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FROM GOOD INTENTIONS TO GOOD PRACTICE:
THE G8 AND NEW CONFLICT PREVENTION INITIATIVES FOR AFRICA

Kristiana Powell and Gina Stephens
with John Kirton, University of Toronto

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Department of Foreign Affairs
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Introduction

The G8 as an institution has consistently sought new and increasingly useful ways to contribute to a stable international order in the post-Cold War era. Traditionally it has accomplished this function by acting as a catalyst to the peace and security agendas of other international fora (such as the UN, World Bank, and the IMF to name a few). In recent years, however, the G8 has directed its security focus toward the development of an international conflict prevention regime which incorporates the participation and utilization of all relevant international and regional actors. Although this new conflict prevention focus is characterized by "a high level of abstraction"[1], its sustained emphasis within the Summit process has done much to highlight the unique and beneficial ability of the G8 to provide impetus to a variety of conflict prevention processes within other, more diffuse, organizations. At their 2001 Summit meeting in Genoa, Italy, the G8 signalled the beginning of a new and intensive partnership with African nations to facilitate growth and development throughout that continent. A large part of this new initiative will intersect with the G8's pre-existing focus on conflict prevention.

This paper, then, seeks to develop and assess the feasibility of realizing a new generation of conflict prevention initiatives, to be advanced through the G8 at this year's Canadian hosted G8 Summit and Foreign Ministers' meetings. These initiatives reflect Canada's current and evolving foreign policy priorities, especially Canada's commitment to working with its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) partners. Accordingly, this paper examines the possibility for the realization of a new generation of conflict prevention issues that synthesizes the concerns of the G8, the Canadian government and its NEPAD partners. Building on past successes, and current and evolving international need, this agenda considers conflict prevention mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming as lenses through which all development, trade, investment, and peace and security initiatives should be examined. This paper then turns to a discussion of the contributions the G8 members can make to successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives. Finally, this paper examines the role of business in potential and actual conflict zones in order to assess some of the possibilities and problems with current approaches to developing standards of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The recommendations suggested in this paper draw on initiatives pursued by individual member countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the academic community, as well as the relevant international organizations (IOs) including the World Bank, and the UN. This paper also incorporates a number of suggestions and responses emerging from a Roundtable discussion of its preliminary draft.[2]

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[1] David Malone, "The G8 and Conflict Prevention: From Promise To Practice?" in Kirton, J. and Trebilcock, M. (eds) Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environmental and Social Governance, forthcoming 2002.

[2] This Roundtable was held at the University of Toronto, Munk Centre for International Studies, March 22, 2002 and involved participants from the academic, NGO, and diplomatic communities. The authors of this paper thank all the participants for their invaluable insights.

Structure

The structure of this paper is straightforward. It first considers the conceptual and theoretical foundations of conflict prevention with an eye to the G8's comparative advantage in the field. Here the paper discusses what it is exactly that the international community is trying to prevent, and then turns to an examination of different forms of conflict prevention. Next, it discusses what the G8 has accomplished so far in the field of conflict prevention (Cologne, Miyazaki, and Genoa). It first traces the evolution of conflict prevention as an issue area within the G8. It then examines the substance and results of the first large-scale conflict prevention initiatives undertaken by the G8, and the resulting implications for those initiatives in the area of conflict prevention that form an integral part of the G8 Africa Action Plan that will be unveiled in the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002. Next, the paper looks at the origins of the NEPAD initiative, the implicit conflict prevention priorities within it, and the explicit conflict prevention overlap between the NEPAD document and the G8's Kananaskis Africa Action Plan. This paper's final section examines new NGO and IO proposals in these four areas, as well as concepts and ideas emerging from the academic community. It also draws extensively on the contributions of participants of the Roundtable discussing an initial draft of this paper.

Each section first discusses *the issue* under consideration with the intention of couching it in the broader body of literature on conflict prevention. The second section identifies *progress* made in these areas. The next section reviews the *challenges and recommendations* emerging from the academic and NGO literature and IO initiatives as well as the insight of Roundtable participants, and finally, the paper presents *G8-specific recommendations* in these four areas. The purpose of this paper is to help the G8 move from good intentions to good practice in its conflict prevention commitments.

Introducing Conflict Prevention

What is conflict prevention?

The end of the Cold War brought with it myriad complex changes in the international system and the dynamics of conflict. Increasingly violent and unresolved ethnic conflicts and civil wars, a growing gap between industrialized states and economically underdeveloped countries, worldwide environmental degradation and the spread of trans-national crime contribute to a turbulent political and social climate. The nature of warfare in the new international system has created a need to supplement traditional concerns of state security with a broader consideration of intra-state violence and domestic civil war as well as non-military threats including overpopulation, the spread of infectious disease, mass migration, environmental degradation, trans-national crime, disease, social inequity, and a lack of economic opportunity. Project Ploughshares' Armed Conflict Report 2000 estimates that there are armed conflicts[3] occurring in 35

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[3] "Armed conflicts," according to Project Ploughshares, includes a minimum cumulative total of combat deaths of 1,000 in the current phase of the conflict. See Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/acr.html

territories around the world. According to the report, Africa is the major site of enduring war, with over 40 per cent of all wars being fought on the continent.

These conflicts have devastating and far-reaching effects. In addition to the tragic loss of lives and widespread human rights violations that are products of civil wars, these conflicts also serve to destroy badly needed infrastructure, and impede or reverse development and discourage investment[4]. Violent civil conflict can also seriously impact the environment, causing the wide-scale destruction of forests and mountains, and the unchecked exploitation of natural resources[5]. These conflicts also contribute to food insecurity and its counterpart, the spread of disease, which in itself may indirectly contribute to conflict in the long run[6]. Furthermore, longstanding violent conflict or civil war often serves to create a "culture of violence", characterized by the widespread tendency to solve disputes through violent rather than peaceful means[7], and a "militarized society" in which families and individuals arm themselves in self-defense or to prey on others[8]. These developments contribute to a cycle of violence. The causes of these civil wars are difficult to isolate, and vary extensively from case-to-case. Literature on civil wars in Africa points to, for example, widespread inequality among different groups, a history of division based on ethnic or racial lines, resource scarcity, pervasive poverty, insecurity and fear among populations, poor governance, greed and the desire to profit from war, and grievance with the state of affairs in a country, as inter-related causes of violent conflicts in Africa.

The literature on conflict prevention emerging from the academic community tends to consider the multi-causal nature of conflict and present integrated recommendations that attempt to respond to a number of potential causes and effects of conflict. The literature generally frames discussions of the value of preventing the occurrence, escalation or re-occurrence of conflict in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the costs of early action against the risks of escalation without earlier involvement. In their edited volume "The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena" (1999), Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance of the Carnegie Commission test the popular adage that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Specifically, they are concerned with determining whether conflict prevention is cost-effective from the perspective of outside parties including, neighbouring countries, regional powers and the international community more generally. Drawing on nine studies of both failed and effective prevention, including the African states of Rwanda and Somalia, the Brown and Rosecrance volume indicates that the costs of conflict escalation far outweigh the costs of early action. While these authors focus on the costs of intervention to third parties, studies completed

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[4] See, for example, "Assessing the Risks of the new types of conflict and examining ways of dealing with them". Paper presented by the Executive Secretary of the GCA delivered at the JIIA International Conference on Conflict Prevention, Tokyo, Japan, June 12-13, 2000. Available at www.gca-cma.org/esecurity.htm.

[5] See, for example, Vayrynen, Raimo "Environmental Security and Conflicts: Concepts and Policies" *International Studies* 35, 1 (1998) and Foster, Gregory D. "Environmental Security: The Search for Strategic Legitimacy" *Armed Forces and Society* Spring 2001.

[6] From Roundtable discussion. University of Toronto. March 22, 2002.

[7] Breines, Ingeborg et al (eds) Male Roles, Masculinities and Violence: A Culture of Peace Perspective (Paris: UNESCO, 2000).

[8] See "Assessing the Risks of the new types of conflict and examining ways of dealing with them". Paper presented by the Executive Secretary of the GCA delivered at the JIIA International Conference on Conflict Prevention, Tokyo, Japan, June 12-13, 2000. Available at www.gca-cma.org/esecurity.htm.

by the World Bank and UNU/WIDER stress the internal costs of conflict in terms of loss of lives, damaged facilities and foregone production (Carment and Schnabel 2001).

As Martin Landgraf (2000) argues, these findings have been largely internalized by international actors involved in conflict prevention and further consensus has emerged around the notions that the prevention of violent conflicts needs to be considered a long-term, proactive activity rather than short-term and reactive. Indeed, international institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank are gradually moving from a policy focus on intervention and crisis management to an emphasis on conflict prevention. Moreover, institutions like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have come to recognize that conflict prevention should not be considered an isolated branch of policy but rather needs to be mainstreamed into current policies. Given that conflict prevention has found a permanent position on the international agenda, academics, NGOs and practitioners are compelled to consider effective approaches to conflict prevention.

In order to engage the work of academics, NGOs and governments in the review that follows, it is first necessary to develop the conceptual and theoretical foundations of conflict prevention with an eye to the G8's comparative advantage in the field. As an organization whose concentrated power and influence allows it to play a key role in international agenda setting, the G8 is uniquely suited to act as the global nexus for action in the area of conflict prevention. Sharing an overlapping membership in many of the most influential, multilateral organizations in the areas of development, finance, and security, the G8 is well placed to provide leadership and an impetus toward a truly holistic approach to conflict prevention – particularly in Africa. Yet conflict prevention (treated as an issue bundle) is a relatively new focus for the G8 and, to a lesser extent its multilateral partner institutions. As David Malone so aptly observes, both the G8, and the international organizations that share its conflict prevention agenda, are still "attempting to come to grips with both short-term prevention of the fire-fighting sort and longer term prevention, often of a developmental nature that builds up firewalls."[9]

Thus, with the constantly evolving approach to this issue area, a first step in the examination of conflict prevention foundations will be to generate a clear understanding of the notion of conflict itself. What is it exactly that the international community should be aiming to prevent? In their work on building conflict prevention capacity, Carment and Schnabel (2001) note that "conflict properly channelled can be constructive and transformative. It can be a positive constructive process under certain conditions" (14). Indeed, as Jean Daudelin of the North-South Institute recently remarked, conflict often serves as a catalyst for positive change; moreover, the pursuit justice may sometimes lead to conflict. Efforts that seek to blindly prevent conflict may serve the perpetuation of injustice[10]. The goal of conflict prevention then, according to Carment and Schnabel, is "not to prevent conflict *per se* but to prevent destructive and potentially violent conflict at any stage of conflict (latent, pre and post-phases)" (14). Conflict prevention therefore

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[9] *Ibid.*
[10] Daudelin reminded the authors of this report that the North-South Institute conducts "research for a fairer world, not a quieter one". Personal interview, March 5, 2002. Ottawa, ON, Canada.

requires some form of "social engineering[11]" (14). Consistent with this perspective, Michael S. Lund provides a useful working definition of conflict prevention as:

> "governmental and nongovernmental actions, policies, and institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially in situations where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change" (in Carment and Schnabel 2001: 15).

Conceptual clarity also requires a consideration of various forms of conflict prevention. Lund (2000) identifies a central conceptual muddle confusing the thinking and action of third parties. Similar to David Malone's observation above, Lund argues that NGOs, governments, and the media often obscure the distinction between reactive humanitarian and peacekeeping conflict interventions, on the one hand, and more proactive efforts aimed at alleviating the problems and tensions that lead to conflict in the first place, on the other. This reactive-proactive confusion is reflected in thinking on the phases of conflict that attract third party concern and involvement. Lund (2000) notes that "many recent publications on the subject of how third parties should deal with conflicts still automatically focus, without explanation, only on the conflicts' advanced stages, as if conflicts are presented to the international community suddenly as full-blown humanitarian crises and wars[12]" (12). The point to be made here is that conflicts "have a beginning without violence" (12). While reactive involvement to prevent escalation of conflict once violence has broken out is in itself an important objective of the international community, responding proactively to the root causes of conflict is equally important inasmuch as it serves to avoid the human, political, social and economic costs of violent conflict.

Miall (2000) offers further clarification to this debate by distinguishing between "light" and "deep" prevention. Light prevention refers to actions intended to avert the outbreak of large-scale violence once the conflict has reached a potential breaking point. Deep prevention, on the other hand, is concerned with addressing the root tensions in society, often, but not exclusively, focusing on the latent, pre-violence or post-violence stages of conflict[13]. It is important to note that these categories reflect understandings of the causes of conflict. Joseph Nye draws the distinction between immediate triggers of conflict and deeper underlying structural sources of tensions that may lead to the eruption of conflict over time (in Miall 2000: 24). A report

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[11] For a discussion of the implications of pursuing a "social engineering" approach to third party involvement in post-conflict situations, see ed. Michael Pugh, Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (New York: Macmillian Press Ltd, 2000).

[12] Indeed, this perspective is reflected in influential work in the field including Mary B. Anderson's Do No Harm (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) and John Paul Lederach's Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: United States Peace Press, 1997).

[13] Other authors refer to "light prevention" as "direct conflict prevention" or "operational prevention", and "deep prevention" as "structural prevention". See for example, Peter Wallensteen, "Preventive Security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflict" in Peter Wallensteen (ed.), Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Records and Future Challenges (Uppsala: Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).

produced by the International Peace Academy (IPA) fleshes out these concepts by identifying a trigger as "a catalyst which spurs violent conflict" under various combinations of structural sources of tension, including insecurity, inequality, private incentives and perceptions (p3).

Light prevention responds to triggers while deep prevention addresses structural conditions. While light and deep prevention address different causes of conflict, it is also useful to consider the distinction between these two forms in terms of the duration of preventive initiatives. Light intervention involves short-term involvement at critical stages of a conflict. Deep intervention, on the other hand, addresses longer-term issues and initiatives. Since this paper is concerned primarily with the G8's role in deep intervention (whose evolution will be traced below), it is helpful to consider the parameters of this form of prevention. Carment and Schnabel (2001) note that long-term prevention seeks to provide long-term stability and includes "[a]ny activity that advances human security, alleviates poverty and threats to the environment, increases respect for human rights, or fosters good and stable governance" (13).

With the increase in civil, regional, and ethnic conflict in the 1990s, and the resulting large-scale humanitarian interventions undertaken by the UN with the participation of G8 members, the cost of a reactive policy toward conflict has become all too clear to the international community, and especially the G8, whose armed forces and personnel are predominant on the frontlines of both intervention and reconstruction efforts. The first-hand experience of the very real emotional and financial toll of violent conflict has informed a new approach within the G8 toward adopting deep intervention approaches toward their conflict prevention initiatives and those that they spur within the broader global community. The next section of this paper examines the progress of the G8's conflict prevention agenda, and demonstrates the evolution of an approach that is informed by the benefit of longer-term developmental policy initiatives.

Conflict Prevention and the G8:

Originally formed as an institution designed to deal mainly with macroeconomic policy coordination, the G8's depth and breadth of policy issues has grown exponentially following the end of the Cold War. The advances have been particularly notable in those issues which are politically global in nature. The G8's expanded role in global political issues has brought it into tighter cooperation both internally and externally with other international organizations (such as the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations). One particular issue area where the G8's agenda is particularly intertwined with that of other international organizations is in the area of conflict prevention. The following section charts the evolution of the G8's approach to conflict prevention. The substance and results of the first large-scale conflict prevention initiatives (Miyazaki, and to a lesser extent Genoa) will be examined with an eye to their implications for the newest tranche of conflict prevention initiatives which form an integral part of the G8 Africa Action Plan to be unveiled at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002.

The Origins Of Conflict Prevention As A G8 Issue Area

While agenda items dealing with areas of conflict prevention have been dealt with by the G7/8 since the early 1990's, its interest in the area as an institution has been particularly notable in the

later half of the nineties. Conflict prevention was first mentioned in the political communique from the Tokyo 1993 Summit, specifically highlighting the need to strengthen the UN's capacity for "preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding"[14] Substantive treatment of conflict prevention issues by the G7/8 itself, however, were initially introduced under the larger rubric of transnational organized crime. In Halifax 1995, the issue of firearms trafficking was added to the Summit's agenda and a special working group (G7/P8 Experts on Transnational Organized Crime) was formed to deal with this issue among a host of others. G8 focus on illicit arms trafficking increased in the years following Halifax. This intense scrutiny yielded many policy benefits, not only in domestic policy among the Eight, but in external organizations such as the UN (by catalyzing the progress toward the ECOSOC Firearms Protocol and encouraging the work of the UN's Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms).[15] This early attention to conflict prevention highlights the many advantages to sustained G8 involvement. While the G8 is in many ways a deliberative body rather than a decisional one, it's restricted membership (comprised of some of the most powerful nations of the world) makes it one of the more flexible institutions and one that can provide leadership to those organizations that have more diffuse and slow-moving mechanisms for policy implementation.

The Conflict Prevention Focus – Cologne 1999

In realizing that the increased occurrences of intra-state, regional and ethnic conflicts were highly destabilizing to the international system, the G8 began to seek solutions for the underpinnings of conflict itself. Thus, the G8's approach to conflict turned to that of prevention. Indeed, G8 attention to the more holistic nature of conflict prevention (as an issue bundle whose elements were inter-related) was initiated at the 1999 Cologne Summit where the foreign ministers openly stated that there was a need for policy improvement and innovation in the area of conflict prevention – especially in the more general, long-range areas of democratic institution building. The Heads of State, in their final communiqué also called for further attention to this area, leading to an ad hoc Ministerial session on conflict prevention in Berlin in December 1999.[16] At this meeting, the G8 Foreign Ministers asked their Political Directors to meet specifically and regularly to shape the conflict prevention initiatives for the Okinawa Summit. Although this particular group was not institutionalized as an official working group, their sessions were referred to as Conflict Prevention Officials' Meetings (CPOM).[17]

Berlin 1999

It was in Berlin where the Foreign Ministers marked the beginning of a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention by the G8. While stressing that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace is conferred on the Security Council by the UN Charter, the G8 Foreign Ministers explored how the G8 might approach conflict prevention. Most importantly, the

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[14] Government of Japan, "Tokyo Summit Political Declaration: Striving For A More Secure and Humane World. July 8, 1993 Accessed 03/23/02. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1993tokyo/political.html
[15] Fen Osler Hampson, et al. *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. p. 112.
[16] Italia, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Conflict Prevention : Fact File". July 20, 2001. Retrieved 03/01/02 from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre :
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/2001genoa/pres_docs/conflict.html
[17] *Ibid.*

Foreign Ministers indicated that a holistic approach that identifies the underlying causes of conflict was necessary:

> The causes of armed conflict are multiple and complex. Its prevention requires an integrated comprehensive approach encompassing political, security, economic, financial, environmental, social and development policies, based on the principles of the UN Charter, the rule of law, democracy, social justice, the respect for human rights, a free press and good governance.[18]

To further address this issue fully, the Foreign Ministers created a special ad hoc body composed of their political directors. The Conflict Prevention Officials' Meeting was dedicated exclusively to examining the "various roles played by each factor at every stage of the development of crises, … taking into account the diversity and complexity of causes of conflict".[19] It was through this forum that G8 Miyazaki Initiatives For Conflict Prevention were produced.

Miyazaki 2000

The Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention (13 July 2000), were produced against a conceptual framework guided by what the G8 Foreign Ministers termed a "culture of prevention".[20] This "culture of prevention" was to be created through not only the bilateral aid projects of the G8 itself, but through "encouraging international and regional organizations, states, NGOs and other actors to view their activities and policies from the vantage of conflict prevention, and to commit themselves to work toward this goal."[21] This holistic treatment of conflict prevention as an issue area denoted a realization that the prevention of conflict needed to be a sustained priority that involved chronological comprehensiveness, a wide-range of policy tools, and a heightened realization of the individual contexts of conflicts.

The concrete policy objectives presented in the Miyazaki Initiative were chosen based on three criteria developed by the Conflict Prevention Officials and the Foreign Ministers:

A) Whether the issue has a direct relevance to conflict prevention.
B) Whether the G8 has a comparative advantage over other players in dealing with the issue.
C) Whether a joint initiative by the G8 could bear fruit.[22]

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[18] Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Berlin" December 17, 1999. Retrieved 03/01/02 from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm991216.htm

[19] Italia, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Conflict Prevention : Fact File". July 20, 2001. Retrieved 03/01/02 from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/2001genoa/pres_docs/conflict.html

[20] Government of Japan, "G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention", July 13, 2000. Retrieved 03/01/02 from from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm000713-in.htm

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

Given these criteria, the G8 Foreign Ministers undertook five broad conflict prevention initiatives, most of them with very tangible and concrete aims. These initiatives were within the following areas (excerpted from the *Conflict Prevention Fact File*[23]):

1) Small Arms and Light Weapons

The G8 underlined that the uncontrolled and illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons and the excessive proliferation of these weapons in many parts of the world pose a threat to peace and security. Emphasizing the need for international institutions and individual states to improve and increase the effectiveness of their efforts by developing co-ordinated and coherent policies, the G8 decided not to authorize the export of small arms to those countries where there is a clear risk that these might be used for repression or aggression against another country. The group agreed, at the same time, to ensure that its export licensing decisions respect the ECOWAS moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons approved in October 1998.

The G8 likewise urged other exporting states to adopt such a policy.

With regard to the fight against the illicit trafficking of small arms, the G8 emphasized the fundamental importance of respecting all embargoes imposed by the United Nations, and encouraged the countries and regions directly affected by illicit arms trafficking to enhance transparency in this regard by adopting measures such as the exchange of information on arms supplies and the registration of small arms. To this end, the G8 offered financial and technical assistance to support those countries that intend to take concrete steps to reduce excessive accumulations of small arms on their territory.

2) Conflict and Development

Peace and democratic stability are indispensable pre-conditions for economic growth and sustainable development. In this sense, development co-operation has a key role to play in fostering peace and stability. As the major provider of development assistance, the G8 can play a crucial role, both in terms of its own development cooperation policies and in co-ordination with the main international financial institutions, to promote democratic and legislative institutions and good governance by countries located in conflict areas, with a view to sustainable development, and human, natural and financial resources.

3) Illicit Trade in Diamonds

The G8 reiterated its concern that the proceeds from the illicit trade in commodities, such as diamonds in Africa, are aggravating international

[23] Italia, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Conflict Prevention : Fact File". July 20, 2001. Retrieved 03/01/02 from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/2001genoa/pres_docs/conflict.html

conflicts and crises. Whilst insisting that the interests of the legitimate diamond producers and traders be protected, the G8 decided to co-operate with the various actors involved (governments of diamond-producing states, neighbouring states, major marketing centres, as well as regional organizations and the private sector) in order to curb illicit diamond flows. At the same time, it calls on producers and buyers to adopt specific measures to counter such trade. The G8 in particular expressed support for the activities carried out by the United Nations in Angola and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, calling for urgent cooperation with the government of Sierra Leone on the proper control over trade in diamonds produced in that country.

4) Children in Armed Conflict

At times direct participants, and too often helpless victims, children are the social category that most directly and most dramatically suffers the harmful effects of conflicts. The G8 agreed to concert pressure in all international fora against individual governments and armed groups when access to assistance is denied to children or when children are specifically targeted as victims and/or participants in a conflict. Emphasizing the importance of universal adherence to the International Labour Organisation Convention no.182 on the elimination of worst forms of child labour, the G8 is committed to promote, in close collaboration with the United Nations, the adoption of international standards for the protection of child rights, including by supporting action by those who contribute towards highlighting and raising awareness of the issue of children in armed conflict.

5) International Civil Police

United Nations civilian police forces are a critical element in conflict prevention as they help indigenous civilian police forces develop the capacity to maintain law and order. Recognizing this important contribution, the G8 urged states with civilian police expertise to make a contribution. To this regard, the G8 underlined the importance of helping the United Nations develop its capacities in this sector in the framework of the peace-keeping functions conferred upon it by the Charter.

Rome and Genoa 2001

Under the Italian Presidency a report card on the above initiatives was issued by the foreign ministers at their Rome meeting (July 18-19, 2001) prior to the Summit in Genoa.[24] The most successful initiatives were those that relied on other international organizations for follow-through. Most notably the successful completion of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

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[24] Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting: Attachment 1 – Progress on the Miyazaki Initiatives" July 18-19, 2001 Rome, Italy. Retrieved 03/01/02 from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm091901_con_att1.htm

and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its resulting Program of Action. Likewise, the foreign ministers lauded the progress made within the Kimberly Process toward developing a certification process that would break the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and conflict. Work on the Children in Armed Conflict agenda was also successfully carried out through the UN, resulting in the signature of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Children in Armed Conflict at the Millenium Summit in New York. Further work in this area was also pursued through the ILO resulting in a convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.

In the area of Civilian Police, the G8 was gratified to see advances within the UN system in this area with the release of the Brahimi recommendations on Civilian Policing. These recommendations stemmed out of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The Panel, which was chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, Under-Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Support of the Secretary-General's Preventive and Peacemaking Efforts, presented its recommendations in August 2000, recommendations which included the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The Comprehensive Review of the DPKO was acknowledged and it was noted that further work needed to be pursued on the UN's early warning capabilities.

Significantly, in the area of conflict and development – perhaps the most diffuse of all of the Miyazaki initiatives – the foreign ministers re-emphasized that "preventing conflict and promoting development are mutually reinforcing and pressing top priorities on the international agenda".[25] To underscore their intent to move toward a more comprehensive and holistic approach, they agreed to promote "the consideration of conflict prevention in development assistance strategies – including the HIPC initiative – and ensure a smooth transition from relief to post-conflict development."[26] As an example of such a strategy, the foreign ministers lauded the April 2001 OECD/DAC Supplement to the 1997 Guidelines ("Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners"). The DAC Guidelines continue to underpin the G8's move toward a more holistic treatment of conflict prevention as an issue-bundle.

This review document went further to identify two relatively new areas for future work: cooperative and sustainable water management and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR).

Alongside the document detailing the progress on the Miyazaki Initiatives, a further annex to the foreign ministers' communiqué examined two initiatives in the area of conflict prevention that were a direct result of the process leading to the Rome foreign ministers' meeting. The first examines the role of women in conflict prevention, sourcing a variety of UN reports and the DAC Guidelines. The foreign ministers' document from the meeting concluded the following:

- [The G8] Emphasizes the importance of the systematic involvement of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, as well as women's full and equal participation in all phases of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding.

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[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

- Encourages the participation of all actors of civil society, including women's organizations, in conflict prevention and conflict resolution as well as encourage and support the sharing of experiences and best practices. In line with the 1997 OECD/DAC statement, and its April 2001 Supplement, the G8 is confident that women's full and equal participation in all the phases of the process of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding will enhance the opportunities for building a just and peaceful society. Special attention should be given, in this context, to identifying and working with local women who represent an influential voice for peace.

- Encourages those involved in planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs to consider the specific needs of female ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents, particularly in the design of reintegration approaches to education, training and resource distribution.

- Supports the provision of appropriate gender-sensitive training for participants in peace-related operations, including military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.

- Encourages the appointment of more women to national and international posts, including SRSGs, Special Envoys, Resident Coordinators and other operational positions.

- Commits, where appropriate, to the integration of a gender perspective and to the participation of women in the development, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes.[27]

The second section of the Rome Annex explored the foreign ministers' work in the area of Corporate Citizenship and Conflict Prevention. Noting the work done on Corporate Social Responsibility in various other for a (the UN, World Economic Forum, and the OECD), the foreign ministers isolated areas of particular regard for the G8. They stated that the G8 :

- recognizes that the private sector through good citizenship can play an important and positive role in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. welcomes the UNGA Resolution A/55/215 entitled "Towards Global Partnership" adopted by consensus in December 2000, and takes note of initiatives such as the UN Secretary General's Global

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[27] excerpted from Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting: Attachment 2 – G8 Roma Initiatives on Conflict Prevention", July 18-19, 2001 . Retrieved 03/01/02 from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm091901_con_att2.htm

Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and similar work in other multilateral fora, including the World Bank.

- expresses its intention to co-operate with private and non governmental sectors using these initiatives as points of reference.

- intends to work further with the private and non-governmental sectors to explore best practices to respond to specific challenges faced in high-risk environments. stresses the valuable contribution that partnership between corporations and local communities can make to the development of civil society.

The G8 Record on Conflict Prevention: Successes and Challenges

From the self-directed report card on Conflict Prevention that was released at the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Rome, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions about the G8's areas of success and challenge in their approach to Conflict Prevention. What is most obvious from this record is the great successes that have been achieved by the G8 in giving impetus to the work of other multilateral fora. The G8's overlapping membership in many of the key international bodies (UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank) does much to assist these organizations internally and provide energetic, political will in many areas (support, for example, for the *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects,* as well as their key role in supporting the Kimberly Process for certifying rough diamonds). Perhaps the most important aspect of the G8's work in the area of conflict prevention is it's ability to act as a leader within other organizations, or as an agenda setter for the broader international community.

Particular challenges still exist, however, in the less specific areas, such as mainstreaming conflict prevention and gender (which will be discussed more systematically below). While the G8 must be praised for highlighting the importance of both these concepts, their concrete and systematic integration into *all* aspects of bilateral and multilateral development as a *lens* seems to remain as a further step not taken.

Likewise, in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility, there exists a realization on the part of the G8 (and other multilateral fora) that trade and investment can contribute significantly to the initiation and sustenance of conflict, yet the political will for compulsory regulation of trade and investment in conflict areas seems to be lacking. The G8's support of such efforts as the UN's Global Compact are key to the advancement of corporate social responsibility, yet these types of codes remain voluntary and thus not systematically adhered to by all private sector entities. The UN itself stresses that "voluntary initiatives of the kind represented by the Global Compact are no substitute for action by governments. Effective governance is critical for the promotion of human rights, decent work, environmental protection and development."[28]

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[28] United Nations, Press Release SG/2065 ECO/18, "Executive Summary and Conclusion of the High Level Meeting on Global Compact" 27 July 2000. P. 2.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the G8

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) had its genesis in two separate development plans for Africa, each created by African leaders. The first plan, developed within the context of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by African leaders[29], was entitled the Millenium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP). The second was a separate initiative (the OMEGA Plan) created by President A Wade of Senegal for the Franco-Africa Summit in Yaounde, Cameroon in January 2001.[30] After extensive consultations between the authors of the two plans, followed by their conclusion that every effort should be made to integrate them as one common document, an integration team was assembled at the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The two, African-authored initiatives were finally reconciled at the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia.[31] The resulting document was entitled the New African Initiative: Merger of the Millenium Partnership for the African Recovery Program and the Omega Plan (NAI). Immediately following the Lusaka Summit, broader international support for the Initiative was sought beginning with a presentation of the document to the G8 leaders in Genoa. The G8 enthusiastically agreed to support the New African Initiative, recognizing that it "provides the basis for a new intensive partnership between Africa and the developed world."[32] To underscore their support, the G8 immediately agreed to "designate a high level personal representative to liase with committed African Leaders on the development of a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the G8 Summit next year [in Kananaskis] under the leadership of Canada."[33] After later negotiations with key continental and international partners, the final (and current) name was devised for the plan: The New Partnership for Africa's Development.

The NEPAD presents a new paradigm for African development. Differing from previous plans, the NEPAD is for Africans by Africans with a future-oriented approach. It responds to a number of failed initiatives for development in Africa, including for example the Lagos Plan of Action (early 1980s) and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (early 1990s)[34]. The NEPAD represents a set of a commitments put forth by African leaders recognizing an obligation to improve the lives of their citizens, as well as work toward deepening the continent's participation in the world economy and international organizations. It serves as a framework for guiding interaction with the rest of the world based on equality and justice, and the realization of the continent's potential.

The NEPAD member countries are committed to changing the nature of their relationship with each other and the rest of the world; indeed, the document states clearly from the outset that

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[29] Specifically President T Mbeki (South Africa), President O Obasanjo (Nigeria) and President A Bouteflika (Algeria) were the architects of the MAP.

[30] South Africa. Department of Foreign Affairs. "NEPAD Background 2: A Historical Overview" 28 February 2002. Accessed 3/19/02. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/nepad2.htm

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Italia, Ministero degli Affari Esteri. "Genoa Plan for Africa" Genova, July 21 2001. Accessed 3/1/02. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/2001genoa/africa.htm

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] The New Partnership for Africa's Development. Report from the African Development Forum III 3-8 March, 2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by Amb. L. Aluko-Olokun. Head, Nigeria NEPAD Team. available at www.uneca.org/adfiii/coverage/

Africans are not willing to further reinforce their dependency on the rest of the world through aid, nor will they accept marginal concessions. The time has come to develop initiatives that build on the natural and archaeological resources of the continent as well as to take advantage of the talent and creativity emerging from Africans' unique and diverse experiences and circumstances. Critically, the NEPAD centres on African ownership and management. It calls for a new relationship with industrialised countries and multilateral organizations that takes country programmes as their point of departure. As the drafters of the document state, "[t]he agenda is based on national and regional priorities and development plans that must be prepared through participatory processes involving the people" (11). This people-centred approach is further emphasized in a call for African peoples to mobilize support for the implementation of the initiative by developing structures for organization, mobilisation and action at all levels (13). However, at the same time, the plan recognizes a pressing need for good leadership capable of and committed to acting on behalf of the people.

Consistent with the comprehensive approach to human security and conflict prevention pursued by the G8 and the Canadian government, the NEPAD initiative recognizes the integrated nature of the social, political, economic and security aspects of sustainable development, and their implications for preventing conflict. To achieve its objectives, the African leaders have agreed to take joint responsibility in a number of critical areas, all of which must be addressed to enable the continent to achieve peaceful and sustainable development:

- Enhancing existing mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution sub-regionally and continentally. The peace and security initiative focuses on four key areas: prevention, management and resolution of conflict; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions. This involves drafting standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national and subnational levels.

- Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability.

- Instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and the auditing of private companies and the public sector.

- Revitalizing education and training systems, with high priority given to addressing the problem of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases. This initiative is linked to development of the public health and education sector.

- Promoting the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by developing revenue-generating activities; and by assuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries. The NEPAD initiative aims at achieving gender equity in primary and secondary education enrolment by 2005. It also

calls on members to give special attention to the reduction of poverty among women and to address the gender-specific implications of poverty reduction strategies.

- Building the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, and to maintain law and order.

- Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export markets.

Despite these progressive commitments, it is important to note here that the NEPAD is not without its critics. Indeed, the plan is perceived as weak and/or potentially ineffective for a number of reasons. For example, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) has criticized the top-down formulation of the initiative. This organization points to the fact that the NEPAD was devised by a small group of African leaders without civil society consultation. They suggest that the success of NEPAD may be undermined by this lack of consultation. Neville Gabriel, director of SACBC's Justice and Peace Department stated: "Without participation there can be no real partnership and no real development"[35]. In addition, Mongezi Guma, director of the South African Council of Churches points to some of the inconsistencies within NEPAD: "Nepad [sic] correctly states that current "globalization" policies fail to lift Africa out of socio-economic decline but then goes on to say that Africa therefore needs more of the same policies."[36] Similarly, Ambassador L. Aluko-Olokun, the Head of Nigeria's NEPAD Team recently noted that globalization has increased Africa's marginalization. However, it may at the same time "provide the means for the continent's rejuvenation[37]". Central to this discussion is the transformation of power relations between Africa and her development partners embedded in the NEPAD: "Unlike past partnerships allegedly conceived abroad, this one is product of indigenous efforts as African leaders are determined to convince sceptics and Afro-pessimists that they have indeed become the architect of their own destiny, offering African methodology, solutions to African problems[38]." Some of the implications of an "African Solutions to Africa Problems" approach are discussed in further detail below. The point here is simply to demonstrate that the NEPAD has been and needs to continue to be subjected to informed scrutiny in order to secure its success, a task that is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper.

As mentioned above, the NEPAD cooperation between the G8 and African leaders was initiated in Genoa. At Genoa, the G8 created Personal Representatives for Africa "who

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[35] From "Bishops Blast Plan" Daily Mail and Guardian March 26, 2002. available at www.mg.co.za/archive/2002mar/features/11mar-bishops.html.

[36] Ibid.

[37] The New Partnership for Africa's Development. Report from the African Development Forum III 3-8 March, 2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by Amb. L. Aluko-Olokun. Head, Nigeria NEPAD Team. available at www.uneca.org/adfiii/coverage/

[38] Ibid.

would be responsible for developing a concrete Action Plan for Africa[39]." The Action Plan for Africa is meant to address particular aspects of the NEPAD initiative while at the same time drawing on relevant G8 initiatives already in play, (i.e. education, health, and information and communications technology). The leaders in Genoa "agreed that the Action Plan for Africa should reflect areas in which the G8 can bring value in addressing systemic challenges confronting Africa[40]." The G8 emphasize particularly those areas that support the previously agreed upon Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) including:

- Reducing by half the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015;

- Achieving universal access to primary education by 2015;

- Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary school enrolment by 2005;

- Reducing infant and child mortality rations by two-thirds by 2015;

- Reducing maternal mortality rations by three-quarters by 2015; and

- Implementing strategies for sustainable development by 2015[41].

The Kananaskis G8 process will concentrate on five broad themes: peace and security, governance, knowledge and health, trade and investment, agriculture and water. These are shared priorities stemming from the NEPAD. Conflict prevention will be addressed under peace and security. Within the peace security umbrella, the G8 process will address four areas specific to conflict prevention. These include follow-on commitments in the areas of corporate citizenship in conflict prevention, and women in conflict prevention[42], as well as newer initiatives pertaining to water and conflict, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), identified at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Rome, 2001. These are very general conflict prevention initiatives that will be tailored toward the development and security needs of Africa, and the G8 priorities for the NEPAD initiative.

The above discussion of conflict prevention indicates that, although these initiatives are targeted, considerations of the impact of various initiatives on the prospects for both peace and conflict should be a predominant lens through which the NEPAD and G8's Action Plan for Africa are realized. This paper, therefore, considers the distinction between integrative and targeted

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[39] Government of Canada, "Works of the Personal Representatives for Africa" available at: http://www.g8.gc.ca/summitafrica_apr-e.asp.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Reproduced. Ibid.

[42] Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Italia. "Conclusion of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting" Attachment # 2. G8 Roma Initiatives on Conflict Prevention. July 18-19, 2001. Rome, Italy. www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm091901_con_att2.htm.

action[43]. Integrative initiatives, or mainstreaming initiatives, serve to guide thinking and action by compelling organizations to "consider how a certain issue relates to every relevant activity and sets up the structures to address it" (Leonhardt 2000: 92). Targeted action refers to policy objectives that aim at reforming or offering support in specific sectors pertaining to conflict prevention. In what follows, this paper examines two integrative initiatives: conflict prevention mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming, and two targeted initiatives: corporate social responsibility and DDR.

Conflict Prevention Prescriptions for the Kananaskis G8 Africa Action Plan

Within the broad conceptual parameters of the types and objectives of conflict prevention, as well as the G8's comparative advantage in conflict prevention, and the objectives of the NEPAD initiative, this section of the paper reviews the academic, and NGO literature, as well as progress made by IOs on four key areas of conflict prevention. It does so with the intention of documenting the progress, challenges and recommendations pertaining to these issues in order to devise a set of proposals for action on the part of the G8. It is hoped that the information gleaned from these reviews will help the G8 move from good intentions to good practice in the field of conflict prevention. In what follows, this paper reviews insight emerging from the academic and NGO communities on effective, integrative frameworks and targeted strategies. Specifically, this section engages the work of scholars and NGOs in developing broad, overarching frameworks of conflict prevention and gender mainstreaming. It then turns to a discussion of innovative thinking on specific conflict prevention issue areas by considering literature on corporate social responsibility, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

A: Conflict prevention mainstreaming

As mentioned earlier, the G8 has underscored its commitment to nurturing a "Culture of Prevention" and they have linked this with a "Comprehensive Approach" to conflict prevention that addresses both chronological comprehensiveness as well as comprehensiveness in measures.[44] Yet when one examines the proposed Africa Action Plan, it is difficult to see that a conflict prevention "lens" has been applied to all areas in a way that would indicate a deep commitment to a systematic "comprehensive approach". To truly address comprehensiveness, considerations of conflict prevention would be mentioned in all key areas, rather than simply dealt with under the rubric of peace and security. As the below examination of the existing academic recommendations on conflict prevention mainstreaming will attest, the necessity of internalizing the requirements for a truly comprehensive approach at the domestic and inter-G8 level will require a substantial investment of political will.

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[43] The authors are indebted to Dr. Jean Daudelin of the North-South Institute for offering insight into this distinction.

[44] Government of Japan, "G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention", July 13, 2000. Retrieved 03/01/02 from from the University of Toronto's G8 Information Centre : http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm000713-in.htm

The Issue and Challenges

The international community is acknowledging that the prevention of violent conflict is a critical first step toward advancing human, regional and international security as well as promoting successful development and trade projects. Lund (2000) notes that considerable progress has been made in the field of conflict prevention; conflict prevention is now addressed frequently in the policies and agendas of the EU, the UN and regional bodies; intergovernmental organizations and NGOs have hosted international conferences on conflict prevention in Europe, North America, Africa and Asia; and case studies identifying lessons learned from past conflict prevention successes and failures are being produced. Despite these advancements, however, a number of obstacles stand in the way of developing highly effective instruments and mechanisms for preventing the outbreak and escalation of violent conflict. A number of scholars identify a general lack of political will on the part of relevant parties as one of the greatest challenges confronting conflict prevention. Indeed, Brown and Rosecrance (1999) argue that "one of the main barriers to conflict prevention is motivating outside powers to take action" (1). A similar conclusion is drawn in a Carnegie Commission publication on the gap between early warning and effective response[45].

Carment and Schnabel (2001) reflect on some of the reasons why political will is often lacking despite the existence of a general consensus on the importance of prevention. They argue that even though prevention is cost-effective, it still costs money and resources that could be spent on higher profile emergencies. This assertion reveals related obstacles articulated by Lund (2000). This expert notes that a lack of public awareness of the value of conflict prevention, combined with the crisis-oriented mentality of the major non-governmental and international governmental entities, compels these organizations to prioritize reactive interventions and to overlook opportunities for prevention. The IPA substantiates the work of these scholars by reporting that "...in the absence of violence, it is usually difficult to mobilize resources for preventive action: political attention is highly selective and resources for prevention are relatively scarce" (2000: 6).

Progress

What is required then is the creation of a mentality or "culture of prevention". "Prevention does not receive nearly the political and public priority it merits on its face, and more energetic and targeted advocacy of the value of prevention and to establishing the organisational and political apparatuses to do it is essential to moving the field forward" (Lund 2000: 19). Carment and Schnabel suggest that prioritizing conflict prevention requires the "mainstreaming of conflict prevention thinking" (17). This essentially means that governments and NGOs alike must imbibe the principle that *if violent conflicts are not inevitable and can be prevented with*

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[45] Bruce W. Jentleson (ed), <u>Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized</u> (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000).

reasonable effort, international actors are bound to act to do what is possible wherever situations could very likely lead to massive violence (Lund 2000: 16)[46].

Mainstreaming conflict prevention in the sphere of "thinking" also guides efforts to mainstream conflict prevention in the sphere of "action". This requires organizations involved in conflict prevention to institutionalize conflict prevention (and peace building) in their normal operations (*International Alert* and *Saferworld*). According to Martina Huber of the *Conflict Prevention Network*, mainstreaming therefore involves:

> Combining policy-specific knowledge with conflict prevention expertise with the help of social, economic, political and security instruments. Mainstreaming is thus about establishing an in-house "culture of prevention" and providing appropriate means and procedures to effectively follow a "mainstream" policy, i.e. conflict prevention. As opposed to a "sidelined" subject, the mainstreamed issue is systematically incorporated in and becomes and integral and equal part of all essential areas of engagement.

A recent survey of major donors conducted by International Alert's Conflict Impact Assessment Project suggests that this type of mainstreaming of conflict prevention has influenced the policy articulation and commitments of key international actors, including the European Commission, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Norway, Canada and the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP).

Nurturing the development of a culture of prevention through mainstreaming conflict prevention and thinking is seen as necessary for generating the political and public will to engage in peaceful preventive measures. It may also increase the likelihood of success in development and trade projects. Nevertheless, the idea is not without its critics. Indeed, there is a danger associated with the reactive, rather than reflective, pursuance of conflict prevention initiatives. Scholars like Miall (2000) and Anderson (1999) demonstrate how external involvement in conflict prevention at any stage of a conflict can actually worsen rather than mitigate tensions. What is required for successful mainstreaming is both a deep understanding of the dynamics of a particular conflict as well as an effective framework for assessing the impact of certain policies on conflict (Anderson 1999, Bush 1998). Effective conflict prevention initiatives, therefore, require a thoroughly conducted analysis of the nature of a specific conflict. According to a report produced by *International Alert* and *Saferworld*, such an analysis should include an assessment of a country's conflict risks as well as the major factors contributing to the perpetuation of violence, and opportunities for peace.

Recognizing the need to mainstream thinking and action that is based on a clear understanding of the dynamics of a conflict as well as the impact of certain projects on those dynamics, Leonhardt (2000) produces a comprehensive framework for orienting the conflict prevention activities of major donor countries, IGOs and NGOs. Leonhardt argues that the mainstreaming of conflict prevention can apply to the following areas: policy articulation and commitments;

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[46] For a discussion of what is required to "mainstream" conflict prevention thinking see Appendix: "Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention Thinking".

conflict analysis, strategy formulation, institutional capacity, monitoring and evaluation, documentation of good practice and institutional learning, human resources and devolution of analysis and decision-making. Kenneth Bush of the IDRC also provides insight into the kinds of frameworks that are appropriate for evaluating both the pre-project and post-project impact of various development and humanitarian operations on conflict. This paper develops a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) framework for assessing the impact for peace and conflict of development policies in conflict-prone regions. Jean Daudelin of the North-South institutes adds that PCIAs should be used to make donor governments and international organizations "conflict aware" rather than to compel them to altogether avoid policies and programs that may lead to conflict. Daudelin submits that equity must come first; PCIAs may indicate that donor governments and international organizations need to be more cautious in pursuing particular approaches but these actors should not be unwilling to support initiatives that generate conflict in the process of pursuing justice[47].

Conclusion and Recommendations

A review of a number of sources on conflict prevention reveals that some of the greatest barriers to effective conflict prevention include a lack of political will and a lack of public awareness of the importance of prevention. The authors reviewed here suggest a partial solution may be found in mainstreaming "conflict prevention thinking", such that the public and governments internalize a prevention mentality and thus encourage prevention-based activities, as well as mainstreaming "conflict prevention action", such that governments and organizations take into account how their development and trade policies will impact conflict, and its exacerbation or prevention. This paper's discussion of corporate social and responsibility and DDR underscores the importance of applying this lens to specific initiatives. More specifically, these authors make the following observations and recommendations:

1) While many donor agencies[48] have committed themselves to conflict prevention in their policy statements, these commitments need to be further operationalized.
2) Donor agencies tend to create "specialized units" for addressing conflict issues. Agencies should be encouraged to integrate "conflict advisors" into the various branches of the agency involved in operations in actual or potential conflict zones.
3) In addition to undertaking PCIA of projects, donor agencies should also perform long-term impact assessments in order to generate a body of knowledge concerning lessons learned and best practices.
4) A central information body should be created to ensure the accumulation and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices.
5) Donor agencies should only pursue policies that are supported by local or national initiatives. Projects and programmes must be "locally owned".

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[47] This was also a concern expressed at the Roundtable (held at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, March 22, 2002) where an initial draft of this paper was discussed.
[48] "Donor agency" is used here to refer to government agencies and inter-governmental organizations involved in development or trade projects.

G8-Specific Recommendations

1) For a "Comprehensive Approach" to conflict prevention to become a reality, it would be essential to re-examine all aspects of the Action Plan for Africa to determine what their impact (separately and taken together as a whole) will mean for the possibilities of conflict and conflict prevention. This is particularly necessary – as noted above – in the areas of the plan that deal with trade and investment. The G8 themselves can encourage a "conflict prevention mentality" by increasing their efforts to inform their domestic polities of the benefits accrued through a long-term, sustained investment in prevention-targeted ODA. Domestically, the G8 governments should take the lead in applying conflict prevention considerations systematically to an evaluation of their individual trade and development policies.

2) To underscore their intent to apply continued emphasis on the implementation of the Kananaskis Action Plan for Africa, and its mandate for conflict prevention, the G8 should institutionalize the previously *ad hoc* forum of Conflict Prevention Officials. The institutionalization of a working group will not only speak to the G8's sincerity and political will to fulfil their side of the partnership for African development, it will ensure that continued attention is paid to considerations of conflict prevention within the Action Plan. Working groups enhance the G8's ability to implement and support projects that are long-term in scope, and provide sustained attention to areas that may be eclipsed by other international areas of concern. Recently, following the devastation of September 11th, a pre-existing G8 working group on terrorism proved to be invaluable in combating this insidious threat.[49] In a similar fashion, an institutionalized G8 Working Group on conflict prevention could achieve a great deal toward conflict prevention mainstreaming and coordinating the G8's (and other international organizations') continued efforts in this area.

B: Gender Mainstreaming

The work on gender[50] and conflict prevention emerging from the academic, NGO and IO literature is dynamic and complex. Two broad debates can be identified in the literature concerning gender and conflict prevention. On the one hand, some authors and organizations emphasize the contribution *women* can make to both conflict and its prevention. On the other, authors consider the impact of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives on the conditions of women's lives, and gender relations more generally. However, upon further reflection, this distinction is rendered artificial. Indeed, a critical review of the literature, and NGO and IO work in the field suggests that pursuing a gender mainstreaming approach to policy making and implementation is a critical step in securing the success of initiatives to prevent

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[49] As noted by a DFAIT official during an authors' interview.
[50] Gender is a complicated concept. This paper uses the following definition of gender: gender is "the social construction of masculinity and femininity. It is a relational concept insofar as it is "not possible to define femininity without also having an idea of masculinity and vice versa" (Olsson and Tryggestad 2000:3).

conflict and its reoccurrence. Consistent with the preceding discussion of the importance of constructing a "conflict prevention lens," this section considers the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches to "gender mainstreaming" in peace and security as elucidated in the academic literature and the work of NGOs and IOs. Without belittling the achievements made thus far, this paper draws attention to oversights and criticisms of current approaches to gender mainstreaming in the field of conflict prevention specifically, and peace and security more generally. It concludes with a set of recommendations on gender mainstreaming tailored to the comparative advantage of the G8.

The Issue

The importance of integrating a gender perspective into all policies and programs is widely recognized and emphasized in the work of governments, academics and NGOs. Reanda (1999) notes that considering the concerns and priorities of women, and gender relations more generally is central to the transformation of unequal relations and the empowerment of women. However, the integration of a gender perspective into policy planning and implementation is more than a human rights and social justice issue; it is critical to the success of the development and security programs and policies pursued by donor countries. Indeed, the World Bank notes that "countries that promote women's rights and increase their access to resources and schooling enjoy lower poverty rates, faster economic growth and less corruption than countries that do not.[51]" A number of authors and organizations also point to the link between gender equality and peace. For example, Mary Caprioli finds that societies with higher degrees of gender equality are likely to be "more pacific in their international behaviour" (271). It is important to note that Caprioli is not arguing that women are inherently more peaceful than men; rather, she submits that societies with greater levels of equality (among races, classes as well as gender) tend to be less supportive of international conflict (Caprioli 2000). This understanding has permeated international thinking on peace and security. Indeed, on International Women's Day 2000, Ambassador Chowdhury of Bangladesh issued a statement recognizing that peace and gender equality are "inextricably linked". This statement marked the first official acknowledgement at the international level that "the full involvement of women in conflict prevention is essential to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security[18]."

Specific to conflict prevention, a recent document produced by *International Alert, Swiss Peace Foundation, FEWER and Africa Peace Forum* acknowledges the importance of integrating a gender perspective into early warning and response: "early warning is the *sine qua non* of effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding... [A] gender-sensitive approach is needed for the early identification of conflicts at the micro-level and in order to prepare adequate response options that ensure the human security of both women and men[52]." According to this document, women make critical contributions to early warning and response, not only as providers of information but also as leaders responsible for devising and executing response

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[51] World Bank. "Women Key To Effective Development" December 6, 2001 available at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/news/pressre.
[18] In International Alert et al "Implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security: Integrating Gender into Early Warning Systems". Report on 1st Expert Consultative Meeting. 7th May 2001, Nairobi, Kenya.
[52] Ibid.

options. Focusing on post-conflict reconstruction, rather than conflict prevention, Sørensen (1998) considers the potentially destabilizing effects of failing to take into account the priorities and needs of women, as well as the dynamics of gender relations in post-conflict reconstruction. She notes that women contribute to post-conflict reconstruction in a number of crucial ways. However, when it comes to peace negotiations and the process of peace building, women tend to "fade into the background"; that is, their needs and priorities are ignored by key decision-makers. Moreover, their contributions to reconstruction are often overlooked or restricted by post-conflict structures and processes. This reality may have a negative impact on the consolidation of long-lasting peace in post-conflict societies. Failure to make full use of women's capacities may frustrate the reconstruction process. In addition, organizations and actors involved in reconstruction processes that fail to appropriately assess the ways in which gender roles and identities are affected by these processes risk exacerbating social tensions, and identity and power struggles in these fragile societies. What is required, according to a number of authors and the work of organizations, is a gender-sensitive lens through which all activities and programs can be assessed.

Progress

A number of key international organizations have responded to this call for gender-sensitive approaches to policy-making. The past few decades have seen shifts in conceptual approaches from "women as a sector" to "gender" as a conceptual approach that needs to be integrated into all aspects of policy-making and programming. The application of a gender sensitive lens has been labelled "gender mainstreaming" by organizations like the UN. According to the UN Economic and Social Council conclusions 1992/7, gender mainstreaming is:

> "the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned
> action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels
> and as a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences
> an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
> policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that
> women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate
> goal is to achieve gender equality" (Giercyz 2001:19).

Reanda (1999) notes that despite the fact that various governments have entered reservations to parts of the Platform (as they have to some provisions of the Women's Convention), "its endorsement by consensus at the UN General Assembly makes it clear that gender mainstreaming has become official policy not only for the UN system of organizations, but also for governments and for the international system as a whole" (60). Indeed, other organizations have also committed themselves to the application of a gender lens to all aspects of their own policy formulation, planning and evaluation and decision-making as well as their relations with partner countries[53].

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[53] For example, OECD members have committed themselves the following gender mainstreaming objectives:

- To shift in emphasis of women as a target group to *gender equality as a development objective*;

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While gender mainstreaming achieved international consensus (albeit with reservations from national governments) in the areas of development and human rights, peace and security, the "hard core" of international affairs remained much more resistant to including a women's dimension in policy and program considerations. However, on 21 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security which acknowledges the need to mainstream gender perspectives and analyses into every aspect of the UN's peace and security operations. The "regime of gender mainstreaming responsiveness and women's rights in peace negotiations" became legally binding with the passing of Resolution 1325. Members of the Security Council also affirmed that "equal access to and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts were essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" (Olsson and Tryggestad 2000: 1). In summary, recent developments in the United Nations and other international organizations indicate acknowledgement of the importance of mainstreaming gender perspectives in all projects and programming, both as a human rights and equality issue as well as a necessary condition for the successful implementation of these policies, including those pertaining to peace and security.

Challenges and Recommendations

Despite these obvious advancements, current approaches to gender mainstreaming, particularly in the field of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, are not without their obstacles and shortcomings. A selective review of NGO and academic work identifies four major challenges, including obstacles at the conceptual level, a tendency to exclude men, the tension between change and the restoration of the status quo with respect to gender relations, the diversity of experiences among women, and obstacles at the level of mechanisms. This section also considers recommendations for addressing these challenges.

Obstacles at the Conceptual Level

The above discussion has considered the importance of and approaches to ensuring that a gender lens is used in all activities pursued by donor governments. Sorensen's (1998) analysis of women and post-conflict situations reveals, however, that in order to be effective, a gender lens must provide a deep, rather than cursory, perspective on the actual effects of initiatives on women's lives. For example, she notes that post-conflict political arrangements call for equal voting rights. However, analyses of these arrangements fail to recognize that women face a number of informal obstacles to voting,

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- To mainstream gender approaches into policy formulation, planning and evaluation, and decision-making procedures;
- To establish effective partnerships with local authorities, civil societies and external partners to secure *locally owned* strategies in the field;
- To emphasize *supportive role of DAC members* in advocating the implementation of international agreements;
- To ensure mainstreaming of equality considerations in their own processes and products;
- To support efforts of partners to promote equality.

From DAC Guidelines for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Co-Operation: Executive Summary.

including restrictive social norms, or family or care-giving obligations that limit access to ballot boxes. For gender mainstreaming to effectively work toward gender equality, the realities of women's experiences must be accounted for. Likewise, simply pursuing initiatives that increase women's participation in decision-making is often not enough to ensure that women's needs and concerns are addressed. Indeed, Dahlerup notes that the inclusion of women in decision-making does not necessarily lead to the transformation of structural inequality and, thus, the empowerment of women (2001); participation alone is often not enough. A similar point was made during the Roundtable discussion of the first draft of this paper. One participant noted that the NEPAD initiative was "light on gender"; that is, it does adequately consider the needs and priorities of women. Moreover, the plan's scant recommendations are so general that they will not be useful guides for policy-making.

The Role of Men

International Alert et al also argue that gender mainstreaming approaches will not work if they do not truly engender conflict prevention or post-conflict initiatives. Referring to consultations on gender and early warning, International Alert et al reported that the consultation also expounded the belief that to engender early warning systems, it is not enough to simply empower and involve women. Indicators and systems would have to have men and women working together, with men trained to understand women's reality in societies engulfed in tension that may lead to open conflict. Men need to understand women's rights, experiences and perspectives in conflict situations. Exchange, dialogue, and education are necessary.

Change and Stability

Conflict can produce profound changes in gender relations. During conflicts, women often assume non-traditional roles. Female combatants, for example, often enjoy a degree of gender equality that does not exist outside of the military (Loten 2001). Female civilians often assume the roles of heads of households when their men are away or killed at war. A return to peace, therefore, raises important questions about the reconfiguration of gender roles. ACCORD reports that in post-conflict situations identities and relationships are in flux. "This ... may create possibilities for change and/or conflict as some actors attempt to introduce new ways of being while others attempt to retain the status quo."

Diversity of Experience

It is important to note, however, that women do not comprise a homogenous group (Farr 2000, Sorensen 1998); indeed, women can assume very different roles in both peace and war. ACCORD, for example, asserts that while some women may promote peace, both before, during and after violence, others may be motivated, for a variety of practical and emotional reasons, to encourage violence and the seizure of land[54]. Moreover, each unique cultural context represents different challenges in terms of expected positions and aspirations. International Alert et al write: " It is also important to recognize the role of women in different contexts and cultures and acknowledge that gender dynamics are not the same in all conflict situations" (2). Furthermore,

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[54] African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) at www.accord.org.za

women of different age groups play different roles and have varying experiences in war and its aftermath. Girl and adult female soldiers have unique needs and capacities coming out of war, as do elders. The conclusion to be drawn here is that gender mainstreaming as it pertains to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction must be considered critically in order to reveal underlying assumptions of the commonalities between women as well as the appropriate roles of men and women in post-conflict societies. Farr (2000) suggests that what is required is a case-by-case analysis of the needs and aspirations of men and women from a variety of perspectives. Awareness of the culture, context and power-relations in the community is important. Developing this understanding requires working with local men's and women's groups.

Obstacles at the Level of Mechanisms

Reanda (1999) argues that one of the main barriers facing effective gender mainstreaming is the lack of appropriate mechanisms for implementation at the national and local levels. While responsibility for implementation of gender mainstreaming commitments lies with national governments, Reanda suggests that the international community can provide assistance in disseminating information and mobilizing public opinion, or through the provision of expertise, financial assistance, training and other operational activities.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This section highlighted the debates surrounding the formulation of a specific lens, or way of looking at conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction from a gender perspective. It identified a number of challenges facing the effective application of gender mainstreaming and considered possible solutions. The following recommendations emerge:

1) Gender mainstreaming must move beyond surface level initiatives to deeper understandings of the opportunities and structural constraints facing women, particularly in post-conflict societies. This is crucial for the durability of peace in these societies.

2) Effective mainstreaming must be truly *gendered*. That is, it must not focus solely on the empowerment and equality of women but also on women's relationships with men and vice versa.

3) Gender mainstreaming must be undertaken critically. Assumptions should not be made about the homogeneity of women's experiences or aspirations. Local women's groups provide invaluable insight and leadership skills. This also means that gender mainstreaming should be accompanied by some sort of 'age mainstreaming' that considers the particular needs and contributions of different age groups of women.

4) Effective gender mainstreaming requires a number of important tasks to which the international community can contribute, including information and mobilization of public opinion, or through provision of expertise, financial assistance, training and other operation activities.

G8-Specific Recommendations

Combining the conclusions drawn from the literature with an understanding of the G8's comparative advantages, the following G8-specific recommendations on gender mainstreaming emerge:

1) G8 member governments should be encouraged to continue to apply a gender perspective to all their development, and conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction projects and programs. In order to ensure the success of these programs from the perspective of gender, the G8 members should be encouraged to develop a streamlined monitoring and assessment system that is capable of generating long-term evaluations of the impacts of their projects from a gender perspective. This would also allow G8 members to share lessons learned and best practice.

2) G8 members must not be paralysed by notions of cultural relativism with respect to the NEPAD's neglect of substantive gender issues. This is not a cultural issue. G8 members need to design projects in consultation and dialogue with African women in order to determine their needs, concerns and capabilities. It cannot be assumed that African men are capable of speaking on behalf of African women.

3) While it is essential to apply a gender lens, these must be applied critically so as not to assume commonalities among women or static gender relations. G8 members should be encouraged to consider the assumptions about appropriate relations between men and women, and women's position in society that underpin their conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction projects.

4) While responsibility for gender mainstreaming lies with national governments, the G8 members can support these efforts, particularly in post-conflict societies, by offering assistance to information dissemination and the mobilization of public opinion, and through the provision of expertise, financial assistance, training and other operational activities

5) The G8 can help overcome resistance on the part of national governments in post-conflict situations to treat women's concerns and contributions seriously by providing financial and technical support for women's groups.

6) G8 members need to take more seriously their obligation to consider the impact on lives of women, and the dynamics of gender relations of their peace and security policies and programs. This requires a deep rather than superficial understanding of how initiatives affect the actual conditions of lives of women and girls of all ages and to what extent these initiatives address their needs and concerns.

C: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

When civil wars end, societies are faced with the enormous tasks of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating into society former combatants, as well as people displaced during the war. Successful DDR can be an essential step toward consolidating peace and preventing the re-eruption of violence in war-affected societies. DDR is also undertaken in conditions of relative peace by countries that want to reap the benefits of a smaller mobilized population, including a less militarized and thus less conflict-prone society. The processes of DDR are complex and challenging in both actual and potential conflict zones; accordingly, there exists a number of ways in which external parties can contribute positively to these processes. This section reviews academic and NGO literature concerning the components of DDR, its role in peace building and conflict prevention, and the challenges it presents. Finally, this section selectively considers some of the problems and solutions associated with current approaches to DDR in order to elucidate some of the ways that the G8 can assist in the undertaking of these complex and multi-faceted initiatives.

NGO and academic literature provides varied understandings of the objectives, and processes of DDR. Mats Berdal (1996) argues that the goal of DDR is a dual one: "to reduce the size of armed forces, while redefining their proper role in society alongside, although constitutionally and functionally separate from, the police and security forces" (5). However, Jennifer Loten (2001) indicates that the disarmament and demobilization activities pursued in many post-conflict situations focus only on formal combatants, overlooking, therefore, paramilitary groups, militias, private security bodies and "a host of other individuals who are not members of organized bodies considered official parties to the conflict" (2001: 68). Members of these groups are also important participants in DDR. Furthermore, Kees Kingma (2000) notes that reintegration does not only involve former combatants[55] but also their families as well as civilians who have been displaced during the war.

DDR is considered by many to be one critical component of the broader processes of post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development as well as conflict prevention. Kingma notes that "[p]ost conflict demobilization and efforts to support reintegration are usually part of a broader process of reconciliation, nation building and the strengthening of civil society" (1997: 154). Likewise, Project Ploughshares *Armed Conflict Report* and Nat J. Colletta et al (1996) draw the link between DDR and development. They note that DDR is an important aspect of security and that long-term development and peace cannot be sustained in the absence of underlying security. Accordingly, successful DDR is considered a necessary (albeit clearly not a sufficient) step toward achieving sustainable peace and development. These authors write: "Orderly demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of military personnel are central contributions to the restoration of civil society and the peaceful return to productive civilian life of hitherto destabilizing forces" (1996: 72). However, as Kingma (2000) notes, the complex processes of DDR may also

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[55] Consistent with the work of Kees Kingma, the term combatants is used here to refer to former government soldiers as well as former members of armed opposition groups (2000: 22). Kingma, Kees (ed), Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa- The Development and Security Impacts, International Political Economy Series, MacMillan Press, 2000).

contribute to the disruption of new political and social conflicts. Indeed, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) is undergoing studies to determine the impact of demobilization and reintegration on the consolidation of peace in post-conflict societies. At minimum, this lack of consensus suggests that DDR must be undertaken with extreme caution, a warning discussed in further detail below.

Different views also emerge on the timing of DDR. For example, Forman and Patrick (2000) refer to DDR only in the post-conflict context of a peace agreement. Consistent with the typology of war-to-peace transitions employed by many scholars and practitioners of post-conflict reconstruction, these authors consider DDR to be part of the *security* transition, which is in itself, one third of the "triple transition" to peace.[56] Others consider DDR an important part of preventing conflict from erupting into mass-scale violence. The Project Ploughshare's Armed Conflict Report[57], for example, considers "preventive disarmament" as defined in *Agenda for Peace* to be a necessary measure for preventing the eruption of violence in conflict-prone societies. Likewise, Nicole Ball (1997) points to the role demobilization can play in contributing to the security and development of society, even in times of peace. She notes that "[w]hile the armed forces can play an important role in nation building, they can also severely constrain national well-being by absorbing too many resources, preventing the growth of responsible, accountable government, and encouraging conflict over compromise. … Reducing the size and political power of the security sector can substantially increase economic and political stability and thereby significantly enhance a country's long-term development prospects" (85). Furthermore, Carbolla et al (2000) draw the link between DDR and national stability, and regional and international security: "local security logically contributes to regional security, which in turns contributes to a more stable global environment" (2). Thus, demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers can play an important role in preventing conflict or the re-eruption of violence at a number of levels.

The Issue

Kingma (2000) argues that the DDR process forms a *continuum*. "Different components are sequenced or overlapping, according to the specific circumstances" (19). However, in order to generate a better understanding of what DDR involves, the challenges it presents for participants, and the contribution the G8 can make to these processes, it is helpful to briefly consider the actual steps involved in DDR. Carbolla et al (2000) describe disarmament as the collection- and often also the destruction - of weapons held by fighting parties. More generally, disarmament involves reducing the number of small arms and light weapons in conflict-prone zones, as well as restricting the transfer of these weapons (Berdal 1996).

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[56] A *democratic* transition from authoritarianism to participatory governance, and a *socio-economic* transition involving the rebuilding of economies comprise the other two thirds of a war-to-peace transition. For an alternative view see Ramsbotham, Oliver. "Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding" *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7(1), Spring 2000: 167-189. Special Issue and Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

[57] Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/acr.html

Nicole Ball (1997) provides a useful typology by dividing the demobilization-reintegration processes into four phases. Demobilization first involves the assembling or cantonment of soldiers. *Assembly* entails taking account of all combatants and their weapons, as well as, in the case of government troops, confining them to barracks. The process of assembling and cantoning soldiers' subsistence, leisure and health needs are adequately met[26]. The second stage of the demobilization-reintegration process involves the *discharge* of soldiers. Discharged soldiers are often transported to their home regions. Some receive food provisions for travel, as well as orientation and some proportion of their benefits upon arrival. The third stage of the process is reinsertion. According to Ball reinsertion involves the administration of transitory provisions to assist former combatants in adjusting to the immediate challenges of civilian life[27]. The final step is reintegration. This involves "incorporation of the veteran and his [*sic*] family into civilian society and the attainment of financial independence through involvement in productive activities[28]" (90).

While Ball's typology is helpful in determining the components of demobilization and reintegration, Kingma (2000) reminds readers that reintegration involves not only combatants, but rather all people that have been uprooted and affected by conflict. Moreover, Colletta et al argue that reconciliation is also a necessary step toward successful reintegration. They note that reintegration requires the "reentry into political and social as well as economic life" (73). This implies that reintegration must also include some form of reconciliation addressing how former enemies, and victims and perpetrators will relate to one another in the aftermath of violence.

Challenges

The above discussion indicates that DDR is a highly complex, and indeed, an extermely expensive undertaking. Accordingly, despite its obvious benefits, a reivew of the literature indicates that DDR faces and presents a number of challenges. At the same time, its successful completion in the face of complexity can be crucial; a number of authors argue that poorly executed or incomplete DDR can have catestrophic effects for immediate and long-term peace. This section selectively considers some of these challenges, including weapons control, disarmament and security, special needs of those affected by DDR; and inadequate or poorly coordinated assistance. It also presents some recommendations offered in the literature for meeting these challenges.

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[26] Ball (1996) identifies the following possible needs (and thus areas requiring support): food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, medical exams, medical care, basic education, leisure activities, orientation on adjusting to civilian life, assistance to child soldiers, census and discharge documentation (88).

[27] These provisions can include food supplements, clothing and personal items, housing material, short-term medical care, basic household goods, land, basic agricultural supplies (seeds/tools), severance pay/ other cash allowances, veteran/spouse information/ counselling, assistance to child soldiers, rehabilitation for physically/ mentally disabled soldiers (89).

[28] Reintegration can require: job generation, job placement services, training, credit schemes, education, and agricultural extension services (89).

Weapons control

A number of authors demonstrate that a central challenge confronting disarmament and demobilization is the proliferation and accessibility of small arms and light weapons. Disarmament is a key step in building lasting peace, since the accessibility of arms may contribute to higher rates of criminal activity as well as facilitate more immediate re-mobilization of fighters and re-eruption of violence in vulnerable societies (ICG 2001, BICC 2000). Nevertheless, Mats Berdal (1996) demonstrates international and regional attempts to control the trade in light weapons and small arms have been largely unsuccessful. Indeed, the availability and widespread use of these weapons as well as the fact that they can be easily concealed pose serious obstacles for their collection or control (Brem and Rutherford 2001). Furthermore, even within the G8 there have been problems with the continued export of arms to conflict areas through G8 national middlemen.[58] There is also a lack of political will to restrict legal small arms exports or the civilian possession of firearms – particularly from the United States and Russia.[59]

Moreover, a barrier facing the collection and/or disposal of weapons is the lack of resources for weapons control programmes. Insufficient resources for disarmament can have dire consequences for DDR specifically and the consolidation of peace more generally. For example, as Ian Spears (2000) notes, the American food-for-guns program in Somalia came to an abrupt halt when the United Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) ran out of wheat flour. "Such a failure not only left American forces with no other choice than to adopt the more threatening task of confiscating weapons, but it also showed total disregard for the safety of those who had already surrendered their weapons" (Spears 2000: 41). The conclusion to be drawn here is that technical and financial assistance for weapons destruction and buy-back programs may provide. for some improvement in disarmament measures but pledged funds must be forthcoming Moreover, efforts can be made to support sub-regional, regional and national initiatives to control small arms transfers and monitoring arms flows, including, for example, the ECOWAS and ANAD (Accord on Nonaggression and Assistance in Defense Matters) moratorium on small arms. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (2000) recommend that international organizations can effectively contribute to providing technical and monitoring capacity. However, the barriers confronting effective weapons control and the corresponding problems these pose for successful DDR, represent only part of the challenge, and as some authors argue, disarmament is not even the most pressing problem facing DDR.

Disarmament and Security

Despite the existence of a general agreement on the importance of DDR for building peace and preventing the reoccurrence of violence, disagreement exists over the most appropriate time within the context of a peace agreement to disarm and demobilize. For example, Manuel

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[58] The French Government, for example, was engulfed in scandal last year following the discovery of French arms exports to Angola and Cameroon through French middlemen. International Action Network on Small Arms. "French Arms Scandal Implicates Politicians". http://www.iansa.org.
[59] U.S. Department of State, "UN Small Arms Conference a Success, U.S. Official Says", 20 August 2001. Accessed 02/27/02. http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/01082001.htm.

Carbolla et al note that "the control of heavy and personal weapons is usually the first step in war-to-peace transitions and it is generally accepted that all "surplus" weapons and equipment must be destroyed or closely controlled before further negotiation steps are taken" (2000). However, Barbara Walter (1999) argues that peace settlements frequently breakdown because the demilitarization provisions of negotiated settlements create "security dilemmas in the reverse" (134). Walter explains that as groups begin to disarm they become more vulnerable to surprise attack. This sense of vulnerability creates fear among combatants and the population at large as well as heightens sensitivity to the possibility that the opposing group will violate its commitment to disarmament and demobilization. Consequently, each group becomes more likely to renege on its commitments to demobilize; continued fighting offers a safer option than agreeing to increase vulnerability through negotiation. For Walter, a third party is needed to create a sense of security and enforce the terms of the settlement: "Third parties can verify compliance with the terms of demobilization and warn of a surprise attack, they can guarantee that soldiers will be protected as they demobilize, and they can become involved if one or both sides resumes the war" (137).

Mats Berdal also argues that creating a "secure environment" is a necessary condition for the successful disarmament and demobilization of military personnel following a peace settlement (1996: 24). According to Berdal, a measure of trust or confidence is required before disarmament should begin. Disarmament therefore may not be the first step toward consolidation of peace in post-conflict societies. Spears (2000) suggests that emphasis should be placed on building confidence among (formerly) warring factions before proceeding with disarmament and demobilization.

At minimum, this debate points to the need for careful consideration of the dynamics of power and violence, and the environment in which DDR is occurring; indeed, "if the consequences of disarmament and weapons-control policies are not carefully considered in terms of their likely impact on the local balance of influence and power among contending factions, the overall security situation may well deteriorate rather than be enhanced" (Berdal 1996: 37). Furthermore, this debate reveals that there may be room for the international community to help build a secure environment. The monitoring and verification of disarmament by an independent international or regional entity may serve to alleviate some of the problems related to the security dilemma produced by disarmament in the absence of confidence. According to Spears (2000), "[i]nformation regarding each sides' capabilities can be important in indicating the true intentions of the parties. Effective verification is not only a role which can be carried out by the international community, but it is also essential if peace processes are to be completed with confidence" (35).

Special needs

As mentioned above, DDR affects of people positioned very differently in societies (consider the varied experiences of former combatants compared with war widows or internally displaced people). Review of the literature reveals that a failure to meet the needs of all those affected by DDR may hinder the success of the processes. Loten (2001) and McKay and Mazurana (2001) note that there is little information available on how women and girl soldiers are affected by DDR. With the exception of Eritrea, most DDR programs in Africa have not taken the needs of

female combatants or wives of combatants into account (BICC 1999). The United Nations Briefing Paper 4 writes: "There is little documentation on the gender dimensions of DDR" (3). This oversight is clearly not due to women's absence in war. Indeed, women are implicated in war in a number of capacities, as combatants[29], wives of fighters, or war widows (Farr 2000). However, DDR may ignore women's experiences, with dire consequences for those women. For example, the demobilization program in Mozambique in the mid-1990s provided only men with resettlement packages and administered only male clothing despite the fact that women were also combatants in this civil war (United Nations 2000).

When they include women at all, DDR programs tend to assume that men and women have similar experiences in armed conflicts. However, female ex-combatants face different challenges than men when reintegrating into society. For example, as Colletta et al note, "…social integration is often difficult for female ex-combatants, who are likely to have become accustomed to an independent and egalitarian way of life in the military; they understandably find it hard to adapt to the expectations of traditional communities" (23). DDR programs also tend to assume that men and women have the same access to resources in post-conflict societies. However, due to unequal distribution of power between men and women, men are often in a better position to benefit from reintegration initiatives[30]. Moreover, the reintegration of female combatants may be complicated by the fact that many are single mothers requiring special provisions for childcare and supplemented assistance for immediate reintegration and longer-term survival (Loten 2001).

The implication here is that a reintegration program that works for a man may not work for a woman given different demands, and roles in society. These barriers also face the wives of former combatants who may not be fully accepted upon re-entrance into a community (BRIDGE 1996). DDR programs that fail to consider the needs of women in DDR risk exacerbating gender inequalities, and indeed contribute to social instability in fragile societies (Sorensen 1998). Indeed, understanding the ways in which a society can successful rebuild, including how men and women interact, "increases the possibilities for lasting peace" (UN 2000: 1). This literature suggests that successful DDR requires long-term and nuanced reintegration projects that take into account the diverse needs and aspirations of war-affected women. Recent academic and NGO literature provide guidelines for producing a gender-sensitive approach to DDR that can help inform the work of organizations working in this field[31].

Another important issue related to demobilization and special needs elucidated in the literature concerns HIV/AIDS. Manuel Carballo et al point to the high risk of infection of military members, and their sexual partners. Accordingly, these authors call for the integration of HIV/AIDS prevention activities into demobilization programs. They note that donor countries

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[29] For example, women comprised one third of fighters for the FMLN forces in El Salvador and EPLF in Eritrea, women comprised one third of the fighters (BICC 2000).

[30] United Nations, Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Briefing Note 4, 2000.

[31] 8 Farr (2000), for example, offers a "checklist" that guides program planners in the application of a gender perspective to DDR initiatives. See the BICC website: "The Demobilization and Reintegration of Women Combatants, Wives of Male Soldiers and War Widows: A Checklist."

and international organizations are deeply involved in both demobilization and HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns and treatment initiatives, "yet few attempts have been made either within and/or between the organizations to rationalize their initiatives and to create coherent and mutually supportive approaches" (2). They suggest that demobilization and reintegration phases offer a number of key opportunities for including HIV/AIDS prevention programs as well as providing for individuals already affected. Intervention can include awareness campaigns, information, education, counseling and care for combatants infected with HIV/AIDS as well as their partners and families. They also suggest that resources should be available to the partners and families of infected combatants.

Inadequate and Poorly Coordinated Assistance

The discussion above indicates that DDR is an extremely expensive undertaking requiring extensive technical and financial support, often from international actors. For example, the Armed Conflict Report concludes that effective reintegration depends on the availability of jobs and growth for demobilized soldiers. This report argues that providing alternative livelihoods not only requires extensive resources in the immediate term but also long-term development and growth. Ball (1997) sheds light on the enormity of this task in Africa noting that "African ex-combatants constitute a specially disadvantaged group. The typical veteran is semiliterate at best, is unskilled, has few personal possessions, often has no housing or land, and frequently has many dependents. Some veterans are also physically and psychologically handicapped by wartime experiences" (Ball 1997: 86, Colletta et al. 1996). The BICC finds that failure to provide productive alternatives may encourage former combatants to re-employ their military skills and weapons to make a living (through, for example, armed robbery or mercenary activity). Evidence from Mozambique suggests that inadequately demobilized combatants have turned to banditry in this country. The ICG also reveals that remobilization in the Great Lakes region has been due, in part, to a lack of alternative ways of making a living. Drawing on the example of Congo, they argue that this remobilization has clearly exacerbated the conflict which has claimed close to 3 million lives in southern Congo alone over the past three years[32]. Clearly, successful reintegration, as expensive as it may be, is a crucial step toward preventing the re-eruption of conflict.

However, Mats Berdal (1996) has found that one of the greatest obstacles to successful DDR is a lack of resources for DDR programs, and/or poorly coordinated resouces. The BICC finds that "[i]n most countries that implemented demobilization and reintegration programs, post-war economic conditions appeared to be such that solely national resources could not fund support activities … External funding, indeed, contributed in most countries to the speed with which demobilization was implemented, and in principle freed up resources for use elsewhere." However, Forman et al (2000) argue funding from donor countries and international organizations for post-conflict reconstruction is often inadequate and poorly administered, with dire consequences for the sustainability of peace. They note that a large portion of the aid that is pledged by international actors for post-conflict activities ("much of the aid pledged by the international community arrives only after considerable delays" (6)). Drawing on a number of case

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[32] International Crisis Group (ICG). ICG Africa Report No. 38. Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War. 14 December 2001.

studies, they argue that such delayed pledges "can wreak havoc on reconstruction and peace building efforts (6)", inasmuch as they result in incomplete projects and unfulfilled expectations for peace. Similarly, Berdal (1996) argues that "donor countries and NGOs usually choose to fund only specific parts of a programme" (67), often in accordance with their own political interests rather than the needs of recipient countries. The result is a lack of coordinated and integrated programmes that reflect donor rather than recipient interests. Berdal (1996) argues that "if international support for operations cannot be sustained, the end result of a "fits-and-starts" policy may be worse" (37).

Forman et al argue that a primary factor accounting for these shortcomings is the absence of a "*regime* – in the sense of institutionalized norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures – governing multilateral support for reconstruction" (13). Despite recent attempts to devise "common principles" and "best practices" including, for example, the OECD/ DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and UN's "Strategic Framework for Response to and Recovery from Conflict," funding remains *ad hoc*, voluntary and poorly coordinated. This volume offers a number of recommendations for overcoming some of the problems of aid distribution and coordination in post-conflict situations. First, Patrick argues that donors need to create a framework outlining donors' aid principles, objectives and strategies for each post-conflict situation. This would facilitate the formulation of a "common assistance strategy, and to help the recovering state in drafting an initial recovery plan" (in Forman et al: 35). Moreover, he argues that donors should strive to create flexible and rapid assistance funds that could meet the immediate recovery needs of societies emerging from war, and avoid critical pledging delays.

While these recommendations suggests improvements to donor approaches, it is important to note that the problem of inadequate or inappropriate funding for reconstruction, including DDR, does not reside solely at the "supply-side" (Ball 1997, Forman et al 2000). To the contrary, these authors note that even when resources are forthcoming, the "demand-side" of these resources (the recipient countries) often lack the absorption capacity to use them appropriately. For example, the problems associated with the pledging and delivery of recovery funds to Rwanda were due, at least in part, to Rwanda's limited absorptive ability (including the absence of skilled personnel in the wake of genocide). The conclusion to be drawn here, therefore, is that in addition to the coordination and commitment of donor countries, successful DDR, and indeed post-conflict reconstruction more generally, requires the strengthening of local capacities, as well as assistance in monitoring the use of external funding.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Even a cursory examination of academic and NGO literature on the elements of DDR suggests that these processes are highly complicated, expensive, and long-term initiatives. With complexity comes a myriad of challenges confronting organizations in their attempt to support successful DDR measures. Some of these challenges include weapons control, disarmament and security, special needs of those affected by DDR; and inadequate or poorly coordinated assistance. In considering each of these challenges, this section also reviewed possible responses to these challenges with the intention of highlighting areas in which the G8 may have a comparative advantage for assistance. The following recommendations can be gleaned from the above review:

1) Disarmament measures need to be supported but caution needs to be exercised in pursuing disarmament and demobilization. These initiatives may fail in the absence of confidence and trust among parties to the peace agreement.

2) Those affected by DDR have special needs. Attention needs to be given to women affected by war. Opportunities exist within DDR processes to pursue HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs.

3) A more comprehensive framework for coordinating aid and monitoring its disbursement is required among donor countries.

4) Donors must also focus on building local capacities to absorb aid.

G8-Specific Recommendations

As mentioned above, is successful as acting as a catalyst for the processes of other IOs and regional organizations. The following recommendations are based on an understanding that these are initiatives that the G8 can pursue in other fora. Accordingly, these recommendations also consider what has been done by other IOs in the considered areas.

1) G8 can support regional organizations involved in disarmament as well as also that provides primarily financial and technical assistance for disarmament and weapons moratorium programs. However, it is also important to note that the G8 and the international community more generally cannot use an "African solutions to African problems" approach as an "exit strategy or a comfortable way for the international community to abdicate its responsibility.[60]" This applies to all initiatives to support regional organizations.

2) Consistent with a conflict prevention mainstreaming approach to policy-making, the G8 should carefully consider the potential impact of DDR on the process of building peace. Assessments should be made of the consequences of disarmament and demobilization on internal balances of power. Considerations of this type could most usefully be handled by an established Working Group of G8 Conflict Prevention Officials (as recommended earlier).

3) Consistent with a gender mainstreaming approach to policy-making, the G8 should encourage member countries providing resources to DDR to ensure that the programmes they support take into account the specific needs, unique experiences and capacities of female ex-combatants as well as war widows. Assessment of these needs is best accomplished in consultation with women's organizations.

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[60] From "Assessing the Risks of the new types of conflict and examining ways of dealing with them". Paper presented by the Executive Secretary of the GCA delivered at the JIIA International Conference on Conflict Prevention, Tokyo, Japan, June 12-13, 2000. Available at www.gca-cma.org/esecurity.htm.

4) Considering the high prevalence of HIV/ AIDS among military personnel, G8 members who fund DDR projects should be encouraged to integrate HIV/ AIDS prevention programs into demobilization activities.

    a) G8 members should support interventions that include prevention campaigns, information, education, counselling and care for those infected with HIV/ AIDS.

    b) Interventions should also target the families and communities of military personnel.

    c) G8 members can also encourage their national organizations supporting demobilization to provide resources and support to families, orphans and widows of affected combatants and former combatants.

5) The G8 can encourage member countries to push for the development of a more coherent and binding framework or strengthen their commitment to the OECD/ DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the UN's "Strategic Framework for Response to and Recovery from Conflict" in order to coordinate and monitor of donor aid to post-conflict societies.

6) The G8 can also focus attention on the need to build local capacities in order to facilitate the absorption and appropriate use of donor funds in post-conflict contexts. Many NGOs who are actively involved in post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention have repeatedly expressed the need for a greater investment in training/capacity building.

7) The G8 can reinvigorate commitment on the part of its members to the UN Trust Fund for the Prevention of Conflict in order to ensure the fast and flexible disbursement of resources to areas at risk of escalating conflict.

8) The G8 can reinvigorate commitment on the part of its members to the World Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Fund to ensure the fast and flexible disbursement of resources in situations where a shortfall of resources risks disrupting the peace building process. The G8 can push for the creation of a more effective DDR Trust Fund through the World Bank that attempts to cover expenses not anticipated or not otherwise provided.

D: Corporate Social Responsibility

This section deals with the important issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its relationship to conflict and conflict prevention. As a result of globalization, economic privatization and the decline of state-directed development, private sector actors have become increasingly more involved in the peace, security and prosperity of developing countries (IPA 2001: 3). Consequently, the human rights and human security responsibilities of corporations operating in unstable zones has rapidly become an issue of concern for academics and NGOs, not to mention governments and inter-governmental organizations. NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Global Witness, and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) have launched active campaigns exposing the link between business

operations and the exacerbation, or continuation of conflict in unstable regions. Others argue that multi-national corporations can play, and have played, a positive role in mitigating violence and preventing conflict. This section reviews the central tenets of the debate over whether corporations can be conflict-reducing or conflict-promoting emerging from academic and NGO literature. It distinguishes between situations of civil war and those of comparative peace with respect to corporate activity[33]. It then elucidates and critically assesses a range of approaches and policy instruments for corporations operating in both peace and conflict zones with an eye to developing the recommendations for G8 presented in the final section of this report.

The Issue

In the introduction to their edited volume Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas and Civil Wars (2000), Mats Berdal and David Malone offer some insight into key economic issues in civil wars. Based on the preliminary results of a multi-year study conducted by the IPA on economic agendas in civil wars, these authors argue that current approaches to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building are often based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the causes and nature of conflict. Emphasizing the importance of recognizing the "political economy" of civil wars, they submit that, in many cases, elites, the military, and citizens have a stake in continued violence insofar as they come to rely on the resources and employment gains provided by war. These authors argue that conflict prevention and peace building mandates tend to conceptualize the roots of conflict as essentially political, resulting from a "collapse of a process or a particular order" (4) and, consequently, often ignore the economic dimension of conflict. Similarly, David Keen argues that "[p]art of the problem is that we tend to regard conflict as, simply, a breakdown in a particular system, rather than as the emergence of another, alternative system as of profit and power[34]" (1996).

Specifically, the IPA's initial findings indicate that globalization may create opportunities for leaders of competing factions to "pursue their economic agendas, through trade, investment and migration ties, both legal and illegal, to neighbouring states and to more distant, industrialized economies.[34]" Furthermore, many individuals who "do well out of war" may be reluctant to sign peace agreements, aiming instead to perpetuate violence for their own gain. Finally, the IPA report notes that a formal end to hostilities does not necessarily indicate that the underlying causes of conflict have been eliminated. While this study is a work in progress, the implications of these findings on the role of corporations in both post-settlement and conflict zones are profound. They suggest that, at minimum, economic considerations play a central role in determining the dynamics of a conflict. From this it follows that a corporation with operations in actual or potential conflict zones can influence the dynamics of violence or potential violence, for better or for worse.

Accordingly, a central challenge facing academics and NGOs investigating corporate social responsibility as it pertains to conflict prevention is to assess the ways in which private sector

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[33] The authors are indebted to Prof. Hevina Dashwood for making clear this distinction. Personal interview. University of Toronto. March 12, 2002.

[34] Critics of this view argue that an "economic causality" model is based on a highly deterministic understanding of human nature and individual motivation. See de Zeeuw, Jeroen and Frerks, Georg "Coping with Internal Conflict Project (CICP) Proceedings. International Seminar on Political Economy of Internal Conflict. 22 November, 2000.

[35] "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars" at www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgreseEcon_body.htm

business activity relates to violent conflict by, for example, influencing the dynamics of violence, the curtailment or perpetuation of human rights abuses or the sustainability of militaristic regimes. According to a number of scholars and organizations, corporations can play a positive role in promoting peace. These authors focus on the link between business activity and long-lasting peace. The IPA notes that "[f]oreign direct investment (FDI) may stimulate economic growth and facilitate economic and political liberalization in some circumstances", developments which are linked in the minds of many to peace and stability.[36] Moreover, as Arvind Ganesan of Human Rights Watch argues, the conventional wisdom holds that "constructive engagement" on the part of businesses and governments is likely to lead to "greater revenue, jobs, roads, schools, hospitals, and ultimately a middle class participating in government[37]". *International Alert*, an NGO focusing on conflict resolution and peace building bridges the gap between the development contribution of corporations, on the one hand, and their influence on conflict, on the other: "[t]he private sector, from multinationals to small local businesses, has a vital role to play in creating wealth, promoting socio-economic development and contribution to the prevention and resolution of violent conflict[38]".

Focusing specifically on situations of conflict, the International Peace Forum's *The Business of Peace* project provides a framework for assessing both the positive and negative roles business can play in situations of violent conflict. The project also explicitly outlines the ways in which business can make a positive contribution to conflict prevention and resolution, through, for example, engagement in preventative diplomacy, deployment and disarmament, and participation in both emergency humanitarian relief and long-term peace building which addresses the root causes of conflict[39]. Also pointing to the potentially positive role of business in zones of conflict and areas at risk of conflict, Virginia Haufler (2001) identifies a number of ways industries can contribute to peace. Focusing on non-extraction industries, she demonstrates how companies concerned with their reputation and brand name operating in unstable areas are likely to adopt codes of conduct dealing with human rights issues. They can also serve an important employment role in post-conflict reconstruction. This is also true for information industries, such as those operating in post-genocide Rwanda, which have served to help rebuild infrastructure. In addition, Haufler points to companies like American Express who are actively engaged in peace promotion activities.

Despite these examples of positive contributions, the idea that business can and should play an active and positive role in conflict prevention and/or resolution is not without its critics. Some participants at the Roundtable discussing an initial draft of the present paper noted that the

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[36] For an assessment of arguments concerning the link between economic and political liberalization, and peace as it pertains to post-conflict peace building see Paris, Roland. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997): 54-89. For a critique of Paris' review see Ramsbotham, Oliver. "Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding" *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7(1), Spring 2000: 167-189. Special Issue.

[37] Arvind Ganesan. "Closing Remarks". International Peace Forum Conference. "Business and International Security Conference". April 29, 2000. To find go to "events" at www.intpf.com.

[38] In Bennett, Juliette, "Business in Zones of Conflict – The Role of the Multinational in Promoting Regional Stability" Prepared fro the UN Global Compact Policy Dialogues, January 2001. Available at www.unglobalcompact.org/un/gc/.

[39] The Business of Peace: The private sector as a partner in conflict prevention and resolution. The project divides the contributions businesses can make into the broad categories of social investment, core business activities, and policy dialogue and then highlights specific measures that businesses can undertake based on these divisions.

"constructive engagement" argument that is often espoused by the Canadian government to legitimize trade relations with countries with questionable human rights records does not hold much weight in Africa. Governance structures on the continent are often too weak and ineffective to be influenced by efforts on the part of Africa's trading partners to "work from within", that is, to push for internal reform through the promotion of trade links.

Furthermore, a number of scholars and NGOs argue that, rather than help prevent or resolve conflict, corporations operating in actual or potential conflict zones may both directly and indirectly fuel or contribute to violence. In a recent article in *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Craig Forcese draws on the example of the Talisman Energy Inc. case to shed light on the characteristics of what he calls "militarized commerce", the ways in which business and violence can interact in conflict-prone zones. Far from helping to mitigate violence, firms can contribute to conflict in a number of ways. For example, firms operating in potential or actual conflict areas may hire security firms to protect investments. In some cases, companies rely for their security on state militaries, many with poor human rights records. Consequently, argues Forcese, "companies retaining disreputable security forces may run the risk of discovering themselves closely affiliated – in fact or perception – with repressive regimes, and more critically, with both unconscionable actions by state armies and stepped-up civil or regional conflict" (38).

A second way in which firms' presence can contribute to violence is by producing products, revenue, or infrastructure that can serve to increase a regime's ability to engage in abuses (IPA 2001, Forcese 2001: 40, Pegg 2000). Furthermore, a firm's presence can provide international credibility to a repressive regime. Pegg (2000) also argues that firms can have a "catalytic effect" by "bringing local populations into confrontation with military forces" (40).

Firms may also contribute more directly to violence and the perpetuation of conflict in their foreign operations.[40] For example, recent developments concerning Talisman Energy's presence in Sudan suggests that it is possible that corporations act less as a catalyst than a direct conspirator in violence and conflict. In a class action lawsuit filed against Talisman Energy in November 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan charges the Canadian corporation with ordering the active displacement of people by the military. Article 27 of the lawsuit reads: "Defendants' concerted actions are demonstrated, inter alia, by a communication dated May 7, 1999, from Petroleum Security's central office in Khartoum to its office in Heglig. The directive, denominated as "very urgent" states, in pertinent part:

> In accordance with directives of His Excellency the Minister of Energy and Mining *and fulfilling the request of the Canadian Company* ... the armed forces will conduct cleaning up operations in all villages from Heglig to Pariang.

(translation obtained by Plaintiff's counsel, emphasis added)[41]".

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[40] For NGO literature on this connection see, for example, Partnership Africa Canada's "Integrative Study of Issues Relating to Corporate Responsibility and the Role of Economic Agendas in Civil Conflict" for studies on Sierra Leone, West Africa, Congo/Central Africa, and Southern Africa. Available at **www.partnershipafricacanada.org**.

[41] Civil Action No. 01 CV 9882 (AGS). The authors are indebted to Prof. Robert O. Matthews for bringing this lawsuit to their attention. Personal interview. University of Toronto. March 13, 2002.

Another extreme example the possibility of direct complicity is provided by the IPA's work on business and conflict. The IPA Workshop report on *Private Sector Actors in Zones of Conflict* identifies private sector actors that intentionally seek profit from instability and conflict. Similarly, one of the participants at the Roundtable noted that foreign corporations operating in Africa often have an incentive to promote conflict. This participant noted that the majority of investment in Africa is in the extractive industries. Unlike investment in agriculture or other "peace sectors" which depends of peace to secure profits, companies involved in resource extraction can operate smoothly in conflict environments. In fact, these industries may profit from war inasmuch as the state collapse that often accompanies civil wars in Africa allows companies to avoid paying taxes and adhering to environmental standards or extraction quotas. In short, a review of a number of sources and case studies suggests that corporations operating in unstable regions can directly or indirectly contribute to violence, human rights abuses and conflict.

It is important to note that a causal link between business operations and violence in conflict zones remains tenuous. Indeed, participants in the IPA workshop on *Private Sector Actors in Zones of Conflict* concluded that more systematic research on the relationship between private sector activity and violent conflict was required before an understanding of the "bigger picture" of this relationship can be established[42]. This may be true. However, as even a cursory review of a wide range of case studies reveals, the smaller pieces of the bigger puzzle suggest, at minimum, that firms can and often do contribute to human rights abuses and violent conflict in zones of actual or potential conflict. This conclusion is revisited in this paper's discussion of recommendations for the G8 with respect to corporate activity in actual and potential conflict zones.

Progress and Challenges

It is to this concern that a number of civil society and academic groups, as well as governments and inter-governmental organizations have responded. In what follows, this review considers efforts made by various groups in developing mechanisms to address the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR), including voluntary codes and legal regulations. The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches in order to direct thinking on recommendations on CSR appropriate for the Government of Canada and the G8.

The IPA identifies three tools available to international actors concerned with promoting conflict-reducing behaviour on the part of corporations with foreign operations in conflict-prone zones: normative, instrumental, and coercive. Normative approaches focus primarily on the "promotion of principled conduct, either through advocacy campaigns that mobilize public awareness and pressure, or the voluntary adoption of codes of conduct. The "naming and shaming" approaches undertaken primarily by NGOs have proven effective in exposing corporate behaviour "deemed contrary to accepted international norms[43]." The restriction here, however, is that exposure campaigns are effective only against companies concerned with their public image. The IPA

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[42] Participants found "little empirical study of the actual consequences of private sector activity, particularly in countries at risk of, or undergoing conflict" (IPA 2001: 3).

[43] Consider, for example, the actions of 'Essential Action', Global Witness, Human Rights Watch and numerous other organizations against Shell Oil in Nigeria.

reports, "Consumer pressure … may only be effective where the targeted company has a broadly recognizable product brand and where documented misdeeds are persuasive enough to induce consumers to forego the benefits they derive from the good in question. Companies that have a lower public profile, have extensively diversified holdings, or which deal in "generic" commodities like timber and oil, may be less amenable to this sort of pressure" (2001: 11).

The creation of voluntary codes seems to hold greater promise. A number of comprehensive voluntary codes of conduct for corporate activity in both peace and conflict zones have been developed recently by civil society groups, independent governments and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). The following section will consider in more detail the work of governments and IGOs in the area of CSR. What is important to note here is the content and scope of codes emerging from within civil society. One example of a comprehensive set of guidelines is produced in the January 2002 report of the Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission (CDCAC)[44]. These guidelines were drafted in accordance with information and ideas emerging from Canadian business people, church groups, trade unionists, government leaders, investors, academics and concerned citizens in public hearings conducted across the country[45]. The report does not offer a definitive code for CSR but rather demarcates specific areas and basic standards that should form the content of corporate responsibility. Critically, these standards draw on established voluntary codes of conduct in order to provide a comprehensive and standardized approach to CSR. Participants at the Roundtable noted, however, that voluntary codes tend to focus exclusively on the responsibility of home governments (in this case, G8 countries). They suggested that, in order to be effective, NEPAD countries must also take some responsibility in promoting, monitoring and enforcing adherence to voluntary codes on the part of foreign investors.

Moreover, missing from these standards is a distinction between corporate behaviour in conflict and peace zones. As the section in this paper devoted to a discussion of governmental and intergovernmental voluntary codes demonstrates, the UK and the US have taken initial steps to filling this lacuna by jointly developing "Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights[46]". However, there are still a number of barriers hindering the success of voluntary codes in controlling the behaviour of corporations. Voluntary codes have been widely criticized for "not going far enough". Indeed, voluntary codes lack effective monitoring mechanisms capable of assessing the appropriateness of certain codes in specific contexts as well as the accuracy of companies' reports on their compliance with these codes[47]. Moreover, the proliferation of codes over the past decade has made it difficult to consider methods of deepening commitment (through, for example, appropriate monitoring) to these codes. This also may complicate participating companies' efforts to adhere to voluntary codes (IPA 2001). Another concern of

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[44] A number of other guidelines for corporate action in areas of peace have been developed. See, for example, the CBSR Guidelines, the Conference Board of Canada, and the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility's "Benchmarks".

[45] The report is entitled "The New Balance Sheet: Corporate Profits and Responsibility in the 21st Century".

[46] On December 20, 2000 the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom jointly produced a code of conduct for businesses in conflict zones entitled "Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights". This agreement was a joint project of NGOs, government and MNCs in the extraction industry, and has been signed by a number of major oil and mining companies that have agreed to voluntarily support human rights principles guiding the use of security forces in their overseas operations.

[47] See Global Witness: http://www.fatbeehive.com/globalwitness/text/campaigns/oil/display2.php?id=91

many firms is that adhering to voluntary codes will undercut their competitive advantage compared to business rivals (CDCAC 2002). Firms that might otherwise agree on to codes may refuse in the face of losing their competitive advantage to less ethical rivals ("defection"). Indeed, this points to the problem of unilateral standard-setting.

Most importantly, however, and central to a discussion of corporate activity in situations of actual or potential conflict, is a consideration of the limits on voluntary codes in conflict zones. Even when complying with voluntary standards, companies operating in conflict zones are often unable to ensure that they are not indirectly involved in fuelling or contributing to violence or human rights abuses. As Matthews' work on Talisman in the Sudan suggests[48], and as Talisman's own *Corporate Social Responsibility Report* reveals[49], Talisman does not have the authority or ability to address issues of human rights violations linked to oil extraction, to control the ways in which the oil infrastructure is used, or to monitor the ways in which oil revenue is spent. Moreover, companies pursuing voluntary codes may also operate in an environment in which attaining information regarding the implications of their operations or even the conditions in which they are operating is difficult.

The third approach to ensuring that corporations act responsibly is through the use of domestic or international legal regulation. However, this approach is not without its problems. The IPA (2001) notes with respect to international regulation that "all regulation has the perverse effect of increasing the incentives for evasion, and hence, can actually generate new forms of corrupt and illicit activities" (12). Indeed, some private sector actors actually profit from the flouting of international or national laws and norms (consider profits made through the trade in illegal goods). Moreover, international regulation requires the cooperation of a number of states to commit to providing domestic implementation and enforcement of international standards or to devolve power to an international enforcement and monitoring body. IPA research reveals that "[i]n reality, ... getting states to commit to these sorts of legal regimes is a notoriously difficult task" (2001: 12).

Developing domestic legal regulation is also difficult. Craig Forcese argues that Canada's Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), has proven ineffective, at least in the Talisman case[50]. He argues that the application of SEMA was constrained by its reliance on two elusive triggers: a concrete definition of "grave breaches" or a resolution or recommendation by international organizations. He argues that Canada needs to strengthen its ability to regulate corporate activity abroad. The CDCAC (2002) makes a similar argument noting that Canada is lagging behind other countries in developing effective codes of conduct. Pointing to progress made by the US, the UK and the EU, the report concludes that "[i]f Canada does not adopt our recommendations or others similar to them, it will find itself not among the leading nations promoting corporate social responsibility but lagging further behind" (3). Pushing for domestic

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[48] Matthews, Robert O. "Canada and the Sudan: An Ambiguous Relationship" in Kirton, John and Trebilcock, M. (eds) Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environmental and Social Governance, forthcoming.

[49] Talisman Energy, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000 on Sudan Operations. Available at www.talisman-energy.com/responsibility/framework.html

[50] For an alternative view see Matthews, Robert O. "Canada and the Sudan: An Ambiguous Relationship" in in Kirton, John and Trebilcock, M. (eds) Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environmental and Social Governance, forthcoming.

regulation in host countries is also problematic. Indeed, countries desperate for FDI are often not willing or capable of imposing regulations on potential investors, especially when other countries are not doing so as well. Moreover, even in countries that have devised comprehensive legal regulations, weak governments are unable to protest the illegal or unscrupulous actions of powerful corporations[51].

Conclusion and Recommendations

A review of the literature on Corporate Responsibility and Conflict Prevention reveals a debate over the actions corporations can and should when conducting or considering conducting foreign operations in situations of actual or potential conflict. On the one hand, some commentators argue that corporations can actively promote peace in areas of both open and potential conflict. Others argue that the presence of a corporation often serves to exacerbate violence in areas experiencing open conflict. The academic and NGO literature presents a number of tools and recommendations that can be used to govern the actions of corporations in both peace and conflict zones. Some of the recommendations explicated in the literature reviewed here include:

1) Individual members need laws that allow them to take action against their own corporations. Accordingly, Canada needs to strengthen its commitment to CSR. Some suggestions include improving SEMA or developing more appropriate instruments such as those devised by the US, the UK and the EU.

2) Corporations should be actively discouraged from investing in conflict zones since it is extremely difficult to avoid contributing to violence and human rights abuses in zones of civil war.

3) Corporations already operating in conflict zones should conduct a review of all of their activities and report these findings to an international body of some kind.

4) Compliance with voluntary codes must be monitored and verified by an independent body that can produce reports on upholding voluntary principles, as well as on the accuracy and adequacy of the codes. The continued work of the UN Global Compact in areas of governance and strategy is to be applauded.

G8-Specific Recommendations

1) The G8 can encourage its members to make clear distinctions between potential (peace) and actual conflict zones. There exist numerous typologies to assist in the creation of these distinctions, including, for example, Project Ploughshares' quantitative definition of "armed conflict".

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[51] Dr. Owens Wiwa. Presentation on "Globalization and Corporate Responsibility." University of Toronto. March 14, 2002.

2) *In Peace Zones*: The G8 can encourage its members and other OECD countries to harmonize voluntary codes of conflict for corporations operating in peace zones. G8 and OECD members can consider offering tax cuts or other incentives to companies that commit to voluntary standards and, through their investment, contribute to building infrastructure in their host countries.

3) The G8 can support the creation of an independent international body of experts that can conduct fact-finding missions for corporations with foreign operations, and provide context-specific advice on conflict prevention considerations that would assist with compliance to accepted voluntary codes. This international body can also assist both home and host countries, and regional organizations, to monitor compliance with these voluntary principles, as well as the accuracy and adequacy of the codes in specific situations.

4) *In Conflict Zones*: The G8 can devise a set of *legal regulations* for the conduct of corporations already operating in zones that have become violent throughout the duration of their investment period. These regulations can be derived from the voluntary principles for corporations operating in conflict zones devised by the UK and the US.

5) An international body working alongside home and host governments, and regional organizations, can monitor compliance with these legal regulations. Penalties for violation will be determined and enforced by the home country.

6) The G8 can encourage its members to actively discourage initial investment in conflict zones through the creation of legislation, similar to the OECD's Convention on Bribery, requiring signatories to outlaw violations by companies operating in signatory jurisdictions.

General Recommendations

On Civil Society
Given the problems surrounding good governance in Africa, some of the most powerful and effective forces for positive change in Africa emerge from civil society.

1) G8 members should be encouraged to support via financial and technical resources civil society organizations in Africa. The G8 can help build the institutional capacity of these organizations by offering technical and financial assistance.

2) Several NGOs working at various levels of conflict prevention in Africa were contacted for their opinions on the possibilities of their work being enhanced by G8 initiatives. The vast majority replied in the affirmative, indicating a strong perception of an `opportunity structure' for work to be done by civil society with

the help of G8 support. This positive response also reflects the need for reciprocation through a commitment to follow through on civil society driven initiatives. In many conflict zones, state collapse is an undeniable reality, and civil society has the ability to fill the gap and concomitantly nurture social responsibility and activism in the citizenry.

On Regional Peacekeeping

In past conflicts, African countries have made positive contributions to regional peacekeeping efforts but have often lacked the logistic and financial resources required to effectively carry out the complicated tasks associated with peacekeeping. Western countries have become increasingly less willing to contribute militarily to peacekeeping operations in Africa.

1) G8 member countries should be encouraged to provide logistical, technical and financial resources to sub-regional peacekeeping operations.

On Governance Mainstreaming

1) Participants at the Roundtable expressed interest in pushing the G8 to also consider "governance mainstreaming". This essentially requires G8 countries to consider the effects of all their development, trade and security operations on the governance structure of the state. This is a particularly important area of concern given that good governance has been identified by many, including NEPAD leaders themselves, as an essential prerequisite for the success of the plan.

2) Similarly, poor governance is cited as a central cause of violent conflict. In addition to mainstreaming governance concerns, the G8 can consider supporting orderly succession to power as a strong conflict prevention policy. Specific actions can include providing support for African initiatives, like those undertaken by the GCA, to encourage African leaders to leave office peacefully by providing pensions, and roles or positions in international organizations.

Concluding Discussion

The central purpose of this paper was to develop both general and specific recommendations to enable the G8 to move from good intentions to good practice in its conflict prevention commitments. This paper developed and assessed the feasibility of realizing a new generation of conflict prevention initiatives to be advanced through the G8 at this year's Canadian hosted G8 Summit and Foreign Ministers' meetings. These initiatives reflect Canada's current and evolving foreign policy priorities, especially Canada's commitment to working with its NEPAD partners. This paper first considered the conceptual and theoretical foundations of conflict prevention with an eye to the G8's comparative advantage in the field. This section discussed a number of views on the causes of civil conflict in Africa as well as explored various forms of conflict prevention.

It made the distinction between "light" prevention- actions intended to avert the outbreak of large-scale violence once the conflict has reached a potential breaking point- and "deep" prevention – initiatives concerned with addressing the root tensions in society,

often, but not exclusively, focusing on the latent, pre-violence or post-violence stages of conflict. This discussion underscored the reality that the G8 is best equipped to forward deep intervention initiatives, mainly through other institutions and organizations. But it also made clear the notion that conflict can serve as a catalyst for positive change; indeed, the pursuit justice may sometimes lead to conflict. Efforts that seek to blindly prevent conflict may serve the perpetuation of injustice. The goal of conflict prevention, therefore, is not to prevent conflict *per se* but rather to prevent violent and destructive conflict.

This paper then discussed what the G8 has accomplished so far in the field of conflict prevention, looking at advancements made at Cologne, Miyazaki, and Genoa. It traced the evolution of conflict prevention as an issue area within the G8. We then examine the substance and results of the first large-scale conflict prevention initiatives undertaken by the G8, and the resulting implications for those initiatives in the area of conflict prevention that form an integral part of the G8 Africa Action Plan that will be unveiled in the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002. It was concluded that the G8 performs an integral role in catalyzing initiatives undertaken by other international organizations in the area of conflict prevention. It was also observed that significant challenges remain for the G8 in terms of their implementation of a "culture of prevention". Concrete and systematic integration of conflict prevention and gender mainstreaming considerations in all G8 multilateral and bilateral development programs remains a step not taken.

This paper then explored the origins of the NEPAD initiative, the implicit conflict prevention priorities within it, and the explicit conflict prevention overlap between the NEPAD document and the G8's Kananaskis Africa Action Plan. This section highlighted the main priorities of the NEPAD, including enhancing existing mechanisms for conflict prevention; promoting and protecting democracy and human rights; restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability; instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets; revitalizing education and training systems; promoting the role of women in social and economic development; building the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, and to maintain law and order; and, promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification. Itt also explored some of the criticisms of NEPAD emerging from the literature. Indeed, critics pointed to the top-down orientation of the NEPAD as well as its failure to address inconsistencies as shortcomings that may undermine the goals of the initiative. Furthermore, in its discussion of gender mainstreaming, this paper also highlighted that the NEPAD initiative is "light on gender", an oversight that may have dire implications for the long-term success of the plan.

This paper's next section considered new NGO and IO proposals in four areas of conflict prevention, as well as concepts and ideas emerging from the academic community. It also drew on information gathered at a Roundtable held at the University of Toronto to discuss a draft version of this paper. The final version of this paper considered two integrative initiatives, conflict prevention mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming, and two targeted initiatives, DDR and corporate social responsibility. The recommendations

drafted in this paper fall into two categories: innovative and rejuvenating. Innovative recommendations are those that compel the G8 to 'do something new', create new initiatives or foster new ideas that will improve the G8's commitment to conflict prevention. Rejuvenating recommendations are those that call on the G8 to 'do something better', to deepen previously made commitments to conflict prevention. In the concluding discussion that follows, this section briefly summarizes the recommendations made throughout this paper, identifying innovative and rejuvenating initiatives.

Summary of Conflict Prevention Mainstreaming Recommendations

Rejuvenation:

- This paper found that, with respect to conflict prevention mainstreaming, it is essential that the G8 re-examine all aspects of the Action Plan for Africa to determine what their impact (separately and taken together as a whole) will mean for the possibilities of conflict and conflict prevention. This is particularly necessary – as noted above – in the areas of the plan that deal with trade and investment. The G8 themselves can encourage a "conflict prevention mentality" by increasing their efforts to inform their domestic polities of the benefits accrued through a long-term, sustained investment in prevention-targeted ODA.

Innovation:

- Domestically, the G8 governments should take the lead in applying conflict prevention considerations systematically to an evaluation of their individual trade and development policies.

Summary of Gender Mainstreaming Recommendations

Rejuvenation:

- G8 member governments should be encouraged to continue to apply a gender perspective to all their development, and conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction projects and programs.
- While responsibility for gender mainstreaming lies with national governments, the G8 members can support these efforts, particularly in post-conflict societies, by offering assistance to information dissemination and the mobilization of public opinion, and through the provision of expertise, financial assistance, training and other operational activities.
- The G8 can help overcome resistance on the part of national governments in post-conflict situations to treat women's concerns and contributions seriously by providing financial and technical support for women's groups.
- G8 members need to take more seriously their obligation to consider the impact on lives of women, and the dynamics of gender relations of their peace and security policies and programs. This requires a deep rather than superficial understanding of how initiatives affect the actual conditions of lives of women and girls of all ages and to what extent these initiatives address their needs and concerns.

Innovation:

- G8 members must not be paralysed by notions of cultural relativism with respect to the NEPAD's neglect of substantive gender issues. This is not a cultural issue. G8 members need to design projects in consultation and dialogue with African women in order to determine their needs, concerns and capabilities. It cannot be assumed that African men are capable of speaking on behalf of African women.
- While it is essential to apply a gender lens, these must be applied critically so as not to assume commonalities among women or static gender relations. G8 members should be encouraged to consider the assumptions about appropriate relations between men and women, and women's position in society that underpin their conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction projects.

Summary of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Recommendations

Rejuvenation:

- G8 can support regional organizations involved in disarmament as well as also that provides primarily financial and technical assistance for disarmament and weapons moratorium programs. However, it is also important to note that the G8 and the international community more generally cannot use an "African solutions to African problems" approach as an "exit strategy or a comfortable way for the international community to abdicate its responsibility." This applies to all initiatives to support regional organizations.

Innovation:

- Consistent with a conflict prevention mainstreaming approach to policy-making, the G8 should carefully consider the potential impact of DDR on the process of building peace. Assessments should be made of the consequences of disarmament and demobilization on internal balances of power.
- The G8 can encourage member countries to push for the development of a more coherent and binding framework or strengthen their commitment to the OECD/ DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the UN's "Strategic Framework for Response to and Recovery from Conflict" in order to coordinate and monitor of donor aid to post-conflict societies.
- The G8 can also focus attention on the need to build local capacities in order to facilitate the absorption and appropriate use of donor funds in post-conflict contexts.
- The G8 can reinvigorate commitment on the part of its members to the UN Trust Fund for the Prevention of Conflict in order to ensure the fast and flexible disbursement of resources to areas at risk of escalating conflict.
- The G8 can reinvigorate commitment on the part of its members to the World Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Fund to ensure the fast and flexible

disbursement of resources in situations where a shortfall of resources risks disrupting the peace building process.   The G8 can push for the creation of a more effective DDR Trust Fund through the World Bank that attempts to cover expenses not anticipated or not otherwise provided.

- Consistent with a gender mainstreaming approach to policy-making, the G8 should encourage member countries providing resources to DDR to ensure that the programmes they support take into account the specific needs, unique experiences and capacities of female ex-combatants as well as war widows. Assessment of these needs is best accomplished in consultation with women's organizations.
- Considering the high prevalence of HIV/ AIDS among military personnel, G8 members who fund DDR projects should be encouraged to integrate HIV/ AIDS prevention programs into demobilization activities.

d) G8 members should support interventions that include prevention campaigns, information, education, counselling and care for those infected with HIV/ AIDS.

e) Interventions should also target the families and communities of military personnel.

f) G8 members can also encourage their national organizations supporting demobilization to provide resources and support to families, orphans and widows of affected combatants and former combatants.

Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility Recommendations

Innovation:

- The G8 can encourage its members to make clear distinctions between potential (peace) and actual conflict zones. There exist numerous typologies to assist in the creation of these distinctions, including, for example, Project Ploughshares' quantitative definition of "armed conflict".
- *In Peace Zones*: The G8 can encourage its members and other OECD countries to harmonize voluntary codes of conflict for corporations operating in peace zones. G8 and OECD members can consider offering tax cuts or other incentives to companies that commit to voluntary standards and, through their investment, contribute to building infrastructure in their host countries.
- The G8 can support the creation of an independent international body of experts that can conduct fact-finding missions for corporations with foreign operations, and provide context-specific advice on conflict prevention considerations that would assist with compliance to accepted voluntary codes. This international body can also assist both home and host countries, and regional organizations, to monitor compliance with these voluntary principles, as well as the accuracy and adequacy of the codes in specific situations.
- *In Conflict Zones*: The G8 can devise a set of *legal regulations* for the conduct of corporations already operating in zones that have become violent throughout the duration of their investment period. These regulations can be derived from the

voluntary principles for corporations operating in conflict zones devised by the UK and the US.

- An international body working alongside home and host governments, and regional organizations, can monitor compliance with these legal regulations. Penalties for violation will be determined and enforced by the home country.

- The G8 can encourage its members to actively discourage initial investment in conflict zones through the creation of legislation, similar to the OECD's convention on bribery, requiring signatories to outlaw violations by companies operating in signatory jurisdictions.

Final Thoughts:

While conflict prevention has proven to be a sustained area of interest for the G8 over the past few years, it is important to note that significant challenges still remain. Some of the best work done by the G8 in this area has been the result of its overlapping membership within other international fora, and thus its ability to invigorate policy prescriptions within these bodies. But how can the G8's own work in this area, particularly as it applies to the upcoming Kananaskis Action Plan for Africa, be better tailored so as to lead from good intentions to good practice? Many of the above recommendations require a detailed, long-term approach that would entail sustained attention that may not be possible to achieve at the Sherpa level. Perhaps the most important expression of political will, fulfilling the Miyazaki pledge of a "comprehensive approach", would be the institutionalization of the Conflict Prevention Officials' Meetings (CPOM). The fruits of the Action Plan for Africa will likely take many years to develop. What better way to nurture its promise than to insure that violent conflict does not deter its other aims? It is within the G8's ability to create a "culture of prevention" and to fulfil the promise of a true partnership with Africa.

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