




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


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With the author's comments:

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MEMORANDUM

OR

THE MILITIA SYSTEM

OF

CANADA.

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL FLETCHER.


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Military Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General.

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MEMORANDUM

ON THE

MILITIA SYSTEM OF CANADA.

At a time when changes in the Military Organization of the country seem to be impending, and when the management of the Militia has passed into new hands, it may not be considered out of place if I offer a few observations on a subject in which I take a deep professional interest. The question at issue is not one of mere detail; it involves principles of which a due consideration is absolutely necessary if any important changes be made in the present system of militia, or if any broad scheme be proposed of national defence.

Now in all matters involving large military expenditure there is one problem presenting itself under different aspects, which simple in its formula, is yet extremely difficult of solution. The problem may be stated in these terms:—Given the number of men required, and the efficiency to which they are to attain, what amount of money will be annually necessary? Or as it is stated in Canada—Given the amount of money voted, and the number of men required, what is to be the standard of efficiency? Or again—Given the amount of money and the required efficiency, how many men can be raised? This problem comprises the whole principle of the organization of a military force under ordinary conditions, when the national spirit is not excited by ^{an} eminent danger, or not roused by enthusiastic feeling.

If these ^{propositions} ~~axioms~~ be accepted, as containing at least the germs of truth, it may be well—before enunciating any new ideas—to see how they have been worked out during the last few years, and what are the present results of the military organization in Canada.

Now it appears that when it became probable that the onus of providing for the national defence would, by the withdrawal of the Imperial forces, be thrown upon the Dominion, a Commission was issued in the year 1862 to report on a system of militia suitable for the requirements of the country. On this commission, Sir John Macdonald, Sir George Cartier, and other well-known statesmen—assisted by Colonel, now General Lysons—served, and the result was a report, of which the substance was as follows:—It was considered that the number of the active force should be fifty thousand, and that even this force (a very large increase on any number previously

organized) would be insufficient in the event of invasion, without the assistance of a strong body of regular troops, and a powerful fleet of gunboats on the lakes. It was recommended that the country should be divided into Military Districts, which should comprise Regimental Divisions; that a permanent head-quarter, district, and regimental staff should be maintained, and that the usual period of training should be for twenty-eight days.

Had this report been acted upon, a force respectable both in regard to numbers and efficiency would have been created; but unfortunately, owing to the expenditure necessary to carry out the plan, it was not pleasing to the House of Assembly; consequently the Government which had embodied it in a bill was defeated, and was obliged to resign. ~~However it was only for a short time that they were out of office, and in 1863 a Militia Bill was passed, considerably modified in regard to its provisions from that which would have been requisite had the report of the Commission been approved.~~ ^{and this} This Act continued in force until the Confederation of the Dominion, when in 1868 the present Militia Bill received the Royal Assent.

The basis of the system is the enrolment of the whole of the male population between the ages of eighteen and sixty, not exempted or disqualified by law, and being British subjects by birth or naturalization. This force—numbering in the four Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 694,008—is divided into four classes. The first comprises the unmarried, and widowers without children, between the ages of eighteen and thirty; the second, the same description of persons under forty-five years of age; the third class includes those between eighteen and forty-five who are married, or who are widowers with children; and the fourth class comprises the whole of the enrolled population between forty-five and sixty. From the total number thus enrolled, the Active Militia—which, as the law now stands, is limited to 43,000 men—is raised by voluntary enlistment, and engaged for three years. Power is given to fill up the ranks by means of the ballot; but this power is in abeyance, and has not been resorted to even when the numbers of the Active Militia have fallen short of those demanded. The command of the whole force is vested in the Queen, and through Her, in Her representative, the Governor General, who is advised on all questions relating to the Militia by the Minister of Militia and Defence—a Minister similar, as regards his functions, to the Secretary of State for War. The actual discipline is under the Adjutant-General, who must be a field officer in the regular army, and has the rank of Colonel in the Militia. Each district, of which there are eleven, viz. :—Four in Ontario, three in Quebec, one in New Brunswick, one in Nova Scotia, one in Manitoba, and one in British Columbia, is under the command of Deputy Adjutant-Generals, who have the rank of Lieut.-Colonels, and who are assisted by Brigade Majors. The period of drill during peace time for the Active Militia is to be not more than sixteen days and not less than eight. The force assembled in 1872, and who performed their regular period of

sixteen days' drill, was 30,141, including officers. Of these, 25,724 were infantry, 1,666 cavalry, 951—with 40 guns—field artillery, and 1,697 garrison artillery. The estimates for that year amounted to \$1,549,400; of which \$550,000 was appropriated to the pay and allowances of the troops during their annual training, including the expense attendant on encamping a portion of the force. In the present year the estimates were reduced, and the camps in which the Militia have for the past few seasons been exercised, were not formed. The minimum amount of money to be applied to national defence was fixed at one million of dollars (\$1,000,000) ~~when~~ the several Provinces were united by Confederation, and it appears probable that unless the House of Commons had thus been tied down to the expenditure of a specified sum, the estimates would have been still further reduced.

Taking the year 1872 as a sample of the last few years, we find that rather over a million and a half of dollars was voted, and that about 30,150 men were provided as the force of the active militia. On these data the following questions arise: **First**,—To what efficiency did this force attain? And given the amount of money, would it be better to diminish the numbers and increase the efficiency, or to keep the force as it is? For to lower the average standard of efficiency without altogether doing away with even the appearance of military training, would be almost impossible. To reply to the first question is difficult, as the results in the several Provinces of the Dominion were not identical. There were great differences between the regiments, some comparing very favourably with the best of the militia of England, others inferior, in the matter of training, to the very worst. It would be of little avail to criticize sharply where the difficulties to be contended with are so great, and where those who have overcome them deserve much praise. The most noticeable point was the apparent ignorance, in some instances, of the existence of faults which would attract the attention of all who are conversant with military affairs; thereby forcing the conclusion that unless some pattern should exist to which the regiments might conform, officers and men would be unaware of their shortcomings; and gradually, but surely, the efficiency of the whole force would yearly deteriorate. The second question involves so many considerations that its solution cannot be given in any dogmatic form, but may receive an answer from the teachings of history, and from the example of other nations. To revert to first principles,—For what is a Military Force required? First, to defend the country against external foes; Secondly, to act as a last resource in maintaining the power of the law; Thirdly, but far in the background, to be a symbol of the state which pertains to all nations aspiring to rank as such among their compeers.

Now the first and most important requisite of a military force depends so entirely on the position of the country to which it belongs in regard to its neighbors, that it is impossible to consider it abstractedly, and consequently the case as regards Canada must present itself *per se* in respect to the question at issue. This great and growing

Dominion stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, bounded on its southern frontier by the United States, and extending northwards into the forests and deserts of the Arctic regions, comprises a population of not more than 4,000,000 of which by far the greater portion reside between the south eastern shores of Lake Huron and the Atlantic. Putting aside therefore the Province of British Columbia, which if war were to break out must rely for its defence on other help than could be furnished from Canada; and the newly settled Province of Manitoba, which, bordering on a country almost as thinly populated as itself, has at present more to fear from Indians, or the lawless hunters and traders of the west, than from a regular enemy, what may be called Canada proper and the Maritime Provinces remain to be dealt with. These present a frontier, contiguous to the United States of about one thousand (1,000) miles whilst along the coast many harbours, for the most part closed during the winter months furnish shelter for shipping and points of defence in case of war. The only enemy that appears likely seriously to threaten Canada is her powerful and now friendly neighbour the United States of America. There, in contradistinction to the condition of Europe, the military force is reduced very low, the total number of regular troops being about 30,000, scattered for the most part on the Indian frontier; whilst since the great civil war, the Militia and Volunteers which constituted on either side the vast majority of the army have received but little training. In fact the aspect of affairs appears so peaceful that some may be tempted to question the necessity on the part of Canada of keeping up any military force, and to ask why the money so applied should not rather be employed in developing the resources of the country. No reply except a reference to history can be given to those who broach such opinions. There, however, the lessons have been so often repeated that they may be considered as conclusive. Periods of peace have never continued for any length of time, and clear as the political horizon now is, there are still clouds no larger perhaps than a man's hand which may be seen by those who are not dazzled by its brilliancy. On the other hand, the smallness of the force at the disposal of the United States, permits her neighbour to dispense with all but a skeleton of an army, sufficient to be a nucleus of a larger force in the event of war, and adapted for the minor but still necessary purposes already indicated. What description of force is best suited for these requirements is the question at issue.

As long as a garrison of Imperial troops remained in Canada (for the present small force at Halifax is far too feeble even to man its forts, and therefore cannot be counted for the defence of the country generally) the Active Militia formed the second line, whilst the main body of enrolled men was available as a reserve. The regular troops furnished also a standard to which the militia were bound as far as possible to conform, and the several stations where they were quartered served as schools at which its officers and non-commissioned officers might acquire the rudiments of instruction, and become imbued with a proper military spirit. With the departure of the Imperial troops these advantages have disappeared, and although it

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may truly be said that a great and growing nation such as Canada now is, will feel its responsibilities and act up to them, and will even by relying on its own strength increase in vigor when the artificial supports are withdrawn, yet the difficulties engendered by the absence of all professional soldiers must be faced, and the want they supplied must be met, by some well digested plan. There is a feeling in the Dominion that the present militia system, admirable in its conception, and good in many of its details yet scarcely fulfils the expectations entertained when it was first framed, and that the time has come for a modification of some of its features. To suggest any alterations without first stating the grounds for so doing, would be presumptuous, and it is only by appealing to the teachings of recent events on both sides of the Atlantic, that any opinions that may be urged would merit consideration.

The first instance that occurs is that of the United States when the great war of 1861 broke out, and when the nation divided into two hostile camps strove to put forth its whole strength either for aggression or defence. Previous to that event but a very small regular force had been maintained; but the several States had organized a system of militia, some States excelling others in military ardour and consequently in the number and efficiency of their troops. War commenced, large armies were organized, the small regular force furnished officers as far as it was able to do so; but on both sides during the first campaign, the troops were little better than armed mobs. The result was that the war was greatly prolonged, and much useless slaughter of men and expenditure of money were the result. It is almost certain that if either side had possessed but a small body of well disciplined troops to leaven the larger masses, the battle of Bull's Run would have resulted in the capture of Washington or Richmond, according to the weight thrown into the scale by the regular troops. It was only gradually that the belligerents fully recognized the fact that the military profession meant more than the mere wearing of uniform. The regular officers were, at the commencement of the war, looked upon with jealousy and their opinions regarded as the results of professional pedantry. Gradually, however, public feeling on this point changed, and it is a remarkable fact that with scarcely an exception no officers acquired any wide renown on either side excepting those who had been educated in the United States regular army. This example is cited as showing that principles recognized in Europe have been proved by practice as applicable to the condition of society on this side of the Atlantic.

To take more recent instances, the teaching of the last wars in Europe appears to point to two great results. One is that modern armies will in future be of vast size and beyond the possibility of being maintained at full efficiency during times of peace, consequently the greater portion of the force will partake of the character of Militia. The second is, that these short service men, and, when the reserves are called out, these soldiers who have returned to civil life, require highly educated

officers and thoroughly trained non-commissioned officers to lead them in time of active service. This is the system approved of in the most highly organized of European armies, where the short service regular troops, and the landwehr are officered by men who have received considerable professional instruction.*

Now, to advocate for Canada any plan approaching to that which prevails in Germany, would be manifestly absurd; as, happily, the political condition of the two nations, in regard to the necessity for military preparation, is as different as it well can be: whilst an attempt to enforce compulsory service in Canada would, even if it were approved by the people through their representatives, tend to injure the prosperity of the country by the check it would cause to emigration. The instance is merely quoted to show the opinion held in the most military nation in Europe of the necessity of training for those who aspire to lead troops, whether as officers or in the lower grades.

The inference to be drawn from the instances quoted would appear to be—That a small force, well trained, and officered by men who have learned their profession, has become a necessity for Canada; this force being intended to serve as a training school, and as a standard of comparison for the real army of the country—*i e.*, the Active and the Reserve Militia. An argument may be raised against this scheme, on the ground that the Imperial forces, although removed from the country, would, in the event of war, supply skilled officers to train the militia; and that consequently the expense which the small force here proposed would necessitate, might be an unnecessary burden on the resources of the country. To this it may be replied,—That a war that would involve Canada in serious hostilities, would be also one which would tax to their utmost the resources of Great Britain, both in officers and men. Her own reserve forces would require a supply of trained officers, and it would be difficult to provide sufficient young and energetic officers and non-commissioned officers for her increased needs. The most that Canada could expect, irrespective of any troops that might be sent to her aid, would be a staff; and, as a matter of course, a supply of the material of war.

There is another argument in favor of the plan proposed, which would appear likely to occur to those who believe in a future for the Dominion. Can a country aspire to greatness which neglects its own means of self-defence; and would the people of Canada be satisfied to provide men insufficiently trained, and to rely for officers from the regular Imperial Army? Does not the proper organization of a defensive force, including training for its officers, devolve on a country as much as the formation of the means for administering justice, or of a Department to preside

*NOTE.—In a recent report on the Swiss Militia, where its many shortcomings are pointed out, it is recognized as a fact by all who advocate reform, that a civic force requires a thoroughly trained staff to guide it, more, rather than less, than a professional army.

over its maritime interests? In all that concerns self-government, the Dominion has made rapid strides; its civil service is well organized, its public departments carefully managed. Would it not therefore follow that steps should be taken to provide for the efficiency of the military establishment by supplying the want which the withdrawal of the regular troops has created? This want is only beginning to be felt; as yet, officers who have received instruction in the volunteer schools formed in connection with the regular regiments, which were first established in Canada, and afterwards introduced into England, hold commands in the militia; and non-commissioned officers, formerly soldiers of the Imperial army, are still available to instruct the recruits in the rudiments of drill. These conditions will, however, soon change; and even supposing the schools formerly established continue to maintain their efficiency when deprived of the assistance the regular regiments afforded, there is no body of men with professional training to insure the advance of military science, and to profit by the experience which the Continental nations of Europe have earned at the cost of blood and treasure. Without a professionally trained force, the standard of efficiency will gradually become lower, and the form of military service will be maintained, whilst the spirit will be dead. There will be plenty of officers in gay uniforms too closely resembling those of the Imperial army, and at parades there will be some showy manoeuvres; but the true instruction of the modern soldier, to the necessity of which, all who think seriously of war are awakening, will be neglected, and even ignored. A revolution is even now passing over the organization and training of European armies, and if Canada wishes to profit by the changes which will follow, she must have men whose business it is to study the art of war as professionals, and not as amateurs.

Having thus stated briefly the want which it is believed exists, and the reason, which have led to this belief, it remains to be seen whether, at but little expense, this want can be supplied. It is presumed, as has been already stated, that some small permanently embodied force is necessary; and that without it there is a danger lest the whole defensive organization of the Dominion should in a few years deteriorate. By merely improving on what already exists, the nucleus of an army could be obtained, and the expense involved would be more than compensated for by the benefits that would accrue. It must, however, always be remembered that the true defensive strength of the country will remain with its militia; the active force, as is the case at present, being in readiness to be called out at a short notice, the reserve forming the second line and serving as a feeder to the active force. With regard to the organization of the active militia, it will be seen on reference to the report of the commission above alluded to, to whose labours the organization of the present system is in great measure due, that a head-quarters, divisional and regimental staff are recommended. But only the two first of these recommendations have been as yet carried out. The third has been omitted, and there is no permanent regimental staff of any description. It is proposed to remedy this defect and at the same time to

avoid the evil of keeping on pay for long periods of each year men for whom no work, except during the season of training, can be found, by a plan of which the outline only can be furnished, to be filled up by those who have practical experience of the needs of the Canadian militia.

It is suggested to establish in the Dominion three training schools, using those already in existence at Quebec and Kingston and adding another for the maritime provinces, probably at Halifax, where the presence of the regular troops might be of advantage. These training schools should consist of a small force of the three arms, viz., cavalry, artillery and infantry, which should correspond with the active militia of the four provinces. The troop, or even half troop, of cavalry would contain the permanent regimental staff of the cavalry of the district; the battery of artillery, in the same way, of the field and garrison artillery; and the companies of infantry of the militia infantry. Supposing about 34,000 men (*i. e.* rank and file) to be the numbers of the active militia, divided in equal proportions between three districts; that is, three regiments of cavalry equal to 1,800; twelve batteries of artillery 3,000; and thirty-six regiments of infantry of 28,800, with possibly a small force of engineers numbering 200, and of a military train 200.* These troops, as is the case at the present time, to be called out for yearly training and inspection. The duration of the drill to be fixed by statute, due regard being had to real efficiency. To correspond with this force, at each of the three training schools would be one half troop of cavalry numbering about 40 non-commissioned officers and men and 30 horses; one battery of artillery numbering about 250 men, of which two guns only would be fully horsed, requiring seventy-eight horses; † three companies of infantry, each section of each company corresponding with a regiment of infantry, in all 240 men, and a few non-commissioned officers to be instructed in the duties of engineers and train; the whole force at each of the three schools would not be more than 530 non-commissioned officers and men. With regard to officers it would probably be necessary at the present time to obtain commandants of these schools from the regular army, as is now done at the artillery schools of Quebec and Kingston. These should be selected either from officers who have been educated at the staff college, due regard of course being had to other qualifications; or from those who, known to

* NOTE.—These numbers are given approximately, regard being had to the establishment of the cavalry, artillery and infantry in the Imperial service.

† NOTE.—The number of horses for the two guns might possibly be reduced, or some of the horses used for other purposes when not required for service or instruction. The proportion of artillery permanently embodied is high in comparison with the infantry, partly because the battery is the lowest tactical unit of that arm, partly on account of the additional training required by artillerymen, and the consequent necessity of a larger number of instructed men, and partly from the fact that infantry drill forming a part of the instruction of garrison batteries, a portion of the men would be available as a means of teaching the infantry officers battalion drill.

be good regimental officers, have passed through one or more of the various schools at Shoeburyness, Chatham or Hythe. If Canadians can be found who, having entered the Imperial army, are in all respects well qualified, preference might be given to them; but high proficiency should be required, qualities for command being combined with power of imparting instruction. The appointment should be for five years, with possibly power of renewal for an additional term, and conditional on the officer's visiting Europe and keeping himself acquainted with the changes and improvements in the art of war. It would be a question whether the command of the school could not be united with the Deputy Adjutant Generalship of the district,* the brigade majors acting as seconds in command. A second in command (if the brigade majors were not utilized), an adjutant, a doctor and a quarter-master would form the staff of the school, whilst a due proportion of officers, say two for the battery of artillery, one for the cavalry, and three for the three companies of infantry, selected from militia officers who, having evinced good capacity, are willing to embrace the military profession as a career, would receive commissions to act as instructors in the training schools and as staff during the drill season of the active militia. To these schools all gentlemen recommended for commissions in the active militia would be required to come for a period of six months on first appointment, when their commissions would depend on the ability they displayed during the course of instruction. In the event of regimental promotion,† and no other promotion, except in the permanent staff of the militia, should in peace time be possible, officers should be required to attend for three months at one of the schools, passing through a severe training, both bodily and mental; and being required to obtain a qualifying certificate before their promotion could be confirmed. A judicious transference from the active to the reserve lists, of officers who either from age or other

*NOTE.—The appointment of the Deputy Adjutant General of the district to the command of the school would save expense, but would render difficult the selection of an officer to fill the important post. It would have the advantage of consolidating into one place the military duties of the district, and of keeping the officer in command in constant intercourse with military life; whilst during the time of the yearly drill he would be free for purposes of inspection, as the schools would in great measure be broken up by the employment of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men with their several regiments. It might be a question whether the brigade majors could be spared from their several localities, and whether it would not be desirable, in the event of the Deputy Adjutant General being an infantry officer, of the second in command being an artilleryman, combining, as is at present the case, the inspectorship of artillery and warlike stores of the district with the work of instruction. If the Deputy Adjutant General were an artillery officer, the second in command should be taken from the infantry.

† NOTE.—The present system of promotion, viz., that of giving a step in rank after five years' service in the Active Militia (entailing probably not more than eighty days' actual duty) without regard to the command attaching to rank, will go far to reduce to a minimum the value of military titles, to injure discipline, and to render impossible the proper working together in time of war of the imperial and colonial forces. It is a most serious mistake, and one that requires immediate remedy.

causes appeared unlikely to be fit for service, would keep the senior ranks of the active militia sufficiently young, and would facilitate promotion. Any promising young officers who might evince a desire to remain longer at the schools of instruction either with the object of qualifying in the event of a vacancy occurring in the permanent force, or with the view of obtaining a deeper insight into their professional duties, should be encouraged to do so; and it might be a question whether some opening could not be found for them in one or other of the public departments or public works after their period of training: military education, both in regard to knowing how to command and how to obey being no bad qualification for young men commencing life. Should these officers elect to remain in the school for a longer period than six months, they should be required to receive instruction in the other arms of the service than in that to which they might first have been appointed, and to pass a second and more severe examination, care being taken that the time passed at the schools should be utilized to the utmost. It may be objected that there would be risk lest young men, having received a military education, might decline to give the country the benefit of their instruction, by refusing to serve in the militia. Safeguards might possibly be provided against this eventuality, but the best guarantee would be a good selection of cadets for first appointments. Again, there may be a difficulty in inducing young men to come forward; should this be so, inducements must be offered, but if a check be placed on the assumption of rank and uniform by those who are not really qualified and ready to serve in the active militia, much will be done to exalt the position of the officer. At present, the Dominion swarms with officers of high rank who have received little instruction and have seldom or ever held proportionate commands; consequently, as is the case in the United States, military titles are held in little esteem. There will unquestionably be a difficulty in procuring trained officers of local standing for some of the country corps, but if the system proposed be adopted gradually, *i. e.*, instruction previous to first appointment being insisted on, and a proportion of qualified non-commissioned officers being also provided, the officers at present holding commissions as field officers and captains will feel themselves morally obliged to learn their professional duties.

With regard to the non-commissioned officers and to the rank and file of the schools, men should be enlisted for one year, if possible from the localities to which the regiments of active militia of the district belong, with power, in the event of their showing efficiency, to re-engage for five or more years. From these latter, non-commissioned officers will be selected first for the school itself, both as staff sergeants and as pay-sergeants of the companies, and then for service in the active militia when embodied or called out for training. These latter would learn the duties of non-commissioned officers, but with the exception of the few who would be required for duty would serve, when at the schools, as private soldiers, being excused the more irksome work which would fall on those who did not aspire to rise above that grade.

During the training or embodiment of the active militia, these embryo non-commissioned officers would act as sergeants and corporals to the companies of the regiment to which each section of the infantry company would correspond, and in a similar way, to the regiment of cavalry and batteries of artillery; those who evince the greatest aptitude being selected as sergeant-majors and staff-sergeants. It would be well that even in respect to these men, long periods of service should not be exacted or permitted; as, in such case, there would be a difficulty in providing for them after their term of service had expired; whereas, if discharged in the prime of life, they could return to civil occupations, probably remaining in the active or reserve militia, and would easily obtain situations in the railways or in the police force, where men of good character, with a knowledge of discipline, are constantly in demand.

By the plan proposed, there would always be a force of nearly 1,600 men at hand, in case of sudden emergency, a standard of efficiency would be supplied (which ought to be fully as high as that of any Imperial regiment) to which standard the militia might endeavour to conform, and there would be the means of training officers and non-commissioned officers for service in the active militia. The plan would be elastic, as if a more numerous permanent force were required, the schools could be enlarged without change of system, half companies, or companies corresponding to the regiments, in place of sections, whilst in the event of danger being apprehended the efficiency of the active militia might be increased, by lengthening their period of drill, or if numbers were required by calling in more men from the reserves. The plan is, however, only sketched, and its details require to be filled in. There are doubtless many difficulties attending it and also many defects, but it appears to provide for a want, which is now felt, and which will declare itself more and more, year by year, at what (is conceived to be) the least possible expenditure of men and money.

It may not be out of place if I allude, very briefly, to other minor points connected with the instruction to be given at these schools. Their object must be clearly kept in view, viz: That besides maintaining a body of regular troops, ready to be used as such, if required, they are above all schools of instruction. The work and the discipline must, therefore, fulfil both objects, and as it is very necessary that the time spent there should be fully occupied, and habits of discipline inculcated in the shortest possible time, variety of instruction to prevent tedium becomes necessary. The officers aspiring to first commissions, should be treated as cadets, and should learn the duties of the private soldier equally with those of the officers. They should be taught to impart instruction, and the examination at the end of the six months should be severe as well as practical. The simpler principles of field engineering, almost necessary for all officers campaigning in a country like Canada and the United States, should be inculcated theoretically and practically, whilst to those who might elect to remain for an additional period, the principles of the other two arms might be taught in the same

way as I believe is done at West Point.* Above all the instruction should be practical nothing should be sacrificed to mere show; order, cleanness, steadiness under arms are all essentials to discipline, whilst individual activity, mental and bodily, skill in the use of weapons and an intelligent appreciation of the principles of fighting in open order are equally necessary to the modern infantry soldier. The cavalry should be carefully taught the principles of patrolling and vidette duty, whilst instruction in the duties of field and garrison artillery would probably necessitate for the officers of that arm a longer period than six months training. When officers of the active Militia join the schools previous to promotion, opportunity would offer to ascertain whether in body and mind they are fit for command. The instruction given would correspond with their higher rank, but should be severe with the double object of attaining efficiency, and of weeding out men whom age might have rendered more suitable for corresponding rank in the reserve Militia. All details connected with the military districts would probably be kept at these schools, and information would thus be collected, which would prove of invaluable assistance in the event of war. Encouragement would be given to qualified officers to attend the manœuvres of the English army, and to avail themselves of the instruction afforded at the various military schools. Arrangements might probably be made with the Imperial authorities to admit a certain number of officers to the Staff College, to the Artillery School at Shoeburyness, the Engineering School at Chatham, and the School of Musketry at Hythe. In the event of young Canadians entering the Imperial service, and showing themselves able officers, their services should not be lost to the Dominion. Every effort should, in fact, be made to provide officers and non-commissioned officers for the militia, both active and reserve

The scarcity of labour, the scattered settlements, the short summer, all render it most difficult in ordinary times, except at a great sacrifice of money, to assemble together any large body of troops for the annual drill. Frequently the best men are not found in the ranks of the active militia during the yearly training, although more than one instance has proved that they are ready to come forward at the least threat of war. Owing to these causes the militia will (at all events for the present) receive but little military instruction and in the event of emergency must depend for its efficiency on possessing ready at hand a proper staff with each of the regiments. By the method proposed, some at least of the officers will have received the rudiments of military training, whilst a permanent staff of non-commissioned officers will, if occasion so require, be in readiness to join the regiments and companies of the respective localities to which they belong.

There is much in the life of the Canadian that qualifies him for military service. As a result of the scarcity of labor and of the comparative isolation of the scattered

*NOTE.—This principle is strongly advocated by recent German writers, in order to insure the three arms working well and intelligently together.

farms, owing also to the great changes of climate from an almost arctic winter to an Italian summer, men have to adapt themselves to various conditions of life and to accommodate themselves to circumstances not met with in England. The aptitude, the skill, the energy and the patience derived from such training form no slight foundations for the highest discipline and for the most perfect military efficiency. In one especial branch of industry common to all four provinces, qualities that should characterize the officer and the soldier are called forth in no ordinary degree. The organization of the gangs of lumberers, their provisioning, their discipline, and in fact the care taken of their general well being, demand many of the characteristics which should be long to those high in command of a military force. The foremen of the several gangs have duties to do not dissimilar to those expected from officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of companies of soldiers, whilst the actual work performed by the men is such as would serve, mentally and physically to train them for much that would be required of troops in actual war. Their skill in road making, in hutting themselves, and in the rougher engineering works, might prove invaluable to soldiers campaigning in a forest country, their practice in driving teams over ~~roads~~^{roads} which an English carter would consider impossible, might go far to qualify them for artillery drivers, whilst the excitement and even danger attending a portion of their labors would tend to bring out qualities not dissimilar to those called forth by active service. Then again, the very mixture of races in Canada ought to furnish the essentials for a good army, the intermingling of English, Scotch, Irish and last but not least of French, should combine the military qualities of each nation, and should tend to that wholesome rivalry which adds stimulus to war-like enthusiasm. What Canada ought to strive for is a good organization, and a sufficient force to resist any sudden raid arising from turmoils on the frontier, until help could arrive from the opposite side of the Atlantic. She must remember that her neighbour although friendly, and with but a very small army, yet possesses a vast element of strength and experience which has been gathered in the great civil war, and which now lies dormant. In the event of hostilities there would be no lack of experienced officers and of men able quickly to organize troops, and peaceful as the aspect of affairs now is, and improbable as any disturbance of friendly relations appears, yet it behoves Canada to counterbalance these advantages by a careful training of a small force, which, while providing for defence could not be mistaken for a menace to her powerful neighbor. It is as difficult to keep the necessity for military preparation before the eyes of a free and peaceful population bent on energetically developing the vast resources which surround them, as it is to preserve from rust and from the deterioration of prolonged peace, the military institutions themselves.

The excitement of danger, consequent on the Fenian raids produced excellent results in the Dominion, especially on the menaced frontier, in inducing military preparations. The volunteer system and the responsibility thrown upon the officers and men for their efficiency appear to suit the English race. In New Brunswick,

in the Townships, and in Ontario, the militia system has shown excellent results. In Quebec it has not worked so well, not from the want of military qualities inherent in a French population; but from the fact that the greater part of the Province being removed from the danger of invasion, a feeling has arisen among the population that they will willingly obey an order for enrollment, but that to volunteer for service is not among the duties of a citizen. In conclusion, I would urge that the scheme proposed is merely put forward to invite the opinions of those who are well acquainted with the feelings of the people and the interior economy of the militia force. One great difficulty lies in the scattered condition of the country regiments which renders their drill and inspection difficult, another lies in the necessity for taking officers from the influential men of the districts without reference to their military qualities, as unless well known men are chosen, the companies and battalions cannot be raised or kept together. Of course such men will frequently make the best officers, but being almost always engaged in business operations they cannot spare much time for military training. These are difficulties, but six months or a year's training at the commencement of life is not long, and may even be counted as education, whilst three months on promotion to the rank of field officer, is not a great sacrifice with so honorable a position in prospect. Officers would doubtless require to be paid during these periods, but the money spent would be well laid out. The same applies to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the embodied force, their career should be sufficiently promising to induce men of respectability from the various localities to come forward, whilst as there would be two classes, viz: the first class or non-commissioned officer when called out for training, and the second or simple private soldier, two rates of pay would probably be considered fair. Above all, the appointments should be kept clear from political influence; at present officers of the militia are recommended for commissions by their several colonels, and it is believed the system works well. To allow them to be nominees of the House of Commons would lead to the introduction into the force of a political element very prejudicial to military discipline.

There are still two important subjects which have not been touched on, one the best method of conducting the yearly training of the militia; the other, the condition (taken generally) of the defences of the Dominion, as handed over by the Imperial authorities on the departure of the troops. In regard to the first, the amount of money to be expended will, to a certain extent, fix the duration of the training, but given a specified sum, it may be a question whether it is better to expend the whole with the object of extending the period as long as possible, or to pay a portion for the assembly of the companies into battalions, the battalions into regiments and brigades. If the companies be drilled separately the men will, as a rule, live at home, their pay will be less, and the money can be spread over a longer period; but there is a risk of the drill being slurred over, and at all events, of there being little opportunity of inculcating discipline as well as drill during the instruction. The advantage of

comparison with other companies and of the wholesome rivalry thereby engendered is wanting, together with the military feeling created by the mere assembly of considerable bodies of soldiers. The formation of battalion camps appears preferable to drill performed by individual companies, as the officers acquire practice in providing for the maintenance, comfort and health of the men; and habits of order are learnt by the discipline of a camp. The larger camps are doubtless the best means of training soldiers, including in that term the higher officers, but the cost of transport is great, and political considerations may sometimes weigh in determining the desirability of forming large camps on or near the frontier. Their advantage lies in the training given to the staff, in the rivalry between battalions, and in the enthusiasm which, both among the soldiers and civilians, is aroused by great military spectacles. The evil of false musters, which recent enquiries have shewn to be too prevalent, is checked, and should be, with care, entirely prevented. No doubt if the troops are assembled for any length of time, the practice of manœuvres, and the working together of the three arms would be a means of imparting valuable instruction; but where the period of drill is limited to but, at most, a few days, the ground-work of military education can alone be attempted. Careful instruction by companies is the foundation of all infantry tactics, and under the present conditions of warfare this instruction should be pushed even further than has hitherto been done.

The solution of the question appears to be, to allow of an elastic scheme, and not to draw hard and fast rules for all the provinces or for all the regiments. In some scattered districts where labour is scarce, and where men must per force combine some daily work with drills, training by companies may be the better method of meeting a difficulty which, if a strain were put on the men, might break down the organization in that locality.*

When possible the battalion training will be better, and near towns, the system tried with some success in England by the volunteers of pitching the camp in the vicinity of the ordinary places of labour of the men, and having morning and evening drills might be pursued with advantage. The brigade and division camps should not be neglected. If they cannot be organized yearly in every military district on the score of expense, they might be triennial, so that every man in the militia might once in the course of his service receive the benefit of the instruction thereby afforded. The formation of a cadet camp which met with so great success when organized by General McDougall, might again be tried. The young officers and non-commissioned officers who would have passed through the training schools being called on to volunteer for the extra education that would thereby be offered. Whatever plan be

* Note.—This may apply to some of the villages in the outlying districts of the maritime provinces and on the shores of the lakes, where batteries of artillery suitable for coast defence might go through their yearly drill in their own localities.

pursued, care must be taken that the training period be perfectly utilized, and full value obtained for the money expended.

The second subject which remains to be noticed is the condition of the defenses as handed over to the Dominion by the Imperial authorities. The completion of the system of fortification recommended by Colonel Jervis and partially commenced in consequence of his report, will probably not be effected until an alarm of war should occur; but fortresses of great value have been confided to the care of the Dominion, and costly property, such as barracks, storehouses, &c., are awaiting decision as to their disposal. Many of the buildings are in the heart of thriving cities, and could be sold at a considerable gain. The time appears to have arrived for some decision to be taken in respect to the most fitting mode of dealing with this property, and it seems at first sight consistent with proper administration, that the money obtained should be re-invested for military purposes. Supposing, for instance, that some of the older fortifications of Kingston should be useless for the purpose of defence in consequence of changes in the art of war, and at the same time, the decision by competent officers should point to the importance of Kingston as a position to be defended, might not the older buildings be disposed of and the money obtained be applied to the purchase of land on which fortifications suitable to modern requirements might be raised, when political considerations should point to the necessity of doing so? The rent in the meantime being appropriated for military purposes. The sale of old barracks would furnish drill-sheds and storehouses for the militia, and the property would thus be used for the purposes for which it was designed.*

These are merely crude suggestions; indeed, the whole scheme for militia improvement, as given in this paper, is traced out more with the object of provoking thought and criticism than of dogmatically urging any particular plan; and I can only venture to express a hope that those who are cognizant of the subject will criticize it freely, adopting or rejecting the whole or portions of it as they may consider most applicable for the good of the militia, and for the well being of the Dominion.

H. C. FLETCHER,

*Lieutenant Colonel Scots Fusilier Guards.
Military Secretary.*

OTTAWA, November, 1873.

* NOTE.—In fact, militia property should be so administered that its proceeds would be expended for the purposes for which it was intended. The maintenance of the necessary forts, drill-sheds, &c., would thus cease to be included in the yearly estimates, but would be provided for out of a consolidated fund.

ESTIMATE for PAY AND SUBSISTENCE OF ONE TRAINING SCHOOL,
for Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry,—for One Year,—of the strength
of 45 Cavalry, 250 Artillery, and 240 Infantry.

NO.	DESCRIPTION.	PER DIEM.		TOTAL.	
		\$	cts.	\$	cts.
1	Commandant the D.A.G. of the District			1,700	00
1	Assistant do.,—Artillery Instructor	3	90	1,423	50
5	Captains:—1 Cavalry, 1 Artillery, and 3 Infantry, to act as Instructors	2	82	5,146	50
1	Adjutant	2	44	890	60
1	Quartermaster	1	94	708	10
10—	3 Surgeon	3	65	1,332	25
1	Sergeant Majors.....	1	00	1,095	00
1	Laboratory Foreman	1	00	365	00
1	Ordnance Armourer.....	1	00	365	00
1	Small-Arm Armourer.....	1	50	547	50
1	Master Gunner.....	1	00	365	00
20	Sergeants.....	0	80	5,840	00
20	Corporals	0	70	5,110	00
6	Bombardiers	0	60	219	00
1	Trumpet Major.....	1	00	365	00
6	Trumpeters	0	50	1,095	00
235	Troopers, Gunners, and Privates.....	{	0 60	86,151	00
235		{	0 50		
10—530	TOTAL FOR PAY.....			\$112,718	45
	540 Rations of Bread and Meat.....	0	12	23,652	00
	78 Horses—Forage,	0	30	8,541	00
	Fuel, say 1000 Cords.....			7,000	00
	Light.....			500	00
	Clothing, Winter equipment, Medical supplies, Regimental necessaries, Attestation, Transport, Barrack utensils and equipment, at the most moderate computation,.....say			40,000	00
	Contingencies.....say about			7,588	55
				\$200,000	00

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MEMORANDUM No. 2.

ESTIMATE for maintaining three training schools.....	\$600,000
ALLOWANCE TO CADETS undergoing Training.....	95,800
	—————
	\$695,000
 ESTIMATE for TRAINING 25,000 officers and men in camp for sixteen days, being the probable number out of the 34,000 that could be placed in camp.....	\$400,000
 ORDINARY CONTINGENT MILITIA SERVICES for the year, after deducting the pay of three Deputy Adjutant Generals, who would receive pay as Commandants of the Schools; and the items for Drill Sheds, Rifle Ranges, and care of Militia Properties, to be provided for out of funds obtained by the rent or sale of Militia property *.....	\$489,900
	—————
TOTAL.....	\$1,584,900
	—————

*NOTE.—A further deduction of \$10,000 could fairly be made, as the expense of maintaining the Gun Boat might in peace time be very properly transferred to the Marine and Fishery Department.

\$695,000

\$400,000

\$489,900

1,584,900

maintaining the
Department.

