



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 65/30

CANADA AND THE U.S. IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Address by the Honourable Paul Martin,
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
at a Dinner of the Midwestern Regional
Conference of Attorneys General in
Detroit, Michigan, December 7, 1965.

I should like to express my appreciation of your invitation to speak at the dinner being held in connection with this Conference of Attorneys General. I should also like to take this opportunity of conveying greetings from across the border to the eminent representatives of so many states. It is always a pleasure to be with persons skilled in the law. I have a natural common interest with those holding executive positions in government. My Detroit friends know that I have one other good reason for welcoming your invitation, since I am a close neighbour from across the river. You have many themes of regional and national interest to consider.

Later this week I shall be leaving for Europe in order to attend the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council. The foreign ministers and defence ministers of the countries composing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will consider questions of vital importance to the alliance. These are questions of what is best for the alliance in political strategy, military arrangements, and in methods of political consultation. They are fundamental questions of achieving an effective partnership between member countries which will advance the interests of the whole Atlantic Community.

Since the Council meeting is also an occasion for governments to take stock of the world situation, we shall be considering the general progress of the world community towards security and the rule of law.

Consideration of topics as wide as these presents some difficulties. What, for example, is the connection between our obligations under NATO to develop regional defence and partnership and our obligations under the United Nations to develop world security and law?

These obligations are not merely complementary. They are ultimately the same. There is no such thing, in my mind, as regional security in the abstract, divorced from international security in the broader sense. There may be -- there are -- many examples of defence arrangements

based on regional co-operation, but the security of any part of the world must, in the present day, be considered as an international objective which can be realized only by the achievement of a strong and stable international legal order.

In working towards this legal order we must recognize the conflict of national interest, however. Even if we leave out of the question major ideological disagreements or conflicts of interest at the level of the few big powers, the differences in outlook, in background, in economic interest and in power among most nations are formidable. They can be overcome only by the unremitting effort of nations dedicated to the ideals of a world community and the rule of law. The problem lies at the heart of bilateral negotiations, of relationships within such bodies as NATO, of debates over collective action in the United Nations.

We have in the relationship between the United States and Canada experience of the problems to be surmounted and also, I am glad to say, ample evidence of the great benefits which flow from effective partnership.

I need hardly remind you of all our interlocking interests in economic, defence and many other matters. The United States is by far our largest export market. It is from the United States that we draw the greatest proportion of external resources and technological information necessary for the rapid development of our economy. At the same time, we provide the greatest single market for United States goods and the largest source of profitable opportunities for American investors. Our governments stand pledged to co-operate in securing the best use on a broad basis of resources vital to both of us.

There is, of course, a very great discrepancy of power between us. With respect to issues affecting material interests, the preponderance is heavily in favour of the United States. The influence exerted on Canada by its neighbour to the south, the degree of interdependence and the occasional disagreement or public controversy over aspects of Canada-United States relations lead some people to claim that Canada is a reluctant satellite of the United States.

I am sure you would reject this claim as emphatically as I do. We are not a satellite of any kind, reluctant or otherwise. We consider Canada to be a willing partner in an association to which it makes a contribution in the common interest commensurate with its resources and its points of view.

Unlike the barren controversy which characterizes some international exchanges, the disagreements which arise in Canadian-American relations are rather part of the bargaining process involved in reaching agreement on some major undertaking. From our discussions, negotiations, debates -- and even disagreements -- have come the most impressive results. Canadians and Americans can jointly be proud of a number of agreements, such as the gigantic Seaway stretching from the Atlantic to the heart of the continent, the immense Columbia River project and the Canada-U.S. Automotive Agreement, which benefits our people on both sides of the border. These were not dictated by an overwhelmingly powerful nation and accepted by a servile one. They were the fruits of painstaking discussion, normal bargaining and mutual respect.

Even as recently as yesterday, when various financial measures were announced by our two governments, we had another example of the close and complex relations which exist between our two countries. In a situation in which some action had become necessary, co-operative efforts were made to ensure that continued expansion in our economies and in our economic relations with each other would not be impeded. You will no doubt have noticed that specific recognition was given to the high priority of the automotive programme. In many other respects as well, the unique economic and financial relations between Canada and the United States were recognized.

We in Canada naturally have an interest in the strength of the United States dollar as the world's greatest trading currency. Equally, you in the United States have an interest in the prosperity and economic growth of your neighbour. We Canadians have contributed and are continuing to contribute very substantially to the credit side of your balance of payments. To go on doing this we need access to United States capital to help meet our current deficit. Fortunately, with constructive co-operation between the authorities in the two countries, the new and temporary United States measures announced on December 6 maintain unlimited and unrestricted access for Canada to the United States capital market.

In the broader context of political relations and world affairs, there are considerations about relations between Canada and the United States which may appear elementary and obvious but which are worth repeating from time to time.

On the fundamental questions affecting the destiny of our two nations and the nature of our society, these relations are based on trust and friendship. Canadians want partnership with the United States in all the major fields in which that now exists, and could scarcely now conceive of any other type of basic relationship with their neighbour. They welcome the fact that the United States has achieved a position of great power, responsibility and leadership in the world and they understand that this responsibility carries with it the necessity of making very difficult decisions of concern both to the United States and other nations.

I believe that Americans understand that Canada, for its part, has a role in world affairs arising from its own traditions, contacts and commitments. Whether that role is seen in terms of actions as a middle power in the United Nations, or membership in the Commonwealth or NATO, the important point is that we have to arrive at our own judgments on world affairs. We do not make those judgments irresponsibly or without careful consideration of the views of our closest friends.

The partnership between Canada and the United States does not impede the United States in its role as a great power. We do not consider that it should inhibit us in playing our part in international affairs. On the contrary, the close and friendly relationship which exists between us provides a firm base for our action elsewhere.

These are some of the ingredients in Canadian-American relations. They are not created by any automatic processes nor are they dependent primarily on the machinery set up to administer our relations. They are dependent on the firm intention of governments, on a sustained effort to

effect improvements, on personal contacts and on politically imaginative approaches to the problems which inevitably occur as a result of our interdependence.

If these are aspects of the continental relationship, what can we say of the more complex relationships in the Atlantic Community, which is of such great importance to both our countries?

People tend to say a good deal at present about NATO's difficulties, about the differences and uncertainties which the alliance faces. While I do not deny that there are differences and uncertainties, I think the emphasis that is sometimes put on them is misleading and can be dangerous. It is not new for NATO to be faced with problems and differences and uncertainties, and some of these in the past have been serious.

Considering the problems which we successfully resolved since 1949, I cannot be pessimistic about NATO's ability to deal effectively with the difficulties it now faces.

That the alliance remains necessary is fully recognized by all; President de Gaulle has himself emphasized the point. We have to recognize, however, that conditions have greatly changed since the creation in the early 1950s of NATO's existing machinery. We cannot, therefore, out of hand discard the French proposition that some overhaul of that machinery, to adapt it to the political and military and economic circumstances of today, could be beneficial.

In view of the great complexity of the relations within NATO and the world around it today in comparison with the situation in its early period, it is not surprising that there are differences of view about what changes might be desirable. Some want changes in the arrangements relating to nuclear capabilities; President de Gaulle apparently wants changes in the integrated military structure, although he has not yet revealed precisely what he has in mind; still others have ideas for improving the arrangements for consultation within the alliance. And in each of these areas of possible change there are different ideas about the precise arrangements to be preferred.

What I want to emphasize is that, in a free alliance, such differences of view about how to improve the organization are in themselves healthy, a sign of vitality and adaptability. Indeed it could be argued that if there were no such differences it would be a sign of stagnation. The important thing to my mind is that, in tackling these various questions, we should bear in mind our common interest in maintaining and improving the alliance. We should approach our problems patiently and constructively, avoiding division and rancour. We should remember that, while there are many things we seek in common from the alliance, there are other things, legitimate national objectives, which may not be shared by all members and that these naturally give rise to honest differences about the best course.

In such cases, we must all be prepared to compromise, recognizing that it is in our national interest to do so; for if we do not, if we adhere rigidly to national views unacceptable to our allies, then we can end

only in damaging, or even destroying, the organization which was designed to serve, and does serve, and must continue to serve, the collective defensive interests of us all.

I have stressed the fact that the continental partnership of two nations and the Atlantic partnership of 15 must not prevent, but should encourage, a full sense of participation by all these nations in the decisions and action required to advance peace and welfare in the world.

And at this point I should like to say something about the prospects for action at the world level in the United Nations.

If the great majority of members of the United Nations felt that, for better or for worse, all important decisions about world affairs were going to be made by a few great powers, then the essential meaning of the Charter of the United Nations signed in 1945 would have been lost. In the end, it would be discovered that even the great powers could not discharge such a heavy responsibility.

It is possible, of course, to become concerned at times over the slow progress in achieving world security, in extending those spheres in which international agreements constitute a body of law regulating the conflict of interest among nations. Nevertheless, if we have any sense of commitment to world peace, we must move ahead step by step. I should like to give two examples of areas in which this is true.

One of the major responsibilities of all United Nations members is to find ways of controlling, limiting and finally abolishing national armaments, particularly nuclear weapons. You know how difficult it will be to find exactly the right conditions for general disarmament.

Nevertheless, I believe that there are signs that, even in the difficult field of disarmament, we are not engaged in a Utopian quest but are aiming at something which could be achieved. There are four points emerging from our experience in recent years to which we must give most careful consideration:

- (1) Major accomplishments in history have been as much the result of a series of small steps, taken one at a time, as from a sudden breakthrough to some new plateau. We may find that this will be true of progress towards disarmament.
- (2) It would also seem likely that progress will occur, for the moment, in measures designed to deal with partial or peripheral questions, rather than at the heart of confrontation between the major powers.
- (3) It becomes increasingly obvious that, in the verification of disarmament agreements, as in so many other fields, science and technology can and must be harnessed to help achieve man's objectives.

- (4) Experience in limited agreements makes it clear that we must have a form of international verification which is impartial and objective and satisfies the international community as a whole that the obligations undertaken in multilateral disarmament agreements are being carried out.

In making these points, I have in mind the agreement in 1959 to designate Antarctica as a disarmed area, the discussions this year about nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the measures accepted by many nations for safeguards in the peaceful use of atomic energy and the limited agreements about the use of outer space. In these newer areas of international concern, the world community is establishing controls and laying the basis for the eventual application of much wider systems of law.

Our experience with United Nations peace keeping is surely similar. The United Nations has, on the whole, responded effectively to the challenge of conditions which have threatened or breached the peace in various parts of the world. In so doing, it has built up an impressive set of safeguards, presences and forces which, whatever current or future disagreements over financing and control may be, will constitute an invaluable base for the building of more permanent arrangements.

I believe, myself, that members of the United Nations will not have found lasting solutions to the problems of ensuring peace until they have agreed to set up a permanent United Nations police force, properly financed, well trained and ready to do the jobs required of it. Indeed, the general disarmament treaties contemplated by the United States and the Soviet Union both envisage the creation of a United Nations force to ensure preservation of the peace.

We have to work towards this objective step by step, however. The financial problems arising from recent or current peace-keeping operations must be solved first. There must be more reliable arrangements for initiating and controlling the operations. Nations which can offer troops or technical services should perfect their standby arrangements. The United Nations Secretariat must further develop the knowledge and skills necessary to co-ordinate and direct these efforts.

These have been some examples of international problems currently before the NATO alliance or the United Nations and of continuing concern to the Canadian and many other governments.

Perhaps I could stress one essential fact relevant to all these problems. The difficulties will not be overcome unless many nations, of differing sizes and degrees of power, are convinced that it is in their interest to share in the risks and benefits of real partnership in various spheres of international action. They must be willing to accept appropriate responsibility and want to make an effective individual contribution.

We desire most of all a steady growth of universal institutions towards peace, sanity and the rule of law. We cannot sustain that growth unless we are completely convinced and proclaim vigorously our conviction that there are loyalties beyond nationalism. There is ample proof that this belief is strongly adhered to by many and that it can be given effective application. The measures taken to preserve and give more adequate expression to old friendships, the common commitment to principles and interests among allies extending far beyond national boundaries and the determination of states large and small to implement the provisions of the United Nations Charter are evidence of the strength of this conviction. We have begun to develop additional loyalties and to create new realms for the activities of man in his search for peace, security, and freedom.

S/C