





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

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
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THE  
RED RIVER REBELLION.

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EIGHT LETTERS

TO

HON. JOSEPH HOWE,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE PROVINCES, ETC.,

IN REPLY TO AN OFFICIAL PAMPHLET.

BY


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LATE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, AND COMMISSIONED TO BE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF RUIERT'S  
LAND AND THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES.

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Toronto :

PRINTED BY HUNTER, ROSE & CO., 86 AND 88 KING ST. WEST.  
1870.



THE  
RED RIVER REBELLION.

*Account of the Rebellion*  
EIGHT LETTERS

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## EIGHT LETTERS

H. J. M. D.

TO

# HON. JOSEPH HOWE,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE PROVINCES.

IN REPLY TO AN OFFICIAL PAMPHLET, ENTITLED "RED RIVER INSURRECTION;  
HON. WM. MCDUGALL'S CONDUCT REVIEWED."

### LETTER I.

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- A.—Last official letter from Mr. McDougall to Mr. Howe.  
 B.—Two letters, Bishop Tache to President Riel.  
 C.—Report by Major Wallace of his interview with Col. De Salaberry, after the latter had passed Mr. McDougall on the Plains.  
 E.—Letter of Sergeant Mulligan, a loyal pensioner, detailing his treatment by Governor Archibald.

# THE RED RIVER INSURRECTION

REVIEWED.

LETTERS TO HON. JOSEPH HOWE,

*Secretary of State for the Provinces, &c., &c., &c.*

## LETTER I.

SIR,—I have just received by post from some friend in Montreal a pamphlet of sixty-six pages, entitled "RED RIVER INSURRECTION—*Hon. Mr. McDougall's conduct reviewed.*" It is issued from the press of Mr. Lovell, but the name of the author is conveniently blank. I have no difficulty, however, in filling the blank with the name of one of your colleagues, who has seldom, hitherto, lacked the courage to affix his name to his productions. In the present case there was no doubt a difficulty—the *role* was yours; you had promised in one of your public speeches to play it, and your damaged reputation seemed most in need of repair. But what if you should blurt out another confession? It is evident you have been told not to *write*, as you were more than once told by your master last session, not to *speak* on Red River matters.

I shall deal with this *brochure* as an emanation of yours, because you are the Minister officially charged with the subject of which it treats, and the chief delinquent in whose behalf it has been sent forth. You attempted last session to escape from the consequences of your own perfidy by attacking me, and by repeating the slanders against the loyal Canadians of the North-west, which you had heard from the Yankee annexationists, and the traitors in the service of the Hudson Bay Company, with whom you consorted at Fort Garry. But you utterly failed in your attempt, and only succeeded in confirming the suspicion that

prevailed within, as well as without the walls of Parliament, that you were the chief abettor, if not the chief instigator of "the Red River Insurrection." Finding that the verdict of public opinion was clearly against you, and that your colleagues were involved in the same condemnation, you have appealed from that verdict, and now move *in arrest of judgment* on the ground that "false impressions" have been made upon the "public mind," "chiefly by the Hon. Wm. McDougall," that he is, in fact, the one man who is "censurable," whose "conduct was wholly indefensible," whose "policy" "would have deprived Canada of Imperial countenance and support;" while "Mr. Howe must be completely exonerated from all blame," the Manitoba Act, admitted to be "generally acceptable to the people of the North-west," and the Canadian Government lauded for its "singular judgment, decision, and conciliation," in the whole matter! This is certainly a novel, as well as a bold proceeding, and must, I think, have been resorted to in the absence of the legal adviser of the Government. "A motion in arrest of judgment," we are told, "must be grounded on some objection arising on the face of the record itself." The defendant cannot, at this stage, re-argue his case, or adduce the "opinions" of third parties as evidence in the cause, or attempt to change places with the plaintiff. Judgment *non obstante veredicto* is the exclusive privilege of the latter. Even in the high Court of public opinion, some regard must be paid to those rules of logic and procedure which judicial experience has found to be indispensable in the administration of justice. You admit that the verdict on the pleadings, and on the evidence submitted, is against the Government; you have not shown any mistake or defect in the indictment; you] have not brought forward anything that can be regarded as new, or additional evidence—admitting that, in such a case as this, you might be permitted to produce it if you could. The judgment must, therefore, I respectfully submit, be entered against you—as it has been already in the mind of every man in Canada who is not a sympathizer with rebels and "banditti." But, pursuing the legal analogy a step further, perhaps your motion is for a new trial? Be it so; I do not object. Nay, I am under obligations to you for the opportunity thus afforded me, to produce important evidence hitherto withheld from motives of prudence, even under the strongest provocation to make it public. I am absolved; by this official attack, (if not made at the

cost of the Secret Service Fund, it certainly is with the assent of the responsible guardians of confidential State papers) from all obligations to secrecy or reticence respecting the *res geste* of this whole matter. You have invited a "review" at my hands, and neither you nor your colleagues shall have reason to complain of any material omission. I will merely add, before entering on my task, that reserve is no longer imposed upon me by the personal and public considerations, which weighed so heavily while rebellion was rampant, and the question of accepting the great Territories of the North-west by Canada, was hanging in the balance at Ottawa. Much against your will, and that of some of your colleagues, these Territories are now added to the Dominion. The "Insurrection" of foreign Jesuits, foreign adventurers, Canadian outlaws, Hudson Bay Company employees, and their ignorant dupes—the poor half-breeds—was blown into fragments by the bugle blast of Col. Wolesley's advance guard. The authority of the Dominion has been at length established over that vast region, and can only be endangered by treason or incapacity at Ottawa. The latter, we know, reigns supreme in every department; the former is more than suspected in yours. When I use the word "treason," I desire that you shall understand it in its widest sense. *Treason*, not to the lawful Sovereign of this Dominion only, but *treason* to the people of Canada; *treason* to the interests, civil and religious, of the people of the North-west; *treason* to human progress, freedom, and civilization in every Province of the Dominion.

You begin your "review" of my conduct, as you are pleased to express it, by charging me with making "false impressions" upon the public mind. What are these false impressions? When and where did I make them? I have written and spoken frequently, and at some length, during the last two or three years, on subjects relating to the acquisition of the North-west Territories, and the attempt to organize government within them. Could you not in all these minutes, reports, correspondence, despatches and speeches, find one line to support your charge? If you felt it necessary for your case to make so serious a charge against me, it was surely incumbent on you to call a witness, or quote a line or a paragraph to prove it. You have not done so; you have not even made the attempt. I have read carefully your garbled extracts, jumbled together in equal disregard of chronological and logical sequence, and I do not find a statement or a suggestion, for

which I am responsible, that is not strictly true, even when read by the light of subsequent events. I ask you, sir, how can a man who reports the truth and nothing but the truth, whose statements you have been unable in a single instance to disprove, make "false impressions" on the public mind? That kind of logic, let me remind you, did not prevail with many of your own supporters in Parliament, and it will not remove the impressions—the true impressions—which the public mind has received, and will indelibly retain, in regard to your conduct. But you have called a witness, not to prove the truth of your charge against me but to exculpate the Canadian Government. A despatch from Lord Granville, dated 18th May, in which he acknowledges a telegram of the 3rd of May, informing him that "the Canadian Government *and the delegates*"—Richot and Scott—had "come to an understanding," is cited to prove that what Lord Granville said in the House of Lords in praise of the Canadian Government, on receiving this, as he supposed, important intelligence, cannot even now be disputed. Lord Granville's official compliments in May, though he had written long and argumentative despatches to prove the very opposite, a few weeks previously, are seized upon with avidity, and paraded in the first paragraph of your "review" to "disabuse" the public mind in this country, of impressions formed upon a much better knowledge of the facts than Lord Granville could possibly obtain from your telegrams. Lord Granville is an exceedingly polite official. He belongs to that school of tacticians who believe that, as the past cannot be rectified, it is best to forget it as quickly as possible, and make terms with the future. The *Saturday Review*, in a recent article, approving of the Foreign Secretary's diplomatic reply to Count Bernstorff's remonstrance on the subject of neutrality, remarks, that "it is the duty of a diplomatist to "say nothing disagreeable, except when it is necessary to the attainment "of his object." My own experience of Earl Granville's suavity, and diplomatic agreeableness, corroborates the judgment of the English writer. He is, without doubt, the most conspicuous example among living statesmen, of the *agreeable* in diplomacy. It is rather unfair to the noble Earl, therefore, to publish his little complimentary despatch of 18th May, written under a "false impression" of the actual state of the case, as a complete vindication of the acts and policy of the Canadian Government. Whether his Lordship will consider it his duty to say

"nothing disagreeable," when he learns that you have paraded his "happy despatch," as an admission that his previous despatches, in which he condemned those acts, and denounced that policy, with a severity of language to which his pen is so unfamiliar, remains to be seen. I, for one, am incredulous on the point.

But, sir, I apprehend that the opinion of Lord Granville, even when all the facts are before him, is not conclusive upon the merits or demerits of Canadian Ministers. The Canadian Parliament and the Canadian people, are the constitutional judges in their case, and judges too, let me add, from whose decision there is no appeal. When I had the honour, along with Sir George E. Cartier, to discuss with Lord Granville the claims of Canada to acquire, without purchase from the Hudson Bay Company, the great Territory that lies between Lake of the Woods and the Rocky Mountains, I felt it my duty to dissent very strongly from some of the noble Lord's opinions. That dissent, reiterated and persisted in for weeks—and without intending any reflection upon my colleague, I know he will yield me the position of *chief* dissenter—saved to Canada a very large sum of money, and eliminated from Lord Granville's proposals many onerous and embarrassing conditions. We thought then, that the opinions, and even the *wishes* of an Imperial Secretary of State, surrounded by influences adverse to Canada, with Hudson Bay shareholders in his own office, and an ex-Governor of the Company in the same Cabinet, were to be received, with respect certainly, but not without question, and might even be controverted and resisted without incurring a *premunire*. But the supple courtier from Demerara, and the mollihed blusterer from Nova Scotia, have promulgated a new dogma of infallibility. If a Secretary of State for the Colonies, pays a compliment to a Colonial Government that has fallen into disfavour with its own people, the Government must be right, and the people must be wrong! If he expresses regret that a Government official assumed authority "in a difficult and embarrassing position," which he would have lawfully exercised, but for a breach of agreement by the Government that commissioned him—an act that is reprehended in the very despatch that conveys the "regret"—the official must accept the "regret" as equivalent to condemnation, and the defaulting Government may point to the "responsibility" and the "added complications," which are declared to have arisen from their "delay,"—may even quote

the opinion of the Secretary, that they are bound to pay interest on the purchase money, which was due the first of December but not paid till May, as a proof that the official who represented and trusted them, is the real delinquent, and the men who betrayed him, violated their agreement, and are told they must pay interest as a consequence, are innocent, meritorious, clever people, whose policy it is every one's duty to approve!

I much mistake the signs of the times, if this new political dogma is not destined to be followed by the discomfiture of its promulgators, as swift and as signal as that which has just overtaken the author of that other dogma, who, like Prometheus, attempting to steal the attributes of Heaven, suddenly finds himself prone upon the earth, imprisoned and eviscerated, and no Hercules to deliver him.

I am, Sir, &c., &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

TORONTO, Oct. 27th, 1870.

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LETTER II.

SIR,—I submit that Lord Granville's "opinion" of the policy of the Canadian Government in dealing with the Red River Insurrection during its *first* stage—the only stage which concerns me—is not evidence in your favour. 1. Because up to April 23rd, as his despatches show, it is against you. 2. Because the opinion of 18th May was based on a report of facts which did not exist, to wit, that the *people* of the Red River Settlement had sent "delegates" to the Canadian Government, and that the Manitoba Bill, as settled with these so-called delegates, was acceptable to the people of Red River. Your report was not true on either point. Riel, the rebel President, sent the delegates, if any one sent them; and the "understanding come to" was not recognized by him, for he remained in arms, imprisoning and plundering Her Majesty's loyal subjects, and defying her authority, till Lord Granville's regular troops drove him in terror from the country. I shall defer any further remarks upon this point till I ascertain his Lordship's "opinion" of these transactions, after the truth has reached

him through Col. Wolseley's reports, and the private correspondence found among Riel's papers. These will disclose the "policy" of the authorities at Ottawa in a much clearer and truer light than the cable telegrams of last spring.

Disregarding for the present the "opinion" of Lord Granville, who is the Alpha and Omega of your pamphlet, I proceed to review your accusations against me, and to answer them.

Your first charge is, that "Mr. McDougall and his partizans have persistently denounced the Government for not adopting a policy which would have deprived Canada of Imperial countenance and support, and which would, most assuredly, have brought about a war between Canada and the Red River settlers, in which the latter would have had the aid of any number of sympathizers from the United States of America." The same charge is repeated further on, with an extended list of calamities that "would," and of blessings that "would not," have happened, if Mr. McDougall's policy had been adopted. Let me tabulate them for greater convenience:—

#### CALAMITIES.

1. Mr. McDougall's policy would have deprived Canada of the "moral and material support" of the Imperial Government.
2. It would have "brought about a war between Canada and the Red River settlers."
3. It would have given the settlers the "aid of any number of sympathizers" from the States.
4. It would have caused "the expenditure of an enormous sum of money, the sacrifice of many lives," &c.
5. "Riel would have retained his ascendancy until conquered by Canada."

#### BLESSINGS.

1. "General Lindsay would not have been sent."
2. "Col. Wolseley would not have been allowed to command the expedition."
3. "Bishop Tache would not have been summoned from Rome."
4. "The people of Red River Settlement would not have been invited to send delegates to Ottawa."
5. "The Territory" would not have "been organized into a Province."

6. "An excellent Governor has been (which would *not* have been, in the other case,) sent to it, whose policy will be to restore harmony and to administer equal justice to all."

Adding the "woulds" and "would nots" together, you have made out, I confess, a formidable catalogue. But as there is no limit to airy conjecture, when the region of solid fact is left behind, I consider myself fortunate that your retrospective predictions are only eleven in number. When you unshipped your balloon, *Speculation*, and threw out ballast so recklessly, you surely did not expect me to follow you. Nevertheless, I will try a few shots, and if I hit your wind-bag, and you come down with a thump, and get badly bruised, you must blame your own temerity.

The first question that suggests itself, and one that you ought to have considered, is this:—What is, or rather what was, Mr. McDougall's policy? You say, "No one who reads the Parliamentary papers "carefully can arrive at any other conclusion than that if Mr. "McDougall's policy had been adopted," &c., &c. Now, sir, I have read again, at your suggestion, these Parliamentary papers, and I have re-examined certain other papers not yet made public. The policy adopted, and the policy recommended by me, will be found in these papers. Beginning with my first letter to you from Pembina, and ending with my last speech in Parliament, I submit it for your reconsideration:—

"This morning I determined to send forward Mr. Provencher to Fort Garry, if permitted to go so far, with a verbal message to Governor McTavish, announcing my arrival within his jurisdiction, and claiming his protection for myself and party. Mr. Provencher was instructed to ascertain from the insurgents by a friendly conference, if possible, their object, and the extent of the force at their command. He was instructed *to assure them of the determination of the Government to deal justly with all classes, and to respect existing rights without reference to race or religion.* But he was to explain to them that until the new Government was organized, and so long as they remained with arms in their hands, no official communication could be held with them by me, or any one on my behalf." (*Letter from Pembina, Oct. 31, 1869. Correspondence and Papers, &c., page 5*)

"I cannot help thinking that a proclamation from your Government explaining the provisions of the late Imperial Act respecting the Territory, and the authority under which the new Government will exercise its powers, at the same time warning the malcontents of the serious nature of the crime they meditated, and the grave consequences to all concerned that must result from its commission, would have been well-timed, and perhaps sufficient to prevent the designing men at the head of the movement from accomplishing their purposes. I understand from Col. Dennis, that no proclamation or

warning has yet been published at Fort Garry, under official sanction.' (Letter to Gov. McTavish, Nov. 2. Correspondence and Papers, page 29.)

A proclamation followed on the 16th November from Gov. McTavish: "protesting" against the unlawful acts of the rebels, and "charging" them to disperse and depart out of Fort Garry to their habitations. They had found the gates open two weeks previously; were allowed to enter without protest; were accommodated with pemmican, brandy, tobacco, &c., *ad libitum*, by the obliging officers of the H. B. Company; and when asked, for form's sake, to walk out, declined with thanks! They laughed at the "protest," more boisterously, but not more heartily, than their willing captive, the unwilling *protester*, and then made themselves comfortable for the winter. Mr. Book-keeper McTavish, no doubt, for form's sake also, *charging* the pemmican, brandy, &c., to the Canadian Government! As matters turned out, I frankly admit that my "policy," in respect to Governor McTavish, and the H. B. Company's servants at Fort Garry, was not a success. I assumed that they were loyal to Her Majesty, and I invoked their aid to restore law and order in the country. I found they were only loyal to St. Boniface, and its agent, Riel, and that they preferred to give aid and comfort to him, and had only curses,\* and lectures on the shortcomings of the Canadian Government, for (as they supposed) Her Majesty's representative! But, sir, let me ask you which of your hypothetical calamities might, could, or would have happened, if my "policy" in seeking the active co-operation of the Governor and his Council, in behalf of peace and order, and the supremacy of the constituted authorities, had been successful? I admit, at once, that your entire list of "blessings" *might*, in that case, have been unattained!

Your partizans have industriously circulated, and you have asserted in your speeches and in your pamphlet, that my policy, while at Pembina, and since, was "blood-thirsty," "warlike," "imprudent," &c. An extract from certain correspondence, not heretofore published, will throw some light on this point. On the 30th November, at the most critical moment of my expedition—being, as all about me knew, the eve

\* "I met Mr. McKenny's son in the Council room (in Father Richot's house), at River Sale, when I was arrested. Both Bannatyne and McKenny stated that there had at that time been no official notification that there had been any transfer of the Territory. The former (Bannatyne) when in the Council of Assinaboia, heard the Governor of the Company swear heavily at Mr. McDougall, when he read a letter from the latter, urging him to issue his Proclamation to call upon the loyal inhabitants to preserve law and order."—*Extract from a Report of Major Wallace to me at Pembina.*

of the transfer, which the three Governments had agreed to—a military man who attained some celebrity in the North-West, the son-in-law of a now Cabinet Minister, and one of the persons sent by you to dragoon the half-breeds into the habits of civilized life, gave me in writing the benefit of his advice :—

\* \* \* \* \*

“The reports from Fort Garry persuade me that I might be of use *in striking whilst the iron is hot there*. The present feeling against the French  $\frac{1}{2}$  breeds may cool unless the Government party there are encouraged, and I am sure there cannot be a doubt about its being for the future welfare of the country that the present rising should be quelled by the inhabitants, rather than by soldiers, employed by the new Government to introduce itself.

“Yours very sincerely,  
“D. R. CAMERON.”

“Fort Garry, 1st December, 1869.

The gallant captain's letter was written and sent to me on the last day of November, and the writer was not at Fort Garry, but at Pembina, 65 miles distant. These little slips were, no doubt, caused by his nervous impatience to get at the “ $\frac{1}{2}$  breeds” before his “feelings” had time to “cool!” He struck the iron while it was hot with much less danger to the “ $\frac{1}{2}$  breeds,” *after* he had been safely brought back to Ottawa by his father-in-law. His feelings having been cooled to the proper temperature, he was set to translate Bishop Tache's “Sketch of the North-West,” in which your Reverend Ambassador depreciates the country; deprecates immigration; defends and eulogises the *Bois Brûlés*; apologises for the murder of Governor Semple, and does not hesitate to publish a scandalous libel upon the character of Lord Milton. I think, even you, will not deny, that the captain's literary exploit in your service at Ottawa, reflects more credit on his scholarship, than his martial exploits at Pembina and Riviere Sale have added to his fame as a warrior.

In replying to the proposal of my military adviser, I informed him that :—

“I have never proposed, contemplated, or asked for the aid of *soldiers*. If any fighting becomes necessary, it must be done by the loyal people of the settlement in their own way and at their own time. Organization is now going on, prompted by themselves, and so far as I could give it, with the sanction of authority. I shall be happy to avail myself of the offer of your military skill and experience, whenever operations of that kind are contemplated, or become necessary. I have determined, for the present, to act

wholly through 'conservators of the peace,' and in the name and with the forms of the civil power."

The captain was irate because I reminded him of his insubordination in attempting to pass the barricade against my written protest, and the advice of Governor McTavish—(*See Correspondence and Papers, pages 14-24.*)—and in his reply, peremptorily repudiated my authority. He also informed me that *he* was in communication with "the friends of the new Government," a circumstance of which I was not previously aware. The following passages of his letter caused some anxiety in my camp, lest the bold "Penetrator," as the Yankees dubbed him, should attack the barricade a third time, and, installing himself as Dictator, leave us all in the lurch!

"But your remarks suggest the idea that you consider my services were untimely offered. As it was only on Saturday, the 27th inst., that a message was sent to me from the settlement—where no authority is in force—inviting me to lead 'the friends of the new Government,' and of law and order—to whom you probably refer, my proposal to you on the night of the 25th inst., that I should go amongst them, was surely not premature." "You state, sir, that you never proposed, contemplated, or asked for the aid of soldiers. To a military man, the possible necessity for their services is immediately suggested by the rising of rebels in arms, and the overthrow of civil authority."

Somewhat puzzled by the captain's attitude, and having expressed a wish in my first letter to see him at my residence, at a certain hour, for "a special purpose," which he declined, unless I would send him a written statement of the subject matter of the interview—which Col. Stutsman would probably have perused on the way—I sent him the following instead, and have not since had the honour to receive a communication from him, *civil* or *military* :—

"PEMBINA, December 1st, 1869.

"DEAR SIR,—I beg to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from you, in reply to mine of yesterday, in which you 'decline to consider yourself subject to my reprimand or my rebuke.' As I sufficiently indicated the acts and proceedings on your part to which I took exception at the time, and also the *reasons* which led me to do so, in my note of yesterday. I shall not *argue* the matter with you any further.

"You do not seem to comprehend the situation, or the policy which has been adopted in dealing with it. You do not even seem able to arrive at any conclusion in your own mind, as to what ought to be done; for, in your note of yesterday, you declare that, 'for the future welfare of the country the present rising should be quelled rather by the *inhabitants* than by soldiers, employed by the Government,' and when I informed you that I had neither 'proposed, contemplated, or asked the aid of *soldiers*,' but relied upon the loyal inhabitants, you reply that to you, 'a military man, the possible necessity of their services is *immediately* suggested, by the rising of rebels in arms!

"I do not quite comprehend your advice, (if you meant to advise,) and must, therefore, respectfully 'declino' it.

"With regard to my request that you should 'see me here to-day, about 11 a. m. for a special purpose,' and to which you reply by asking to be 'informed of the character of the special purpose,' before granting me the interview, I beg to say, that if, at such a time, and place, and with spies, and eaves-droppers all about us, you require me to send specific information, (in writing I presume,) of the 'purpose' of any interview I may desire, I must decline to hold interviews with you.

"I am, Sir,

"Respectfully yours,

"W. McDougall.

"D. R. Cameron, Esq.,  
"Captain Royal Artillery."

Before quitting the case of Capt. Cameron, I feel it my duty to state, partly in my own defence, and partly in the interests of truth and honest administration, two or three facts not generally known:—

1. Capt. Cameron was sent to the North-West against my strong remonstrance. I was told that he had to be provided for,—that Dr. Tupper demanded it; and that, being a military man, I would find him useful in organizing a force of mounted police, &c.

2. I consented to take him, remarking, that as he was an artillery officer, I should probably find him more useful in mounting guns than horses; but with this express stipulation, that no other person who *must* be provided for should be forced upon me. It was rumored about that time that a formidable array of officials was to be sent out from Canada, and believing that such a proceeding would excite great jealousy and indignation in the North-West, I thought it would be a good bargain if I could get off with *one* supernumerary, and a solemn promise that no more should be sent.

3. When I found the gallant Captain rushing at the barricade against my wish, made known to him in writing,—sending his servant and horses a second time, after he had failed himself, and then negotiating for an expedition on "his own hook," I began to think he must be an incorrigible madcap, or else was acting under some mistake as to his position and authority. Expressing this view to one of my party, I learned that the Captain had given out that he was going to Fort Garry *under the Minister of Militia, and not under my Government!* This was news to me, but whether the fact was so or not, it enabled me to read his actions in a new light, and it revealed, at the same time, the nature and meaning of some other movements, which subsequent events have more fully explained.

4. In a short conversation with Dr. Tupper, whom I met on the plains, as I was returning to Canada, he informed me that Captain Cameron was sent to the North-West under a *promise that he should be a member of my Government*, and that he (Dr. Tupper) had that promise in writing! This also was news to me. If true, it was a palpable breach of the agreement with me at Ottawa, and placed me in the awkward predicament of having to break faith with the people of the country, who were assured, on my authority, that my "hands were untied in the matter of my council," except as to two persons, both of whom were residents within the Territory (*See Correspondence and papers, page 55*), or, to disappoint the just expectations of the Doctor's son-in-law.

The evidence I have submitted will, probably, be sufficient to convince the public—whatever its effect may be on your mind—that up to the 1st of December, 1869, "my policy" was not so blood-thirsty, or so warlike, or even so *impudent*, as that of your confidential military agent, whose wisdom and prowess you extolled in your place in Parliament, and whose fitness for high command in Manitoba, Governor Archibald warmly maintained in the same place, and *proved*, by reading letters of recommendation from the Yankee Postmaster at Pembina!

I am, sir, yours, &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

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#### LETTER III.

SIR.—On the first day of December, 1869, I believed, on grounds which I shall presently state, that Rupert's Land, and the North Western Territory, had, that day, been transferred to, and had become part of, the Dominion of Canada. As my instructions authorized me "to assume the Government of the Territories on their actual transfer to Canada," and as my Commission "authorized, empowered, required, and commanded" me, "from and after" that day, "to do and execute in all things that should belong to my said command," I had to decide between action and inaction, obedience and disobedience. Not a word, not a hint, not a circumstance from which I could infer, that you and your colleagues had determined to break the agreement with the Imperial Government and

the Hudson Bay Company, by refusing to accept the transfer of the country, had reached my ears. For trusting you, for assuming that you would keep faith at all hazards, with the other high contracting parties, (to say nothing of my position as your beleaguered representative,) you and your small faction—very small, I am happy to say,—censure and denounce me! Well, sir, I shall now give you, and them, the answer for which it seems you have been waiting. It will be all the more satisfactory, I trust, because I am now enabled to make it complete. The *fact*, as well as the law, is on my side, and you and the legal quibblers, who have instructed you, are condemned by both.

You devote some eight or ten pages to prove, that in assuming the fact of the transfer on the 1st of December, I acted "illegally," committed a "fatal error, with full knowledge that I was doing so," &c. That the transfer did *not* take place on the 1st of December, no one has ever denied; that my commission took effect, or could take effect without the transfer, no one has ever pretended. But that I "had full knowledge" that I was then acting illegally, is a false, a wilfully false suggestion. There is not a member of the present cabinet, not even the writer of your pamphlet, who believes, or ever has believed, that I knew, or suspected, or had any reason to suspect, that the solemn agreement made and concluded between the *three* governments, would be broken by one of them, and that one, the government of Canada, of which I was still a member. Why, sir, you know and all Canada knows, that you met and passed me on the plains, leaving me in complete ignorance of the state of affairs at Fort Garry, at the date of your departure,—for you confessed the fact in your place in Parliament; and you know, though you have tried hard to convey to the public, a contrary impression, that I was kept, during the whole period of my stay at Pembina, entirely in the dark as to your policy of refusing the transfer! That no despatch or telegram, or messenger was sent to apprise me of your sudden change of policy, (which cut the ground from under my feet), till I was several days journey from Pembina on my way to Canada! And here I must recall a little ruse you resorted to in the publication of the "correspondence and papers," which you have repeated in your pamphlet. Conscientious of the fatal error you and your colleagues had committed, in countermanding payment of the £300,000 to the Company, and in refusing to accept the transfer on the 1st of December, as agreed upon, without

taking any steps to advise me of the fact, though it was most important I should know it, you endeavour to convey the impression that *you had advised me* so early as the 19th of November! And how is this done? By transposing your despatch of that date from its proper place, and foisting it into my correspondence from Pembina, written as early as the 4th of that month. I protested, in the committee appointed to select and arrange the correspondence, against this confusion of despatches, and the majority of the committee concurred with me. But I fell ill, and did not recover until the correspondence was published, when I found you had carried your point, and placed your despatch of the 19th *before* mine of the 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 13th of November. Now, as I did not receive yours till the 6th of December, and as it contained no hint that you intended to refuse the transfer on the *first*, but, on the contrary, actually conveyed the information that a "Proclamation annexing the country to Canada," would probably be issued on the 2nd of December, you have not, as it seems to me, gained much by the transposition, and subsequent citation of this despatch. Even in your despatch of the 29th of November, written some days after you had telegraphed Mr. Rose to withhold the £300,000,—and to Lord Granville to postpone the transfer, you do not advise me of these acts! You tell me that you are in "telegraphic" communication with the Secretary of State;" that it appeared to you "unwise to complicate matters by any hasty action until the policy of the Queen's Government was known;" that the council "desired that all collision with the insurgents" might be avoided; that "no violation of the neutrality laws" should occur, and that I was to "remain at Pembina, *cheered by the conviction which animated*" you at *Ottawa*!! But not a word that you had refused to pay the money or to accept the transfer. Lord Granville, as the correspondence shows, was at that very moment pressing the transfer upon you, threatening to make it in spite of your refusal, and interrogating the law officers of the Crown,\* on the question of seizing the purchase money by legal process! This contest between the Canadian government and Lord Granville may account for your inability to announce that the transfer would

\* "Lord Granville learns from the law officers of the Crown, that although it would be competent to Her Majesty's government to complete the transfer by accepting the surrender of the Company and *issuing the requisite order in Council*; yet this acceptance would not place the Company in a position to obtain, by any legal process, the sum of £300,000 recently deposited by Mr. Rose." *Sir F. Rogers to Sir S. Northcote. Cor. and papers, p. 132.*

not take place—that you had come off victorious in the struggle—but it was no reason for withholding from your representative in the Northwest, all knowledge of your new policy, till it was too late to be of service. Nor does your ultimate triumph over Lord Granville, the H. B. Company, and the law officers, give you any right to make me your scape-goat, and to talk now of “illegality,” which, but for your interference—prompted by motives you have never dared to avow—would have been undoubted legality.

In the absence of any instructions or information from Ottawa, the question, and the only question that remains to be answered under your count, charging a guilty knowledge of illegality, is this :—Had I reasonable grounds to believe that the transfer of Rupert’s Land, and the Northwest Territory to Canada, would be made on the 1st day of December, 1869? Here are the grounds :—

I knew, of my own knowledge, and had in my possession the official documents to prove, that all the parties to the contract, had agreed to the terms; that the day was fixed, and that the money was ready to be paid over. Before leaving Ottawa, I took the precaution to obtain copies of all the despatches, draft agreements, and other documents, relating to the Northwest, which, I have since found, was a wise precaution. I knew by experience, that it would be unsafe to rely upon official promptitude, or perspicacity at Ottawa; or to assume that the proper minister or a quorum of ministers would be found at the Capital in any emergency that might happen. And I knew—what this case has conclusively established—that you and the majority of your colleagues, would not hesitate to garble or suppress important state papers, even when demanded by Parliament, if their production was likely to expose or embarrass the government. The following important despatch was *not* sent down to Parliament with the other correspondence :—

DOWNING STREET, 11th August, 1869.

SIR—With reference to my despatch of the 22nd of July, I have the honour to inform you that the Hudson Bay Company have altered the draft deed of surrender, so as to make it conform with the terms in the draft order in Council, *and that I have approved of the draft as altered.*

I transmit for your information, a copy of the draft, and also of the Rupert’s Land Loan Guarantee Bill, which has just received H. M. assent *and become law.*

I shall be glad to learn from you, at your earliest convenience, whether any arrangement has been made for the payment of the £300,000, *as this is*

*the only point* now remaining to be settled before *the Order in Council* can be issued

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE."

To SIR J. YOUNG, &c., &c.

This despatch, with other documents in my possession at Pembina, showed me, (what I of course knew as a member of the government), that as far back as August 11th, *all the preliminaries for the transfer had been settled*, and that "the only point" remaining, was the payment of the £300,000. The published papers show, (p. 147—151) that on the 20th September, authority was given for the payment of the purchase money "forthwith," out of funds then in the hands of our London agents. This suppressed despatch also shows, that the Imperial Government, and the Company, were anxious that there should be no delay in making the transfer at the time agreed upon. And it shows further, that the instrument of transfer, was an "Order in Council," and that the "draft" of the order had been prepared early in August.

But this was not the only evidence in my hands on which I relied. On the 26th of November, I received the following letter from Sir Curtis Lamson, the Deputy Governor of the H. B. Company :—

KINLOCHUNE, BY DINGWALL, 25th Sept., 1869.

"MY DEAR MR. McDOUGAL.—I received here yesterday, your kind favour of the 7th inst. I was glad to hear that you had consented to take charge of Rupert's Land for a time. *We have received notice from the Colonial Department, that the transfer will take place on the 1st of December*, in accordance with the wishes expressed by the Canadian Government.

Perhaps Mr. McTavish's action with reference to the settlers at Muskrat Creek, has been misrepresented. Your letter, with the enclosure, shall go before our board when we meet in October, and you shall have all the information in our possession, as to the arrangements between Lord Selkirk and the Indians. You may rest satisfied that everything in the power of the Hudson Bay Company will be done to aid you in the management of the Indians. Our interests are identical, and our views and wishes will be made known to all our agents in the Hudson Bay Territory." \* \* \*

Very sincerely yours,

C. M. LAMPSON."

This letter was enclosed to me from Fort Garry, by Governor McTavish, having been sent under cover to him by Sir Curtis Lamson. I thus became aware that Mr. McTavish had at last received instructions from England, (the non-receipt of which he had taken pains to make known) and from the exceedingly friendly tone of a private note that accom-

panied the above, I was satisfied that he *then* had official intimation of the transfer, and that it was to take place on the 1st of December. I inferred also that he would probably discontinue his practice of "swearing heavily" at me, for having asked him to notify the Priests and their armed adherents, that they were not acting in the interest or with the sanction of the Company. It will thus be seen that I had direct, positive, written notice of the intended transfer on the 1st of December, from the Deputy Governor in England, and that the Company "had received notice" from the Colonial Department, "that the transfer *will* take place on the 1st of December." Nor was this all. I had received a few days previously, from Ottawa, a private note from Sir John A. MacDonald, enclosing a copy of a letter from Sir Stafford Northcote, the Governor of the Company, to Governor McTavish. It was dated 19th of October, and contained this passage:—

"You are no doubt aware that it has been arranged that the *transfer* of the country shall take place on the 1st of December."

But my case is not yet concluded. On looking into the "British North America Act, 1867," and the "Rupert's Land Act of 1868," I discovered that the transfer was to be made "by Order in Council," and *not* by Proclamation, as was provided in the case of the union of the Provinces, under the act of 1867. Here are the words:—"It shall be lawful for the Queen, &c., to admit Rupert's Land and the Northwest Territory, or either of them, into the union, &c., and the provisions of any *Order in Council* in that behalf shall have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom."—*Sec. 146, J. N. A. Act, 1867.*

"It shall be competent to Her Majesty *by any such Order or Orders in Council*, as aforesaid, to declare that Rupert's Land shall, *from a date to be therein mentioned*, be admitted into and become part of the Dominion of Canada." *Sec. 5, Rupert's Land Act, 1868.*

There is not a word in these Acts, nor in the Canadian Act, for the "Temporary Government of Rupert's Land," about a Proclamation. And what has since happened? Why, sir, after telling me in your famous despatch of 19th November, (which did not reach me until a week after the event), that I "could claim or assert no authority in the Hudson Bay Territory, until the Queen's *Proclamation*, annexing the country to Canada, reaches *you (me) through this office;*" after the legal

quibbles on this point which we heard from one or two of your partizans in the House of Commons; after all the positive accusations of your organs, inspired from the office of the Attorney-General, the country *has been* transferred, exactly in the way I supposed it would be, by Order in Council, and *not* by Proclamation! So far as I have seen, no Proclamation has been issued by the Queen, or through your office, to this day! What now becomes of your Proclamation theory? What of the brilliant legal doctrine, that a commission, which was in express terms to take effect, "from and after" an event, whenever it might happen, could *not* take effect until a "Proclamation"—unnecessary and unauthorized—had been issued, and had "reached," through your office, the unlucky holder of the commission? Does it help your legal theory that this waiter for futile Proclamations was more than a thousand miles distant—in the middle of the Western plains—on foreign soil—with a rebellion in front: and the allies of rebels—three hundred miles of uninhabited country—and winter, 30 degrees below zero, in the rear? *Non constat* that your Proclamation, or your messenger, would ever reach him! And it is now clear, that if he had remained at Pembina to this hour, "cheered by the conviction that animated" you and your cheerful colleagues, no Proclamation, such as you described, would, or could, have reached him!

You seem to have discovered, before writing your pamphlet, that the Proclamation story—which had served its purpose—was exploded by the action of the Imperial Government, and you hit upon another form of indictment. In several despatches, written in November, I complained of the delay in sending instructions for my guidance after the transfer. In your despatch of December 7th, you endeavoured to hide your shortcomings on this point by stating an untruth. You enumerated a list of eight "assurances" that I might give to the residents of the North-West, and then remarked, "You had, of course, *instructions* on all the above-mentioned points, excepting as regards the tariff, before you left Ottawa." Now, I had received *no* "instructions" before I left Ottawa, except those of 28th September, which were *preliminary* merely, and directed me "to report" on a variety of subjects. The only acts I was authorized to *do*, were two—to offer seats in my Council to Messrs. McTavish and Black, and to make "provisional arrangements" for the extension of the telegraph system, both of which I did. Your despatch

of 7th of December, with its glittering generalities, met me on my way to Canada. Its tardy receipt was no deprivation, except as to the tariff, for it gave no information, and no authority, which were not to be found in my Commission, and in the Acts of Parliament. But my chief cause of anxiety, as the 1st of December drew near, was the non-receipt of the Order in Council, or of any notice that it had passed. As early as the 13th November, I wrote thus :—

“ I expected to hear by this time that the transfer had been agreed to, and the Imperial Order in Council passed. If I don't receive notice of this “Order” in a few days, I shall be much embarrassed in my plans, and the leaders of the insurrection will be emboldened and strengthened.”

On this passage of my despatch you comment as follows in your review :—

“ How could Mr. McDougall have expected to hear at Pembina, on the 14th November, that the Imperial Order in Council had been passed? The date fixed for the payment of the money to the Company, and the concurrent transfer to the Crown, was fixed for the 1st December; but Mr. McDougall was well aware that after the transfer to the Crown, a *future* day for the transference to Canada would have to be fixed by an Order of the Queen in Council; and even if the Canadian Government had paid over the money on the 1st of December, as contemplated when Mr. McDougall left Ottawa, the proclamation would have been illegal.”

The above short paragraph contains one question and three statements of fact. The question is easily answered, and the statements are untrue. First, as to the question :—How could I expect to hear “ on 14th November, that the Imperial Order in Council had been passed ?”

1. Because the order was prepared and its terms agreed to before I left Ottawa.
2. Because the payment of the money to the Company was “ the only point” then “ remaining to be settled before the Order in Council can be passed.” (*Despatch of 11th August*).
3. Because the Canadian Government had authorized Mr. Rose, on the 20th September, “ to pay *forthwith*, out of the funds now in the hands of the Canadian Government, the £300,000, payable to the Hudson Bay Company.” (*Correspondence and Papers*, p. 147).
4. Because the payment of the money, the surrender by the Company to the Crown, and the passing of the Order, *before* the day fixed for the actual transfer, were expected by all parties, were highly expedient, and within the terms of the Statutes.
5. Because Mr. Rose reached England early in October, and a telegram to St. Cloud would have reached me at any time, by post or messenger, in nine or ten days. Therefore, it was not unreasonable that I should

have expected to hear in the middle of November, that the Order in Council had passed.

But, secondly, as to the statements. They are each and all of them disingenuous in terms, unwarranted in law, and untrue in fact.

(1.) "The date fixed for the payment of the money to the Company and the concurrent transfer to the Crown," were *not*, when I left Ottawa, "fixed for the 1st of December." You have used the word "transfer" disingenuously as well as inaccurately. The Statutes direct that the Company shall *surrender* to the Crown, and the Crown *transfer* by Order in Council to Canada. But I will not bandy words with you. The fact, as it has occurred, contradicts you, and that is enough. I have before me the *Canada Gazette* of 23rd July, 1870. I find there the Deed of Surrender, with this conclusion:—"In witness whereof, the Governor and Company, &c., have hereunto caused their common seal to be affixed this 19th day of November, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine." So, after all your quibbles on this point, it turns out that the Deed was actually executed within three or four days of the time I expected to hear of it, and *not* on the 1st December! In his despatch of the 30th of November, Lord Granville, resisting your attempt to postpone the transfer, reminds you that:—

"The other requisite Instruments have been prepared, and the Canadian Government itself has named first, the 1st October, and next, the 1st December, for the *completion* of the transfer. Meanwhile, the Company have been informed by the agents of the Canadian Government, (Messrs. Baring & Glyn), that the indemnity of £300,000 will be paid on due proof of the *surrender*."

So, here again is evidence that previous to the 1st December, (we are not told how long, but no doubt it was before the execution of the Deed) the money was ready to be paid, not on the 1st December, as you have stated for the purpose of making a point against me, but on the "completion of the surrender."

(2.) "But Mr. McDougall was well aware that after the transfer to the Crown, a *future* day for the transference to Canada would have to be fixed by an Order of the Queen in Council." The object of this tricky perversion of the fact, as well as of the law, is apparent, and is worthy of its source. I first heard it from one of your colleagues, on my return to Ottawa. It was resorted to as a sort of legal straw to save a drowning case. I scouted it as a quibble on the instant, and never

expected to hear it again in any serious discussion. But, driven out of every other position, you come back to your sharp practice argument, and exclaim, "Well, at any rate, you were wrong in acting on the 1st, you ought to have waited till the 2nd of December!" You probably never heard, or perhaps I should say, never comprehended the maxim, *De minimis non curat lex*. But I am fortunately able to answer one "minimis" by another. In point of fact, I did not sign the "proclamation" or notice of transfer, until the morning of the 2nd December, Greenwich time! I had a sort of instinctive suspicion that I had left behind me official superiors, who would not hesitate to take even so *small* an advantage as the difference of a few hours to prove "illegality" against me, and I took measures accordingly. But what does the official record of these events prove? Why, sir, that but for your interference, the "completion of the transfer" would, on the authority of Lord Granville himself, have been effected on the 1st December! Thus your little quibble, for which "the law cares not," disappears, let us hope never to be heard again.

(3.) The last statement, that if the money had been paid over on the 1st, my proclamation of the fact of the transfer "would have been illegal," is perhaps sufficiently answered already. But it presents the opportunity, which I shall use, for a final and, I venture to think, conclusive rejoinder to the dishonest casuistry of your despatch of the 24th December, better known as the "brutal despatch"; to the carping of your newspaper organs—though I must do them the justice to say they have not made much of the point,—and to the *suggestio falsi* of your pamphlet, the writer of which seems to have had little more than this idea in his head from the first page to the last. All your arguments as to the "wholly indefensible" character of my conduct on the 1st and 2nd of December, may be summed up in these words: "You ought not to have assumed a transfer on the 1st, because, though that day was fixed for the transfer, the Order in Council could not be passed till *after* that day." To which I answer,—the *Canada Gazette* of the 23rd July last contains the following despatch:—

DOWNING STREET, 25th June, 1870.

"SIR,—Having reference to your telegram of the 12th instant, in which you stated that the transfer of Rupert's Land to the Dominion of Canada might properly take place on the 15th July, I have the honour to inform you

that on the 22nd instant Her Majesty was pleased to accept from the H. B. Company the surrender of that Territory, in pursuance of the Rupert's Land Act of 1868, and by the accompanying Order in Council to unite Rupert's Land and the North-West Territory to the Dominion of Canada from the 15th day of July.

"I have, &c.,

"GRANVILLE.

"Governor-General

"SIR JOHN YOUNG, BART., &c., &c., &c."

So, thank God, the great act of State was done! As to the fact itself—in spite of your disloyal intrigues, and the "parish politics" of your allies in the east; in spite of Jesuitical plots in the North-West, and ministerial connivance and irbecility at the Capital. As to the manner and form—in spite of your quibbles, in spite of your "brutal despatch," exactly as I imagined and assumed it would be done. Let me recapitulate:—

1. The day was agreed to *beforehand*, to wit, on the 12th June.
2. The money was paid in *advance*, to wit, on the 4th of May (per telegram to Mr. Rose of that date, as stated in your pamphlet, p. 64).
3. The *surrender* was accepted *before* the day fixed for the transfer, to wit, on the 22nd June.
4. The Order in Council was passed *before* the day fixed upon, to wit, on the 23rd June.
5. The transfer took effect from and after the day fixed, to wit, the 15th July, *without* any "Queen's Proclamation."

As you will hardly contend that Lord Granville has acted illegally; or that Rupert's Land and the North-West Territory did not, in fact and in law, become a part of the Dominion on the 15th July; or that Governor Archibald's commission, of the 20th May, did not, on that day, take effect, without the Queen's Proclamation reaching him, "through your office," I respectfully demand a retraction of your arguments and assertions to the contrary in my case,—of your pretence that the same acts, having the same order and relation to each other in 1869, would have been illegal, and ought not "to have been expected" by me.

I have the honour,

&c., &c., &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

## LETTER IV.

SIR,—The legal arguments and pretences about the Queen's Proclamation which, ever since the concoction of your sinister despatch of 24th December, you and your partizans, with dishonest intent and malicious zeal, have hurled at my head, are now answered. I again thank you for the opportunity afforded for this *review* of the question. Your legal champion, the portly member for West Toronto, who never refuses an official retainer, took his brief at Ottawa, and on one of the ast nights of the session, flung two or three forensic missiles across the House. At the next meeting I was ready to answer him, but on enquiry found he had taken the night train for Toronto as soon as he had discharged his pop-gun. And now your clumsy and dishonest "review"—dishonest because its writer *knew* that the accomplished fact had given the lie to the legal theory—makes its unwelcome appearance, and, unhappily for you, falls to the ground silent and harmless! I am told by a member of the Press, that up to this date, not a single newspaper of influence in the country (except the moribund organ of the Finance Minister) has ventured to reproduce its arguments, or even to notice its appearance! It seems to have fallen still-born, and if I had not felt that justice to the loyal Canadians of the North-West, who have suffered, and still suffer, from the malevolence and treachery of men who for the moment control the administration of their country's affairs, demands some further explanation and exposure of the real delinquents in this matter, I should not, on my own account, have deemed it necessary to notice your *blank* production. But the acquisition, by *purchase*, and the political re-organization of a Territory, estimated by Russell to cover an area of 2,210,000 superficial miles, is not an every day occurrence—is, indeed, a transaction without precedent in ancient or modern times—and no serious incident in its history can be regarded as trivial, or unfit to be recorded in some form more durable than the daily broad-sheet. I shall, therefore, having put my hand to the plough, turn over a few additional furrows which, but for you, might have hidden a little longer the unsavoury facts beneath.

I return, for a paragraph or two, to the consideration of my policy while at Pembina. You ring the changes upon certain expressions in

the commission to Colonel Dennis—"attack, arrest, disarm and disperse armed men disturbing the public peace," &c., &c., as if there was something illegal, blood-thirsty and awful in the use of such terms. Let me ask you, sir, this plain question. Suppose that you and your colleagues had not prevented Lord Granville from making the transfer on the 1st December, and I had remained inactive at Pembina after that date, while the loyal inhabitants were arming, drilling, forming committees of public safety, and preparing to put down the handful of rioters, who had made prisoners of the Governor and his officers at Fort Garry, what would they have said? And if I had turned my face towards Ottawa, instead of giving the countenance of authority to their loyal efforts, and had waited for your message or messenger, what would the loyal people of Canada have said? You apparently did not know a week before the 1st December, but the transfer would be made on that day, and yet your messenger under the greater urgency of a sudden change of policy, did not reach Pembina until the 25th day of December! I would thus, in the case supposed, have stood looking on with closed mouth and nerveless hand for a whole month, while riot and theft, and robbery, and (what would no doubt have happened in that case) bloodshed and murder ravaged the settlement! And this is your idea of duty in a Representative of the Crown, sent to a distant and half-civilized colony, in such an emergency? The chief Magistrate, the only person with authority to command, ought, you tell us, to have folded his arms for a whole month, while rebellion perfected its plans and gathered strength; and bewildered loyalty, appealing for advice and authority to act, ought to have been ignored, discouraged and abandoned to its enemies! Such a policy, I admit, would have accorded well with the views *you* expressed at Ottawa, at St. Paul, at Fort Abercrombie, and at Fort Garry. You declared in Parliament that Canada ought not to ask for, and if offered them, ought not to accept, the "big shoes" of England in the North-West. You told your American friends in St. Paul, and elsewhere on your journey, that our great Territories in that part of the Continent belonged naturally, geographically and commercially to the United States. You assured the Hudson Bay malcontents and Canadian outlaws in the settlement, that they would be much better off under brother Jonathan, and that if they took their ground firmly, and demanded their rights boldly, Canada would not,

and could not, coerce them !\* But to a man who believed exactly the opposite of all this ; who had laboured for years to secure this "fertile belt," with its fifty millions of untilled but teeming acres as a great inheritance for our children—an acquisition unexampled in the history of the world for its magnitude and its splendour,—who could not sympathise with the medieval proclivities and anti-British prejudices of a few foreign Priests and Jesuits, or the selfish and disloyal aims of a handful of petty traders ; who knew that the half-breeds—about whose rights you talked so much—were merely tools in the hands of others, and had no grievances to complain of, and nothing but benefits to re-

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\* "Mr. Bannatyne (Post Master and a member of Council at Winnipeg), stated to me on several occasions, between the 6th and 20th November, while I was at Fort Garry, that Mr. Howe told him that he (Howe) approved of the course the half-breeds were taking, and if they held out they would get all they wished for from the Canadian Government. That Nova Scotia held out and succeeded with no better plea. That he (Howe) had held very little intercourse while there with that party calling itself the "Canadian Party." for he firmly believed that Schultz, Mair and Bown, with his *Nor-Wester*, had acted in a very unbecoming manner towards the half-breeds, and he only wondered how these men were tolerated in the settlement. And further, that when he (Howe) took his place in Parliament, he would certainly do his best for the half-breeds. Mr. Bannatyne put great stress upon the latter expression, and told me that Howe and the Lower Canadians would make a big fight against Upper Canadians, not to have any coercion used in the settlement. Mr. Howe further told him that the settlement would prosper if left to govern itself. (!)

"Mr. Howe also told Mr. Bannatyne that Mr. McDougall was unpopular in Canada, and hinted at the probability that he would make himself so if allowed to govern Red River."

"Mr. McKenney (Sheriff), told me that Mr. Howe made himself very popular while at Red River, and he believed, if they wanted a Canadian Governor there at all, they would have accepted him ; but the time for Canada to rule their country was past, that their natural outlet was through the United States. That no Canadian Government could be established permanently in the settlement. Mr. McKenney also confirmed Bannatyne's statement that Mr. Howe told him he had no doubt of the success of the half-breeds if they were firm and held out.

"Mr. McKenney also laid great weight on the action that Mr. Howe would take in the Canadian Parliament, assisted by Lower Canadians." *Report of Major Wallace on his return to Pembina from Fort Garry.*

"Robt. O'Loan, one of those I met in Council at Riviere Sale, spoke highly of Mr. Howe, and said he was as much a Republican as he was, and he knew he would not wish to force that settlement into subjection to Canada—that he was a very liberal minded man, &c. He also corroborated the statements made by many others that Howe, along with most of the Lower Canadian members, would range themselves in the Canadian Parliament on the side of the Red River people, and that through his eloquence and the precedent of Nova Scotia before them, he had no doubt but they would be left to themselves, for the concessions they would ask would not be granted by the Canadian Government."—*Ibid.*

ceive at the hands of the Canadian people ; who understood that his duty to the Crown, to Canada, to the cause of order and law and civilization, required him as a loyal subject, *not* to fold his arms in the presence of riot and rebellion, but to be prompt, decided, and ready to share with others the danger in front, and submit, if need be, to treachery and desertion in the rear, if by his example and counsel he could reassure the well-disposed, and re-establish the authority of the Sovereign he had been commissioned to serve. To such an one, Mr. Howe, *your* policy was neither prudent nor loyal, nor manly, nor just. It was a policy, moreover, that could only, if successful, have had one result—the extinction of all loyal feeling in the country, the establishment of an independent Government, and the loss of the whole territory to Canada and the British Crown.

When I had ascertained beyond doubt that the Company's Government was deposed ; the Governor a close prisoner ; the principal Fort, with its armament, in the hands of the French half-breeds ; and that Richot and his creatures had usurped all the powers and functions of government, I could see no impropriety in any loyal subject taking measures for the protection of life and property, and the restoration of order. Even if I had doubted my authority under your commission, I should have felt no hesitation on the score of interference with the authority of Governor McTavish and his Council. Their authority was already at an end. The supposed transfer on the 1st December could only have operated as a legal transfer of functions which had for some time been openly usurped by another. While you were gravely discussing at Ottawa the importance of "continuing the authority of the Company," for fear that "anarchy and confusion might ensue," they had begun their reign. While you were trying to frighten Lord Granville into postponement by reminding him that if the Company's Government was superseded, "a legal status might be given to any Government *de facto* formed by the inhabitants for the protection of their lives and property." I, and every one in the settlement, knew that the Company's Government was then as much a thing of the past as the Government of Napoleon III. after the surrender at Sedan, and the *decheance* voted by the Corps Legislatif. The very danger that you pretended you were anxious to avoid—by the coward's expedient of running away—I saw before me as a *fait accompli*, which no despatches or telegrams could re-

verse or ignore! A *de facto* government was in existence; a declaration of independence adopted by it had been sent to Washington; and if President Grant had taken the same view of international law and duty that some wise people in Canada—one of whom recently exhibited his naval prowess on the Flats of St. Clair—so imprudently avowed at the outbreak of the Southern rebellion, we should be discussing the question to-day under different circumstances, and possibly under different auspices.

My policy, sir, in a crisis so grave—according to your own showing—was to avert the danger of foreign interference by proving to the world the true character of the insurrection. I knew that the great majority of the respectable inhabitants of the country, French as well as English, were entirely opposed to the political designs of the small faction that rallied the Buffalo-hunters to their standard. Frequent and urgent messages reached me from this loyal majority for instructions and guidance. It seems I ought to have told them to submit to the “established authorities!” Your special agent, hastily summoned from Rome, inculcated instant submission to President Riel, and I observe he still possesses your confidence.\* But I remembered enough of my legal studies to satisfy me that I would be right in law, if not in your estimation, in advising resistance to the rebels wherever they appeared, and by whatever means the local magistrate might find available to disperse them. Accordingly, I requested Col. Dennis to convey my answer to the loyal portion of the people, to confer with Judge Black and the other magistrates, and to *concert measures with them and under their authority*—lest by any chance there should be a question as to mine—to attempt nothing *without* their concurrence, and to raise no force, except volunteers in aid of the civil power. The commission which you have so often paraded to frighten those timid people who want “peace,” even though submission to the rule of robbers, murderers and rebels, is the condition on which they are to enjoy it, was issued to Col. Dennis, as explained in my despatches, to protect him against personal reclamations—so far as my authority could do it—and was never intended for publication *in hæc*

\* “No one had done more good to conciliate the people than the Bishop.”—*Sir Francis Hincks’ speech at Renfrew.*

“Salute for me Mr. O’Donohue and others at the Fort. *Pray much for me.* (!) I do not forget you. Your Bishop who signs himself your *best friend.*”—*Bishop Tache’s letter to M. le President.*

*verba*. It was shewn to Judge Black, who pronounced it legal and sufficient. By some mistake it was printed and got into the hands of the enemy before Col. Dennis had completed his plans, but whether any harm resulted from it in the North-West I am unable to say. It has furnished you with a good deal of *bunkum*, and as you had but little material otherwise of which to compose your favourite oratorical dish, I suppose you will admit that the commission has, at least, served a good purpose in your case. My *instructions* to Col. Dennis—how to act and when to act—were not embodied in the commission, but were the subject of a separate communication, and will be found, in substance, in the Colonel's reports of his proceedings. These instructions were followed to the letter, and although Col. Dennis failed in putting down the insurrection by a *coup de grace*, his movement had the effect of showing that the statement (repeated daily by your organ at St. Paul), that the people of the settlement were unanimous for independence, was untrue. It established a distinct and ineffaceable line between the rebels and the rest of the population, and proved that the former were a small minority—the very scum of that variform society—led by a few foreign Priests, Fenian agents and American citizens; and that they could not be regarded as representing a resident British community, seeking to throw off the yoke of the Parent State. It proved to the satisfaction of all the respectable newspapers of the United States that this *de facto* authority in one part of a scattered settlement of half-breeds and Indian traders was merely the authority of “banditti,” who, with arms in their hands, levied contributions upon all who came in their way. My policy developed these facts. *Yours* would have hidden them, with what result we may guess. I have not been endowed, like you, with the gift of prophecying backwards, and, therefore, I leave the point entirely to your imagination.

There is one question yet to be answered under the head of “my policy” in the North-West. Why did the movement of the loyal people of the settlement, under Col. Dennis, fail? Leaving out of view all secondary and minor causes, the reason was this:—*The rebel leaders had private information from Ottawa by the same mail that brought me your non-committal and deceptive despatch of 19th November, that the Canadian Government would not accept the transfer!* That their so-called Governor *had no authority*, would be left to get out of the scrape as best

he could, and that the leaders of the insurrection *need not fear either punishment or coercion!!* I may add that the same mail brought me the *Montreal Gazette*, with a paragraph informing the public that the Government had telegraphed Mr. Rose not to pay over the £300,000! This was the first and only information I received while at Pembina from which I could infer your policy. Richot and Riel were better advised; they had positive information and acted upon it at once. They laid seige to the house of Dr. Schultz, in which the Canadians and loyalists of the town of Winnipeg had assembled, cut off their supplies and made them prisoners. Father Richot and the Priest of White Horse Plains were seen rushing through their respective Parishes, taking men and boys out of the houses by main force, putting arms in their hands, and sending them off to Fort Garry. Secret messages were sent from H. B. Company officials to the Anglican Priests and other prominent men in the Lower or English settlement, apprising them of the same facts! Meetings were held which Col. Dennis was *not* invited to attend,\* and it was resolved that the half-armed loyalists *had better not take the field*—they could not expect to conquer the French half-breeds and the Canadian Government at the same time!

Perhaps, sir, you will allow me to conclude this letter with a retrospective affirmation after the manner of your pamphlet:—If the Canadian Government, instead of repudiating their contract, leaving their representative uninformed and unsupported, and communicating privately and without his knowledge with the rebel leaders, had kept faith with the Imperial Government, with the H. B. Company and with him—had announced boldly, not only their acceptance of the North-West into the Dominion, but their determination to hold it by all the force at their command—that *FACT ALONE* would have done all that Col. Wolsley's bugles accomplished at a later date, and would have saved to Canada a million of dollars at least, a vast amount of humiliation and disgrace, political complications and difficulties that are only just beginning to

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\* "I was informed that a public meeting held in the vicinity had just broken up, at which delegates had been appointed to visit me at the Stone Fort without delay to request that aggressive measures, for the present, might be abandoned. This attitude on their part, just at the present time, strengthened the conclusion I had come to, as to a change in the sentiments of the people of the Lower Parishes."—*Col. Dennis' Report, p. 112, Cor. and Papers.*

manifest themselves, and, in all human probability, the one brave life that was sacrificed on the altar of TREACHERY !

I am, Sir,  
&c., &c., &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

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LETTER V.

SIR,—I shall devote this letter to the refutation of two or three of the auxiliary mis-statements with which you have studded your review. For the purpose of turning “the sympathy extended throughout Canada to those who were compelled to immigrate”—emigrate, you mean—“from Red River during the ascendancy of Riel,” towards “all who supported the Provisional Government,” including, of course, those who *recognised* it at Ottawa, you boldly attempt to make me, as Minister of Public Works, responsible for the Rebellion, and insinuate that I acted without the privity or consent of my colleagues : The Canadian Government, by allowing its organs to announce a large emigration of ready-made officials from Canada to the North-West, and preparing and carrying an Act for the government of the country, without even recognising the municipal rights of the inhabitants—contrary to my strongly expressed views as a member of the Government—did nothing to provoke the outbreak. Your denunciation of the British flag, with the word “Canada” upon it, at Fort Garry ; your admitted sympathy with the mal-contented who, as soon as your back was turned, and acting upon what they understood to be your advice, became *rebels*, was quite proper ! Even your qualified assurance to the mal-contented that the incoming Governor, your then colleague, “*if a man of sense*,”\* would treat them well, and that other encouraging and judicious information reported by you in advance, that the man whose appointment as Governor, you had, upon your oath as a Minister of the Crown, advised, was “unpopular in Canada, and would in all probability make himself so, *if allowed* to govern Red River,” was so far from provoking to insurrection—was so fitted to allay the appre-

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\* Mr. Howe’s speech in the House of Commons, February, 1870.

hensions of the half-breeds, that "it appears" from your review, you "must be completely exonerated from all blame!" But I, who came *after* your conciliatory official visit to the half-breeds—I, who found all your admirers in arms to resist my entrance into the country, am the chief criminal, and responsible for the rebellion! Yea, more. I am solely to be blamed for the wicked Orders in Council, deliberately adopted by the Government! I suppose this kind of logic is good enough for the political junto who still want to use you, and I readily admit that it will not shock the common sense of your followers, "if," to use your cautious phrase, any followers endowed with that faculty still adhere to you. But it will require several pamphlets, and a good many visits to the country, by that zealous colporteur, the returned Hero of the York Roads and the £10,000 Debenture case, to convert the unbelieving public.

You and your honest colleagues, with an utter disregard of all constitutional propriety, try to fasten upon me the responsibility of undertaking *surveys* in the North-West before the actual transfer of the country. You know the truth of this matter. The errant knight, the writer of your pamphlet, probably does not. It is my duty now to make it known to the public. In the latter part of June, 1869, when it was expected the transfer would take place about the 1st October, it was proposed by Sir J. A. Macdonald that at least "twenty surveyors" should be immediately sent to the North-West to lay out townships for settlement. I strongly objected to the proposition, and gave my reasons. It was urged that it was a good opportunity to gratify "our friends" who wanted employment. That the *Globe* and other leading western papers were denouncing the Government for its tardiness in the matter, (which was quite true), and that a season would be lost if we did not act at once. I pointed out the danger of such precipitation, the absence of any necessity for the survey of so many townships immediately, and the *fact* that we had no authority until after the transfer to make surveys at all. You and your then colleagues will remember the warmth of the debate, and that the result was a telegram to Earl Granville asking him to obtain from the H. B. Company permission to begin the survey of townships previous to the formal transfer. In two or three days an answer came from the Colonial Secretary that the Company had consented. The Premier was ill, and

did not attend Council for some days after the reply was received. His proposition to survey twenty townships at once was taken up in his absence, and you all agreed, without a dissentient voice, that my plan was preferable, viz. :—To employ an able and experienced surveyor, with a small staff ; to send him out to examine the country and report a plan of survey adapted to its topographical peculiarities ; to find out the views of the land-owners, and the position of surveys and titles already made in Red River settlement ; and if he found it expedient, to begin operations at Oak-point, a place some thirty miles from Fort Garry, on the Government Road between Red River and Lake of the Woods. In consequence of the peculiar views of the Premier, I was unwilling to proceed without another discussion with him, and a formal decision of the Government, but all present on the occasion, and you among them, authorized me to adopt the course I had indicated, and to proceed departmentally. That very afternoon I telegraphed Col. Dennis, a gentleman whose professional skill and energetic character I knew would be everywhere admitted, and offered him the position of superintendent of this work. He promptly visited Ottawa, received his instructions from me. (July 10th), conferred with other Ministers, and proceeded to the North-West. The press generally, including the *Globe*, spoke highly of the appointment. He was directed to “confer with Governor McTavish” before commencing operations, and carried a letter informing the Governor of the authorization of surveys by the Company through Lord Granville. In the face of these facts, you have the hardihood to assert that “the course taken by Col. Dennis, *according to his instructions*, was the most imprudent that he could have adopted ;” and shirking for yourself and your colleagues your just share of responsibility, boldly charge that the “most serious of the difficulties were the consequence of Mr. McDougall’s imprudence.” Not content with this, you misrepresent, in your zeal to assail me, the facts as they occurred. After accusing me of “withholding altogether very alarming information” as to the necessity of extinguishing the Indian title, which Col. Dennis had pointed out as “the first question of importance to be dealt with by the Government,” you quote as mine, in order to condemn it, a letter from the Department of Public Works, written on the 4th October, some days after I had left Ottawa ! I observe that Sir Francis Hincks repeated at Renfrew, the mis-statements of your pamphlet on this point, and asserted with

emphasis that "the surveys produced the rebellion!" Every person in the North-West, acquainted with the movements of last fall and winter, will laugh at the absurdity of this statement.\* The surveys were made the pretext by Richot & Co., at some of their first meetings, to excite the ignorant half-breeds, but they were never seriously put forth as a reason for rebellion. In the "Declaration of Independence," and the "List of Rights," they are not once referred to. But if this silly story were true, why is the Premier, who wanted "twenty townships" surveyed forthwith, to be excused, and the Minister of Public Works who reduced the proposal to *one* township at Oak-Point, and a meridian line and preliminary report, to be condemned? And why should you, and Sir George Cartier, and the other members of the Council who concurred in my plan, escape censure? Is this your idea of Responsible Government?

You have published lengthy extracts from two letters of Col. Dennis, received at the Department of Public Works on the eve of my departure for the North-West. These extracts contained nothing but opinions and suggestions as to the best mode of dealing with the Indians and the Indian title on my assumption of the Government, and had no reference whatever to the "plan of survey" which he recommended, and which I asked the Council to approve. Yet you blame me for not embodying these *opinions* in my official report upon "rectangular" townships, meridian lines, &c., and accuse me of "withholding" them from the Government! My answer to this charge—paltry, if true, but which only a man dead to every sentiment of honour would make, if false—will be explicit, and fortunately can be corroborated by evidence as strong as my answers to your other charges:—Col. Dennis' apprehension of trouble from the Indians, as well as a recommendation—which you have *not* noticed in your "review"—to send arms and ammunition for the equipment of two or three companies of volunteers, *were* brought under the notice of all the members of the Government who took any interest in the subject, *and resulted in my being authorized, by the Minister*

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\* "The men who have thus interfered say they know the survey could proceed without any injury to any one; but stopping it is always a beginning, and they are desirous to let the Canadian Government know that it (the Canadian Government) is not wanted by them."—*Extract from letter of Governor McTavish to W. S. Smith, Secretary H. B. Company, dated Red River, 12th October, 1869.*

of Militia, to take with me 350 breech-loading rifles, with 30,000 rounds of ammunition, which you passed on the plains, probably without notice, certainly without any warning that they would fall into the hands of your friends the French half-breeds, if taken into the territory! I was absent from Ottawa on official duty when the letters of Col. Dennis arrived, and you were on your way to Fort Garry to explain the good intentions of the Government, and to ascertain the true condition of affairs. What more could have been done? Do you mean to contend that because Col. Dennis advised an early settlement with the Indians, and thought it "likely" the French half-breeds would prove a "turbulent element," I ought to have declined to follow you, and that the Government ought *then* to have declined to accept the country? As to the Indians I had no apprehensions, and the result proved that I was right, and that Col. Dennis was unnecessarily anxious. As to the French half-breeds, we all knew that they were under the control of their priests, and that Governor McTavish, when in Ottawa, had not even hinted at any "turbulence" from that quarter.\* I cannot, after what has since occurred, undertake to say that the lay Jesuit in the Council—the gentleman whose services to the Priesthood have since been rewarded by the decoration of the Order of St. Gregory, conferred upon him by the Pope—did not know that the Jesuit Priests in the North-West were plotting rebellion and murder; but I do not believe that Sir George Cartier at that time suspected it, and I know that it was wholly unsuspected by me. You will, perhaps, allow me to conclude my answer to the charge of suppressing important information with a question:—If you did not think the *fact*, that the half-breeds had stopped one of Col. Dennis' surveying parties, (which occurred before he left Fort Garry), of sufficient importance to communicate it to me when you met me on the plains—if you could "withhold" from me, your colleague, without "blame," the actual fact, (which you did), how can you find fault with me for "withholding" (which I did not) from

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\* On the 16th December, after Mr. Howe had read Col. Dennis' letters to me and had visited the country himself, he concurred in the following justification of the peace policy of the Government:—"When Governor McTavish visited Canada in June last, he was in communication with the Canadian Government, and he never intimated that he even had a suspicion of discontent existing, nor did he make any suggestions as to the best mode of effecting the proposed change with the assent of the inhabitants."—*Report of Committee of Council, 16th December, 1869, in answer to Lord Granville.*

my colleagues at Ottawa, the mere apprehension of one of my subordinates that such a thing was "likely" to happen from the "turbulence" of the half-breeds? I shall leave you, sir, in that *crux*, confident that you will not, even with the aid of the artful dodgers about you, be able to escape from it, until we meet again on the floor of Parliament.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

#### LETTER VI.

SIR,—Having noticed, and I trust sufficiently answered, the material accusations of your pamphlet against the "policy of Mr. McDougall and his partizans," I shall now take the liberty of which you have so freely availed yourself in my case, to pass under review "the policy" of the Canadian Government in dealing with rebels, when they happen to be patronized in certain influential quarters.

That policy may be conveniently reviewed under five heads or divisions :—

1. The conduct of the Government prior to the 16th November, when they received notice of the armed insurrection of Richot & Co.
2. Their conduct and policy from that date to the introduction of the Manitoba Bill.
3. The Manitoba Bill, and the policy of the Government as evidenced by its provisions.
4. The Expedition, and the attempts to render it subservient to the objects of Bishop Tache and his co-conspirators.
5. The policy of the Government since the transfer of the country, —preventing emigration, obstructing settlement, introducing Quebec lawyers and French law into Manitoba, breaking faith with, and ignoring the Indians, thereby exposing the distant settlers and settlements to their depredations.

(1.) Under the first head I may remark, that in replying to your strictures upon my conduct during the same period, I have necessarily stated some facts and expressed some opinions which illustrate, if they do not

ully explain, the policy of the Government previous to the outbreak. It is sufficient, perhaps, to add that by endorsing and defending your disloyal and mischievous conduct as their representative, and as my precursor, they have made it their own, and must be held to have meditated, planned, and intended that which by your mouth they proclaimed, and in your person have deliberately approved. This conclusion is in strict accordance with the theory of responsible government; it commends itself to our common sense and is justified by our political experience. The policy of the Canadian Government as proved by the terms of Sir John A. Macdonald's Bill of 1869, for the temporary government of the Territories; by the sending of a considerable number of officials from Canada and instructing me to select others from the officials of the Hudson Bay Company, was well adapted to excite the indignation, and the moral, if not the physical, resistance of the people of Red River, while your seditious talk, and bibulous fraternization with the leaders of the conspiracy at Fort Garry, and your offensive discourtesy to, and open denunciation of, the loyal portion of the settlers, were the most effective complement of the original design that could have been devised. The one provoked rebellion; the other promised it success.

I am disclosing no secret of the Council room when I affirm that in September, 1868, except Mr. Tilly and myself, every member of the Government was either indifferent or hostile to the acquisition of the North West Territories. When they discovered that a ministerial crisis respecting the route of the Intercolonial Railway could only be avoided by an immediate agreement (and immediate action) to secure the transfer of these territories to the Dominion, they were ready to act. On the same day that Sir John A. Macdonald, and Mr. Campbell surrendered the interests of Ontario to Quebec and Mr. Mitchell—and threw eight millions of dollars into the sea—I carried a proposition to send a deputation to England with full power to close negotiations for the purchase of one-third of the North American continent as an off-set. The purchase was effected, and to all appearance the Anti-North-West-Extensionists accepted the situation. You had not yet extorted your two millions for Nova Scotia, nor secured a place for yourself, and places for your two sons, on the official staff of the Dominion. You were willing to carry the railway around by the north shore, to prevent the people of the west from making St. John their winter seaport, by

which they would save 260 miles of expensive and hazardous transportation by rail, (to say nothing of the extra eight millions,) but you never agreed, it seems, to give up your hostility to the founding of provinces and the creation of political power in the North-West. I leave the question whether you have advanced or they have receded, to the sober judgment of those intelligent observers, who have not forgotten your antecedents nor theirs.

2. From the day on which you received notice at Ottawa of an armed resistance to my entrance into the territory as the representative of the Canadian Government—information which did not surprise you—until my return to Canada, the policy of the government was consistent—and Sir Francis Hincks tells us, harmonious—in one direction, namely, *to abandon the country!*

Your first position was, that you had bought an estate, and that there was an implied contract to give you quiet possession. The armed uprising of a Roman Catholic priest and a few of his parishioners, inspired and encouraged by letters from Canada, first from Bishop Tache, and afterwards from political as well as clerical sympathisers—including your own special visit of sympathy and encouragement—was made a charge against the H. B. Company and the Imperial Government, and a reason for refusing to accept the transfer of the country. You contended that Richot and his parishioners, must be put down by British soldiers, sent at the expense of the over-taxed people of England, and you have boasted of your success in forcing Lord Granville to undertake the job, as a great diplomatic *coup*; “General Lindsay would not have been sent out, and Col. Wolseley would not have been allowed to command “the expedition!” Not only would we have suffered that deprivation, but a greater still,—“Bishop Tache would not have been summoned from Rome (why?) and as the people of Red River would not have been invited (by whom?) to send delegates to Ottawa, Reil would have maintained his ascendancy until conquered *by Canada.*” Therefore it was a great policy—an achievement for which Canada should hold its incomparable ministers in ever grateful remembrance—to refuse the transfer at the time agreed upon, and to compel the Imperial Government to send General Lindsay to Canada, and Col. Wolseley, with 300 British soldiers on an expedition into the wilderness, paddling and scrambling for hundreds of miles through dangerous rapids, and (until

they bridged them, impassable swamps, in order that Riel might be "conquered" by England and not by Canada! All honour to the gallant Colonel: he like the King of France, with his "twenty thousand men, marched up the hill," blew his bugle blast, "and then marched down again." If he had found an enemy no doubt he would gladly have measured swords with him, but being sent on a "mission of peace," he had no power to arrest Reil and his co-conspirators if he had met them. They might have taken sanctuary (as it was for some time supposed they had) with their "best friend" the Bishop,\* or even have walked out of Fort Garry and bestowed themselves in their mud cabins at St. Norbert, with perfect impunity. A more humiliating service no British officer was ever asked to undertake; a more contemptible farce no strolling players ever offered to the small boys of a penny theatre with the expectation of applause. Your next decision,—in arriving at which, Sir Francis tells us, there was not a shadow of a shade of dissension among you,—was to leave me without support, advice or direction, except to "remain at Pembina."† You knew I was surrounded by outlaws and desperadoes, who were in league with the rebels. They were daily threatening, and nightly watching for an opportunity to take my life, and yet you generously left me to myself, and considerably allowed me to "exercise my own judgment, and decide on the instant what was best to be done."‡

Your next step was to send messengers to the insurgents with instructions to recognize them as "established authorities." Mr. Donald Smith and Vicar General Thibault did this so effectually, that one man was tried and shot for speaking disrespectfully of these "authorities," and others were imprisoned and threatened with death for like offences, while your missionaries looked on with mild disapproval, but without loss of prestige with the rebels, with whom they still continued to advise in the administration of affairs!

Your "special messenger," Col. De Salaberry, who was sent to me

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\* See the letter of Bishop Tache to Riel, Appendix B.

† "If he (Gov. McTavish) either declines to admit you, or is powerless to give you safe conduct, stay where you are till further advised."—Despatch signed "Joseph Howe," dated 19th November.

‡ "At this distance from the scene of disturbance, any instructions that could be sent to you would only embarrass you and restrain your freedom of action. You will, therefore, exercise your own judgment, and decide on the instant, as circumstances change, what is best to be done."—Despatch of 29th November.

because he "spoke French fluently" and was "a gentleman of some experience," came fresh from your department at Ottawa with the old Jesuit falsehood about my oppression at Manitoulin, and my unjust treaty with the Indians,\* and as soon as he passed me on the plains, developed the real object of his mission by denouncing me and my "partizans," (as you stigmatize the loyal Canadians of the territory) to the half-breeds he met on his journey. (*See Major Wallace's Report, Appendix C.*) This special messenger immediately fraternized with the rebels, followed your example in railing at the loyalists and devoted his military "experience," with Riel's approval, to the training and drilling of the half-breed pupils of St. Boniface, so that they would be able to "present arms" in the most approved manner at any Canadian troops that might be sent to subdue them! The mock trial and subsequent butchery of the unfortunate prisoner Scott, took place in their presence—we may some day learn how far, if at all, with their connivance. But this we already know, that they continued to fraternize, and consult, and drill, as before. We know also, that the dignitary who was summoned from Rome, and entrusted by you with a higher and more special commission than either of the three gentlemen who preceded him, arrived *after* the murder, and immediately recognized the murderers as the "established authorities" of the country. A word from their Bishop to the ignorant half-breeds, who prostrated themselves before him as he passed, would have sent them all to their homes, and re-established the lawful Government of Assinaboia, *but that word was not spoken.* At a later date, while intriguing with some of your colleagues to smuggle Mr. Archibald into the country in advance of the troops, he addressed Riel in the most affectionate terms, and deemed him so good a Christian, so nearly a Saint, that he thought even a Bishop might be benefited by his prayers! (*See Appendix B.*) All these missionaries have been extolled, their acts have been approved, and their expenses liberally paid by the Government. *Their* policy is, therefore, *your* policy; and I am not surprised, that seeing the storm-cloud in the sky, you are anxious to seek

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\* The cession of Manitoulin was proposed by the Tache-McDonald Government, completed by the McDonald-Sicotte Government, and confirmed, and modified to the disadvantage of the Indians, at the suggestion of Mr. Campbell, by the Belleau-McDonald Government; yet the organs of the present Government hold me guilty of a crime for agreeing to the treaty!—*See Report of Col. De Salaberry's conversation with Major Wallace, App. C.*

any refuge, even that which the Prophet assures us, the hail shall sweep away and the waters overflow.\* The Manitoba Bill and the Expedition, so far as they illustrate your policy and aims, are too important to be reviewed in this letter, and I remain, therefore,

Yours, &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

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#### LETTER VII.

SIR,—The Manitoba Bill has a history which is too important to be relegated to the limbo of unrecorded controversies. It will justify an effort to set down the principal facts in precise terms and in chronological order :

(1.) A Bill to secure to Red River settlers their "rights" was not proposed or apparently intended to be passed by the Canadian Government, until Lord Granville made such a measure the condition on which Imperial assistance would be given to put down the rebellion.

(2.) Although Lord Granville telegraphed on the 5th March, that military assistance would be given "provided reasonable terms are granted Red River settlers," &c., and, again on the 23rd April, sent an ultimatum in which he stipulated that the Canadian Government should "accept the decision of Her Majesty's Government on all points of the settler's Bill of Rights," no answer was returned on the subject of this stipulation; because as the official "Review" informs us, it "might have led to grave complications."

(3.) The Imperial Government were led to believe that "delegates appointed by a council freely elected by the *people of all classes* in the Red River Settlement," were on their way to Ottawa when these stipulations, as to a settler's Bill of Rights, were made conditions precedent to Imperial co-operation.

(4.) In the second week of April Pere. Richot, next to Pere. Lestanc, the chief of the Insurrection; Scott, an American citizen, acting as a clerk in McKenney's shop, and representing no one but himself and the

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\* Isaiah, Chap. 28, v. 15, 17.

American or annexation party, followed by Judge Black, of the Hudson Bay Company, who was leaving the country for his own, if not the country's good, appeared at Ottawa, calling themselves *Delegates* from Red River. They were named at a Convention of the Insurgents in Fort Garry, attended by a few English who were present rather from fear of personal violence than of free will, and could only protest against the acts of the majority. The "freely elected council" deliberated with Riel's armed guards at the door,—Governor McTavish, Dr. Cowan, and even Mr. Donald Smith, being at the time close prisoners!

(5.) With these so-called Delegates (two of them reeking with the blood of a murdered prisoner) whose acts in their pretended character of Delegates, the Provisional Government refused to acknowledge, the terms of the Manitoba Bill were arranged. The loyal portion of the settlement sent delegates in a less formal way, but they were only consulted *after* the Bill was agreed to by the other parties, and little if any attention was paid to their suggestions.

(6.) Notwithstanding the recent asseveration to the contrary, of Sir Francis Hincks, it was well known at Ottawa that while the Bill was on the Ministerial anvil, there were many and some hot controversies in the council room. Sir John, who was believed to be contending against the schemes of the Jesuits, fell ill and well nigh lost his life. The chevalier of St. Gregory took charge of the measure on behalf of the priesthood; Sir George conducted it through the House, and but for the determined efforts of a few members of the opposition, it would have passed in its original form. A French Catholic Province would have been established in Manitoba; a French Governor would have followed; and French customs, and French civil law, would have taken the place of English institutions, and English law, which prevailed before the transfer, and still have legal existence in that country. Even under the Bill as it passed, an attempt is being made with the aid of Lower Canada Lawyers, and a subservient Governor, to supercede the English Judicial system, by one more agreeable to Bishop Tache and his foreign priests.

(7.) The Bill as submitted to Parliament by the dominant faction in the Cabinet, was *on the face of it*, a Bill to establish French half-breed and foreign ecclesiastical ascendancy in Manitoba. The English and Protestant settlement of the *Portage*, the most promising in the Territory, was, by a cunningly drawn boundary line, excluded from the Province.

Father Richot expected by his arrangement to secure for himself and his faction, the easy control of the new government. When I pointed out this as the probable result and object of the peculiar configuration of the proposed province, and Mr. Mackenzie with his compasses on the map, proved the truth of my suspicion as to the exclusion of the *Portage* settlement, Ministers confessed the fact, and attempted to justify it by a falsehood,—to wit, that the people of the Portage “desired” to be excluded! A sufficient number of the Ontario supporters of the Government signified their intention to vote with the opposition on this point to compel even the chevalier of St. Gregory to expand his contracted ideas a little, and take in the English settlement on the borders of Lake Manitoba. But the emasculated section of the Cabinet cannot claim any credit for the change; it was forced upon them by the House, and their helplessness in the subsequent stages of the measure, proved that their political virility was lost forever.

(8.) The “Appropriation” \* of 1,400,000 acres of the ungranted lands of the Province “towards the extinguishment of the Indian title”—but by a strange contradiction reserved “for the benefit of the families of the half-breed residents,” was intended to prevent, and is now made the excuse for discouraging immigration and settlement in Manitoba. No land system has since been promulgated, no surveys ordered, no authority given to settlers to preempt vacant lands, but the half-breed *reserve*, which was not even asked for in their “List of Rights,” is used, as the Quebec *Mercury* and other ministerial organs said it would be used, to keep English settlers out of Manitoba. †

(9.) All the usual qualifications required of Candidates for a Legislative Assembly were purposely, and in spite of amendments proposed by members of opposition, omitted from the Manitoba Act. Candidates for

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\*In your Review you have so altered the 31st section of the Act by omitting the words which make an “appropriation” of lands, as to convey an impression that no specific quantity of land has been reserved. Is this quite honest?

† “Mr. Langevin need be under no apprehension from the threats and muttered thunder of the Western Clear Grits. His country will stand by him as a unity if he has but attempted to *keep the speculators, jobbers, and land sharks of Ontario*, from plying their destructive, dishonest and injurious vocation amongst the people of Assinaboine territory. *Ontario is not to be suffered to mirror herself and her institutions in the Saskatchewan Valley.* Nothing short of the foundation of such a province in the North West as shall give the Lower Canada of yore and Quebec of to-day a *staunch Western ally in the Confederation* should content either this province or the bold and patriotic descendants of the North West pioneers.” *Quebec Mercury, (Mr. Langevin's English organ,) on the debates in Parliament*

the House of Commons must be of age, subjects of Her Majesty, resident for a year before the writ of election within the Province, and *bona fide* householders ; but for the Local House they may be strangers, aliens, outlaws, murderers, anything the half-breeds are told to vote for ! The object of this unprecedented liberty of choice was all but avowed. The flutter created on the Ministerial benches when I moved a proviso that "no person guilty of felony," should be eligible, and the pressure put upon a distinguished supporter of the Government from Ontario to induce him to argue that such a proviso was legally impracticable, showed the anxiety of Ministers on the subject and their determination to open the Assembly to Reil, O'Donohue, Lepine, Ross, McKenney, Scott, and the like.

(10.) The imposition of a system of sectarian schools upon the new province, in advance of legislation by the Local Assembly, and in the absence of any expressed desire for such a system,—nay, in opposition to the claim of Reil's Convention (see "List of Rights" No. 6 and 16) to regulate all such matters for themselves, is a flagrant proof of the determination of the dominant faction at Ottawa, to "mirror"—in the language of Mr. Langevin's English organ—Quebec "and its institutions" in the province of Manitoba.

Your "policy" in respect to the North West, may be collected with tolerable facility and little danger of misconception from these ten particulars of the history and provisions of the Manitoba Bill. I shall not dwell upon them. None of them are new to you, and with most of them the public are already familiar. I will merely add that nothing has occurred since Parliament rose to convince me that the territorial system, which the experience of our American neighbours has so fully approved, which even the self-asserting constitution-makers at Fort Garry, deemed sufficient for their case,\* and which I had the honour to submit in amendment to your scheme, would not have been a far safer, a far less expensive, and more acceptable system of Government for the

\* (4.) "That while the burden of the Public expense in this country is borne by Canada the country shall be governed under a Lieutenant Governor from Canada and a Legislature, three members of whom being heads of departments shall be nominated by the Governor General of Canada."

(5.) "That after the expiration of this exceptional period (how long it should last they did not suggest) the country shall be governed as regards its local affairs as the Province of Ontario and Quebec are governed, by a Legislature elected by the people and a ministry responsible to it," &c.—*List of Rights adopted by Reil's convention, Feb. 10, 1870.*

political neophytes and unlettered hunters of the western plains. You and your colleagues, ignoring all experience, and deaf to the wishes and suggestions of that convention of "the people" of Red River, you recognized as a legitimate authority, gave them a complicated and costly system of responsible self-government in 1870, although you had refused the same people even so much as a Municipal council in 1869!—and you now ask the world to applaud your statesmanship, and admire your "policy!" A year ago, *luctucas non esse dandus dum cardui sufficient* was your motto and policy, but Father Richot taught you a new version when he reached Ottawa. Translated into plain English I have no doubt it would read:—"Give me a small Province on the American border, with a local responsible government; cut off the pestilent English settlement at Lake Manitoba; reserve all the best land along the River for my half-breeds; give me a pliant Governor; let me fill the Manitoba Parliament with my faithful cut-throats, Riel, Lepine, O'Donohue, & Co., and I will undertake that no "land shark" shall settle there. Holding the gate-way to the North West, I will see that Ontario is not "suffered to mirror herself or her institutions in the Saskatchewan Valley!" A new view of the question was thus presented to the opponents of western extension. From the extreme of indifference and political deprivation, you suddenly rushed to the other extreme of local independence, democratic license, and half-breed ascendancy. Hence the enormous reserve of 1,400,000 acres of the best land; hence the restriction of the franchise to householders for a year previous to the elections, and the exclusion of all Canadians not actual householders in the territory, or who may remove to it within the next four years, from all electoral privileges; hence the efforts to delay, and at one time procure the recall, of the Expedition; hence the intrigue to send Mr. Archibald under convoy of Bishop Tache, *via* the United States, to receive the reins of Government from the hands of President Riel; hence the unjust and insulting exclusion of all the loyal Canadian and native refugees from the territory, from any part or lot in the Military Expedition, which they could have pioneered and greatly aided; hence the sending with that expedition of a clerical emissary, who was to keep, and did keep, Riel informed of its progress, of the number of soldiers and volunteers, their arms, supplies, &c.; hence the invitation to disaster in the swamps and defiles of Rainy lake and river, by violating promises made to the warlike Indians of

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that region, in the name of the Government and on the authority of the Premier ; and hence, finally, the schemes now on foot to unite the Hudson Bay Company's employees, who wish to keep the whole North West a hunting ground as long as possible, with Bishop Tache, Richot, and their Buffalo-hunters, and a few easily persuaded adventurers from Canada, into a political party to carry the elections, and—accomplish *your policy*. But you will not succeed. History, and science, and the irrepressible spirit of modern civilization are against you. Your Jesuit allies with their treacherous doctrines, their blood-stained hands, and their indiscriminate hostility to human progress in whatever form, have ruined every power and every cause that has trusted or employed them. Even the Pope himself could not survive their patronage. By their intrigues, they rendered him so unpopular with his own subjects that his reign as a temporal sovereign could not be maintained. Driven, and being driven, from nearly every country in Europe, these dark birds of evil omen seem to have alighted upon the northern shores of the great lakes of America, and to have spread themselves, under the name of *Oblats*, over the vast regions and among the nomadic tribes of the North West. They will fight hard to retain possession. In the course of official duty I disturbed, a few years ago, one of their out-posts on the Island of Manitoulin, and the falsehood and calumny with which they have pursued me ever since, and the secret wires pulled for that purpose, prove at once their vindictive spirit, their indomitable energy, and their powerful influence in our complex society. When the Chevalier of St. Gregory, under the pretence of visiting the site of a talked-of Canal at Sault Ste. Marie,—of which he understands little, and about which he cares less—is met by a flock of Jesuit Priests from distant missions, who must have been notified of his coming, and when he ventures to employ one of Her Majesty's Gun Boats for such a service, we must admit that they have secured at least, one bold and efficient representative in the Cabinet. When you and the ex-ruler of Demarara, who could pull a Chief Justice from his bench without a wry face, are compelled to write pamphlets defending the priests, and charging me with “fearfully abusing” them, because I simply reported the truth respecting their unlawful act, as it was my duty to do, and which no one has ventured to contradict,—which even you admit in the same page that contains your shabby charge—we may see to what straits you have been reduced,

what dirt-eating and dirt-throwing service is exacted from you, by your inexorable masters.

The history of the Military Expedition to Fort Garry cannot now be written. If the official reports of Col. Wolesley and other officers of that expedition, should happen to be asked for in the English House of Commons, we may have an opportunity of verifying a good many curious statements at present passing from mouth to mouth under the restraint of confidential communication. But enough has transpired to satisfy every attentive observer that it was never *your* policy or that of a majority of your colleagues, to send any expedition whatever to the North West. The indignant expression of public opinion—chiefly from Ontario—and the bold and determined attitude of the leaders of opposition in Parliament, compelled you to organize the force and put it motion, The same unmistakable opinion, reinforced by public meetings, and the denunciations, all but unanimous, of the loyal press of the Dominion, prevented you from recalling it after it had reached Thunder Bay, \* but while you were deterred from the execution of Bishop Tache's plan—probably Sir George was unable to "induce" His Excellency to assent to it,—you did the next best thing for Bishop Tache's "best friend," the rebel President,—you deprived the Commander of the Expedition of the power to arrest him, or to invoke the aid of any magistrate for that purpose! Riel sat upon a horse at the Stone Fort and watched the approach of Col. Wolesley's boats, saw the soldiers land, counted their numbers, and rode leisurely to Fort Garry. The messenger left behind to give him notice of the advance of the troops towards the Upper Fort, was captured by the skirmishers, and the President had barely time to gather up the £5,000 he had *borrowed*—to use the word which will be most agreeable to your ears,—from the Hudson Bay Company, and make off towards Pembina. He could easily have been caught and the booty recovered, but no one had authority to take him. His private correspondence was left behind. A portion of it has been published, but a still more curious and instructive portion was carried off while the

\* "Ottawa, July 18.—Bishop Tache will arrive here this evening from Montreal. The Privy Council held a Special meeting on Saturday.

It is stated here on good authority, that Sir George E. Cartier will proceed with Lieut. Gov. Archibald to Niagara Falls next Wednesday to induce His Excellency, Sir J. Young, to go to the North West *via* Pembina with Lieut. Gov. Archibald and Bishop Tache. On their arrival Riel is to deliver up the Government to them and the expeditionary troops will be withdrawn."—*Special despatch to Toronto Leader.* (Government organ.)

officer in charge was at dinner. One of the loyal clerks of the Hudson Bay Company, who was seen going into the room is supposed to have performed this useful service for the President's epistolary friends.

The consequences of your "policy" in sending a military officer to put down the rebellion with his hands tied (civilly) behind his back, were soon apparent at Fort Garry. A letter from General Lindsay—at whose instance written we can guess—rebuking the gallant commander of the expedition for referring to civil affairs in his Proclamation to the Red River people, compelled him to fold his arms, and look on in helpless disability, while riot and debauchery held high revel in the town. If the mass of the people had ever seriously meditated revolution, your expedition, disarmed as it was of all civil power, would have introduced anarchy, and not order, into that distracted settlement. But the Indians were loyal, and the English and Scotch half-breeds were loyal, and a large number of the French half-breeds were, from the first, opposed to the designs of the insurgents. All these well-affected people believed that the interregnum of disorder would not last long; that the volunteers at least were their friends, and that your Representative, whatever his instructions might be, would not dare to attempt a reactionary policy of his own authority, and without the consent of responsible advisers. appointed under the provisions of their new constitution. They waited with as much patience as they could command, but their confidence, as it seems to me, has not been completely justified by the tardy and uncertain acts of the Governor. They more than suspected that his hands had been tied, as well as those of his military predecessor. Events will soon exhibit your policy in the civil administration, but they have already shown, beyond question, that the success of the Expedition, so far as it may be said to have extinguished Riel, and subdued the rebellious priests has been accomplished against the wish and in spite of the secret intrigues of the pro-rebel faction at Ottawa.

Grave constitutional questions are involved in your mode of organizing and conducting military expeditions, which parliament will be compelled to answer as soon as it meets.

These questions are:—Can the Dominion Government, responsible to the people of this country for the expenditure of public money, be permitted to abdicate its authority whenever a few desperadoes assemble on the frontier, or a few priests excite a riot in some distant settlement?

Can that Government transfer to Imperial officers, the duty of directing operations, and the authority to incur expenditure *ad libitum*, which the Parliament of Canada is bound to pay? Is there any constitutional check, control, or responsibility in such a system? If blundering incapacity, and reckless extravagance—such as we have witnessed in the fitting up of unnecessary barracks, and the chartering of foreign steamers that were not wanted—should be proved against these Imperial officers, will the Minister of Militia be permitted to say that *he* is not responsible because they were not subject to his orders? The representatives of the Canadian tax-payers will, let us hope, be ready to give the proper answers to these questions when submitted, as they soon must be, for their decision.

One word, in conclusion, as to the composition of the expeditionary force. Instead of calling for volunteers who wished to *settle* in the new Province, and who would have been glad to serve for a year or more, at the minimum of pay, with a grant of land on their discharge in Manitoba, you attempted to organize a force in equal proportions from Quebec and Ontario, in the hope that one half would, politically, antagonise the other—one man for Bishop Tache and one for Canada,—but the result disappointed the cunning projectors, and your scheme miscarried. After weeks of delay which cost this country a large sum, and increased unnecessarily, the expense of the Imperial contingent, less than a hundred French Canadians were enlisted! The remainder of the “Quebec battalion,” as, by a pleasant metonymy, it is still called, were drummed up wherever they could be found, in Ontario! The enterprising young men of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were not wanted because, probably, they could not be trusted; they were, therefore, ignominiously excluded. When the accounts of the expedition are submitted to parliament, we shall be able to estimate how much this part of your “policy” has cost the Dominion.

I am yours, &c.,

WM. MACDOUGAL

## LETTER VIII.

SIR,—I shall conclude my review of your policy with a brief notice of the course of events in the North West, and at Ottawa, since the appointment of Mr. Archibald as your representative. Of the appointment itself, and the circumstances under which it was made, I cannot, for obvious reasons, speak without some reserve; but as a faithful servant of Her Majesty, as a native Canadian of the stock of "United Empire Loyalists," as one of the earliest projectors, and in the course of events, one of the responsible constructors of the political confederation, authorized by the Imperial Act of 1867, I may, perhaps, be permitted to say that in my judgment, that appointment was, under the circumstances, not the best that could have been made in the interests of the new Dominion.

It is much to be feared that the keystone in that majestic political Arch, which all true Canadians hoped would soon span the northern half of this Continent, has received a treacherous blow from some of its architects. Unfortunately it came from within, and before the cementing mortar had time to dry. There are signs, sufficiently alarming, that a dangerous displacement has occurred, that the equilibrium of the structure has been impaired, and that a heavy or sudden pressure would tumble it in ruins. I have spent the greater part of my political life in advocating the extension of popular rule, yet I never doubted or denied the necessity for a prompt and vigorous execution of the law, and a stern assertion of authority by the governing power of the state against its armed foes, whether from within or from without. Nothing in the history of modern political science is more instructive to governments, or more gratifying to the admirers of free institutions and the sovereignty of the people, than the determined spirit, the willing sacrifice of life and property, and the unflagging faith in the ability of their government to establish its authority in spite of frequent and disheartening reverses, which the inhabitants of the free States exhibited in their recent terrible struggle with the rebel slave-holders of the South. Thousands of the northern people believed that some of the complaints of their southern brethren were well founded, but when they preferred them at the cannon's mouth; when to redress them, they

assailed the national fortresses, tore down the national flag, and avowed their intention to dis sever the Union, there was no halting between two opinions in the North, and if the Government had responded at once to the popular demand for an adequate repressive force, the first year of the war would have been the last. But even during that deadly and protracted struggle, no compromises were made with armed rebels, except such as humanity required in the hour of conflict, and no laws were passed by Congress at the demand of rebel "delegates," hobnobbing with Secretaries of State in the Capital. The rebellion was put down with a strong hand, and although the lives of the chiefs were spared, they were not immediately selected for preferment, nor consulted as to the organization of government in the States they had seduced into rebellion. Honest Lincoln and "unconditional surrender" Grant, taught the refractory citizens of the American Republic a lesson of submission to constituted authority, which will not be forgotten, at least by this generation.

But the "advisers of the Crown" in our case have inculcated another and a different lesson. They have said that it is not inconsistent with sound policy, or derogatory to the honour and dignity of the Sovereign, *to treat with rebels in arms*: they have not hesitated to humiliate Parliament by submitting for its adoption, laws dictated by these rebels with arms in their hands, and still holding a Government Fort, in which they imprisoned Her Majesty's subjects, and exacted *ransoms* from her merchant traders, for the restoration of their confiscated property!\* But even this was not enough; they descended still lower in the scale of degradation, and surrendered the very prerogatives of the Crown into rebel hands, by superseding one Governor because he was obnoxious to their leaders, and appointing another who had first made himself acceptable by publicly defending their representatives, and denouncing loyal men who risked their lives in support of the authority of their Queen.† They have taught the savages and semi-savages of our out-

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\*Bishop Tache's "best friend," Riel, after sending Delegates to treat with the Queen's Representative at Ottawa, made a levy on the furs of the Hudson Bay Company at Fort Garry, and exacted \$25,000 as a *ransom*, before he would give them up. This is now one of the items of claim against Canada by the Hudson Bay Company!

†See Mr. Archibald's speech in the House of Commons during the debate on the Manitoba Bill, 7th May, 1870. See also the suppressed passage of Vicar-General Thibault's Report, in which he announced that "neither Mr. Macdougall nor any of his party would ever be allowed to enter the country."

lying territories that they may rob, and imprison and murder loyal men with impunity, whenever their ghostly instructors incite them to such outrages; and they have notified peaceable, honest, and loyal men everywhere, that resistance to rebels in such cases is impolitic, if not criminal, and certain to be followed by official censure, deprivation of office, refusal of indemnity, and ostracism from public life, both civil and military.\* The most implacable enemies of England and of English institutions on this side of the Atlantic; the most inveterate opponents of confederation (of whom you have been, and still are, the chief) could not have suggested the adoption of a policy better fitted to attain the ends *they* desire, than the policy which teaches such lessons as these.

This policy to which you have given the euphemistic name of "conciliation," marks every step of the "excellent governor" who, you tell us in your pamphlet, "has been sent to administer equal justice to all." It is pretended that Mr. Archibald, like Mr. Howland or General Doyle, is the Governor of a federalized province, the constitutional head of a co-ordinate member of the confederation, ruling by the advice of responsible ministers, and subject to instructions from Ottawa in matters of federal and imperial concern only. To this view corresponds the law, but where are the responsible ministers in Manitoba? Who has delayed the summoning of the local legislature for months, under the pretence of a difficulty in designating the electoral divisions, a work that could easily have been accomplished in two or three weeks? At whose instance, and at whose cost, is the *New Nation* converted into a Government organ, and Ex-Chief Justice Ross, and other worthies of the same school, sent into the parishes to proclaim Government candidates, and to get kicked out for their pains? What responsible minister advised the dismissal of the loyal Mulligan, and the appointment of the rebel Rickards, as Chief of Police? Who advised, and who is responsible for the appointment of unpardoned and unrepentant rebels to the magistrate's bench, that they may dispense "equal justice" according to their standard, upon the loyal inhabitants whom they had robbed, imprisoned and terrified with daily threats of assassination only a few weeks previously? Who is responsible in Manitoba and at Ottawa, for

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\*To the list of the proscribed, well-known in Ontario, add Mr. Mulligan, Chief of Police at Fort Garry, a brave and loyal soldier, and a Roman Catholic.

See his letter, appendix E.

the unsatisfactory and dangerous policy of putting-off, till a more convenient season, the long-looked-for arrangements with the neighbouring Indian tribes, whose lands are being occupied, though still unceded? Who is to pay the enhanced annuities which this injurious delay is certain to entail? Who will answer to the British sentiment of the Dominion—to the offended spirit of modern progress—for the insult perpetrated and the wrong intended by the appointment to the office of Judge, and judicial organizer of the new Province, of a Lower Canada lawyer, unfamiliar with the principles and practice of our English legal system, but well-grounded in the ancient "Customs of Paris," many of which have been tenaciously retained in Lower Canada, though repealed long since in the country of their origin? Who invited, or who sent to Manitoba, with a view to the Attorney-Generalship, another Lower Canada lawyer, a Protestant pervert, lately editor of the *True Witness*, and the most rabid enemy of Protestantism, the most slavish supporter of the ultramontane faction in the Roman Catholic Church, to be found in all Canada? Is the Minister of Justice, or Governor Archibald responsible for this last selection? When the constitutional vote of censure is about to be invoked against the advisers of these injurious—if not traitorous—acts, shall we be met by the shuttle-cock manoeuvre of throwing the responsibility on a distant authority—Manitoba or Ottawa, as the case may be? Or will the Minister of Militia boldly, as becomes his office, and boastfully, as accords with his habit, cut the matter short by proclaiming,—

"I fluttered your Volscians in Corioli;  
Alone I did it."

"Mr. Speaker, call in the members!"

The difficulties of Mr. Archibald's position are, I admit, sufficiently embarrassing. Much forbearance is necessary in the public interest, even from those who did not approve of his appointment, and now condemn his administrative acts. I shall not, therefore, push the case against him by going into details, or using materials which have been placed in my hands by credible correspondents. I have merely indicated some of the features of his policy, which I deem unjust and impolitic, and the result of unconstitutional pressure from Ottawa—at least I give him credit for the disposition to do otherwise if he were free to act—and I throw upon you and your colleagues the

responsibility which attaches to principals in the case, for all the mischiefs which have grown, and are still likely to grow, out of "your policy." I had intended to offer some observations upon the *land system*, which ought to have been promptly adopted, but which appears to have been purposely delayed. To discourage and repel settlers from the North West, in accordance with the avowed intentions of your supporters in Quebec and Manitoba, is evidently your object; but as Parliament is soon to meet, and as we can better discuss, face to face, the propriety of measures, and the details of a policy which are yet to be adopted, I shall content myself now by protesting, in the name of every true Canadian, against your wilful and criminal delay in offering the lands of the North West to impatient settlers. You have lost one, and probably two seasons, in preparing for the victorious march of our industrial and political forces to the foot of the Rocky Mountains. You know that the vast plains of the Winnipeg basin must be dotted with settlements, organized into some form of provincial or territorial life, before we can plant securely the flag of our Dominion upon the Pacific coast. Yet, after reserving the best lands in Manitoba for the half-breeds, who do not and cannot use them; after "conciliating" insurgent priests, by acceding to demands which must turn the tide of emigration into foreign states, where the animated relics of the dark ages are not permitted to dictate the laws, or control the civil administration; after telling the wandering savages of the plains that to plunder the white man is permissible; that to depose magistrates and usurp authority, musket in hand, is meritorious and not very displeasing to the Queen, you wilfully ignore, and by your neglect violate, the only salutary provisions of the Manitoba Act, to wit, those which place the *lands* of the Province under federal control. We all know that the concession was yielded under pressure, and against the wish of the agents of the insurgents; but there it is, and I admit, that in the hands of an honest minister this power alone would, in a few years, rectify some of the worst features of the measure, and make it impossible for the enemies of our new Dominion to obstruct its all-conquering yet peaceful march across the continent. Parliament intended that power to be used promptly, and in the interest of the Dominion; you have either not used it, or resigned it into the hands of the enemy.

But, Sir, I do not despair of my country. I have not lost faith in

that "New Nationality," foreshadowed by Lord Monck in his speech from the throne, in 1866, "the dimensions of which will entitle it to a high place amongst the powers of the world." Traitors may conspire; jesuits may plot; sectional politicians may intrigue, and moribund ministers may hesitate and succumb; but "westward the star of empire takes its way," and in spite of all obstacles, the immense wheat-growing and cattle-grazing vallies and plains of our "Great West," will soon be subdued and occupied, not by priest-ridden natives addicted to the chase, but by sturdy cultivators of the soil, carrying with them the civilization, the political principles, the self-reliant energy, and the contempt for sacerdotal leadership, which distinguish the colonizing populations of the new world.

Your "policy" may interpose a temporary check, but unless we ignore the past and lose faith in the power of free thought and free institutions to permeate, to expand, to conquer in this hemisphere, we must trust the future, and march onward. Christian philosophy forbids us to doubt the ultimate triumph of a cause that is at once patriotic and just, benignant and true. Even if the skies were darker, and the waves more tumultuous, no storm-tried mariner who loves his country, no honest pilot who has guided the helm of state in rough weather, would now counsel delay or propose to abandon the voyage. We have hoisted sail; the ship is new and staunch; a rival trader is cruising in the same seas, and may forestall us. If we are wise we will tack no longer but run before the wind, or, if need be, against it. Difficulties there have been, and dangers there may be, but the faith of the pious Æneas should be ours:—

"O passi graviora, dabit Deus his quoque finem."

I remain, &c.,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

Nov. 1870.

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[The text on this page is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a list or a series of entries, possibly a table of contents or an index, but the specific details cannot be discerned.]

## APPENDIX

## A.

TORONTO, September 3rd, 1870.\*

SIR,—I had the honour, during your recent absence from the seat of Government, to receive from Mr. Under-Secretary Meredith, a letter (dated 2nd August), informing me that "His Excellency the Governor General in Council," had been pleased to direct that the Commission issued to me on the 29th September last, appointing me Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Territories, "be revoked."

Mr. Meredith does not mention the date of the writ of *supersedeas* which it appears His Excellency was advised to issue, but as the official *Gazette* had already apprised the public of the appointment of another person on the 20th of May to the same office, I am left to infer that the revocation and supersedure took place at some date antecedent to that appointment.

I regret that the Government found it necessary, after my letter to the Premier, Sir John A. Macdonald, in January last, (in which I voluntarily placed my Commission at his disposal), to resort to the adverse process of *supersedeas* without previous notice to, or communication with me. And I also regret, though with much less poignancy, that you should have availed yourself of your last official opportunity to add insult to the injury you had already inflicted on one of your recent colleagues, and now a chief victim of your policy.

I am persuaded you would not have withheld from me until the 2nd of August, the official notice to which, in all courtesy, I was entitled on the 20th May, unless you had determined that the first cycle of your ill-starred administration should be completed by an act that would not relieve by contrast your proceedings at Fort Garry, your reticence on the plains, or your speeches in Parliament.

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\* This letter is added to illustrate official courtesy at Ottawa. It closed my correspondence with Mr. Howe under the Royal Commission.—W. MCD.

I acquit His Excellency as the Representative of Her Majesty in this country of any participation in, or knowledge of your last official eccentricity, and I await with all possible equanimity the approach of the hour when the loyal Canadians of the North-West, and myself among them, will be amply vindicated, and their enemies, and the enemies of their country, here as well as there, shall receive their deserts.

Already the first wave of the flowing tide has struck the shore. Our country's flag, which gave you so much offence at Fort Garry, has again been raised by loyal hands. Your special envoy was not present, and the bells of St. Boniface were dumb; but the loyal half-breeds and Canadians, whom you scorned to their face and caluminated behind their backs, welcomed their deliverers with shouts of exultation and tears of joy. The very savages, against whom it was pretended at Ottawa that your forces were to be sent, hailed with unwonted delight the unfurling of that flag which, with a truer and better instinct than they had discovered in at least one of their Canadian governors, they regard as the sole emblem of authority and law, and of justice and protection to their race. At the first blast of Col. Wolsey's bugles, *your* proteges—"the established authorities" of your ghostly representative—sped across the prairie to the shelter of that other flag which you had told them was at once their best protection, and their ultimate and certain destiny.

So the wheel turns! The truth may now be told, and *will* be told, and confident that its revelations will abundantly corroborate my case, I can bear, without dejection or solicitude, the "stingless insults" of a man who secured office without honour, who has signalized his administration by drivelling imbecility, if not by perjurious incivism, and who elings to his post to the evident mortification of his colleagues, and amid the scorn and contempt of his countrymen.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient servant,

WM. MACDOUGALL.

HON. J. HOWE,

Secretary of State for the  
Provinces, &c., &c., &c.,  
Ottawa.

## B.

## BISHOP TACHE TO PRESIDENT RIEL.

Monsieur L. Riel, President—

I had an interview yesterday with the Governor-General at Niagara, he told me the Council could not revoke its settled decision to send Mr. Archibald by way of the British Possessions, and for the best of reasons, which he explained to me, and which I shall communicate to you later. We cannot therefore arrive together, as I had expected. I shall not be alone, because I shall have with me people who come to aid us. Mr. Archibald regrets he cannot come by way of Pembina, he wishes, notwithstanding to arrive among us, and before the troops. Therefore he will be glad to have a road found for him either by the Point des Chenes or the Lac du Roseaux. I pray you to make enquiry in this respect, in order to obtain the result that we have proposed. It is necessary that he should arrive among and through our people. I am well content with this Mr. Archibald. I have observed that he is really the man that is needed by us. Already he seems to understand the situation and the condition of our dear Red River, and he seems to love our people. Have faith then that the good God has blessed us, notwithstanding our unworthiness. Be not uneasy; time and faith will bring us all we desire, and more, which it is impossible to mention, notwithstanding the expectations of certain Ontarians. We have some sincere, devoted and powerful friends.

I think of leaving Montreal on the 8th of August, in which case, it is probable I shall arrive towards the 22nd of the same month.

The letter which I brought has been sent to England, as well as those which I have written myself, and which I have read to you.

The people of Toronto wished to make a demonstration against me, and, in spite of the exaggerated statements of the newspapers, they have never dared to give the number of the persons present (?) Some persons here at Hamilton wished to speak, but the newspapers discouraged their zealous efforts.

I am here by chance, and remain as this is Sunday. Salute for me

Mr. O. (O'Donohue?) and others at the Fort. Pray much for me. I do not forget you.

Your Bishop, who signs himself your best friend,

A. G. DE ST. BONIFACE.

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LETTER NO. 2.—BISHOP TACHE TO PRESIDENT RIEL.

Bourville, 5th August.

M. Le President,.—I well know how important it is for you to have positive news—I have something good and cheering to tell you. I had already something wherewith to console us when the papers published news dear and precious to all our friends, and they are many. I shall leave on Monday, and with the companions whom I mentioned to Rev. P. Lestang. Governor Archibald leaves at the same time, but by another road. He will arrive before the troops, and I have promised him a good reception if he comes by the Snow road. Governor McTavish's house will suit him, and we will try to get it for him. Mother salutes you affectionately, as also my uncle. Mad'le Masson and a crowd of others send kind remembrances to your good mother and sisters. Forget not Mr. O., and others at the fort. We have to congratulate you on the happy result. The *Globe* and others are furious at it. Let them howl leisurely—they excite but the pity and contempt of some of their friends. Excuse me—it is late, and I am fatigued, and to-morrow I have to do a hard day's work.

Yours devotedly,

† A. G. DE ST. BONIFACE.

[The above letters were found among Riel's papers after his hasty flight from Fort Garry.]

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C.

ABERCROMBIE. Dec. 27th, 1869.

HON. WM. McDOUGALL,

SIR,—Having heard some expressions at Grand Point touching Red River matters, from an ignorant man who drove Col. De Salaberry. I

was led to believe that they were not original with him, and made it my business to call upon his master, the Colonel; at a house adjoining that in which I put up for the night. I introduced myself and the following questions were put to me by the Colonel:—"Is there any late news from Red River?" "When did you leave?" "What do you think of the state of things there?" "Anything you say to give me information will be confidential." The first two I answered shortly, the latter I went into as fully as I could, but was interrupted several times by De Salaberry saying, "what could the Governor expect?" "He treated those people very roughly and very unbecomingly when they called upon him at Pembina." "He also spoke harshly to them at the Hudson Bay Company's post and would not even condescend to speak to the men who bore the message from Riel to himself." "He on other occasions called those French half-breeds a set of scoundrels, villains, robbers and such names." "Could he think or expect men to submit quietly to such epithets?"

I at this point said, "Sir, you are mistaken and I am in a position to prove you are. I was present when the half-breeds delivered the letter to the Hon. Wm. McDougall in the Custom House, at Pembina, and also when the party arrived at the Company's post to drive the Governor across the line. I heard those men when they delivered the message there, and there was no such language used on either occasion. On the contrary, he treated both parties very civilly, and gave them pork, sugar, tea, &c., for their supper and breakfast, and farther, Sir, I can show you in my memorandum book, every word that was spoken by the Governor and also by the half-breeds through an interpreter, taken down by myself at the time." "Now where did you get your information?" He answered, "In the newspapers." "Yes," said I, "in the *Globe*, I fancy." Said he, "in other papers as well, and also from private parties." "But did you never hear anything at Fort Garry of him" (McD.) "having cheated the Indians out of their lands?" I said, "No, the first I heard of that was what I read in the *Globe*." "Well," said the Colonel, "Brown is a great friend of McDougall is he not?" I laughed, and said, "I thought not, but had it not been for Brown and Howe, assisted by the Hudson Bay Company giving the Yankees in Fort Garry and on the lines, a lever to take advantage of, we should have had no such trouble as there has been in the settle-

"ment." Finally, Col, DeSalaberry, said, "Don't you think McDougall is very unpopular in the settlement?" I answered, "No, that when I left Fort Garry in September, last, his appointment was very popular." Then said he, "Why the change?" I said, "I am not aware of any change in that respect, but if there is any it is occasioned by the continued harping in the ears of the ignorant half-breeds the sentiments expressed in the *Globe* against the Governor personally, by such men as Bannatyne, McKenney, O'Loane, Emerlin, Donaldson, and a few others, who have expressed themselves openly to favour annexation to the United States." "Well," said the Colonel, "The Canadian Government is much to blame; they should have sent *us* before the surveyors went into the country and we could have arranged it. The surveyors have done much harm by some of the employees stating that this farm would belong to one, and that to another, and so on, irritating in every way those men, who no doubt have their rights in the land." I told him that I chanced to be with the surveyors and that Col. Dennis and his employees on every occasion told the half-breeds and others that the rights of every one *would* be respected, and that the survey would not interfere with the lands now held by the half-breeds. He immediately said, "it was not Col. Dennis and his party he meant; it was Snow and his employees." I then said, "Do you think the Governor will get into the country before Spring?" He said, "It was doubtful if McDougall would ever govern the country."

I am, Sir,

Your obed't servant,

JAMES WALLACE.

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### E.

Red River Settlement, Oct. 1st, 1870.

Hon. Wm. Macdougall, C.B., Toronto.

SIR,—In a time of great trial and anxiety, I took the liberty of addressing you from Pembina, where I was driven to seek refuge last winter. I have again the honour to address you and inform you of

some additional facts which may tend to show you that the forces employed to keep you out of the country are yet actively in existence, although Riel, their tool and agent, has been forced to flee. To tell you the truth, sir, I have learned the bitter lesson that rebellion and disloyalty is likely to be rewarded, while those who remained staunch to the Queen are likely to be overlooked and considered fools for their pains. You must excuse me if I feel indignant and express that indignation. I am a British subject and a soldier, and have served Her Majesty in various regiments in India, in England, in Ireland and Scotland, from the age of eighteen years, till my hair has grown grey, after twenty-four years of service, and I am proud to refer yourself, sir, or any else, to the records in the office of the Secretary of War, as to my character.

I am a Roman Catholic, and can speak without religious bias in this matter, and I tell you, sir, that the detailed statement which I made to you, in a former letter, is true, and that I am prepared to furnish proofs. The presence of this force here, which is much against the will of Bishop Tache, prevents the possibility of armed opposition, and their dodge now is, if possible, to quiet matters, and by getting the ears of the present Government to influence them against every loyal man in this country.

They have already commenced this course, and I will give you the following instance :—I have been Chief of the Police in this town of Winnipeg for the past four years, and yet, when, after imprisonment for three months, and when forced to flee to the other side of the line to save my life, I return here, after the arrival of the 60th Rifles, to resume my services, I find myself set aside, and a man named Rickards, whom I have proved to be a rank rebel, and to have instructed Riel's men in the use of the big guns, is put in my place, and is this moment on duty, and I am discarded.

Now, sir, for what ? Because, in daring to be loyal, I conflicted with the interests of the Hudson Bay Company and Bishop Tache. Had I chosen the other course, all would have been smooth, I could have got a leading position in the Rebel Government, and could have fattened myself on the spoils robbed from honest and loyal men. But no, I will remain true to the Queen to the end, and if the present Governor is so hampered by promises to Cartier and others in Canada, that he dare

not countenance loyal men, I will sell the property I have honestly accumulated here, for what I can, and leave this country for ever.

This opposition is not to me alone. Dr. Schultz, the friend, and the most powerful, of our loyal people here, native and foreign, is this moment, and will be, in danger of assassination. It is well known that they will seek to remove every obstacle in their path to accomplish their ends. Sir, I am sorry to trespass on your time, yet you are in a position to let the people of Canada see things in their right light. I take the liberty of enclosing a photograph of myself in the uniform of which I am proud, and also the picture of a group of the scoundrels who directed the robberies and murder of last winter. You will notice in the group, that the only English ones are Thomas Spence and Thomas Bunn, and that both are with downcast looks, as though they had an idea that sooner or later the scorn and contempt which is shown here now for them, would come to pass.

I have, sir, letters from Governor McTavish, to show my official position, and I again repeat that I have made no statement that I am not able to prove.

Belieivng, sir, that sooner or later it will be clearly shown that the fault of this rebellion, with its crimes, lies with my own clergy and with the crafty and unscrupulous Hudson Bay Company.

I remain yours very respectfully,

SERGEANT JAMES MULLIGAN,

Late of Her Majesty's 17th Foot.

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