




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

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Occasional REFLECTIONS
ON THE
IMPORTANCE
OF THE
WAR in *AMERICA*,

And the REASONABLENESS and JUSTICE of
Supporting the KING of PRUSSIA, &c.

In DEFENCE of the
COMMON CAUSE.

Founded on
A GENERAL VIEW of the State and Connections
of this Country; the General System of *Europe*;
and the ambitious Designs of *French* Policy for
overturning the Ballance of Power and Liberties
of *Europe*.

In a LETTER to a MEMBER of
PARLIAMENT.


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
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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following sheets were written on a particular occasion; but the reflections contained in them are of a general nature, and relate to things which appear to be pretty much connected with the real interests of this country.

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




OCCASIONAL
REFLECTIONS, &c.

S I R,

London, June 2, 1757.



LATE incident recalled my thoughts to an important question, which has often been the subject of our mutual speculations: and as it has rather confirmed my opinion, I beg leave now to submit to your candid judgment those considerations which have the greatest weight with me; that, if I am not able to give you satisfaction in any of the points wherein we differ, I may at least put it in your power to oblige me with fresh proofs of your superior abilities and knowledge in these matters, and to correct my errors and mistakes.

There was lately a debate in the H—— of
L——s upon the King's message, the avowed
B purpose

purpose whereof was, a vote of credit for a million of money, when the address moved for met with some opposition: not so much, as I understood, with an intention to obstruct the grant, as to point out an appropriation of it, by which his Majesty would have been restrained from applying any part of it towards the support of the *Common Cause*, or the assistance of any particular Princes or States upon the Continent: which brought the reasoning directly to the point I now propose to subject to your view.

I was pleased to hear a thing of that kind managed more in the way of argument than debate, as, I own, I think it was neither a season nor a subject for dissention, whatever occasion there might be to deliberate, or even to expostulate. At the same time I was glad, since there was any doubt stirred, to hear the L——s not only give their opinions, but their reasons, in support of the measure in its full extent: and the rather, that certainly his Majesty, who knows what passes, is susceptible of all the pleasure, and subject to all the anxiety and concern, that, as the true Father of his people, he can suffer or enjoy in matters essential to their happiness, and is therefore entitled to receive
from

from his great Council all the consolation it can give him; to know, that they are as heartily touched, as he seems to be, with the present critical situation of public affairs; that the real interest of their country is the chief object of their attention and study; that they are duly sensible of his paternal regard, and are no less desirous to know, than zealously resolved, with steadiness and fortitude, cost what it will, to pursue, those measures that may most effectually conduce to the safety and security of the nation, against the machinations and attempts of those powers, be they never so great and formidable, whose ambition prompts them to think of forging chains for our necks, or of wreathing a yoke of servitude upon any other part of the world, with which we are in the least degree connected by interest, blood, religion, or even humanity alone.

I know it would have been the meaning of that great assembly to do so, by whatever address they should, on such an occasion, present; but as it has not been usual, seldom would be practicable, and perhaps never proper, to be very particular in addresses of that sort; it seemed the more decent, if not necessary, for them in a critical conjuncture like

this, to declare their sentiments so fully among themselves, as that not only there could be no doubt what was the mind of the H—e, but that, so far as was consistent with the rules of P——t, the Throne itself might understand what was intended by the words used in approaching it.

It was with pleasure, therefore, that I heard so many of them explain their sentiments freely. In this they both imitated the candour, and emulated the abilities of a noble L—d, with a B—r in the M——y, who always shines, and, with his usual frankness and spirit, said he would speak out, and speak all out, conscious that there was nothing designed that needed to shun the light.

I did not find by what dropt from any L—d, that there was one of them who called in question the propriety or expediency of the thing itself, which they were all sensible was the scope of the message. And indeed I should have much wondered if there had been a difference of opinion there, as, I think, he must be blind to the situation we are in at present, or, which is yet worse, lost to any feeling for his country (a case so alien to the human mind, that God forbid it should ever be found in noble breasts, where

it is natural for virtue to reside), who could so far disagree with the tendency of his Majesty's gracious message, the principles whereof appear to be not only just but obvious, and the conclusion from them no less clear and necessary.

His Majesty tells his people "that this is a critical conjuncture." And is it not so? If the most valuable Interests of these kingdoms being at stake, we may say in hazard, and great events hanging as it were on a single thread, do make a crisis, we are now in it; nor can it be denied, nay, if the other be true, what he further says must be so; "That emergencies may arise which may be of the utmost importance." And if they arise, it is beyond doubt what is added, "That they may be attended with the most pernicious consequences, if proper means should not be (and be *immediately*) applied to prevent or defeat them." What then follows? What can follow, But that measures should be taken to secure these means, His Majesty therefore says, "He is desirous" (nor can he be more so than every good subject ought to be) "that he be enabled to take all such measures as may be necessary to
" disappoin

“ disappoint or defeat any enterprize or de-
 “ signs of his enemies.” A desire so just, so
 reasonable, and of such moment to the na-
 tion, that a H——e of P———t could not
 but agree to it, and do what in them lay to
 make it effectual.

But, I apprehend, it was the words with
 which the message concluded, that alone
 could furnish occasion for any diversity of
 sentiment, it being added, “ and as the exi-
 “ gency of affairs may require.” A noble
 L——d, therefore, to whose zeal for the wel-
 fare of his country all possible applause is due,
 as there is not the smallest doubt of its sin-
 cerity, said a vote of credit might be often
 proper ; he admitted it might be so now,
 and so far was willing to concur with his
 Majesty’s views, and the inclinations of such
 as declared for the address that had been
 moved ; but his L———p argued for such
 a limitation as I mentioned, which led my
 noble L——d to consider what were the exi-
 gencies of affairs that might, and, in his opi-
 nion, ought to require the application of the
 means proposed by this measure to be put
 into his Majesty’s hands, for enabling him to
 disappoint or defeat the enterprizes or designs
 of

of his enemies. And it was there the difference lay between his L——p and the others who supported the motion for an address, as at first made.

The two great objects that distract, I do believe only because they concur, for I am persuaded that the least favoured of them would be considered as of the greatest consequence to the nation, if there were not another that to some appears yet more material and interesting, I say the two grand objects are, *America* and the *Continent*, and particularly the King of *Prussia*, Electorate of *Hanover*, and Prince of *Hesse-Cassel*.

Now it seems to be only the latter of those, I mean the *Continent*, that makes any ground of dispute; for as to *America*, I dare say every body is agreed, it is an object of such magnitude as cannot be forgot or neglected— And indeed, unless it were to be the subject of a question, Whether we are to give up our existence as a nation, it never can be matter of speculation, whether *America* is to be defended and supported?—Our existence I say as a nation, I mean a commercial and independent Nation; or, in other words, Whether we shall cease to be a free and happy people?—For by trade we do,
and

and must, if at all, subsist; without it we can have no wealth; and without wealth we can have no power; as without power we can have no liberty (which makes us even indebted to trade for that inestimable blessing). These are twin sisters, never to be separated, else they both die.

It is trade that secures liberty, not only because it brings, but because it distributes and divides riches and power, which are the sure pillars of independency: it dissipates and diffuses an equality of wealth amongst the people; and it is this wealth that in the total or aggregate of it, makes a nation powerful in reference to other countries, and consequently free and independent as to them; at the same time that the happy distribution of it does, in respect of the internal system, secure against national or domestic tyranny, oppression, and slavery, which are the necessary consequences of the property, which will always draw the power with it, being in the hands of a few, and poverty the portion of the rest.

On our trade therefore depends our *all*; and how much our trade depends on our dominions in *America*, he must be a stranger to this country that does not know. It is to our
cur

our plantations and colonies that by far the greatest part of those manufactures go, which employ the skill and labour of the people of *Great Britain*; as it is from our colonies that, in return for these manufactures so exported, we draw great abundance of those commodities which are their native growth, and cannot be produced at home, but are highly serviceable to us, and of which we re-export great quantities, beyond what is sufficient for our own consumption, to other countries; whence we get money or goods for them, and so form the connections of commerce with other nations. And in the same manner we have many things from our plantations, which are the materials of our home manufactures, the various branches and working up of which employ the industry and genius of our people, for the supply of foreign markets, from which we have proper returns.

In carrying on this grand circulation of commerce, of which the *British* empire in *America* is the parent, though this is the mother-country, of what extent is our shipping! which again constitutes our glory and security, our figure and felicity, as the first maritime power in the world. A character

C

, which

which trade alone gave us, which it alone can preserve to us, and without which we should be on a level almost with the lowest of the states of *Europe*.

These I consider as the things which make *America* of that consequence we all acknowledge it is; and I am so thoroughly convinced of their importance, that I think it impossible my zeal for *America* can be much inferior to theirs who speak the warmest on that subject. I wish that every one, as well those in public trust as others, thought justly on the vast moment *America* is of to us. These are words which are in the mouths of many, but, as is often found, without proper ideas, at least without their being possessed of the knowledge, which is the proper foundation of the opinion they declare: and therefore perhaps it is, that this doctrine, however incontestable in itself, has not always had its due influence on the system of our domestic affairs. I shall not at present pretend to examine how far may be owing to that fatal error, however excusable in what first gave rise to it (as I am not without suspicion that there were faults in our colonies abroad that produced the error at home); I shall not, I say, at present examine, how far some of the distresses
we

we now labour under may be owing to that error. I see no advantage in looking back on faults with any other design than to correct and amend them: but a proper attention to some of these things seems necessary for our future guidance.

It might also be of some use to the public service, that our commercial people too should know that their interests are not quite overlooked by those who are not immediately engaged in trade, though nobody is independent on it, but, on the contrary, greatly and directly connected with it, as being that which constitutes the value of the land property of the nation.

Every one, therefore, must be sensible of the value of *America*. If we are, we must of necessity be awake to the importance of the present war, the true cause of which is *America*: and, if I mistake not, the real dispute which has produced the war, and is to be determined by that last of arguments, the reason and the judge of Kings, is, Whether this country shall, either in whole or in part, lose the advantage, and perhaps be stript even of the property, of its colonies; and, which is yet worse, whether our most ancient and inveterate enemy, our most formi-

dable rival in trade and in our maritime power, is to gain what we lose? A question that, methinks, may make the ears of an *Englishman* tingle; for, in truth, it is little less than, Whether he, and his posterity after him, shall continue to be free *Britons*; or whether we shall now become the vassals, if not the slaves, of a power I chuse not to describe, but of which we all know what is to be expected.

We are embarked in a war, the most important *Britain* ever was engaged in: a war begotten of true *British* principles, pure commercial views:— And so far let us rejoice, it is a just, as it was a necessary and unavoidable, war.

The last war with *Spain* took its rise from *America* too: but it was a sad one, the very bane of this country. It brought on the *French* war, and all the train of dreadful consequences that ensued. It was indeed the war of the people: but they are not always in the right; though perhaps they do not continue, for the most part, a great while in the wrong. And I suspect now, when considered with cool reflection, that must appear one of their blunders. In the light I view the matter, it was a senseless war. I doubt, and always did, if it had
much

much pretension to be called a just one. It was a war for what never could be decided by arms, for a purpose never to be compassed at all: either to obtain a free commerce with the *Spanish* dominions in *America* (a thing wise people that love *Britain* might wish for, but that even fools can hardly expect the *Spaniards* will so far exceed them in folly as to agree to); or it was to ascertain, whether the *Spanish* guardacosta's, or the *British* traders, did the greatest number of illegal things, or the most grievous wrongs: an affair which might have been the cause of precautions, or the object of a negociation, conferences, or a treaty, which, if managed with a proper spirit, might have produced the desired end; but hardly could be a wise reason for declaring war with a nation, whose connections in trade are so valuable to us.

But the present war is, in short, Whether *France* shall expel us from dominion in *America*, and from commerce with that part of the world, and take all that we now possess of *American* property, trade, and navigation, from *Britain*, and throw it into the scale of *French* power. What must be the consequence? This country must of necessity be poor, dependent, nay, a province to *France*.

And

And if we go, others too must add to the cost of the sacrifice. The issue of the contest is dreadful, not to *Britain* only, but to *Europe*.

Thus far then, I dare say, I should have the honour to agree in opinion with the noble L—d who first found fault with the motion as made: and I should imagine the same principles that produce a conformity of sentiment upon the one point, would prevent any difference as to the other. For, as matters stand, the more I consider the thing with as great impartiality, and as free of bias, I think, as possible, the more I am confirmed in the opinion, that it is impossible for us, if we would preserve a just regard to our interest, and to the grand object of the war—*America*, to detach ourselves from the *Continent of Europe*, or even to rest satisfied with giving assistance to the powers now engaged in alliance with us in *Germany*, in any less degree, than with the utmost exertion of our whole strength. I think it is apparent that the connections we at present have with the Continent, and which call for our interposition, or tend to engage us in continental measures, as they are called, are, in truth, no other than our own interests; and that

that the war, so far as concerns us, is the same, both in the principle or cause of it, and in its consequences, whether in *America* or on the Continent.

This may seem a paradox. Nor am I unaware of the ridicule such a saying may be exposed to amongst those who in former times have been accustomed to hear or talk of the Continent, continental measures, *German* connections, and all the other hard words which have been used in arguments of this sort with no small degree of warmth: but I am not at all afraid of that clamour at present, with any body at least who considers things, not names, or that goes deeper than the surface of affairs, so as to be able to discover the difference of seasons and circumstances.

I will not approve of all that has been either said or done sometimes as to the Continent. Perhaps if I had had the honour of giving an opinion in some of the questions relating to it, I should not have been of the side I may be supposed to take now. But, whatever was the case during the last war, and even admitting, though it is not to my present purpose to discuss that matter so fully as it ought, in order to receive a proper judgment;

ment; admitting, I say, that our connections with the Continent last war were erroneous, or that we hurt ourselves by assisting others, for whom we were not bound, at least to go the lengths we did; still I am satisfied that the difference betwixt that and the present case, is sufficient to warrant me in saying, that if we do not now, to our very utmost, assist and support the King of *Prussia*, and the Electorate of *Hanover*, we offend against our own interest, and our own safety. So thoroughly I must be of the mind of the noble L—d, in a high office, who said in the debate; that be the King's ministers who they will, they are responsible in the highest degree to their country, first if they do not push the war in *America*, and next, if they do not lend all the aid they can, and give the utmost attention, to the affairs of the Continent, and especially if they do not, by the most efficacious means, assist that great and magnanimous Prince, whom, thank God! we have now for our ally: a circumstance which makes an important difference from the time when he was our enemy. I heartily wish it had never been so: but, as I said before, it is in vain to look back only for the sake of complaining. Now he is with us, let us not,

for

for God's sake, lose him, and endanger ourselves, the liberties of *Europe*, and the Protestant religion, by acting improperly towards him.

I am, and I dare say every body who knows any thing of what passes must be, sensible under what prejudices many of the well-disposed subjects of this country yet labour in their notions of the Continent, owing to the same things being now buzzed into their ears, that they have, on former occasions, been accustomed to hear with great resentment, and perhaps not without some reason of disgust, but which, if rightly considered, cannot now admit of the odious construction they then bore, and that is yet endeavoured by some to be put upon them. And it is of great consequence that these good mistaken people should be disabused of their error, that they may not by a confusion of language be misled to distress, or cry out against, measures of Government necessary to be taken for the security of what is above all things dear to them, their Religion, Liberty, and Property. I wish any thing I could say had so happy a tendency.

The Continent, *Germany* and all the rest of it, were words used ten years ago to inflame

the minds and irritate the passions of the people, and not without success, whatever was the foundation for it; (I am sorry if there was any); but they can only now catch the ignorant and unwary. Let us but consider how we stood last war, and see what similarity there is between the circumstances of that and the present time.

It is well known that the last war, which we had the misfortune to have so deep a share in, was a war which I do not say, because I do not seriously think it, we had no concern in; for I am satisfied of no one thing more than of this, that we have a concern, and a material one, in whatever relates to the State of the Continent: but surely it was a war, the causes whereof were remote, that is, they did not directly strike at any thing belonging to ourselves, nor was the immediate purpose of it to contend, as the *British* nation, for any of our own possessions or rights, which the struggle now is to wrest from us. For my own part, I considered it as a step of that scheme which has been carrying on in *France* ever since the days of *Lewis* the Thirteenth, whose great and wicked minister, *Richlieu*, laid the plan for universal monarchy; which has been pursued with
unremitting

unremitting zeal in the two succeeding reigns, though perhaps disguised in the shape of ambition for universal or general influence only, which, though more easily to be obtained, would not be less fatal to those affected by it, and must be equally founded in the weakness, poverty, and dependence, of the other powers.

That some such scheme as this has found a place in *French* councils, is evident from all their conduct for above a century past, in which no opportunity has been omitted by that court to bring it to bear—Thus the death of the Emperor *Charles* the Sixth, was laid hold of as a golden season for doing something to the purpose this way. The House of *Austria* had for ages been the rival of the *French* monarchy, and was justly considered as the barrier of the *Germanic* constitution, and of the liberties of all *Europe*. It was therefore the natural enemy of *France*, and then was a time for humbling it. Accordingly, in breach of the most solemn engagements to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, that establishment which the Emperor had, from a primary regard to his own family, but some regard to his neighbours too, made to secure the unity of his succession,

and prevent the dismembering of his dominions, and which all the other powers of *Europe*, as well as the *French* King, had by treaties become bound to support, the most of them, and we in particular, for the sake of the general peace, and to preserve a poise to *Gallic* power: In breach, I say, of these engagements, *France* attacked the Queen of *Hungary*, after her father's death, set up a competitor to the Imperial throne, and a Pretender to the hereditary dominions, which were formally disposed off by a treaty of partition.

Such being the cause, or rather the pretence, of the war, *Britain*, bound, as I hope she always will be, by the faith of treaties, did interpose to assist the distressed Princess; and so far we did right, if we had kept within due bounds, or taken proper measures. I own, I fear we were chargeable with errors, but they were in our conduct, and not in the principle on which we acted; and I suspect our ally was greatly to blame in her behaviour.

It certainly had been no worse for her, and much better for us, if, instead of regarding the King of *Prussia's* pretensions to *Silesia*, as an infraction of the Pragmatic Sanction,

tion, which he also was engaged to maintain (which never did to me appear a clear point, considering the foundations of his claim), his offer to assist the Queen in defending the rest of her dominions had been accepted of on the terms of a cession of what he demanded, and made good, as it would have quite altered the face of affairs, and, instead of a long and expensive, as well as bloody, war, have made a very short one.

It might have procured the Duke of *Lorraine's* election to the imperial dignity, the thing his royal consort had so much at heart, and at any rate would probably have added to his interest the votes of *Brandenburgh* and *Hanover*. For, had it not been for the King of *Prussia's* coming on one side of our Sovereign's Electorate with an army, at the same time that the *French* penetrated to it through *Westphalia*, which forced the King to a short neutrality in his electoral quality, his Majesty would not have been under the temptation to that step, which in those circumstances it became prudent, if not necessary, for him to take, and was always matter of regret, because it exposed his councils to obloquy, as if, as King of *Great Britain*, he had fought for the Queen of *Hungary*, and,
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in opposition to the Emperor Duke of *Bavaria*, for whom as Elector he had been induced to vote; a seeming inconsistency, the very appearance of which was a consideration sufficient to make the well-affectionate to his Majesty, with the King of *Prussia* had not been provoked to act the part he did, by the Queen of *Hungary*'s refusal of his offer, and perhaps going too far in schemes for resenting his supposed Incroachment on the Pragmatick Sanction, if it be true, as has been said, that a division of his dominions was projected or concerted. However, here seems to have lain the original and fatal blunder which lost the King of *Prussia*, and threw him into the *French* interest; to which unhappy union may be charged all the bad consequences of the war, the heaviest part of which fell on us, who were at best but auxiliaries.

But, after all, was that war like this? If it can in any degree be said, that the vitals of this country were then wasted in a *German* quarrel, not immediately, though by consequence affecting us, as it did the rest of *Europe*, but which surely did not oblige us to pour forth our blood and treasure as if we had been fighting *pro aris et focis*, for our country

country at home, or our colonies abroad: Or if it be true, that, even so far as we were engaged to meddle on the Continent, we, or our ally, mistook our measures, and thereby produced unnatural alliances against us; nay, let it be, that not only the Queen of *Hungary* cost us much more than we ought at any rate to have bestowed on her account—and to make the thing as complete as the strongest *Anti-German* could desire, if it be alleged that we were made to defend *Hanover*, when exposed, from the measures pursued by its Sovereign after his hands were let loose, and the engagements of neutrality at an end—Be it all! and it is surely giving as much as can be asked, and what is it to the present question?

For is there a man in *Britain* who can deny that the present war is begun on true *British* principles, and these only; that the quarrel we are now engaged in with *France* is for *British* dominions;—for the trade, the glory, and the liberty of *Britain*?

We are not now fighting in a contest, whether a foreign power, a family upon the Continent, shall have its estates dismembered or no; whether the Duke of *Bavaria*, or some other Princes, shall divide the *Austrian*

domi-

dominions; or who shall be raised to the supreme government of the Empire, and wear the imperial diadem:—events, I have already said, we have a just concern in; but very different from our interest in the questions now to be decided by the sword, which are not only, whether *France* shall overmatch all *Europe*, but, which comes home to us, whether *Britain* or she shall be the first maritime power; whether the *French* shall have all the commerce, navigation, and naval strength, we have now for a long time possessed, and we be reduced as low, in these respects, as they were even at the beginning of *Lewis* the Fourteenth's reign, who had hardly an, Fleet (and his grandfather, *Henry* the Fourth, had none at all); some even pretend to say, that, at the beginning of last war, *France* did not afford forty ships of war of all sizes;—an anecdote which, compared with what we now see, may almost make us tremble.

The question now is, Whether we shall have any trade,---any colony; and have we not even had reason to say, it is whether we shall enjoy peace at home?---Such is the present war: and, under these circumstances, who
can

can imagine there is any comparifon between it and the laft.

But it may be faid, All this is true ; and therefore let us exert a vigour proportioned to the value of *Britain* and *British America* : but what is our concern with *Pruffia*, or with *Hanover* ? That is going back to the old fcheme, foreign connections, *German* quarrels, and fo forth. And therefore, without intending in the leaft to weaken what I have already faid as to the one, I fhall fuggelt what occurs to me as to the other.

Thefe names, as has already been obferved, have had their fuccesfs on former occafions in raifing rancor and ill blood ; but I hope no thinking perfon will be led away with found : I even trust, the multitude will not all, or always, be in the wrong. I have fupposed, that poffibly it was an error that made it become neceffary for us, or that tempted us, to take fo deep a fhare in the laft war ; and that perhaps there were miftakes in the management of our part : but I have alfo taken the liberty to deny, becaufe I never can allow, that we had no concern in that war, or that it had been proper for us to lie quite by, as matters then flood, merely becaufe the great object of the land-war was

the continent. Such a doctrine seems to me subversive of the very fundamental system of true *British* politics, and absolutely inconsistent with the real interest of this country. Let us exercise judgment, as to the time and circumstances in which it is proper for us to meddle in the affairs of the continent; and when we do it, let us deal out our assistance with just œconomy. Why not? But that we should never meddle, is a position appears to me to be radically wrong. Far less can I be of opinion, that we should not at present take a concern in the affairs of *Germany*. For if we had any interest at all in the last war, as I have endeavoured to shew was the case, sure I am, we have every interest, every call, and every obligation, that possibly we can have, now to interfere on the continent. We are, and give me leave to say we ought to consider ourselves rather as principals, than as mere auxiliaries, in the present war upon the continent: and, as the great personage said, whoever are the ministry, it will be at their highest peril, if they neglect or forbear to give the most effectual assistance we can, in our present situation, which indeed I am sorry is no better, to the King of *Prussia*, and Electorate of *Hanover*:
and

and I shall submit the reasons, which move me to be of this opinion.

First of all then, I cannot help mentioning, what always had great weight with me in this matter; I mean, the general interest and concern, which, independent of all particular connections, we have in the preservation of the King of *Prussia*, and Electorate of *Hanover*, as powers that at present make some figure in the *European* system, and, I will add, as *protestant* powers; as I hope every good protestant will think. This is a circumstance of some moment.

When I speak of our concern in the preservation of any foreign power or state, it is easy to perceive I have reference to the Balance of Power: a term that has been often tossed about in political disputes; but a thing which, in my own mind, I am, and I hope most people now are, thoroughly convinced has a real existence, and is by no means an empty name or an idle thing; and not the less, that it may not possibly be always easy with precision to define what it is, or where it lies. And therefore, however much it may have been made a stalking-horse of by one, and a butt to the raillery of another party, and perhaps alternately of the same persons;

I scruple not to give it that place in my argument, which to me it appears, upon good principles, to merit.

One thing I may take the liberty to remind of; a matter of fact, too true to be denied, and too serious to be neglected; That while we in this country have at different times, and with various success, been employed, some to establish, and others to destroy, the notion of a ballance of power in *Europe*, as ideal or imaginary, there is one court, where there never has been any diffension, as to the reality of its existence; and in the councils and schemes of which it has always been a great object. While we have endeavoured, in the course of different administrations, to invalidate or expose the name, every administration in *France* has laboured what they could, by art and power, to destroy the thing.

French policy has not wanted the justest notions of this ballance. While amongst us it has not failed to be represented as a mere bugbear set up by ministers to serve jobs, a succession of ministers in *France*, of whose abilities *Europe* bears sad marks, has given ample proofs how much they considered it as an obstruction to their designs; insomuch that

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 every thing, that invention could devise, and
 fraud or force use, been employed with
 ceaseless assiduity. The destruction of the
 ballance of power in *Europe*, by aggran-
 dizing *France* at the cost of every other
 country and state, has been the chief scope
 of an uniform plan of *French* government:
 and *Britain*—*Britain*, which, without boast-
 ing, we may, and with gratitude to Heaven
 we ought to say has, in many valuable re-
 spects, been the Queen of the modern world,
 —is the great, tho' (thank God!) from her
 natural strength, she is even in the project
 reserved to be the last, sacrifice to *Gallic* am-
 bition.

To destroy us, and cut us off from being
 a nation, is the great mark, by reducing us
 to subjection to the Grand Monarque, or at
 least making little better than a blank of the
 place we now fill in *Europe*, by divesting us
 of our power and influence: for, monstrous
 and incredible as it may seem, and vain as
 all notions of erecting an universal Empire,
 whether formed by a *Philip* of *Macedon*,
 an *Alexander* the *Great*, or a *Charles* the

Vth of *Germany*, all of whom were in some measure the bubbles of that impracticable design, may be supposed; I little doubt, were it necessary, I think it could be shewn, that *Princes* have been bold enough to hatch, and *French* kings, or ministers, which is the same thing, wicked enough to adopt, the romantic scheme; and that the conquest of *Britain* is, as well it may, a principal part of it.

There is nothing more common in the mouths of the people of this country, even the lowest of them, than expressions of hatred and aversion to the *French*. And tho' I shall very readily admit the justness of the observation, that general or national prejudices are improper; yet I believe the truth of the remark depends more upon the misapplication than the groundlessness of those prejudices, which, it is probable, take their rise from general or national characters: for tho' perhaps it is true, and I am as sensible of it as any can be, that it is wrong to apply the general character, which we have of a nation, or the prejudices thence arising, to individuals of that country, as they will often be found to be most improper; yet I am convinced there is a great reality in the thing
itself,

itself, and perhaps not so very great a mistake in the notions that prevail of general national characters, and that both with respect to morals and politics, which are things very near akin to one another.

And therefore, however much I should be against treating a private *Frenchman* upon the foot of any general or national prejudice I have against his country, yet I have no inclination to discountenance, or eradicate out of the minds of *Englishmen*, the prejudice itself. I don't expect that every one that entertains it can give a rational or philosophical account why he does do it: that is not to be imagined, considering how we all imbibe prejudices, and suck in opinions, that may be just enough in themselves, but were never examined by us; which makes them deserve no better name than that of prejudices, tho' in themselves they may be very well founded. Yet I believe the notion is but too just, which we have of the *French*, in what may be called a *moro-political* view, as the perfidious enmities of this country: a character that lays a very good foundation for any aversion we bear to them; and therefore, instead of being offended with it, I rather regret, that in spite of our aversion

to the country, we should be so fond of its fashions and customs; the importation of which is so great an article of our commerce with *France*, and the cultivation thereof so dangerous a preparative to a corruption of manners, which may in time destroy the distinction that, I hope, yet remains between the *French* and us in that respect.

It were rather to be wished, that this aversion had a greater effect on our public and national conduct towards the *French*; the want of which can hardly be ascribed to any other reason, than that general inattention to public affairs, which has place amongst us; all regard to the public being jostled out by undue respect to private interest; or that dissipation and dissoluteness of manners that so remarkably prevails.

We cry out against the *French*, often we know not why: but there is a good reason for it, if it were attended to, which ought to make us do more, tho' we would speak less. The true and the just cause of that proper anti-gallican spirit, which ought to be cherished in the breast of every *Englishman*, lies in the character of the *French* nation itself, and the point of view they stand in with respect to us: than which, I know

know not a more serious or interesting subject of reflection, especially to our governors: for tho' it may be the amusement of others, it is the duty of those, who have any share in public management, to study our relations with other countries; and not only those, whose interests are connected with our own, but especially those, whose interests are opposite to ours; which is the known and avowed case as to *France*.

There is too good evidence of such a repugnancy of interest, and enmity to our happiness as a nation, as surely gives no reason to abate our aversion, and ought, if not to produce in us a reciprocation of hatred, at least to excite us to a firmness and constancy of conduct, necessary to defeat or repel the mischievous attempts of that tyranny and ambition, which so justly characterizes their government. Such must become the genius of this nation, if we hope to subsist. Would to God we saw the beginning of so wise and nervous a system, that would yet give stability and glory to a tottering state! Then might we hope to see ourselves become an overmatch for the all-grasping and aspiring monarchy of *France*.

The same evidence that shews how opposite the interest of *France*, or what is pursued by her as her interest, is to ours, is also incontestible proof of what importance a proper attention to the ballance of power is: and the evidence is, their general plan, which is too manifest and visible to be doubted or denied.

It is well known, what pains *Colbert* took to lay a foundation for raising the commerce and maritime power of *France*: but this was but one part of the grand system formed by *Richlieu*, and fostered by his disciple *Mazarin*, and which has throve wonderfully well ever since. One great advantage it has had, that it has not been prosecuted by fits and starts: it is an object they never lose sight of; it is the constant scheme, the very system of their government; and systematical governments, like what has been wisely observed of administrations of that kind, are most likely to compass whatever is proposed as the end in view. We talk of this; but, alas! we don't think of it. We often allude to it, and take it for granted, that the government of *France* now does, and has for a great while past, pursued a scheme of power to themselves, inconsistent with the liberties

of.

of *Europe*, but the fact, tho' it is believed, makes a light impresson upon us.

I confess one could hardly credit so surprising a story, as we have been told by some, that there has lain in the *French King's* cabinet, now of a great while, a digested system and plan of operations, which is as constantly in view, as regularly consulted, and steadily followed, as the plan of any private gentleman's policy for beautifying and improving a country seat: and yet, upon reflection, it will appear to be the best solution of the conduct of the *French* nation; for it is impossible that such a train of actions, as has been seen in a long period of time, could have happened, without we suppose not only an aim at universal dominion of some sort or other, but also believe they act upon some general plan, which they are striving to execute by degrees, as the course of things gives them opportunity.

Accordingly, a late writer * has not only said there is such a plan, but has ventured to exhibit it to the public from good authority: and, upon my word, I think we are obliged to him, as it seems to be a most efficacious

* See *Great Britain's true System.*

sternutatory to rouse the inhabitants of this island, from the highest to the lowest, out of their lethargy.

This system, we may presume, *French* policy never intended should be public. And one would naturally think, that the discovery of it should have been a pearl of great price to this country in particular, not only on account of our own interest, but as we have been, and I hope will yet be, the great pillar of human liberty. But so it is (as that author has told us), it was divulged in a treatise said to be wrote by a gentlemen bred under *Colbert*, and given to *Lewis XIV.* in manuscript; but that some-how or other came to be published in the year 1664, which, and no wonder, brought its author under disgrace, and made him actually to be sent to the *Bastille*, and afterwards banished, for suffering the matter to become public: an anecdote we are, it seems, indebted for to a writer of authority of our own country in the year 1680, who mentions the thing in a treatise, intituled, *Britannia Languens.*

The particulars of this system or plan are truly amazing; and they merit not only to be read, but ruminated upon, by every *British* man, who knows the value of his birthright.

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The plan wisely proposes, as the foundation of wealth, a number of useful subjects; and, for providing what is necessary for their support, a great regard to agriculture. — Then great care is to be taken to stock the country with artificers and handicrafts, to manufacture the growth of the country (which naturally increases the quantity of its productions), not only for home consumption, but for export. — This is trade. — Then there must be merchants to carry on this trade. — These, therefore, are to be much encouraged. — Next, out of commerce a fleet is to be raised, which commerce will always support as well as produce: and it will not only protect the commerce out of which it arises, but it will also weaken the Maritime Powers, by obliging them also to keep great fleets for protecting their trade. And a method is laid down for employing this *French* fleet, and for creating work for those of the maritime states. — So much for trade and maritime power.

The system next proceeds to project the increase of dominion; and plans out adding to *France* all the Low Countries, which would make it master of the north seas. — It would be convenient, it says, to have

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Straſburgh, to keep *Germany* quiet — There is need of *Franche Comté*, to lay reſtraints upon the *Switzers* — *Milan* is neceſſary, in reſpect of *Italy* — *Genoa*, to make the *French* King maſter of the *Mediterranean Sea*. — An eye is caſt to *Sicily*, as important for the *Levant* and *Italian* trade. — *Portugal* is looked upon as a perpetual inſtrument for weakening *Spain*. — *Venice* and *Italy* are to be reduced to the *French* intentions by downright force. — The Pope's reſpect is ſuppoſed to be ſecured, becauſe of the county of *Avignon*. — *Holland*, it is ſaid, will keep themſelves to our (the *French*) alliances, as much as poſſibly they may: they are rich: it is expedient the King ſhould interpoſe in their affairs; and that ſome diviſions be ſown amongſt them. — The *Switzers* are mercenary, and will always ſerve the King for his money. — *Denmark*, ſays the projector, is a ſmall ſtate: meaning, its buſineſs would be eaſily done. — The *Swedes*, it was expected, would not break from the intereſt of *France*. — Mark what follows. “ We ought to
“ conſider all the inſtruments, which for
“ our money we may make uſe of, to divert
“ the forces of *England* and *Holland*, when
“ his majeſty makes any enterprize that
“ pleaſes

“ pleases them not.”— The friendship of *Turkey*, it is said, is very good for *France*.
 — And last of all, which is indeed the cap-stone, the scheme speaks of *England*, as easy to be conquered, when the other points should be carried by *France*; for that a war with *France* would ruin her: — and lays it down as a maxim, that no peace should be made with *England*, but upon conditions of the greatest advantage to *France*.
 — And the league with *Holland* should be renewed, and the *Dutch* made to believe, that *France* should give them all the trade still, because they have the knowlege of it, and are proper for it: but that the *French*, as is to be suggested, have no inclination that way; and neither knowlege nor inclination can be forced. They must be told, they are come to the happy time for advancing their affairs, and ruining their competitors (the *English*) in the sovereignty of the northern seas.

These are the great out-lines of this grand system of *France*. But alas! one half is not yet told. The scheme is indeed big with terror: but what shall we say, when we look at the counterpart, and compare events with the project, and consider how

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much of this vastly comprehensive and dangerous scheme is already executed? How may we be alarmed, when we hear that it is advanced more than half-way? Yet I doubt, mortifying as it is, we shall find it is not wide of the mark to say so.

It is a truth that *Britain* knows, by sad experience, to what an amazing height the commerce and naval power of *France*, those inseparable companions, have arrived; which is the first part of the scheme. How successful the wise and skilful measures pursued for attaining that great end have been, their equality with us at sea, and the decline of our trade in some of its most material branches, teach us.

Agriculture, I believe, has done pretty well. But what a rapid progress have not arts and manufactures of all sorts made in *France*, even the most staple manufactures of *England*? In spite of all disadvantages, in point of wool, they have reared a manufacture of cloth that rivals ours; and, without the climate of *Italy*, they have, by uncommon industry in propagating the mulberry, transplanted the growth of silk into the southern parts of *France*, where it is now become a natural production.---And indeed

it is hard to say, what with art added to nature they may not do, as to raising a species of sheep that will equal *England* in wool, so as even to make them independent of the counterband trade of woolling they now carry on with us, very much to our own detriment.

It is almost incredible how, in so short a time, they have extended their trade to every quarter of the globe, the *Levant*, *Africa*, *America*, *East* and *West Indies*. ----- For instance, it is computed, it seems, that instead of thirty, they have, since 1720, come up to three hundred (a very material addition of a cypher) sail of ships annually employed in the *American* trade from *Bourdeaux*:—they have quadrupled the sugar trade, while we have not near doubled it;— and their fur trade is a third more considerable than ours. — In proportion to the extent of their commerce is the strength of the *French* navy, as naturally might be expected.

But have not the other parts of the system advanced with almost an equal pace? If we take a survey of the dominions of *France*, we shall find that their desires have not only been fulfilled, but their wishes in some in-

stances exceeded. *France* has got a slice of country at almost general peace, down from the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* in 1688, to that concluded at the same place in 1748. Are the Low Countries a desirable morsel, said the system? Has not *France* got some large districts of them, and several cities and towns of great importance, such as *Namur*, *Charle-Roi*, *Aeth*, *Douay*, *Tournay*, *Lisle*, and others;—and they were in possession of the whole country at the end of last war, which indeed cost them time, labour, money, and men; but now we see a stranger thing! when we behold the gates of *Bruges* and *Ostend* opened to *French* garrisons, and the *Empress Queen*, their Sovereign, not only admitting them as allies, but peaceably yielding to her new confederate a government, which she may find not so easy to recover from the hands it is got into.

Was *Strasburgh* wanted? *France* has got it, and all the country of which it is the capital, *Alsace*, the most unhappy accession which could be in regard of the Empire, the very bowels of which are laid open by this dismemberment, and a blow given to the protestant religion that was established at *Strasburgh*; and, not to lessen this misfortune,

tune, *Lorraine* is now perpetually annexed to the kingdom of *France*.

Franche Comté the *French* got, according to custom, by the peace of *Nimeguen*, at the expence of the House of *Austria*. As to *Milan*, it is hard to say, if matters remain as at present, how long it may be before they recover the possession they had in it at the time of *Francis* the First. The Empress's voluntarily giving away her right ear, will not hinder them, if they are able, from taking the left also.—*Genoa*, it is true, is yet its own sovereign; but the last war shewed, and I fear this has already taught us, how great and how valuable to *France* is her influence over that little maritime state, by which she procures so convenient supplies of sailors to her own navy: and it looks as if the *French* had a good chance to get *Corfica* to themselves, which with *Minorca*, if they are able, or get leave to keep it, will give them the dominion of the *Mediterranean* seas.

The face of *Italy* has much changed since this strange system was formed; and what power *France* has got there by the settlements of younger branches of the House of *Bourbon*, does, I fear, more than answer the

purpose of having *Sicily* to themselves, as wished for, and ballance the friendship we preserve with the court of *Portugal*, or the indifference that *Venice* shows.

As to the northern powers, we see what influence *French* gold has there.—But for *Holland*, could a prophet have more exactly foretold the event projected by this scheme? —It were expedient, does it say, that the King interposed in their affairs, and that some divisions were sown among them.—The expediency of this measure has been proved by the experiment; for *Holland* is not any more to us, what she formerly was, the faithful friend and ally of *Great Britain*. And, that nothing might be wanting to favour the designs of *France*, the pacific turn, which the *Ottoman Porte* has of late years assumed, seems at present to be rather an advantage than a loss; because, tho' it has left the natural enemies of *France* in possession of an unusual quiet, they are, by that very circumstance, permitted to join their arms with those of *France*, however unnatural the conjunction or mad the combination is which is effected by this new, and hitherto unheard of, alliance.

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Having thus taken a view of this *French* scheme, and of what is much more material, and surely very terrible, the progress of its accomplishment; may we not, with the deepest feelings, recall to mind what is the conclusion, and, we may say, the very *butt* of the system—“*England* is to be conquered:” and, after certain points gained, which have been projected as to other countries, so many of which we see are already brought to pass, it is expected that the conquest would be easy; and that the mortal stroke could be given by a war with *France*, which it is hoped would ruin *England*: And the resolution is, that no peace is to be made with *England*, but upon conditions of the greatest advantage to *France*—A resolution, which, we see, is the very spring of *French* councils: and there is not the smallest prospect of its being departed from, unless from a defect of power to carry it into execution; of which the hopes at present are, alas! but distant.

The effect of one war, and another, with *France*, we have felt since this system was formed; and the latest is too good a proof how well the *Frenchman* could guess: for how near to ruin has it not brought us? But
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if one or even two wars have not done the business, God knows what a third may do; and that we are now engaged in.

Did we obtain a peace when sued for? No: say rather a deceitful truce; and the conditions of it of such a nature as I choose not to mention with, nor will I without, their proper name: but this we may depend upon, if experience can convince us of any thing, that not the *semblance* of peace need we expect from *France*, but on the worst conditions for us that they can give, or that we will accept of.— And a solid and lasting peace I as much look for as the junction of the *Poles*, while *France* continues as she is: and if she becomes yet more powerful, there will be still less chance to see it.

Is all this so (and that it is, I appeal to inflexible truth), and will any man say, that the ballance of power is a mere ideal or imaginary thing? or will any *Englishman* say, that *Britain* is not highly interested in the preservation of it? Is the language with respect to us, the same that was used of old by that antient haughty state, once the mistress of the world, *delenda est Carthago*, or no peace for *England*? Nay, are they in hopes of our destruction? hardly mixed

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with doubts of perfecting it, after the fate of other states has paved the way to it? And can *England* be indifferent to what *France* does, or what is done to any other country? Or can it be denied, that this same ballance of power, on which our own preservation so much depends, is endangered by every commotion that *French* machinations, or arms, are able to raise in *Europe*? Is the great aim of *France* to destroy the ballance of power, and should not all the rest of *Europe* unite to sustain and preserve it?

It is no less ground for wonder, than matter of regret, that so many of the *European* states are empoisoned by *French* influence to go counter to their own evident interest, and tempted or seduced, as it were, to lay hands on themselves, and become the instruments of their own death; which will as surely be the issue of these lingering distempers, the seeds whereof are sent from *Versailles*, as of the most acute or violent disease.

But whatever others are, or whatever they do, we must, and will, if we are ourselves, not only not neglect, but, of all others, regard as the most important, that very object, the Ballance of Power.

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It is too clear not to be seen, how great danger this country is in from the ambitious views of *France*; which are so much the more terrible and alarming, since, as has been observed, they are pursued in a systematical way: nor is it, in my humble apprehension, less demonstrable, how misguided and erroneous a notion that is, which, I don't know how, has crept into the minds of our people, and only of later years, as I shall by and by take notice, That *Britain* can, with safety to herself, be wrapped up in her own natural and internal strength, however great, or be detached from every other part of the world; and particularly that she can, without hazard, lose or renounce all connections with the continent.

It is a doctrine so opposite to any idea I can form of the true system of *English* policy, that I look upon it as little less than a melancholy prelude of our ruin; and cannot dissemble my fears, that it is a weed of foreign importation, sown by the grand enemy, who is always on the watch, and misses no opportunity of doing what tends to promote the great end they have in view; and, among other means, but too successfully uses this of disseminating opinions contrary to
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the true interests of those who embrace them.

Of this there are not wanting instances, both at home and abroad, worthy enough to be attended to, lest we should imbibe the poison.—We see, in our next neighbouring country, how effectually *French* deceit, or something else, hath blinded a people once on a day not remarkable for being short-sighted to their own interests, and thereby carried them off from their natural attachment and connection with us, to the great and unspeakable detriment of the common cause.

That such an opinion, however, has got footing in this country, is certainly too obvious to be doubted and yet how so pernicious a maxim could find a way into the breast of any well-disposed man, capable to exercise the slightest reflexion upon the present state of *Europe*, or compare it with past events, is to me, I own, a mystery.

Let us but think for a moment. Is the conquest of other places, the ruin of other countries, laid down as the great, the necessary, and indeed the sure means of vanquishing *England*? and have we no interest or concern in what passes in the world around

us? Does it import us nothing, whether *Germany* be over-run, and dismembered, and great accessions made to the *French* territories? Branches of the House of *Bourbon* placed as a sort of *French* Viceroy, under the title of Sovereigns, of other, and some of them the most powerful, Kingdoms in *Europe*? Is it a matter of small moment to us, that our sister maritime power *Holland* be destroyed; or, which is much the same thing, be drawn off from the inseparable connection she ought to have with us, and that union, so essential to our mutual security; or that she become a downright province of *France*, retaining nothing but the form of her government, divested of her power, and stript of her barrier? The necessary consequence of which is, that she must be under absolute *French* sway, and subject to the nod of *French* will; as we have formerly seen, now do, and always must see, when *France* is master of the keys of their country.

For goodness sake, where is the difference betwixt these instances of an older date, that have been mentioned, and others, that do now occur! Is it less our business now to withstand the growing power of *France* where

where-ever the storm of her Thunder breaks ; because she has in a course of sixty or seventy years made such vast havock in *Europe* ; laying waste kingdoms and countries at her pleasure ? Is there nothing left for us, but to look on till the devastation seize ourselves ? God forbid !

What then is the meaning of the modern cry, No *German* connections, no business with the Continent, no concern with *Prussia* or *Hanover* ? Is the power of *France* already so much swoln, and must it yet rise higher ? Has she added *Alsace* and *Lorraine* to her dominions, which was like cutting off the skirts of *Germany*, and must she now penetrate to the very heart of the Empire ? Has she dismantled the *Low Countries*, and got possession of a great part of *Flanders* by former wars ? Nay, are not only the gates of the barrier, the defence of which, of old and of late, cost so much blood and treasure, but the very sea-port towns of the *Netherlands* open to her, without stroke of the sword ; and *Holland* itself at her command ? And are we to sleep ? Are *Prussia* and *Hanover* to be the portion of this war ? And what shall be the next destined victim to the Great Monarque's ambition ? Where shall *England*

then be? Shall we alone remain unmoved? Does *France* think that is impossible; and will we yet amuse ourselves with a fond conceit of our own impregnable city? An opinion which, at least, might have been staggered by our late alarms!

The things that I have mentioned are the outworks: the *French* themselves consider them as such. They laid their account, that they must first be done, in order to make *England* an easy prey: and indeed it will be too much so, when once the ballance of power is overthrown. If *France* comes to have a greater force than all *Europe* beside, we must yield our necks to the ignominious yoke. Ought not we then to stand on our defence, when the knife is at our throat; and, if possible, stem the tide, and repel this inundation, that must sooner or later, if not resisted, overwhelm us, after it has, in our helpless fight, swallowed up our friends and neighbours?

I would not once mention the notion that has long prevailed, and which I approve of in a proper limited sense; but doubt has had too great influence to mislead well-meaning people. The sea, it has been constantly cried out, is our bulwark. We are entrenched with water; and, if we keep our force on
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that element, no matter what becomes of the Continent. I forbear, I say, so much as to mention this; because I hold it to be exploded. Late experience having taught us the vanity of that defence, if trusted to alone.

That might do very well when *France* had no naval strength at all; hardly a transport, and never a ship of war to guard an embarkation of forces; and, I might add, not a place in her possession, from which to send them to invade us; as was, in a great measure, the case, while we retained *Dunkirk*, that constant source of terror to us now. But when we see such armaments as have of later years appeared destined for invading this country, and all but—accomplishing the design; our very deliverance owing to the immediate interposition of Providence; old maxims, as to our wooden walls, abate their strength, with change of circumstances, which overcomes opinions, as length of time destroys things.—And were we but to suppose *Ostend* now to be transferred to the *French*, how much more precarious would our safety be thereby rendered?

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Perhaps, indeed, as one extreme commonly succeeds another, we are now apt to go too far the other way: for the *French* king seems, at present, to have no more to do but to march a regiment or two to the coast of *Normandy*, or assemble a parcel of fishing boats upon the opposite side of the Channel, and presently we are in a hubbub! Something like a saying I once heard a great man repeat, of the time when the Court of *Ver-sailles* needed only to white-wash *St. Ger-mains*, and *England* was in terror: but, at least, I take it to be now the general opinion, that the sea, and the fleet of *Great Britain*, great and strong as it is, is not of itself an absolute security.

- It is therefore needless to enlarge on this worn-out topic: I shall only make this one observation, applicable to it—That in proportion as the territories of *France* enlarge, its commerce must increase, and, of course, its naval power grow. This we see by experience; and herein appears the unity of their scheme, which connects all the different parts of it together. Nor need I add, that every addition that the maritime strength of *France* receives, must, in the nature of the thing, be not only a real diminution of ours, but

but is a virtual abatement of its efficacy, considered as a defence to our country: the security whereof depends on our superiority at sea to any other nation, that is disposed to disturb our tranquility; which we are all sensible is the invariable character of *France*.

Hence it becomes necessary to consult other measures for our own safety. I don't say, but it is a good thing, a wise and just precaution, to form a proper militia, for our internal defence; that we may not on any emergency be reduced to the ignoble necessity of calling foreign troops into our bowels; or of being distressed for want of such a mercenary, and I do admit dangerous, assistance.

But even that will not be found sufficient. We must look about us, and prevent mischief while at a distance. We must not wait for the enemy's coming to the door; but meet him, while yet a great way off: for we may talk what we will, but it's the *power* of *France* that is the enemy we have to dread: it is that therefore we must check. Our security cannot lie wholly in our own ability to defend ourselves either by natural, or artificial, and acquired strength. It consists more in the incapacity of *France* to distress or annoy us; and that again depends on the success

cess of her ambitious schemes; which we must consider as aiming at us ultimately where-ever the present scene of execution may be.

This one thing we may be sure of; That *England* is never out of their eye; and even we who now live, may, but our posterity must, feel, that it is a deadly mistake in *British* policy, if we persuade ourselves, that, unless the attack is directly levelled against us, we are not concerned where the sound of war is heard.

Prussia, Hanover, Holland, or any other state in *Europe*; some perhaps are more material, others less; but all are of some and even a great degree of consequence.

Now we hear these are attacked by *France*. Suppose we were next to hear of their being conquered: And does not that affect us? As easily would I believe, if I lived at *Newcastle*, and heard *Berwick* was in possession of an enemy, that I was nevertheless in no hazard.

No doubt *France* would gladly conquer any of those countries, or any other that they have not already, some way or other, got under their influence: But is it only for the sake of the addition that such conquest would make to its territories, that *France* would wish to be

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in possession of them? Will they stop there? No.—This thing, and t'other, are but steps; *Power, Universal Power*, is their view; to be, if not the only, at least the great, the supreme power, that shall give law to *Europe*, is what they aspire at; to be able to send her rescripts from *Versailles*, and her edicts to the ends of the world: in short, to destroy the independency of other states, to lessen their figure, and deprive them of their liberty, and, above all, to crush *England*, is the scheme; for we are the great eyesore, as a poet of our own long ago expressed it, with great strength and beauty, when he said,

*These contending kingdoms, England and France,
Whose very shores look pale
With envy of each other's happiness.*

To us, therefore, it is a matter of the last importance how quick the advances are to this summit of unruly ambition.

Europe is a system, one great body constructed of different parts and members, which make an entire whole; and what preserves the system, sustains its general figure, and maintains its integrity, is nothing but the equilibrium of power; which depends not on one branch, or another, but on the

general constitution, and relation the parts have to one another, and all together. This is the *Ballance of Power*; which, tho' a figurative term, is a just and significant expression.

What gravity or attraction, we are told, is to the system of the universe, *that* the ballance of power is to *Europe*: a thing we cannot just point out to ocular inspection, and see or handle; but which is as real in its existence, and as sensible in its effects, as the weight is in scales. And if we suffer this ballance to be destroyed, or overturned in any remarkable degree, we endanger the whole system, and, by consequence, the safety of every particular branch of it: much more if we allow the power to go all into one hand; which is what the ambition of *France* grasps at, that she may thereby become the absolute mistress of *Europe*.

It is the happiness of later ages, that, by a wise providential distribution of power, and division of dominion, there is established a general independence (that great patron of liberty) in this quarter of the globe; which, for that reason chiefly, if not only, is esteemed the best and happiest part of the world, in spite of its inferiority to other climates,
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where nature is more bountiful in its finest productions; of which, however, by the engine of Commerce, that other intimate friend of liberty, we have enough not to feel our own natural indigence. And they that machinate and contrive to overturn that, I will call it, *divine* constitution, fight against God himself, and are the malignant enemies of mankind.

Yet it is no calumny to say, that such has been the devilish spirit of all the princes or ministers that have governed in *France* since the house of *Valois* was succeeded by that of *Bourbon*, one instance only excepted; I mean, the first King of the last-mentioned family, that great and good prince *Henry* the IVth, who came to the crown a Protestant, and died so, as is recorded to his immortal honour, with the most sacred notions of the ballance of power in *Europe*, and the necessity of preserving it; and was big with a scheme for settling it upon a firm and solid basis, when the hands of an infamous assassin deprived him of his life, and the world of a blessing; at once murdering a King, and extinguishing the last sparks of the love of liberty, public justice, and national faith, that ever dwelt in *French* blood royal; his successors,

down to this day, having either used others as the instruments of their own inclination, or been themselves the tools of able but abandoned servants, to destroy that ballance which is the best cement of society, and the surest band of human happiness.

We should be perfectly satisfied of this, by reflecting on the history of *France*, from the period of *Lewis* the XIIIth's accession; which is little else than the history of one continued war against Liberty and the Protestant religion. He succeeded his father, the good King *Henry* the IVth; and he, or rather his minister, began the work, in which it is evident he proceeded on a general scheme. The destruction of the Protestants, who were at that time a very considerable part of the kingdom, and humbling the Nobility and Princes of the blood, who had hitherto enjoyed great power, and been able, by a proper poize against the power of the crown, to preserve their own and their country's liberty (*France* being before that time little different from ourselves in constitution and government) was one great object: reducing the house of *Austria*, then the known rival of the *Gallic* monarchy, was another: and in both these *Richlieu* succeeded to a
miracle;

miracle; for in this one reign the liberty of *France* was absolutely overthrown, and despotism established, not more to their own misfortune than the terror and confusion of all Christendom, which has sensibly felt the fatal effects of that grievous change in their internal system, as has been judiciously remarked in speculation, and sadly confirmed by experience: so true it is, that one nation cannot undergo any remarkable change in its state without affecting the best concerns of those around them. And, at the same time that this overturn was made at home, the arms of *France* brought the Emperor and *Spain*, which was at that time governed by a branch of the Imperial House of *Austria*, so low, as not to be able to give the smallest check to *French* ambition.

These were the doings of one reign; but, great as they were, they were only the beginnings. The next outdid them much by the advantages of an uncommon length of time which it lasted, and a relief of very great men for ministers, almost perfected the system at home, and was once, to appearance, little short of the same success in what was projected as to foreign affairs; for what did not *Lewis* the XIVth, with a *Mazarine*, a *Colbert*,

bert, and others, do? The very mention of the names is sufficient. *Cætera quis nescit?* Had it not been for the remarkable check Providence gave to the designs of *France* in the latter part of that long reign, after a train of successes in former wars, under the auspices of *Queen Anne*, and by the valour and conduct of that immortal name, which honours a country that ungratefully attempted to disgrace him; who can say what kingdom or country had at this day been in possession of their liberty? Would to God we had done what we could! and it might have been effectual to keep *France* at that low ebb to which she was brought at the conclusion of that war, from a height of greatness that had been the astonishment as well as terror of the world: a change of the situation of *France* so much for the advantage of the general tranquility, that even the inglorious peace, that sullies the annals of that period, could not quite efface that happy effect of its victories.

I wish it were as customary for us to think seriously on the stupendous works of that one reign of *Lewis le Grand*, as he is stiled, as it is to read some memoir or history of its exploits; nobody would then, I am confident, stand up and say, the ballance of
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power was an empty sound, or that *Britain* had no concern with the affairs of the continent. We should all rather be deeply impressed with the proper ideas of an epithet better known fifty years ago, because then more current ; but which is as true now, as it was believed to be at that time, and is of no less importance at this day than half a century ago ; I mean, the name *Lewis* the XIVth bore, during the grand confederacy, as the *Common Enemy* : not the enemy of *England, Holland, Austria*, and so forth, but the common enemy of *Europe* ; yea, of the human species ; which he was with a witness : and so will his successors be, and ought to be esteemed, whatever shape they assume, or in whatever way their enmity appears, whether against this or that country, as circumstances and opportunities invite them, so long as they tread the same path, and act on the old plan ; which we have yet no ground to think they mean to abandon, but, on the contrary, the highest reason to believe it is in prosecution of it, that every commotion we see is raised by *French* influence, and every attack made, whether against *Great Britain, Prussia, Hanover*, or any other power : all are but the means to one end.

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From these considerations, I apprehend, it is indisputably clear, that there is not a worse-founded, nor can there be a more dangerous, opinion for *Englishmen*, than that we have no concern with affairs abroad ; or a more unjust aspersion, than to alledge, that it is for the sake of particular connections, or attachments to any one country, that we interpose in the quarrels that are indeed stirred up on the other side of the channel, but far from being confined, in the extent of their consequences, to what lies beyond that branch of the sea.

That we may, and should, be more or less liberal in our assistance, as it always must be expensive, according to circumstances ; and that it may be more necessary, and even more natural, for us to take a part at one time, and for one country, than another ; I shall be far from disputing ; and therefore, that a certain prudence and discretion ought to govern our continental measures, as they are termed : but I do, with great deference, maintain, that there can be no war kindled abroad by *France*, nor any attack made by that crown upon the most insignificant prince or state, that now enjoys independent sovereignty, which will be absolutely

solutely foreign to our concern, or that we can prudently consider ourselves as indifferent to the issue of the contest, and ought not, if we find it necessary, to interfere either by softer or stronger measures, as the exigency of the case requires.

For, as has been said, it is not merely those who immediately suffer the injury that we are to regard (though no doubt they may touch us nearer, or in a less sensible manner, according as we happen to be directly connected with them by interest, or any other tie); it is *France* itself that we are to keep our eye upon as the common enemy. Their scheme is general, and ours ought not to be limited or confined to any partial views or interest. The struggle with them is for immoderate power; and, opposed to that, we are always to hold general liberty and independency to be the common cause in which all *Europe*, and we ourselves in particular, are most deeply concerned.

It is self-defence on our part against the common aggressor, and the general system is to be attended to. To preserve it intire is the great point; and, as I have endeavoured to shew, that cannot be effected, if particular members of it are not protected and

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defended: we must consider the whole as attacked in the person and property of every single and individual state.

Nor is it ever to be forgot, that in proportion to the stake that the different branches of the system have, they are concerned for the support of the whole, and ought to exert their strength accordingly; from which it will follow, that as we cannot deny but our own share in the stake is the largest, without doubt we ought to take the greatest concern in providing for its security.

England, as has been observed, seems rather to be the great object of *French* ambition. They thrust at us through the sides of others, who must be felled like trees in their way, to come at us effectually; though indeed, to do them justice, they seldom now-a-days kindle a combustion, but we find ourselves immediately, if not first, in the midst of the flame; other projects being used as auxiliary to our overthrow. For, I think, it can admit of little dispute, that, were *England* conquered, *France* would be in a fair way to get the upperhand in *Europe*; and, if they could think of defeating us at once, or in a sort of single combat, other schemes would not be called in to the aid; but, because

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cause we are yet too many for them, they must first add to their own strength by swallowing up or debilitating other states; the effect of which is, that besides the power it throws into the *French* scale, it greatly lessens our own, dries up the sources of our force, and wounds the very sinews of our constitution, our trade and commerce, which wholly depend on our connections with other countries, which connections must fail when those countries fall under *French* power or influence.

I am so much satisfied in my own mind that there is no part of the *French* system or plan, and consequently of their conduct, but what is in some degree interesting to us; that, were it not for the prejudice I know there is against the opinion extended to the length I have already carried it, I would not scruple to go a step farther, as my own conviction inclines me to think, that we are not only concerned when we see *France* invading or attacking other countries, but have reason to pay some regard and attention to what passes within herself.

Repeated instances have proved to us, how considerable an engine it is in the hands of the *French* government to interfere in our

domestic affairs, by the rebellions they have been instrumental in raising and fomenting in this country, which have not wanted influence on the state of *Europe*. And we know, that besides the loss of those unfortunate people (for a loss it is for any country to be drained of its subjects) whom they have abused, by making them tools in their attempts to impose a prince upon us, they never want a considerable body of *British* subjects in their army, by means of a national corps, which they keep up as a trap to seduce poor deluded creatures from their natural allegiance, which shews that nothing is too trifling, or too far out of their way, or of the scheme of their policy, that can in the least hurt us; well knowing how much a nation is weakened by intestine broils, and that it is a high stroke in politics to shed our enemies blood by their own hands.

I would not be understood as if I meant to say, that we should retaliate the vices of the *French* government upon them, which would be contrary to the ingenuity I wish always to see prevail in the principles of *British* independence; but neither do I think that the inhabitants of *France*, so far as they do not themselves forfeit their natural claim

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to it, are excluded from the benefits of that regard to human liberty, which, I trust, will never fail to be a sacred part of our system; and, if assisting their endeavours to recover it, had the smallest tendency to support the common cause, it should appear to me no improper exercise of our inclinations to maintain it.

The fate of kingdoms does, in many respects, depend upon their own conduct, as often appears with wonderful certainty; and perhaps amongst the many surprising circumstances of the present times, there are some peculiar to the state of *France*, which may be justly reckoned not the least considerable, or altogether destitute of a good prospect to the friends of liberty.

We see what diversions are among them; how high the disputes have run between the King and Parliament; how eager the contest is between the ecclesiastic and secular power; and who can say what may be the issue of these things, or what is in the womb of an All-wise Providence? For my own part, as I cannot help reverencing that noble spirit the *French* parliament has shewn of late, like the last groans of expiring liberty, or rather the pangs of a second-birth to it, I would
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almost hope it may produce something in which *Europe* would rejoice.

And here again I would repeat the observation formerly made upon the consequences, we must be sensible the change of the *French* constitution and government has had on all *Europe*. The first part of their scheme against the general liberty, was to bring *France* itself into slavery, which was accomplished by turning a limited monarchy into the most despotic power. This, without entering into particulars, must have produced these visible effects, that it at once corrupted the principles and enlarged the power of the government. The effect of the one is to introduce an insatiable thirst for extension of sway and dominion, not to be found where a spirit of liberty reigns: and the other makes way for attaining it by the command it gives over the subjects property, to lavish it away in boundless attempts to oppress their neighbours.

These are the principles on which my notions of the balance of power are formed, and, consistently with them, I cannot allow myself to doubt of the reality of its existence, or the importance of its preservation;

tion; neither can I imagine it a matter of no moment, or even of small consequence, to us, that any of the powers that now subsists in *Europe*, should be swallowed up by *France*; and particularly whether *Prussia* or *Hanover* fall a sacrifice to the ambitious designs of that restless and turbulent neighbour: and consequently I cannot doubt, but it is our business to give all the help we can to prevent it, and all the countenance and support in our power to spare to the common cause, at the head of which the brave King of *Prussia* has put himself, with an unparalleled greatness of spirit, risking the whole for the whole.

What I have suggested on this subject, leads me to make these general reflections: That a just conception of the balance of power, which I have endeavoured to shew consists in the preservation of every particular state, comprehends a very large and extensive view: that it is the reverse of limited and confined notions: that it destroys all partial regards, and tends to establish a general and diffusive concern for the welfare of mankind: that the friends of it are the friends of liberty; and those who
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would destroy it, the common enemies of mankind: that the nations who consult their own security, must be firmly attached to the preservation of this balance: that, in vain do we imagine it can be maintained without a just regard to our neighbours as well as to ourselves, and to all that are embarked on the same bottom with us: and that a watchful eye should constantly be kept over the counsels of the grand enemy, and the Princes and States dependent upon, or connected with that power.

Hence we see that nothing of a public nature can pass in the most remote corner of *Europe*, foreign to the stability of the general system: more especially that any great revolution or change in the constitution or government of any one country, or its connections with others, and, above all, the political alliances of the several powers as they vary and fluctuate, are inseparably connected with it, and ought therefore to be an object of the strictest attention of all wise and well-disposed councils.

It is grievous to observe it: but the present circumstances of *Europe* afford a strong proof of the great importance of alliances, and the necessity of attending to them. The hereditary

tary opposition and rivalship between the two Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon* has for many ages past been a safeguard to the liberties of *Europe*, the power of these families having hitherto been a pretty equal poise to each other: but we now see a thing that hardly could have been foretold or expected, a confederacy of these two powers; particles, it must be confessed, so heterogeneous, that it is not probable the coalition will subsist long; but the very junction, however short it may prove, is dangerous to the last degree, and the consequences of it we already feel too bitterly not to be alarmed.

Had *France* stood, as she did the last war, separated from, or opposed to, the Empress Queen, the war had been at this day in *Flanders*; and we know how tedious and costly a conquest that is: but now, by having nothing to do on that side but to assume a relinquished possession, and enter gates set wide for her reception, not only is her power turned against *Germany*, but the combined strength of the unforeseen allies is pointed there, and the consequence of this strange event is, that *Holland* is laid open, which ties up her hands, if she were more inclined to move than she seems to be, and

affords somewhat of a plausible pretext for a conduct, which probably was more the cause, than it is in truth the effect, of the bridle they have so quietly submitted to.

This we may be pretty sure of, if past experience can at all help us to foretell futurity, that the Empress Queen has, most unhappily for *Europe*, and for us in particular, as well as in the end it may appear for herself, become the dupe of *French* intrigue; but, as we see the mischievous consequences of the union that subsists for the time, we must perceive the absolute necessity there is for our throwing all the weight we can into the opposite scale. Our great hopes are in the King of *Prussia*, and he may, if properly supported, be able to bring things back to their equilibrium, and to let the Empress feel the folly of her conduct; but if that heroic Prince is not supported, God knows how matters may go.

Some years ago an alarm was taken from an alliance, perhaps new, but not, for aught I can see, so unnatural as was pretended. When the King of *Spain* attacked the Emperor, the quadruple alliance had been formed to prevent a general war being kindled, which it effected; but as the terms were not

to the satisfaction of *Spain*, the congress of *Cambrai* was thought necessary, in order to fix the tranquility of *Europe* on a solid basis: The views of it were, however, disappointed, by a sudden treaty clapt up between the courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, in consequence of a private negotiation. What happened then? The union, it is true, did not long subsist. But did the other great powers look on it with indifference? No. *France* herself joined the Maritime Powers, by the treaty concluded at *Hanover*: the professed view of which was, their common security against, I truly believe, a very imaginary hazard. However, this last-mentioned treaty broke the neck of the other alliance.

The part which *England* took in that affair was indeed censured by some of our greatest statesmen: and that very treaty of *Hanover* was made one of the grounds of accusation against the then Minister. Nor do I take upon me to say it was an unexceptionable measure: for as I have no idea, that *France* ever can be bound by any treaty, to the true interest of *Europe*, I am apt to believe, every alliance or junction of power that offends her, is for the good of the common cause, to which she is the known enemy: and I

'am sure, it is for the particular interest of this country to be on good terms with *Spain*, and that to detach her from any dependence on the court of *Versailles*, has always been understood to be a sound *British* maxim, the pursuit of which ought to go hand in hand with a care to preserve the strength of the House of *Austria*: both for the same end of keeping *France* down.

According to my weak judgment, therefore, *England* had reason to promote a friendship between the Emperor and *Spain*, and to join in the alliance, rather than do any thing to defeat it. But still the conduct of *France* on that occasion affords substantial evidence of the importance of a proper union of strength against her: as any thing like an alliance for that purpose, or the loss of one of her dependent friends, gives her the alarm; and her fears of it ought to be our strongest motives to bring it about.

If the treaty of *Vienna* was so dangerous to *France*, in her own opinion, that it forced her to do a thing very unlike herself; I mean joining with the Maritime Powers; and if the treaty of *Hanover*, by which that of *Vienna* was defeated, was brought about, as loudly said, by *French* influence in our councils;

cils; surely now, when *France* and *Austria* are combined, which, without doubt, is a conjunction as dangerous as uncommon, we are loudly called upon to make the best alliance that possibly we can, for a poise against that monster of power. And this, I think, we shall do, if we pursue the measures I have been arguing for, remain steady to our alliance with the King of *Prussia*, and give him the most powerful support we can. I wish we could bring the Catholic King into action, in concert with his *Sardinian* Majesty, our old and faithful ally. That might produce a very happy diversion upon the side of *Italy*.

Such an instance as that I have just now mentioned clearly shows how real the balance of power is, and what necessity there is to maintain it.

And indeed I might ask, When was the time when it was not regarded, and provided for, by the several powers of *Europe*, taking different measures according to the necessity of circumstances.

It has, however, been sometimes represented as a new conceit, and a start-up notion, and that our attachment to the Continent of late years has been the effect of
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certain particular connections, with which we were formerly unacquainted. That insinuation, doubtless, has had effect upon weak minds, fit to be wrought upon by prejudices:—but a very superficial acquaintance with history should, I think, satisfy any impartial person how groundless that pretence is.

Was it any thing but a regard to the balance of power that occasioned the great war about the *Spanish* succession? the very purpose of which, and of the treaties of partition of the dominions that the last King of *Spain* of the *Austrian* family died in possession of, being to prevent too much power coming into one hand. And all the preceding wars with *Lewis* the XIVth were nothing else than the effect of that Prince's ambitious views, which pushed him on, regardless of all treaties, and of all justice, to attack his neighbours one after another; with no other design, than to increase his own power at their expence: and to prevent which, strong confederacies were always formed against him, being considered as the common enemy.

It was upon these principles (so far are they from being new) that the *English* and
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Dutch, after some time foolishly enough doing the *French* King's work for him, by fighting against one another, made up their idle quarrel, and concluded the triple alliance, *Sweden* making the third contracting party, merely to set bounds for *France*. And when, by the intrigue of the *Duchess* of *Orleans*, who was sent over to *England* on purpose to persuade her brother *Charles* the II. into it, *Lewis* got the triple alliance dissolved, and fell at once upon the *Dutch* in 1672; the *Emperor* and *Spain* took part against *France*, and the *Parliament* of *England* forced the King to assist the *Dutch*, which made an end of the war.

These are instances of *English* measures before the Revolution: so that nothing can be more unjust than to ascribe our conduct, which has since proceeded on the same plan, to any particular connections, either with *Holland* in King *William's* reign, or with *Germany* since the happy accession of the present Royal Family.

It is plain, that it is the true *English* spirit, and the proper plan of *English* government, to take a just share in the affairs of the Continent: and that, so far from being, as has been said, the only people who officiously meddle

meddle where they have no immediate interest of their own, we should be singular of all the powers in *Europe*, if we stood by when these commotions arise.

I have mentioned instances of some the most considerable of them happening; and there are of all of them, at one time or another. Nor can any period, I believe, be pointed out, when *England* acted another part. Even during the Usurpation we sent a fleet into the *Baltick*, with the *Dutch*, on occasion of a quarrel between the *Swedes* and the *Danes*. And the same measure was followed in the end of King *William's* reign, as well as much later, to keep the peace of the North. Such influences, it is justly esteem'd, the lesser and subordinate ballances have upon the general one, that we must not allow even the smaller powers to hurt one another: much less can we be inactive spectators, when the whole system is attacked, as we may be sure is always the case when the common enemy stirs.—Then is there a call to all the friends of liberty, all who wish to be free, to put their hand to their sword.

This doctrine is no novelty. Reason teaches, and experience confirms it. It cannot fail, that

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that whenever one power becomes overgrown, all the rest must dwindle, and be inconsiderable.

The world was for many ages the prey of a succession of monsters of power, which destroyed one another: but while they subsisted severally, like Leviathans, devoured all the smaller Fish. I need not ask, Who would wish to see another *Alexander* rise, or be fond of an universal empire being established, such as last fell with the *Romans*? Who would even like to behold as much power in one family as the Emperor *Charles* the Vth, or his son *Philip* the IId. of *Spain*, possessed? In both of whose reigns the other powers of *Europe* made but a silly figure. *France* would engross universal monarchy or power; but *Europe* must not suffer it. She is already rather too strong, and it is not for the general interest her force should increase. All hands therefore should fall to work, to stem the tide of her ambition.

The tendency of what I have said has been to show, that, out of regard to ourselves, and our own safety, we must, ought, and cannot avoid to interpose; as it is, in truth, but to defend, when or where-ever *France* makes an attack. But there is yet a consideration, which

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I cannot pass over; and I mention it with the greater pleasure as well as confidence, because something like it dropt from the n— L—d who first opposed the motion I referred you to, or was at least for varying it.

His L——p said (and the thing pleased me much), that not only for our own sakes would he be content to do something for the assistance of other powers, but even for humanity's sake, would he dare to suffer somewhat. It was nobly said; like an *Englishman*. It breathed the air of this climate. And indeed I think, independent of the argument that has been urged, this one observation puts the thing in a light that must strike every ingenuous mind.

Providence has made this a great country. We are the first of the Protestant powers; at the head of that glorious, that divine cause; and I hope we shall always boast of being the asserters of human liberty. I trust also, that *England* will never be so little, as not to be able to do something for others, or ever unwilling to lend a helping hand to the oppressed.

We all allow, it is most inconsistent with the character of true greatness for a man to be wrapt up in himself, void of all feeling
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for his own species. And the principles that govern human conduct are much the same in one and in a combination of many men. There is a morality of character in a nation, as well as in a particular person. Every state sustains a certain figure, and bears a certain condition; and, according to its order, and the advantages it enjoys, ought to exert itself in every thing that is, or is allied to, the common and just cause of mankind; which liberty can never cease to be.

Thank God! we stand in so illustrious a rank amongst the powers of *Europe*: and as God has been kind to us, let us be well disposed towards our brethren, mankind, and never turn our eye from the distressed, or oppressed.

We did well, and like ourselves, when we sent a national relief to *Portugal*, as other countries too did, on occasion of the late terrible catastrophe of that kingdom. I hope it proceeded not barely from an interested view, on account of the commercial connections that subsist betwixt the two nations; but rather that a pure moral principle was the spring of our munificence; and the same principle is equally operative in other things. Liberty is more valuable than life: and, if we would

succour the one, we ought to vindicate and support the other.

I have not the smallest doubt that it is our duty to act on the principles of universal benevolence in a national and political as well as in a private capacity; and that, as a nation, we are accountable for our conduct, and the use we make of national advantages, not only in respect of ourselves, but of other nations, as much as each individual is accountable for his own behaviour; with this acknowledged difference, because it is a necessary one, that the present only can be the state of retribution to communities. There is a mutual relation between nation and nation, as there is between person and person; and a certain duty arising from it in the one as well as the other's case: and, as I am persuaded *England* has its national character no less than other countries, I hope we shall always maintain it with honour, for public justice and faith, and a firm attachment to the cause of liberty; and that wherever it is invaded, we shall not think it a foreign quarrel.

Nor ought Religion to be quite forgot in this question. The season of holy wars is over; and there is not, perhaps, true religion
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enough to be found in the bulk of men to animate them to fight for it; but there is so much of temporal interest connected with the name of religion, that it is far from having lost its influence. We know the fury that the Popish faith inspires; and, whatever else we may be, I hope it is a small part of us that are not enemies to it, and would be sorry to see it gain ground, as we cannot but be sensible it carries along with it a tyranny over the most sacred and unalienable rights of mankind.

But we see with what zeal Popery is kept up and propagated; what pains are taken to debauch Protestant princes from their professed faith; and we also see the consequence these things have on the Protestant interest: nor can we be blind to the effect that any addition to the Popish, or diminution of the Protestant interest in *Europe*, has upon the general cause of liberty.

Slavery is the right-hand attendant of Popery, and persecution for conscience sake its inseparable companion: the two greatest curses that can befall mankind. Therefore it was that, in the beginning of this letter, I expressed my hopes, that the preservation of a *Protestant Power* would be a thing this country would have at heart.

The Protestant religion has not the advantage of that unhallowed fire, on the wings of which the other spreads: but, for God's sake! let it not lose ground, so far as we can possibly prevent it: let not us, who have the honour to be the greatest Protestant power, lose or renounce the glorious character of being the Defender of the true Christian faith: a title which adds lustre to the *British* crown.

A n—c L—d did, with great propriety, take notice of the fatal blunder of *James I.* who would not, even when his parliament pressed him, assist the poor Protestants of *Bohemia*; and his own son-in-law the Elector *Palatine*, whom they had chosen for their King, and the vindicator of their liberty. It is well known how unfavoury the memory of that Prince continues to this day on that account: and I doubt if any so good reason can be assigned for his ill-judged and unnatural conduct, as his own too great attachment to superstition, and the heart-love he had of arbitrary power.

But let not our posterity curse us; nor let us expose ourselves to the hazard that, in the nature of the thing, a weakening of the Protestant interest abroad, threatens our liberty and religion at home; as destroying the balance

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lance of power shakes the security of our possession of both these valuable blessings; nor let us provoke the Divine judgments by deserting the good cause.

The cause of Liberty, and of the Protestant Religion, is the cause of God himself: and as he can reward those that fight for it, so can he severely chastise those that do it not: and he has denounced an awful curse, which stands upon authentic record, against them who come not out to battle against his enemies.

The instance just now referred to has a striking influence this way. The posterity of that forlorn Princess, who got the title of Queen, and shared with her illustrious consort the loss of his original dignity and hereditary dominions, for espousing the cause of liberty and religion, we now, blessed be God for it! see elevated to the throne of these kingdoms; while the first branch of the descendents of her father, who with cruelty refused to assist her, is justly expelled from the crown by a forfeiture, whereof he himself sowed the first seeds, in those principles of despotism which he transmitted to them.

It is evident that the King of *Prussia* has now put himself at the head of what I will
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beg leave to call the Protestant Cause and the Cause of Liberty. The great Powers against him are the strength of the Popish interest: bigotry and tyranny are the characters of the house of *Bourbon*; and in these, as well as power, has the family of *Austria* been their constant rival. On the contest now begun, I think, hangs the fate of the Protestant interest, and of Liberty (for I cannot separate them), to be determined by the issue, whether it shall sink or swim. His *Prussian* Majesty has staked not only his crown, but his Electoral principality; *Hanover* and *Hesse Cassel* are the next most considerable Protestant Princes in the Empire; and they all depend on the same events. Should we then, I again ask it, hesitate to interpose, with all the vigour we can, in support of them?

These are general, but I think important, considerations, which I have taken the liberty to mention: and to myself they appear founded in the true notions of the system of *Europe*, and of the dependence of particulars on the preservation of the whole, and the close connection there is between the cause of Liberty and the Protestant Religion: and, for my own part, I cannot but think they are sufficient, were there no other more particu-

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lar reasons or arguments for these our allies, and both our duty and our interest in them.

But neither are there any reasons arising from the particular connections which subsist between this country and the Kingdoms of *Prussia* and *Hanover*.

It may be laid down as a general principle, that the interests of no dispute, that the interests of commerce are the vitals of a country, and that we have in lieu of a *Mexico* a *Prussia* interest, and consequently that it is the duty of our government, to give the support to whatever is connected with the interest of the nation.

Such connections between this country and the Kingdoms of the Elector of *Hanover* and *Prussia*, will not be denied, and they are of great importance to our commerce; insomuch that they have been made a subject of inquiry, and the connections, particularly with the Kingdoms, might be improved to the advantage of this country: and for my own part, I was willing to support them for this reason; That

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lar reasons or arguments to stir up our zeal for these our allies, and to convince us it is both our duty and our interest to support them.



But neither are there wanting those motives of a more private and interesting nature, arising from the particular connections that subsist between this country and the dominions of *Prussia* and *Hanover*.

It may be laid down as a position that admits of no dispute, That as trade and commerce are the vitals of our state, all that we have in lieu of a *Mexico* and *Peru*, it is our interest, and consequently the duty of our government, to give the greatest attention to whatever is connected with the commercial interest of the nation. And that there are such connections betwixt us and the dominions of the Elector of *Hanover*, and the King of *Prussia*, will not be denied; and that they are of great importance to the *British* commerce; infomuch that it has of late been made a subject of inquiry, how far these connections, particularly with the *Hanoverian* dominions, might be improved to the advantage of this country: an inquiry, to which, I own, I was willing to listen with attention for this reason; That nothing has given me





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greater concern than the apprehension which is too prevailing not to be observed, that these dominions are a drawback and dead weight upon *Great Britain*: and all the friends of the King, at least, would certainly wish, that there were no foundation for such an opinion; and that, if it can be done, it were demonstrated to the satisfaction of the people, as we must be sensible what a perpetual ground for murmuring this is.

I am far from saying, that *Great Britain* has not a just title to expect that her own interests are not to be sacrificed or neglected for the sake of any separate or independent estate possessed by its Sovereign: at the same time I cannot dissemble, that I think we are too apt to be uneasy, and more forward to vent our disquiet, upon account of the *German* dominions, than is fit; and sometimes in a manner that, to me, seems hardly consistent with the respect we owe his Majesty.

The case plainly is, that the necessity of our own situation made us call the family of *Hanover* to the throne of these kingdoms, as the only means the nation could see of continuing our security against Popery, Tyranny, and Arbitrary Power, from which we had
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been happily delivered by the Revolution: and, as it would have been vain to expect, and, I think, foolish to ask, the family to abdicate its own proper patrimony even for the crown of *Great Britain*, the attaining of which no good prince, or any wise man, will consider in any other view than that of accepting a trust, and a very troublesome one, without any real profit, for our protection, and the preservation of our happy constitution.

For however good the title of his Majesty and his illustrious house to the crown is (and I believe it to be the best in the world), the free grant of the people, those for whose benefit government is bestowed, and with whom I have no doubt the only real right to confer it is lodged, and from whose consent the power to exercise it only flows; a title that, I am also confident, no length of time will derogate from, but the latest ages see confirmed by the growing affection of a happy and perhaps a wiser people: yet I must acknowledge there is some difference to be made between the tenure by which his Majesty holds what may be called his own dominions, in contradistinction to the crown of *Great Britain*: and it would be hard to cut off that retreat which they afford, were the remotest chance of a

change in our government to be supposed ; nor can I see any right we have to do it, and consequently no reason to grudge that it is not done ; since it was no part of the original compact, or of the terms upon which the crown of *Great Britain* was given and accepted ; which now makes it impossible that there can be a separation between the different dominions, so long at least as matters continue upon the footing we certainly wish they should : nay, I can freely go a step farther ; for I own, whatever may be commonly thought and said, as the thing appears to me, it was *We*, and not the family of *Hanover*, who received the favour, when they were called to this government ; and therefore I think there is a certain piece of justice in this, that we should not complain too heavily of any burden, if such be the case, that our near connection with that family may have brought upon us ; providing always that it be not, by misconduct of any kind, upon whomsoever chargeable, rendered more grievous than in the nature and necessity of the thing it should ; of which, whenever I observe it, I shall for one not be the last to complain.

But tho' these are my own sentiments, in respect

respect of this matter, yet still, as I said, I should be pleased to see the thing upon a footing that would give universal satisfaction; which doubtless would be the effect of shewing, that our connections with *Hanover* might, by a proper care and cultivation, be made advantageous rather than hurtful to us: and therefore I was happy to find any attempt made to point that out, and, to say the truth, as I had entertained some such prepossession before, I am glad to see, at least, sufficient reason against being violent in the opposite extreme.

At any rate certain it is, that the disadvantages of *Hanover* are not in the commercial way; the connections of trade with that country, and the places belonging to it, being not only favourable, but valuable, to us; which is what I meant to mention as an interesting motive of obligation, upon our own account, to support and protect the *German* dominions of our King.

Germany is one of the great markets for *English* manufactures and commodities; and one part at least of the value of *Holland* to us is, that the *Dutch* merchants take great quantities of goods from this country, not only for their own consumption, but to send up
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to *Flanders* and *Germany*, where there is a large opening, and in all the great fairs of which, vast quantities of *English* goods are always to be found (it is so yet, though perhaps not so much as has been formerly, for a reason I shall hereafter mention; and this is done by the communication *Holland* has with *Germany* by the *Rhine*.

But then there is also an opening into *Germany* on the other side, by means of these great rivers, the *Aller*, *Weser*, and *Elbe*, of all which the Elector of *Hanover* is now master, and by which we possessed a very considerable branch of trade, even before the accession of the duchies of *Bremen* and *Verden* to the Elector of *Hanover*; which acquisitions have not a little added to the advantages of it, as was foreseen by the *British* parliament, when they wisely enough, though that also was made the subject of clamour, contributed towards making the purchase.

The *Elbe* itself runs above 500 miles thro' *Bohemia*, *Saxony*, *Brandenburgh*, and the rest of *Germany*; and the *Weser* more than 250 through the countries of *Hesse*, *Westphalia*, and others of the Empire; and by these streams the woollen, and other manufac-
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tures of *England* are conveyed, and likewise the growths of our *American* plantations.

It would be needless here to enter upon particular computations of the extent of this branch of our commerce, which I must myself take upon the credit of others more conversant in that science: but I imagine it will be admitted by every one that knows any thing of the matter, to be very considerable.

It is also said, and not altogether without ground, that the friendship of the Elector of *Hanover*, which may certainly be depended upon, gives an additional security to the continuance of our trade to *Hamburgh*, which is another great article of our commerce, and a source of much wealth, which centers in this kingdom by the retreat of our *Hamburgh* merchants after they have made their fortunes.

It is well known of what value and importance the *British* factory residing in that great trading city is, which has a settlement peculiar to itself, and makes no small figure in that commonwealth. *Hamburgh* is to *Germany* what *Amsterdam* is to *Europe*, a magazine of the merchandizes of
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the trading world; and the *English* manufactures have no inferior place in the collection, and are from thence issued, so far as they do not go directly from *England*, up the *Weser* and the *Elbe*, or pass by the way of *Holland*, into *Germany*. Nor is it any real loss that they circulate through *Hamburg*, as it is our own subjects settled there who have the benefit of this mediation of commerce, and who have also in their hands a great part of the trade carried on from that place to *Russia* and *Livonia*, and other parts of the world, such as *Spain*, *Portugal*, the *Mediterranean*, &c.

The concern which the Elector of *Hanover* has in this matter, so far as is valuable to us, arises from the command he has of the navigation to and from *Hamburg*, by means of his own city of *Stade*, which lies on the *Elbe* below *Hamburg*, of *Brunhausen* at the mouth of the *Schwing*, and of *Lawenburgh* upon the *Elbe*, above *Hamburg*. *Stade* itself once enjoyed that very commerce which is now in the possession of *Hamburg*, and might very probably be able, by the encouragement its Prince could give it, to recover it again, if any trouble from *Hamburg* made it necessary for the *British* merchants to

change their residence; who would at least carry with them some of the trade, for *Stade* has all natural advantages equal, and some superior, to *Hamburg*; and *Harburg*, which is another port belonging to the Elector of *Hanover*, lying almost opposite to *Hamburg*, on the river *Lotze*, and very little inferior to it, might be made to answer the same purpose: but these towns are of use at present both to the trade of *Hamburg*, and that carried on directly from *England* by the *Elbe*, nor is it desirable for us to see a necessity for the experiment of any variation in that matter *.

I do not, therefore, think it can well be said, that dominions so connected with us in trade, ought to be neglected, as it should seem the protection of them is the defence of our own interest.

The King of *Prussia* has a good title of the same kind to our support. The chanel of the trade which our merchants carry on from *Hamburg* to *Poland*, and the north part of the Empire is the rivers *Oder* and the *Spree*, which fall into the *Elbe* in the Marquisate of *Brandenburg*, and is so far under his power: and his Majesty now

* *Pofflethwait* has treated at large on this subject.

has, by *Prussia* on the one hand, and *Gueldres* on the other, a free communication with the sea, which he can turn to the advantage of any trading state in friendship with him.

Let us then but reflect whether it can be a matter of indifference to us to abandon or retain such avenues of commerce: for it must hold as an undoubted maxim, that if we would preserve our trade, we must keep our customers, and, in order to that, we must protect and defend them when necessary; and, I believe, it will be admitted, that we should not have this trade with the same advantages that at present we may reasonably expect, and, in some sort I may be allowed to say, command, if these territories, on which it depends, were not in the hands of their present Sovereigns: perhaps we should lose it altogether, were they to come into the possession of an enemy of this nation.

We depended a good deal more than we would wish to do for a valuable branch of commerce, on *Sweden*, when that crown had *Bremen* and *Verden*: but if we were to suppose *France* to snatch them, as she would be glad to do, where should we be? That the trade would be lost to us, is the least part of the consequence of such a change; for

it would be gained to *France*, which is of much greater moment to us and to *Europe*, considering the additional weight of power which such an acquisition of territory and commerce would throw into the scale of *France*, at the expence of the friends of liberty, and the Protestant religion.

We regret, and justly, the loss of *Minorca*, and should have the like reason to be alarmed at any hazard of *Gibraltar*, because the preservation and security of our *Italian*, *Turky*, and *Levant* trade, depends so much upon the possession of those places; and, upon considerations of the same sort, ought we to be concerned for the electoral dominions of *Hanover*, and those of the King of *Prussia*.

Nobody denies the importance of the connection between this country and *Holland*. Formerly it was the mutual opinion of both nations, that we were bound by interest to support each other: and, whatever may be the case of the *Dutch*, I believe that still continues to be our sense of the matter; and one part of the reason, as has already been taken notice of, is the advantage we reap by *Holland*, as one of the chanel of our trade with the Continent. This we also see is the case as to *Hanover* and *Prussia*, and therefore

the argument is equally conclusive with regard to them.

But the other view, which has also been hinted at, is of no less moment, in which our interest in the preservation of *Holland*, and *Hanover* and *Prussia*, lies, I mean the defence of our religion and liberty. These have always connected us with *Holland* as well as our trade does. I am sorry that the latter has, by the woeful connections that have now too long subsisted between *Holland* and *France*, not only been diminished (for I fear *France* has wrested a great part of the *Dutch* trade from us) but has also, to appearance, lost its political influence, and perhaps been used against us by jealousies arising from a supposed rivalship, which, however, might, with due care and attention, possibly be removed. But our religion and liberty must, if reason does not altogether depart from *Dutchmen*, or their profession of religion change, be a tie, the strength of which should appear; and here there is no jealousy, nor any place for rivalling one another. And I apprehend the same thing ought to be a bond of union betwixt us and those Protestant states of *Germany*, *Prussia* and *Hanover*.

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I will not pretend to enter on the consideration of many things that have been very ingeniously suggested by sensible men, how far these countries might be, and how far it is our interest they were, raised to a greater degree of power than they yet possess, and even be made maritime states; or how such a project might be conciliated to the mind of the *English* nation, who would naturally enough be alarmed with it at first view: but this I may venture to say, that *Prussia* and *Hanover* are the natural allies of *Great Britain*, and that it were rather to be wished these countries had more power, even maritime, than that the power of *France* should increase.

Were we and they properly united, it is hard to say what influence it might have on the other northern powers. Without the spirit of prophecy we may guess, that there would be a greater probability of getting and keeping those courts attached to our interest, rather than to the court of *France*, which has for a great while held some of them in chains of very mean dependence, contrary to their own true interest, as well as that of *Europe*, and to see them more steady to the common cause, in spite of the influence

influence of the enemies thereof. And certainly if such a connection and alliance could be formed, not on temporary considerations of present gain, but on the solid basis of a real union and reciprocation of interest, we might hope it would go farther to humble the House of *Bourbon*, than any other design we have yet seen, or at present expect.

But all I now plead for is, not to let us lose any of the strength of the Protestant interest, and cause of Liberty, especially not to suffer the enemy, already overgrown in power, to increase her strength by fresh spoils; but to defend and protect those who are now attacked, in hopes of being hereafter able to make them of greater use, and more importance, by constituting a firm league and coalition of force, that may prove a real bulwark to Liberty, and the security of the Protestant religion.

And, while we are sometimes complaining of want of allies, and that too great a share of the burden lies on us, complaints for which I do not say there is no reason, let us not lose, or throw away, good allies, those that are natural, and in whom we have some ground of trust; but let us succour and support them; that others may be encouraged to
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join the confederacy. Union makes strength, and strength produces more strength;— power procures accessions to itself; many who otherways would not, nay, who for convenience sake would, even against their inclination, take the opposite side, will rather join the just cause, when they have that prospect of safety, which the strength of a good, well-concerted, and firm alliance gives.

Thus have I considered the ties of interest both of a general and more particular nature, which, in my humble apprehension, do, and ought to engage us to a zealous and hearty support of the King of *Prussia* and Electorate of *Hanover*. But, were I addressing myself to an assembly of *Britons*, when I should think I talked to brave and noble minds, I should hope generous and disinterested motives would be stronger with the people of *England*, upon whose approbation depends the efficacy of the resolutions of the *British* senate: for, I trust, the sentiments of ingenuity are native with *Englishmen*, whose birthright it is to be free-born. Let me therefore beg your attention to one thing more, which, I own, carries with it, in my opinion, an irresistible force in considering this matter.

We

Great Britain is now engaged in a war with *France*. This war, I have endeavoured to show, is truly a *British* war, begun on *British* principles, and for the sake of *Britain*. Not for its lesser interests or concerns neither, but for its essential and most valuable rights.

I ask now, abstractedly from the consideration of that real interest, which I have submitted, if we have not as a part, and a great part, of the general Community of *Europe*, and as head of the Protestant religion and cause of Liberty, an interest in every commotion that is stirred by *French* schemes and politicks in this quarter of the globe, independent of that interest, which strikes too, as I have endeavoured to show, at the very root of our being, as a great and free nation? We are now fighting with *France* for the most valuable possessions we have, our colonies and settlements in *America*; for the dominion of the sea; for our trade and commerce, which are the sources of the figure the *British* empire makes in the world.

The cause of the war, you will grant me, is to defend against encroachments upon our undoubted rights and property as a nation; to resist the attempts of the *French* government

ment to possess themselves of territories to which they have no just claim; to repel invasions on our own dominions, and frustrate devices for adding to theirs, in a manner, and to an extent, absolutely inconsistent with the security, and destructive of the value of the establishment we enjoy in the western part of the world. And when we began this war, (or rather to defend against *France*, which had begun it,) in a way I will maintain was no less justifiable than necessary, highly consistent with the law of nations, I mean by reprisals, though no publick declaration of war was made, was not all *Europe* at peace, except the common enemy? Was there the least disturbance abroad? Indeed we see what combustible materials the system of *Europe*, or the powers that compose it, are made up of: How soon they can be set on fire! *French* policy can easily throw in the squib, and presently all *Europe* is in a flame: but what was the cause or occasion of all the quarrels we now see? Was it not the war begun betwixt *England* and *France*?

Would the *Empress* have thought of attacking *Prussia* without a *French* alliance? Would *France* have dreamed of an union with its natural old and inveterate enemy,

its perpetual rival, the House of *Austria*, on any other consideration than to disconcert the measures, and distress the government, of *Britain*?

Is there any body foolish enough to believe it is out of regard to the Empress-Queen that *France* has joined in a league with her, and buoys her up (for I doubt if there be any such intention in the Court of *Versailles*) with the hopes of recovering *Silesia*, to which I am sure the House of *Austria* has not a better, if so good a title, as to those parts of her ancient possessions which the Crown of *France* has at different times wrested from her, and now retains, to the much greater detriment of *Europe*, and danger of the ballance of power? No. I dare say nobody entertains any such notions. But the thing does not rest upon arguments and suppositions. Are not we all sensible that the happy turn, as we esteemed it, and as it really was, which we got the Councils of *Europe* to take, produced this strange and unexpected conjunction abroad.

Wisely, I do say, (for it is a just tribute to give praise where it is due) did our Ministry, whoever they were, foresee, that no sooner should we break with *France*, than she, in
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her ordinary way, would set to work to raise a flame in *Europe*, to kindle up a general war on the Continent; being fully acquainted with the good effect of such policy in former disputes with us. Infomuch that now-a-days we may be as sure, as we declare war with *France*, the fire shall immediately break out abroad: foreseeing this, I say, our Ministry began with forming such connections on the Continent, as were absolutely necessary, and well calculated to prevent the bad effects of *French* schemes there.

Sensible of the error of last war in that respect, the Administration was desirous effectually to take off the King of *Prussia* from his alliance with *France*, which then had such pernicious consequences, and to bring him to the side that was more natural for him.

To secure this great point, and to prevent the mischiefs that it was once before brought to remedy; we began this time with a *Russian* treaty; and like a charm it wrought; for immediately after, an alliance was concluded with the King of *Prussia*: in making which, the conduct of those then at the helm must be approved, who gave up trifles, and yielded smaller matters, which, had they been ten times more, it was wisdom not to insist on,

for the sake of procuring so necessary and so useful an ally.

So far we were lucky; that if it was with reason objected to our former conduct, that we had been guilty of some errors in the first concoction, which alienated the King of *Prussia* from us, now that blunder was redressed, and it was a great stroke in politicks, have the praise who will. It was matter of joy to compass that point, to bring the King of *Prussia* off from *France*, and unite him to the Protestant, which to be sure is his natural interest; and which, I dare say, he at no time wanted inclination to support: for Religion, though not so forcible a motive as it has been, has yet its own effect; even where we do not look for the greatest share of its intrinsic virtue. Protestant and Papist, Bigot and Heretick, are terms of importance yet in the world. Persecution, and Liberty of Conscience, are considerations that must operate on the minds of men, and will, even with Princes, be their indifference to serious piety never so great.

This then was done; an alliance effectuated with the King of *Prussia*: and I dare say nobody could have imagined that the Empress-Queen was to forsake us. It would
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have been strange to suppose (though now we see it), that a family, for which we had so lately lavished our blood and treasure, to protect her against *France*, should now take part with her own enemy against us, when our wounds in her cause were yet so fresh, that we have hardly strength left to defend ourselves. I hope this same conduct of our old ally, which was never to have been suspected, now that it has appeared, may be a lesson to us; for it may teach us the value of popish faith.

However, so it is in fact, that not only did *France*, when she saw she had lost the King of *Prussia*, attempt, but which is more wonderful, she has succeeded in persuading the Empress Queen, which it could hardly have been thought any motives, promises, or professions, could have done, that it was her interest to take that side; which, in the end, she may repent, when she perceives the delusion, by failing, even with the powerful assistance she has trusted to, to attain what she is in quest of.

And is it not owing to the same intrigue, and from the same source, that the change we perceive in the sentiments of the *Russian* court proceeds? I am hopeful we shall not
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feel much bad effect from the lukewarmness, or, if it should so happen, the unfriendly measures of that northern Princess*: but certain it is, if it was the *Russian* treaty that produced the *Prussian* alliance, it has been the latter that changed the views of the court of *Petersburgh*; and for a plain reason I need not mention.

That power wishes to have an influence in the nearer part of *Europe*; the road to which was, till very lately, to them an untrodden path; and to secure a prospect of some profit to itself from the occasional necessities of the more southern states.

Now taking all these things together, is it not plain, that the King of *Prussia* at present suffers in the *British* quarrel? He had no motive or occasion to enter into a war himself. Nobody can find fault with any thing he wanted, or had in view to obtain: but, no sooner does he enter into an engagement with us, than, by the intrigues of *France*, and in hopes of her support promised and accordingly granted, and doubtless also on the faith of *Russian* aid, *Prussia* is pointed out as the bait, and devoted as the

* The court of *Petersburgh* had not openly declared itself, when this was wrote.

sacrifice, to entice the Empress Queen to attack him, with the assistance of her old friend the Elector of *Saxony*, King of *Poland*; who, it seems, had not so easily forgot what he suffered last war, as he neglected to remember what was the cause of it, and in whose quarrel it was that he was then almost destroyed.

And is not the conclusion obvious, that we ought, that we are bound to the utmost of our power to support the King of *Prussia*; and make good the engagements to which we caused him to trust? He is involved in a war, for no other reason, but that, instead of being against us, he agreed to be with us: and suffer what he will, it is on our account. If therefore we permit him to be sacrificed, especially so recently after we, with profusion, assisted that family, never so naturally connected with us, and whose principles and interest are no ways so co-incident with ours, I think we should incur the censure both of folly and ingratitude, as well as want of faith; we shall do what is absolutely wrong in itself, and what will in the end take its own revenge; as it cannot be, that the King of *Prussia* should suffer, and we and the common cause, which we ought to have
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at heart, receive no hurt : not to say, that if we desert him, it may provoke, and even force him to a measure, which another Power, notwithstanding all that has happened, will be ready enough to fall in with ; but which *Europe* in general, and this country in particular, would, if I mistake not, have sad cause to lament.

Good faith to allies has always been a maxim of every wise government. By this the *Romans* made their alliance be esteemed the greatest privilege or advantage that any state could attain ; and they shewed the same resentment for injuries done their allies as themselves. Therefore it is that *Cicero*, with reason, says, That *Rome* became the mistress of the world by defending her confederates. And that great orator *Reetsons* places indifference to oppression, where-ever exercised, and abandoning confederates, among the vices universally confessed to be the most odious. His words are : “ Those
 “ who make no resistance against, or oppo-
 “ sition to an injury, when they have it in
 “ their power, are equally guilty with those
 “ who abandon their Parents, their Country,
 “ or their Confederates.”

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After saying so much in regard to *Prussia*, let me add but a word in the same view as to *Hanover*. And I call upon the man that can tell me, what quarrel *France* has with that Principality, or what pretence she has to distress it, if it is not that the King of *England* is its Sovereign? A reason is hardly alleged: but it is imagined, and very justly, that it will distress us, if *Hanover* is attacked; because, upon the principles of our known honour, as well as for our interest, we must defend it: so that the thrust is truly at us, tho' the attack be on *Hanover*.

But, alas! is that really the case, and are we not bound by ties of the most sacred nature to take the part I am arguing for? Is an injury done them on our account; and shall we not resent it? Nay, more; Is *Hanover* attacked because *Hanoverians* came here for our internal defence and security against a *French* invasion; and is that plea of no force for our protection against the ravages threatened in revenge for the seasonable assistance afforded us?

Or is *Hanover* attacked for fear it should be of any use to the King of *Prussia*? on whom, it is too evident not to be discerned by the *French*, depends the fate of all their schemes on the continent; as, if he is de-

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stroyed, all goes with them to their wish; whereas, if he stand his ground, they fail of their attempt. And still in that view, is it not our duty as well as our interest to defend *Hanover*? We hear, and we have no reason to doubt it, that *France* has offered the King a neutrality for his Electoral dominions, on condition his Majesty, in quality of Elector, does not take part in the war in *Germany*; but that his Majesty has, with all the tempting circumstances of the offer, rejected it as inglorious*. He will not forsake the King of *Prussia*, after involving him in the war: he will not sit quiet, and see his natural ally suffer on his account, or on account of this country; nor will he permit such a stroke to be given to the Protestant interest abroad, as a blow to the King of *Prussia* would be; at least so far as his assistance can prevent it.

The King of *Prussia* has risked all he has: his very crown, as I have said, he has staked for that cause, which I have so often, and yet I cannot too much repeat it, called the cause of Liberty, and of the Protestant Religion: and the King of *Great Britain*, as Elector of *Hanover*, bravely resolves to stand and fall

* The E. of H——s, S——y of St——e, declared so in the H——e of L——s.

with

with his Protestant and natural ally: and they will, I hope, together, be the support of the good cause. But the consequences, in the mean time, we see are, that the Electorate of *Hanover* is now in the jaws of the lion; a great army ready to pour in upon them; which, I think, calls upon us, by every tie of ingenuity and interest, to interpose with our most powerful assistance.

I am far from saying, that *Hanover's* own proper strength should not be exerted; because I have no notion that its Sovereign can think of sparing any means in his own power: the best prospect he can have of assistance from us cannot tempt him to so absurd a conduct. To me it is impossible to conceive, that any Prince, much less so wise a one as we know his Majesty is (not to avail myself of the goodness of his inclinations, which is equally incontestible), will suffer his dominions to be destroyed, when he has it in his power to save or secure them: and therefore, not doubting but his Majesty will do the utmost that his strength admits of in his Electoral capacity, we ought to do all we can to prevent his country's suffering from any resolution taken by its Prince out of regard to us and our interest.

I cannot help mentioning, on this occasion, a rule which we must allow to be binding, because it is of eternal obligation; I mean, the great golden rule of *doing as we would be done by*; and I the rather mention it, because I have already, in the course of the argument, said, that nations have a moral character, and are under moral obligations, as well as private persons: and the influence of this rule we shall easily discover, if we apply it to the present case.

We have often heard the common topic of popular clamour, *Hanover, Germany*, and the Continent; that this country is sacrificed to *German* connections; and, in short, that all our continental schemes and operations are only for the sake of *Hanover*.

I have endeavoured to shew a real and radical connection between this country and the affairs of the continent; and that the true *British* system, more especially when compared with that which *France* steadily pursues, necessarily obliges us to interfere in them: that such was the system, and the rational and wise conduct of *Britain*, long before we had any connection with *Hanover*; and that our own essential and valuable interest required it should be so. I have also taken the liberty to maintain, that regarding
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Hanover merely as an ally, a Protestant ally, and one with which we are connected in the way of national interest, she is intitled to our assistance and connection; and I will once more repeat, that I conceive nothing more unworthy the notion that the true spirit of *British* government inspires, than that base idea, that we ought, if we could with safety to ourselves (which never can be the case), to be wrapt up in a selfish indifference to the rest of the world, the Christian and Protestant world; and that, I trust in God, however gloomy our present prospects may seem, this country will never be so far reduced, as not be to able to give effectual assistance to those that need it, especially our friends. Were we as wise as we should be, this nation might yet hold the ballance in her own hands, as she has done heretofore, when, *Neptune*-like, she shook her trident, and the kingdoms trembled. Such, from the advantageous circumstances that nature and commerce have placed us in, ought to be our character in *Europe*, our friends to revere and trust us, and our enemies to be afraid of us.

But I mean not now to insist any more on these considerations, which are fit to operate

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on noble and generous minds, and to inflame the sparks of *British* dignity that should be found within our breasts. I was going to say, that, in strict justice, and by the strongest ties of moral equity, we are as much bound to assist *Hanover* at present, as to secure ourselves; and it is founded upon what has been already observed, that the quarrel is with *Britain*; that *France* has no pretence of war with *Hanover*; and that it is on our account, and not her own, she suffers, and for the part she has taken at our instance: so that she now may well return the compliment that has been so often paid to her in this country, when the cry has been, That we were sacrificed to the interest of *Hanover*.

Let us but, for once, change sides (which is the fairest way of judging), and suppose we were the subjects of *Hanover*, ready to be over-run by a *French* army, and for no cause that they know, or can know, because really there is no other but this one, that the *French* King is at war with *England*; and I ask, Have not they good reason to say, in their turn, that they are sacrificed to *England*, and to wish they had no connection with our island? The argument strikes home; every man's own breast feels its force.

As, then, it is our quarrel, and our cause, we ought to treat it accordingly: the motives of justice, as well as generosity and interest, concur to demand it of us.

I do not however say, that now, more than on any former occasion, we are to give the assistance justly expected of us imprudently, either beyond proper bounds, or in an improper manner: let us be governed in these respects by every wise consideration. It is the measure itself I argue for, trusting the manner of its execution to those whose province it is; whom I esteem better judges in that matter, than to need any instruction, were it proper for me, or were I capable, to give it; and who are, in every part of their conduct, accountable to their King and Country, and particularly now, and to what good end they lay out the public treasure.

The argument I have insisted on, at some length, in favour of the King of *Prussia* and of *Hanover*, or rather for the necessity and of obligation we are under, both in respect of duty and interest, to assist the King of *Prussia* and *Hanover*, is likewise applicable to the case of the Prince of *Hesse Cassel*, who has also been mentioned, and whose present situation we all know.—But I cannot dismiss the subject without

without saying a word as to him in particular, because of some circumstances in which he is singularly unfortunate.

It is no secret, since all the gazettes and newspapers have published it, that this Prince has also been offered a neutrality, on condition he would withdraw his troops; and this he has refused. Tho' destruction is at the very door, and, for aught human knowlege can foresee, he must be sacrificed, and his country overrun, he stands inflexible. A virtuous man, in distress for his virtue, challenges not only pity, but even reverence: but a Prince or a Country suffering for an adherence to the cause of Virtue, Religion, and Liberty, is a venerable figure: and who would see it, and not endeavour to relieve it?

The present situation of the Prince of *Hesse's* family is a farther consideration that adds to my concern in his behalf. I say nothing of the connection we have with his family by our near alliance, tho' that is not altogether to be forgotten, as the strength of the branches of our Royal Family abroad is for the advantage of the common cause: but what I have now in my eye is, the unhappy change of religion which the apparent heir of that Prince has made, to the great hurt of
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the Protestant interest abroad. — This is a circumstance which, with me, goes much deeper than it would, considered only as an affliction, however great, to that Prince. I cannot help viewing it in a more general light: and I think it affords matter for reflection, which might be advanced in corroboration of the general doctrine I have been endeavouring to maintain, and consequently add weight to the argument that has been founded upon it.

Religious systems are nearly connected with civil policy; and it is a great point in the latter to promote and extend the former: but in this the Protestants fall vastly short of the Papists, though the reason is equally strong for both. It is from that real connection between religion and policy, that I have so often spoken of the Protestant Cause, and the Cause of Liberty, as one and the same: and I do not only mean Religious Liberty, which is destroyed by that persecution for conscience sake practised by the *Romish* church, which convinces men by fire and faggot, when every other argument and all reason fails; but it is Civil Liberty I have chiefly in my eye; to which there is not a greater enemy than the *Romish* religion,

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and consequently nothing that should alarm us more than its gaining ground, or the decline of the Protestant interest.

The church of *Rome* has motives of a very different kind from what the Protestant religion admits of, to propagate their principles, which necessarily draw with them a power over the persons and property of their votaries; and therefore they are zealous in extending it: and the Popish Princes, even when they have not religion enough themselves to be enthusiasts, find their account in promoting the designs of the Holy See for enlarging its jurisdiction; because they reap advantages of a political nature from that authority which the Pope, as the visible head of the church, has over all of that communion; and who, as a reward for supporting and promoting the *Roman Catholic* religion, uses his influence with the Princes that profess it to bring one court into the views of another, when disputes and wars arise between different nations.

The effects of this are visible in that ascendant which the Most Christian King, the eldest son of the church of *Rome*, has in Christendom, and which puts so much strength into his hands, when disposed (as that

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court always has been, and always will be) to use it for the disturbance of the peace and the overthrow of the liberties of *Europe*. The Protestant Powers, on the other hand, as they are not always too much under the influence of that kingdom which is not of this world, and are not so keenly prompted by the ecclesiastics of a church that has no views but men's spiritual interests, let the Protestant religion take its chance, unmindful of its importance to their secular interests; which, if duly attended to, would of itself be sufficient to inspire them with a greater concern for the maintenance and security of it, either against open violence or secret devices, with both which it is daily beset: and the misfortune is, that, added to all the disadvantages which proceed from the purity of its own principles, and the bloody opposition it has to struggle with; it has this obstacle to its progress, and hindrance to its stability, that, instead of being united by our faith, as the Papists are, in so strong and useful a degree, the Protestants have always been distracted by different opinions in religion, and are as much divided in their politics.

It cannot be said they have not, but it is true they will not pursue, a common interest,

and promote it by joint measures: and as they have not an unity of religious principles, neither have they a Head to interpose as a mediator, to whom they would pay some regard, as the highest Popish Princes, from the maxims of their policy, fail not to do to his Holiness. The consequence of all this is, that the Protestant cause and interest is absolutely destitute of that firmness and strength, which the union of the Popish party gives them.

This is a dismal consequence, and merits to be well attended to at all times, especially on such an occasion as this of the Prince of *Hesse's* changing his religion: for if we look around us in *Germany*, and consider how much the Protestant interest has suffered, or, which is the same thing, how great an accession of power the Popish religion has received, by the perversion of the Electoral House of *Saxony*, which, by the league of the Reformation, was placed at the head of the Evangelic Body of the Empire, and by the transition of the *Palatinate* to the Popish branch of the house of *Newburgh*, this unaccountable corruption of that unhappy Prince will appear terrible to any one, who has the smallest regard for the Protestant religion,

ligion, or considers the connection betwixt it and the cause of Liberty. So far it is lucky, that it has appeared before he was in possession of the dominions whereof he is the heir apparent; which gives some hopes, that, by prudent precautions, the worst of its effects may be prevented. And it is our duty, as a Protestant Power, to give all possible assistance to that State at this juncture, were it only to prevent any advantage being taken against the Protestant religion in *Hesse Cassel*, which the introduction of a victorious Popish army will so greatly favour, in the present mortifying circumstances of that Prince's family, who has had the courage to venture his country and his sovereignty for a glorious attachment to that Religion and to the Liberty of *Europe*.

It is matter of comfort, and challenges our gratitude to Heaven, that, in some degree to compensate for the diminution of the Protestant power abroad, in the instances I have mentioned, Providence has raised up so great a Prince of that religion as the King of *Prussia*, and put so much power into his hands. But the imminent hazard of losing one branch more, and, next to the Electors
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that remain, one of the most considerable of the Protestant interest in *Germany*, does, I own, awaken my concern, and perhaps adds to my zeal in behalf of these Princes of whom I have been speaking; and give me leave to take an opportunity of saying, that the Prince of *Hesse's* conduct in particular is not only a powerful motive for supporting him, but a sharp reproof to some parts of our own behaviour, and particularly the freedom with which we have been too much used to dispense a certain kind of obloquy, when edged by the keenness of party.

Nothing has been more common among us than to talk of the *German* Princes, to whose assistance we have been indebted on former occasions, as well as of late, as base mercenaries, who gladly took our money when there was nothing to do, but on whom we could have no dependence in a real exigency. But is it so with the poor Prince of *Hesse* now, whose troops, after we dismissed them from the friendly office of guarding our domestic tranquility, and, I am sorry to say it, sent them home not with all the marks of honour that I should have thought them worthy of, had they come at our request in a case of less real necessity, are now hazarding
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their lives in defence of our own Sovereign's dominions, when attacked on our account, and in support of the common cause, and he himself forced to abandon his country, because he refuses to withdraw his troops from the scene of action. This is not enriching himself with the price of his subjects blood, which has sometimes been the style of political satire, but suffering with them for a fidelity to his engagements with us, which loudly demands that we should not be unmindful of him.

I shall conclude what I have to say with an argument for the expediency of supporting our allies abroad; and that is, the wisdom of giving *France* full employment, when we have both *Britain* and *America* to defend against her, and of finding other work to those forces that, if left at leisure, would be employed either in invading this country, or in carrying on the war upon the other side of the *Atlantic*.

The war in *Germany* is a strong diversion to the power of *France*; and the King of *Prussia*, if properly supported, may, under the protection of Heaven, be able, not only to defend himself and our other allies, but even to give a blow to the combined strength
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of *France* and *Austria*, that will check the boundless ambition of the one, and smartly rebuke the precipitant folly and matchless ingratitude of the other.

Were we so happy as to see that happen, we might, with a proper exertion of our own naval strength, yet have it in our power effectually to humble the pride of *France*, pull down the common enemy, and settle the liberty and peace of *Europe* on something like a solid foundation; which is never to be expected as long as *France* retains the power she is already possessed of, and much less if she yet farther enlarges her dominions, and adds to her strength, by which she may at last attain universal monarchy, if God has appointed such a scourge for the end of the world.

These are the things which I submit as my reasons for thinking, that it is the duty of this nation to give an attention to the affairs of the Continent, to the state of religion, and of power there; and that our own particular interest, as well as the good of the common cause, demands the most powerful interposition we can make in the present critical conjuncture of affairs abroad.

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But, after all, I may be told, and indeed it has been loudly said, What can we do, where we are so weak, and have so much upon our hands at home, every thing at stake within ourselves, and our strength almost exhausted? And I doubt not but it will be added, that to the Continent we owe much of our misfortunes, and the greatest part of the heavy burden we now groan under, and which presses us to the ground, and that it is therefore vain to insist on either the necessity, utility, or expedience, of interposing, if we have not the means wherewithal. One that is hardly able to save himself, cannot assist another when sinking.

I set out with this caution, that I would not undertake so difficult a task as to vindicate all our past conduct, or take upon me to affirm there had been no blunders in the management of former wars, especially the last: but I may venture to say, that one error will never be rectified by another. I have admitted, or at least supposed, that perhaps we went too far in the last *German* quarrel, farther than either our engagements to the House of *Austria*, or a necessary regard to the general good of *Europe* required; and I am pretty confident that it was a mistake to lose

the King of *Prussia's* alliance at that time, which would have been an accession to the common cause, in my humble apprehension, more than sufficient to compensate any diminution the loss of *Silesia* made of the power of the House of *Austria*, which has been considered as a sort of bulwark against *French* ambition on the one hand, and *Turkish* barbarism on the other; nor is there any question that, by having done so much lately, we are now able to do the less either for ourselves or others.

But as a resolution to do nothing would be dangerous, neither can I allow myself to think we are yet reduced to the necessity of taking it from absolute inability; and I know, if something is not done to restore the equilibrium that is at present so totally unhinged, I, for one, shall give up for lost that cause which our forefathers thought worthy of the greatest expence of blood and treasure that it could cost them to maintain it. And I cannot help saying a thing that possibly proceeds from my prejudices in favour of the Protestant religion, which is, That if we did so much, that I am almost ashamed to mention it, for the Empress *Queen* last war, we must be black to future ages if we do not now do the
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very utmost we can for the King of *Prussia*. She, like the spirit of her party, and her religion, has deserted us; with what grace, the world may read in our confusion; and has joined herself to her own, as well as our, hereditary enemy, against us; and we cannot say what effects the vice of their common religion, and the malignant influence which it has over them both, may produce, when the struggle is with a Protestant Prince, who bids so fair to add strength to the reformed communion, if he is left to contend with them alone: but as the King of *Prussia* is our natural, so I hope he will be a faithful, because he is a Protestant ally, unless he is provoked or forced to abandon the side he certainly must be biased to.

His interest cannot alienate him from us, and his religion rather attaches him: I must therefore say, that as it goes more with my heart that we should be confederate with Protestant powers, than with the bigots of the Popish faith, so I am the more ardent in my wish, that now, when we have got so far the better of a former blunder, as to bring the King of *Prussia* back to his natural bias, we should assist and support him against the com-

bination of powers which threaten, like a deluge, to overwhelm him.

And I have not any fear, as the cause is good, but that if we are hearty in it, we shall find means to gratify our desire to support it. I will presume so far on the inclinations of the people of *Great Britain* in behalf of that religion and liberty, the value of which is not so well known to any other people under the sun, as confidently to believe that, notwithstanding all our burdens, and all our demands for our own affairs, they will yet make a stretch for so great and noble an end; which they may do without these misgivings of mind that were natural enough to arise in the hearts of Protestants, when they were assisting, however necessary they thought it was, a family whose bloody persecutions had often drawn from them cries to Heaven for vengeance against them.

We are not so weak as to despair, whatever the fears of some, and the caution of others, may suggest to them: *Britain* will yet find funds, if they are to be made a good use of, and we shall never be outdone in our inclination to raise them, by our enemies, who give with an astonishing pleasure for the glory

glory of their grand monarch, from whom, indeed they would not be allowed to withhold any thing necessary to support his pretensions to that title. We give freely, and will give chearfully to the very last shilling, when nothing less than all that is dear and valuable to us as Men, as *Britons*, and as Christians, calls for it; and the wealth of *England* is, at this day, great, more so than ever it was; nor will any good citizen desire to conceal or abstract it from the reasonable service of the public, but every one will be rather zealous to point out the ways and means for raising the necessary supplies, when they know they are to be well bestowed.

I heard it once publicly said in a very great assembly by a great man, whose authority is good, because his knowlege in these matters is conspicuous, that, only to lay open the trade that is locked up by monopolies in this country, would, of itself, produce funds sufficient to carry on any war *Great Britain* could be engaged in: and, as I think I do not altogether want reason to believe it true, although I had not such authority for it, I am satisfied, that the common objections are by no means solid at bottom, nor any thing like a sufficient reason for upholding such

such murderers of commerce, as some of our exclusive companies are. It is amazing that in a country such as this, the very being of which depends upon trade, the axe has not long ago been laid to the root of this evil, especially when the uncommon exigencies of the state have called for extraordinary means of raising the necessary supplies.

For the comfort of the timid and faint-hearted friends of their country, they might be informed, that some ways and means, have been suggested, and that more might be pointed out, less exceptionable and fully as effectual, as many of those that are used.

We have yet no tax upon the funds; against the equity of which it would perhaps be hard to find an objection: for, supposing them at three and an half, or even three, *per Cent.* they yield a larger return than land, at the rate it is now bought and sold, besides being free of many expences and short comings, that necessarily attend real property. And I am apt to believe, that such a tax would answer more good purposes than one: for, as it certainly would raise a considerable sum, so there seems to be ground for the observation which has been made, that
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it would tend to quicken and increase our commerce, that great source of private wealth and public revenue; as it would lessen the temptation there is at present to lock up so considerable a part of the capital of this country in these dead funds, and rather force the people that have the money to employ it themselves, or to lend it at moderate premiums to merchants, who would lay it out in trade, which at present languishes, from this among other causes, that the money with which it should be carried on is withdrawn by the funds, where it lies little better than rusting.

But, without entering into particulars, which might easily be enlarged upon, it is sufficient to say, that if such a political reformation were to take place, as would restore the now so much enervated frame of our constitution, and bring us back to the proper principles of our government, and a true public spirit and disinterested regard, not only to ourselves, and the present age, but also to posterity; the want of which is nothing less than downright destruction; then would it be found, that there is no want of means to raise, or inclination in the people to give cheerfully, such supplies, as any wise or honest

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honest administration would demand, or the exigency of the state require, according to its own situation and that of the rest of the world. Then would the supplies be properly laid on, without a view to any other thing than merely raising the money at the smallest expence, and with the least distress and greatest equality to the subject—And be raised within the year, instead of that infernal scheme of perpetual mortgaging; the end of which must be certain ruin, and that at no great distance.

By this very one thing only, the saving to the public would be immense; as is evident from the calculations that have been made thereupon, the data of which cannot be contested. The government would, by paying ready money, or at three months credit, buy I know not how many *per cent.* cheaper, than they do at present, when a public contract debt is reckoned well paid, if it be discharged within two years: besides the saving of the interest of the money, which, on our present scheme, must always be borrowed; because it is to be employed before it is raised: and the vast sums that those blood-suckers, the stock-jobbers, and money-brokers rob both the public and the subject
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of, making to themselves amazing fortunes at the expence of those who have spent their blood and hazarded their lives in defence of their country.

And surely, if, on such a scheme, so apparently ruinous, we have been able to raise such vast sums as have in fact come into the treasury of late years (for the money is always raised, and raised once in the year too, though not for the supplies of that year); can any man doubt, but that, if we saw a plan founded in redressing errors, restoring hopes, and securing our very being, every one would be glad to stretch the utmost length, and not only to bear but cheerfully to contribute to, public burdens, when he saw a prospect of an end to them, and to the hazard of running into absolute perdition, by a continual increase of debt, and eternal taxes; which must be the case till the death of the nation puts a period to them. For as, without a true spirit of patriotism, no state can subsist, so it is undoubtedly certain, that nothing can so effectually produce it in the people, as the prevalence of it amongst those entrusted with the government. Good principles are of their own nature as communicative, as bad ones are contagious; and no reformation is so promising as that which begins at the

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head, as it at once takes away the example, and removes the temptations which are the cause of corruption in the inferior part of the system.

In short, were we to see such proofs of a thorough attachment and assiduous application to the real interest of our country, in the important articles of public as well as private virtue, and national œconomy; we should easily be persuaded, that the money, prudently raised, was well and faithfully employed: we should not hear any more cries against *Germany* and the Continent. The distractions too would cease that are occasioned by measures which are made a handle of to set the minds of the people in a ferment. Instead of dissention and division, a mutual confidence would prevail between the King's ministers and subjects, and all, with one consent, would concur to promote the interest of our country, and support the common cause, with which it is so intimately connected. The heaviest of our burdens would feel light, when we are satisfied, that they were necessary to be laid on, and profitably laid out, for the maintenance and defence of our valuable rights and possessions, and for protecting and establishing the general peace and liberties of

Europe, and the independence of the several powers necessary thereto ; all encroachments upon which so evidently tend to shake our own security and disturb our quiet. Then would those who are called to govern be encouraged to apply themselves to the study of the true interest of the nation, and particularly to devise and promote every proper scheme for reviving and enlarging our commerce, which is the fountain of our wealth and the support of our grandeur, by making wise regulations of trade at home, and proper commercial alliances abroad ; which would prove more durable and lasting, as well as advantageous to the nation, than all the subsidy treaties we ever were or can be engaged in : because the councils of commerce, when properly settled, have a permanent and mutual interest for their foundation, which must be surer than any present or temporary bait. But these things, however agreeable it might be to consider them in their proper extent and tendency, are not so immediately connected with the subject I had in view, and would lead into a very wide field : therefore, sensible that my keenness has already carried me too far, I must beg your pardon, and assure you,

I am, &c.

