation. Recent riots and massacres where perpetrators have gone unpunished, or where government inquiries were insincere, can greatly inflame enmity and provide the context or "excuse" for massive retaliation. Another important indicator here is the presence of refugees and/or internally-displaced, and the camps that sustain them. Unintegrated, un-repatriated refugees are often a sign of a conflict that is merely in a dormant phase, and camps often become the staging ground for militancy and extremism (e.g. Rwanda and RPF, Palestine and HAMAS).

Some early warning approaches refer to this category as "accelerating factors", an intermediate stage between conflict trigger incidents and the structural conditions referred to below. The HEWS system at DHA, for example, makes this distinction in its methodology. Such delineations, however, are ultimately arbitrary, and in actual cases of conflict escalation the factors that one might group under "accelerating factors" versus "triggers" could be almost interchangeable with each other depending upon the specifics of each situation. It may be, particularly for the conflict analyst or desk officer concerned with setting operational priorities, that a broad distinction between near-term/dynamic and longer-term/relatively static factors is quite adequate.

C) Structural / Societal Tension

This category of indicators is closely related to those noted above under B, and addresses the presence of structural inequality and discrimination in society, or "relative deprivation", particularly when state-sponsored.¹⁰ Common indicators would include: unequal access of ethnic groups to resources (land, water, credit), opportunities (education, commercial/managerial/professional positions, employment in civil service, recruitment into police and armed forces), and government services. The inter-group tensions created by such inequality are particularly acute during periods of rapid political and economic transition, such as during liberalisation or structural adjustment programs. Minority groups concentrated in a specific region will often have markedly lower levels of over-all economic development, limited local economies, and face environmental/ecological exploitation. These factors combine to increase the volatility of the sociopolitical atmosphere, making violence appear more inevitable.

In order to narrow the focus on conditions which may actually indicate a high potential for conflict, officers should look for an over-all pattern of deliberate structural inequality *linked* to political closure and marginalisation (A above). This is a difficult analytical task, and one that is largely absent from quantitative, computer models of structural conditions, given that it clearly relies on a strong dose of human acumen. It is, however, critical for the purposes of policy relevance. The more that dataset-based systems lack this analytical component, the less they are able to present results in a manner suggestive of logical operational responses, which is perhaps the pre-eminent interest of the policy-maker. Proponents of these projects argue that they are not intended to provide such analysis, but rather to suggest priorities for closer monitoring and interpretation of specific conflict dynamics - in other words, as context-setting for response-oriented early

warning.11

D) Human Rights Violations

Violations of fundamental human rights and civil liberties are often the first clear warning sign of escalation. The focus here should be on certain *key violations* of core rights: right to life, freedom from torture and extrajudicial execution, freedom from arbitrary arrest, *habeus corpus*/disappearances, freedom of expression and association, freedom of religion, freedom of movement. Other indicators here are the severity of coercive force used by government (army, security forces, paramilitary groups) and militant rebel groups, arrest of human rights activists and banning of human rights NGOs (particularly those focusing on ethnic minority issues), restrictions on the independence of the judiciary to investigate violations, and the use of collective punishment to target identifiable ethnic and political/ideological opposition.

As above, the important analytical point here is that officers should look for a *pattern* of serious violations of these core political rights which indicate specific targeting on the basis of group identity (ideological, ethnic, religious, clan). This can indicate the deliberate coercion of civilians or "state terror". Cordon, search, and destruction of entire neighbourhoods and villages in the name of counterinsurgency, indiscriminate retaliation by security forces, and destruction of cultural and religious symbols (e.g. places of worship) is often indicative of such targeting. Massacres and genocide are the most extreme forms of this.

E) Military / Arms Supply

This category tracks the decisive shift from dialogue to coercive tactics by both the state and militant opposition. Have there been recent indications of a sudden increase in the internal deployment of security forces, and/or an increase in recruitment to such forces? Is there a concentration of such internal deployment to a minority and/or frontier region? Are there paramilitary militias or death squads which are suspected of being government-backed and -controlled? Has the government recently increased its imports of light and medium weapons (e.g. assault rifles, land mines, armoured personnel carriers. RPGs) which are more suited to the demands of waging a counterinsurgency campaign? Is there a ready supply of light weapons in the immediate region (perhaps in a neighbouring state) because of recent or ongoing internal wars? Arms supply to insurgent minority groups is particularly likely where such weapons are available across an international border from related ethnic/religious groups, or where a single ethnic group is divided by international borders. Another indicator of ascendant militancy is the removal and/or exile of moderate political leaders (who perhaps have advocated dialogue and compromise) and their replacement with militant leaders bent on military solutions.

F) External Support

The more numerous and committed the sources of external support for anti-state militants, the greater the likelihood of protracted conflict. Identity-based conflicts often involve an irredentist element, where a single ethnic or religious group may be present in two neighbouring sovereign states. This can create the conditions for the external support of a "proxy war": transborder encouragement (diplomatic and political), and supply of training, materiel (arms and supplies), and base camps for militant insurgent groups. The international status of the government under attack is also an important consideration in this calculation, as neighbouring states may feel a certain "obligation" to support the destabilisation of a pariah regime. Regional security and geopolitics is the context for the consideration of these indicators.

G) Other Context-Specific Factors

There will always be some measure of factors which are specific to the conflict being analysed. It is thus very important to include a consideration of conflict-specific indicators such as local political history, unique political groups that may be organised around ideological identity (such as some millenarian religious

movements), the variations in popular support for different factions/groups, and overall trends in inter-group cooperation vs. hostility. In a sense this is a residual category, but it is very important for some consideration to be given to possible local exceptions to the "rule".

To recap the main points made above, officers should orient their analysis in terms of discerning: 1) <u>patterns</u> of relative deprivation and sociopolitical discrimination; 2) the dynamic interaction/overlap of indicator categories; and 3) the critical presence of category A - political process breakdown. A dynamic conflict profile which presents these elements, rather than an unstructured listing of multiple unranked indicators, should provide a reasonably clear warning of high potential for escalation and protracted violence. This approach prioritises certain conflict factors such that they may be targeted for specific operational responses, and matches indicator categories with common current policy frameworks, such as those in use in the DFAIT Global and Human Issues Bureau. This addresses the process link issue by matching analysis with operational capacity. Where such respose-oriented early warning takes place in the context of interagency coordination, strategic targeting of analysis at the relevant operational organisations will be crucial for the promotion of effective early action.

Notes

¹ This was one of the primary points of common understanding at consultations held by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) with the Canadian non-governmental peacebuilding community, 7 February 1997, Ottawa. These consultations, which discussed both preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding policy, were part of an ongoing enabling process for the new Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative. Background briefs and concept papers may be downloaded from <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca>, or obtained from the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Ottawa.

² See in particular Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with Bruce Jones, *Early Warning and Conflict Management*, Vol. 2 of *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: DANIDA/Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). The authors argue that "Early warning was less critical in the Rwanda crisis than the willingness and ability to respond. Nevertheless, the failure to respond adequately was in part influenced by the failure to collect and analyze the data that was available and to translate this information into strategic plans. Information and analysis is critical, not only in assisting in anticipating a crisis, but in determining the appropriate response in a particular situation" (80).

³ For further discussion on this issue, see the Canadian chapter on "Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding," in *DAC Policy Orientations for Development Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Recovery* (Paris: OECD Development Cooperation Directorate, 1997 forthcoming), the final report of the OECD-DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation. See also S. Bassey Ibok and William G. Nhara, eds., *OAU Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in Africa* (Addis Ababa: OAU Conflict Management Division, 1996). This does not, of course, sufficiently address the problem that in several crisis-prone regions, such as South Asia, the regional organisation in question is either too weak or non-existent. Where present, it may only have a social and economic mandate, or where political, only inter-state issues may be addressed in the context of regional security.

⁴ This point was argued in the Netherlands 1996 draft paper for the OECD-DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, "Early Warning and Encouraging Coordinated Action on Analyses of Violent Conflict Potentials" (Working Group I - Topic Area IV). A revised and abbreviated version of this paper appears as part of the chapter "Sources of Violent Conflict: The Scope for Early Warning and Preventive Assistance" in *DAC Policy Orientations*, op.cit.

⁵ UN Secretariat staff from various relevant departments held a series of meetings as an early warning working group in the early 1990s, and concluded that what was important was not so much information itself, but the "combination of skills to recognise early indicators of impending tension, anticipate the likely course of events, and make political judgments about the consequences of recommending a course of action to the decision-making organs and bodies ... [this] stresses the importance of analysis in relation to information management and policy advice." See Juergen Dedring, "Early Warning and the United Nations," *Journal of Ethno-Development* 4, 1994, 102.

⁶ See United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS): Progress and Prospects (New York: UN-DHA, 1995).

⁷ This observation is now almost standard in the literature on internal conflict analysis. Aside from the Dutch DAC paper (which refers to this as a "dynamic phase model"), recent references would include Ronald J. Fisher, "The Potential for Peacebuilding," *Peace and Change* 18(3), 1993): Louis Kriesberg, "Preventive Conflict Resolution of Communal Conflicts," unpublished ms. 1995: Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace* (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 13-15; and Jean-H. Guilmette, "Beyond Emergency Assistance: Early Warning, Conflict Prevention, and Decision Making." in Government of Canada, *Conflict Prevention: African Perspective*, Proceedings of the International Francophone Meeting, Ottawa, 19-22 September 1995 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996).

⁸ See for example B.G. Ramcharan, *The International Law and Practice of Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: The Emerging Global Watch* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991). The author notes that it may be the case "that the world is evolving in a direction making it almost inevitable that the United Nations maintain and operate systems of early warning and urgent action in the environmental, political, economic, social and humanitarian sectors ... the United Nations ought to be able to rise to the needs of the international community for early warning and urgent action" (170-171).

9 This analytical framework draws on several sources dealing with early warning systems and/or conflict indicators. These include: the textual indicator categories of the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, New York (see United Nations, Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS): Progress and Prospects (New York: UNDHA, 1995), 5-8); Juergen Dedring, "Socio-political Indicators for Early Warning Purposes," in Kumar Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda, eds., Early Warning and Conflict Resolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 87-91; The PIOOM Foundation's Checklist for Country/Conflict Profiles (PIOOM, Leiden University); Andrei Dmitrichev, "Indicators (Triggers) for Early Warning of Population Movements at a Country Level," internal policy paper (Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research): Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbours (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 6-12; David Gillies, "Evaluating National Human Rights Performance in the Developing World." Centre for Developing Area Studies Discussion Paper No. 58 (Montréal: McGill University, 1989); Alex P. Schmid, "Repression, State Terrorism, and Genocide: Conceptual Clarifications," in P. Timothy Bushnell, et al., eds., State Organised Terror: The Case of Violent Internal Repression (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 23-37. Discussions with Howard Adelman, Juergen Dedring, Jeremy Bristol, and Adeel Ahmed at the Humanitarian Policy Forum on Humanitarian Early Warning (Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 17 May 1996) also contributed to my approach here. Juergen Dedring, James Mayall, Charlie Jefferson, Andrei Dmitrichev, and David Carment provided comments and suggestions.

¹⁰ For some early warning analysts, the factors grouped in this category appear to be more like "accelerating" factors than structural, background conditions. As alluded to above in the discussion of Category B - Polarisation, this analytical framework focuses on political analysis of dynamic factors in conflict escalation. It thus largely dispenses with macro-level risk assessment of the relatively static elements that make up a country's human development and socioeconomic profile. The quantitative computer modelling and coded datasets typical of this sort of macro analysis are not, in and of themselves, well-placed to guide policy-makers on operational options in specific cases of conflict escalation. Because of this operational orientation here, "accelerators" become the relatively more static, or "structural", indicators. This confusing explanation demonstrates, perhaps, that these distinctions work better in theory than in policy practice.

¹¹ This clarification was emphasised at the November 1996 workshop at CIDCM, U. of Maryland. I am grateful to Ted Gurr for explaining at that time this difference between the purposes of risk assessment as distinct from early warning. Readers will no doubt detect here, however, a definite preference on the part of this author for "small N", case-specific approaches rather than general observations based on "large N" presumptions that statistical significance is necessarily relevant for operational decision-making. Gurr has noted elsewhere that "Risk assessments are based on the systematic analysis of remote and intermediate conditions. Early warning requires near-real-time assessment of events that, in a high-risk environment, are likely to accelerate or trigger the rapid escalation of conflict." See Gurr, "Early Warning Systems: From Surveillance to Assessment to Action," in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 130-138.

and the second
Mapping Violent Conflicts & Human Rights Violations in the mid-1990s: Assessing Escalation and De-Escalation **PIOOM's Approach**

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Since 1993 PIOOM has been monitoring armed conflicts on three levels of intensity, using a broader definition of war than some other monitors like SIPRI (Stockholm) or AKUF (Hamburg). The result is a somewhat less optimistic overall assessment of the world conflict situation. The paper presented explains and comments upon a new version of the PIOOM Conflict Map, which contains new dimensions, partly generated by PIOOM itself, partly synthesized from other sources.

- The paper discusses the following variables and indicators:
- 1. Conflict Levels;
- 2. Confirmed and Suspected Presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction;
- 3. Countries Severely Infested with Land Mines
- 7. States of Emergency;

4. Use of Child Soldiers in Conflicts;

5. United Nations and Regional Peacekeeing Operations; 6. Refugees and Internally Displaced People by Country of Origin; 8. Level of Political Terror under Severely Repressive Regimes;

9. Military Rule;

- 10. Coups d'Etat and Army Mutinies;
- 11. Presence of Systematic Torture;
- 13. UN and other Peacekeeing Operations; 15. Food Security;
- 12. Annual and Cumulative Fatality Figures for High Intensity Conflicts; 14. Use of the Death Penalty;
- 16. Human Development Index.

Introduction

The 20th century has so far seen 250 wars, causing 109,746,000 war-related deaths, according to one estimate.1 The period since 1945 alone has seen close to 200 wars, most of them fought in the Third World. The majority were civil wars, with 84 percent of the estimated 22 million killed in these world being civilians.² The end of the Cold War has seen a reduction of the number of soldiers by 4.6 million, Even so, 22,4 million men and women remain under arms, two-thirds of them in the developing countries. While global military spending began to decline in 1987 and has fallen on average below 3 percent of GNP, today still more than \$ 700 billion is spent on the military worldwide.³

The number of international wars (like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) has greatly declined, except for brief border wars (e.g. Ecuador/Peru) and cross-border hot pursuits (like Turkey's incursions into Northern Iraq). Large-scale wars, like the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, have become exceptional. Instead, domestic conflicts have escalated, sometimes leading to state collapse (as in East Germany) or (near-) state

3 R.L. Sivard, op. cit., p. 11.

R. L. Sivard. World Military and Social Expenditures 1996. Washington, D.C., World Priorities, p. 7. 1

The data refer partly also to the post-Cold War period. - Michael Cranna (Ed.). The True Cost of Conflict. 2 London, Earthscan, 1994, p. xvii.

failure such as in Albania, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, (Northern) Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire.⁴

Between full-scale war and stable peace there are scores of situations of political tensions that can, and in many cases do, give rise to serious and violent political conflicts, low-intensity conflicts and, if unchecked, to high intensity conflicts. PIOOM uses a five-stage model of escalation. The fifth stage of 'high-intensity conflict' is used as substitute for 'war' since the classic battle-field has largely disappeared and the line between war and genocide is becoming fuzzy as civilians are the main victims and often also the deliberate targets in many of these conflicts.

Conflict magnitudes and fatalities

In the following the various features of PIOOM's World Conflict Map for 1996 are explained and commented upon.

The Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) categorizes domestic political situations in a five stage model:

Five Stages of Conflict and Two Crises Thresholds				
STAGE 1: PEACEFUL STABLE SITUATION High Degree of Political Stability and Regime Legitimacy				
STAGE 2: POLITICAL TENSION SITUATION GROWING LEVELS OF SYSTEMIC STRAIN AND INCREASING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLEAVAGES, OFTEN ALONG FACTIONAL LINES				
POLITICAL CRISIS				
STAGE 3: SERIOUS POLITICAL CONFLICT EROSION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND/OR RISING ACCEPTANCE OF VIOLENT FACTIONAL POLITICS				
STAGE 4: LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT Open Hostility and Armed Conflict among Factional Groups; Regime Repression and Insurgency	0			
***HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ***				
STAGE 5: HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT Massacres by, or Open Warfare among, Rival Groups and/or Mass Destruction and Displacement of Sectors of Civilian Population				

• In 1996 PIOOM registered 19 High-Intensity Conflicts (HICs) with more than 1,000 fatalities in a twelve month period (Stage 5). High-intensity conflicts are defined as resulting in 1,000 or more deaths from armed conflict (not necessarily 'war's with 'battle-field' deaths) in a twelve months period.

• In addition, 42 Low-Intensity Conflicts (LICs with more than 100 but less than 1,000 deaths last year) were recorded (Stage 4).

• The number of less lethal Violent Political Conflicts (on the map termed Serious Political Conflicts (SPCs)

⁴ List partly based on K.J. Holsti. *The State, War, and the State of War.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 121.

involving fewer than 100 killed in the reporting period) was 74.

The harvest of death of the high-intensity conflicts alone was at least 131,000 people. Cumulatively, since their beginning, these 19 currently on-going most bloody conflicts alone resulted in between 6,944,000 and 8,384,000 human beings killed. Not included are mass fatality conflicts which since our mid-1996 reporting (for the period mid-1995-mid-1996) have fallen below the 1,000 fatalities a year level in 1996 - conflicts such as Ethiopia (1,500,000 cumulative deaths), Somalia (350,000 cumulative deaths), Bosnia-Herzegovina (60,000 - 263,000 deaths), Iraq (180,000-250,000 dead Kurds and between 100,000 and 300,000 Shi'ites), Peru ((25,000 -30,000 dead), Azerbaijan (25,000-40,000 killed), South Africa (21,000 deaths), Uganda (12,000 killed), Croatia (10,000-50,000 dead). In total these recently de-escalated or terminated high intensity conflicts in the range of ten million people. Even that count is not complete: if we go one more year go further back in time than the last 18 months we would also have to include the conflicts in Mozambique (an est. 1,000,000 killed), Guatemala (150,000), Burma (130,000) India's Punjab conflict with 20-30,000 killed), and Georgia (10,000 killed).⁵

A number of the de-escalated conflicts still figure on the current list of Low Intensity Conflicts, while others have fallen back to the level of Serious Political Conflicts. PIOOM's list is subject to both continuity and change. If we would not have taken the end of 1996 as last registration point we could have added new armed conflicts such as a popular rebellion in Albania, the conflict in West Kalimantan or the repression of an Islamic revolt in China.

Compared to our last Conflict Maps there have been some shifts in the number of high and low intensity conflicts and violent political conflicts:

Contracto and the lower of the	1993	mid-1995	mid-1996	end-1996
High Intensity Conflicts	22	22	20	19
Low Intensity Conflicts	384	39	31	42
Serious Political Conflicts	} °4	4 0	44	74
Total	106	101	95	135

 Table 1: Number of Armed Conflicts between 1993 and 1996

The figures reveal a relatively constant level of about twenty High Intensity Conflicts with a slightly falling tendency. The situation with the Low Intensity Conflicts is less clear since in 1993 we did not differentiate between Low Intensity Conflicts and Serious (but still violent) Political Conflicts. Assuming that there were about as many LICs as SPCs in 1993, the number of LICs also appears relatively constant, though at almost twice the level of HICs. The number of Serious Political Conflicts, on the other hand seems to have gone up dramatically since the last reporting. However, this is only partially so: we did, through more thorough monitoring, discover some violent conflicts which we missed earlier. Another part of the seeming increase in SPCs is also due to the fact that we dis-aggregated some conflicts from the national to the regional level.

⁵ For earlier PIOOM surveys, see PIOOM Newsletter & Progress REPORT, 6 (1994), 20-21; dito, 7 (1995), 21, and A.J. Jongman & A.P. Schmid. Contemporary Armed Conflicts - A Brief Survey, in Dutch Centre for Conflict Prevention, in cooperation with ACCESS and PIOOM (Ed.), Prevention and Management of Conflicts. An International Directory (pp. 25-29). Amsterdam, NCDO, 1996.

In the case of India, for instance, we now list 2 High Intensity Conflicts, 4 Low Intensity Conflicts and 7 Serious Political Conflicts while we had only partly distinguished these in earlier Conflict Maps.

New an interaction of the station of the state		1993	mid-1995	mid-1996	end-1996
	HICs	3	1	1	and a second
Centr. & S. America	LICs	37	7.	4	3
	SPCs		3	5	10
	HICs	3	4	3	2
W., Centr. & E. Europe		}15	6	4	4
	SPCs	1	9	11	20
	HICs	8	10	8	8
Africa (Sub-Sah.)	LICs	}28	9	11	17
	SPCs	1	¹ 6	10	18
	HICs	1	4	2	10000
N. Afr. & Middle East	LICs	}10	5	4	7
	SPCs	,	5	3	7
	HICs	6	3	6	7
Centr. and E. Asia	LICs	}24	12	8	12
	SPCs	1	7	15	19
	HICs	22	22	20	19
Total	LICs	}84	39	31	43
41	SPCs	,	⁴ 0	42	74

Table 2: Regional Distribution of High Intensity Conflicts between 1993 and 1996

The third category - Serious Political Conflicts - is harder to identify due to lack of good data on fatality levels. This is even more true for the category of political tensions (stage 2) which we did not include on the map - a category involving another 60-90 latent and emerging conflict situations. The systematic tracing of all these conflicts is a time-consuming matter and unfortunately well beyond the resources of PIOOM. If Early Warning research wants to reach more maturity the monitoring of the category of 'political tensions' cannot be neglected.

Almost all of these conflicts are domestic conflicts, with or without (clandestine) foreign intervention. There are a few border conflicts (such as Ecuador-Peru, Eritrea-Yemen) but on the whole the trend of war from inter-state to domestic continues. However, the number of foreign military interventions in various forms continues to be high. (Between 1945 and 1991 690 overt military intervention have taken place by various states - that more than one every month in the average)⁶

⁶ David Kinsella and Herbert K. Tillema. Arms and Aggression in the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions, 1948-1991. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(2), June 1995, 311.

United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping Interventions

PIOOM's new Conflict Map lists a more or less constant number of US Peacekeeping and Observer missions compared to our last map - despite a number of new emergencies. The hesitancy to engage in new missions is due to lack of political will, financial constrains, public apathy, some mixed and some disappointing results in the past,⁷ and confusion about the motives and organizational capabilities of some of those involved. An element that has contributed to second thoughts about UN missions has been the realization that extrication from a peacekeeping operations appears to be difficult as most of the conflicts are not really resolved but just linger on, flaring up from time to time to remind a forgetful international community that peace without justice is but temporary. As the United Nations has, in the absence of a United States commitment to multilateral interventions, become more hesitant to intervene, regional actors try to beef up their capabilities for peacekeeping operations though on an inadequate scale and generally with less than impartial objectives. Humanitarian interventions, while saving many lives, have at times had the unfortunate result of 'freezing in' conflicts and delaying or even preventing a resolution. This has made life hard for millions of refugees and other displaced persons. A result has been the emergence of refugee warriors, a major destabilizing element in international relations.

Especially painful has been the inability of the international community to attend adequately to the crisis in the Great Lake district which resulted from the Hutu refugee warriors hostage taking of tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees in Zaire and Tanzania and the subsequent rebellion against the Mobutu regime. If one compares the number of countries caught in high intensity conflicts with those receiving United Nations involvement that goes beyond humanitarian aid, one cannot fail to note an uneven and disproportional distribution of UN efforts. This however, is more a reflection of the political interests of the permanent members of the UN Security Council than the organization itself which is deliberately kept underfunded by key actors preferring non-multilateral approaches in their zones of influence.

Refugees and the Internally Displaced

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) saw her budget triple between 1990 and 1995 to keep up with multiple refugee crises. Part of the budget, however, was also used for the repatriation of some ten million refugees. Nevertheless the situation continues to be grave: According to the 'World Disasters Report 1996', there were, in 1995, no less than 37 million people who had to flee either within their country or across international borders to escape life-threatening situations - an increase with almost 70 percent from the 22 million people counted for 1985.⁸

There are various counts of refugees, and people in refugee-like situations. According to U.S. Committee for Refugees, at the beginning of 1996 the number of refugees and asylum seekers in need of protection

Some of the UN peace missions date back to the origins of the organization (e.g. UNTSO in Israel Palestine since 1948; UNMOGIP at the Indian/Pakistani border, since 1949) and once they were there they tended to last for decades (as UNFICYP in Cyprus since 1964 or UNDOF at the Israeli/Syrian border since 1974 or UNIFIL in southern Lebanon since 1978), indicating that these conflicts were never solved. However, most are of recent post-Cold War origin, like the long overdue UN mission to Cambodia (UNTAC) which began its work in 1992 - almost 14 years after the genocide of the Khmer Rouge that killed up to a third of all Cambodians. While some missions like UNTAC can be considered at least a qualified success (these would include ONUSAL in El Salvador, NOMOZ in Mozambique and UNTAC in Cambodia) others have brought at best mixed results (such as UNOSOM II in Somalia since 1993 or UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia since 1992) while others have been a failure (notably UNAMIR in Rwanda since 1993 or inconspicuous in its results (like UNAVEM II in Angola since 1991).

⁸ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. World Disasters Report 1996. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 9.

and/or assistance numbered more than 15 million people. In July 1996, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees referred to a total of 26.1 persons of concern to UNHCR, of whom just over half, 13.2 million people, were refugees. Of the remainder 3.4. million were returnees, 4.6 million were internally displaced persons, and 4.8 million were others of humanitarian concern, for the most part victims of conflict.⁹

Table 3: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Need of Protection and/or Assistance (as of 31 December 1995).

Table 5. Rejugees und Asytum Sector of the sector of	5,222,000
Africa	2,521,000
Europe	256,000
The Americans and the Caribbean	453,000
East Asia and the Pacific	5,499,000
Middle East	1,386,000
South and Central Asia	15,337,000
World Total	

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey 1996. Washington, D.C., USCR, 1996, pp.4-5.

 Table 4: Number of External Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in 19 High-Intensity Conflicts, End

 of 1995

0) 1995	Ext. Refugees	Internally Displaced
	290.000	300.000
Burundi	460.000	250.000
Chechnya	1.545.000	500.000
Rwanda	2.220.200	450.000
Afghanistan		40.000
Algeria	?	225.000
Zaire (East)	56.000	
Turkey	17.000	2.000.000
Liberia	724.000	1.000.000
Sierra Leone	364.000	1.000.000
Sri Lanka	94.000	850.000
	313.000	1.500.000
Angola	26.200	55.000
Cambodia	200	> 300.000
Colombia	> 1000	250.000
India	?	?
Pakistan	535.000	4.000.000
Sudan		500.000
Tajikistan	170.400	200.000
Chad	29.000	:
Total	> 6.845.000	> 13.220.000

Source: U. S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey 1996. Washington, D.C., USCR, 1996; PIOOM.

In 1995 (the latest year for which figures are available at the time of this writing) more than 250,000 asylum seekers have been denied refugee status and have been sent back against their will to the country of origin,¹⁰ despite, in many cases, grounded fears of persecution or death. This is a growing and especially

⁹ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Statement to the 1996 Substantive Session of ECOSOC on the Annual Report of UNHCR, 18 July 1996 (mimeo), p.1.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

worrisome trend, since it deterioration of the world's refugee regime reflects a lack of solidarity and an unwillingness of honouring obligations of international law.

The number of internally displaced persons is much higher than the one of externally displaced but there are no complete and reliable data on their number and whereabouts. In Europe alone there are over four million displaced persons in the Balkan, Turkey and the Caucasus. 17 of the 19 High Intensity Conflicts on PIOOM's current Conflict Map together have resulted in almost seven million refugees and more than thirteen million internally displaced persons - together some twenty million uprooted people. For Pakistan and, in part, Algeria and Chad, we lack figures.

Weapons

One of the ironies of the present world order is that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are responsible for more than 80 percent of all arms exports to the Third World - the main theatre of armed conflict. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a considerable flow of surplus arms from these - and other - countries to conflict theatres. Some of the large weapon producers find it especially hard to convert military to civilian production and have sought to maintain or (re-)gain markets abroad. While ten years ago Soviet arms exports were almost one third -\$ 25 billion - of the global arms trade which then stood at a record \$ 74 billion, Russian weapon exports were down to \$ 1.7 billion in 1994 - less than ten percent of global arms trade which by 1994 had dropped to \$ 22 billion." Since 1994, however, Russian sales rose, thanks to cut-rate prices, to \$ 3 billion in 1995, \$ 3.5 billion in 1996 while estimates for 1997 are \$ 5 billion. The United States has, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, become the most prominent exporter of arms; three quarter of its arms sales in the first half of the 1990s went to regimes where the people had little say in government.¹² In 1993, 73 percent of all official arms agreements with the Third World - worth \$ 14.8 billion - were concluded by the United States.¹³ While in the Cold War the main antagonists were arming their client nations and insurgent groups, the trading of drugs for arms has become a major alternative for obtaining arms. The SLORC regime in Burma has been said to use drug moneys for arms sales amounting to \$1 billion from China. In some conflicts ivory *e.g. Angola) and diamonds (e.g. Sierra Leone) are taking the place of drugs. This is, in part, also the case in the current conflict in the African Great Lake district which has been attracting weapons from 18 different countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The Hutus in Zaire were, for instance, in possession of Italian landmines. ¹⁴ Italy is just one of some fifty nations that export landmines which come in some 350 different types.¹⁵

Landmines

There are over one hundred million landmines waiting for victims in 69 countries.¹⁶ While some date back to World War II, many are of recent making and cruel sophistication. In 1993, for instance, another 2.5

R. L. Sivard. World Military and Social Expenditures 1996. 16th edition. Washington, D.C., World Priorities, 1996, p. 12; Jo L. Husbands. Preventing the Spread of Arms Delivery Means and Conventional Weapons, in: J.A. Larsen & G. J. Rattray (Eds.). Arms Control. Toward the 21st Century. Boulder, Rienner, 1996, p. 229.

¹² R.L. Sivard, op. cit., p. 5.

¹³ Jo L. Husbands, op. cit., p. 232.

¹⁴ Ad Woudenberg. Oorlogsbedrijven en de Wapenhandel in Afrika. Overleven, 15(64), March 1997, p. 10, 12 [magazine Amsterdam].

¹⁵ R.L. Sivard et al. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1996.* 16th edition. Washington, D.C., World Priorities, 1996, p. 15.

¹⁶ Jane E. Holl. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Second Progress Report. New York, July 1996, p. 3; Jo L. Husbands, op. cit., p. 237.

million new mines were hidden in the ground - more than 30 times the number removed from the soil in that year. While there have been increasing calls for the banning of the use of landmines and 50 governments announced in June 1996 their determination to prohibit exports, the campaign against the use of landmines has still a long way to go while more than 2,000 people are injured or killed by them every month.¹⁷ Landmines leave a legacy of death long after a conflict has come to an end. They make farming risky if not impossible in some parts of the world. At least 17 countries are sown with at least one million landmines:

Egypt	23 million	Vietnam	3 million
Angola	9-15 million	Croatia	3 million
Iran	12 million	Bosnia-Herzegovina	3 million
Afghanistan	10 million	Mozambique	1-2 million
Irak	10 million	Somalia	1-2 million
Cambodia	8-10 million	Ukraine	1 million
Libya	2-12 million	Sudan	1 million
Kuwait	5-7 million	Eritrea	1 million
China	6 million		

 Table 5: Countries Most Severely Affected by Landmines

Source: UN/Etat du Monde 1996; Handicap International 2/97; International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Weapons of mass destruction

The number of nuclear warheads in the world has been reduced since the end of the Cold War. It is now assumed that Russia still possesses 20,000 nuclear weapons, the United States 15,200, France 600, China 500, while the United Kingdom has 300 such weapons of mass destruction. Israel, India and Pakistan are also assumed to be nuclear powers, as was South Africa. There is greater uncertainty about the current state of the nuclear programmes of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya.¹⁸

Nuclear programmes have in the past also been attributed to Argentina, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan. Unfortunately the end of the Cold War has increased rather than decreased the risk that weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of madmen and terrorists. After the occupation of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein engaged in a crash programme to develop a nuclear weapon by the spring of 1991 - having already experimented with radiological weapons. His biological weapons programme had given him 19.000 litres of deadly Anthrax and in the field of chemical weapons he had by 1990 produced over 100 tons of the VX nerve gas.¹⁹ It is still not clear how much of his ABC programme he managed to hide away from UN inspectors. Other states like Iran, Libya, Taiwan, Egypt and North Korea have also made efforts to acquire

17 R.L. Sivard, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁸ Pacific Research (Australian National University), 9(3), August 1996, p. 5.- SIPRI lists figures that differ somewhat from the above: "At the beginning of 1995, there were at least 20,000 nuclear warheads in the operational inventories of the NPT nuclear weapon states: 7770 strategic and several hundred tactical warheads for the USA; 8.527 strategic and 2.000-6.000 tactical warheads for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); 250-300 warheads for the UK; just over 500 warheads for France; and approximately 300 warheads for China. There were fewer than 100 warheads in Israel". -SIPRI Yearbook, 1996, p. 327.

¹⁹ David Kay in lecture at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., January 14, 1997. Figures cited by R.L. Sivard differ from these. According to Sivard "....Iraq had stockpiled over 27,000 chemical bombs, rockets and artillery shells, 30 SCUD chemical warheads, 500 tons of mustard and nerve agents, and thousands of tons of precursor chemicals.(...) In 1995 Iraq also revealed an extensive biological warfare program to United Nations inspectors including :90,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,300 liters of anthrax, large amounts of a cancer-causing agent, and research on mycotoxins and infectious viruses". Op. cit., p. 27.

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some types of weapons of mass destruction.²⁰ States are no longer the only 'players' in the field. In Japan, a blind religious sect leader managed to built up \$ 1.4 billion in financial holdings and recruit physicists and chemists for his experiments in mass destruction. In two Sarin nerve gas attacks in Matsumoto (June 26, 1994) and in the Tokyo subway (March 20, 1995) the AUM Shinrikyo sect wounded thousands of people while 18 persons were killed. In the papers of Shoko Asahara price lists of Russian nuclear warheads were found.²¹ Proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state i.e. non-territorial actors (the AUM sect had followers in several countries, including Russia) means that deterrence becomes impossible. The more governments acquire weapons of mass destruction, the more likely such weapons end up in the hands of some non-deterrable non-state actors. The most likely threat are not so much nuclear explosives but the dispersion of highly radioactive materials by conventional explosives (radiological bombs) and the use of biological and chemical weapons. Table 6 provides an overview of known and suspected producers.

Table 6 reveals that there at least 31 states engaged in the production or acquisition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Chemical weapons are the easiest to produce and while almost as many states which engaged in bacteriological weapon programmes also engaged in nuclear programmes the number of states associated with chemical warfare preparations is largest and includes other suspects than listed below (in particular Sudan (C), Vietnam (C), Guatemala (c), Peru (c), Chile (c), and Afghanistan (c).

Table 6: States with a Chemical and/or Bacteriological Warfare Programmes (1993)

Known: Iraq, former Soviet Union, United States.

Probable: China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Israel, Libya, Burma, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan.

Possible: Angola, Argentina, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, France, Indonesia, Laos, Poland, Romania, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa and Thailand.

Source: Marie Isabelle Chevrier. The Control of Biological Weapons. In: Jeffrey A. Larsen & Gregory J. Rattray (Eds.) Arms Control Towards the 21st Century. Boulder, Rienner, 1996, pp. 219.

Child Soldiers

Civilians have become the main victims of armed conflict: only 1 in 10 conflict casualties is estimated to be a soldier. In former Yugoslavia rape of women has been elevated to a tactic of warfare in the process of 'ethnic cleansing'. At the same time children are recruited in many theatres of conflict where there is a short supply of war-loving adults. In the PIOOM Conflict Map combatant are identified as child soldiers - whether on the side of government or armed opposition - when they are younger than 18 years of age. This is the general age of majority where young people also receive voting rights. States have generally been keen to recruit young men at an early age. The Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols both mention a minimum age for recruitment of only 15 years of age and even the Convention on the Rights of the Child did not manage to include a higher age.²² Two hundred thousand and possible as many as one quarter million of child soldiers under 18 years of age are estimated to take part in the fighting in at least 32 current and recent conflicts on all continents, often on both sides of a civil war.²³ They have also been recruited for terrorist operations such as the recent occupation of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in

²⁰ According to the CIA; cit. Marie Isabelle Chevrier. The Control of Biological Weapons. In: Jeffrey A. Larsen & Gregory J. Rattray (Eds.). Arms Control toward the 21st Century. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 217.

²¹ For a history of this bizarre sect, see: David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall. De sekte aan het einde van de wereld. Amsterdam, Sijthoff, 1996.

²² Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin. Children. The Invisible Soldiers. Vaxjo, Redda Barnen, 1996, p. 16.

²³ Ibid., pp. 20-21, 23, 31.

Lima, Peru where some of the Tupac Amaru terrorists with dynamite strapped around their waste were girls and boys not older than 15-16 years.²⁴ Some child soldiers were as young as 5 years of age (Cambodia, Sierra Leone), 6 (Liberia), 7 (Sudan, Turkey), 8 (Angola, Colombia), 9 (Peru, Lebanon), or 10 (Bosnia, Burma, Iraq, Philippines, Sri Lanka).25 Often children have been used in the front lines. In the 1980s Iran reportedly used waves of children in its war with Iraq to clear mine fields, hanging the children a key around their neck that would open the door to heaven when they stepped on a landmine.26 Child soldiers are of both sexes and the young girls are prone to be abused for military as well as sexual services.

In the current 19 High Intensity Conflicts child soldiers were seen in all but four conflicts (Pakistan, Chad, Zaire and Tadjikistan). Especially in the last two cases this might be more a consequence of lack of data than non-existence of child soldiers.

States of emergency

In times of increased armed conflicts the government often imposes a State of Emergency in which many civil liberties and rights are suspended, arrests without trial take place and various forms of censorship are imposed either in part or all of the country. Such situations lend themselves to various multiple abuses of power and need to be carefully watched. Some governments and military establishments use the draconian instrument of a State of Emergency routinely. In Brunei a State of Emergency has been in place since the early 1960s, despite the absence of manifest conflict. Syrians live under a State of Emergency since 1963. In Colombia, the military has learned to appreciate the double pay they enjoy under a State of Emergency. According to the UN Rapporteur on States of Emergency, Leandro Despouy, such States of Emergency were, in early 1996, in force in 30 countries or parts thereof.²⁷ The list includes sometimes unexpected places like Venezuela or the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). Since 1985 no less than 87 states have proclaimed, prolonged or terminated States of Emergency.

Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East & N. Africa	Asia	Americas	Europe
Burundi Liberia Mali Niger Rwanda S. Leone Somalia Sudan Zambia	Algeria Egypt Israel Territories occu- pied by Israel Syria Yemen	Brunei Burma Kyrgyztan Sri Lanka Tadjkistan	Colombia Peru Venezuela	Azerbajian Bosnia-Herz. Croatia Georgia RusFed. Turkey U.K. (N.Ireland) Yugoslavia

Table 1: Countries (or part of cour	itries) were State of Emergency was in Force in F	
1	integy were blute of Emergency was in Force in F	arb, 1006

Source: Mr. Despouy, UN Rapporteur, cit. Human Rights Monitor, No. 34, Sept. 1996, p. 40.

From the 19 high intensity conflict situations on PIOOM's list, all but six (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Cambodia, Angola and Chad) figure on UN Rapporteur Despouy's register of States of Emergency.

²⁴ Sally Bowen. An unscripted bit-part player in a televised revolution. Financial Times, 28 December 1996, p. 2.

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 53-65.

²⁶ R. Brett & M. McCallin, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

²⁷ Human Rights Monitor, No. 34, September 1996, pp. 37-38.

Military Rule, Coups and Mutinies

High conflict levels tend to increase the role of the military vis-a-vis civilian ministers. In some cases the military - or warlords - take over the government as has been the case in Burma, Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan in recent years.²⁸ In fact the list of quasi-military regimes is much longer as successful Putschists who managed to take state power tend to exchange their khaki uniforms for civilian cloths and legitimize their rule with usually (not always!) rigged elections. Military control can take several forms: 1. key political leadership is performed by military officers, 2. there exists a State of Emergency or Martial Law; 3. the security forces exercise extrajudicial authority, or 4. there is a lack of central political control over the armed forces. Military rule in this wider sense was the social reality in 61 countries in 1992, according to one source.²⁹ The list includes countries occupied by a foreign military power as is the cases in places like Lebanon, Cyprus, Tibet, East Timor, Syria (Golan), Azerbajian or Moldova.

Compared to previous decades military coups d'etat have become fewer. In 1996 there was a bloodless coup in Sierra Leone on January 16th, a successful army coup in Niger on January 27th and a Tutsi coup in Burundi on July 25th. A coup attempt in Qatar - one of almost a dozen surviving absolutist systems in the world³⁰ - on January 17th, 1996 could be prevented. An unsuccessful military coup was also attempted in Iraq in August 1996 but was quelled by Saddam Hussein. An American secret operation from North Iraq to weaken his regime also backfired as one Kurdish fraction invited Saddam Hussein into Free Kurdistan against the other.

Latin America, traditionally a hot-bed of military coups, has been remarkably free of Putsches since its governments agreed not to recognize any regime that came to power by force anymore. There was, however, an army mutiny in Paraguay in April 1996 when the military Chief of Staff was fired. After the revolt he was promoted to become Minister of Defense. An army mutinies took also place in Guinea (Africa) on January 26th 1996. The Central African Republic saw even three such mutinies in April, May and November 1996, with the French intervening militarily to restore order.

Russia has been several time on the verge of a military takeover since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most notably in 1993. In 1996 only the clever manoevering of President Jeltsin - he brought in and subsequently fired General Alexander Lebed to win the elections from the former communists and their nationalist allies - saved the country from a return to a situation where the military would again have played a prominent role in national affairs.

Coups and mutinies are not the only form of irregular regime changes. For those in power it is enough to rig elections as was the case in Armenia and Albania in 1996. The price for the latter, however, was a popular revolt which begun in southern Albania which might yet cost the head of Sali Berisha.

Political Terror Scale

For some years PIOOM has monitored repression levels in all states, using a Five-Point Political Terror Scale developed by Michael Stohl et al. at Purdue University (USA). It is based on an annual coding of the U.S. State Department Country Reports which usually are published in February of each year. The various shades of green on the Conflict Map reflect the upper three levels of political terror (flight green signifying lighter repression than darker shades). The present colouring reflects the situation of 1995 as we have not yet begun the coding of the 1996 edition of the 'Country Reports'. We compare our coding with the one of Mark Gibney

²⁸ Darbyshire & Darbyshire, 1996.

²⁹ R.L. Sivard. World Military and Social Expenditures, 1993, p. 23.

³⁰ The others absolutist systems are Bhutan, Brunei, Swaziland, Bahrein, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the Vatican and Tonga. - Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1996.

and his colleagues at Purdue University who have been doing this since 1980, using in addition to the State Department's 'Country Reports' also Amnesty International yearbooks. Generally there is a 90 percent overlap between the PIOOM and the Purdue coding. Where there are differences we re-evaluate our own interpretation on the human rights situation to determine whether our or their coding has been too high or too low in any controversial case. The current map excludes repression level 2 which is relatively hard to distinguish from a repression-free situation.

With regard to the 19 high intensity conflict situations we found, not surprisingly given the internal character of these conflicts, that the Political Terror Scale indicated level '5' (highest level, in half of these conflicts: Burundi, Chechnya, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Algeria, Liberia. Sri Lanka, Sudan) or level '4' for the other half (Turkey, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Pakistan, India, Tadjikistan, Chad and Zaire). The Political Terror Scale, it should be noted, measures the situation in 1995, as the 1996 coding has not yet begun at PIOOM.

Torture

Another index of repression is the systematic use of the politics of pain - torture - for social control.³¹

Americas (7)	Africa (26)	Middle East (6)
Brazil	Algeria	Bahrein
Colombia	Angola	Iran
Guatemala	Burkina Faso	Iraq
Mexico	Burundi	Lebanon
Paraguay	Cameroon	Saudi Arabia
Peru	Chad	Syria
Venezuela	Congo	
	Djibouti	Asia & Far East (14)
Europe (5)	Egypt	Afghanistan
Bosnia-Herz.	Equit. Guinea	Bangladesh
Chechnya (Russia)	Ethiopia	Bhutan
Georgia	Gabon	Burma (Myanmar)
Serbia	Gambia	Cambodia
Turkey	Guinea	China People's Rep.
All plans when many bridge	Guinea Bissau	India
	Kenya	Indonesia
	Liberia	North Korea
	Libya	Pakistan
	Mozambique	Philippines
	Nigeria	Sri Lanka
	Rwanda	Tajikistan
	Senegal	Thailand
	Sierra Leone	
	Somalia	
	Sudan	
	Zaire	

Table 8: Countries in which torture has been common in recent years

Source: Redress: *The Worldwide Extent of Torture 1995*. London, The Redress Trust, 1996; U.S. Government, Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995. Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, in accordance with Sections 116(d) and 502 (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended. Washington,D.C., Government Printing Office, February 1996. State, 1996.

³¹ Cf. R.D. Crelinsten & A.P. Schmid (Eds.). The Politics of Pain. Torturers and Thier Masters. Boulder, Westview, 1995.

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While torture occurs - either by governments or, less frequently, by armed opposition forces in more than 100 countries, torture and/or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment emanated from 151 countries (out of 185 UN member states) in 1995³². On the basis of a reports from The Redress Trust and the State Department's 'Country Reports' as well as other sources that noted 'systematic','widespread', 'common','frequent', or 'routine' use of torture by agents of state we have assigned the torture symbol 'T' to our map. It comes as no surprise that the 19 high intensity conflict situations figure, without a single exception, among the states that practice systematic torture. Incidentally, it should be noted that torture is practiced also by guerrilla movements, terrorist organizations, organized crime and in sexual crimes. Such uses are not recorded here. Torture is a crime and the crime of torture in all 19 High Intensity Conflicts has become routine.

Death penalty

Another indicator of state protection of its citizens is the application of the death penalty. Generally there is considerable overlap between the countries that apply the death penalty for a variety of crimes and those that also show little concern for the rights of men and women in the context of political conflict. The number of governments that still have the death penalty on their books is decreasing: in 1979 the death sentence was still an option in 143 countries; by 1996 there were 'only' 95 countries that still had the death penalty on their books and applied it.³³ The Russian Federation, for instance, eager to join the Council of Europe, brought the number of crimes for which the death penalty could be applied back from 28 to 5 and suspended the application of the death penalty in all cases on August 2, 1996. Yet the Duma, the Russian parliament, might yet reverse this presidential decision, given the fact that Russia has one of the largest prison populations in the world with more than one million prisoners in camps and detention centers (780 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, as compared to 565 in the United States or 66 in the Netherlands).³⁴ China, in contrast to post-Communist Russia, uses the death penalty on a very large scale.

With regard to the 19 High Intensity Conflict countries we find the death penalty in place in all countries except Russia (since August 1996), Angola and Colombia. Given the cheapness of life in the latter countries - Colombia, for instance, is said to have commercial bureaus for hired killers and one of the highest murder rates in the world - these exceptions unfortunately mean little. Where extrajudicial killings by military-, police- or vigilante-directed death squads and 'sicari' (assassins) have become routine, the 'need' for the death penalty is small indeed.

Food Insecurity

While poverty and hunger are not a direct cause of armed conflict, they are often a contributing factor and almost always a consequence. A look at the countries suffering from food insecurity shows a large overlap with the ones of violent conflict. All but three (Malawi, Madagascar, Vietnam) are currently experiencing violent conflicts of various levels of intensity. More than 100 million people in conflict zones are chronically malnourished.³⁵

³² The Redress Trust. The Mission of Redress. London, The Redress Trust, 1996, pp.11-12.

³³ D. Bronkhorst. Prisma van de mensenrechten. Utrecht, Het Spectrum, 1992, p. 70; Amnesty International (International Secretariat). The Death Penalty. List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (October 1996). London, AI, 1996 (ACT 50/09/96), p. 1. Of the total of 99 abolitionist countries 58 had abolished the death penalties for all crimes, 15 for ordinary crimes only and 26 countries were abolitionists.

³⁴ NRC-Handelsblad, 10 March 1996, p. 6.

³⁵ United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 1996. New York, Oxford University Press, p. 24.

	GNP p.c.	HIC	LIC	SPC
Thirty status 3	(1994)			
Rwanda*	\$ 80	Х		THE STREET IS COMPLETE
Mozambique*	\$ 90		х	
Ethiopia*	\$ 100		x	
Tanzania	\$ 140			х
Sierra Leone	\$ 160	х		
Burundi*	\$ 160	х		
Malawi*	\$ 170			
Chad*	\$ 180	x		
Uganda*	\$ 190		х	
Madagascar	\$ 200			
Nepal	\$ 200			x
Vietnam	\$ 200			
Bangladesh*	\$ 220		х	
Haiti*	\$ 230			x
Niger	\$ 230			x

 Table 9: Conflict Level of 15 Poorest Countries in the World

 (Countries where food supply per capita is 10-30 percent below

Sources: UNDP, Worldbank, as quoted in Bodo Harenberg, op. cit., p.37; R. L. Sivard. World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, op. cit., p.31; <u>NRC Handelsblad</u>, 9 Nov. 1996, pp.24-25.

Currently, the world still counts 1,3 billion people who live in deep poverty. ³⁶ As the world's population grows from 5.75 billion people (1995) to an estimated 8.3 billion in the year 2025 if present trends continue, this will require an increase in food production of 75 percent, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). However, while grain production rose each year by about 3 percent in the period 1950-1990, annual increased decreased to one percent in the 1990s - way below the current population growth rate of 1,6 percent. While the world has focused mainly on the food crisis in North Korea there were, in 1996, more than 800 million people were constantly undernourished, including an estimated 200 million children. Countries most severely affected, in addition to those marked with an asterix in Table 9 are Afghanistan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Bolivia, Namibia, Peru, Sudan, Zambia, Kenya and North Korea. The only consolation in this bleak picture is that the situation has been worse in the past when 1 billion people were underfed in 1975.³⁷ Yet the future might be more bleak again. When grain production in 1995 was reduced by 3 percent due to drought and inundations, world reserves were halved. In Europe reserves were down to 3 million tons in early 1996 from 25 million tons of grain in 1993 while global reserves in 1996 were down to just 49 days (compared to more than 70 days in the 1980s). This will increase the price of grain (in 1973 when stocks went down to 55 days prices doubled).³⁸ Rich countries have reduced their food aid by half during the 1990 ³⁹ while at the same time about 40 million people were, in 1995, directly dependent on International Air or stay alive in Azerbajian, Georgia, Tadjikistan, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Liberia. Bosnia, Angola, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia - all war-torn countries or countries

³⁶ R.L. Sivard, op. cit., p. 30.

³⁷ Lester R. Brown, Nicolas Lenssen, and Hal Kane. Vital Signs 995/1996. The Trends that Shape our Future. London, Earthscan, 1996, p. 146.

³⁸ L. Brown et al. Vital Signs 1995- 1996, op .cit., p. 18.

³⁹ Bodo Harenberg (Ed.). Harenberg Lexikon der Gegenwart '97. Dortmunt, Harenberg Lexikon Verlag, 1996, pp. 191-192.

housing refugees from such neighbouring countries⁴⁰. While natural disasters such as drought played a role in the food shortages of Chad, Ethiopia and Kenya, those in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi were mainly a consequence of the civil wars.⁴¹

For the 19 HIC countries of our Map food insecurity (defined as food supply per capita 10-30 percent below nutritional requirements) has been a problem for eight countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, Chad while ten (Algeria, Cambodia, Chechnya. Colombia, Liberia, India, Pakistan, Tadjikistan, Turkey, Sri Lanka and Zaire) seem less affected. ⁴²

Human Development Index

One of the most sophisticated indexes that has emerged in the 1990s from the United Nations is the Human Development Index, which is a composite index of equal weight of achievements in basic human capabilities in three crucial dimensions :

- a long and healthy life;
- knowledge, and
- a decent standard of living.43

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has classified all countries into three groups: those with

- a high level of human development (with HDI values of 0.800 and above);
- those with a medium human development level (with values between 0.500 and 0.799), and
- those with HDI values below 0.500. 44

The countries which have the largest cumulative fatalities from current conflicts are listed in the following table and compared with averages of groups of countries.

In the second	HDI	Rank (n=174)
Cambodia	0.325	156
Afghanistan	0.229	169
Sudan	0.359	146
Angola	0.283	165
Rwanda	0.332	152
Chad	0.291	163
Burundi	0.282	166
Liberia	0.331	158
Colombia	0.840	49
Russia (Chechnya)	0.804	57
Algeria	0.746	69

Table 10: Countries in	Conflict and thei	r Human Development	Index,	199345

40 According to the United States' Central Intelligence Agency. For details, see: A.P. Schmid (Ed.). Whither Refugee? The Refugee Crisis: Problems and Solutions. Leiden, PIOOM, 1996,, p. 6.

41 Rudiger Dingemann. Westermann Lexikon. Krisenherde der Welt. Konflikte und Kriege seit 1945. Braunschweig, Westermann, 1996, p. 13.

42 R.L. Sivard, op. cit., p.31; <u>NRC Handelsblad</u>, 9 Nov. 1996, pp.24-25.- As India appears twice on the Map it does not add up to 19.

43 In the Human Development Index the level of education is expressed as average years of schooling of adults and the literacy rate. Health is expressed as life expectancy at birth. Standard of living is expressed by purchasing power parity (PPP). - Brigitte Hamm. Gross Human rights Violations in 1994. Duisburg, INEF, 1996, p. 7.

44 India and China were excluded from aggregate calculations because of the size of their populations and Gross Domestic Products. -Cf. UNDP. *Human Development Report 1996*, op. cit., p. 132.

45 UNDP. Human Development Report 1996, op. cit., pp. 135-137.

Sri Lanka	0.698	89
India	0.436	
Zaire	0.371	135
Sierra Leone	0.219	141
Turkey	0.711	173
Pakistan	0.442	84 134
For comparison:		
All developing countries	0.563	
Least developed countries	0.331	
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.379	
Industrial Countries	0.909	
World	0.746	

The table reveals that only one country (Colombia) among the top fifty countries on the Human Development Index also features on the High Intensity Conflict level countries. Four more (Russia, Algeria, Sri Lanka and Turkey are in the 51-100 group of the 174 countries ranked. Four more (Pakistan, India, Sudan and Zaire) are in the ranks between 100-150 while no fewer than seven are ranking in the 150-174 group of countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index. The group of countries not ranking among the hundred top countries on the HDI also include many countries with ongoing Low Intensity Conflicts such as Guatemala (rank 112), Ethiopia (168), Mozambique (167), Uganda (155), Somalia (172), Bangladesh (143), India (135), Pakistan (134) Burma (133), South Africa (100), Egypt (106), China (108), and Iraq (109). The question of what causes what - a low HDI rank a high HIC rank or vice versa - can only be answered on a case by case basis.

Conflict Escalation Assessment

In our 1995 survey of Contemporary Conflicts⁴⁶ we compared several existing conflict registers in an attempt to: (AKUF (Hamburg), DCPR (Uppsala), SIPRI (Stockholm), Annual of War (London) with PIOOM's own monitoring attempt to

- 1) determine trends in warfare;
- 2) determine reliability of death toll estimates and
- 3) determine major escalation indicators.

One of our findings was that the PIOOM Conflict Map included a number of conflicts that were missing in other lists, particularly conflicts on the serious political conflict level (see Tables 11 and 12). Death toll estimates by PIOOM also resulted in the fact that more than a dozen conflicts were listed as high-intensity conflicts by PIOOM while there were excluded from other lists or listed only at the lower end of the violence spectrum. This has resulted in a discussion whether death toll estimates should be used as the major criterium for classifying conflicts. As tables ? and ? show even the well-known and respected SIPRI conflict list has quite a number of conflicts for which there are no reliable estimates of battle-related deaths.

Some registers close the books following the conclusion of a truce or peace accord. Post-agreement situations too should be monitored to be able to register signs of conflict re-escalation. In several post-truce situations the level of violence remains high and so does the risk of relapse into major fighting. Many armed conflicts go through alternating periods of high and lower levels of violence until a sustainable peace is reached. A better analysis of the conflict dynamics is necessary. This requires a more reliable escalation index than is presently available in the (open) literature.

⁴⁶ A.J. Jongman in cooperation with A. P. Schmid. Contemporary Conflicts. A Global Survey of High- and Lower-Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes. <u>PIOOM Newsletter & Progress REPORT</u>, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1995, pp.14-23.

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AKUF	A. of War	DCPR	PIOOM *	SIPRI
(Hamburg)	(London)	(Uppsala)	(Leiden)	(Stockh.)
41 wars 17 armed conflicts	42 wars	7 wars 18 intermediate armed conflicts 17 minor armed conflicts 13 unclear cases	22 high-intensity conflicts39 lower intensity conflicts40 serious disputes	31 major armed conflicts

Table 11: Number of Wars and other Forms of Violent Conflict in Five Conflict Registers for the Year 1994

* = PIOOM covered the period of 31st July 1994- 31st July, 1995.

Table 12: Coverage of Cases by Four Conflict Registers

. Checkings	PIOOM	(Leiden)	AKUF	(Hamburg)	DCPR (Uppsala)	SIPRI	Annual
-HOMORY	>1.000	>1.000			10	eoph e ligos	(Stockh.)	of War
1 Creeks	>1.000	>1.000	War	Armed	Armed	Unclear	6 1 -100 11	(London)
Alter take	deaths	annual		Conflict	Conflict		Major	11
- Zacharth	threshold (cumula.)			I weatsons;			Armed Conflict	War
Burundi	х	Х	-	х	-	х	-	x
Chad	x	x	x	-magining	COURCE ID. 7	x	to guiden	· · ·
Chechnya	х	x	х	Seicond Jo	minor	o transform	sept listaor.	
Ethiopia	х	х	-	x	controctation of the	ini l <u>o</u> tiviti	nobin <u>p</u> ettas	x
Ghana	х	х	- 1	· · ·	-	_ [mol	100 200:00	-
Iraq (Kurds)	х	x	х	is an-the los	i) ol-jacoli	a 150-1556	anto Liberta	x
Mali	х	-	х	-	minor	-	-	-
Pakistan	x	x	milit- als	x	1040-018	erata anti-tra	100 - 10 mm	x
Philipp. (Moros)	х	-	x	- •	minor	telai-ci at) El = estad	
North Uganda	х	-	-	- 20070	minor	10 V2 302	130-29-001	x
Sierra Leone	х	х	x	-	minor	1000-0 74	Nosile har	stimal s
South Lebanon	x	end- saur	x	nod mailten h	wish-artsh	ator 14 miles	Augente anti-	x
Zaire	x	x	-	х	- 31	muc-mark)	store-a le	-

We discovered that the existing conflict registers do hardly contain any information on escalation or deescalation. Only by consulting successive annual reports one can extract information on changes. SIPRI is the only register containing information on one escalation indicator, the increase or decrease in battle-related deaths. However, for one third of the thirty plus conflicts SIPRI has no reliable death toll estimates which results in a very incomplete assessment. Based on discussions on (de-)escalation indicators at early warning conferences in the past few years, PIOOM has developed a master list of about 400 indicators which have been suggested in the literature on Early Warning. In general, PIOOM distinguishes between four different types of indicators.

- 1. General facilitating, pre-disposing conditions (Example: Current regime accurit
- (Example: Current regime acquires power through force (revolution or coup).) 2 Specific facilitating and the second secon
- 2. Specific facilitating proximate situational circumstances (Example: Regime refuses to hand over political power after lost elections.)
- General inhibiting pre-disposing conditions (Example: A system of 'checks and balances' assures that government is limited and power is not centralized.)
- Specific inhibiting proximate situational circumstances (Example: Cease-fire and controlled disarmament of political factions accompanied by dialogue between opponents.)

With regard to conflict escalation, the PIOOM Checklist for Country/Conflict Profiles distinguishes 14 variables (which we brought back to 13 for the current paper, pulling together questions 3 and 4):

Recent Conflict (De-)Escalation

Has the conflict (de-)escalated in the past six months? Fill in between brackets: E for Escalation, D for De-Escalation, S for 'more or less the Same as six months ago', H for 'Hard to tell'.

- () Excessive use of force by government forces;
- () Number of attacks by opposition forces;
- () Change in the number of total direct and indirect conflict fatalities above (= E) or below (= D) 10-50% compared to 6-12 months earlier;
- () Change of total direct and indirect conflict fatalities above (=E) or below (= D) 50% compared to 6-12 months earlier;
- () Number of people disappeared;
- () Killings of non-combatant civilians;
 - () Widening of threatened victim groups;
 - () Increase in the use of sophisticated weapons;
 - () Widening of the theater of conflict (inc. spill-over to other countries);
 - () Widening of the number of parties participants in conflict;
 - () Forceful resettlement/ deportation of people;
 - () Destruction of vital infrastructures;
 - () Refugee outflow;
 - () Internal displacement of people (inc. ethnic cleansing).

For this paper we coded the same 31 major armed conflicts identified by SIPRI in its last three yearbooks for the following 13 (de-)escalation indicators:

- 1. Excessive use of force by government forces;
- 2. Number of attacks by opposition forces;
- 3. Change in the number of total direct and indirect conflict fatalities compared to 6-12 months earlier;
- 4. Number of people disappeared;
- 5. Killings of non-combatant civilians;
- 6. Widening of threatening victim groups;
- 7. Increase in the use of sophisticated weapons;
- 8. Widening of the theater of conflict;
- 9. Widening of the number of parties participating in the conflict;
- 10. Forceful resettlement/deportation of people;
- 11. Destruction of vital infrastructures;
- 12. Refugee outflow;
- 13. Internal displacement of people;

For each of these thirteen indicators the absence/presence (-/+) or changes (increase/decrease) (1/1) has been indicated in Table 13

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Afghanistan	+	+	×	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	Ţ	1
Algeria	+	+	~	+	+	+		+	+	_	2007-1440) 2012-1410	1- 11	1
Angola	+	1	1	+	+	+	+	*	+	-	+	1	
Azerbaijan		1	1	00-70	+	+	+	+	+	6021.0	+	T	T
Bangladesh	+	1	1		+	191	12.00	1 11 200	in <u>c</u> ie	+	lages 1	æ	infigure of
Bosnia-H.	+	+	T	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	t	*
Cambodia	1 ien +	1	1	1.1	+	10-11				17.423	10_01 s	1	1 100
Chechnya	+	t	1	+	+	+	+	+	+	11100	+	≈	
Colombia	+	*	1	+	+	+	+	-	+	_	+	t	≈
Croatia	+	T	*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	t	-
Georgia	EL zard.	1	1	+	ŭ +				+			1	•
Guatemala	+	Ţ	1	+	+	+	_		+				- ~
India	+	*	t	+	+	+	+	10.0	+			bisele:	~
ndonesia	-	1	1	+	+		_			the series	ladore	10-10-20	a faller
ran	-	*	T	+	+	+			+		-	+	?
raq	+	1	1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	_		1.50 2.1
srael	+	1	~		+	+	+	+	+	1	T		~
Liberia	+	1	1	+	+	+		+	+	-	+		6.402
Myanmar	+	t	≈	+	+	+	+	+	+	-+	+	+	
N.Ireland		1	1		+			Ŧ	—	+	+	1	*
Peru	+		• ≈	+	+	-+	-+	-	•	-	-	-	-
hilippines	+		-	+	+	-	T	- N insi	-+	. North	-	a dev	1
Rwanda	+	•	•	-	+	-+		-+	+	See see	- 		
Sierra Leone	+	•	+	-+	+	+	-	+	++				1
omalia	+	1	~	Ŧ	+	+	-	+		-	+	1	oot naada
outh Africa		1	~ 1	-	++	+	+	-	+	- 10 Ja	+109	1	selandar
ri Lanka	+	+	1	-+		++	-	-	+	-	-	- 000	
udan	+	- ≈	1	+	+++	++	+	+	-	-	+	1	Ť
ajikistan	+	~	t T	++	+++	+	+	+	+	+	+	1	*
urkey	+						+	-	+	-	+	1	?
'emen	T	•		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	T	1
Chieff		+	•	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

 Table 13: Major Armed Conflicts, 1993-1995, changes in 1995 in comparison to 1994 situation

 Escalation assessment on the basis of PIOOM's thirteen escalation indicators

The findings on the individual indicators were added up and subtracted to create an simple unweighted composite escalation index which is presented in Table 14. There the PIOOM escalation index is compared with the SIPRI escalation index which is based only on one single indicator, namely the annual change in battle-related deaths compared to the situation of the previous year. As the Table 14 shows, there are only three matches where SIPRI and PIOOM interpret the escalation/de-escalation in the same way: Colombia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Since SIPRI does not or no longer list (n.l. on the overhead) a number of conflicts or has no fatality data (n.a. on the list) there are in fact only fourteen of the 31 conflicts where a comparison between SIPRIs and PIOOM's escalation assessment is possible. We conclude that our index is more complete and broader than SIPRI's. It is, to our knowledge, the only one around which amazes us for how can all those who are engaged in early warning and early response act when they have no good data.

PIOOM's current escalation index can be used to classify countries in different groups - countries where conflicts escalate, stay about the same, or de-escalate - but it cannot in its present form be used as a good predictor for future violence. Whether a conflict will escalate to higher levels of violence is, after all, also highly dependent on bilateral and multilateral efforts to mediate and intervene in a conflict. The war-wariness of the conflicting parties and other factors also play a role. An overall (de-)escalation assessment should be based on the combination of the results of questions 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the PIOOM Checklist for Country/Conflict Profiles.

What we can state on the basis of an analysis of the 13 escalation indicators for 31 countries is that a more sophisticated escalation measurement than SIPRI's can be constructed and that the necessary information for the 13 indicators is available in the open literature. In the future we will - if we can get funding for our work - attempt to present the escalation index for the countries/conflicts with intensity levels 3, 4 and 5 on the basis of more recent (1996/97) data.

Change in battle-related deaths	Symbol used	Number of countries 21 (
no longer listed	n.l.	Number of countries 31 (n=31)
no data available	n.a.	6 4
insufficient or unreliable data		7
>50 % decrease		1
10-50 % decrease	-	1
+/- 10 % (in)decrease	0	6
0-50% increase	+	5
>50 % increase	++	Cibero
THE REPORT OF CONTRACT OF CONTRACT	1.1	1 A Turning of the

Table 15: SIPRI Escalation assessment 1995 (change from 1994)

Table 16: PIOOM Escalation assessment 1995 (change from 1994)

Overall Change on Basis of 13 Indicators	Symbol Used	Number of C
Escalation	1	Number of Countries (n=31)
Continuation of conflict on same level	~	8
De-escalation	~	13
	1	10


Country	SIPRI	PIOOM	Match Result
Afghanistan		~	
Algeria	-	≈	
Angola	erton. The Mona	~	
Azerbaijan	n.l.	~	
Bangladesh	0	Jacques Lerverd	
Bosnia-H.	-	lath Soon Institut	
Cambodia		1	
Chechnya	n.a.	~	
Colombia	0	~	Yes
Croatia	n.a.	a conflict 1 The paper former	105
Georgia	n.l.		
Guatemala	0	territoria l'internationalitatione distri	
India	Legen Autom The sape	~	
Indonesia	0	er the discription	
Iran		~	
Iraq	-Warnie reservoir to	1	
Israel	As pass exposed to		
Liberia	internet and a second		
Myanmar	spops - dare scenari		
N.Ireland	n.l.		
Peru	0	stearts of preventine the c	
Philippines	-		Vac
Rwanda	n.l.	toot confirm before it ore	Yes
Sierra Leone	n.a.	in a second on the second cost	
Somalia	conflic in the second	~	
South Africa	n.l.	excite the new met for est	
Sri Lanka	++	seeffert or modersmall and	Var
Sudan	and substant street s. s	an opposite would be be	Yes
Tajikistan	n.a.	~	
Turkey	+	1	
Yemen	n.l.	(Pesset) (Miles	

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 Table 14: Conflict Escalation Assessments by SIPRI and PIOOM

Conclusion

The present paper presents an interim report of our current efforts in monitoring and forecasting. We are convinced that with adequate funding, great advances could be made in the systematic monitoring of emerging conflicts and the detection of escalatory trends. Unfortunately PIOOM which receives no university funding nor any substantive grants for its work in this area is currently not capable to do comprehensive, systematic and up-to-date monitoring and forecasting. We continue, however, to be amazed that many NGO- , university- and government-funded organizations and institutes have not done this necessary work of tracking conflict escalation and de-escalation and wonder why.



Conclosee

Institutions for Managing Ethnic Conflicts: Selected Cases

Jacques Bertrand North-South Institute

What kinds of actions can help to reduce conflict before it becomes violent? There are an array of possible measures that exist, from dialogue and mediation to sending peacekeeping troops. Which measures are appropriate and effective depends on the type, the stage and the source of the conflict. This paper focuses specifically on ethnic conflict. It argues that, irrespective of the sources of ethnic conflict, institutions are an important mediating factor in fuelling or reducing the potential for ethnic violence. It proposes to deepen the research on the institutional sources of conflict to understand how institutional change can alleviate ethnic tensions. It situates the argument within the broader debate on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The paper then discusses institution-building in a multi-ethnic context. It will use the cases of Indonesia and Nigeria to illustrate the discussion.

Linking early-warning research to responses is the major challenge of establishing a meaningful early-warning system. As past experience has shown, there is often a wealth of information suggesting that tensions between antagonistic groups are evolving into a potentially violent crisis, yet the international community fails to respond. There were numerous reports of an impending crisis in Rwanda, for instance, but the international community remained inactive. Even after the crisis actually erupted, and there were clear reports that a genocide was in the making, the international community still failed to respond.¹ In light of these problems, the search for effective means of preventing the emergence of conflict is particularly challenging.

What kinds of actions can help to reduce conflict before it becomes violent? There are an array of possible measures that exist, from dialogue and mediation to sending peacekeeping troops. Which measures are appropriate and effective depends on the type, the stage and the source of the conflict. This paper focuses specifically on ethnic conflict. It argues that, irrespective of the sources of ethnic conflict, institutions are an important mediating factor in fueling or reducing the potential for ethnic violence. It proposes to deepen the research on the institutional sources of conflict to understand how institutional change can alleviate ethnic tensions. The next section situates the argument within the broader debate on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The paper then discusses institution-building in a multi-ethnic context. It will use the cases of Indonesia and Nigeria to illustrate the discussion.

Early-Warning, Conflict Prevention, and Peacebuilding

Early-warning may be most effective if it identifies potential violence at a sufficiently early stage that international responses may be more gradualist and oriented towards long-term solutions. Early-warning can be used to detect rising tensions between communal groups at an early stage or to trigger alarms of an

¹ The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the Rwanda experience. Ottawa: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996.

impending crisis. When a conflict is sufficiently acute that violence is imminent, the signals are often clearer and the outcomes more predictable. Yet, when faced with an imminent crisis, the international community still fails to respond because the large commitment of resources and the political costs of failed responses often paralyzes political leaders from adopting preventive measures. Only when crises actually erupt can sufficiently strong, "humanitarian" reasons be put forward to gain the political support for action.

In this context, early-warning may be most useful at a latent stage of conflict, when tensions are rising but there is no sign of immediate outbreak of violence. The flexibility of response is greater and there is more leeway for coordinated responses to rising tensions. Also, the commitment of resources need not be as large as in peacekeeping operations. If one is able to prevent the eruption of violence, which would necessitate the deployment of peacekeeping forces, one may argue that intervention at latent stages is the most cost-effective means of promoting peace.

Th disadvantage of acting upon early-warning signals at a latent stage is that prediction is even more difficult than with an imminent crisis on the horizon. When tensions are rising, they may diminish on their own without external intervention. When committing resources for preventing an escalation, one may never know that those resources actually contributed to the desired outcome. It is a risk, of course, but one which mainly depends on the quality of information about rising tensions. A thorough analysis of the sources of rising tensions can, at the very least, better enable us to target resources to reduce tensions.

Problems associated with measuring the success of prevention should not pose an obstacle to preventive action, since the international community seems to have already accepted this level of unpredictability in post-conflict situations. Post-conflict peacebuilding, which complements peacemaking or peacekeeping, involves similar levels of uncertainty over the outcomes produced. In *An Agenda for Peace*, former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali

defined peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."² Under this broad rubric, the agenda sets out a range of activities designed to enhance peace, such as cooperative projects in agriculture or transportation, sharing resources such as water and electricity, and joint programmes based on cultural exchange and education. In addition, the agenda emphasizes the need for the United Nations to support "the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and [for] the strengthening of new democratic institutions."³

These measures are examples of what Boutros-Ghali proposes as a post-conflict initiative for peacebuilding but the same types of actions can be taken in pre-conflict situations. In the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, the former Secretary-General recognized the usefulness of peacebuilding at the pre-conflict stage. "Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred."⁴

Peacebuilding was designed to complement peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions which are specifically targeted at crises. Peacemaking involves the search for negotiated ends to conflict, while peacekeeping is specifically designed to contain conflict through the use of military force. Peacebuilding involves the reconstruction of societies along lines that can prevent the recurrence of conflict. In this sense, post-conflict and pre-conflict peacebuilding initiatives are likely to be similar.

Peacebuilding in a pre-conflict setting, however, is a more delicate task than in post-conflict situations. After a crisis, the leaders of antagonistic groups are often open to external support designed to

² Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace. (United Nations, NY, 1992), p. 11.

³ Ibid., p. 33-34.

⁴ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros . Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, United Nations, January 3, 1995.

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reduce the potential recurrence of violence. The exhaustion from war often triggers a need for solutions. Also, as previously mentioned, the mustering of sufficient political will to act is more difficult in pre-conflict than post-conflict situations. Overall, the predictability of success, however, is similar. The only difference is the political justification to commit resources. It is easier to justify a response to humanitarian crises, such as conflicts in the Great Lakes region or Afghanistan, than to proactively identify countries in pre-conflict situations.

The Canadian context illustrates the dilemmas very well. Since Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy announced a major new peacebuilding initiative, peacebuilding has become a "buzzword" in Canadian foreign policy circles. As Canada searches for ways to increase its peacemaking presence in the world, peacebuilding has become an important component of this effort. For Minister Axworthy, however, peacebuilding essentially refers to "a package of measures to strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure of human security. Peacebuilding aims to put in place the minimal conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and social, political and economic development become possible... I see peacebuilding as casting a life line to foundering societies struggling to end the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet."⁵ Not that he does not recognize the importance of preventing conflicts, but the dilemma essentially resides in the ability of measuring success in pre-conflict situations. From this perspective, targeted actions in post-conflict reconstruction are more rewarding politically.

From another angle, Canada's international development agency, CIDA, argues in favor of long-term peacebuilding activities to prevent the emergence of conflict, but it adopts a much too broad conception of peacebuilding. From its perspective, most "development" activities contribute to peace, be they agricultural programs, irrigation projects, or education programs. It views peacebuilding as an integral part of development programs, alongside other goals. Its main concern is to avoid exacerbating conflicts when implementing projects to improve living standards. This means, consequently, that one assumes a causal relationship between an improvement of material conditions and the reduction of conflict.⁶ While this proposition may well be true in many cases, poor material conditions are not always the main sources of friction and violent conflict. To target scarce resources towards improving material conditions may successfully contribute to embettering people's lives but may only marginally contribute to reducing conflict. One must therefore choose between assessing peacebuilding impacts of existing projects and programs, targeting scarce resources to the sources of conflict, or finding a compromise solution between these two options.

The challenge of conflict prevention, therefore, is to overcome the political obstacles to preventive measures as well as targeting resources to specific sources of conflict, when they can make a difference. Given these constraints, peacebuilding initiatives can be useful, despite the difficulty of measuring their success. As long as resources are targeted specifically to the sources of conflict, and the latter are well analyzed in their specific contexts, there are several avenues that can contribute significantly to reducing tensions. The following sections propose an agenda for research one of these avenues: institutional reform as a means of preventing the occurrence of ethnic conflict.

⁵ Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at York University. Government of Canada, October 30, 1996.

⁶ Bush, Kenneth. "Development Work as Peace Work: CIDA Programming and Project Initiatives", unpublished paper, 1995. This view of peacebuilding is also advocated by the Local Capacities for Peace Project. See Anderson, Mary B. Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid. Cambridge, MA: Local Capacities for Peace Project, 1996.

Ethnic conflict and institutional responses

Ethnic conflict is one type of intra-state conflict that involves identity either as source of conflict or as an instrument for political mobilization. The central problem of ethnic conflict is less the causes of conflict, which are endemic in most multi-ethnic societies, but the eruption of violence. Why does ethnic conflict become violent? We can assume that violence is an instrument of last resort, once other means of resolving conflict have been exhausted. Violence is an outcome of the failure of formal and informal domestic institutions to provide channels of communication between conflicting parties to pursue their interests and resolve their disputes, in a way that is deemed legitimate by all parties in the conflict. The prevention of violence depends both on the existence of such channels of communication as well as the **perceived** legitimacy of the outcomes they produce.

Explanations for the causes of ethnic conflict are often classified as "primordialist" or "instrumentalist". The former seek explanations in the nature of group identities and the fundamental incompatibilities between groups of different identities, be they race, descent, language or religion.⁷ They argue that fundamental differences in cultural ways of life lead to clashes which, at a global level, can even lead to clashes of whole civilizations, as Samuel Huntington has argued.⁸

These arguments have been rejected on several grounds. Some argue that the mere existence of identity differences cannot explain conflict, since they are present in many societies where they produce no conflict at all. Others contend that such views crystallize ethnicity around a specific set of conflicting identities, while ignoring that ethnic identities are often multiple and shifting. Not all of these identities are mobilized for political ends and, in some cases, there may be significant changes over time in the nature of the group identities that become sources of conflict.⁹

The "instrumentalists" argue instead that ethnic identity *per se* is rarely a source of conflict. Most often, the sources of conflict lie in the competition for scarce political or economic resources in which ethnicity becomes a vehicle for political mobilization to reach other ends. They explain conflict in terms of socio-economic differences or in terms of the ambition of political entrepreneurs rather than by deep seated, incompatible cultural differences¹⁰ (Brass, 1991). This approach is criticized. in turn, for its failure to provide an adequate explanation for the intensity of ethnic mobilization and the severity of ethnic violence. "Why [do] the followers follow", as Donald Horowitz pointedly asked in his seminal monograph *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.*¹¹ Political entrepreneurs may use ethnicity to reach their own interests, but they obviously tap into deep-felt suspicions or frustrations that are ethnically-based. or they would have no following.

Irrespective of one's theoretical position, political institutions are often cast as solutions to ethnic conflict. For primordialists, ethnic division has a more permanent character and, consequently, solutions to conflict must entail compromises between conflicting groups or secession. Secession and partition are rarely satisfactory, since they often fuel violence and seldom do they solve the problem. Newly-created states most often preserve significant minorities which they must accommodate within a new political framework. They find themselves back to their original institutional problem.

⁷ Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books, 1973, pp. 255-311 and Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

⁸ Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

⁹ Brass, Paul R. Ethnic groups and the state. London: Croom Helm, 1985; Brass, Paul R. Ethnicity and nationalism: theory and comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991 and Young, Crawford. The politics of cultural pluralism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976.

¹⁰ Brass, Ethnicity and nationalism.

¹¹ Horowitz, Ethnic groups, p. 140.

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Among those who promote compromise, there is a search for ways that formal political institutions can stabilize endemic conflict in multi-ethnic societies. Arendt Lijphart, for example, has argued that stability is best ensured by designing political institutions that are based on a bargain between the élites of the various ethnic groups. Known as "consociationalism", this structure of political institutions favors power-sharing between groups over equal representation of all individuals.¹²

"Consociationalism", however, has been criticized on several grounds. Among others, it has been criticized for its undemocratic nature and its rigidity. Some scholars argue that its reliance on élite bargaining defies the principles of democratic representation. Instrumentalists, such as Paul Brass, reject consociationalism because it formalizes divisions between ethnic groups. They argue that ethnic identities are often times constructed and manipulated, leading to different patterns of ethnically-based divisions. From this perspective, the state is often an actor in the shaping of politically relevant ethnic identities. To support consociationalism mainly serves to consolidate the power of certain élites, who profit from a particular configuration of division, while excluding others from power. In the meantime, the élite bargain may not reflect the more fluid nature of group identities within the respective ethnic communities.

While the critics of consociationalism may be right to reject rigid institutional solutions, this does not diminish the usefulness of institutions to accommodate various ethnic demands. Donald Horowitz has offered a host of suggestions on ways to fine-tune political institutions and reduce ethnic tensions. Instead of espousing a particular "type" of political system, such as "consociationalism", he instead looks at particular institutions and identifies sources of strain. Elections and legislative systems, for example, can produce divisions if they tend to reproduce the domination of one or several ethnic groups, while consistently excluding others. Attempts to remove ethnicity from the configuration of political parties, as in Nigeria's imposition of two political parties along ideological lines, is unwise since it only denies the legitimate political functions that ethnicity plays in politics and is unlikely to eradicate the powerful forces of ethnicity in any case.¹³

While a case-by-case analysis of various political institutions may provide important insights into sources of strain and stability, they must add up to a coherent set of institutional solutions that reinforce one another. One needs a "coherent package of conflict-reducing techniques" to ensure stability:

"Such a package would include electoral systems to create ongoing incentives for interthnic cooperation and for preelection coalitions based on vote pooling. For many countries, there would also be provisions for federalism or regional autonomy,. Combined with policies that give regionally concentrated groups a strong stake in the center, devolution can help avert separatism. The skilful division of territory can foster multipolar fluidity where it exists and prevent bifurcation; it can also produce commonalities among similarly situated regional units that cross ethnic lines; and it can give politicians a chance to practice conciliation before they arrive at the center."¹⁴

The problem is particularly acute when trying to reach the double goal of stability and democracy in multi-ethnic settings. Horowitz warns, indeed, that "...there are good systemic reasons why is it difficult to produce institutions conducive to the emergence of multiethnic democracy",¹⁵ including the difficulties of preventing the crystallization of majority or minority rule which polarizes ethnic groups and often leads to conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new democracies has demonstrated the

¹² Lijphart, Arendt. Democracy in plural societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

¹³ Horowitz, Donald K."Democracy in Divided Societies" in Diamond, Larry Jay and Marc F. Plattner.

Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 35-56.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 53

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 37

difficulties of establishing sustainable democracies. The tendency has often been to import political systems from abroad or revert to old political institutions that led to the ethnic breakdown in the first place. This leads him to the pessimistic conclusion: "As the recent wave of democratization now runs its course, it is not too soon to say that a major opportunity for constitutional planning for interethnic accommodation has largely been lost, and the emerging results are there for all to see."¹⁶

This pessimism about new democracies in multi-ethnic countries should send clear alarms to policymakers and academics who view democracy as a solution in its own right. It is particularly puzzling that so much energy is devoted to pressuring regimes to hold free elections and establish the institutional framework of democracy without questioning its stability and quality. Larry Diamond rightly insists on the need to go beyond constitutional democracy to consolidate democratic institutions. In his recommendations to the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, however, he lists a number of measures to implement and enforce democratic institutions without questioning and analyzing their impact in multiethnic settings. Such an approach sets out a policy-agenda based on a set of assumptions about what constitutes "democracy". Consequently, he recommends such actions as programs for strengthening legislatures (skills for writing legislation, research support, and opening of the legislative system to citizen access, etc...); improving communication between local governments and constituents, strengthening political parties by training in membership recruiting, fundraising and policy research; improving legal and judicial assistance by providing, among other things, expert legal advice to redraft criminal codes; and aiding civil society by funding advocacy organizations and programs for free media, as well as education and training in running organizations democratically.¹⁷

At the same time, he acknowledges that there may be obstacles to democracy that are specific to multi-ethnic settings. He warns that international actions can "stimulate religious and cultural conflict by advancing Western notions of development, democracy, and the "good society" in societies with strong alternative notions of these values."¹⁸ Moreover, in the collective volume on *Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democracy*, he supports Horowitz' warning that ethnic conflict is a major obstacle to democracy and it calls for caution when establishing democratic institutions. He reaffirms the "…value of democracy for controlling the worst impulses of ethnicity and nationalism, but also the *importance of structuring democracy properly and in timely fashion for that purpose.*"¹⁹

Even amongst some of the most unconditional supporters of policies to promote democratic development, as the preceding discussion shows, there is a recognition that this task may be particularly difficult in multi-ethnic countries. It is unwise, therefore, to approach peacebuilding measures or conflict in a homogenous fashion, without considering differences in political contexts. Peacebuilding measures, such as the promotion of democratic institutions, reinforcing the judiciary, supporting civil society and many other similar actions, can contribute to both peace or conflict in multi-ethnic states, depending on their impact on the multi-ethnic reality.

While there are many policy proposals on ways to enhance peace, there are still many unanswered questions. Why do democracies fail in multi-ethnic settings? How can democracies be stabilized in multi-ethnic countries? Why is authoritarianism often cast as a "solution" to ethnic instability? Is authoritarianism really more stable than democracy in multi-ethnic countries? How can ethnic identity be reconciled with individual rights and freedoms in a multi-ethnic democratic system? More research is required to deepen

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 52

¹⁷ Diamond, Larry <u>Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments, Issues and Imperatives.</u> A report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1996, pp. 40-48.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁹ My emphasis. See Diamond and Plattner. Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democracy, p. xxviii.

our understanding of how political institutions can reduce ethnic tensions while ensuring respect for individual rights and freedoms.

A research program on Indonesia, Nigeria, Zaire, and India

What kinds of political institutions can accommodate the dual goals of democracy and stability in multi-ethnic countries? The research program on peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the North-South Institute proposes to address this research question through a study of formal and informal political institutions in four cases: Indonesia, Nigeria, Zaire and India. They represent a mix of cases from a long-standing democracy (India) to long-standing authoritarian regime (Zaire). Two cases. Indonesia and Nigeria, have experimented with both democracy and authoritarianism. They have had difficulty in maintaining democracy (Nigeria) or in creating the conditions for a new democracy to arise (Indonesia). Why is it so difficult to accommodate democracy and multi-ethnicity?

The study goes beyond current debates over the appropriate structures of political institutions to accommodate multi-ethnic differences. Current debates often view the existing problem as one of fine-tuning electoral and legislative systems in order to find the appropriate way of "dividing the pie" between different ethnic groups. The preceding section outlined some of these propositions, from élite bargaining under a consociational model to federalism and the avoidance of majority/minority dominance.

Most of these measures are targeted at the political élites and the process of élite competition for political power. If élites tend to mobilize ethnicity to reach political ends, however, they are likely to seek loop-holes in the institutional structures to advance their group interests. In order to give élites the political incentives for tolerance and compromise, as suggested by Horowitz, one may attempt to modify institutional structures but one should also seek to enhance the quality of these institutions. Institutions must be perceived as the legitimate locus of political authority and their outcomes perceived as just and appropriate.

The central hypothesis of the proposed study is that political institutions must be legitimized and recognized as the primary source of political authority in order to produce multi-ethnic stability. While democracy is likely to provide such legitimacy and recognition, it must be adapted to particular political contexts. Democratic institutions *per se* are insufficient to produce stable multi-ethnic accommodations. They must also be *embedded* or *infused* with legitimacy. Legitimacy does not automatically derive from the mere existence of democratic structures and free elections.

Two propositions can be derived from this general statement. First, the legitimacy of institutions can only be ensured if they are perceived to be legitimate both by the élites and their respective constituents, in this case their respective ethnic communities. If constituencies do not respect existing institutions, political élites can easily break away from compromises with the élites of other ethnic groups and mobilize their constituents against the existing political institutions. Second, the locus of political authority and legitimate political power must be shifted away from informal political institutions, such as ethnic associations and religious organizations, to the formal political institutions of the state. Political competition from informal institutions is likely to produce instability, since it remains a source of ethnic mobilization to advance élite interests.

For the purposes of this article, the cases of Indonesia and Nigeria will illustrate the problem. Since obtaining their independence, Indonesia and Nigeria have been struggling to find political institutions that can ensure ethnic stability. Both countries have attempted democratic as well as authoritarian solutions, yet they have failed to produce stable and legitimate political institutions. They are now both faced with rapidly rising ethnic tensions that threaten to produce violent conflict. In fact, they represent two cases in which we have ample early-warning signals of increasing ethnic tensions. As they are both likely to undergo significant institutional changes in the next decade, there is a window of opportunity to reflect on the ways that new political institutions can enhance the dual goals of ethnic stability and democracy.

Indonesia was a democratic polity at independence and approached the issue of national unity by

fostering national goals and symbols under a unitary state. During the 1950s, ethnic challenges were expressed through regionalist demands as well as religious revolts. Some of these rebellions challenged the fundamental basis of the Indonesian national state, whereas others demanded for more regional autonomy. Regional autonomy in Indonesia is synonymous with giving more power to ethnic groups outside of Java. These strains on the political system were important catalysts for the failure of democracy. Since 1959, and especially after 1965, Indonesia has been ruled by an authoritarian system. It has an elaborate set of government institutions and processes from the capital city down to every village.

Nigeria is also currently under authoritarian rule, but it has been hailed in the past as a successful case of institutional engineering under democratic rule to create stable ethnic relations. Under three different republics, Nigerians adopted constitutions that established complex political institutions to balance the power of various ethnic groups. They tinkered with the number of states, to reduce the potential for power concentration in the hands of any major ethnic group, while also limiting numbers of political parties to avoid ethnicity as the major basis of political organization. New constitutions and different political institutions, however, only changed the rules of the game of ethnic competition, which has continued under both authoritarian and democratic rule. Since 1983, Nigeria has been mainly ruled by a military regime. The latest attempt at democratic rule in 1992 was abruptly suspended in 1993, leading to one of the worst periods of political decay in Nigeria's history. The regime of Sani Abacha, which assumed power at the end of 1993, has used ruthless repression to eliminate political opponents and has now practically turned Nigeria into a pariah state in the international community.

Part of the problem in both cases resides in the approach to institutional engineering for managing ethnic differences. In both cases, there has been a top-down attempt to impose political institutions that would provide some form of accommodation between ethnic élites, while assuming that such solution could then trickle down to their respective constituencies. The current Indonesian government has been particularly keen on this approach. It continues to support a centralized, unitary state: a central role for the military; homogenous bureaucratic structures; and reduced freedoms of political organization, particularly political parties. It sees this approach as a necessary means to maintain national unity. It finds itself with an institutional crisis, however, as the legitimacy of these institutions continues to erode with the longevity of President Suharto's rule. By keeping a cap on political expression in society-at-large, it is creating frustrations and tensions which have begun to erupt into violent ethnic conflict, albeit still at a relatively small scale.

In Nigeria, no political élite has been able to maintain such tight control over the polity for extended periods of time, in part because of divisions within the armed forces. Whether under democratic or authoritarian rule, the solutions to ethnic problems in Nigeria have been managed through instituting various forms of federalism. For years, the fine-tuning of federal units was seen as a solution to Nigeria's ethnic divisions. The division into three states, under the First Republic, was blamed as the main source of imbalance which produced ethnic breakdown and led to the Biafran war (1967-70). The later division of the federation into 12 and then 19 states was viewed positively by political observers, who argued that the multiplication of states helped to increase the representation of ethnic minority groups and divide the territorial power of the large ethnic groups: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, the Christian Igbo and the bicommunal Yoruba communities. Under the military rule of general Babangida, this division was increased to 30 states but was largely seen as a measure to increase the centralization of the federal system and to reduce the power of state governments. At this point, the continuos fine-tuning of the number of states has become a virtual political joke and simply another means of increasing the power of the élite now in power relative to other élites.

In both the Indonesian and Nigerian cases, attempts to ignore or to eradicate the politics of ethnicity have not been successful. Attempts by the Indonesians to create an Indonesian nation and to reduce ethnic differences by ignoring them has led to a situation in which the Javanese and Muslims now dominate the

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polity, and other ethnic and religious groups, particularly the Christians, now resent this dominance. As for the Nigerians, the political competition between ethnic groups has simply shifted location. Under Babangida's rule, the number of political parties was restricted to two, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRP). It was thought that by restricting political parties and deethnicizing them, one could oblige ethnic élites to reach compromises, thereby reducing the usefulness of ethnic politics. Instead, the locus of ethnic competition simply moved from that of inter-party to intra-party competition.

The proposed institutional solutions to multi-ethnic problems has focused on élites rather than societal groups, thereby reducing the effectiveness of institutional reform. Agreements between élites are insufficient to consolidate political institutions, and can easily be broken when certain élites wish to change the status quo. They may tap into informal channels of authority to mobilize their constituencies against the existing order, leading to a renewed cycle of institutional decay and possible conflict. In Indonesia, for example, the locus of power remains in the tight circle close to President Suharto, despite the wealth of formal political institutions that have been created to manage the polity. The channels for expressing regional (or ethnic) demands depend on access to the President through informal means. In recent years, this has been particularly problematic for the Christian minorities, which have seen most of their internal channels of communication closed at the top. Other groups have also seen their influence decline at the center, such as the Bugis from Sulawesi. Mounting frustrations among the population are expressing themselves into violent demonstrations, indicating an erosion of ethnic stability. Authoritarianism has almost closed the formal channels for expressing ethnic demands, while there are few alternative forms of political authority. Islam has the potential for becoming such an alternative vehicle, but it has not yet assumed such a role (which would probably trigger fierce responses from non-Muslim minorities and some Muslim groups alike). With an impending succession, there are pressing questions about the survivability of the current political system after Suharto, which can have very destabilizing effects on ethnic relations.

In Nigeria, the current regime has also closed most doors to the political expression of various ethnic groups. The locus of political authority has therefore been shifted to the informal realm. There have been clashes between Muslims and Christians, which have both mobilized their constituencies and organized umbrella organizations to protect and advance their interests. This new element is added to the ethnic divisions between large and minority ethnic groups, and feeds into the division between Hausa-Fulani, who are mainly Muslim, and Igbo, who are mainly Christian.

The challenge of institutional reform, in both cases, is to create an institutional framework that will incorporate the symbolic strength of informal institutions organized around ethnic identity, and to give a stake for respective communal groups to cooperate. Institutional solutions must reflect compromises between élites, but they must also remove the potential for élites to break-out of these compromise solutions. This can be done by infusing new institutions with the symbolic power of informal institutions. If ethnic groups recognize new institutions as legitimate and reflecting their concerns, élites will be less able to break away from new-found arrangements.

Democratic institutions offer the best means of ensuring that such legitimacy can be infused into new political institutions, but it is not sufficient. The new institutions must also accommodate or incorporate elements of the informal institutions and their political force. They must be able to accommodate demands for justice according to the *shari'ah*, for example, where Islamic groups demand it. At the same time, compromises must be made with non-Muslim constituencies. Dialogue can be fostered between Muslim and non-Muslim groups, through non-governmental organizations or other civil society organizations, to increase tolerance and understanding between the respective communities. It is by building these types of intercommunal bridges, while also accommodating their demands, that one can more easily infuse legitimacy to political institutions.

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Conclusion

This paper has not presented an argument or solutions to the problem of ethnic accommodation. It has presented the argument for a research program based on finding institutional solutions to problems of ethnic conflict. It is perceived as one of many ways that research can find new solutions to the prevention of conflict in multi-ethnic societies. Its novelty lies in identifying types of democratic institutions that can foster individual freedoms and rights, while also supporting group identities and needs. It is only by promoting both, it is argued, that one can increase the authority and legitimacy of formal political institutions, while reducing that of informal institutions which often lead to conflict.

The goal of this program is to undertake research that can be coupled with the early identification of institutional problems between ethnic groups, and subsequently to inform international efforts in support of institutional reform. This can best be done by adopting a multi-faceted approach, using advocacy and partnerships through NGO networks, support for multi-ethnic group meetings discussing issues of institutional reform, as well as advocacy and political pressure at a governmental level. While the latter is least likely to be successful, the former offers the possibility of developing political institutions that adequately respond to grass-roots demands.

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Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes'

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The greatest danger to peace processes comes from spoilers - leaders and parties who see peace as a threat to their power, world view, and interests, and use stealth or violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. When spoilers succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. In both cases, the casualties of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of the preceding war. The paper argues that spoilers differ by the goals they seek and their commitment to achieving those goals. External actors have a range of strategies available to them, from ones that rely heavily on conciliation to ones that rely heavily on coercion. The appropriateness of a particular strategy depends on the goal and commitment of the spoiler and the constraints posed by other parties in the peace process. Selection of a robust strategy requires that the custodian overcome various organizational and individual blinders that prevent it from accurately interpreting the intentions and behaviour of the spoiler. Implementation of a successful strategy depends on the ability of the custodian to create an external coalition for peace; the resources that the coalition brings to its responsibility; and the consensus that the coalition forms about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of spoiler demands and behaviour.

The wars of the 1990s have confirmed a basic finding from the literature on civil war termination: "peacemaking is a risky business."¹ The fundamental source of risk comes not from the lack of trust between adversaries, nor from the inability of parties to credibly commit to peace.² Rather, the greatest danger to peace processes comes from spoilers -- leaders and parties who see peace as a threat to their power,

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¹ Stephen John Stedman, <u>Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980</u> (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 231. For analysis of various risks see pp. 14-16, 231-232.

² This analysis does not discount such sources of risk, but argues that they are secondary to the risks posed by spoilers. For arguments about risk, credible commitment, and civil war termination see Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1994; and Donald Rothchild and David A. Lake, "Containing Fear: The Management of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., <u>Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1997).

world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.³ By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement to eliminate them, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who either seek to alter the process or overturn it. By implementing a peace agreement, outsiders put themselves at risk from attack from those who are uncommitted to peace. And most importantly, the risks of peacemaking increase the insecurity and uncertainty of average citizens, who yearn for peace, but have the most to lose if war returns.

When spoilers succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. In both cases, the casualties of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of the war. When Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of UN monitored elections in 1992 and plunged Angola back into civil war, approximately 300,000 people died. When Hutu extremists rejected the Arusha peace accords in Rwanda and carried out genocide over 1 million Rwandans died in less than three months.⁴

If all spoilers succeeded, then the quest for peace in civil wars would be quixotic and dangerously counterproductive. But not all spoilers succeed. In South Africa, the 1994 elections that brought to power Nelson Mandela and ended a long-simmering civil war successfully overcame the resistance of ethnic and racial spoilers. In Mozambique, RENAMO, a party known as "the Khmer Rouge of Africa," stalled in meeting its commitments to peace, and threatened to boycott elections and return to war. In the end, however, RENAMO joined parliamentary politics, accepted losing an election, and disarmed, thus ending a civil war that had taken 800,000 lives. And the Cambodian peace process was able to proceed despite the resistance of the real Khmer Rouge, the party with the dubious distinction of providing the sobriquet for bloodthirsty, fanatic parties elsewhere.

The crucial difference between success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians of peace. Where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited and peace has triumphed. Where international custodians have failed to create and implement such strategies, spoilers have succeeded at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives.

Diplomats and policy-makers involved in peace processes, as well as journalists and area experts, often have implicit theories about the motivation of spoilers and how best to manage them, but there has been no systematic study of the problem. This study proposes to fill this gap by 1.) sensitizing policy-makers to the complexities and uncertainties of managing spoilers; 2.) creating a typology of spoilers that can help international actors choose robust strategies for keeping peace on track; 3.) describing various strategies that external parties, here referred to as peace custodians, have used to manage spoilers; 4.) proposing which strategies will be most effective for particular spoiler types; and 5.) comparing several successful and failed cases of spoiler management to suggest some conditional generalizations about which, when, and how different strategies are likely to be effective.

The paper argues that parties who stymie peace processes differ by the goals they seek and their commitment to achieving those goals. While some spoilers have limited goals, others see the world in all or nothing terms and pursue total war aims. Furthermore, while some spoilers are willing to make reasoned judgments concerning the costs and benefits of their actions, other show high insensitivity to costs and risks, and some even hold immutable preferences. External actors who seek to implement peace agreements have

³ Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts," in Michael E. Brown, ed., <u>The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict</u> (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1996), pp. 369-371.

⁴ Until now, the most widely cited figure for deaths in the Rwandan genocide is 800,000 from Gerard Prunier, <u>The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Howard Adelman has informed me that the estimate is too low. In a forthcoming book on the subject, he estimates the number to be over 1 million.

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a range of strategies available to them, from ones that rely heavily on conciliation to ones that rely heavily on the use of coercion. The appropriateness of a particular strategy depends on the goal and commitment of the spoiler and on constraints posed by other parties in the peace process. The implementation of a successful strategy depends on the ability of the external custodian to create an external coalition for peace; the resources that the coalition brings to its responsibility; and the consensus that the coalition forms about the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of spoiler demands and behavior.

Spoilers

Peace processes create spoilers. This is a statement about definition and a statement about causality. In the midst of war there are combatants, who can be identified in myriad ways - e.g., aggressors, rebels, bandits, pariahs, rogues or terrorists -- but not as spoilers. Spoilers are only spoilers when there is an existing peace process to undermine; that is, after two parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement.⁵ Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously. A negotiated peace often has losers: leaders and factions who do not achieve their war aims.⁶ Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties. The spoiler problem in peace processes does not go away by insisting on a peace where everybody wins and nobody loses. For example, the most perfectly crafted power-sharing institutions in the world will not matter if one of the parties does not want to share power.⁷ All of the measures in the world to assuage the fears of warring parties will not matter if one of the parties is motivated by megalomania or paranoia. Even in the best designed settlement and peace process, external actors must be prepared for challenges, usually violent, from leaders and organizations who decide that peace is not in their interest.

Custodians of peace processes confront several different spoiler problems, which differ on the dimensions of *position* of the spoiler (inside or outside of an agreement); *number* of spoiler(s) (one or more); *type* of spoiler (limited, greedy, or total); *locus* of the spoiler behavior (leader or followers, or both); and *strategy* of the spoiler (stealth or violence).

Position of the Spoiler. Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. An inside spoiler has signed a peace agreement, signaled a willingness to implement a compromise settlement, and yet fails to fulfill key obligations to the agreement. Examples include Juvenal Habyirimana, President of Rwanda in 1994 who failed to implement key measures of the Arusha Accords to end the war in Rwanda; the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, which signed the Paris Peace Accords, but then refused to demobilize and disarm its soldiers and boycotted elections; and UNITA in Angola, which signed the Bicesse agreement in 1991, but returned to war in 1992 when it lost elections.

⁶ This point is made for the case of Zimbabwe in Stephen John Stedman, "The Case of Zimbabwe," in Roy Licklider, ed., <u>Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End</u> (New York: NYU Press, 1993).

⁷ Timothy D. Sisk, <u>Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts</u> (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 1996), concludes that successful power-sharing depends on "a core of moderate, integrated elites (which) has a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny," p. 117. Most recommendations for powersharing in civil wars simply assume parties willing to share power.

⁵ For example, in South Africa prior to 1990 there was no public agreement among the antagonists committing themselves to a peaceful resolution to their conflict. Only after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the reaching of several public agreements that committed the African National Congress (ANC) and South African government to a process of negotiation, can one speak about a South African peace process. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, even though negotiations dragged on for several years, it is only after the parties formally committed themselves to the Paris Peace Accords that one can speak meaningfully about a Cambodian peace process.

Inside spoilers pose several problems for custodians. First, they have signed a peace agreement, thus indicating an interest in making peace. Custodians must create tests to explore whether they are sincere and are willing to live with a compromise solution, or whether they are insincere and have signed the agreement as a tactic to weaken their adversary. Second, inside spoilers give their initial consent to outside implementation of the agreement. Such consent invites custodians to implement an agreement, but places constraints on how the custodians can react to spoiler behavior. Peacekeepers who are deployed on the basis of consent are rarely equipped or configured to compel compliance with an agreement; moreover, troop contributors who participate in peace implementation on the basis of consent rarely commit to enforce peace if consent is withdrawn or decays. Third, the signing of a peace agreement and deploying of an implementation force creates a vested interest for custodians to succeed in making peace. Perversely, this can blind custodians from accurately interpreting the intentions and behavior of spoilers; custodians can develop an overwhelming interest in giving a spoiler a passing grade regardless of how well it scores on tests of sincerity.

Outside spoilers are parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves, and use violence to attack the peace process. Examples include the CDR in Rwanda, which attacked the Arusha Accords and committed genocide to prevent them from being implemented; the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa, which boycotted negotiations between the ANC and NP between 1992-94 and used violence to try to reconfigure the peace process to its advantage.

An outside spoiler poses several challenges for an international custodian. First, the custodian must determine whether the spoiler is using violence to gain entry to the peace process or to destroy the peace process. Second, the custodian must determine whether there is a negotiating space that can simultaneously preserve the settlement sought by inside parties and meet the demands of the outside spoiler. Third, the custodian must strengthen the inside parties, and protect them from outside attack. This proves difficult because the inside parties tend to be extremely untrusting of each other and may still be competitive with each other over the spoils of a settlement. Finally, if one of the inside parties has historical ties to the outside spoiler, as for example, the relationship between the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa, and FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, there will likely be elites in the inside party who advocate reestablishing those ties.

<u>Number of Spoilers</u>. The presence of more than one spoiler creates a compound challenge for custodians. Any strategy chosen to deal with one spoiler has implications for the strategy chosen to deal with other spoilers. In Rwanda, for example, the stability of the peace process was endangered because one of the inside parties, Juvenal Habyirimana, refused to fulfill his obligations to the peace agreement he had signed. The United Nations threatened to withdraw its peacekeeping operation in order to coerce Habyirimana into implementing the agreement. Yet Habyirimana was only one of two spoilers. The CDR, former members of Habyirimana's regime, rejected the peace agreement and conspired against the peace process from outside. The UN strategy succeeded in pressuring Habyirimana, but emboldened the CDR to attack the peace process. Similarly, in Cambodia, the United Nations had to manage an outside spoiler (the Khmer Rouge while it boycotted the peace process in 1992-3) while one of the inside parties, the State of Cambodia, violated its commitments to the Paris Peace Accords. Because the United Nations needed SOC as a partner against the Khmer Rouge, it felt hamstrung in opposing SOC's spoiler behavior.

<u>Types of Spoilers</u>. Recent work on civil wars fails to make any distinctions among warring parties. At one extreme are analyses that see parties whose sole motivation is insecurity and whose sole goals are party survival.⁸ The only reason for parties in civil wars to fight is their fear that if they make peace and disarm, then their adversary will take advantage and eliminate them. The fact of anarchy in civil war -- the

⁸ Walters, "The Resolution of Civil Wars," passim.

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lack of an overarching authority that can enforce a political settlement -- means that warring parties cannot credibly commit to make peace, either in the short term (through disarmament) or in the long term (through a constitution). Thus, any party who violates or opposes a peace agreement does so out of fear, not out of myriad other motivations. Spoiler behavior can only be addressed by reducing the fears of the spoiler - through international guarantees. Like those international relations theorists steeped in the security dilemma or spiral model of conflict, recent writers on civil war believe 'the central theme of civil war termination is not evil but tragedy."

At another extreme are those who assert that all parties in civil war are alike because they all want total power.¹⁰ This, however, is too facile; all parties in civil war seek power, but not all parties seek total power. Some parties seek exclusive power and recognition of authority; some seek dominant power; some seek a significant share of power; and some desire to exercise power subject to democratic controls. This should not be surprising: power is a means or resource to realize other goals. Some goals, for instance, the permanent subjugation or elimination of an ethnic group, race, or socio-economic class need more power than goals of creating a democratic political regime or gaining recognition of political equality among races or ethnic groups. That parties differ in their goals and commitment to total power can be seen by all of the parties who have accepted and lived with compromise solutions to civil wars (in Colombia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, El Salvador, South Africa and Mozambique). Similarly, not every winner of a civil war creates a totalitarian regime or slaughters its opponents.¹¹ A thought experiment makes the point: if you had to be on the losing side of a civil war, would you rather surrender to Abraham Lincoln or to Hafez al-Assad, to Nelson Mandela or Mao Zedong?

A final version asserts that all parties in civil war are alike because they all have total goals, but are all equally reasonable in weighing the costs and benefits of their actions and their likelihood of attaining their goals.¹² In essence, all parties in civil war are rational actors, who prefer victory, but are willing to alter their goals as costs and risks run too high. Like the previous model of civil war combatants, it ignores that the goals of parties in civil war vary tremendously. It also ignores that parties may differ in their commitment to achieving their goals. Finally, there is enough evidence of pathologies of leadership decision-making in civil war to question the assumption of universal rationality among parties.¹³

The analysis of civil war termination runs the risk of choosing a flawed, attenuated view of combatants and their war aims. Some parties in civil war do suffer from deep security dilemmas, but not all. Some parties in civil war do seek total power, but not all. Some parties rationally weigh their goals against the cost and benefits of pursuing them, but not all.

As a first cut, spoilers vary by intentions, which, following the lead of Robert Jervis, are defined here as a composite of two dimensions: goals and commitment (the cost and risks that a party is willing to incur

⁹ This is a paraphrase of a quote from Robert Jervis, <u>Perception and Misperception in International Politics</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66.

¹⁰ Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20-33.

¹¹ Roy Licklider's estimates that 81% of civil wars in the twentieth century that were fought over identity issues and ended through the victory of one side did not result in genocide. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681-690.

¹² T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 4, (December 1996), pp. 546-568.

¹³ Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation," pp. 347-49, cites several examples of leader pathologies.

to reach its goals).¹⁴ These two dimensions yield three ideal types: those who hold total goals and have immutable preferences (total spoilers); those who have expansive goals, but may vary in their sensitivity to costs and risks (greedy spoilers¹⁵); and those who have limited goals and are willing to accept a compromise settlement of the conflict if their goals are met, yet show high insensitivity to costs and risks (limited spoilers).

Figure 1. models spoiler types as a function of the two dimensions of goals and commitment. At the top right of the graph are groups who seek total goals and are totally committed to attaining those goals. Such groups see conflict in all or nothing terms, and their commitment to total power is insensitive to costs and risks. For such groups, their preference for total power is immutable; that is, not subject to change. For example, at the top right would lie the CDR, which refused to accept a powersharing agreement in Rwanda, viewed the rebel RPF as inhuman cockroaches, and was willing to kill over a million people to keep power.

At the lower end of the graph are groups who seek limited goals and show little commitment to achieving those goals. Within the limited type, but at the bottom right would be groups who possess limited goals, but show total commitment to those goals. For example, the African National Congress, which insisted that "one person - one vote" was a non-negotiable demand, was willing to bear enormous costs to achieve that goal. Once the goal was conceded, however, it was flexible on other demands.

Between these two points are a range of parties who have total or expansive goals, but are willing to redefine their goals in the face of costs and risks. Toward the total end would be parties who may be willing to accept something less than total power, but are willing to bear costs and run risks to maximize their power and goals: such parties are "greedy." The closer the party lies to the total threshold, the price of defeating it may be only marginally less than defeating a total party. In one interpretation, for example, UNITA is a "greedy" spoiler - not committed to total victory, but seeking as good a settlement as it can get. After losing the settlement election, it returned to war, demanded a complete renegotiation of its settlement with the government of Angola, and refused to make any concessions until it took a pounding on the battlefield. Toward the middle of the continuum are those who are willing to accept less than total power, yet are not willing to incur great costs or risk to maximize their power; an example here is the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa.

Locus of the Spoiler Problem. Spoilers can differ according to the appropriate level of analysis for identifying the locus for spoiler behavior: the leader, the leadership faction, or the larger group. The key question is whether a leader's decisions to act a spoiler reflect group preferences or do they reflect the leader's preferences imposed on his followers.

In some cases, the impetus for spoiler behavior comes from the leader. There are several examples where parties ceased being spoilers when their top leadership changed. For instance, a negotiated settlement to the Zimbabwean civil war only became possible when Ian Smith was replaced by Bishop Abel Muzorewa as top negotiator for Rhodesia. Likewise, the willingness of the South African government to honor its commitment to the Namibian peace process was aided immensely by the incapacitation and replacement of President P. W. Botha. Longtime observers of Angola, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka argue that peace remains unlikely in those countries as long as Jonas Savimbi remains in charge of UNITA, Pol Pot in charge of what

¹⁴ Jervis, <u>Perception and Misperception</u>, pp. 48-54.

¹⁵ The appellation of greedy comes from Charles L. Glaser, but differs from his definition. In his article, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," <u>World Politics</u>, 44: 4 (July 1992), pp. Glaser substitutes motivation of players for intentions of players, the difference being the internal source of aggressive behavior - greed or insecurity. In my use of the term, greedy does not imply that the spoiler acts out of greed, but rather that it expands its goals and is willing to incur high costs and risks to reach them.

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is left of the Khmer Rouge, and Velupillai Prabakaran in charge of the Tamil Liberation Tigers.

To see the locus of spoiler behavior as the leader is not to dismiss the goals of followers. Rather, since total goals are so extreme, it seems possible that a change in leadership can move a party from the total type of spoiler to the greedy or limited type of spoiler. Likewise, if there are leadership factions who differ over the goals and commitment of the party, then a change in leadership can alter the position of the party.

Other cases suggest that there are times when leaders are quite constrained by their followers. In Zimbabwe in 1977, it was extremely dangerous for any leader of the ZANU-PF guerrillas to take a moderate line towards peace, let alone Robert Mugabe who had just taken over the mantle of leadership and was seen with suspicion by many of his soldiers. Similarly, in Rwanda in 1994, at least some of the reluctance of Juvenal Habyirimana to fulfill his commitments to the Arusha accords came from his fear that his followers would attack him.

<u>Spoiler Strategy</u>. Spoilers vary in the strategy that they use to undermine peace processes, especially in terms of the emphasis placed on stealth or violence. Inside spoilers tend to use strategies of stealth; outside spoilers tend to use strategies of violence.

Spoilers who have signed peace agreements for tactical reasons have an incentive to keep their threat hidden and minimize the amount of violence that they use; they want a peace process to continue as long as it promises to advantage them against their adversary. Inside spoilers need to comply enough to convince others of their good will, but not so much that it weakens their *offensive* military capability. UNITA in Angola, for example, wanted an election to take place in September 1992, because it believed it could win power through the ballot box. It used the year-long cease-fire, prior to the election, however, to station military and political cadres in areas of the country that had been inaccessible to it during the war and cached arms and weapons throughout the country. It maintained its army's discipline and stalled in fulfilling its obligations to demobilize. Its refusal to meet key disarmament provisions of the Bicesse Accords was always explained as a function of its insecurity, thus legitimizing reneging on its commitment. When UNITA lost the election, it possessed a nation-wide military advantage which it pressed almost immediately.

Outside spoilers tend to use overt violence as a strategy toward undermining peace. Both the CDR in Rwanda and Inkatha Freedom Party assassinated moderates who stood for a negotiated peace, carried out massacres to coincide with any progress in reaching a negotiated settlement. and allied itself with conservative members in the armed forces and police to sabotage the agreement. The IFP, because it hoped to split the National Party from the ANC, and because it hoped that its demands of a confederal constitution would receive support from the United States, attempted to hide its role in the violence. A favorite tactic of its leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was to insist that 'the anger of my followers is so severe that I can not promise I can constrain them.'¹⁶ The CDR, on the other hand took the violence strategy to its genocidal limit; the very evening that its former ally, President Habyirimana, agreed to comply with the provisions of the Arusha Accords, the CDR systematically assassinated Hutu moderates who sought accommodation with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and began killing Tutsis in Rwanda at a rate of nearly 100,000 a week for ten weeks.

The Khmer Rouge, which began as in inside spoiler, hoped to use its noncompliance with key provisions of the Paris Accords, to pressure the United Nations into interpreting the Accords in ways that would severely damage its chief rival, the State of Cambodia. When it became clear that complying with the peace agreement would not strengthen the KR, it became an outside spoiler. It boycotted the process, and used violence as a means to weaken the will of the United Nations to implement the Accords.

¹⁶ Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton, <u>An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa</u> (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), provides evidence that this has been Buthelezi's mode of operation for over two decades.

Strategies of Spoiler Management

Custodians of peace processes in the 1990s have pursued three major strategies to manage spoilers. These strategies vary by emphasis on conciliation vs. coercion. Each strategy can combine elements of different sources of leverage available to the custodian - remunerative, normative, and military power. In order of conciliation to coercion, the strategies are: 1.) inducement or giving the spoiler what it wants; 2.) socialization or changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms; and 3.) coercion, or the punishment of spoiler behavior or reduction of spoiler capacity to destroy the peace process. These strategies are ideal types; in practice, international actors can employ more than one strategy -- either simultaneously (with different priority and emphasis) or in sequence.

Inducement as a strategy for managing spoilers entails taking positive measures to address grievances of factions who attempt to obstruct peace or acquiescing to aggressive behavior that violates a peace agreement. As to the former, custodians attempt to induce the spoiler into joining a peace process or fulfilling its obligations to an existing agreement by meeting the spoiler's demands, which can be of several types. Spoilers may insist that their behavior is based on fear and demand greater protection. Spoilers may insist that their behavior is based on fairness and demand greater benefits. Spoilers may insist that their behavior is based on fairness and demand greater benefits.

Inducement can be rigorously applied by meeting costly demands made by spoilers, as the United Nations did in Mozambique in 1993-94. Or it can be something as lax as offering a spoiler a continued role in negotiations, even when the spoiler has returned to war as in the case of Angola in 1992, or when the spoiler has engaged in genocide as in Rwanda in 1994, or when the spoiler assassinates political opponents and engages in numerous human rights violations as in Cambodia in 1992-93. Indeed, the frequency of inducement attempts in peace processes suggests that it is a "default mode;" a convenient, automatic strategy that will be applied unless the actor makes a conscious choice to try something different.

The strategy of *socialization* requires custodians to establish a set of norms for acceptable behavior by internal parties that commit to peace or seek to join a peace process. These norms then become the basis for judging the demands of the parties (are they legitimate or not?) and the behaviors of the parties (are they acceptable in the normative framework?). In turn, the strategy relies on two components: the material and the intellectual. The material component involves custodians carefully calibrating the supply of carrots and sticks in order to elicit acceptable behavior. The intellectual component emphasizes regular persuasion by custodians of the value of the desired normative behavior. Normative standards can include commitment to the rules of democratic competition and adherence to the protection of human rights. Intellectual socialization can be aimed at both elites - the attempt to inculcate appropriate values - and at citizens - the attempt to educate the mass of citizens into norms of governance, democratic competition, and accountability, as a means of pressuring elites.

A strategy of coercion relies on the use or threat of punishment to either alter spoiler behavior or reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt the peace process. The strategy of coercion has several variations. The use of *coercive diplomacy*, or the use of threat and demand, has been used infrequently against spoilers in peace processes, the notable exception being the use of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995.¹⁷ A major reason for its infrequency is that the United Nations, which has been the major lead actor in implementing peace agreements in civil wars, has been very careful to draw a line against the use of military threats. The use of coercive diplomacy runs counter to the traditional peacekeeping approach of neutrality, impartiality, and self-defense. Indeed, the British doctrine of wider peacekeeping, as well as the Nordic approach to peacekeeping draws no distinction between the threatened use of force to gain

¹⁷ This is a tough call whether by my definition the Bosnian Serbs were a spoiler at that point. One could argue that the public peace process had achieved the commitment of the Bosnian and Bosnian Croat parties and therefore the Bosnian Serbs were spoilers.

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compliance to an agreement and war.¹⁸ Likewise, the *use of force to defeat the spoiler* has been attempted infrequently - most notably, in Somalia, when the United Nations decided to hold Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed, responsible for an ambush by his forces against Pakistani peacekeepers, and in Sri Lanka, when an Indian peacekeeping force attempted to forcibly disarm Tamil rebels and capture their leader, Velupillai Prabakaran.¹⁹

Two more common variations of the coercion strategy are what I call the *departing train* strategy and the *withdrawal* strategy. The departing train strategy combines a judgment that the spoiler's demands and behavior are illegitimate with the assertion that *the peace process will go irrevocably forward*, regardless of whether the spoiler joined or not. In Cambodia and South Africa, the strategy was linked to the holding of an election, thereby using a deadline to set a time limit for joining the process with the promise of a change in the status quo. The departing train metaphor implies that the peace process is a train leaving the station at a preordained time: once set in motion, anyone not on board will be left behind. In the South African case the strategy included minor face-saving compromises - throwing ladders from the moving train - in a final attempt to convince the spoiler to join. In the Cambodian case, no such compromise was offered. The departing train strategy may require active measures to limit the ability of the spoiler to attack the peace process - by protecting the parties of peace and by deterrent threats.

Finally, the withdrawal variation of the coercive strategy threatens to punish spoilers by the threat to withdraw international support and peacekeepers from the peace process. This was the dominant strategy pursued by the United Nations in Rwanda and IFOR in Bosnia, but was also used in a tertiary manner in Mozambique and Angola. The strategy stresses that international support for peace is conditional on the progress of <u>all</u> warring factions meeting their obligations.

Matching Strategies to Spoiler Problems

As a rule, the type of the spoiler should be paramount in crafting a strategy for managing the spoiler. For limited spoilers, inducement is an optimal strategy; for greedy spoilers, socialization is an optimal strategy; and for total spoilers, coercion is the optimal strategy.

When a spoiler defines the conflict as total, there are only two possible outcomes: victory or defeat of the spoiler. A total spoiler cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can it be socialized; moreover, either strategy can strengthen the spoiler by providing it with rewards. Custodians therefore should choose a variation of the coercion strategy. If custodians are unwilling to use force, then they should strengthen the parties of peace so that they can defend themselves. At a minimum, the custodian can declare the demands and behavior of the spoiler illegitimate. If the spoiler tends more to a stealthy strategy than a violent strategy, the departing train strategy can legitimize the parties of peace and delegitimize the spoiler. Custodians can strengthen the parties who are committed to peace by depriving the spoiler of resources both capital and weapons - that can be used to undermine peace or by redeploying peacekeepers to protect internal parties.

However, two versions of the coercive strategy are irrelevant and can be dangerously counterproductive for managing total spoilers. First, coercive diplomacy is unlikely to succeed, given the cost insensitivity of total spoilers; they call bluffs and test will. If custodians fail to carry through on threats or fail to establish escalation dominance, the spoiler's position may be strengthened. By showing the

¹⁸ See Stephen John Stedman, "Consent, Neutrality, and Impartiality in the Tower of Babel," in Virginia Gamba and Jakkie Potgieter, eds., <u>Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues (Geneva: UNIDIR, forthcoming)</u>.

¹⁹ Again, this is a tough call as to whether Aideed was a spoiler by my definition. One could argue that the Addis Ababa agreements between the various clan factions in Somalia constituted a formal peace process and therefore Aideed was a spoiler. Likewise, although Indian diplomats claimed that Prabakaran provided his consent to the peace agreement in 1987, he never signed the agreement.

inadequacy of international force, the spoiler adds to its domestic reputation for coercive strength. Second, the strategy of withdrawal does not punish a total spoiler, but in fact rewards it. Total spoilers do not want peace and therefore have everything to gain if custodians abandon the peace process.

If a spoiler is a limited player, an inducement strategy may establish a bargaining range and opportunity for a compromise settlement. If the limited goals of the spoiler center on security, the use of a coercive strategy, especially the use of force or coercive diplomacy, may prompt an escalation of violence and demands. The departing train strategy may be appropriate if the spoiler has a strong incentive to join the peace process. Moreover, the departing train need not threaten the spoiler, therefore it does not risk an inadvertent cycle of escalation. The threat of withdrawal may be effective, if the spoiler has an interest in the peace process.

The greedy spoiler requires a long-term strategy of socialization. Since the spoiler is not total, there is at least a possibility of bringing it into the peace process. Since inducements alone will serve to whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler, care has to be taken to draw a line on the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands. Moreover, depending on the cost-insensitivity and risk-taking of the spoiler, the use of coercive sticks may be necessary to impose costs and create a strong sense of limits to the spoiler's demands. On the other hand, a reliance solely on coercion will ignore that even the greedy spoiler has legitimate security goals that can only be met through inducements.

Limitations of the Custodian. Policy-makers often have concerns other than a specific conflict at hand; as Alexander George notes, a strategy that may be the best from a perspective of solely managing the conflict may not be the best for a policy maker considering a range of interests.²⁰ This is certainly so when it comes to conflict resolution in small, unimportant (to American national interest), and faraway countries. Even the United Nations considers its actions in particular cases against its corporate interest and the need to protect the reputation and institution of peacekeeping. What might be an optimal strategy to end a conflict and manage a spoiler may be too costly or risky for external actors. As one American department of defense official told me, "one should not confuse what is needed to end these conflicts with what the United States is prepared to do."²¹

With the exception of the implementation of the Dayton peace agreements on Bosnia, and the implementation of the South African settlement, the chief custodian of peace processes in the 1990s is the United Nations. Although the United Nations possesses formal authority, its agent on the ground (the Special Representative of the Secretary General) is constrained by the direction, commitment, and will of the Security Council in New York. Special Representatives have to borrow leverage through coalition-building; their ability to supply inducements or punishments, even their ability to credibly rule on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of demands depends on the support of member-states. In some cases, such as the Salvadoran and Cambodian peace processes, the United Nations has relied on 'groups of friends;' that is, formal associations of all member-states who have an interest in the peace process and therefore bring their power, energy, and attention to bear on seeing peace implemented. In other cases, the Special Representatives on set.

The biggest potential liability (yet source of possible leverage) in managing a spoiler are memberstates who are patrons of the spoiler. On the one hand, such patrons, if they are sincerely interested in making peace, may supply the Special Representative with assets of leverage, credibility, and trust in managing the spoiler. On the other hand, such patrons may be slow to acknowledge that their client is acting as a spoiler and may be reluctant to declare its client's demands illegitimate. Indeed, almost every patron

²⁰ George, Bridging the Gap, pp. 25-26.

²¹ Confidential interview.

of a spoiler brings with it baggage (personal networks and domestic groups that support the spoiler and prior beliefs about the spoiler) that can lead it to continue to support the spoiler, even in the face of outrageous behavior.

Case Studies of Spoiler Management

To evaluate the efficacy of different strategies of spoiler management, I have chosen to examine several cases of spoiler problems in the 1990s. I have selected cases where it is possible to judge the outcome of a particular strategy; thus ongoing peace processes, where the outcome is uncertain, such as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Bosnia have been avoided. The cases include variation on the dependent variable - successful management of the spoiler (Inkatha in South Africa, RENAMO in Mozambique, and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia) and failed management of the spoiler (the CDR in Rwanda and UNITA in Angola and SOC in Cambodia). The cases vary on the two principle independent variables -- the mix of strategies chosen to manage the spoiler and the type of spoiler. In terms of primary strategy, South Africa and Cambodia (against the Khmer Rouge) are examples of the 'departing train'' version of the coercion strategy. Angola and Cambodia (against SOC) are examples of the inducement strategy; Mozambique is an example of a mixed inducement and socialization strategy. Rwanda is an example of the withdrawal version of the coercive strategy. In terms of spoiler type, the Khmer Rouge and CDR are examples of total spoilers; UNITA and SOC are ambiguous spoilers -- either total or extreme greedy spoilers; IFP is a greedy spoiler and RENAMO is also an ambiguous spoiler -- either limited or greedy.

The judgment of successful and failed management of the spoiler is based on whether the spoiler has been relatively weakened or strengthened vis a vis its opponents. The judgment of spoiler type is based in part on revealed preferences, but is also based on evidence of intentions at the time. Spoilers who in the end accept electoral defeat reveal themselves to be limited spoilers.

These cases are not completely independent of each other. Strategies for managing a particular spoiler were sometimes the result of lessons derived from another case. Some UN personnel worked on more than one case. Some spoilers themselves likely drew lessons for their strategy based on evaluating the efficacy of custodians in other cases. In a technologically interdependent world, there are probably few cases that are truly independent.

Following the method of structured, focused comparison of Alexander George,²² the case studies tried to address the following general questions

1.) What was the spoiler's behavior? What demands did the spoiler make? What was the rhetoric of the spoiler?

2.) How did external parties interpret the empirically verifiable observations of the spoiler? What judgments did the custodians make about the intentions and motivation of the spoiler?

3.) What evidence existed for interpreting spoiler intentions? What evidence existed for evaluating the organizational unity of the spoiler? What evidence was in the hands of the custodian? What evidence did they cite to support their interpretations? Was there other evidence that was ignored or disregarded?

4.) Before the implementation process did the custodian anticipate likely spoiler behavior? What strategy did the custodian choose to manage the spoiler? What was the theory behind the strategy? Did the custodian implement the strategy effectively? What was the effect of the strategy - on the spoiler and on other parties in the conflict?

5.) What awareness did the custodian have about its leverage in the peace process? What leverage did it think was available? What sources of power, authority, and influence did it call upon? What sources

²² Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 15-16, 1982.

of power, authority, and influence were left untapped?

Case 1.) Rwanda: Limited and Total Spoilers and Threatened Withdrawal

The Arusha Accords, signed by Juvenal Habyirimana, president of Rwanda, and officials of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel force composed of mostly Tutsi exiles, in August 1993, promised to end a three year civil war that had killed approximately 10,000 people. The Accords were an ambitious attempt to end a history of violent conflict between the Hutu ethnic group that formed approximately 70% of the population and the Tutsi ethnic group which mostly comprised approximately 30%.²³ Simultaneously, the Accords attempted to end Hutu political hegemony over the Tutsi, integrate thousands of Tutsi exiles into Rwandan life, and liberalize and democratize Rwandan government, which had been dominated for over twenty years by a small elite group of Hutu formed around Habyirimana. The Accords contained elaborate provisions for power-sharing in government, integration of the two armies, a detailed plan for the return of some soldiers to civilian life, procedures for democratization of Rwandan politics, and the establishment of a coalition transition government, the BBTG (Broad Based Transitional Government). The Accords were the product of fourteen months of negotiation, and had been mediated by Tanzania, in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity and the governments of France, Belgium, and the United States. The implementation of the Accords was to be overseen by the United Nations; both the RPF and the Rwandan government wanted a robust peacekeeping presence during the implementation.

The mediators of the agreement apparently foresaw that there would likely be resistance to the accords from Hutu extremists in the army and government, who had rallied under the banner of the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR).²⁴ The United States and France advocated inclusion of the CDR into the peace process. The RPF had vetoed provisions that would have given it a role in a new Rwandan government, arguing that it was not an independent political party and that its extreme belief in ethnic superiority were contrary to the spirit of settlement. Without a robust mandate for a UN peacekeeping mission or the inclusion of the CDR as advocated by France and the US, no alternative was put in place to cope with its challenge.

A further point of contention concerned representation in the army: Arusha allotted 50% of position in the officer corps and 40% of the rest of the army to the RPF. Although such numbers were a sensible solution to RPF security fears, they were contested by the government. The Rwandan government negotiating team foresaw likely obstruction by the CDR, but nonetheless reached agreement with the RPF on those terms.

As Howard Adelman points out, this was the

serious flaw in this near-perfect agreement. No action plan had been agreed to with respect to the extremists who played an important role in the government and the army but who were denied a role in the new BBTG (Broad-Based Transitional Government). The United States and France had urged the RPF to concede the extremists such a role on the premise that a danger was better if it could be openly watched rather than allowed to proceed in a hidden way. The RPF just as understandably rejected any provision for including the extremists on the argument that any party that refused to

²³ Another group, the Twa, comprises 1% of Rwanda's population. A common figure for the respective populations is 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. On the basis of new calculations, Howard Adelman estimates that the percentage of Tutsi was greatly underreported, hence the 70%/30% figure here. (Private communication, Howard Adelman, 10-10-96).

²⁴ Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with Bruce Jones, <u>The International Response to Conflict and</u> <u>Genocide: Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, Study 2 Early Warning and Conflict Management</u> (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 25.

recognize the legitimacy of the refugee warriors and their right to belong and play a part in Rwanda would only undermine the peace process from within. Instead, it was hoped that the new UN peacekeepers would neutralize the extremists.²⁵

The United Nations, however, did not envision such a role. Some UN diplomats foresaw implementation as a relatively easy task. The force that was ultimately deployed to Rwanda was not only less than the parties had agreed to, but also less than what the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) force commander, General Romeo Dallaire, believed necessary. Chastened by its recent experience in Somalia, the UN had no intention of robust peacekeeping.

Between the signing of the Accords in August 1993 and the full deployment of UNAMIR in February 1994, tension, uncertainty and political fluidity were rife in Rwanda. The peace accords provided room for the resurgence of moderate Hutu politicians who could provide an ethnic bridge to the mostly Tutsi RPF. Habyirimana's party itself was undergoing splits; the CDR, resolutely opposed to compromise with the RPF, emerged as a possible competitor to Habyirimana. In October 1993, a coup attempt in Burundi by Tutsi officers against its recently elected Hutu president, triggered acts of genocide in that country. Between 50,000 and 100,000 people died, including the president of Burundi. This event increased Hutu extremist antipathy for the Arusha compromise, sowed suspicion and doubt among Hutu moderate politicians towards the RPF, and emboldened the Hutu extremists to advocate openly extermination of the Tutsi as a final solution to Rwanda's ethnic problem.²⁶

UNAMIR's top officials, Special Representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, and field commander, Romeo Dallaire confronted several challenges: the unwillingness of Habyirimana to carry out his obligations to the Arusha Accords and form the BBTG, low-level political violence and ethnic killings, growing public incitement of ethnic hatred - especially by the popular radio station Radio Mille Collines, and growing evidence of a plan among several members of the government to carry out a genocidal attack if the BBTG was installed. Evidence of the plan was conveyed in a cable to the UN Department of Peacekeeping on January 11, 1994. The cable informed the UN that a high level defector from the government had given them details about the formation of specially trained militias to carry out a genocide, the creation of lists of targets of Hutu moderates for assassination, a plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers in the hope of driving the UN out of Rwanda, and a specific threat that the BBTG would be attacked upon installation.

Dallaire requested better equipment that would improve UNAMIR's capacity to respond in the case of crisis. The request was ignored. He also requested permission to begin independent searches for arms caches, but was told to do so only in conjunction with local authorities - some of whom were implicated in the warning of January 11. In the words of the definitive account of this period, UN headquarters was only prepared to okay "what the traffic would bear."

A major difficulty in creating a coherent strategy to deal with the spoiler problem in Rwanda concerned Habyirimana's role and motivation. Analysts were uncertain as to whether Habyirimana was himself an extremist, who was only tactically committed to the peace process or a pragmatic peacemaker, who was boxed in by extremists surrounding him. The faction that was implicated in the January warning to Dallaire were members of Habyirimana's own elite troops, the Presidential Guard, several close advisers of the president, as well as the president's wife.

Habyirimana's behavior could be interpreted as supporting either interpretation. Habyirimana's prevarication might have been evidence that he hoped events would provide the extremists with an

²⁵ Howard Adelman, "Preventing Post-Cold War Conflicts, What Have We Learned? The Case of Rwanda," Paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, California, April 17, 1996, p. 7.

²⁶ Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 198-203.

opportunity to return to war in a stronger position. Alternatively, his refusal to implement Arusha might have been evidence of a lack of maneuvering room from the extremists. It was possible that Habyirimana feared for his life if he implemented the accord, and therefore "buying time, without knowing exactly for what purpose, became a kind of survival reflex."²⁷

American officials close to the implementation process believed that there was no split between Habyirimana and the extremists; therefore, the key to dealing with the extremists was to get Habyirimana to install the BBTG. They simply assumed that Habyirimana would deliver his followers to the peace process.²⁸

There was no coordinated, unified international approach stance towards the extremists. Booh-Booh took a hard line against CDR demands for inclusion in the peace process, only to reverse himself and argue for their participation. France continued to have cordial relations, not only with Habyirimana, but officials implicated in the January warnings. Indeed, arms supplies from France, in violation of the Arusha agreement arrived in Rwanda in January, and according to UNAMIR officials, in April after the beginning of the genocide. Donor nations in Kigali neither formulated a coherent, consistent mention regarding their concerns with the violence and on-going human rights violations by the government. Even the issue of hate radio and the broadcast of genocidal threats did not yield a consensus towards the extremists. The failure of international actors to assert unified, minimal standards of human rights "probably succeeded only in eroding the credibility of diplomatic suasion."²⁹

When a strategy emerged for dealing with the stalled implementation in late March 1993, it proved completely counterproductive. Pushed by the United States and endorsed by the United Nations, the strategy bore little connection to any of the problems in Rwanda - the presence of extremists pledged to attack the parties of peace, the uncertainty about whether Habyirimana was himself allied to the extremists, or Habyirimana's reluctance to fulfill the obligations of Arusha. Instead, the UN threatened to withdraw its peacekeeping mission unless the warring parties committed to fulfilling their obligations to the peace plan. Although the US government clearly saw the main culprit as the Rwandan government³⁰, the strategy threatened to punish all of the parties for any one's obstruction. On April 5, the UN Security Council announced that the mandate for UNAMIR would be extended, but warned that its patience had worn out; if the parties did not comply with Arusha, the UN would leave.

On April 6, the strategy, combined with growing diplomatic pressure on Habyirimana, succeeded in winning from him a commitment to install the BBTG. In a meeting in Arusha with the regional mediators and representatives of France and the United States, he acceded to their demands that he implement the accord, only to be assassinated on his return to Kigali later that night. Immediately, the Presidential Guard and CDR, carried out the swift assassinations of almost all of the Hutu moderates, and instructed its militias to begin the systematic killing of all Tutsi in the country. In keeping with the dictates of the plan, in addition to assassinating the Hutu moderate Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, soldiers of the Presidential Guard killed 10 Belgian peacekeepers who were attempting to protect her.

In the ensuing two months of genocide that killed over 1 million people, the United Nations and its member states withdrew substantially the peacekeeping presence. It would be charitable to describe UN

²⁷ Ibid., p. 203.

²⁸ Anthony Marley, US Department of State, presentation at the 14th Annual Africa Conference, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, April 7, 1995. Lt. Colonel Marley (ret.) was the American military attache to the Arusha process.

²⁹ Adelman, Suhrke, with Jones, The International Response, p. 32.

³⁰ Michael Barnett, "The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations: the Security Council, Peacekeeping, and Genocide in Rwanda," Journal of Cultural Anthropology, forthcoming. Dr. Barnett was a Council on Foreign Relations fellow with the U.S. Mission to the UN at the time.

actions after April 6 as constituting a strategy for addressing the spoiler problem in the Rwandan peace process; the essence of its approach was appeasement by inaction. For two months, the UN and the United States urged the RPF and those who organized and ordered the genocide to establish a cease-fire and return to negotiations. The United Nations and United States conveyed a clear message: committing genocide was not enough to disqualify a party in Rwanda from a legitimate place at the bargaining table.

Analysis. The most devastating failure of international actors to manage a spoiler problem occurred in the implementation of the Arusha accords. The failure resulted from treating a multi-party peace structure as only having two parties, from an inability to create a response to Hutu extremists who organized and planned to attack the peace process and from incorrectly detecting the motivation for Habyirimana's obstruction and creating a means for addressing his concerns. When the UN finally came forth with a strategy for managing the spoilers in Rwanda, the strategy possessed little logical connection to the problem at hand.

The custodians of peace in Rwanda treated the possibility of a spoiler attack with benign neglect. At Arusha, France and the United States advocated the use of inducements to bring the CDR into the peace process; this was overruled by the RPF. The RPF preferred a coercive strategy, but this was unlikely with the United Nations as the chief custodian of the process.

When the UN developed a strategy for managing the spoiler problem in Rwanda, it targeted Habyirimana, who was a spoiler, but a limited spoiler. Nor did Habyirimana control the CDR, who were total and sought to destroy the entire process. The strategy chosen against Habyirimana was a coercion strategy: the threat of withdrawal. In April 1994 the parties to the conflict were informed that if the agreement was not implemented during the following six months, UNAMIR would pack up and go home. From a logical perspective such a strategy might make sense, if <u>all</u> of the parties to an agreement were equally culpable in failing their obligations and all were limited spoilers who wanted a settlement to succeed. The threat of withdrawal could provide a test of motivation: if the parties were really committed to seeing the peace process through, the possibility of losing international support might provoke them into beginning the implementation process.

In Rwanda, not all of the parties were spoilers: by threatening all parties with withdrawal, even the parties that were committed to peace would be punished. If any of the spoilers was a total player, it would receive a veto on the peace process. The threat of withdrawal was sufficient to force Habyirimana to reveal that he was a limited spoiler who preferred peace. But the threat of withdrawal had no leverage on the CDR and Presidential Guard, and indeed, signaled to them a basic lack of international commitment to the implementation.

The threat of withdrawal against Habyirimana produced his commitment to implement an agreement that his former allies rebelled against. This has led some to argue that a more gradual strategy towards Habyirimana and inducement towards the extremists would have succeeded. This is doubtful for several reasons. Inducement towards CDR and the extremists was limited by the bargaining range established by the other parties. Moreover, the argument that including spoilers in an agreement is better than excluding them is irrelevant if the spoiler is a total player; it will undermine the process by stealth from within.

As for Habyirimana, it must be remembered that he had evaded meeting his obligations for several months; a lack of pressure was not producing any signs of compliance; and the uncertainty and violence during the implementation process was weakening the security of the Hutu moderate parties who were in the transitional government. Until April 6, there was great uncertainty as to whether Habyirimana was an extremist who talked peace - or a reluctant peacemaker at odds with his own people.³¹

³¹ As Alan Kuperman points out, the failure in Rwanda stemmed from both errors of intelligence and errors of judgment. See his article, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage Than Good," <u>SAIS Review</u>, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Winter-Spring 1996, pp. 221-240.

The only possible strategy that might have avoided the cataclysm of April 1994 would have been one which combined protection for the parties of peace - the moderate Hutu parties, and the RPF - through a larger, more proactive peacekeeping force, clear credible threats against the use of violence by extremists, defanging the extremists by reducing their capability to attack the peace process and an active initiative to separate Habyirimana from the extremists. In essence the international community would have had to acknowledge that a peace process it had treated as a two-party structure between the RPF and Rwandan government was in fact a multiparty structure with the RPF, moderate Hutu parties, the Rwandan government, and the CDR/Presidential Guard. The goal then would have been to protect the coalition for peace, marginalize the extremist Hutus, and create the opportunity for Habyirimana to distance himself from the extremes to join the middle.

That such a strategy was not articulated and attempted was overdetermined. Beyond the obvious intelligence failure in detecting Habyirimana's position, there were myriad reasons that led to an absence of critical judgment. Right from the beginning of the planning for implementation, the UN and its member-states were only minimally committed to the peace process. A key consideration in the choice of the withdrawal strategy was the Clinton administration's desire to send a message to Congress that the UN had the discipline to say no to peacekeeping operations that seemed troubled.³² Organizational politics and the frailty of individual decision-making combined to ignore warning of spoilers committed to genocide. Mediators could not overcome the basic contradiction in their analysis - that on the one hand, Arusha excluded Hutu extremists who threatened the peace process, but on the other hand, those same extremists would not really do anything when the peace process was implemented. The UN and its member-states did not want to face up to the implications of an accurate diagnosis of the problem. The UN and the member-states most intimately involved in the peace process failed to create a unified, disciplined message of disapproval to the extremists.

Case 2.) Cambodia I: The Khmer Rouge and the Departing Train

The Paris Peace Accords, signed on October 23, 1991, culminated four years of international negotiations aimed at ending Cambodia's civil war. Several factors contributed to the settlement. The war had reached a stalemate between the major combatants - the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the royalist party of Prince Norodom Sihanouk; the Khmer Rouge (KR); the State of Cambodia (SOC); and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The external patrons of the warring parties had tired of the stalemate and wished to divest themselves of their clients. The countries of the region coalesced around a framework that called for multiparty elections, demobilization and disarmament of the parties and United Nations implementation of the agreement. The warring parties consented to the agreement due to the coercion of their sponsors, and not out of a genuine desire to make peace. The parties remained deeply suspicious of each other, as well as distrustful of the international consortium - the Core Group, consisting of the Perm 5 of the UN Security Council and interested regional states such as Japan and Australia - that brokered the agreement.

The party to the settlement that commanded the most scrutiny was the Khmer Rouge. Responsible for the deaths of between 1 and 2 million of their citizens during their brief three year stint in power, the KR survived due to its military prowess, support from China, and diplomatic recognition from the ASEAN countries and the United States. The deal to bring the Khmer Rouge into the peace process was a bow to realpolitik - a recognition by the United States and others that the KR could not be defeated militarily - and the hope that the politics of peace would marginalize them.³³

³² Barnett, "The Politics of Indifference," p. 35.

³³ Stephen Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vol. 69, No. 2, (Spring 1990), pp. 99-115.

Between November 1991 and May of 1992 the Khmer Rouge sporadically complied with the Paris settlement. Immediately after signing the accords, but before the deployment of UNTAC, KR spokesperson, Khieu Samphan, attempted to open a political office in Phnom Penh, only to be chased out of town by SOC inspired rioters. Khieu Samphan retreated to Bangkok and the KR demanded the deployment of a thousand peacekeepers to provide security in Phnom Penh. At about the same time, Norodom Sihanouk floated the idea of a SOC-FUNCINPEC coalition government as a means of isolating the Khmer Rouge, a move that was against the spirit and law of the Paris Accords. These two incidents created a lobby for the Khmer Rouge that argued that it was ready to implement the Paris Accords, but was frightened into obstructive behavior by the aggressive behavior of its antagonists. An alternative view insisted that there were two "Khmer Rouges," consisting of 'moderate' KR who wanted peace, and 'hard-line' KR who opposed implementation. Other analysts countered that the KR's commitment to the accords was always tactical and the belligerence of their adversaries provided them with a convenient excuse for their spoiler behavior.

The debate over KR motivations continues to this date, but the best evidence of their intentions, based on interviews that they themselves - both top officials and lowly foot soldiers -- have given, suggests that the party was only committed to the peace process in so far that it promised to return it to power.³⁴ It interpreted the Paris Accords as giving UNTAC the power to dismantle SOC's administrative apparatus and expel all ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia. If UNTAC carried out such a program, then the KR would benefit from the crisis that would ensue for SOC.

Inconsistent behavior by the KR between November 1991 and May 1992 provided evidence for both sides of the argument about its intentions. Its soldiers frequently violated the cease-fire. It restricted UN mobility in its areas of control, withheld cooperation by not participating in joint military consultations, and attacked a UN helicopter in February 1992, wounding a Canadian soldier.

When UNTAC began in March 1992³⁵ the Khmer Rouge "adopted a posture of cautious cooperation, despite engaging in numerous cease-fire violations."³⁶ On the positive side, it accepted the presence of some civilian members of UNTAC in its areas. Khieu Samphan actively represented the KR on the Supreme National Council (SNC), a transitional body composed of representatives of the warring parties, and cooperated on several political and humanitarian initiatives with the United Nations.³⁷ On the negative side, the Khmer Rouge refused to allow the deployment of any UNTAC units in their areas. The few military observers allowed into KR territory were so limited in their activities that "at times they seemed more hostages than monitors."³⁸

The issue of KR noncompliance came to a head in May and June of 1992. On May 30, 1992, a group of lightly armed Khmer Rouge soldiers refused to allow an armed UN convoy, accompanied by the Secretary

³⁶ James A. Schear, "Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia," in Daniel and Hays, ed., <u>Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping</u>, p.253. Schear was an assistant to Akashi in Cambodia.

³⁸ Trevor Findlay, <u>Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.51.

³⁴ See especially Steven Heder, "The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers,' in Steven Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds., <u>Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping</u> (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 73-113.

³⁵ Although the Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991, the operational plan for UNTAC was not presented to the Security Council for approval until February 19, 1992. On February 28, the Security Council approved the mission and on March 15, the Secretary General's Special Representative to Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi arrived in Phnom Penh. A small UN holding operation, UNAMIC, was deployed as a bridge between the signing of the Paris accords and the arrival of UNTAC.

³⁷ Ibid.

General's Special Representative Yasushi Akashi and his force commander, General John Sanderson, to enter Khmer Rouge territory in western Cambodia. Instead of insisting on the United Nation's right of passage and using force to challenge the soldiers, Akashi chose to retreat.

When cantonment, demobilization, and disarmament of all of the warring parties began in June, the Khmer Rouge refused to participate. Their leaders argued that they would not canton their soldiers because Vietnamese forces were still present in Cambodia in violation of the Paris Accords and because UNTAC had not established effective control over the SOC. The Khmer Rouge insisted that it would comply with the demobilization process only if UNTAC dismantled existing SOC administrative structures and vested the SNC with the power to run the country.

Khmer Rouge obstruction prompted heated debates in UNTAC on the proper strategy for managing the KR and the possible use of force to gain its compliance. French general Michael Loridon, UNTAC's deputy military commander, believed that a show of strength would compel the Khmer Rouge to meet its obligations and would establish a reputation among the other factions that the United Nations would enforce compliance. If the United Nations did not act, Loridon maintained, it would lose credibility with the KR and among the other parties. He asserted that UNTAC had the legal authority to enforce compliance, and did not need to seek a Chapter 7 mandate to do so. Loridon's recommendation for a tough line against the KR was seconded by human rights organizations and nongovernmental organizations involved in humanitarian work in Cambodia.³⁹

Akashi and Sanderson, opposed using or threatening force against the Khmer Rouge for several reasons. First, Sanderson drew no distinction between threatening the Khmer Rouge with force to gain compliance and going to war with the KR.⁴⁰ This dovetailed with Akashi and Sanderson's assessment that the troop contributors to the mission, as well as the Core Group would not favor fighting a war. Second, they felt that UNTAC was not organized for offensive operations and would prove ineffective. Third, they both felt that any attempt to use force would destroy the Core Group's consensus; it was unlikely that the consortium would immediately agree to condemn KR behavior and condone the use or threat of force. Fourth, they believed that if the Core Group disintegrated, the operation would collapse. Fifth, they feared that any use of force would undermine the attempt to negotiate compliance, which was the preferred approach by Akashi and which meshed with Sanderson's view of the "good Khmer Rouge - bad Khmer Rouge" explanation of KR behavior; as long as there were good Khmer Rouge there was a possibility of earning their voluntary compliance. Finally, Akashi was concerned of the internal repercussions of using force against the KR. FUNCINPEC and the small KPNLF party derived some of their power in the peace process from the Khmer Rouge counterbalance to SOC; to weaken the Khmer Rouge might swing the balance of power to SOC, which might be tempted to then abandon the peace process and seek an outright victory.

Akashi chose to eschew the threat or use of force and instead sought meetings with the Khmer Rouge to discuss its reasons for noncompliance. He quickly realized that the KR interpreted two key components of the Paris accords in dramatically different ways than what Akashi considered the spirit of the accords. First, the KR believed that the Paris injunction for the removal of all "foreign forces" meant all foreigners, regardless of their status as combatants. At stake then was the political status of non-Khmer Cambodians, especially ethnic Vietnamese who lived in Cambodia. Second, the KR insisted that the Paris accords

³⁹ Steven R. Ratner, <u>The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War</u> (New York: St. Martin's Press and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), pp. 170-171; Michael Doyle, <u>UN</u> <u>Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate</u>, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p.67; and Findlay, <u>Cambodia</u>, pp. 37- 38.

⁴⁰ John Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures," in H. Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), pp. 16-31.

required the complete destruction of the SOC administrative structures. Akashi realized that meeting the first demand would be a gross violation of human rights and pandering to ethnic extremism, and that meeting the second demand was an impossibility - UNTAC could not replace SOC, it had neither the administrative personnel or know-how to do so. The likely result of such an attempt would be absolute ungovernability, which - while pleasing KR aspirations - would destroy the peace process.⁴¹

Akashi chose not to appease KR demands and began to build a strategy for managing the party's obstructionist behavior. He met with local representatives of the Thai and Chinese governments - the KR patrons - to create a unified approach to the problem, privately condemned KR noncompliance at SNC meetings, and warned UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali that some kind of pressure would likely have to be applied in the future.

Akashi's appraisal of the problem can be found in a letter he sent to Boutros Ghali on July 27, 1992, where he describes the Khmer Rouge rejection of UNTAC's well-intentioned efforts to address its concerns. Akashi states that KR behavior had demonstrated that it was not sincerely committed to the peace process. He attributes KR noncompliance to its attempt "to gain what it could not get either in the battlefield or in the Paris negotiations, that is, to improve its political and military power to such an extent that the other parties will be placed at a distinctive disadvantage when UNTAC leaves."⁴² Akashi then chronicles the manner in which the KR has acted in bad faith and asserts that "Khieu Samphan is little more than a glorified mouthpiece of . . . Pol Pot," who "seems to be dedicated to the doctrine of simultaneously 'talk and fight."⁴³

Akashi argues that under the circumstances a stand of "patient persuasion" and "sustained pressure" is his best strategy. He insists that UNTAC "will adhere to an impartial stand, while criticizing any acts in violation of the Paris Agreement." Although doubting Khmer Rouge good faith, he asserts that keeping an open door to its participation will prevent turning its followers into a "permanent disgruntled minority."⁴⁴

Akashi points out the biggest possible sources of leverage to impose costs on the KR are the influence of its patrons, Thailand and China. He expresses skepticism about the former because of the unwillingness of the Thai government to control several generals of its military, who had become partners with the KR in illegal timber and gem trading across the Thai border. Akashi was also skeptical of China's influence over the KR, as it seemed to wane after the signing of the peace accords and China's cessation of military assistance to the KR. Akashi requests that if KR noncompliance continues, then the Secretary General should attempt to mobilize economic pressure against the KR: "this should not however involve any spectacular action, but rather a steady strengthening of our border checkpoints adjacent to the DK [KR] zones, in order to control the inflow of arms and petroleum and the outflow of gems and logs, a major source of DK's [KR'S] income."⁴⁵

By leaving the door open to the Khmer Rouge to rejoin the peace process, Akashi hoped to contain its dispute with UNTAC and to limit its hostility to the peace process. An aggressive stance towards the KR would endanger all members of UNTAC, including civilian staff, who could become KR targets. If KR opposition could be contained, Akashi believed that elections could still be held and that UNTAC could redeploy its peacekeepers to protect the election.

Akashi's approach was promoted by the Australian foreign ministry, which issued a policy paper in

- 43 Ibid., p.207.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.

⁴¹ Heder, "The Resumption of Armed Struggle," passim.

⁴² "Document 43: Letter dated 27 July 1992 from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Cambodia," in <u>The United Nations and Cambodia:</u> <u>1991-1995</u> United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume II (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), p.206.

September 1992 that became the basis of the international response to the KR.⁴⁶ It sought a concerted response from the Perm 5, the core group and ASEAN, based on the judgment that KR "demands are not in strict accord with the actual terms of the Paris Agreements."⁴⁷

Although General Sanderson was loathe to try to enforce Khmer Rouge compliance with the peace process, he reconfigured the military mission to protect the strategic objective of holding the elections. In doing so, he redeployed his battalions in ways that could contain Khmer Rouge attacks. He re-interpreted the traditional peacekeeping doctrine of neutrality and impartiality, going so far as to use military units of all of the factions (save the KR) to assist UNTAC in providing security during the election. Sanderson justified using soldiers from the other parties by insisting that these armies were not deployed against the Khmer Rouge per se, but rather against any force determined to disrupt the election. In a rather ingenious formulation, he described the changed military mission as "an interposition strategy, but not between opposing forces. Rather, it was between a highly moral act sanctioned under international law and supported by international consensus, and any person or group which might threaten it."⁴⁸

To establish an atmosphere where civilians would feel secure in participating in an election, UNTAC established a radio component in December 1992. Although its purpose was to convince voters of ballot secrecy and to explain UNTAC's mission and activities, it also aimed to neutralize Khmer Rouge propaganda. The decision to establish Radio UNTAC had to overcome previous objections of the United Nations Secretariat, among others, that an independent media outlet could endanger UNTAC's perceived neutrality.

From September 1992 to May 1993, the scheduled date for elections, UNTAC held firm in its strategy. It was aided by clear signals from the Core Group that the peace process would go forward without Khmer Rouge participation. China and Thailand acceded to a non-binding resolution of the Security Council to impose economic sanctions on the KR. And as the election date grew close, both China and Thailand, the KR's closest international patrons, explicitly lent support to the elections. Although the KR increased attacks against UNTAC during March and April of 1993, it did not unleash a military offensive against the elections, which were successfully held as planned.

UNTAC's strategy for dealing with the KR was imaginative and effective, and serves as the prototype of what I call the "departing train" strategy for managing spoilers. When faced with KR attempts to undermine peace, UNTAC emphasized that the peace process would not exclude the spoiler, but would not be held hostage by the spoiler. To carry out this strategy. UNTAC sought to address the specific demands of the spoiler. When such demands were found to threaten the core agreement of the peace process, UNTAC sought international consensus to delegitimize the demands of the KR and to legitimize the strategy of continuing the peace process in its absence. UNTAC reconfigured itself militarily to protect the electoral process from KR attack, but left the door open to the KR if it wanted to re-engage the peace process.

Case 3.) Cambodia II: SOC and Inducement

A difficulty in gauging Khmer Rouge motivation stemmed from the fact that its grievance towards UNTAC's lack of control over SOC had some merit. An ongoing problem for UNTAC was the problem of lack of compliance by the State of Cambodia. UNTAC never established control of SOC's administrative structures. This was due to lack of qualified personnel in the numbers that were needed, the ability of the SOC to ignore and sabotage UNTAC direction, and the unwillingness of UNTAC to assert its administrative

p.71.

⁴⁶ "Document 44: 'Cambodia: Next Steps,' Australian Paper Dated 16 September 1992," in <u>The United</u> <u>Nations and Cambodia</u>, p.208.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Jianwei Wang, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1996),

prerogatives as outlined by the Paris Accords.

An equally pressing matter of control concerned the police and security forces of SOC. Throughout UNTAC's lifespan, SOC police intimidated, and harassed civil society organizations and physically assaulted and occasionally assassinated opposition personnel. While UNTAC reconfigured its military mission to protect the election from KR attack, SOC security personnel waged a low-level reign of terror against its electoral competition.

Despite warnings and protest by some UNTAC human rights officials, Akashi was slow to perceive SOC as a potential spoiler and was unprepared when SOC openly attempted to undermine the peace process immediately after the May 1993 election. The election results provided a stunning blow to SOC; despite its use of intimidation, assassination, and fraud, SOC was outpolled by FUNCINPEC. SOC's political party, the CCP, refused to accept the election results and attempted to grab power. Hun Sen charged that the election was marred by massive fraud; some CCP officials declared secession for one region of the country; and SOC-orchestrated riots throughout Cambodia threatened and attacked UNTAC officials. At the very moment that UNTAC had seemingly achieved success, SOC threatened to tear down the whole edifice of peace in Cambodia.

From the beginning of the implementation of the Paris Accords, Akashi, the United Nations, and the Core Group mostly focused on the Khmer Rouge as a threat to peace and ignored the potential for SOC to play a spoiler role. Moreover, Khmer Rouge spoiler behavior created incentives and excuses for SOC to undermine the peace process. Unless both spoilers carried out their commitments to the peace process, each could claim that their behavior was a function of the other. Seeing violence or lack of commitment by their opponent, they could assert that playing by the rules would leave them vulnerable if they made peace.

This rationale can became a barrier for peacemakers who seek to determine the real motivation behind acts of violence and subversion. In cases of mimetic spoilers, peacemakers tend to accept a situational explanation for spoiler behavior -- an explanation that may be correct and will seem reasonable -- and overlook the fact that such explanations may also be a facade for a party already committed to tactical subversion of the peace process.

The creation of the departing train strategy towards the Khmer Rouge increased the perception of UNTAC officials that they were dependent on SOC and limited in their options for controlling its violations of the Accords. That UNTAC was dependent on SOC is in little doubt; if SOC left the peace process, there would be no elections and a return to war. What Akashi failed to comprehend, however, was SOC's mutual dependence on UNTAC. The presence of UNTAC had greatly strengthened the SOC administration; SOC had a stake in getting to the election and gaining international legitimacy and support. If SOC had to return to war against the KR, it would do so from a stronger position with international support and FUNCINPEC's abandonment of its former coalition partner. Akashi also misread command and control relations within SOC. He explained to his aides that he feared that Hun Sen had only tenuous control over hardliners in SOC, and if pushed too hard, they would rebel against Hun Sen and return to war. On this issue, however, Akashi was not supported by his staff, who perceived Hun Sen to be firmly in charge of his followers.

Although the Paris Accords contained numerous references to administrative control, UNTAC was unwilling to seize such control when SOC failed to comply with the Accords. The UN interpreted UNTAC's mandate in a limited way right from the beginning of its creation. UNTAC was "urged to rely on 'codes of conduct and guidelines for management" and to eschew issuing binding directives.⁴⁹ Akashi, under the advice of Boutros Boutros Ghali, envisioned UNTAC exerting control through monitoring and supervising existing administrative structures.⁵⁰ Moreover, Akashi worried about UNTAC's lack of domestic legitimacy;

⁴⁹ Doyle, <u>UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia</u>, p.37.

he envisioned the Supreme National Council as a governing body that could take hard decisions and referee the peace process and therefore provide domestic legitimacy for actions against spoilers. The SNC did assist the strategy against the KR by providing a domestic basis for ruling that its demands were illegitimate. On the other hand, the device was much less effective towards SOC.

For the most part UNTAC restrained from attempting to enforce compliance with its administrative directives. Akashi did not want to use the prerogative of replacing or repositioning SOC bureaucrats. Indeed, SOC often refused requests by UNTAC that it change administrators. Akashi's restraint in the face of SOC obstruction prompted the head of UNTAC administration, Gerald Porcell, to resign in February 1993. Porcell at the time lamented that as long as UNTAC did not "have the political will to apply the peace accords, its control cannot but be ineffective."⁵¹

UNTAC was also lax in holding SOC accountable for human rights violations. Although UNTAC's mandate for creating an environment conducive to human rights was the most ambitious ever for a UN peace operation, its enforcement of violations was "dilatory, sporadic, and improvised."⁵² Akashi chose to interpret UNTAC's human rights mandate narrowly. He believed that rigorous action to enforce human rights would endanger UNTAC's neutrality and moreover, he felt that a wide interpretation of human rights "seemed to be based on unrealistically high standards in the context of Cambodia's reality."⁵³

As violence increased and the political climate deteriorated at the end of 1992, Akashi acceded to the establishment of an Office of Special Prosecutor. But as Willliam Shawcross notes, "the office languished as Akashi, Sanderson, and other UNTAC officials began to fear that prosecutorial zeal might destroy the entire mission's fragile links with the Phnom Penh regime."⁵⁴ Akashi was indirectly supported in this in February 1993 when ASEAN and China exerted pressure to limit the human rights component of UNTAC to education and training.⁵⁵

Between May 1992 and May 1993, UNTAC pursued a de facto policy of inducement against SOC. It usually did not act against SOC violations; when it did, it sought to deter SOC obstruction through private persuasion. Akashi asserted that the parties need not adhere strictly to all of their commitments. As he wrote afterwards, "too rigid, legalistic interpretations of the agreements would have hindered my work." He believed that while the Paris Accords were "based on the concepts of Western democracy, Asian methods and procedures should be used in the negotiations." Such methods found public reprimand (or even acknowledgment of infringement or violation of agreements) distasteful.

In May 1993, what had been a tacit strategy of inducement became explicit in its response to SOC's attacks immediately after the election. UNTAC's adherence to the election results was less than steadfast. Within the first forty eight hours Akashi attempted to console Hun Sen and promised to investigate fully his charges of electoral fraud. He also sought out FUNCINPEC leader, Prince Ranhridden, to urge him to be conciliatory towards the CCP.

In the two weeks after the election the CPP resorted to violence "to blackmail both FUNCINPEC and UNTAC in an attempt to reverse the election results." As William Shawcross writes, the CPP attempt at black mail was largely successful. Fearing a return to open civil war, the United Nations acceded to a power sharing arrangement mediated by Sihanouk that provided SOC with more power and positions than its electoral performance deserved. Akashi acknowledged that the deal was "unorthodox by universal democratic principles," but he defended it on the basis of the "practical wisdom" of combining

⁵¹ Quoted in Findlay, <u>Cambodia</u>, p.63.

⁵² Ibid., p.64.

⁵³ Ibid., p.66.

⁵⁴ William Shawcross, <u>Cambodia's New Deal</u> Contemporary Issues Paper No.1 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1994), p.59.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.59-60.

FUNCINPEC's political appeal with the administrative experience and power of the CPP.56

Akashi believed that compliance on most of the dimensions of the peace process, including demobilization and disarmament, and human rights protection, was secondary to compliance with holding an election. The election became a 'holy grail' for UNTAC; it became the one measure of success for the mission and all was to be subsumed in the attempt to attain it. In the end this even included rejecting a "strict adherence" to the results of the election; Akashi and UNTAC did not want to insist that the political outcome of the election accurately reflected the electoral outcome, for fear that conflict would undermine the triumph of the election.

Analysis: Comparing Cambodia I and II. The implementation of the Paris Peace Accords was hampered by the obstruction of two of the parties to the accord: the Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia. Both parties failed to carry out various obligations of the accords and both parties used violence to undermine the peace process. UNTAC developed separate strategies for managing the two spoilers. In the case of the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC developed a sophisticated 'departing train' strategy. It investigated various grievances of the Khmer Rouge and found them illegitimate, gathered international consensus for its position, pledged that while the Khmer Rouge was free to rejoin the peace process, the settlement would not be held hostage to Khmer Rouge obstructionism, and took military measures to contain possible KR attacks. Towards spoiler behavior by SOC, on the other hand, UNTAC pursued a policy of inducement. It largely ignored SOC violations of the accords or used quiet normative persuasion to try to alter its behavior. In the end, UNTAC acceded to SOC blackmail and legitimated SOC's larger share of power than it had warranted by its electoral performance.

With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to hazard a tentative judgment about the effectiveness of UNTAC's strategies for managing the spoiler problems in the Cambodian peace process. The strategy chosen to deal with the Khmer Rouge has been vindicated: the threat of the Khmer Rouge has been contained, its power has declined, and in the summer of 1996 a severe factional split decimated the party. Time has not been so kind in evaluating the UN's strategy towards SOC. Since 1993, SOC steadily increased its grip on power to the point that by 1996 several Cambodian experts warned of a "creeping coup."⁵⁷ If such a coup is realized, then SOC will have skillfully manipulated an internationally negotiated and implemented peace process to triumph in a war that it could not win on the battlefield.

UNTAC's biggest failure was its inability to interpret and counter the behavior of one of the parties -SOC - that professed commitment to the peace process. But event that failure is ambiguous. UNTAC may not have realized that its strategy towards the KR left it hostage to SOC intransigence; when SOC's character was revealed, UNTAC was limited to inducement. A more sympathetic explanation is that UNTAC realized the danger of its strategy and decided that the risk of SOC usurpation of power was worth the successful marginalization of the Khmer Rouge.

The strategy of the departing train establishes a partnership between the custodian of the peace process and the parties publicly committed to peace. The unforeseen danger, however, is that one of the parties committed to peace may also be a spoiler - tactically engaged in the peace process. A delicate balancing act then ensues for the custodian. On the one hand, the custodian must keep the peace process moving forward, cooperate with the parties of peace, and assist in protecting them. On the other hand, the custodian must not become so hostage to the parties of the middle that it condones and encourages their violations of the peace process and attempts to win power unilaterally.

⁵⁶ Yasushi Akashi, "The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons to Be Learned," Paper presented to the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, November 29, 1993, p.8.

⁵⁷ Michael Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia," Occasional Paper, International Peace Academy, January 1997.

Case 4.) South Africa: the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Departing Train

In South Africa in 1994, ethnic and racial extremists nearly plunged that country into renewed civil war on the eve of its first non-racial elections. After the consolidation of several pacts between the two dominant political actors in the country - the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) - a coalition of ethnic parties from the white right wing (the Afrikaner Volksfront and the Conservative Party) and the black right wing (the Inkatha Freedom Party) boycotted the formal negotiations for democratic transition, actively fomented violence, and publicly threatened civil war in the hopes of derailing the incipient peace process. In the end the coalition of spoilers splintered when Inkatha and the Afrikaner Volksfront ended their boycott and joined the elections at the last moment.

Unlike Cambodia, international actors played a much less visible and intrusive role in the South African peace process. Nonetheless, actions by key states, in particular, the United States, through their diplomatic personnel on the ground and their explicit policies towards the peace process increased the chances of its success. Unlike Cambodia, where the strategy of the departing train was developed by UNTAC, in South Africa it was the parties of the middle (the ANC and NP) that chose the strategy. The supplementary role for international actors was to legitimize the strategy and support it.

The success of managing the spoilers in South Africa relied on a strategy of not rewarding violence and intransigence, of addressing the concerns of the extremists only through the framework that had been agreed on by the middle - and not by scuttling the hard achieved negotiating progress of the middle parties to start again at ground zero.

The South African peace process was dependent on two parties - the African National Congress and the National Party - reaching an agreement on the mode of transition to a one-person/one-vote democratic political system and creating a mutual interest in transition apart from their narrow self-interest as political parties.⁵⁸ These two parties were paramount for reasons of power and legitimacy. The ANC was widely recognized to be the most popular political party in South Africa. It was accorded international legitimacy and was seen by many to be the rightful representative of the anti-apartheid movement and non-racialism in South Africa. Although it never possessed the capacity to overthrow the white government, its links with youth and organized labor provided it with the capability to render many major urban areas of the country ungovernable. The National Party's status as the most popular political party among the whites of South Africa had been established through the electoral process. Its control over the military and police provided it with a veto over any transition. The boldness of F.W. de Klerk's moves towards unbanning the ANC and undertaking negotiations won him, and by extension his party, international praise and support.

A necessary condition for the peace process to succeed was the need for the ANC and NP to be able to form a solid coalition of the middle. There were four deep, recurrent problems that vexed relations between the ANC and NP. First, the parties had to find solutions to constitutional, economic, and security issues that would meet the minimal needs of their constituents. Second, although the parties had incentives to cooperate to create new institutions, they also had incentives to compete in order to get institutions that disproportionately benefited themselves. Throughout the peace process negotiations were threatened by the parties search for unilateral advantage. Third, a new political dispensation would threaten individuals who were connected with the apartheid regime. Two categories were particularly at risk: 1.) members of the security and defense forces who were involved in hit squads, assassination, and human rights abuses, and 2.) black leaders who had benefited from apartheid and were connected to the security and defense forces. Finally, uncertainty about government and NP complicity in ongoing violence created a barrier for the parties to overcome their mistrust.

⁵⁸ Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, with Robert Davies, The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict <u>Resolution in Southern Africa</u> (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 131-188 and Timothy D. Sisk, <u>Democraticization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

There were two dangers to the middle coalition. First, if the parties engaged in brinkmanship to pursue unilaterally advantageous institutions, they risked the collapse of the whole peace structure. Second, a deal between the ANC and NP would have to entail an overall political realignment in South Africa, as the NP would have to jettison its relations with the Afrikaner right wing and the IFP. Such an external political realignment would have to lead to a simultaneous realignment within the National Party. There was nothing automatic about this. Progress between the ANC and the NP materialized only in late 1992, when there emerged a factional split within the NP between those who saw their political future as dependent on reaching accommodation with the ANC and those old guard politicians who preferred a stronger relationship with Inkatha and a dictated peace with the ANC. Although De Klerk succeeded in holding his party together, there were several defections of NP politicians to Inkatha, and as late as summer 1993 there was the possibility that the NP would split - with a major faction of the party jettisoning the ANC policy.

This dynamic within the NP is necessary for understanding Inkatha's actions between Feb. 1990 and April 1994. Its strategy was based on the goal of preventing the formation of a negotiation coalition between the ANC and NP. To carry out its strategy it conspired with elements in the police and armed forces who opposed a settlement to use violence whenever progress occurred towards a settlement. It boycotted negotiations in the hope of obstructing progress towards a settlement; put forward extreme negotiating proposals that were outside the bargaining range of the parties of the middle; and attempted to woo the old guard in the NP to exit the party.

Inkatha and its leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi defy simple description. Within its regional power base, KwaZulu Natal, Inkatha draws support from rural dwellers and traditional chiefs. Its power base is consolidated through extensive patron-client relationships, oppression of dissent, coercion and extortion. This is the side of Inkatha that exhibits totalitarian tendencies, uses warlords to stamp out opposition, and made a deal with the South African military and police in the 1980s to destroy autonomous civil society and the threat posed by the anti-apartheid movement. Its public persona to the rest of South Africa and to the world is as the arbiter and voice of interpreting and protecting Zulu ethnic identity. Since Buthelezi has always had ambitions to be a South African leader, and not just a Zulu leader. Inkatha advocated strong regional powers as a means of checking possible future ANC one-party rule: unfettered free enterprise; the rights of property and Christian values of piety. During the 1980s South African whites looked to Buthelezi with hope as a black alternative to the ANC. International media, foreign governments, and international NGO's tended to only see the patriotic, Christian, capitalist side of Buthelezi and Inkatha, and ignored the violent, fanatic, and dangerous side.⁵⁹

American policy-makers in 1993 understood that Inkatha held enormous wrecking power. They also understood that the movement's supporters had legitimate aspirations - protections for ethnic identity - and legitimate fear - a sense that if the movement lost power in KwaZulu Natal its supporters would feel terrible vulnerability. On the other hand, American policy-makers realized that the emerging deal between the ANC and NP was historic and necessary for peace. The only policy requirement that the United States had towards the emerging deal was that it contain a federalist constitution as a means of balancing regional demands for self-rule with the central power necessary to govern South Africa. The challenge then was to investigate Inkatha and Buthelezi's demands, figure out which of them could be addressed through the peace process, and convince them that the peace process was the only opportunity for meeting their needs.

Detecting Inkatha and Buthelezi's motivations was a difficult task. First, Inkatha demanded a confederation agreement between the various provinces and a weak central government. To gain support for their proposal, however, Inkatha constantly described their demands as federalist. The clear intent was

⁵⁹ The best sources for understanding the Janus faced nature of Buthelezi and Inkatha are Mare and Hamilton, <u>An Appetite for Power</u> and Gerhard Mare, <u>Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in</u> <u>South Africa</u> (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992).

to garner sympathy for their cause by portraying the ANC as old-style African state socialists who planned to create an all powerful central state that would run roughshod over the provinces. By declaring that their proposals were federalist, Inkatha could claim that they were the reasonable alternative. In fact, the interim constitution negotiated by the ANC and NP was federalist in character. Inkatha descriptions of ANC plans may have been accurate for the party in 1983, but certainly not in 1993. The ANC had made significant concessions to federalism and had satisfied the NP, which had also been concerned with limiting central state power.

The inability of negotiators from the ANC or NP or members of the foreign diplomatic community to engage Inkatha in a dialogue over meeting their regional concerns finally led American policy-makers to question the basic motivations of the party and its leader. In July of 1993, the ANC and NP had set a firm election date for April 27, 1994. KwaZulu/Natal was essentially in the middle of a regional civil war. But violence throughout South Africa had also escalated. By October 1993, the Inkatha strategy seemed to be an all-out attempt to destroy the negotiated settlement between the ANC and NP, and not to boycott in order to get better terms.⁶⁰

Between October 1993 and April 1994, American diplomats backed the departing train strategy and stood firmly behind the decision to hold the elections in April. Nonetheless, they sought face-saving ways to bring Inkatha in to the process without fundamentally altering the ANC-NP deal. They consistently conveyed the message to Inkatha that elections would not be postponed, that Inkatha should participate, and that there would likely be disastrous consequences to the movement if it did not. American officials, however, felt stymied by a sense that their message was not getting through to Buthelezi. Buthelezi often exploded with anger, accusing white diplomats of racism, of speaking condescendingly towards him. He surrounded himself with hardline advisers, such as Walter Felgate and Mario Ambrosini, who reinforced Buthelezi's sense of right and grievance. Several privately mediated agreements between the ANC, NP and Inkatha were overturned at the last moment because of Buthelezi's veto.

Violence increased steadily as April approached. Media reports established that Inkatha had established armed camps in KwaZulu/Natal, where approximately 5,000 recruits were receiving paramilitary training. A key police informant testified to the independently established commission to investigate violence, that generals in the South African police in conjunction with Inkatha had detailed plans for terrorist violence to stop the elections. The ANC-NP went public with this information and arrested several high ranking police officers, declared martial law and sent South African soldiers into KwaZulu Natal.

Despite the machinations by Inkatha and their role in obstructing the peace process, the American media published several misleading interpretations of the conflict. One opinion piece in particular by Stephen Rosenfeld of the Washington Post put Inkatha into the role of patriotic defenders of ethnic self-determination being driven to violence by parties seeking an all-powerful central state. Rosenfeld drew parallels between South Africa and Yugoslavia, and explicitly condemned the refusal of the ANC and NP, and the United States as an interested party, to appease Inkatha's demands and cancel the elections.

The ANC, NP and IFP acceded to an external mediation attempt to begin the second week of April. The effort, chaired by Henry Kissinger and Lord Carrington, was dead on arrival. Kissinger and Carrington, after consulting with the ANC and NP, announced that the date of the elections would not be on the mediation agenda, which prompted the IFP to quit the mediation before it began. However, an assistant to Kissinger, Washington Okumu, a Kenyan diplomat who had known Buthelezi for nearly 20 years, stayed behind in South Africa. Over the next week Okumu delivered a clear and consistent message to Buthelezi:

⁶⁰ This impression is based on a dinner that the author attended with the Inkatha constitutional committee and several U.S. state department officials in September 1993 to discuss IFP proposals and demands. This impression was seconded by Timothy Sisk who also attended the meeting and our evaluation was sent to the American embassy in Pretoria.

that the elections were going forward, that after the elections he would be seen as an outlaw not only in South Africa but in the world, and that his only alternative would be to fight a guerrilla war with no international friends.

After a last minute meeting with Mandela, who acceded to several minor face-saving concessions, and with approval of the election authorities, who would have to make special provisions for IFP participation in the election, Buthelezi joined the peace process on April 19 - exactly one week before the elections.

The South African case provides an example of extremely propitious conditions for the departing train strategy. The strategy was formulated by the internal parties of peace, who were powerful enough and unified enough to establish firm rules and conditions for the peace process and were committed to seeing the peace process through. With strong, committed parties of the middle, the demands upon international actors were dramatically lessened. The donor nations in South Africa largely followed the American example. They influenced the successful application of the strategy by judging what were legitimate demands and what were not; they minimized the ability of Inkatha to call upon international friends to alleviate the pressure on them; they were firm on insisting that Inkatha play by the rules or be prohibited from the process; and they kept pressure on the ANC and NP to throw the IFP a ladder to convince it to jump on the train as it left the station.

Case 5.) Angola: UNITA and The Failure of Inducement

The two main antagonists of the Angolan civil war, the government of Angola and UNITA, signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal in May 1991 that had been mediated by Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The agreement called for an eighteen month transition period during which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. At the end of the eighteen month period, elections would be held to determine the presidency and composition of a national assembly. The agreement contained no provisions for power-sharing: the loser in the election would not automatically receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure. Although each party had been urged to consider various powersharing options, both vetoed them in the belief that they would win the elections.

The government of Angola reluctantly accepted a role for the United Nations to monitor and assist implementation of the peace agreement. The role and size of the UN presence was the result of hard bargaining between UNITA which wanted a large UN force with an active mandate to implement the agreement and the government of Angola which perceived a large UN presence as an infringement of its sovereignty.

The United Nations operation in Angola was done on the cheap, and with little independent latitude vis a vis the parties. The parties themselves were left to carry out the demobilization, and they failed. Margaret Anstee, U.N. special representative to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, (UNAVEM II), stated that by May 1992 about 70% of the estimated 160,000 soldiers had been processed at the assembly points, but only 6,000 had been demobilized. By the election on Sept.29-30, substantial more government troops had demobilized than UNITA soldiers, but nonetheless both sides had intact armies.

The year before the elections was a particularly dicey period. There were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least sixteen skirmishes could have flared into major combat between the parties.⁶¹ That they did not was attributed to the parties' will to see the process through to elections and their command and control over their armed forces.

Until late summer 1992, the United States and United Nations were more apprehensive about the

⁶¹ Ohlson and Stedman, <u>The New Is Not Yet Born</u>, p. 111.

willingness of the Angolan government to abide by the peace process than the willingness of UNITA. Indeed, during that time the biggest worry for American policy-makers on Angola was that the government might not accept an electoral defeat and would create a crisis for the peace process.⁶²

Nonetheless there were signals that UNITA's president, JonasSavimbi, might be the obstacle to the ending of the war. Under cover of the agreement, UNITA had stationed armed personnel throughout the country, penetrating areas of Angola it had previously not engaged and it buried arms caches for quick access. There were several rumors that UNITA was holding back armed battalions across the Zaire border. The defection of a top Savimbi lieutenant informed the U.S. of a plan for a quick strike offensive to take the country by force.

The transition period had also upset the balance of power between the two militaries. The cantonment process had worked decisively in UNITA's favor; UNITA's men in their camps kept their discipline and remained a unified force that could be quickly mobilized for fighting purposes. The government's army on the other hand suffered from lack of morale; desertion and drunkenness fueled rumors of military disintegration. Savimbi's generals informed him that Angola could be taken by military surprise attack - a sentiment that Savimbi relayed to American policy-makers in Washington during a trip there in August, two months before the elections.⁶³

As elections grew near, there was a sign that American policy-makers were growing alarmed about Savimbi's potential as a wrecker of the peace process. Reports were circulating that Savimbi's standing among the Angolan populous was declining. Suddenly there was a possibility that Savimbi would lose the election. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen and his Portuguese counterpart traveled to Angola at the beginning of September to gain from the two leaders a commitment to power-sharing after the election. Savimbi responded enthusiastically to the plan and Dos Santos expressed private interest, but felt that he could not publicly commit to such a deal. In the end, no contingency plan was formed in case Savimbi lost the election. In the ten days before the voting, some American officials in Luanda were expressing the belief that Savimbi would win after all.

The election itself ran smoothly and peacefully. Multiple, intricate precautions were taken to prevent fraud: representatives of the competing parties were present at the 5,800 polling stations and at every municipal, provincial, and national electoral center. Results sheets were signed off by party representatives at each level, a process that added days to the vote counting. There were numerous logistical foul-ups, but international observers agreed that the elections were free of intimidation and fraud. The election results jibed with the UN electoral unit's quick count, which suggested that fraud did not occur.⁶⁴

In the legislative elections, the ruling MPLA party outpolled UNITA by a five-to-three margin. Dos Santos received about 49.5 percent to Savimbi's 40 percent for the presidency; since no candidate received 50 percent of the vote there was to be a run-off election in 30 days.

Problems emerged as soon as preliminary results were reported. The first results came from Luanda, an MPLA stronghold; not surprisingly, they showed the MPLA and dos Santos with a large majority. Savimbi and UNITA immediately cried foul and issued a bombastic five-page memo (in English) declaring that the MPLA was engaged in massive fraud and warning that UNITA would go back to war if it lost the election. When it became clear that returns from the central provinces (UNITA's stronghold) would not offset MPLA's early lead, UNITA withdrew its generals from the joint command of the just established new Angolan army. Savimbi retreated to his redoubt in Huambo, refused to meet any foreign officials or take a phone call from Cohen, denounced the United Nations, and repeatedly ignored international calls for

⁶² Confidential interview.

⁶³ Confidential interview.

⁶⁴ Margaret Anstee, <u>Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace</u> <u>Process, 1992-1993</u> (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 205.

reasonableness. His army then launched attacks throughout the Angolan countryside, quickly seizing large amounts of territory and destroying government arms depots.

The international response to Savimbi was scattershot. The United Nations at first insisted on the primacy of the peace process and condemned Savimbi for his obstruction. The initial American response was to urge Savimbi to use the established mechanisms for investigating his electoral grievances. but the appeal had to be made over Voice of America because Savimbi would not speak with American officials. As the UN attempted to press Savimbi to honor the election results and participate in a presidential run-off election, South African foreign minister Pik Botha visited Savimbi and unilaterally put forward a plan to shelve new elections and to provide for a government of national unity. Very quickly, policy-makers in Washington chose a similar option: to press the MPLA into offering a power sharing agreement to appease Savimbi.

The American response was crucial for establishing the international response to Savimbi's actions. By initially equivocating, the U.S. failed to draw a line against Savimbi, and then by interpreting his actions as understandable and reasonable, it chose a strategy of inducement, which only served to encourage further aggression by Savimbi. Savimbi continued his attempt to defeat the Angolan government and avoided serious negotiations. A year later in November 1993, after the rearmed Angolan military had dramatically rolled back UNITA's gains, after the United States had finally granted diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, after the UN imposed economic sanctions against UNITA, and after several hundred thousand Angolans had died, Savimbi Savimbi seriously returned to negotiations.

The American decision to use inducements towards Savimbi was at odds with what American officials in Angola, including Ambassador designate, Edmund De Jarnette, recommended. From the beginning of the crisis, he and others stationed in Luanda diagnosed the problem as stemming from Savimbi's personality and ambitions. They believed him to be motivated for a desire to win complete power in Angola, and not simply to get a better deal. These officials counseled tough action and threats, including giving Savimbi an ultimatum to return to the peace process backed up by a threat to use American military force, as the only way of managing him. From the onset of the crisis through the next year, de Jarnette argued that a carrots only strategy towards Savimbi would fail.

Instead, U.S. officials in Washington read Savimbi's actions as not aimed at overturning the peace process, but as a way to get a better deal. Part of the problem was the long-standing ties Savimbi had to the Defense department and intelligence agencies; individuals who knew Savimbi, had been romanced by Savimbi, could not bring themselves to an explanation that saw him as being at fault. Likewise, the negotiators who had worked hard to get an agreement, could not believe that one of the signatories was rejecting a compromise solution out right. Finally, those in Washington who were swayed by the analysis of the Americans on the ground in Luanda, found themselves stymied because of the tight connections between Savimbi and the Bush administration through Black, Manifort, and Kelly, Savimbi's Washington lobbying group.

In retrospect, one top American policy-maker admits that the strategy of appeasing Savimbi was "clutching at straws," but insists that a tougher policy was out of the question.⁶⁵ The Bush administration was preoccupied with the November election at home and then with Somalia abroad. Moreover, Savimbi's Washington connections precluded any use of the stick.

In Angola, inducement failed because American policy-makers erroneously believed that limited incentives would satisfy Savimbi. Nor were they prepared when inducement emboldened Savimbi to continue his spoiler behavior. In part, Savimbi's personality defined the conflict in all or nothing terms; a combination of racism, paranoia, and megalomania led him to believe that the election had been stolen from

⁶⁵ Confidential interview.

him and that he had the right to rule of all of Angola. At the time that he rejected the elections in October 1992, anything less than an absolute firm line against his pursuit of war and a credible threat of force and sanctions against him had any chance of persuading him to return to the peace process. The initial choice of inducement served to convince Savimbi that the international community would likely defer to his return to war. Inducement had shown that important elements in the American and South African governments saw Savimbi's demands and actions as legitimate. There was little international support for rallying behind the sanctity of the Bicesse process.

Moreover, the change in power positions of the two main players, the MPLA and UNITA, worked against the inducement strategy. In October of 1992 the peace process had greatly strengthened them vis a vis the MPLA; Savimbi and his generals were confident that they could win the war outright and they grossly underestimated the resolve and capability of the MPLA to return to war and win. It is possible that if Savimbi had been in a position of military weakness in October 1992, and the international community held a monopoly of rewards, inducement might have brought him back into the fold. Savimbi, however, had a continuing source of arms and capital -- diamonds -- as well as neighbors - Mobutu in Zaire and rogue elements in the South African defense forces - who would continue to supply him with arms, ammunition, and fuel to aggressively fight the war.

Case 6.) Mozambique: RENAMO and Successful Inducement

The Mozambique peace process provides a case of the successful use of inducement to manage a spoiler. In October 1992, the government of Mozambique and its ruling party, FRELIMO, signed a peace agreement with RENAMO, a South African trained and assisted guerrilla movement. Although RENAMO was unable to defeat the Mozambican government, it had been able to render much of the country ungovernable. RENAMO's use of terror, indiscriminate killing of civilians, pressganging of child soldiers, and its destructive capacity - the Mozambican civil war killed between 800,000 and 1 million people - had earned RENAMO the appellation, "the Khmer Rouge" of Africa. Upon taking over the task of implementing the peace accords, the United Nations, seeing Savimbi return Angola to the brink of war and concerned about the character of RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, doubted the sincerity of RENAMO's commitment to the negotiated settlement.⁶⁶

The tardy deployment of UN peacekeepers and establishment of an administrative capacity to oversee cantonment and demobilization of troops provided both RENAMO and FRELIMO with an excuse to disregard their obligations to the peace treaty.⁶⁷ But as the necessary UN units and personnel arrived in Mozambique and eliminated the excuse, the UN Special Representative, Aldo Ajello, found himself stymied by continuing non-cooperation from the warring parties, especially RENAMO which embarked on a three month boycott of the implementation process.⁶⁸

To bring RENAMO back into the fold, Ajello pursued two policies. First, the mediators of the peace accord stressed that Dhlakama, in addition to searching for security assurances, placed a high priority on the issue of legitimacy - that his movement had fought for a just cause, had domestic roots and was not simply a puppet of South Africa -- and hungered for recognition as a Mozambican nationalist who fought for democracy. Of course, much of RENAMO's behavior belied such a self-image; moreover, Dhlakama's vision of democracy was unlikely one of multiparty pluralism where parties do not return to war if they lose or eliminate their adversary if they win. A key task for Ajello therefore was to socialize RENAMO into the

⁶⁷ Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," <u>The Journal of Modern African</u> <u>Studies</u>, Vol. 33: No. 1, 1995, pp. 112-114 and Stephen M. Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique: Learning the Lessons of Experience," <u>Contemporary Security Policy</u>, Vol. 17: No. 1, April 1996, pp. 133-134.

⁶⁶ Eric Berman, <u>Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique</u> (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1996), p. 81.

⁶⁸ Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict," pp. 113-114.

rules of democratic competition, and to make its legitimacy contingent on fulfilling its commitment to peace. The sub-custodians of the peace process assisted Ajello in this regard. First, the representatives of the countries assisting the peace process understood the importance of continuously reinforcing Dhlakama's desire for legitimacy. Second, leaders of neighboring countries overcame their distaste of RENAMO and met with Dhlakama and treated him as a legitimate national leader.

Secondly, Ajello understood that it was crucial to wean RENAMO from its military raison d'etre. To do so, he fulfilled a promise that was made to Dhlakama during the negotiations that financial assistance would be made available to RENAMO to transform it into a democratic party. Ajello's home country, Italy, gave him a \$15 million fund to assist RENAMO's facelift. This fund, combined with the flexibility to use it in conjunction with gaining incremental compliance to the accords, gave Ajello enormous leverage with RENAMO. This leverage was amplified because of the unique context of the Mozambican case. Unlike Angola where Savimbi bankrolled his spoiler behavior through the illegal diamond trade or Cambodia where the Khmer Rouge replenished its weapons and ammunition through illicit gem and timber deals, Mozambique's paucity of accessible valuable commodities deprived RENAMO of possible resources if it chose to continue its boycott of the peace process.

Although Ajello's provision of incentives kept RENAMO engaged in the peace process, it also encouraged RENAMO to continue finding grievances and making demands on the United Nations. For example, Ajello resolved several incidents involving cantonment and demobilization by acceding to RENAMO demands that were not contained in the peace accord.⁶⁹ The inducement strategy therefore ran the risk of whetting Dhlakama's appetite, a risk that grew more dangerous as the holding of elections drew near. How would Dhlakama and RENAMO react if it lost the elections? Would it accept defeat or make demands to annul the elections, in the hope of again receiving rewards for obstructionist behavior?

The United Nations had hoped to make the actions of a post-election spoiler irrelevant by insisting on full demobilization of both armies and the creation of a new unified army. Demobilization, however, was incomplete; both RENAMO and FRELIMO had an armed capacity at the time of the elections in October 1994. Neither side, however, had anything close to the amount of troops wielded by the parties in Angola in October 1992; RENAMO and FRELIMO both had on the order of several thousand troops held in reserve.⁷⁰ If the loser decided to defect from the peace process, it would still possess a destructive capacity, but not a force capable of winning the civil war in a short period.

Given the UN and American experience of Savimbi's overturn of the elections in Angola in 1992, as well as the use of violence by SOC to blackmail UNTAC after the Cambodian elections, it is remarkable that as late as June 1994, four months before the Mozambican elections, neither the UN or the United States embassy in Maputo had contingency plans in case the loser of the election refused to accept the results.⁷¹ Instead of thinking through strategically how it would respond if faced by such action, the US and UN urged the parties to consider a power-sharing pact that would establish a South African style government of national unity after the election. This plan went nowhere, however, as the government of Mozambique

⁶⁹ Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 303 (London: Institute for International and Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43.

⁷⁰ Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique," p. 137.

⁷¹ My impression from interviews with UN and American officials in Maputo at the time is of the unwillingness to seriously consider the possibility that a loser might overturn the election. The refrain that I received from both UN and US officials was "this is not Angola." When pushed to describe the differences that mitigated against a Savimbi type outcome, the same officials stated that the elections would only take place in October if both armies were fully demobilized, thus rendering any obstructionist behavior moot. In the end, this proved not to be the case.

rejected it. On the other hand, the governments of the region, very much chastened by the experience of Savimbi in 1992, did begin cooperative consultations on responses if Dhlakama also rejected the results.

In the end there was an attempt by RENAMO to boycott the elections and reject the results. Since the UN had not set a limit on how far inducement would go, it was left to diplomats from the neighboring countries of Zimbabwe and South Africa to meet with Dhlakama and warn in no uncertain terms that they would not accept any obstruction of the election. It was left to the UN and United States to follow the warning with an appeal to Dhlakama's desire to be a legitimate national actor and democrat and to promise to investigate any alleged electoral fraud. RENAMO rejoined the elections, withdrew its charges of fraud, and took its seats in the newly elected parliament of Mozambique.

Findings

This study is a first step towards understanding the spoiler problem in peace processes and evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of different strategies of spoiler management. The findings that emerge from this study are provisional. As case studies of other examples of spoiler behavior emerge, as new research develops on the cases described above, and as more theoretical attention is aimed toward the problem, some of the findings will need to be revised and reconsidered. At this time, however, several conclusions can be put forward. I will first revisit the typology developed in the introduction of this paper, then suggest conditional generalizations about successful strategies, and finish with a discussion of general conclusions.

Spoiler Type and Appropriateness of Strategy

Earlier in this paper, I argued that as a rule, the most important factor in choosing an appropriate strategy of spoiler management is the type of spoiler: inducement for a limited spoiler, socialization for a greedy spoiler, and coercion for a total spoiler. The cases described above confirm the rule and provide insight into the constraints posed by mitigating factors.

<u>Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, and SOC</u>. The Cambodian peace process faced two spoilers, the Khmer Rouge and SOC, both of which began as inside spoilers. When the settlement failed to yield benefits to the Khmer Rouge, it stepped out of the settlement and became an outside spoiler. Evidence at the time and afterwards suggests that the Khmer Rouge was a total spoiler and that a coercive strategy was necessary. The United Nations judged that it was constrained from using either force to defeat the Khmer Rouge, or coercive diplomacy to threaten it. The use of force against the KR ran the risk of escalation, which could have endangered the overall UNTAC mission. Moreover, the use of force against the KR could have weakened FUNCINPEC, which used the existence of the Khmer Rouge as leverage against the State of Cambodia. UNTAC therefore invented the departing train version of the coercive strategy. While leaving the door open to future participation by the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC established a standard of legitimacy that it would have to meet. UNTAC made it clear that the peace process would go on without the KR, and established a deadline - the election - for it to join the process. UNTAC then redeployed its force in order to protect the election.

When UNTAC departed in 1993, the Khmer Rouge had not been eliminated, but it had been marginalized. If one aspect of Akashi's strategy had been more forcefully implemented by the Thai government - that is, a rigorous enforcement of sanctions against illegal timber and gem trade between the Khmer Rouge and Thai generals - the KR would have been even further weakened. As it is, subsequent developments have vindicated the strategy, as a major faction of the KR broke away from the party in 1996, leaving the remainder of the party in crisis.

UNTAC chose an inducement strategy towards SOC, an ambiguous spoiler that is either aggressively greedy or total. UNTAC's inducement strategy strengthened SOC's position to achieve its goals of maximum power and weakened the position of FUNCINPEC. Having said that, however, UNTAC's strategy

towards SOC was constrained by its strategy against the Khmer Rouge: the departing train required SOC to be on board. What was less understandable, however, was the unwillingness of Akashi to combine inducement towards SOC with a strong socialization effort that would have established strong norms of human rights, democracy, and good governance, as well as a systematic use of carrots and sticks to gain compliance. Part of Akashi's answer was that Asian norms were different from Western norms and that they were inappropriate to the situation. This seems in retrospect to have been a great error. UNTAC can rightly argue that the facts of power on the ground implied a gamble: appease SOC to get a short-term solution to the conflict, and hope for FUNCINPEC to assert itself over time. This gamble may still turn out a winner, but political trends in Cambodia suggest not.

<u>Rwanda and the CDR/Presidential Guard</u>. The typology suggests that the threat of withdrawal (a coercive strategy) is an inappropriate strategy towards a spoiler with total motivation. Since a total player does not want a compromise settlement, the threat of withdrawal gives it what it wants. In the Rwandan case, not only was the strategy irrelevant to the spoiler problem at hand, it sent a signal to the CDR of very low international commitment to the peace process.

Part of the problem stemmed from an unwillingness of the custodian to treat the CDR as a spoiler in its own right. In fact, there were two spoilers in the Rwandan case. Habyirimana stalled in meeting his commitments to peace, while the CDR used violence to undermine the peace process. The United States assumed that Habyirimana was a limited spoiler and could deliver the CDR, therefore it advocated the withdrawal strategy. The strategy did serve to win a late pledge by Habyirimana to implement the Arusha accords, but provided a green light for the CDR to carry out genocide to stop them.

South Africa and Inkatha. In South Africa the peace process faced an outside greedy spoiler, which was effectively managed by the departing train strategy. In South Africa, the bargaining range established by the parties of the middle ruled out inducement; meeting Inkatha's demands would have entailed losing the ANC. On the other hand, the fragility of the ANC-NP relationship ruled out using force to demand IFP participation or to eliminate the IFP as a player. Yet South Africa was similar to Cambodia, the coalition of the middle was strong enough to use force to protect the peace process and to deter attacks against it. Thus, martial law was declared in KwaZulu/Natal in order to make it possible for the election to go forward. A last minute security crack down on rogue elements in the police and Inkatha likely prevented large scale terrorist attacks during the election.

Angola and UNITA; Mozambique and RENAMO. The typology suggests that inducement can be an appropriate strategy only if there is a limited spoiler. The cases of UNITA and RENAMO support this assertion. Clearly, if a player has total intentions, then inducement is inappropriate. In the case of a greedy spoiler, inducement can whet the appetite of the spoiler. Thus, even if UN and American policy-makers were correct in 1992 that Savimbi was not a total spoiler, the only strategy that would have managed him would have been a socialization strategy with a heavy dose of coercion. Even in the case of a limited spoiler like RENAMO, inducement can encourage continuing obstructionist behavior in the hopes of getting more rewards. By continuing to undermine the peace process, the spoiler runs the risk of convincing its opponent that it is in fact a total player, for whom no concession will gain his commitment to a settlement.

If inducement is pursued, it probably should be supplemented by a socialization strategy as in Mozambique. In civil wars the rules of law have broken down, force has become an arbiter of disputes, and accommodation can easily interpreted as weakness. It makes sense then that inducement alone cannot effectively manage any spoiler.

Conditional Generalizations About Successful Strategies

The Departing Train. The departing train strategy worked in Cambodia and South Africa because of the strong degree of international consensus and unity behind the peace process; the ability of the

peacemakers to learn the intentions of the spoiler; the ability to deploy force in a defensive fashion to protect the peace process; and the ability to be firm in sticking to a plan for implementing the peace process.

The departing train strategy requires that external actors take a stand towards the demands of the spoiler: Are they legitimate and important enough to halt the progress at compromise that the other parties have made? For the strategy to work, external actors (including current or former patrons of the spoiler) must concur that if the demands of the spoiler are met, peace may be unattainable. On the other hand, external actors must encourage the parties of peace to hold out minor face-saving compromises or "ladders" should the spoiler decide to jump aboard at the last minute.

Having made a decision that the peace process will go on without the spoiler, external actors must find ways to protect the parties of peace. Attempts can be made through the spoiler's patron to warn the spoiler of dire implications if it escalates its attacks. Military forces can be deployed to protect people and processes such as elections.

The departing train strategy also depends on the ability to credibly convince all parties that the peace process will really proceed without everyone on board. International consensus is crucial for sustaining such credibility. In Cambodia, the commitment of China and Thailand to the election timetable clearly conveyed to the Khmer Rouge that the peace train was departing. Similarly, when no external actor supported Inkatha's demand for postponing the election in South Africa, Inkatha's alternatives became sharply focused: grab whatever benefits they could from participating in the election or go to war with no friends or patrons.

Inducement. In contrast to failure in Angola, inducement in Mozambique largely succeeded, albeit in conjunction with a heavy emphasis on socialization of Dhlakama and RENAMO as well as an implied threat by regional actors that established the limits of inducement. Unlike Savimbi, Afonso Dhlakama showed little total vision of his conflict. United Nations and American policy-makers came to believe that Dhlakama's goal was not total power in Mozambique, but rather to gain legitimacy for his movement, for the war he waged, and for the people and region that supported him.⁷² When faced with continuous demands by Dhlakama for money and recognition of various grievances, UN Special Representative, Ajello, believed that financial resources and benefits would keep Dhlakama and RENAMO in the peace process. Unlike Savimbi in Angola, Dhlakama had no independent source of capital, if he chose to return to war. Moreover, the surrounding countries, the United States, and the UN continued to play on the legitimacy theme - to try to socialize Dhlakama and RENAMO into playing by the rules and transforming themselves into democratic politicians. The message was clear: that Dhlakama's newly recognized legitimacy depended on his willingness to meet his obligations. When the moment of truth came, and Dhlakama's commitment wavered, the regional states, the United Nations, and the United States delivered a strong, unambiguous signal: his legitimacy would be lost and there would be a high cost to pay.

The Mozambican case suggests several requirements for successful inducement towards spoilers in peace processes. First, the spoiler must be a limited type. The detection of Dhlakama's intentions was no easy thing; the view that he sought limited goals was disputed by veteran Mozambique watchers, as well as at odds with the past brutal behavior of RENAMO. Second, external actors must be unified in establishing the legitimacy and illegitimacy of spoiler demands and behavior. Again, this seems deceptively simple. At the time, there were many in the human rights community that disputed the legitimacy of RENAMO as an actor. The United States, the United Nations and the countries of the region all had to reverse their characterization of Dhlakama as a puppet of the former apartheid regime in South Africa and a leader with

⁷² This is an ongoing theme of Cameron Hume, <u>Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Good Offices</u> (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). Hume was the US State Department delegate to the Rome peace talks.

no domestic constituency.⁷³ Third, inducement is aided if the custodian, by acting in coordination with others and by the fact of no rogue alternatives, is the sole source of rewards to the spoiler. Fourth, in civil wars where the goal is the establishment of sustained peace, inducement is probably best carried out in conjunction with a concerted international effort to socialize the spoiler into accepting basic rules of good governance and democracy. Finally, inducement must be accompanied by a credible threat if necessary to establish its limits, and break any cycle of grievance, reward, new grievance, reward, new grievance.

General Conclusions

This study provides several general conclusions about managing spoiler problems in peace processes. An obvious, but not trivial, conclusion is that custodians of peace need coherent strategies to protect peace and manage spoilers. Crucial to forging such strategies is the ability of custodians to cut through the fog of peacemaking -- the environment of immense uncertainty and complexity in the transition from war to peace. The case studies above show, however, that often the very decision rules, beliefs, and frames that custodians use to cope with complexity defeat them. That some custodians succeed, however, demonstrates that spoilers need not destroy peace, if information is used intelligently, if international unity and coordination is sought behind strategy, and if custodians recognize the much maligned force of normative power.

The Need for A Strategy

The first general lesson from this study should be an obvious one: spoiler management cannot be achieved without the development of a well-considered, sophisticated strategy. Yet in several of the cases - UNITA in Angola, Hutu extremists in Rwanda, and SOC in Cambodia - external actors did not foresee a spoiler problem, or if they did, were unable to craft a clear, coherent strategy to manage the spoiler. All of these spoilers created crises for which no or little contingency planning had occurred. In contrast, despite different strategies for managing the spoiler, common to the successful cases - the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, RENAMO in Mozambique, and Inkatha in South Africa - was an early identification of a potential problem, the development of an action plan to incorporate or marginalize the spoiler, the search for tools to carry out the plan, and the search for international consensus to give the strategy bite.

Successful strategies against spoilers share generic similarities to successful strategies in other fields of human interaction: the ability to set a goal, to convey a clear sense of what is wanted and what is offered in return, to send unambiguous signals, to make credible commitments to carry out threats or deliver on promises, and to anticipate likely problems. There must be an intelligent assessment of the decision-making process of the target and a keen sense of the likely effect one's strategy will have on the target. There must also be a keen sense of how one's actions towards the target will affect other interested parties.

The effectiveness of a strategy of spoiler management requires a judgment about the intention of the spoiler and an awareness of constraints posed by other parties, especially if there is more than one spoiler in a peace process.

The Fog of Peacemaking

Crafting effective strategies requires that custodians cope with uncertainties and an environment of immense complexity. Sources of uncertainty in peace processes include: 1.) the goal of a spoiler; 2.) the intent behind acts of non-cooperation or aggression; 3.) the degree of commitment of the spoiler; 4.) the degree of leadership command and control of followers; 5.) the degree of unity within the spoiler; 6.) the likely effects of custodial action upon the spoiler's willingness to continue aggression; 7.) the likely effects

⁷³ Donald Rothchild's recent work on mediation emphasizes that the granting or withholding of legitimacy can be an effective tool in resolving internal conflicts, but that there are often high domestic and international costs for actors to declare previously rogue leaders or factions legitimate.

of custodial action upon the other parties to the peace process; and 8.) the likely effects of custodial action upon interested external actors.

Custodians must interpret why a particular party attacks a peace process or refuses to meet its obligations to implement a peace agreement. Several possible interpretations exist. A party that has signed an agreement, but refuses to fulfill its obligations may be motivated by fear. It may see an agreement as desirable, but fears putting its security into the hands of its adversary. This leads it to stall on its commitments, cheat on agreements by creating a fail-safe option. A party that has signed an agreement may cheat because it is greedy and desires a better deal; it may want a negotiated settlement to succeed, but wants to increase its chances of maximizing its return in the settlement. A failure to fulfill its obligations may be a means of seeking advantage in an election that may determine partially the division of spoils and power of the settlement; alternatively, holding back from commitments may be a way of strengthening bargaining position in the result of losing an election. Finally, a party may cheat because it has signed a peace agreement; if the agreement looks like it will bring it to power then it will abide by the agreement; if the agreement looks like it will not bring it to power, then it will cheat to overturn the agreement. In such a case, the spoiler is motivated by total goals and sees the stakes as all or nothing.

When a party is outside of a peace process and uses violence to attack the parties within, a custodian must judge the intention behind the violence. Is it an attempt by the spoiler to force its way into negotiations - to alter a process so that its demands are included in a settlement? Or is it an attempt to weaken the commitment of the internal parties as a means to destroy a negotiated settlement? Again, the action must be connected to a judgment about the spoiler's motivation - is it motivated by limited grievances that can be incorporated into an agreement, is it motivated by total goals that are unalterably opposed to agreement?

Custodians of peace processes must make judgments about the commitment of a spoiler to its preference. Spoilers may vary in their sensitivity to costs and risks; greedy parties may only seek limited opportunities to maximize their goals or they may be willing to incur high costs and take large risks to improve their position.

All of the above interpretations assume a unified party - that the leader's behavior reflects a group consensus about its aims. But if there is uncertainty about the extent to which a leader can deliver his followers, then a leader may sign an agreement but be reluctant to implement it for fear that any act of compromise may prompt a rebellion of hardliners. Alternatively, an act of aggression by a party may or may not be evidence of a leader's willingness to make peace; it could be the act of rogue elements who are opposed to settlement and seek to wreck an agreement.

Custodians of peace face uncertainty about the effects of actions they take towards a spoiler; willit encourage the spoiler to desist from attacking the peace process or will it encourage the spoiler to continue its resistance? Furthermore, if there are indications of splits between hardliners and moderates within the spoiler, there will likely be uncertainty about how one's actions will effect the relative strengths of the factions.

Actions taken by a custodian, likewise will have uncertain effects on the other parties to a conflict. The development of effective strategy is made difficult because one's action towards a spoiler affects and is affected by the behavior of other parties in the conflict. Custodians may have to temper the use coercion against a spoiler for fear of upsetting fragile balances of power that might lead other internal parties to eschew a peaceful settlement. Custodians may be constrained in the use of inducements by the bargaining range permitted by the other parties to the conflict. The failure of a custodian to respond to spoiler behavior by one party may trigger a mimetic response by other parties to the conflict. If a custodian is lenient towards a spoiler, will it encourage other parties to also cheat? If it acts aggressively towards a spoiler, might it encourage other parties to say that the strategy that custodians pursue towards a specific spoiler must take into account the positions of other internal parties to the conflict and perhaps even work

with those parties to coordinate action.

Organizational and Individual Blinders

In order to cope with the fog of peacemaking, international custodians rely on prior beliefs, decision rules and organizational frames. All too often, however, these beliefs, rules, and frames prove to further blind the custodian, instead of assisting it to cut through the uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of peace processes.

Organizational Blinders. There are several organizational blinders that lead international custodians to simplify away the spoiler problem. These include: 1.) prior commitments of the organization to the spoiler; 2.) organizational doctrine; 3.) organizational 'holy grails;' and 4.) organizational interest.

In several of the cases, prior ties between individual states and spoilers blocked a correct interpretation of the intention and behavior of the spoiler. In the case of Angola, the American government had long been a patron of Savimbi, had supplied him with arms and supplies, and had cultivated his friendship. When Savimbi rejected the election results and returned to war in late 1992, there was an initial tendency to believe Savimbi's versions of events; to discount interpretations that Savimbi intended to win complete power; and to emphasize that even-handedness was still called for because the MPLA was no better than UNITA. The psychological commitment to Savimbi was buttressed by the impressive network of friends, supporters, and representatives that he possessed in Washington, including among others, the firm of Black, Manifort, and Kelly which had extremely close ties to the Bush administration. While the psychological commitment led to benign interpretations of Savimbi's actions, or at least to assertions that there were no good guys in the conflict, the personal networks served to constrain the influence of those who sought a more aggressive policy towards Savimbi.

The case is similar to the French relationship to the CDR and Presidential Guard in Rwanda. The prior organizational commitment of the French military to the Presidential Guard led them first to demonize the RPF - to see it as the all or nothing party, a Khmer Noir, an image that reinforced and legitimized the Hutu extremist version of the conflict. Second, the prior relationship led them to ignore clear signs of planning of genocide. Third, the personal network of relationships extended high into the Mitterand government, thus paralyzing conflicting policy tendencies in the French foreign ministry.

Prior organizational commitments do not necessarily lead to blindness about spoilers. Two counterexamples, American behavior towards Buthelezi in South Africa in 1993-94 and Chinese behavior towards the Khmer Rouge in 1993 suggest that individual states can overcome previous interpretations of their client and refuse to legitimate their spoiler activity. In both cases, there was an overriding national interest; Angola was a regional sideshow in Africa compared to South Africa for the United States and China had a key interest in bringing the war to a close in Cambodia. In the case of South Africa it was clear that peace in that country would depend first and foremost on the partnership between the ANC and NP. Nonetheless, the American refusal to legitimate Buthelezi's behavior may have been a function of the change of administration in Washington in 1993 and the replacement of key personnel who worked on the South African account.

Beyond prior ties to the spoiler, the ability of organizations to interpret the intentions and behavior of spoilers and to fashion effective responses is constrained by their doctrine. The United Nations, for example, approaches its custodial role with several assumptions. First, its representatives assume that the parties are acting in good faith when they sign a peace agreement. This leads UN personnel to put the best face on violations by signatories to agreements. Second, its representatives tend to be slavish in their devotion to the troika of traditional peacekeeping values - neutrality, impartiality, and consent. Such values when followed blindly constrain challenging spoiler behavior, for fear of being seen as partial to the victim. Even when spoiler behavior is recognized as such, the doctrine may insist on reestablishing consent.

In every successful case of spoiler management, custodians have had to take a stand on the merits

of issues under dispute. In Cambodia, UNTAC considered, then rejected Khmer Rouge grievances as illegitimate. Its success stemmed from its ability to garner international consensus against Khmer Rouge interpretations of the Paris Peace Accords. In South Africa, the strategy of the departing train also necessitated custodians rejecting the extreme demands of the spoilers. The United States, in particular, insisted that the provisions of the settlement between the ANC and NP were robust enough to protect the interests of the spoilers. In the case of Mozambique, the regional custodians of the peace process confronted RENAMO when it attempted to withdraw from the election at the last moment and threatened to return to war.

Even the successful cases of spoiler management do not diminish the larger point that doctrine poses constraints; they simply show that custodians had to reinterpret their actions so as not to appear to be in conflict with their principles and had to triumph in intra-organizational battles over the doctrinal implications of their actions. For instance, in Cambodia, General Sanderson succeeded in employing soldiers from the warring factions to protect the election against the Khmer Rouge, by redefining the meaning of impartiality and neutrality. Radio UNTAC, which earned universal praise for its role in combating Khmer Rouge propaganda, was established only over strenuous objections from UN headquarters that such a station would imperil UNTAC's neutrality.

A third organizational blinder is the tendency of custodians, when faced with complexity and uncertainty to redefine their goals and standard of success to one overriding accomplishment - a Holy Grail. When implementing peace, the United Nations often drops its commitments to various components of the peace agreement, to focus on getting to an election. When spoilers plunge their countries into war, the United Nations focuses on obtaining a cease fire. Cambodia and Mozambique illustrate the former tendency, while Rwanda and Angola illustrate the latter.

When faced with Khmer Rouge intransigence in Cambodia, UNTAC narrowed its mission to getting to an election rather than the complete implementation of the Paris Accords. This redefinition of mission was an appropriate response to the attempt by a spoiler to veto the Paris agreements. Yet UNTAC became so focused on attaining the election that it ignored the violence and obstruction by the State of Cambodia during the electoral campaign. The need to reach an election took precedence over how the parties got there. When an election finally took place, UNTAC acquiesced to SOC blackmail, and encouraged its quest for a coalition deal disproportionate to its electoral result. UNTAC feared that SOC's threat would nullify the achievement of the election, and therefor compromised the quality of the election to appease it.

In Angola, UNAVEM II chose to ignore myriad violations of the warring parties, including their almost complete failure to meet their obligations to demobilize soldiers and form a new army, and insisted on elections in September 1992. When one of the parties refused to accept the results, the outcome was catastrophic. The United Nations was said to have learned from this experience and pledged that elections would not take place in Mozambique unless complete demobilization and disarmament had taken place. At first, UNOMOZ honored this commitment by postponing elections, when the parties were slow to meet their obligations. In the end, however, UNOMOZ nonetheless went forward with holding the postponed election, even though it failed to accomplish the tasks of disarmament, complete demobilization and demining of the country.

When spoilers in Rwanda and Angola attacked and plunged their countries back into civil war, the United Nations responded by insisting on a cease-fire and return to negotiations. In both cases spoilers were willing to kill hundreds of thousands of people to demonstrate that they did not want peace, yet the answer of the United Nations was to plead with them to return to negotiations. What would the CDR or UNITA have had to do to convince the United Nations that they did not want a cease-fire? And when the tables were turned militarily against the spoilers by their enemies, why would a custodian pursue a cease-fire when it would benefit the spoiler?

The final blinder that prevents custodians from recognizing and effectively managing spoilers is their

own sense of organizational interest. In Rwanda, like Angola before it, the United Nations interpretation of the conflict and its consideration of appropriate response was based heavily on "what the traffic would bear." Faced with information that demands costly and risky action, the United Nations and many of its member states, choose to ignore the information.

This helps explain why inducement is a default mode for custodians of peace processes. Without a powerful interest in making peace, the choice of coercion is deemed a non-starter and thus custodians tend to respond to spoiler behavior with inducements.

Individual Blinders: Roles and Beliefs. The conceptions that mediators and UN special representatives have of their roles can blind them to interpreting evidence of spoiler intention. Both mediators and special representatives invest enormous time and energy into negotiating and implementing peace. When faced with spoiler behavior, they tend to see spoiler motivation and behavior as negotiable, as not inferring that their function as peacemaker is irrelevant. They tend to seek out any evidence that confirms the basic willingness of the parties to still reach agreement and ignore compelling evidence that suggests that one of the parties may reject peace completely. They tend to grab at any straw that seems to hold out the promise of a settlement; when confronted by compelling evidence of bad faith and the preference of one or more of the parties for war, they are likely to insist that there are no alternatives to negotiation. In some cases, the mediators or special representatives seem unwilling to place the responsibility for continued hostilities on the parties themselves, but rather blame their own organizations for not providing the one single request that would have made the difference between war and peace. And finally, there is the perverse tendency of custodians to so value an agreement that they blame the victim, rather than the spoiler.

Several of the individuals in key custodial positions held beliefs that cannot be reduced to their roles or organizations, but proved inimical to managing spoilers nonetheless. Yasushi Akashi believed that Western norms of democracy and human rights had little relevance for the implementation of peace in Cambodia. His writings suggest a belief in Asian norms of conflict resolution that stand opposed to Western norms of conflict resolution. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali seemed incapable of understanding that the collapse of peace processes does not imply that all parties are equally responsible. His reaction to spoiler attacks on the peace process in Rwanda was to hold all parties responsible for the failure to implement the Arusha Accords. His policy towards the spoilers - a threat to withdraw the UN would punish those Rwandans who wanted peace and reward the spoilers. Similarly, in Angola in 1992, on two occasions Boutros-Ghali condemned both parties for the collapse of the peace process, and threatened UN withdrawal. Margaret Anstee's memoir of the time attributes Boutros-Ghali's sweeping condemnation of every party as a function of demands on his time and on an imperious, impatient attitude toward all parties in conflict.

The Need for International Agreement and Coordination

A common denominator among the successful cases of spoiler management is unity and coordination among external parties - unity in the definition of the problem, unity in establishing legitimacy for the strategy, and unity in applying the strategy. While this is not a surprising finding, it is nonetheless a robust one and external parties to a peace process ignore it at their peril.

Where there are internal spoilers, there are external spoilers. Internal spoilers exist because external patrons provide them with guns, ammunition, capital, and sanctuary. External patrons may also help internal spoilers to survive by supporting their claims to legitimacy. The latter support can play havoc with a strategy such as the departing train, where the key to putting pressure on the spoiler is to declare their grievances illegitimate and to insist that the peace process itself embodies the best chance for resolving the conflict. Domestic lobbies for spoilers in Washington DC, London, Bonn, and countless other cities try to undermine the ability of the international community to forge a common approach to protecting peace.

In the cases of successful spoiler management external support for the spoiler had either dried up or had been severely curtailed. Inducement succeeded with RENAMO, because its external patron, South Africa, wanted a peaceful settlement to the war. Unlike UNITA or the Khmer Rouge, it did not have easy access to illegal markets to finance continuing the war. Inkatha acceded to the peace process in South Africa, because its friends in Washington, London, and Bonn had no purchase in persuading their governments to back its position.

International unity and cooperation requires cultivation, time, resources, and pressure. It is therefore better if it is institutionalized in the peace process, as with the Core Group in Cambodia.⁷⁴

The Legitimating Function of Spoiler Management

Finally, a key aspect to spoiler management is the development of an international consensus about what is a legitimate and illegitimate solution to a country's civil war. The successful strategies of spoiler management all have in common a unified stance by external actors about which demands by the spoiler should be met and which are to be rejected. For example, the departing train strategies in Cambodia and South Africa depended on the willingness of international actors to define limits of accommodation for the spoiler. In Cambodia, Akashi could develop his strategy only if the former patrons of the Khmer Rouge agreed that their client's demands were illegitimate and that the peace process could move forward without them. In South Africa, the departing train only had credibility in so far as external actors did not step in and insist that if Inkatha's demands were not met, then the elections could not go forward. In Mozambique, external actors agreed to legitimate RENAMO as a nationalist party, socialize it into an agreed set of rules of behavior, and establish limits on how far it would be appeased.

By contrast, in the failed cases of spoiler management, no international consensus formed about legitimate and illegitimate solutions to the civil wars. In Rwanda, external actors failed to create a common stance towards the Hutu extremists and wavered about the content of the Arusha Accords. In Angola, little attempt was made to rally international support against UNITA's return to war. Indeed, the strategy that emerged from the United States insisted that legitimacy was irrelevant to ending the war, and proceeded to pressure the party that had won the election.


The finding that legitimization is an integral part of spoiler management is important in two regards. First, it flies in the face of pious pronouncements that solutions to internal conflicts must come from the participants themselves. In this study, successful management of internal conflict has been due in part to the willingness of external actors to take sides as to which demands and grievances are legitimate and which are not. Second, it shows that when there is external consensus and when used in conjunction with a coherent larger strategy, the setting of a normative standard can be an effective tool for conflict management.

This last point is crucial. For all the lip service that they pay to the power of norm-setting, when it comes to protecting peace and managing spoilers the member-states and many UN personnel seldom act like they mean it.

⁷⁴ This has been the thrust of much of Michael Doyle's latest work on peacekeeping.

FIGURE 1

SPOILER TYPE AS A FUNCTION OF COMMITMENT AND GOALS



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An Early Warning about Political Forecasts: Oracle to Academics

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While we develop quantitative models for forecasting political and humanitarian crises, questions linger about their efficacy. In econometrics, there are accepted methodologies for determining the closeness of fit between the predicted and observed values. However, apart from the challenges of appropriate data and methods of analysis, many of these standard techniques either a) tell us little about the relative efficiency of our forecasting model or b) they do not even apply to the prescriptive models. This is because, first, after decades of economic forecasting, empirical evidence suggest that no single method predominates over others. Second, since EW models are for directing public policy, the predicted values are not independent of the observed values. That is, if a model places a nation on its list of highest risk, which provokes the intended policies for averting the crisis and the early actions are successful, then how do we measure the model's success? In this paper, I emphasize that these models should not be considered as "forecasts" and should be taken as "warnings." Therefore, we should acknowledge that the EW models offer one of the best tools for managing future humanitarian and political crises, but at once recognize their shortcomings.

Two golden rules of forecasting:

It is extremely difficult to forecast, especially the future.
But, if forecast you must, forecast and forecast often.

I. Introduction¹

In 1992, The UN Secretary General called attention of the international community to the security threats arising from ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. In his *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the need for systematic efforts directed toward developing early warning systems. This new agenda paved the way for the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Centre for Documentation and Research of the UN High Commission for Refugees to carry out systematic research and data analysis for developing an early warning system (EW from now on). Today a number of prominent researchers in various universities, NGOs, and national and international governmental agencies all over the world are currently engaged in developing such a system for political crises, genocides and refugee migrations. Although efforts at building EW models are fairly new in the field of political and humanitarian crises, early warning models cover an wide range of phenomena from natural disasters, such as earth quake and flood, to outbreak of epidemics and famines.

¹ I am particularly grateful to Professors Ted Gurr, Barbara Harff and Timur Kuran for their comments on the earlier version of this paper. Also, I thankful to Craig Jenkins and Jim Gerber for their suggestions. The remaining errors reflect my own shortcomings.

From the earliest times of recorded history people have tried to forecast the future; they have attempted to develop early warnings for disasters to come by interpreting omens from animal entrails to tea leaves. In the book of Genesis, Joseph, after being betrayed by his brothers, languishing in prison, used his skills to gain the Pharaoh's favor by successfully interpreting his dreams. He warned the Pharaoh that there would be seven years of bountiful harvest followed by seven years of drought. So, he advised the Pharaoh to stock up his granaries during the fat years to prepare for the leaner ones. His early warning was proven right, and while Canaan and the surrounding areas were suffering, Egypt was able to avert the ravages of a disastrous drought. Throughout history people have feared the unknown future and have attempted to bring it within the realm of systematic analysis; frightened individuals as well as the political leaders of all ages have sought early warning of impending doom from the shamans, oracles, astrologers, holy men, and lately, the academics.

Within social sciences, forecasting has largely been the domain of the economists. Emboldened by the policy implications of John Maynard Keynes' empirically testable hypotheses, economic profession went full steam into the business of forecasting. Today we see established corporations such as the Data Resources, Inc., Chase Econometrics, as well as many government agencies including the Office of Management and Budget and Congressional Budget Office routinely engage in economic forecasting. Modern economies all over the world are heavily dependent upon forecasting of their economic stabilization policies. By using large econometric models, the effects of a tax increase or decrease are analyzed; monetary policies are guided by early warnings of leading economic indicators. Although economic forecasts like the weather report are often objects of much derision, evidence based upon long term data is fairly clear; we have been able to avert the extreme swings of business cycles in the post war year compared to those previous to the Wars.

The virtual explosion in ethnic violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coupled with decades long quantitative research into the causes of collective violence have generated enthusiasm for forecasting of political and humanitarian crises.

However, forecasting, especially of catastrophic events. carries its own hazards. For instance, forecasts of cyclones, epidemics and earthquakes can impose tremendous economic and political costs to the affected regions. Therefore, responsible forecasters must always be concerned about making false positive (predicting a crisis when nothing happened in reality) or false negative (predicting calm, yet the nation experiences an upheaval) predictions.²

In the mean time, a number of scholars have expressed deep skepticism regarding our ability to forecast political events.³ For instance, the failure of the intelligence community and political pundits to predict the sudden demise of communism in the Soviet Union and other parts of Eastern Europe, Timur Kuran has argued about our inability to forecast the future, when it comes to war and revolution.⁴ Kuran bases his analysis on peoples' practice of falsifying their private preferences fearing government oppression, reprisal by other powerful forces in the society or peer pressure. If nobody expresses his or her true preference, the observers have no knowledge about the pervasiveness of antipathy toward the established political system. However, when a small crack appears in the seemingly solid edifice, people join the bandwagon in increasing rate finding comfort in the anonymity of large number of protesters. Although the efforts at forecasting political and humanitarian crises is still at its infancy, the possibility of disappointment with EW results, prompted Professors Gurr and Harff to warn that "if early warnings are too often inaccurate,

² Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff (1996) p. 9.

³ See, for example, Alker (1994).

⁴ For example, see Timur Kuran (1995) "The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises." American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 100, No. 6. Pp. 1528-1551.

early warning research may be discredited."5

Given the state of the debate, the problem boils down to measuring the relative effectiveness of the EW models. Although forecasting and developing EW models are fairly routine in economics, it is new in the realm of political science. Yet, econometric literature is not particularly rich in explaining how to evaluate a forecasting model, especially those used for policy analyses. Is accuracy in forecasting the only criterion for choosing a particular EW model or should we consider other factors as well. In this article, after reviewing the relevant literature, I would like to examine the question of evaluation of forecasting methods. In this context, I would also like to ask the question: "How much can we expect from the our forecasting exercises?" The purpose of this article is not to pick one method of forecasting over others, but to delve into the criteria for choosing the method of developing an early warning and to explore ways of making forecasts more accurate. We conclude that a model of early warning must be treated as an warning rather than as a forecast or prediction. In sum, echoing the sentiments of the former Secretary General of the United Nations, I argue that although it is impossible to forecast the exact outcome, the development of EW models remains one of the best chances of managing the devastating effects of wars within nations.

II. Types of Forecasting Models: A Quick Tour

The myriad forecasting techniques may be classified in two broad (and often overlapping) categories. We may call the first *Data-based* and the second, *judgment-based* methods of forecasting. The data-based forecasting requires the collection of large data sets either over time and/or over cross-section of the cases, and the use of statistical analysis of the data. In contrast, for the expert-based methods, the preponderant emphasis is not on the collection of data or its systematic analysis but on the subjective assessment by the experts based on relatively less specified methodology. Figure 1 describes the taxonomy of the major forecasting tools.

[insert figure 1 here]

The category of data-based analysis can be further sub-divided into those based on standard econometric models and those which use new methods of pattern recognition. The econometric method of forecasting involves developing detailed statistical models. The econometric models can once again be divided into *causal* models and *time-series* models. Causal analysis requires the analyst to specify the causal linkages which bind the dependent variable with a set of independent variables. Thus, in causal analysis, the value of the dependent variable (Yt) at time (t) is explained with the help of a number of independent variables (Xit): Yi = a + biXi + e

where: a and bi are the estimated coefficients and e is the random error term.

The resulting model can then be estimated with the help of either a single equation Classical Least Square (CLS) method or by using a large set of simultaneous equations through multi-stage estimation techniques. Many governmental agencies and for-profit forecasting outfits derive their forecasts by running simultaneous equation models with large number of interdependent equations.

However, of late, econometricians are increasingly using time-series analysis for forecasting economic trends.⁶ In time-series analyses, we do not look for causal linkages; there is no effort made to explain the "why" of events. Instead, they rely on the hypothesis that every data series, spanning a long enough time period consists of an underlying pattern + randomness effects of variables extraneous to the model. The object of time-series analysis is to describe the pattern and minimize the domain of random

⁵ Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff (1996), op cit. p. 9.

⁶ See C.W.J. Granger (1980).

effects. The trend pattern of a time-series model can be evident when the series is smoothed through moving average. In the moving average method, the forecasts for the period (t+1) is given by averaging the data of the past periods. However, as the series progresses over time, our moving average forecasts are often not accurate due the effects of random variations. This random variations can be minimized by adjusting the target by the amount of the past period's mistake. This is the process of auto regression. By combing auto regression (AR) with moving average (MA), the method of ARMA is created.

However, the random effects can include the impacts of natural disasters, a sudden change in preference pattern, or a sudden shift in government policy. Therefore, some effort have gone into developing a hybrid model by combining causal analysis with ARMA model. This is called multivariate ARMA or MARMA.⁷

There is yet another approach to forecasting of a series is a variation of MARMA. Where we engage in serial forecasts, we can learn from our past mistakes in forecasting. The *Bayesian forecasting* or *Kalman filter* is designed to take advantage of the latest actual value of the dependent variable as well as its corresponding forecasts. Based on the two information, forecast for the future value of Y is specified as: Ft+1 = w Yt + (1-w) Ft

where, w is the relative weight that we attribute to the current period's (t) actual and forecasted values. The Baysian forecasting method attempts to estimate the optimal value of w. If there is less uncertainty about the future, then we attribute a lower weight to our forecasted value of the current period. In the extreme case of certainty where the future is perfectly predicted by the current period, w will be equal to 1. Clearly, then, as uncertainty goes up, we place more weight on the forecasted value, which is estimated from information of the entire past series.⁸ In the extreme case, where the immediate past is no indicator of the past, w is set equal to 0. The most important assumption about Bayesian forecasting is that the actual and the forecasted values are independent of each other.

It should be intuitively clear that time series analyses work best where there is a more or less monotonic (without bending backward) trend. Thus, most national economic and demographic data series exhibit upward trend with fluctuations due to the effects of business cycles, seasonality or impacts of some other random (or unaccounted for variable in the model) variable. However, decades of extensive uses of the various kinds of models have yielded some counter-intuitive results about the relative efficacy of the two types of econometric modeling.

The other branch of data-based models is what we may call, *pattern recognition*. These techniques do not necessarily want to find the relative strengths of the causal variables by linking them to the dependent variable. And, unlike the time-series models, they do not make the assumption of a trend pattern linking the dependent variable to its previous values. In stead these models attempt to locate the variables which were present the previous times an event had taken place. Based on that information, this set of techniques attempt to find the presence of similar variables in the current condition to forecast the future. Pattern recognition can be done by *neural networking*, where based on the past occurrence of events, the computer model is "trained" to recognize the essential pattern. However, the broad category of pattern recognition offers two hybrid kinds of methods. The *Hidden Markov* method uses the neural network model to estimate the elements of the transitional matrix (Reference to HMM). Another hybrid variation of the pattern recognized from past experiences; b) extensive data on these variables are collected and c) based the presence of these variables,

San Francisco: Holden-Day. For application, see Stella M. Atkinson (1979) "Case Study on the Use of

⁷ See G. E. P. Box and G. M. Jenkins (1976) Time Series Analysis Forecasting and Control. rev. ed.

Intervention Analysis Applied to Traffic Accident." in Journal of Operations Research Society. Vol. 30, No. 7, pp. 651-59.

⁸ For a detailed explanation see, Makridakis et al. (1983), Newbold (173).

expert-based predictions are made. Harff (in Gurr and Harff, 1996) called this the Sequential Model of forecasting.

Many of the judgmental or subjective methods of forecasting techniques were created during the World War II as a means of military strategic planning. In due course, these systematic analyses of expert opinion have found its place in the forecasting literature. However, most textbooks on forecasting place them at the end of the book, almost as afterthought. Yet, owing to a number of shortcomings of the objective methods as well as new advancement in cognitive sciences, the expert-based forecasting methods are increasingly finding their place in the sun. The judgmental models can be divided in two major groups: those which use structured methods of arriving at expert forecasts and those which do not. For instance, the Delphi method of forecasting would go through a definite set of rules to keep the panel of experts free of "group-think" by systematically polling the experts anonymously and distributing the statistical compilations of the responses for successive iteration of the process (Dunn, 1994).

In contrast, unstructured method of forecasting follow no such definite procedural steps. In an unstructured model, an expert or even a group of experts can draw conclusions about the future course based on their accumulated knowledge. For instance, most of the public sector planning is conducted on the basis of forecasted values of future revenues, needs etc. Frequently, such decisions are made by a group of experts agreeing to a "reasonable" rate of growth.⁹

II. Political Forecasting: A Brief Review

In political science, the entry of forecasting is relatively new and until recently, has been confined mostly in the area of election outcomes through opinion polling. Political scientists have come a long way since 1936 when, based on a their subscription list and a random telephone survey. *Literary Digest* boldly predicted electoral victory for Alf Landon and a sound defeat of President Roosevelt by nearly 3 to 1 margin.¹⁰ However, when the actual results were out, it was Roosevelt who won the election by a landslide. Since then, the doomed magazine has defined a textbook case of a biased samples; in 1936 telephone was but an instrument of selective ownership and the subscription list of the literary journal certainly did not represent the cross-section of the population. Today, in the United States, unless the voters have reasons to hide their true preferences and deliberately falsify responses¹¹, the forecasts of electoral fortunes have been quite accurate.

This is not to say that there has been a dearth of sophisticated quantitative analyses in political science. Over the last three decades much scholarly effort has gone toward building econometric models, virtually in all branches of political science, especially in the areas of comparative politics. However, a few,

⁹ For instance, in his autobiography, George Ball, the former Undersecretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, narrates how crucial decisions during the Vietnam war were taken on the basis of subjective probabilities of success given by Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense (see Ball, pp. 173-74).

¹⁰ See Darrell Huff (1954).

¹¹ For example, in the 1990 U.S. Senate election in Louisiana, the Democratic candidate was widely predicted to score an overwhelming victory over David Duke, a former grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan whose platform rested on opposition to affirmative action. Pre-election polls projected that Duke would garner no more than 25% of the votes. Yet when the actual poll results were tabulated, he had managed to get 44%, including 60% of the white votes (see P. Thomas, 1990). Even the exit polls turned out to be in accurate, suggesting that many people would not admit to having voted for Duke. Similarly, on the eve of the 1989 mayoral election in New York, polls gave David Dinkins, an African-American candidate, a 14 to 18% lead over Rudolph Guiliani (who is white). the exit polls predicted a 6 to 10% spread between the candidates. However, the actual margin of win turned out to be much smaller, a meager 2% margin. (see A. Rosenthal, 1989 for the news report. For analysis see Timur Kuran, 1993).

if any, until quite recently, have considered using their models for forecasting. Although EW models for political and humanitarian crisis is still at its infancy, a significant number of scholars from many parts of the world are attempting to develop such models.¹²

Econometric models

Inspired by the introduction of empirically testable hypotheses by Professor Gurr (1970), the area of comparative politics that has enjoyed a long history of empirical model building is the analysis of cross-national political rebellion.¹³ Almost all of these comparative studies used causal analysis on cross-national data. However a few others have used time series or ARMA models.¹⁴ Even though these models were based on econometric modeling, their primary purpose was analytical; with the exception of Gurr and Lichbach (1986), most these researchers made no attempt to forecast the future values of their dependent variables.¹⁵

In his more recent work, Professor Gurr (1993) broke tradition with the previous studies by gathering comparative data on sub-national minority groups. On the basis of this information, Gurr and his associates proceeded to forecast risks facing minority population groups around the world. Gurr bases his forecasting on the basis of three broad categories of variables: *regime durability, resource base,* and *regime democracy.* He argues that durable nations, with their long-standing tradition of governance will be less amenable to engage in gross violation of human rights. Similarly, if nation has deep resource base, it can easily co-opt the opposition without having to coerce with extreme force. Finally, data suggest that democracies are less likely to resort to violent repression than their authoritarian counterpart. Based on these three variables, Gurr analyzed the relative proneness of a particular society being involved with genocide and gross violation of human rights of a minority group within its political boundaries.

In continuation of his work, Gurr and Moore (1996) combined Gurr's hypothesis of relative deprivation (group grievances) with Tilly's (1978) mobilization as explanations of states' repressive behavior toward minorities within its political borders. Based on a three-stage least square method, Gurr and Moore analyzed minority group rebellion as a result of interaction with repression, grievances and mobilization. Based upon their estimated results, Gurr and Moore developed their early warning forecasts for the 1990s.

Similarly, in the area of refugee migration, Jenkins and Schmeidl have attempted to develop causal models based on multiple regression models (see, Jenkins and Schmeidl, 1996; and Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1996). Their results point to the fact that ethnic discrimination gives rise to large scale refugee migration, especially when the state becomes weak. Further, mass trans-national movements of people are also likely when there are non-violent protest demonstrations in authoritarian regimes.

Models of Pattern Recognition

The models of pattern recognition require the collection of large amounts of data but they do not attempt to estimate the coefficients, measuring the strength of their association with the dependent variable. In this area, Peter Brecke has been experimenting with neural networking models. The problem of EW is that it is often not "early" enough (se Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1997). The policy makers may require quick or even real time analyses of events data, which elaborate econometric models are often unable to do. The advent in computer technology and information gathering, transmitting and processing have allowed a

¹² For a detailed description of the various efforts, see Gurr and Harff (1996) and Schmeidl and Jenkins (1997). For relevant discussion, see Singer and Wallace, 1979; Clark, 1983, 1989; Gordenker 1986, 1992; Rupensighe and Kuroda 1992; Duffy et al. 1996; Schrodt and Gerner, 1996; Davis and McDaniel 1996).

¹³ See, Douglas P. Hibbs (1973); Gupta (1990); Lichbach (1996).

¹⁴ See, for instance, Lichbach (1985).

¹⁵ See Singer and Wallace (eds. 1979), especially Gurr and Lichbach.

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number of researchers to look into new ways of developing EW signals. A number of different data systems have sprung up in developing real time early warning system. For instance, the Global Events Data System (GEDS) is capable of generating conflict indicators on a near real time basis (Davies and McDaniel, 1996).

However, their coding is done by hand and, therefore, the results are not instantaneous. The drive to develop even faster warning have prompted researchers to seek help from the recent advancements in artificial intelligence and develop computer-based coding. These systems are able to glean the essential information automatically from electronic transmissions of a wide-ranging texts, such as news reports from the wire services, diplomatic cables, and electronic mail messages sent by the NGO field observers. Thus, the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) codes interactions among the parties in the Middle East by using Reuters World Newswire (Schrodt, 1995, 1997; Gerner et al. 1994). Similarly, the Protocol on Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) rely on sparse parsing techniques to code a wide-ranging events data on political conflict on a world-wide basis (see, Bond and Bond, 1995; Bond et al. 1996). In further refinement of the technique, Bond (1997) has recently created an integrated system, Find-Read-Extract-Display (FRED), which is able to link microcomputer spreadsheets and produce graphics on a real time basis.

The recognition of pattern may not be sanitized by automatic coding and "training" of the computer to recognize the pattern for the forecast of political and humanitarian disasters. In a hybrid effort, pattern recognition may be mixed with expert opinion or the use of political theory. Another group of studies, without employing any strict methodology of analytical techniques, have broadened our horizon of knowledge in the areas of monitoring and forecasting of genocides and politicides. Posing the question, "Can we predict genocide?" Harff proceeds to develop what she calls *sequential modeling*.¹⁶ I should point out here that I do not use the term "unstructured" to mean seat-of-the-pants analysis. These, like the one proposed by Harff are grounded in theories of human motivations. However, for these models, theory goes up to the selection of the relevant variables and their measures. Once the data is assembled, there is no defined structure; much like the economic forecasts based on the *leading economic indicators*, forecasts are done by experts by reviewing the development in the political/military environment.

For instance building upon her past theoretical work on politicide and genocide (1987; 1992), Professor Harff (1996) advocates the "sequential model." This model includes national and international background conditions, intervening conditions, and the "accelerators." Harff defines accelerators as "events outside the parameters of the model: they are essentially feedback events that rapidly increase the level or significance of the most volatile of the general conditions, but may also signify system breakdown or basic changes in political causality." After the relevant data is called from the news reports and other reliable sources, these factors are coded. Based on this information, early warning forecasts are made.

Structured Judgmental Methods

Although it is not clear whether good data precedes good theory, quantitative analysis mushrooms when systematic data are kept. In fact, the earliest empirical analyses were based on national demographic data, thereby acquiring the name "statistics" (numbers relating to the state). In a similar fashion, when keeping of systematic data on conflict between nations were started, an impressive number of books and articles developed analytical models for analyzing and eventually forecasting war between two nations.¹⁷ Most of these models benefited from systematic analysis of decision making under uncertain conditions. Most of these efforts employ game theory and expected utility models for forecasting of international hostility. This group of studies starts with four sets of explicit or implicit assumptions about the process

¹⁶ See Gurr and Harff (1996). Ch. 3, p. 46.

¹⁷ A comprehensive list in this area is naturally too extensive to mention in a footnote. For a representative sample, see Bruce Bueno de Mensquita (1981, 1985a).

through which two rival nations engage each other in warfare:18

- Competition between groups produces political conflicts
- Groups compete over specific policy-related issues
- A strong leader dominates each group
- Each strong leader is a rational decision maker who seeks to maximize expected utility.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1985b) developed the analytical scheme shown in Figure 2. As can be seen from the diagram, the expected payoff of the government has been mapped on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis maps the expected payoff of the opposition. The individual quadrants on the diagram have been marked with heavy Roman numerals. In the top right hand quadrant both the parties expect to gain from a confrontation. Therefore, we can expect that in such a situation the risk of confrontation remains high. In segment I, the government expects to gain more from a confrontation than does the opposition, therefore, we can expect the government to initiate a policy of direct confrontation. Similarly, in II, it the opposition which can expected to lead the confrontation. In the upper heft-hand quadrant, the opposition expects to gain from a confrontation while the government expects to lose. Therefore, one can expect a compromise. However, in segment III, the government's loss is less than the opposition's win. Hence, in such a situation, there will be a negotiated settlement where the government is likely to give up some to avert a direct confrontation. In the IVth segment, the government loses a lot more than the opposition gains from an open hostility. This is likely to bring about a government initiated peace settlement. The Segments VII and VIII are the mirror opposite of III and IV. Finally, when reality reflects a situation close to the lower left hand quadrant, where both parties expect to lose from confronting each other, we can safely expect a stalemate with little or no confrontation. Bueno de Mesquita and his associates attempt to gauge the "expectations" of the parties by combining expert opinion with the structure of FAT.

[insert figure 2 here]

Thus, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita analyzes expert-based judgmental method of forecasting similar to *Feasibility Assessment Technique*.¹⁹ In his scheme, systematic data is presented to a small group of country experts who determine the relative positions of the most influential players in the game on a ratio scale between +1 and -1. Similarly, the relative assessment of available resources of the players along with their levels of commitment are made by the experts on a scale between 0 and 1. By multiplying the three values and adding them up for all the players (relative value position x available resources x commitment) the future outcomes are estimated.²⁰ Based on these two models, Bueno de Mesquita and his associates have forecasted a wide variety of political events, including the political future of Hong Kong after the Chinese takeover (1985b) and the political developments in the post-Khomeinin Iran (1984)

IV. Relative Efficiency of Forecasting Models

Scholars who have examined the relative effectiveness of predictive theories from epistemological standpoint, have put the question of relative efficiency under analytical microscope. However, wherever they start from they end up looking at the forecasting models, they, in ultimate analysis, link the forecasted values to the actual observations. So important is this congruence that Milton Friedman in his seminal article (1953) a theory should be judged not for its assumptions (as economists are frequently questioned on their

¹⁸ Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman and Alvin Rabushka (1985) p.16.

¹⁹ See Dipak K. Gupta (1994).

²⁰ See for example, Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman and Alvin Rabushka (1985).

unrealistic assumptions about human behavior) but by their predictive abilities. Some have expanded this simple criterion for the choice of theory, but their emphasis remains the similar in spirit. For instance Imre Lakatos (1978) suggests that :

A scientific theory T is *falsified* if and only if another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: (1) T' has excess empirical content over T: that is, it predicts *novel* facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden. by T'; (2) T' explains the previous success of T, that is all the unrefuted content of T is included (within limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated.

In other words, we should choose theory (or a predictive model) T' over T, if T' is able to explain more than what T could, and its excess predictability can be empirically verified. However, while the epistemologists are certain about the need for predictive accuracy, there is hardly a unanimity within the ranks of the econometricians about how to measure forecasting accuracy. In the standard textbooks "accuracy" may mean "goodness-of-fit," that is, how well the forecasting model is able to reproduce the data that are already known. For causal analyses (multiple regression models), most researchers use the goodness-of-fit measures. In contrast, for many time-series models, where past data predict the future behavior, a subset of the known data can be used to forecast the rest for the model's measure of accuracy. Standard statistical measures of goodness-of-fit includes (among others):

Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) =
$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} |e_i| / n$$

1

Mean Squared Errors (MSE) = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{e_i^2}{n}$

or, Mean Absolute Percent Error = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| \frac{X_i - F_i}{X_i} \right| x (100)$

Unfortunately, none of the above measures is free of its own peculiarities and biases. For instance, MAE places equal weight to a slight deviation from the forecast and a huge error. If we want to place a greater significance large false positive or false negative (as we should), then we should square the errors (MSE). Although the objective of statistical optimization is to choose a model which minimizes MSE. However, even its use carries three important reservations.

First, if MSE refers to a time series data, such fittings may not necessarily lead to good forecasting. An MSE of zero can always be obtained by using polynomials of sufficiently high order or an appropriate Fourier transformation. Such overfitting a model to a data series simply internalizes the randomness of the series and does not lend itself toward forecasting the underlying trend. In other words, although we may have a high R-squared value, yet do a lousy job of forecasting.

The second limitation of MSE is that if there are several models using various estimation techniques, the simple comparison of the MSEs will not give us a good enough measure of choosing the best method. This is because different methods use different techniques for fitting data. For instance, smoothing methods are highly dependent upon initial forecasting estimates, standard regression methods minimize MSE by giving equal weight to all observations, Box-Jenkins method minimizes the MSE of a nonlinear optimization procedure.

Finally, unlike the national economic statistics, there is no standard data set that every researcher uses for developing early warning models. In such cases, MSE, being an absolute measure, cannot be used for comparative purposes to determine predictive accuracy when the data sets, time horizons of forecasting and methodologies vary among the forecasters.

In comparison, while having similar shortcomings, the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE), at the very least, has the advantage of simplicity. Since MAPE explains deviations from the forecasts in percentage terms, the result derived from one method can be compared to those obtained from others. Second, it is much more intuitive to the reader if we say that the forecasts, based on method A yields 5% error as opposed to its average mean squared error of 323, for instance.

Makridakis et al. (1985) however, offer yet another method of evaluating forecasting efficiency. They argue that the relative efficiency of intricate (and hence, expensive) models may be judged by setting it against the simplest of all methods of forecasting, the *naive forecasts*. Naive forecasts simply takes the current period's value as the predicted value for the future period. The MAPE of naive forecast may be written as:

MAPE_{NF} =
$$\frac{\sum_{i=2}^{n} \left| \frac{(X_i - X_{i-1})}{X_{i-1}} \right|}{n-1} \times (100)$$

Makridakis, et al. suggest that in order to remove subjectiveness of relative accuracy this measure can be used as the benchmark against which all other the MAPEs of all other forecasting methods can be measured.

V. Regress or not to Regress: That is the Question

Let us now look at what econometric literature is saying about the relative efficiency of the various measures of forecasting. Consider Figure 1 as the starting point. We would first consider the relative efficiency of causal or econometric models versus time series analyses. Then we will compare forecasts derived from objective methods against those derived from subjective methods.

As the econometric methods were developed and more high speed computing capabilities were available, the decades of 1960s and 1970s, causal forecasting became extremely popular. So much so that a scholar called it the "age of large scale econometric model."²¹ However, the early success of the causal models had great deal a lot to do with the 105 months of uninterrupted economic growth, longer than anytime since 1850. Since econometric models, despite their names, can only measure co-occurrence and do not measure causality, with all the series moving upward, it was relatively casy to find high R-squared values and obtain good forecasts. However, a number of econometricians remained skeptical about the success of causal models as forecasting tools. As early as in 1951, Christ indicated that when structural changes were taking place, causal models were not superior to time-series approaches. Evidence piled up as further studies, using the same data set pitted causal models against time series. Steckler (1968), Cooper (1972), Naylor et al. (1972), Fromm and Klein (1973) all echoed Nelson's (1972, p. 915) conclusion, "the simple ARMA models are relatively more robust with respect to post sample predictions than the complex (causal) models. Thus if the mean squared error were an appropriate measure of loss. an unweighted assessment clearly indicates that a decision maker would have been best off relying simply on ARMA predictions in the post sample

²¹ See Naylor et al. (1972).

period."22

In a provocative article, appropriately entitled, "Forecasting with Econometric Methods: Folklore versus Facts," Armstrong (1978) surveyed a wide ranging empirical studies and compared forecasts derived from causal models to those obtained from using time-series analysis. He concluded that:

- 1. Forecasts on the basis of causal analyses were not significantly better than time-series forecasts.
- 2. In terms of accuracy, complex causal models did not perform better than the simpler causal models.

So, from these studies, we can conclude that in general:

- time series models perform better that the causal models
 - simple causal models perform just as well as complex causal models with large number of variables, using multi-stage least squares methods.

Having established the fact time-series methods are no inferior to causal analyses, let us look at the effectiveness of forecasts based on econometric models versus the judgmental methods. Econometricians, by and large, are skeptical about the efficacy of expert-based predictions. This is because, expert-based methods, especially the unstructured ones are so closely dependent on seemingly arbitrary (and not articulated) reasoning process of one or more individuals. However, after extensive research where forecasts based on judgmental methods were pitted against those derived from objective econometric analyses, McNees (1982) comes to the conclusions:

- 1. There is no tangible proof that forecasts from objective models are generally poor and specifically inferior to judgmental forecasts. At various levels they can perform equally well or equally poorly.
- 2. Time series forecasts may be more accurate than those derived from causal models in the short term (one period ahead of the current period), but as the time horizon of forecasts increases, the causal models tend to perform considerably better than those of the time series.²³
- 3. None of the major forecasts are decidedly superior to the others, when one considers difference in various variables or time horizons. Even for a specific variable and time horizon the differences tend to be rather small.
- 4. However, most importantly, McNees confesses that he is not aware of any test to determine whether the differences are significant in a statistical sense.

VI. What Have Learned About Forecasting?

In the beginning of the article, I have mentioned two seemingly facetious "golden rules" of forecasting. However, what we have learned from methodological development over the years parallel those "golden rules."

• Reduce our expectations out of social forecasts. Without clairvoyance, it is impossible to predict the future perfectly. This is particularly true of catastrophic events, such as a revolution or genocide and politicide. We must realize that forecasting based on catastrophe theory is still in its infancy. However, while many of these models can be adapted to analyze the past data, their track record in an open system

²² "Post sample period" means outside the currently available data, looking into the future. For similar conclusions, see, Kirby (1966), Levine (1967), Gross and Ray (1965), Raine (1971), Gardner and Dannenbring (1981), Newbold and Granger (1974) Makridakis et al. (1982).

²³ However, we should recall that as the time horizon of forecasts outside of the sample set increases, the standard error of forecasts increases exponentially, thereby limiting the efficacy of the causal models.

prediction is perhaps no better than those derived from much simpler exercise. For instance, at the time of writing this article, the Serbian regime of Slobodan Miloshevic is under siege from month-long protest demonstrations. Can we predict how it will end up? If it seems that as social scientists we cannot predict these sudden changes (as Kuran would lament), neither can physical scientists in predicting a particular event in an open, complex system. As the river rises, can an engineer predict the exact time a levy is going to break? Can we predict the last snowflake that will start an avalanche?

• Therefore, all forecasts have to be stochastic. Like the weather report, when we hear that there is a 50% chance of rain, do we take it mean that it is going to a) rain half the day, b) will it rain every half an hour, c) or, that rain will cover only half the region? In fact, even without the problem of having to decide exactly how much moisture would constitute "rain," the outcome of a forecast has to be binary; it is either going to rain or not. Rather, we should interpret the report as follows: If the current weather condition prevails, then over many many cases similar to this, half will produce rain. Hence, while developing EW models, we should not expect to see exact predictions of specific events.

• In regression analysis, and in fact, in all methods of forecasting, the errors of prediction increases exponentially as we move away in time. Therefore, it is prudent not to make on single long-term prediction and stick by it, but to do series of forecasts with time. We can learn equally from our mistakes as well as from our successes. The FAO, for instance, makes its early warning predictions for crop failure and famine, but does it on a continuous basis; as more data come in, new forecasts are updated (Rashid, 1997).

• While evaluating a suitable model for EW, we must make the distinction between *passive* and *active* forecasting. We may call a forecast passive when it is done for analytical purposes (may be as an academic exercise) or it has no impact on the final outcome. A weather forecast is a passive forecast (since no one does anything about it). On the other hand, when actual outcomes are not independent of the outcomes, we may call them active or policy oriented forecasts. *Alas, for policy level forecasts, there is no statistical way of measuring forecasting accuracy*. Econometric models, such as the MARMA, is fundamentally based on the assumption of independence between the actual outcomes and their predicted values (Xt and Ft in equation 1). When the two terms are not independent, then we cannot use any standard method of goodness-of-fit. This is clear even at the intuitive level. If forecasts are used for policy purposes, then the final outcomes may reflect either self-fulfilling prophesies or the result of a correction based on the forecasts. For instance, if I alert the inattentive driver of a car that if the car moves along the line it is going right now, it is going to go off the road, and the driver corrects the course. Can I be held responsible for an erroneous forecast? In the Biblical story of Joseph, if his early warning was for a humanitarian crisis for Egypt, then we can point out that that part of his prophesy did not turn out to be true, since the Egyptians did not suffer from famine due to prudent public policy taken by the Pharaoh.

• If the effectiveness of early warning forecasts cannot be statistically determined, their efficacy will be discernible in the long run when we compare the number of conflicts in the pre and post-EW periods. In fact, if the EW models serve their purpose, we will only have false positive results.

• Even when there are false positive forecasts without any change in policy, they may be of use as consciousness raising tools. For instance, the global environmental early warnings of the Club of Rome in the 1960s have turned out to be false alarms. Yet, the sheer publicity that the shocking study generated created bands of environmentalists. In true sense of the term, the Club of Rome group cannot claim much success as a forecasting exercise. However, looking back, the members can take satisfaction for influencing environmental awareness and changing public policy world wide. After all, this was the true purpose of the

project and, in that sense it was of invaluable service to the future of global ecology.

• Experiments in economic forecasting was possible because of standardization of macroeconomic data and its collection over a long period of time. Unfortunately, in the area of political and humanitarian crises, there are possibly as many data sets as there are researchers. With everyone collecting own data sets, there is a significant need for a systematic effort at collecting relevant data. This data set need to be definitionally clear, as accurate as possible and collected over time by agencies which are free of political or ideological biases. Further, there should be continuity with the data set. Without the existence of a standard data set, similar to the Census Bureau or the Commerce Department, we will never be able to determine the relative efficiency of even the passive models of conflict analysis.

• Finally, even after collecting meticulous data and conducting sophisticated analyses, debate over the efficacy of EW models is likely to go on for ever. For instance, *Keynes' The General Theory* was published in 1936. After 60 years of experimenting with EW models for policy analysis, the controversy still rages on. For instance, most economists agree that as a result of economic forecasting and anti-cyclical policies, the economy is now more stable that it was in the past.²⁴ Yet Christina Romer in a provocative yet highly influential series of articles, has challenged this optimistic assessment of the historical record.²⁵ She argues that the measured reduction in volatility may not reflect an improvement in economic policy and performance but rather an improvement in the economic data. Since the post war data on real GDP and unemployment were poorly calculated, much of the volatility can be attributed to this data collection error. After constructing new data series out of the old ones, Romer finds that the recent period appears much more volatile - indeed, almost as volatile as the early period. Therefore, in constructing EW models, we have a long road ahead and cannot be too impatient about getting rid of forecasting inaccuracies.

VIII. How to Improve Forecast Accuracy?

The above discussion points out problems associated with the various methods of forecasting. We have also seem the limitations about our quest for the knowledge about the future. Yet, within the constraints, without seeking perfection, we can look for ways to improve the quality of our forecasts. In fact, a great deal of thought has gone into the question of improving accuracy of forecasting. If we look at our broad classification of objective and subjective methods of forecasting, there seems to be good points for both sides.

The advantage of the objective or econometric methods are fairly obvious. When we are dealing with a large amount of data, the underlying patterns of causality is often opaque to a casual observer. The use of statistical method can provide us with precise quantitative estimate of the relative and absolute impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. However, in political science and especially in the field of studies of catastrophic events, such as genocide and politicide, skepticism about our ability to capture the complex socio-cultural dynamics within the strict structure of econometric modeling is abound. In fact, some have argued that putting analyses within such straight jacket of structured reasoning often leads to "shoddy thinking and the subordination of inquiry to practical utility."²⁶

On the other hand, subjective methods, structured or unstructured, can seem chaotic or "seat-of-thepants" analysis to those seeking objective analysis. It does not require a great deal of statistical insight to know that when forecasts are being conducted on the basis of subjective assessment, it is likely to be

²⁴ See, for instance, Mankiw (1997) pp. 369-70.

²⁵ Romer (1986a; 1986b).

²⁶ Hedley Bull (1986). In this context, also see Alker (1994).

influenced by the forecaster's prejudice, preconceived ideas, ideology and self-interest.

However, cognitive scientists studying information processing within human brains have presented a stronger case for accepting expert-based judgment. For instance, in a provocative work, Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1987) has argued that our cognitive structures are well-equipped to handle large number of diverse information is a systematic manner. For instance, the company CEOs or other experts often can come up with intuitive forecasts, which may turn out to be no less accurate than ones derived from more complex mathematical estimation techniques. Political scientists, historians, and students of genocide have put up spirited defense in support of expert analysis. People who have spent the better part of their professional lives studying a particular event, problem, or a region, are in command of a vast array of factual information. Their knowledge of the specifics cannot be overruled by statisticians conducting cross-national studies without the necessary background of the diverse effects unique to each situation. By the very nature of regression analyses, forecasts are weighed toward the average. The experts, in contrast, can make their forecasts specific.

This debate between subjective and objective analysis is not confined within political science or genocide studies. Economists are still embroiled in the controversy. For instance, a *Wall Street Journal* story reports how important decisions about the future inflation is rate is made by the Federal Reserve Chair, Alan Greenspan.²⁷ Although the US economy has been able to achieve the enviable position of moderate economic growth with minimal inflation rate for one of the longest economic recoveries in history, spanning nearly 28 quarters, Greenspan has been able to use his uncanny ability to assimilate an incredible amount of quantitative information and pick out the most important ones to forecast the future course of the economy. It is not that his forecasts have always been correct or the path taken has been free of controversy, but the overall achievement speaks for itself. However, skepticism regarding such intuitive method of forecasting remains high despite obvious success. The story quotes Alan Binder, the Vice-Chair of the Federal Reserve saying, "I find it amazing that such good decisions can be made on the basis of numbers like that." Summing up the sentiment of the objective social scientists, Allan Metzler a noted economist from Carnegie Mellon University states that "I have no fault with the outcome, but we don't know whether it is hocus pocus."

The efficacy of expert-based intuitive forecasting has come under scrutiny from psychologists as well. Some time we come across forecasts based on elegant econometric procedures which goes against our own "horse sense." Should we question the results or since they were derived through a complicated statistical procedure, or should we hold back your doubts? This is an extremely important question, since public policies are based on future expectations. There are a number of highly regarded outfits such as the Data Resources Inc. (DRI), Chase Econometrics, along with government's own Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office routinely put out forecasts of future economic behavior based on highly complex econometric models. How do the forecasts based on large econometric models compare with the subjective forecasts made by field experts has been the subject of inquiry in recent economic literature. Based on a well-known framework used in psychological research by Egon Brunswick,²⁸ called the *Lens Model*, a number of studies have attempted to show the relative reliability of subjective and objective estimations.²⁹

²⁷ The Wall Street Journal, Monday, January 27, 1997, p. 1 "Choosing A Course: In Setting Fed's Policy, Chairman Bets Heavily on His Own Judgment. Greenspan Loves Statistics, But Uses Them In A Way That Puzzle Even Friends. Some Forecasts Go Awry."

²⁸ Egon Brunswick (1956) Perception and the Representative Design of Experiments. Berkeley: University of California Press.

²⁹ See, Harinder Singh (1990) "Relative Evaluation of Subjective and Objective Measures of Expectations Formation" Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 64-74.

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The empirical results based on controlled experiments show that although subjective estimations appear to be less accurate in the first blush, when the level of structural uncertainty is held constant, both tend to offer forecasts with equal amount of variability. Second, when the subjective forecasts are based on a group consensus, the results tend to show a greater degree of consistency, implying that the group as whole is better able to weed out random disturbances more effectively. Finally, as the field experts gain more experience in forecasts improve. These results point out the need for mutual understanding between statisticians and the field experts in producing better forecasts.

V. EW Models: What to Expect

Although economic forecasting has evolved over half a century, political forecasting is but of recent origin. Therefore, despite skepticism about our ability to develop early warning systems of political and humanitarian crises, we can safely state that although it is difficult to predict the exact nature of the future, it is not impossible to warn nations when they cross the threshold of a safety zone. However, there should be yet another caveat. Even under the best of circumstances, there is no necessary link between good forecast and good policy. Hence, we should be extremely cautious about what we can expect from EW models.

However, there should be no doubt about the importance of the task. As professors Gurr and Harff (1996) have pointed out: ethnic hostility remains the most vexing problem for the next century. Therefore, we should acknowledge that the EW models offer one of the best tools for managing future humanitarian and political crises, but at once be realistic and recognize their shortcomings.

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
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
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Bayesian model





APPENDIX A: Abstracts of Papers Unavailable for Inclusion

Mapping Mass Political Conflict and Civil Society: Issues and Prospects for the Automated Development of Event Data

Doug Bond (Harvard University), J. Craig Jenkins (The Ohio State University), Charles Taylor (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) and Kurt Schock (Rutgers University)

Mass political conflict is typically examined in terms of violence and in isolation from routine civil interactions. We argue that mass conflict is multi-dimensional and that violence should be treated as an outcome of conflict, as well as a form of action. We define three dimensions of conflict--contentiousness, coerciveness, and change goals--and indices of the civil society that are central to mapping global trends in mass conflict. We then outline a strategy for mapping mass conflict and civil interactions using the PANDA protocol to generate highly reliable event data and then use these indices to trace two democratic transitions (in Poland and South Korea), a conflict crisis that was repressed (China) and a conflict escalation that flared into a civil war (the former Yugoslavia). Automation has major advantages over human coding in terms of transparency, integration with existing event data series, real time availability and long-term maintenance costs. It also opens up new ways of thinking about event data and the assessment of reliability. Note: This article is scheduled to appear in the August 1997 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Early Warning for North Korean Flood Victims at Refugee Risk: Victims of Nature or Politics? Shin-wha Lee (Korea University)

The term Early warning' has become something of a buzzword in the international community. An urgent need for a global early warning system for ethnic conflicts and related humanitarian crises (genocide, and the mass movements of refugees and displaced persons) in the post-Cold War world led researchers and policy-makers to actively involve in early warning studies. For the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and its allies, however, early warnings for the crisis on the Korean Peninsular where the ideological rivalries still prevail have been regarded as the state of readiness to get fully prepared against a surprise attack from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). South Korea's 660,000-strong military on the around-the-clock alert and the nationwide civil defense training held every month represent the necessity of being 'combat-ready.' And the United States maintains some 37,000 military personnel in South Korea by way of precaution against the North Korean invasion of the south. It was not until very recently that developing an early warning network for preventing and responding to humanitarian crisis such as hunger-stricken people escaping from North Korea was accorded a higher priority in the security agenda for the Korean Peninsular. This recent upsurge of interest in a traditionally less-recognized issue arises from a prominent change of North Korea's status in the international community during the past two and a half years. In mid-1994, North Korea's reported development of nuclear facilities raised serious concerns worldwide. North Korea threatened regional and global security by rejecting the observance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The policy challenges posed by North Korea at that time were on how to construct a coordinating policy among South Korea, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the United States in order to halt the North's nuclear program. But North Korea is now suffering substantial food deficit and heavily depending on international assistance to feed its citizens, particularly in the wake of the floods of 1995 and 1996 which aggravated the seriousness of the country's existing food supply problem. The concerns related to the possibility of sudden and unpredictable changes on the Korean Peninsula have revolved around the plausibility of North Korean flood victims becoming refugees. The need for contingency planning is required to prepare for massive refugee flows that might result from the country's further economic decline and famine. Yet, efforts to do everything possible to minimize, if not prevent, refugee flows by stabilizing the agricultural production and feeding people in at-risk areas are more desirable, since refugee flows mean a following indicator, not a leading indicator, of the country's insecurity.

Citing the country's food crises initiated by natural disasters (floods) and aggravated by politics, I argue that despite this study's attempt to shift emphasis to environmental context, categorizing environmental factors alone in early warnings of North Korea's vulnerabilities is not feasible and a more comprehensive analysis is needed. The question raised in this context concerns: 'Under what circumstances are preventive actions less feasible though the early warning

models are successful and the crises are detected in a timely fashion?' Finally, I will then move to a discussion of prerequisites for a timely and effective response to refugee crises.

Contents II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

III. CAUSES OF AND RESPONSE TO FOOD CRISIS 1. Causes of Food Crisis 2. Food Supply Problems

3. Inadequacy and Politicization of the Response to North Korean Food Crisis

IV. POSSIBILITY OF MASS REFUGEE FLOWS

V. CONCLUSIONS

Combining Indicator Research and Case-Based Analyses

Adeel Ahmed and Elizabeth V. Kassinis (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs)

While it is clear that if crises could be prevented, lives and scarce resources would be saved, there is much less clarity with regard to "prevention" as a concept and "early warning" as a tool. While prevention has proven to be an elusive goal, early warning continues to receive increased attention, with the term used to describe an increasing number of different, and differing, activities. For the last three years, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) has been struggling to turn early warning from a sound concept into a series of implementable and fruitful activities. This has included defining what early warning is; how it can be operationalized; and most importantly, how it can be used to initiate early and effective action on the part of the UN and the humanitarian community. The Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) was established to identify crises with humanitarian implications, recognizing that the causes of crises are as numerous and complex as the implications themselves. This paper will trace the evolution of thinking within DHA on the tools, mechanisms, and processes needed to accomplish the task. In particular, it will examine the balance required between indicator analysis and case-based research to support decision-making within an organization such as the UN. Striking such a balance is critical, in order to translate analyses derived from systematic indicator research into viable and practical policy options for decision-makers.

Propaganda and Genocide

Frank Chalk (Concordia University)

This paper offers a preliminary comparative historical examination of the role of state and regime-supported propaganda in inciting civilians to implicate themselves in genocides and gross violations of human rights through participation and/or acquiescence in killings. Reviewing past cases in light of mass participation in the Rwanda genocide of 1994, it examines the twentieth century genocidal killings of Armenians, "kulaks" and "bourgeois elements" in the Soviet Union, Jews, Indonesian Communists, Cambodians, and several groups of victims in the former Yugoslavia. Conclusions are drawn regarding the techniques adopted by the perpetrators to demonize the victims, the role of the media of the time in mobilizing mass support for the killings, and the contributions of communication theories to understanding the circumstances under which victims become vulnerable to propaganda. Questions for future research are posed.

U.S. Television Network Coverage on Humanitarian Crises: Can they be a Source of Early Warning? Steven Livingston (George Washington University)

Livingston's remarks will focus on the response of American television news to humanitarian emergencies. He will focus on two interrelated questions: To what extent might we reasonably expect American television networks, including CNN, to serve as a reliable source of information regarding nascent or even extant refugee crises? Secondly, what role might media play in the humanitarian policy responses of the United States government? While considerable expectation is sometimes placed in media, particularly television, to serve as response catalysts in humanitarian crises, a close and careful examination of the evidence garnered from recent humanitarian crises suggests prudence in developing these expectations.

The Media in Conflict Prevention and Management: Curse or Catalyst? Nik Gowing (BBC World TV)

Much is expected of the media in conflict prevention and management. The reality is different from the expectation. Based on new work for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, this paper analyses the myths of the media's role in early warning. How accurate, how partial and therefore how credible is real-time reporting in the build up to, and prosecution of a conflict?

RefWorld as an Early Warning Tool

Udo Janz (UNHCR)

Reliable information from a variety of tested sources within the public domain that have withstood the challenge of corroboration and verifiability over time, inevitably forms the backbone of any analytical attempt at early warning in humanitarian crises situations. Speedy access to this information has been considerably enhanced over the past years as an increasing number of governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations make the information they generate available through the World Wide Web in addition to hardcopy dissemination. Although extremely useful for its currency, the WEB does however still pose limitations with regard to carrying out efficient searches of less time sensitive information that may nevertheless be crucial to assess for early warning purposes. Since the early 1990s UNHCR has embarked on a project of converting large amounts of critical information relating to the international refugee regime, situated in the broader human rights context, and consisting of legal and country information, from hardcopy into electronic format for dissemination to its field offices worldwide and the public at large. This project, known as REFWORLD, has in the meantime come to fruition and the combined databases are available already in its 3rd edition on CD-ROM since January 1997 with a complementary edition available through UNHCR's home page on the World Wide Web. The end product probably constitutes the most comprehensive refugee and human rights information resource available to date, including many early warning benchmark reports on country situations around the world that are not available elsewhere in electronic format. REFWORLD is also the result of unprecedented collaboration among a great variety of actors in the humanitarian and human rights fields with UNHCR, and its success can be attributed to all who had the vision and the determination to contribute to this endeavour even in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

IOM and Early Responses

William Hyde (International Organisation for Migration)

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has the objective to ensure the orderly migration of persons in need of international assistance. IOM is an intergovernmental membership organisation with 59 Member States and 48 Observer States. IOM enjoys a close working relationship with many UN agencies, other IOs and NGOs working in humanitarian assistance. The IOM Emergency Response Unit (ERU) was established to (a) develop policies, practices and resources in order to respond more effectively to Organisationally determined emergency needs and (b) to initiate or support emergency response efforts. Building on relevant materials of others, and adapting and supplementing them through IOM's unique experiences, the ERU has developed several course books and guides for internal staff training in emergency operations. Regular Workshops are facilitated for IOM staff both at Headquarters and field locations, in order to prepare for better response. The ERU participates in various UN and other interagency / interorganizational bodies dealing with better humanitarian response.

Bridging the Gap between Warning and Response: Approaches to Analyzing Effective Preventive Interventions

Michael S. Lund (Center for Strategic and International Studies and Creative Associates International, Inc.)

Early warning data systems have been proliferating for some years and are gaining verification. But analysis of what individual and multiple responses are effective in preventing violent conflicts has begun only recently. Until high-level policymakers have received authoritative analyses of what preventive interventions work under what

circumstances, we cannot say whether their failures to respond arise from lack of will or lack of a way. The knowledge policymakers can use involves several key action-oriented questions -- when? what? why? who? how? and whether? -- but existing early warning research addresses these only partially. The paper discusses the units of analysis that might be most useful for codifying recent preventive experience, impact criteria, and two forms of such analysis that might provide policy relevant answers to the action questions. These forms are evaluations of differing policy tools of intervention (e.g. preventive deployment, conditional development aid), and case-studies of successful and unsuccessful multi-tooled preventive interventions (e.g. Macedonia, Burundi). How this knowledge might be incorporated into the country-level strategic plans of donors and other third parties is discussed. The resulting idea of "rolling" prevention, rather than the prevailing "alarm bell" model, is offered. Evidence and examples are drawn from recent case-study research on paired successes and failures, tools' work done for the U.S. Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, and evaluation of development aid's effect on conflict.

APPENDIX B: Schedule of Conference Proceedings

Day 1 Sunda	ay March 1	6, 1997 A. Synergy in Early Warning Research		
A-I. 9:00 am -10	:30 am	Linking Early Warning and Intelligence		
<u>Chair</u> : <u>Rapporteur</u> :	and the second of the second s	phael, The Raphael Group, Ltd., USA uianzon, The Strategy Group, USA		
	man, Philosophy ng Humanitarian I	and Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada Early Warning."		
	Oor, University of ence and Early W	Haifa, Israel /arning: Lessons from a Case Study."		
		ecurity Council, USA Crises: The Warning Process and Roles for Intelligence."		
Discussant:	Janice Gross Ste	ein, Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada		
A-II. 10:45 am -	12:15 pm	Quantitative Modelling and Computerized Coding		
<u>Chair</u> :	Peter Brecke, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA			
Rapporteur:	Adeel Ahmed, U	IN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, USA		
	Recognition for .	ence, University of Kansas, USA Early Warning: Crisis Classification using Event Data and Hidden Markov		
a second s	ng Mass Political	ional Affairs, Harvard University, USA Conflict and Civil Society: Issues and Prospects for the Automated Development		
		alifornia, Riverside and Ted Robert Gurr, CIDCM, University of Maryland, USA orebellion in the Year 2000: Three Empirical Approaches."		
		ne Study and Prevention of Conflict, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia g of E-Mail Reports through Database Systems."		
Discussant:	J. Craig Jenkins Allen Moulton,	, The Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, USA MIT, USA		
A-III. 1:30 pm -	3:00 pm	Qualitative Analysis and Case Studies		
<u>Chair</u> : <u>Rapporteur</u> :	Andrei Dmitrichev, Centre for Documentation&Research,UNHCR,Switzerland Didier Bigo, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, France			

1. Shin-wha Lee, Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, South Korea

"Early Warning for North Korean Flood Victims at Refugee Risk: Victims of Nature or Politics?"

- 2. Mara Ustinova, Center for the Study and Prevention of Conflict, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia "Early Warning: The Case of the Former Soviet Union."
- 3. Eugeni Kritski, North-Caucasian Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia "Research on Socio-Psychological Factors in a System of Early Warning."
- Discussants: Barnett Rubin, Centre for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations. USA Sergey Sokolovski, Center for the Study and Prevention of Conflict, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

A-IV. 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm Synergy of Qualitative Studies with Quantitative Models

Chair:Hayward Alker, International Relations, University of Southern California.USARapporteur:Mikhail Alexseev, International Studies, University of Washington, USA

- 1. John Davies, CIDCM, University of Maryland, USA and Barbara Harff, U.S. Naval Academy, USA "Dynamic Data for Conflict Early Warning."
- 2. David Carment, Carleton University, Canada and Frank Harvey, Political Science, Dalhousie University, Canada

"Early Warning and Deterrence Strategies: States versus Institutions."

4. Elizabeth Kassinis and Adeel Ahmed, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, USA "Combining Indicator Research and Case-Based Analyses."

Discussant: Deborah J. Gerner, Political Science, University of Kansas, USA

A-V. 7:00p.m. - 9:00 p.m. The Media and Early Warning

Chair: David Last, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Canada

- 1. Frank Chalk, History, Concordia University, Canada "Propaganda and Genocide."
- 2. Steve Livingston, The George Washington University, USA "U.S. Television Network Coverage on Humanitarian Crises: Can they be a Source of Early Warning?"
- 3. Nik Gowing, Main Presenter BBC World TV, London, United Kingdom "The Media in Conflict Prevention and Management: Curse or Catalyst?"

Critical Response to Papers by Chalk, Livingston and Gowing:

Clyde Sanger, The North-South Institute, **Canada** Paul Knox, The Globe and Mail, **Canada** Andreas V. Kohlschütter, Swiss Peace Foundation, **Switzerland** (formerly Die Zeit (Hamburg) and Swiss Televison News)

^{3.} Andrea K. Riemer, Political Consultant, Austria "The Systematic-Evolutionary Extended Signal Approach."

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Day 2-- Monday March 17, 1997 -- B. Synergy in Organization

B-I. 9:00 am - 10:30 am Governments and Early Warning

Chair: Ruth Archibald, Global and Human Issues Bureau, DFAIT. Canada

Andreas V. Kohlschütter and Günther Bächler, Swiss Peace Foundation. Switzerland "How to Establish an Early Warning System: Concept and First Steps in Switzerland."

Critical Responses to paper by Kohlschütter and Bächler:

Mike Elliot, Regional Security and Peace Keeping, DFAIT, Canada Karen Toombs Parsons, Joint Warfare Analysis Center, DOD, USA

B-II. 10:45 am - 12:15 pm The Role of the UN and UN Organizations in Early Warning

Chair:	Jürgen Dedring, Graduate SchoolCUNY, formerly UN-DHA, USA
Rapporteur:	Kurt Mills, The American University in Cairo, Egypt

- Walter Dorn, International Relations Programme, University of Toronto, Canada "Early and Late Warning of Acute Conflict by the UN Secretary-General."
- 2. David Last, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Canada "Early Warning of Violent Conflict: The Role of Observer Missions."
- 3. Abdur Rashid, Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO), Italy "Averting Famine Through Linking Early Warning with Response Mechanisms."

Discussants: Sharon Rusu, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Switzerland Udo Janz, UNHCR, Centre for Documentation and Research, Switzerland

B-III. 1:30 pm - 3:00 pm The Role of NGOs in Early Warning

Chair:Eugenia Piza-Lopez, International Alert, United KingdomRapporteur:Helen Fein, Institute for the Study of Genocide, USA

William DeMars, The American University in Cairo, Egypt
 "Eyes and Ears: Limits of NGO Information for Early Warning."

 Janice Gross Stein, Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada and Bruce Jones, London School of Economics, United Kingdom. "NGOs and International Relations Theory: The Rwandan Case."

Critical Response to Papers by DeMars and Stein/Jones:

Maureen O'Neil, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Canada Kate Whidden, Canadian Red Cross, Canada Paul Hannon, Emergencies and Special Projects Officer, OXFAM, Canada

New Approaches to Collaborative Early Warning Information, Analyses and B-IV. 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm Network Systems Joyce Neu, Conflict Resolution Program, Carter Center, USA Chair: Susanne Schmeidl, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada Rapporteur: 1. Udo Janz, UNHCR, Centre for Documentation and Research, Switzerland "RefWorld as an Early Warning Tool." 2. Sharon Rusu, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Switzerland "The Role of ReliefWeb in Early Warning." 3. Kumar Rupesinghe, International Alert, United Kingdom, Sharon Rusu, UN-DHA, Switzerland, and Howard Adelman, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada "FEWER: An Example of Improving the Collaboration of Diverse Organizations toward Joint Early Warning Efforts/Actions." Günther Bächler, Swiss Peace Foundation, Switzerland Discussants: Heather S. McHugh, USAID, USA

B-V. 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm Special Graduate Student Workshop on Early Warning

Troy Goodfellow, Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada Andrew Price-Smith, Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada Edward Opoku-Dapaah, Sociology, York University, Canada David O'Brien, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA Patrick Doherty, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA Steven Scanlan, Sociology, The Ohio State University, USA Melissa J. Gabler, University of Guelph, Canada Andre Beauregard, Political Science, University of Guelph, Canada Susannah M. Cameron, Rural Planning and Development, University of Guelph, Canada Suzanne Quinn, Peace and Conflict and Political Science, Wayne State University, USA Dan Moller, History, Aarhus University, Denmark Stefanie Apollonio, N.P.S.I.A., Carleton University, Canada

Day 3-- Tuesday, March 18, 1997 - C. Synergy of Analyses and Responses

C-I. 9:00 am - 10:30 am Early Responses

Chair:Larry Seaquist, The Strategy Group, USARapporteur:Elizabeth Kassinis, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, USA

- 1. Jean Guilmette, Office for Central and Easter Europe Initiatives, IDRC, Canada "The Paradox of Prevention: Successful Prevention Erases the Proof of Success."
- 2. William Hyde, Emergency Response Unit, IOM Headquarters, Switzerland "IOM and Early Responses."
- 3. Dane Rowlands, School for International Affairs, Carleton University, Canada "Quantitative Approaches to Sovereign Risk Analysis: Implications for IMF Responses."

Discussant:	John J. Stremlau, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, USA				
C-II. 10:45 am -	- 12:15 pm	Linking Early Warning Research to Responses I			
<u>Chair</u> : <u>Rapporteur</u> :	Janelle Diller, Consultant to Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, USA Bruce Jones, London School for Economics, United Kingdom				
1. John Cockell, "Towar	Peacebuilding ds Response-O	and Human Development Division, DFAIT, Canada riented Early Warning Analysis: Policy and Operational Considerations."			
"Bridgi	and, Center for a ing the Gap betw ntions."	Strategic and International Studies; Creative Associates International, Inc., USA ween Warning and Response: Approaches to Analyzing Effective Preventive			
3. Alex Schmid, "Armeo	PIOOM and L d Conflicts and	eiden University, The Netherlands Human Right Violations: PIOOM's World Conflict Map 1996."			
Discussant:	Louis Kriesb Andre Ouelle	perg, Sociology, Syracuse University, USA ette, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada			
C-III. 1:30 pm	- 3:00 pm	Linking Early Warning Research to Responses II			
<u>Chair</u> : <u>Rapporteur</u> :	Rodolfo Mar Sharon Rusu	rtinez, College of Education, Wayne State University, USA 1, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Switzerland			
1. Jacques Bertr "Institu	and, The North ations for Mana	n-South-Institute, Canada aging Ethnic Conflict: Selected Cases."			
2. Steve Stedma "Spoile	in, African Stud er Problems in I	dies Department, SAIS, USA Peace Processes."			
3. Dipak Gupta, "An Ea	, Public Admini arly Warning a	istr. and Urban Studies, San Diego State University, USA bout Forecasts: Oracle to Academics."			
Discussants:	David Dewi Otto Feinste	David Dewitt, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Canada Otto Feinstein, Department of Political Science, Wayne State University, USA			
C-IV. 3:30 am	- 5:00 pm Rec	capitulation on Crisis in Zaire: An Analysis of Decision Making or Connecting Analyses, Strategic Options And Policy Makers			
<u>Chair</u> : <u>Rapporteur</u> :	Dr. James O Frank Veree	Orbinski, Health and Human Security Group, Canada ecken, Centre for European Policy Studies, Belgium			
1. Donald Krun	nm, Refugees I	international (formerly US State Department), USA			
2. Christopher	Cushing, CARE	E, Canada			
3. Jean Gauthie	er, Advisor, Gre	eat Lakes Region, DFAIT, Canada			

Jürgen Dedring, Graduate School--CUNY, formerly UN-DHA, USA

Discussant:

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APPENDIX C: Biographies of Programme Participants

Howard Adelman has been a Professor of Philosophy at York University in Toronto since 1966. He was the founder and Director of the Centre for Refugee Studies and editor of Canada's periodical on refugees, *Refuge*, until 1993. Currently he holds the position of Director of the Prevention/Early Warning Unit at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. He has served in many university positions, including Acting Dean of Atkinson College and two terms as director of the graduate program in philosophy at York University. Professor Adelman has been the recipient of numerous awards and grants and has authored and edited 18 monographs, edited books and special editions of journals, as well as 31 chapters in edited books and 45 articles in refereed journals. Howard Adelman has written extensively on the Middle East, humanitarian intervention, membership rights, ethics, refugee policy and refugee resettlement. His three most recent co-edited volumes were: *Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared*, University of Melbourne Press and University of Toronto Press, *African Refugees*, Westview Press, and, with Astri Suhrke, *Early Warning and Conflict Management: the Genocide in Rwanda*, DANIDA, Copenhagen.

Adeel Ahmed has been with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs for over two years. His responsibilities have included the technical design and implementation of the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS). Before joining the United Nations, he served as Software Specialist / Lecturer at the University of Technology in Kingston, Jamaica, and as a Research Assistant at the McGill Research Centre for Intelligent Machines in Montreal, Canada. He has a Master's degree in Operations Research from Cornell University.

Mikhail Alexseev, a native of the former Soviet Union, worked as editor with Radio Kiev English Language Service and News from Ukraine Weekly. He served as a Kremlin correspondent covering momentous political changes in the former USSR and high level negotiations that brought an end to the Cold War (interviewing Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Mulroney, Mitterrand and other key players in the process). His commentary on Soviet and post-Soviet developments were published in The New York Times, Newsweek, Toronto Globe and Mail, and some were widely syndicated in North America. Mikhail Alexseev received his PhD in political science at the University of Washington in 1996, specializing in comparative war threat assessment of major powers and has a book contract with St. Martin's Press to publish his dissertation research. He published in Oxford International Review, Political Communication, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, and The National Interest. At present Mikhail Alexseev is developing a research program to study the prospects of political early warning in ethnic conflicts.

Hayward Alker is the John A. McCone Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, and Emeritus Professor of Political Science at MIT. He is also the Coordinator of the Conflict Early Warning Systems Research Programme of the International Social Sciences Council. Currently he, Kumar Rupesinghe and Ted Gurr are editing a book of case studies of Early Warning successes and failures. He is currently developing an online "Prototype Action Recommending Information System" (PARIS in LA) making available related analyses based principally on The Sherman-Alker and Ernest Haas conflict management data sets, partly coordinated as well with the Bloomfield-Moulton CASCON case lists, with cases from West-Asian and Northern Africa. He is the author of *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, and numerous other articles, chapters and books.

Ruth Archibald is the Director General of the Global and Human Issues Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Bureau was created two years ago following a review of Canadian foreign policy by a Joint Parliamentary Committee. The Bureau develops integrated approaches to deal with cross border issues in close cooperation with other government departments, the non-governmental community, through multilateral institutions and agreements in selected bilateral relationships. The Bureau deals with issues ranging from human rights, indigenous issues, the environment, migration, population, peace-building and democratic development, humanitarian assistance, crime, drugs, terrorism and social development issues. Prior to becoming the Director General of the Bureau, she was Director of Human Security Division; Chief government negotiator during the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and negotiator during the Beijing Womens' Conference. Ms. Archibald served as Chief of Staff to the Minister of External Affairs, Employment and Immigration before joining the Department of Foreign

Affairs. She has over twenty years experience in government and politics particularly in the area of policy development, training and organization. Ms. Archibald is a graduate of Memorial University in Newfoundland.

Günther Bächler received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Free University in Berlin. He worked as a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg, and became the Director of the Swiss Peace Foundation in Berne in 1989. In 1996-1997 he was a Research Associate at the Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School, Harvard University. His research covers the Democratization of Security Policy, Environmental Transformation and Violent Conflicts, Conflict Management (Mediation), and Preventive Diplomacy.

Gabriel Ben-Dor is Professor of Political Science at the University of Haifa. Among the many diverse and prestigious positions, Professor Ben-Dor served as the Rector of the University (1986-1991), and was the former Chairman of the Department of Political Science, as well as the former Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies and the Chairman of the Jewish-Arab Centre. He was the past President of the Israel Political Science Association. He was a member of the Council for Higher Education (1983-1986), and on two occasions (1976 and 1991) he chaired an advisory commission to the government of Israel on Druze affairs, in which he is the leading expert in the scholarly community. Professor Ben-Dor is a member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, one of the most prestigious publications in the field. Ben-Dor is the author of six books on middle east politics, strategic studies and political theory including *The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study* (1979) and more recent *Confidence Building In the Middle East* co-authored with David Dewitt. He is currently engaged in writing a major study of the state of contemporary theory and praxis in the craft of intelligence, tentatively entitled *Modern Intelligence*. Ben-Dor has served as a consultant and commentator on middle eastern affairs and lectures widely around the world. Recently, Professor Ben-Dor has been appointed as chairman of the governmental committee for the development of infrastructure in social sciences in Israel.

Jacques Bertrand is a researcher at the North-South Institute and a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada post-doctoral research fellow. He holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University. At the North-South Institute, he leads the research program on conflict prevention. Among other things, his current work focuses on institutions and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, India, Zaire and Nigeria. Jacques Bertrand is a specialist of Indonesian politics and has been working recently on ethnic and religious issues in Indonesia. He is also preparing a book manuscript on peasants and the state in Indonesia, based on his doctoral dissertation entitled "Compliance, Resistance and Trust: Peasants and the State in Indonesia". His recent publications include "False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, 69:3, 1996 and "l'Indonésie: la prévention des conflicts ethniques" [Indonesia: the prevention of ethnic conflicts], North-South Institute/Institut Nord-Sud, January 1997. He is a board member of Cancaps (the Canadian Consortium on Asian Pacific Security) and a member of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee.

Didier Bigo is a lecturer at the l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Science Po) and a research associate at CERI/FNSP, where he teaches courses such as, state formation and security, and political sociology of international relations. He delivers seminars at the doctorate level on: "The merging of internal and external security in Europe" and "Sociology of conflict and domination" (in Paris X Nanterre). He is also the director of the Center for Study of Conflict and the editor of the quarterly journal "Cultures & Conflicts" published by l'Harmattan. He has written various articles in the field of sociology of mobilisation and conflict, coercion, violation of human rights. Dr. Bigo's focus is on the relationship between conflict and security (externally as well as internally) issues. His recent publications include book chapters and manuscripts on the role of policing in Europe. In addition, Dr. Bigo is directing a series of collective books on *Frontiers and Migration, Identity and Security, Police and Army Knowledges*. He received his doctorate (PhD) in political sciences from the Sorbonne in 1986. His dissertation, "Power and Obedience in Central African Republic", was published at Khartala in 1989. Dr. Bigo also researches issues on French Africa. As a previous co-director of the French Institute of Polemology, he has designed various research programmes for the department of Defence to combat terrorism in France.

Doug Bond is Associate Director of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. He is leading the development of the PANDA (Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action) project. This project makes use of automated event coding tools to identify and track conflicts at their early stages of development, before they have had a chance to erupt or escalate into violence. As part of an effort

to develop early warnings on violence and instability, the project has developed profiles of the conflict carrying capacity of regimes as well as the forms or methods of action wielded, the civility (coerciveness and contentiousness) and outcome violence of conflict. These profiles are generated in real-time with automated event data development tools, including the FRED software program, identified by its Find, Read, Evaluate and Display functions.

Peter Brecke is an Assistant Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs of the Georgia Institute of Technology and teaches classes on Science, Technology, and World Politics; Global Peacemaking; Computer Simulation; and Empirical Research Methods. Dr. Brecke received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1988. He was a research scientist on the team that built the GLOBUS world model in Berlin in the mid-1980's. In 1989 Dr. Brecke initiated the development of an Early Warning System at the Office for Research and the Collection of Information in the United Nations. Since arriving at Georgia Tech in 1991, Professor Brecke has been working on the further development of a computerized Conflict Alert System, reconciliation in international politics, a model of environmental conflict, and a database of all violent conflicts since 1400 for the purpose of developing an empirically-based taxonomy of violent conflicts.

David Carment is Assistant Professor of International Affairs and teaches courses on international conflict analysis, conflict mediation and resolution, and international relations theory. His research interests include the international dimensions of ethnic conflict, conflict prevention and resolution and security issues in South and Southeast Asia. Recent articles have appeared in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research. Etudes Internationales and Third World Quarterly. Professor Carment has also co-edited two volumes on The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence and Policy and Prevention published by the University of Pittsburgh Press and University of South Carolina with Patrick James.

Frank Chalk is associate professor of history at Concordia University, where he teaches the History of genocide, African History and United States foreign relations. Prior to that he taught at the Texas A & M University. Between 1975-76 he was a Fulbright professor at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. Professor Chalk was also the former president of the Montreal Holocaust Memorial Centre of the B'nai Brith League for Human Rights, Canada and is currently vice-president of the Canadian Association for African Studies, as well as the Co-Director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia University. Professor Chalk has co-authored the book: *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (Yale University Press, 1990). He has written numerous articles, lectured and has spoken on the history of genocide at many universities and conferences around the world, including the International Criminal tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

John G. Cockell is the Policy Analyst for conflict prevention and early warning in the Peacebuilding and Human Development Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada. He has authored a number of policy frameworks on these issues, and regularly contributes papers and analysis to a range of interdepartmental and multilateral policy processes, including the UN, the OECD, and the G7. He is also currently engaged in research projects on ethnic conflict with the Conflict Data Service of INCORE (United Nations University/University of Ulster), and the Centre for International and Security Studies (York University). He has served as a CIDA consultant on human rights, and from 1993 to 1995 was Honorary Fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies in New Delhi, India. During his years in South Asia, Mr. Cockell conducted extensive field research on ethnic nationalism and conflict in India, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka. Recent publications include "Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding," in *Policy Orientations for Development Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Recovery* (Paris: OECD-DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development, 1997), and "Azadi as Alternative Politics: Towards a Dialogical Process in Kashmir," in G.M. Wani, ed., *Kashmir: Need for Subcontinental Political Initiative* (New Delhi: APH Publishing, 1995). Mr. Cockell was educated at the University of Alberta, Jawaharlal Nehru University in India, and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. As of September 1997, he will be based at the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, as a SSHRC Doctoral Fellow.

Christopher Cushing, will be the Coordinator of the Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Crisis Management Cluster at the United Nations Staff College in Turin, Italy as of April 1997. He has been the Senior Programme Officer and Manager, Emergency Assistance Operations Emergency Response Unit, CARE Canada, Ottawa, since 1995. His recent field work with CARE includes: Country Coordinator Zaire, (Dec. 1995-Feb 1996); Liberia Assessment Team (April-May 1996); CARE International Regional Coordinator, and Central African Zaire-Rwanda Crisis

(October-December 1996). Prior experience includes a year with the Canadian Red Cross, and three years with Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in Canada, Bosnia, Rwanda and Georgia. Cushing served as an Adjunct Faculty member, (1991-1996) at The Lester Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis, Canada. His M.A. from University of Toronto (1987) focused on War Termination and his Ph.D work focuses on "Sustainable Humanitarian Relief Strategies in Complex Emergencies".

John Davies is Director of the Global Event-Data System (GEDS) Project at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland, where he has also been Research Coordinator since 1988. His current research and teaching interests are in dynamic indicators for crisis early warning, data systems, and analysis and management of protracted communal conflicts. He has published several journal articles on these topics and is currently editing two books--one on risk assessment and early warning systems (with Ted Robert Gurr), the other on the management of ethnic conflicts (with Edy Kaufman).

Jürgen Dedring, a native of Germany, graduated with a Ph.D in Political Science from Harvard University. He formerly taught at Harvard, Dartmouth and Long Island University. Dr. Dedring also worked as a Research Associate, Political Officer and Humanitarian Affairs Officer in the UN Secretariat in 1972 to 1996. At present, he is an Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Graduate School and University Center at City University, New York. Dr. Dedring has been involved in early warning work since 1984, spending five years in the UN early warning office, ORCI. He is also involved indirectly in early warning, especially of refugees and displaced persons' flows, in UN-DHA. His writings have focused on early warning, preventive diplomacy and other related aspects of international matters.

William DeMars is Assistant Professor in International Relations at the American University in Cairo. He is currently writing a book on *Inadvertent Power: Humanitarianism, War, and Statebuilding in Africa*, which investigates the politics of international humanitarian action in the Ethiopia/Eritrea war. His research analyses the evolving roles of international NGOs in world politics, their implications for international relations theory, and innovative forms of cooperation for conflict prevention between NGOs and the U.S. national security bureaucracy.

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Nik Gowing was appointed a main programme anchor for the BBC s international TV news service BBC World in February 1996. The new appointment draws both on his extensive reporting experience over two decades in diplomacy, defence and international security and his presentation/chairing skills. From 1989-1996 Nik Gowing was Diplomatic Editor for the one-hour nightly news analysis programme Channel Four News from ITN in London. His reporting from Bosnia was part of the Channel Four News portfolio which won the BAFTA Best News Coverage award in 1996. Since 1978 he has reported on many of the main international conflicts. He has written many ground-breaking stories, such as the confirmation of covert US weapons air drops into Tuzla, the fall of Srebrenica, and the secret departure of the Russian troops from Afghanistan. Gowing collected a BAFTA award for his exclusive coverage of martial law in Poland, and an award from the New York TV Festival for his military and diplomatic analysis of the Gulf War. His Channel Four documentary, Diplomacy and Deceit, on the limits and failures of diplomacy in conflict management was widely acclaimed. In 1994 he was a resident fellow at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. His published Harvard study challenged conventional wisdom of an automatic cause and effect relationship between real-time television coverage of conflicts (the CNN factor) and the making of foreign policy. It has received wide attention and stirred new debate. He is currently a consultant to the Carnegie Commission on Prevention of Deadly Conflict and New York University's Center for War, Peace and the News Media. He is a governor of the Westminister Foundation for Democracy and the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe.

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Clyde Sanger was Director of Communications for the North-South Institute from 1898 to 1996; Special Assistant to the President of the Canadian International Development Agency from 1970-72. Associate Director for Communications, International Development Research Centre 1972-77. Prior to that, he was an editorial writer for the Globe and Mail, Toronto; and United Nations, Africa and Latin America correspondent for the Guardian Newspaper. He is active in several Canadian NGOs and was a member of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation's mission to Namibia in 1989. His several publications include Central African Emergence (1960); Half a Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role in Developing Countries (1969); Canadians and the United Nations (1985) and Malcom MacDonald: Bringing an End to The Empire (1995).

Susanne Schmeidl will be Assistant Professor of Sociology at the American University in the Fall of 1997. She was the Post Doctoral Researcher and Coordinator for the Prevention/Early Warning Unit at the Centre for Refugee Studies, from 1995-1997. In 1996-1997 she also coordinated the Interim Secretariat of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, an international consortium of IGOs, UN organizations, NGOs and academic research centres. A native of Germany, Dr. Schmeidl received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the Ohio State University in 1995. Her dissertation, which will be published in a revised form by Praeger as a book entitled "International Forced Migration -- Exploring a Refugee Early Warning Model," dealt with the issue of refugee early warning and the quantitative prediction of refugee exodus. Dr. Schmeidl's research on early warning and the dynamics of forced migration has resulted in several articles in refereed journals and edited volumes such as *International Migration Review* (forthcoming), *Social Science Quarterly* (1997), *Whither Refugee?* (1996), *Sociological Focus* (1995), and the *International Journal of Group Tensions* (1994). Dr. Schmeidl also recently edited a special issue of *Refuge: Canada's Periodical on Refugees* on Early Warning.

Alex P. Schmid has been attached to the Center for the Study of Social Conflicts (COMT), which is part of the Leiden Institute for Social-Scientific Research (LISWO) since 1978. He has also been a member of the Department of Political Science of Leiden University, teaching in the fields of human rights and political conflicts. Previous to that he taught European Civilization at Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska. In 1985, he received an award for the 'Best Book of the Year in Political Science' for his work 'Political Terrorism'. In 1991, Schmid became Professor for Conflict Resolution at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Currently he is Research Director of PIOOM, an independent, non-partisan research organization in the field of human rights. Schmid has authored or (co-)authored a dozen books in history, sociology and political science. He is chairman of the Resource Committee on Human Rights in Criminal Justice as well as Executive Board member of the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council (ISPAC) of the United Nations Crime Division.

Philip A. Schrodt is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas. He received an M.A. in mathematics and a Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University in 1976. Prior to coming to the University of Kansas in 1988, he taught for eleven years at Northwestern University in Illinois. Dr. Schrodt has also taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, the University of California at Davis, the American University in Cairo, Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, and spent a year at the University of Lancaster (England) on a NATO Postdoctoral fellowship. Dr. Schrodt's major areas of research are formal models of political behaviour, with an emphasis on international politics, and political methodology. He is currently finishing a book on artificial intelligence and computational models of international behaviour. Dr. Schrodt has published more than 50 articles in political science, and his Kansas Event Data System computer program won the "Outstanding Computer Software Award" from the American Political Science Association in 1995.

Larry Seaquist, an international security strategist, is the founding chairman and CEO of The Strategy Group, an independent, international non-profit "do tank" specializing in innovative approaches to international public policy debates on security issues. In his role as special advisor to the Director-General of UNESCO, he directs a peace-building project called the "Venice Process". Mr. Seaquist is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington, and he lectures regularly at several universities in the USA where he is also a frequent public speaker. Prior to consulting, Mr. Seaquist held numerous responsibilities in the U.S. Navy and Government including a tour on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. He is the author of *Commanding Peace: Civilization and Security in a Disorderly World* (forthcoming).

Sergey Sokolovski is a senior researcher at the Centre for the Study and Prevention of Conflicts (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Acad.Sci.). He holds a PhD (1986) from the Moscow Institute of Ethnography, Acad.Sci of the USSR and is the author of 8 books in the field of ethnopolitics, ethnic conflicts, ethnicity and minority issues and more than 90 articles. He has had long fieldwork experience with Mennonites in the Western Siberia, as well as indigenous peoples (Altays, Shors in the south-western Siberia, Veps in the European North). Currently he is engaged in monitoring the data-base on ethnicity and conflicts in the post-Soviet space and several individual projects (international dimension of minority rights protection, ethnic violence etc.).

Stephen Stedman is an associate professor of African Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is the author of Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 and (with Thomas Ohlson and Robert Davies), The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. His recent work focuses on the implementation of peace agreements in civil wars, the role of spoilers in peace processes, preventive diplomacy, and American foreign policy and the wars of the 1990s. He has served as a consultant to UNIDIR on peacekeeping in civil war and the light weapons trade in Africa and was an election observer in Angola in 1992 and in South Africa in 1994. In 1993, Professor Stedman was a Senior Fulbright Research Fellow at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. In the summer of 1997, Professor Stedman will move to Stanford University, where he will be a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Janice Gross Stein is the Harrowston Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. She specializes in conflict management, Middle East Politics, and Canadian Foreign Policy. Her recent publications include, *We all Lost the Cold War* (with Richard Ned Lebow) and *Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security* (Edited with Geoffrey Kemp). She regularly lectures on conflict management at the Centre for National Security Studies in Ottawa, Canada and the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy. She is a member of the Advisory Group on Cross Cultural Negotiation at the United States Institute for Peace, of the Workshop on Middle East Negotiations at the National Academy of Science and of the Advisory Committee on Conflict Management in the Gulf for the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Professor Stein is currently Chair of the Research Advisory Board to the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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John Stremlau is advisor to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, based in Washington D.C. From 1989 - 1994 he served as deputy director of the Department of State's policy planning staff. He moved to Washington in 1988 where he served briefly in the World Bank's strategic planning division. From 1974 to 1987 he was an officer of Rockefeller Foundation, becoming head of its international relations division in 1984. For several years he was also an adjunct professor at Columbia University. He holds a BA with honours from Wesleyan University and PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the author of *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, the editor of two books on international affairs, and his most recent monograph is *Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations*, published by the Carnegie Commission in November 1996. Some of his more widely read articles of the past year include "Clinton's Dollar Diplomacy" and "Dateline Bangalore: Third World Technopolis," that appeared in *Foreign Policy*.

Mara Ustinova is Executive Director of the Centre for the Study and Prevention of Conflict, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences and Senior Researcher on the project "Ethnic Conflict management in the Post-Soviet States". A member of the Russian Sociological Association's Committee for Ethnosociological Studies and Internal Conflicts and their Resolution Study Group, Ustinova's research interests include ethnicity, identity, interethnic relations, tensions and conflict with the modern post-soviet society and family. Since 1993, she has been an editor of the Bulletin of the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts and has more than 60 publications to her credit.

Frank Vereecken is Research Fellow, foreign policy and security programme and Coordinator of Phare & Tacis Programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies. He is a founding member of the International Dialogue- Centre for Conflict Prevention and was the Administrator from 1994-96. He has a Ph.D from Paris University and his research interests include European integration, early warning and prevention, international dialogue and the Great Lakes region. He is the author of *La Lutte Pour Les Etats-Unis D'Europe*, 1938-1947 (1995).

Kathryn Whidden has worked as an International Services Officer at The Canadian Red Cross Society since 1993. She is currently responsible for operations in Central and Eastern Europe, having done monitoring and evaluation missions in Bosnia and Russia, as well as, in Ethiopia. She has previously worked as a reporter and a news director, and on several CIDA-funded projects in Barbados and South Africa. Ms. Whidden holds an M.A. in International Affairs from Carleton University, Ottawa.

Graduate Student Workshop Participant Biographies

Stephanie Apollonio is in her second year of graduate studies in International Development at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Her undergraduate degree is in International Development from the University of Guelph. She is currently writing a research paper on refugee assistance strategies.

Andre Beauregard received his B.A. at University of Toronto with a joint specialist in History and Politics. He is currently writing his thesis at the Department of Political Science, University of Guelph on "Peacekeeping and the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda". It primarily focuses on the working relationship between NGOs and peacekeepers in the field. The three areas of emphasis are: 1) communication and coordination between NGOs and peacekeepers, 2) the consequences for NGOs when the UN military contingent utilizes force, 3) means to improve the working relationship and to respond more rapidly to humanitarian crisis. (This possibly includes the establishment of a joint early warning program between peacekeepers and NGOs). His advisors are Professors Henry Wiseman and Peter Stoett.

Susannah Cameron is a Master's student in the University School of Rural Planning and Development at the University of Guelph. In 1996, she spent five months in Vietnam doing field research in connection with Oxfam Quebec for her thesis entitled "An Examination of Rapid Rural Appraisal Methods for Use in the Evaluation of Agricultural Projects in Vietnam." Her undergraduate degree is in Political Science and English.

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Patrick Doherty is a first-year Master's student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston, MA, USA. After completing his undergraduate degree at American University in 1992, he worked at the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, in Washington, DC, as a program associate until May 1996. AT IMTD, Mr. Doherty worked on community-level conflict resolution programs in Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, the Greater Horn of Africa, and Liberia, among others. During the summer of 1996, he worked as a research associate at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. His current focus is on addressing Africa's need for developing a comprehensive conflict response infrastructure, with a particular interest in conflict prevention mechanisms, and is currently developing this work with Conflict Management Group of Cambridge, MA, USA.

Troy S. Goodfellow BA (St. Thomas) MA (Univ. of Toronto) is currently in the third year of his Ph.D. program at the University of Toronto, majoring in international relations with a minor in political theory. A non-resident Junior Fellow of Massey College, Mr. Goodfellow is researching the factors which make compellent threats effective tools of foreign policy. His research is being supervised by Dr. Janice Stein.

Dan Møller received his Masters in History Science at Aarhus University, Denmark, in the summer of 1997. He was also the NGO representative of Amnesty International's Action Group, Danish Section at Aarhus. Currently he is working on his thesis in which he is undertaking a comparison on the three post Cold-War UN peace enforcement operations to determine why they were initiated. The roles played by five explanatory factors are examined in the operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda. These factors are: a clear humanitarian and/or legal case, national interest, chance of success, domestic pressure and the CNN effect. The comparison is also dealing with the perspectives of the Croatian dilemma of order versus human justice, instrumentality of the UN, codification problems etc. The second part of the comparison focuses on the UN's conflict management, mandate problems and reform needs in the light of the three humanitarian interventions.

David O'Brien will be graduating from a joint degree program in international nutrition and international relations at Tufts University. As a masters degree candidate at both the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the School of Nutrition Science and Policy, he has studied agriculture and development economics. complex humanitarian emergencies, and malnutrition and famine. His thesis is on famine early warning systems and the breakdown between warning and response. Mr. O'Brien has also worked as a research assistant at the Tufts University Feinstein International Famine Center where he has written grants and authored various reports.

Suzanne Quinn is a student in Peace and Conflict and Political Science at Wayne State University. She has worked in Mozambique for about two years as a development worker. She is interested in Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution and the link between IGOs, NGOs and Development.

Steve Scanlan received his B.A. with high honours in Sociology in 1993 from the University of Dayton with minors in history and religious studies. In 1995, he received his M.A. in Sociology, from The Ohio State University with a Thesis entitled "Guns and Butter but for Whom? Inequality, Militarization, and Development in the Third World" and received the Outstanding M.A. award within the Department of Sociology. His current research interests are on the determinants of food security in the Great Lakes and Horn regions of east and central Africa including the effects of militarization, international economics, population pressure, and inequality. He is presently preparing for candidacy exams and teaches a class on global social change: Contemporary World Societies: Social Institutions and Social Change.

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