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Canada

Patterns of Peacebuilding:


An Analysis of the International Demands
for Peacebuilding Activities

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Introduction

The following analysis is an examination of peacebuilding activities in six recent or ongoing conflicts. The aim of the analysis is to gain insight into the international demand for peacebuilding activities, as well as understand the effectiveness of specific peacebuilding initiatives. To this end, the conflicts have been analyzed using the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee's (CPCC) Peacebuilding Activities Chart. The case-studies include Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan.

The results of the case-studies have been aggregated into a "Peacebuilding Patterns" document which follows this introduction. The study suggests that recent conflicts can be classified into a variety of different types. Peacebuilding activities within a particular type of conflict have a unique character which seeks to address the particular nuances or characteristics of that conflict type. When taken as a whole the case-study results also suggest that there is a particular peacebuilding template which reflects the relative importance of specific peacebuilding initiatives. The analysis concludes by suggesting that there is a specific niche within international peacebuilding activities in which Canada can play an important role.

Methodology:

The report was completed by first conducting a preliminary survey of approximately fifteen recent or ongoing conflicts. From these a sample was selected which represented a broad geographic distribution of cases, and a variety of the different peacebuilding challenges. In order to deal more completely with each case, the initial sample size of ten was reduced to six.

For each individual case material was gathered from a variety of sources including UN publications, and information posted on the Internet by agencies such as USAID, UNICEF, and the ICRC. One extremely useful resource in this regard was the Relief Web, an internet site which provides up to date information on the activities of a wide variety of relief organizations. Additional resources included think-tank publications, journal articles, and academic publications. As most of the case-studies are either recently resolved or ongoing conflicts, the availability of the latter was limited. Once adequate material was collected it was analyzed using the categories provided by the CPCC Peacebuilding Activities Chart. Peacebuilding initiatives which were related in the research material were classified using these categories. In some cases, no material for a particular category was found so that category was not included in the case-study. Once the available material had been categorized, the peacebuilding effort as a whole was analyzed in order to get some idea of which activities were the most important in terms of the success of the overall peacebuilding effort, and which activities were empirically linked.

Once the six case studies were completed, the results were then aggregated in order to get some understanding of the international demand for peacebuilding activity. The aggregation allowed certain conclusions to be drawn concerning the relative importance of the various peacebuilding activities, the relationship between conflict type and the character of peacebuilding activity, and the main areas of failure in these peacebuilding cases.

Executive Summary:

1. The cases analyzed suggest that there are three different types of conflicts to which peacebuilding efforts are applied. Post-Colonial conflicts are the result of the decolonization process during the 1950's-1970's and result in states which are military-dominated, suffer from human rights abuse, and have poor economic development. The conflicts are generally sustainable. Post-Cold War conflicts find their origins in the fall of the USSR and occur predominantly along ethnic or nationalist lines. They also involve high levels of human rights abuse and government capacity is limited by underdevelopment or destruction. The parties are highly dependent on regional support and therefore more vulnerable to regional pressures if surrounding states wish to end the conflict. Independent Conflicts find their origins within states and usually revolve around agrarian or economic issues, pitting the minority government and wealthy class against the poor majority. Regional influence is limited, the military usually uses terror as an instrument of control, and thus there are high levels of human rights abuse. The resolution of these conflict relies on domestic ripeness.
2. The particular characteristics of each type of conflict result in slightly different peacebuilding approaches. In each there are three distinct Tiers of peacebuilding initiatives, but the composition of these tiers differs according to the type of conflict. For Post-Colonial conflicts Tier 1 includes conflict resolution initiatives, humanitarian relief efforts, and physical security initiatives such as demobilization and disarmament. Tier 2 initiatives include the development of both government and NGO capacity and the development of a neutral police force and a neutral civil service. Elections are also included in Tier 2. The third Tier involves social and economic reconstruction. For Post-Cold War conflicts the pattern is similar with Tier 1 including conflict resolution, physical security and humanitarian initiatives. Tier 2 includes government and NGO capacity development, and the development of neutral police forces and civil services. Tier 3 initiatives include the holding of elections, as well as social and economic reconstruction. The first Tier of peacebuilding in Independent conflicts includes conflict resolution initiatives, elections, some physical security initiatives, and crucial economic and human rights provisions. Tier 2 includes the development of government and NGO capacity, in particular the formation of an independent judiciary. The third Tier includes demobilization and reintegration efforts and remaining economic and social reconstruction initiatives.
3. When these observations are aggregated, they suggest a particular peacebuilding continuum which ranks the various peacebuilding initiatives in order of importance. Tier 1 includes conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, and physical security initiatives. Tier 2 involves the development of government and NGO capacity, including the formation of police and military forces and of an independent judiciary. Tier 3 requires social and economic reconstruction efforts, the holding of elections, and the implementation of human rights initiatives.
4. Many of the peacebuilding efforts have been linked to the deployment of a peacekeeping

operation. In general peacekeeping missions focus on Tier 1 physical security initiatives such as supervising cease-fires or monitoring the demobilization and disarmament of combatants. Their value in this respect is significant. However, the inability of most peacebuilding efforts to implement the first Tier of initiatives has resulted in a high rate of failure. While this is not the fault of peacekeeping alone, the trend does suggest that problems of timing, coordination, and implementation of Tier 1 initiatives needs to be improved, particularly in terms of physical security initiatives.

5. In terms of Canadian Peacebuilding Policy, this study suggests that one of the most crucial areas of peacebuilding which has not been adequately addressed is the provision of training to assist in the development of government and NGO capacity - Tier 2 initiatives. This Tier provides the crucial link between the short term initiatives of Tier 1 and longer term initiatives such as economic and social reconstruction. Preliminary results of the CPCC Canadian Capacity Map suggest that Canada possesses a great deal of domestic capacity which can provide this government and NGO training. It seems prudent to match this Canadian supply with the international demand. To do so would significantly increase the success of future peacebuilding efforts.

Patterns of Peacebuilding:

Part I: Conflict Types and the Demands for Peacebuilding

It is possible to identify three general types of conflict from the cases analyzed in this study. The first is the post-colonial conflict which has a variety of specific characteristics and problems which are uniquely associated with the process of decolonization and the transition or attempted transition to independent administration. The second type of conflict can be referred to as post-Cold War conflicts which find its origins and peculiarities in the end of the bi-polar order and the retrenchment of the superpowers' respective spheres of interest. The third and final type of conflict which can be identified from this study is the independent conflict which does not find its origins and characteristics in systemic or international causes, but rather is focused inwards and occurs in a predominantly national, unilateral manner.

It should be noted that the three typologies are not mutually exclusive. Some conflicts reflect characteristics of two of the types. Similarly, not all conflicts of one type will necessarily display all the characteristics that are associated with that type. The conflict in Angola, for example, has at times displayed various characteristics which suggest that it has both post-colonial and post-Cold War origins.

It is also important to recognize that the typologies and patterns of peacebuilding which are developed below arise from a relatively small sample of case-studies. The conclusions which emerge should therefore be considered as preliminary ones which suggest areas appropriate for further analysis.

Type I: Post-Colonial Conflicts:

The origins of post-Colonial conflicts lie in the decolonization process which occurred predominantly during the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. During this time, the main colonial powers, under pressure from the non-aligned movement and due to "imperial overstretch" sought to reduce their overseas commitments. This led to a series of former colonies being granted independence quite rapidly, and without sufficient training or domestic capacity to assume full responsibility for the administration of a new state. The problems of this rapid changeover in governance were compounded by the presence of significant development challenges facing these new states. Similarly, unfamiliar European administration structures were applied to people who were more accustomed to alternative, traditional administration mechanisms. In terms of this study the conflicts which fit into this category are Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, and Cambodia.

In general these conflicts reflect certain characteristics. They are governed primarily by hardline military regimes which rely on force to keep order and ensure respect for the authority of the government. This then creates an environment in which there tends to be a high incidence of human rights abuse. The government structure is predominantly focused on the maintenance of its power base through force and this leads to neglect of other government ministries resulting in a low government capacity and low levels of economic development. These post-colonial conflicts also tend to stem from the power-seeking motivations of the government and opposition leaders. In general political motivations such as social justice or

free markets which resonated in the context of the Cold War and ensured super-power support have evaporated with the end of the bi-polar order. This type of conflicts is also characterized by its sustainability which is demonstrated by a protracted history and the continued availability of resources for the main combatants. They have the ability to find news sponsors or arms suppliers in order to continue their conflict. For the antagonists, this means that their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is significant, and therefore this type of conflict is more difficult to resolve than the other two types.

Type II: Post-Cold War Conflicts

The nature of conflicts which have arisen as a result of the Cold War are unique in that they have occurred primarily along ethnic, religious, or nationalist lines. They do not voice support for particular ideologies, and thus they have non-specific political agendas and are instead focused on the success of one "people" or clan over another. This leads to a high incidence of human rights abuse in the conflict against both combatants and civilian populations. The relatively recent outbreak of these conflicts, coming as they have with the fall of the USSR in 1989, means that they do not have the sustainability of post-colonial conflicts. In general they are reliant on regional powers for financial, material, and political support. The BATNA of the primary combatants is limited. This makes this conflict type more ripe for settlement because of the leverage that can be exercised on the combatants by regional powers. Most of these post-Cold War conflicts occur in states or regions where there is low government capacity and consequently low economic development, or where existing government capacity has been destroyed during the conflict. Example of this type include Tajikistan, Angola, and Bosnia.

Type III: Independent Conflicts

The primary defining characteristic of these conflicts is that they occur largely in isolation of regional powers and are not linked in any substantial way to the process of decolonization or the end of the Cold War. Ruling state apparatuses in such conflicts tend to be military regimes which are opposed by the majority of the people. The government often operates in a manner consistent with the perpetuation of its power and furthers the interests of a minority wealthy class. This results in terror-based rule and a high incidence of human rights violations. This is inflicted on the rest of the population which is predominantly poor and has an agricultural economic basis. There is a specific political agenda for the oppressed masses often focusing on agricultural reform or the alleviation of poverty. Government capacity is generally high. Due to general fatigue with the conflict the BATNA in Independent types of conflict is minimal, making them the most amenable to resolution. Examples include Guatemala, Columbia, and Haiti.

Consequences For Peacebuilding:

As a result of the specific characteristics of the three types of conflict, peacebuilding efforts seems to reflect a particular pattern for each of these types. Certain initiatives that are useful and effective in a post-Colonial conflict may not be as effective in a conflict which fits into the Independent category. This therefore has led to the development of general peacebuilding package to match a conflict type. Within this package particular initiatives can

be divided into three Tiers. Tier 1 initiatives, for example, are the most crucial and must occur first in order to allow a secure basis to be established for the remaining peacebuilding initiatives. Importance determines temporal location in the overall process, but all initiatives are required in order for the peacebuilding process to succeed. The terms used to refer to particular types of initiatives, such as physical security initiatives or social reconstruction initiatives, refer to the CPCC categorization.

Type I: Post-Colonial Conflicts

Tier 1

Conflict Resolution initiatives are essential to ending of post-Colonial conflicts. The success of such initiatives appears to depend on a combination of political will of the combatants to settle their differences through negotiation and also of the surrounding regional powers to use their influence to bring about the end of the conflict. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone, the influence of Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria was essential in bringing about negotiations between the RUF and both the NPRC and Kabbah government. Similarly, in Angola the Bicesse Accords were in large part facilitated by the involvement of Portugal as the former colonial power as well as the indirect involvement of the US and USSR. However, in both cases political desire domestically was also crucial in reaching a negotiated agreement. In Sierra Leone this came from the general population who demonstrated great resolve to see the elections process through - capitalizing on an opportunity provided by the NPRC ruling council. In Angola, in the Bicesse phase of the conflict, the commitment of both parties to peace as was indicated by the sixteen months of calm leading up to the elections.

Humanitarian relief initiatives also belong in Tier 1 because they are directed towards removing the destabilizing influence of large populations of refugees and IDP's. These initiatives generally involve the reintegration of such groups, following the provision of food aid, basic medical services, and adequate shelter. In both Angola and Sierra Leone this meant the grouping of refugees and IDP's in camps where such services could be centrally delivered. In both cases this was also done to ensure that the majority of the population could vote in the general elections, thus ensuring the legitimacy of the elected government.

Physical Security initiatives tend also to be implemented in the first tier. These included the disengagement of forces, the implementation of a stable cease-fire, and the demobilization and disarming of the combatants. This is designed to ensure that grievances can be voiced and addressed only through due political process and not through a return to arms. Disarmament is crucial in order to ensure that a party is not able to reject the political process, as UNITA did when it refused to accept the election results of 1992.

Tier 2

The second tier of initiatives which relies on the first involves the development of a national institutional capacity which is intended to assume responsibility for the solidification of Tier 1 initiatives and prepare for Tier 3 initiatives. This has tended to involve strengthening both government and domestic NGO capacity with the aim of ensuring that the government is able to exercise independent planning and leadership and that NGO's can

provide an oversight capacity for the activities of the government. Additionally, NGO's can assist the government agencies in implementation development programmes at the community level. Capacity development occurs in the fields of humanitarian assistance, reintegration, human rights monitoring, and the development of neutral police forces and civil services.

Elections are also included in this second tier, with the implementation of Tier 1 designed to establish conditions conducive to the democratic process. Once a new national government is elected, further peacebuilding initiatives can then occur.

Tier 3

The third tier of initiatives involves ones which are developed or planned to occur later in the peacebuilding process as they are reliant on the implementation of the previous two tiers. They included initiatives towards social reconstruction, economic reconstruction and development initiatives which are designed to be carried out by a combination of the developed government and NGO agencies.

Type II: Post-Cold War Conflicts

Tier 1

The peacebuilding initiatives of the post-cold War variety differ only slightly in form rather than focus from those that are suitable to post-Colonial conflicts. The main difference occurs in the nature of the conflict resolution initiatives. Because of the relatively recent nature of the conflicts and the general reliance of the combatants on regional support, the conflicts are relatively more amenable to resolution. Additionally, regional powers can have a disproportionately large impact on the success of negotiations. In Tajikistan for example, the involvement of Russia and Iran in the peace process was crucial to the eventual settlement. Similarly, in Cambodia the involvement of Viet Nam, Thailand, and Indonesia was very important to the eventual settlement. Generally, there is a lack of conflict resolution initiatives from the primary antagonists. Physical Security initiatives as well as Humanitarian initiatives also proved to be vital components of the first Tier of the peacebuilding process. In Tajikistan it is one of the main provisions of the recent peace agreement, and in Cambodia demobilization and disarmament provisions were partially implemented in the lead up to the elections.

Tier 2

The success of post-Cold War peacebuilding initiatives also depend on the development of an adequate government and NGO capacity which can assume the implementation responsibilities of the peacebuilding process. In Cambodia, certain NGO capacities were developed, such as a large human rights monitoring network and an active independent media. These however proved unsustainable because the parallel need for government capacity was not met. The government of Cambodia was divided along factional lines preventing the effective implementation of other crucial peacebuilding initiatives. This can be linked to the failure to demobilize the Cambodian civil service and reform it along national as opposed to factional lines.

Tier 3

The third tier of post-Cold War conflicts also involves the implementation of social and economic reconstruction initiatives. Elections can also be placed in this tier since they were not vital elements in the early stages of the peacebuilding process either in Cambodia or Tajikistan. The SNC in Cambodia was effective as a transitional authority and the elections were seen as the culmination of the peace process towards which other initiatives were directed. In theory, all that was to remain for Cambodian peacebuilding following the elections was the continuation of social and economic reconstruction programmes. In Tajikistan the issue of elections has not been a main issue in the early phase of peacebuilding.

Type III: Independent Conflicts

Tier 1

These types of conflicts are substantially different from the preceding two in their requirements for effective peacebuilding. In terms of conflict resolution initiatives, these do not rely on the influence of foreign states, but instead originate domestically. Foreign actors can encourage and facilitate this process, but the idea of the conflict being "ripe" for settlement is vital for a successful peacebuilding process. Elections are also a key element which must occur early on in order to establish credibility for the peacebuilding process. Physical security initiatives may be limited to the establishment of a stable cease-fire which then creates an environment of limited security in which early peacebuilding initiatives can be implemented. Other crucial Tier 1 elements include the incorporation of specific economic and human rights provisions in any negotiated settlement.

Tier 2

The second tier also involves the building of domestic capacity, but this predominantly must occur in the NGO sector in order to create mechanisms to balance the role of the government as well as assist it in the implementation of economic and social reconstruction efforts. Specific areas of capacity would include the development of an independent media, medical facilities, and organizations working in land reform or economic development. Government institutions, although relatively developed, would need to be reformed in order to reflect the new distribution of political power while retaining their capacity. Specific initiatives would include the formation of a neutral police force and an independent judicial system.

Tier 3

The third tier covers initiatives such as the demobilization and reintegration of combatants and civilians into the society. This relies on the prior implementation of Tiers 1 and 2. Similarly, this tier includes the reconstruction of the social and economic sectors. In Guatemala the national desire for reconciliation was such that some physical security initiatives could occur later in the peacebuilding continuum since a resort to violence was not a desirable option for most parties involved.

Part II: Forming a Peacebuilding Template

When looking at the case-studies as a group, a dominant peacebuilding template emerges which suggests a particular continuum of peacebuilding initiatives. Again three separate Tiers can be identified. Tier 1 initiatives must occur first followed by Tier 2 and then Tier 3. However, Tiers can overlap to a certain extent, and particular initiatives within a Tier are likely to be implemented simultaneously. The placement of a particular initiative within the continuum is a function of its relative importance at a particular phase of the peacebuilding process. Again, CPCC categories are used to classify the initiatives.

Tier 1:

Conflict Resolution:

In order to bring about an initial settlement, however tenuous or superficial, conflict resolution efforts must take place in order to get the peace process underway. In general this involves a combination of domestic desire for peace as well as international political will to resolve the conflict. This in turn means that regional powers will become involved and pressure the parties towards settlement.

Physical Security:

In order to create conditions which allow the implementation of further negotiation, capacity building, and economic and social reconstruction the next initiative which must occur is the establishment of a durable cease-fire. Following this, the demobilization and disarming of the combatants are essential factors which assist the confidence of the combatants towards the negotiation process, as well as improve the general security situation. Demining is also essential to ensure that humanitarian efforts can be safely carried out.

Humanitarian Relief:

The improvement of the security situation within a state means that humanitarian relief efforts can be more easily implemented, reach a larger proportion of the population, and assist in stabilizing the situation further. This is done by reducing population flows by providing food security, shelter, and medical care. These efforts then complement continued political negotiations and efforts at demobilization and disarmament.

Tier 2:

Government and NGO Capacity:

Initiatives such as the development of an NGO community or an expansion of government capacity can be achieved more easily and be more effective once hostilities have been stopped and there is an ongoing political process. While they do not rely on the prior achievement of Tier 1 initiatives, in the overall scheme of peacebuilding they are not as

crucial in the early stages of the process. Capacity development can include the provision of technical assistance to government ministries in economic areas, developing their ability to provide basic services to the population. Similarly it can include the development of a robust and effective NGO community in the fields of human rights, agriculture, and reintegration. Capacity building at this stage can also include the formation or reform of such components as a national judiciary, a new national army, and a neutral police force.

Tier 3:

Social Reconstruction:

Social reconstruction relies on a stable security situation to facilitate the return of IDP's and refugees as well as the demobilization of combatants. Reintegration programs for both rely therefore on a stable platform of Tier 1 initiatives. They also depend on the availability of an adequate government and NGO capacity which can assist in the implementation of reintegration, education, and health programmes. In order to be effective and sustainable this process must be a cooperative one, involving both international and national agencies. For this reason Tier 2 initiatives must occur prior to the implementation of Tier 3.

Economic Reconstruction:

In order to be able to design and implement suitable and sustainable economic regeneration projects, not only does a stable security situation have to be established, but the most basic needs of people have to be ensured. This means that economic reconstruction efforts are dependent upon the prior implementation of Tier 1 initiatives. Similarly, in order for there to be a cooperative process of development which involves both international and national agencies and institutions in economic development projects there needs to exist a capable network of government ministries and NGO's. This then relies on the prior implementation of Tier 2.

Within Tier 3 a symbiotic relationship is necessary between the implementation of economic and social reconstruction initiatives. Economic reconstruction relies on human manpower in order to implement specific development projects. This manpower must be provided by the reintegration of displaced persons and combatants. Similarly, reintegration programs are likely to be much more effective if they involve sustainable jobs which are immediately available following an ex-combatants' or refugees' departure from an assembly area or relief camp.

Elections:

In practice, elections have tended to occur in Tier 2 and in a particular conflict, such as Angola, the achievement of physical security initiatives has occurred with the next immediate goal being national elections. This trend however represents one of the main weaknesses of recent peacebuilding efforts. The attention that has been focused on them has meant that fundamental parts of the peacebuilding process have been omitted or delayed in favour of the democratic process. Consequently, in some cases this has meant that in the post-election period there has not been sufficient stability elsewhere in the society to ensure

that the peacebuilding process continued.

In five of the six cases studies completed in this study national elections were held. In two of these, namely Guatemala and Sierra Leone, elections were held early on in the peacebuilding continuum due to national desire for them. In the remaining three cases - Angola, Liberia, and Cambodia - the implementation of Tier 1 initiatives was conducted in order to permit the holding of elections. Elections in Angola were preceded by the Bicesse Accords and sixteen months of peace. In Liberia they were preceded by the deployment of the ECOMOG force which provided the necessary physical security conditions to allow the democratic process to proceed. In Cambodia the SNC was established in order to pave the way towards an elected government and the UNTAC mission was deployed in order to canton and disarm the individual factions.

In the case of Angola the rush to elections resulted in only a partial completion of the demobilization and disarmament process, thus making it easy for UNITA to reject the election results and return to the battlefield. In Cambodia, elections occurred without the required demobilization and re-creation of a unbiased, national civil service or the disarmament of the armed factions. This meant that the newly elected government was extremely fragile and had to cope with a continued insurgency by the KR. In Liberia the election results favoured the Taylor faction, arguably the strongest in the country. The demobilization and disarmament process had been reasonably effective, although the secure conditions for the elections were provided by the ECOMOG force. Arguably, had Taylor lost it is conceivable that he could have gathered his troops and returned to battle much like Savimbi did in Angola.

In all cases the election process was rushed through at the expense of other crucial Tier 1 and Tier 2 initiatives. This created significant problems in Angola and Cambodia with the ultimate result being the failure of the peacebuilding process. In Liberia, the fact that Taylor won the election meant that they were successful. If he had lost, it is likely that he also would have rejected the election results and regrouped his remaining military forces.

Considering this pattern it is possible that national elections, as a peacebuilding initiative, fit most appropriately into the third Tier. To hold elections without adequate security guarantees or stabilization of humanitarian needs, and without the previously developed government and NGO capacities to implement the elections results, can create a very destructive force within the overall peacebuilding process.

The perception of elections as a finalizing step in the peacebuilding process means that they have significant repercussions. They finalize political relationships such as power distributions which, for long term adversaries, can be difficult to accept. A particular faction which retains a favourable BATNA following elections is unlikely to respect their result. However, if the peacebuilding process, through the implementation of Tier 1 and 2 initiatives can sufficiently minimize or sour this BATNA, the antagonists will have no other alternative than to accept the election results.

Human Rights:

For the purposes of peacebuilding the term human rights must be separated into two categories. The first category refers to what in international law are known as non-derogable human rights. This term includes rights such as the right to life, liberty, security of person, freedom from torture, and freedom from slavery - the most basic, inalienable human rights.

The next category of rights includes those which international humanitarian law regards as secondary. These "secondary rights" can be temporarily suspended by the state and include such rights as freedom of expression and freedom of association.

For the purposes of this study and the placement of human rights initiatives in the continuum of peacebuilding it is essential to recognize that through the implementation of Tier 1 initiatives, the non-derogable, that is inalienable rights of the individual, will be preserved. The imposition of a cease-fire, the demobilization and disarming of combatants, and the implementation of humanitarian relief will remove the primary causes of human rights abuse - the conflict and the combatants.

Specific initiatives designed to relieve abuse of other secondary human rights are best implemented following the prior implementation of Tier 1 and 2 initiatives - that is they should occur in conjunction with the economic and social reconstruction efforts of Tier 3. To attempt to address the abuse of secondary human rights at an earlier stage is not only likely to be ineffective since the appropriate mechanisms such as government or NGO agencies will not be adequately developed, but will also threaten to undermine overall confidence in the peace process. Mechanisms such as truth commissions or the investigation and punishment of human rights abusers often end up focusing on combatants. Any political leader, general, or soldier is unlikely to submit to judgement or investigation while they still hold a rifle or the power to derail such initiatives. To address secondary human rights issues too early in the continuum may undermine the entire process, and should be delayed until a robust peacebuilding process is underway and seemingly irreversible.

There are of course exceptions. The development of an effective and neutral police force, which is a Tier 2 initiative, will require a complementary human rights initiative to educate and train the police officers to respect human rights themselves. In some types of disputes such as those that are considered Independent by the typology suggested above, human rights are a key issue which must be addressed within the first tier in order to ensure that the peace process is viewed by the parties as being credible. However, the results of this study suggest that the majority of peacebuilding initiatives concerned with human rights should occur in Tier 3 of the peacebuilding continuum.

The Relationship Between Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Operations:

In all six of the cases studied a peacekeeping operation was deployed to supervise or help implement various elements in the peacebuilding process. These deployments ranged from UN military observer missions such as UNMOT and MINUGA to more robust deployments of traditional blue beret peacekeeping forces in Cambodia under UNTAC and in Angola under UNAVEM II and III. Other peacekeeping initiatives involved regional organizations such as ECOWAS which deployed an ECOMOG peacekeeping force into both Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the CIS which deployed a peacekeeping force in Tajikistan.

While it is not within the scope of this study to analyze the interface between peacekeeping and peacebuilding the six case-studies do reflect an interesting relationship between the two. For peacebuilding purposes the deployment of peacekeeping forces focuses largely on the implementation of Tier 1 initiatives. The provision of physical security, from

basic tasks such as monitoring a cease-fire to more complex challenges such as overseeing the demobilization and disarming of entire armies, has involved a peacekeeping force in each case. As a peacebuilding tool, a peacekeeping operation is often the only way which such tasks can be implemented. The neutral and impartial identity of each peacekeeping force is often essential to reassure demobilizing combatants that their adversaries are also demobilizing. Similarly the deployment of peacekeeping forces throughout a country can assist in improving the overall security situation, thus facilitating tasks such as demining and providing humanitarian assistance.

When looking at the six case studies, it is interesting to note that in most cases where peacebuilding efforts failed, the failure occurred within the range of Tier 1 initiatives. In Sierra Leone the government was ousted in a coup and the ARFC/RUF coalition, using forces which were not disarmed in the demobilization and reintegration process, now control the country. In Cambodia, FUNCINPEC is at war with the CPP government and each is using armies which were not demobilized under UNTAC. In Angola, the failings of the Bicesse Accords led to continued conflict.

It is evident that the requirements of physical security initiatives lie solely within the realm of peacekeeping operations. There is no other mechanism which can implement the tasks of demobilization, monitoring cease-fires, and disarming the combatants. This observation does not imply that the failure of peacebuilding recent peacebuilding efforts has been the fault of the peacekeeping component. Instead, what has seemed to complicate the entire peacebuilding process is the desire to implement a variety of Tier 2 and Tier 3 initiatives at the same time. This has meant that the attention of the international community has been divided among a number of different projects, resources have not be directed towards the most crucial peacebuilding initiatives (a la UNAVEM II) and the result has been a series of ineffective and ultimately failed peacebuilding efforts.

Although this study has in part indicated the extreme complexity of peacebuilding efforts with the many problems of timing, implementation and coordination, it also suggests that greater effort should be directed towards recognizing that at different stages of the peacebuilding process some initiatives are more crucial than others. Accordingly, greater attention should be focused on ensuring that Tier 1 initiatives, in particular those within the realm of peacekeeping, be implemented with adequate resources and to such a degree that a solid platform is provided for the implementation of Tier 2 and Tier 3 initiatives.

Canada and Peacebuilding:

In looking at the three Tiers of peacebuilding the one in which there appears to be a Canadian niche is in the implementation of Tier 2 initiatives. This includes the development of government and NGO capacity through the provision of technical support, financial support, and training programs. This has proved to be the crucial elusive second stage of peacebuilding efforts which has not been adequately supplied by the international community. Attention has been focused elsewhere in the peacebuilding continuum, and this has meant that few peacebuilding experiences have been able to progress from Tier 1 through to Tier 3 and a sustainable peace and reconstruction process. In Cambodia the failure to develop adequate

government capacity was one of the key reasons for the failure of the Paris agreements. Similarly in Sierra Leone that limited capacity of the Kabbah government made it a relatively easy target for the ARFC. Clearly the demand for more peacebuilding focus on Tier 2 initiatives exists.

In terms of Canadian capacity, its most important asset is its reputation as one of the most stable and successful democratic societies in the world. For Canadians involved in peacebuilding initiatives this provides them with a certain operational credibility and national actors are more likely to respect peacebuilders which come from a country with a proven track record. This credibility is complemented by the fact that the preliminary results of peacebuilding capacity in Canada suggests that developing government and NGO capacity in other states is where many Canadian organizations have experience. It would seem appropriate then to encourage the expansion of this role, matching the international demand with the skills and expertise of Canadian organizations in order to improve a Tier of peacebuilding initiatives which has been underdeveloped in the past despite its importance.

This does not mean that other Canadian peacebuilding initiatives in other Tiers should be ignored. Canada will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in peacekeeping, and in the provision of humanitarian relief. Similarly, Canadian agencies have expertise in the field of economic reconstruction and social rehabilitation. However, it is desirable to orientate Canadian peacebuilding policy in a direction which recognizes the demands of current international peacebuilding efforts and meets these demands by utilizing the expertise and capabilities available within Canada. In this way Canada can make a substantial contribution in assisting war-torn states to continue on the path towards democratic and peaceful development.

Angola:

Period of Analysis: May 1991 to July 1997

Background:

The conflict in Angola can be divided up into four general phases. The first phase began with Portugal's decision to grant independence to its Angolan colony in 1974. As negotiations for independence began it became clear that three main parties were vying for power within the country - none of which were powerful enough to singlehandedly replace the Portuguese administration. These parties included the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

Independence in November 1975 was followed by an ineffective transitional coalition government that suffered from inter-factional rivalry. This rivalry turned into armed hostility, and as the conflict spread throughout the country each faction received external support; UNITA from the South African Government and the US, the MPLA from Cuba and the USSR, and the FNLA from Zaire. It was not until the 1980's that concerted efforts were made at ending the Angolan war, although in a roundabout fashion. The US, through its policy of "constructive engagement" sought to bring democratic change to South Africa. This required Namibian independence which in turn relied on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This grand strategy eventually resulted in the Angolan-Namibian Accords of 1988 which fulfilled the latter two goals.

The second phase followed the withdrawal of Cuba and South Africa from the Angolan conflict. The MPLA and UNITA, as the primary antagonists, continued to fight among themselves and the war effectively became internal, having been extricated out from under the influence of the Cold War. From 1988 until 1991 this civil war continued with one African mediated attempt at peace, the Gbadolite Accords, failing outright, as the commitment of both parties towards reconciliation was non-existent. UNITA was led by Jonas Savimbi, while the MPLA was led by Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

The Bicesse Accords of May 1991 presented Angola with its first real hope of peace, and represents the start of the third phase. Brokered by the three power "Contact Group", the US, Portugal and the USSR, the Bicesse Accords resulted in sixteen months of comparative peace in the lead up to national elections. The MPLA received the majority of the votes but, despite the fact that the UN had declared the elections generally free and fair, UNITA rejected the results and redeployed its army. The renewed conflict occurred with unparalleled ferocity, with conservative estimates suggesting that more than one thousand people per day were killed as a direct result of the war. Despite UN efforts at mediation, proposed cease-fires never materialized and the official, public commitment of the two parties to reconciliation seemed no more than political posturing to retain international credibility.

Fighting continued even as the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol was being negotiated and it was not until February 1995 that a stable cease-fire took effect. At this point the Angolan conflict entered its fourth and most recent phase. A complex plan of national reconciliation was put into effect, including the formation of a transitional government, the demobilization and reintegration of combatants, the formation of a national police force, and the creation of a joint national army. However, despite some political progress such as UNITA representatives taking their seats in the national parliament and initial moves by UNITA towards demobilizing its army, progress has now stalled. The UNITA leader, Jonas

Savimbi retains a 3000 strong force for his "personal security", sporadic fighting has continued, and the general security situation has worsened following a rise in demobilized soldiers turning to crime in order to support themselves. The United Nations has attempted to use economic sanctions to force UNITA to return to the fold of the peace agreement, but it appears that both UNITA and the government have been using the recent cease-fire to rearm themselves in preparation for continued offensives.

Conflict Resolution Initiatives:

The Angolan-Namibian Accords

Post-independence Angola found itself on the Cold War frontier between the US and the USSR, being pushed and pulled as each super power sought to ensure the creation of an Angolan government that was favourable to its interests. The first concerted efforts to resolve the conflict came about as part of the US grand strategy of bringing democratic transition to South Africa. In order to bring independence to the South African administered territory of Namibia, the US first had to work to remove Cuban troops from Angola. The conflict in Angola and Namibia were intimately linked. UNITA received support from the South African government as well as the US. The MPLA was backed by the USSR and Cuba. The Namibian independence movement, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), had its bases in southern Angola and received support from the MPLA. South Africa itself supported UNITA with both money and troops as it considered the deployment of Cuban forces and the threat of communism as a threat to its national interests. Thus US efforts became focused initially on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This withdrawal was supervised by the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I).

The removal of the Cuban threat then made South African amenable to settlement of the Namibian question and a gradual transition to independence for this territory became possible in December 1988. This overall settlement process was led by the US which mediated both between Angola and South Africa in the initial stages of the process, with the later inclusion of Cuba once the issue of Cuban forces became the key to the peace settlement.

The negotiation process itself began in 1983 and lasted until the eventual signing of the Angolan-Namibian Accords in December 1988. The first initial agreement that was reached occurred in 1984 with the signing of the Lusaka Accord between South Africa and Angola. South Africa agreed to withdraw its forces from Angola in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Cunene province in the south of Angola. A series of unproductive talks then occurred over the next four years. Finally, in January 1988, discussions in Luanda led to agreement on the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as part of an overall settlement. In addition, the superpowers jointly pledged their support for Namibian independence and supported the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This process culminated nearly a year later when a bilateral Angolan-Cuban agreement was signed regarding troop withdrawal and a tripartite agreement was signed between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba concerning the overall settlement in southwest Africa. It was at this point that the UN agreed to deploy the UNAVEM I mission.

The Bicesse Accords

During the second phase of the conflict, UNITA and the MPLA government retained enough military hardware to continue the conflict without foreign support. This ability led them to prefer armed conflict over a negotiated peace. This preference was demonstrated by the failure of the African mediated Gbadolite accords in 1989. A proposed cease-fire never took effect and hostilities quickly resumed, despite the involvement of Zaire's Mobutu and Zambia's Kaunda. A general lack of precision in the agreement - it was never set down on paper - led to a variety of irreconcilable interpretations of what had been agreed. Fighting continued until Portugal, the former colonial power, mediated a new round of talks in April 1990. These efforts were initially assisted by a low-profile US involvement but in August 1990 the US and USSR agreed to work together on the Angola peace process and subsequently sent their officials to attend the peace talks as observers. Negotiations centred on a potential cease-fire, national elections, and the role of the Contact Group in policing any resulting agreement. The US and USSR agreed to do so and the peace process consequently advanced. US President Bush met with Savimbi in late 1990 and the Americans and Soviets agreed to eliminate their respective arms shipment to the Angolan parties. Eventually in May 1991 the Bicesse Accords were signed following the implementation of a cease-fire. The Accords included provisions concerning the continuation of the cease-fire, national elections, and the demobilization of the armed forces with the subsequent creation of a new Angolan National Army (FAA).

The Lusaka Protocol

Despite nearly sixteen months of peace and a successful election process, Angola returned to war when UNITA refused to accept the results of the election. This renewed conflict continued until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. Mediated by the United Nations and with the continued involvement of the three nation Contact Group the Lusaka Protocol effectively represented a patching up of the Bicesse Accords in order to strengthen the peace process and correct perceived failings of the Bicesse provisions.

Agreement was reached concerning the quartering and demobilizing of troops, the integration of UNITA into the institutions of government and the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation which would reflect the electoral support received by each party in the 1992 elections. Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has been limited though UNITA delegates have, after considerable delay, recently occupied their seats in the National Assembly. Demobilization has occurred half-heartedly and UNITA's commitment to the process appears disingenuous. Many of its demobilized troops included peasants recruited to pretend that they are UNITA fighters. Similarly attempts to demobilize and disarm the civilian population have met with limited success. The UN has attempted to force UNITA to comply with the Protocol through a series of economic sanctions, most significantly on petroleum. However, UNITA enjoys revenues from its diamond mines at an estimated half a billion dollars a year so the threat of sanctions is limited and the UN demands have accordingly lost much of their credibility.

Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance:

Following the breakdown of the Bicesse Accords, the need for humanitarian relief in Angola reached new heights. The intense fighting meant that the security of aid workers was often directly threatened by both parties and relief supplies were delivered only as security conditions allowed. This meant that for two years until the cease-fire in 1994 some portions of Angola, particularly UNITA controlled areas, received no humanitarian aid. By September 1994 an estimated 3.7 million Angolans, mostly internally displaced persons (IDP's) had been affected by the fighting and needed relief supplies. During this time the distribution of assistance was limited to basic medicines, food aid, limited vaccinations, and blankets. The mining of roads meant that much of the relief supplies needed to be airlifted to their intended recipients. One of the triumphs of the humanitarian community was the provision of essential relief supplies to government controlled cities which had been isolated inside UNITA held territory in 1994. Through the airlifting of supplies the humanitarian community provided a lifeline to these besieged cities.

In general, the relief efforts among UN agencies, NGOs and bi-lateral donors were coordinated by the UN Humanitarian Coordination Assistance Unit. On the ground a variety of feeding centres were established close to needy populations from which relief supplies and services were delivered.

The humanitarian situation improved somewhat with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol and the eventual establishment of a cease-fire in March 1995. More sections of the country were able to be reached by aid agencies and thus relief efforts as a whole were expanded, though the types of activities remained limited to the provision of emergency food supplies and medical services. During this time a significant amount of effort was directed to coping with measles epidemics brought on by the seasonal rains. In January 1995 a Humanitarian Coordination Group, consisting of UN agencies, NGOs, and the Angolan Government's Ministry of Social Affairs, was formed in order to look at the overall humanitarian situation in the country and define humanitarian priorities.

The next stage of humanitarian operations came with the deployment of the UNAVEM III peacekeeping operation. An improved security situation and better road access meant that a larger percentage of the population could be reached and medical services could be expanded. By October 1995 the emphasis of international agencies and local NGOs had shifted to focusing on the return of IDP'S and the repatriation of over 300,000 refugees in neighbouring states. The onset of the planting season meant that seeds and tools were also increasingly distributed. In 1996 over one million people remained displaced and humanitarian efforts were forced to continue the distribution of essential goods and services rather than focus on longer term integration. Their tasks became more difficult as UNITA again placed restrictions on convoys and relief flights.

In early 1997 relief efforts became focused on the reintegration of former combatants, in an effort to avoid the problems which had plagued the implementation of the Bicesse Accords. These initiatives included the reintegration of the dependents of soldiers as well as the provision of basic services to areas where large influxes of returning IDP's were expected. Due to a low projected agricultural output, basic food provision services are expected to continue although the activities of the HACU will be scaled back to reflect the overall smaller degree of UN involvement and the withdrawal of UNAVEM III in September 1997.

Physical Security:

I. Post Bicesse:

The Bicesse Accords included provisions for a cease-fire, the demobilization of both government and UNITA troops, the formation of the FAA, and a "triple zero" option in which the government and UNITA both agreed not to purchase new weapons. The implementation of the Accords was to be carried out by a Joint Political-Military Commission which was comprised of senior representatives of both the government and UNITA. The three nation Contact Group sent representatives as observers and the UN was an "invited guest". The cease-fire was monitored by another Joint Commission made up of representatives of both sides as well UN representatives. A third Commission was responsible for the formation of the FAA which was to be trained by Britain, France and Portugal.

The role of the UN during this process was very limited. Although UNITA had sought a strong UN presence, the Angolan government preferred to limit the UN role so as to better protect its sovereignty. This meant that the UNAVEM II operation was restricted to monitoring and verifying a series of demilitarization measures. To compound problems UNAVEM II observers were late in being deployed from New York and, because of limited personnel and financial resources, the operation was stretched to breaking point as it attempted to carry out its duties. At the time of its initial deployment UNAVEM II had only 350 military observers and 90 police observers with which to carry out its duties of monitoring and investigation.

Cease-fire:

Despite problems with the deployment of the monitoring mechanism the cease-fire generally held across most of Angola for the year prior to the elections in October 1992. The two forces disengaged as agreed. This can be attributed, in large part, to the desire of the parties to settle the conflict by ballot rather than by bullet.

Demobilization:

The demobilization of the two armies was the main achilles heel of the Bicesse Accords. In total over 185,000 troops had to be demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated back into Angola society. The FAA was to be comprised of 50,000 individuals selected from the two forces. The assembly areas in which troops were to be cantoned were poorly prepared with inadequate shelter, food, and water provisions. The government proved unwilling to provide the necessary transportation and food for the assembled troops which in turn led to rioting among its soldiers. They were protesting the poor camp conditions and the slowness of the overall demobilization process. Their discontent threatened a spontaneous, uncontrolled, demobilization.

UNITA leaders refused to demobilize their troops, citing the fact that inadequate preparations had been made in the assembly areas. In addition they viewed the plans for the reintegration of their soldiers into civilian troops as poor. UN access to UNITA controlled territory was restricted and so there was effectively no monitoring of UNITA troop movements. Nevertheless, as elections approached UNITA demobilized portions of its forces.

The demobilization and reintegration process was supposed to have been completed

before the elections, which were scheduled for September-November 1992. By June 1992, it was reported that 85 percent of UNITA troops were in the assembly areas as well as 37 percent of government troops. By October the UN claimed that nearly 100,000 government troops had been demobilized. However, there were continual accusations and counter-accusation that each army was in fact keeping troops in reserve.

Following the national elections and UNITA's loss, the incomplete demobilization process made it easy for Savimbi to reassemble his army and return to the battlefield, which he did in the last few months of 1992.

Police:

The formation of a neutral national police force was also a failure. The Angolan government used this opportunity to reassemble segments of its armed forces under the guise of the new Rapid Intervention Police. The force received significant amounts of training and substantial resources were made available to it. However, it was a far cry from the neutral police force envisaged in the Bicesse Accords. It was trained by Spain's notorious Guardia Civil and was given the nickname "the Ninjas". Not surprisingly, its neutrality was a major source of contention between UNITA and the government.

National Army:

The resources that were made available to the Rapid Intervention Police meant that the new army was deprived of adequate facilities for its soldiers. This problem was compounded by the fact that the Angola military was also illegally selling off government property that would otherwise have been used by the new military force. Despite the official inauguration ceremony for the new FAA in September 1992, there was no effective force established. As soon as UNITA withdrew from the peace process its generals were removed from the FAA and redeployed along the frontlines against the government forces. The FAA became the new government army.

II. Post-Lusaka:

The Lusaka Protocol was effectively a supplementary agreement designed to strengthen the perceived shortcomings of the previous Bicesse Accords. It also contained provisions for the implementation of a new cease-fire, but more importantly set down precise provisions concerning the quartering of the armed forces from both sides, the selection of troops for the new national army, and the demobilization of the remainder. A Joint Commission was again formed to oversee the implementation of the political-military agreement.

Cease-Fire:

Although the Protocol was signed in October 1994, a cease-fire between the two forces did not materialize until February 1995, prompting the deployment of the UNAVEM III peacekeeping operation. As the peace-keeping force gained a foothold in Angola the cease-fire was stabilized. However, the bulk of UN forces were kept in reserve only to be deployed once the two armies had disengaged. By April-May 1995 the cease-fire was deemed effective enough to justify the further deployment of UNAVEM III police and military forces.

Demobilization:

In early March 1995 the Demobilization and Reintegration office of the UN's Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (HACU), together with UNAVEM, set up a committee to examine the needs for quartering sites and the provision of critical services such as health care, sanitation, and food. The quartering process did not begin until November 1995, with the preceding months spent selecting and establishing the sites. UNITA forces were to be held in the quartering sites while the government forces were to return to their barracks. Once in the assembly areas, soldiers were registered on a computerized information system, issued with identification cards and given a hygiene kit. Soon after this process began however UNITA announced that its demobilization had been suspended. As of January 1996 only 693 UNITA troops had been registered. The camp construction had been completed, with the necessary UN and NGO agencies ready to begin support services, but there were no troops to assist.

Nearly one year later, the demobilization of UNITA had progressed slowly, with the significantly lengthened demobilization period putting strains on the support network that was in place. Progress that was made in demobilizing UNITA troops was worthless when it became evident that UNITA had purposely recruited peasants and non-essential members of its militia forces to pretend to be demobilizing troops. In effect both the government and UNITA used the period of cease-fire to restock themselves with military hardware in preparation for a new offensive. Currently the UNAVEM III force is serving as a buffer between the two armies. In government controlled areas security problems have increased as demobilized soldiers have deserted their barracks and turned to banditry in order to support themselves.

National Police:

Progress towards the formation of a new Angolan National Police force (ANP) did not occur until January 1996 when UNITA delegates resumed negotiations concerning its formation and allocation of command posts. One year later only 625 UNITA police had been selected for inclusion into the ANP though nearly 5000 UNITA police had been gathered in quartering areas. UNAVEM's CIVPOL contingent was responsible for the oversight of the quartering and selection of ANP personnel. The government's Rapid Intervention Police were also quartered in assembly areas and as of June 1997 its demobilization was ongoing. The sections of the ANP that had been formed and were operating in Angolan society were reported to be involved in a considerable number of civilian abuse incidents which were being investigated by CIVPOL.

National Army:

The formation of the new FAA also ran into similar problems. Due to the slow pace of demobilization only a limited number of troops were available for selection into the new army. In June 1997 only 10,000 UNITA personnel had been selected out of an expected contribution of around 26,000. UNITA continued to retain most of its battlefield command infrastructure which led to further questions regarding its commitment to the demobilization process.

Demining:

Early in 1994 a nation wide mine awareness campaign was launched by the UN through the mass media. The UN's Mine Action Office also began dissemination services to the Angolan public, conducted minefield surveys, and began training of mine clearance instructors and technicians through its Training School. This centre worked in conjunction with the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROE) which conducted its own demining program. Mine awareness programs were conducted throughout Angola by UNICEF and a variety of international and local NGOs.

Following this early initiative considerable efforts were made in restoring the viability of roads and communities in battlezones, primarily to allow the safe deployment of UNAVEM III units. These initiatives were a cooperative undertaking which included UN units, combined FAA/UNITA units, a private South African company MECHEM, and four NGOs.

Much of the gains made by these demining initiatives, including the clearing of large portions of roadway throughout Angola, have recently been reversed as the two sides have both been re-laying mines.

Disarmament of Civilians:

One area that had been left out of the Bicesse Accords but was felt to be essential to the stability of Angola was the disarmament of civilians. Accordingly, suitable provisions were made in the Lusaka Protocol. Implementation however has not been as successful as was originally intended. The Angolan government is responsible for the initiative and, despite the formation of a special section of government to cope with the issue, progress has been negligible. The programme lacks any material or financial incentives to encourage the population to hand in their weapons.

Human Rights:

Following the breakdown of the Bicesse Accords, human rights initiatives were restricted to coping with the effects of the hostilities. This primarily meant ensuring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians. This role was carried out by organizations such as the ICRC and some local human rights groups. Specific programmes included dissemination seminars which educated battlefield commanders and soldiers in international humanitarian law. Similar efforts were also made with the civilian population. UN activities during this period in the lead up to the Lusaka Protocol were restricted to monitoring and investigating human rights abuses.

Following the deployment of UNAVEM III and its CIVPOL contingent, the UN was better positioned to take a more active role in the human rights field. The UN police monitored the activities of the ANP to ensure that its members operated in a manner consistent with humanitarian law. CIVPOL also visited prisons and detention centres to ensure adequate treatment was provided by the Angolan government to its prisoners. This monitoring role was assisted by the Human Rights Component of UNAVEM III which provided orientation for members of CIVPOL on human rights in order to increase the effectiveness of their monitoring efforts.

The UN also held a series of seminars, chaired by its Special Representative, with the aim of familiarizing government officers with the role of the Lusaka Protocol in the

protection of human rights and on the UN's role in this area.

Despite these initiatives and the limited formation of the ANP, human rights abuses have continued to occur in Angola over the last few months. Perpetrated by government forces as well as UNITA and ANP officers, civilians have been arbitrarily detained, harassed at military checkpoints, and physically abused. With the expected scaling down of the CIVPOL component as UNAVEM III is gradually withdrawn, progress in the human rights field is unlikely.

Economic Reconstruction:

The failure of the Bicesse Accords and the intense fighting which followed meant that the scope for any significant economic rehabilitation effort was severely limited. During this period UNAVEM II engineering units were able to conduct some bridge reconstruction and road rehabilitation. Limited agricultural rehabilitation was possible through the provision of seeds and agricultural tools to returning IDP's and refugees following the signing of the Bicesse Accord and the lead up period to the elections. Such activities were conducted under the auspices of the HACU.

Post-Lusaka

Picking up the pieces of Angola's economic infrastructure fell largely on the shoulders of UNAVEM III as they were forced to rebuild bridges and roads once again. Demobilization and economic rehabilitation were seen as two sides of the same coin, each dependent upon the other. Just as soldiers need job, the economy needs employees. In late September 1995 the Brussels Summit was held which brought together the Angolan government, the UNDP, the EU, western governments, the IMF, and the World Bank. The main item on the agenda was the reconstruction of Angola. However, any major initiatives were put on hold as both the IMF and World Bank required significant evidence of economic commitment and reform on the part of the government prior to the provision of debt relief and investment. At this stage the ability of the Angolan government to meet such demands was questionable.

Some limited economic reconstruction initiatives were begun, including a program conducted by the Agency for the Co-ordination of Relief and Development (ACORD). It set up training programs, credit and seed loans to local communities. USAID has also continued its involvement in Angola implementing a \$500,000 Agricultural Recovery Program designed to increase farmer productivity and develop agricultural technology. It is working in cooperation with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research and a variety of implementing NGOs, including World Vision. Much of the economic development has been limited to towns and cities in government controlled areas along the coast. These areas have tended to be more stable and so longer term programmes have been implemented. There has been virtually no economic reconstruction conducted by international agencies in UNITA's territory, due to the tight control placed on it by Savimbi.

Social Reconstruction:

Reintegration:

The reintegration of refugees and IDPs during the various phases of the Angola

conflict has been extremely problematic. Following the signing of the Bicesse Accords, significant numbers did return to their places of origin though many remained unable to because of a lack of transportation and the dangerous conditions of most roads. Those that had resettled were quickly sent fleeing again once hostilities recommenced.

Following the Lusaka Protocol, many refugees remain sceptical of the peace, having been proven wrong once before. Consequently, many of the IDPs are not expected to return to their places of origin. For those that have attempted to return, agencies such as the WFP and the HACU have set up transit camps which provide temporarily resettlement. Similarly, international aid agencies have liaised with local municipalities in order to prepare for the resettlement of IDPs and ensure the suitability of basic services and local capacity. ACORD has implemented a program of settlement in secure locations, providing basic infrastructure, income, and housing. However, continued scepticism surrounding the peace prevents any longer term initiatives being implemented.

Recently, the Angolan government has launched a socio-economic programme aimed at reducing inflation, establishing effective monetary control, limiting the state budget, and unifying foreign exchange rates. With the help of UNDP it is planning a programme of economic management to assist its main economic institutions, and has agreed to establish an Inter-Ministerial working group which will advise the government as well as conduct negotiations with the IMF and World Bank.

Child Welfare:

Significant resources were directed towards the reintegration of child combatants during both attempted demobilizations of the two armies. A series of specific programmes were set up within the assembly areas in order to cope with under-age combatants. The UN and its NGO partners provided tracing services in order to reunite these children with their families. The first attempt failed as most child fighters return to their units once hostilities began. As of March 1997 over 2000 UNITA child-fighters had been demobilized in the second attempt but efforts have become complicated by the limited access to UNITA controlled areas and incidents of humanitarian personnel working on tracing being harassed by UNITA troops.

Governance and Institutional Capacity Building:

Elections:

The elections in 1992 could not have occurred without international assistance. Although the MPLA government remained responsible for the administration of the country in the lead up to the elections, including UNITA held territory, immense logistical difficulties could not have been overcome without the assistance of the UN and US. The United States contributed \$5.2 million in electoral assistance. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was responsible for the development and distribution of voter information literature, as well as the financing and training of six teams of Angolan voter awareness trainers who were to educate the population about the elections. IFES also fielded 39 electoral observers. The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducted pre-election assessments.

The UNDP was responsible for the coordination of international election assistance, working in cooperation with the Angolan National Election Commission which held ultimate responsibility for the election process. Election observers were provided by UNAVEM and a variety of NGO'S. In total more than a dozen international donors participated in election preparations.

Within Angolan politics the MPLA Angolan People's Assembly undertook a series of reforms in order to permit the elections to proceed. These included the legalization of other political parties, extensive amendments to the constitutional law, the approval of a electoral law, and the setting up of the National Election Commission. Many of these reforms occurred after consultations with UNITA, and were subsequently ratified by the People's Assembly.

Institutions:

Through its work with a variety of international agencies the government of Angola has received a substantial amount of technical support. This support has been provided in the fields of electoral preparation, economic reform, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and the formation of new military and police forces. The development of government institutions has occurred simultaneously with the development of a large network of Angolan NGOs. There are currently around 300 local NGOs with various areas of expertise which have all been brought under the umbrella of a National NGO Federation (FONGA). This federation includes 40 UNITA officials and some NGO's which operate within UNITA held territory.

USAID, through its implementing partners Voice of America and Search For Common Ground has provided journalistic training in order to increase the development of an independent media in Angola. Funding has also gone to the Conflict Management Group which has trained Angolan church groups, NGOs, and community leaders in conflict resolution techniques.

Capacity building in particular fields such as health and education has been limited due to the outbreak of fighting following the Bicesse Accords and the seemingly failed peace process of Lusaka. Facilities within government controlled towns have, in general, been developed to a greater degree than those in UNITA territory.

Peacebuilding Training and Trainers:

Some training initiatives have occurred in Angola. UNAVEM II units, for example, trained local military teams in demining techniques, eventually creating 3 operational demining brigades. Similar efforts occurred under UNAVEM III. The UN Mine Action Office has trained a number of mine clearance instructors who have now come under the administration of INAROE. Similar training initiatives occurred in the field of electoral administration. IFES was involved in training six teams of Angolan voter awareness trainers who were subsequently able to reach 30,000 other voters prior to the 1992 elections. Angolan NGOs have also benefitted a great deal from their work with international aid groups, particularly in the field of emergency relief, reintegration planning, and human rights monitoring.

Evaluation:

Given the outright failure of the Bicesse Accords and the apparent failure of the Lusaka Protocol it is possible to get a reasonably accurate idea of the relative success or failure of the various peacebuilding initiatives. The **conflict resolution initiatives** were effective in at least getting the MPLA and UNITA into the negotiating process with the eventual emergence of the Bicesse Accords. For this to occur, the combined influence of the US, USSR, and Portugal was needed. The UN was prevented, largely because of MPLA demands, from playing a larger role in the peace process. This had significant repercussions on the **demobilization and reintegration** phase of the Accords. These initiatives clearly failed as there was insufficient planning and too few resources provided by the international community for the establishment of assembly camps and reintegration programs for ex-combatants. When UNITA eventually rejected the election results, Savimbi had little difficulty in reassembling his disgruntled troops and heading back into the bush.

One of the main problems which caused difficulty in implementing the Bicesse Accords resulted from the fact that the Joint Political and Military Commission held ultimate authority for the implementation of the Bicesse provisions. It operated by consensus under the alternating chairmanship of the two parties. This meant that there was no clear leadership or decision making, and issues of contention were normally settled in such a way as to leave them unresolved. The UN had no authority to operate outside this framework, and the Commission remained dependent on the good faith of the parties.

Given the scant resources of UNAVEM II it was a small miracle that the **elections** were able to be held at all. With the cooperation of the MPLA government via the National Elections Commission and support from the US, the elections themselves went off relatively smoothly. The main problem came with their timing. During the negotiating process the date of the elections had been negotiated on and agreed to by the parties. It was therefore not possible to alter it without another round of negotiations. This meant that elections went ahead despite the inadequate demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the fact that the new FAA had yet to be formed. Given the poor coordination and implementation of these crucial peacebuilding initiatives, other initiatives in the **economic and social spheres** had no time to become established before the resumption of fighting. Similarly, the **humanitarian relief efforts** which had been effective until this point suffered a serious setback as hundreds of thousands fled their homes once again.

Following the Lusaka Protocol there have been similar shortcomings although for different reasons. **The demobilization process**, despite the significant amount of planning and resources which have gone into it, appears to have failed. The government and particularly UNITA seem not to be committed to the peace process. UNITA's efforts towards demobilizing have been aimed at deception and the government forces are eager to return to the battlefield in order to press the military advantage they held prior to the signing of the Protocol. This lack of demobilization has meant that many IDPs and refugees are suspicious as to the durability of the peace and are thus hesitant to return to their homes. For this reason, **economic and social rehabilitation initiatives** have been limited to short term projects, rather than longer term development. The **education, human rights and medical sectors** are also suffering as a result of the uncertain peace. In very basic terms it seems that the parties were committed to peace during the Bicesse process but the international

community failed to back them up. Now the situation is reversed. While the international community has committed substantial resources to Angola, the commitment of UNITA and the government to peace is lacking.

There are some signs of encouragement for Angolan society. UNITA deputies recently took their seats in the National Assembly, although Savimbi remains at his base in the bush. In terms of **institutional and civil capacity**, the NGO community in Angola has become very diverse with a number of highly effective agencies which cooperate with international NGOs. Similarly some **economic development** has occurred in the more stable government controlled areas. The capabilities of the Angolan government have increased substantially following their cooperative involvement with UN agencies, the IMF, World Bank, and other international organizations. Assuming that this capability remains intact in the event of UNITA's inclusion into the government, Angola will be well able to take advantage of peace and focus on rebuilding itself.

Acronyms:

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| ACORD: | Agency for the Coordination of Relief and Development |
| ANP: | Angolan National Police |
| CIVPOL: | Civilian Police (UN) |
| FAA: | Angolan National Army (post-Bicesse and post-Lusaka) |
| FONGA: | Angolan National NGO Federation |
| FNLA: | National Front for the Liberation of Angola |
| IDP: | Internally Displace Persons |
| IFES: | International Foundation for Electoral Systems |
| IMF: | International Monetary Fund |
| INAROE: | Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices |
| IRI: | International Republican Institute |
| HACU: | Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UN) |
| MPLA: | Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola |
| NDI: | National Democratic Institute for International Affairs |
| SWAPO: | South West African People's Organization |
| UNAVEM: | United Nation's Angola Verification Mission |
| UNDP: | United Nations Development Program |
| UNICEF: | United Nations Children's Emergency Fund |
| UNITA: | National Union for the Total Independence of Angola |
| USAID: | United States Agency for International Development |
| WFP: | World Food Program |

Selected Timeline:

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|-----------------|--|
| November 1975: | Angolan Independence granted |
| January 1988: | Luanada discussion result in agreement on Cuban withdrawal |
| December 1988: | Namibian Independence |
| December 1988: | Angolan-Namibian Accords signed |
| January 1989: | UNAVEM I deployed |
| May 1989: | Gbadolite Accords signed |
| April 1990: | Portugal begins mediation |
| May 1991: | Bicesse Accords signed |
| June 1991: | UNAVEM II deployed |
| October 1992: | National elections |
| November 1992: | Savimbi returns to battlefield |
| November 1994: | Lusaka Protocol signed |
| January 1995: | Humanitarian Coordination Group formed |
| February 1995: | UNAVEM III deployed |
| February 1995: | Cease-fire established |
| September 1995: | Brussels Summit |
| September 1997: | Final withdrawal of UNAVEM III units |

Cambodia

Period on Analysis: December 1987 to July 1997

Background:

Cambodia has long suffered from foreign occupation and civil war. Following the totalitarian regime of Pol Pot in the late 1970's, a Vietnamese invasion meant the 1980's were a period of civil war between the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) and a coalition opposition made up of Pol Pot's Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), the Khmer People's Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). This coalition was led by Prince Sihanouk while Hun Sen became leader of the CPP in 1985. The sides reflected the larger Cold War divisions with the CPP government supported by the USSR and Viet Nam, and the US and ASEAN nations supporting Prince Sihanouk.

In December 1987 Hun Sen and Sihanouk met for talks in France and gradual progress was made towards a general peace agreement. In July and August 1989 the Paris Peace conference was convened and established a broad strategy for peace, although it did not reach a comprehensive settlement. In late September 1989 Viet Nam withdrew its troops from Cambodia. The five UN Security Council nations met to discuss the situation as part of the ongoing post-Cold War *rapprochement* and eventually they reached agreement on a framework which foresaw a major role for the UN in supervising a transitional Cambodian administration involving all four factions. This proposal was accepted by the parties and talks proceeded, with the assistance of France and Indonesia, towards a proper peace agreement among the Cambodian factions. In April 1991 a general cease-fire was established and in October 1991 the Paris Peace Accords were signed by the factions, the UN, and a number of other mediating nations.

The UN, through its UNAMIC and later UNTAC deployment, sought to reinforce the peace process by providing peace keepers, organizing and supervising elections, and undertaking a series of socio-economic reforms. In late May 1993 national elections were held resulting in the formation of a Constituent Assembly which drafted a new national constitution. Prince Sihanouk was elected king and head of state by the Assembly and he appointed Prince Ranariddh of FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen First and Second Prime Ministers respectively. At this point UNTAC's mandate ended, and the last peacekeeping troops were withdrawn by December 31, 1993.

Factional rivalry characterized Cambodian politics following the withdrawal of UNTAC. The PDK continued its insurgency from the jungles along the Thai-Cambodian border, while in Phnom Penh the political situation remained fragile. Up until December 1996 at least three coup attempts were made against the government. Recently in July 1997, Hun Sen ousted Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC from the coalition government and assumed power himself. FUNCINPEC has withdrawn to bases along the Thai-Cambodian border where they are fighting against the Cambodian (CPP) army.

Conflict Resolution Initiatives:

Attempts to solve the conflict in Cambodia began, for the most part, in July 1981 when the UN General Assembly held a International Conference on Kampuchea which was attended by 93 states. This initial discussion was followed up by regional visit by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in South-East Asia as well as by the

UNSG himself in 1985. Following that visit, the UNSG outlined the main elements of a general peace plan.

This UN involvement was simultaneously complemented by the work of the ASEAN countries to bring the factions together for talks. Much of these early discussions centred around the legitimacy of the Phnom Penh government and whether the conflict was primarily an internal one between the various Cambodian factions, or whether it was an international conflict between Viet Nam and the exiled Cambodian factions led by Prince Sihanouk.

These talks were followed by meetings between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk in December 1987 during which the peace proposals of the UNSG were considered. In 1988 and 1989 two meetings were held in Indonesia at which all four Cambodian factions met face to face to discuss the peace proposals. Following these constructive sessions, the Paris Conference on Cambodia was convened in August 1989 which was attended by the four factions, the UN, and 19 other states. No agreement was reached due to disagreement over the issues of power sharing during a transitional period of elections and the future participation of the PDK in the transitional government.

Following this impasse, momentum shifted to discussions among the five permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council. These were complemented by the discussions between the factions held in February and June 1990 in Jakarta. In late August 1990 the P-5 reached an agreement on a general framework for peace which was then accepted by the four Cambodian factions in September 1990. The framework established a Supreme National Council (SNC) as a unique temporary depository of Cambodian sovereignty, unity and independence throughout the transitional period. This framework was further elaborated on in subsequent consultations conducted among the factions by France and Indonesia. In early 1991 the main issues of contention of the draft framework were ironed out among the factions, with agreement reached on issues such as the degree of demobilization and the nature of the electoral system. On October 23, 1991 the Paris Peace Plan was signed by the SNC, the UN and 18 other states.

The next phase of conflict resolution initiatives occurred when the PDK refused to demobilize its forces during the implementation of the Accord provisions. In response Australia, issued a paper which outlined a number of options which the international community could adopt in order to demonstrate its resolve. Similarly the KPNLF worked from within the SNC to resolve the problem. The SRSG also sought to end the non-compliance, suggesting that economic pressure be used to force the PDK to comply. These initiatives failed as did those undertaken by Japan, Thailand, France and Indonesia. Diplomatic pressure was brought to bare on the PDK but more tangible measures, such as economic sanctions via Thailand were never implemented.

Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance:

In 1992 the UN Secretary General identified three urgent areas of need for Cambodia. One of these was the provision of humanitarian aid in the form of food, health services, and housing to disadvantaged peoples within Cambodia. Other relief supplies were distributed to returning refugees, predominantly from Thailand. Temporary shelter and food supplies were provided to them during the repatriation process. However, much of the assistance delivered by the international agencies was done through resettlement packages and focused on short-

term resettlement initiatives as will be seen below.

Physical Security:

Demobilization and Disarmament:

The UN operation UNAMIC was deployed in order to supervise the cease-fire which had been put in place prior to the signing of the Paris Agreement. This deployment was then expanded and incorporated into the UNTAC mission which had the responsibility of monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces, the cease-fire, the cessation of foreign military assistance to the Cambodian factions, and the demobilization of at least 70 per cent of factional military forces.

The demobilization and disarmament objectives were hampered by two main problems. The first was the delayed deployment of UN personnel and materials to the theatre of operation. The second was the unwillingness of the PDK to comply with the cease-fire and demobilization process. The lack of cooperation from the PDK prevented UNTAC from being able to deploy in PDK controlled areas or establish a reliable idea of the number of personnel and material in the PDK army. Despite these difficulties (the process of UNTAC deployment was accelerated once PDK non-cooperation became evident) it was decided to press ahead with the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of the other factions. UNTAC gave its assurances that these three cooperative factions would not be left vulnerable in the face of a non-demobilizing PDK.

Despite these assurances, the other factions became less willing to disarm as long as the PDK refused to cooperate. Intense diplomatic efforts failed to bring the PDK back into the fold and their persistent non-cooperation eventually resulted in the suspension of the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization process in November 1991 with only about ten per cent of the armed forces in Cambodia having been disarmed and demobilized.

Police:

The UNTAC mission had a civilian police component (CIVPOL) which was mandated to oversee the maintenance of law and order by the Cambodian police force. The Cambodian force operated under the official authority of the SNC during the transitional period, but was under the effective control of UNTAC. CIVPOL was to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms by exercising oversight on the national police force.

CIVPOL also provided local Cambodian forces with instruction in the basic principles of policing and gave briefings on human rights. These efforts were somewhat successful in uniting all factions in the police force and provided a means to establish a better rapport between the international and local representatives. CIVPOL also played a role in monitoring election rallies and providing logistical support during the elections themselves.

The tasks assigned to CIVPOL were immense and it was beset by poor preparation and a variety of logistical problems. Its deployment occurred very slowly, few of its officers had formal training for the supervision tasks they were assigned, virtually none spoke Khmer, and many did not speak either French or English-the official languages of the mission. To make matters worse there was no independent judicial framework which meant that criminals could not be prosecuted. Attempts to rectify this problem, such as creating a Special

Prosecutors Office and a UN prison were too small scale to be effective.

Demining:

The Mine Clearance Training Unit which was part of UNTAC's Military Component was successful in training over 2000 Cambodians in mine clearance techniques. By the end of the operation they had clear over 1.6 million acres of land, much of which was agricultural land used for the resettlement of returning refugees. The demining efforts continued following the end of the UNTAC operation with the establishment of the Cambodian Mine Clearance Centre which continued the process of clearance and training.

Human Rights:

The responsibilities of UNTAC in human rights as set down in the Paris Peace Agreement included fostering an environment which respected human rights, encouraging the SNC to ratify the relevant international instruments and treaties on the subject, spread human rights information, and investigate alleged human rights abuses.

A total of thirty-one human rights officers were eventually deployed and despite their small numbers the human rights component were able to play an effective role in the peace process. They managed to get the SNC to adopt all the main human rights covenants, and provided an effective education program across schools, universities and, via CIVPOL, into the Cambodian police force. In addition, the component supported the formation of local human rights organizations which eventually acquired a membership of over 100,000. This was complemented by the establishment of a UN Human Rights Centre which provided the local organization with meeting facilities, a library, and research facilities with which to perform their own monitoring role.

However, due limited personnel and, in particular, the lack of a judicial system to back up investigations of human rights violations, such abuses continued to occur. The steps taken to remedy this situation, such as the appointment of a public prosecutor, failed to reverse the situation and the SOC proved reluctant to prosecute its own members using its own judicial system.

Following the withdrawal of UNTAC human rights abuses continued to be perpetrated by the PDK as it pursued its insurgency. Government officials and the military also acted with relative impunity as they conducted arbitrary arrests and silenced critics of the government. Gains were made at the community level as the court system became more entrenched, but in general the judicial system reflected wider political allegiances.

Economic Reconstruction:

The introduction of the UNTAC operation led to the essential reconstruction of roads, rail lines, and basic infrastructure. This was done primarily to allow UN personnel to operate but it also had the added benefit of improving the national infrastructure and thus encouraged and facilitated economic activity. Most of the infrastructure improvement projects were carried out by the engineering battalions attached to the UNTAC mission.

The UNTAC Mine Clearance Training unit cleared more than 1.6 million acres of land for agricultural production which was essential for the resettlement of refugees.

The Rehabilitation Component of UNTAC monitored aid flows, and introduced

financial reforms on currency control with CIVADMIN in order to stabilize the Cambodian economy. These reforms were undertaken with the assistance of international agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. In 1993 a food for work program was instituted which helped 88,000 people via 70 separate infrastructure schemes establish a toehold in the economy. However, from the outset of the operation UNTAC was only to be responsible for the short-term rehabilitation and assistance, whereas full responsibility for rebuilding the destroyed Cambodian economy would fall on the shoulders of the new Cambodian government. Exacerbating the problems of short term relief was the absence of any skilled Cambodian economic planners, local NGOs or community organizations which could assist in the development process.

The massive influx of financial resources which occurred with the deployment of UNTAC served to exacerbate disparities between rural and urban areas as much the consequent development occurred in Cambodia's cities. Rural areas bore the brunt of the resulting inflation, only serving to further fuel rural-urban tensions.

More recently, military spending has also hampered economic development as it accounts for more than 70% of total government expenditure. Considering that over half of government revenues come from foreign assistance, military expenditures outstrip Cambodian tax revenues and prevent the achievement of budgetary independence.

Social Reconstruction:

Reintegration:

The assurances and security provided by UNTAC's deployment served to encourage over 370,000 refugees to return from exile in Thailand and other neighbouring states. UNTAC's Repatriation Component, staffed by UNHCR, was responsible for ensuring that these returnees were then provided with resettlement packages that allowed them to rejoin Cambodian society. Once the refugees had arrived inside the Cambodian border they were provided with a number of options from which they could select one. These options included two agricultural choices for those that wished to return to farming, employment with UNTAC, the provision of money, or transportation to the homes of relatives and the provision of money. The project was organized with the assistance of Cambodian Red Cross and other NGOs and the UNHCR provided for the transport of refugees.

Health:

Within the context of the UNTAC mission a limited number of health personnel were assigned to the refugee camps and medical clinics in Cambodia in order to provide basic medical care to returning refugees. This activity was complemented by the work of organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, the ICRC, and CARE in which training programs for doctors and nurses were implemented, medications supplied, and basic medical material made available to rural clinics. This activity occurred in conjunction with the Cambodian Ministry of Health and continued after the withdrawal of UNTAC. USAID also played an important role in the health sector, working to assist expand the limited capacity of the Ministry of Health, improving water and sanitation facilities, hospital rehabilitation, and developing community capacity in health related skills.

Governance and Institutional Capacity Building:

Elections:

The UNTAC mission was unprecedented in the extent to which it planned, organized and implemented the electoral process in Cambodia. Its many tasks included voter registration, the writing of electoral law, supervising the actual voting process, as well as counting the votes and providing security on polling day. Other tasks such as the repatriation of refugees occurred specifically so that displaced Cambodians would be able to vote.

The execution of the elections was undoubtedly one of the success of the UNTAC mission. The extent to which it contributed to the development of Cambodian institutional capacity is somewhat less clear given the overwhelming presence of UNTAC. There were certain gains made such as development of a largely free media which could operate independently of factional influence. Similarly, a significant amount of technical and logistical expertise was passed on simply through the implementation of the election process as a whole. For a country which had not experienced any form of national self-determination, the electoral process provided a significant learning experience.

Civic Education:

The UNTAC operation had an Information/Education division which was responsible for educating the Cambodian people about the human rights provisions of the Paris Agreements, as well as providing them with accurate information about the nature of the elections and the role of UNTAC. Through its "Radio UNTAC" facility the division produced nine half-hour radio programs which disseminated electoral information across Cambodia. This was of particular value to the operation because it allowed the UN to bypass the propaganda of the various Cambodian factions.

In addition, United Nations Volunteers were deployed in nearly every village in Cambodia with the job of registering voters and spreading information about the electoral process and the role of UNTAC. Other voter education methods included candidate debates, public rallies, and extensive radio coverage of electoral events.

Institutions:

Following the massacres of the late 1970's by the Khmer Rouge and the decade of civil war that had followed much of Cambodia's institutional infrastructure was decimated. What remained was rendered ineffective due to the partisan nature of factional politics. Often, with each change of foreign ruler or faction a purge of government institutions occurred. The Paris Peace Agreements, in creating the SNC, provided the first opportunity to have the four main factions working together in cooperation with the UN. The extent to which the UN exercised control over the country and its administrative functions during the transition period limited the extent to which SNC had to control its own country, and thus its institutional capacity development was limited.

Certain Ministries, such as Health, benefitted from working with international agencies by gaining technical expertise as well as receiving practical assistance such as the rebuilding of facilities. Similarly the Ministry of Finance has experienced a sharp learning curve through

its operation with the World Bank, IMF, and more recently the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia. Through the provision of technical assistance and major international loans the government has been able to stabilize the economy and implement projects aimed at resource development and long-term economic growth. With each successive project the independent capacity of the government has been enhanced.

Following the Peace Agreements the new civil service was formed by simply adding new FUNCINPEC officials to the pre-existing SOC state apparatus. Despite progress towards the formation of a new Cambodia along national lines, factional politics proved hard to remove, and the result was a largely ineffective government. While this task was not an official role that UNTAC was given by the peace accords it nevertheless proved to be a key issue affecting the prospects for continued peace.

By December 1996 the new government had experienced at least three coup attempts, and its operation was characterized by intense factional tension. Due to this lack of civil administrative capacity many international aid donors such as the World Bank have adopted development strategies which intentionally avoid collaboration with Cambodian authorities, thus preventing the development of institutional capacity. Similarly, factional divisions have precluded the formation of other key institutions which are vital to the development of a democratic society. Cambodia's Constitutional Council was never convened since the factions could not agree on its composition. This in turn limited the development of an independent judicial system. UNTAC did assist in the emergence of a large civil society comprised of national NGO's in the fields of human rights and health while a market economy has flourished in the cities, schools have been reconstructed a religion has been revived.

Following the July 1997 coup many international aid and reconstruction missions have been withdrawn from the country. International condemnation of the coup makes continued economic assistance unlikely.

Policy Development, Assessment and Advocacy:

Numerous policy reassessments were conducted by UNTAC during the course of the operation, in response to developments on the ground. One example was the decision to push ahead with elections despite the failure of the demobilization and disarmament program.

Following the withdrawal of the UN from Cambodia a number of academic studies have been conducted on the UN operation, both in military and civil mandate terms. Others have focused on later peacebuilding efforts or specific issues such as human rights. In terms of peacekeeping-peacebuilding initiatives, Cambodia is one of the most extensively analyzed and documented cases.

Environmental Security:

Limited initiatives have been undertaken in the field of environment security. For the most part, the issue of hardwood lumber and gem exports lay at the heart of the peace process since trade in these items provided the PDK with much of its funding. As the Thai government came to support the peace process, they cooperated in tightening controls along the Cambodian-Thai border which limited the PDK's trading opportunities and also worked to conserve the remaining areas of virgin rain forest.

Other cooperative initiatives between the Cambodian Ministry of the Environment and international agencies such as CARE have sought to implement environment protection plans. These involved ensuring the inclusion of the issue in national economic plans, as well as developing local technical expertise in environmental management. Despite these efforts logging and gem exploitation by government officials remained a severe problem following the UN's withdrawal. Most of the proceeds from the sale of these resources goes into either personal, party, or military coffers at the expense of the national budget. The environmental situation is likely to deteriorate following the coup as it is likely that hardwood and gem exports will be used to finance both government activities and the exiled FUNCINPEC party.

Evaluation:

The peacebuilding efforts undertaken in Cambodia had a mixed record of success. Some of the more effective were the **conflict resolution initiatives** which brought together the four main conflicting factions in a process of negotiation and reconciliation. The role of both ASEAN and the five permanent members of the Security Council, once they had decided to exercise their collective political will, quickly brought the factions into line with the consequent signing of the Paris Agreements. This involvement at the political level, however, was not followed through sufficiently to ensure that the parties adhered to their commitments concerning **demobilization and disarmament**. The PDK refused to comply with its commitments which in turn meant that the remaining factions also refused to demobilize their forces. This left UNTAC with a much more difficult security situation with which to cope as other elements of the reconciliation process went ahead. Other **Physical Security initiatives** were more successful. The role of CIVPOL went some way to training local police forces, and providing security during the electoral process though this role was undercut by the lack of an impartial judicial system. Demining efforts were highly effective given the challenge they faced, and large numbers of Cambodians were trained in mine clearance, thus increasing domestic capacity. Promising gains were made in the field of **human rights** with the establishment of a large domestic NGO capacity and the creation of the UN Human Rights Centre. During the UNTAC deployment incidents of human rights abuses were reduced, though these gains were largely reversed following UNTAC's departure given the relative impunity with which government officials and soldiers were allowed to operate.

Economic reconstruction initiatives were largely ineffective despite the large sums of money which flooded the country following the peace agreements. While limited gains were made in stabilizing the economy, rural-urban disparities were exacerbated and the implementation of many foreign assistance projects was done by foreigners due to the lack of Cambodian expertise. This squandered the opportunity to develop domestic capacity. The fact that nearly one half of the government budget is financed through foreign aid and that 85% of investment is foreign financed leaves economic reconstruction a major challenge.

Social reconstruction initiatives were more effective. Efforts to repatriate refugees from neighbouring countries so that they could participate in the elections was one of the major accomplishments of the peacebuilding process. Refugees were, by and large, relocated to the area of their choice and the resettlement packages provided to them not only enhanced their reintegration into society, but also gave an important boost to the agricultural sector. **Environmental security** initiatives also made a promising start, but without the oversight of

UNTAC logging and gem concessions were given out by party officials and individuals gained while the state finances were left to suffer.

The holding of elections represented a significant step towards increasing the Cambodian experience of **democratic governance**. To this end UNTAC made a significant contribution in that it developed a great deal of practical expertise with Cambodia as a whole in terms of electoral process. However, the factionalization of the civil service with the resulting paralyzation of government restricted the ability of the government to consolidate its democratic gains. The failure to establish the Constitutional Council also impeded efforts towards a truly "Cambodian" state apparatus and that the failure to reform the civil service has had a lasting effect on the formation of other crucial elements of democratic government. The July 1997 coup has reverted Cambodia to a political dictatorship in which truly democratic elections are unlikely to be held in the near future.

Acronyms:

CARE: Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CIVADMIN: Civil Administration Component of UNTAC
CIVPOL: UN Civilian Police
CPP: Cambodian People's Party
FUNCINPEC: United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and
Cooperative Cambodia
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF: International Monetary Fund
KPRLF: Khmer People's Liberation Front
P-5: UN Security Council Permanent Five Members
PDK: Party of Democratic Kampuchea
SNC: Supreme National Council
SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNAMIC: United Nation's Observer Mission in Cambodia
UNHCR: United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSG: United Nation's Secretary General
UNTAC: United Nation's Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID: United States Agency for International Development

Selected Timeline:

July 1981: Interational Conference on Kampuchea
December 1987: Prine Sihanouk and Hun Sen meet for talks in France
July 1989: Paris Peace Talks convened
September 1989: Viet Nam withdraws troops from Cambodia
April 1991: General Cease-fire established
October 1991: Paris Peace Accords signed
October 1991: UNAMIC deployed
March 1992: UNTAC deployed
May 1993: National elections held
September 1993: New Constitution promulgated
December 1993: UNTAC withdrawal
July 1997: Hun Sen coup

Guatemala

Period of Analysis: January 1986 to May 1997

Background:

In 1986, Guatemala experienced a transition from military rule to a democratically elected civilian government led by Vinicio Cerezo. This reform oriented government sought to end political violence, establish the rule of law, and fight the corruption that was endemic to Guatemalan politics. For its first two years the Cerezo government stabilized the economy and brought about an initial decrease in the level of political violence. Its fortunes changed following two abortive coup attempts made by junior military personnel in May 1988 and May 1989. Although the military leadership maintained its support for the government, the administration failed to make advances in the field of human rights, the economy faltered, and there were allegations of widespread corruption. Violence again increased and the general population went without basic social services.

In November 1990 national elections were held again and the Movement of Solidarity Action (MAS) leader Jorge Serrano replaced Cerezo in the Presidential role, while in the Congress the MAS entered into a fragile coalition government with two other parties. The elections represented the first peaceful transition from one elected civilian government to another. Once in office the Serrano government brought the economy under control, attempted to consolidate civilian control over the army, and engaged the military in peace talks with the rebel movement the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). In an alleged attempt to combat corruption Serrano illegally dissolved Congress in May 1993, but this "autocoup" attempt failed in the face of domestic and international pressure. On June 5, 1993 the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon Carpio was appointed as interim president by Congress. De Leon instituted a series of constitutional reforms adopted by popular referendum and the peace process - with the assistance of the UN - began to advance. From March 1994 to March 1995 a series of four agreements were signed between the URNG and the government.

A third set of elections was held in November 1995, with the eventual selection of Alvaro Arzu as President on January 7 1996. The main priority of this new government was the resolution of the civil conflict. Arzu made further inroads towards increasing civilian control of the military and made a significant effort to meet with rebel leaders to discuss peace. From May to December 1996 a further eight substantive agreements were signed by the parties, with the concluding Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace signed on December 29, 1996. Shortly thereafter Arzu reaffirmed his commitment to peace and reform by purging the police of nearly 200 corrupt officials, shaking up the military high command, and pursuing reform of the tax system and economy.

Following the signing of the Peace Accords the UN MINUGUA mission was deployed on December 29, 1996 to oversee both the implementation of the Human Rights Accord as well as supervise the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the URNG combatants. The Arzu government is currently tackling the challenges of reforming the military, addressing the political and social concerns of the indigenous population as well as reforming the economy.

The URNG rebel movement was formed in the early 1960's when a coup attempt against the then President General Fuentes failed and led to the rebels going into hiding.

From their jungle bases the insurgency movement focused on activities such as economic sabotage, assassination, and harassment of security forces. It was comprised of four principle groups; the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the communist party (PGT). The aims of the rebel movement were primarily to establish a government representative of the people, eliminate the human rights abuses conducted by the various military regimes, and improve the economic and social conditions of the largely indigenous population which had suffered under the rule of military governments comprised largely of *landinos* - people of mixed European and Mayan descent.

Conflict Resolution Initiatives:

The peace process in Guatemala was exceptional in that the entire peace agreement drew together a series of preliminary, substantive accords on specific issues that were signed over a two-year period beginning in March 1994. The first accord was on human rights and established the UN MINUGUA operation, strengthened human rights organizations, and sought to end the impunity of the military forces. The other agreements covered the issues of Resettlement of Displaced Persons, Historical Clarification of Past Human Rights Violations, Indigenous Rights, Socio-economic and Agrarian issues, and the Strengthening of Civil Authority and the Role of the Military in a Democratic Society. This last agreement was signed in September 1996. There were also a number of procedural agreements.

The consolidation of the reconciliation process was made possible by the appointment of De Leon to power following the ouster of Serrano. The URNG was included in peace talks which addressed substantial political issues, and with the assistance of the UN the first four agreements were signed between the two adversaries. This momentum was sustained by the Arzu administration which completed the work on the Socio-economic and Agrarian Agreement, as well as the Civil Authority Agreement. Arzu himself went to great lengths to meet with the URNG leaders, travelling to Mexico and El Salvador to meet with them.

The UN involvement in the peace process was vital. The two parties had requested that a UN mission be deployed to oversee the implementation of the Human Rights Accord and to this end the MINUGUA mission was deployed. Its specific tasks included the investigation of reported human rights violations, verifying the competence of national institutions in conducting their own investigations into such abuses, and verifying the commitments made by both parties in the Agreement. This mandate was later expanded to include the deployment of military observers to monitor and verify the cease-fire between the two parties as well as the subsequent demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of URNG personnel.

The UN Secretary General acted in a supervisory capacity over the majority of the negotiations, ensuring that the momentum of the peace talks was sustained. A UN Moderator, Mr. Jean Arnault was appointed by the UNSG in 1993 and played a direct mediating role in the negotiations.

Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance:

The Humanitarian Relief projects that have been undertaken in Guatemala have not occurred in response to an imminent or occurring humanitarian disaster, but instead have been

focused on the alleviation of poverty and malnutrition in portions of the Guatemalan people.

USAID has implemented a series of food for work programs designed to provide sustenance to poor families while also promoting community organizations. It has also directed coordination efforts aimed at the more efficient and effective use of food aid resources to achieve improved access and service to needy people.

CARE promotes the improvement of the availability of food through increased and diversified agricultural production, as well as stressing the need for good nutrition and hygiene. Part of this effort has been directed towards improving the basic services which the Ministry of Health provides to local communities. CARE has also started a food for work program in which participants are given nutritious food, oil, and flour in return for the construction of drainage, sewage, and potable water systems.

Physical Security:

From the start of its implementation in early 1997 the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process worked very efficiently. This was due to the desire of both the government and the URNG for peace. The Military Observer component of MINUGUA was established in order to verify the Agreement on the Definitive Cease-fire signed in Oslo on December 4, 1996. The operation was to monitor compliance with the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of the two forces, and the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the URNG. Eight URNG assembly points were established around each of which a "security zone" was created to ensure that government forces and the police were kept out. The registered URNG fighters moved into the assembly areas where their weapons were handed over to the UN Military Observers. While they were in the assembly areas, a variety of international agencies under the auspices of the Logistical Support Commission supported the URNG. The organizations involved included the OAS, USAID, the EU, UNDP and the WHO.

Following their disarmament, one third of the ex-combatants were demobilized every six days and received a demobilization certificate and identity card upon leaving the assembly area. These ex-combatants were returned to their home villages using transport provided by international agencies. For those who could not return home, four shelters were constructed which provided lodging, vocational training and a variety of other reintegration projects to assist in their return to civilian life. The entire process was completed by May 14, 1997. On the whole the operation was considered a success with only a few minor violations of the Agreement which were subsequently investigated by the UN.

Human Rights:

The issue of human rights was critical to the settlement of the Guatemalan conflict. The society had been characterized by years of brutal repression by the government security forces which occurred with impunity. Two of the main agreements signed by the URNG and the government dealt directly with the issue of Human Rights and with the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The UN MINUGUA mission was deployed specifically to ensure that the provisions of these agreements were respected by both parties.

MINUGUA's task was assisted by the presence within the country of a wide variety of institutions which were directed towards the improvement of the human rights situation.

These included the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Presidential Human Rights Committee, and the Counsel for Human Rights. In addition to its verification role MINUGUA was to work in support of these institutions and other national human rights based organizations in order to promote a culture of respect for human rights in the country.

A variety of other agencies and organizations, both internal and external, assumed a monitoring role on the state of human rights in the country. Initially these included a UN appointed Independent Expert, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Counsel for Human Rights and the Archdiocesan Human Rights Office. These activities have been complemented by more activist organizations such as Amnesty International or local groups such as the Mutual Support Group of Families of the Disappeared (GAM) who lobby the government to uncover the truth behind certain human rights violations. For many of the government agencies, working with the UN gives them access to technical and logistical expertise to help them investigate human rights complaints and develop a more effective, independent capacity.

In the UNSG's most recent report on MINUGUA he notes that incidents of human rights abuse, since the signing of the Peace Agreement, have declined. Verified incidents of extrajudicial killings, murders, and death threats have decreased. In part this is due to an increase in administrative control being exercised by the government over its agents, and the cessation of hostilities which has reduced the number of human rights abuses committed by the armed forces. Progress has also been made in the development of institutions responsible for the administration of justice. The court system has operated with improved regularity, although tensions exist between traditional legal norms and recent reform attempts. An inquisitorial culture within the judicial system threatens to undermine these reform initiatives. Progress has been noted in the reform of criminal prosecution policy, the performance of some judges and prosecutors, and the general training of judges and magistrates. Nevertheless, some abuses do continue to occur and have been traced to both government and non-government sources.

Economic Reconstruction:

Since the election of the Arzu administration, the economic priorities have been liberalizing trade and foreign exchange regimes, reforming the tax structure, demonopolizing the telecommunication and electricity industries, and improving the climate for foreign investment. The government has received a great deal of support in these ventures from members and institutions of the international community. The US, as Guatemala's largest trading partner, has committed substantial resources to the reform efforts as have other donor countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the UN, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Much of the US assistance has been channelled through USAID and in the economic sector has been focused on broad-based economic growth, poverty reduction, and sustainable resource management. Some sample programs that have been directed towards these goals include a project implemented with the Ministry of Labour that trained labour inspectors, another which implemented innovative training schemes in bargaining strategy provided by the US Department of Labour, and a third which supported increased production of non-

traditional exports assisting tens of thousands of small scale farmers.

In addition, the World Bank is funding a variety of projects implemented by government ministries aimed at modernizing the public sector, increasing the quality of infrastructure, and increasing the modernizing role of the private sector in the economy. To this end the World Bank has provided funding and advice on projects such as the concessioning of road development, the establishment and implementation of a wholesale market in the electricity industry, and funding for public information campaigns designed to promote investment.

Social Reconstruction:

The social sector has seen the most intensive revitalization in the wake of the peace agreements. Although resources are more readily available for urban as opposed to rural areas, since the Peace Accord, social reconstruction initiatives, particularly those conducted by international agencies, have been focused on more remote, underdeveloped areas. There is a broad consensus that the future hopes for Guatemala continuing on the road to peace lie in increasing education across all segments of the society, improving health standards, and resettling those people who were displaced by the war.

Health:

USAID has supported a project which seeks to provide immunizations, oral rehydration therapy, and pneumonia management in order to save children's lives. Implementation has occurred with the assistance of UNICEF, the Pan American Health Organization, and the European Union. CARE has implemented a project designed to provide training, health education, and food to pregnant or nursing mothers and infants. The food has been provided through government health facilities and the project has been implemented in close partnership with the Ministry of Health. MSF has conducted a program in the inner city areas of Guatemala City, providing medical care and sanitary support to local populations and distributing essential medical supplies to local pharmacies.

Education:

The literacy rate in the country is estimated to be 42% but in Mayan female populations this figure is much lower - about 10%. One of the main development challenges in securing peace therefore is the education of the people. A number of small projects have sought to meet this need. CARE has a Rural Girl's Education Project which works to promote the school attendance, education, and self-esteem of these young students. It also seeks to strengthen parent-teacher associations, and form educational saving groups as a way of helping parents to fund their child's education. USAID has implemented a project designed to improve the quality, efficiency and equity of primary education. Specific elements of this project included providing bilingual education services for Mayan students, management of information systems and management services training, and achievement testing. Partners in this project have included UNICEF, The German Technical Cooperation Agency, and the Ministry of Education.

Reintegration:

The resettlement of displaced peoples was another item high on the agenda during the peace process. In June 1994 the Agreement on Resettlement set out particular objectives for the resettlement and economic integration of displaced persons back into Guatemalan society. In addition to government agencies, these efforts have been complemented by the work of a number of international governments and NGOs.

Some sample projects include the work of the Quebec based Société de Coopération pour le Développement Internationale which is the implementing partner with CIDA on a project to strengthen local cooperatives and community infrastructure and provide training activities for refugees and displaced persons. A second Canadian initiative implemented by the Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation, developed with UNICEF, helps refugees return to their communities by providing funding to increase their food security, create jobs and generate community income. The NGOs Peace Brigades International and Project Accompaniment also helps the return of refugees by providing a highly visible escort which reassures returnees that they will not be harmed. For people that have been hiding in the jungle for over ten years, this accompaniment provides crucial security that helps them to rejoin particular communities and society at large.

Governance and Institutional Capacity Building:

The government of Guatemala has a variety of government agencies which have the responsibility to implement the societal reforms desired by the Arzu administration, but they often lack the practical experience to do so. Many government agencies still retain allegiances to serving the interest of the government as opposed to the interests of the Guatemalan people. In order to change this focus, a number of international governments and agencies have provided the government with training and logistical support to increase their institutional capacity.

One such project undertaken by UNICEF involved helping the government to define and undertake projects to improve the living conditions of the poor and increase societal understanding of the needs for policies supporting women and children. More specific activities include the conduct of media campaigns, training and capacity building workshops and community organization.

Another project undertaken by the Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation involved supporting human rights organizations, providing management support to leaders of women and indigenous people's groups and supporting judicial reform. This support was provided by way of the Democratic Development Fund administered by CIDA.

The UN, through its MINUGUA mission, also implemented a variety of projects aimed at increasing domestic understanding of democratic society. One such project involved a series of radio campaigns which sought to provide information on human rights, the role of MINUGUA, the acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity as well as other subjects related with democracy. On the whole the strategy was designed to increase general understanding of the peace process and the gains that it secured for the people.

Peacebuilding Training and Trainers:

A number of peacebuilding training schemes have been undertaken although these have primarily occurred under the auspices of other peacebuilding activities. Such initiatives include the training of health workers in the administration of oral rehydration therapy, the education of small-scale farmers in environmentally sound agricultural practices and resource management, as well as the training provided to government agencies in planning economic and tax reforms.

Environmental Security:

A number of projects were implemented that concerned the issue of environmental sustainability and natural resource management. One such project, implemented by CARE, worked with small land holders, providing training and technical assistance in agroforestry, reforestation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture in an effort to increase their production.

Another CARE initiative was the Integrated Watershed Management Project which worked with residents of 30 medium sized watershed areas providing education in environmental monitoring, sustainable agriculture and income generation.

USAID has also been an important donor supporting environmentally sound management in Guatemala with such initiatives as establishing a legal framework for a national system of protected areas, watershed management projects, and education in sustainable income generation practices. The goal has been to preserve biological resources by providing sustainable income alternatives to marginalized populations and improving the management of these resources.

Evaluation:

The peacebuilding efforts in Guatemala have largely been focused on reaching a settlement between the URNG rebel and the government, improving human rights conditions in the country, and reforming its socio-economic basis so that excluded peoples such as the indigenous population can begin to participate in the national economy. In terms of specific initiatives, the **conflict resolution efforts** that occurred were primarily the result of both the government's and the rebel's desire to finally end the civil war. The assistance of the UN was crucial in that it was able to inject momentum when the process began to stall, as well as provide a monitoring role for agreements such as the Accord on Human Rights and the disarmament of the URNG. **Physical Security** initiatives built on the desire of both parties to live up to their word as set down in the peace agreements. This meant that the demilitarization of the URNG and its inclusion into the political process occurred smoothly and without any major hitches. The success of this initiative then removed a major factor contributing to the general insecurity within the country, and also removed one the prime justifications for the military or police to act repressively.

Humanitarian assistance was primarily directed towards alleviation of poverty among inner city and indigenous populations, and was linked to short term development initiatives such as food for work projects that meant that other sectors such as health or the economy also benefitted. The **Human Rights** situation in Guatemala experienced improvement following the signing of the Agreement on Human Rights as well as the Agreement on the

Identity and Rights of Indigenous peoples. The monitoring role of the UN, the removal of the URNG as a reason for repression, as well as the support provided to government agencies and local NGOs working on the issue resulted in a decrease in politically motivated violence and violations of human rights. This can be directly attributed to the breadth of initiatives which occurred at all levels of society. However, problems still persist despite attempted reform of the judicial system. Many people are afraid to testify in human rights trials for fear of retribution, significant numbers of prisoners remain in government prisons pending their trial, and many government and military officials are still able to operate with relative impunity.

The relative success of the **economic reconstruction** process is difficult to judge since many of the reforms are large scale and will occur over the longer term. Community based initiatives have assisted in improving agricultural production, but large scale projects such as trade liberalization and the demobilization of the telecommunications industry may have a negative impact on disadvantaged populations - primarily indigenous- which rely on traditional products and communal agricultural schemes for their income.

Social reconstruction schemes have targeted a wide segment of the population and sought to increase general standards of health and education. Again the results of such programs are hard to judge in the short-term, but over the longer term economic success and institutional capacity relies on a well trained and skilled population. Many of the social reconstruction initiatives are designed to address these concerns. The reintegration of refugees and displaced persons has succeeded when training programs and the provision of food security have ensured that the refugees have a means of support and role in the community once they return. With the decrease in political oppression, much of their original reason for fleeing their homes has been reduced. The challenge of increasing **Institutional Capacity** has been undertaken through a variety of programs that have been implemented in other sectors. Educational projects in the field of human rights, economic reform packages, and the provision of health training have all increased the ability of the Guatemalan people and government to further the peace process and consolidate the gains already achieved. Nowhere has this commitment to the future been more clearly demonstrated than in the initiatives undertaken in the field of **environmental security** which included a variety of forest management programs, sustainable resource training, and environment friendly agricultural practices.

When taken as a whole the importance of both parties being committed to the peace process must be highlighted as a major factor in its initial success. This commitment ensured the solidity of the Peace Agreements and the effectiveness of the **conflict resolution initiatives**. Similarly the relatively rapid **demobilization process** following the December Peace Agreement ensured that the momentum towards peace was sustained and largely removed armed conflict as a destabilizing factor. The **reintegration** of the URNG also removed one of the main excuses behind the political repression of the Guatemalan people by the police and military forces, directly benefitting the human rights situation and refocusing peacebuilding efforts on the reform of the socio-economic sector of society.

Acronyms:

| | |
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| CARE: | Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere |
| CIDA: | Canadian International Development Agency |
| EGP: | Guerilla Army of the Poor |
| FAR: | Rebel Armed Forces |
| GAM: | Mutual Support Group for Families of the Disappeared |
| MAS: | Movement of Solidarity Action |
| MINUGUA: | UN Observer Mission in Guatemala |
| OAS: | Organization of American States |
| ORPA: | Revolutionary Organization of Armed People |
| PGT: | Guatemalan Communist Party |
| UNDP: | United Nations Development Program |
| UNICEF: | United Nations Children's Emergency Fund |
| UNSG: | United Nation's Secretary General |
| URNG: | Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity |
| USAID: | United States Agency for International Development |
| WHO: | World Health Organization |

Selected Timeline:

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|----------------|--|
| November 1990: | 2nd National Elections held |
| May 1993: | Serrano dissolves Congress |
| June 1993: | De Leon appointed interim President |
| March 1994: | Government and URNG begin negotiations |
| June 1994: | Agreement on Resettlement |
| November 1995: | 3rd National Elections held |
| December 1996: | Agreement on Cease-fire |
| December 1996: | URNG and Arzu sign Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace |
| January 1997: | MINUGA deployed |

Liberia:

Period of Analysis: December 1989 to July 1997

Background:

On Christmas Eve 1989 the Liberian civil war began as members of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, infiltrated into Liberia in opposition to the regime of then President Samuel Doe. Initial popular support lay with Taylor as the NPFL battled against Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Six months later Doe had lost control and was holed up in the former government offices in Monrovia while the AFL, NPFL and a variety of other factions fought for control. Fearing that the chaos in Liberia could create refugee flows and political instability across the entire region the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to take action. Together they deployed a regional peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). On 30 October 1991 ECOWAS brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord which outlined the steps to be taken from the cease-fire through the demobilization phase with the agreed deployment of ECOMOG force as well as initial steps towards eventual national elections. The Cotonou Peace Agreement signed on 25 July 1993 built on the previous accord and was itself followed by a series of agreements which solidified progress towards peace. The efforts of ECOWAS were complemented by those of the United Nations following the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in September 1993. The peace process was continually beset by delays as the factions consistently renewed their fighting, particularly in April 1996 when all but the most crucial relief efforts were shut down. Gradually resolution efforts were solidified and, as the ECOMOG force was able to penetrate the more remote regions of the country, peacebuilding efforts were similarly extended. Recently on 19 July 1997 the Liberian national elections were held as the formal culmination of the political process though much peacebuilding remains to be done.

Conflict Resolution Initiatives:

For the most part the conflict resolution activities that occurred in the Liberian dispute came from external actors, most of whom were members of ECOWAS. Much of the negotiation between the Liberian factions occurred directly as a result of ECOWAS pressure and facilitation. There were no significant inroads towards peace prior to the involvement of ECOWAS and the deployment of its Monitoring Group peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) in August 1990. The UN and the US were at this time preoccupied with events in Kuwait. On 30 October 1991 the Standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS was able to broker the Yamoussoukro IV Accord which represented the first comprehensive peace plan. The 25 July Cotonou Peace Agreement represented the next significant building block to peace as it laid out a continuum of action from cease-fire through the demobilization and disarmament phases to national elections. These first negotiations had limited success since the NPFL was not committed to reconciliation and effectively at war with Nigeria.

Negotiations continued and the Cotonou process was subsequently modified by a series of agreements which culminated in the August 1995 Abuja Agreement. This caused a reinvigoration of the peace process as well as renewing humanitarian and other peacebuilding efforts. ECOWAS involvement continued throughout the conflict and following the September 1993 deployment of UNOMIL, worked with the UN. In addition to direct negotiation with

the factions, ECOWAS held meetings of its Committee of Nine (usually its heads of state) to discuss the overall peace strategy and the UN was often involved via the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in shuttling between ECOWAS capitals in an attempt to uncover ways and means of advancing the peace process.

These efforts were augmented by a significant amount of bi-lateral diplomacy which occurred between the factions and a number of west African nations, Nigeria in particular. Many had political and military ties with the various factions. Cote d'Ivoire for example had provided the NPFL with staging bases, Guinea supported the ULIMO-K faction, and Nigeria was often accused of having geopolitical designs on Liberian natural resources. The United States provided political and financial support for the peace process, although it was reluctant to become directly involved. As the prospects for peace began to grow a great number of states became more willing to make contributions. On 12 June 1997 there was a Special Conference to Support the Peace Process in Liberia held in Geneva. Many countries including those of the European Union, Denmark, Canada, the United Kingdom all made financial or personnel contributions to assist with the holding of elections in Liberia on 19 July 1997. Former US President Carter also made numerous trips to Liberia meeting with faction leaders and interim governments in the search for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

There were national efforts that originated from within Liberia aimed at conflict resolution, but these occurred on a far smaller scale than the international efforts. In July 1995 the Women's Group of Liberia sponsored peace talks in Monrovia between all of the factions involved in the fighting. Similarly, there were other initiatives such as the Liberian Initiative for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution and the Liberian Network for Peace and Development. The former worked with faction leaders and military personnel to conduct peacebuilding dialogue while the latter gathered together Liberian NGOs and civilian groups to promote community empowerment. Both initiatives were supported by the Carter Centre.

Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance:

The early focus of humanitarian assistance agencies was on negotiating with the factions for access to war-affected populations behind the battle lines. This significantly limited the level of humanitarian assistance provided. Often such efforts served mainly to benefit the fighting factions as they looted and stole much of relief supplies. As a result the NGO community took collective action and decided to limit their involvement to only emergency assistance programmes until such time as a safe working environment was restored. The UN agencies followed suit. Following the signing of the Abuja agreement in August 1995 the emphasis shifted towards developing a comprehensive strategy for the integration of the war-affected populations, re-orienting relief programmes toward development as well as continuing to provide humanitarian assistance to the war affected population. These programmes were interrupted by the April 1996 outbreak of fighting which hindered all relief efforts but, as the security situation was gradually restored, so too were the relief and development programmes.

The provision of humanitarian assistance was largely a cooperative venture between international and national aid agencies and NGOs. In late 1995 the United Nations established a UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office (HACO) with a Humanitarian Coordinator whose job was to ensure the effective and well-coordinated provision of

humanitarian assistance. Prior to this the coordination of humanitarian relief assistance was jointly coordinated by the SRSG and UNDP resident coordinator. The Liberian National Transitional Government established a number of commissions to work with the international community as did the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

The war created an estimated 660,000 refugees in the subregion and more than 750,000 internally displaced people as of June 1997. A year earlier there were an estimated 800,00-900,00 internally displaced persons as well as 800,00-900,000 refugees. To meet the humanitarian challenges posed by such massive numbers the international and national aid efforts were largely cooperative. For example, the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation improvement was carried out primarily by international agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Medecines sans Frontiers (MSF) Save the Children-UK (SCF), and the Africa Muslim Agency (AMA). These NGO's worked closely with national agencies such as the Liberian Water and Sewer Corporation and the Monrovia City Council. In many cases the reoccurring pattern was one where the larger international agencies such as the World Health Organization, the HACO, or USAID made funds for relief efforts available and these were then channelled directly into Liberia by ways of implementing partners such as the Adventist Development Relief Association (ADRA), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), or local NGO's such as the Liberian National Red Cross.

In development areas where no local agency was responsible, such as in the provision of water and sanitation services to rural areas, international agencies such as UNICEF implemented its programmes in partnership with local NGOs and communities. Typical relief activities included the provision of food, water and shelter to war affected populations. Basic health services were provided to prevent the outbreak of disease and health standards were improved through the rehabilitation, chlorination, and digging of wells, the installation and repair of hand pumps, and the provision of latrines.

Physical Security:

The dual nature of the ECOMOG and UNOMIL deployments were intended to ensure that there was a significant international presence within Liberia that was able to limit the fighting of factions by separating their forces, monitoring the cease-fire agreements, as well as monitoring compliance with demobilization and disarmament schedules. Before 1995 no real progress was made towards these goals except in the areas of Greater Monrovia, Kakata, and Buchanan. It was only post-Abuja that the security situation improved throughout Liberia. A Cease-fire Violations Committee was established through which the UNOMIL and ECOMOG could address violations of the cease-fire with the factions involved. Similarly a Disarmament Committee, chaired by ECOMOG, was established to draw up plans for the disengagement of forces, their disarmament, and the exchange of prisoners of war.

The disarmament and demobilization process began on 22 November 1996. UNOMIL and HACO were responsible for the operational aspects of demobilization and for co-ordinating bridging and reintegration activities, although they faced logistical, financial, and manpower constraints. UNOMIL was only able to deploy two military observers to watch each of the main demobilization sites. To lend credibility to the demobilization programme, a fixed ration was given in exchange for a serviceable weapon or one hundred rounds of ammunition. Reintegration coupons and/or food rations were issued to demobilized fighters

who were then transferred to their final destinations. The food ration was provided by the WFP and by 26 January 1997, 596 metric tons of food commodities had been distributed to some 25000 combatants. As of 13 June 1997 ECOWAS had collected 10,036 weapons and more than 1.24 million rounds of ammunition within the official disarmament areas.

In the lead up to the elections ECOMOG troop strength was increased and it extended its presence throughout the country to ensure continued security and encourage the civilian population to move freely throughout the country. Initially there was great enthusiasm for the disarmament process and fighters turned out in large numbers to be disarmed. This process slowed as deep mutual suspicion between factions made some reluctant to take part in the mass demobilization. As the initiative progressed the ECOMOG force began to conduct cordon and search operations with the intention of disarming elements or factions which had not complied with the peace agreement. By June 1996 such operations had resulted in a further 3500 weapons and 150,000 rounds of ammunition being collected.

The physical security initiatives were predominantly carried out by ECOMOG with the assistance of UNOMIL. Although the Liberian National Transitional Government had set up the National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (NDDC) neither it nor the Council of State took the concerted action required to either kick-start or follow through on the demobilization or disarmament programme. This is not to say that they were unresponsive of the initiative. The chairman of the Council of State made two trips across the country attempting to encourage fighters to turn in their weapons. However, the composition of the Council of State stemmed from the factions themselves and this thus limited the extent to which any of its members could play a disinterested third party role.

Human Rights:

In the field of human rights there were also a number of initiatives conducted which have involved the cooperation of both local and international agencies as well as involving the Liberian government. UNOMIL conducted a number of missions throughout Liberia in order to assess the general human rights situation. It also worked in conjunction with the Liberian human rights community which functioned within the scope of the Liberian Human Rights Centre. Individual members carried out programs such as the monitoring and reporting of the human rights situation, hosted civic education programmes and workshops, and provided legal aid to victims of human rights abuses. UNICEF held workshops intended to sensitize decision-makers and members of the LNTG to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The SRSG also exhorted Liberian faction leaders to exert proper command and control over their forces to ensure the well-being and property of civilians was protected and human rights abuses stopped. He also called on the Council of State to take measures to ensure general respect for human rights. Amnesty International made similar demands as they too maintained a monitoring presence in Liberia.

The Council of State did in fact establish a committee to investigate various reported human rights violations, which was chaired by the Minister of Justice. UNOMIL adopted an investigative role and looked into reported episodes of brutality carried out by ECOMOG troops.

Economic Reconstruction:

Efforts towards economic reconstruction were largely collaborative, involving agencies of the UN, international NGO's and the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture. In most cases the funding was provided by an agency such as the UNDP and then the projects were implemented by other UN or NGO partners. The International Labour Organization, for example, started a vocational training programme in order to increase the availability of skilled labour. Similarly, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) used UNDP funding to create a number of micro-projects ranging from small loans to women to the construction of wells, bridges, and latrines. Such projects were expected to serve as the building blocs for wider economic recovery. UNHCR directed its activities towards the creation of small scale income generation projects and infrastructure rehabilitation in and around refugee settlements with the intention of making them self-sufficient.

In the agricultural sector the FAO collaborated with the Ministry of Agriculture and local NGOs in order to identify and formulate projects aimed at the revitalization of Liberian farming. Teams of consultants were sent out to prepare a national food security strategy and a national workshop to this end was held by the partnership of the Ministry of Agriculture and the UNDP. The FAO provided technical assistance by training local NGOs, Liberian farmers and staff of the Ministry of Agriculture in the basics of areas such as crop husbandry, fertilization, and the production of cassava tubers. Similarly through its implementing partners like the Lutheran World Service, Africare and CRS, the FAO provided agricultural goods such as seed, tools, fertilizer and pesticides.

A combined UNDP-World Bank mission visited Liberia in March 1996 to undertake a technical assessment of all critical development sectors. To do so it employed teams of national consultants. The IMF, which sent two missions to review the Liberian tax system and expenditure management procedures, was equally reliant on national cooperation.

Social Reconstruction:

Reintegration:

The challenge of reintegrating the thousands of demobilized troops was largely met through the strategy of bridging activities. Such activities were designed to keep the former combatants occupied while more substantive reintegration schemes were developed. This strategy was overseen by the Liberian Ministry of Planning which set up the National Reintegration Steering Committee to coordinate the effort. Once again, the initiatives were conducted by a variety of international and national NGOs as well as UN agencies. In general, labour intensive, community based projects which were small scale but had a large impact were used to provide jobs and training. Specific reintegration schemes included the rehabilitation of public works using both civilians and ex-combatants to carry out the work. This initiative was funded by the UNDP and carried out by UNOPS. The international community also adopted a concerted strategy towards reintegration and in December 1996 the UN Inter-agency Program for Community Reintegration and Peacebuilding for Liberia was launched, with UNDP as the main coordinator. The programme was designed to resume the development process that had been halted in April 1996.

Child Welfare:

UNICEF took the lead in the reintegration of child combatants. It supported four national NGOs - The Community and Human Development Agency, The Children's Assistance Programme, The Sustainable Development Promoters, and the Liberian Opportunity Industrialization Centre - in efforts to reintegrate more than 8500 former child-combatants and War Affected Youths (WAYS) into communities. A curriculum developed between UNICEF and the Ministry of Education provided vocational training, basic literacy and numeracy skills as well as counselling services. Upon completion of the programme the youth were organized into co-operatives and given small development loans.

UNICEF also trained 20 physiotherapists and orthopaedic assistants to help more than 500 disabled children, in addition to supporting numerous small scale community level projects aimed at assisting children through the provision of counselling, education, or helping them to be reunited with their families. Basic services to children were provided on a national scale through a cooperative venture involving the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, Health and Social Welfare, and Education and Rural Development, as well as national and international NGOs and UNICEF.

Health:

The WHO, using UNDP funding, applied a number of initiatives in the health sector. It sought to strengthen the Rapid Epidemic Response Task Force in Liberia by creating a national disease surveillance system, helping the government to plan and monitor disease trends in the country. It also implemented health development programs at the community level in order to build on peoples own capacity for health action. Together with UNICEF and the Ministry of Health and a variety of national and international NGOs, the WHO also sought to provide curative and preventative health care as well as reform of the health sector. Such efforts were limited due to the frequent outbreak of fighting and epidemics. Numerous vaccination campaigns were undertaken against measles, yellow fever and other diseases in conjunction with the NGO community and the Ministry of Health. The limited hospital and community clinic facilities were staffed by volunteers from MSF and a national aid agency MERCI. Aids control programmes were implemented by the WHO with the National AIDS Control Programme of Liberia by way of public awareness campaigns, education schemes, and condom distribution.

Education:

The LWS and UNICEF distributed free educational material throughout the country in order to encourage both students and teachers to go back into the classroom. UNICEF also supported the Christian Relation Education Development Organization in its implementation of a revolving project fund for school supplies and equipment in those areas where people could afford to pay school fees. UNICEF also funded teacher training workshops which instructed teachers in areas such as curriculum development, war trauma counselling, educational psychology and lesson planning.

Governance and Institutional Capacity Building:

Electoral Assistance:

On 2 April 1997 the Liberian Independent Elections Commission (IECOM) was installed with the responsibility for the organizing and execution of the elections. Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court was assembled and was to adjudicate in the case of electoral disputes. On most issues concerning the conduct of elections there were three main groups involved, including the Committee of Nine (ECOWAS), the factions, and the IECOM. Repeated consultations between these groups led to the establishment of the electoral calendar and the resolution of practical and technical questions surrounding the election process such as the electoral laws, the date of elections and the electoral budget. A standing committee was established in Monrovia to resolve questions that arose as the process went ahead and was comprised of members of the IECOM as well as those of a mediation team involving ambassadors from Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the US.

Observation and verification of the elections were carried out by UNOMIL observers. Initially the UNOMIL Electoral Unit consisted of four electoral officers with 34 civilian electoral observers joining the 78 military observers already in the field. These number were augmented by 200 more observers deployed specifically for the election period. UNOMIL helicopters and vehicles were shared with IECOM officials for movement in the field. Beyond this UNOMIL's role involved only the provision of technical advice to the elections commission as it co-ordinated with ECOMOG and donor states in implementing the logistical plans for the elections. IECOM recruited and trained local registration staff in Monrovia and in the counties as well as magistrates who were responsible for coordinating elections at the regional level. IECOM also held workshops for the political parties and media to improve their understanding of the electoral package. These initiatives were supported by the UNDP, ECOWAS and the European Commission.

Other cooperative initiatives between international and national agencies also occurred in this area. Certain preparatory initiatives to pave the way for the election process were implemented by both international and national agencies. For example, an ECOWAS assessment team, led by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, visited Liberia in order to assess the status of electoral preparations and the suitability of the electoral package. This initiative was designed to exercise close control over the election process. It was conducted through close and extensive consultations with the Liberian Council of State, the Independent Elections Commission, the registered political parties competing in the election, and with UNOMIL.

Civic Education:

The Public Information Unit of UNOMIL was one of the agencies which provided information on voting and registration to the Liberian public. UNDP and USAID provided wind-up radios through the NGO Search For Common Ground to schools, churches, and community centres to increase public access to the media. Cartoons, newsletters, and radio programmes were also used to convey information about the electoral process. Efforts were made to encourage the return of refugees for the election.

Institutions:

UN agencies helped to restore public institutions considered critical for the recovery process. The Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, Agriculture, and Health and Social Welfare, Commerce and Education, and the Budget Bureau, and a variety of local

NGOs also received logistical support. The UNDP promoted the return of ex-patriots through its TOKTEM programme and a similar initiative was conducted by the WHO in order to repatriate Liberians who were living abroad and had expertise in the health sector. Both initiatives sought to increase the pool of human capital available in Liberia for the reconstruction and recovery process. Such contact between national and international agencies primarily occurred during the design and implementation of economic or social reconstruction programmes.

Policy Evaluation and Development:

As demonstrated by the collective action taken by aid agencies and the UN when they determined that their looted relief supplies were serving to strengthen the factions, peacebuilding strategies in Liberia experienced continual short-term re-assessment in the field. The ongoing nature of the peace process has meant that little, if any, academic analysis of the peacebuilding effort has occurred. Instead, the assessment of activities and the internalization of such evaluations has occurred largely *ad hoc* as necessity has dictated. The Committee of Nine, for example, often met in order to discuss alternative conflict resolution strategies when the peace process appeared to be going nowhere. ECOMOG adopted more aggressive peace-enforcement tactics when it became clear that more impartial peacekeeping methods were largely ineffective.

Peacebuilding Training and Trainers:

A variety of training initiatives were conducted in Liberia by the international agencies and NGOs involved. The majority of training efforts were directed towards the education, health, and agricultural sectors. UNICEF conducted teacher training workshops to assist with the preparation of lesson plans, curriculums, and educational psychology. Health workers received instruction in how to assist disabled children, traditional birth attendants received refresher courses in pre-natal care, and farmers were introduced to new agricultural techniques. For the most part such training was short term and designed to kick-start the recovery of the health, education, or agricultural sectors.

Evaluation:

When viewed as a whole, the various peacebuilding initiatives that were undertaken in Liberia can be considered to be largely responsible for the eventual cessation of hostilities and the national elections that were held on 19 July 1997. However, when divided into their specific categories it becomes evident that the relative impact of different initiatives varied greatly.

The most effective type of peacebuilding activity in this conflict were the **conflict resolution initiatives** taken by both ECOWAS and UNOMIL. Although early attempts at negotiation were complicated by the NPFL-Nigeria confrontation, the Abuja agreement in particular provided a significant step towards peace. The sustained interest of the ECOWAS nations, as demonstrated by the early deployment and maintenance of the ECOMOG force despite the opposition of the NPFL faction, slowly increased the momentum of the peace process. ECOWAS, with international assistance, was the main agent in brokering the series of accords that led to the signing of the Abuja agreement in August 1995. Despite continual

violations of these agreements, including the major outbreak of fighting on April 1996, the scope of international action and external political pressure slowly reduced the political room for manoeuvre of the Liberian factions. These conflict resolution initiatives occurred in conjunction with the deployment of the ECOMOG force, but were crucial for creating the political space that the force required if it was to have a legitimate and effective role in the Liberian conflict. As advances were made on the political front, so the military side of the operation became less difficult. The political initiatives created an environment conducive to reconciliation and represented the most important factor in the overall peace process.

The role of the two peace-keeping missions -ECOMOG and, to a lesser extent, UNOMIL-in creating the conditions of relative **security** for the disarmament of troops and holding of elections can also be considered as having made an effective contribution to the eventual securing and maintenance of the cease-fire. The effectiveness of ECOMOG was directly proportional to the amount of political and financial support which it received. Throughout 1996 and 1997 as international support for the peace process grew, so too did the resources of ECOMOG in terms of logistical equipment and the number of troops deployed. Gradually the force was able to interposition itself between the factions, isolating them from each other and helping to create on the ground the cease-fire which had long existed on paper. During the demobilization and disarmament phase, both ECOMOG and UNOMIL were able to supervise the partial dismantling of factional forces. ECOMOG was pro-actively engaged in cordon and search operations which led to the confiscation of a significant amount of weaponry and ammunition and also kept a tight grip on the overall security situation. As mentioned above however these military contributions, although helping to cement progress in the peace process, were dependent upon political gains made through conflict resolution efforts.

Humanitarian assistance efforts were effective in reaching large proportions of the IDP population as well as significant numbers of refugees located in surrounding states. This became more limited once aid agencies themselves realized early in 1996 that the looting of their supplies went a long way towards strengthening the factions, and thus in part perpetuated the conflict. Accordingly they reduced their role to the provision of emergency aid only until the security situation improved.

This unreliable security situation effectively limited the impact of **economic and social reconstruction initiatives**. It is too early to judge the effectiveness of such efforts towards the creation of social stability since Liberia is still very much in a state of transition. The few social and economic reconstruction efforts that did occur did generally do so together. Through the food-for-work programmes the provision of employment for both civilians and ex-combatants was designed not only help them reintegrate into society, but also to provide a basic economic foundation from which more sophisticated economic reconstruction initiatives could emerge. Such activities however, were critically dependent on the effectiveness of both conflict resolution initiatives in securing political agreement between the factions and also the ability of the ECOMOG force in helping to ensure that political obligations were respected in the field. Some specific initiatives, such as the provision of health care, were effective in reducing the outbreak of disease and generally softening the overall impact of the conflict on the civilian population.

Other initiatives such as **governance and institutional capacity building** cannot be

evaluated since the fragility of the peace settlement endures. While significant numbers of personnel have been trained and much practical experienced has been gained, these national human assets will require a secure political and military environment if they are to put their training into practice in the future. Similarly, **human rights** gains will rely on continued political stability.

Acronyms:

| | |
|---------|--|
| ADRA: | Adventist Development Relief Association |
| AFL: | Armed Forces of Liberia |
| AMA: | African Muslim Agency |
| CRS: | Catholic Relief Services |
| ECOMOG: | Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group |
| ECOWAS: | Economic Community of West African States |
| FAO: | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| HACO: | Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office |
| ICRC: | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IECOM: | Liberian Independent Elections Committee |
| LWS: | Lutheran World Service |
| MSF: | Medicins sans Frontieres |
| NDDC: | National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission |
| NPFL: | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| SCF: | Save the Children Fund |
| SRSR: | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| UNDP: | United Nation's Development Program |
| UNICEF: | United Nation's Childrens Emergency Fund |
| UNOMIL: | United Nation's Observer Mission in Liberia |
| UNOPS: | United Nation's Office For Project Services |
| WAYS: | War Affected Youths |
| WHO: | World Health Organization |

Selected Timeline:

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| December 1989: | NPFL infiltrate into Liberia |
| August 1990: | ECOMOG deployed |
| October 1991: | Yamoussoukro Accord brokered |
| July 1993: | Contonou Peace Agreement signed |
| September 1993: | UNOMIL deployed |
| July 1995: | Women's Group of Liberia peace talks |
| August 1995: | Abuja Agreement signed |
| October 1995: | HACO established |
| March 1996: | UNDP-World Bank mission to Liberia |
| November 1996: | Demobilization and Disarmament Process begins |
| April 1997: | IECOM established |
| June 1997: | Special Conference to Support the Peace Prices in Liberia |
| July 1997: | Liberian National Elections held |

Sierra Leone:

Period of Analysis: 1990 to present

Background:

Since it achieved independence from Britain in 1961, Sierra Leone has been characterized by a series of intensely corrupt and ineffective military regimes. Popular resentment of this corruption, poor leadership, and Sierra Leone's support for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia created an environment from which a period of civil anarchy emerged in 1992.

One factor which instigated this decline into anarchy was the creation of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) by Liberian faction leader Charles Taylor. It was Taylor who infiltrated an RUF force into Sierra Leone to oppose the corrupt government of Saidu Momoh in March, 1991 in response to Sierra Leone's support for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia. Corporal Foday Sankoh led the RUF from within Sierra Leone, heavily influenced by both Taylor and Libya's Moammar Gadhafi. Politically Sankoh was committed to social justice through the provision of free education, housing and health services for the people of Sierra Leone.

Faced with this RUF threat and unsupported by their political leaders, a group of army officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser rebelled and toppled the Momoh government. Calling themselves the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) the coup leaders were greeted with popular enthusiasm as they promised to end the traditional of corrupt government. However, they failed to live up to this promise and were soon presiding over a situation of civil anarchy as NPRC soldiers turned to looting. Much of the unrest was blamed on the RUF as the conflict between the NPRC and the RUF continued. The situation remained unclear until 1994 when traditional institutions such as men's secret societies, paramount chiefs, and kamajors (traditional hunter-warriors) faced off against both the RUF and government soldiers in an attempt to protect their communities.

This rise of 'people power' and growing public resolve led to national elections in 1996. The country's first civilian president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, was elected and a new multi-party constitution drafted. On November 30, 1996 the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Agreement. The agreement ended six years of civil war which had resulted in nearly 10 000 people killed and over 2 million displaced.

However, Sierra Leone's experience with conflict was to continue as a coup ousted the newly elected Kabbah government on May 25, 1997. It was orchestrated by a group of junior army officers calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and led by Major Johnny Koroma. The AFRC soon joined forces with the RUF, and allied themselves against both the kamajors and the ECOMOG force which was already stationed in Freetown assisting the Kabbah government

The AFRC have stated that they would accept a UN or ECOMOG peacekeeping force, but not the reinstatement of the Kabbah government. The OAU, UN, US, and EU have condemned the actions of the AFRC, with the UN and OAU having given their backing to ECOWAS efforts to reverse the coup. ECOWAS remains committed to reinstalling Kabbah.

Conflict Resolution Initiatives:

The efforts towards resolving the civil war in Sierra Leone represent a two pronged process. Pressure from within the country, stemming largely from the electorate caused the

NPRC, and the subsequent Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) government of Kabbah, to be receptive to negotiations with the RUF. Similarly, external pressure and support from international actors facilitated this process.

Following a change in leadership within the NPRC, when Strasser was removed and replaced by Brigadier Bio, the NPRC became willing to meet with RUF representatives for peace talks. A week long cease-fire was declared by the RUF and representatives from the two parties met in Abidjan in February/March 1996. After this initial success the party leaders, Bio and Sankoh met in Yamoussoukro in late March. They established three working groups to discuss various elements of the peace process and agreed to begin a two month cease-fire. These talks were continued on April 22, 1996 but with Kabbah representing the newly elected government of Sierra Leone. The cease-fire was extended and the discussions centred around devising a general peace accord which, once formulated, became known as the Abidjan Agreement.

This Agreement established the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) which was to act as a verification mechanism responsible for supervising the implementation and compliance with all the provisions of the accord, with a variety of sub-committees responsible for implementing particular provisions such as demobilization. The Accord also provided a framework to further the process of democratization and begin social and economic development in Sierra Leone.

One of the key issues of the peace talks centred around the withdrawal of foreign troops, in particular the firm Executive Outcomes, which had been hired by the government to assist in the fight against the RUF. The company had provided military advisors - mainly former South African special forces troops - and had had a significant impact on the balance of the war. It was this issue that caused an impasse in the final round of talks in May 1996, but the issue was eventually resolved and it was agreed that EO would withdraw.

Throughout this peace process of variety of international actors acted as facilitators and impartial observers. From 1994 the UN, OAU, International Alert (IA), and the Commonwealth encouraged dialogue between the RUF and NPRC with the assistance of certain West African governments, in particular Cote d'Ivoire. It was Cote d'Ivoire's Foreign Minister Amara Essy who was first approached by IA for advice on pursuing reconciliation strategies in Sierra Leone. Essy often worked as the direct channel of communication through which the main international organizations communicated with the parties. Similarly he was instrumental in facilitating the peace talks themselves, often acting as chairman.

The Abidjan discussions in February/March and those later in Yamoussoukro not only had high level intervention from representatives of the Cote d'Ivoire, but also involved the UN, OAU, IA and the Commonwealth. In addition to the observer role many of these same international actors engaged in intense "shuttle-diplomacy" efforts to effectively grease the wheels of the negotiations when agreement became difficult.

Post-Coup:

Following the May 25 coup a number of conflict resolution efforts have occurred, most of which have originated from two sources. One source has been the ARFC. On June 7 a ARFC/RUF delegation went to Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to search for regional support and avert any potential military intervention by ECOWAS. On June 20 the AFRC called an

ECOWAS meeting to discuss foreign intervention in its internal political affairs. Talks have also occurred at the operational level between Koroma and the ECOMOG commanders regarding a possible cease-fire.

The second source of conflict resolution efforts has been ECOWAS. Immediately following the coup a number of meetings took place between ECOWAS member-states as they attempted to decide on how to respond Kabbah's ouster. The result of these meetings has been the imposition of economic sanctions on Sierra Leone in the hopes of crippling the ARFC regime. Additionally, ECOWAS has established a four member Committee consisting of Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire to oversee the sanctions and conduct an assessment mission to Sierra Leone. The stated ECOWAS objectives are threefold; the reinstatement of the legitimate government, the return of peace and security, and the resolution of the issues surrounding refugees and internally displaced people.

Throughout this process ECOWAS and the UN have kept in close contact, with ECOWAS briefing the UN Security Council (UNSC) on its strategy and the Committee of Four going to New York to meet the UN Secretary General (UNSG).

Other unilateral conflict resolution efforts have occurred. Ghana, for example, independently sent a delegation to Freetown to meet with the coup makers to discuss potential avenues to peace.

Early Warning:

One of the primary early warning roles in the attempted resolution of the civil war was conducted by International Alert. In many cases its efforts can be considered as conflict resolution initiatives, but much of IA's work accord before any substantial conflict resolution process was underway. Initially, IA sent a special envoy to discuss with the Foreign Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Amara Essy, the potential for peace talks between the parties. This was then followed by a series of consultations with both the Secretary-General of the OAU and the NPRC government in Sierra Leone. In early 1995 IA organized a Conflict Resolution Workshop in Senegal at which a representative of the RUF was present as well as a representative from the Commonwealth Secretariat. It also coordinated, with the ICRC, the release of hostages held by the RUF, and convened a second meeting - the Joint Action Peace Forum on Sierra Leone - which involved members of the West-African diplomatic community and NGOs.

As dialogue for peace began to gain momentum, IA facilitated communication between the RUF, the OAU, UN and Commonwealth - efforts which culminated in the first meeting of the RUF, the OAU and the UN in December 1995. While these preparatory talks were occurring Brigadier Bio gained control of the NPRC and expressed a willingness to negotiate with the RUF. Pursuing this opportunity, IA worked as a go-between among the RUF and NPRC and the various international organizations with its efforts being rewarded in late February 1996 when direct peace talks were begun in Abidjan involving all parties concerned.

IA has recently been criticized for its continued role in the Sierra Leone peacebuilding process. While the value of its early initiatives is generally accepted, IA and one of its Special Envoy to Sierra Leone have been accused of complicating the later stages of the peace process. A proposed preliminary peacekeeping deployment by the UN was rejected by Sankoh, and it is generally believed that the IA's Special Envoy advised Sankoh

to do so. Thus the IA's role went from being that of an impartial mediator to a partial advisor for one of the key antagonists, consequently drawing international criticism.

Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance:

The humanitarian relief efforts in Sierra Leone prior to the May coup were well organized and demonstrated effective collaboration between international relief agencies, NGOs, and the national government agencies responsible for relief efforts.

In order to expedite the efficient delivery of relief supplies, a particular aid agency was allocated a chiefdom to which it would ensure the delivery of food assistance. There were many international actors involved, including the WFP, CRS, World Vision, CARE, German Agro-Action, and Concern Universal all of which had their own direct food pipelines into the country. Once the food was delivered to a particular chiefdom the distribution became the responsibility of another agency.

Much of the relief effort was co-ordinated by national agencies. The Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MNRRR) oversaw and co-ordinated humanitarian assistance and post-war recovery efforts, its activities sponsored by the UNDP and the World Bank. Within the MNRRR, the National Committee on Food Aid developed a sophisticated programme of relief assistance. In conjunction with relief agencies it developed a strategy whereby NGOs were authorised to provide one-off emergency rations to the vulnerable. This category was considered to include rural displaced persons, recently released ex-captives and those who were not registered in the relief programme. A number of Regional Food Aid Technical Committees worked in co-operation with community groups in order to register people considered vulnerable and in need of food assistance.

This programme was complemented by another which focused on longer term projects. Once people were registered in relief camps and provided with resettlement packages they became ineligible for food assistance but instead received practical forms of assistance such as tools and seeds, or employment in food for work programs. This registration process and system of having a tiered relief programme allowed the food agencies to ensure that emergency food aid was distributed only to the truly vulnerable. In this way, dependency on emergency relief was discouraged and the reintegration process was accelerated.

One typical relief initiative was conducted by CARE and provided 70,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) with a monthly ration of food. This project was focused predominantly in the temporary relief camps in Bo, Bonthe, and Freetown. The project also had the additional benefit of building technical expertise for the national NGO implementing partners in food handling.

Post-Coup:

The political upheaval which occurred in May had a detrimental effect on the security situation in regions of the country and adversely affected the emergency relief efforts. Many aid agencies evacuated staff during the coup and the looting which followed. In early June an attempt was made to re-start food distribution programmes, but success was extremely limited.

A joint UN/NGO strategy was devised for Sierra Leone in response to the poor security situation following the coup as aid agencies became concerned that the distribution of food could endanger the recipients and make them vulnerable to looting and acts of violence.

At the same time the agencies urgently needed to distribute the supplies before they were looted from warehouses by soldiers. Other problems included limited relief supplies and fuel brought on by the economic embargo implemented by ECOWAS.

Such difficulties have limited the activities of the remaining relief agencies to the provision of medical assistance, distribution of remaining food supplies, and the pre-positioning of food stocks in neighbouring countries to assist in reaching rural areas when the security situation improves. The ICRC, for example, flew in a medical team to assist in the hospitals in Freetown and have directed their efforts towards sustaining a minimal level of surgical care. They have continued to support local clinics in outlying districts as well as distributing food to vulnerable groups. The WFP also started food distribution in conjunction with the ICRC, national NGOs and community groups.

These assistance efforts have continued in cooperation with the government in exile. It has set up the Economic, Finance and Humanitarian Committee in Guinea to meet with the relief agencies and UN concerning the embargo and assistance activities. The committee has discussed the relief strategy with the aid community in order to ensure that assistance initiatives continue in spite of the economic blockade as well as ensuring that these relief efforts do not work to the political advantage of the AFRC.

Physical Security:

With regard to the issues of demobilization and disarmament, the Abidjan Accord called for the downsizing and restructuring of the Armed Forces (RSLMF), the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the demobilization of the RUF and incorporation into the RSLMF. National initiatives to meet these tasks included the deployment of local police forces at the district level to provide security for demobilized troops, but their effectiveness was severely hampered by manpower and logistical constraints. The Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Committee was set up to oversee the process, and working in conjunction with NGOs four reception centres were set up for RUF soldiers. The four NGO's working in the centres included Africare, CRS and two local agencies. Once in the reception areas training schemes and resettlement packages were intended to help the soldiers reintegrate.

The demobilization process was to have been overseen by a series of international and national observers. The Neutral Monitoring Group, consisting of representatives from the international community was to have monitored the implementation of the Accord as well as the demobilisation and disarmament of the combatants. A Joint Monitoring Group, consisting of representatives of the government as well as the RUF was to have ensured compliance with the cease-fire. These provisions were effectively still born due to the fact that the RUF failed to nominate any representatives to work in either the JMG or the DDRRC, and did not comply with the security provisions of the Abidjan Agreement.

Post-Coup:

Following the May coup all efforts at demobilization and disarmament ceased. The RUF have joined with the AFRC and together are opposed to the ECOMOG force which has been deployed in Sierra Leone in an effort to assist in the return of the Kabbah government. The situation is further complicated by the existence of the kamajors in the south and the

kapra - a similar civil defense force - in the north.

Human Rights:

The signing of the Abidjan Accord resulted in the formation of the National Commission for Human Rights. In the lead up to the peace settlement there was a lot of pressure from both international and national human rights groups that the issue of human rights be addressed by the two parties. Amnesty International, for example, had stressed to both the government and the RUF that any political settlement had to include strong guarantees of respect for human rights if the peace process was to be effective.

On July 1, 1996 the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission was established to address abuses against civilians by the former government. Those found to be victims of injustices were able to apply for compensation. The Commission was also supposed to investigate and identify why society had become divided as a means of preventing future conflicts. Again in this instance, the coup cut short the work of the Commission.

Post-Coup:

Initiatives in human rights after May 1997 have been limited to monitoring the overall human rights situation and a minimal role in ensuring the human treatment of prisoners. The Civil Liberties Congress (CLC) of Liberia has reported that human rights abuses increased following the arrival in power of the AFRC. Summary executions, armed robberies, murder, and incidents of mutilation have all occurred. The National League for Human Rights and Democracy has also accused the new junta of human rights violations. Similarly, Amnesty International has expressed concern over the detention of political prisoners. ICRC delegates have been able to visit detainees in various prisons to register people held as a result of the coup and notify their relatives of their whereabouts.

Economic Reconstruction:

Initiatives concerning economic rehabilitation were primarily limited to the start-up of small income generation projects, the reinvigoration of the agricultural sector, or the provision of basic logistical assistance to such schemes. The implementation of these projects was carried out through a combination of foreign aid agencies as well as national agencies. For example, in the agricultural sector, the government established the Agricultural Emergency Relief Committee. This was divided into three sub-committees which each had responsibility for various areas including the selection of suitable seed and fertilizers for farmers, and the distribution of land for various agricultural inputs.

These national activities were complemented by those of various international actors. CARE, for example, had a Productive Activities Project which targeted productive members of 16000 war affected families by focusing on intervention that maintained or revived initiatives that resulted in food production or cash generation. Specific programs provided seeds and planting materials or basic farm kits which were intended to provide enough food for feeding families as well as some surplus for sale. Women were also helped to start income generation activities such as soap making or tie-dyeing by way of short term loans and technical assistance. Similarly, ActionAid began an EU funded agricultural rehabilitation programme in two districts which distributed seeds and tools to more than 4900 families in

each district. Other beneficiaries included displaced or disabled people, female-headed households, and other vulnerable groups.

Post-Coup:

Following the coup, most of the civil workforce went on strike and refused to work under the new regime. As a result, there was no functioning government and much of the economic infrastructure shut down. Some limited agricultural aid was distributed - primarily the remaining stocks of seed and farming tools. World Vision was able to set up some agricultural demonstration plots and seed variety trials in regions isolated from the fighting, and the ICRC has continued its 1997 rehabilitation plan for one area, distributing seed and hoes as well as conducting some food-for-work programmes. The UN has dispatched investigative missions to determine the sustainability of basic services such as the provision of clean water and the supply of electricity. Most nationally based economic reconstruction efforts have stopped.

Social Reconstruction:

Reintegration:

Due to the coordinating activities of the MNRRR following the formation of the Kabbah government and the subsequent Peace Accord, there were a variety of reintegration initiatives undertaken both by national and international actors. The MNRRR, for example, consulted with members of the relief community by way of the Resettlement and Repatriation Planning Committee. A variety of packages were devised in order to match the resources available with the most appropriate recipients. A food package was available, its contents based on recommendations of the National Committee on Food Aid. A second, non-food package was also prepared containing cooking pots, sleeping mats, and a variety of agricultural components. As a source of funding the World Bank created an Emergency Recovery and Reintegration Credit to support the NRRR programme.

There were also a variety of international initiatives ranging from the provision of funding to specific reintegration and resettlement programmes. In one case, ADRA and German Agro-Action provided transport and conducted an emergency food distribution to 660 people as they were moved from temporary camps to their areas of origin. They also conducted a family tracing initiative. Another initiative involved the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), part of USAID. Its strategy was to empower civilians to prevent the re-occurrence of violence and consequently supported resettlement efforts. Specific projects within this programme were implemented through operational NGOs in the country including Africare, World Vision and Care and involved the transport of IDPs and the distribution of resettlement packages. Just prior to the coup, the UNHCR dispatched a technical mission to assess and prepare a reintegration programme in returnee areas, but its efforts were severely curtailed by poor security conditions

Child Welfare:

Following the Peace Accord, a number of initiatives were begun that directly concerned the issue of child welfare. A series of meetings took place which were facilitated

by UN-HACU and attended by representatives from the government, other UN agencies and NGOs. These were designed to devise an inter-agency strategy for coping with the problem posed by war-affected youth. As a result of these meetings the Child Welfare Forum was created with the Unaccompanied Childrens Unit serving as an inter-agency co-ordination body.

One initiative that was put into practice came from UNICEF which provided unaccompanied children with learning materials and teaching assistance so that they could continue their educations once resettled. A number of small community-based programmes were also set up to re-integrate child combatants.

Health:

A number of collaborative projects involving both the international NGO community and local organizations were conducted in the health sector. CARE, for example had its Water, Sanitation and Animation for Cholera Prevention Project, which provided adequate water and sanitation services in Freetown through the construction of two gravity systems, three spring systems, ten wells, and 400 latrines. These were built in partnership with the target beneficiaries. A second large scale project implemented by CARE was its Water, Sanitation and Health Education Project which devised emergency rehabilitation and developmental responses to the need for water and sanitation systems in both urban and rural areas.

Other collaborative initiatives included MSF working with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation conducting exploratory missions to assess health conditions in different parts of the country. Similarly, a cholera task force was activated by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation with support from UNICEF, WHO and medical NGOs in order to improve preparedness as the rainy season approached. It compiled an inventory of all items available in country for the prevention and treatment of cholera and also included training for "blue flag" volunteers to assist in the prevention of cholera outbreaks.

Post-Coup:

Due to the uncertainty of the security situation following the coup the majority of the formal reintegration and resettlement programmes were halted as well as the health and child welfare programmes. A few international agencies have managed to continue their operations on a smaller scale. These include the ADRA and Christian Brothers which have continued their reunification programme for separated families. Some programmes which were designed to assist in the reintegration of child fighters have also continued, but many of the children rejoined the fighting factions. A Child Protection Committee was set up in Conakry on to discuss child demobilisation and reintegration schemes by the exiled Kabbah government. The ICRC has also dispatched an engineer to assess the situation concerning water and sanitation in Freetown since refuse collection had been suspended and the spread of disease was a distinct possibility.

Governance and Institutional Capacity Building:

Electoral Assistance:

In the lead up to the 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the NPRC invited the Secretary General of the Commonwealth to send a planning mission to Sierra Leone to consult with the local parties to ascertain their level of support for the presence of a Commonwealth observer mission at the elections. Following a positive response the Commonwealth dispatched a team of twelve observers to Sierra Leone. The Commonwealth mission operated under the umbrella of the Joint International Observers Mission which was co-ordinated by the UN Electoral Assistance Secretariat and included observers from the African-American Institute, the OAU, members of the diplomatic community, the UK, the UN and the World Council of Churches. Overall responsibility for the conduct and supervision of the elections lay with the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) although this power was in practice shared with the outgoing NPRC regime.

Much of the initiative towards the elections stemmed directly from the people of Sierra Leone themselves who sought to capitalize on the momentum established by the two consultative conferences held by the NPRC. In each civilians ran considerable risks to publicly demand that elections be held, and during the first round of the elections civilians were seen battling soldiers in order to protect the ballot boxes.

Civic Education:

During the elections a concerted effort was made to educate voters and parties about the electoral process. Overall responsibility for voter education lay with the INEC. It compiled handbooks about the electoral process and conducted information sessions with the press and political parties. The National Commission for Democracy also conducted a voter education campaign creating educational posters which were displayed throughout the country.

Institutions:

While the years of civil anarchy has meant that much of Sierra Leone's public and private infrastructure was destroyed, the Kabbah government seemed to have quickly developed a good organizational capacity which resulted in many of the peacebuilding activities being coordinated at a national level. The assistance that international actors were able to provide to these fledgling institutions and ministries was therefore primarily of a technical nature. Since the coup - and the consequent general strike of public servants - much of this national capacity has disappeared with the poor security situation preventing its return.

Policy Development, Assessment and Advocacy:

The peace process in Sierra Leone has generated a number of assessments which have assisted in the development of future peacebuilding strategies and have also had practical implications on the ground for ongoing peacebuilding initiatives. Both the Commonwealth Secretariat and International Alert have produced reports documenting and assessing their respective roles in electoral observation and early warning/conflict resolution initiatives.

A significant amount of *ad hoc* strategy assessment has occurred with regard to particular peacebuilding initiatives, particularly following the May 1997 coup. The

humanitarian agencies have reorganized themselves and devised an alternative humanitarian assistance programme that has sought to protect both the aid recipients and distributors, and to ensure the effective distribution of supplies before they are lost through looting. This change of strategy has occurred in collaboration with the UN and the exiled Kabbah government.

Peacebuilding Training and Trainers:

Specific peacebuilding training initiatives were limited and the extent to which training did occur was the result of practical experience, as national agencies learned through working with international agencies. One example of this occurred in January 1997 when the WFP and CRS undertook a joint mission to sensitise the Regional Food Aid Technical Committee and other interested parties to the 1997 food aid strategy. Similarly training has occurred in the health and agriculture sectors with aid workers being trained as health facilities were expanded, and farmers were trained in new planting techniques and fertilizer use.

Civilian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations:

There was no UN peacekeeping mission deployed into Sierra Leone. The UN was making plans to do so in order to monitor the demobilization and disarmament of the RUF. The May coup has effectively put this proposed deployment on the back shelf.

The ECOMOG deployment following the coup has sought to reinstall the Kabbah government, and the work of civilian international aid agencies has continued with this deployment. The international aid agencies operate independently of the ECOMOG force.

Evaluation:

In assessing the variety of peacebuilding initiatives which have recently been undertaken in Sierra Leone it would be all too easy to suggest that they have all been ineffective given the breakdown of the peace process and the current chaos in the country. Such an assessment however ignores certain initiatives which were extremely effective in getting the peace process on track up until the ouster of the Kabbah government.

The **conflict resolution efforts** were instrumental in reaching a political settlement between the Kabbah government and the RUF. Much of this initiative came from the people of Sierra Leone who had expressed their desire for an end to the war both under the NPRC regime and also during the national elections. This resulted in the Kabbah government pursuing talks with the RUF. This desire for peace was supplemented by the international efforts at conflict resolution which facilitated communication between the parties and ensured that the momentum towards peace was not lost.

Similarly, the **early warning initiatives** undertaken by International Alert were crucial in getting the political process underway. IA ensured contact was made between the parties and a variety of international actors, each of which played a role in the later stages of the peace process. The Commonwealth, for example, not only observed the early rounds of the negotiations on the Peace Accord, but also played an effective role in monitoring the conduct of the national elections.

In terms of **Physical Security Initiatives**, this is perhaps where the weakness lay in the peace process. Although the general security situation improved following the signing of

the Abidjan Agreement and there was a number of organisational structures designed to oversee the demobilization and disarmament of the RUF these clearly failed. The failure was not so much due to the inadequacies of the initiatives themselves, but because of the questionable commitment of the RUF to complying with them. Only a limited number of RUF fighters disarmed and this occurred spontaneously. The RUF failed to appoint its representatives for the DDR Committee. The provisions for reintegration were also poorly distributed. For example, when the NPRC was disbanded no demobilization or reintegration package was provided for its senior military officers, or its soldiers. Some of these individuals re-emerged in the coup of May 25, 1997 which overthrew the Kabbah government.

Some promising gains were made in the field of **human rights** in the peace settlement, however their implementation was cut short by the coup. Current monitoring initiatives are limited due to the ongoing fighting. Similarly, initiatives towards **economic reconstruction** were beginning to take effect with the renewed confidence in the peace process resulting in a dramatically reduced inflation rate and a gradual economic recovery until the coup occurred. The agricultural sector was improving, but it was especially hard hit as the coup occurred just as the planting season had begun. Since then the economy has been paralyzed due to the economic embargo implemented by ECOWAS.

Social Reconstruction efforts were also progressing well. At the end of January 1997 an estimated 200,000 people had returned to their areas of origins and were settling down. Programs to assist child combatants were expanding, and health services were gradually improving the overall well-being of the population by working pro-actively to prevent outbreaks of disease. All of these gains were reversed by the renewed fighting. Similarly the gains made in developing **institutional capacity** were cut short. This was particularly unfortunate given the expanding competence of government agencies in organizing the national elections and co-ordinating many of the peacebuilding projects in the months immediately following the signing of the peace accord.

Overall, the few successful peacebuilding initiatives have been overshadowed by the failure of the RUF to comply with the demobilization and disarmament provisions of the Abidjan Agreement. This in turn had severe repercussions for the rest of the peacebuilding initiatives. This in part could be considered the fault of the UN which acted slowly to plan the deployment of military observers to oversee the demobilization, but then the RUF might still have delayed its compliance with the Abidjan Agreement. The failure of the demobilization programme should not detract from the relative success of the early action initiatives and the efforts at conflict resolution, both nationally and internationally, which paved the way for the signing of the peace agreement.

It is important to note that despite intense conflict resolution initiatives leading up to the peace agreement, these gains were not cemented in the later stages of the peacebuilding process. The RUF was easily able to renege on its commitment to disarm and demobilize its fighters which then meant that attention could not be fully directed towards reform in the socio-economic sector. This lack of follow through ultimately resulted in the re-ignition of conflict. The experience of Sierra Leone would suggest that the demobilization and disarmament process must be completed before other initiatives occur, and that even in the context of a peace agreement conflict resolution initiatives must continue until this

demilitarized stage is reached. This then creates a solid platform of peace on which other peacebuilding initiatives can build.

Acronyms:

| | |
|---------|---|
| ADRA: | Adventist Development Relief Association |
| ARFC: | Armed Forces Revolutionary Council |
| CARE: | Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere |
| CLC: | Civil Liberties Congress of Liberia |
| CCP: | Commission for the Consolidation of Peace |
| CRS: | Catholic Relief Services |
| DDRC: | Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Committee |
| ECOMOG: | Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group |
| ECOWAS: | Economic community of West African States |
| EO: | Executive Outcomes |
| HACU: | Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit |
| IA: | International Alert |
| ICRC: | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDP: | Internally Displaced Persons |
| INEC: | Interim National Electoral Commission |
| JMG: | Joint Monitoring Group |
| MSF: | Medicins sans Frontieres |
| MNRRR: | Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation |
| NGO: | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NPRC: | National Provisional Ruling Council |
| OAU: | Organization for African Unity |
| OTI: | Office of Transition Initiatives |
| RSLMF: | Armed Forces of Sierra Leone |
| RUF: | Revolutionary United Front |
| SLPP: | Sierra Leonan People's Party |
| UNDP: | United Nations Development Program |
| UNHCR: | United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNSC: | United Nation's Security Council |
| UNSG: | United Nation's Secretary General |
| USAID: | United States Agency for International Development |
| WHO: | World Health Organization |
| WFP: | World Food Program |

Selected Timeline:

| | |
|----------------|---|
| March 1991: | RUF infiltrate into Sierra Leone |
| February 1996: | First direct talks between government and RUF |
| March 1996: | Cease-fire declared and government meets with RUF |
| April 1996: | Kabbah government elected |
| November 1996: | Government and RUF sign Abidjan Agreement |
| May 1997: | Coup ousts Kabbah government |

Tajikistan

Period of Analysis: May 1992 to June 1997

Background:

In May 1992 the Republic of Tajikistan became embroiled in a civil war as the forces of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) attempted to seize power from the Tajik Supreme Soviet government. The UTO was later defeated in December 1992 and a reconstituted Tajik government, led by President Emomali Rakhmonov, assumed power. The country remained beset by fighting as the UTO, led by Abdullo Nuri, continued its insurgency.

Soon after the outbreak of conflict the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed a peacekeeping force to assist in the stabilization of the situation. Russia unilaterally deployed, with the consent of the Tajik government, its border forces along the Tajik-Afghan border in order to repel infiltration by the UTO. These regional forces were supplemented by the presence of a UN military observer mission which was deployed in 1994 to monitor the fragile cease-fire that was reached between the two countries.

On June 27, 1997 a Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed by the Tajik government and the UTO which brought a series of earlier Protocols into force. These Protocols were preliminary agreements on a variety of issues ranging from the creation of a unified armed forces, the problems of refugee reintegration, to the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission.

The roots of the conflict are to be found in a variety of economic, social, and religious factors. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, rapid political and economic change placed stress on traditional institutions and power structures. Ethnic groups which had been excluded from political affairs expected fuller participation in the new republic and their demands led to struggles within traditional clan based structures for a redistribution of the political pie. This political tension occurred alongside growing economic hardship and religious tension between the limited religious orientation of Rakhmonov and the more hardline Suuni orientation of the UTO. In terms of regional support, the Tajik government still retains links to the Russian Federation as is demonstrated by the deployment of Russian border guards with Tajik forces, and the political support which Moscow provides to Rakhmonov. Russian concerns are focused on the potential expansion of the Taleban movement north from Afghanistan. Tehran, on the other hand, supports the UTO and desires a revival of Tajik culture and religion within the borders of Tajikistan. Both Russia's and Iran's primary interests lie in stabilizing the situation on their respective borders.

Conflict Resolution Initiatives:

The most intensive conflict resolution initiatives in Tajikistan have been conducted by Russia, Iran, and the United Nations. Russian and Iran have been essential in bringing both the Tajik government and the UTO to the negotiating table. The dependence of each party on these regional powers has meant that the peace talks have occurred largely in response to pressure from Moscow and Tehran. The Russian Federation appointed its Foreign Minister Kozyrev as the Special Representative for Tajikistan with the intention of promoting talks between the UTO and government as well as among the surrounding states of Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Turkmenistan. Russian President Yeltsin hosted a summit meeting of the leaders from these same states and called on the international community to support efforts on reconciliation in Tajikistan. Tehran has been instrumental in talks between Kabul

and the UTO and has provided facilities for the peace talks.

These reconciliation efforts have been complemented by the mediation efforts of the UN. In October 1992 the UN Secretary General was asked by the Acting-President of the Tajik Republic to despatch a good offices mission to the country. Three months later this UN deployment was expanded to include a unit of political, humanitarian, and military officers who were assigned the task of monitoring the situation on the ground. The UN efforts at conflict resolution were led by the Secretary General's Special Envoy who was appointed in April 1993. Immediately he began dialogue with the two main parties as well as with the governments of surrounding states. These efforts assisted in convening the first round of inter-Tajik talks in Moscow in early 1994.

Following this initial attempt at political dialogue the Tajik government and the UTO held a further four rounds of UN mediated talks. In mid-September 1994 agreement was reached on a temporary cease-fire as well as details for the formation of a Joint Commission to monitor the cease-fire. Subsequent agreement was slow to precipitate as most of the following talks revolved around potential venues for negotiations instead of constructive engagement of pressing political issues. It was not until late December 1995 that substantial progress was made on political issues, which resulted in the signing of a number of Protocols covering the issues of refugees, military forces, and national reconciliation. These Protocols came into force with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord on June, 27, 1997.

The UN has been at the centre of the negotiating process, with the UN Special Envoy chairing the majority of talks as well as engaging in intense shuttle diplomacy between the Tajik government, the UTO, and numerous regional capitals. When confronted by a lack of progress the UN has either expressed its dissatisfaction and withdrawn its support temporarily, leaving the parties to demonstrate their continued commitment to reconciliation or, in other cases, the UN has intensified its efforts and despatched a UN Under-Secretary General to assist the Special Envoy to get the talks back on track. A significant amount of the UN's energy was directed towards the governments of surrounding states, such as Moscow and Kabul, which were then able to place direct political pressure on either the Tajik government or the UTO to reach agreement.

The UN has been assisted in its mediation efforts by other international organizations. The OSCE deployed a seven member mission to Tajikistan to facilitate dialogue and confidence-building among the political forces in the country as well as to promote respect for human rights. The OSCE mission often served as an observer at the various rounds of negotiations between the two parties. A similar role of observation was played by the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Physical Security:

Cease-fire:

As part of the agreement reached between the parties on a cease-fire in mid-September 1994, a Joint Commission was established with the responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire and investigating reported violations of it. Comprised of

representatives of both the government and the UTO, the Commission worked relatively independently of each, though it was reliant on the government for resources and transportation.

The UN also operated a military observer mission in order to support the work of the Joint Commission in monitoring the cease-fire. The United Nation's Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was established by the UN Security Council on December 16, 1994. This was done in accordance with the wishes of the Tajik government and the UTO who, in the cease-fire agreement, had made its implementation contingent upon the deployment of a UN observer force.

The Commonwealth of Independent States also deployed its own peacekeeping force in Tajikistan following the outbreak of hostilities. It was comprised of soldiers from Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The CIS force was intended to help stabilize the situation within the Republic and ensure the separation of government and UTO forces on the southern border. Russian forces were also deployed along the Tajik-Afghan border in order to repel infiltration by UTO rebels. Both the CIS force and the border forces were primarily intended to deter a Taleban move north from Afghanistan. UTO attacks within central Tajikistan were left in the hands of the Tajik military.

Demobilization:

One of the Protocols signed by the parties in the build-up to the final peace accord concerned military issues. This agreement set out a plan for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of UTO units during a transitional period which was to follow the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. The Protocol provisions are to be implemented by the Commission on National Reconciliation and a joint central review board comprised of both government and UTO representatives. This demobilization process is to be supervised by UNMOT.

Demining:

There have been some limited initiatives undertaken towards demining parts of the country. In late 1996 a UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs assessment mission was sent to Tajikistan in order to gather information on the situation concerning mines. As a result a Mine Action Centre was established which is capable of dealing with mine related activities such as the establishment, with the Government and UTO, of a Mine Action plan. This is intended to develop and manage a mine information system, as well as coordinate and support mine-awareness training.

Social Reconstruction:

Humanitarian Relief:

In addition to the outbreak of civil war in 1992, Tajikistan was hit by severe flooding which only served to worsen its humanitarian crisis. In response to both the natural and man-made chaos a variety of initiatives were undertaken to cope with the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Russian, Byelorussia, Iran, Turkey, the US, and the EU all contributed significant sums of money for humanitarian efforts as well as practical relief and

medical supplies. The United Nations relief agencies became involved in January 1993 with the majority of relief efforts coordinated by the UNHCR. Through implementing partners such as the ICRC, WHO, and UNICEF efforts were also undertaken to assist returning refugees resettle. These initiatives included the provision of food, shelter, and basic medical care. Similar services were provided for those who, due to the fighting, were unable to return to their homes and instead had to stay in refugee camps.

Once the flood waters had abated and the parties had agreed on the cease-fire, large numbers of refugees were able to return to their homes, and the efforts of the international relief agencies were focused on reintegration initiatives. These included increasing the availability of health services through agencies such as MSF and ICRC, implementing food-for-work programs designed to increase overall food security, and rebuilding essential infrastructure in affected communities. Food distribution was controlled by the WFP, with NGO's such as German Agro Action and the Aga Khan Foundation implementing specific projects. Following the June 1997 peace agreement, UNHCR involvement in the situation has once again been increased in order to assist with the expected return of substantial numbers of refugees from Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries.

A Protocol on Refugees was signed between the two parties which set out a time-line for the resettlement of displaced persons, as well as specific obligations on the part of the government for the provision of financial and humanitarian aid to help the refugees reintegrate into Tajik society. The Protocol also included a general amnesty for all refugees and displaced persons which ensured that no legal action would be taken against them for their involvement in the political or military confrontation.

Health:

Throughout the conflict the health situation in Tajikistan remained critical. Given the inaccessibility of most areas due to the fighting or mountainous terrain, agencies such as ICRC and MSF could only implement limited projects of medical assistance. No state-wide vaccination program had been implemented in the country since the outbreak of the civil war. The pre-existing health care system in Tajikistan was relatively modern but, as a result of the conflict, medical supplies, drugs, and immunizations were in short supply. With the massive numbers of migrating refugees the outbreak of epidemics was a constant threat. The general health situation was exacerbated by poor hygiene practices, and deteriorating water and sanitation conditions in refugee camps, communities, and medical facilities.

Economic Reconstruction:

Both the IMF and the World Bank are involved in Tajikistan, helping to rehabilitate the economy. In September 1996 the World Bank approved a \$50 million Agricultural Recovery Credit designed to stabilize the economy and ease a foreign exchange shortage which had prevented the purchase of essential imports. In addition funds were targeted towards reforming agricultural policy, including the pricing and marketing of agricultural commodities. The IMF has assisted the Tajik government with balance of payments support as well as providing it with technical assistance.

The FAO has also provided technical assistance and management back-up to the Tajikistan government in the agricultural sector, including the design of short-term agricultural

rehabilitation projects aimed at increasing food and cash crop production. The implementation of similar small scale projects has been carried out by the UNDP which has launched multi-sectoral development projects. These have been aimed at the development of small business enterprises, and assisting in the provision of loans to women.

Human Rights:

Both the OSCE and the ICRC have undertaken human rights initiatives. The OSCE despatched a team of human rights monitors which gathered information on the general human rights situation in Tajikistan and monitored the extent to which the combatants respected OSCE norms. This has been complemented by a dissemination programme implemented by the ICRC which has sought to educate delegates from both the government and the UTO on humanitarian law. Similarly, dissemination efforts have been focused on the Tajik military, the Russian border guards, and members of the opposition forces in the hope of reducing the impact of the fighting on civilian populations.

Governance and Institutional Capacity Building:

Through cooperation with international institutions such as the IMF and the various UN agencies, the government of Tajikistan has acquired an enhanced ability to stabilize its economy and undertake reforms in the agricultural sector. This capacity building at the governmental level has been complemented by the development of a local NGO capacity. The OSCE has sought to increase its ties with local human rights NGO's in order to promote humanitarian monitoring, and increase local capacity by establishing a nation-wide human rights network. Save the Children has been involved in training a Tajik NGO in the field of project and business management, and it has set up an NGO resource centre which provides local NGOs with a "self-help" capacity-building facility.

Evaluation:

Peacebuilding initiatives in Tajikistan have been primarily focused on **conflict resolution efforts**. Iran and Russia were key forces in the negotiating process which brought the parties to the negotiating table. Following this initial step, UN efforts focused on establishing a durable cease-fire and promoting discussion of concrete political issues. While the deployment of the CIS force had a limited effect on reducing conflict between the government and the UTO, the UNMOT mission provided an impartial mechanism by which the cease-fire could be verified as well as a solid backdrop for further negotiations. The ability of the UN to deploy this mission quickly ensured that the cease-fire component of the peace process was consolidated.

Within the larger context of political negotiations, limited initiatives assisted in the **resettlement of refugees** or the **provision of humanitarian relief**. These efforts were largely reactive and occurred in response to renewed outbreaks of fighting which in turn caused a new exodus of displaced persons or critical medical or relief needs. The fact that the UTO insurgency was a limited movement which occurred in specific areas of the country meant that the government retained its ability to work with international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF and implement strategies aimed at **economic rehabilitation**. These were very effective in addressing certain economic instabilities which had contributed to the

outbreak of hostilities. Inflation rates were reduced from 2000% in 1995 to less than 10% in 1997, while the Tajik rouble has stabilized and government revenues have increased.

More substantial peacebuilding initiatives in the areas of **social reconstruction, human rights, physical security, democratic development, and civil capacity building** had all been delayed pending the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. As set out by the series of Protocols signed by the government, strategies in these areas have already been developed and now, with the Peace Accord in hand, the implementation phase must begin.

In retrospect the ability of the UN to play an impartial mediating and supervisory role in the negotiations, particularly in a conflict with such profound regional implications, meant that the political might of Russia could be brought together with the relatively small political force of the UTO in the same negotiating forum. This of course was predicated on the fact that both Russia and Iran placed sufficient pressure on the Tajik government and the UTO to ensure their commitment to peace. This was crucial to the success of the negotiations. The initial establishment of the cease-fire provided the first building bloc from which negotiations could proceed. Without it progress would not have been possible since the cease-fire demonstrated the commitment of both parties to reconciliation. The degree to which the cease-fire was violated at any one time provided an accurate indication of the current state of the peace process. Thus the ability of the UN to provide a timely observer mission was important because it reinforced this initial concession by the parties and held them to their commitment to political dialogue.

Acronyms:

| | |
|---------|---|
| CIS: | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| FAO: | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| ICRC: | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IMF: | International Monetary Fund |
| MSF: | Medecins sans Frontieres |
| OSCE: | Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe |
| UNDP: | United Nations Development Program |
| UNICEF: | United Nations Children's Emergency Fund |
| UNHCR: | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNMOT: | United Nation's Observer Mission in Tajikistan |
| UTO: | United Tajik Opposition |
| WHO: | World Health Organization |

Selected Timeline:

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| May 1992: | Outbreak of Civil War |
| October 1992: Tajikistan | UN Secretary General requested to send good offices mission to |
| December 1992: | UTO defeated |
| January 1993: | UN Relief Agencies become involved |
| February 1993: | CIS Peacekeeping force deployed |
| April 1993: | UN Secretary General Appoints Special Envoy for Tajikistan |
| January 1994: | First round of inter-Tajik talks in Moscow |
| September 1994: | Agreement reached on cease-fire |
| December 1994: | UNMOT deployed |
| September 1996: | World Bank Agricultural Recovery Credit approved |
| November 1996: | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs dispatches assessment mission |
| June 1997: | Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed |

Appendix I

Terms of Reference:

The study requested is an analytical review of country case studies documenting peacebuilding activities in a select sample of countries where these are/have been the major focus of national political activity. The object of this research is to provide AGP with substantive illustrative information on past and on-going peacebuilding activities in selected countries based on an empirical peacebuilding activities inventory drawn from existing literature.

The report will identify a number of specific country case studies documenting peacebuilding activities as a major focus of national political activity. Taken as a set the cases identified should be representative of the different problems and challenges entailed by peacebuilding. It will classify the types of peacebuilding activities that were engaged in by both national and international actors in each case using the categories of peacebuilding activities employed by the CPCC.

Within each case the report will analyze the relative impact of each type of peacebuilding activity on the overall goal of attaining and maintain relative peace and social stability. Relative impact will be assessed from different perspectives including temporal priority and indispensability to the final result. Empirical linkages between the different forms of peacebuilding used in each case will also be identified.

To the extent that the data permits, the results should be aggregated across the cases examined in order to answer the following questions:

- 1) What forms of peacebuilding activity were relatively important in the largest number of cases; and what in the least number of cases?
- 2) What are the dominant empirical linkages between different peacebuilding activities that emerge from the data?
- 3) Is there an identifiable temporal sequence for peacebuilding activities across some or most cases?
- 4) Are some peacebuilding activities predominantly conducted by domestic actors and some by international actors?

The report will also, based on the results of its survey and on the preliminary data available from the other four surveys conducted over the same period, formulate recommendations regarding the niches which Canada should play in international peacebuilding.

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