




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


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


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
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Reserve



AN
A P O L O G Y
FOR THE
LIFE AND ACTIONS
OF
GENERAL WOLFE.





AN
A P O L O G Y
FOR THE
LIFE AND ACTIONS
OF
GENERAL WOLFE,

AGAINST THE
MISREPRESENTATIONS

In a PAMPHLET, called,
A Counter Address to the PUBLIC.


WITH
Some other Remarks on that PERFORMANCE.

*Miles alacer: qui tamen jussa Ducum interpretari, quam
exequi, mallet.*

TACITUS.

L O N D O N:

Printed in the YEAR 1765.




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
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A N

A P O L O G Y, &c.


T H E R E is a reverence due to the dead, which in polite nations has always been observed; and gentlemen of character, even in party disputes, have ever acted upon this principle. The dead cannot speak for themselves; and therefore good Writers, in every age, have been extremely tender in saying any thing, which might be thought injurious to their memory.

MUCH more is this respect due to characters of real worth and excellence.

B U T if the universal voice of a nation have been declared in favour of some justly honoured hero, who has eminently distinguished himself in his country's cause, and

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at last greatly died in its service; any attempt to lessen or detract from the merit of his glorious course of life, is an affront offered to the publick, as well as an injury done to the dead; and must be resented by every ingenuous mind as insult added to ingratitude.

UPON this account I am at a loss to assign a reason, why so exact a writer as the author of the Counter-address to the public, in drawing the character of the late General Wolf, should choose to make mention of only one important action; as if his whole merit, with the public, rested in that, and the other actions of his life were not worthy of attention. "*Wolf, says he, was a very young man, but a genius. He atchieved his glorious career in one important action, for ever memorable; and reflecting consummate honour on his country, on himself, and on the great man, whose councils he executed (a).*

THAT Mr. Wolf *was a young man and a genius, superior to most of the Generals*
under

under whom he served, is agreed : but does our author remember no other action but his last ? or shall the nation forget all the honours he acquired in the two proceeding years of his life ? Every grateful mind must recollect the singular merit, which the publick gave to General Wolf in the year 1757. When it was said, that he expressed his readiness to land on the coast of France with only a thousand men, while the commanders in chief were holding councils of war to prove it unsafe to do it with near ten times that number ; and when from that excellent set of precautions, which he drew up for the preservation of his men in their march on shore ; it was plain, that he had not the least conception of their being to stay a week, on shipboard, looking upon the coast ; and then to come home without landing at all.

BUT tho' Mr. Wolf's rank in that first campaign was not high enough, to enable him to perform any action, of sufficient importance, to merit our author's regard ; yet the government then took so much notice of him, as to think him worthy to be entrusted with a much higher command in the next. Admitting however that the first year of the General's career was not so eminently

distinguished ; yet, I thought that all men had agreed, that his second campaign was by much too important to be overlooked.

THE landing in Cape Breton, for the reduction of Louisburgh, was an action, which was not only great in itself ; but was the leading conquest, which opened the way to all the rest. The two houses were so fully possessed with the sense of its importance, and of the meritorious part, which General Wolf had acted in it ; that tho' the forms of parliament withheld them from giving a public vote of thanks to an inferior in command ; yet all agreed that he deserved them.

BUT as our author does not choose to mention this part neither of the General's character ; but rather seems, in haste, to get the reader on to the end of his career ; and, huddling all his great actions into one, appears to wish us to forget the proceeding glories of his life ; he will give me leave to pay this part of a debt due to a good man's memory, by pointing out the peculiar merit of this atchievement.

AND in order to do justice to the subject, I find it necessary to hold it up to the reader in a comparative light ; by which he will have the clearest view of its merits, and perhaps at the same time gain an insight into the reasons, which may have induced our Author to draw a shade over the former parts of the General's career.

IN the year 1757, the government sent out an army of twelve battalions, with instructions *to land, if possible, at or near Rockfort ; in order, if possible, to make an attack upon the place.*

THE troops, without meeting with any misfortune in their passage, arrived safe in ten days at the place of their destination : when the officers, after having held several councils of war, at length found out reasons for not landing, and came home again.

IN the year 1758, the nation sent out another army of fourteen battalions for the attacking of Louisburgh. The officers held no council of war ; but pursued their instructions, and took the first opportunity to land,

land, and drive the enemy into the town; and then considered of the proper means of reducing it.

IN the descent on Cape Breton, the swell of the sea was so great, that the Admiral, who had the charge of the debarkation, for three days successively, after the disposition had been made, and the troops were in the boats, reported that it was impossible to land: and at the fourth attempt, when the swell was decreased, the troops were cast on shore rather than landed; and not less than a hundred boats were lost in landing the men and stores, upon so rough a coast (*b*).

IN the Rochfort expedition, the bay of Chatelaillon, was pointed out as a safe place of landing. The Admiral, who had the direction of the boats; gave in his report, That *it was a fair, firm sandy bay* (*c*.) the sea was calm, no French troops appeared there to oppose them: no French batteries were erected within reach of the place: and the Admiral, after viewing of the bay, told them

(*b*) Major General Amherst's Letter, Gazette, Aug. 19. 1758. (*c*) Inquiry, p. 45.

them that he would land them without waiting their shoes (*d*).

BUT there were sand hills upon the coast; and the Generals did not know, but that their might be men behind them.

IN the descent on Cape Breton, a large body of the enemy was actually seen drawn up in a chain of posts upon the shore, with batteries of cannon and mortars erected in the proper parts, to oppose the landing; the coast was rough, and the surf so great, that a place could hardly be found to get a boat on shore. " Yet under all these disadvantages " (says general Amherst) brigadier Wolfe " pursued his point, and landed just at the " left of the cove, took post, attacked the " enemy, and forced them to retreat. Many " boats were overset, several broke to pieces, " and all the men jumped into the water," and some of the grenadiers were drowned in trying to get on shore (*e*).

AFTER viewing the contrast, which subsists between the conduct of these two different enter-

(*d*) Inquiry, p. 45. (*e*) Gazette, August, 19, 1758.

enterprises, the reader perhaps may now be less at a loss to assign a reason, for our Author's having chosen to pass over this part of the General's career, and to hurry us on to the end of it. For should we stay to reflect on the particulars of these great intermediate achievements, it would be impossible not to recollect, that at the Rochfort expedition general Conway was second in command, superior to a Wolfe; and that at the Louifburg expedition, general Wolfe was second in command, without a Conway.

AFTER sinking the remembrance of the former great actions of his life, it might have been hoped, that our Author would at least have given to the dead hero his full share of praise for the last. But not content with contracting three years service into one, he will allow him but half the merit even of that.

GENERAL Wolfe achiev'd his glorious career in one important action, for ever memorable, and reflecting consummate honour on his country, on himself, *and on the great man, whose councils he executed.* The one important action, with which general Wolf, after

after all his other achievements, completed his glorious career, doubtless did honour to his country, to himself, and to all those brave men, who fought with him in its cause. But what the meaning can be of that addition, of its *doing honour to the great man, whose councils be executed*; or why the reader is led to consider general Wolf as the hand of execution only, and not as ^{the} head also of this great achievement is not easy to conceive.

I would in this and in every case, be as far from attempting to lessen the merit of the Minister, as that of the General. But, if the landing and fighting the enemy at Quebec be the one important action here referred to, a very little reflection will convince the reader, that the ascribing of this attempt to the councils of Mr. Pitt is not merely making an innocent mistake, but is offering an affront to the wisdom of his councils, under an appearance of doing him honour. And the guarding against any injurious imputations upon Mr. Pitt's designs, and the securing to Mr. Wolf the intire merit, which belongs to him, is a piece of justice due to them both.

IN treating the performance of so accomplished an Author, I am almost ashamed to recur to common principles; and must ask the reader's pardon for referring him to the universally received maxims of prudence. But in the choice and ~~the~~ forming enterprizes every one knows, that the wisdom of council consists in the proposing some great and valuable end, and the furnishing of sufficient means for its attainment.

THAT the taking of Quebec was a very wise object, no one, I suppose, will deny: at least I readily acknowledge, that whoever proposed it, or how obvious soever it must have appeared in our councils, yet it was a great and important design; and the proposing of it did honour to the adviser.

BUT then as much the more important as the end appeared to be, so much the more solicitous will every wise administration be to provide the necessary means for its attainment.

FROM the most authentic accounts published in our own Gazettes, it appears, that general Wolf sailed up the river St. Lawrence,
and

and landed for the attack of Quebec, with a body of troops much inferior in number to the French forces, which were appointed for the defence of it. That besides the great army intrenched on the river, the country itself was so strong, as to baffle all our attempts to come near it. When I learned, says his excellent letter (f), that "succours
 " of all kinds had been thrown into Que-
 " bec; that five battalions of regular troops,
 " completed from the best inhabitants of
 " the country, some of the troops in the co-
 " lony, and every Canadian that was able to
 " bear arms; besides several nations of Sa-
 " vages, had taken the field in a very ad-
 " vantageous situation; I could not flatter
 " myself that I should be able to reduce the
 " place." But great as was their army, there was a still greater obstacle in the General's way, which arose, he says, *not so much from the number of the enemy, (though superior to us) as from the natural strength of the country.* From the same account it appears, that the number of French troops, which marched to the battle near Quebec, exclusive of those which remained in the

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town,

(f) Extra. Gazette, Oct. 16, 1759.

town, was much superior to the English. They out flanked our army, tho' their center was a column (*g*) not to add another body of two thousand of the enemy (*b*), which appeared in our rear immediately after the battle. Four or five thousand men Mr. Wolf says, (*i*) is nearly the whole strength of the army, which he had to send up above the town, to join about fourteen hundred more, which were already there. This disproportion was such, that he calls his army a *bandful of men*.

WILL this gentleman now, upon recollecting the state of the case, think that he does honour to any minister, by supposing that he sent a General to attack a strong fortified town, with a much smaller army, than that which he was to find at the place for the defence of it?

THIS is not agreeable to the practice of ministers of State in every other case. And though instances may possibly be found of fortified towns having been taken by a force less than their own; yet there is hardly any

(*g*) Brig. Gen. Townsend's Letter. (*b*) Ibid.
 (*i*) Extra. Gazette, Oct. 16, 1759.

any example of a cabinet council's having deliberately and unnecessarily exposed their troops to so unequal a hazard; at least, whatever may have been the event, no one before this Author ever thought of complimenting the wisdom of such councils.

NOR would I for a single moment be understood to insinuate, that Mr. Pitt was really chargeable with such rash and desperate designs. It has always been thought, that the scheme of that expedition, as formed here at home, was, that general Amherst should have marched by land, and assisted in the operations of the siege. Possibly too it might have been hoped, that the troops, which had been sent the winter before to the attack of Martinico, would ~~be~~^{be} able to sail from the West Indies, and join the General in his voyage. This is what is commonly understood to have been Mr. Pitt's plan. And if those troops had met, they would together have certainly made a force sufficient to give to the enterprize a probability of success.

HAD it been the original intention, that General Wolf should singly undertake the siege, with the troops he was to carry out
with

with him; it cannot but be supposed, that the wisdom of Mr. Pitt's councils would have furnished him with a force, which should be adequate to the design: and it would have been easy to have allotted for him a part of that great army, which marched with General Amherst; who with ten or fifteen thousand men might have moved as expeditiously, and come up as soon, as with twenty. And with a less number, would have been just as able, as with a greater, to struggle with the seasons, and buffet the winds and waves upon Lake Champlain. Our author, therefore, far from complimenting, really detracts from the wisdom of his great man's councils, by supposing that out of so large a body of troops, as were then in America, he originally apportioned so small a force to so great an undertaking.

NOR is it at all agreeable to Mr. Pitt's practice in other cases to make a provision of means, so very inadequate to the end. When, for instance, he determined to make a descent upon Belleisle, there is not the least appearance of his having been sparing in the number of troops allotted for that purpose. Some, perhaps, may have been tempted to think, that

that there were more ships and men employed there, than were necessary, and may have doubted whether the whole island was worth the armament; but no one ever thought that the armament was not enough for the island.

AND when this great man, two years before this, resolved upon making an attempt upon Rochefort, the council, at St. James's, were very far from intending to send, for that purpose, a body of men, which should be unequal to the enterprize. They did not finally determine, that this army should consist of twelve battalions, till they knew, by an exact list of all the regiments in the French service, and the disposition of them in the several parts of their empire, through which they were distributed, that there could not be a force equal to this in that part of the country.

IN justice to Mr. Pitt's character, and to show how far he was from any such rashness, as this author ascribes to him; I cannot help observing, that his precaution went much farther than common, in securing success to this enterprize. And, therefore, as Sir John Mordaunt was thought to be in an infirm state

state of health, he took care to fortify him with the assistance of another General, of great understanding and abilities; who was admitted into all the consultations of the cabinet, previous to the expedition; and who, therefore, tho' not the first in command, was yet a principal in Mr. Pitt's councils, as much as Sir John Mordaunt; and, perhaps, was still more than he depended upon for all the subsequent councils of execution. As to fresh councils of deliberation, Whether they should proceed or not in the service, for which they were sent, when nothing appeared to hinder them, that was a measure, of which no one of the cabinet-council could, at that time have had the least suspicion.

To return then to the argument. That Mr. Pitt heartily desired that Quebec should be taken, cannot be doubted: that he planned a sufficient force for that purpose, if the three different corps had joined, as he intended, is not to be denied: but from the time, when General Amherst could not come up, and when the troops in the West Indies were detained there; from that time Mr. Pitt's plan was at an end. And all the subsequent operations were the several General's

neral's own : about which, from the nature of things, Mr. Pitt could have had no knowledge, and therefore could give no counsel.

B U T though it would be an affront to common sense, and an injury done to Mr. Pitt's administration, to suppose, that he, or any member of it, could resolve to send Mr. Wolf, with his single command, to attack a fortified town, guarded by an army much superior to his own ; yet the wisdom of council, is one thing, and the bravery of enterprize, is another. Mr. Wolf, and the officers with him, had now failed, and were landed for the service : General Amherst, how well soever his conjunction with them might have been intended here at home, had not been able to effect it ; nor were the West India forces arrived. Two parts in three, therefore, of Mr. Pitt's plan had failed. But this was all the force they had, and the enterprize was to be attempted with this alone, or not at all.

T H E Generals had made their utmost efforts to force a passage at the falls at Montmorency, and had failed. How easy would it have been, in this case, to have held a

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council

council of war, and found reasons to come back again? They had landed and done enough for their own honour; and all men would have allowed, that they had exerted their utmost strength; but had found themselves too weak for the troops actually in the field; and much more to take the town. But they felt for their country, and knew the distress, which such a miscarriage must occasion in our councils and finances at home. They saw the necessity of hazarding an attempt, which the wisdom of no cabinet council would have originally advised. *The affairs of Great Britain*, says this true patriot, *I know require the most vigorous measures; but then, ^{the} courage of a handful of brave men should be exerted only*, where there is some hope of a favourable event. Such were the sentiments which actuated his great mind thro' his glorious career; and under this conviction he greatly adventured in his country's cause, and has for ever endeared to it his memory by the atchievement.

FROM a Letter of Mr. Wolf's, writ at the time, I could show, that he had once actually resolved to return. Suppose he had returned; no one could have said, but that he

he had executed all Mr. Pitt's councils, and much more; all I mean which related to his part of the scheme. Every one must remember the universal concern, which his public letter occasioned. They, who best knew the country, had declared their opinion before; but all men then wished, that the forces had gone together, and the success of the expedition not been left to the uncertainty of an after conjunction.

IN this choice of difficulties, when he owns himself at a loss how to determine; did the council at St. James's suggest the expedient of sailing by night up above the town, and getting on the other side of it? Shall then any one attempt to rob these brave men of the whole praise of their generous resolution to land under every disadvantage, and with a handful of an army, to fight one of near double their number? The General greatly fell in the attempt; but he left others, like himself, to carry it on, who animated with the same zeal for their country's service, soon compleated the atchievement. Instead of amusing themselves with the examination of paisants, with looking through spying-glasses, at the landing-place, and wearying

their imaginations for six days together with supposed difficulties ; they overcame all their real ones in a few hours ; and, after beating the enemy into the town, without losing time in holding councils of war, or staying to go through the forms of a first, second, and third parallel, they pushed on their assaults, and in three days carried the place by a coup de main.

IN all this it is impossible for the reader not to see, that the minister, at home, could have no knowledge, and therefore could give no counsel. Yet so meanly does our author think of his great man's understanding, as to imagine that he will snuff up incense, offered to the wisdom of his councils, for a measure, of which he was utterly ignorant ; and take to himself a merit, in the success of an attempt, which the wisdom of no cabinet council ever could have advised. So weakly greedy of praise, does he suppose him, as, merely in order to avail himself of the event, to incur the imputation of having deliberately exposed the honour of the nation, and risked the expence of a whole year's service, and the lives of seven thousand subjects,

jects, upon the most uncertain and desperate kind of hazard.

BUT if, as this author supposes, Mr. Wolf did so much honour to himself, and to his country, by executing Mr. Pitt's counsels; what then are we to think of those Generals, who treated this great man's orders with neglect; and declined the executing of them, though they failed under his immediate and express direction? I should have spared this reflection, if our author had not unavoidably forced me into it, by bringing this very charge against other men. *The Patrons of this writer, says he, always called that Rochefort scheme one of Mr. Pitt's visions (k).* Who the writer of the address is, or who are his patrons, I don't at all know. But without regarding persons, in which the wisdom of the measure is not at all concerned; I confess myself one, that always approved and admired it; and I did it upon attending to the whole evidence, as it appeared at the Board of Inquiry, and at the Court Martial, which were held upon it. There is a justice, which is due to every man, and as I would not ascribe to Mr. Pitt the honour of achievements, wherein his councils were not

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concerned; so I would be far from withholding from him the praise of those, wherein they were.

THAT the attacking of Rochefort was a wise measure, is evident from the nature of the thing itself; and the lights (1) we have since acquired, put it beyond dispute. To Mr. Pitt therefore is due, not ^{the} honour of having first projected it; for that was Mr. Clarke's: not the judgment of having first approved of it; for that was Lord Ligonier's: but the merit of having adopted, encouraged, and forwarded it; and of furnishing the Generals with all the necessary requisites for the success of it. Who they were that treated the scheme as visionary, will best appear from the examinations.

HIS Majesty's orders, which Mr. Pitt and Lord Ligonier both told the commanders, (m) were as positive as can be given
in

(1) Several of the officers who were at Rochefort, served the next year at Louisburgh, and were brought prisoners to Andover; and they acknowledged, that the place would have surrendered, if the troops had landed and marched up to it on their first arrival.

(m) Inquiry, p. 987.

in such cases ; were, “ to attempt, as far as
 “ shall be found practicable, a descent with
 “ the forces under their command, on the
 “ French coast, at or near Rochefort ; in
 “ order to attack, if practicable, and by a
 “ vigorous imprefion force that place ; and
 “ to burn and destroy, to the utmost of
 “ your power, all Docks, Magazines, Arse-
 “ nals, and shipping that shall be found
 “ there ; and exert such other efforts as you
 “ judge most proper for annoying the ene-
 “ my.” Sir Edward Hawke, in his letter
 to Mr. Pitt, upon receiving the report of the
 sea Captains, sent to examine the coast, says,
 “ I was of opinion that they might land ;
 “ on which Sir John Mordaunt desired
 “ a council of war might be assembled, to
 “ consider, of it. There it was granted
 “ by every body, that the landing could be
 “ effected.” (n)

IF the reader now will give himself the
 trouble to look into the minutes of this council
 of war, or into the reasons assigned by these
 gentlemen themselves, for their resolving not
 to land at the bay of Chatelaillon, he will
 find, that, without having gained fresh
 intelligence

(n) Inquiry, p. 101.

intelligence of any certainty or importance, their reasons against landing almost all turn upon points, which were well known at St. James's before they failed; and which, therefore, if they justified them in not attempting to execute it, must directly condemn the scheme itself, as originally visionary and impracticable.

THE long detention of the troops in the Isle of Wight; the expectation, thereby, raised in the minds of both nations, of a descent upon the French coast; the time of the equinox, and of the full moon; the dangers of high winds; the possible interruptions of storms, and the swell of the sea in the Bay of Biscay, were circumstances as well known in England, as in the road of Aix. If these reasons are good ones, do they not hold just as strongly against their having been ordered to sail for Rochefort, as they do against their landing, when they came there? Is it possible then, for men to pour stronger contempt on Mr. Pitt's councils, than these gentlemen do, by assigning such reasons for not following them, as must directly condemn him for giving them?

Rochefort was certainly the second place in im-

portance

portance on the whole coast (o). Must not then the King's ministers, have been extremely uninformed not to have known this? or rather was not this the very reason why they wished to take it? *It was not likely that a place of such importance should, after such warning, be totally neglected.* Did any man in the kingdom, except these gentlemen, think, that Mr. Pitt had not sagacity enough to discern this? When therefore, Mr. Conway, being asked to give his reasons for having voted against landing at the first council of war, says, (p) "*as well from general reasoning, as intelligence, tho' he knew of no considerable army in the field, he was persuaded there must be a considerable number of men at Rochefort;*" did not this general reasoning, and the persuasion founded upon it, hold as good at St. James's, as at Aix? When he was in consultation with Mr. Pitt, at Lord Holderness's, as in the council of war on board the Neptune? Mr. Pitt himself, says, upon oath at the Court Martial, (q) *that the memorial there shewn to Sir John Mordaunt and Major General Conway, of the French*
 E "land"

(o) Inquiry, p. 14.
 (q) Trial, p. 9.

(p) Inquiry, p. 35, 36.

“ land forces, and the services, on which they
 “ were employed, was a paper, on which much
 “ reliance was had by the King’s servants ;
 “ as coming from one of their most confi-
 “ dential correspondents ; and was then pro-
 “ duced, as a piece of intelligence, to which
 “ they gave much credit ;” and Sir John Ligo-
 nier appears to have intirely believed it (s).
 Yet so very cheap did they hold the great
 man’s judgment of this intelligence, that
 they rather chose to listen to that of
 prisoners, interested in deceiving them, and,
 upon whom they both say, they could have
 no dependence. Sir John Mordaunt tells us,
he gave little or no weight to what the French
prisoners said ; and Mr. Conway, being ask-
 ed, what reason he had to apprehend a body
 of troops to oppose their landing ? Answers,
from general reasoning upon the subject, and
the information of prisoners. Q. What was
that information ? A. One said there were ele-
ven battalions, another mentioned seven ; and
though he paid very little regard to any of
them singly, yet, upon the whole, he thought
there was no room to doubt but there were
 SOME troops. Did then, Mr. Pitt set the
 valour

(s) Inquiry, p. 43.

valour of ~~the~~ British soldiers so very low, as to think that he ought to send them only to places, where he was sure that the enemy had NONE? Whether the information of the French land forces, on which Mr. Pitt and the King's servants placed so much reliance, might not have obtained sufficient credit with these officers, to have induced them to land directly, without waiting for more; or whether the intelligence of one of the Secretaries of State's most confidential correspondents, to which the cabinet-council paid so much regard, might not as well have been trusted to, as the stories of fishermen, masons, and labourers (*t*) at Aix, are not now subjects of inquiry. The question before us, is only the degree of respect, which these gentlemen shewed to their great man's councils: and in that point of view, it is impossible for the reader not to see that, little as was the regard, which Mr. Conway says, he paid to the information of the prisoners; it must, at least, have been greater, than that paid to the information of Mr. Pitt's councils; because he acted upon it, and voted

(*t*) Inquiry, p. 49 and 53.

against the landing at Chatelaillon upon the credit of it.

THE examination goes on : *General Conway being asked, whether any batteries or troops appeared to him? Answers, very few. There was a small battery; but he imagined, the troops would naturally conceal themselves, till the attempt to land. (u)* Yet in all the descents, which we have since made on French and Spaniards, they have never once acted according to this supposition.

THE other reasons alledged by General Conway are, “ They had been seen five days
 “ upon the coast; and two days more must
 “ have been taken up in landing with the
 “ stores. They had no particular intelli-
 “ gence of many necessary circumstances,
 “ relative to the state of the place: they
 “ could not surprize it; and had not artill-
 “ lery to attack it in form: and no secure
 “ retreat for the troops (u).”

SIR John Ligonier, on the other hand, judged the intelligence of the French force,
 so

(u) Inquiry, p. 36.

(u) Ibid.

so very particular, that he thought fit to add, as a postscript, to the paper of hints, given to Sir John Mordaunt, in which he had spoken of *securing a communication*, or retreat: "When Sir John Ligonier wrote
 " this paper, he knew nothing of the dis-
 " position of the French troops; the small
 " number of those troops, which could be
 " upon that coast, by the disposition, pro-
 " duced at the cabinet-council, lessened very
 " much the necessity of the precautions to
 " to be taken for a communication or land-
 " ing." (w)

IT is not necessary to my argument to determine, whether the Minister or the Generals were in the right. All which I contend for is, that the reasons here alledged, are such as actually were, or might have been foreseen before they left England; and therefore were not of weight enough in Mr. Pitt's estimation, to induce him to prevent their sailing. He knew what the intelligence was, with which he had furnished them; and that the other necessary circumstances about the state of the place were to be learned on
 shore

shore. They confessedly had intelligence enough to land. Did Mr. Pitt promise them, that the other intelligence should be brought them on ship-board, if they would not land and seek it? It could not have been Mr. Pitt's hope, that the fleet, when it came upon the French coast, should become invisible; or that the troops should land, and steal into Rochefort without being observed. Nor was it this great man's desire, that they should first hesitate; and then make the time lost in holding councils of their own, instead of executing his, a reason for losing the whole expedition. If the landing the stores and artillery would have taken up too much time, 'twas as well that they had no more. But whether the quantity were too great, or too little; for the objections go to both; it was not less at Rochefort, than it was at Portsmouth; and it was all, which this great man had allotted for the enterprize. And whether Mr. Pitt were in the right, or in the wrong, in ordering them out with these stores, with this intelligence, and with these troops, they could not vote them insufficient for the purpose, without impeaching the wisdom of his councils in sending them with no more.

THE reader will always remember, that we are not trying the merits of the cause over again; but only who they were that deserved the charge, of having treated the great man's scheme as visionary. It has ever been understood to be the duty of officers to proceed in the execution of orders as far as they can go. Had any obstacle presented to disable them from landing, it might have been natural to hold a council to consider how to remove it: but why not go on at least as far as they could? it had been time enough to have stopped, when they came to a difficulty. But these gentlemen inquire at sea, whether the ditch at Rochefort was wet or dry, instead of going to look; and with an open bay before them, stop short to try the great man's councils over again; and resolve, that the undertaking is neither advisable nor practicable for reasons, which they themselves cannot believe to be right, without thinking Mr. Pitt intirely in the wrong for sending them upon it.

WITH extreme indelicacy therefore does this advocate for the Rochefort Generals attempt to fix upon others the charge of having treated Mr. Pitt's scheme as visionary

visionary, when they themselves avowed it in the most open manner. Ill does it become them to impute to others as a crime, that very thing, of which they stand convicted upon record.

SHOULD there however have been any others, who treated the scheme as visionary; theirs were only the speculative opinions of private men; but these gentlemen were intrusted with the carrying it on: and instead of holding a council of execution, and consulting how they should most effectually perform the service, for which they were sent: or rather instead of landing directly, without calling any council at all, they hold a council of deliberation, and try the wisdom of the great man's councils over again; and condemn their orders, instead of performing them. Others therefore treated the scheme as visionary in theory; these in practice. Other men, till the event was over, knew not what the scheme was, and therefore could say nothing about it: but these men had the honour of having been called in to Mr. Pitt's councils; were intrusted with the several motives and informations, upon which he determined to send them; had the examining

mining, and as Mr. Pitt declares upon oath *a very long and close cross examination* (a) of the evidences, upon whose information, the scheme was founded. They knew that after the most scrupulous discussions, Mr. Pitt and the cabinet council were of opinion that it might succeed, and therefore had ordered them to make the attempt. They might then have urged their objections, and their general reasonings upon the subject, and have heard them over-ruled : instead of which, they take upon themselves to over-rule the determinations of the cabinet council, and vote that the service they were sent on, was neither adviseable nor practicable : holding Mr. Pitt's opinion in such extreme contempt, that they resolve, tho' they had an open bay before them, not to land and give it a trial. These supposed scoffers, if there were any such, treated the scheme as visionary, at the expence of nothing but their own judgments : but these Generals did it at an expence of half a million, and the loss of a whole year's service of the fleet and army to the public.

(a) Trial, p. 9.

By the failure of the Rochefort expedition, Mr. Pitt saw all his important hopes of annoying the French coast, and of reducing a great part of their naval strength, defeated; the principal objects of the war set a twelve-month backward; and the nation put to a great expence, to no other effect, than to point out to its enemies the part where they were most assailable; and by warning them to put it into a better state of defence, for the time to come, to make any second attempt on it really impracticable (*u*).

BESIDES the advantage, which might have accrued from the destroying one of their principal docks; 'tis remarkable, that some of the men of war, which then took shelter at Rochefort, were the very ships, which the next year made the principal resistance, and held out the longest at Louisbourg (*x*).

IN

(*u*) This was actually the case of Port l'Orient, which was now rendered unassailable in this war, through the warning given by that fruitless attempt on it in the last.

(*x*) The Prudente was the last ship, which was burnt in that harbour.

IN an evil hour, therefore, must the friends of these gentlemen charge upon others the irreverent usage of Mr. Pitt's councils, when they themselves first set the example, and were the only effectual contemners of them : nor could they, who were disposed to be scoffers, have found an occasion to treat his scheme as visionary, if they who should have been actors in it, had not first set his understanding so very low, as to be put off with their dreaming dreams of wet ditches on the ocean, and seeing visions of armed men behind sand hills ; and resolved to stay on shipboard, and make it so. Yet would their advocate now fasten upon others the crime incurred by their own misconduct ; and would ascribe to the great man, to whom they pay their court, the merit of those conquests, in which his councils were not concerned ; in order to atone for their having robbed him of the glory of those councils which really were his ; and would have done honour to him, to the nation, and to themselves, in their execution.

IN fact, tho' this author speaks of others having called this one of Mr. Pitt's visions,

yet I know of none, who treated it as such, but the friends of these Generals. And tho' the shiftings and coalitions of parties may have now induced a change of language, yet every one, who was acquainted with the complexion of the time, and the connections of these Generals, must remember, that they were then far from shewing that reverence to his councils, which they now choose to express. At a time, when the D—— of C———'s favourite minister was overset, when the royal commander himself was forced to resign, when his services were disgraced, his negotiations disown'd, and his treaty publicly stigmatized by Mr. Pitt as an *inglorious Padlock*, every one, who remembers these things, must know, that the doing honour to his councils was then judged to be a motive, which the very least of all others would have operated upon the minds of these Generals; and that they were then far from treating him as the great man, how much soever they now affect to call him so.

BUT he is now necessary to the very being of their party; and therefore they now seek to purchase the forgiveness of their former neglecting to execute his wise coun-

cils, by ascribing to him the glory of those achievements, which flowed from no council of his at all. Fond on any terms to gain his favour, they would even violate the most sacred rights of the dead, and tear off the laurels from a fallen hero's brow, to plant them on a head, which never planned the achievement.

Do then these gentlemen think, that the public has forgot the account, which was sent to all the papers at the time, in which the nation was so emphatically told, that the fleet was returning home, *No attempt having been made to land on the coast of France?* Or can they imagine, that it is not still remembered, how the whole kingdom sympathized with Mr. Pitt in the memorable expression of his grief, in his letter to the Mayor of Bath? Yet would they now affront his understanding, by giving to him the honour of councils, which were not his; in order to atone for their having before affronted his authority, by refusing to execute those, which really were his: and with the most nauseous kind of fawning, would now spit in his mouth, in return for their having formerly broken his heart.

HAVING now vindicated the honour of a brave man, whom I thought deserving of a better treatment than was here given him ; I am more indifferent about any points of controversy, between our author and his adversary.

FAR be it from me to plead for the turning any gentleman out of his profession upon account of his parliamentary behaviour. Freedom of speech is essential to the very being of parliament, and the basis of all our liberties.

BUT there are two facts laid down by our author, which are the foundations, on which all his arguments are built ; neither of which he has proved ; and either of them failing, his whole work falls to the ground.

The first is, that General Conway was turned out upon account of his behaviour in parliament. If his Majesty has been pleased, by himself or by his ministers, to signify this at the time of the dismissal ; then this author has a just warrant to write upon that supposition. If the weak concessions of
his

his adversary are his sole authority; then this is only an affair between these two combatants, in which others have no concern.

WHEN our author shall have proved, as he intimates (page 42) will be done, that this really was the motive, he will then have a claim to the publick attention.

BUT it is a piece of justice we owe to every man, not to judge of the reasons of his actions without knowing them; and as a good subject, I will not believe that his Majesty would wantonly or unjustly exercise this part of the prerogative. In the mean time, till the true cause of this dismissal shall appear, there is nothing in General Conway's case different from that of any other officer; all hold their commissions subject to his Majesty's pleasure, and we have seen the greatest Generals turned out, without the least impeachment of the right of the Crown in so doing.

EVERY one must remember a very recent instance of a favourite General's having been dismissed, who both in rank and merit was much superior to General Conway, without
a single

a single pamphlet, I had almost said a single paragraph in a news-paper having been writ against it. The Duke of Cumberland, after having received the public thanks of the nation, and a settlement of five and twenty thousand pounds a year, for the victory of Culloden; after having been the only support of his father's throne, when the boasted friends of the house of Hanover, soon after the battle of Falkirk, all resigned, and deserted him in his distress; after having by his sword, and by his councils, twice rescued his country out of the two greatest calamities, which can befall it; a rebellion and a continental war; this Royal General was forced to resign all his honours, and the command of the best regiment in the service; and yet the news-papers did not utter a single complaint upon the occasion.

If the dismissal happen in times, when men's passions are agitated with party contests, they will then act very differently; And while those on one side say, it is the act of the Crown, and the Crown can do no wrong; those on the other say, it is the act of the Minister, and a Minister can do no right.

THE usual practice, in such cases, has been for the friends of the sufferer, to look for some one of his most popular actions, and to assign that as the cause of the dismissal. And, in order to interest the publick concern, they generally propagate reports of an intention to turn out many others. They who remember, or will look into the debates of the time, will know, that just the same things were said, in Sir Robert Walpole's days, upon the dismissal of Lord Cobham, and of the Duke of Bolton and Lord Westmorland, which are now said upon Mr. Conway's. The nation might justly be alarmed to see this part of the prerogative carried to any great extent; but people are not disposed to quarrel with their Sovereign, at the exertion of it in a few particular instances.

THE accounts, therefore, so often repeated, of an intention to turn out all the officers, who voted on one side at a county election; of the garbelling of the army, and suffering none to remain in it, who will not blindly follow the mandates of a Minister; *of the carrying a list of sixteen officers to his Majesty*; and the like; far from being new inventions, are but copies of reports of

the same kind, which were spread thirty years ago, and probably will be imitated thirty years hence upon some like occasion.

AND an opposition will always find their account in them : for tho' time and experience may prove such reports to have been groundless, and in the end the people come to be convinced of their falshood ; yet in the mean while they receive them as truths : and the bad impresson made by them, while they thought them true, still remains upon their minds, even after the deception is over ; and prepares them to receive the next invented story with the same greediness as they did the last.

As Mr. Conway is in parliament, and took the popular side of a question in debate, it is not to be wondered at, that his friends have chosen to assign that as the motive of his dismissal. If any minister will avow the having advised the measure upon that account, he will be best able to give his reasons in the defence of it. It is a usage, which has been occasionally practised under all administrations, is seldom to be justified, and scarce ever to be commended ; and, if carried

carried to any great extent, would be a just ground of alarm. But till this motive is avowed, it is just as easy for one party to deny, as for the other to affirm, and I concern myself with neither.

IT is our author's second position ; which I principally meant to consider : and which, I confess, I was not a little surpris'd to see so positively affirmed as a fact, and made the foundation of so great a part of his argument : that Mr. Conway had differ'd with the administration only in a single vote : or rather, as he explains himself in the note, and desires to be understood in that sense thro' his whole book : *It was not, strictly speaking, by a single vote ; but on a single subject, that General Conway differ'd with the Administration. (a)*

Is it possible then that so respectable an author, who assumes the character of Mr. Conway's friend, should be so little inform'd in the subject, on which he writes, as not to have heard of another speech of his upon a very different occasion ? in which he impeach-

(a) Page 8.

ed the conduct of the administration in a much more national and interesting concern. As it is the professed desire of some among us, to throw a universal blot (*a*) over the relation of his Majesty's unparalleled munificence ; and to wish to keep concealed from the view of his subjects that tender concern, which he has expressed for their interest ; the Reader will give me leave to relate the whole affair.

AFTER all those amazing sums, which had been annually sent to Germany for the support of the war there, there still remained at the close of it, demands made upon us under various pretences, to the amount of no less a sum than seven million, eight hundred thousand pounds. Demands, I say, not debts. Time was, when German demands were German debts : when the prevailing humour of the reign, or the necessities of the public, would not permit us to contest them. When our mercenaries, by holding twenty thousand Englishmen in their power, under a German General, could make it dangerous
for

(*a*) *Emendare tuos quamvis Faustine libellos
Non multæ poterunt, una litura potest.*

The motto of the Budget.

for us to offend them. Thanks to his Majesty, the nation is now delivered from this foreign thralldom, and governed by English councils. In consequence of this, a commission has been appointed to examine and state these several demands. Out of the first thirteen hundred thousand pounds worth of these claims, which have come under examination, one hundred thousand was found good, two hundred thousand was reserved for farther proof, and the remaining million was disallowed. I take the round numbers, but the accounts themselves were laid before Parliament. Upon the perusal of these accounts, it has been currently said, though our Author seems not to have heard of it, that General Conway was pleased to express a dissatisfaction at the large deductions, which were made from the claims of one German court, whose hereditary Prince had fought so bravely in our service. If this story be true: for I don't choose to entangle myself, or the Printer with a house of Commons, how little must our Author know of his friend's behaviour, who has so positively affirmed to his Readers, *That from the 15th of November, the day the Parliament met, to the 19th of April, when*
it

it rose, General Conway was not once of a different opinion from the King's servants, but on the single affair of the warrants (b). It was the duty of administration, under the distresses of that heavy load of debt, which the war had brought upon us, to be as frugal as possible of the public money. It might have been thought, that such a measure deserved the thanks of every Englishman at least; and that even party itself might have rejoiced at the hearing of any thing having been saved out of that general wreck of our treasure. But this gentleman it seems thought that the ministers had saved too much. They had answered all the arguments of these foreign claimants: fraud and avarice were both silenced; but Mr. Conway still remained unsatisfied. And, without having heard them, censures the proceedings, and thinks, that too large deductions, greater than their proportion, had been made from the accounts of one German court, whose interest it just at that time became the fashion of party to espouse. This surely was differing, not with the public ministers only, but with the public itself, whose posterity,

sterity, I fear, for ages to come, must be burdened with taxes, to pay the interest of sixty millions of debt, incurred in the late reign for the sake of these several German courts, as each of them came in their turn to be so much our favourites.

READER, 'tis the distinguishing felicity of the present reign, that we are now under an English Government, and have a native Prince to rule over us ; and that any gentleman, in taking the part of foreigners against his country, is sure to be of a different opinion from his Majesty himself: who upon his appointing this commission for settling the German claims ; far from pleading either the bravery or the sufferings of his Electorate ; which surely were as great as those of any other German state, was pleased to declare it to be his royal pleasure, *that justice should be done to every German court ; but that favour should be shewn to none.*

OUR author frequently reminds his readers of his friend's great services in Germany ; and tells us, that he came from thence recommended to favour by a prince of that very court

court (c). His behaviour since shews how just an estimate Prince Ferdinand could make of mens characters and dispositions ; and, after having heard him plead the cause of this foreign court against his country, no one can doubt of his gratitude.

IN taking leave of this very erroneous assertion, *that it was only on one single subject, that the General differed with the administration* ; I can't help observing, that from the sameness of the mistake, the similitude of the stile, and the very peculiar tenderness of the expression, it is impossible not to be led to guess at the hand, from which we are to derive certain other articles, which appeared in the news-papers immediately after Mr. Conway's dismissal (d).

“ WE hear a certain general officer, who
 “ was lately turned out of his regiment ; and
 “ who is adored by the army for his bravery,
 “ humanity and integrity, has begged of all
 “ his friends not to express the least murmur
 “ or dissatisfaction on his account : as he is
 “ content with having served his country in
 his

(c) Page 14.

(d) The Gazetteer.

“ his profession, and in parliament, without
 “ enjoying the smallest gratuity. . A rare
 “ example of moderation, virtue, and disin-
 “ terestedness. May it be imitated !

“ IT has been said, that this gentleman,
 “ upon one question, voted with the Min-
 “ ority.

“ THE report gains credit, that six or seven
 “ more general officers, besides General Con-
 “ way have been dismissed from the service.”

THE mistake, the reader sees, is just the same. No one of the General's friends in parliament, could have been ignorant of his speech there; and hardly any of them therefore, beside our author, could have fallen into it. The sentiments in these paragraphs exactly agree with those of the Counter address; and for the manner, that in both is so singularly indearing, that one knows not where to find another artist, who could swell the notes of his praises to so high a pitch. How divine is the character of a General just turned out ! *Adored by the army for his bravery, humanity and integrity.* What a pattern of meekness and submission is here set before

H

us ?

us? *The General has begged of all his friends, not to express the least murmur or dissatisfaction upon his account.* What heart but melts with sorrow for such a rare example of moderation, virtue and disinterestedness? And, how devoutly must we all join in the pious prayer at the close? *May it be imitated!*

THE last quoted article: *The report gains credit, that six or seven more general officers, beside General Conway, have been dismissed from the Service,* I do not ascribe to our author. The writer of that paragraph probably knew it to be false at the time he sent it. That therefore is an infamous fallacy, of which no gentleman of character ought to be suspected. And though the report itself be of a like kind with that of our author's list of fifteen; yet, with that profound reverence, which he expresses for the spotless character of General Conway, it seems scarce possible for *him* to have thought of making any addition to the guilt of those, who turned him out. The most accumulated crimes cannot rise to a mountain of guilt high enough to equal this one. What are the sufferings of six or seven reprobate sinners, compared with those

those of the faint-like, the spotless, the adored General Conway ?

THE reader, I hope, will interpret nothing, which is said on this head, to the prejudice of the General's own character. I think him a gentleman of great abilities, of a very fine understanding, and of an amiable deportment. Nor would I in the least degree call in question his personal bravery. I will go farther, and cheerfully acknowledge, that among the Rochefort chiefs, I think him the least unequale of the three.

BUT a gentleman, who has the misfortune to be made the subject of party contest, has this singular disadvantage above other men, that he incurs the double danger of being hurt, not only by the accusations of his enemies, but by the injudicious commendations of his friends : and, like a wounded soldier lying between the two lines of battle, may be as effectually shot by his defenders, as by his enemies.

IN the case before us, it is scarce possible for an unprejudiced bystander, not to have remarked the very different light, in which

the General himself makes his appearance, from that in which his advocates have chosen to represent him. So little did his adoring friends regard his pious request, *not to express the least murmur or dissatisfaction upon his account*; that for ten days together after his dismissal, not a paper came out, without some inflammatory letter or article upon that subject. The perpetual repetition of invectives at length produced an answer: when this spotless General, whom his panegyrist had been holding out to us as a standard of disinterested virtue and resignation, came forth himself in an advertisement, to tell us, that he would cut the throat of any man, who should call him a timid and unenterprising General. Every gentleman, doubtless, has a right to shew himself to the world in what character he pleases: but when he himself chooses to appear in an advertisement with the fierceness of a lion, he will give us leave to laugh at his friends painting him with all the emblems of meekness. It had been better, surely, for our author to have consulted his original; that the piece might at least have preserved some appearance of justness.

But

But at present, how great soever may be his skill in the art of painting, he may, if he please, value himself upon the *beauty* of his portraits, but no one will compliment him upon their *likeness*.

Who was the writer of the letter in the Gazetteer, at which the General and our author, are so much offended, is to me a matter absolutely unknown; nor do I at all enter into the dispute between them. But as this is the first instance of a challenge being publicly given in the news-papers, they will give me leave to observe: that, if any gentleman in the papers shall impeach the personal courage of General Conway, that possibly may give him a right by the law of honour to vindicate his character as a private man; and to prove by a challenge, that he has as much personal bravery as his accuser. But personal courage in a private man, and bravery of enterprize in a General, are very distinguishable qualities, and the one does not necessarily imply the other.

FAR be it from me, however, to determine any thing about the principle, from which we are to derive the inactivity of the commanders

manders in the Rochefort expedition : Doubtless there are many other causes, beside Fear, which may prevent soldiers from doing their duty. The reader, perhaps, has in a former part (*a*) recollected the description, which the historian gives of Otho's (*e*) : *Miles alacer ; qui tamen Jussa Ducum interpretari, quam exequi, mallet.* I acknowledge myself to be an incompetent judge on that head : The only thing, which I pretend to know about it is, that nothing was done, *no attempt was made to land on the coast of France.* And when General Conway, in conjunction with other Generals, takes upon himself the charge of an important Expedition, upon which the publick had raised the highest expectations ; and those expectations are all disappointed : General Conway must expect that the publick will take notice of it, and give their opinion upon the behaviour of those Generals, with the same freedom, as they do upon the conduct of other men in publick stations.

'Tis the tax, which is ever laid upon great offices : gentlemen who will undertake them,
and

(*a*) Page 32.

(*e*) Tac. Hist. Lib. 2. cap. 39.

and appear upon the public stage, know that they must draw to themselves the public attention : and men will give their opinions upon what they see and hear.

WAS not the loss of all our hopes from Mr. Pitt's first and favourite scheme for the taking of Rochefort, an event as interesting to the public, as Mr. Conway's loss of his regiment? Surely then a general officer must be as answerable to the public for the failure of that Expedition, as his Majesty or his Ministers can be for his dismissal. Yet after the papers had for many days together been filled with the most injurious reflections upon other characters for turning him out, no sooner did the exorbitant praises given him upon that occasion, provoke any person to reply, but the General sends him a challenge.

Do then these gentlemen think, that they have an exclusive property in the papers? And that they ought to be used only as channels to convey to the public their extravagant panegyrics upon their friends, and invectives against their adversaries? Does the liberty of the press, for which gentlemen affect to appear so much concerned, in
order

order to make others believe, that it is in danger of being violated; does the liberty of the press consist in giving them a right to publish what they please on one side of a question, and to run a man through, that writes on the other?

I WOULD in every case abhor all personal reflections; and in this case, from the high opinion I have of Mr. Conway's private character, I am least of all in danger of being betrayed into them: but it may not be so easy for other men to catch the rapture, with which our author dwells upon his praises. Other men, who do not behold him as a spotless mirror of virtue, may perhaps ask, what there is in Mr. Conway's character so very sacred, as to demand so profound a reverence? And while reflections of the most abusive kind are every day thrown out on one side, it will be difficult to assign a reason, why other men have not as good a right to say, wherein they think Mr. Conway has been mistaken, or has failed in his duty, as he or his friends have to say, wherein they think Mr. Grenville or lord Halifax have been deficient in theirs.

For

FOR myself, though I enter not into the motive of these gentlemen's determining not to land at Chatelaillon, and am far from ascribing it to timidity, yet were the general's sword at my throat, I must still maintain my opinion, and say, that I thought he mistook his duty in that determination. And though I am not conscious of having any where in the least degree insinuated the want of courage; yet perhaps, the General himself, upon cooler reflection may agree with me, that this courage might have been expressed in a much happier manner, by landing and seeking to fight the King's enemies at Rochefort, than by offering to murder the King's subjects in Hyde Park.

When there is a minister, says our Author, (f) as virtuous as General Conway, and who has been only as much abused, I will allow that he has reason to harangue against invectives. And is he then really so great a stranger to the works of his friends? does he indeed entertain so very mean an opinion of his com-
 I *peers*

peers of the minority? ('Tis his phrase and not mine.) It had been better surely not to have discovered to us at least, that he thinks them all such very bad writers, as not to be worth his looking into: for it is impossible he should have read any of them, and not have met with more abuse of one minister, who is confessedly of an unexceptionable character, and as far from profligacy as Mr. Conway himself, than he will find in the writings against General Conway all put together. I shall not enter into any invidious comparisons between them; I wish that both parties could boast of more good characters, but wherein has Mr. Grenville come so very short of this mirror of perfection? or in which of the relative virtues, so largely ascribed to Mr. Conway, has he been found so very deficient? I will not combat this author's boasts of Mr. Conway's *most spotless character, of his unquestionable virtues as a man, a husband, a father, a subject, a senator, his conspicuous disinterestedness, his amiable modesty, his laborious attention, and his unquestionable courage in his profession*; only let not this overweening fondness for one man make him blind to every other man's good qualities.

BUT,

BUT, says our author (g), General Mordaunt commanded the Rochefort Expedition, and not General Conway; Does an inferior in command deserve to be punished for that miscarriage, when the Principal did not, but was honourably acquitted? And that very acquittal was a convincing evidence of the little good, which is to be expected from Courts martial: and strongly proved to the nation, that, if a general be but on the right side, be a favourite of the Commander in chief, and have not made his brother officers his enemies, he has very little to fear from a Court-martial of his friends. The decisions of such a set of old gentlemen might do for the time; and, as the army was then constituted, might by their authority be made to pass upon the public. The nation had long been estranged from conquest, and knew no otherwise. We have since been made wiser, and are become much better instructed by the more enterprising genius, and the great achievements of soldiers of another forme.

I 2

WHICH

WHICH of all our conquests had been ours, if the commanders, who so gloriously acquired them, instead of landing as soon as they came to the place of their destination, had declined to quit their ships, because they saw troops on shore to oppose them? and much more because they did not know, but that there might be troops behind sand-hills, though they did not see them?

EVEN our first Martinico Generals did not determine, that they would not land by day, because their enemies might see them; and then that they would not land by night, because they *must have a full view of the ground they were to land on* (g); and, at last, in their defence object against moon-light as worst of all. (b)

THE gallant General Draper tells us, that, upon their arrival in Manilla Bay; “ To increase, as much as possible, the visible
“ confusion and consternation of the enemy,
“ we determined to lose no time in the attack of the Port of Cavite, which was at
“ first

(g) Inquiry, p. 23.

(b) Page 17.

“ first intended, but proceed directly to the
 “ grand object. And the next day, having with
 “ the Admiral and other principal officers
 “ examined the coast, in order to fix upon a
 “ proper spot for landing the troops, artillery,
 “ and stores, the boats were that same even-
 “ ing prepared for landing.” What had become
 of the Expedition, if, instead of attacking
 the town directly, they had for six days to-
 gether held councils of war, to consider of
 fit places of landing; and fancied no one
 proper, but that where the ships might do
 the business for them? Does any man think,
 that Manilla had ever been our’s, if, instead
 of improving the first consternation, they
 had spent three days in examining of prison-
 ers, and debating whether the ditch round
 it was a wet or dry one? They asked them-
 selves no such question, while they were on
 ship-board; but went ashore to see; and
 found one part of it wet, and another dry. (i)

FROM

(i) The front we were obliged to attack, was defend-
 ed by the bastions, St. Diego and St. Andrew, with
 orillons, and retired flanks, a wet ditch, covered way,
 and glacis; the bastions were in excellent order, lined
 with a great number of brass cannon; but the ditch was
 not produced round the capital of the bastion of St.
 Diego, which determined us to attack it, and make our
 dispositions accordingly. Gazettee, April 19, 1763.

FROM Mr. Conway's own note-book, (*k*) it appears, that the one, who said there were eleven battalions, was Boneau a fisherman of L'Isle Diew, of whom Sir John Mordaunt observed, "*That Boneau was examined almost a whole day before the council, and he was so very indistinct and unsatisfactory, that the council was quite out of patience with him (l)*". Had not the public rather more reason to be quite out of patience with a set of gentlemen, who with so fine an army hanging on their resolves, could suffer the ardor of the troops to cool, and the enemy to recover from the surprize of their first arrival, while they trifled away almost a whole day, in trying to get information from a fisherman, upon a subject of fortification and engineering?

BUT General Conway was urgent in advising some attempt (*m*) and never acquiesced in abandoning the project, till it was too late to undertake it. And it is with
plea-

(*k*) Inquiry, p. 53.

(*l*) *Ibid.*

(*m*) Page 37.

pleasure I acknowledge, that it was upon this account I have said; that among the chiefs in that Expedition, I have always reckoned that General Conway was the least blameable of the three. But one of the reasons, which this General himself gives for his voting against the landing at Chatelaillon, on the 25th of January, was, that the fleet had been seen five days upon the coast: were it not better for our author not to remind us of a scheme given in on the 26th for landing in Oleron, attacking the castle on the south end of the island, and passing over from thence to the continent? Would not the fleet have been seen as many more days, by the time, when they should have landed in that island; attacked and taken the Fort of Oleron, and marched to the other end of it; there to be embarked, and relanded on the continent? Would they, at the end of so many more days circuit, have been nearer to Rochefort, than if they had landed the 25th at Chatelaillon, they might have found themselves, after a march of three hours? I forbear to say more: but let not the reader think, that I rest upon my own judgment, in supposing that the Expedition

dition

dition was ruined by that vote, not to land at Chatelaillon. I am founded in the observation by too good an authority, to be contested.

OUR author very deservedly mentions the praises of the General Waldegrave; he was most certainly loved and admired in his profession. If, as he seems to intimate, there was a friendship between the two Generals, so much the more is Lord Waldegrave's judgment to be regarded. He knew that General Conway had voted against the landing at Chatelaillon; yet he would not suffer his friendship to bias his opinion; or conceal his judgment upon a subject, in which the honour of his Majesty's arms, and the interest of his country, were so deeply concerned. And though our author justly observes, that he would not *deign to countenance a scribler in malicious insinuations*; yet there is a hand-writing of General Waldegrave's, which, being now become a part of our history, can never be erased. 'Tis the result of his judgment, upon hearing the whole evidence on the affair. " We conceive
 " another cause of the failure of the Expedi-
 " tion to have been, that, instead of attempt-
 ing

“ ing to land when the report was received
 “ on the 24th of January, from Rear Admi-
 “ ral Brodrick and the Captains, who had
 “ been sent to sound and reconnoitre, a
 “ a council of war was summoned and held
 “ on the 25th; in which it was unanimouf-
 “ ly resolved not to land : as the attempt
 “ upon Rochefort was neither advisable nor
 “ practicable. But it does not appear to us,
 “ that there were then, or at any time af-
 “ terwards, either a body of troops, or
 “ batteries on the shore, fufficient to have
 “ prevented the attempting a defcent in pur-
 “ fuance of the instructions figned by your
 “ Majesty; neither does it appear to us,
 “ that there were any fufficient reasons to
 “ induce the council of war to believe,
 “ that Rochefort was fo far changed in ref-
 “ pect of its ftrength, or pofture of defence,
 “ fince the Expedition was firft resolved on
 “ in England, as to prevent all attempts of
 “ an attack upon the place, in order to burn
 “ and deftroy the docks, magazines, arfe-
 “ nals, and fhipping, in obedience to your
 “ Majesty’s commands.

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 c
 “ AND we think ourselves obliged to re-
 “ mark upon the council of war, of the 28th
 “ of September, That no reason could have
 “ existed, sufficient to prevent the attempt
 “ of landing previous to that day, as the
 “ council then unanimously resolved to
 “ land with all possible dispatch.”

THE last clause in this report is still
 more remarkable: “ We cannot but look
 “ upon the Expedition as having failed,
 “ from the time, the great object of it was
 “ laid aside in the council of war on the
 “ 25th.”

THE reader here sees every thing, which
 I have said, confirmed by the deliberate
 judgment of General Waldegrave and the
 other officers, after the most impartial inqui-
 ry into the causes of the failure of that Expe-
 dition. I have now, therefore, done with
 the subject, and am sorry to have been forc-
 ed to say so much upon it. But when gen-
 tlemen take to fainting their friends, and
 holding them up for adoration, merely because
 they are legally and constitutionally dis-
 missed;

miffed ; they muft expect to hear fomewhat
 in return. General Conway has not indeed
 been one of our conquering Generals, nor
 poffibly the moft happy of our officers : but a
 man's worft enemies are fometimes thofe,
 who profefs themfelves his greateft friends :
 and under all his misfortunes, the General's
 evil genius never did him fo great a fpite, as
 when it fent him fo over zealous an advocate.

F I N I S.

