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
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
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View of United Nations Headquarters Buildings, New York City.

We the peoples...

REFERENCE

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
1945-1965

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1966

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Foreword

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, has said that "the basis of both the League of Nations and the United Nations is the pledge by sovereign states to co-operate, a pledge which involves some measure of sacrifice of sovereignty in the common interest". By 1965 the United Nations had been in existence for almost exactly the same number of years as the effective life of the League. Far more than its predecessor, the United Nations is an organization expressly designed to promote international co-operation among sovereign states, not only in maintaining peace and security but also in solving international problems of an economic and social character and in encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The first 20 years of this second experiment in large-scale international organization, with its many associated agencies, its annual diplomatic conference and meetings throughout the year on every conceivable subject, give rise to a modest hope that, with patience, and the will to unite our efforts for the common good, it will prove possible to lay the foundation for a rational and stable world order.

We in Canada should remember that the effectiveness of the United Nations is almost entirely dependent on the actions and policies of the member states. It is they who give it life and a sense of direction. In the last analysis, it is for the members to decide whether the United Nations will have the strength, flexibility and resources needed to fulfil the increasing demands made upon it.

It was this obvious but so often overlooked aspect which the late Jawaharlal Nehru wished to emphasize when he proposed to the General Assembly in 1961 the designation of 1965 as International Co-operation Year. He considered that a period of time should be set aside in which people everywhere might take

the opportunity to put into practice the ideal of international co-operation.

Canada joined with India and other countries in sponsoring the resolution that gave birth to this proposal. I am pleased to say that Canadians have responded generously to ICY and that, as a result of their efforts, individually and through private organizations, the essential character of international co-operation is now not only better understood in Canada but has been given tangible expression in aid projects on behalf of a number of developing countries.

International Co-operation Year ended with the close of 1965. But it is my hope that Canadians will continue to be inspired by the ideals which led to its proclamation and by the achievements which followed. The following pages, which trace Canada's role in the United Nations during the first 20 years of its life, are offered as a contribution to this end.



*Secretary of State for
External Affairs.*

AUGUST, 1966
OTTAWA

Introduction

This booklet was prepared to mark the twentieth year of the United Nations, which the General Assembly designated as International Co-operation Year. It seeks to present, in compact form, an accurate and balanced survey of Canada's participation in United Nations activities. It explains something of the philosophical basis of Canadian policy, or in other words, the Canadian "approach" to issues coming before the United Nations. Above all, it is intended to reflect Canadian confidence in the future of the United Nations system of international co-operation.

The text draws its inspiration from the four main purposes of the United Nations, as defined in Article 1 of the Charter, namely:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."

The first chapter covers the historical background and the main organizational problems of the United Nations. The remaining chapters deal with particular facets of the four purposes for which the United Nations was established. They do not cover all aspects of United Nations activities, an impossible task in the space available, but concentrate rather on the areas which have been of major concern to Canada.

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1: The United Nations: Origins, Nature and Membership

We the peoples of the United Nations determined

TO SAVE succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

TO REAFFIRM faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

TO ESTABLISH conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

TO PROMOTE social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

and for these ends

TO PRACTICE tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

TO UNITE our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

TO ENSURE, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

TO EMPLOY international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations

Steps to the Charter

The Allied Powers in the Second World War began to plan for the United Nations several years before the hostilities ended. The Atlantic Charter, drafted by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill and issued on August 14, 1941, speaks of the need for the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, the abandonment of the use of force, and a desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field. Twenty-six nations, including Canada, subscribed to these purposes in the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942.

At Moscow in October, 1943, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and China recognized "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security".

During the next year, documents were prepared by these four powers as a basis for the Dumbarton Oaks conversations which took place in Washington in the autumn of 1944. From these conversations emerged a set of proposals which, in April of 1945, were placed before the United Nations Conference on International Organization, attended by 50 states. After two months of discussion, the Conference reached agreement on the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the new International Court of Justice. The Charter was adopted unanimously and came into force on October 24, 1945.

There were 51 original members of the United Nations, comprising those states which took part in the San Francisco Conference or, like Poland, had previously signed the Declaration by the United Nations. Today the membership stands at 121, and there are still more to come.

The Charter and the League

The United Nations Charter owes a great deal to the League of Nations. A comparison of the experience and development of the two organizations will also reveal major differences in their origins, constitutions and environment.

The Canadian Delegation at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. At the top of the table, the Hon. Louis St. Laurent, M.P., Minister of Justice, the Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, and Mr. Gordon Graydon, M.P.



The Canadian Delegation at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. At the top of the table, the Hon. Louis St. Laurent, M.P., Minister of Justice, the Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, and Mr. Gordon Graydon, M.P.,

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From the League of Nations Covenant the United Nations took over the idea that aggressive war is a crime against humanity and that it is the duty of all members to join in measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Covenant was the first multilateral treaty to incorporate the idea, now universally accepted, that the community of nations has the right to discuss and pass judgment upon the international conduct of its members. Other ideas in the Covenant which were taken over and expanded in the Charter include the principle of respect for the rights of small nations, recognition of the need for international co-operation in social and economic affairs, the concept of an international public service and the habit of public debate on even the gravest political issues.

Institutionally, the United Nations was built on an infrastructure created during the period of the League of Nations. Apart from the main political structure, the International Labour Organization was maintained and the Permanent Court at the Hague was re-established as the International Court of Justice. The World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) grew out of the corresponding parts of the League Secretariat, while the Mandates System of the League became the Trusteeship System of the United Nations. Many other activities, such as the control of narcotic drugs, and relief and rehabilitation of refugees, were passed from the old organization to the new.

Differences begin to show up when one compares the origins of the two organizations. The League Covenant was an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles. It was thus linked from the outset with the outcome of the First World War and dominated by European issues. The Charter was drafted before the end of the Second World War, was not part of the postwar settlement, and looked to the future rather than to the maintenance of the status quo.

In the United Nations Charter there were advances that reflected the increased interdependence of states. Thus the Charter forbids the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization. It obligates member states to supply armed forces and other assistance to the Security Council.

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In practice the Charter has proved to be a much more flexible instrument than the Covenant. The Security Council, despite the veto provision, has a wider discretion than the League Council in deciding what constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Still another illustration is the system of Specialized Agencies, which, together with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and their related bodies, now makes possible much wider, more systematic and better organized international co-operation in the economic, trade and development fields than was ever dreamed of under the League.

The dynamism of the Charter is perhaps best shown by the development of the use of international military forces for purely peaceful purposes, at the invitation and with the consent of the state on whose territory the force is stationed. The growth of the peace-keeping idea is described in more detail in a following chapter. It is sufficient to note here that it represents a pragmatic and largely unplanned extension of the machinery for peaceful settlement described in Chapter VI of the Charter. Although the peace-keeping techniques which the United Nations has developed are fundamentally different from the kind of coercive enforcement action envisaged in Chapter VII, they are, in many ways, more in accord with the Charter's emphasis on peaceful co-operation and with the realities of power in the world.

Canada at San Francisco

At the opening of the San Francisco Conference Prime Minister Mackenzie King spelled out the Canadian approach to the preparatory proposals for the Charter which had been drafted at Dumbarton Oaks. He said that, in putting forward suggestions for amendments, the Canadian Delegation's sole preoccupation would be "to help in creating an organization which over the years and decades to come will be strong enough and flexible enough to stand any strains to which it may be subjected".

He added:

We recognize the principle that power and responsibility must go hand in hand and that international security depends primarily upon the maintenance of an overwhelming preponderance of power on the side of peace.

Power, however, is not exclusively concentrated in the hands of any four or five states, and the Conference should not act on the assumption that it is. Such a position would not only be contrary to the facts as they have been demonstrated in the past five years, but it would also be dangerous to the cause of security itself, for it would foster in many smaller countries the development of a new type of isolationism, a feeling that the task of preserving the peace could be left exclusively to Great Powers. Such a habit of thought would make it difficult for the smaller powers to make their contribution. Experience has shown that the contribution of smaller powers is not a negligible one, either to the preserving of the peace or to its restoration when peace has been disturbed.

The Canadian Delegation at San Francisco was a very strong one and its members, who included representatives of the two major opposition parties, participated actively in the work of all the technical committees set up by the Conference. For example, the Canadian delegates on the Committee on Economic and Social Co-operation were Mr. Gordon Graydon, Mr. M. J. Coldwell and Mr. L. B. Pearson. The Prime Minister represented Canada on the Committee on Enforcement Arrangements, while Mrs. Cora Casselman was the Canadian representative on the Committee on Pacific Settlement of Disputes.

Perhaps Canada's chief interest lay in trying to make the security provisions of the new organization as effective as possible. This meant that the Great Powers would have to be accorded a special position in the Security Council ("power and responsibility must go hand in hand"). Canada was nevertheless determined that the smaller and middle powers should have an effective voice in all decisions which imposed obligations on them, or affected their security.

The idea of international co-operation for economic and social development also had a strong appeal for Canadians. In this sphere, the Canadian Delegation advanced many proposals, designed to clarify the Dumbarton Oaks draft and to arrange its provisions in a more logical order.

(a) *The Security Council*

The League Covenant gave the Assembly and the Council concurrent jurisdiction over the peaceful settlement of disputes and the taking of enforcement action. However, under the United Nations Charter, primary responsibility for the maintenance of

peace is concentrated in the Security Council and, within certain defined limits, the Council has the power to direct members to take action to enforce peace. At Dumbarton Oaks it was recognized that the foundation of the new security system rested on the continued collaboration of the Great Powers, who were, therefore, to be given permanent membership on the Security Council and a veto power on all matters other than procedural questions.

Canada accepted this conception of the role and functions of the Security Council as more realistic and likely to prove more effective in deterring aggression than the League system. At the same time, the Canadian Delegation wished to ensure that the "middle powers" would be associated with measures to keep the peace. These efforts produced several changes in the Charter.

On the insistence of Canada and a number of other states, a functional approach was adopted in the Charter as regards the election of non-permanent members. Thus Article 23 directs that, in the election of these members of the Security Council, due regard should be "specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization". The idea here was that among the non-permanent members there should be several states of middle rank that were in a position to make a really substantial contribution to the purposes of the United Nations. In practice, apart from the early years, this aim has largely been overlooked. This was perhaps unavoidable since, as United Nations membership expanded, equitable geographical representation tended to become the main consideration in elections to the Council, as well as to most other United Nations bodies.

Another Canadian objective was to obtain the inclusion of a provision under which the armed forces of a state not a member of the Security Council could only be called out for action after that state had taken part in the Security Council's decision. Canada therefore submitted an amendment intended to give effect to the axiom of "no taxation without representation" in the most important case in which a state's interest could be involved — that is, the contribution of its own armed forces to enforcement action de-

cided upon by the Council. The outcome was Article 44, which says that when the Security Council decides to use force each member which has been asked to contribute a contingent shall have a voice, and a vote, in decisions concerning the employment of its own military forces.

In the discussions concerning the veto, Canada accepted the necessity of Great Power unanimity (and hence the veto) in applying coercive measures for the maintenance of peace under Chapter VII, but considered that the extension of the veto power to the peaceful settlement provisions in Chapter VI of the Charter was undesirable and unnecessary. The Canadian Delegation was also opposed to granting any one of the five great powers a veto over the admission of new members. In both cases, however, the Great Powers overrode the opposition of the middle and smaller states at San Francisco. The Charter therefore provides that the rule of unanimity of the permanent members (or, in practice, the absence of a negative vote by one of them) applies to the admission of new members, as well as to decisions of the Security Council during the stage of peaceful settlement. The veto power thus extends into many fields and has affected the entire character of the Organization. While the Canadian Delegation did not regard the outcome as satisfactory, it felt that the veto was not too high a price to pay for a world organization which was good in other respects.

(b) *The General Assembly*

At San Francisco the Canadian Delegation tried to ensure that the powers of the General Assembly would be as wide as possible, save for one important limitation — in order to place responsibility where it belonged and to avoid jurisdictional disputes, Canada agreed that the Assembly should not be able to make recommendations on a matter relating to international peace and security which was being dealt with actively and effectively by the Security Council. In the Canadian view it followed that if, because of the use of the Great Power veto or for some other reason, the Security Council was unable to act, then provision should be made to enable the General Assembly to take over the task of maintaining order and restoring peace. The outcome was Articles 10 and 12 of the Charter, which Canada supported.

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One of the problems at San Francisco was how to provide for co-operation between the Assembly and the Security Council while maintaining their difference in function. Canada sought to do this by an amendment calling on the Security Council to submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration. Although this was adopted and incorporated in the Charter as Article 24, paragraph 3, the relationship between the two bodies has at times been an uneasy one. In large measure this can be traced to the failure, thus far, to reach agreement on the procedures which should govern the establishment, control and financing of large scale peace-keeping operations.

(c) *The Economic and Social Council*

Among the amendments submitted by the Canadian Delegation to the San Francisco Conference was a complete revision of the chapter in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals dealing with international economic and social co-operation.

Many of the Canadian proposals were adopted and written into the Charter. They included a number of provisions aimed at clarifying the relationship between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, and strengthening the position of the Economic and Social Council as the body responsible for co-ordinating the activities of these agencies. Another Canadian suggestion which the Conference adopted increased the authority of the Economic and Social Council by giving it power not only to make recommendations on matters falling within its competence but also to make or initiate studies and reports on such matters.

(d) *The Secretariat*

Canada thought that the United Nations could succeed only if it was served by a truly international civil service responsible to the Organization itself. Three Canadian proposals were advanced to ensure the independence, integrity and efficiency of the Secretariat. The first was adopted as Article 100, a key provision of the Charter. This is intended to make members of the Secretariat independent of control by any authority outside the Organization, including their own states. Another Canadian amendment, providing that the staff should be appointed by the Secretary-General and that the paramount consideration should be to secure the highest standards

of efficiency, competence and integrity, became Article 101. The third Canadian proposal, to give representatives of member states and Secretariat officials the privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization, appears in Article 105.

Assessments of what was achieved at San Francisco in 1945 will vary depending on the viewpoint adopted. But experience in the working of the Charter would seem to show that, despite the absence of any substantive revision, it has proved to be a fairly flexible and, in some cases, a dynamic constitution.

Thus, in practice, the domestic jurisdiction reservation contained in Article 2(7) has not proved to be a bar to the adoption of recommendations on many questions which today are regarded as issues of international concern, even though, in 1945, most governments would have taken a different view. Likewise, while the Charter framework for economic and social development was intended to limit the functions of ECOSOC to the compilation of studies, reports and recommendations, in recent years the role of the United Nations in this broad area has expanded out of all recognition, and in a manner unforeseen by the delegates to the 1945 Conference.

Nor could one have predicted, in 1945, that the enforcement provisions in Chapter VII would remain unimplemented, and that in their place, without any revision of the basic instrument, an entirely new concept, that of peace-keeping, would be developed.

The point is that, despite many inadequacies, the United Nations Charter and the Organization which it created have shown themselves to be capable of sustained growth and adaptation to changed circumstances. This is perhaps the best hope for the survival of the United Nations.

The Canadian attitude towards the United Nations has been in the main a pragmatic one. The extent to which the Organization has worked and has adapted itself to meet new circumstances has, therefore, tended to strengthen the value of the United Nations in Canadian eyes.

The International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ

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The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, signing the UN Charter, June 26, 1945.

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of the United Nations. It was established in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is annexed to the Charter, of which it forms an integral part. Thus all members of the United Nations are party to the Court's Statute. In addition, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and San Marino, while not members of the United Nations, are parties to the Statute of the Court.

The jurisdiction of the Court is not obligatory except where states have submitted to its compulsory jurisdiction by filing a declaration pursuant to Article 36 of the Statute or have agreed in treaties or other international agreements to do so. Canada has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with reservations concerning disputes for which some other method of peaceful settlement has been provided, disputes with members of the Commonwealth, disputes falling within the domestic jurisdiction of Canada and disputes arising out of events of the last war.

The Court consists of 15 independent judges, normally elected for nine-year terms. A Canadian, Judge John E. Read, was a "founding member" of the Court, and served on it from 1946 until his retirement in 1958.

Canada has not been directly involved as a party to any disputes before the Court. However, the Canadian Government did present both oral and written statements when the Court was called upon to render an advisory opinion to the United Nations General Assembly on whether or not certain expenditures of the United Nations to cover peace-keeping operations constituted "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter.

In 1947 Canada supported the United Nations resolution to the effect that the Court was competent to render an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the Charter. At that time Canada stated that "not only is the Resolution . . . quite within the letter and spirit of the Charter but it is also designed to develop a rule of law and order based on justice."

Since its inception, 35 contentious cases have been submitted to the Court. In addition, it has given 13 advisory opinions. This

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volume of business is far below the actual capacity of the Court. However, it has to be recognized that the institution of an international court to settle disputes between sovereign nations is still in an early stage of development. As progress is made in developing and codifying international law — a process in which the United Nations is making significant strides through the International Law Commission — and as states become more accustomed to using international organizations rather than unilateral methods for settling disputes, continuing progress is likely to be achieved in gaining more general acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Meanwhile it is important to foster those conditions which will facilitate an increased reliance on the judicial settlement of disputes, especially where less formal methods have failed.

Admission of New Members

United Nations membership has more than doubled since 1945. The majority of its 121 members now come from Africa and Asia and there has been steady progress towards universality. In contrast, the League of Nations was largely a European-dominated organization, from which 14 countries withdrew during its active history, leaving it with a membership of 53 in 1939. Only one country, Indonesia, has withdrawn from the United Nations, and it has recently resumed full participation in the Organization.

The United Nations was not intended to be an exclusive club. U Thant put the case for universality in this way, in an address at the University of Denver in April 1964:

This trend toward universality is unquestionably beneficial—indeed it is essential—to an organization one of whose primary functions is to reflect the state of the world as it is and to harmonize the policies of nations. This main difference between the United Nations and the regional pacts, such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, is sometimes overlooked by the United Nations' critics. The United Nations exists to reflect the diversity of the world as it is and to try to bring order, reason and the motivation of common interest into that diversity. If it reflected only one side or the other of the world's problems, it would no longer be able to perform its true function.

In Canada it has always been accepted that the ultimate United Nations goal should be universality of membership. At San Francisco Canada had been opposed to granting any one of the five great powers a veto over the admission of new members and had



In 1952 the Hon. L. B. Pearson of Canada was elected President of the General Assembly. At his right is the first Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie.

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strongly supported an Australian proposal by which new members, apart from the ex-enemy states, would have been admitted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. This Australian proposal was defeated, however, and the veto continues to apply to the admission of new members.

Under the Charter, membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. New members are admitted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Beginning with an original membership of 51 in 1945, there was a gradual increase over the next five years. By September of 1950 the membership stood at 60. At that point the cold war imposed a "freeze" on new admissions that lasted for many years.

At the tenth session of the General Assembly Canada took the initiative in sponsoring a resolution aimed at breaking the membership deadlock. In the past, the 14 applicants favoured by the non-Communist members had all been vetoed by the Soviet Union while the seven sponsored by the U.S.S.R. had not been able to obtain the necessary affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council.

Soon after the opening of the 1955 Assembly, Canada sought and received widespread support for a plan to admit simultaneously all outstanding applicants other than the divided states of Korea and Vietnam. Since action on the admission of new members must commence in the Security Council, the Canadian Delegation, with 27 other co-sponsors, introduced a draft resolution requesting the Security Council to consider the pending applications of all the 18 countries where no problem of unification existed.

In introducing the resolution, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation observed that the record of the United Nations in dealing with this matter had been one of failure and had reflected on the prestige of the Organization. Canada now believed that the deadlock could be broken. The problem was not strictly legal, constitutional or procedural, but was rather a political issue that could only be solved by compromise. Some applicants were controlled

by regimes or followed policies which Canada did not like, but the edge was "more likely to be taken off intolerance and misapprehension within the United Nations than in barren isolation". The United Nations could have been formed with a membership "exclusive to those who see alike on most things", but Canada had never had any doubt as to the infinitely greater value of an organization embodying all the major traditions and contemporary philosophies of government.

The General Assembly approved the 28-power resolution on December 8, 1955, by a vote of 52 in favour to 2 against, with 5 abstentions. But the applications of Japan and Outer Mongolia were vetoed in the Security Council. Consequently, only the following 16 states, instead of the original 18, became members of the United Nations: Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain.

In succeeding years United Nations membership has increased by leaps and bounds and, by the end of 1965, stood at 117. In large part this has been brought about by the rapid accession to full sovereignty and independence of many new African states including members of the Commonwealth. The decolonization of Africa has been one of the most significant developments of our time and the admission of the new African members has had a profound effect on the United Nations.

Although there has been no recurrence of the earlier membership deadlock, the United Nations has thus far failed to find a solution for the problem of the divided states. The applications of four such states (North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam) have been pending since 1948-51. Nor has it been possible to resolve one of the most difficult problems ever to confront the Organization and one which affects the representation of a permanent member — namely, the question of Chinese representation.

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, it has been said, "stretches like a long serial story through the debates of the General Assembly".

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It was first debated by the Assembly in 1950, one year after the Chinese People's Republic had secured control of the mainland. Immediately upon the opening of the fifth session on September 19, 1950, the question was raised by the Indian and Soviet representatives and resolutions were introduced seeking support for the immediate seating of representatives of the Chinese Communist Government. Both of these resolutions were rejected.

On the same day and in order to provide an opportunity of examining the issues involved the Canadian Delegation submitted a resolution proposing the establishment of a special committee to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back to the Assembly with recommendations. This resolution was adopted by a large majority. Any hope there might have been for a dispassionate examination of the problem was dashed by the Chinese Communist intervention in November in the Korean conflict, and the subsequent failure to arrange a cease-fire between the opposing sides. The Korean crisis soon overshadowed all other questions and the special committee failed to agree on any recommendations in the matter.

At the time of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, Canada had not taken steps to extend recognition to the Government of the Chinese People's Republic. The Canadian position was outlined by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on February 2, 1951:

... the Peking Government can hardly expect recognition now from those member states of the United Nations against whom they are fighting in Korea. The remedy for the situation now lies with the Communists themselves. They should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the United Nations.

Most other members of the United Nations appeared to share this view. At subsequent sessions of the Assembly the problem was dealt with on the basis of a procedural motion designed simply to postpone consideration. Although Canada supported postponement, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in Vancouver on August 25, 1955:

... it is becoming clearer that, if the United Nations is to play the part that it should in the solution of certain Far Eastern problems, the *de facto* government of China has to be present in its discussion of these problems. If it is not, then the political conferences and negotiations concerning them will often have to be held outside the United Nations—which is unfortunate.

The Assembly continued to postpone consideration of the subject until 1961, when there was a full-scale debate on the substantive question. Canada voted for a resolution deciding that any proposal to change the representation of China would be regarded as an "important" question under the Charter, requiring a two-thirds majority vote. The Canadian Delegation opposed a Soviet resolution which called for the expulsion of Chinese Nationalist representatives and their replacement by representatives of the Peking regime. At the same time, the Canadian statement made clear the Canadian Government's willingness to consider carefully any proposal to settle the question of Chinese representation equitably, and to this end suggested a full examination of all elements of the question.

At succeeding sessions, the only choice offered to the Assembly has been a resolution similar to that put forward by the U.S.S.R. in 1961—an all-or-nothing proposition which would remove the Nationalist representatives "who are illegally occupying China's place in the Organization" and invite the Government of the People's Republic of China to send delegates in their place. The most frequent sponsor for this motion, which has thus far failed to gain even a simple majority of votes, has been Albania.

Canada has opposed resolutions of the Albanian type because they couple the so-called restoration of the rights of the Communist Chinese with the expulsion of the Nationalists and would, therefore, leave the people of Formosa unrepresented in the United Nations. Canadian representatives have repeatedly stated Canada's preference for an equitable solution to the Chinese representation problem which would protect the interests of the inhabitants of Formosa and safeguard their right of self-determination, while bringing Communist China out of its largely self-imposed isolation and into the mainstream of world affairs.

Up to the present, there has been no indication that such a solution could be achieved. Canada has been increasingly disturbed by the dangers inherent in Mainland China's continuing isolation and in recent years has encouraged an increase in contacts at the non-diplomatic level which has led to greater trade between the two countries and in a number of visits by Canadians to Peking.

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Many United Nations members share Canada's reluctance to see the people of Formosa deprived of the international status that membership in the United Nations provides. Sentiment in favour of some type of "one China, one Formosa" solution seems to be growing, but such a solution is not easy to attain. To achieve it would require above all the co-operation of the parties immediately concerned, but a practical and equitable solution along these lines has not so far proved acceptable either to Peking or to Taipei.

At the twentieth session of the General Assembly in 1965, two draft resolutions were tabled under this item. The first, by which the General Assembly would reaffirm its 1961 decision that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question as defined in Article 18 of the United Nations Charter, thereby requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption, was tabled by 11 countries (Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and the United States). A second draft resolution, co-sponsored by 12 countries (Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Pakistan, Romania, Somalia and Syria), called for recognition of representatives of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China in the United Nations and for the expulsion of "the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek".

On November 17, the 11-power draft was adopted by a vote of 56 in favour (Canada) to 49 against, with 11 abstentions. As a result the President announced that a two-thirds majority would be required for adoption of the 12-power draft. The 12-power draft resolution was then put to a vote. It was defeated in a vote of 47 in favour, 47 opposed (Canada), with 20 abstentions. The General Assembly thus decided once again not to seat representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations at the price of expelling the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China.

In a statement issued the same day, the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained Canadian policy on this question. He said that Canada would have welcomed the opportunity to see Communist China take a seat in the world organization had Peking made this possible, and continued:

If that has not yet happened, it is because Peking itself has set a price on participation which is unacceptable. In the view of the Canadian Government, it is not for the United Nations to accommodate itself to the views of a single nation, however powerful or populous. It is for Communist China to make that accommodation. Much to the regret of the Canadian Government there is no present evidence that she is ready to do so.

Problems of Enlarged Membership

The United Nations itself is changing, as is the climate within which it must operate. The major cause of this change is the expansion of membership which has occurred in the past five years. The "winds of change" which have blown through Africa in the wake of Western decolonization have resulted in the admission to the United Nations, since 1960, of 29 new states from Africa alone.

The effect has been felt in all areas of United Nations activities. In his address before the General Assembly on September 19, 1963, the Prime Minister commented:

Of all the changes of the past few years, none has been more dramatic than the emergence of new and free nations in Africa. This emergence has had a profound impact on the political evolution of the United Nations and on international affairs generally. It has added heavy responsibilities to our Organization in many fields of activity. It has given new and urgent emphasis to two major questions of our time—colonialism and racial discrimination, both of which can exist in many forms and have no common political pattern.

The new states have brought United Nations membership closer to the goal of universality. They have also brought inescapable problems of growing pains. This process of growth and adjustment is bound to be difficult. It requires patience and tolerance and understanding on the part of all members, new as well as old.

The increase in membership has produced many problems, but the most immediate and obvious need has been to adjust the composition of the principal organs in order to provide adequate representation for states in all geographical regions. The original allocation of elective seats in the various bodies, as well as of posts within the Secretariat, was determined when the membership was less than half what it is now, and when Asia and Africa were barely represented.

A formal attempt to enlarge the Councils was made in 1960 when some 40 members, including Canada, co-sponsored resolutions recommending the enlargement of the Security Council by two seats and the Economic and Social Council by six seats. The

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The Hon. Paul Martin (right), Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, talking with UN Secretary-General U Thant, at United Nations Headquarters in May 1963.

debate revealed a widespread desire to provide for greater Asian and African representation. The principal stumbling-block, however, was the position taken by the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. refused to consider any amendments to the Charter as long as Communist China was unrepresented in the United Nations, and instead suggested a redistribution of the existing seats, at the expense of the Western countries.

For two years no progress was made towards a solution of this problem. Each time the issue came up the Soviet Union insisted on linking the question of expansion of the Councils with that of Chinese representation. But in 1963, as Afro-Asian pressure for enlargement became stronger, the pretext for Soviet opposition — namely, the link with the Chinese representation problem — was suddenly destroyed by Peking itself. The latter announced that,

if it were necessary to amend the Charter rather than redistribute the seats on the Councils, the People's Republic would "naturally favour the corresponding revision of the relevant articles of the Charter so as really to satisfy the justified demand of the Asian and African countries".

This removed the *raison d'être* of the Soviet stand and the U.S.S.R. shortly afterwards reversed its own attitude. Resolutions were then passed incorporating Charter amendments enlarging the Security Council to 15 by adding four non-permanent elective seats, while membership on the Economic and Social Council was increased from 18 to 27. These amendments came into effect in 1965.

Powers and Functions

Enlarged membership has brought other problems in its train. Some of these problems formed a main subject of the Prime Minister's address before the General Assembly on September 19, 1963:

We might also consider how to modify the (Security) Council's function to make it more effective as the instrument of political action for the United Nations. Indeed, the time may be at hand for a Security Council which can keep continuing watch on the affairs of the Organization as a whole in much the same way as the executive committees operate in the Specialized Agencies.

If the enlarged Security Council were given a properly balanced composition with sufficient safeguards as regards voting rights, it could conceivably become the main arena for political decision on questions which require urgent action. It could assume responsibility for many of the items which now lie heavily on the agenda of the General Assembly. Such a Council could be in session virtually throughout the year and make it possible to cut drastically into the excessive time and energy now consumed by Assembly proceedings.

There is another change that might be considered.

The United Nations will inevitably remain the central world forum for international discussion and recommendation on a wide range of subjects. We already have, on the other hand, regional groupings of states—in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Other groupings conceivably may be formed. The time may have come to correlate the activities of these regional groupings more closely with those of the United Nations. It is possible to envisage a stage in the evolution of the United Nations when regional assemblies may be used to deal with regional problems in search of local solutions or in the preparation for broader treatment at the United Nations.

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Since 1963 the Security Council has, in fact, begun to meet more often than at any time since 1947-48, and it is to be hoped that its new composition will encourage this trend. There has also been increasing co-operation between the United Nations and regional agencies, particularly the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States, although the respective competence of the United Nations and regional agencies in the field of peace and security remains subject to dispute.

Another problem of enlarged membership is that of voting. The principle of equal political rights is a fundamental principle of the Charter. It is reflected in the "one state, one vote" rule in the General Assembly. By some calculations, a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly could now be formed by nations with only ten per cent of the world's population or member states contributing only five per cent of the assessed budget. Thus suggestions have been made from time to time for a system of weighted voting in the Assembly. Canada considers this idea unwise. Aside from the fact that a Charter amendment to this effect would never carry, the idea of weighted voting strikes right at the principle of state equality. Canada would agree with the comment of Dag Hammarskjöld:

The criticism of 'one nation, one vote' irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individual members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of member states represent governmental policies, and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case.*

What is required, perhaps, is the development of an accommodation between what might be called the power base and the voting base. In the early days of the United Nations the members which were instituting programmes for action were at the same time those with the resources to carry them out. Today this is all too often not the case. To work out a new answer for the old principle that power and responsibility should go hand in hand will not be easy. It will be dependent partly on the progress made in strengthening the economies of the less-developed nations so that in time they acquire the capacity to shoulder a larger share of the fiscal responsi-

bility for decisions taken by the United Nations, and partly on finding new institutional mechanisms and arrangements that can give manageable form to the process of negotiations.

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*Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1956 - 15 June 1957.

2: Peace, Security and Disarmament

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

—the First Purpose of the United Nations
(Article 1, para. 1 of the Charter).

The first purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. The main instrument for that purpose is the Security Council, which, under Article 24 of the Charter, is charged with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and by Article 26 “shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments”. In the early years of the UN, it became evident that the Council could not carry out these tasks effectively because of disagreement among the Great Powers. This chapter considers how the United Nations met this formidable challenge to its authority and competence and the contribution which Canada made.

1. PEACE KEEPING

The Charter System

The Charter provides for a kind of ascending scale of actions to keep the peace. First, it calls on parties to a dispute to seek a solution themselves through negotiation or other means, including

resort to regional agencies. If this fails, the parties to the dispute "shall refer it to the Security Council", which may recommend either methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. Moreover, any member may bring any dispute either to the attention of the Council or the Assembly. The Council, after determining whether there exists a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, "shall make recommendations or decide what measures are to be taken". The latter may include non-military sanctions, or, if necessary, military action. In addition, the Charter affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations".

Article 24 of the Charter gives primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council, although the Assembly has the power to discuss such questions and to make recommendations. It is clear from the wording of Article 24, however, that the authors of the Charter believed that the Security Council could act more expeditiously than the Assembly (it begins by stating: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . ."). This being the case, it is significant that the Security Council can only take action on matters of substance if its five permanent members agree. Without such agreement, the authors of the Charter assumed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain peace and security because the permanent members themselves would bear the chief responsibility for this job. The veto was the constitutional expression of this responsibility.

The machinery provided in the Charter for action to maintain or restore peace and security included a Military Staff Committee, consisting of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, which was to be responsible for the strategic direction of armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. All members of the United Nations undertook to make available to the Council on its call such armed forces, but the kinds of armed forces were to be worked out by agreements between the Council and individual members. Moreover, it was stated that action required to carry out the decisions of the Council "shall be

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taken by all members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine". The Council could, therefore, order states to carry out decisions requiring the use of force although the kinds of forces provided and the character and extent of the military obligations which members assumed would have been determined by special agreements to be negotiated with the Council.

The Canadian Delegation noted, in its report on the San Francisco Conference, that "any one of the five Great Powers could veto the application of the enforcement arrangements. Thus the Organization could not in practice use force against a Great Power or, indeed, against any other state if one of the Great Powers exercised its veto". The actual use of force was believed to be "a remote contingency since the mere willingness of all the Great Powers to use force would ordinarily be sufficient to bring any conceivable combination of middle and small powers to heel".

The members of the Canadian Delegation at San Francisco did not regard the security provisions of the Charter as a perfect system. In particular, Canada would have wished to see some limitation on the power of veto affecting the peaceful settlement of disputes. But Canada agreed, as the Delegation reported, that "without united action by the Great Powers the Organization could not be made to function". Otherwise, it was thought, the United Nations would go the way of the League.

The Breakdown of the Charter System

Article 43 of the Charter states that all members, in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace, should make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for this purpose. Appropriate agreements were to have been negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council.

Canada was one of those nations which urged the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee to make all possible speed in negotiating these special agreements and organizing the military and economic measures of enforcement. The Chairman of the Delegation told the Assembly in 1946:

"We are all of us bound under the Charter to refrain from using armed force except as provided by the Charter. The Government

and people of Canada are anxious to know what armed forces, in common with other members of the United Nations, Canada should maintain as our share of the burden of putting world force behind world law."

No Article 43 agreements were ever negotiated because the permanent members disagreed on the kinds of military forces to be raised, the size of the units each would contribute and the military bases they would use. The Military Staff Committee reported its failure to reach agreement in 1947, and no further attempt has since been made to implement the enforcement provisions of the Charter. Disagreement among the Great Powers had thus called into question the political assumption on which the Charter security system was based.

The disappointment and disillusionment which this failure produced were reflected by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the second session of the General Assembly in 1947:

There is a growing feeling in my country, as in other countries, that the United Nations, because of the experience of the Security Council, is not showing itself equal to the discharge of its primary task of promoting international confidence and ensuring national security. The Economic and Social Council is functioning fairly successfully. The specialist organizations are doing good work. But the Security Council, founded on what is called the unanimity of its permanent members, has done little to strengthen the hopes of those who saw in it the keystone of the structure of peace. It has done much to deepen the fears of those who felt that, with the veto, it could not operate effectively in an international atmosphere of fear and suspicion, where pride is often allowed to take precedence over peace and power over reason.

In the same speech occurs this sombre passage, a warning that states like Canada would not remain content with the hamstrung condition of the Security Council, and a forecast of the formation of regional self-defence arrangements like NATO under Article 51 of the Charter:

Nations, in their search for peace and co-operation, will not, and cannot, accept indefinitely an unaltered Council which was set up to ensure their security, and which, so many feel, has become frozen in futility and divided by dissension. If forced, they may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security. Such associations, it has already been pointed out, if consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter, can be formed within the United Nations.

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It is to be hoped that such a development will not be necessary. If it is unnecessary, it will be most undesirable. If, however, it is made necessary, will have to take place. Let us not forget that the provisions of the Charter are a floor under, rather than a ceiling over, the responsibilities of member states. If some prefer to go even below that floor, others need not be prevented from moving upwards.

Two, or more, apartments in the structure of peace are undoubtedly less desirable than one family of nations dwelling together in amity, undivided by curtains or even more substantial pieces of political furniture. They are, however, to be preferred to the alternative of wholly separate structures.

The Peace-Keeping Record

The peace-keeping methods of the United Nations were evolved out of necessity, not as a conscious and deliberate alternative to the Charter system. The breakdown of the Charter security system produced a political vacuum at first and then a change in thinking and emphasis which through the years has helped to revitalize the Organization. The process has been thus described by Secretary-General U Thant:

Due partly to the lack of unanimity among the Great Powers ever since 1946 and partly to the radical change in the nature of war resulting from the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, there has been a gradual change in thinking on questions of international security in the United Nations.

There has been a tacit transition from the concept of collective security, as set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to a more realistic idea of peace-keeping. The idea that conventional military methods—or, to put it bluntly, war—can be used by or on behalf of the United Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace seems now to be rather impractical.

There has also been a change in emphasis from the use of the military forces of the Great Powers, as contemplated in the Charter, to the use, in practice, of the military resources of the smaller powers, which has the advantage of not entangling United Nations actions in the antagonisms of the cold war.*

In the early years the United Nations had some success in dealing with disputes in which the Great Powers were not directly involved. The despatch of observers to Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir and Palestine in the period 1947-50 were small but significant steps on the way to the bolder experiment of employing major peace-keeping forces, first in the Middle East (UNEF), then in the Congo (ONUC), later in West New Guinea (UNTEA) and most recently

*Extract from an address by Secretary-General U Thant to the Harvard Alumni Association at Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 13, 1963.

in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Canada was a member of the Security Council from 1948 to 1950 and was involved in some of these early initiatives. Two are of special interest.

Kashmir and Palestine

On December 30, 1947, after attempts to negotiate, India appealed to the Security Council to urge Pakistan to restrain its nationals from assisting the invaders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan responded with counter-complaints about India. Thus began a long and complicated consideration of the Kashmir question by the Council. In due course, a Commission established by the Council brought about a cease-fire with a truce agreement, and in 1949 a United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), including nine Canadian officers (in June 1964 a Royal Canadian Air Force crew was assigned to the Group to fly a Caribou aircraft), was established to help supervise the cease-fire. With relatively few incidents, the 40-man observer group helped keep the peace until August 1965, although the Security Council was unable to induce the parties to agree to a final solution of the underlying dispute.

The outbreak of fighting in August-September 1965 led to a Security Council decision to strengthen UNMOGIP and Canada agreed to send ten additional officers. When in September 1965 the Council established the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission of about 100 observers to supervise the cease-fire on the border outside Kashmir, Canada provided the commander of the new group, as well as 12 officers to act as observers, and an air-transport unit, including six aircraft.


In May 1948, the Security Council adopted a resolution which called for a cease-fire and period of truce in Palestine. Although this resolution and many others which followed were not fully effective, the United Nations succeeded in establishing on the ground a group of military observers who were called upon to supervise first the cease-fire and later the arrangements under the Armistice Agreements of 1948-49 concluded between Israel and its several Arab neighbours. Ever since, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) has tirelessly carried out these peace-keeping responsibilities. From UNTSO and UNMOGIP has

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UN observers inspect the border between Israel and Jordan in 1954.

come much of the "know-how" for subsequent operations, and the nucleus of a group of professional military officers from many countries accustomed to thinking and working as part of an international military team. Canada contributes 20 observers to the total of some 140 observers, and they normally serve a term of one year.

In the case of Palestine, the Canadian approach was consistently pragmatic, searching for a practical basis for resolving the conflict and arriving at a stable settlement. Canada was a co-sponsor of the Security Council resolution of November 16, 1948, which called on the parties to negotiate an immediate armistice, and also gave full support to the General Assembly's attempts at conciliation. The names of individual Canadians are associated with



Major-General E. L. M. Burns (left), of Canada, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, conversing with Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations at UN Headquarters in 1954.

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various phases of this prolonged and unhappy dispute. Mr. Justice I. C. Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada was one of the members of the original UN Special Committee on Palestine, and from 1954 to 1956 Major-General E. L. M. Burns took on the onerous task of Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

United Nations machinery still functions in the case of Kashmir and Palestine, although the disputes which first led to fighting have never been resolved. The Charter does not authorize the United Nations to enforce the settlement of a political dispute. It can only assist the parties themselves to reach an agreement and, failing this, help to prevent the recurrence of large-scale hostilities by the presence of United Nations military observers in the critical area.

Korea

In June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. For the first time, the United Nations had to deal with a major military conflict in which the parties were cold-war antagonists. Moreover, the attack was a direct challenge to the efforts which the United Nations had been making to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea. The methods of persuasion, mediation and observation, which had been effective in stopping the fighting elsewhere, would have been insufficient in the face of the Communist calculation of quick victory in Korea.

In its initial dealing with the Korean aggression, the Security Council was able to act swiftly because the Soviet Union, protesting the form of China's representation in the United Nations, boycotted the Council. Furthermore, United States forces were on the spot and the United States was willing and able to organize collective resistance. The Council could not use the machinery for collective action described in Chapter VII of the Charter because no earmarked forces or agreed command system were available. In these circumstances, the practical alternative adopted was to establish a unified command under the United States. Member states were asked to contribute to a UN force under this command.

The large majority of members gave their political support to the Korean operation. Canada was no exception. The Secretary of State for External Affairs stated at the time that "our obligation in this matter is one which springs from our membership in the



A wounded Canadian rifleman is helped to an aid station near the front lines by another member of the Canadian Battalion in Korea.

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UN . . . it places upon us the duty and privilege of doing what we can to see that peace is preserved". On July 12, Canada informed the Secretary-General that three destroyers would be made available to the UN; on July 19, the Prime Minister added that the Government had decided to provide a long-range transport squadron for service in the Pacific area, and on August 7 he said that the Government had authorized the recruitment of an additional army brigade to be known as the Canadian Army Special Force, which would be "specially trained and equipped to be available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Pact".

The first battalion of the brigade group arrived in Korea in December 1950 and the rest of the Force in March 1951. In September the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained to the House of Commons:

"We have begun the establishment of United Nations forces for use not only in Korea but elsewhere . . . the next time this kind of aggression by proxy takes place there will be forces in being not only in Canada but in other countries".

With the return of the Soviet representative to the Security Council on August 1, the Council was of no further use in providing political control of the United Nations action in Korea. The initiative passed into the hands of the General Assembly, where Canada helped to fashion the resolution which established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. In November the news of Chinese intervention in Korea led to the appointment of a three-man committee, including the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, "to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged". When the cease-fire effort failed, Canada voted reluctantly on February 1, 1951, for a resolution which condemned the People's Republic of China as an aggressor.

More important, however, from the point of view of Canada's long-term policies, were the recommendations made by the Assembly on November 3, 1950, known as "Uniting for Peace". These resulted from United States proposals aimed at strengthening

ing the capacity of the United Nations to keep the peace in circumstances when the Great Powers were divided and, therefore, the Security Council would be incapable of taking action. The most important provisions of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution were those which empowered the General Assembly to meet in emergency session to deal with a breach of the peace if called upon to do so by seven members of the Security Council or a majority of members of the United Nations; called on states to hold in readiness units of their armed forces for service with the United Nations as required; established a Peace Observation Commission; and provided for a Collective Measures Committee to report on "methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security". Canada supported these proposals wholeheartedly. Speaking to the Political Committee of the Assembly on October 11, the Canadian Delegate expressed the hope that the resolution might "provide the germ of an international force by making it possible to earmark national contingents for United Nations purposes". He referred to Canada's action in recruiting a Special Force and hoped that the great majority of United Nations members would take similar action. "If so and if we are again confronted with an emergency such as that which faced us last June, we who accept our obligations under the Charter and desire to do what we can to carry them out will be in a better position to make a speedy and effective contribution to the defeat of aggression". The proposals were approved by the Assembly by a vote of 53 in favour, 5 against (the Soviet bloc), with 2 abstentions. Their significance will become clearer as subsequent peace-keeping operations are discussed.

In Korea armistice negotiations were begun in July 1951 after the fighting had been stabilized along a line approximating the 38th Parallel. The negotiations lasted almost two full years and Canadian forces remained in Korea for another four years after that. In all, some 27,000 officers and men of the Canadian Armed Services served in the Korean war theatre, suffering more than 1,500 casualties.

What were the lessons of the Korean experience? One was the need to prepare in advance for future emergencies. This was the task of the Collective Measures Committee, in which Canada parti-

icipated actively. Yet, after the Committee submitted its third report in 1954, there was a general reluctance to follow up its studies. The armistice had been signed. No other immediate threat to the peace seemed near. Canada had been simply reflecting the general view when she informed the Committee in 1952 that she was not prepared to commit herself to earmarking specific units or services for United Nations use in the future beyond the contribution she was already making to the operation in Korea. Indeed, a second lesson of Korea was that, apart from what individual countries might do on their own, it was still too soon to organize international standby arrangements or to make detailed preparations in advance of the emergency which might call them into being.

On the political side, Canada believed it was right for the United Nations to keep the conflict localized. Enforcement action taken against Communist China would have been a mistake. In the words of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in March 1951:


"The enforcement action to be taken against an aggressor must be related to the practicability of such action and to the general strategic and political situation".

The United Nations was unable to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea. The political conference held for this purpose in Geneva in 1954 broke up over the issues of the authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question and to supervise free elections. Failure made it clear, in the Canadian view, that the United Nations would have to find a mutually acceptable procedure for sponsoring negotiations with non-members, when necessary, if it was to serve as the principal forum for the settlement of contentious international issues.

Canada had in mind Indochina as well as Korea. A conference to devise a political settlement in Indochina also took place in Geneva that year, outside the United Nations framework. Canada accepted truce supervision responsibilities in Indochina which she still maintains but, because these are separate from her obligations as a member of the United Nations, they will not be further described here.

United Nations Emergency Force

One of the highlights of Canada's association with United Nations peace-keeping was the establishment and organization of the United



A Canadian reconnaissance patrol on duty with the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai Peninsula.

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Nations Emergency Force which the United Nations sent to patrol the border between Israel and Egypt in November 1956. This was quite a different kind of United Nations intervention from that which took place in Korea, where the United Nations acted as a belligerent, but it came naturally to Canada to seize the occasion in order to put forward views and to take action of a kind which she had advocated before as a result of the Korean experience.

Canada was not involved in the events leading up to the hostilities which began with Israel's attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956. She had not been a participant in the international conferences which considered the future of the Suez Canal after its nationalization by Egypt in July, nor was she a member of the Security Council which held meetings on the subject in October. But, when Britain and France intervened in the fighting and the Assembly was called into emergency session on November 1 (after the use of the veto blocked action by the Council), Canada had at once both reason and opportunity to come forward.

She had special reason to do so because of the close ties between Canada and Britain and France and because of the potential strains on Commonwealth unity which continued fighting would be bound to cause. She took the opportunity to do so because the cease-fire resolution which the Assembly approved was inadequate in Canada's view. It neither provided for a peace settlement nor for a United Nations force "large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out", in the words of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Assembly on November 2. Accordingly, Canada introduced and the Assembly approved a further resolution on November 3. It requested the Secretary-General to submit within 48 hours "a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities . . .". The purpose of the resolution was to facilitate compliance with the Assembly's request for a cease-fire by providing for international supervision of such compliance.

The Secretary-General went to work promptly. The Assembly accepted his recommendation for the establishment of a United Nations Command and for the appointment of Major-General E. L. M. Burns, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce

Supervision Organization, as Chief of the Command. On the same day Canada announced her willingness to participate in the force if requested to do so. A cease-fire became effective on November 7, and, with the acceptance in principle on November 8 of withdrawal of their troops by the three governments concerned, the worst of the crisis was over. The Assembly had responded with a speed and efficiency which would hardly have been considered possible ten days earlier. On November 15 advance units of the United Nations Emergency Force arrived in the Canal Zone. By mid-December the Force was fully operational and shortly after the last British and French troops had completed their withdrawal.

UNEF was a pioneer force in the history of international peace-keeping, and it is worth while to consider briefly its nature and functions. Mr. Hammarskjold was responsible for spelling out the functions of the Force, based on the terms of the resolution passed by the Assembly. He recommended that the Force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the conflict. There was no intent that the Force should influence the military balance and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. The Force would be limited in its operations to the extent that the consent of the parties concerned was obtained. No use of the Force under Chapter VII of the Charter, involving enforcement action, was envisaged. Thus, "although para-military in nature, it is not a force with military objectives". The chief function of the Force would be "to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of November 2". The Force would not have military functions "exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions". Finally, the Secretary-General explained his preference for a balanced composition of the Force; in fact he managed to obtain offers of contributions from 24 countries, nine of which were accepted. To assist the Secretary-General in defining the further functions and organization of the Force, the Assembly established an Advisory Committee composed of representatives from seven countries including Canada.

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Speaking to the Assembly on November 23, the Secretary of State for External Affairs defined Canada's attitude to UNEF:

There is very strong, enthusiastic support in my country for this Force—but only as a United Nations Force, under United Nations control, and as an effective and organized Force which can do the job that has been given to it and which, if it can do that job, may be the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our Organization: something which we have talked about at United Nations meetings for many years, the organization of the peace through international action. Therefore, it is important that this Force should be so constituted and so organized that it will be able to do the work that it has been given to do and thereby set a precedent for the future.

Canada's insistence on control by the United Nations was related in part to Canada's own experience when she offered to contribute to the Force. On November 7, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would offer a contingent of battalion strength. It was later discovered, however, that this battalion, the Queen's Own Rifles, might not be an appropriate contribution both because of its name, when coupled with the possible similarity between Canadian and British uniforms, and because offers of infantry battalions had also come from several other countries. After further consultation with the United Nations, it was decided, instead, to contribute specialist troops, such as administrative, signals, engineer and medical units. There was also need for an air-transport unit. Accordingly, on December 10 it was announced that Canada had accepted these different requirements. By the end of December about 800 Canadian servicemen were in Egypt or *en route*, and a squadron of transport aircraft was serving in the theatre. Nine years later a group of over 900 Canadian servicemen were still associated with the Force. In addition to a Reconnaissance Squadron engaged in patrolling the desert frontier between Israel and the United Arab Republic, the Canadian contingent included a detachment of engineers, a Signal Squadron, a Transport Company, an Infantry Workshop and an RCAF Air Transport unit.

In an article contributed to the spring 1957 issue of the *Quarterly Foreign Affairs*, the Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed the hope that out of the experience acquired in Korea and in the Middle East some permanent United Nations machinery could be developed, including, as required, a peace supervision force. In particular, he returned to the idea already advanced at

the time of Korea that member governments should be invited to signify a willingness to contribute contingents to the United Nations for peace-keeping purposes. Again, however, the crisis was allowed to pass without member governments following up the lessons learned. The Secretary-General set down what he considered to be the minimum conditions necessary for future peace-keeping operations and presented these in a report to the General Assembly in 1958. The Communist governments were opposed to any discussion, and most other governments preferred not to press the issue. It was allowed to drop. Nevertheless, Canada decided to go ahead on her own. Even though the battalion originally selected to go to the Middle East was not, in fact, sent, it was kept on standby duty for possible service with the United Nations, and since then a new battalion has been earmarked for standby duty each year. The Defence White Paper of 1959 stated for the first time that it was the defence policy of Canada "to provide forces for the United Nations to assist that Organization in attaining its peaceful aims".


Canada found herself involved in Middle East affairs again in 1958, this time as a member of the Security Council. After a complaint by Lebanon concerning outside intervention in its internal affairs the Council sent an observation group to the country to patrol the frontiers. Canada contributed 78 military observers of the total of 591 officers and men from 19 countries. The observation group was able to conclude its activities in December after conditions had returned to normal.

The Congo and Cyprus

There were other United Nations peace-keeping operations in which Canada participated, including the sending of observers to the Yemen in 1963 and the despatch of a force to keep order for a temporary period in West New Guinea in 1962. In Both cases Canada contributed RCAF personnel and services. However. Canada's largest commitments towards the end of the period under review were to the United Nations Operation in the Congo, which began in 1960 and was terminated in 1964, and to the United Nations Force in Cyprus, which arrived on the island in March 1964 and is still there at the time of writing.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) began

Some Congolese workmen listen to a Canadian Signalman who is seen on duty at the entrance to a firing range outside Leopoldville where Congolese soldiers were trained.



Some Congolese workmen listen to a Canadian Signalmen who is seen on duty at the entrance to a firing range outside Leopoldville where Congolese soldiers were trained.

after authorization by the Council on July 14, 1960, for the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to provide the Government of the Congo with such military assistance as might be necessary until Congolese security forces were in a position to maintain order. The resolution also called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo. Canada was asked to provide specialized personnel for the new Force and Parliament agreed to supply up to 500 servicemen, including a signals detachment and a headquarters detachment. Canada also provided RCAF personnel to organize the air transport requirements. Eventually, the Canadian contribution to the Congo Operation consisted of 280 officers and men from the Canadian Army, most of whom were responsible for maintaining communications between United Nations headquarters in Leopoldville and military sector headquarters in other parts of the country, and 24 Air Force personnel.

Canada fully supported the Secretary-General in his difficult task of managing the Congo Operation, a task for which he gave his life in September 1961. The Prime Minister defined Canada's view of the general problem as follows, in his speech to the General Assembly on September 26, 1960: "The African nations must be permitted to work out their own destinies; when they need help the best source is through the agencies of the United Nations." He also remarked that the experience in the Congo was yet another demonstration of the need "to have military forces readily available for service with the United Nations when required" and he pointed out that Canada held in reserve "a battalion transportable by air and earmarked for such service". Speaking in the General Assembly in April, 1961, the Canadian representative defended the United Nations record in the Congo from attack by the Soviet Union and others:

"Yet the involvement of the United Nations in the Congo was unquestionably right and perhaps inevitable . . . it is not unreasonable to suppose that the involvement of the United Nations and the physical presence of United Nations forces in the Congo have been a factor in keeping the peace internationally."

The Congo Operation was by far the most costly and diffi-

cult of all United Nations peace-keeping operations. At its peak strength, the Force consisted of over 20,000 men from 19 countries, and at one time or another almost 100,000 soldiers served in it. The total cost was estimated to be more than \$400 million. The Secretary-General summed up its achievements in a report on the withdrawal of the Force at the end of June, 1964:

“The presence of the United Nations Force has been the decisive factor in preserving the territorial integrity of the country; it has been solely responsible for the cessation of the activities of the mercenaries in Katanga; and it has been a major factor in preventing widespread civil war in the Congo.”

Although Canada's numerical contribution to the United Nations Operation in the Congo was relatively small, the Canadian signals detachment had the important role of providing a bilingual communication network for the many national units making up the United Nations Force. In Cyprus, on the other hand, Canada at first provided the largest single national contingent. Cyprus, unlike the Congo, is a member of the Commonwealth and the subject of a grave dispute between two of Canada's NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, Canada looked with caution upon the possibility of a request to participate in UNFICYP. The Prime Minister explained to the House of Commons on February 19, 1964, that certain requirements would have to be met before Canada would decide to participate. These included satisfactory composition and terms of reference for the Force, prospects for the finding of a political solution within a reasonable time, the agreement of the Government of Cyprus to the arrangements proposed, and the association of any peace-keeping force with the United Nations.

These conditions were generally satisfied by the passage of a Security Council resolution on March 4, which recommended “the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus”, the composition and size of which were to be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the governments directly concerned. The function of the Force was set down in the resolution as “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary to



A Canadian soldier on duty in Cyprus with the UN Force in 1964.

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contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". The resolution also recommended that the Force remain for a period of three months and that the Secretary-General designate a mediator whose job it would be to help find an agreed settlement. The chief drawback of the resolution in the Canadian view was that the terms of reference for the Force were too vague, and did not give the Force sufficient authority to carry out a difficult task in a delicate situation. Canada was also disappointed that the costs of the Force were to be met by the governments providing the contingents, by the Government of Cyprus and by voluntary contributions, and not by collective assessment of the membership.

Nevertheless, on March 13, Parliament approved the participation of Canadian troops in the Force and on the same day the Canadian advance-party left for Cyprus. Later in the month, the Canadian standby battalion, plus a reconnaissance squadron and logistic support elements, over 1,100 men, were airlifted to Cyprus. Since that time, the Canadian battalion in Cyprus has been rotated every six months. Military personnel from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom and civilian police from five countries helped make up a total Force of over 6,000 men. The Council has agreed to renew the mandate of the Force at regular intervals since March 1964.

By its presence and by its prompt intervention in local situations as they arise, the Force has been able to settle countless disputes which might otherwise have led to serious incidents. It has been successful in preventing a resumption of hostilities on the island, with the exception of those in August 1964, which the United Nations was able to bring under control. United Nations efforts have also exerted a useful moderating influence on the two communities and have maintained open the lines of communications between the two sides at all times. Some progress has also been made in the restoration of more normal conditions. At the time of writing, however, no significant progress has been made by the parties toward a negotiated solution despite attempts at mediation, and the United Nations Force has therefore remained an essential element in the preservation of law and order on the island.

Planning for Peace-keeping

One of the distinctive threads running through the above account of Canadian policy and action in the field of United Nations peace-keeping has been Canada's consistent concern for advance planning both by contributing governments and by the United Nations Secretariat. After the Suez Operation, as noted above, Canada earmarked a battalion for peace-keeping service. Other countries, particularly the Scandinavians, have also taken similar action but, on the whole, general preparedness for peace-keeping still leaves a good deal to be desired. One result has been the creation by the General Assembly of a Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to make a comprehensive review of the matter, but so far this Committee has been concerned almost entirely with questions of financing¹. A more specifically Canadian initiative was the convening of a meeting in November 1964 to examine the practical military aspects of peace-keeping.

Speaking to the General Assembly in September 1963, the Prime Minister, referring to this question of advance planning, proposed "that there should be an examination by interested governments of the problems and techniques of peace-keeping operations", an examination which might "lead to a pooling of available resources and the development in a co-ordinated way of trained and equipped collective forces for United Nations service". Canada followed up this proposal with invitations to 27 governments chosen on the basis of their contribution to peace-keeping operations in the past and specific indications of their general willingness to participate in the future. Governments were invited to send military experts to discuss such technical aspects of peace-keeping as command and control, logistics, status of United Nations forces, etc. There were to be no political discussions nor were there to be formal conclusions. The idea was simply to bring together past participants to evaluate in an informal way their common experience. The meeting was not to be held under United Nations auspices but the Secretary-General was kept informed of the preparations and was invited to send an observer (his Military Adviser, Major-General Rikhye, attended). Twenty-two govern-

(1) See the following section.

ments responded to the Canadian invitation, including countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Western Europe.

The meetings were held in private and there was no public announcement of the results achieved. It can be said, however, that, as a pioneer attempt to introduce an element of advance preparation into peace-keeping, it achieved the purposes of exchanging much useful information, establishing contacts or resuming them at the staff level and of increasing understanding of each other's special problems by the governments concerned. Canada would be the first to admit, nevertheless, that, ideally, exchanges of this sort should take place at the United Nations itself, and it is to be hoped that, once the problems of authorization, control and financing of peace-keeping can be worked out satisfactorily, there will be less difficulty about the United Nations undertaking this kind of detailed advance planning.

The Financing of Peace-keeping Operations

With the exception of Korea, which did not engage the financing machinery of the United Nations, the costs of all peace-keeping activities authorized by the Organization prior to the Suez crisis were included in the regular budget, with the required funds coming from the regular assessments upon member states. These activities were on a relatively modest scale, of course, and involved the use of military personnel merely in an observer capacity. However, with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956 under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, the Organization was faced for the first time with the problem of how to meet heavy peace-keeping expenses. The estimate of costs for the initial year of operation was \$25 million, and this was at a time when the regular United Nations budget for all other activities totalled only about \$50 million. (The 1965 UNEF budget was about \$18.5 million). The Canadian Government believed strongly that it would be improvident for the United Nations to finance the activities of the Force by the uncertain means of an appeal for voluntary contributions. UNEF, Canada felt, should be financed by fixed assessments, which would guarantee more adequately the collective responsibility of all United Nations members for the maintenance of peace.

Although the Canadian viewpoint prevailed, there were multiple dissenters. A majority of 51 nations supported the assessment resolution but the Soviet bloc voted against and 19 others abstained. The U.S.S.R. contended that peace-keeping was the sole prerogative of the Security Council and that the General Assembly was acting illegally in establishing the Force and by imposing assessments to pay for the Force. A number of Latin American states questioned the binding character of an assessment to provide funds for an extraordinary expenditure not included in the regular budget. Some of the Arab states protested that the victim of aggression should be exempt from assessment. A number of other governments simply pleaded poverty.

In order to attract the maximum number of contributions, developed countries, including Canada, made substantial voluntary contributions which were intended to reduce the scale of assessments of the less-developed countries by about half. The success of this tactic, however, was doomed by the Congo crisis, which triggered the formation of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in August 1960 and a monthly bill of about \$10 million. Peace-keeping expenses now dramatically overshadowed the regular budget of the Organization and led, in turn, to greatly increased demands by the less-developed countries for financial relief. Moreover, a second Great Power, namely France, now joined the U.S.S.R. in active opposition to the principle of mandatory assessments for peace-keeping operations. To finance the Congo Operation, the General Assembly, led by the U.S.A., Britain, Canada and a number of other governments upholding the principle of collective responsibility, continued to support and to adopt resolutions assessing peace-keeping costs against the whole membership. At the same time, it was necessary to allow greater deductions to the less-developed countries.

In 1961, the financial situation had deteriorated to such an extent that no assessment was enacted. Instead, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to float a United Nations bond issue of up to \$200 million and to use the proceeds for purposes normally related to the working capital fund. Canada was the first country to announce its intention to subscribe to the bond issue, and purchased in all \$6.4 million (U.S.) worth of

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bonds. The Assembly also decided to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether or not peace-keeping costs were "expenses of the Organization" and thus assessable under Article 17 of the Charter. In July 1962, the International Court by a majority of nine to five answered the question affirmatively.

Certain governments, particularly the Communist governments, refused to acknowledge the Court's advisory opinion and the subsequent Assembly resolution accepting this opinion. The result was that by January 1, 1964, the Communist states were subject to Article 19 of the Charter, which deprives states in arrears over a fixed amount in the payment of their financial contributions of their vote in the General Assembly. In order to avoid a confrontation over Article 19, the short-lived nineteenth session of the Assembly approved essential items of business without voting and in February 1965 established a Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, of which Canada is a member, to make a comprehensive review "of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization". This Committee was able to reach agreement in August 1965 that Article 19 would not be applied to UNEF and CONGO arrears and that voluntary contributions should be made to help meet United Nations debts. Canada anticipated this appeal by making a voluntary contribution of \$4 million in June. But by the end of the summer there still remained a deficit of some \$80 million on the United Nations' books.

The financing of UNFICYP has been accomplished without open dissension at the United Nations because no definite assessments are involved. The Security Council resolution which established UNFICYP provided that it should be financed by the governments providing the contingents, by the Government of Cyprus and by voluntary contributions. It is estimated that costs to the United Nations for UNFICYP were \$27.1 million (U.S.) from its inception in March 1964 until June 26, 1965. As of June 9, 1965, some 38 governments had pledged approximately \$25.5 million to the UNFICYP Special Account. Canada paid the costs of her contingent, which during this period amounted to \$5.2

million over and above the costs which Canada would normally absorb to maintain these forces in Canada.

In addition to the formulae which govern the contributions of United Nations members (varying from *direct assessments* for UNEF and ONUC to *voluntary contributions* for UNFICYP), the division of the costs of peace-keeping operations between the United Nations and the national governments (such as Canada) which have contributed military personnel or forces to these operations is governed by principles agreed upon between the United Nations and the individual governments concerned. With respect to ONUC and UNEF, the United Nations agreed to reimburse Canada for all extra expenses over and above those which Canada would bear had it maintained its military personnel in Canada. As of December 31, 1965, Canada had paid ONUC and UNEF assessments or voluntary payments of approximately \$13.5 million and had waived the recovery from the United Nations of initial airlift and sealift expenses of \$1,701,000, making a total "out-of-pocket" contribution to ONUC and UNEF of approximately \$15.2 million. In regard to UNFICYP Canada agreed to pay for her contingent because no collective assessments were involved.

Conclusion

As the above discussion makes clear, Canada has been in the forefront of United Nations efforts to keep the peace. Canada does not claim any special virtue which qualifies her for this role, although she has on the whole been in a position to give assistance when it was needed. Nor does Canada pretend to have any greater urge than other nations to help prevent war. Rather, Canada was ready and willing, when the Charter system of security was found wanting, to put into practice that theory of functional contributions to the United Nations which she had advocated from the beginning. If the Great Powers were not to perform the function of maintaining the peace, then it was natural for a middle power with the required military capability and without major political handicaps to make an appropriate contribution.

Canada has coupled with this readiness to participate in peace-keeping a consistent belief that United Nations actions to keep the peace are in the interests of all United Nations members, and that all should bear some share of the burden—a belief, that is, in

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collective responsibility. This responsibility has not, in fact, been supported equitably; some members of the United Nations have borne more than their share of peace-keeping costs, whereas others have borne less.

Canada is aware, therefore, that the gap between the ideal of collective security and the facts of life in the United Nations remains wide. The United Nations was not meant to enforce the peace between Great Powers nor to enforce decisions on them. But Canada continues to believe that, even if we cannot now expect full implementation of the principle of collective responsibility it is vital that, in the absence of Great Power agreement, the United Nations should continue to be able to "unite for peace" when the occasion requires.

2. DISARMAMENT

Progress towards disarmament has consistently been a major policy objective of the Canadian Government since the end of the Second World War. During these two decades, Canadian initiatives in the United Nations and other bodies concerned with various aspects of disarmament testify to the importance attached by successive governments to the attainment of that objective.

On November 15, 1945, the Prime Minister of Canada joined the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in a declaration proposing the establishment of a United Nations Commission to study the problems created by the release of atomic energy, so as to ensure that this great force would be used for peaceful rather than for destructive purposes. Canada's association with this proposal stemmed not so much from her role as a leading military power but rather from her rapid economic growth and in particular her role as an associate of the United States and Britain in the wartime development of atomic energy.

Because of this background, Canada was keenly alive to the great issues involved and well qualified to take part in efforts to solve them. Moreover, in order to build and maintain international peace and security—one of the prime purposes of the United Nations—, it was clear that any plan to regulate and reduce armaments would have to include atomic weapons.

The early hopes attending the creation by the United Nations in 1946 of an Atomic Energy Commission composed of the

members of the Security Council and Canada were quickly shattered when the Baruch Plan for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Authority, although supported by a majority of the members of the AEC and later endorsed by the General Assembly, was rejected by the U.S.S.R. This radical plan proposed that the Authority would own "in trust" for the nations of the world, *all* fissionable material from the time it was taken from the ground, and would also control the mining of all such ores.

Any optimism regarding rapid agreement on the control of atomic weapons was also dispelled by the realization that serious differences existed between the positions of the Soviet Union and the West over reduction of conventional armaments. It was the view of the Western powers that disarmament could not take place until international confidence had been created by the settlement of major political issues and an adequate system of inspection and control to safeguard national security had been established. The Soviet view was that an immediate reduction of armaments and of armed forces would create this sense of international security and confidence, and that any system of control and inspection must be established within the framework of the Security Council, and thus subject to the veto of the permanent members.

Canada was a member of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, established in 1947 to deal with those questions, during her period of membership on the Security Council in 1948-49, and took an active part in helping to draw up plans for the exchange and verification of information on conventional armaments. When in 1949, however, the Soviet Union insisted on associating the regulation of conventional armaments with the control of atomic energy, the possibility of reaching agreement virtually disappeared, and was dashed completely when the Soviet Union walked out of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the CCA in protest against the presence of representatives from Nationalist China.

Throughout the decade which followed—the fifties—a number of proposals and counter-proposals were presented in the search for a basis of agreement. The forum for negotiation also changed frequently. In 1952 a new UN Disarmament Commission, composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada, assum-

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ed the combined tasks of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. However no progress was made while the Korean war lasted, and later difficulties over control procedures and the priority of disarmament measures continued to plague the Commission.

In 1954-55, Canada participated with the four major powers in a sub-committee set up by the Disarmament Commission in an effort to break the deadlock over the question of control and inspection. Despite the lack of progress, Canada constantly urged that negotiations be continued. In 1954, for example, the Canadian Delegation to the UN submitted a resolution—eventually co-sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—which expressed the General Assembly's recognition that the continuing development of armaments increased the urgency of the need for a solution to the disarmament problem and concluded that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention. This resolution was adopted unanimously.

Being a close neighbour of both the United States and the Soviet Union, Canada would occupy an exposed position in any future war involving these powers and was therefore concerned about the danger of surprise attack. In 1957, when the United States proposed an "open skies" plan designed to minimize this danger, Canada announced that she was ready to co-operate by permitting inspection from Canadian skies. The Prime Minister said:

... The Canadian Government has agreed, if the U.S.S.R. will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection and will do its utmost to assure that the system works effectively. We consider that a useful start in providing safeguards against surprise attack could be made in the Arctic areas.

This offer was communicated to Mr. Khrushchov on two occasions in 1958 and was repeated on several occasions afterwards.

Canadian efforts have not been directed solely towards the control of atomic weapons and disarmament. During the fifties, Canada was an active participant in international efforts to establish

a control agency to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful purposes were not diverted to military use. As a result of such efforts, the International Atomic Energy Agency began its work in 1957 and has developed and administered a system of safeguards. Canada also took a leading part, as a member of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, in efforts to evaluate the hazards of radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear weapons tests conducted in the atmosphere.

In 1958 Canada participated in a conference attended by experts of eight nations, including the Soviet Union and Western allies, to study various methods of detecting nuclear explosions. They agreed on the technical feasibility of establishing a control system incorporating a network of land and ship-borne control posts, to detect atmospheric, underwater and underground nuclear explosions. In the same year, Canadian representatives took part in a similar conference to study the technical problems involved in preventing surprise attacks, but this time no agreement could be reached on the issues at stake.

In succeeding years Canada constantly stressed the importance of recognizing the responsibility for disarmament vested in the United Nations and the value of making regular reports from the negotiating bodies to the UN Disarmament Commission, which was expanded to include all UN members in 1958. Canada never accepted the view that responsibility for disarmament and for the control and elimination of nuclear weapons should be left to the major powers. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained to the First Committee on October 19, 1960:

We believe that the non-nuclear powers have a direct responsibility for urging that the search for agreement be pursued with the utmost vigour. We believe that the non-nuclear powers represented around this table must put the pressure on the nuclear powers to see that the search for agreement is not dropped but is continued with the utmost urgency because the fate of humanity is at stake in this question.

The importance of the Canadian contribution to disarmament discussions was again recognized when Canada was invited as one of the five Western nations to join the short-lived Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee agreed to in 1959 but which broke down in June 1960 after the Communist delegates withdrew. In Decem-

ber 1961, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to resume negotiations in an Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, composed of the original ten countries plus eight non-aligned nations.

During the first meeting of the ENDC in Geneva in March 1962, Canada followed up a recommendation of the UN General Assembly in December 1961 on the application of the principles of international law to outer space by submitting the draft of a declaration designed to ensure that outer space would be used for peaceful purposes only. The declaration called for the prohibition of the orbiting of devices for delivering weapons of mass destruction and urged that advance notification of the launching of satellites and missiles should be furnished to the United Nations. The first of these ideas was eventually incorporated in a United Nations resolution. Indeed Canada has taken an active part in urging a role for the United Nations in outer space activities and is a member of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, formed in 1959.

The search for agreement on partial disarmament measures led in 1963 to the signature of the partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Canada welcomed this important step and adhered to the treaty on August 8, 1963, three days after its signature in Moscow. Canada has continued to press for a comprehensive treaty which will prohibit all nuclear tests, including those carried out underground, under conditions offering firm assurance that the obligations undertaken are being carried out. So far the inability of the two principal nuclear powers to reach agreement on effective means of verification has prevented the conclusion of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. During the 1965 session of the ENDC Sweden proposed an international "detection club", to pool information obtained from improved seismic equipment and the introduction of array techniques in order to improve the international capability to detect underground nuclear explosions. Canada has the technical knowledge and equipment and is well placed geographically to make an important contribution to a world-wide surveillance system. The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced in the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1965, that the Canadian Government is willing to

join with other nations in international efforts to help to achieve a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

In recent years, the diffusion of nuclear knowledge and improved industrial capacity have created conditions in which many nations could embark on a nuclear weapons programme. Consequently, the search for a way to halt the spread of nuclear weapons has taken on a new sense of urgency.

In an address in Geneva on May 3, 1965, the Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out that the principal objective in the field of disarmament today is the limitation of the spread of nuclear weapons. This objective had been pursued, he said, through the application of safeguards to transfers of nuclear materials and equipment from one country to another and the conclusion of the partial nuclear test ban treaty. He then went on to suggest the following new directions of approach to the question:

- (a) The extension of safeguards on commercial transactions in nuclear materials on as comprehensive a basis as possible;
- (b) the extension of the partial test ban treaty to include underground tests;
- (c) the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers;
- (d) agreements among non-nuclear countries on the "non-acquisition of nuclear weapons", as envisaged in various proposals for regional nuclear-free zones;
- (e) the provision of guarantees against nuclear attack to non-nuclear countries;
- (f) the conclusion of a universal non-dissemination treaty wherein the nuclear powers would undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries and the latter not to acquire them;
- (g) the development of universal or regional verification and control organizations.

Addressing the General Assembly on September 24, 1965, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said:

Nuclear weapons are now in the possession not of one power or two, but five, and many other governments are acknowledged to have the

capacity to make them. The Secretary-General . . . has described the spread of nuclear weapons as the most urgent question of the present time. The Canadian Government fully supports this judgment.

Canada has played an active part in efforts to promote an international agreement to prevent the spread or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Together with the United States, Britain and Italy, Canada contributed to the preparation of proposals for a non-proliferation treaty which were presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the United States on August 17, 1965, and continues to play an active role in negotiations to attain a universal non-proliferation treaty.

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3: Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

The Second Purpose of the
United Nations (Article 1,
Para. 2, of the Charter).

Colonialism, or “the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”, as the Charter puts it, has been a fact of life throughout recorded history, but it is only within comparatively recent times that it has come to be regarded in most parts of the world as a political evil and as something which should cease as rapidly as possible.

The League of Nations Covenant recognized that colonialism was a major international problem but laid down obligations only in relation to the colonial territories of the defeated powers. The Covenant declared that the “well-being and development” of the peoples of these territories was a “sacred trust of civilization” and entrusted their tutelage to certain Allied Powers as mandatories on behalf of the League. The sole obligation on League members with colonial territories outside the mandates system was to “secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control”.

The Charter and Decolonization

The United Nations Charter made substantial advances over the League Covenant. In the first place all members of the United Nations having dependent territories under their control recognized that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories were para-

mount, and agreed that their well-being was to be promoted to the utmost. This undertaking was defined as "a sacred trust" and to emphasize its importance was given the form of a Declaration (Chapter XI of the Charter). Secondly, the emphasis in the Charter was on progress towards self-government or independence. This represented a tremendous change in thinking from 1919. Perhaps the third great advance in the Charter was the specific obligation placed on all colonial powers to transmit regularly to the United Nations detailed information on economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they were responsible. This became the springboard from which the General Assembly gradually assumed a supervisory role in respect of the development and political advancement of all colonial territories.

The Charter divides colonial territories into two categories. An International Trusteeship System was set up to replace the League Mandates System and all the mandatory powers (Australia, Belgium, Britain, France, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa) except one agreed to transfer their remaining mandated territories to the new system (South Africa refused to place the mandated territory of South West Africa under trusteeship). Under the new system the United Nations, acting through the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, had substantially greater supervisory powers. Especially important were the authority to consider oral and written petitions without the intermediary of the administering power and the right to send visiting missions to the trust territories. By the end of 1949, 11 territories had been placed under United Nations trusteeship by individual trusteeship agreements.

In the second category were placed all non-self-governing territories apart from those specifically brought under trusteeship. Here the main legal obligation was to furnish information to the United Nations on economic, social and educational progress, but the avowed goal was to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the indigenous peoples under colonial rule, and "to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement" (Article 73).

South West Africa is the only mandated territory that was neither granted independence nor placed under the trusteeship system. In 1950 the International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa continued to have the international obligations laid down in the Covenant and the mandate and that the United Nations was entitled to exercise supervisory functions over the South African Government's administration of the territory. It has never been able to exercise this function effectively, however, and the status of South West Africa has remained unchanged to this day, although the United Nations has taken an increasing and determined interest in the welfare of the African population and their right to self-determination.

Although these three categories have continued to exist, the difference between them has become more a matter of terminology than of substance ever since the passage of the Colonial Declaration of 1960.

At San Francisco, the Canadian assessment was that Chapter XI represented a more extensive codification of the principles to be applied to colonial territories than had ever been attempted before. This was all to the good. Canadian delegates hoped that out of the Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories embodied in this Chapter would come "a healthy competition between colonial powers for the achievement of better conditions for the people under their care". At the least it would bring to the United Nations an unprecedented flow of information, which could be used to suggest lines along which improved colonial policies might be developed.

Progress in Decolonization

The drive for decolonization has been a major feature of the politics of the United Nations. It is not easy to say how much credit for the incredibly rapid pace of decolonization should be assigned to the United Nations. One observer puts it this way:

One cannot divide the history of the United Nations into distinct before and after periods, segregating in time the impact of the United Nations on decolonization and the impact of decolonization upon the United Nations. Decolonization is a continuing process, and the United Nations continues both to affect it and be affected by it. Indeed, the involvement of the Organization in the colonial issue tends to be self-perpetuating and

even self-augmenting; every victory for self-determination produces a new member state which adds to the strength of the anti-colonial forces in the Organization.¹

Another significant aspect has been the gradual enhancement of the General Assembly's role as the main arena of colonial debate, largely because the states which pressed for rapid decolonization were in a stronger position in this body. In the early years, the Western colonial powers had a safe voting majority against any resolution which they regarded as unacceptable. This position was soon eroded with the influx of the new member states from Africa and Asia, which were both the products of colonial emancipation and its most vigorous advocates.

In the struggle against Western-type colonialism, the Afro-Asians could count on the votes of the Communist states, but the decolonization drive has never been controlled by these states.

Non-Self-Governing Territories

Nowhere has the pace of decolonization been faster than in the British colonial territories. Since the end of the Second World War, Britain has granted independence to over 665 million people in 21 territories. Still under colonial tutelage, but in various stages of self-government, are 34 entities with over nine million inhabitants. British colonial policy has been empirical and enlightened, based on a conception of colonial territories, particularly the larger ones, as "nations in embryo", and the constitutional evolution in individual British colonies resembles in many respects the course taken over the centuries by British parliamentary institutions.

At the United Nations, British colonial policy has generally had a sympathetic hearing, for there has never been any doubt in the post-war era as to the end sought by British policy; self-determination was accepted as the objective. This has also been true since about 1959 of the other great European colonial power, France, but it has clearly not been true of Portugal, whose policies have had quite different aims.

The role played by the United Nations in facilitating decolonization has been decided not by the Charter provisions on colonial

Inis L. Claude, Jr.: *The Changing Nature and Role of the United Nations*—essays based on a series of lectures given at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, October 27-29, 1964.

territories, which are limited and carefully circumscribed, but by the intent and meaning given to these by the overwhelming majority of United Nations members. In turn, the willingness of most colonial powers to respond to reasonable demands made rapid progress possible. The following developments illustrate this process:

- (a) Although there was no obligation to transmit political information on **non-self-governing territories**, from the first Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States included information on governmental institutions in their territories. In 1961, the British took the step of going beyond the Charter by providing the United Nations with information on political and constitutional advance in their dependent territories, a decision rightly regarded as one of the first importance.
- (b) Again, the Charter does not specifically authorize the Assembly to make recommendations on the political affairs of colonial territories. Yet this right has been gradually asserted. Over the initial opposition of the colonial powers, the Assembly developed the practice of making general recommendations on regional groups of territories. In recent years it has moved much further, to the point where recommendations on political developments in individual colonial territories are the accepted order of things. Colonial powers such as Britain have moved with the times in response to "the winds of change", a much-quoted phrase in the United Nations and one, it might be noted, which was coined by a British Prime Minister. While reserving its position on the legality of such recommendations, Britain has continued to co-operate with the United Nations in the work of decolonization and, as far as possible, has sought to respond to United Nations demands.
- (c) A similar evolution occurred as regards the right of the Assembly to hear petitioners from colonial territories. Since this is not laid down in the Charter, the practice in the early years was to hear petitioners only if the colonial power concerned agreed to their appearance. In time, as the anti-colonial voting majority grew, the Assembly asserted the right to hear petitioners from territories on which no information was sent to the United Nations—e.g. the Portuguese territories such as Angola and Mozambique. The attitude of the colonial powers also changed. Since they could no longer prevent the Assembly from voting to hear petitioners, most came to acquiesce in the procedure and to accept this extension of the Assembly's jurisdiction, provided the petitioners could properly claim to speak on behalf of people in the territory concerned.
- (d) Britain and other colonial powers have usually drawn the line at visits to their colonial territories by United Nations committees, seeking to inquire into conditions there and to report their findings back to the United Nations. Such visiting missions are permitted in the case of trust territories, but the Charter makes no provision

for visits to non-self-governing territories. In the British view, this would mean unacceptable intervention in the administration of its territories. Yet one administering member, New Zealand, recently went far beyond the Charter requirements by asking for United Nations supervision of the elections which were held in the Cook Islands in 1965. This is one example of how a flexible approach by a so-called "colonial power" can in practice outstrip Charter obligations or Assembly demands.

From Trusteeship to Independence

The proof of the success of the United Nations trusteeship system is that eight of the 11 territories that were once under trusteeship have by now achieved independence on their own or by joining with an independent state.

British Togoland elected to join Ghana which became independent in 1957. The same year a special United Nations Commission, of which Canada was a member, visited French Togoland and recommended that elections be held in 1958 to enable the inhabitants to decide their own future. Canada later joined in co-sponsoring a resolution providing for United Nations supervision of the elections. The elections favoured independence, a status Togoland achieved in 1960.

The French Cameroons and Italian Somaliland also secured their independence in 1960. In 1961 the British Cameroons Trusteeship was terminated when the Northern Cameroons voted to become part of Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons elected to join the Republic of Cameroun (the former French Cameroons). Tanganyika became independent in December 1961 and the New Zealand trusteeship territory of Western Samoa acquired independence a month later on January 1, 1962.

Ruanda-Urundi has had a more troubled history. In 1960, after violent disorders had racked this Belgian trust territory in the heart of Africa, a United Nations Commission was set up to visit the country and supervise legislative elections. A special amnesty commission, in which a Canadian representative participated, was also sent to Ruanda-Urundi in 1961 to examine cases of grave crimes with a view to implementing the Assembly's recommendation that a full and unconditional amnesty be granted. Two RCMP officers were part of this United Nations team. After elections later that year, the General Assembly approved July 1, 1962,

as the date for the accession to independence as separate states of Rwanda and Burundi.

Three territories in the Pacific still remain under trusteeship: New Guinea and Nauru under Australian administration and the United States-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

The Colonial Declaration

On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly, after a long and exhaustive debate on the whole problem of decolonization, adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was approved by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly; 89 states, including Canada, voted in favour; no member voted against its provisions, and only a small minority abstained. In a sense, this was the culmination of United Nations efforts to end colonialism. The Declaration has four key points:

- (1) In the Colonial Declaration the Assembly proclaims the necessity of bringing colonialism "in all its forms and manifestations" to a speedy and unconditional end.
- (2) The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation is declared to be a denial of fundamental human rights, contrary to the Charter and an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
- (3) All peoples have the right to self-determination. In addition, the Declaration calls for an end to all armed action or repressive measures directed against dependent peoples and says that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never be used as a pretext for delaying independence.
- (4) Most important of all, the Declaration calls for the taking of immediate steps, in all colonial territories, to transfer full power to the peoples of those territories without any conditions or reservations, and in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

It is difficult to judge the effects of the Colonial Declaration on the movement of dependent territories towards independence.

The Declaration was more in the nature of a statement of objectives than a stimulus to new efforts on the part of the administering powers, most of which, by 1960, had already accepted the shape of things to come. Moreover, the Declaration is not of great help in drawing up guide-lines for the disposition of many of the remaining colonial territories (about 50 in 1965), either because they are too small for independence to be meaningful or because the problems of race relations inhibits and bedevils the reaching of quick or simple solutions.

The Canadian Approach

The Canadian attitude to the problem of ending colonialism is based on support for the concept of *self-determination* and our wish to assist in promoting the evolution from colonial rule to self-government and independence for all dependent peoples who desire that status, at a rate of development governed only by practical considerations of internal stability. Canada recognizes that each remaining colonial territory has its own special problems and its own conditions. The United Nations approach, in our view, should therefore attempt to apply appropriate methods to fit the circumstances of each case. Finally, since the administering authorities cannot be expected to share or shift their responsibilities for the dependent peoples under their control, Canada believes that if the United Nations is to contribute to orderly evolution it must take account of these responsibilities as well as of the wishes of the inhabitants of the colonial territory concerned.

At the United Nations Canada, with countries like Ireland and the Scandinavian states, has represented a moderate point of view—Western but “non-colonial”. On occasion Canada has been able to play a useful and constructive role. A typical example of this occurred in 1959, when Canada co-sponsored a resolution setting up a committee to study the principles determining when an obligation exists to transmit information to the United Nations on colonial territories. The committee’s report helped to clarify a long-disputed point.

We have tended to judge colonial resolutions on the basis of practicality: Would they work? Would they secure the co-operation of the colonial power concerned? Were they reasonable and constructive?

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For these reasons Canadian delegates have frequently laid stress on the need for the rapid professional training of personnel in trust and non-self-governing territories. Experience has shown that, if colonial territories are to reach the "take-off point" for viable nationhood, it is essential for them to have a solid base of trained administrators. In this task all countries can help. For many years now Canada has provided technical training and higher education for thousands of students from colonial territories.

Canada saw the best answer to the decolonization problem in careful preparation for independence, conducted with a proper sense of urgency, and a desire to respect the wishes of the peoples in the colonial territories. The Canadian representative put it this way in 1961:

It seems to me that the danger lies not so much in the possibility that the administering authorities will not compromise eventually with the force of nationalism; indeed, the vast majority have shown impressive proof to the contrary. Rather, the danger is that in the case of territories administered under a different philosophy, independence when it comes may find the inhabitants almost totally unprepared to handle the responsibilities which they are certain to demand and get.

That is why we in Canada endorse wholeheartedly the British policy of creating an administrative base, by training a core of public officials who will owe their allegiance not to a tribe or party but to all the people of their country when independence comes. The wisdom of this policy has been amply demonstrated.

Likewise, if independence is to be of lasting value, if factionalism and civil strife are not to follow, it must be achieved in a harmonious and orderly manner. Britain and France have met this test on a scale and speed without precedent in world history.

In the Canadian view, the Colonial Declaration of 1960 has universal application. On occasion Canadian spokesmen have reminded the United Nations that colonialism is not a problem for which the West is solely responsible, that it is equally applicable to the denial of freedom and self-determination to all subject peoples, and that the Assembly should bend its efforts towards implementing the Declaration in all areas in which progress toward independence and freedom is being deliberately impeded or denied.

The Remaining Colonial Problems

If one leaves aside territories that are on the road to independence and such special cases as Papua and New Guinea, the remaining colonial problems can be classified under three headings:

- (1) The smaller island territories, which can scarcely hope in the future to support a viable independence. Here the solution seems to be federation into larger entities or free association with an independent state. Examples of such territories are the Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides, Pitcairn Island, the Seychelles, St. Helena, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos.
- (2) Territories with special problems, strategic or otherwise. Examples in this category would be Aden, Hong Kong, Gibraltar and Swaziland.
- (3) The most severe problems of decolonization occur in Central and Southern Africa among multi-racial societies still under colonial rule or that of a white minority. Solutions to these questions, whether viewed from the standpoint of racial discrimination or transition to majority rule, present the United Nations with one of its greatest political problems.

Under the latter category there are two issues sometimes referred to as the "hard-core" problems:

- (1) The question of the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea) raised by Portugal's insistence that these possessions are part of her metropolitan territory. Portugal has steadfastly refused to admit that the Africans in her overseas territories have the right to self-government and independence;
- (2) The problem of Rhodesia, a territory which for 40 years has been virtually self-governing in all but external affairs but which still has the technical status of a British colony. Although Rhodesia's racial policies are not based on *apartheid*, progress towards a partnership of the Africans and the ruling European minority has been painfully slow.

A third issue, which is not a question of decolonization but has some similar aspects, is that of racial policies in South Africa and South West Africa.

In forming its attitude towards these problems, Canada has been conscious of the difficulties involved. In the case of the Portuguese territories in Africa, Canada has urged Portugal to accept and recognize the goal of self-determination for the African peoples in Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. The Canadian attitude is well expressed in the following statement by a Canadian representative, speaking during the 1962 debate on a draft resolution dealing with the situation in Angola:

It would have been unrealistic to expect the people of Angola to remain unaffected by the wave of pressure for independence, freedom and equality which has swelled over Africa in the past few years. The prerequisite to

satisfactory political development is that there should be broad general agreement on ultimate objectives between the people of a non-self-governing territory and its administering power. This entails, in Africa today, a clear acknowledgement that self-determination is the goal of political development. The result need not be a sharp disruption of long-established ties with the administering power; we have seen how economic and cultural links may survive and grow after the achievement of independence, and even a continuing political association need not be excluded. But the people of dependent territories—and the people of Angola will not allow themselves to be made an exception—insist on being able to look forward to deciding their own political destiny.

. . . While the means of achieving self-determination, and the timing of progress toward that goal are negotiable, the definition of that goal will not wait.

As regards the supply of arms and military equipment which might be used by Portugal in its African territories, Canada has delivered no military equipment to Portugal under mutual aid arrangements since November 1960. In 1963, following a Security Council resolution which requested all states to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for use by Portugal in maintaining its rule over its overseas territories, this policy was reaffirmed. The Canadian reply to the United Nations stated in part:

With respect to the sale of arms and military equipment on a commercial basis, it has been the policy of the Canadian Government since 1960 not to permit the export to Portugal or the territories under Portuguese administration of any arms or equipment which, in the opinion of the Canadian authorities, would be used for military purposes in the Portuguese overseas territories.

Although South Africa's racial policies do not come under the heading of decolonization but rather that of racial discrimination, it may be convenient to touch on the Canadian attitude here. While condemning *apartheid*, Canada has been opposed to extreme measures such as sanctions or expulsion. On October 18, 1963, the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained the Canadian attitude towards this question:

There have been demands from some members that South Africa should be expelled from the United Nations or that the Security Council should impose other sanctions on South Africa in order to force its Government to change its policies. Because we believe that the South African Government's racial policies are abhorrent and degrading and offensive to human dignity, this does not mean that the best remedy is to force South Africa outside the boundaries of the world community. Expulsion would make it even more difficult to persuade the white population of South Africa to

seek a way out of their present untenable position and could conceivably intensify the difficulties of the non-white population.

This Assembly has a most serious responsibility in this matter. My Delegation believes that only if we act with restraint is there any possibility of convincing the present Government of South Africa of the necessity to come to terms with the great movement of independence and freedom which has swept through the continent of Africa during the past 20 years. If we pass a resolution condemning South Africa's policies but calling for action which, because of lack of unanimity regarding the means to be employed, in practice will not be carried out, we will be no closer to a peaceful solution to this problem.

It has been made clear to South African representatives on a number of occasions that Canada urgently desires to see a change in the policies practised by the South African Government and an end to repressive measures, including the arbitrary trials and arrests of individuals for political offences which have been condemned in United Nations resolutions.

Canada gives no military or economic assistance to South Africa. In 1963 the Security Council adopted two resolutions directed against the *apartheid* policies of the Republic of South Africa. The first called on all states to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. The second called for a ban on the supply of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa. Following the adoption of these recommendations by the Security Council, the Canadian Government decided that it would not authorize the acceptance of any new orders from South Africa for items of military equipment or permit the shipment of such equipment to South Africa. A similar policy was adopted in regard to the provision of equipment and materials for the manufacture of arms in South Africa.

Canada has been deeply concerned about the trend of events in Rhodesia during the past few years. It would be impossible, in a publication of this size, to explain the complicated background to the Rhodesian crisis. It is perhaps sufficient to note that the attempt by Premier Ian Smith's Government to seize independence in November 1965 was not only an illegal act but in direct conflict with a basic principle of policy followed by successive British Governments—namely, that independence should come about

only under constitutional arrangements acceptable to the majority of the peoples of the territory concerned.

The Canadian Government's views on Rhodesian independence were set out by the Prime Minister in his statement to the House on July 17, 1964, following the Commonwealth prime ministers' conference of that year. The Prime Minister pointed out that the governments of all Commonwealth countries, including Canada, had agreed that they would not recognize the validity of a unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia. He then referred to the serious political and economic consequences which might follow any unconstitutional action by the Rhodesian Government. He also expressed the Canadian Government's support for the idea of a conference attended by representatives of all political parties with the objective of seeking agreement on the steps by which Rhodesia might proceed to independence within the Commonwealth, in the words of the Communique, "at the earliest practicable time on the basis of majority rule".

In June 1965, the Commonwealth heads of government once again affirmed their opposition to any unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia and their insistence on the principle of majority rule. Soon afterwards events reached the breaking-point. Talks between the British and Rhodesian Prime Ministers failed to find a basis for agreement and, on November 11, 1965, Mr. Smith's Government unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence. The Canadian Government immediately stated that it would not recognize either the unilateral declaration of independence, the allegedly independent state of Rhodesia, or the government headed by Mr. Smith. Canada also announced a series of measures ranging from the withdrawal of Commonwealth preferences on Rhodesian goods to a complete arms embargo. The same day Canada voted for a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which condemned Rhodesia's declaration of independence and asked the Security Council to consider the situation as a matter of urgency.

The Security Council then adopted two resolutions on Rhodesia. The first called on all member states to refrain from recognizing the illegal Rhodesian Government or providing any assistance

to it. The second called upon all states "to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime, and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products".

By the year's end, Canada had taken action to ban over 90 per cent of Rhodesian imports. A total embargo had been placed on the export of oil and petroleum products to Rhodesia, and export credits and insurance facilities had been withdrawn from all Canadian exports to Rhodesia. These steps were the result of Canadian support for the economic measures recommended by the Security Council. Canada was also participating in an airlift to assist the Government of Zambia.

Canada shares with other Commonwealth members the hope that in time Rhodesia will take its place as an independent state within the Commonwealth on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. While the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rests with Britain, the Canadian Government has indicated its readiness to assist in bringing about a solution to the Rhodesian problem based on the principles of racial equality and co-operation.

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4: Economic, Social and Humanitarian Co-operation

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.


The Third Purpose of the United Nations (Article 1, Para. 3, of the Charter).

There is an intimate connection between world peace and security on the one hand and economic and social progress on the other. They are two sides of the same coin. Why should the United Nations concern itself with economic and social questions? Article 55 of the Charter suggests one reason: "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations", and it also sets out some of the fundamental aims of the Organization in this field, namely:

"the United Nations shall promote:

- a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
- c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

In recent years the United Nations has increasingly become an agent of change in the economic field rather than simply a forum



Thai villagers gather round a Canadian plane and its crew conducting a survey in 1960 of the Mekong River as part of a multi-purpose UN programme to develop the water resources of the area.

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for discussion and debate. The reason? To quote U Thant, "there is no acceptable alternative to international co-operation if mankind is to survive . . ." ¹

It was this conviction which led to the designation of the 1960s as the United Nations Development Decade. The purpose was to mobilize and sustain support for measures intended to lighten the burden of poverty, hunger, ignorance and disease which still afflicts two-thirds of the world's population. The objective is the attainment by the developing countries of a minimum annual rate of growth of five per cent in aggregate national income by the end of the Decade in 1970. Mobilization of human resources is one main goal of the Development Decade. Other priority areas include industrial development, promotion of exports, avoidance of trade restrictions, provision of long-term development capital and the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

Important actions taken within the context of the Decade to date have been the decisions to establish the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as a permanent organ of the United Nations and to create continuing machinery to supervise the application of science and technology for the benefit of the developing countries. Both decisions committed the United Nations to intensive action on behalf of the low-income countries in areas largely unexplored by it before. Both represented further steps in a process which had been at work since the founding of the United Nations in 1945.

The activities of the United Nations in the economic, social and human rights fields are as diverse as the problems which confront its less-developed member states. The network of institutions set up over the course of 20 years to translate conviction into action is complex and occasionally tangled; the machinery and programmes have been established more in response to immediate or emerging needs than in conformity with any long-term plan. The United Nations family of organizations comprises not only the United Nations itself but 14 major related agencies. Within the United Nations alone there are a host of intergovern-

(1) Address by the Secretary-General to the thirty-seventh session of the Economic and Social Council, July 16, 1964.

mental committees and commissions, four major development assistance programmes, special funds established to provide humanitarian assistance, specialized institutes for training and research at the regional and international level, and the battery of specialized committees, working groups and international meetings which compose the new Conference on Trade and Development.

The economic and social work of the United Nations captures few of the headlines accorded to the Organization's activities in the political and security fields. It is the nine-tenths of the iceberg which lies beneath the surface, seldom exposed to view. It is well, therefore, to remember—as the Secretary-General pointed out some time ago—that the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies employ about 23,600 men and women in various departments; of this total some 22,500 are engaged in "non-political" activities. Although the discussion of political problems takes up most of the time of the General Assembly, the United Nations family is, in fact, equally concerned with economic, social, trusteeship, health, labour, educational and scientific questions. What follows is a brief look at some of these activities and the part Canada has taken in support of them. For reasons of space the work of the specialized Agencies is not described here.¹

Economic and Social Council

At the centre of this complex network is the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a Charter organ which now consists of 27 member states elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. Canada was one of the 18 countries first elected to membership on the Council in 1946. Canada served two further terms during the periods 1950-52 and 1956-58, and in 1965 began its fourth term of membership.

At the opening meeting of the Council in 1946, the Canadian representative said of it:

We represent, one might say, the positive side of the work of the Organization. Our task is not so much to prevent as to do, not so much to avoid the undesirable as to accomplish the good . . .

(1) Information about the Specialized Agencies is available in the annual publication *Canada and the United Nations*

ECOSOC is the nearest equivalent in the field of economic and social co-operation to the Security Council. It is essentially an executive body, directing the economic, social and human rights activities of the United Nations itself, and co-ordinating the activities of the 14 Specialized Agencies which deal with such subjects as labour relations, agriculture and food production, health and nutrition, education and science, investment and monetary conditions, transport, communications, weather and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Council also scrutinizes the work of such special bodies as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the United Nations Development Programme.

A number of specialized commissions and committees have been set up under the direct jurisdiction of the Council to deal with problems which are not already being handled by a separate Specialized Agency, e.g. social welfare and development, statistics, population problems and migration, human rights, the status of women, narcotics control, industrial development, housing, building and community planning, and the application of science and technology to development. Canada has served on almost all these bodies; three on which it has been represented almost continuously are the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Statistical Commission, and the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning.

A further function of ECOSOC is to serve as a focus for international debate on economic and social issues. The Council itself initiates studies and makes recommendations on subjects falling within its general competence, and under its authority international conferences have been convened to consider questions such as statelessness, world trade and economic development, and the application of science and technology for the benefit of the less-developed areas of the world.

United Nations Assistance Programmes

Technical assistance to developing countries is now so integral a part of international co-operation that it is difficult to remember a time when it did not exist on any significant scale. Yet in 1946,

when the regular budget of the United Nations first made modest provision for this co-operative transfer of skills, the concept of a systematic and sustained technical assistance programme was an exciting departure in international thinking. Hugh Keenleyside of Canada was the first United Nations Commissioner for Technical Assistance. By 1949 it was apparent that the demand for expert skills and equipment from the United Nations and its affiliated agencies would require steadily increasing resources and that the new efforts of all the member agencies of the United Nations should be financed where possible from one large central fund voluntarily pledged by member governments. Thus was the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) brought into being by the United Nations and the transition made from assessed to largely voluntary financing, following a pattern already established in 1946 for UNICEF.

The need for more assistance funds and a wider range of projects prompted the establishment in 1959 of the United Nations Special Fund. Whereas EPTA and the regular programmes of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies had been limited to the dissemination of skills by sending experts abroad and granting fellowships, the Special Fund was designed to undertake "pre-investment" assistance—developing large-scale projects to the point where capital assistance from other sources would be attracted. Other major developments in the assistance field followed rapidly in the 1960s; the International Development Association was established in 1960 as a Specialized Agency within the United Nations system to supplement the work of the IBRD, a UN Specialized Agency which lends on commercial terms for development projects of high economic priority. IDA provides loans on a long-term, interest-free basis to developing countries. On joint Canadian-American initiative the United Nations experimented further in types and channels of aid by establishing in 1961 the World Food Programme, which in its initial three-year period used over \$90-million worth of foodstuffs, services and cash to implement economic development projects and to meet emergency food needs. Another experiment in adapting types of assistance to immediate needs was the inauguration in 1958 of the United Nations OPEX programme to meet the need in newly-independent coun-

tries for trained administrators who would not merely appraise and advise (as United Nations experts are limited to doing) but would, in fact, take daily decisions as "operational executives" and train nationals of the country to succeed them in their posts:

At the end of 1965, the mid-point in the Development Decade, the process of changing, adapting and expanding the assistance efforts of the United Nations was still at work. EPTA and the Special Fund, whose efforts had become virtually interlocking over the course of the years, were merged into a unified United Nations Development Programme with combined resources for 1966 estimated at close to \$160 million (\$9.5 million of which was pledged by Canada). The World Food Programme, no longer experimental, has been renewed for a further three years with a proposed target of \$275 million for the period. Up to \$30 million in cash and commodities has been promised by Canada. Additional capital for development, including that of the developing countries, was being mobilized through newly-established regional development banks brought into being under the United Nations umbrella. The most recent of these, the Asian Development Bank, was created in December 1965, backed by a Canadian pledge to contribute \$25 million towards the initial capital target of \$1 billion.

Development assistance through the United Nations and its family of related agencies is a tangible manifestation of the international community's resolve to promote the economic and social betterment of mankind. Assistance bearing the United Nations label is a co-operative undertaking; as an index of its commitment, each receiving government is expected to make some contribution to the project, whether token payment towards local expenses or the lion's share of the total project costs (as in the case of the Special Fund). Recipient governments, moreover, pledge sizeable sums each year to help maintain the voluntary programmes. All assistance from the United Nations and its agencies is granted to governments and only at their specific request. No political strings are attached; the only requirement for eligibility is that the receiving country be a member state of the United Nations family of organizations, or a recognized dependency of a member state.

The history of the United Nations assistance programmes is in a real sense the history of the changing United Nations. Against

this background of constant growth and adaptation, it is worth looking more closely at the four major voluntary programmes of the United Nations: the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the Special Fund, UNICEF and the World Food Programme.

(1) *The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA)*


The Expanded Programme is a worldwide system for the pooling and exchange of technical skills and knowledge. It has assisted underdeveloped countries in fields as diverse as agricultural development, irrigation, engineering, meteorology, native handicrafts and communications. Each Specialized Agency is responsible for technical operations within its special area of competence. Thus, for example, the execution of projects in malaria or tuberculosis control is the responsibility of WHO, while FAO would take over operation of a wheat improvement scheme and ILO would be the agency concerned with a request for a manpower survey.

In the course of 15 years, EPTA has provided to more than 130 countries and territories, at a cost of \$500 million: some 32,000 man-years of expert advice training and other assistance; some 32,000 scholarships and fellowships; and access to hundreds of seminar study tours and short-training courses. No fewer than 150,000 men and women have acquired through EPTA useful additional skills or knowledge. Of the \$60 million destined for EPTA work in 1966, \$3.3 million will come from Canada, making it the third largest contributor.

(2) *The Special Fund*

Production in the low-income countries cannot be raised without substantial capital investment. But investment will not always venture into the unknown; it will move freely only when a country's potential is revealed by preparatory investigation of existing natural and human resources. Pre-investment exploration is the job of the Special Fund. Established in 1959 as a programme designed to have the widest possible impact in advancing the economic, social and technical development of the low-income countries, the Special Fund has channelled assistance into projects to survey, assess and develop natural and physical resources, to

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Prime Minister John Diefenbaker at the speaker's rostrum as he addressed the Assembly on September 26, 1960. Seated at the presidential rostrum behind him are (left to right) UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, Mr. Frederick H. Boland (Ireland), President of the session, and Mr. Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General.

establish and strengthen national advanced education and technical training programmes, and to provide research and advisory services suited to the specific requirements of agriculture and industry.

The results are already evident. In 130 developing countries and territories, the Special Fund has helped finance 522 pre-investment projects of a net worth of \$1,151 million, of which \$478 million has come from the Special Fund itself. The projects have reached into all economic sectors of the developing countries. By mid-1965, the identifiable flow of capital arising directly or indirectly from just 23 of these projects exceeded one billion dollars; 86,000 persons had by the same date benefited from courses offered by 129 institutes assisted by the Special Fund.

Canada has been closely identified with the Special Fund from the outset, helping to frame its legislation, serving on its Governing Council without interruption since 1959, and pledging sizeable sums to finance its programmes. Of the estimated \$100 million pledged by governments for the 1966 programme, Canada will contribute \$6.2 million, compared to \$5 million pledged for each of 1965 and 1964 and \$2.35 million for 1963.

(3) *UNICEF*

Of the children now growing up in the world, three out of four live in economically less-developed countries. Many suffer from hunger and disease; many lack the chance to learn to read and write and acquire elementary skills. The purpose of UNICEF is to help these countries to help themselves, by providing aid for health, nutrition and welfare services so their children can grow up into healthy and useful citizens.

Canada was one of the members of a committee which recommended in 1946 the establishment of a temporary voluntary fund to provide emergency aid for children in war-ravaged countries. UNICEF was the outcome. In succeeding years its terms of reference were revised, more emphasis was placed on long-range programmes of child welfare, and the Children's Fund has now become a continuing part of the positive work done by the United Nations. Recognition of UNICEF's unique contribution to creating a better and more stable world for tomorrow's citizens came

late in 1965 with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. UNICEF's assistance programme for 1965 was budgeted at more than \$40 million, of which \$1 million was contributed by the Canadian Government. A further \$1 million came from private citizens throughout the country, the proceeds of the Hallowe'en "shell-out" and Christmas-card campaigns.

(4) *The World Food Programme*

Under the joint auspices of the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme began operations on January 1, 1963, for an experimental period of three years. The Programme, designed to provide relief from hunger and malnutrition in food-deficient areas, gave concrete expression to an earlier Canadian proposal for an international food bank in which participating states would operate food-surplus assistance on a multilateral basis. In using foodstuffs as the basic ingredient of its operations, the World Food Programme has enabled the United Nations to mobilize new resources for its widespread assistance efforts. While a certain proportion has been earmarked for emergency situations (natural disasters and the like), the bulk of the foodstuffs and supporting cash and services have gone to development projects and projects designed to eradicate chronic malnutrition.

The initial programme target for the period 1963-65 was \$100 million; the success of the programme in its infancy can be gauged from the fact that it was renewed in 1965 "for as long as food aid shall be feasible", with an immediate 3-year target of \$275 million. Canada, which contributed nearly \$7 million in the first three years, promised to contribute up to \$30 million to the second three-year programme ending in 1968.

UNCTAD

"A change of political dimensions" has taken place, the Secretary-General declared in July 1964, "in the awareness of the need for a more organized international co-operation in the economic and financial field."¹ The tangible expression of this change was the convening in March 1964, at Geneva, of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

(1) Address by the Secretary-General to the thirty-seventh session of the Economic and Social Council, July 16, 1964.

This was the first conference ever held for the express purpose of coming to grips with the trade and development problems of the less-developed countries of the world. The 59 recommendations adopted by the Conference cover a very wide range of principles to govern trade and aid relations, commodity problems and arrangements, measures to promote exports of semi-manufactures and manufactures, industrial development, economic aid and related financial questions.

Among the institutional arrangements recommended by UNCTAD and approved by the General Assembly was the holding of similar conferences at three-year intervals (the next in 1967) and the establishment of a permanent United Nations Trade and Development Board whose first sessions were held in April and August 1965. Canada is a member of the Board and of the Board's four permanent committees on commodities, manufactures, invisibles, and shipping.

At the Geneva Conference, the Secretary of State for External Affairs outlined the Canadian approach to trade issues as follows:

We believe that much more can be done and must be done to free the channels of trade. We think that, if this were done, the developing countries would have a better opportunity of competing on terms which would bring into play their natural advantages as efficient producers of certain commodities and manufactures

The object of the Conference, as we see it, will be to contribute to the solution of problems which are crucial to the well-being of a very large proportion of the human race. They are urgent problems and their solution is urgent. Many new nations have come into being over the past decade or so. Their governments are concerned, as they must be concerned, to ensure that the political independence they have achieved should find fruition in rising standards of living, in better health and improved opportunities for education, and in the greater happiness of all their people. The urgency of this task is such that they cannot accomplish it by themselves. The more-developed countries must come to their aid, recognizing that, in a world which is becoming daily more interdependent, the conditions under which mankind lives will have to be brought into a more equitable relationship.

Assistance to Refugees

At the conclusion of the Second World War, there were more than seven million displaced persons in Europe alone. The job of repatriating them, feeding them, and initiating programmes of resettlement was shared by many governments, and was the special

task of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. UNRRA was set up in 1943 and officially ceased its activities in 1949.

IRO

By the time of the first session of the General Assembly in the summer of 1946 the numbers of refugees had diminished but there were still more than a million displaced persons. To assist them the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was brought into being. From 1948 to 1951, IRO succeeded in resettling more than a million displaced persons and refugees in new homes throughout the world. Canada contributed to the work of IRO in two ways—by providing financial support (over \$18 million) and by accepting refugees and displaced persons for resettlement in this country (123,479 by 1951).

UNHCR

As a more permanent follow-up to the work of the IRO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established by the General Assembly on January 1, 1951. The basic tasks of UNHCR are to provide international protection for refugees, and to seek permanent solutions to their problems by facilitating their voluntary repatriation or assimilation within new national communities. As defined in the UNHCR mandate, refugees are persons who, owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, are outside their country of origin and cannot or do not wish to avail themselves of that country's protection. It was generally assumed in the closing days of the IRO that, in the work of post-war resettlement, the problem of refugees would rapidly be reduced to manageable proportions. But to the ranks of refugees still unsettled at the termination of IRO in 1951 there were now added large numbers of new refugees who had escaped from countries in the process of political upheaval.

The High Commissioner's activities are not confined to Europe. On an ever-increasing scale they benefit refugees in many other areas, particularly in Africa. At various times UNHCR has been asked to co-operate in the repatriation of Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia and to lend assistance to Chinese refugees

in Hong Kong, Tibetan refugees in Cambodia, Angolan refugees in the Congo (Leopoldville), refugees from Ruanda in Burundi, Tanganyika and Uganda, and Cuban refugees in Spain.

UNHCR administrative expenses are financed under the United Nations budget, but its programmes are supported through voluntary contributions from governmental and non-governmental sources. Canada's voluntary contributions to UNHCR have ranged from \$100,000 in 1952 to \$350,000 for 1966. In its total pledged contributions Canada rates as the fourth largest contributor.

UNRWA

UNHCR is not responsible for the nearly one million Arab refugees left homeless as a result of the 1948 hostilities in Palestine. Their care falls to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) established in 1949.

The total number of refugees registered with the Agency numbers well over 1.25 million, most of whom are receiving full UNRWA assistance and full rations. The majority are located in Jordan, with others in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The Agency is much more than a provider of rations and relief. It has extensive education and vocational training programmes designed to enable the refugees and their children to become self-supporting.

About 70 per cent of UNRWA's regular budget has always been financed by the United States, which contributes more than \$23 million annually. Britain has been the second largest contributor followed by Canada and France in that order. For the past ten years, Canada has made a regular annual contribution of \$500,000 in cash. A special contribution of \$1,500,000-worth of Canadian wheat flour was made on an *ad hoc* basis for the years 1958 to 1961, this amount being reduced to \$500,000 *per annum* since 1962. In 1965, however, Canada pledged a further \$200,000 in wheat flour to provide funds for vocational training. For 1966 Canada has again pledged a total of \$1.2 million. Canada's total contribution in cash and kind to the support of the Palestine refugees, from 1948 through 1965, has amounted to more than \$18 million.

A special Canadian gift to UNRWA of \$1 million worth of flour

for World Refugee Year was supplemented by a quarter of a million dollars provided by the Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year and the Canadian Junior Red Cross. The money was used to construct two new vocational training centres for refugees. The centre at Sibliin in Lebanon was inaugurated in October 1962 at a ceremony attended by the Prime Minister of Lebanon. The Canadian Junior Red Cross also gave an additional gift of \$50,000 to provide for two years training of 50 students at Sibliin. The other centre, at Homs in Syria, began operations in 1962.

Human Rights

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights began its work in 1947, concentrating first on the preparation of a declaration of human rights and later on the drafting of separate covenants dealing with civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948. It sets forth those basic rights and fundamental freedoms to which all men and women everywhere are entitled, without any discrimination, and was adopted as a common standard of achievement for all nations.

Despite the fact that it contains no binding legal obligations, the Declaration has exercised a profound effect upon the minds of men. It is frequently quoted or referred to in United Nations resolutions as setting accepted standards for state behaviour. The constitutions of many of the newer countries reflect its influence; it has been cited in governmental legislation, including two Acts of the Province of Ontario regarding employment and accommodation; it has also inspired a number of recent international conventions such as those dealing with slavery, forced labour, stateless persons, political rights of women, nationality of married women, and discrimination in respect of education, employment and occupation.

Other declarations followed. A Declaration on the Rights of the Child was adopted in 1959 to reinforce the Universal Declaration and to emphasize the need for special safeguards and care for children, before as well as after birth. In 1963 the

Assembly approved unanimously a Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Probably the principal achievement of the United Nations in the human rights field over the past several years was the approval by the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. While the Convention has certain defects, it meets the need that has been long felt by those who consider that racial discrimination must be attacked in its global as well as in its national aspects. One of the Convention's most important features is its provisions for implementation. Here it breaks much new ground in an attempt to ensure that the rights set forth in the Convention are secured and protected. A state party to the Convention is required to report periodically on what it has done to give effect to the purposes of the Convention. More important, the Convention establishes a conciliation procedure which makes it possible for a participating state to bring to the attention of a special committee instances in which other states parties have not lived up to their undertakings. Finally, in perhaps its most novel feature, the Convention allows individuals, if their governments agree, to complain directly to a special conciliation commission if they believe that they are victims of a violation of its provisions. Canada and other Western delegations not only welcomed these measures of implementation but were instrumental in persuading others of their value and need.

With the precedent of the implementation articles of the Convention on Racial Discrimination, it is hoped that progress will be made in approving the Draft Covenants on Human Rights. These far reaching instruments have been under discussion for the past 12 years and, while the substantive articles have been approved, the General Assembly has not been able to agree on effective implementation measures for them. Canadian delegations to successive sessions of the General Assembly have played an active and useful role in the article-by-article consideration of the Covenants in spite of the constitutional difficulties which are posed by divided federal-provincial jurisdiction in the field of human rights.

The Balance Sheet and the Future

From this brief review, it is evident that the economic and social work of the United Nations, its subsidiaries and its affiliates have been of vital importance in the quest for a stable world. Much, however, remains to be done. There is now ever-increasing pressure from less-developed countries for an expansion of United Nations activities designed to further economic development. Economic progress, moreover, has no meaning if it is not closely related to social aspirations and it may be dangerously impaired if it does not fully take into account the social conditions of development.

Progress on human rights has been slow; 16 years after the adoption of the Declaration, the United Nations still awaits its universal bill of rights. Recently the emphasis has been on the elimination of racial discrimination. Understandably the new states of Africa and Asia are determined to use their influence at the United Nations to bring about as quickly as possible the independence of all non-self-governing territories and to put an end to racial discrimination, especially where it has become a matter of government policy.

There is a continuing need at the international level for comprehensive, systematic and continuing review of both national and international programmes in the economic and social fields in order to lend greater clarity and urgency to the widely-diffused and often unrelated efforts being made today towards development. This is a function which can be of infinite value to the international community.

For the future there remains for solution the urgent problem of narrowing the gap between the industrially-developed countries and the two-thirds of the world which is under-developed. The benefits which would flow from this would not be one-sided or limited to the under-developed regions. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has put the problem as follows:

However much is being done to help the trade of the developing countries, more will undoubtedly need to be done in future. If that is done by the advanced countries acting in concert, the burden of adjustment should not be too onerous. But, beyond that, it is well to remember that expanding prosperity in the developing countries means expanding world trade. It

is also well to remember, I think, that the cause of world peace and security is not likely to be advanced by stagnation and disillusionment in these countries. This is the real measure of interdependence in the world today and of the stake a country such as Canada has in the broadest possible development of international co-operation."

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5: A Centre for Harmonizing the Actions of Nations

*To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common ends.*

The Fourth Purpose of the
United Nations (Article 1,
Para. 4, of the Charter).

The fourth purpose of the United Nations is that it should be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining the three other main purposes stated in Article 1. Whether the United Nations is a means for harmonizing international action or a centre for noisy discord is perhaps one of the most significant questions to be answered in any attempt to assess the political value of the Organization. It is easy to produce evidence that at times the United Nations is little more than a sterile international debating society. There are many persuasive illustrations.

But it is not enough to judge the United Nations only in terms of the public record and of decisions and actions taken. The number of resolutions adopted and the number of delegations voting for them frequently give very little indication of the political realities at the time of their adoption. The best resolutions are often those which result from close consultation involving all the main regional groupings in the Organization. The least effective are those which are pressed to the vote in the face of known and determined opposition. In many situations it may be desirable to have no resolution at all but simply a debate in which the various positions can be fully expounded and explained.

What may be far more important is the degree of consultation, negotiation and accommodation of viewpoint, all of which lie behind the public results. Developments behind the scenes may determine whether any meeting of the United Nations will show political gain or deficit.

For the United Nations derives its political meaning from the policies which member governments practice both within and outside the United Nations framework. Much depends on the extent to which members live up to their Charter commitments. The so-called "failures" of the United Nations to decide or to act or to reach agreement depend not so much on the nature of the Organization as on the attitudes of member governments and on the international climate in which they may be meeting at any given time.

The Diplomacy of Reconciliation

The breakdown of the Charter security system and the subsequent search for improvised methods of keeping the peace have been described in Chapter 2. The lack of Great Power consensus and the resulting effects on United Nations procedures and machinery had important implications for the United Nations' role as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. Leadership by the Secretary-General and diplomatic manoeuvring between East and West by the new states became the key to the successful functioning of the United Nations.

This meant that Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes, would be used more and more as the framework for action to maintain peace and security. Under this Chapter, the Security Council has no coercive powers; a state is not bound to carry out its recommendations. Nevertheless, as the Canadian Delegation at San Francisco noted, "this Chapter can, if its provisions are fully utilized, become the most important part of the Charter". In the Delegation's view, the possibility of its effective use depended on four things:

- (1) A willingness by the Security Council to employ its powers—"or, put it a different way, the willingness of each of its five permanent members to refrain from vetoing the use by the Security Council of its powers".
- (2) A wise use by the Council of the wide discretion given to it under this Chapter—"the Security Council will have to demonstrate that in its capacity as conciliator it can keep the balance between practical political considerations and regard for world opinion and the principles of justice and fair dealing".
- (3) A readiness by states to act on the recommendations which the Council makes to them.

- (4) The success of the Council in dealing with potential threats to the peace while they were still "situations" and before they became "disputes".

The Security Council was the main forum for the discussion of grave international problems from the beginning. Ideological distrust and the division of Europe made it more difficult to discuss such problems constructively, however, and there were many occasions when propaganda seemed to be the main concern of speakers. Not only were the Great Powers unable to agree on enforcement machinery under Chapter VII of the Charter or to make headway on disarmament and the control of atomic energy but specific political issues brought to the United Nations, such as relations between Greece and her neighbours and the reunification of Korea, led to bitter controversy. The Soviet Union, it became clear, would not tolerate United Nations "interference" if, in her judgment, Soviet interests were at stake. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. blocked the entry of certain countries that had applied for membership. It was this situation which led the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the second session of the Assembly in 1947 to describe the Security Council as "frozen in futility and divided by dissension".

Nevertheless, the Security Council had some limited success during this early period. In 1947 the Council was able to help the Netherlands and Indonesia enter into political negotiations and in 1948 it was successful in arranging a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the United Nations did manage to develop in these years certain procedures, designed to help in the settlement of disputes, which were not without significance. The General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in May 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans in October 1947, and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in November 1947. Even though some of the states concerned refused to co-operate with these committees, they were able to develop procedures of inquiry and observation, which, in the case of Palestine and the Balkans, helped to prepare the way for the eventual settlement of the immediate issues at stake. Canada was a member of the Palestine and Korean Committees.

On the basis of these precedents it was possible to conclude, by the end of 1949, that, although the United Nations had fallen short of the expectations of its founders, there were at least some areas of international politics, usually those not involving the vital interests of the Great Powers, where it could perform useful work. In particular, it could bring the parties together under the aegis of the United Nations to discuss their differences. This might take place behind the scenes at New York when delegates attended the annual sessions of the General Assembly. Or it might take place on the spot with the United Nations acting as a go-between.

Canada served a two-year term on the Security Council in 1948-49 and the experience was sobering. "We have not been sufficiently conscious of the realities of the world situation," the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation said in his speech to the third session of the General Assembly in September 1948. "We have overlooked the fact that any world institution . . . is certain to be of slow growth . . . One reason why the international institutions the United Nations has created since the close of the war are not working in the way we hoped they might be is that the sense of a world community of interest on which these institutions must rest and which, in themselves, they tend to create, has not yet been developed. It may take a long time to develop."

By the following year Canada had drawn certain conclusions on the basis of this more realistic view. The Canadian Delegate told the Assembly that "practicability" had been the touchstone of Canada's attitude towards the United Nations. Using this yardstick, he suggested that the Security Council should endeavour to be guided by certain principles of action "in default of an improvement in relations between the Communist and democratic worlds":

- (a) It should not initiate action it could not complete.
- (b) So far as possible, solutions to political problems should be sought by the parties directly concerned.
- (c) The Council should concentrate its influence on putting an end to hostilities whenever they occurred.

These principles might have helped the Security Council to function more effectively had it not been for the outbreak of the

Korean War in 1950. After this, the Council lost even the semblance of Great Power unity, and political initiative, by and large, passed to the General Assembly. The Assembly had already given some study to the promotion of international political co-operation; for example, it had set up a Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation designed to provide a roster of names of men who might serve on United Nations commissions of enquiry or conciliation, and a Panel of Field Observers who might serve on truce observation missions and similar exercises. After the Korean aggression, the Assembly appointed a Peace Observation Commission of 14 members, whose purpose was to "observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension . . .". As it turned out, the Assembly never made much use of this Commission, perhaps because its membership included all five permanent members of the Security Council. More important than machinery, however, was the realization that in certain circumstances collective measures against aggression were possible in a United Nations framework despite the lack of Great Power unanimity. The "talking shop" had taken action. Korea was not, in fact, to be a model for collective measures by the United Nations and United Nations peace-keeping afterwards took other forms. But at the time collective resistance to aggression was an important boost to United Nations prestige.

As the United Nations drew to the end of its first decade, there were also other reasons for believing that its diplomatic and political functions had survived the turmoil of "cold war" tensions. It continued to provide a forum for international debate and, despite Korea, it was talk rather than armed combat which most governments preferred. Public debate often acted as a screen for private negotiations, as in the case of the Berlin blockade in 1949. Public pressure on governments to press on with disarmament negotiations led to the setting up of the Disarmament Commission in 1952 and the five-member Disarmament Sub-Committee (including Canada) in 1954. The Palestine Conciliation Commission created in 1949 remained at the disposal of the parties to that intractable and bitter conflict. United Nations efforts to help solve the Kashmir dispute through conciliation and mediation continued. And increasingly, in the 1950s, the General Assembly found itself

dealing with the more serious colonial disputes—Morocco, Tunisia, Cyprus and Algeria. With the admission of 16 new members in 1955 and six new members in 1956, the balance of United Nations membership and the weight of United Nations influence began to be tilted in favour of the interests of the smaller and middle powers, an increasing number of whom wished to avoid “cold war” polemics and entanglements. This combination of new kinds of issues and a flood of new members gave greater scope for the exercise of diplomacy at the United Nations, an opportunity of which the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, was quick to take advantage. Canada, too, was to find new opportunities for leadership, particularly at the time of the Suez crisis of 1956 and the creation of UNEF.¹

The events of 1956, when the United Nations met the challenge of armed conflict in the Middle East but was unable to respond to the appeal for help from the new Government of Hungary in the face of Soviet repression, were the occasion for a re-statement of Canadian views about the Organization. In his foreword to *Canada and the United Nations 1956-57*, the Secretary of State for External Affairs recalled that, although Canadians had always looked upon the United Nations as “an essential framework for international collaboration”, it should not be expected to act like a world government:

“The Canadian view is that the United Nations is an agency for reconciliation and negotiation, a forum where opponents can maintain contact and eventually reach compromises and solutions. It is not a substitute for diplomacy; it is a place where one can conduct diplomacy more effectively”. He reiterated Canada’s belief in realism, in “the world as it exists”, which the United Nations in turn reflected. If Canadians wished the United Nations to act wisely, we should conduct “an active policy within its framework” and be prepared to accept responsibilities:

“It is a place . . . where countries of the size and population of ours can best work for peace, because our influence is not judged strictly in accordance with our population.”

These views reflected a widespread Canadian confidence, shared

(1) Described in Chapter 2.

by Liberal and Progressive Conservative Governments alike, in the value and future of the United Nations. Speaking to the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the Prime Minister said that Canada's support of the United Nations "is the cornerstone of its foreign policy". He endorsed the following concept of the Organization contained in the Secretary-General's 1957 Annual Report:

"If properly used the United Nations can serve the diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to the member states. All the varied interests and aspirations of the world meet in its precincts upon the common ground of the Charter".

Canadian policy was directed to supporting "the diplomacy of reconciliation" in a number of ways. In 1958-59, Canada served her second two-year term on the Security Council. During this time the United Nations was able to play a useful role in the Middle East, particularly in facilitating the withdrawal of U.S.A. and British forces from Lebanon and Jordan, and in Southeast



The Hon. Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the speaker's rostrum of the General Assembly, September 25, 1962.


Asia, where United Nations representatives were able to ease tensions between Cambodia and Thailand and on the borders of Laos. Canada was active behind the scenes in resolving deadlocks over elections to the Security Council and over the composition of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and in working to set up the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Canadian contributions of men and money to United Nations peace-keeping activities were continued. Canada served on the UNEF advisory committee and later on the Congo advisory committee. Canadian representatives worked hard to revive the stalled negotiations on disarmament after the Disarmament Commission was boycotted by the U.S.S.R. in 1957. Canada welcomed the admission of new members, of whom 17 were admitted in 1960 alone, all but one from Africa. "The United Nations", the Prime Minister said in his speech to the Assembly in 1960, "constitutes the greatest hope for the middle and small powers."

In the late fifties, the diplomatic function of the United Nations began to be increasingly reflected in the activity of the Secretary-General. Mr. Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, had run afoul of Soviet opposition and his successor, Dag Hammarskjold, was at first cautious about developing the potential powers of his office. The increased importance of the General Assembly after the Suez crisis, and its changing pattern of membership, gradually opened up new opportunities for leadership, executive action and personal diplomacy by the Secretary-General. Mr. Hammarskjold took advantage of United Nations involvement in the Middle East after 1956 to conduct delicate negotiations on behalf of the parties and in subsequent years he widened this technique to cover other trouble spots, such as Laos. He began the practice of leaving representatives *in situ* to act on his behalf, a further refinement of the United Nations "presence" concept, which ranged all the way from United Nations military forces in some strength to a single diplomatic representative. The Secretary-General was always careful to keep the Security Council or the General Assembly informed of his activities and to act on the assumption that his mandate derived from their authority. But the Congo operation which began in 1960 placed a heavy strain on his role as executive head of the United Nations Force and indeed

led to the same kind of Soviet attack which had brought down Trygve Lie. However, the U.S.S.R.'s efforts to cripple executive action by the Secretary-General through the establishment of the "troika" were rejected by the vast majority of United Nations members, who agreed, by and large, with Hammarskjold's concept of "preventive diplomacy"—the need for the United Nations to localize conflicts and to step into "power vacuums" between competing interests, especially when the Great Powers threatened to become involved.

By the end of 1965, there were 117 members in the United Nations, more than double the membership in 1945. Sixty-one members were from Africa and Asia, compared to 11 in 1945. The tempo of private consultation and negotiation, often at the foreign minister level, was greatly stimulated by this dramatic increase. Most of the new members were also newly sovereign states. They found in the United Nations a convenient meeting-place to discuss their common problems or to negotiate differences, and they tended, more than the older states, to take advantage of United Nations procedures for the safeguarding of peace. At the rostrum of the General Assembly, the new members could define their particular interests and state their views on an equal basis with all other member states. These newer members were inclined to look to the Secretary-General as an executor of United Nations decisions in whom they had confidence. Both Dag Hammarskjold and his successor, U Thant, have fully justified this confidence.

As the United Nations enters its third decade its character and procedures are therefore different from those of 1945. Great power disunity has meant new roles for the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. The middle and smaller powers have taken on greater responsibilities. Economic and social items crowd the agenda. And yet, at the same time, the United Nations scene is not unfamiliar to those who knew it in the early years. The Security Council held more meetings in 1964-65 than at any time since 1947-8. It continued to give its attention to some of the same issues—Kashmir and Arab-Israel tensions for example—or to the same kinds of problems, caused, for example, by the withdrawal of European rule from parts of the Afro-Asian world. Its peace-keeping record in the early sixties, as in the late forties,



The raising of the new Canadian flag at UN Headquarters, February 15, 1965.

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is not an unhopeful one. If one is, nevertheless, tempted to reflect that the United Nations has been able to do little more than talk about the basic causes of tension—great power rivalries, racial discrimination, economic and social disparities, ideological suspicions, to mention only a few, or has even helped to exaggerate them, it is salutary to reflect on what might have happened if the United Nations had never existed. It is conceivable that these basic causes of tension, if unchecked or given no outlet, would have led to a major conflict, as has happened twice before in this century.

What Kind of United Nations Do We Want?

Underlying these problems is a fundamental issue—what do its member states wish the role of the United Nations to be? Dag Hammarskjöld's last Annual Report on the work of the Organization, submitted shortly before his death, dealt at length with this question. He put the issue in the following terms:

On the one side, it has in various ways become clear that certain Members conceive of the Organization as a static conference machinery for resolving conflicts of interest and ideologies with a view to peaceful co-existence within the Charter, to be served by a Secretariat which is to be regarded not as fully internationalized but as representing within its ranks those very interests and ideologies.

Other Members have made it clear that they conceive of the Organization primarily as a dynamic instrument of governments through which they, jointly and for the same purpose, should seek reconciliation but through which they should also try to develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf of all Members, and aiming at forestalling conflicts and resolving them, once they have arisen, by appropriate diplomatic means, in a spirit of objectivity and in implementation of the principles and purposes of the Charter.

Mr. Hammarskjöld then made crystal clear where he stood on this issue:

The first concept can refer to history and to the traditions of national policies of the past. The second can point to the needs of the present and of the future in a world of ever-closer international interdependence where nations have at their disposal armaments of hitherto unknown destructive strength. The first one is firmly anchored in the time-honoured philosophy of sovereign national States in armed competition of which the most that may be expected in the international field is that they achieve a peaceful co-existence. The second one envisages possibilities of intergovernmental action over-riding such a philosophy, and opens the road towards more developed and increasingly effective forms of constructive international co-operation.¹

Canada is in full agreement with this dynamic view of the nature of the United Nations. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs told the House of Commons on March 28, 1963:

“In spite of its imperfections, this international instrument has demonstrated its capacity to respond to most of the basic needs of the international community.”

Canada, indeed, may be said to have taken an optimistic view of the potentialities of the United Nations, a view which is, nevertheless, not unmindful of the realities of a world of sovereign states. For, in these days of bewildering technical progress, a sense of realism is also a sense of optimism in the future ability of mankind to bring order out of chaos. Canada's view was summed up by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the occasion of the United Nations' tenth anniversary:

To make a true assessment of the value of the United Nations, it should be considered primarily not as an alternative to painstaking diplomatic negotiations, but as a symbol of the community of nations and peoples, and an attempt to work out the implications of their interdependence, the recognition of which is its starting point. This world community is yet a very shadowy and insubstantial thing, but it is a goal toward the realization of which we may work. Like all the best symbols of the greatest truths, the United Nations is not an inanimate thing, a badge or a flag; it is human, and alive, made up of men. It is embryonic, certainly, but it has at least the possibility of progressive development into a real community. Is there any other way than this to reach our one world, except that of total destruction and total subjection? Is there ultimately any other kind of world for the hydrogen age?

(1) Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1960, to June 15, 1961.


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