





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


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
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
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**TITLE PAGE OF  
"THE EXPEDIENCY OF SECURING OUR AMERICAN COLONIES"**



**METHOD**  
**OF SECURING OUR**  
**AMERICAN COLONIES**  
**BY SETTLING**

The Country adjoining the River  
**MISSISSIPPI**, and the Coun-  
try upon the **OHIO**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Respectfully, at Liberty Bell, at New York, 1847*

*By the Author*

**NEW YORK:**

**W. H. BROWN, 1847.**



## CHAPTER III

### THE PROPOSED COLONY OF CHARLOTINA

THE OPPORTUNITY OF GREAT BRITAIN — THE FRENCH SETTLERS MAY MOVE ACROSS THE MISSISSIPPI — NEED OF PROTECTING THE BOUNDARIES — BOUNDARIES PROPOSED FOR THE OLD COLONIES — BOUNDARIES OF CHARLOTINA — ADVANTAGES OF THE SITUATION — THE PRODUCTS OF THE COUNTRY — HOW SECURE SETTLERS — THE INDIANS SHOULD BE TREATED KINDLY AND BE EDUCATED.

#### THE EXPEDIENCY OF SECURING OUR AMERICAN COLONIES, &c.<sup>1</sup>

PROVIDENCE having favoured the *British* arms with surprising success, in the prosecution of the late war, our enemies have been obliged to abate of their usual haughtiness, and to accept of reasonable terms of peace. Not to mention our advantages by this peace in the *East Indies* and *Africa*, an addition is made to our *American* territories of about 500,000 square miles, which we either did not pretend *right* to before, or had not in *possession*. This vast acquisition, above four times larger than all the lands of *Britain* and *Ireland*, is, most part of it, very fertile and valuable of itself, and all [4] of it very convenient, along with the other plantations, to *Britain*. For hereby our deminions in that continent are closely united; so precisely determined, that there can be no ambiguity nor dispute hereafter about the limits; have no neighbours from whom danger can be appre-

<sup>1</sup> The only copy of this pamphlet known is in the library of Harvard University. It was probably written in Scotland and was published in Edinburgh sometime between October 10 and the end of November, 1763. It thus appeared subsequent to the announcement of the proclamation of 1763. The authorship of the pamphlet may be ascribed to some one who was familiar with the intent of the proclamation and who was a supporter of Shelburne's policy of westward expansion. For a full discussion of this, see Susan Martha Reed, "Early Colonial Schemes in the West," in manuscript; Alvord, "Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763," in *Michigan Historical Collections*, 36: 20 *et seq.* In this reprint the pagination of the original is indicated.

hended, but upon one side only; and are of as large extent as *Britain* can be supposed ever to have occasion for, or as may be thought proper for the mother-country to have in any separate continent, and so remote.

OUR Rivals, no doubt, will look with regret, and with a wishful eye upon the fine extensive country they have been obliged to cede, and may, in some future period, agreeable to their usual temper and practice, attempt to annoy and disturb us in that quarter, if they shall have, or imagine they have, any probability of retrieving, were it but in part their late great and galing losses.

THE object they had in view, according to a plan concerted long before the last war commenced, was no less than the command of the whole continent of *North- [5] America*. With this view, were all their encroachments upon our settlements, begun many years ago, but carried on chiefly after signing the treaty of *Aix la chapelle*; great numbers of their troops, with large quantities of military stores, clandestinely sent to their plantations; the *Indians* debauched and spirited up to the most shocking instances of barbarous cruelty against our Planters; and their intended chain of forts, from *Canada* to *Louisiana*, not only begun, but considerably advanced.

BUT Heaven supporting our just cause, and making our arms remarkably victorious both by sea and land, our insidious enemies, like the dog with the piece of flesh in the table [fable], have not only been entirely frustrated of this their design, but obliged to relinquish all their former encroachments, and cede to us all *Canada*, with whatever else they possessed of *North America* to the river *Mississippi*.

Thus have the *French*, to their great mortification, been disappointed of a design they seem'd to have had much at heart; by the accomplishment of which, they would, [6] in all probability, not only have had *Britain* at their mercy within a few years, but been capable to give law to *Europe*.

THEIR passion for universal empire having been thus frustrate [*sic*], and their deep concerted scheme of *American* dominion rendered abortive, they will, no doubt, be filled with revenge, and with a strong desire to recover the power they have lost, and the territory they have been forced to cede. These and other considerations give us great reason to expect, that a Nation, whose humour is constitutionally ambitious and restless, and which keeps no treaty longer than they

think it their interest to break it, will, by their natural subtlety, evade the late treaty also, whenever a promising view of advantage shall offer. An attempt of this kind, if compared with many similar instances of their conduct, both in former and later times, need give us no surprise. But the probability of such event, ought to make us use all necessary precaution for our own security, especially where it may seem most in their power to annoy or injure us.

[7] WHETHER the *French* in *Canada* will continue there or not,—time will discover. It seems most probable indeed, that national and natural relation; the same Religion, Language, Customs, and Manners; the engaging views of superior wealth, and a much more agreeable life in *Louisiana*, a place incomparably more fertile and pleasant than the other; will occasion a general Emigration of these *Canadians*; to whom, no question, encouraging offers will be made by their old masters, in order to such a removal [*sic*].

BUT though, for the reasons mentioned, the *most part* of them should remove within the stipulated time, yet it is probable *some* of them will continue. The Protestant Religion will be a motive to retain those of that persuasion. The greater security of their whole rights and properties, under the mild equitable *British* Government, than under the arbitrary power of *France*, may possibly prevail with others also, to continue in their natural Climate and place of Nativity, in the full enjoyment of their estates and effects. Such of them [8] as may chuse to do so, ought to be discreetly used. For it is to be hoped, that these new subjects, under the cherishing wings of *British* protection and liberty, will, before many years, by civil usage and prudent management, entirely incorporate with their fellow-subjects, without distinction of Nation, Language, or Religion, as was the case of the *Dutch* in *New York*. Particular care, however, should be taken, to prevent, by strict penal laws, any of these *French* from removing, after the time allowed them by treaty shall have elapsed.

BUT though the greater part of them, or even the whole, should continue in *Canada*, there is little reason to apprehend danger from that quarter. Our military establishment in that country, would render any attempt in them to raise disturbance, folly, and madness.

BUT to secure our Colonies on the west-side, seems to merit our serious attention. There the *French*, our constant Rivals and most

violent Enemies, are our *next neighbours*. Interest, and many political motives, can- [9] not fail to make *them*, who abound in numbers of people, careful to settle *Louisiana*, the only Colony they now have in that continent, in as speedy and effectual a way as possible. In doing this, they certainly will, agreeable to their constant practice, erect forts wherever thought necessary, especially upon the *Mississippi*, in order to secure the Country, and favour their future designs. If, when they shall have done so, the Country upon our side of that river shall have been neglected, or but thinly peopled,—no Fort above the river *Iberville*,—and perhaps no *British* Family for several leagues south of the *Forks* of the *Mississippi*: It is not to be expected, they will confine themselves within their own limits, and not scruple to cross the *Mississippi* with their usual encroachments, contrary to the late treaty, more than they did formerly to cross *St Laurence*, in manifest violation of the treaty of *Utrecht*. It is very natural to expect, that, in this case, they, in conjunction with the *Indians*, [10] whom we found to our cost they are very dexterous at corrupting, would by no means let slip what they might look upon as an opportunity of encroaching a-new upon our territories, and would renew their former scenes of cruelty upon such of our people as might be exposed to their revenge.

Thus, if the *French* should be beforehand with us (as they still endeavour to be, and often are) and, by putting *Louisiana* in a respectable condition, be capable to play their old game over again, numbers of our innocent Planters would lose, in a few days, what they might have gained by labour and industry in several years; whole Families of our people either barbarously murdered in cold blood, or driven from their habitations; our Colonies thrown into confusion; and the Nation put to the unavoidable expence and calamities of a new war.

BUT that any such opportunity may, as much as possible, be prevented in all time coming, we may be confident, that [11] His Majesty, whose paternal affection for his people is most conspicuous, and who, by the assistance of an able Ministry, hath happily brought about an honourable and advantageous Peace, will, in his royal wisdom and goodness, use the most proper means for improving it in such a way, that all his Subjects may avail themselves of it, in the most speedy, general, and effectual manner.

IN order to the effectual improvement of our Dominions in that Continent, three things seem to fall naturally under consideration.

1. What part of our new acquisition there, it might be most proper to add to our former Colonies, and what parts of it to form into new Colonies, one or more.
2. Settling what parts first and chiefly, would contribute most to the security and advantage of the whole.
3. By what ways this might be effected most speedily, and to the best purpose.

UPON these Questions, a few plain simple thoughts are here humbly offered; written, designedly, without art or ornament, purely for amusement, and as they [12] occurred to the writer, upon reading the articles of the late peace. He afterwards made some additions to his notes, upon reading a History of *Louisiana* lately published,<sup>1</sup> and the accounts of the *Indian* insurrections. Any Maps he had occasion to see of that Country, are small and incorrect, which is the reason why so little is said upon the first Question, and in such general terms. Hoping the honesty of his intentions will atone for his deficiencies and inaccuracies, he shall reckon his pains, in writing this small Essay, very well bestowed, if it shall be a mean to cause any person of ability, and knowledge in these matters, and acquainted with that Country, to favour the Publick w<sup>th</sup> his thoughts upon this Subject, and propose a practicable scheme in order to so useful an end.

As to the *first* Question:—In order to determine what may be the most convenient Partition or Division of that Country into Colonies,—not only a general but a particular knowledge of the Situation, Climate, Soil, Mountains, Rivers, &c [13] of the several parts of it is requisite. And if the Plan of a certain worthy Nobleman lately in the Administration, relating to this very thing, shall be executed, as, considering its great usefulness to the publick, there is reason to expect it shall; this will give proper light into an affair of such importance and national concern.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This reference is doubtless to Le Page du Pratz, *Histoire de la Louisiane* (Paris, 1758. 3 v.). This was one of the chief authorities on the Mississippi Valley, and there is evidence that it was used extensively by the English.

<sup>2</sup> This is a reference to Lord Shelburne's plan as outlined in a portion of the proclamation of 1763. On account of certain changes in the ministry, he resigned the presidency of the board of trade in September, 1763; but before his resignation he had drafted the proclamation which was to prepare the way for future westward expansion. The measure was, however, carried out by other minds. See in this connection Alvord, "Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763," in *Michigan Historical Collections*, 36:20 et seq.

SOMETHING intended to have been offered upon this Head, being prevented by the division of *Florida* into *East* and *West*, only two things shall be here proposed.

1. THAT *Virginia*, *Maryland*, and *Pensylvania*, be terminated by a Bound to be fixed thus:—From Lake *Errie*, up the river *Miamis* to the Carrying-place, from thence down the river *Waback* to where it runs into the *Ohio*, and from thence down the *Ohio* to the *Forks* of the *Mississippi*. This would leave the Colonies to the north-east of *Carolina*, pretty equal length from the sea to the north-west; and seems a more just and proper Limit on that side, than either the *Apalachian* mountains or [14] the *Ohio* in its whole course. A Bound from Lake *Errie* to the *Forks*, drawn this or some other way, as the nature of the Country shall be found most conveniently to answer, seems necessary. For, supposing any of these Colonies to extend that way, without any Bound, to the South-Sea, is ridiculous and absurd, and would entirely prevent settling the Country upon the *Ohio*, either so soon or so effectually, as the safety, peace and prosperity of that whole Country, absolutely requires. Therefore,

2. That the Country betwixt the *Mississippi* and the fresh-water Lakes, extending north-west from this proposed bound, be formed into a new Colony, which might be called CHARLOTINA,<sup>1</sup> in honour of Her Majesty, our present most excellent Queen.

As to the second Question:—From all observations we can make, and the accounts we have of that country, we ought principally, and as soon as possible, to fix Settlements in such particular places of the country adjoining the *Mississippi*, [15] as shall appear, upon the above mentioned Survey, to be most convenient. A Settlement and Fort at *Rosalie*<sup>2</sup> seems necessary. But in how many, and in what other particular places from thence to the river *Ohio*, must be determined upon a thorough knowledge of the country, or as the Colonists shall find occasion.

BUT of all *North-America*, the place of most importance to *Britain*, and where a new Colony is most requisite, is at the *Forks* of the *Mississippi*. The *Expediency*, yea *Necessity* of this, both in respect

<sup>1</sup> Incorrectly spelled "Charlotiana" in Alden, *New Governments West of the Alleghanies*, 12; and Howard, *Prcliminaries of the Revolution*, 228. This was due to an error in a manuscript copy in the library of the Wisconsin Historical Society.

<sup>2</sup> Natchez.

of *Security* and *Interest*, appears with such force of evidence, even upon looking to a map of that country: that it may seem quite superfluous to enumerate or enlarge upon the many reasons that might be given for it. Most of the principal rivers of that extensive country, navigable for many hundred miles, East, West, North and South, meet in this place as the centre. Hither the staple Commodities of the inhabitants, whether Colonists or *Indians*, and the merchandise of the whole country for near a thousand miles all around, [16] and in some places much farther, might be convey'd with more ease and convenience, than to any other spot of our Dominions in that quarter of the World. Besides, as the Country for about 8 or 900 miles south, and several hundred miles north, upon the *Mississippi*, is acknowledged to be the most fertile and healthful of any in *North-America*, a town at or nigh the *Forks*, would be the common *Emporium* of the produce and riches of that vast Continent: And a Colony extending from that place along the north-west of the *Ohio*, might be expected remarkably to increase and flourish.

In short,—a Colony fixed in this place, with suitable encouragement, would give us the entire command of that Continent; secure to us the trade with the *Indians*: be an effectual Barrier for the defence, security and quiet of all our Colonies; check the natives; prevent the *French* from having access to and corrupting them; and render any attempt in after-times, from either or both of them, vain and ineffectual.

[17] FATHER *Heunepin* [*sic*], a *French* Jesuite, who, about 80 years ago, traversed and accurately survey'd this Country, expressly says, that whatever nation should secure the country on the *Ohio*, by a chain of Fort from the Lakes to the *Mississippi*, might command all *North-America*. Every body knows, of how great importance to their usurping scheme, his countrymen look'd upon this hint; what extraordinary pains and diligence they were at for a great many years, to possess and secure this very country; and how much labour, blood and treasure it cost this Nation, to defeat and overturn the small part of their plan they had executed. So very much were they taken with this their favourite scheme, as conducive to some valuable prize their ambition had fixed upon, that they expended several millions of treasure, and the lives of many thousands of their people, in the course of a seven years war, to accomplish it. This

they neither would nor did fall from, nor consent to relinquish their encroachments, [18] till reduced to the lowest state of distress—beaten in all quarters of the world,—their Fleets destroyed,—their trade and credit sunk; they were upon the very brink of national ruin, and incapable any longer to avoid impending destruction.

WHAT, therefore, our vigilant enterprising Rivals (*jas est et ab hoste doceri*) found a very promising means for obtaining so great a prize, and laboured with assiduity and perseverance to make good, notwithstanding the opposition they might rationally expect from us, of whose just Rights the execution of this their darling plan was a most manifest Invasion; let not us neglect nor delay to execute, while we can do it without opposition; and thereby secure to ourselves the full and undisturbed possession of our own indisputable property, that is of so great importance and value: Which if we had done about 12 or 14 years ago, when the designs of our Enemies were by that time pretty evident, the late bloody war, in all probability, might have been prevented, [19] and our national debt between forty and fifty millions Sterling less than it now is.

It would be tedious to mention all the advantages, obvious to every one, that would accrue to us, and to our whole *American* Dominions, from the proposed settlements. Besides these already hinted, others will appear from comparing the country in general with our present Colonies, and observing its vast superiority in extent, properties and productions.

A Colony is profitable, according as its land is so good, that, by a part of the labour of the inhabitants bestowed on its cultivation, it yields the necessaries of life sufficient for their sustenance; and by the rest of their labour, produces staple commodities in such quantity and of such value, as bring from the Mother-country, in the way of commerce and traffick, all manufactures necessary for the proper accomodation of the Colonists, and for the gradual and more extensive improvement of the Colony, as the number of people increases.

So that *Fruitfulness of Land* is the principal property of a Colony, and that wherein [20] its usefulness chiefly consists: Because (*Mines* are supposed to be out of the question here) in proportion to the quantity of the necessaries of life, with the number and value of staple commodities that it produces, will be the number of people encouraged to go to it; the cheapness of labour; the small share of



it needful for the maintenance of the inhabitants; and, consequently, the more of it bestowed on staple commodities.

If, besides fertility of soil, it hath also a *healthful Climate* and *extensive Bounds*,—of so much greater value must it be accounted, and merits proportionably greater care and encouragement from the Mother-country. A Colony having these properties, if duly supported in its infant state, must soon flourish and become strong; and will, like a dutiful child, return manifold the favours of the kindly parent, to the great convenience and advantage of both.

But a Colony, whose inhabitants are obliged, from the barrenness of the country, [21] the length and coldness of the winters, or whatever other cause, to bestow all or most of their labour on having the necessaries of life, can scarcely be supposed to avail the mother-country: Because the people, for their own subsistence, must of necessity apply themselves to Farming and Manufactures, and thereby, instead of benefiting, must interfere with her in many branches of trade.

WITHOUT depreciating our former Colonies, or detracting in the least from their real worth, it must, however, be acknowledged, that most of them are rather of the last, than of the first mentioned kind: that, excepting the Furs which we purchase from the natives, all our northern Colonies produce very little staple, and but of small value for *Britain*, and that all of them, except some lands on the south parts of *Carolina*, scarcely produce any but *Tobacco*. The lands of the very best of them, for several miles from the sea, are low, marshy, hot, and therefore unhealthy; and their [22] soil, from the Sea to the *Apalachian* mountains, is shallow, light, and soon worn out with culture. Beyond these mountains to the *Ohio*, particularly upon the back of our most southerly Colonies, the lands are said to be of a more deep, strong and fertile soil: But these have never yet been occupied by our people, nor could be, on account of the encroachments of the *French*, and the cruelty exercised by them and the natives in their interest, against our Planters, for a good many years past.

So that, however valuable these our Colonies are (and that they are of great value, is certain) yet they may be made infinitely more so to *Britain* as a trading nation, conjoined with, and by a proper improvement of our new acquisition. For, if the Settlements here

proposed were made, our old Colonies would see it their interest, to extend their Plantations, each within their respective limits, to the *Mississippi* and *Ohio*, as far as the *Forks*. This they would be encouraged to do, from the motives of gain, safety, undisturbed possession, the prospect of [23] improving their lands at pleasure and to the best purposes, with the convenience of Navigation, whether for Export or Import, by the rivers that run from the *Apalachian* mountains into the *Ohio*, by the *Ohio* itself, and the *Mississippi*. Thus the old Colonies and the new one proposed, might be joined before many years, to their unspeakable mutual help and interest.

BESIDES this and other advantages, arising from its *contiguity* to our other Colonies, this extensive pleasant country, of which very little hitherto hath ever been opened, could not be expected to wear out by culture; and is of so deep and rich a soil, that, upon proper improvement, it would yield, not only all things necessary for the maintenance of the inhabitants, tho' several millions in number, but produce staple commodities for the Mother-country, in far greater plenty and variety, and of far more value, than all of that Continent we ever were possessed of before.

[24] THE south part of it, for about 30 or 40 miles from the Seashore, tho' by far the most barren of all the country, is stored with plenty of the finest Pines, Cedar, Cypress, ever-green Oaks, &c. of which large navies might be built at small expence. Care and pains in draining the swamps and clearing the ground in that low part of the country, as the *French* do in *New-Orleans*, would render it far more healthy, and fit to produce immense quantities of Rice, and other valuable productions.

FROM thence to the *Forks*, about 8 or 900 miles, the country, we are told, is healthful, and the soil exceeding fertile, the lands being of a rich black mould, three feet deep in the hills, and much deeper in the bottoms, with a strong clayey foundation; producing all kinds of provisions and esculent plants, with little or no care or labour, and almost without culture. The lands are dry, hilly, and in some parts mountainous, which greatly refreshes and cools the air over the whole country, and [25] renders the climate extremely healthful. This account we have from a history of that country lately published, written by a *Frenchman*, who resided a good many years there. He says further,—'The air is perfectly good there; the blood is pure; the

people are healthy; subject to few diseases in the vigour of life, and without decrepitude in old age; which they carry to a farther length than in *France*. People live to a long and agreeable old age in *Louisiana*, if they are but sober and temperate."<sup>1</sup> When the *French*, who have been in possession of this country upwards of half a century, own and publish this,—we may believe the acknowledgment: And the rather, as some of our own people, who had been sent by the Government of *Virginia* about 20 years ago, after going down the *Ohio* and *Mississippi* to *New Orleans*, reported, 'that they saw more good land on the *Mississippi*, than they judged to be in all the *English Colonies* so far as they were inhabited."<sup>2</sup> Thus we have sufficient evidence, that this is a fertile, [26] healthy fine country in general, and what claims our highest attention to occupy and secure.

BUT still,—that part of the Country upon the *Mississippi*, from the *Ohio* to the *Illinois* river, seems to be the most fertile, healthful, inviting and encouraging of all, and the most necessary place to us for a Colony, of any in *North-America*; being as it were intended by nature, and adapted by its convenient situation in the very heart and centre of the country, to be the key of all the inland parts, and to command the whole of that vast continent. So very pleasant and delightful did the country upon the north-west of the *Ohio* appear to the *French*, that they called this the Fair River. Such is the mildness of the air, consequently healthfulness of that climate, such the fruitfulness of the many pleasant extensive vallies interspersed thro' out the whole country, among the numerous rivers whereby it is watered; in short so agreeable and charming a country is this, so abounding in both the necessaries and [27] pleasures of life, that the *French* usually called it, a Terrestrial Paradise. The better sort of their people, of both sexes, from *Canada* and other parts, chused to reside and end their days *here*, as the most pleasant desirable place they had in that Continent. *Here* they formed a settlement and built some forts, to check our southern Colonies, and secure their own interest in that important place, which they acknowledge, as they

<sup>1</sup> Du Pratz, *Histoire de la Louisiane*, 1:141.

<sup>2</sup> This refers probably to the expedition made in 1741 by John Howard and John Peter Salley under commission of the governor of Virginia. The exact quotation is not to be found in the "Brief Account of the Travels of Mr. John Peter Salley," in Darlington, *Christopher Gist's Journals*, 253 et seq.

justly may, is one of the most considerable posts in all *Louisiana*. They acknowledge also,— that this country is very good and fertile: That of the whole Colony (*viz.* of *Louisiana*, of which they reckoned this a part) this is the country in which, with the greatest ease, they grow Wheat, Rye, and other like grain: that turning the earth in the slightest manner, is sufficient culture to make it produce as much as can be reasonably desired; that Tobacco thrives there: that all plants transported thither from *France*, succeed well; as do also the fruits: That there are Mines of Silver, Lead, and Iron there: And that in the country north of the *Illinois*, Mines are said to be in great numbers, and very rich. What place more encouraging for a new Colony!

It would make up a volume, to mention, at any tolerable length, the productions, already known of this whole Country, with their uses and advantages. And it is more than probable, there are many, especially of the *vegetable* kind, that have not yet fallen under the notice of *Europeans*. It would be both tedious and superfluous to enumerate the many sorts of Grain, Fruits, Roots, Plants, Beasts and Fowl, wild and tame, Fishes, &c. which are there in the greatest variety and abundance.

As to Productions for *Commerce*:—Hemp, Flax, Silk, Cotton, Cochineal, Oil, Raisins, Currants, Almonds, Oranges, Citrons, Walnuts, Chesnuts, Prunes, Potash, Indigo, Rice, Copper, Iron, Pitch, Tar, Rosin, Saltpetre, Sweet-gum, Wax, Sasafra, Salsaparilla, &c. besides innumerable materials for Medicine and Dyeing, might all be had from thence, and in great plenty. In short, of the numerous articles of Commerce from this large, fruitful Country, *these* which by nature *are*, with *these* that, if transported thither from other places of similar Climate and Soil, by artificial culture *might* be produced,—may justly be supposed of such variety, quantity and value, as, when purchased with our manufactures, would enable us to keep in our pockets some millions of our Treasure, which, for these very Commodities, we yearly give out to other Nations; besides immense profits that we might draw from foreign parts, for such of these Commodities as would exceed our home Consumption. If, for instance, we pay, as it is acknowledged we do, near two millions Sterling yearly to other Nations, for these two necessary articles of *Hemp* and *Flax*, which may be raised in this Country, and that in

the greatest plenty; what vast profits would arise from the whole of the above List? And, besides our own savings and actual profits, what Resources of treasure, which hitherto we have furnished [30] our Enemies with, would thereby be cut off? The writer of the above mentioned History says of this Country,—“That whatever way one walks from the Sea-coast for 500 leagues northwards, he cannot proceed 100 steps without meeting with a Vine.”<sup>1</sup> Is there not good reason, then, to expect, that *Wine*, and the other produces of the *Grape*, which we purchase from Enemies with great sums of money, might, by proper cultivation and care, be had from thence; perhaps sufficient, before many years, to answer the most, if not the whole, of our home consumpt?

FROM what hath been observed of this Country, comparatively with our Colonies so far yet settled, it plainly appears to have very much the preference in extent, fruitfulness, as also in quantity, variety, and value of Productions, and in every other respect, except nearness to the Sea. But making the Settlements here proposed, would entirely remove this objection, if any should think it one: Be- [21] cause, hereby would be secured to us, the navigation of the Rivers in these inland parts of the Country, particularly the *Ohio* and *Mississippi*. This is of the utmost importance to us, and what the very Being of our *American* Colonies depends upon; and which, if these Settlements shall be neglected a few years, the *French* will leave no means unattempted to wrest from us. In which event, all the Lands to the north-west of the *Apalachian* mountains would be useless to *Britain*, and might be given up at once; and the rest also would fall of course, unless the pervidious Invaders should again be driven out, at the expence of several millions of our Treasure, and the Blood of many of our innocent Countrymen.

BESIDES what hath been said from the topic of *securing* against *French encroachments*, another consideration seems equally to claim our attention. Of the two most usual means of aggrandizing a Nation, *Conquest* and *Trade*, the *French* have of late, to the utmost of their might, attempted, [32] by the *first*, to raise themselves and humble us: But (thank God) have come off entirely disappointed. Their boundless Ambition, which would be satisfied with no less than the whole of *North-America*, hath tended *doubly* to their own loss.

<sup>1</sup> Du Pratz, *Histoire de la Louisiane*, 2:15.

For, in the *first* place,—while, intoxicated with the views of Conquest and Territory, they disposed of what people they had in that Continent, sparsely, throughout these extensive Countries which they called *Louisiana* and *Canada*, and in the inland parts upon the back of our Colonies, in order to facilitate their encroaching Designs; they neglected the *Improvement* of the whole, at least of the very best Lands in all their Colonies. Again, in the course of the War, which their continued insufferable Usurpations and repeated Insults had rendered unavoidable, so great were their Losses notwithstanding their formidable confederacy with the mightiest Powers of *Europe*,—and such our success, by the remarkable assistance of the God of Armies, maintaining the justice of our Cause; that [33] these boasting Invaders, besides *renouncing all their Usurpations*, were obliged to *cede* to us *immense territory*, which, otherwise, they might have possessed and improved at their pleasure.

If disappointment of their hopes with respect to *American Empire*, and their late great loss of Men, Ships and Territory, shall cure them for some years of their usual itch of *war*, and make them discontinue their old usurping practice; a *superiority in Trade* will be the next object of their incurable ambition, and what they will strain every nerve to make good.

UPON comparing circumstances, ours and theirs, in that Continent, there seems to be more reason to apprehend their Rivalship in *this*, for some years at least, than in *war*. Besides the Island and Fort of *New-Orleans*, they are yet possessed of vast territory on the west of the *Mississippi*; the South part of which, from that river to mountains of *New-Mexico* westward, and from the Sea to about six Degrees northward, we are told, is one entire level [34] champaign Country, as large as both *France* and *Spain* together; exceeding fruitful; and alone sufficient to supply the World with the productions of *North America*; being fertile in every thing, both in Land and Metals; and watered by several large navigable rivers that spread over the whole country. Upon supposition, then, of the *Canadians* and other *French* subjects in that Continent, their settling in the most convenient parts of that fine extensive Country, it may be expected they will, by cultivating it with care and diligence, endeavour to obtain by the *Improvement of Trade*, that advantage and superiority, which they could not by their *Martial Efforts*.

FROM the fruitfulness of these fresh virgin lands, and two or three months more of summer season in *Louisiana* than in our old Colonies, which, so far as hitherto occupied, are now much worn out, they can in one year make two or three crops of *Tobacco*, for instance, upon the same ground, as easily as we can make one, and in far greater plenty too, according to the superior fertility of soil. And if the *Tobacco* they used to make in this country, is of such value as they give out, they may by the improvement that country is capable of, as effectually outdo us, after some years in that article, the only one we have hitherto kept entire to ourselves, as they have already done in that of the *Sugar*.

BUT while we have ten or twelve times, if not more, the number of people that they yet have, in that Continent, and a country much of the same latitude and nature with theirs; it is in our power, and should be our endeavour, both to secure this valuable acquisition against *Encroachments*; and, by a proper timely improvement of it, to prevent our Rivals, as much as we can, of superior commercial advantages: Both which necessary ends, it is presumed, the proposed settlements would answer.

In this argument from *Trade*, it is supposed that the *French* will be pacific, and behave strictly conform [*sic*] to treaty. But their speedy endeavours to restore their Marine; the freedoms they are said to be already using at *Newfoundland*; the present insurrection of the *Indians* (of which afterwards) no question excited by *French* Jesuits and Priests; seem to indicate, that they are rather disposed to continue their former turbulent practices, than to maintain peace and good neighbourhood. This makes it still more necessary for us, to be upon our guard.

We are told in the public News-Papers, 20th July last, 'that according to advices from *France*, they were doing all in their power to establish their Colonies in *America* upon a firm foundation, and expected 60 or 70,000 Inhabitants from *Canada* to settle at *New-Orleans* and on the west side of the *Mississippi*.' No question this is their design, and what they will spare no pains to effectuate. If, for the reasons before hinted, the *Canadians*, or greater part of them, shall go thither, as is most likely, they will be of more use, both for themselves and their Mother-country (in point of national profit, tho' perhaps not so well answering the late project of Usurpation [37]

and Conquest) in *Louisiana*, than in the cold regions of *Canada*. But as the *French* will see to avail themselves the best way they can of this last return they are to expect from that place, they will take care to dispose of them in such a manner, and in such places, as shall contribute most to their future Designs: And what these shall be,—time will discover.

SUSPICIONS and suppositions are indeed no arguments; but, so far as probable, deserve notice. And is it not natural to think, a considerable number of these *Canadians*, and other *French* from the east-side of the *Mississippi*, with many others from *France*, will settle on that river, opposite to the country betwixt the *Ohio* and *Illinois*? The famous Silver-mines of *Marameg*; the Lead-mines and Salt-pits betwixt that place and the *Forks*; the acknowledged Fruitfulness and Worth of that part of their country, &c. maybe justly reckoned such powerful motives (really, or in pretence, the same thing to us) that one can scarce help thinking, they will not let [38] that place be long unoccupied. But if we take this motive also, the strongest of all, into consideration, *viz.* a Design,—tho', according to their usual way, absolutely disowned till discovered by an attempt to execute,—of seizing the country on the *Ohio*, the grand object of their ambitious views, and cause of the late war; this makes the matter still more serious and interesting to us. For is it not rational to expect, they would carefully erect Forts; secure the country to the utmost of their power; cultivate a constant trade and correspondence with, and, when strong, spirit up against us, the numerous nation of the *Illinois* and other *Indian* tribes, their old acquaintance; whose firm alliance and friendship ever since they knew these parts, they acknowledge and boast of? In this event, and if we shall be so careless (*infatuated* would be a more proper term) as to neglect settling this important place: Let any one who reflects on the usual behaviour of that nation, and their continued course of encroachments in that part of the [39] world for about thirty years past, figure to himself,—what we might expect from such restless, perfidious, neighbours, whom no treaty ever bound, when their interest and convenience came in competition: Especially as such neglect on our part, would encourage them, by the most probable views of success and impunity, again to grasp at the valuable and long coveted prize of *North America*.



ONCE more upon this head:—If we will advert to these two facts mentioned in the News-papers 10th Oct. That *Frenchmen* are seen among the warring parties of the *Indians*; and that large quantities of various sorts of goods of *French* manufacture, are conveyed from *France*, in vessels sent upon pretence of the fishery, to be distributed among the *Indians* and natives in the Gulph of *St. Lawrence* and other parts of that coast; it appears pretty evident, whence these our present disturbances by the natives, have originally proceeded, and by whose influence they are maintained.

[40] To raise up the *Indians* against us, and in these very parts, is one of the best cards they can now play, and very artfully contrived to serve a double end, both very much favouring the Design they seem already to have in view. For, such a war, they well know, must draw our attention and forces to those more barren northerly regions, and make us neglect the far more fertile and valuable countries upon the *Mississippi* and *Ohio*; while, in the mean time, alluring by great encouragements, their late subjects from *Canada* and other parts, they are losing no time to settle *New Orleans*, and *Louisiana* to the best advantage. Which done,—their numbers increased,—their country secured,—and the *Indians* on that side also wheedled over and depraved by the contagion of their pernicious influence; as much mischief may be expected from them in some future period, and that perhaps not remote, as at any time before; if not timeously, and by suitable measures on our part, prevented.

[41] Thus far of the expediency, advantage, and necessity of settling the country upon the *Mississippi*, and particularly of planting a new Colony at the *Forks*.

As to the *third* question:—No doubt there is difficulty as to the numbers of people requisite for the proposed Settlements. But the difficulty, it is hoped, is not insurmountable. That considerable numbers for beginning a new Settlement, might be had from several parts of the *British* Dominions, where they are not so usefully employed,—is evident: And that encouraging terms, with other views of gain, would engage many to go accordingly,—is equally certain. Were these settlements once begun in earnest, their numbers, tho' fewer at first than what might be wished, would soon increase. The prospect of gain in a country so far preferable in every respect, would engage spare hands from the northern Colonies, to settle either at the

*Forks*, or in other places betwixt that and the Sea, where found most necessary and convenient.

[42] THE harbours from *Georgia* to *New Orleans*, particularly at *St. Augustin* and *Pensacola*; the towns already built, and the convenience of carrying on trade along that whole coast; the improvements and cultivation of lands already made in these parts by the *French* and *Spaniards*; will contribute much to the speedy settlement and peopling of *East* and *West Florida*; still more so, if a considerable number of the old inhabitants shall continue in their habitations.—The Colonies of *Georgia* and the *Carolinas*, from the motives of interest and safety, will, no doubt, take care to extend their settlements, within their respective bounds, towards the *Mississippi*. All this may be done with no charge to the mother-country.

TOWARDS settling the new Colony proposed, which seems to be more material, and therefore to claim greater notice; it were to be wished, the Government would give good encouragement. For, in proportion to this, undeniably, would be the number of adventurers at first; their future increase of people, whether by incomers, or in the usual way of population; and, consequently, their prosperity, wealth, usefulness, &c. What encouragement in particular should be given,—these who are proper judges in such matters, would determine, according to the importance and public utility of the design. Besides, some present advance, as is usual, for helping the new planters to a stock of cattle, furniture, utensils, and other necessaries,—a favourable easy tenure of lands; a set of well contrived good rules with respect to their constitution, polity, œconomy and order; wise prudent Governors, and a sufficient number of able approved Clergymen and teachers, &c. would be of the utmost consequence to their future welfare and prosperity.

BUT more particularly:—Of our Soldiers and Sailors lately dismissed without provision or encouraging prospect of business, many, 'tis to be feared, will rather become beggars, loose idle vagrants, or even worse, than re-apply themselves to labour, after [44] so many years disuetude. Immediately upon the conclusion of the peace, scarce any one thing seemed to have a preferable claim to the attention of the Government, than these two;—providing for those brave fellows by whose intrepidity and valour so much Glory and Conquest had been obtained to the Nation;—and settling some of the

most important parts of the fine Country acquir'd. It is indeed hard to say, in which of these two the neglect was most surprising. The inseparable connection, and numerous advantages of both, are obvious. Justice, Gratitude, and Humanity, required the one; Interest and Necessity, the other. But as it is not yet too late, numbers of these our Countrymen, who so highly merit the thanks of the Nation, might be sent thither, and supplied with lands, upon the condition of military service when wanted, as a reward of their extraordinary bravery and the duty they faithfully did their King and Country during the late war. *These* would be most suitable for a new Colony, and *this* as ad- [45] vantageous a disposal of them, both for themselves and the publick, as any other yet proposed.

**MEN** of the several necessary Crafts also, such as Masons, Carpenters, Joiners, Bricklayers, &c. would be requisite: And according to what history we have of that Country, a company of Miners, at least after a few years, might turn out to very good account.

**AGAIN,** — It is undeniable in fact, whatever may be the cause or causes, that there are in many parts of *Britain* and *Ireland*, great numbers of Housholders, such as reduced Farmers, Cottagers, and others, in very low circumstances; who, by all their labour and industry, can scarcely scrape together a sorry subsistence for themselves and needy families. These, bred up to no mechanical employment, and having no prospect at home but continued poverty, would, many of them, it is to be supposed, embrace with cheerfulness an opportunity of going to settle in a Country, where [46] their labour would yield them plenty and affluence.

**Lastly,** — It may be supposed, there are many throughout *Britain* and *Ireland* pining in Jails, unable to do good to themselves or others, while in that sorry situation. Besides the publick-good, would it not be an act of humanity, to send thither all that are confined for Debt, whose characters are otherways fair and unblemish'd? would the act of Royal mercy, soon expected, be one whit tarnish'd, by annexing to the liberation of such, a condition of being removed from a Country where they could expect nothing but straiten'd circumstances and disregard, to where they might have, not only a comfortable Subsistence, but probably of wealth and opulence in a few years?

To strengthen their hands, and as a mutual security and help

both to this and the adjacent Settlements, the Colonies of *Virginia* and *Pensylvania*, but chiefly the first, might, upon recommendation from the Government, and no doubt, would, [47] upon the prospect of Interest, send people, according to their own plan and design about 20 years ago, to settle in the Lands adjoining the South-east of the *Ohio*, and other parts of the Bound above-proposed; who might extend their Plantations South-east within their respective Limits, while the new Colony extended theirs along the *Ohio* and *Mississippi*, as their people should increase.

As a Colony in this important place would be of incomparably more advantage to the Mother-country, as well as to the other Colonies, than *Nova Scotia*, to settle which, the Nation, for some years past, hath been at considerable charges; to neglect such a valuable purpose, therefore, on account of what expences might be necessary to effectuate it, would be an imprudent, ill-judged parsimony. A competent sum bestowed upon it, and properly applied, under the direction of Gentlemen of probity, appointed for that purpose, like the seed sown on good ground, would soon produce an hundred-fold.

[48] For the same reason, we should not grudge sending thither a few thousands of people, of the sorts before named. The extent and worth of this our new acquisition; the danger that we have reason to apprehend from restless insidious Neighbours, in case of neglecting it; with the expediency and advantage of securing that Country, particularly, where the new Colony is proposed, make this necessary; and in all appearance but for *once*. For, such a number being fixed there as encouraging terms would procure, besides numbers of strangers that so fine a Country could not fail yearly to allure thither, having most fertile ground to occupy at pleasure, and the necessaries of life in great abundance, and produced by little labour; would marry in their early years: Whereby, together with the healthfulness of the Climate, they could not, humanly speaking, but increase and multiply as much as any Colony could be expected. And it is observed, that in our *American* Colonies the number of Inhabitants is doubled in 25 [49] years, exclusive of Incomers. According to which calculation, *Britain*, one Century hence, would have sixteen times the number of Subjects in *America* that are there at present, besides all Strangers, with their proportional increase.

SOME assistance therefore of *people* and *money* being bestowed upon this one, urgent, useful and necessary design, which can neither be neglected nor delayed with safety, it is not likely there would be any demand of this nature afterwards. For, these places being thus secured, our Colonies, enjoying peace and quiet, would so prosper and multiply, that they would be able to repel any force or injury attempted by whatever assailants on that Continent, without putting the Mother-country to the great trouble and charges of sending thither Armies, Artillery, &c. as in the last War. Moreover, in proportion to the increase of people, and improvement of lands in these parts, would be the demand for *British Goods*, to the great encouragement of our [50] Manufactures, the increase of trade and navigation, and of the national revenue.

THE new Colony, and the Bound above proposed, ascertaining the limits betwixt it and the other Colonies, could be no injury to them. They would have more land besides than they could fully settle in a great many years. For which reason,—proposing to settle that country, by extending the limits of our old Colonies that way, or by two or more new ones at first, instead of answering, would, it is to be feared, entirely defeat the excellent ends proposed. For it is notorious fact, that not only a carelessness in general, but a jealousy of one another's prosperity prevail; among our Colonies. As a proof of this,—the greatest dangers lately hanging over all their heads, was for several years insufficient to make them enter into any association, or to unite them in any public measure for their common safety. Nor is it to be expected, that they would, in this case, do any thing jointly or to purpose, for the effectual security of that country, nor build [51] forts in proper time, if at all, needful for that end.

But a considerable body of people settled there, in one community, having one Governor, one law, one council, and one common interest; gathering additional strength by the yearly accession of strangers, that, for the above reasons, would flock to it, whether from the other Colonies, or from whatever Protestant Countries; would in proper time become so powerful, as fully to answer all the salutary ends already named. Afterwards, when become populous, strong, and its limits extended, it might, as has been done with some of our Colonies formerly, be divided into two or more, as convenience or reasons of state should require.

THE objection,—‘That in a Colony so remote from the sea, there would be little or no consumpt of *British* goods, rendered dear by the necessary charges of land-carriage,’—is frivolous. For common sense and experience dictate, that the trade of every country must be in pro- [52] portion to the quantity and value of its staple commodities: And that, if the productions of a country find their way out of it, the manufactures of the country to which they go, will certainly find their way into it. We are assured by those who are well acquainted with that country, such as the ingenious Dr *Franklyn*, that goods may be conveyed in boats or canoes, to and from the most inland parts of it, by great navigable rivers and fresh-water lakes communicating one with another, very small portages here and there excepted. Much more now must that be the case, when the navigation of the *Mississippi* is free to us, and the whole country, with the rivers and lakes on the east of it, are our own. Such additional charges, therefore, must be inconsiderable.

If it shall be alledged, as an objection,—‘That some or all of the places proposed to be settled, are the property of the *Indians*,’—It is answered, — Supposing the fact, what then? So was once that whole Continent. Nothing is known to [53] hinder our purchasing from the natives, as hitherto, whatever lands we have occasion for, and that at an easy rate. But the objection is not fact. For whatever lands the *French* possessed on the east of the *Mississippi*, except *New Orleans*, is now by treaty, as much our right and property, as any part of that Continent. And besides the extensive country on the east of the *Mississippi* from the sea northwards, they had Forts and settlements nigh the *Forks*, where the new Colony is proposed. Further it may be observed, both from the history and maps of that country, that from the *Illinois* river to the sea, scarce any of the *Indian* tribes have their habitation within a great many miles of the *Mississippi*; which, in this case, is a very favourable encouraging circumstance.

FROM [From] the recommencement of hostilities upon our back Settlements by the *Indians*, Some may perhaps object,—‘That a number of our people, though considerable, when settled at a distance from the parts occupied of our other Colonies, yet might [54] be in danger, before they gathered sufficient strength, of being perpetually harassed by the Natives, whom the *French* would not fail to instigate.’—

The objection is as much against *extending* our *old* Colonies as *settling* a *new* one; and amounts plainly to this,—That we must attempt neither the one nor the other, without the permission and good leave of the *French* and *Indians*: which is absurd and ridiculous. But if a new Colony where proposed, is necessary at all,—so far from being delayed, it ought to be much rather hastened, on account of the present *Indian* insurrections. This being self-evident, to say any thing in support of it, would be altogether idle.

That the *French* Jesuits and Priests are concerned in these disturbances, is fully confirmed by accounts from these parts. This hath been their usual practice, even in times of profound peace. But whether these incendiaries are, in this, acting by authority from the *French* nation, we cannot as yet [55] positively say: Though, from the public accounts already noticed, it is more than probable, they have instructions, or permission at least, from some leading Persons of that faithless Court, which countenanced proceedings of the same nature, immediately after the treaty of *Aix-la-chapelle*.

BUT be this as it will,—Shall *Britain*, whose troops carried victory wherever they advanced their Standards in that Country during the late war, and drove the armies of both *French* and Natives before them, be intimidated by any such thing as an *Indian* war, from settling and securing these acquisitions that have cost the Nation so much. Ought we not rather, without loss of time, to send a respectable body of regular forces, with express orders to the several Colonies to join them with sufficient numbers of Provincials, that these insurrections may be quelled by force, if other means shall prove ineffectual?

BUT we are sorry to hear, from the publick and other accounts, that some of our own people are not blameless. Some, [56] in the frontiers of our Colonies, where generally the most worthless persons are to be found, remote from the notice and restraint of Government, had, we are told, lately possessed themselves of Lands belonging to the natives, without purchase or treaty. This encroachment, notwithstanding the repeated Remonstrances of the Natives and the Proclamations of the Governour of the adjacent Colony, could not but highly irritate the original proprietors against our people; especially, at so critical a time. Many of our Colony-traders also, intent upon Gain, right or wrong, sell them spirituous Liquors; and

after making them drunk, cheat, defraud and over-reach them in bargains. Is it any wonder then, that these poor *Indians* when exasperated to the highest degree by such injustice and bad usage, endeavour by what methods they can, to do themselves justice, and maintain their natural rights?

Thus it is that a parcel of Sharpers, the scandal and disgrace of our Colonies, observing neither law nor equity, occasion general mischief. For, by these their shameful low practices, they provoke the *Indians*, who, if discreetly used, would keep treaties as strictly as we do; but when exasperated by such glaring injustice, are of all men the most revengeful and cruel.

The *French*, who neglect no means of securing their interest and power wherever they have footing, are careful to gain the affection of these *Indians*: And, according to their superior dexterity in address and civility of usage, they are more successful than we, in procuring and retaining their friendship. They are at the utmost pains, by religious and matrimonial ties, and by whatever methods their art and cunning can suggest, to engage them firmly to their interest: Whereby they manage them to their own mind, and find great account in so doing.

How highly imprudent and impolitick, therefore, it is, thus to injure and provoke these natives, may be known from the melancholy accounts from these parts, for some months past. These unjustifiable proceedings afford very plausible arguments to the *French* Jesuits and Priests, who, like Satan, whose creatures they are, love to fish in muddy waters, and are ever rambling in these parts, —to create jealousies and suspicions; widen breaches however occasioned; inflame the revengeful spirits of these cruel savages, whom they still abuse; and in short, to persuade them, that our design is, to expel all the natives, and take possession of the whole country: A notion, with which they seem to have been strongly impressed of late; but by whom, is no mystery.

But, to get free of a vexatious, fatiguing, inconvenient *Indian* war, however or by whomsoever raised, it is to be wished, some effectual method were taken to compromise the present differences by a fair and equitable treaty; to prevent our people, particularly the Colony-traders, from abusing and injuring them; to deal fairly, and as much as possible, maintain a strict inviolable friendship with them; to



execute the laws impartially against those [59] that happen to injure them; and, chiefly, to search out, with rewards for discovery, and make public examples of, these plagues of society, disturbers of mankind, and constant source of mischief to us in these parts,—whatever Jesuits, Monks, Priests, &c. can be apprehended any where throughout the whole country eastward from the *Mississippi* and *Iberville*.

WHAT might be the most effectual way of managing these *Indians*, so as to have lasting peace and good neighbourhood with them in time coming,—is a very material consideration. Some are of opinion, that, on account of their insufferable repeated treachery, and the infinite mischief they have done us for many years past; not only *war*, but *extirpation* of some of the most unruly of these tribes, is necessary. Others,—that we ought to keep muskets and powder from them altogether.

BUT both these are liable to objections. For, the immense extent of the country; the large woods, rivers, lakes, mountains and other incumbrances throughout almost [60] the whole of it; the *Indian* method of carrying on war, in small parties, by stolen marches, unexpected attacks upon our sparse defenceless Plantations, and suddenly retreating thro' woods impassable by our people; cannot but render a *war* with them most difficult to us, and *extirpation* next to impossible. Nor would this method, tho' easy and actually practiced, be found to answer the end. For, while any of these tribes remained, the out-parts of our Settlements would still be exposed to their cruelty and fury, and in danger of being perpetually harassed. Neither could we, in many years, people the territories of any of these Nations that might be thus extirpated. Besides,—That of *extirpation*, however agreeable and common to the cruel *Spaniards*, is a method by which, it is hoped, the humane generous *Britons* will never chuse to extend their dominions.

WITHOLDING gun-powder and fire-arms from them, would certainly occasion heavy complaints, and exasperate them exceedingly. The *French* too, would not [61] only improve such refusal, and represent it as a strong argument, to incense the whole tribes against us, as keeping from them the necessary instruments of their game, food, trade, and war; but would find ways and means, while they have any interest in that Continent, to furnish them with these

implements, as much to their own advantage in trade and other ways, as to our loss.

BUT tho' these, and other such forcible measures, may be improper for gaining over people of so cruel revengeful tempers, as they are in their present Pagan state; yet there are certainly some methods, which, if carefully pursued, would be found effectual.

BESIDES justice in dealing, and discreet fair usage, we ought, principally, to endeavour *civilizing* them. The most effectual way of accomplishing this, would be,—using all due pains to teach them our language,—and, chiefly, to instill into them the principles of the true Religion: [62] Which we have hitherto neglected, equally to our shame and loss.

THE *Spaniards* make more useful subjects and friends in *South-America*, and elsewhere, by their missionaries than by their soldiers; and more faithful too: For, of all obligations, these from Religion must be the most firm and lasting.

ONE reason, among others, why the natives shew more favour, and are more firmly attached to the *French* than to us, is manifestly this: Because many of them, by the indefatigable diligence of their Priests, are proselyted to the Catholic faith.

THE impious freedoms, indeed, gross absurdities [*sic*] and blasphemous prostitution of the most sacred truths, whereby the *French* endeavour to engage them to their interest, and work up their indignation against us, are shocking, and altogether unworthy the Christian name. Besides their common maxim, of keeping no faith or promises made to those differing from them in religion, they are at great pains to make these Natives believe the most absurd stories and [63] falsehoods, the very naming of which would be disagreeable to Christian ears: Such as,—that our Saviour was a Frenchman, and the English those that crucified him, &c. By these, and other scandalous abuses, which scarcely any other Nation on earth would dare to attempt, instead of teaching them Divine Truth; they debauch and deprave them; make them still more faithless, treacherous and cruel; extinguish any notions of morality that the light of Nature furnishes; and in short render them seven-fold more the children of the Devil than before.

BUT still, this makes the duty more necessary, of endeavouring to free these our poor abused fellow-creatures and neighbours from the fatal impositions of these arch-deceivers, who, from base selfish views,

thus defy the Arm of Omnipotence, prostitute Religion, make no scruple to pervert and mislead by the grossest lies upon all occasions, and ruin the souls of many thousands.

[64] NOT to mention the Honour of our Nation, King, Church and Government, and other motives yet more noble; this, even from political considerations, claims our sincere regard. The national advantages that would accrue to us from thence, cannot be told. By the light of the Gospel planted among these poor Heathens, would the ferocity of their tempers be removed; their Lives and Manners polished; and the Souls of many saved. Instead of Jealousies, Hatred, Diffidence, Insurrections, and Hostilities, they would love and reverence us as their spiritual Deliverers, and Guides: would be fond to imitate us in polite fashions and civilized manners: would use apparel; build and live in towns and villages; cultivate lands; and, thro' time, study Arts and Sciences. Finally, instead of being idle wanderers, they would make a great addition of very useful Subjects to the *British* Empire.

THEN might we expect, with much more reason than in the present situation, peaceable neighbourhood with them: Ju- [65] stice in dealings; a close lasting friendship; mutual affection and confidence; and their chearful ready assistance when wanted.

THE most effectual way of obtaining and securing these advantages by them, is,—to instruct them carefully in the Knowledge of the true God; the immortality of the Soul: a future State of rewards and punishments; the nature, usefulness and necessity of Truth, Justice, Uprightness and other moral Virtues, with the turpitude and danger of their contrary Vices, &c.

THIS would be the most glorious Conquest we ever made in *America*; and a suitable return of gratitude to our GOD, who of late gave us so many Victories there, and such large Dominions.

IN case of attempting this worthy Design (and would to GOD it were attempted) we never had such promising views of Success as now. For, supposing the present differences with the Natives accommodated, and peace restored, 'tis hoped we [66] shall take care not to be any more pestered with the *French* Jesuites, &c. in these parts.—Again, how favourable for such a design is it, that a Prince of such eminent Goodness, and possessed of all the amiable Virtues, now fills the *British* Throne! A Prince,—who would rejoice to be the

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Instrument of sending the Light of God's Word to so many thou-  
 sands of the human species, sunk in the woeful darkness of Heathenish  
 Ignorance, or abused by nominal Christians, but falsely so called:  
 A Prince,—whose principal aim is, the Glory of God whom he serves,  
 and the good of Mankind whom he loves: A Prince,—against whom  
 the wanton opposition of selfish designing Men, must be as wicked and  
 odious, as his disinterested truly patriotick Views and endeavours for  
 the welfare and happiness of all his Subjects, are remarkable: A  
 Prince, as well qualified as disposed to bring us to the Æra of the  
 highest Glory and Felicity that *Britain* ever enjoyed; if, turning  
 precious Liberty into Licentiousness, and [67] abusing the greatest  
 Mercies, and most distinguished privileges that any Nation on earth  
 is favoured with,—we do not, peevishly, and with unparalleled  
 perversity, provoke Heaven to withdraw the numerous Blessings now  
 in our offer.

To conclude.—Seeing the late war, which was cheerfully gone  
 into by the *British* Nation; prosecuted by Measures as wisely con-  
 certed as vigorously executed; maintained by a steady firmness, and  
 at vast expence;—is at length happily terminated by a peace, the most  
 advantageous to us of any ever made betwixt the two Nations, and  
 which, if but as carefully improved, as its improvement is easy, may  
 render *Britain* more glorious, powerful and wealthy, than in any  
 former period: It is hoped, that those in power, particularly the  
 Lords of Trade and Plantations, will join our most excellent, amiable,  
 virtuous, and truly worthy Sovereign, and use all proper methods,  
 timeously and effectually to accomplish a matter of such importance  
 and general concern: that the [68] now extensive *British* Dominions,  
 by the blessing of the *British* High, who has done such great and  
 marvellous things for us, may henceforth flourish and prosper, under  
 the mild, auspicious and happy Reign of His Majesty and of his  
 Royal Descendants, as the Guardians of Liberty, and Defenders of  
 the true Religion in these our Realms, till earthly Kingdoms and  
 Dominions shall be no more.

F I N I S

