



THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC  
AND THE  
BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

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THIRD VOLUME










Fig. 1. in A. II. B. 1780

*Guy Carlton*

Sculpit & C<sup>o</sup>. Paris.

Government Edition

The Siege of Quebec  
AND THE  
Battle of the Plains of Abraham

BY

A. DOUGHTY

IN COLLABORATION WITH

G. W. PARMELEE



Illustrated with Plans, Portraits and Views

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
THIRD VOLUME



QUEBEC  
DUNSMUIR & PROULX

1901

THE ARCHIVES  
OF CANADA



*Guy Carlton*

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THIRD VOLUME



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
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## ILLUSTRATIONS.

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Sir Guy Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester.

Photogravured by Goupil et Cie., Paris, from a steel engraving in the possession of Mr. Philéas Gagnon, Quebec.

Cuirass of the Marquis de Montcalm.

Collotyped by Hyatt, London, from a photograph sent by the Marquis de Montcalm, Paris.

James Wolfe, Esqre.

Collotyped by Hyatt from an engraving in the possession of the authors.

Plan of the Siege of Quebec.

Engraved on stone by the Forbes Company, Boston, from an engraving in the possession of M. Philéas Gagnon, Quebec.

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The Honourable Robert Monckton.

Collotyped by Hyatt from an engraving in the possession of the authors.

A Part of the Ground near the walls of the city upon which the left of the French army was drawn up on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, 1759.

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Photogravured by Hyatt, from an engraving after the painting by Hoppner.

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Fac-simile of a page of an album in the Ursuline Convent, Quebec. Alberttyped by the Forbes Company, Boston, by permission of the reverend Ladies of the Convent.

Interior of the Chapel of the Ursuline Convent, Quebec, where General Montcalm was buried.

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Collotyped by Hyatt, from the original document in the Colonial Office London, by permission of the Colonial Secretary and of the Public Record Office, London.

Proclamation "par Son Excellence Monseigneur Jacques Murray."

Albertyped by the Forbes Company, Boston, from a photograph of the original in the Hotel Dieu, Quebec.

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THE KING'S BASTION

*Fierce on this bastion beats the noonday sun ;  
The city sleeps beneath me, old and grey ;  
On convent roofs the quivering sunbeams play,  
And batteries guarded by dismantled gun.  
No breeze comes from the Northern hills which run  
Circling the blue mist of the Summer's day ;  
No ripple stirs the great stream on it's way  
To those dim headlands where it's rest is won.  
Ah God ! what thunders shook these rocks of yore !  
What smoke of battle rolled about this place !  
What strife of worlds ! What pregnant agony !  
Now all is hushed, yet here in dreams once more  
We catch the echoes ringing back from space  
Of God's strokes forging human history.*

FREDERICK GEORGE SCOTT.

*The authors desire to acknowledge the valuable co-operation  
of Mr. E. T. D. Chambers in the  
preparation of this volume.*

## CHAPTER I.

---

### A COUNCIL OF WAR

As a result of the deliberations of the Brigadiers at the time that General Wolfe was indisposed, the base of operations had been transferred from the north to the south shore.

The Brigadiers had set forth in their Plan that it would be a simple task to secure a footing on the North Shore. "There can be no difficulty to effectuate a landing in the night without the least loss, it may be done anywhere for an extent of a few leagues, viz. from the height of St John to Cap Rouge River."

With a plan in hand this no doubt seemed feasible, but they were no sooner in the vicinity of the proposed landing place, than they found innumerable obstacles in their way. Near the mouth of the River Cape Rouge they discovered an excellent spot for the disembarkation of the troops, but to their surprise and annoyance the French had six or eight floating batteries moving to and fro in this direction, and in addition to this they were observed to be throwing up breast works.

Wolfe was anxious to execute some design, for his failure at Montmorency, his illness, the skilful counter movements



and defence of Montcalm, and the approaching winter combined to discourage and depress him. He therefore appears to have been willing to carry out the suggestions of his Brigadiers, although their plan was one which he had considered and laid aside during the early days of the Siege.

It is probable too that the sentiments of his chief officers whose confidence in his generalship was on the wane were ill-concealed. Townshend confided to his wife the opinion that Wolfe's generalship was no better than his health. Captain Schomberg even on the 5<sup>th</sup> of September writes that "General Wolfe appears in his Conduct more like *Fabius Maximus* than Achilles, notwithstanding what has been said of his impetuosity by his Enemies and Rivals".<sup>(1)</sup>

Wolfe had stated that his own project for reducing Quebec was too dangerous to entrust to others; and as he was too ill to undergo any great exertion, he was quite willing to assist any enterprise that would contribute to the success of His Majesty's arms.

Admiral Saunders, who was always anxious to cooperate with the land forces, had made a judicious distribution of the fleet.<sup>(2)</sup> Off Point Levi were the Stirling Castle, Dublin,

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(1) Letter to Admiral Forbes.

(2) A good biographical sketch of Admiral Saunders is to be found in "Memoirs of an officer in the army of Wolfe", we give it in extenso:

"In 1747, he, for the first time, distinguished himself by something more than prudence and good conduct. In the brilliant affair off Cape Finisterre, between Admiral Hawke and Letendur, which took place on the 14th of August in that year, he commanded the Yarmouth, sixty-four, and fought his ships with great intrepidity. The Neptune and Monarque, both of seventy-four guns, struck to him; and so unsated was he with strife and success, that, disabled as he was and with near a hundred of his men out of condition to fight, he wished to pursue

Shrewsbury, Alcide, Vanguard, Centurion, Captain, Medway, Pembroke, Trident, Richmond, Scorpion, Racehorse, Pelican, and the Vesuvius. In the river, above Quebec, to facilitate the movement of the troops, were the Sutherland, Squirrel, Lowestoffe, Seahorse, and Hunter Sloop. Admiral Durell, was at Ile Madame with the Princess Amelia, the Northumberland, the Royal William, and eight other ships. Vessels were also stationed at Bic, Ile-aux-Coudres, Kamouraska and Gaspe. This distribution of the naval force rendered the operations on land less dangerous,

---

L'Tonant and L'Intrepid, the two ships which had escaped the fate of their comrades.

"In 1750, he came into Parliament for Plymouth, and in the September of the same year, married Miss Buck, daughter of a wealthy London banker. In May 1752, he went out in the *Penzance*, of forty guns, for the protection of the Newfoundland Fishery. Returning to England, he was appointed in 1754, Treasurer of Greenwich Hospital, and in the ensuing May, through the interest of his great patron, Lord Anson, was returned a member of Parliament for the borough of Hendon, in Yorkshire.

"In March 1755, he was appointed to the *Prince* of ninety guns. Being a little proud of his ship, which was a beautiful specimen of marine architecture, just off the stocks, elegantly fitted up, and altogether worthy of a sailor's love and courtship, he gave a splendid entertainment at Spithead, in the cabin of his ship, to the nobility assembled to witness the nautical doings upon the anniversary of his Majesty's coming to the throne. In the ensuing December he was made comptroller of the Navy, and about the same time chosen and Elder Brother of Trinity House.

"In June, 1756, he was promoted Rear Admiral of the Blue, and went out to the Mediterranean as second in command to Sir Edward Hawke. Upon the return of that officer to England, in 1757, he left Admiral Saunders in command of the fleet. In 1759, he was made Vice Admiral of the Blue, and appointed naval chief of the expedition against the Canadas."

"In all his various commands he was distinguished by an union of consummate prudence and ready valour, seldom found in one and the same person. His opportunities for distinguishing himself were not as many and frequent as those which had occurred to many other command-

for it would have been exceedingly difficult for any portion of the regular French army to have taken Wolfe by surprise.

The troops were not entirely withdrawn from the other camps. The Island of Orleans was left in a fair state of defence, but the greater strength was at Point Levis. A sufficient number of men were now above Quebec ready and anxious to put into execution any plan that would ensure an engagement with the enemy. The place of landing could not be determined. Indeed the Brigadiers seem to have made all their suggestions on the presumption that the French would offer no opposition. While the main force of the Army was at Levis and Orleans,

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ers; but, when they offered, he had improved them to an extent which gave him the entire confidence of the country, and caused him to be numbered amongst the "Emergency men," amongst those who should be called to perilous commands, and entrusted with momentous undertakings. The friend of friendless young men, and equally the discoverer and rewarder of merit under a gaberdine with that which was veiled by an embroidered vest, he brought out many who did honour to his judgment, and afterwards became ornaments to the British navy.

"Kind and humane to his men, he was ardently beloved by them, affable and pleasant in his deportment and demeanour, he was very popular with all classes. Upon his return from Quebec, Admiral Saunders was received with great joy and affection.

"He was appointed Lieutenant-General of Marines, and upon taking his seat in the House of Commons, January 28th, 1760, received through the Speaker the thanks of that House, for his gallant conduct and invaluable services. In the succeeding May he went to take command in the Mediterranean.

"In May 1761, he was made a Knight of the Bath, and in October, 1762, advanced to the rank of Vice Admiral of the White. In September, 1766, having sometime had a seat at the Admiralty-Board, he was sworn in of the Privy Council, and appointed First Lord of the Admiralty.

"At the funeral of the Duke of York, in 1767, he was one of the Admirals chosen to support the canopy.

"In October, 1770, he was made Admiral of the Blue.

"He died December, 7th, 1775, at his house in Spring Gardens, and was interred in Westminster Abbey on the 12th."

Montcalm had little to fear, but now that a large body of men had been removed, and the ships had remained above the town, the French general was naturally very alert. A council of war was decided on, and on the morning of the seventh General Wolfe met his officers on board the Sutherland to consider the final details for the attack.

We have several accounts of what transpired at this meeting. From Brigadier Townshend we learn that the army was divided into three Brigades; that an order for forming a line of battle was given out; the first and last brigades were to form the first line under Brigadiers Monckton and Murray; the second Brigade was to form the second line under Brigadier Townshend. From the subsequent action of the fleet it would appear that Cap Rouge Bay was still considered the best landing place, for the admiral ordered two of the frigates to cannonade the floating batteries, and for the men to be in readiness to land. However, the rain prevented the execution of the design, and on the eighth of the month the three Brigadiers went up as far as Pointe aux Trembles to search for a landing place.

A French authority gives this version of the proceedings at the Council of War:—

“ The movements we saw the enemy making for some  
“ time, above Quebec, and the knowledge we had of the  
“ character of Mr. Wolfe, that impetuous, bold and intrepid  
“ warrior, prepared us for a last attack. Such a resolution  
“ was really fully adopted in the English army; after  
“ breaking up the camp at the Falls, a Council of War, as  
“ we have since learned from divers English officers, had

“ been held, at which all the general officers voted unani-  
“ mously in favour of raising the siege ; the naval officers  
“ observed that the season already far advanced, was  
“ rendering the navigation of the river every day more  
“ dangerous, and the officers of the line, disgusted at the  
“ tediousness of a campaign, as fruitless as it was difficult,  
“ considered it useless to remain any longer before intrench-  
“ ments which appeared to them impregnable. Both added,  
“ moreover, that their army, always a prey to disease, was  
“ melting insensibly away. Then, Mr Wolfe, seeing that  
“ he could not gain anything by openly resisting the  
“ general opinion, adroitly took things by the other side :  
“ He declared to the members of the council that, so far  
“ from differing from them, he was on the contrary, of  
“ their opinion in regard to the inutility of prolonging the  
“ siege of Quebec ; and therefore in the proposition he  
“ was about to submit to them, he wished to divest himself  
“ of the quality of general ; in order to throw himself  
“ entirely on their friendship for him.

“ Finally, Gentlemen, said he, to them, as the glory of  
“ our arms appears to me to require that we should not  
“ retire without making one final attempt, I earnestly  
“ demand of you not to refuse your consent thereto ; I  
“ feel that, in this instance, it is necessary our first step  
“ should place us at the gates of the town. With this  
“ view, I am about to try to get a detachment of only one  
“ hundred and fifty men to penetrate through the Sillerie  
“ woods, and the entire army will prepare to follow. Should  
“ this first detachment encounter any resistance on the part  
“ of the enemy, I pledge you my word of honour that then,

“ regarding our reputation protected against all sort of reproach, I will no longer hesitate to reembark.”

“ The zeal that animated so brave a general communicated itself to all the officers who heard him, and nothing was any longer thought of in his army but the arrangements.”

These facts were recorded after the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, but on the seventh of September, the day on which the council of war was held no agreement had been made regarding the landing.

On the eighth the Brigadiers appear to have been satisfied that Pointe aux Trembles would be the most advantageous place for the attack; and they prepared to effect a landing on the morning of the ninth. These arrangements were made by the Brigadiers. General Wolfe did not accompany them, indeed he reconnoitred the river in an opposite direction from his own barge.

A few weeks earlier Wolfe had said that his operations could not go beyond the month of September, and he knew too that the long expected aid of Amherst could not be had. The conduct of Amherst during this campaign cannot easily be explained. It certainly was his duty to push forward to join Wolfe, and it is certain that he could have done so. But instead of advancing he quietly established himself at Fort Frederick, protected his communications, and began to build ships to fight the French on Lake Champlain, where they were not, while Wolfe with a smaller force than his lay before Quebec eager for a fight he could not compel. Kingsford says that the secret of Amherst's inactivity, “ can only be attributed to his belief

that Wolfe would fail in his enterprise", and that he should waste so much time is inexplicable "except in the belief, that if he reached Montreal, owing to Wolfe's failure, he would have the whole French force upon himself". These conjectures, although charitable enough, are insufficient as Kingsford admits. Amherst's services before and after this campaign made and saved his reputation. No word of censure was uttered by Wolfe because of his Chief's dilatory movements. He did not know what reasons Amherst might have for his non-appearance, but Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester, strongly condemned in later years, (1777) Amherst's failure to co-operate with Wolfe. <sup>(1)</sup>

Had Wolfe returned to England without striking a blow, posterity would probably have justified him but he felt certain that his contemporaries would not. He had been a witness a year before against the Rochefort Generals, and although the contrast between their action and that of Wolfe up to the first of September was marked <sup>(2)</sup> his super-sensitive spirit revolted against the idea of returning to report another barren expedition.

What was expected of him he very well knew. The claims of rank and seniority had been disregarded by Pitt in the choice of the young general, at whom the finger of scorn would have been pointed had he gone home baffled and discredited. At any rate, confident that his men would give a good account of themselves, and despising

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(1) Canadian Archives Report 1885, p. cxxxiii.

(2) See vol. I. Chapter V.

the fighting power of the Canadians, he was determined to make an effort before withdrawing his forces.

The French knew too that honour required a serious attack before Wolfe could retire.—“ il seroit singulier que M. Wolfe s'en tint aux incendies, aux ravages et à une seule tentative assez mal conduite, que lui coûta quatre cents grenadiers, le 31 juillet sans aucun fruit ; il faut que cet homme finisse par un grand effort, par un coup de tonnerre.”<sup>(1)</sup>

Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which Wolfe laboured he possessed at least two points of superiority over Montcalm. His men were all well seasoned regulars, and his fleet controlled the St. Lawrence. The advantage of quality in soldiers is obvious, but we are likely to forget the value of mobility. Some one has said that the first duty of a general in the field is to know where he is, and the second is to know where his enemy is. Montcalm had difficulty in following the rapid movements of his enemy at the beginning of the campaign, but when the activity of the early days of September began, as related in volume two, it became impossible for the French General to know where the enemy was. By the seventh of September, Wolfe had four thousand of his soldiers aboard ship ready to land upon receiving his orders, while, so careful had been the embarkations, Montcalm supposed the bulk of the English army was still in camp at Point Levis and at Orleans. On the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> the dreary fall rains began, rendering the weather unfavourable for

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(1) Journal de Montcalm, Levis Collection, p. 598.



military operations. Feints were to be made on the 8<sup>th</sup> at Beauport, Cap Rouge and Pointe-aux-Trembles to divide the enemy's attention, but the continual downpour necessitated an alteration of the plans.

On the ninth the weather was still more unfavourable and as the men were beginning to suffer from the overcrowding of the vessels the General ordered 1,520 men to land at St. Nicholas, on the south shore. They were to be quartered in the church and were to hold themselves in readiness to re-embark at the first signal. The signal by day was to be "two guns fired fast, and two slow, from the Sutherland; the signal by night to be three lights at the main-top-gallant mast head of the same ship, and two guns."

On this day, the ninth of September, Wolfe wrote his last despatch to England addressing it from the Sutherland off Cap Rouge to Lord Holderness, Secretary of State. A melancholy interest attaches to this letter from the fact that the last sentence shows Wolfe going calmly to an expected defeat "without the consolation of having done any considerable service to the State." We reproduce the letter in full.

"My Lord,

"If the Marquis de Montcalm had shut himself up in the Town of Quebec, it would have been long since in our possession, because the defences are inconsiderable and our artillery very formidable, but he has a numerous body of armed men (I cannot call it an army) and the strongest country, perhaps, in the world, to rest the defence of the town and colony upon. The ten battalions, and the

Grenadiers of Louisbourg are a chosen body of troops, and able to fight the united force of Canada upon even terms. Our field artillery, brought into use, would terrify the militia and the savages ; and our battalions are in every respect superior to those commanded by the Marquis, who acts a circumspect, prudent part, and entirely defensive ; except in one extraordinary instance, he sent sixteen hundred men over the river to attack our batteries upon the Point of Levy, defended by four battalions. Bad intelligence, no doubt, of our strength, induced him to this measure ; however, the detachment judged better than their General, and retired. They dispute the water with the boats of the fleet, by the means of floating batteries, suited to the nature of the river, and innumerable battoes.

“ They have a great artillery upon the ramparts towards the sea, and so placed, that shipping cannot affect it.

“ I meant to attack the left of their entrenchments, favoured by our artillery, the 31<sup>st</sup> July. A multitude of traverses prevented, in some measure, its effect, which was nevertheless very considerable, accidents hindered the attack, and the enemy's care to strengthen that post has made it since too hazardous. The town is totally demolished, and the country in a great measure ruined particularly the lower Canada. Our fleet blocks up the river, both above and below the town, but can give no manner of assistance in an attack upon the Canadian army. We have continual skirmishes ; old people seventy years of age, and boys of fifteen, fire at our detachments, and kill or wound our men from the edges of the woods. Every man able to bear arms,

both above and below Quebec, is in the camp of Beauport. The old men, women and children are retired into the woods. The Canadians are extremely dissatisfied; but, curbed by the force of their Government, and terrified by the savages that are posted round about them, they are obliged to keep together, to work and to man the intrenchments. Upwards of twenty sail of ships got in before our squadron and brought secours of all sorts; which were exceedingly wanted in the Colony. The sailors of these ships help to work the guns, and others conduct the floating batteries; their ships are lightened and carried up the river out of our reach, at least out of the reach of the men of war. These ships serve a double purpose; they are magazines for their provisions and at the same time cut off all communication between General Amhurst's army and the corps under my command, so that we are not able to make any detachment to attack Montreal, or favour the junction, or by attacking the fort of Chambly or Bourlemaqui's corps behind, open the General's way into Canada; all which might have been easily done with the floating batteries carrying each a gun, and twenty flat bottomed boats, if there had been no ships in the river. <sup>(1)</sup> Our poor soldiery have worked without ceasing and without murmuring; and as often as the enemy have attempted upon us, they have been repulsed by the valour of the men. A woody country so well known to the enemy, and an enemy so vigilant and hardy, as the Indians and Cana-

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(1) Wolfe is evidently willing to make every possible allowance for the actions of his commander-in-chief.

dians are, make entrenchments everywhere necessary, and by this precaution we have saved a number of lives, for scarce a night passes that they are not close in upon our posts watching an opportunity to surprise and murder. There is very little quarter given on either side.

“ We have seven hours and sometimes (above the town after rain) near eight hours of the most violent ebb tide that can be imagined, which loses us an infinite deal of time in every operation on the water ; and the stream is so strong, particularly here, that the ships often drag their anchors by the mere force of the current. The bottom is a bed of rock ; so that a ship, unless it hooks a rugged rock, holds by the weight only of the anchor. Doubtless if the equinoctial gale has any force a number of ships must necessarily run ashore and be lost.

“ The day after the troops landed upon the isle of Orleans, a violent storm had nigh ruined the expedition altogether. Numbers of boats were lost ; all the whale boats and most of the cutters were stove ; some flat-bottomed boats destroyed and others damaged. We never had half as many of the latter as are necessary for this extraordinary and very important service. The enemy is able to fight us upon the water, whenever we are out of reach of the cannon of the fleet.

“ The extreme heat of the weather in August and a good deal of fatigue threw me into a fever, but that the business might go on, I begged the Generals to consider amongst themselves what was fittest to be done. Their sentiments were unanimous that (as the easterly winds begin to blow and ships can pass the town in the night

with provisions and artillery, &c.) we should endeavour by conveying a considerable corps into the upper river, to draw them from their inaccessible situation, and bring them to an action. I agreed to the proposal; and we are now here, with about three thousand six hundred men waiting an opportunity to attack them when and wherever they can best be got at. The weather has been extremely unfavourable for a day or two, so that we have been inactive. I am so far recovered as to do business; but my constitution is entirely ruined; without the consolation of having done any considerable service to the State; or without any prospect of it. I have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord,

“ Your Lordships most obedient

“ and most humble servant,

“ JAM. WOLFE.”<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) Chatham Correspondence.

## CHAPTER II.

---

### THE LANDING PLACE DETERMINED

**W**HILE the weather was too bad for military operations Wolfe was busy reconnoitring the shore near Point aux Trembles, part of the time upon his barge and part of the time upon the south shore, as the Brigadiers decided upon the vicinity of Point aux Trembles for the attack. He had busied himself too by inspecting the ships and the transports and enquiring about the health of the men, every one of whom was in better physical condition than he.

On the tenth he went down the river to reconnoitre the shore near Sillery. Rear Admiral Holmes, Brigadiers Monckton and Townshend, Colonel Carleton and Captain Delaune accompanied him. The officers appear to have gone in disguise, for the General ordered six Grenadiers coats to be sent to him before starting. The object of this visit was to select a place for the landing of the troops. The place chosen was the Foulon, the inaccessibility of which seems to have been its chief recommendation to the General.

"They reconnoitred it, says Moncrief," from a rising ground on the south side of the river, below the mouth of the Etchemin, (near Goreham's post) from whence there

was a fair view, not only of the place itself, but likewise of a considerable part of the ground between it and the town, which is a mile and a half below. The bank which runs along the shore is very steep and woody, and was thought so impracticable by the French themselves, that they had only a single picket to defend it. The picket, which we supposed might be about 100 men, was encamped upon the bank, near the top of a narrow winding path, which runs up from the shore. The path was broken up by the enemy themselves and barricaded with an abatis; but about 200 yards to the right there appeared to be a slope in the bank which was thought might answer the purpose."

General Wolfe disclosed a portion of his plan to Colonel Burton on this day in the following letter :

"Sutherland" above carouge, Monday Sept. 10, 1759.

"Dear Colonel,

"You perfectly understood my meaning in every particular. Goreham's first post is under the hill, where there is a little road running from Dalling's old quarter up to the river; the way down is very steep, but I believe the troops can march all along the beach from the Point of Levi. I think it is not above a mile and a half or two miles from the batteries. The deserter's intelligence in respect to Mons. de Vaudreuil's movements agrees in part with our observations; but it is absolutely impossible that the Marquis can have so large a corps; I dont believe that their whole army amounts to that







“ number. That De Levi may be gone towards Montreal  
“ is likely enough, and seems to mark our General’s pro-  
“ gress: the more necessity for vigour on our side to  
“ second his endeavours. Sixteen hundred of our men  
“ are upon the South shore, to clean and refresh them-  
“ ves and their transports; and, indeed, to save the whole  
“ army, which must have perished if they had remained  
“ forty eight hours longer on board. To morrow the troops  
“ reimbarc, the fleet sails up the river a little higher as if  
“ intending to land above upon the north shore, keeping a  
“ convenient distance for the boats and armed vessels to  
“ fall down to the Foulon; and we count (if no accident  
“ of weather or other prevents) to make a powerful effort  
“ at that spot about four in the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup>. At  
“ ten or eleven, or twelve at night, sooner or later, as may  
“ be necessary, of Wednesday the 12<sup>th</sup> we get into our  
“ boats. If we are forced to alter these measures, you  
“ shall know of it, if not, it stands fixed: be you careful  
“ not to drop it to any, for fear of desertion; and it would  
“ not be amiss for Carleton to pass his troops (from  
“ Orleans) in the beginning of Wednesday night. Crof-  
“ ton can file along the shore to his right, and meet you  
“ at the post you take: let the men have their blankets,  
“ and let the tents be struck, bundled up, and ready to  
“ bring over. If we succeed in the first business, we may  
“ produce an action, which may produce the total conquest  
“ of Canada; in all cases it is our duty to try the most  
“ likely way, whatever may be the event.”

Although Monckton and Townshend accompanied Wolfe  
in the morning, they do not appear to have gained any

definite information from the General as to the plan of the attack. Even Colonel Burton who evidently had discussed the matter with Wolfe, was not positive of the site. Townshend knew that the General had changed his mind regarding the place where he intended to land, as he remarks in his journal on the 10<sup>th</sup>, but he did not know what place Wolfe had chosen instead.

Orders were given on the eleventh for the troops on shore to embark on the morrow. Thirty flat bottomed boats were detailed from the different vessels of the fleet to transport the troops to the shore. The transports which had been specially made for the purpose were found to be useless.

#### ORDERS

“ The troops on shore, except the light infantry and  
 “ Americans, are to be on the beach, to morrow morning,  
 “ at five o'clock, in readiness to embark; the light infantry and Americans will reembark at, or about, eight  
 “ o'clock; the detachment of artillery to be put on board  
 “ the armed sloop this day. The army to hold themselves  
 “ in readiness to land and attack the enemy. As the  
 “ Lowestoffe and Squirrel frigates are ordered to follow  
 “ the flat bottomed boats, the troops belonging to those  
 “ ships are to remain in them, and the boats intended for  
 “ these corps are to take in others, according to the  
 “ following distribution :—

Stirling Castle	2	} To take fifty into each boat of Bragg's regiment, out of the Ann and Elizabeth transport, instead of Amherst's.
Dublin . . .	3	
Alcide . . .	1	

Pembroke . . . 4	{	To take in Kennedy's regiment out of the Employment transport.
Vanguard . . . 4		{
Trident . . . 4		
Centurion . . . 2	{	To take in Anstruther's out of the George transport.
Shrewsbury . . . 4		
Medway . . . 2	{	To take Lascelles's regiment, in five boats, out of the Ward transport, and fifty of the Royal American grenadiers, out of the Sutherland, in the sixth boat.
Captain . . . 4		

" There remain to be taken into the boats of the fleet  
 " two hundred Highlanders, of which the Terror of France  
 " schooner takes fifty from the Ann and Elizabeth ; the  
 " remaining one hundred and fifty Highlanders, in the  
 " Ward transport, will be taken by the following boats :—  
 " Sutherland's long boat, fourty ; Alcide and Medway,  
 " fourty each ; Admiral's flat-bottomed boat, fifteen ; Suther-  
 " land Cutter, fifteen. Ships that carry troops immediately  
 " after the flat bottomed boats. Lowestoffe frigate, three  
 " hundred of Amherst's ; Squirrel, two hundred and fourty  
 " of Louisbourg Grenadiers ; Seahorse, two hundred and  
 " fifty Highlanders ; Hunter Sloop, one hundred and  
 " twenty Highlanders ; three armed vessels, two hundred  
 " Light Infantry ; Laurel transport, four hundred Royal  
 " Americans ; Adventure transport, four hundred of  
 " Otaway's. Ordnance vessels, with tools and artillery  
 " men. The George transport to be evacuated, and High-

“ landers being one hundred and fifty, to be removed into  
 “ the Seahorse frigate ; and one hundred of the same corps  
 “ from the Ann and Elizabeth, to be removed also on board  
 “ the Seahorse to-morrow morning, after the reimbarcation  
 “ of the first body of the troops from Brigadier Monckton’s  
 “ corps, at St. Nicholas.

## ORDER OF TROOPS IN THE LINE OF BOATS.

## NUMBER OF BOATS.

8	1 <sup>st</sup>	Light Infantry leads.
6	2 <sup>nd</sup>	Bragg’s regiment.
4	3 <sup>rd</sup>	Kennedy’s regiment.
5	4 <sup>th</sup>	Lascelles’s regiment.
6	5 <sup>th</sup>	Anstruther’s regiment.
1	6 <sup>th</sup>	Detachment of Highlanders and American Grenadiers.

“ Captain Chads, of the navy, has received the General’s  
 “ directions in respect to the order in which the troops  
 “ move, and are to land ; and no officer must attempt to  
 “ make the least alteration, or interfere with Captain Chad’s  
 “ particular province, lest, as the boats move in the night  
 “ there may be disorder and confusion among them. The  
 “ troops must go into the boats about nine to-morrow night,  
 “ or when it is pretty near high water ; but the naval offi-  
 “ cers, commanding the different divisions of boats, will  
 “ apprise them of the fittest time ; and, as there will be a  
 “ necessity for remaining some part of the night in the  
 “ boats, the Officers will provide accordingly ; and the  
 “ soldiers will have a jill of rum extraordinary to mix

“ with their water ; arms and ammunition, two day's provisions with rum and water, are all that the soldiers are to take into the boats ; their ships, with their blankets, tents &c., will soon be brought up.”

Brigadier Murray, who was in command of the troops at St. Nicholas, sent an officer to the village to procure additional provision for the army. There was scarcely sufficient food in the village for the troops already quartered there, seven head of cattle and a few sheep were all that could be found, and even these were taken by force from some Indians.

The General had decided that twenty four men should scramble up the precipice at a place two hundred yards to the right of the intrenched path at Foulon, to capture the post, in order to leave the path free for the ascent of the remainder of the troops.

“ By 10 o'clock Colonel Howe called for the whole of the volunteers in the Light Infantry, signifying to them that the General intends that a few men may land before the Light Infantry and army, and scramble up the rock, when ordered by <sup>(1)</sup> Captain Delaune, who is to be in the first boat along with us ; saying that he thought proper to propose it to us, as he judged it would be a choice, and that if any of us survived, might depend on our being recommended to the General. Made answer : We were sensible of the honour he did, in making us the first offer of an affair of such importance as our landing first, where an opportunity occurred of distinguishing

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(1) Captain Delaune was on intimate terms with Wolfe.

“ ourselves, assuring him his agreeable order would be put  
 “ in execution with the greatest activity, care, and vigour  
 “ in our power. He observing that our number consisted  
 “ only of eight men, viz :

1 <sup>st</sup> Fitz-Gerald	5 <sup>th</sup> Mackenzie
2 <sup>nd</sup> Robertson	6 <sup>th</sup> McPherson
3 <sup>rd</sup> Stewart	7 <sup>th</sup> Cameron
4 <sup>th</sup> McAllester	8 <sup>th</sup> Bell.

“ Ordered we should take 2 men of our own choice from  
 “ three companys of Lt. Infantry, which in all made 24  
 “ men. Which order being put in execution we embarked  
 “ in our boat. Fine weather, the night calm, and silence  
 “ over all ”.

The French were very vigilant all day and jealously watched every movement made by the British. In the vicinity of Cap Rouge Bougainville had the command of between two and three thousand men.

“ The enemy had a body of between 2000 and 3000 men, including 230 horse under the command of Monsieur Bougainville, a brevet Colonel, posted from Cape rouge river along the coast towards pointe aux Trembles, to watch our motions and to prevent our making a descent at these places, which they conjectured to have been our design.”

“ ’Twas the élite of the army, in which was reunited all the grenadiers, all the pickets, all the volunteers of the army and the cavalry : the order to continue to follow, attentively, all the enemy’s movements, was reiterated to him. His centre was Cap Rouge.”

Under the date of the 12<sup>th</sup> General Townshend records an incident which shows that the British kept faith with the Canadians.

“ General Monckton and Murray with the detachment under their command left St. Nicholas this morning and went on board a ship, they had not a shot fired at them all the three days they were there, although several of the inhabitants were seen in the woods. At the time General Murray was up before he told them that if they fired on him he would burn every house in the Parish, for which reason our Troops came off without burning any of their houses.”

In the evening all the boats of the fleet were filled with marines, and were covered by the frigates and sloops below the town, which remained half channel over as if they intended to make a descent at Beauport on the morrow. This was done to detract attention from the operations at Cap Rouge. The frigates were ordered to edge over as close to the Beauport shore as possible at daybreak, and to commence to cannonade the French camp.

“ The enemy kept up a very sharp fire the entire day  
“ on the town; the fleet, anchored from Cap Rouge as far  
“ as Pointe-aux-Trembles, was continually in motion;  
“ towards night some vessels were detached from it which  
“ came to an anchor at Sillery.”

At nightfall the detachment from the Island of Orleans and from Point Levis, marched along the border of the South Shore, as far as the river Etchemin, where some of the men took boats and were rowed to the ships above Cap Rouge. At the flood tide all the ships moved some-



what nearer to the city, apparently unperceived by the enemy.

From a deserter who arrived in camp on the twelfth, General Wolfe received information which he considered reliable. The particulars gathered from this man were to the effect that Montcalm did not think that an attack would be made near the city: On the contrary he believed that the British intended to go farther up the river to destroy the shipping and to lay waste the country. The man also assured the General that Montcalm would "not be prevailed on to quit his situation, insisting that the "flower of our army are still below the town"—that the Canadians were dissatisfied, and that the French regulars would early desert.

General Wolfe thereupon issued the following orders:

"On board the Sutherland.

"The Enemy's force is now divided, great scarcity of provisions now in their camp, and universal discontent among the Canadians; the second officer in command is gone to Montreal or St. John's, which gives reason to think that General Amherst is advancing into the colony: a vigorous blow struck by the army at this juncture may determine the fate of Canada. Our troops below are in readiness to join us; all the light artillery are embarked at the point of Levi, and the troops will land where the French seem least to expect it."


"The first body that gets on shore is to march directly to the enemy, and drive them from any little post that they may occupy; the officers must be careful that the

“ succeeding bodies do not, by any mistake, fire upon those  
“ who go on before them. The battalions must form on  
“ the upper ground with expedition, and be ready to charge  
“ whatever presents itself. When the artillery and troops  
“ are landed, a corps will be left to secure the landing  
“ place, while the rest march on and endeavour to bring  
“ the French and Canadians to battle.”

“ The officers and men will remember what their country  
“ expects of them, and what a determined body of soldiers,  
“ inured to war, is capable of doing against weak French  
“ battalions, mingled with a disorderly peasantry.

“ The soldiers must be attentive and obedient to their  
“ Officers, and resolute in the execution of their duty.”

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*John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent.*  
*after the painting by Koppner*

## CHAPTER III.

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### THE EVE OF VICTORY

ALL the preparations for the momentous event which was to change the destiny of New France were now complete. Wolfe, who it appears had a gloomy foreboding that his own life would terminate on the morrow, was not sanguine of success, although his countenance did not betray his inmost thoughts. He had already disposed of his property by his will made on the sixth of June, and by a codicil added thereto on the twenty ninth of July. There now remained to him the simple task of seeing that a few personal belongings, henceforth to be treasured as precious souvenirs, were delivered into the hands of a faithful friend who would esteem it a privilege to execute his wishes. The friend whom he chose to honour with his last personal request was John Jervis <sup>(1)</sup> the companion of his school days at Greenwich, under the tuition of the Reverend Francis Swindon.

To Jervis he gave the miniature of Miss Katherine Lowther, <sup>(2)</sup> his will and codicil, and some little notes,

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(1) See note to portrait of John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent. Vol. III.

(2) In the same note reference is made to the delivery of the miniature &c.

which were delivered to Mrs. Wolfe in the month of November, after Jervis returned to England. What confidences were exchanged between Wolfe and Jervis we do not know, but in the midst of his intercourse with his friend on board the "Sutherland", he was recalled to the duties of his profession by the reception of a letter from the Brigadiers who, ignorant of their superior's intentions on the morrow, had requested enlightenment. This letter affords evidence that Wolfe alone was responsible for the plan which he intended to carry out on the morrow, and his answer to the Brigadiers is a proof of his independent spirit to the last.

These letters <sup>(1)</sup> written a few hours before the battle, after final arrangements for the enterprise had been made, are surely a sufficient answer to the numerous critics who have asserted that Wolfe simply carried out the plan of his Brigadiers.

Wolfe's answer to Monckton contained all the information which the general had to give even to his chief officers, and it also contained a rebuke. With the probable reasons for the independent spirit which Wolfe maintained throughout the campaign, and which was often a cause of surprise to his officers, we have nothing to do beyond saying that we do not consider that his secrecy was any reflection upon the honour or integrity of his Brigadiers.

The condition of the troops at this time was not an enviable one. They had been exposed for nearly three months to the hardships of camp life without the necessary,

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(1) These letters have not been published hitherto but they appear in Appendix Vol. VI.

or even usual protection against the inclemency of the weather, and for the last few days they had been crowded, almost to suffocation on board the vessels. Wolfe had intended to have made the final attack two days previously, but an incessant downpour of rain precluded the possibility of an attempt. The troops suffered in consequence, and Wolfe remarked that if they had remained in this condition forty-eight hours longer he would have lost all his army.

At dusk on the twelfth they had all rejoined their ships, but before midnight they were lowered into the open boats. Ten hours, however, were to elapse before the battle, and during six hours it was necessary to preserve silence. All the men were eager for the fray and impatient to proceed. Nevertheless, caution was essential, and patience was a virtue which they were called upon to exercise.

Presently, towards the stroke of midnight, a single light appeared in the main top-mast shrouds of the "Sutherland." This was the signal for the troops in the flat bottomed boats to rendez-vous abreast of the "Sutherland," between the vessel and the South shore. The men plied their oars as silently as possible, and were soon in their appointed positions.

So secretly was this movement accomplished, that no note of warning reached the ears of Bougainville, who for days had been ceaselessly following the passage of the vessels to and fro in their efforts to deceive the enemy.

The arrangement and the disposition of the troops had been entrusted to Captain Chads <sup>(1)</sup> of the navy, to whom Wolfe gave personal and secret instructions.

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(1) Captain Chads appears to have been a friend of General Wolfe.



A short time after, another light appeared above the former signal on the "Sutherland" and immediately the boats dropped away from the vessel.

The final expedition against Quebec was now in motion.

Expectation ran high, but the same rigid silence was maintained. Wolfe, with Captain Delaune, another personal friend, was in the foremost boat. The General seems to have entrusted all the most delicate tasks during the campaign to the men with whom he was particularly intimate. It was Delaune, who witnessed Wolfe's will, to whom was bequeathed a hundred guineas "to buy a sword in memory of his friend," and he it was to whom was given the command of the twenty-four men, upon whom the success of the enterprise so largely depended.

While the boats were falling down with the tide, and the fate of Quebec was already trembling in the balance, the gentle voice of Wolfe was heard above the murmur of the waters, repeating the since well known lines of Gray: <sup>(1)</sup>

"The boast of heraldry, the pomp of pow'r,  
And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave  
Await alike th' inevitable hour,  
The paths of glory lead but to the grave." <sup>(2)</sup>

the last line of which was so soon to be exemplified in his own brilliant passage through glory to the grave.

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Admiral, Sir Henry Chads, K.C.B., a descendant of this family is still living at Southsea. He informed the authors that unfortunately he had not a portrait of the Captain, or any documents relating to the Siege of Quebec.

(1) Wolfe, it is said, received a copy of Gray's poems from Miss Lowther.

(2) In the third volume of "Montcalm and Wolfe," page 129, Mr.

The ears of the General and of his men were ever on the alert to detect the slightest indication that their movements were betrayed to the enemy. Little did they expect that the first real danger which they were to experience would be from their own friends—a danger which threatened to cut still shorter the brilliant career of the commander, and to terminate in an instant all the carefully laid plans for the reduction of Quebec.

The boats were drifting noiselessly on their way, half the journey between the "Sutherland" and Anse du Foulon had been accomplished, and in the distance could be seen the friendly light of the Hunter sloop of war, which was anchored in mid stream.

The light was regarded as a welcome signal, but it almost lured them to their doom. At the moment the boats were approaching the Sloop, the officer in charge, Captain Smith, was conversing with two French prisoners who had been brought on board for safety a few hours previously.

The men were relating to the Captain that the French expected a convoy of provisions down the river that evening, when one of the men suddenly exclaimed "the boats were already upon them. Captain Smith, ignorant

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Parkman, writes :— " The General was in one of the foremost boats, and " near him was a young midshipman named Robinson, afterwards professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. He used " to tell in later life how Wolfe with a low voice repeated " Gray's Elegy " in a Country Church Yard " to the officers about him. "

The fact that Wolfe repeated these lines while on the water does not appear to rest solely on the testimony of Professor Robinson. A few years after the Siege of Quebec a sketch of Wolfe's life was written wherein it is mentioned that on the eve of the battle Wolfe repeated the lines of Gray to the soldiers in the boats.

of Wolfe's intentions, or of his plans, directed the guns against the boats, in the foremost of which was General Wolfe, and prepared to discharge them.

Wolfe was fortunately near enough to observe the temporary excitement on board, and pulled up alongside the vessel, just in time to avert a catastrophe, which would in all probability have ended his life, and alarmed the enemy.

Explanations were hurriedly made, and from the knowledge gained of the expectations of the French, Wolfe was able in a few minutes to ward off another danger which presented itself in a challenge from the French sentinels.

By the time the first division of the boats had passed the Hunter sloop, the second division was on its way, following the same course.

It now became necessary for the first boats to leave the protection afforded by the proximity to the south shore. The greatest circumspection was needed, for the north shore which they were approaching was defended at intervals by the posts of Douglas, Remigny, and Vergor. What hopes Wolfe had of evading the vigilance of these guards we do not know, for notwithstanding that the darkness might prevent observation, the plash of an oar might be sufficient to betray them in the stillness of the early morn.

When the troops had embarked from the south shore it was a clear star light night, but towards midnight the stars disappeared, the moon withdrew her light, darkness favoured the enterprise. The boats drew nearer to the north shore, and the first post was passed in safety. <sup>(1)</sup> As

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(1) Letter from an officer at Quebec, Sept. 19, 1759.

they were opposite the second post, and were still some distance from the Cove, the silence was broken by the challenge of the sentinel, *Qui vive ?* Brave as Wolfe was known to be, this challenge must have caused a momentary shock to the general, for very much depended upon the reception of the answer which he was able to make. Fortunately one of the men understood French very well, and without hesitation he replied, "*France.*"

This did not entirely satisfy the challenger, and he queried further: "*A quel régiment ?*" and again the answer was given readily but in a subdued voice: "*De la reine.*"

The guard who appears to have been intent upon doing his duty was still in doubt, and he once more asked:

*Pourquoi est-ce que vous ne parlez pas plus haut ?* To this interrogation the soldier replied: *Tais-toi ! nous serions entendus.*"

On receiving this plausible explanation, the boat was allowed to proceed,<sup>(1)</sup> and no doubt the troops breathed a sigh of relief. In a few minutes the men had reached their destination.

Some of the boats were carried "near a quarter of a mile below the intended place of debarkation."

"It was determined that, since the boats had fallen so much below the centre of the cove, they could not be rowed or warped back, that the eastern side of the bend should become the place of landing."

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(1) One Journalist mentions that the guard was not quite satisfied, and communicated with his captain, and that the alarm was raised. However, by this time, Wolfe had reached the cove.

The most difficult task was yet to be accomplished. They had so far eluded the vigilance of the enemy, and were treading upon the coveted north shore, but above them frowned the cliffs which had hitherto bid defiance.

The men who formed a part of the first division were not, however, unprepared for the task which awaited them.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> of September, Colonel Howe had been instructed by the General to call for volunteers from the light infantry for a particular service. The Colonel had explained to them that the General desired that a few men should be prepared to ascend the heights at a certain place which would be pointed out to them by Captain Delaune, and that as the service would be dangerous the General would not fail to reward merit. Eight men had responded to this invitation, whose names are already given, and each man was to select two additional men of his own choice, making in all twenty four. These men were now upon the shore eager to redeem their promise.

Anse du Foulon, now known as Wolfe's Cove, the place selected by Wolfe for the commencement of the final operations against Quebec, is particularly adapted for the landing of troops, although the French did not expect any serious attempt would be made there.

It is true that there was a winding path leading from the shore to the summit of the cliff, but in the month of August this path had been broken up, and strewed with trees and branches, and moreover at the termination of the path there was a post defended by a hundred men, who from the advantage of their position could easily keep five hundred of the enemy at bay. Wolfe had observed all

these obstacles two days before when he reconnoitred the situation in disguise, wearing the uniform of a Grenadier.<sup>(1)</sup>

The apparently impracticable nature of the project seems to have been its chief attraction to Wolfe, and it is probable that he did not expect as much opposition at this post as at the others.

About two hundred yards to the right of the foot of the winding path is a bold jutting rock which marks the eastern point of the cove, and it was by this uninviting means of ascent that Wolfe proposed that the twenty-four men should gain the heights, surprise the post by attacking it in the rear, capture the guards, and prepare to clear the path for the remainder of the troops to ascend.

One by one the boats drew near the shore and the small army on the beach was being gradually augmented, until the whole of the attacking force of the first division stood beneath the rugged heights.

The first part of Wolfe's plan had been successfully accomplished.

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(1) Wolfe at first proposed to make the final attack on Quebec in the night, as he was thoroughly acquainted with the ground and possessed a plan.



## CHAPTER IV.

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### MISTRESS OF THE SEAS.

THE plan of General Wolfe, daring even to recklessness in its conception, depended absolutely for its successful execution upon the sympathy and help of the naval officers, and the unquestioning obedience of every member of the expedition whether soldier or sailor. These requirements had been fulfilled and as a consequence the General and his little force now stood upon the beach at Foulon prepared to carry out the still more dangerous part of his design.

It was an essential part of Wolfe's policy to keep the enemy in ignorance of his real intentions, which could only be accomplished with the assistance of the navy. The squadron below the city was therefore ordered to move as close as possible to the Beauport shore, and by a furious bombardment of the French camp to engage the attention of Montcalm. Admiral Holmes in the meantime was to proceed with his ships towards Pointe-aux-Trembles in order to draw de Bougainville westward. This being effected the men were to embark in boats supplied, officered and manned by the navy, and to land on the north shore near the city without alarming the garrison or the sentinels



stationed on the summit of the cliff. So far the whole work was to be entrusted to the sailors, and not until the boats grated on the stony beach and the regiments had formed under the frowning cliff would the duties of His Majesty's land forces begin. It can therefore be seen that great responsibility rested upon the officers and men of the king's ships, for neglect of a single order would have caused the complete failure of the General's plan, and rendered the siege of Quebec abortive; while upon the British sailors, the British soldiers, and the young but gifted commander-in-chief would have rested forever the onus of disaster and defeat.

We have already seen how narrowly Wolfe escaped danger while passing the Hunter sloop, and how much depended upon the prompt action of a naval officer.

The British navy at the time of the siege of Quebec had inherited the traditions of centuries of conflict which had fired officers and men with ambition, and set before them high ideals of service and suffering for the honour of the flag of old England. In order to follow the history of the British navy we must revert to the days when the North sea, and other known waters about Europe were dominated by those hardy navigators and semi-pirates, the sea rovers of Normandy and Denmark. When William the Conqueror became England's King, Normandy was practically removed to England where the adventurous sea fighters found an asylum inaccessible to their enemies. Indeed one of the principal causes of England's strength is, and has always been, the fact that her nearest neighbour is separated from her by twenty-one miles of prob-

lematic and sometimes dangerous navigation, and her inhabitants have little fear of invasion. They have the natural advantage of an island home and this advantage has been increased by an inborn love of the sea, and an insatiable thirst for adventure. The blood of the vikings surges in English veins.

The first naval engagement of importance which we find recorded in English History was at Sluys when the French were utterly defeated. Here of course the fighting was done by knights and men at arms, the masters and sailors of the ships being regarded as mere servants. In 1492, the discovery of America roused the spirit of adventure in England. John Cabot under warrant of Henry VII, cruised in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and along the east coast of America and was succeeded by countless navigators who visited the new world. In 1588, was laid the foundation of English sea power when Hawkins utterly defeated the great Spanish Armada, the most powerful fleet that had ever been known. The exploits of Hawkins and his kinsman Francis Drake against Spain are memorable. The Spanish settlements in America were pillaged, treasure ships were captured and wealth of the West Indies diverted to England. It has been said that Spanish pieces-of-eight were as common in London as in Madrid. True it is that these exploits were not far removed from piracy, but in those days the public conscience was not squeamish, and provided the romantic deeds of Englishmen brought wealth and power to England, the methods by which success had been won were not inquired into. The transition from piracy to legitimate naval warfare was gradual, until at

the declaration of the Protectorate we find the beginnings of an effective force organized solely for offensive and defensive warfare upon the sea. The struggle with the Dutch under Van Tromp strengthened this force and showed the immense value of a war fleet in protecting English shores and repulsing would be invaders. Still the admirals were always men who had gained distinction in land service and who were utterly ignorant of the sea. Admiral Robert, Blake, England's first great sea Commander [1598-1656] was, at first, a famous soldier in the Parliamentary Forces during the civil war, while the Royalist fleet was directed by Prince Rupert, the impetuous cavalry leader, who stood on the quarter deck of his flag-ship roaring the same commands as he used with his grizzly faced troopers. The division between the two forces, naval and military, was effected towards the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and the first admirals of prominence who were sailors as well, were Sir Christopher Mings, John Benbow, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and Lord Byng, viscount Torrington. These brave old sea dogs performed deeds of valour against France and Spain not only in European waters, but in those of the West Indies. Their careless bravery filled the whole service with admiration and made seamen as well as officers eager to emulate their wonderful feats of arms. The fact that Sir Cloudesley Shovel had won his way to the Master-Deck by a conspicuous act of gallantry, when only a ships' boy, that most humble of naval positions, was not forgotten by the men, and their ambition was excited. When opportunity arose they fought England's enemies with an unrelenting ferocity which made the fleet

thoroughly feared, and won for the little Island the title of mistress of the seas.

In the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century George, Lord Anson, [1697-1762] became the admiral of the Fleet. An incident will show the temper of the officers and men of the time. Anson, in 1747, had gone with his squadron in search of a French fleet sailing for North America. He encountered the enemy off Cape Finisterre and immediately signalled his other Captains to form for battle. Peter Warren was his second in command, a competent and able officer. He immediately realized that if any time was wasted the French fleet might escape, so disregarding the signals of his superior officer he immediately closed with the enemy. The other ship came up and as the result of the action the entire French fleet was captured and the admiral, de Jonquière, gave up his sword to Anson. Warren received the order of the Bath and was afterwards created a rear admiral. The failure of the expedition of admiral Byng to Minorca, 1756, and his subsequent execution shows that the system of governing the Naval forces of the country was in great need of reform. Not even expediency can justify the sentence of death passed upon this gallant seaman. The arrest of admiral Byng was effected by admiral Hawke and admiral Saunders<sup>(1)</sup> who were then in the Mediterranean. Saunders, three years later, had the supreme command of the naval forces before Quebec.

The Louisbourg expedition of 1758 brings to our notice Edward Boscawen admiral of the Blue. He was the second

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(1) For Biographical note of admiral Saunders see page 2.

son of Hugh Lord Falmonth and was born in 1711. On March 12<sup>th</sup> 1737 he was a captain and was at Porto Bello under Vernon when he commanded the Shoreham of 20 guns. At Cartagena he led a storming party which captured a battery of 15 twenty-four pounders. In 1741 he was appointed to the command of the Prince Frederick 70 guns and three years later was captain of the Dreadnaught. In the Namur he fought under Anson against de Jonquière. On the 15<sup>th</sup> July, 1747, he was advanced to rear admiral of the Blue, and appointed commander in chief of His Majesty's forces, Naval and Military, in the East Indies. In June 1751 he was lord commissioner of the admiralty and four years later vice-admiral of the Blue, becoming full admiral in 1758. For his success at Louisburg he was thanked by the House of Commons and named a Privy Councillor. In 1759 he was in the Mediterranean; he defeated the French off Cape Lajos and died in 1761.

The progress of the British navy up to the time of the Siege of Quebec can be most effectively shown by the following table.

At the death of Elizabeth there were 43 ships.

"	James I . . . . .	39	"
"	Charles I . . . . .	60	"
"	Cromwell . . . . .	150	"
"	Charles II . . . . .	76	"
"	James II . . . . .	173	"
"	William III . . . . .	272	"
"	Anne . . . . .	247	"
"	George I . . . . .	233	"
"	George II . . . . .	412	"

It will be seen that the halcyon days of the Navy were during the reign of George II. or at the time of the siege of Quebec. Since that day its progress has been continuous and indeed phenomenal until it has become the pride of every Englishman and the fear of the European powers. The pinnacle of glory was reached at Trafalgar when Nelson crushed England's enemies but, alas, gave up his life in the moment of victory.

The most striking feature in the history of the British Navy is the character of the seamen. At the time of which we write the lot of a sailor in a King's ship was anything but a happy one. Even from the time of entering the service he endured a system of slavery under the hardest of taskmasters. The knowledge of this spread abroad through the land and as a consequence but few men could be induced to serve His Majesty, and because of this fact, impressment became a necessity. For over a century the press-gang was the terror of every seaport. There was no respecting of persons, a young able bodied man, whether farmer or laborer, carpenter or student, married or single, was prey for the press-gang. He might never before have seen the trim deck of a man of war, indeed he might "never have been on the sea" but no matter what his experience or lack of it, the boatswain and his mates would guarantee with the assistance of a few judicious applications of the cat-o'nine-tails to make an A. B. out of him in a surprisingly short time. Those thus secured were unceremoniously dumped on deck and when they returned to consciousness were generally assisted to their quarters with a rope's end in the hand of a warrant officer. They

were then instructed "to clean up for inspection" and half an hour later the captain and the first lieutenant would calmly hear their protests and their applications and turn them over to the boatswain to be assigned to duty. How men with any spirit could endure this without mutiny is surprising, but how they could become good seamen filled with a pride for their ship, and for the service, devoted to their officers and fighting the battles of their country with the same fury and energy as if the quarrel were their very own, is indeed the most wonderful and remarkable characteristic of the British tar.

But impressment was an incident soon forgotten or condoned in the light of subsequent experience. The Naval discipline was fierce, and flogging was administered for the most trivial offences.

When George II was on the throne the magazines and books of the time were filled with eulogies of the British sailor. Through two hundred years of strife these eulogies have been justified and to day there is no more striking evidence of the way in which our tars have lived up to the traditions of the Royal Navy than the work of H. M. S. "Powerful's" naval brigade in beleaguered Ladysmith. Over all the seven seas our sailors have fought and died for twice two hundred years.

In 1759 the Royal Navy was stronger than ever before. Commanded by enthusiastic and high-minded officers and manned by bluff, intrepid, British seamen, the force had attained the height of efficiency. Almost constant war had shown that England was the undeniably Mistress of the seas, the deeds of Benbow, Shovell, and others, having

lighted for officers and men alike the rugged path to glory. In the siege of Quebec the one thing needful was co-operation between the squadron under admiral Saunders and the land forces under Wolfe. This was foreseen and pointed out in the "Secret Instructions for Brigadier General Wolfe" dated Feb. 5<sup>th</sup> 1759 and bearing the sign manual of King George.

In accordance, therefore, with these instructions, both General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders did all in their power to act together and to cultivate a good feeling between the officers and men of the two arms of the service. The position of Quebec at the head of 800 miles of river navigation in a hostile country rendered it imperative that the whole of the St. Lawrence from the sea should be guarded during the siege, so that no fleet from France could come up the river and take the besiegers unaware in the rear.

While the principal duty of the fleet was to guard the river during the progress of the siege, the Centurion Capt. Mantle, and the Porcupine Capt. Jervis, did good work at the attack on Montmorency July 31<sup>st</sup>. Both vessels were moved over to protect the landing and did most efficient duty.

When the final attempt at the Foulon was decided upon Wolfe selected Capt. Chads, a very efficient officer, attached to the fire ship Vesuvius, to have charge of the boats which were to convey the troops from the vessels above the town to the landing place. The general's orders were given verbally, in confidence, and that the proper officer had been selected for the carrying out of these orders is evident by



the smoothness with which every thing moved, and the entire success of the landing. A body of sailors who came with the boats were afterwards ordered up the cliff to operate with the army.

The intelligent co-operation of army and navy had placed the British forces before the French stronghold of Quebec, had effectively conducted the siege, and now had brought the British forces to the foot of that rugged path which stretched steeply up the wooded cliff and led either to victory and deathless fame or to ignominious defeat. Whatever the outcome, however, the navy had faithfully done its part and the responsibility now rested entirely with the soldiers.

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## CHAPTER V.

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### THE THIN RED LINE

AFTER three months of a wearisome siege without even hope to buoy the investing army's sinking spirits, the scene has suddenly changed and the masterly strategy of Wolfe has outmanœuvred the vigilance of the too confident enemy.

On the bluffs of Beauport the main body of the French are encamped on this momentous morning, the sentries straining their eyes in the misty gloom to discern the meaning of the peculiar movements of the English men-of-war, and with ears alert to catch the plash of oars or any other unusual sound which would indicate that the expected attack was about to begin. Miles to the westward the intrepid Bougainville and his little army, the flower of the French forces, with untiring vigilance are following the evolutions of Admiral Holmes's squadron, prepared to oppose to the death any attempt at a landing. Having thus doubly deceived the enemy, Wolfe has landed his army and, undisturbed, has leisurely formed it on the beach below the frowning cliff.

The last act of the tragedy is begun. The General's plan was a desperate one, and succeeded because of its

apparent impossibility, but it is the power to perform impossibilities that separates the man of genius from the common herd, that marks epochs in the history of nations, and compels from the reluctant hand of Fame, the laurel wreath, and the adulation of the multitude.

But as the best laid plan of the British Commander would have miserably failed in its execution without the enthusiastic and unquestioning obedience of the forces at his command, it is deemed advisable, at this juncture, to give some detail concerning these forces, in order to throw light on the conduct of the regiments in that short but bloody struggle of September the thirteenth when French power on this continent was finally and irretrievably broken.

From 1618 the date of the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, Europe was torn with conflict. Englishmen by hundreds crossed the Channel to take sides with either the Protestant Elector or the Catholic Emperor of Austria, although it may be admitted that the hope of plunder, and an inborn love for the profession of arms were a more powerful magnet than the principles for which the opposing states were fighting. Still there is no doubt that this bitter Religious quarrel was one cause of the civil war in England between Puritan and Cavalier. There seemed no incongruity in an appeal to arms for the settlement of doctrinal differences, and the fierce and gloomy spirit of the Protestants welcomed with joy the long desired opportunity of "smiting the Amalekites."

The ever increasing importance of the private soldier wrought a great change in the science of war. The gentleman no longer looked with contempt upon the levies from

the common people when he discovered that honour and patriotism burned with just as fierce a flame in the breast of the grenadier or trooper as if he had been entitled to bear a quartered shield. In the long struggle between King and Parliament at Edgehill, at Newbury, Marston Moor, and Naesby the Englishman learned that even cavalry could not withstand a well directed volley of musketry, nor could it avail against a double row of glittering pikes in the hands of determined infantry. This period saw a great improvement in the army and from then onward its record was one of uninterrupted glory. The campaigns of Marlborough and the victories of Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet from 1704 to 1709 completed the education of the private soldier and he emerged from that war with a firm confidence in himself that almost amounted to braggadocio, with an undying fidelity to his officers, and with a reputation for bravery and self sacrifice that he felt it due to his honour to maintain. The accession of the House of Hanover and the consequent Jacobite troubles still further instilled into the mind of the rank and file of the army that sense of personal responsibility for the country's honour which has ever been the distinguishing characteristic of Britain's soldiers. Whether the warrior marched to battle under the banner of the Young Pretender or in the scarlet uniform of King George he had a personal interest in the cause for which he fought, and the approval of his conscience nerved his arm to strike.

The close relation between Britain and Hanover owing to the Teutonic blood of the King was the cause for the employment in the army of a large number of Hanoverians

and Hessians. These men however were simply mercenaries and never were as formidable as the regiments of native Englishmen.

In this connection it may be well to quote an official statement of the British Military Forces in 1743, and their distribution: <sup>(1)</sup>

Great Britain.	{ Cavalry..... 2,827 Infantry..... 20,783 }	23,610
Flanders ....	{ Cavalry..... 3,164 Infantry..... 13,195 }	16,359
Leeward Islands.....		815
Annapolis &c.....		894
New York.....		445
Bermuda.....		57
Jamaica.....		912
Isle of Providence.....		150
Minorca.....		4,075
Gibraltar.....		4,075
Ten regiments available as marines....		11,550
Ireland.....	{ Cavalry..... 2,766 Infantry..... 9,232 }	11,998
Hanoverians in British pay.....		16,268
Hessians in British pay.....		6,172
		<hr/> 96,880

In 1745 occurred the last efforts of the Stuart house to re-establish itself upon the British throne. Scotland, ever loyal to the exiled family received the young Charles

(1) From the *United Service Journal* for 1829, p. 240.

Edward with the greatest demonstrations of joy, the common people were heart and soul with the Young Pretender, the Highland clans were won by the tact of the young Prince in donning the kilt and tartan of his house, and the Scottish nobles hastened to offer their aid and support.

The victory of Preston Pans still further augmented Charles's little army and the march to the southward was begun with a confident enthusiasm. But all hopes were dashed to earth when Cumberland, in 1746, crushed the rebellion completely and finally at Culloden. Besides the hundreds who gave up their lives on this fatal field, about eighty of Scotland's most prominent gentlemen went to the block. By far the best known of these was Simon Fraser, the last Earl Lovatt of the Scottish Peerage. Beloved by his clansmen, and by them alone, his career was marked by double dealing and chicanery, still the evidence that he had been one of the moving spirits in the rebellion was over-whelming, and he was sentenced to death.

He suffered at Tower Hill, meeting death with a careless bravery that in the eyes of many of his contemporaries largely atoned for his misdeeds. The action of Lord Lovatt and his clansmen in supporting the Stuart cause brought charges against his eldest son Simon Fraser, who, if the crown had not confiscated the estates and abrogated the title, would have succeeded his father in the enjoyment of them. The prospect for the young man was at first very dark, but it was finally proven to the satisfaction of the King that young Fraser had been compelled to follow his father's lead and that he did not personally hold to Jacobite doctrines. He therefore received a free pardon in 1750

and to show his gratitude he entered the army and rapidly advanced in rank. In 1757, in view of the troubles in America, he raised among the Fraser clansmen a regiment of 1250 men, all of whom he secured within a week.

He received a commission as Colonel of this regiment which was known as the 78<sup>th</sup> Highlanders and with his kilted warriors crossed the sea to battle against the French. When the expedition for Quebec started from Louisbourg, nine of the transports bore the 1269 men of all ranks who made up the Seventy-Eighth.

Through the whole siege they showed the excellent material of which they were made and at the final battle they played a memorable part in the charge. Accustomed to the feudal law, they recognized the rights of their officers to command them, and their discipline was therefore of a high quality.

It is exceptionally interesting to read the opinions of the Indians and the habitants concerning this regiment and the kilted costume of the Highlands which they so proudly wore. The strange garb of these sturdy warriors appealed to the imaginative faculty of the Indian very strongly. He could not conceive that one of the sterner sex could be thus disguised, and he therefore said that the English *formerly women* were all turned into men.

Although these Highland giants were brave, fierce and relentless on the battlefield, they were singularly simple and childlike in their character. They were remarkably sensitive and as they could not easily be placated after receiving a fancied insult the greatest care was taken by the officers to avoid hurting their pride. In this connec-

tion the quotation which follows gives a quaint example :

“ Among the number of our men was Duncan McFee of our company of Grenadiers, who had been one of McGregor’s men, as wicked a rascal as ever lived, and as brave as a lion.

“ He overtakes a French officer in the chase, who according to etiquette, drops the point of his sword in token of submission, and spoke something in French which Duncan did not understand. This would not satisfy Duncan, but he seizes the officer by the cuff of his neck and snatches away the sword from out his hand, and in this way he brings him into camp and delivers him to our adjutant. This French officer was a very fine gentleman looking man, but Devil a bit would Duncan give up the sword for all the adjutant could say, but he clasps it into the frog of his belt along side his own broad sword as a trophy of war. The French officer made a great remonstrance at the treatment he had received, and stated that it was not the rule of their service, that an officer, although a prisoner of war, should be deprived of his sword, it being sufficient that he was deprived of his liberty, and earnestly requested that the adjutant would see him righted. Upon this the adjutant who knew what sort of a fellow he had to deal with, instead of attempting to force Duncan to give up the sword, he goes to the Head Quarters, (This is the first time I had ever heard the term made use of) to Colonel Fraser, who understood how to manœuvre him, and the colonel’s advice was to go back to Duncan and undervalue the sword as a paltry looking thing beside his own, and not worth his keeping,



“ (I myself saw the sword and indeed it was a poor looking  
“ thing with only a brass hilt) but to offer him a few  
“ crowns for it, which he, the colonel, would undertake to  
“ have repaid.

“ The adjutant accordingly seeks out Duncan, who  
“ he finds strutting about as proud as a peacock, much to  
“ the annoyance of the French officer, and endeavoured to  
“ coax the sword out of him, but no, Devil a bit Duncan  
“ would not part with it, at last after trying to persuade  
“ him that it was not worth a single crown, he asked him  
“ how many he would take for it. Duncan replied that he  
“ did not care a straw for the money, it was the honour of  
“ the thing that he valued, but that if it was for Colonel  
“ Fraser, he could have it for 20 crowns. The adjutant  
“ told him that this was too much and that he would give  
“ him ten for it, but even at that price he was not sure  
“ that the Colonel would be satisfied. To this Duncan  
“ agreed with bad grace, and the sword was again put in  
“ the officer's possession.

“ The very next Day Duncan when on his way to the  
“ Colonel's marquee and he was passing out he saw the  
“ same French officer with the sword at his side. This was  
“ too much for Duncan, and he instantly rushed at him,  
“ and tore it away a second time, and it would have been  
“ a difficult matter to have made him give it up if it had  
“ not been for our Colonel who explain to him the custom  
“ of war, and that it was unbecoming for a brave man to  
“ treat an unfortunate soldier thus.” <sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) History of Duncan McFee of Fraser's.

After the battle of the Plains at which the 78<sup>th</sup> did so well, the Regiment remained to garrison the town. The winter caused the men much suffering until the gentle hearted nuns of the General Hospital knitted long woollen stockings for the Scottish heroes, a gift which they most heartily appreciated.

In 1763 the 78<sup>th</sup> was disbanded not to be resurrected under that title until 1794. But in 1776, when the war cloud hovered over the New England Colonies, Col. Simon Fraser again came to the fore and raised 3,500 men to fight for the King against the rebellious colonists. Two years before this, His Majesty had restored to Fraser his family estates, an act of political generosity, the donor no doubt realizing that a man who could raise regiments so readily — and regiments of such a calibre — was a man well worth placating.

The first distinctively Scottish regiment to wear the national garb in the British service was the Seventy-Eighth. Their work at Quebec established a standard below which their successors have never yet fallen. The whole history of the British army glitters with incidents of the bravery of the Scotch regiments; Piper Findlater, of the Gordons, at Dargai, won the Victoria Cross for his coolness and bravery. He was but one of the long line of heroes who in the past two centuries have brought renown on the scarlet clad ranks of Britain's defenders.

But while the most picturesque of Gen. Wolfe's regiment was Col. Fraser's gallant Seventy-Eighth, they were new accessions to the army and had not the record and traditions of that sturdy corps of veterans known as

Amherst's regiment or the Fifteenth Foot, and under the present territorial designation the East Yorkshire Regiment. This corps was raised in 1685, from among the Nottinghamshire Militia by Lt.-Col. Tufton in order to support King James against the rebels under Monmouth. The Regiment fought at Sedgemoor, but when William III. came to the throne, Col. Tufton was superseded on account of his favouring the exiled Stuart House.

After some minor service in Scotland, the Fifteenth went to Holland in 1695, fighting with credit at Kenoque, Dixmunde, Kaiserwerth, Ruremonde, Liege and Schellenberg. Then ensued nine years of peaceful garrison work, the bugle call then summoning the regiment to do duty under Marlborough against the French. In 1704, the Fifteenth was in Rowe's famous brigade at Blenheim, being then commanded by Lieutenant-Col. Britton. Reckless devil-may-care rascals were they and their work on this famous but bloody field won the admiration not only of Marlborough but of the enemy. A rather interesting incident is told of this fight which tends to show the character of the rank and file. It appears that one of the Majors of the Fifteenth had become very unpopular by reason of his excessive strictness in the enforcement of discipline, and he had every reason to fear that in the coming battle his greatest danger would be from his own men. Just before the attack he addressed the men, admitted that he had been too severe and trusted that if he fell it would be at the hands of the French. — "March on, sir" said a bold grenadier, "the enemy is before us and we have something else to do than think of you just now." — An instant later the regiment

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advanced within sight of the enemy. The unpopular Major shouted "Hurrah" and waved his hat; immediately afterwards he fell shot through the brain by one of his own men. In these campaigns the Fifteenth fought at Ramillies, Oudenarde the Siege of Tournay, and numerous minor skirmishes. At Malplaquet they were in the reserve. Returning home in 1714, they fought at Glenshiel in Scotland, 1719, against the McKenzies and McGregors. In 1741, they were present at the Cartagena affair, five years later at Quiberon and L'Orient, and in 1758, they were under Amherst at the siege and capture of Louisburg. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of May, 1759, they embarked at Halifax for Quebec, 594 strong, under the command of Brigadier General James Murray. The corps did effective work during the siege and on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, under Major Irving, had the place of honor and danger on the British left. <sup>(1)</sup>

The East Yorkshire Regiment, has every reason for pride in its excellent fighting record. An interesting relic of their service in Quebec is preserved in the uniform of the officers. Shortly after the Corps returned to England it was ordered that the gold lace on officers' tunics should be bordered by a black line in memory, it is said, of the gallant Wolfe. The present uniform of the Corps is scarlet with white facings.

Another Regiment which has since won most distinguished honours on British battle fields is the present

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(1) Since the Siege of Quebec the regiment has served in the American Revolution, St. Lucia, Martinique, Guadaloup, Barbadoes, 1805 (as marines) again in Martinique and Guadaloup, Ireland, 1826. Canada, 1832-7, taking part in the suppression of the rebellion. Ceylon, Afghan war, 1879-80, South African war, 1899-1900.

Gloucestershire Regiment, formerly the 28<sup>th</sup> Foot, known in 1759 as <sup>(1)</sup> Bragg's regiment. The Corps dates from 1694 and first saw active service in the Low Countries, at Huy, and Neer Haspen. They fought with distinction at Ramillies and Vigo and at the battle of Fontenoy were under the command of the famous Lord George Sackville. General Wolfe had borne a commission in this regiment, commanded at the siege by Lieut. Col. Hunt Walsh, and he had the utmost confidence in the steadiness and bravery of the men, a confidence fully justified by after events. <sup>(2)</sup>

The Forty third Regiment was another which took part in the Siege of Quebec and assisted in the defeat of the French at the Battle of the Plains. It was then known as Kennedy's, Major General James Kennedy having been a former Colonel. The corps is now the Oxfordshire Light Infantry and its first active service was seen at Quebec. Raised in 1741, the Regiment did garrison duty in Minorca for eight years, going to Ireland on a similar errand in 1749. In 1757 it was ordered to America, being quartered at Halifax on the temporary abandonment of the Louisburg expedition.

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(1) Philip Bragg was appointed Colonel of the 28th in October 1734. He was commissioned Major General July 5th, 1743, Lieut.-General 10th August, 1757, and died in 1759. General Bragg did not serve in America.

(2) Brilliant indeed have been the services of the gallant 28th; after fifty years of almost constant service they formed a part of Picton's brigade at Quatre Bras and Waterloo where they fought with a courageous valor that is one of the proudest traditions of the Army. On the colours of the Gloucestershire Regiment appears " Ramillies, Louisburg, Quebec, 1759, Egypt, Maida, Corunna, Talavera, Barossa, Albuera, Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle Nive, Orthes, Toulouse, Peninsula, Waterloo, Punjaub, Chillonwallah, Goojerat, Alma, Inkerman, Sevastopol, Delhi.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> of May, 1759, they embarked 715 strong at Fort Cumberland for Quebec, commanded by Lt. Col. James and Major Elliott. At the siege the corps did good work and distinguished itself at the battle. A rather interesting incident is recorded in connection with Major Elliott who afterwards commanded the regiment. In 1761 the Forty third was wrecked on Sable Island. In 1842, a violent storm there uncovered a mound of sand disclosing a number of rude huts and numerous relics of the regiment, furniture, boxes, bullets, clothes, shoes, and a tiny brass dog collar engraved "Maj. Elliott, 43<sup>rd</sup> Regiment." In 1804 the famous Ger. W. Napier joined the Forthy-third as a captain. <sup>(1)</sup>

No braver corps took part in the Siege of Quebec than Lascelles's famous old Forty-Seventh, now the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. Raised in 1740, they served against the Pretender five years later, and in 1758 were ordered to America to take part in the Louisburg expedition. They landed at Halifax but were in a rather sorry plight as the following quotation indicates :

" I beg leave to acquaint your Lordships that a French  
" letter of Marque of 26 12 pounders which went up to  
" Quebec last spring, in her return towards Cape Francois  
" on Hispaniola stopped to cruise on this coast and has  
" taken 25 vessels coming to or going from this Port,

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(1) On the colours of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry appear the following names: Quebec 1759, Hindoostan, Vimiera, Corunna, Buraco, Fuentes d'Onor, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Niville, Nive, Orthes, Toulouse, Peninsula, South Africa 1851-3, Delhi, New Zealand.

" Philadelphia, and Virginia among whom one with the  
" cloathing and Baggage of the 47<sup>th</sup> Regiment." <sup>(1)</sup>

They took part in the Siege of Louisburg, gaining much distinction for their bravery.

At the Siege of Quebec they were 679 strong commanded by Lt. Col. Hale who afterwards was deputed to carry to England the official dispatches announcing the victory of the Plains and the Capitulation of Quebec. Other officers specially mentioned in the various journals of the siege are Major Hussey, Capt. Spike, Capt. Cox, and Capt. Smelt. Col. Hale was succeeded in his command by Lt. Col. Spital who was commissioned a Captain in the Regiment on Nov. 24<sup>th</sup> 1755, and served at the Siege of Quebec as Brigade Major of Monckton's Brigade. He was appointed a Major March 1<sup>st</sup> 1760. His successor in the command of the regiment was Lieut. Col. Nesbitt, 21<sup>st</sup> March, 1765. <sup>(2)</sup>

Webb's Regiment, the old Forty-eighth now the Northamptonshire Regiment, had had considerable experience in America before the Siege of Quebec, having been with Braddock in the disastrous affair on the Monongahela, and three years later with Amherst at Louisburg. The regiment was raised in 1740 and performed distinguished services in Flanders in 1747 and 1748 under Col. Seymour. At Fort Duquesne, the officer commanding the regiment was Col. Thos. Dunbar who was appointed on the 29<sup>th</sup> April,

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(1) DeLancy to the Lords of Trade, New-York, 13 December, 1758—New York Colonial Documents VII., p. 352.

(2) The Loyal North Lancashires bear on their colours : Louisburg, Quebec, 1759, Maida, Corunna, Tarifa, Vittoria, St. Sebastien, Peninsula, Ava, Alma, Inkerman, Sevastopol, Ali Musjid, Afghanistan 1878-79.



1752. In 1755, he was sent into retirement as Lieut. Gov. of Gibraltar because of his impetuous retreat after Braddock's defeat. He was succeeded by Lt. Col. Daniel Webb on the 11<sup>th</sup> November 1755. Webb arrived in New York on the 7<sup>th</sup> of June, 1756, but his services here were not of a particularly brilliant nature. On the Oswego expedition he became alarmed on the reported advance of the enemy, and when he heard that the fort had fallen into French hands, he filled the "carrying place" with trees and rendered it impossible to further advance. In the Fort William Henry affair, he shamefully abandoned Col. Muuro although at the time he was at the head of 4000 men. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of June, 1759, he was ordered home and though he died a Lieut.-General in 1771, he performed no particularly meritorious service. At Quebec the Regiment was under the command of Lieut.-Col. Burton. Among the noted officers of the Forty-eighth, was John Montresor who was an Ensign in the Braddock expedition where he was wounded. He was appointed Lieutenant on July 4<sup>th</sup> 1755, and later was at the Siege of Quebec, writing a very interesting journal which is published in this work. <sup>(1)</sup> In 1764, he secured a grant of land in Willsboro, Essex Co. N. Y. and two years later he quitted the army.

Since the siege of Quebec, the regiment has been a very famous one, serving with much distinction, especially in the Peninsula and the Crimea. The Forty-eighth is one of the four regiments entitled to bear on its colours

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(1) Appendix vol. IV. p. 301.



the word Douro in memory of the celebrated Passage of the Douro. <sup>(1)</sup>

What is now the second Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment was originally the 58<sup>th</sup> Regiment, known in 1759 as Anstruther's, from Robert Anstruther, a former Colonel of the Regiment. They were raised in 1755 and their first active service was at Louisburg. They arrived before Quebec 616 strong under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Howe and formed an important part of the attacking force at the final battle before the city. Their record since 1759 has been an exceptionally good one. In 1762, they were at Havana, after which they did a long period of garrison duty during which time one of the captains was Arthur Wellesley. In 1794, they were in the West Indies, then in Minorca, Egypt, Alexandria, Peninsular War, New Zealand, Zulu War, South Africa, 1879-81, Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill. Two rather interesting soubriquets were applied to this regiment, one "The Black Cuffs," and the other the "Steelbacks." The former referred to the regiment's original facings — the latter brings back the old flogging days when the men of the 58<sup>th</sup> prided themselves on being able to take the severest thrashing without wincing.

While all the regiments that have hitherto been mentioned have performed yeoman service in defence of the British Flag, none have a better claim to undying renown

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(1) The colours of the Northamptonshire regiment bear the names: Quebec, 1759, Gibraltar, Egypt, Maida, Douro, Talavera, Albuera, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Orthes, Toulouse, Peninsula, Sevastopol, New Zealand, South Africa, 1879.

than the famous King's Royal Rifle Corps, formerly the Sixtieth Regiment, or the Royal Americans. This famous regiment was raised in the American Colonies in 1755, the first Colonel being John Campbell, 4<sup>th</sup> Earl of Loudoun. The rush for enlistment was so great that four battalions were organized. Their first active employment was at Fort William Henry, in 1758 they were at Louisburg. They were also represented at Ticonderoga and Niagara, and with Amherst's force. Wolfe had the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalions under his command at Quebec, in 1759, and it is said that he it was who bestowed upon the regiment the well known motto: *Celer et Audax*. In this connection the following quotation is valuable: "It does not seem " that there is any positive record of this fact, but the " wording of the order which in 1824 gave special permis- " sion for its resumption bears out the theory. Apparently " the motto had fallen into desuetude for some time, and " representations were made to the authorities with a view " to obtaining official recognition for it. This was duly " given by the order referred to, which ran as follows: " Sir, — I have the honour to acquaint you, by direction of " the Commander-in-Chief, that His Majesty has been " pleased to permit the 60<sup>th</sup> Regiment " The Duke of York's " Own Rifle Corps " to resume the Motto *Celer et Audax*, " which was formerly worn by the regiment in comme- " moration of its distinguished bravery whilst employed " with the British Army in North America, under Major- " General Wolfe in the year 1759." (1)

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(1) " Her Majesty's Army," London (Virtue) n. d. 3 vols. 4to.

The list of officers of the Sixtieth during the years 1755-1760 contains many names of prominence in American history. Lieutenant General John Stenwix, who had gained the reputation of being a most earnest student of his profession was, in 1749, Equerry to H. R. H. the Prince of Wales. In 1752, he was Governor of Carlisle and at the same time represented that constituency in Parliament. Two years later, he was commissioned Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the Forces and, being anxious for active military work volunteered to serve in America. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January, 1756, he was appointed Colonel of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Royal Americans, but he had charge of no extensive operations in this continent and in 1760 he returned to England. The famous Henry Bouquet, was a Lieutenant Colonel in the regiment in 1756. In regard to the detachments of the Sixtieth present at the Siege of Quebec, it is well to mention that the journals describe them separately as Monckton's Regiment and Laurence's Regiment. The former corps was the Second Battalion and gained its distinguishing name from Lieut.-General Robert Monckton second in command at Quebec, who had seen much service as Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel of the Royal Americans. His primary work in America was the reduction and capture of Beausejour and Gaspereau, in Acadia, June 1755. Two years later he was Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia and Colonel of the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the Sixtieth. At the Siege of Louisburg, he commanded the Second Battalion and when the scene of operations was transferred to Quebec and he was appointed a Brigadier, his command devolved on Capt. Oswald with





The Honorable  
ROBERT LIVINGSTON  
Major General  
Governor of New York.

*For J. Hinton, at the Kings Arms in Newgate Street.*

Capt. Ochterloney<sup>(1)</sup> as acting major. According to General Wolfe's Embarkation Statement, June 5<sup>th</sup> 1759 (*q. v.*) the regiment was 581 strong.

Some rather interesting details concerning the after service of Brigadier Monckton are given in the *New York Colonial Documents*, vol. viii.

He was of a very generous nature and had a particular sympathy for his subalterns to whom he was more than a father. During his services in the West Indies when he was in charge of the Martinique expedition, he constantly set his table for forty persons, giving instructions to invite sufficient officers, preferably subalterns, to dinner to make up the complement. If this order were neglected and any vacancies appeared at table the General's aide-de-camp was soundly rated for his neglect.

During the engagement on the Plains, Monckton's regiment was in reserve.

Laurence's Regiment, the third Battalion of the 60<sup>th</sup>, on the day of the battle was commanded by Colonel John Young of whom a very interesting story is told. He was present at the affair of Fort William Henry when he with others was plundered and stripped by the Indians. Col. Young was a tactful and efficient officer, and after the British occupied the city he served with distinction as Judge of the Police. At the Battle of the Plains, Laurence's corps had the honour of holding the landing place at the Foulon in case the attacking force should meet a check, and require to retreat to the boats. Brigadier Lau-

(1) See vol. II, chapter VII.



*Sir A. Hutton, at the King's Arms in Newgate Street.*

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(1) See vol. II, chapter VII.



rence, from whom the regiment was named was its Colonel in 1757 and at the Siege of Louisburg commanded the Second Brigade.

Captain Knox refers to the remarkable recovery of the Colonel's property after the fall of Quebec in these words: "Lieutenant Colonel John Young, of the Royal Americans, having, when made a prisoner, in August 1757, at Fort William-Henry, been shamefully stripped and plundered among the rest of his fellow sufferers, lost, with several other things, a pair of silver mounted, screw barrelled pistols: Monsieur Belcombe, a very agreeable French Officer, was particularly polite to the colonel, in his captivity; this gentleman is now, in his turn, a prisoner to us, and thereby had an opportunity of renewing his acquaintance with Mr. Young. Yesterday, he took a merchant of his own nation, and his intimate friend, to wait upon the colonel, and to request a favour, which the other cheerfully promised to grant if in his power: thereupon the officer produced a pair of pistols, now the property of the merchant, and intreated he would take them into his possession in trust for this citizen, until the fate of Quebec should be determined by a peace; lest upon a general search being made for arms, the pistols should be taken from him, especially being of English workmanship."

"The Colonel, no doubt, agreeably surprised to meet with his old companions, of whom he had been master above twenty years, interrogated the Frenchman, how and when he obtained them, and how long he had been possessed of them."

"To these questions he first received evasive replies, till

acquainting Monsieur Belcombe and his friend, that they were formerly his property, taken from him by the Indians, as before mentioned; producing at the same time, a seal, some spoons and other articles in plate, all equally engraved with the colonel's own crest; and comparing them with the pistols, put it beyond a doubt. At length the merchant politely restored them, upon Colonel Young paying him five Louis d'or, the sum for which he affirmed he bought them from an Indian Sachem, sometime after the demolition of Fort William Henry."

To the Royal Americans belongs much of the glory gained by the British at Quebec in 1759.

It is rather interesting in this connection to note that on the formation of the regiment a large number of the officers were foreigners. By an Act, 25 George II., John de Noyelles and forty nine other foreign officers were commissioned for the American service.

Among the best known of the regiment's Commanders was Sir Frederick Haldimand K. B. who although of English parentage was born in Switzerland. In 1756 he came to America as Colonel of the Sixtieth and in 1760 took part in the expedition against Montreal. In 1777, he was commissioned Lieutenant General and Lieutenant Governor of Quebec. He succeeded Sir Guy Carleton as Governor in 1778, holding the office until 1784 when he retired to Switzerland and died at Yeverden, June 1791.

During the siege of Quebec, one of the officers of the Sixtieth was Lieutenant Arthur St. Clair who was born in Edinburgh in 1735, and came to America in 1755. After the campaign with Wolfe and the end of the war, he secured a

grant of land in Pennsylvania and settled in that state. When the Colonists revolted against the mother Country, St. Clair espoused the American Cause, entered the Revolutionary army and rose to be Major General.

It is not flattery to say that the King's Royal Rifle Corps has one of the finest records of any regiment in the service. After the capture of Quebec they fought in the American war, and in the West Indies, and in 1798, forty three years after their establishment, they performed their first duty in the United Kingdom in helping to suppress the Irish Rebellion of '98. After service in Holland and Surinam came the Peninsular war, rich in honours for this gallant corps.

In 1826, they were represented in the expedition to Portugal under General Blakeney and had no further active service until 1846 when they went to India taking part in various campaigns against the natives. During the Mutiny they gallantly sustained their reputation and at the Siege of Delhi seven Victoria Crosses came to members of the regiment. In 1860 the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was in North China and ten years later the Regiment was represented in the Red River Expedition of 1870. In the Afghan war, in South Africa, 1879-81, in Egypt, 1882, and in the South African war 1899-01, the Regiment has gained still greater laurels.

The only other British Line Regiment present at the Siege of Quebec was the Royal Sussex or the Thirty-fifth Foot, then known by the name of a former Commanding officer, Lieutenant General Otway. Like many another famous corps this is an Irish regiment, and here it is worthy

of note that the forces under General Wolfe were drawn from England, Scotland and Ireland for the reduction of Quebec. The Regiment was raised in Ireland in 1701 by Lord Donegal and during the next year was gazetted to act as a marine corps. Its first service was at Cadiz, then a period in the West Indies, and in 1704 the regiment was at Gibraltar. A season with Peterborough in Spain followed and the Thirty-fifth gained notable honours at the capture and the subsequent defence of Barcelona. After a period of forty years in Ireland the next service was in North America at the capture of Louisburg, 1758. When the Quebec expedition set sail the following spring Otway's was 899 strong.

At the battle of the Plains the Irishmen were engaged specially against the Royal Roussillon Grenadiers of France and for the gallantry displayed on that occasion the Feather on their badge was granted. <sup>(1)</sup>

After the siege the regiment served in Martinique and Havana and also in the American war of Independence. Sixteen years of garrison duty in the West Indies followed, the next active service being in Holland in 1799. Most distinguished renown was won by the Thirty-fifth at Maida where, under Major Robinson they formed a part of the ever famous right wing, and held their position although attacked by a vastly larger force of the enemy. Shortly afterwards, two hundred of the regiment defended Castle Scylla against six thousand French soldiers and when the

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(1) The Badge of the Royal Sussex is a St. George's Cross, with an eight pointed star on a feather. The colours bear the names: Louisburg, Quebec, 1759, Maida, Egypt 1882, Nile, 1884-85, Abu Klea.

fortress was finally captured the undaunted garrison succeeded in escaping in boats. After service in Egypt, the regiment was engaged on the continent, thus missing the opportunity of taking part in the Peninsular war; at Waterloo, the Thirty-fifth was in reserve at Huy. Some service was seen during the Mutiny but since then the Corps has gained great distinction by its work in the Egyptian Campaign of 1882. At present (1901) the Royal Sussex Regiment is doing duty in South Africa, under Lieut. Col. B. D. A. Donne, C. B. The Colonel is General Sir J. Davis, K. C. B.

When the expedition against Quebec sailed from Louisburg in the spring of 1759, three companies of grenadiers unattached to any particular regiment accompanied it. These were known during the siege as the Louisburg grenadiers and were drawn from the various line regiments which took part in the reduction of the Cape Breton stronghold in the preceding year. Some of these were the Seventeenth Foot, the Fortieth, the Forty-fifth (then numbered Fifty-sixth), the Twenty-second, and the Royals. In all there were thirteen officers and three hundred and thirteen rank and file under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Murray.<sup>(1)</sup> They made a name for themselves during the siege of Quebec and at the Battle of the Plains; after the conclusion of the

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(1) Brigadier-General Wolfe-Murray, in the course of a letter addressed to the authors dated at Natal, Oct. 31, 1900, on the eve of his departure for India, says:—"My relative who was at the siege of Quebec was "Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Murray, then of the Louisbourg Grenadiers " (and 45th Regiment). I have letters of his relating to the period, but " it is difficult for me to say when I may be able to lay hands on them."

campaign they were nearly all returned to their original regiments. Other irregulars present at the siege were six companies of New England Rangers under Major Scott. These men being familiar with woodcraft and having had considerable experience in Indian fighting, made excellent scouts and were of great assistance to the investing force. The various companies were commanded by Capt. Goreham, Capt. Stark, Capt. Brewer, Capt. Hazzan, Capt. Rogers,<sup>(1)</sup> and Captain Danks.


The remainder of the military forces before Quebec consisted of the Second and Third Companies of Royal Artillery under Col. George Williamson and a Company of Engineers with Miners and Carpenters, under Major MacKellar,<sup>(2)</sup> Captain Derwine and Colonel Gridley respectively. Such in detail made up the troops which General Wolfe had at his command and with which he hoped when day dawned to lead to battle and to victory.


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(1) See Bibliography Vol. VI—No 157.

(2) See his Account of the City of Quebec, Vol. II. p. 271.

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*A TABLE SHOWING THE PRESENT LOCATION OF, AND THE OFFICERS COMMANDING EACH OF THE BRITISH REGIMENTS WHICH TOOK PART IN THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC.*

<i>Designation in Sept., 1759.</i>	<i>Regimental number.</i>	<i>Designation at present.</i>	<i>Present Colonel.</i>	<i>Present Lieut.-Col.</i>	<i>Where serving 1901.</i>
Amherst's .....	15th..	East Yorkshire Regt. ....	Major Gen. W. Hardy, C.B. ....	Lt.-Col. C. F. Garnett.....	Fort St. George [Madras.
Bragg's .....	28th..	Gloucestershire Regt. ....	Maj. Gen. J. P. Redmond, C.B.	Lt.-Col. S. Humphery.....	Ceylon.
Kennedy's .....	43rd..	Oxfordshire Regt.....	Maj. Gen. F. G. Wilkinson * ..	Lt.-Col. the Hon. A. E. Dalzell....	South Africa.
Lascelles's .....	47th..	Loyal North Lancashire Regt. ...	Gen. Sir R. T. Farren, K.C.B. ...	Lt.-Col. R. G. Kekewich, C.B. ....	South Africa.
Otway's.....	35th..	Royal Sussex.....	Gen. Sir J. Davis, K.C.B.....	Lt.-Col. D. B. A. Donne, C.B.....	South Africa.
Webb's .....	48th..	1st Batt.....	} M.-Gen. R.C.Whitehead, C.B.	Lt.-Col. W. B. Capper.....	Fyzabad, Bengal.
		Northamptonshire Regt.....			
Anstruther's .....	58th..	2nd Batt.....		Lt.-Col. H. C. Denny.....	South Africa.
Monckton's .....	{ ..... 60th. ..2nd Batt..	2nd Batt.....	} Col. in Chief, H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge.....	Lt.-Col. H. Brown-Gore.....	Kuldana, Punjab.
		Kings Roy. Rifle Corps.....		} Cols. Commandant, Gen. Rt. Hon. Sir R. H. Buller, V.C.	
Laurence's.....	{ ..... 60th. ..3rd Batt..	3rd Batt.....	} Lieut. Gen. Sir F.W. Grenfell.	Lt.-Col. W. L. Campbell, A.D.C.....	South Africa.
Fraser's.....	78th..	Disbanded in 1763.			

\* Col. in Chief, H. M. KING CHAS. I., of Portugal and Argraves, K. G.



## CHAPTER VI.

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### THE ASCENT OF THE CLIFF

THE sun had not yet risen above the heights of Levis upon that fateful September morning,—pregnant with deeds of highest valor and of events that were to decide the destiny of nations,—when one of the most chivalrous scenes in the annals of war was already being enacted upon the face of the steep cliffs of *l'Anse-du-Foulon*, now known as Wolfe's Cove, nearly two miles above the Citadel of Quebec. The troop composing the advance guard of the English army, which had landed just before the twilight hours of the early dawn, upon the shelving beach of the little bay, had scarcely stepped from the flat-bottomed boats in which they had shivered for the six coldest hours of the night, when they were called upon to execute the most delicate, the most difficult and the most gallant feat of their hazardous undertaking. From the inner edge of the narrow strip of river bank upon which they had landed, the shaly cliffs rose almost perpendicularly until they attained the level of the heights sloping westward from the walls of Quebec, towards Cap Rouge. Then, as in comparatively modern times, patches of shrubbery, since cleared away, relieved the otherwise barren aspect of the precipice ; for in the crevices of the black

limestone, and upon the little ledges of the rock that scarcely afford a sufficient foothold for a goat, the decay of many seasons' mosses and dead leaves, had supplied the small deposits of vegetable soil, required for the sustenance of the stunted spruce and cedar, the alder, the black hawthorn, the hazel and the choke-cherry bushes, which furnished the necessary shade for a luxuriant growth of coarse ferns; while the hardy bracken thrived here and there in the more exposed situations.

The summit of the escarpment was capped with tamarack, pine and spruce, whose majestic proportions gave them the appearance of sentinels of giant stature, standing guard over the all but inaccessible approach from the great waterway below. Beneath their spreading boughs of darkest green, were twelve or thirteen tents of a French post, scarcely visible from the river side, but plainly observed from the ships and the opposite shore on the previous day. If the dark trees in the thick haze of the early September morn suggested to the adventurous party in the boats and on the beach, the lurking place of more formidable, and perhaps more vigilant guards, the memory of the white tents and the absolute uncertainty which prevailed as to the strength of the force occupying them might well contribute to an uncanny feeling in the minds of the more superstitious of the assailing party.

What were Wolfe's thoughts as he gazed upon the scene before him, and eagerly scanned the heights enveloped in the darkness of night, soon to give place to the grey mist that veiled the ope of day, or as he sought to discover the least difficult route of ascent, where scarcely a choice appeared

possible to him? Some little distance to his left, it is true, was a narrow footway, leading to the brink of the precipice: but this was not to be thought of for the use of the advance guard of his army that morning, for its passage was obstructed by one or more abatis, or rows of fallen trees, placed with the points of their branches towards the foot of the hill, while its summit was known to be held by the French post already referred to. To attempt to scale such a cliff at a point where it was commanded by a hostile force, would have been to ensure certain destruction. It was therefore necessary to avoid the beaten track, and to clamber by an unknown and undefined route. <sup>(1)</sup> Even while the General examined the steep acclivity in the indistinct morning light, the dark clouds grew denser about its brow.

But though "black vapors climb aloft and cloud the day," the ardor and self-confidence of the youthful commander shine through the gloom and point to the glory which awaited him upon the adjacent heights. Goldsmith, who was not then very far on the road to literary fame and prominence, must have brought the scene of Wolfe's achievement of this early morning, to many minds, when, a few years later, he penned the well known lines, suggestive of more than one interpretation:—

"As some tall cliff that lifts its awful form  
Swells from the vale and midway leaves the storm,  
Though round its breast the rolling clouds are spread  
Eternal sunshine settles on its head."

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(1) See letter of Wolfe Vol. VI. page 60. Also Journal of Moncrief, Vol. V. page 49.

The low-lying clouds which enshrouded the summit of the precipice at the Foulon at day light on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1759, sprinkled the ground with light showers between six and eight o'clock, and had so cleared away by a quarter past ten as to give place to "a comfortable warm sun-shine."

The troops that had landed on the beach were fully alive to the perils of the situation, and to the uncertainty that must attend the outcome of the task before them.

In the gallant attack of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, nearly a hundred years later, the noble Six Hundred rode boldly into the "Valley of Death," seeing and knowing full well what they were doing and whither going. With the advance guard of the force that scaled the cliff at Wolfe's Cove, there was an adequate knowledge of the fact that they might well be hastening

" Into the jaws of Death,"

but there was the added element of uncertainty as to the point whence the fatal repulse might come. Half a dozen men exercising the vigilance that was to be expected of sentries guarding the post at the verge of the precipice, might well meet the advance of the expedition's pioneers up the cliff, and leave not one alive to tell the story of the party's fate.

The devotion of the men, their scorn of danger and contempt of death, no less than their confidence in the military skill and tactics of their General, rendered them oblivious of the risks that were to be run, increasing rather than diminishing, as they more closely approached

the most critical stage of their perilous mission. We know from the journal of one of those who participated in the events of the day, and who made notes of what took place in the early morning hours, that though the enterprise was felt to be hazardous, exceedingly doubtful, and attended with the utmost danger in every shape, not the least dejection or sign of fear appeared among the troops, but that on the contrary, an uncommon eagerness to attack the foe was plain in every countenance. They were impatient to be led on, and the general officers only restrained their impetuosity with great difficulty. There is contemporary authority for the statement that their courage rose in proportion to the difficulties they had to surmount and that they were fired with the resolve of avenging the fate of their companions in the late attack, of punishing the infamous and inhuman practice of scalping, and of avoiding a similar fate themselves, by a determination, come what might, never to be taken prisoners.

So much for the feeling of the men and the spirit which actuated them at the beginning of this wonderful *coup-de-main*. As for the gallant commander, there is a pen picture of him drawn before the scaling of the cliff upon this eventful morning, representing him as no more sanguine of success than any of the men of his command. After dwelling upon the great things that might be expected from the disposition of the men, the conduct and prudence of a very good set of officers, and especially from "the gentleman who commands in chief, and who in his military capacity, is perhaps equalled by few and exceeded by none," the writer of a contemporary journal says:

"Yet if I can read aright, though no man doubts his courage, he is not sanguine in his expectations of reducing the place, and can depend on nothing but surprise."

Other authorities record that Wolfe had no sooner touched the land than he leaped out upon the beach ; and when he saw the difficulty, or rather the seeming impossibility of getting up the steep ascent which hung over him, he remarked "I don't think we can by any possible means get up here, but however we must use our best endeavor."

The officers were no more confident of success than was Wolfe himself. One of them plainly expressed, in writing, his doubts of the result, before the climbing of the heights, and referred to the proposed ascent as a work of much labour and difficulty, even it at all practicable. "Should the troops perform this difficult undertaking," he added, "I shall for the future think little of Hannibal's leading an army over the Alps ; the rock is almost steep, and the summit seems to me inaccessible to an army."

The exact locality selected by Wolfe for the ascent was some distance to the right of the zig-zag path guarded by the enemy's post, and just beyond the rocky point that jutted out to form the eastern boundary of the bay or *l'Anse-du-Foulon*. A reproduction of the admirable drawing of this point and the surrounding scenes on the morning of the battle made by Hervey Smyth, aide-de-camp to General Wolfe, is given in Vol. II. The General himself conducted the first detachment of the scaling party to the scene of its heroic endeavor, whence the men were instructed to get up the bank as best they could. At the head of the first



detachment were the twenty-four brave fellows of the Light Infantry, who had volunteered for the valorous task, consisting of Fitzgerald, Robertson, Stewart, McAllester, Mackenzie, McPherson, Cameron and Bell, and the sixteen others whom these had selected to accompany them, each of the original eight having had the privilege of naming two others, as already described. These were under the command of Captain Delaune. Three companies of the Light Infantry composed the balance of the first detachment to attempt the ascent. Their orders were to surprise and capture the French post from the rear, and further on, we shall see how they carried out their instructions. But first they were to give a signal as soon as they reached the heights, upon which the remainder of the Light Infantry were to force the pathway and attack the picket in front. Why the latter part of this order was never obeyed will appear later.

There was the utmost impatience amongst the troops to gain the summit, and each corps was anxious for its turn to come, while awaiting the result of the initial effort. That result was not long in doubt. Eagerly the volunteers clambered up the precipitous steep, often unable to maintain a footing without the assistance afforded them by the shrubbery, and sometimes slipping backwards with loose earth and stones, or because of the insufficient strength of the boughs or saplings upon which they depended for support. Despite the anxiety of each to be first upon the heights, much caution was necessary to avoid alarming the post at the head of the narrow pass to the left. Silence was of course essential to safety, and hence the rapidity of

the ascent was moderated by a fear that every crackling bough or rolling stone might betray their presence.

Frequent landslides have so changed the face of the cliff, that it is almost impossible now to form an absolutely correct idea of the steepness of the cliff at the point where the advance guard climbed up; but Admiral Saunders is authority for the statement that the difficulty of gaining the top of the hill was scarcely credible, on account of both its abruptness and height, showing that it had no path where two could go abreast, and that the men were obliged to pull themselves up by the stumps and boughs of trees which covered the acclivity.

The advance guard reached the summit in safety, Captain Donald McDonald commanding Fraser's Highlanders, being among the first to set foot upon the plateau.

Immediately after the Light Infantry, of which the main body was commanded by Colonel Howe, Colonel Fraser followed with his detachment of Highlanders, and then the Grenadiers came struggling up, pulling themselves along by boughs and stumps of trees. In their haste they sometimes grasped at fancied helps, decayed roots and rotten branches, or at stones but slightly imbedded in the earth, which proving but treacherous supports, often sent them recoiling upon those behind them and for a moment blocked the passage.

The cold night air had thoroughly chilled the men and rendered particularly grateful the gill of rum which had been served to all ranks before the embarkation. They were glad enough, too, of the exercise of climbing the hill, despite the dangers with which it was surrounded. They

Engraved for the Universal Magazine.  
*for. Shuter at the Kings Arms in Newgate Street.*



**JAMES WOLFE Esq**  
*Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces at Quebec: & he gloriously fell  
in the Cause of his King & Country in the fatal Victory over the French, September 1759.*

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
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**JAMES WOLFE Esq<sup>r</sup>**  
*Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces at Quebec: Who gloriously fell  
in the Cause of his King & Country in that signal Victory over the French, Sept. 13. 1759.*



were impeded by no unnecessary baggage, carrying only their arms and munition, their rum and water and two days' provisions. The Light Infantry and the others already described as scaling the cliff had reached the heights without any show of resistance from the French post close by. The remainder of the battalions, under Brigadier-Generals Monckton and Murray were waiting their turn, when the English ships, under Rear Admiral Holmes, which had followed the first division of the boats at an interval of about three quarters of an hour, with intrenching tools and camp equipment, made their appearance opposite the landing place to support the troops.

During the scaling of the cliffs, and before the last of the men were landed, the fire of an enemy's battery, a short distance above the Foulon, caused a few casualties in some of the boats bringing further troops ashore; but the guns were quickly silenced. The story of how this was done belongs to the chapter describing the occurrences on the Heights.

A few of the boats of the second division, swept down by the ebb tide, had passed the landing place and were endeavoring to effect a landing at l'Anse des Meres, somewhat nearer to the city. They did not accomplish their purpose, for some of the pickets who had escaped from the post commanding the precipice, prevented their disembarkation. The attention of General Wolfe was attracted by the firing, and putting out in an open boat, he recalled the men, and upon their return to the cove, he ascended the cliff; having first given orders to hasten the ascent of the remaining troops, which was much facilitated by the

removal of the abatis and other obstructions from the zig-zag path on the face of the hill.

A little later in the day, when the pathway already referred to had been somewhat repaired, two brass six-inch pieces of field artillery were dragged up to the heights, and later on we shall find what account they gave of themselves.

It was an hour before daylight when the advance guard of Wolfe's army found itself upon the summit of the precipice. The entire force, including the guard that had been left to cover the remainder of the landing, had scaled the heights soon after dawn.

The knowledge of this remarkable achievement only reached the French camp nearly two hours later. When Montcalm was told of it he could scarcely credit the intelligence. He had been completely outwitted and outgeneralled by his great rival, never for a moment believing that Wolfe could escape the vigilance of de Bougainville, much less that he could scale the heights at a locality where nature had placed such difficulties in his way. But it was characteristic of Wolfe to make his attacks,—not where they were most likely to be dreaded by the enemy, but at the points that offered the greatest difficulties. Where natural obstacles stand in the way of the success of military surprises, there is apt to be neglect of the ordinary principles of defence, while nothing is spared to strengthen the weaker entrenchments against the possibility of attack.

That great risks were taken by the English general cannot for a moment be doubted. But that he had left



less to hazard and chance than is usually supposed it is not difficult to show. He did not for instance attempt the landing at the foot of the steep cliff clambered by his forces, where a very few men at the top of it must have easily beaten them off, until he had ascertained that the post above was very negligently guarded. This he had learned from two deserters who came to him on the 12<sup>th</sup> of September from one of the posts on the heights. They also informed him that the Plains of Abraham were unprotected by French troops; and he was in possession, too, of a recent plan, which showed that no French works had been constructed there. He had, of course, the best of reasons for knowing that he was out of de Bougainville's reach; for he had decoyed him several miles up the river the night before the landing, and had then slipped away from him, unsuspected and unobserved.

There is every reason to believe that Wolfe would never have landed the whole of his army at the Foulon, or persisted in a vain attempt to scale the precipice, had the French sentinels at its head disappointed his expectations, and upset his calculations, by such a display of vigilance as duty demanded of them. In fact, he had written a letter to Brigadier Townshend only a few hours previously, plainly indicating that it depended altogether upon the success achieved by the advance guard, whether or not the remaining forces were to be landed. "General Monckton," he wrote to Townshend, "is charged with the first landing and attack at the Foulon. If he succeeds, you will be pleased to give directions that the troops afloat be set on shore with the utmost expedition, as they are under your command."

Wolfe would have risked, at most, but a score or so of men, if the advance guard of the scaling party had been discovered and repulsed as it should have been. He would naturally have countermanded the ascent at the first attack by the French post upon the pioneers of his force, if made before they gained the summit of the escarpment; for it would have been madness to have attacked, by main force, a hill so nearly inaccessible, that even without an enemy at the top to repel them, his men had the utmost difficulty to climb it. It was only when he found that silence still prevailed above the cliff, after it had been successfully scaled by the advance guard of his army, and when he knew that he had a sufficient force there to overcome the only danger which threatened the ascent of the main body of his troops, that Wolfe breathed freely; knowing that his plans for attaining the heights of Quebec had not miscarried, that fortune still smiled upon him that day, that his strategy had been tried and not found wanting, and that his most fondly cherished hopes were soon to be gratified, by bringing the French to battle where glory was to be achieved, even though "the paths of glory lead but to the grave." In connection with the task in which he was engaged, his poetic soul may have not inaptly recalled, at this particular moment, the language of Prior,

"Thy arms pursue  
Paths of renown and climb ascents of fame."

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## CHAPTER VII.

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### THE DAWN OF VICTORY

THE land occupying that part of the Heights of Quebec immediately above the landing place of Wolfe's army is now appropriately known by the name of Wolfesfield, and forms a part of the beautiful estate of the Price family. Upon the comparatively level ground, from 250 to 300 feet above the surface of the river, whence a declivity slopes away to the crest of the precipice, the English forces were first formed up after scaling the cliff. There had already occurred on these heights a gallant little episode, which, although it was contemporaneous with the ascent of the rock, finds fitting relation here.

It will be remembered that Wolfe had knowledge of the existence of a captain's post at the head of the zig-zag path a few hundred feet west of the point at which his army gained the heights, because of which it had become necessary for him to send up his pioneers by a much more difficult and more circuitous route, and that their orders were to surprise and capture the French post from the rear. This advance guard, which consisted of the twenty-four volunteers and three first companies of Light Infantry, performed their allotted task with the utmost zeal, courage

and fidelity. The successful manner in which they surprised the post was largely due to the coolness and bravery of a very gallant officer,—Captain Donald McDonald, who upon meeting with a sentry, accosted him in French with great presence of mind, telling him he had been sent there with a large command, to take post, and desiring him to go with all speed to his guard, and to call off all the other men of his party who were ranged along the hill, since he would take good care to give a proper account of the—English if they made an attack there. At this time it was quite dark: it was in fact the hour before the dawn. This ruse undoubtedly gained the invaders some time, and as one of those describing it that day, remarked, “saved us many lives.” By the time that the suspicions of the guard were fully aroused, the volunteers and the remaining men of the first three companies of Light Infantry were so close to them that they had only time to fire once and to attempt an escape. The British briskly returned their fire, which wounded Vergor, the captain in charge of the post, and scattered his men, who escaped into a field of Indian corn, with the exception of one man who was taken prisoner.

The advance guard had been instructed, before engaging Vergor's post from the rear, to signal the remainder of the Light Infantry to come to their assistance by attacking it in front, from the direction of the intrenched path. Events moved so rapidly and so successfully with the assailants, however, from the moment that they attained the heights, that they had no need of support, and Major Moncrief, whose valuable journal contains the order given them,

adds to it "but after a little firing, that picket was dispersed by these three companies only."

Just at this time it was the turn of the invaders to experience a surprise. A body of men were seen making their way towards them, as though to cut them off from the rest of the army. It was still so dark that they could neither distinguish their appearance nor their numbers. Prepared as they were for surprises of any kind, in an undertaking so daring as that in which they were engaged, there was no indication of anything approaching to a panic, but on the contrary, the same stout resolve which had animated them in their ascent of the precipice, to sell their lives as dearly as possible, but on no consideration whatever to permit themselves to fall alive into the hands of the enemy. With the accustomed regularity which characterized their movements, they immediately threw themselves into a posture of defence. There was the necessary discipline and coolness that was to have been expected of them, and this, of course, prevented them from firing until quite sure whom they were engaging. So two of them advanced, and as soon as they came close enough, challenged; when, to their inexpressible joy and satisfaction, they were answered in the broad Anglo-Saxon peculiar to the residents of Northern Britain, and learned that the new-comers were Captain Fraser and his detachment of Highlanders. A few Grenadiers had also early pressed their way to the summit of the cliff, and the entire party followed the fleeing guards of Vergor's post, who were still lurking in the adjoining field. The fugitives fled before them, and being vigorously pursued, their lieutenant, his

drummer, and several of the men were taken prisoners. The remainder escaped from the field, passing through the bushes which surmount the cliff, and endeavoured to reach the shelter of the town.

General Wolfe was now in possession of a number of prisoners, from whom he was able to obtain information in regard to the enemy. He also had a clear and undisputed footway for the ascent of the remainder of his troops, as well as uncontested occupation of ground for drawing up his army. The appearance of the advance guard of the Light Infantry seems to have created quite a panic in the captain's post; and the feeble character of the resistance offered by it, or rather, the absence of any reasonable defence at all, attracted comment in both the English and French camps.

A soldier who claims to have been among the first to scale the cliff that eventful morning, writes:—"The opposition made by the guard stationed at the debouchere, or outlet of this important pass, does not deserve to be dignified with that epithet. Had they been disposed to show fight, we should undoubtedly have driven them from the intrenchment, but it would only have been after a serious loss of men. Before five minutes had elapsed from that upon which I set my foot upon the green sward, we were in possession of the works. Happily for my individual safety the little of their wrath which eventually did show itself, was reserved until 20 grenadiers stood on the same platform as myself. Then without waiting for reinforcements, we attacked and dislodged the guard who hardly made any opposition to boast of."

A French officer who kept a journal of the siege of Quebec, in reporting the attack upon Vergor's post, remarks "Our soldiers, thus surprised, scarcely entered into action, but abandoned their post and fled."

In consequence of the small show of resistance offered at this post, and also because of the manner in which those in charge of it suffered themselves to be surprised, some have gone so far as to charge treachery against Vergor. The fact is in their favour that this is not the first occasion upon which such an accusation was made. Some years earlier, it was alleged that he had capitulated at Beausejour without sufficient reason, and though the fort would doubtless have held out much longer if Commandant Vergor had been as good a combatant as LeLoutre, the Canadian priest, who was one of the besieged, yet treachery was never proved against him, and he was honored with an important command in the army at Quebec. His friend Bigot wrote a glowing account of the zeal displayed by him when wounded in defence of his post on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, 1759, but fails to offer any excuse for the manner in which he permitted himself to be surprised on that eventful day. The supposition is that Vergor and most of his men were sleeping when the English advance guard came upon them. Wolfe's information, when he planned the landing at this point was that the post was very negligently guarded, and M. de Foligne, a French naval officer, who commanded one of the principal forts of Quebec during the siege, seems to corroborate this, when he states that Vergor had been placed at this post as a simple matter of a precaution in case of an attack, which

was regarded as impossible at such a precipitous part of the cliff, where it was with the greatest difficulty that one man at a time was able to ascend. Of treachery, in connection with the post on the heights of Quebec, there certainly appears to be some good reason to suspect Vergor, and neither zeal in the execution of his duty, vigilance nor courage can be laid to his account. He seems to have been cast in a very similar mould to that in which his friend, patron, and protector, the Intendant Bigot was fashioned; for if we can believe a contemporary memoir, many of the men of his post were absent from duty at the time of Wolfe's landing, having obtained leave the previous day to go and work on their farm, provided they also worked upon one belonging to Vergor.

The face of the heights has materially changed since the heroic scenes enacted there nearly a century and a half ago, and under ordinary circumstances, the task of describing them as they appeared to Wolfe and his army would be surrounded by many difficulties. There appear to be only two means of viewing them as they presented themselves to the invading forces; either with the assistance of a model made from elevations taken at the time, or with the aid of numerous profiles. <sup>(1)</sup>

When the invading army had been drawn up on the heights above the landing place, facing the north-west, and with its rear towards the St. Lawrence, it found a

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(1) Three topographical plans of the locality are in existence; one made in 1765, one in 1785, and one in 1803. Two of them show the whole of the ground between the city walls and the landing place, and all of them have been consulted for the purposes of the present work.



tolerably clear pathway or open space of land in its front, a growth of forest trees on its left, and occasional clumps of shrubbery and trees in all directions.

Not far to the right was a cornfield extending from about the centre of the Marchmont property to about the centre of the Race Course, enclosed by a rail fence, while patches of the same cereal were still standing upon the other side of the "road from Sillery," now known as St. Louis Road, as far as Mr. Drysdale's house, near the corner of Maple Avenue.

There were no French works on the heights of Quebec on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1759, except the battery which had fired upon the second division of the English boats, from the left, or west of the landing place, in the direction of Sillery.

Many years later, certain ruins, which had been found in the neighbourhood, caused a good deal of confusion in connection with accounts of the movements of Wolfe's army on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September and the ground upon which they occurred, and led to the serious historical blunders committed by Hawkins and others. The contemporary plans now in possession of the authors of this work prove conclusively, however, that the ruins in question were those of works erected by the English, after the battle of the 13<sup>th</sup>.

Having attempted to familiarize the reader with the topography of the ground upon which Wolfe and his army found themselves after the seizure of Vergor's post and the subsequent ascent of the main body of the troops, it is time to direct attention to the battery at Samos, which had opened fire upon some of Wolfe's boats. This battery,

which was situated several hundred feet west of Vergor's post, in the direction of Sillery, consisted of four twenty-four pounders and one thirteen inch mortar, and was protected by a deep gulley, through which flowed a brook, swollen at this particular time by the recent rains, into quite a mountain torrent. Wolfe's first care, after ascending the heights, was to silence this battery. Against it, he dispatched Brigadier Murray, with the 58<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and the Light Infantry under command of Colonel Howe. Two deserters acted as guides. Murray followed them with the 58<sup>th</sup> to the skirt of the woods, where he posted his men across the road leading to the battery. In order to reach the fortified post, it was necessary for the troops to cross the brook. The French thought to flank the invaders, however, and for that purpose had withdrawn a gun from the battery and placed it across the bridge which spanned the ravine. In the meantime, an order came from General Wolfe, who had been reconnoitering for the position of the enemy, for General Murray to rejoin him with the 58<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and for Colonel Howe, with the Light Infantry, to come and cover his rear. The order promptly reached General Murray, who immediately left to support his chief: but the Light Infantry, having already gone forward against the battery, the officer who carried the order followed them thither with a platoon of Grenadiers, and happening upon a short cut got there before them. Upon his approach, the enemy fired the gun on the bridge, accompanying the action with a volley of small arms, which he returned with vigour; and the Light Infantry coming up just at this time, the enemy abandoned their

battery, together with the gun on the bridge, and without offering any further resistance withdrew to the cover of a wood only forty yards distant. The English took possession of the battery without the loss of a single man, and threw the stock of powder found there into the brook. Upon receiving his orders from the General, Colonel Howe immediately returned with his whole command. Being informed that the Battery had been taken, Wolfe sent back a detachment of Light Infantry to keep possession of it, while the remainder were stationed on the St. Foye Road "eight hundred paces from the line."

The army had been but a short time upon the heights when a picket of the battalion of Guienne passed through St Louis Gate and proceeded to the ridge of ground known as "Buttes à Neveu." This picket it appears had been stationed at the camp for the last few days, while the remainder of the Regiment was encamped near the Hornwork.

The English subsequently heard that the whole battalion of Guienne was to have encamped upon this ground the night before the attack, and if this idea had been acted upon, and proper watch kept by the regimental sentries, it may well be doubted whether the bold designs of the British General could have been executed. On the other hand, there is little doubt that Wolfe had definite information, from deserters and others, that no troops were to encamp upon the heights that night, and that but for this, his plans would have been different. Major Moncrief, who kept a journal of the campaign, admits that the battalion deferred its arrival "by some lucky incident," and adds

“some say they were detained by the French General himself, upon receiving intelligence by a deserter that there was a descent to be made that night upon the coast of Beauport.” General Wolfe had ordered such a demonstration by the squadron off the shore of Beauport, as would convey the impression that an immediate, and very severe attack by the ships was impending there. This skillful ruse on the part of the British General to divert the attention of Montcalm from his actual designs, found its counterpart in the clever deception practised by him upon De Bougainville, who commanded the flower of the army. By this means Wolfe succeeded in keeping him out of his way until the battle had been fought and won.

While Wolfe's admirable tactics in ordering the naval feint at Beauport enabled him to form his newly landed troops, without opposition, on the heights of Quebec, he had also frustrated the designs of Bougainville for preventing a landing of the English troops upon the north shore of the St. Lawrence above Quebec. De Bougainville has been bitterly attacked for his failure to accomplish the mission entrusted to him; when, as a matter of fact, he literally carried out his instructions, in which no provisions had been made for such brilliantly conceived and admirably executed tactics, as those so unexpectedly carried out under Wolfe's own directions, on the night of the 12<sup>th</sup>, and the early morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September.

De Bougainville had been detached by Montcalm, with fifteen hundred of his best troops, composed of the French Grenadiers, the volunteers from the French Regiments, and picked men from amongst the Canadians and Indians,

together with a number of small guns, to prevent the landing on the Quebec side of the river, of the army of Wolfe, which had just been reunited in camp at Levis. His particular orders were to strictly follow all Wolfe's movements, by ascending the river when he went up, and descending as he did the same : in short, to be an army of observation, with only the St. Lawrence between him and the English forces. Day and night he had faithfully carried out these instructions. By their continual passing and repassing up and down the river, the English ships above the town, having on board a number of troops, kept De Bougainville and his forces, who were determined not to lose sight of them, constantly upon the march, until they were quite worn out with fatigue and restless vigil. One of Brigadier Townshend's letters describes these movements as having been purposely made " to amuse the enemy." In conjunction with these movements on the part of the ships, there were also frequent marchings and counter-marchings of the English troops on the south shore. The army of observation on the day previous to the British landing, was chiefly stationed at Cap Rouge and along the shore from the Cap Rouge River to prevent Wolfe's forces from landing there, which was then thought to be their design. The mouth of the Cap Rouge river, about eight miles above the city, which seemed to offer special facilities for the landing of a hostile force, was protected by floating batteries. One of the French accounts of the English movements on the afternoon and evening of the 12<sup>th</sup> of September, shows that Wolfe's tactics, including the hasty embarkation of his troops from the south shore, and the

departure of his ships up stream, conveyed the desired impression that he was about to attempt a descent of his army at Pointe-aux-Trembles, whither Bougainville, with the greater part of his command hastened later on to intercept him. It was no fault of the gallant French commander, charged with this duty, that he failed to observe the departure of the English troops for their destined landing place at the Foulon. Admiral Holmes, who was in command of the ships, kept them moored as near as possible to the south shore, and the barges into which the men were lowered from them, were concealed on the south side of the vessels. The night was so dark, that when the boats floated noiselessly down, away from the ships, on the falling tide, they could not be observed from the French lines posted along the north shore. The stars shone brightly enough, but there was no moon light, and the rustle of a strong south-west breeze, conveyed no sound of the movement on the water to the watchers of De Bougainville's command.

As soon as the troops in the flat bottomed boats had got well under way, a number of the ships of Admiral Holme's <sup>(1)</sup> division, moved slowly up the river, eagerly followed by de Bougainville, and in due time reached Pointe aux Trembles. <sup>(2)</sup> Even if de Bougainville had been aware

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
(1) "Admiral Holmes was accounted a very good seaman, and instructed in his profession Lord Hood, famous for his naval achievements. Admiral Holme died at Jamaica in 1761."

*From the Memoirs of an officer.*

(2) "A movement made at the same time and for the purpose of deception, by Admiral Holmes, with the ships under his command up the river, attracted the attention of the French sentinels, and the important flotilla passed unobserved by them."








REFERENCES TO FIGURES

1. Houses occupied by the light infantry.
2. Wolfe's Monument.
3. Quebec Gaol.
4. Parliament buildings.
5. Monument to Wolfe and Montcalm.
6. Ursuline Convent, where Montcalm was buried.
7. Place where 200 Canadians were killed.
8. Position of Borgia's property, from a plan made by Noel Levasseur in 1766.
9. Race Course.
10. Marchmont Property.
11. Landing place of the British army.
12. Third Battalion of Royal Americans sent to preserve communication with the boats, before the commencement of the battle.
13. 4-gun battery Samos.
14. Franciscan Convent.
15. Place where Wolfe was mortally wounded. He was conducted from here to the spot marked by his monument (2).




PLAN OF THE CITY OF QUEBEC.

Showing the positions of the British and French Armies and the advance by each army after the line was formed on the 13th September, 1759.

N.B. The positions on this plan were determined from several manuscript plans of the battle by British Officers during the years 1759 and 1760.





REFERENCE TO LIBRES

of the fact that some of the open boats had drifted from the English ships towards the Foulon, it would still have been his duty to have followed the larger vessels of the fleet in their westward course, <sup>(1)</sup> because he had been particularly warned to keep a strict watch over the movements of the vessels.

It was not until nine o'clock on the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, that the courier met Bougainville who was returning from Pointe aux Trembles, and gave him the tidings that the British had landed at the Foulon.

Bougainville immediately set forth to join the main body of the army.


The fate of Quebec had been decided, however, before it was possible for him to reach the battle-field.

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(1) " He (Montcalm) detached M. de Bougainville, with five companies of grenadiers, two hundred and thirty cavalry, a body of Canadian volunteers and Militia; in the whole, fifteen hundred men, to follow us and watch our motions. This stupid man proceeded along the western bank of the river but not being aware of our retrograde movement on the night of the 12th—13th, he found himself on the day of the battle, so far from the field on which it was fought that his services were lost to the French army for that time and campaign."

" *Memoirs of an Officer of Wolfe's army.*"

(See also *Journal of Foligné & British Magazine, 1760.*)



## CHAPTER VIII.

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### IN THE FRENCH CAMP

THE firing of the French artillery in the four gun battery at Samos and the noise of the small arms were distinctly heard in the camp at Beauport; the south-west wind and the quiet of the early morning hour having favoured the conveyance of the sound. General Montcalm, who had never for a moment imagined the possibility of such a ruse as that by means of which Wolfe had been able to effect a landing in spite of the faithful execution of the orders to De Bougainville, was much disconcerted at the reports of the guns at Samos. Instead of conveying to him the intelligence of the stirring events which were then transpiring, they seemed to notify him of the seizure, by the English, of the boats bringing from Three Rivers or Montreal, the necessary provisions of which his army stood so much in need. De Bougainville had informed him that the boats would be sent down that night, and knowing the number of British ships in the river, both above and below the town, Montcalm was violently agitated all night long, and repeated more than once to Chevalier Johnstone that he trembled lest they should be taken, as he had only two days' means of subsistence for the army.

On board the ships under Admiral Saunders, lying between Quebec and the point of the Isle of Orleans, off the Beauport shore, the discharge of the guns at Samos came as a signal to commence a heavy cannonade upon the intrenchments at Beauport, and to make preparations as if a general descent was to be undertaken. These tactics, for the purpose of diverting the enemy's attention from the real scene of Wolfe's disembarkation, were simply a continuation of those of the previous evening, when in full view of the French camp, the ships approached as close in to the Beauport shore as the shallows would permit, with every available man on board in sight, and showed every possible indication of a projected land attack, either during the night or early in the following morning. Wolfe's instructions were to make this feint as realistic as possible, even though the proper execution of it should involve a slight loss.<sup>(1)</sup> The orders were so faithfully obeyed that there was no rest in the French camp that night, the army spending all the hours from midnight until after daylight, in the trenches. They were ordered there by Montcalm himself, in consequence of the statement made to him about twelve o'clock, by the commander of the Royal Roussillon Regiment, M. Poularies, to the effect that boats had been seen on the water in front of his regiment. The General sent his secretary and aide-de-camp, M. Marcel, to spend the night at the Governor's,—M. de Vaudreuil's,—together with a messenger, whom he was to send back to him with news of anything extraordinary that might occur in that

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(1) *Memoirs of an Officer of Wolfe's army.*

locality ; Vaudreuil having taken up his quarters in the hornwork near the bridge of boats, and on the Beauport side of the St. Charles River, while Montcalm's were some three miles further from the town and about the centre of the camp. Montcalm and Poularies went out and walked with Chevalier Johnstone until one o'clock in the morning, covering the space which intervened between the General's headquarters and the ravine of Beauport ; but seeing no further indication of an immediate British descent upon the shore, notwithstanding the threatened attack from the fleet, Montcalm sent Poularies back to his Regiment, remaining out with Johnstone until after day-break. He was still without any news from Vaudreuil's headquarters ; but had now a clear view of the British camp at Levis, which despite the threatening aspect of those on board of Admiral Saunders' ships, showed no signs of such unusual life and activity, as must have preceded preparations for an embarkation of troops to threaten his own camp. When Wolfe's forces had marched from their camp at Levis, on the previous day, to gain the point where they were to go on board the ships, they were careful to leave their tents standing, in order to deceive the enemy ; and as a matter of fact, Montcalm, in the early morning of the 13<sup>th</sup>, believed that the flower of the English army was still below the town, notwithstanding the continued activity of the fleet. <sup>(1)</sup> Daylight brought him the satisfactory assurance of comparative quiet and inaction at Levis. He therefore grew more composed, and upon the principle that no news is

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(1) Knox's Journal, page 66.

good news, comforted himself with the delusive assurance that if anything unusual had occurred he must have been informed of it, especially as he had stationed a messenger at Vaudreuil's headquarters, for this particular purpose. The watchers in the trenches were therefore ordered back to their tents, and Montcalm, having first refreshed himself with hot tea, retired to his lodging, but not to rest. He was still without satisfactory explanation of the firing at Samos, and the dread that his provisions might have been intercepted, continued to haunt him. Little did he then imagine that his supplies were still in safety above the English fleet, but that the invading army was drawn up upon the heights of Quebec!

As soon as horses had been saddled, Montcalm and Johnstone set out together for the headquarters of Vaudreuil, determined to have some account of the firing that had been heard at daybreak. It was now about six o'clock, and a dull, showery morning. Vaudreuil had already been informed of the landing of the enemy; the first report to reach the French camp being to the effect that about a dozen flat bottomed boats had appeared off the Foulon, and seemed to make a show of disembarking some men there. <sup>(1)</sup> Ill news travel apace, and this first rumor was soon supplemented by the startling intelligence, contained in an official dispatch to Vaudreuil, from the acting-Commandant of the town, M. le Chevalier de Bernetz, that Wolfe's army had indeed landed at the Foulon, and was now marching towards the town, along the road leading

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(1) *Journal of a French Officer*, Vol. IV., p. 254.

from Ste. Foye. Bernetz was a retired Colonel of the Royal Rousillon Regiment, and for a month past had been acting as Commandant of Quebec, in the absence of M. de Ramezay, who was on sick leave. <sup>(1)</sup> When some of the fugitive guards from Vergor's post reached the town, close upon the heels of an orderly sent by Vergor himself, to notify de Bernetz of what had occurred, the acting Commandant sent out a couple of pickets to reconnoitre and to render any assistance, that might be possible in defence of the heights. <sup>(2)</sup> His pickets only advanced to the first ridge of land beyond the town, when they saw that it was too late for them to prevent the landing of the English forces, and immediately withdrew. Messengers were at once dispatched to the camp at Beauport for assistance, bearing official intelligence to Vaudreuil of the position and movements of the invading army. The information was conveyed to him in a note from de Bernetz, which he wrote so hurriedly that he forgot to date it. It was as startling in its nature as could well be imagined. An orderly just arrived from the Foulon, wrote de Bernetz, had that moment apprised him that the enemy had made a descent there, and that it was necessary to send troops there as soon as possible. Vergor's orderly also told him that the enemy was keeping up a sharp fusilade, but as he could not then hear it, he imagined that they must have re-embarked. At that moment, however, the writer learned, he said, that the English were attempting a landing at

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(1) *Memoire of Major Joannes*, Vol. IV., p. 226.

(2) *Journal abrégé d'un aide-de-camp*, Vol. V., p. 295.



Anse des Meres, and that the Lower Town was being attacked. He concluded that the matter was urgent, and that it was impossible to act too promptly.

It is probable that it was the cannonading of Saunder's fleet, in response to the discharge of the guns at Samos, that led de Bernetz to suppose that the enemy was attacking the Lower Town.

Another messenger was dispatched to the General Hospital to convey the same information to de Ramezay, the Governor of the town, who for several days had been a patient at this hospital, of which his sister was the Superioress.

Although barely convalescent, de Ramezay immediately left to resume his command in the town, where we shall again hear from him during the day. Another French officer, the Chevalier de Boishébert, left the Hospital at the same time to join his Regiment at Beauport.

The news from the town carried consternation to the inmates of the General Hospital, who had barely received the message from de Bernetz when they saw for themselves from the windows of their apartments, the British soldiers on the heights near the Ste. Foye Road.

It was to Vaudreuil, as Governor-General of the Colony, that the defence of New France had been intrusted, and it is interesting to see how he comported himself at this critical juncture in the affairs of the country committed to his charge. He had boasted sometime before of the measures which he had taken, and of the resources which he had still in store to ensure the safety of the colony, and to frustrate every possible design of the enemy. Judging

from the zeal and from the tone of assurance and self-satisfaction pervading his letter, the least that might have been expected of him, upon receipt of the startling intelligence from the heights, was that he would have immediately ridden at the head of a detachment of troops, to ascertain for himself the exact position of affairs, especially as his army was large enough to have permitted him to do so without materially weakening the forces at Beauport; and the more so that he had been so signally outwitted, in his much vaunted plans for the prevention of the very thing which had just occurred. He did nothing of the kind, however. In fact he only appeared on the battlefield three or four hours later, when the day was practically lost. <sup>(1)</sup> His apologists are unable to divest him of the responsibility which he shirked upon this occasion, and to transfer it to the shoulders of Montcalm. The latter was unable to take the initiative in anything. He had simply to act under the orders of Vaudreuil, who was supreme in everything, as the hard and fast terms of his commission abundantly show. <sup>(2)</sup> Yet it must not be supposed that Vaudreuil remained absolutely inactive. Not at all. He stirred up others to action from which he himself refrained, requested Montcalm to take a hundred men with him and go to meet the enemy, and then boldly sat down to the brilliant feat of writing a letter to Bougainville! <sup>(3)</sup> The epistle penned by the Governor of the colony at this crisis, while a hostile

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(1) *Memoire of Major Joannes*, Vol. IV., p. 226.

(2) *Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*, Vol. X., p. 395.

(3) *Correspondence of Bougainville*, Vol. IV., page 126.

army was investing his capital, is worthy of perusal. "I have received, Sir," he says, "the letter which you have done me the honour to write me, together with the enclosed deposition of the deserter or prisoner. I have handed it over to M. le Marquis de Montcalm. It seems quite certain that the enemy has landed at l'Anse-au-Foulon. We have set everything in motion. We have heard several little fusilades. M. le Marquis de Montcalm has just left with 100 men belonging to the Government of Three Rivers, as reinforcements. As soon as I know positively what is going on, I will inform you. I anxiously await news from you, and to learn if the enemy has made any attempt against you. I have the honour to wish you good day, at a quarter to seven o'clock. Your messenger will see M. de Montcalm in passing, and may be able to give you later news."

Vaudreuil had made very elaborate preparations on paper, which he claimed that no enemy could frustrate; but when the emergency arose and the foe was at his door, his brilliant tactics consisted in writing a dispatch, and in notifying the commander of his troops of the proximity of the enemy, as soon as he happened to pass that way, requesting him at the same time, to proceed against the invading army with a hundred men!

From the information he had just received, he knew that the English had landed between his own camp and that of Bougainville, and that any dispatch forwarded from one to the other, at that time, was likely to be intercepted. Yet his letter implies his readiness to remain in waiting for information from Bougainville as to the exact condition of

affairs. When he penned him this letter, on the eve of the battle, Vaudreuil supposed him to be at Cap Rouge. Bougainville was not at Cap Rouge, however, <sup>(1)</sup> and Wolfe knew very well that he was not there, and employed the knowledge to good account, as we shall see when we come to consider the disposition he made of his army on the heights of Quebec. Had Bougainville been at Cap Rouge at this time, it could only have been by disobedience of orders. We have seen that his instructions were to follow the course of the English ships and of their troops on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, by ascending and descending along the north shore, opposite to them, keeping a close watch upon them, in order to prevent a landing anywhere upon his side of the river. The English ships, or at least the largest of them, including the "Sutherland," and most of the vessels under Holmes, in their ascent of the St. Lawrence, did not remain at Cap Rouge, but proceeded at an early hour in the morning to the vicinity of Pointe-aux-Trembles, whither Bougainville, as in duty bound, followed them along the shore. At a somewhat later hour the vessels returned and took up their position at the Foulon. A French relation of the siege of Quebec, is authority for the statement that the ships which were being watched by Bougainville were moored at night opposite St. Augustin, which is fifteen miles above the town, in order to deceive him. M. de Foligné, a naval officer who commanded one of the principal batteries of

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(1) *Relation du Siège de Québec*, Vol. V., p. 322 (foot note).

See also the *Journal de Foligné*, Vol. IV., p. 203, and the *Journal of the Particular Transactions of the Siege*, Vol. V., p. 189.

the town during the siege, is very precise on this point ; stating that Bougainville followed the ships from St. Augustin to Pointe-aux-Trembles, towards which they drew him with all his forces. The Memoir on the siege of Quebec by M. de Joannès omits mention of the place where the ships moored and made the feint of a descent, but records the fact that they kept the French army of observation fully engaged by their pretended preparations for disembarkation ; and in the *Memoirs of an Officer* it is stated that a movement was made by Admiral Holmes with his ships to deceive the French, and that in the meantime the troops passed unobserved. <sup>(1)</sup>

Bougainville himself tells us that he only learned of the landing of the English army at the Foulon, at nine o'clock, and Joannès is authority for the statement that the intelligence was given him by French fugitives, probably some of those who had fled from Samos. It was therefore impossible for him to have reached the heights of Quebec, in time to render any assistance in the battle which was virtually decided before eleven o'clock. According to Major Moncrief's journal, Bougainville's approach was observed from the battlefield between twelve and one o'clock.

It is a simple fact of justice to the memory of Bougainville to point out that in following the English ships to so great a distance from the town, he was not only carrying out the instructions already referred to, but obeying the reiterated orders of Vaudreuil and Montcalm. Vaudreuil

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(1) See also note to the preceding chapter on this incident.

wrote him on the 30<sup>th</sup> of August to watch Cap Santé, for fear the English take the heights there and dominate the post at Jacques Cartier. On September the 1<sup>st</sup>, Montcalm wrote: "Take care of Jacques Cartier and Deschambault," and Montreuil, writing on the same day, says that he is instructed by Montcalm to remind him that Pointe-aux-Trembles and St. Augustin are most important points. Vaudreuil wrote Bougainville on the 8<sup>th</sup> of September that the enemy must have one of two objects, either to divert attention or to land and establish themselves higher up the river. Cadet, writing him on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September, speaks of the fear that the English may land above Cap Rouge, and Montcalm wrote him on the 10<sup>th</sup>, to take care of Deschambault. Cap Santé, Deschambault and the French post at the mouth of the Jacques Cartier are all higher up the river than Pointe-aux-Trembles, and many other passages might be cited from the correspondence of Bougainville <sup>(1)</sup> to show that Vaudreuil and Montcalm, as well as Bougainville himself, dreaded a British descent upon the north shore of the St. Lawrence, at some point above Cap Rouge.

The inaccessibility of some of the journals hitherto unpublished has resulted in the commission of the errors that might have been expected from the employment of incomplete data. The memory of Bougainville has unwittingly been made to suffer in consequence, principally because it was erroneously supposed that he had followed the English ships no further up the river than Cap Rouge,

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(1) See *Correspondence of Bougainville* in Vol. IV of the present work.

during the night of the 12<sup>th</sup> to the 13<sup>th</sup> of September. He has, therefore, not unnaturally, been the subject of much severe, though unmerited censure, for the time occupied in returning to the heights of Quebec, whereas the documents now for the first time brought to light show that he faithfully performed his duty and executed the orders of his superiors in every particular.

It is time, however, that we should return to the French camp at Beauport, where we left Montcalm, hurrying on horseback to Vaudreuil's headquarters, to learn the cause and the other particular of the firing that had been heard upon the heights at day-light.

Vaudreuil had been in so little hurry to notify Montcalm of the important intelligence which had reached him from the city, that, according to Johnstone, the first information the General had of the presence of the British upon the heights, was the appearance of some of them upon the high land above the valley of the St. Charles, plainly visible to him as he approached, with Johnstone, the headquarters of the Governor, near the bridge of boats. Bigot, on the other hand, claims that Vaudreuil had learned of the British landing at the break of day, and had sent to notify Montcalm. The latter, however, seems to have had no intimation of the fact at the time that he set out to ride over to Vaudreuil's headquarters, for he left for the express purpose of ascertaining the cause of the firing some time before. Be this as it may, there was no leisure for parley when the Governor and the General met at half-past six that morning, opposite the former's headquarters. There was a hurried decision on Montcalm's part to hasten with

whatever men were at hand to meet the enemy, and on the part of Vaudreuil to remain with the reserves in charge of the camp. While the Commander hurriedly gave a few necessary orders, dispatching in front of him whatever troops were in readiness, the Governor retired to the shelter of his headquarters, to write the dispatch to Bougainville, which we have already seen.

Two pickets of the Regiment of Guienne constituted the first detachment sent to the heights when intimation of the English landing reached the camp. They were ordered to Côte d'Abraham, to reconnoitre and to secure the road leading from the camp to the heights, and were followed half an hour later by the main body of the Regiment, which had been encamped at the hornwork, close to the bridge of boats over the St. Charles, and was therefore the nearest force to the heights.

Montcalm lost no time in sounding the *générale*—or call to arms—and in ordering one picket from each battalion in camp, and six hundred men of “the government of Montreal,” to be immediately dispatched to the heights.

The general alarm called out from their tents the fatigued forces which had been ordered there scarcely an hour before, after their long night watch in the entrenchments.

Upon learning that the English had gained the heights, Montcalm was completely thunderstruck. The ascent at the Foulon had presented difficulties of such magnitude that he had believed them unsurmountable. Vaudreuil seemed to share the same belief, frequently writing to Bougainville that he considered the post at this point



sufficiently strong, and urging upon that officer the necessity of carefully watching the points higher up the river. It is true that there were no works of defence whatever upon the heights, either at the Foulon or between it and the town. These had apparently been deemed unnecessary by the Governor; and Montcalm, observing the confidence of Vaudreuil, in regard to the posts situated there, depended upon the watchfulness of the guards at Vergor's to prevent any surprise at that point.

Bitterly deceived in his expectations, the news of Wolfe's landing at the Foulon gave him cause to anticipate a simultaneous attack upon the lower and upper town of Quebec, by the combined fleet and army of the enemy; an attack which could only be prevented by an immediate battle upon the heights, for which he proceeded to make preparations. Varied versions of the manner in which he expressed himself, upon learning where the English army was encamped, are given. "*Oui, je les vois où ils ne doivent pas être*;"—"Yes, I see them where they should not be";—and "*S'il faut donc combattre, je vais les écraser*";—"If it is necessary then to fight, I am going to crush them";—are amongst the sayings attributed to him at this time. Another story quotes him thus: "They have at last got to the weak side of this miserable garrison; therefore we must endeavor to crush them with our numbers." How he was handicapped in this design, from a quarter where he had reason to expect assistance and support, will soon be seen.

Turning to Chevalier Johnstone, Montcalm remarked upon the seriousness of the outlook, and instructed him to

proceed with all possible speed to Poularies, who was at the ravine of Beauport, telling him to remain there with two hundred men, but to send him all the remaining force from the left wing of the camp. Johnstone delivered the orders to Poularies, who asked him to repeat them to him, in presence of Brigadier-General de Sennezergue, Lieutenant-Colonel of the La Sarre Regiment, and in the hearing of de Lotbiniere, Captain of the troops of the colony and Aide-de-camp to M. de Vaudreuil, who had just handed him an order from the Governor, which was in flat contradiction to that of the General. Poularies then produced the order, signed "Montreuil," which de Lotbiniere had brought him from Vaudreuil, instructing him that not a man of the left was to stir from camp. Johnstone declared upon his honour to all present, that he had given the General's orders word for word, and entreated Poularies, in the most pressing manner, to pay no attention to those of the Governor, since the want of the two thousand men which composed the left of the camp, would be of the utmost consequence to the Marquis de Montcalm. M. de Sennezergue, who is described as an officer of the greatest worth and honour, and who fell mortally wounded a few hours later, told Johnstone that he should take it upon himself to march off the whole of the left, immediately. Johnstone replied that he was simply the bearer of the orders and could not assume any further authority in the matter; adding, that if he were a Brigadier, and in M. de Sennezergue's place, and therefore, in the absence of General de Levis the next in command of the army, he would not hesitate a moment to order the left to march, without

regard whatsoever to any order that might be hurtful to the King's service, at so critical a juncture. Johnstone states that he left them still irresolute and doubtful how to act, when he put spurs to his horse to rejoin Montcalm, who, by this time, had ascended to the heights, closely following the troops which he had already ordered there, and heading more, with instructions left behind him to be followed by the balance of the men from Three Rivers, one hundred of those of Quebec, as well as the Regiment of La Sarre and four hundred men of M. Leborgne. Two minutes later, another order was received, calling upon Bearn's Regiment to march.

In the interim, Montcalm, at the bridge of boats, had met the Sieur de Boishebert, a captain in the army, Chevalier of St. Louis, and formerly commandant both in Acadia and also at Detroit. He was a most intrepid officer, and enjoyed the thorough confidence of his superiors. At one time he had burned an English ship. At another he set fire to a fort on the River St. John, rather than permit it to fall into the hands of the enemy. When he arrived at Quebec from Acadia on the 19<sup>th</sup> July 1759, he had brought a hundred men with him to reinforce Montcalm. He had just come from the General Hospital, where he had been laid up with a severe illness caused by the excess and the continuity of the fatigues he had endured during the four preceding years. In addition to his other commands, Boishebert was captain of a company of Marine troops, which he was hurrying to join, in consequence of what he had observed that morning from the windows of the Hospital. Looking thence, in the direction of Ste. Foye

road, he had seen the English forces on the crest of the cliff, facing the Hospital, between what is now Maple Avenue and Claire Fontaine Streets. From the unusual activity displayed by the troops, and from the hurried movements and desultory firing of a number of Canadian riflemen, he knew that some important military manoeuvre was in progress.


Montcalm hastily questioned him as to the position of the enemy, and Boishebert reported what he had himself observed from the windows of the Hospital and was instructed by the General to hasten on to Beauport and to see that all the remaining troops were promptly hurried to his assistance.


The threatening action of Admiral Saunders' fleet in front of his camp had at first determined Montcalm to leave a large force behind him with Vaudreuil. He had now become convinced that there was less danger of an immediate and serious descent of the English at Beauport, for it was low tide, and the shallows extended far out from the shore. He must have argued, too, that Wolfe would require all his available strength for such a movement as was in progress above the town, that the continued activity of the ships might as well precede an attack upon the town as on the camp at Beauport, and that the balance of his own troops were likely to prove more necessary as well as more useful in opposing the evident design of Wolfe upon the heights, than in awaiting a problematical assault upon the intrenchments beyond the St. Charles.

The Regiment of Bearn had barely started on its march, when Montcalm was met returning from Côte d'Abraham.

He reported that the English were drawn up in battle array on the heights, and that he had come to see that the Royal Roussillon Regiment and other troops of which he had need were immediately marched along the route taken by the first part of the army to reach the plateau nearest the town. His return at such a time, upon a mission which ordinarily might be entrusted to an Aide-de-camp, illustrates the anxiety which he experienced as to the immediate following up of his instructions. That this anxiety was by no means unnecessary, is shown by the order of Vaudreuil to retain in camp some of the troops which Montcalm had instructed to march. Perhaps it was Johnston's report to him of this strange action on the part of the Governor, which had decided him to ride back to the camp. We shall see later how Vaudreuil's efforts to thwart the endeavours of the Commander of his forces that day, were made to prevail. One would have supposed that the startling character of the information from the heights, which had reached the camp from both Boishebert and the General himself, would have induced Vaudreuil to set out immediately to rejoin Montcalm, with all his available troops. It had no such effect however. Vaudreuil remained in camp until too late to be of any service to his country's cause, only arriving upon the battlefield when the issue of the struggle had been decided, and when the battle that was to seal the fate of New France had resulted disastrously to the cause of France and the King.

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## CHAPTER IX.

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### IN BATTLE ARRAY

WHEN Wolfe, after gaining the heights and ordering the capture of the four-gun battery at Samos, set out to reconnoître for the position of the enemy, he immediately crossed over to the Ste. Foye road to take in the situation, being already quite familiar with the ground, from the plans furnished him some time before by the chief engineer of his army. It was now daylight. His eye swept the valley of the St. Charles: all was quiet. Viewing the ground between his own army and the city, his range of vision could take in the ridge which spanned the plateau at a distance of about half a mile from the walls of the city. To gain this ridge and take possession of it would be quite a simple task; but the opportunity which the situation appeared at first sight to offer him, was one that it was impossible for him to seriously contemplate, since many drawbacks far outweighed its apparent advantages. It was too close to the town, too well within the range of its guns, which could readily sweep him from such a position, and destroy all his plans. He therefore quickly decided that the heights known as the Buttes-à-Neveu were impracticable as a site for the formation of his army in line of battle.



In front of this ridge, and on the right from his point of observation, there was a fair eminence, fifty or sixty feet higher than any ground in his vicinity. It was well towards the right of the plateau, and only about five hundred yards from the ridge. On the left of the plateau, opposite the eminence, he observed a house on the Ste. Foye road, near the foot of what is now Maple Avenue. This was the most westerly of a few scattered houses between the limits now marked by Claire Fontaine Street and Maple Avenue. Here then were two strategic positions, which would enable him to command the entire width of the plateau. The first mentioned was about as near to the valley of the St. Lawrence as the other was to that of the St. Charles.

This determined his choice, and he at once returned to his army, marched across the open ground between the landing place and the Ste. Foye road, wheeled to the right, and followed along the road from Ste. Foye, until he came to the house already referred to, which was owned by one Borgia, and had been taken possession of by a detachment of Grenadiers, ordered some time previously to advance upon it for that purpose. Detachments of the Light Infantry were thrown into this house and into two others nearer to De Salaberry street, on the Ste. Foye road, which had also been seized. A party of sharpshooters was seen about a copse some distance in front of them. Once more Wolfe wheeled to the right, this time as far as the rising ground overlooking the St. Lawrence, which he had observed from his reconaissance on the Ste. Foye road. Thus was formed his first line of battle, immediately in front of the

eminence upon which now stands the Quebec gaol. Quebec was then to the eastward of the English line, in its front, with the enemy assembling and forming up under the walls of the town. The English right was flanked by the declivity which sloped away down to the St. Lawrence, while the River and Valley of the St. Charles, and the rising ground behind them, sloping up to the foothills of Charlesbourg, and thence to the Laurentian Mountains, were on their left.


The first disposition of Wolfe's forces upon the actual battlefield, showed them drawn up in single line, in the following order: "Grenadiers of Louisbourg on the right, Forty-Seventh Regiment on the left; Twenty-Eight Regiment on the right, and Forty-Third on the left; part of the Light Infantry took post in the houses at Sillery, and the remainder occupied a chain of houses which were opportunely situated for the purpose, and covered our left flank, inclining towards our rear". Thus, commencing at the extreme right of the first formed British line, were the Louisbourg Grenadiers, after which came the Twenty-Eighth, the Forty-Third, and the Forty-Seventh, in the order named. The disposition of the troops, thus formed, was varied shortly afterwards, subsequent to the arrival of reinforcements from the south shore by way of the landing at the Foulon, and upon the return of Brigadier Murray with the Fifty-Eighth, and of Colonel Howe with the Light Infantry, from the capture of the four-gun battery at Samos. The Forty-Eight Regiment, (Webb's), and the Second Battalion of the Royal Americans were the last of the troops to join the army, with Brigadier

Townshend, who had been attending to their disembarkation.

The situation of the final line of battle differed but little from the first, though the formation was considerably changed. Both its position and formation are plainly shown upon the plan of the siege made by three officers of Wolfe's army, and also upon the plan of Modern Quebec, which accompany the present work.

Prior to the arrival of the last of these reinforcements, some of the Canadian troops which had first appeared upon the field, and were moving about under the walls of the city, had endeavored to slip around the declivity between the British right and the St. Lawrence. The movement was quickly observed by Wolfe, who advanced some platoons from the Louisbourg Grenadiers and the Twenty-eighth Regiment to the small rising ground on his right, to intercept it, and as soon as Otway's Regiment,—the Thirty-fifth,—came up, he further strengthened his right by extending that battalion between the Grenadiers and the precipice sloping towards the river, and to form part of a second line upon the right. The Fifteenth—Amherst's,—which had arrived at the same time, was ordered to form part of a second line on the left, which was filled in by two battalions of the Sixtieth Regiment. The left of the first line was completed by the addition of the Seventy-eighth,—Highlanders,—and the Fifty-eighth, Anstruther's. The entire formation was then as follows : first line, commencing on the right near the summit of the cliff overlooking the St. Lawrence, — Thirty-fifth,—arranged in a circular form on the slope of the hill,—


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followed towards the left by the Grenadiers, the Twenty-eight,—Bragg's,—the Forty-third,—Kennedy's,—forming the centre, the Forty-seventh—Lascelle's,— the Highlanders, Anstruther's and Amherst's. Some of the enemy having shown an intention of flanking the British left, General Townshend, who had been detained at the landing place, formed the last named Regiment *en potence*, that is to say, caused it to face in two directions, one at right angles to the other.

General Wolfe, with Brigadiers Monckton and Murray commanded the first line, Monckton to the right, while Murray at first commanded the left. When Brigadier Townshend took charge of the left, he stationed himself on the Ste. Foye Road, in charge of two battalions of the Sixtieth, in addition to the Regiment which he had formed *en potence*, and General Murray moved to the centre of the line. Colonel Howe's Light Infantry and the Forty-eighth Regiment under Colonel Burton, were drawn up in eight sub-divisions as a reserve.

The different corps were commanded as follows : Thirty-fifth by Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Louisbourg Grenadiers by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Twenty-eight by Colonel Hunt Walsh, Forty-third by Major Elliot, Forty-seventh by Lieutenant-Colonel Hale, Seventy-eighth by Captain Campbell, Fifty-eight by Major Agnew, Fifteenth by Major Irving. It has already been stated that Colonel Howe commanded the Light Infantry, and Colonel Burton the Forty-eighth, which formed the reserve. The second Battalion of Royal Americans, which covered a portion of the rear of the line of battle, to the left, was commanded



by Captain Oswald, and the third Battalion, which was sent by Wolfe early in the day to cover the landing place, was in charge of Colonel Young.

The strength of the army landed by Wolfe and Townshend at the Foulon, and conducted up the heights, on the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, including those held as a reserve, and the battalions covering the rear and maintaining communication with the landing place, as well as those forming the real line of battle, was 4,829 of all ranks, including general officers, etc. The general officers were one Major-General, three Brigadiers-General, one Quartermaster-General, one assistant Quartermaster-General, one Adjutant-General, four Brigade Majors, and two Aides-de-Camp. Deducting these from the total force, under Wolfe we have 4,816, divided among the different regiments as follows: Thirty-fifth, total of all ranks 519; Louisbourg Grenadiers, 241; Twenty-eight, 421; Forty-third, 327; Forty-seventh, 360; Seventy-eight, 662; Fifty-eight, 335; Fifteenth, 406; Forty-eight, 683; Second Battalion, (Monckton's), of the Sixtieth, (Royal Americans), 322; Third Battalion, do, (Laurence's), 540.

Early in the morning, Wolfe sent the Third Battalion of the Royal Americans, numbering 540 men, to preserve communication with the boats at the landing place. These men were therefore not in the engagement. Only the first line of those drawn up in order of battle played any part in the fight that day viz. three thousand one hundred and eleven men. This was the force that stood the shock of battle against Montcalm's army. The exact strength of the army that fought and won the battle of the Plains of

Abraham, on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, 1759, has never before been satisfactorily established. It amounted to 3,111 of all ranks. The balance of the British forces that stood upon the heights that day, has already been accounted for. The General had detached 172 of the Light Infantry for two distinct missions. Part of this force was ordered to Samos, to hold the four-gun battery, taken earlier in the morning: a very wise precaution, as we shall see later on, when something else happened there. The other mission upon which Light Infantry were employed, was the garrisoning of Borgia's and the other houses on the Ste. Foye road. The Second Battalion of Royal Americans, numbering 322 men, and the Forty-eight, numbering 683, were stationed some distance in the rear of the line of battle, as a reserve force. Adding the figures of their full strength on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, to those of the Third Battalion of Royal Americans, stationed at Samos, and of the Light Infantry ordered elsewhere by the General, we have a total of 1,717, which subtracted from the entire force on the Heights, of 4,829, leaves the strength of the fighting line, as already given, namely 3,111 of all ranks. This corresponds exactly, too, with the number of the combatants on the British side that day as shown in the notes to the very valuable coloured plan of the battle, prepared at the time, and known as the King's Map. In the chapter on the battle itself, we shall see that the reserve forces of the army took no part in the engagement.

There is abundant testimony to prove that the entire force on every part of the heights, under Wolfe's command that day, did not exceed 4,829. Wolfe's own statement is

of course the best that can be had in this connection. Writing to Pitt on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September, of the proposal to land his troops above Quebec, he speaks of "conveying up a corps of four or five thousand men, which is nearly the whole strength of the army, after the points of Levis and Orleans are left in a proper state of defence." Still more definite in the British General's letter to Brigadier Townshend, written on board the Sutherland at half past eight o'clock on the night before the battle, after the whole of the troops that were to float down the river with the tide, in the flat bottomed boats, had been taken on the fleet. He referred to the fact that 3,600 men were then "in the fleet," and he had ordered that 1,200 more were to be sent across from Levis and disembarked by Townshend.

Wolfe's embarkation statement, made on board the Neptune while on his way from Louisbourg to Quebec, states that he had 8,535 men with him. <sup>(1)</sup> A return dated on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September shows the number of killed, wounded and missing in the army at Quebec to that date, was 854, thus reducing his effective force to 7,781. On the day of the battle, Colonel Scott had 1,600 Rangers and others away with him, burning those parts of the surrounding country where the inhabitants persisted in acts of hostility. <sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) 100 men joined at Bird Island on the 9th making 8,635.

(2) In connection with the contention that this burning of houses and devastation of the country by the British was confined to localities where the inhabitants, in defiance of Wolfe's proclamation, had taken sides with the French and been guilty of hostile acts, it is interesting to note that "as the inhabitants of St. Nicholas had not attempted to disturb our (the British) troops, either at landing or when on shore, their houses and effects were left untouched." Vol. IV, page 290.

Eight hundred men had been left behind by him on the south shore to look after the camp at Levis and the other posts, and over 550 on the Isle of Orleans. It will therefore be seen that Wolfe could not possibly have had many more than 4,800 men with him on all the heights above the cliff on the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, and of these, over 1,700 took no part in the battle, which, as already shown, was fought and won by 3,111, of all ranks.

The small number of men composing Wolfe's line of battle and the wide space of ground over which it was necessary to extend them in order to properly secure the flanks, which were constantly menaced by the enemy's sharpshooters, only permitted the General to draw it up two deep. The files were at least three feet apart, and there were forty yards or more in the intervals between the battalions. <sup>(1)</sup> It was indeed a very thin red line, but those who composed it were no mere feather bed soldiers. They were inured to all the perils of Indian warfare, as well as to those that threatened them from an enemy skilled in military science, and fighting upon its own ground. They minimized danger to such an extent as even to derive some comfort from the very lightness of their line, by congratulating themselves upon the fact that the enemy's fire must have little effect upon so thin and straggling a column as they were able to present to the enemy's front.

While the British General was drawing up his army in line of battle, his gallant rival, Montcalm, was hastily concentrating the French forces from the camp at Beau-

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(1) See Vol. V, page 107.

port, preparing them for the coming struggle, and endeavouring, in vain, to obtain the necessary munitions of war from the town behind him, and the reinforcements which he had ordered from the camp on the other side of the St. Charles.

In his anxiety to engage Montcalm in battle, Wolfe endeavoured to conceal as much as possible of the small army accompanying him, and with this object in view, as well as to protect it from the Indians and Canadian riflemen, who under cover of a light wood kept up an incessant fire upon it, he ordered the men of his right wing to lie flat down upon the ground, where the inequalities of its surface, then, as now, existing in front of the eminence upon which the Quebec Gaol is situated, served them for cover. This fact alone, which is reported by several contemporary journals, is sufficient to show that the first formed line of British troops could not have been further from the city than the eminence west of this uneven land. In this position, the troops which were on the right of the field remained for some time, and it is stated that the French, even to the last moment before their advance commenced, were deceived as to the strength of Wolfe's army.

Long before Montcalm's army appeared in sight and even before a good part of it had reached the heights, the British were much harassed by the fire of some of the soldiers of the colony and Indian allies, who were disposed both as flanking parties upon their two wings, and also in a brush wood where the Franciscan church now stands, and in a cornfield opposite the present Athletic Grounds. A

little later on we shall see that quite a scuffle occurred between these irregulars and some of the opposing force, before the engagement became general.

When the entire front line of Wolfe's army was fully formed, it was after eight o'clock. Montcalm made his appearance upon the heights near the walls of the city, coming by way of Cote d'Abraham, between seven and eight o'clock, <sup>(1)</sup> at the head of the Regiments of la Sarre, Languedoc and Bearn. The Regiment of Guienne, which was first on the field, <sup>(2)</sup> had extended itself near the city, but facing the enemy, to await the arrival and further orders of the General, having seen, as soon as it had gained the plateau in the early morn, that it was too late to prevent the landing and ascent of the British troops. Two pickets of the Royal Roussillon had joined it. Montcalm commenced the formation of his troops in order of battle as soon as he had reached the ground, adding to the column as fresh troops arrived. The militia of Quebec and Three Rivers, and 400 Canadians belonging to the Colonial soldiery, commanded by M. le Borgne, Captain of the Marine Troops, <sup>(3)</sup> followed the other Regiments of the field of the battle.

The French General formed up his troops as far as the nature of the ground would permit, about four hundred yards from the walls of the city, near the present St. Augustin Street, at the western side of the Parliament Build-

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(1) *Journal de Foligné*, Vol. IV. p. 204.

(2) *Journal abrégé d'un aide-de-camp*. Vol. V. p. 295.

(3) *Journal des Campagnes au Canada*, (Malartic) p. 284.

ings. The Regiment of Guienne was well to the left, and had on its right the Languedoc Regiment which made its appearance about eight o'clock, the interval between them being filled before nine o'clock by the Regiment of Bearn.<sup>(1)</sup> The detachment of the Royal Roussillon and the troops from Montreal and Three Rivers were on the left of the Guienne Regiment, that is to say they were between it and the St. Lawrence. All the other forces were on the right of la Guienne. The army was too much restricted here, by want of space, to form up in battle array, having on its right a copse, or growth of underbrush, which covered a good portion of the ground between the present St. Louis and Ste. Foye roads, and extended from a distance of two or three hundred feet from the city walls, very nearly to the ridge running across the St. Louis road, then known as the Buttes à Neveu and now as Perrault's Hill. Montcalm was so cramped for room by these clumps of small trees that it was necessary to form his men in column. He had much on his mind at this time. The balance of the troops which he had ordered to have sent after him from Beauport had not arrived, and a demand which he had made upon the Commandant of the town, for cannon to use against the enemy, was almost entirely ignored. He had intended to endeavour to compel Wolfe to retire by a cannonade.<sup>(1)</sup> Consequently, he had sent several persons, with orders to M. de Ramezay, the Commandant, to send him with all possible speed, the twenty-five brass field pieces which were in position on the

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(1) *Malartic's Journal*, page 284.

Palace Battery. Ramezay had sent him three guns, and refused to give him others, saying that he had his town to defend and could not spare any more. The refusal appears exceedingly unreasonable, when it is borne in mind that there were about two hundred cannon at that time in the city, most of them twenty-four and thirty-six pounders, while the small field pieces asked by the General were only two and three pounders. It was certainly strange to see the Commander of the forces refused the necessary munitions of war upon such a flimsy excuse as that given by de Ramezay, since the safety of the town depended principally upon the success of the army which covered and defended it.

About the same time that he met with this refusal from de Ramezay, Montcalm received through the Chevalier Johnstone, an intimation that Vaudreuil had countermanded his order for the troops from the left of the camp at Montmorency. It was a trying moment, and the General felt its responsibilities so keenly, that he invited others to share them. He assembled, immediately, a hurried council of war, composed of all the commanding officers of the several regiments, to hear their opinion as to what was to be done. Some of them pointed out that the British were busy throwing up breastworks. Others expressed the fear that they would descend to the valley and seize the bridge of boats on the St. Charles river, with the hornwork, for the purpose of cutting the communication between the army on the heights, and the left wing detained at Beauport by Vaudreuil. Others, again, not knowing that Wolfe had no more men to land, urged a



prompt advance on the ground that his army would be constantly reinforced as long as the attack was delayed. Not a single individual, it appears, spoke or voted against an immediate attack, and Montcalm having listened attentively to the opinions expressed, without opening his mouth, now remarked that the next question that arose was how the enemy was to be assailed. Montreuil, who claimed after Montcalm's death, that he had told him he was not in a position to attack the British army at all, is quoted by Johnstone as advising an attack in column, which Montcalm showed to be impracticable. Montreuil was a brave officer who had served with ability and zeal under Baron Dieskau as Adjutant-General. He was with him when he was wounded and endeavoured to staunch his wounds, but was ordered by him to take charge of the army and leave him. The Baron subsequently defended Montreuil from the charge of having deserted him. Montreuil played an important part in both battles of the Plains, and also wrote an account of the French campaigns in America from 1754 to 1758. He was a steadfast adherent of Vaudreuil, and, like him, a severe critic of the policy of Montcalm.

In the space between the two armies, at nine o'clock in the morning, there were a few clumps of high brush, apart from the underbrush on the right of the French. Under cover of these skirmishing was warmly kept up on both sides while the two armies were preparing for battle. There was soon to be a good deal of powder burned, but few, if any, of the belligerents received their baptism of fire that day, for both old and young, who were capable

of bearing arms, had already seen some service in this campaign.

Montcalm had not been long upon the field when he advanced a party of some 1,500 Canadians and Indians through the copse at his right, into a wood which partly commanded the position occupied by a portion of the British left on the St. Foye road. This wood extended on both sides of that road from what is now the foot of Claire Fontaine Street to within a short distance of the present site of De Salaberry Street. It had for some time formed a cover for some of the Canadian sharpshooters who were early on the field, and who had considerably harassed the opposing British line.

Shortly after nine o'clock, "the two armies moved a little nearer to each other." As the French made their appearance in columns, on the face of the ridge known as the Buttes-à-Neveu, and saw that the British were also making a short advance, they sent forward several skirmishing parties against the foe, and the British did the same. The French skirmishers against the British right and centre advanced under cover of a series of small hillocks and clumps of shrubbery, until they reached a field of corn opposite the right wing, which stood just below the site of No. 2 Martello tower, and a coppice that stood opposite the centre, inclining to the British left. The fire of these sharpshooters galled the British very much, until Colonel Hale, by Brigadier Monckton's orders, advanced some platoons from the Forty-seventh Regiment, which after a few rounds compelled them to retire.

The British had by this time two pieces of short brass

six pounders playing against the enemy, only one of which could be placed in working order for some time. Most of the contemporary authors of journals do not refer to the second at all. This small piece did such good work, "was so well served", as the chroniclers of that time say, that it is worth while to mention the name of the gallant gunner. It was Captain York. These brass cannon had been dragged up the hill from the Foulon. They were much smaller than those captured earlier in the morning at Samos, by the British which were spiked before the French fled from the battery. The brass gun threw the enemy into such confusion while on the crest of the Buttes-à-Neveu, that they were compelled to change their formation, and it interfered with them very materially while they were being drawn up in line of battle.

The French had a number of field guns in use at this time, some of which had been brought up from the St. Charles, while three had been sent out from the town by the Chevalier de Ramezay.

Montcalm was unable to place his army in battle array, while hemmed in by the wood on his right which extended almost to Claire Fontaine Street, and as we have seen, as soon as he reached that open space and proceeded to extend his columns into the line of battle, he was much incommoded by the fire of the British cannon and sharpshooters.

The five French Regiments of the line formed the main portion of Montcalm's army. That of La Sarre was at the right of his line, and then, in order, came those of Languedoc, Bearn, Guienne, and Royal Roussillon. To the right of the French Regiments, were stationed the troops

of the Quebec Colony, while on their left, beyond the Royal Roussillon, the militia of Montreal and Three Rivers were posted. The somewhat motley appearance of these Colonial troops, though it by no means detracted from the efficiency of their service, contrasted strangely with the trimly uniformed ranks of the French Infantry, soiled and well-worn as were their light grey coats and breeches, white linen gaiters or long coloured stockings. The chief distinguishing marks in the uniforms of these five regiments, consisted in the color of the facings and buttons, the cut of the coat pocket, etc. All wore the usual small black, three-cornered hat, trimmed with yellow, below which protruded their white powdered queues. The then regulation colour of the collar and facings of the Royal Roussillon, La Sarre and Languedoc Regiments was blue, the vest red with white facings and yellow buttons; while Bearn and Guienne had red instead of blue coat facings and collar. The coats were unlined, but the vests had sleeves, and all wore black stocks fastened behind the neck with a buckle, and trimmed with red and yellow buttons. The armament of these famous regiments that day would appear as strange now as their uniforms. The Captains and higher officers carried espontons or half-pikes, eight to nine feet long, except the Grenadiers, who carried guns. Lieutenants and other subalterns bore guns and bayonets, and cartouches on the front of their sword belts. The sergeants carried halberds and the privates, guns, swords and bayonets.

Some of the regiments drawn up by Montcalm in battle array, on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September were amongst the oldest

and most famous of the French Infantry. It was not till the year 1569 that Colonel Strozzi, at the camp of Rochefoucauld, created after the model of the Spanish *tercios*, the first Infantry regiments of France, — the Gardes Françaises, and the Regiments of Picardy, of Champagne and of Piedmont. Prior to that date, the French Infantry consisted of simple bands or companies, more or less accidentally grouped together, under command of a superior chief. Twenty-six years later, namely in 1595, the Regiment of Bearn was established. Headed by the white cross which divided its colors into quarters of alternate orange and red, it had been placed by Montcalm in the very centre of his line. Its past record, both in Europe and America, warranted the confidence reposed in it by the General. For four years and a quarter it had been on active service wherever the struggle between the subjects of England and France in America had waxed the warmest. It landed at Quebec in June 1755, together with the Regiment of Guienne and the companies of the Languedoc battalion which had been fortunate enough to escape capture by the British fleet in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. It had now a record for good work performed in widely separated points of New England and New France, having served with distinction at Fort Frontenac, Niagara, Oswego, Carillon, Fort William-Henry and Ticonderoga. In 1757, the Regiment of Bearn shared with that of Guienne the honour of receiving at the hands of General Montcalm, new colours, for which he had previously sent the necessary request to the Department of War at Paris. Its commanding officer at this time was Dalquier, the gallant

soldier, who was destined to play so brilliant a part, though seriously wounded, in the winning of de Levis, victory of 1760 on the Plains. His predecessor in the command was Colonel Hurault de l'Hôpital. In the fight at Ticonderoga on the 8<sup>th</sup> of July, 1758, the Battalion had lost two of its officers, in the persons of Lieutenant Pons and Ensign Douay.

On Christmas eve, 1758, while a detachment of this regiment was at Carillon, 150 English colonial troops appeared in front of the fort, with the evident intention of burning it. As the guns of the fort kept them at a respectful distance, the invaders contented themselves with killing some fifteen cattle in the neighborhood, and helping themselves to the choicest of the beef. To the horns of one of the unfortunate animals, the English commander affixed a letter, reading as follows:

"I am obliged to you, Sir, for the repose you have allowed me to take; I thank you for the fresh meat you have sent me; I shall take care of my prisoners; I request you to present my compliments to the Marquis of Montcalm.

(Signed) ROGERS,

*Commandant of the Independent Companies."*

"An ill-timed and very low piece of braggadocio" says Mr. Doreil, in reporting the circumstances to the Marshall de Belle-Isle. The next time that Captain Rogers, who was a noted scout, approached the fort, the French let loose their Indians upon his detachment of two hundred men. The savages returned in due course with no less than 114

scalps and twelve prisoners from the party led by Rogers. Rogers had a narrow escape for his life, two of the survivors of his expedition, who escaped with him, having died, from exposure and fatigue.

The Regiment of Guienne was created in 1610. Its colours were quarterly first and fourth *feuille-morte*, second and third *vert*; over all, a white cross. It had seen service at Fort Frontenac, Niagara, Oswego, Carillon, St. Therese, Fort William-Henry, and Ticonderoga, and was commanded by M. de Fontbonne.

Perhaps the most striking colours on the field were those of the Royal Roussillon Regiment, consisting of blue, red, yellow, and green, with a white cross, upon which, both on the Colonel's colours, and on those of the regiment, were fleurs-de-lys in gold. This battalion dated its history from 1655, and as we saw in the camp at Beauport, was commanded by M. Poularies, an officer who was greatly distinguished in the French army by his probity and high sense of honour, no less than by his bravery, experience, and military science. He had already rendered great services to the French cause in America, and was destined to play an important part in the second battle of the Plains (1760), where his bravery was to gain him fresh laurels. His gallant conduct at Fort William Henry had caused Montcalm to recommend him for promotion, and he accompanied the well-known expedition of M. de Rigaud in its sixty league march on snowshoes. His splendid services in America for France, did not count for much in his favour, however, when he returned to that country, and like Colonel Dalquier of Bearn's, he had the mortification

of seeing higher honours paid to less meritorious officers of his own regiment. The Chevalier Johnstone reports that while both these distinguished men were relieved of their command, in consequence of a change of system in the French regiments, Poularies' adjutant of the Royal Roussilon, Lieut-Colonel Belcombe, and Captain Montguary of Bearn's Regiment, which Dalquier commanded, were made Colonels of Foot, being "two very handsome men, capable of attracting the attention of the ladies of any court in Europe, but without any remarkable military talent or ability."

Amongst other points in America where the Royal Roussilon had served with credit and distinction, before participating in the Battle of the Plains, may be mentioned Fort Frederic, Carillon, Fort William Henry, and Ticonderoga.

Perhaps the French Regiment which had suffered more severely than any other during the American campaign was that of La Sarre, which now occupied the right of the regular regiments in Montcalm's line of battle, headed by its alternate red and blue quartered colours, dating from its creation in 1651. Its commander was Colonel Senezergue, Montcalm's first Brigadier, whom Johnston describes as an officer of the greatest worth and honour, and who was destined to yield up his life forty-eight hours later, as the result of the cruel fate awaiting him that day upon the field of honour and of battle. In the expedition against Fort William Henry, he had been second in command to General de Levis, in the right column of the army, being that which worked its way through the woods, while



Montcalm's division was crossing the Lake. He had been made a Brigadier-General in February 1759, at the special request of Montcalm, who further marked his confidence in him upon forming his line of battle that morning, by placing him in charge of the right division of the army. Three Captains and two other officers of La Sarre, besides a number of men, were killed at the battle of Ticonderoga, and two officers and forty-four men were wounded.

In August 1757, a corporal of this Regiment was hung in conformity to the sentence of a court martial held by General Montcalm, before which he was charged with having shown himself wanting in respect to a colonial officer. <sup>(1)</sup> This poor fellow appears to have been largely a victim of circumstances. The Marquis complained that the French soldiers did not entertain sufficient respect and esteem for the officers of the colonial troops, and intimates that the corporal in question was tried and executed as an example to his fellows and as a peace offering to the soldiers of the colony, whom Montcalm had been accused by Vaudreuil with treating unfairly.

The Regiment of Languedoc, which was drawn up on the left of that of La Sarre, possessed a shorter history than any of the other French Regiments on the field. Nevertheless it dated its origin from 1672, so that it had nearly ninety years of service behind it when it faced the British line on the Plains of Abraham. While on its way to Quebec in 1755, four of its companies, which were on board the transport *Le Lys* were captured by the British,

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(1) *Colonial Documents*, Vol. X, page 638.

at the entrance to the Gulf. Its commanding officer was Colonel Privat. The regiment saw service at Fort St. Frederic, Lake George, Ticonderoga and St. Johns, and spent the winter of 1757, in Quebec, while the other French troops were stationed in Montreal and its environs. The glimpses afforded from time to time of this regiment in the official correspondence of the period, are not calculated to impress us with quite so favorable an opinion of it as may have been formed of the sister regiments. Montcalm praises its staff, but complains that the men in the ranks are not up to the standard of those in the other battalions. The recruits sent out from France for the Languedoc Regiment were certainly not composed of very excellent material. Doreil, writing to the Marshall de Belle Isle, on the 30<sup>th</sup> April 1758, describes them as "a collection of very bad boys, who have infected the battalions. Up to this time nearly twenty soldiers have been tried, either by court martial or the ordinary tribunals, and a prodigious number punished by discipline, particularly corporal. We had but one instance of such during the first two years. Those men are besides, but very little to be relied on in war." The colours of the regiment, borne upon the Plains, were purple and red, two quarters of each, divided by the usual white cross.

So much then for the five French regiments which composed the main portion of Montcalm's line of battle. It is now in order to take a hurried glance at the colonial troops, the Canadians and Indians, who formed the remainder of the French army. Care must be taken to distinguish between the first and second mentioned of these troops.

The soldiers or militia of the colony, divided according as they belonged to the "Government" of Quebec, Three Rivers or Montreal, were regularly paid and enrolled troops, known as detached forces of the Marine, being under the jurisdiction of the Department of Marine at Paris, which controlled all colonial affairs, instead of under the Department of War. Montcalm described them in 1757, as "good but unsteady," and he has already been quoted as saying that the French soldiers did not entertain sufficient respect and esteem for their officers. It was but another instance of the exhibition of European superiority,—real or assumed,—over anything and everything colonial, and of the natural colonial resentment thereof.

The Canadians were the volunteers or occasional troops, who had left their farms to assist in the efforts of the regular military forces to rid the country of the invader. While these, with the Indians, were principally employed as sharpshooters and scouts, the colonial troops were placed in line with the French Infantry, whom they equalled in courage, if not in discipline.

Montcalm had secured the confidence of the Indians, to a considerable extent, by his intimate acquaintance with their manners, and the attention he had paid them. He claimed, not without reason, to enjoy their affection.<sup>(1)</sup> The utter lack of discipline among the aborigines disqualified them for service in a regular line of battle, and hence those of them who served in the French army on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, were placed in the wood near the Ste. Foye

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(1) *Colonial Documents*, Vol. X, page 638.

Road, and in other ambush, to harrass the British by their desultory fire, from positions where it was virtually impossible to charge them. One has only to read the account of their manner of dispatching their foes, as given in the *Memoirs of the Quarter-Master Sergeant*,<sup>(1)</sup> to be able to appreciate the horror inspired in European soldiers by the tomahawk and the scalping knife, and the determination already arrived at by every member of the army that faced them that morning, drawn up under the red cross of St. George, to submit to neither capture nor torture, but to fight until the outcome of the struggle should bring to each and to all of them the realization of the battle cry, "Death or Victory."<sup>(2)</sup>

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
(1) Vol. V. of the present work, page 165.

(2) Vol. V. of the present work, page 101.

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## CHAPTER X.

### THE CLASH OF ARMS.

During the early hours of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, 1750, the Plains of Abraham were sprinkled with light showers of rain, ere they were moistened with the blood of the heroic sons of England and of France. Towards ten o'clock the hovering clouds had passed away giving place to a flood of warm sunshine which illumined the gorgeous crimson, purple and yellow foliage of the neighbouring woodlands, and of the more distant heights of Levis on the one side, and of Lorette, Charlesbourg and Beauport on the other. It was reflected from the glittering steel of two armies drawn up in battle array, and facing each other with hostile intent.

It has already been seen that the French army was too much cramped by the nature of the ground near the city, and the shrubbery which occupied so much of it, to be able to form its columns into line of battle until they reached the more open space, extending towards the British line from the Buttes-à-Neveu. The new disposition of the troops was made under most trying circumstances, for as soon as they appeared upon the crest of the ridge, in full view of the enemy, Captain York, whose field gun was in





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advance of the British right, and almost as near to the French army as the present line of De Salaberry Street, brought it to bear with such telling effect upon Montcalm's forces, while they were in course of formation, that they were thrown into the utmost confusion. Montcalm had foreseen the difficulty of reforming his troops in face of the enemy, but there was no help for it. Had he continued his advance in solid column, he might have seriously threatened the British front,—although this had an excellent reserve in Webb's Regiment,—but the enemy's line was such an extended one, that he must have been fatally flanked, and not only caught between two fires, but actually surrounded by them. There was only one thing for him to do, now that the Council of War had decided upon an immediate attack, and that he immediately did. He laid out his plans to divert the attention of the enemy from the main body of his army to his artillery and irregular troops. As soon as he reached the ridge over which he had to pass to find the necessary space for drawing up his men in battle array, Montcalm saw that some of the Canadians were already exchanging shots from the copse or brushwood between the two armies just in rear of the present Franciscan Church. He therefore reinforced them with some of the best marksmen from the troops of the colony, others of whom he had advanced some time before into the cornfield to the left of this copse, and on the other side of the St. Louis Road, which has already been described. The British had also sent forward some small firing parties, under cover of the inequalities of the ground, and there was quite a large amount of this desultory firing

before the battle became general. In consequence of the tactics now adopted on the one side and the other, however, the main body of neither army was very much disconcerted by this firing, though previous to the advance of the British sharpshooters, many of Wolfe's officers and men had been wounded, and some of them killed by the bullets of the Canadians and Indians. This was also the case in the neighborhood of the St. Foye Road, where a good deal of skillful manœuvring, as well as firing, had been going on from the moment of the first appearance of the British in that vicinity. On each side there were several attempts to flank the wing of the other that was the nearer to the valley of the St. Charles. It was to avoid such a movement on the part of the Canadian and Indians, that Townshend, some hours earlier, had formed the troops at the extreme left of the British line, *en pôtence*, and had been so well supported in rear by detachments of the Light Infantry. This latter precaution had also been rendered necessary by the peculiar formation of the cliff forming the Côte Ste. Geneviève, which would have permitted any number of troops to have proceeded unobserved along the road at its foot, and then to have ascended and attacked the rear. From the precautions taken here by the British, some of the French officers were under the impression that Wolfe was bent upon descending into the valley, in order to seize the bridge of boats over the St. Charles, and the adjacent hornwork, for the purpose of cutting off Montcalm's communication with the left wing of his army which despite his peremptory orders to the contrary, had remained in the camp at Beauport, pursuant

to the instructions of Vaudreuil. The French therefore felt themselves called upon to display extra activity at this point, evidently inspiring Monckton with the idea that they were planning a new flanking movement, to counteract which, he advanced a number of platoons from the Forty-seventh Regiment. A movement on the part of the British to take possession of a house and mill on the Ste Foye Road situated near the junction of St. John and D'Aiguillon streets, again alarmed the French right, and the Canadians were ordered to set fire to the buildings, which was at once done, the British retiring to their former position. Still the suspicions of the French were by no means allayed, and the wise precaution was adopted of sending a lieutenant and thirty men of the La Sarre Regiment to closely observe the tactics of an army that had just proved itself so disappointing and unreliable as to scale a precipice in the dead of night, which had been declared, over and over again, to be practically inaccessible. It was feared that such soldiers might take advantage of the blinding smoke from the burning houses to operate some further unpleasant surprise for the opposing army, and it was rightly decided that they were well worth watching. The 1,500 Canadians and Indians who had been placed by Montcalm in the shrubbery about the Ste. Foye Road, some time before, to reinforce those who had fired at the British from the copse, before they turned to their right from the Ste. Foye Road to form their first line of battle, kept up now such a constant fusilade, and engaged so large a share of the enemy's attention, that Montcalm regarded the time as an appropriate one for

charging the enemy. He had other reasons for arriving at this conclusion.

The statement has already been made that Montcalm endeavoured to divert the attention of the British from the movements of his army, while forming it into line of battle, as well by his artillery as by his skirmishers. One of his guns had been playing upon the British lines during the advance of his army to the ridge which they had just passed. During the final formation of his line, he had at least three of them in action. One was on the St. Louis road, one on or near the Ste. Foye road, and one near the Côte d'Abraham.

It was just before the battle commenced that Wolfe ordered the Third Battalion of the Royal Americans to preserve communication with the landing place by taking possession of that part of the Heights upon which the troops had first formed upon ascending the cliff.

When he observed the first part of the French army making its appearance on the heights of the Buttes à Neveu, the General moved his own line towards them, giving his men strict instructions that they were not to fire until within forty yards of the enemy, no matter what provocation they might receive.

The British advanced from their first position, on the city side of the knoll upon which the Quebec Gaol is now erected, and made their final stand within a few paces of the present line of De Salaberry Street; their extreme right resting on a rising ground, almost in line with the present site of the Observatory; the unevenness of the ground partially concealing them from the enemy.

One of the enemy's guns, stationed on the crest of the ridge in front of their column, was now so close to the British line, and the fire of their skirmishers was so brisk, that Wolfe ordered his men to lie down on the ground till the enemy approached, when they were to rise and deliver their fire. A few minutes later, when the French General reached the summit of the ridge, it was but a comparatively small hostile army that met his view.

Admiral Holmes is authority for the statement that Montcalm was deceived to the last as to the strength of the British, being unable to believe it possible that they had so suddenly thrown up so large a force. He adds that "the inequalities of the ground covered numbers of our men and kept him from forming a just opinion of their strength."<sup>(1)</sup>

As soon as his line of battle had been fully formed, Montcalm rode along its front, encouraging his men, and stopping here and there to ascertain if they were tired.<sup>(2)</sup> They all replied in the negative and expressed the greatest impatience to receive the order to charge. These details, which are found in some of the journals not hitherto published, are extremely interesting, disproving, as they do, the stories so long current, that in his impatience to engage the enemy, the French General gave his men no time or opportunity for regaining their breath and recovering from the fatigue of their march from Beauport. On the contrary it was the men themselves who displayed the

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(1) Vol. IV, p. 297, of this work.

(2) Malartic's Journal, p. 285.

greatest impatience to advance upon the foe, <sup>(1)</sup> which increased when they saw the British throw themselves upon the ground, for they then believed that the enemy had been disconcerted by the constant discharge of their artillery.

The clash of arms was now rapidly approaching. There was no longer any reason, on the British side, to dread the intention of the enemy, or to fear for the possibility of a retrograde movement. The supreme moment for which Wolfe had wished and laboured and planned so long was now at hand. The disposition of Montcalm's troops plainly indicated that it was his intention to make an immediate descent upon the foe.

The English Commander had visited every part of his line, to encourage his men and to emphasize the importance of his order that they were to refrain from firing until within forty yards of the enemy. His gallant bearing, and the brightness of the new uniform which he had donned that morning despite the advice of one of his officers, singled him out as a mark for the enemy's sharpshooters, concealed in the copse facing the British centre and left, and he was wounded by a bullet that shattered the bone of his wrist. Painful as this must have been the General simply wrapped a handkerchief <sup>(2)</sup> around the wound, and proceeded on his way towards the right of his line, receiving, *en route*, a second wound, this time in the groin, of which he took no more notice than he had of the first. He

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(1) Vol. V. of this work, p. 297.

(2) Tradition states that this handkerchief was a gift from his betrothed.



had carefully acquainted himself with the movements and appearance of the enemy, shortly before, by a reconnaissance made in the rear of his right wing, from the elevation upon which now stands the Quebec Gaol.

The shock of battle was impending, and the quiet of the British line was simply the calm that precedes the storm.

Annoyed as they were by the firing of the Indians and Canadian Militia, Wolfe's men remained silent and motionless. Not a gun was discharged, except by the body of Light troops which had been advanced against the enemy's skirmishers. Apart from the cracking of the musketry in the space that intervened between the two armies, and the booming of the artillery, no sound was heard along the British line, save the thrilling tones of the Commander as they broke upon the stillness of the hour. Moving about at the head of the Louisbourg and Bragg's Grenadiers, who were now upon their feet awaiting the inevitable charge of the foe in front of them, was their gallant young General; his excited spirit pouring itself forth in animated exhortations and fiery eloquence "which none but heroes can utter," springing "from that deep emotion which none but warriors can feel."<sup>(1)</sup>

His frail and puny frame could scarce contain the noble soul whose overflow had affected his entire army, inspiring it with his own lofty ideals of high resolve and heroic endeavour.

His men loved and trusted him, and had no hesitation to follow wherever he might lead. He thoroughly knew,

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(1) Vol. V., p. 30.

understood, and trusted them in return, and no doubt as to the ultimate issue of the impending struggle seems to have entered his mind. One who was close to him and observed him carefully, says: "I was standing at this precise moment of time within four feet of the General. I shall never forget his look. He was surveying the enemy with a countenance radiant and joyful beyond description." His own fate caused him little or no anxiety. The fact that he had been twice wounded before the shock of battle began was not calculated to disturb the conviction of his approaching fall which seems to have forced itself upon him on the eve of this eventful day, and again after having gained the Heights that morning. He had already offered his King and country the disposal of his disease-racked body, and that he was ready with the sacrifice was made evident by the utter indifference to death in action shown by his reckless exposure at the head of his troops in the positions and at the times of the greatest danger.

What may have been his thoughts at this supreme moment of his illustrious career, it is not permitted us to know. Of one thing we may be tolerably sure: they were not of self. We have seen in the account of his all-too-brief existence that love and duty were the mainsprings of his life and conduct, and that he had so endeavored to regulate his actions as to gain the satisfaction of a self-approving conscience which flows alone from a faithful observance and performance of the obligations and responsibilities of life. He could honestly say that he had done his duty, while he had life and opportunity for it. Little of either now remained to him. He had more than suspected that

he had run his course, and attended to all the small details of his worldly concerns that might occur to one so circumstanced.

The last preparations for the struggle, on his side, had already been made. He had given what well might be his final orders. With his thorough appreciation of the duty still weighing upon him, but with nothing left undone that it was possible for him to do in the performance of it, one can readily conceive how, during the time that now elapsed before Montcalm's Army received the order to charge, his filial affection bore him, in spirit, to the home of his recently widowed and much loved mother beyond the sea; and how memory conjured up for him the image of her, in that other distant English home, who would probably wait in vain for his return, but who would at least receive the token of his practically dying regard, in the shape of the treasured portrait, already entrusted to the tender care of the companion of his youth, and destined to be presented to her in a setting of rare gems.

Duty is with us always, however, and even at this solemn moment, it had still a few more responsibilities for the British General.

While some of the French skirmishers continued to gall, with their desultory fire, a body of Infantry which had been advanced against them by General Wolfe, the British Light troops hastily fell back, thereby causing a slight dismay in their own line of battle. Wolfe immediately rose equal to the occasion, and moving calmly along the line, assured the men that the retiring party was only obeying instructions, in order to draw on the French.

"Be firm, my lads", said he, "do not return a shot till the enemy is within forty yards of the muzzles of your guns. Then you may fire". The men replied by a cheer, and shouldering their muskets, remained as though on parade. (1)

The movement had the desired effect. Montcalm had closely observed the progress of events in order to ascertain the most favorable moment for the attack. As already seen, the British left was actively engaged by the French right and sharpshooters, in the vicinity of St. John Road, and the falling to the ground of those on the British right, in obedience to Wolfe's order, was misunderstood by the French, who believed their opponents confused by the discharge of the guns which had been obtained from the city. Now, the middle of the enemy's line was threatened with unsteadiness by an apparent repulse of their own Light Infantry. The time appeared opportune. The long sought for moment had arrived. The French were in excellent spirits, impatient of the delay which had already occurred, full of enthusiasm at the prospect of a descent upon the thin red line before them, and confident of victory. Their General's great anxiety was to attack the British before they were reinforced or could further intrench themselves.

When Montcalm gave the order to charge, the army advanced in three columns, about six deep, with a shout that expressed its delight at the opportunity of striking the blow for which it had patiently waited. The satisfaction experienced on this score on the side of the French,

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(1) Lawrence Drake's Heroes of England.

was certainly no greater than that felt by the British soldiers, who after having spent the greater part of the cool September night in the flat-bottomed boats on the river, had remained since early dawn awaiting the foe on the field of battle.

Montcalm himself commanded the centre column of his army, with the Chevalier de Montreuil as Adjutant-General, Brigadier de Senezergues, Lt.-Col. of the Battalion of LaSarre had charge of the right, with the Chevalier de St. Ours, M. Beau Chatel and M. de Foutbonne, Lieut.-Colonel of the Battalion of Guienne, commanded the left.

There is great diversity of opinion amongst historians as to the exact strength of the French army upon the Heights of Abraham, but the best authorities are those who were officially connected with the army and the colony. The *Extract from a Journal kept in the army commanded by M. de Montcalm* gives the number as four thousand five hundred. Bigot says it numbered three thousand five hundred, or thereabouts, and his estimate of three to four thousand as the number of the British army on the Heights, was certainly not very far astray. Garneau, the French Canadian historian, gives four thousand five hundred as the strength of Montcalm's army, and these figures are probably a fair estimate.

To the shout that was sent up by the French army as it swept proudly and majestically down the slope of the ridge upon which it had just been formed, there was no reply from the opposing forces. "Our people", says Brigadier-General Townshend, speaking of this particular time, "stood with the greatest firmness, coolness and

silence" <sup>(1)</sup>. It was not long before they observed a striking change in the appearance of the approaching columns. The onslaught of the French had threatened to be extremely furious <sup>(2)</sup>. A splendid intrepidity and a great eagerness to engage had marked the commencement of the charge, but these features of the advance, according to a French officer, did not last long <sup>(3)</sup>. The army had not proceeded a hundred paces towards the enemy, when the Canadians in front of the centre column, fired without orders, and then, according to their custom, threw themselves flat upon the ground to reload <sup>(4)</sup>. The French regulars were not used to such methods, and apparently thought that the auxiliary troops had been overcome by terror. At all events, the movement had the effect of seriously disconcerting all the regular battalions, which were further disorganized when the Canadians, after recovering their position, turned to their right and made for the outskirts of the town; leaving the French regiments almost alone to bear the brunt of the fight, except at the extreme right and left, where the Canadians and Indians poured a continuous fire into the ranks of the foe <sup>(5)</sup>. Though the French columns wavered they continued the advance, but their fire was wild and scattering <sup>(6)</sup>, and had but little effect upon the thin British line. It had been commenced

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(1) Vol V, p. 268.

(2) Vol. V, p. 28.

(3) Vol. IV, p. 254.

(4) Journal of Malartic, p. 285.

(5) *Mémoire de Joannes*, Vol. IV, p. 226.

(6) Vol. V, page 53, and 104.

before the enemy was within proper musket range, and was delivered in a most disorderly and apparently aimless manner. There might have been some excuse for this if the musketeers in the French army were themselves under a heavy fire, but up to this time, not a gun had been fired from the British line, the only reply to the main French assault being that made by Captain York's cannon near the right of Wolfe's army.

Two of the French columns inclined towards their opponents' left, and the third towards its right, firing obliquely at the two extremities of the British line, from a distance of about a hundred and thirty yards. There was now more or less unsteadiness, about both the fire and the advance. We have it upon the authority of an aide-de-camp on the French side, that the fire from his army was most lively from the right to the left. <sup>(1)</sup>

Notwithstanding the imperfections of this fire as judged from a military standpoint, it was galling enough to the British line of battle, standing motionless before it, to be unable to return it. They had received the order that they were not to fire and so far as they were concerned, that settled the question. "Their's not to reason why:" but simply and solely to obey. Though the enemies fire might have been much more telling than it was, it was murderous enough to do some execution, and to pick off a few of the brave men who faced them with their mnskets on their shoulders as if on parade. Their comrades could neither avenge them, nor yet protect themselves from a

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(1) Vol. V, page 298.

similar fate until they should receive the longed for command.

Discipline was an integral part of their duty, and they must die, if needs be, in observing it.

All things come to those who wait, however, and in time came the moment for action to the waiters and watchers of the British army. The enemy had pressed nearer and nearer until the appointed limit of approach had been reached, <sup>(1)</sup> and the actual tug of war was at hand. Every British gun was now levelled, their was a rattle of musketry all along the line, a crashing volley passed from left to right, and a dense smoke followed the discharge and for a minute or so concealed its effects. That volley produced results that decided the fate of nations and changed the destiny of a continent. The breeze carried away the pall of smoke that had momentarily rested upon the lifeless forms of the victims of that fatal discharge, and then the long gaps that had been made in the ennemy's line appeared in all their horror.

Wolfe had ordered his men, when loading, to place and extra bullet in their guns, <sup>(2)</sup> and the execution wrought by their first fire was tremendous. The field piece which had continued to pour grape shot into the enemy, during the whole of its advance, caused considerable havoc, and threw

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(1) Major Moncrief places the distance separating the two armies at the time of the British fire as twenty to thirty yards, Malartic at twenty paces, the *Sergeant-Major's Journal* at twenty yards and Brigadier-General Townshend at thirty yards. The larger number of the authorities gives it as forty yards.

(2) Journal of Knox, page 71.



their columns into some disorder, which increased the difficulty of withstanding the shock of the British volley. A manuscript journal in the library of Congress at Washington, describes this fire as poured into the main body of the French "in a tempest of bullets,"<sup>(1)</sup> and relates that it was sustained with such vivacity that the foe recoiled. Malartic states that most of the men in Montcalm's front rank were either killed or wounded by the British discharge. There is French authority for the statement that their opponent's fire was well sustained all along the line,<sup>(2)</sup> and in the *Memoire of a Quarter Master Sergeant*, the fatal results of the British charge are attributed not only to the excellent aim and deliberated nature of their fire, but also to the closeness of the enemy's ranks, and to the fact that their center was formed in column. The British centre appears to have been extremely steady, and their firing particularly regular, telling, and well maintained. The Forty-third and the Forty-seventh regiments, which occupied this position, were but little affected by the oblique fire of the enemy, for the centre column of the French Army, as well as the right, inclined towards the British left. The author of one of the contemporary journals, who was present on the field, says that the two regiments above named gave "with great calmness, as remarkable a close and heavy discharge as I ever saw performed at a private field of exercise, insomuch as better troops than we encountered, could not possibly withstand it; and indeed

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(1) Vol. 5, page 30.

(2) Vol. V, page 298.

well might the French officers say that they never opposed such a shock as they received from the center of our line, for that they believed every ball took place, and such regularity and discipline they had not experienced before, our troops in general, and particularly the central corps, having levelled and fired, *comme un coup de canon.*"<sup>(1)</sup>

By the time that the smoke had partially cleared away, the British had reloaded, and having made another slight advance, delivered a second telling fire at still shorter range, into the broken ranks of their already demoralized foes, some of whom had already hastened to seek safety in flight. It was but a few minutes till their entire line was broken, and the French soldiery, with their back to the pursuing army, were heading towards the town and the river St. Charles, pressed on by British bayonets and the broadswords of the Highlanders. M. de Joannes, Town Major of Quebec credits the Canadians, on the right of the French line, with having been the first to turn and flee, though be this as it may, it is certain that they were the only men of Montcalm's army to make any determined stand against the pursuers at a later period of the French flight. The disorder which resulted from their panic, and the unpleasant proximity of cold steel to other parts of the French rear accelerated the rout of the entire army. Lascelle's Regiment was the first to break in upon the foe with fixed bayonets and the Highlanders flanked them at the same time. The forces opposed to these regiments were instantly turned and routed, and the whole army

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(1) Knox's Journal.

gave way and fled. The Grenadiers virtually pushed them onwards with their bayonets towards the town and Beauport. <sup>(1)</sup>

The French centre, which consisted of a deep column seems to have made the heaviest onslaught upon Wolfe's army and their left, were stationed, made the longest stand, and in every way behaved the best. <sup>(2)</sup> It was during their brisk and animated attack upon the British right, at the time of the first encounter at close quarters, and before the flight which followed the deadly fire from Wolfe's army, that the gallant Young General received his mortal wound. Of the two previous injuries which he had experienced as heretofore related from the fire of the enemy's skirmishers his men knew nothing. <sup>(3)</sup> His manner was unchanged, his exertions unrelaxed. Before the action commenced, he had moved along the whole of his line, and had received his two first wounds near its left and centre respectively. From the time of the French advance he had remained upon the small rising ground, at the right of his line, a knoll still to be seen a few hundred feet to the north of the Quebec Observatory. Here he obtained a good view of the entire right and centre of the field of battle, occupying a position at the head of Bragg's and the Louisbourg Grenadiers, where the attack was the hottest. "Neither would he be prevailed on to the contrary, although he was often in imminent danger." <sup>(4)</sup> His voice was still heard

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(1) Vol. IV, page 293.

(2) Vol. V., page 268.

(3) Vol. V., page 31.

(4) See *Memoirs of the Quarter-Master Sergeant*, Vol. V., page 104.

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Peak of Oregón - Valle - Oregón - Oregón

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(1) Vol. IV, page 293.

(2) Vol. V., page 268.


(3) Vol. V., page 31.

(4) See *Memoirs of the Quarter-Master Sergeant*, Vol. V., page 104.



*The Death of General Wolfe on the 13<sup>th</sup> Sept 1759 at Quebec.*

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amidst the din of the fight, and he had barely given the order to his men to charge the foe when he fell fatally wounded. <sup>(1)</sup> It is related by a writer in the *British Magazine* for 1760, the year following the battle, that Wolfe received this wound from the party of skulkers which had been stationed by the French in the cornfield facing the British right, and already described. The familiar story of his leaning upon the shoulder of an officer in order that his brave men should not see him fall, the account of his removal to the rear of the battlefield, and his dying expressions of happiness and satisfaction upon being informed of the flight of the enemy, are household words wherever the English language is spoken. Succeeding generations of his fellow-countrymen have paused, in contemplating the account of his heroic death to pay a tribute to his memory.

There are so many versions of these closing scenes in the life of the illustrious General, that the details are dealt with in a chapter of this work, specially devoted to the death of Wolfe. After his fall, the command devolved upon Brigadier Monckton, who had assumed it but a very few minutes, when he, too, was stricken down by one of the enemy's bullets, which inflicted a wound supposed to be mortal. He was borne out of the line, and Brigadier Murray upon learning of the fact, and having also heard that Brigadier Townshend had been wounded near the British left, took charge of the army then pursuing the French towards the walls of the city, and had made some

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(1) The bullet which caused this wound is said to be in the possession of his Majesty King Edward VII.



advance, when he ascertained that he had been misinformed, and that it was Colonel Carleton, Quarter-Master-General, who had been wounded instead of Brigadier Townshend. Carleton received his wound during the skirmishing which immediately preceded the French assault, Monckton was at the head of Lascelle's Regiment, a little later, when a ball entered his right breast, passed through part of his lungs and was eventually cut out "under the blade bone of his shoulder." <sup>(1)</sup>

Brigadier Townshend then succeeded to the command. By this time the rout of the enemy had become pretty general. They did not wait in line for more than two or three discharges from the British Infantry. <sup>(2)</sup> When the latter had advanced to within twenty or thirty yards of them, the whole French line turned, from right to left, and were pursued within musket shot of the walls of the town, scarcely taking back till they got within them. <sup>(3)</sup>

The right wing of the French army, assisted by some of their Indians, had made an attempt to turn the British left, but were repelled by Townshend just before he was called upon to assume the chief command. The Brigadier's own account of this repulse states that the enemy's assault was not so severe here as at other parts of the line. The houses about St. John Street and the St. Foye Road, into which the Light Infantry had been thrown, were well defended, being supported by Colonel Howe, who took up

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(1) Vol. IV., p. 269.

(2) Vol. V., p. 272.

(3) Vol. IV., p. 270.

a position with two companies behind a small copse <sup>(1)</sup> and frequently sallying out upon the enemy when they attacked him, "drove them often into heaps."<sup>(2)</sup> Several interesting episodes occurred on the British left during the day. Townshend reports that when he was forming up with Lascelles regiment only, prior to the French main assault, he was attacked by the Canadians and Indians, whom he kept in check behind a long roadway, assisted by the gallant behaviour of a Captain whose name is not given, and who in his zeal to repel the attack had left a house which protected the front of the Brigadier's position. On ascertaining his mistake, the officer dashed back again, and drove out, at the point of the bayonet, those of the enemy who had in the meantime entered and taken possession of the building.<sup>(3)</sup> Against the front of the enemy's right wing, Townshend now advanced fresh platoons of Amherst's Regiment, which prevented that wing from executing its first design of flanking the British left. The large body of Canadians and Indians which was impatiently waiting to fall upon the British rear in case of a defeat, was therefore doomed to disappointment. All the accounts of the action by those who witnessed it agree that the real shock of battle lasted but a few minutes. Colonel Malcolm Fraser, of Fraser's Highlanders, states that the British firing continued for six, or (as some say), eight minutes. A perusal of the contemporary authorities leaves no doubt that the

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(1) For position of this small copse, see large plan in vol. II.

(2) The Townshend Papers, Vol. V., p. 218.

(3) The Townshend Papers, Vol. V., p. 214.

flight of the French followed almost immediately upon their final advance upon the British line.

A French officer who was present on the field briefly describes the battle as follows :—" Our troops gave the first fire, the British the second, and the affair was over. Our right took to their heels, our center ran away after them and drew along the left, and so the battle was lost in less time than I am telling the story." (1) The Chevalier Johnstone says : " Our onset was neither brisk nor long. We went on in confusion—were repulsed in an instant."

The Intendant Bigot wrote the following account to the Marshal de Belle Isle :—" This little army fired two volleys at that of the English, which amounted, in like manner, to only three or four thousand men, but our's, unfortunately, took to flight at the first fire from the enemy, and would have been utterly destroyed, had not eight to nine hundred Canadians thrown themselves into a little wood near St. John's gate, whence they kept up so constant a fire on the enemy, that the latter were obliged to halt in order to return it. This firing lasted a full half hour, which gave the flying troops and Canadians time to reach the bridge we had on the river St. Charles, to communicate with our troops." (2)

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(1) Vol. IV, p. 256.

(2) Some further incidents of the struggle are recorded in the following paragraph from the *Extract of a journal kept at the army commanded by the late Lieutenant-General de Montcalm* :

" The eminence on which our army was ranged in the order of battle commanded, at some points, that occupied by the English where they were defended either by shallow ravines or by the rail fences of the fields ; our troops, composed almost entirely of Canadians impetuously

Captain James Calcraft writing from Quebec, on September 20<sup>th</sup> 1759, is authority for the following:—"Our people got so near them as to make them feel our bullets and bayonets almost at the same time. The fire continued very hot indeed for about ten minutes, when the French and Canadians turned tail. Then four hundred and fifty Highlanders were let loose upon them with their broad swords, and made terrible havoc among the poor devils, as far as the walls of the city; which they would have entered with the runaways, had they not been called back. One of their captains told me that the French were in so great a confusion, and seized with so great a panic, that the gate might have been kept open by those handful of men, till the rest of the army could have come up, and so have taken possession of the city by storm; and that would have certainly been the case had Gen. Wolfe lived; but his death threw a damp upon the whole army. When everything is considered, the surviving general acted prudently; for if

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rushed on the enemy, but their ill-formed ranks soon broke, either in consequence of the precipitancy with which they had been made to march, or by the inequality of the ground. The English received our first fire in good order, without giving way. They afterwards very briskly returned our fire, and the advance movement made from their centre by a detachment of about 200 men with fixed bayonets, sufficed to put to flight almost the whole of our army. The rout was total only among the regulars; the Canadians accustomed to fall back Indian fashion (and like the ancient Parthians) and to turn afterwards on the enemy with more confidence than before, rallied in some places, and under cover of the brushwood, by which they were surrounded, forced divers corps to give way, but at last were obliged to yield to the superiority of numbers. The Indians took scarcely any part in this affair. They kept themselves, for the most part at a distance, until the success of the battle should decide what part they should take. 'Tis well known that they never face the enemy in open field."

they maintained the ground they were upon, the devil could not keep them out of the city in the course of a few days; whereas if they had attempted to storm or take possession of the city that day, an accident might have deprived them of the advantages and glory they had already won. There was no more than the first line of our army engaged; the second line stood still, there being no occasion for it."

After the fall of Wolfe, and the commencement of the French flight, each corps that joined in the pursuit seems to have exerted itself, says Brigadier Townshend, according to its own peculiar methods. The Grenadiers, Braggs and Lascelles drove on the enemy with their bayonets. Brigadier Murray, with the troops under his command completed the rout on his side, when the Highlanders, supported by Anstruther's, took to their broadswords and drove them in the direction of the town and of the St-Charles. <sup>(1)</sup> Townshend's reference to the zeal displayed by the British in their pursuit of the foe is corroborated in the *Memoirs of the Quarter-Master-Sergeant*, where it is stated that "Every regiment, nay every man exerted himself as if possessed with an extraordinary spirit for the honour of Old England, calling out aloud to one another "Death or Victory"; each man striving to fix a laurel on his own brow; for while the right, under the command of Brigadier-General Monckton, who now had the command in chief, pressed on with their bayonets; Brigadier Murray pressed on as briskly upon the enemy's center; who not

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(1) Vol. V, p. 217.

being able, any longer to withstand the impetuous fierceness of our small handful of men, which at that time did not amount in the whole to four thousand fighting men, they gave way: upon which Colonel Fraser with his Highlanders rushed in amongst the thickest of their column with their broadswords, with such irresistible fury that they were driven, with a prodigious slaughter, into the town and their other intrenchments on the other side of the River St. Charles."

Colonel Fraser has left his own account of the pursuit of the fugitives by the Highlanders. Referring to the time when the British fire was slackening and the smoke of the powder vainshing, he says:—"We observed the main body of the enemy retreating in great confusion towards the town and the rest towards the St. Charles. Our Regiment was then ordered by Brigadier-General Murray to draw their swords and pursue them, which I dare say increased their panic, but saved many of their lives; whereas if the artillery had been allowed to play, and the army advanced regularly, there would have been many more of the enemy killed and wounded, as we never came up with the main body." In the course of their advance, the Highlanders passed over a great many dead and wounded, mostly French regulars. The enemy fled before them in great confusion to the very walls of the city. Comparatively few of them, however, entered the town, the majority making towards the bridge of boats near the General Hospital, in order to cross the St. Charles and gain the camp at Beauport. One journal in describing the panic which seized the French army, relates that "the

bayonnets of the Grenadiers were at their backs; the broadswords of the Highlanders were flashing over their heads. There was no time to rally. Borne down in the assault, the French abandoned the ground and fled in wild disorder from every post, never pausing until they had crossed the St. Charles and had sheltered themselves behind the ramparts of the city, leaving the English on the field with no enemy in sight".

A French aide-de-camp records that the retreat of his army was marked with great disorder, despite the zeal and the best efforts of all the officers. It was impossible, he said, to stop the fugitives, who were influenced by nothing but the impressions of an unprecedented terror. So great was their disorder that it was impossible to rally them. <sup>(1)</sup>

General Montcalm was fatally wounded in the French retreat while endeavoring to rally his men between the ridge at Claire Fontaine street and St. Louis Gate. While approaching the gate he was seen to waver. Two of his faithful Grenadiers <sup>(2)</sup> supported him and he was conveyed within the walls where a surgeon examined and dressed his wounds, which were declared to be mortal. The news of his fall added considerably to the consternation of his army. M. de Foligné, a naval officer, who during the Siege commanded one of the principal batteries of the town, has given a graphic description of the panic which followed the mortal wounding of the French General. "The troops, he says, believed that everything was now lost, and aban-

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(1) Vol. V, p. 298.

(2) See chapter on death of Montcalm.

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LOUIS JOSEPH MARQUIS DE MONTCALM

Seigneur de St. Veran, Condiac, Tournemire, Vestric, St. Julien d'Arpaon;

Baron de Gabriac.

Lieutenant-Général des armées du Roi

Commandeur honoraire de l'ordre de St. Louis &c.

Commandant en chef des troupes françaises dans l'Amérique Septentrionale

né à Candiac le 28 Février 1712, tué devant Québec en Canada le 19 Septembre 1759.

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doned the field of battle to the foe, the flight of the army and its pursuit by the British forming a sad enough spectacle for the anxious watchers at the windows of the General Hospital in the valley below." Foligné could never have believed, he says, that the loss of a general could produce such fearful demoralization, and he describes it as "unexampled".<sup>(1)</sup>

Montcalm's fall was indeed a severe blow, not only to his army, but also to the cause of France in the New World. His character as a brave and generous commander and a high-minded and disinterested patriot, stands out in brilliant contrast to the dark picture of official corruption and peculation in which figured many of those whose hostility he had encountered, by his fierce denunciation of their nefarious methods and practices. It remained for those within the ring of corrupt officialdom, and to such other dignitaries as were allied to or influenced by it, to besmirch his memory. His companions in arms were inconsolable over their loss. "I can never console myself for the loss of my general" wrote a French officer. "He was a great man for us, for this country and for the state. He was a good general, a zealous citizen, a reliable friend, and a father to us all". Commissary-General Bernier, writing to the Minister of War said "Permit me, in conclusion, to drop a few tears upon the tomb of the Marquis de Montcalm. The colony will long feel the loss of him." Captain Pouchot declares that Montcalm's valour was equalled by his disinterestedness and the purity of his

(1) Vol. IV, page 205.



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né à Condiac le 26 Février 1732 - mort devant Québec en Canada le 13 septembre 1759.

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(1) Vol. IV, page 205.

intentions. Bancroft has testified to his indefatigable labours, his justice and disinterestedness, the patience with which he withstood hunger, cold, night watchings and fatigue, the hopefulness of his temperament, the wisdom of his counsels and his activity in action. Full of solicitude for those serving under him, he had little thought of self. "His career in Canada," adds the American historian, "was an admirable struggle against inexorable destiny, and though in the midst of general corruption, he had no other care than the interest of the colony."

The Marquis de Vaudreuil, who had remained in the security of his camp on the Beauport side of the St. Charles, when Montcalm set out to fight the battle of the colony and of France on the Plains of Abraham, and who had refused him the aid of the troops for which he had asked, only started for the battle field, when the heavy discharge of musketry told him that a battle was in progress. Instead of bringing with him all the troops from Beauport, he seems to have left nearly fifteen hundred of them behind him, including a large detachment of the Canadian Militia, who were compelled to witness with heavy hearts, the cutting to pieces of the French Army on the heights, detained as they themselves were in the hornwork, and prevented by superior orders from rushing to their assistance.

The French irregulars upon the British left had moved towards the town when their line gave way, but still maintained their ground along the bank on that side, overlooking the valley of the St. Charles, and being concealed by the coppice and brush, kept up a continual

firing. Here they made a decided stand for some time in front of St. John's Gate, being reinforced there by a body of Canadians whom Vaudreuil states he had met retreating, and rallied in the valley below. After a gallant struggle, this force was finally beaten off by the seventy-eighth Highlanders, assisted by some of the fifty-eighth and others, but not without considerable loss. Brigadier Murray, at the head of the Highlanders, had pursued the enemy's centre within musket shot of St. Ursule bastion, situated between St. Louis and St. John's Gates. It was at this time that he was informed that all the other Generals had been wounded, and as the enemy had now entirely disappeared from the space between him and the town, he was returning to the field of battle, when he heard the fire of the irregulars in front of St. John Gate, and ordered the Highlanders to go and beat them off. Colonel Fraser's narrative furnishes a complete account of this incident, which is also referred to in Major Moncrief's journal. <sup>(1)</sup> As the Highlanders were marched through the brush wood towards the Ste. Foye Road, the garrison of the town played a gun or two upon them, but without doing much damage. A few men were killed and some officers wounded, however, by some of the sharpshooters concealed in the bushes and behind the houses in St. Louis and St. Johns suburbs. Having finally reached the bank at the descent between the heights and the valley of the St. Charles, they met a severe fire from the Canadians and others who were sheltered both by the bushes and the bank. Those

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(1) Vol. V, page 53.

the others, who, according to Fraser, exceeded his men in the bushes were soon disposed of but a brisk discharge was maintained for upwards of a quarter of an hour with number, and killed and wounded quite a number of them, as well as killing a couple of officers. So admirably did the Canadians maintain their position that their assistants were compelled to temporarily retire and reform. The Fifty-Eighth Regiment and the Second Battalion of Royal Americans having now come to the assistance of the Highlanders, forming in all a body of about five hundred men, they made a united attack upon the foe, and drove them first down to the great meadow between the General Hospital and the town,—where St. Rochs is now built,—and afterwards over the River St. Charles.

The lives of many members of the French army were saved by the heroic stand made by these Canadian sharpshooters on the edge of the heights, two hundred of whom gave up their lives. Not only had they fallen upon the left of the British with incredible rage, but by commanding the attention, for so many minutes, of the Highlanders and other regiments, they had delayed the pursuit of the fugitives, and when repulsed, had disputed the ground, inch by inch, from the top to the bottom of the height almost opposite the Intendant's Palace.<sup>(1)</sup> In the neighborhood of the bakehouse near the foot of Cote d'Abraham, the Canadians made a final stand, but almost the whole of

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(1) The place where these brave Canadians fall, and indeed nearly all the battlefield is covered with buildings. It would be interesting to students if all such places were marked by simple tablets, bearing a suitable inscription.

them were cut to pieces by the Highlanders and the Light Infantry. The loss of the Highlanders was very heavy. While in the bushes on the crest of the cliff, before the Regiment was reinforced, it lost Lieutenant Roderick, McNeill of Barra, Alexander McDonnell, John McDonnell and John McPherson, volunteer, besides many of the men. Captain Thomas Ross, who descended the cliff with about a hundred men was struck in the body by a cannon ball from the hulks in the mouth of the St. Charles, and died in great agony a couple of hours later. After the flight to the valley of the St. Charles, the regiments of Guienne, Languedoc and Bearn, formed up near the windmill in front of the St. Charles River, belonging to the governments of Quebec, Montreal and Three Rivers. <sup>(1)</sup> These they followed over the bridge of boats, being replaced at the mill by the regiments of La Sarre and Languedoc, which crossed the bridge at noon, and formed up on the high road on the other side of the St. Charles. Some time after the battalions of Guienne, Languedoc and Bearn had entered the hornwork, detachments were sent out to break up the second bridge of boats and also to destroy the powder in the barn of the windmill already referred to.

The Chevalier Johnstone holds that if the British left, instead of immediately returning to the heights after their pursuit of the fugitives had crossed the level plain whereon St. Rochs is now built, to the River St. Charles, a distance of only a few hundred paces, they would have effectually cut off the retreat of three-fourths of the French army, who

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(1) See *Malartic's Journal*, page 286.



would thus have become invested in the town, without provisions, compelling Vaudreuil, on the following day, to have surrendered Quebec, and to have offered the capitulation of the colony. It is worthy of note that the same thing must have occurred to Wolfe in his dying moments, for he is reported to have issued an order, just before breathing his last, to the effect that Burton was to march down his regiment to the St. Charles, to prevent the retreat thither of the French army. Perhaps Wolfe's successor in the command thought that he knew better than his late chief, or it may be that he believed in the advice of Pyrrhus — quoted by Johnstone as an excuse for the British failure to follow up their advantage at this point — that it is always wise and prudent to give a golden bridge to one's enemy in flight.

When the Chevalier de Ramezay saw the British troops pursued to the city walls by Wolfe's army, he seems to have grown anxious for his own safety and for that of those who were with him within the fortifications, and though he had declined a short time earlier to send Montcalm the guns for which he had asked from the city, to keep the British at a respectful distance from the walls, he now sent to ask the Adjutant-General, Chevalier de Montreuil, for assistance for his defence. Montreuil sent him five pickets of about thirty men each. <sup>(1)</sup>

Reference has been made to the employment during the action, of the guns upon the hulks at the mouth of the St. Charles. The French also made use of several guns in

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(1) Vol V., page 323.

their fortifications including one that fired grape shot against the progress of the British right wing, whose active pursuit of the enemy has been already described. A brief stand was made during the advance of the British right, by a number of sharpshooters stationed in a coppice, but Colonel Hunt Walsh, by a very judicious movement, wheeled the battalions of Bragg and Kennedy to the left and flanked them. A few platoons from these corps completed the victory on this part of the field, and it was about this time when the British forces had split themselves up into a number of small pursuing parties, that Brigadier-General Townshend came up to the advance divisions in front of the town, to take command. Victory had then been practically assured but it was by no means completed. In its pursuit of the fugitives, the army had become thoroughly disorganized, and the different battalions not only widely separated, but in many instances broken up into small fragments. We have already seen that not only each individual regiment, but in some cases each individual soldier pursued the foe in the manner and the direction that seemed for the moment to be the best. Townshend immediately saw the danger to which the army was exposed and the necessity for an immediate concentration of its various parts. There was not much prospect, it is true, of an immediate rally of the enemy's main forces: but there never was a better opportunity than that offered by the scattered British troops, at that moment for an Indian massacre.

The hostile savages had taken but little part in the engagement. For fighting after the methods of disciplined

European soldiers, in organized bodies, they were valueless. Their force lay in trapping their adversaries, as they did the wild animals of the forest, by watching for the opportunity of springing upon them by surprise and taking them unawares. They were at this time skulking about almost every part of the field, always upon the edge of a wood or coppice or within easy reach of cover. The British horror of their tomahawks and scalping knives is well-known. Had these Indians fallen upon the small broken fragments of the English battalions, and once gratified their passion for scalps and plunder, it is impossible to say what might have been the result of the panic that would have ensued. Townshend lost no time in reforming the army upon the field of battle. This had scarcely been accomplished, when Bougainville appeared in his rear with two thousand men. In fact Townshend had only one battalion with him at the time, but immediately dispatched his aide-de-camp to bring up reinforcements, and at the same time advanced a couple of field guns against the foe. When they commenced firing, Townshend was mortified to find that his artillerymen had brought up the wrong ammunition. They were thereupon ordered to fire at a considerable elevation, in order to reach the enemy, who were seen to be forming at the edge of a wood. In the meantime, Townshend was reinforced by another battalion. A brief but brisk cannonade was maintained by his two guns, and Bougainville soon retired with the loss of five or six men. He was without artillery, and in no condition to cope with the victorious British army. He therefore withdrew his force in the direction of Ancienne Lorette,

and Townshend, seeing that he would not attack, did not believe it to be his duty "to risk the fruits of so glorious a day, and to abandon so commanding a situation to give a fresh enemy battle upon his own terms, and in the midst of the woods and swamps where he was posted."

Bougainville, on his way from Point-aux-Trembles and Cap Rouge, that morning, had reached the battery at Samos about eleven o'clock, only to find it in possession of the British. When Colonel Howe had taken possession of it earlier in the day, as described in a former chapter, he had spiked the guns and destroyed the ammunition. An officer and fifty men of the Light Infantry were stationed in a house near by to assist in maintaining communication with the landing place, and to cover the ascent of artillery and stores. Lieut. Macalpin of the Royal American Regiment, commanded the detachment, which was unsuccessfully assailed by a party of men sent against it by de Bougainville under command of Captain Le Noir of the La Sarre Regiment. The besieged party discharged two or three heavy fires from the windows of the house, and obliged the besiegers to retire with a loss of thirty men killed and wounded. <sup>(1)</sup> It was then that Bougainville filed off through the woods to his own left, and appeared at noon upon the Ste. Foye road, in rear of the battle field, with two hundred cavalry in his front. Finding that the British were in undisputed possession of the heights, and that he was too late to unite with the *débris* of Montcalm's army for any immediate effective operations, no other course

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(1) *British Magazine* (1760).

was open to Bougainville, than the retreat which was effected by his troops, in an orderly manner, in the direction of L'Ancienne Lorette; a retreat which stands out in admirable contrast to the disorderly flight of Vaudreuil's command towards Charlesbourg, a few hours later.

Bougainville is one of the most interesting figures in the campaign covered by the present work. He was born in Paris, in November, 1729, of a family which claimed descent from an ancient house of Picardy. His studies, pursued in his native city, developed a remarkable taste for language and science in both of which branches of knowledge he attained distinction. His father, a notary, destined the young man for the bar, to which he was admitted, practising a short time as advocate in the Parliament of Paris. Although his talents and his learning gave him standing at once amongst his colleagues and friends, his taste for adventure, and the movement of conflict led him to take up arms in a wretched war, but still a war for his country. In 1755, he was attached for a few months to the French Embassy in London, where he was made a member of the Royal Society, and in the following year he became the first aide-de-camp to Montcalm. A friendship strong and lasting sprang up between these kindred spirits, and the confidence which the General reposed in his young friend was never shaken, not even, we may suppose, on the fatal thirteenth, when Montcalm waited for him in vain on the field of battle. The biography of Bougainville from 1756 to 1759 is a history of the campaigns in which he was engaged, and which he served to enliven within his own circle by his

brilliant and caustic wit. From his pen we have illuminating observations upon a multitude of objects, Indian customs and character, official plunder, Canadian militia, the jealousies between Montcalm and Vaudreuil, the progress of the struggle, and military criticism. After his return to France in 1760, he served with the army in Germany, as aide-de-camp to M. Choiseul Stainville, in such a manner as to call forth the special notice of the King,

After the peace, he was engaged by the merchants of St. Malo to form an establishment at the Malouines islands and was accorded the Commission of Captain in the navy. He sailed in 1763 for these islands, but they were shortly afterwards ceded to Spain.

In 1766, he set sail for the Falkland Islands on a political mission for the French Government. He continued his voyage, discovered several islands in the South Sea and passed near the group which was afterwards called the New Hebrides by Captain Cook, who, by a curious coincidence, fought on the British side during the Siege of Quebec.

Returning to France in 1769 as the first circumnavigator, he wrote an account of his voyage around the world which was published in 1771. His services as a navigator were so great that he is yet known in that capacity better than in any other. In 1778 and 1779, he commanded the "Guerrier" in Count d'Estaing's fleet, and was at the reduction of Savannah in the latter year, when he was promoted to the rank of Commodore. In the year 1781, he commanded the "Auguste," in Count de Grasse's fleet, and was

in the engagement of the 29<sup>th</sup> of April, against the English fleet under the command of Hood. He commanded the van in the November following and commenced the action off the Chesapeake, when the French fleet fought that of the English under Graves. After reaching the rank of Major-General, he retired from the public service in 1790. after a brilliant career of over forty years. He was elected a member of the French Institute in 1796, and was afterwards created a Senator and a Count of the Empire.

He had projected a voyage to the North Pole, and elaborated two plans for reaching it, but was dissuaded from the attempt by the Count de Brienne, Minister of Marine, who complained that he had not the funds for it. The Royal Society of England, upon learning that the French Government had given up the idea asked Bougainville for his plans, which he sent to them. He preferred the second of the two, which he had designated as plan B. Captain Phipps, who afterwards became Lord Mulgrave, followed the other route, but only got as far as 80° 44' north latitude. <sup>(1)</sup> Bougainville was always of the opinion that some of the whalers, if offered a sufficient inducement, would succeed in reaching the pole.

After M. Fleurien's withdrawal from the Ministry of Marine, Louis XVI. offered the position to Bougainville. He declined the offer, though he was most devotedly

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(1) The *Biographie Universelle* of Michaud, "edited by a society of savants and men of letters," states that Phipps reached a latitude of 88 degrees. (See Vol. V, page 204 of that work). This is obviously an error, since up to 1875, the highest latitude reached was 82° 40', by Perry. In that year, Captain Naves attained 83° 20' north latitude.

attached to that unfortunate prince, and was constantly near him in the trying days that elapsed between the 20<sup>th</sup> of June and the 10<sup>th</sup> of August 1792. He was arrested in 1795, but released after the fall of Robespierre. He died in his 83<sup>rd</sup> year, on the 31<sup>st</sup> August, 1811. His wife who was one of the beauties of her age, and whose portrait, hitherto unpublished, appears in the first volume of this work, had predeceased him, leaving three sons, one of whom became a page to Napoleon, while of the others, one entered the army and the other the navy.

Amongst the enemy's wounded upon the field of battle, the British found a former member of the Royal Americans, who had deserted from them during the campaign and had fought on the French side that day. He was immediately tried by a general court martial, and was shot to death pursuant to his sentence.

The miraculous escape from death of a French officer, during his army's flight illustrating the apparently charmed life lived by some men amid a perfect rain of bullets, is furnished by Chevalier Johnstone, the officer in question. Johnstone was a Scotch Jacobite who had fled to France after the defeat at Culloden, and had obtained from the French monarch a commission in the French army, with several other Scotchmen. He sailed from Rochefort in 1758 as an ensign, with the troops going to Cape Breton, and continued to serve in America until 1760, when he returned to France, having acted as aide-de-camp to General de Levis in 1759. He states that having become convinced of the impossibility of rallying the French troops after their flight on the Plains of Abraham,



he determined to descend the hill opposite the windmill near the bakehouse. The bakehouse was situated near the foot of Côte d'Abraham, between the upper part of the present Church and Crown streets, and the windmill was near the centre of that portion of St. Rochs, south-west of Crown street, between the bakehouse and the bridge of boats. The Chevalier thus intended to reach the hornwork on the other side of the St. Charles, by the meadows lying between him and the bridge, rather than to risk a nearer approach to the town, where he feared a siege. He was carried away however by a stream of fugitives, without being able to stop himself, until he reached a marshy spot where some gunners were endeavoring to save a field piece which had become embedded in the mud. He remained with them a short time to encourage them to get the gun into the town, and upon gaining firmer ground suddenly found himself in presence of a large force of the enemy. He humourously remarked that they must have taken him for a General, on account of the fine black horse which he rode, for they saluted him with a thousand musket balls from half the front of their army. He put spurs to his horse in his endeavor to reach the windmill, and escaped the terrible fire of the enemy without any other injury than four balls through different parts of his clothing, one in the pommel of his saddle, and four in the body of his horse, which notwithstanding its wounds lived to carry him to the hornwork.

This hornwork, to which several references have already been made, appears, from the old plans, to have covered about ten acres of land, surrounded on three sides by a

deep moat, with its front facing immediately on the St. Charles. On the Beauport side it was defended by heavy earthworks. Its front, facing the river was composed of strong, thick and high palisades, erected perpendicularly, with gunholes for several large pieces of artillery. The river was deep, and only fordable at low water, at a distance of a musket shot or so from the works. The officers and men in this fortress, including the Governor, M. de Vaudreuil, who had also sought shelter there, were as much terror-stricken, according to the Chevalier Johnstone, as they had been on the field of battle. The Chevalier states that they all seemed to lose their heads when they saw the English on the plain at the foot of the cliff, whether they had followed and slaughtered the Canadians who had made so gallant a stand near St. John's Gate. On the appearance of the troops near the bakehouse, Montgnet and LaMotte, two old captains in the Regiment of Bearn, cried out vehemently to Vaudreuil that the hornwork would certainly be carried by assault, and that they would all be cut to pieces without quarter unless they at once capitulated the whole country. In vain Montreuil assured them that such a fortification as the hornwork was not so easily taken. A general cry arose for the cutting of the bridge of boats, though not a fourth of the army had yet crossed, and the Royal Roussillon Regiment was just then approaching it. The bridge would doubtless have been destroyed and the bulk of the French army cut off from the fortress and left at the mercy of the British, but for Hugon, who commanded, and Johnstone, who ran together to the bridge, and without waiting to ask who had

ordered the cutting, sent away the soldiers who already had their axes uplifted to perform the work of destruction.

The losses in the battle were much more severe upon the side of the French, so far as numbers are concerned, than upon that of their opponents. In the British army, nine officers and forty-nine non-commissioned officers and men were killed, while fifty-five officers and five hundred and forty-two non-commissioned officers and men were wounded.

The British officers killed were Major-General Wolfe, Captain Ross of Fraser's, Lieut William Cooper of Bragg's, Lieut. William Mason of Otway's, Lieut. Seymour of Lascelle's, Lieut. Roderick McNeil of Fraser's, Lieut. Alexander McDonnell of Fraser's, Lieut. Humphrey Jones of the Louisbourg Grenadiers and Ensign Tottenham of Anstruther's.

The authorities all agree as to the difficulty of arriving at the exact number of the French loss. The French and Canadian soldiers who fell upon that part of the battlefield beyond the reach of the guns from the town were buried by the English. Many of the others were interred by the French under a flag of truce from the city. Thence one of the difficulties in the way of arriving at a correct estimate. Notwithstanding the terrible slaughter upon the field of battle itself, and the large number of Canadians cut to pieces on the plain below, many of the British estimates of the loss are absurdly high. Of the French contemporary writers at Quebec, who ought to be the best authorities on this point, *The Journal of a French Officer on board the Chezine Frigate*, gives seven to eight hundred

as the number of killed and wounded, The *Relation du Siège de Québec*, says that the number of killed, wounded and prisoners amounted to twelve hundred men, while Foligné, in his journal, states that one hundred and fifty were killed and nearly three hundred wounded. However correct Foligné's estimate of the killed may be, there is little doubt that he much underestimated the number of the French wounded. The French Canadian historian, Garneau, places the French loss at one thousand including two hundred and fifty prisoners.

The disparity in the number of killed and wounded in the two armies may be easily accounted for. *The Accurate and Authentic Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1759, by a Gentleman in an eminent station on the Spot*, which was obtained for this work from a copy in the British Museum, also explains why the number of wounded in Wolfe's army was so largely in excess of the number of the killed. It says that the enemy fired at so great a distance that their bullets were almost spent before they reached the English lines, and that several of the men composing those lines received "contusions", or slight wounds upon parts of the body where they must have proved mortal if the fire had come from a shorter range.<sup>(1)</sup> In the *Memoirs of the Quarter-Master Sergeant*, the small British loss in the action is accounted for by the thinness of their line of battle and the imperfect fire of the French, as contrasted with the heavy column formation of a large part of Montcalm's army and the directness and closeness of the British

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(1) Vol. IV, p. 293.

fire. <sup>(1)</sup> In the pursuit of the fugitives by the Grenadiers with their bayonets and the Highlanders with their broadswords almost the entire slaughter was, necessarily, amongst the flying French troops.

Nearly all the general officers on the French side were killed on the field or fatally wounded. Montcalm's death occurred at an early hour on the following morning. Brigadier-General Senezergue died a day later on board a British ship, whence he was taken a prisoner, when found wounded on the field of battle. Brigadier-General St-Ours fell on the scene of the conflict.

Endowed with exceptional activity and valour, St-Ours had obtained favorable mention in the Governor's official dispatches, for his services at Fort George and Carillon. It was on the right of the French army, where he commanded, with M. de Bonne, on the Plains of Abraham, that St-Ours was slain. He had married in 1747, Therese Hertel de Cournoyer, of the noble family of Hertel, who with nine children survived him. Captain de Bonne, who assisted Brigadier St-Ours at the French right, escaped the slaughter of this eventful day, only to fall upon the same field in the action of the following year. He was a nephew of the Marquis de la Jonquiere, and before coming to Canada had served in the regiment of Condé. He had been named Captain in 1751 and Chevalier of St. Louis in 1759.

Brigadier-General de Fontbonne, Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment of Guienne, who commanded the left wing of

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(1) Vol. V, p. 107.

Montcalm's army, was amongst the slain of the fateful 13<sup>th</sup> of September, and so were many other officers of his regiment, and also of Bearn's. Captains Tignes and Maubeuge of the latter mentioned corps, fell on the fatal field, and Captains Figuiery and Tourville were wounded. Brigade-Major Malartic, of this regiment, had his horse killed under him, and several shots passed through his clothing. Malartic left a journal of the siege, to which we have had frequent occasions of referring in the course of this work. He was the second son of the Count of Montricoux, was born in 1730, entered the regiment of La Sarre at the age of fifteen years, and shortly afterwards obtained a company in that of Bearn, in which he served, as Captain, in the campaigns of Flanders, of Italy and of Provence. He took part in the battle of Plaisance and became Assistant-Major in 1749. He joined the army in Canada in 1755, and after Montcalm assumed the command in 1756, Malartic accompanied him in all his campaigns. He fought at Fort-William Henry and at Carillon, where he was wounded in the left knee. After the battle of the Plains he was left in charge of the guard at the General Hospital, where he not only secured the gratitude of the wounded but the esteem and affection of General Murray. He was severely wounded at the second battle of the Plains, in 1760, and returned to France with the remainder of the army. He was appointed Colonel of the Vermandois Regiment in 1763, and Governor of Guadeloupe with the rank of Brigadier, in 1770. He was made a Commander of St. Louis and died at Mauritius, of which he was Governor, in 1800, much beloved and lamented by the colonists.

Two Canadian officers of Montcalm's army are worthy of special notice. Captain Dumas was one of the bravest and most experienced of the officers of the Colonial Troops, and the Chevalier de Repentigny had already greatly distinguished himself in repelling the British assaults at Montmorency. He performed prodigies of valour in the following year in the engagement between Murray's and de Levis' armies where the British were defeated and where he arrested the progress of the British centre. He left Canada for France after the cession, and was subsequently made a Marquis, then a Brigadier, Governor of Senegal on the coast of Africa, and finally Governor of Malie in the East Indies, where he died in 1776. He came of a noble family, whose name is intimately associated with many of the stirring incidents recorded in the history of Canada, his great grand father having settled in the colony in the early part of the seventeenth century.

Before the statue of the Blessed Virgin in the Chapel of Saints, within the Ursuline Convent of Quebec, burns a votive lamp which was lighted in 1717, and has never since been extinguished. Its flame is due to the piety of a young novice of the institution, as a perpetual testimony of her gratitude for the joy and consolation that came to her in answer to her prayers in that very sanctuary. She had been racked with doubts and fears as to the choice she was called upon to make, between life in the world and a sacrifice of its pleasures for the duties and the self abnegation of the cloister. The young Ursuline Sister was Marie Madeleine de Repentigny, and her brother was the father of the Chevalier de Repentigny, who fought

under Montcalm in 1759 and under de Levis in 1760. With brotherly devotion he paid the three hundred *livres* for the lamp donated by his sister and for the cost of its perpetual maintenance. <sup>(1)</sup> Miss Repentigny was one of the most beautiful young girls of her time in Canadian society, and shortly after leaving the Ursuline Convent as a pupil, was engaged to be married to an officer who died a few months before she made her resolve to enter the cloister. Her own death had occurred before the battle of the Plains, which was destined to terminate the era of French sovereignty in Canada, but the lamp she lighted in the Ursuline Convent under that regime, to which her family was so warmly attached, still burns to day as brightly as it did of yore; and the annals of the monastery after recording the chief stirring scenes of the engagement described in the present chapter, admit that "History has kept her record, and taught the same lesson as Faith: that all things work together for good to them that love God." <sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) *Les Ursulines de Quebec*, Vol. II, page 126.

(2) *Glimpses of the Monastery*, Part. III, page 64.

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## CHAPTER XI.

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### UNE MORT GLORIEUSE.

THE battle had been fought and lost. Montcalm, already slightly wounded, was endeavoring to rally his troops, when he received a fatal shot through the loins. Two grenadiers hurried to his side, and supported by them, the unfortunate general entered the city through St. Louis gate. As he rode down the street on his black horse, bleeding, and supported in the saddle by his disheartened soldiers, some women overwhelmed by the momentous events of the day, by the frightful clamour of defeat, by the mournful sight of the death-stricken hero, by all the crushing feelings of this tragic and dark hour, began to weep despairingly, exclaiming: "*Oh mon Dieu ! Mon Dieu ! le Marquis est tué !*" (1) Montcalm, concealing his sufferings, courteously tried to reassure them: "*Ce n'est rien ! ce n'est rien ! Ne vous affligez pas pour moi, mes bonnes amies.*" (2)

He was conducted to the house of Mr. Arnoux the

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(1) "My God, the Marquis has been killed!"

(2) "It is nothing; don't be distressed on my account, my good friends!"



HOUSE OF SURGEON ARNOUX, IN WHICH MONTCALM DIED.

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
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surgeon.<sup>(1)</sup> This officer was on duty at lake Champlain. But his younger brother, a surgeon himself, dressed the wound and saw at once that it was a fatal one. Being asked by Montcalm what his medical verdict was, he thought it his duty to tell him the sad truth. "This truly great and worthy man heard Arnoux pronounce his sentence of death with a firm and undaunted soul: his mind calm and serene; his countenance soft and pleasing, and with a look of indifference whether he lived or died. He begged of Arnoux to be so kind and outspoken as to tell him how many hours he thought he might yet live. Arnoux answered him that he might hold out until three in the morning. "So much the better," returned Montcalm. "I am happy that I shall not live to see the surrender of Quebec."<sup>(2)</sup>

During this time, the French army had fallen back on the camp at Beauport, and Vaudreuil had held a council of war at the head-quarters, to decide upon the course to be pursued in this dreadful emergency. At that council, with the Governor and Bigot, the following officers were present: Falquier, Poulariès, Pontleroy, Dumas, Duchat, Manneville and Duparquet.<sup>(3)</sup> Vaudreuil sent a message to Montcalm to ask for his advice. It appears that the dying general in answer, pointed to a threefold choice; a new engagement, retreat to Jacques-Cartier, or surrender.

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(1) This house was situated in St. Lewis street.

(2) These details were given by Arnoux to chevalier Johnstone, a Scotch Jacobite, who had served as aide-de-camp to Levis, and afterwards on Montcalm's staff—See Johnstone's *A Dialogue in Hades*, p. 45.

(3) *Collection Moreau St. Méry*, XIII, folio 324.

The council of war, after having discussed the situation, decided on retreat. At night the army left the camp and retired to Lorette, and thence to St. Augustin, Pointe-aux-Trembles and Jacques-Cartier.

Before leaving Beauport, Vaudreuil sent a letter to Montcalm in which he tendered him his sympathy, and explained the reasons for his actions, including the articles of capitulation which M. de Ramezay, the commanding officer in the town, was eventually to propose. This letter was written at six o'clock. Montcalm directed his secretary, Marcel, to forward the following answer: "The Marquis de Montcalm fully appreciates your kindness and directs me to tell you that he approves of all; I have read to him your letter and the draft of capitulation, which I have delivered to M. de Ramezay together with the letter addressed by you to that officer". Then as a post-script, Marcel added: "The Marquis de Montcalm is hardly better; however, his pulse is a little stronger at ten o'clock".<sup>(1)</sup>

During these hours of pain, Montcalm did not forget the companions of his exertions and the faithful people for whose defence he had sacrificed his life. It is said that he dictated these lines to the address of Brigadier Townshend, who was at this time in the camp before the walls of Quebec: "Monsieur, the humanity of the English sets my mind at peace concerning the fate of the French prisoners and the Canadians. Feel towards them as they have caused me to feel. Do not let them perceive that they have changed

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(1) *Collection Moreau, St. Méry, XIII, folio 317.*


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*Cuirass of the Marquis de Montcalm.  
From a Photograph of the original in the possession of the Marquis de Montcalm, Paris.*


masters. Be their protector as I have been their father"<sup>(1)</sup>

The general had fulfilled his last public duty. To M. de Ramezay who came to ask for some advice in relation to the defence of the town, Montcalm replied: "I have no more orders nor advice to give on earth. My time is very short, I have far more important business that must be attended to." According to some relations, Mgr de Pont-

(1) Are these celebrated lines authentic? After a patient and prolonged study of books and documents, we have come to the conclusion that the question is, at least, doubtful. Our earlier Canadian historians, Séguin, Garneau and Ferland, do not speak of this letter to Townshend. The first writer who quoted it was father Martin, a French Jesuit, who lived in Canada for many years, and was rector of St. Mary's College at Montreal. In 1867, he published a book,—*Montcalm en Canada, par un curé de Missionnaire, Tournai, 1867.*—where for the first time appeared Montcalm's touching recommendations to the English general. No name was indicated for this new piece of information. But it added a fresh note of pathetic interest to Montcalm's dying moments, and was eagerly seized upon by subsequent writers. Father Soumervogel, M. de Bonnechose, Abbé Casgrain and many others quoted unhesitatingly the famous letter. Parkman himself, the great scrutinizer of manuscripts and documents, gives it in his book *Montcalm and Wolfe*. But he would not publish it on his own authority, and wanting to shield himself against the possible reproach of inaccuracy, he wrote: "I am indebted to abbé Bois for a copy of this note." (*Montcalm and Wolfe*, Sixth edition, Vol. II, p. 309.) Abbé Bois, born in 1813, was parish priest of Maskinongé from 1848 to his death in 1889. He was a renowned collector of historical documents and published many pamphlets on Canadian history. It is most likely that he became acquainted with father Martin during the latter's sojourn in Canada, and that he communicated to him the same note for which Parkman gave credit to the Abbé some years later. Now, what was abbé Bois' authority for attributing these lines to Montcalm? It would be difficult to answer this question.

Montcalm's letter to Townshend is mentioned by no contemporary writer that we know of. Johnstone, Marcel, Bougainville, Vaudreuil, Louis, Knox, Joannès, Malartic, Bigot, Bernier, the Sieur de C., Foligny, Ramezay etc., who have left letters, journals, diaries, relations bearing on the Siege and surrender of Quebec in 1759 are mute on this point. No trace of it is to be found in the *Siege de Québec en 1759 d'après un manuscrit déposé à la bibliothèque d'Hartwell*, nor in the *Journal tenu à l'armée*, nor in the *Relations de ce qui s'est passé au Siège de Québec par une reli-*

*From a Photograph of the original in the possession of the Marquis de Montcalm, Paris.*



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briand, who had retired to Charlesbourg since the month of July, came to Quebec to minister to the hero during his supreme ordeal. Montcalm received the last rites of the Church with the feelings that could have been expected from such a true Christian. Then his mind turned towards his dear ones at Candiac, towards his revered mother, his beloved wife and children whom he was never to see again in this world. He entrusted his secretary with the mission of conveying to them his last farewell and recommendations.

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*gieuse de l'Hôpital Général*, nor in the *Journal of the Expedition on the River St-Laurence*, nor in the *Short authentic account of the Expedition against Quebec*, nor in Fraser's *Journal of the Siege of Quebec*. Moreover, Townshend himself, the supposed recipient of Montcalm's letter, makes no reference to it in his reports and letters. He does not speak of it, does not seem to know anything about it. Is it likely that Townshend would not have mentioned a document so honourable both for the victor and vanquished, if he really had received it?

Montcalm wrote a letter to this Brigadier, but it is altogether different from that which Abbé Bois has communicated to Parkman. Here is the text of it; we translate it from the French:

Sir,

Being obliged to surrender Quebec to your arms, I have the honour to recommend our sick and wounded to your Excellency's kindness and to ask the execution of the *cartel d'échange* agreed upon by His Most Christian Majesty and His Britannic Majesty. I beg Your Excellency to rest assured of the high esteem and respectful consideration with which I have the honour to be

Your most humble and obedient servant

MONTCALM.

This letter is found in the Townshend papers; why should not the other one have been preserved in the same way if it had ever existed?

We state the case as we find it. We do not contend that Montcalm never wrote the lines quoted first by Father Martin, and communicated to Parkman by Abbé Bois. But we say that we have found no evidence of their authenticity. Of course the Abbé Bois' sincerity is not to be impugned. But he may have been misled by some fabricated document of the same stamp as the spurious letters published in London in 1777.

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
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


He gave also instructions to the effect that all his papers be delivered in to the hands of M. de Lévis, for whom he expressed the highest regard. Having thus done with all earthly cares, he devoted his last moments to the thoughts of God and eternity. During that gloomy night he was often heard praying aloud, and thanking the merciful Providence for having favoured him, in his hour of defeat, with the blessed consolations of faith.<sup>(1)</sup> At five o'clock in the morning he breathed his last.

All was confusion in Québec, and no workman could be found to make a coffin for the illustrious dead. Seeing this, an old servant of the Ursulines, called the "Bonhomme Michel,"—weeping mightily, says the annalist of the Monastery,—contrived to make with a few boards a kind of shapeless box. It was in this rude and humble bier that the mortal remains of Louis de Montcalm, Marquis de St-Véran, lieutenant-general of the King of France, commander of the Order of St. Louis, were laid. On the evening of that day, the 14<sup>th</sup> of September,—at nine o'clock, the funeral procession made its way through the dark streets, lined with shattered houses and walls towards the Ursuline's chapel, the only one that had not been utterly ruined by the English shells. M. de Ramezay, the officers of the garrison, and a gathering of citizens including many women and children, followed the coffin in a dismal silence, their hearts burdened with grief and anxiety. The sad ceremony was presided over by M. Resche, the parish priest of Notre-Dame, assisted by canons Collet and Cugnet.

(1) *Les Ursulines de Québec*, Vol. III, p. 7.





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
They sang the *Libera* in which the eight nuns present behind their grating, joined their trembling voices. A few torches shed their pale light on the melancholy scene. The coffin was lowered into the grave that had been dug under the floor through which a shell had made a large excavation and all was over. Once more had been fulfilled the historical omen : "*La guerre est le tombeau des Montcalm.*"<sup>(1)</sup>

Montcalm's loss was mourned by the whole army and country. The letters and writings of Levis, Bougainville, Johnstone, Bernier, Foligny, Mgr. de Pontbriand, gave expression to the universal sorrow. But there was one exception. Vaudreuil's spiteful rivalry was not to be stopped by the death of Montcalm. As soon as he had reached Montreal, he began to cast aspersions on and to defame the memory of the man whose lips were sealed for ever. Speaking of the departed general, he wrote to the Minister of Marine : "From the moment of Monsieur de Montcalm's arrival in this colony, down to that of his death, he did not cease to sacrifice everything to his boundless ambition. He sowed dissension among the troops, tolerated the most indecent talk against the government, attached to himself the most disreputable persons, used means to corrupt the most virtuous, and when he could not succeed became their cruel enemy." These shameful attacks against a dead man, were as calumnious as they were ungenerous. To use Parkman's expressions, "when Vaudreuil charges Montcalm with attaching to

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(1) War is the tomb of the Montcalms.

Ann. 1759, p. 45. On nous en Septembre, se été enlève dans l'Eglise des Religieuses Ursulines de Québec, Haut et présent de Monsieur Lamoignon, commandant général des Armées du Roy, Commandant en chef de l'Ordre Royal et Militaire de St. Louis, Commandant en chef des Troupes de Terre en l'Amérique.



**MONTCALM**

**HONNEUR**

À

**MONTCALM**

LE DESTIN EN LUI DÉROBANT

LA

**VICTOIRE**

L'À RECONSTRUÏ PAR

UNE MORT GLORIEUSE

Telle est l'Inscription que porte un petit marbre, placé en 1822, dans l'Eglise des Dames Ursulines de Québec par lord Aylmer, Gouverneur en chef du Canada. Ce fut dans cette Eglise que l'on déposa à la hâte, et à la lueur des flambeaux le soir du 14 Sept 1759, la dépouille mortelle de

**MONTCALM.**


mort le même jour des blessures qu'il avait reçues au combat de la veille

La France jalouse de perpétuer la mémoire d'un nom cher à sa Gloire Militaire, décerna à MONTCALM un Monument Funèbre. Ce Monument n'est jamais arrivé au Canada mais l'Histoire a conservé la belle Epitaphe écrite par l'Académie Française et destinée à orner le mausolée.

La tombe de MONTCALM fut ouverte en 1822. A l'exception du crâne l'on trouva les ossements et la bière dans un état de décomposition complète.

Le crâne recueilli, et placé dans une belle Chasse vitrée se conserve religieusement dans le Musée du pensionnat des Dames Ursulines de Québec.

rique Septentrionale, décide le même jour, de ses blessures au combat de la veille, muni des Sacraments qu'il a reçus avec beaucoup de piété et de Religion. — *Était présent à ses inhumations M<sup>r</sup> Beuché, Cuygnet et Collet, chevaliers de la Cathédrale, M<sup>r</sup> de Raimé-dy, Commandant de la place, et tout le*



himself the most disreputable persons and using means to corrupt the most virtuous," the true interpretation of his words, is that the former were disreputable because they disliked him (the Governor), and the latter virtuous because they were his partisans." (1)

We have mentioned one exception. We should have mentioned two. The notorious Bigot tried also to cover Montcalm's grave with ignomy. When he was put on his trial in France on account of his robberies in Canada, he had the audacity, in his factums, to call the late general an informer. But the mother and the wife of Montcalm asked leave to appear in the case as plaintiffs, and, at their request, this base imputation was suppressed as calumnious.

Besides his mother and wife, Montcalm had left five children: two sons and three daughters. The King's favours were continued to his family. Madame de Montcalm retained part of her husband's pension of 4,000 francs; each of the children received a pension of 900 francs. The eldest son succeeded his father at the head of his regiment, and the younger, who was a knight of Malta, was appointed captain of a company in the same body. In 1773, the King granted to one of Montcalm's daughters, who was to be married to the viscount de Damas, a pension of 4,000 francs. During the french Revolution, when the National Assembly enacted the suppression of all pensions, a Member of the House asked that an exception be made in favour of the Montcalm family. "M. de Montcalm's services," he said, "made our name famous in the New as well as in the Old

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(1) *Montcalm and Wolfe*, vol. II, p. 320.

World. His valour and his military talents have honoured the French armies." This appeal was not fruitless. The four living children of Montcalm received a pension of 1,000 francs each. Madame de Damas received 4,000 francs.

The Journal and letters of Montcalm to M. de Lévis, to Broulmaque and to some others were published a few years ago by the Quebec government.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1777 a volume of letters said to have been written by the dead general, was published in London. These letters were clearly fabricated. No trustworthy historian has ever admitted their authenticity.

Montcalm's memory has always been cherished in Canada. But for over half a century no monument was erected to record his glorious deeds. In 1827, under the auspices of Lord Dalhousie, a stone column was dedicated to the two illustrious leaders to whom a common death had given a common glory.<sup>(1)</sup> A few years later, in 1831, Lord Aylmer directed a mural tablet in white marble to be erected in the Ursuline's chapel, with this inscription: *Honneur à Montcalm, le destin en le privaut de la victoire l'a récompensé par une mort glorieuse.*

Sixteen months after Montcalm's death, Bougainville had written to the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* praying that renowned body to prepare an inscription recalling the life and achievements of the victor of Carillon. The inscription was to be engraved on a mar-


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(1) In the Levis collection given to the Province by M. de Nicolay, great grand son of the chevalier, afterwards the duke de Levis.

(1) We have given in the first volume of this work the celebrated lines inscribed on this monument.

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
COPYRIGHT BY A. G. DOUGHTY, 1900.

ble monument which would be erected at Quebec, in the Ursuline's Chapel, as a tribute of faithful remembrance from the officers and battalions who had served under this general in Canada. A special permission having been asked on that purpose, from the English Minister, Mr. Pitt had courteously granted it. But for some unknown reason the project was not accomplished.

It was only after the lapse of a century that M. de Bougainville's idea, was acted upon. A marble tablet bearing the Academy's inscription, was placed, by means of a public subscription, in the Ursuline's chapel, above the hero's grave.<sup>(1)</sup> On the 14<sup>th</sup> of September 1859—the hundredth anniversary of Montcalm's death and burial,—an imposing ceremony took place within the sacred and historic walls which had witnessed such a different scene one hundred years before. The chapel hung with funeral draperies, was filled to its utmost by the élite of Quebec's population. On a catafalque covered with a pall over which were spread the silvery *fleur-de-lis* of olden time, the skull of Montcalm was to be seen under a crystal globe. Monseigneur Baillargeon, bishop of Tioa, in his episcopal robes presided over the *Libera* and a French Jesuit, Father Martin, delivered the funeral eulogy.

Montcalm's remain's were at last honoured with the religious pomp from which defeat and public ruin had robbed his obsequies one hundred years before.

(1) A reproduction of a photograph of the tablet is given in the first volume of this work by permission of the Ladies of the Community.



Copyright by A. G. DOUGHTY, 1906.

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## CHAPTER XII.

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### WOLFE'S DYING MOMENTS.

A CAREFUL study of the several contemporary accounts of Wolfe's death, particularly those of his principal officers, removes all difficulty in the way of indicating, with absolute certainty, the position which he occupied when struck down fatally wounded;—a position from which he was sorrowfully and tenderly borne to the sheltered hollow in rear of his army, which was thus hallowed for all time to come, by the life blood and the dramatic death of the victorious General, his glorious renown, and the world wide significance of his dying victory.

He had been twice wounded just prior to the fateful engagement which was to bring him undying fame and a soldier's grave. Contrary to the advice of one of his officers, he had rendered himself particularly conspicuous that morning, by donning a new uniform, and as he moved about giving orders to that part of his army drawn up near the Ste. Foye road, he presented an easy mark for the ambushed Indians, concealed in the wood on the city side of DeSalaberry Street.<sup>(1)</sup> He received his first wound

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(1) For the position of this street, see the modern plan of Quebec in this volume.

about half an hour before the battle commenced. It was not serious. He was struck in the wrist and the wound was staunched with a handkerchief lent him by one of his officers.

Remaining in front of his army, Wolfe almost immediately advanced along the line towards its right. While still a little to the north of the St. Louis Road, he was shot in the groin. This was only a short time after he had been first wounded. He still continued his instructions for the approaching crisis, and passed to the rear of his army, to reach an eminence from which he might observe the movements of the enemy. Ascending the height upon which the Quebec Gaol now stands, he saw that the French were moving in a body to the attack. Wolfe lost no time in placing himself at the head of Bragg's Regiment and the Louisbourg Grenadiers, to receive the enemy. The French advance, down the slope topped by the eminence now known as Perrault's Hill, has already been described. Wolfe's army stood its ground and waited. Nearer and nearer came the French. Not until they had advanced to the position shown upon the plans, that is to say, within forty yards of the British lines,—one writer giving it as twelve yards,—was there any movement of the latter. Then, however, Wolfe gave the order to return the fire. The effect of this volley from all along the British front, at so close a range, can easily be imagined. The long line of fire gave way to a thick column of smoke, and by the time that this had sufficiently cleared to allow the condition of affairs to be seen, it was found that the French were thoroughly disorganized and had commenced retreat.

The deadly aim with which the British had poured their shower of lead into the ranks of their opponents, had amply justified the strategy of Wolfe, in reserving the fire of his men until it would have its most telling effect.

Before the French had time to recover from the shock, the British General gave the order to advance, and prepared,—but alas! in vain,—to lead his men in pursuit of the retreating foe, hoping to snatch the further fruit of the advantage already secured. So rapidly did these movements follow upon each other's heels that it is related by James Calcraft, one of Wolfe's officers, that "Our's were ordered to keep up their fire, and receive that of the French, which was accordingly done; and then our people got so near them as to make them feel our bullets and bayonets almost at the same time."

Wolfe had scarcely given the order to advance when he received his third and mortal wound. A contemporary manuscript records that "at the moment of making the charge a ball struck him." The bullet entered his breast and he sank to the ground.

In Wynne's *General History of the British Empire in America*, published in three volumes, in 1770, the wounding and the fall of the gallant commander are thus described: "General Wolfe himself was stationed on the right, at the head of Bragg's regiment and the Louisbourg Grenadiers where the attack was warmest and standing conspicuous in the very front of the line, had been aimed at by the enemy's marksmen, and at last received a shot in the wrist, which did not oblige him, however, to quit the field. Having wrapped his handkerchief round his



arm, he continued giving orders without the least emotion, and advanced at the head of the Grenadiers, with their bayonets fixed, when another ball unfortunately pierced the breast of this young hero, just as the enemy gave way, and victory was crowning all his labors with success."

An officer in Wolfe's army, whose letter appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of December, 1759, wrote to a friend in England the following account of the wounding of the General: "He first received a musket ball thro' his right wrist, which tore the sinews much, but he wrapped his handkerchief round it, and marched on. The next he received was in his belly, about an inch below the navel, and the third shot just above the right breast. He then went reeling aside, but was soon supported by an officer."

There is no longer any possible doubt as to the exact spot where he fell. On the famous plan in the British Museum, known as the King's Map, which measures fourteen feet long by five in width, and is one of the finest examples in existence of the cartographic art, the small rising ground upon which the heroic leader received his death wound, is made the subject of a special reference, so precise and convincing as to leave no room for doubt, no possible opportunity for advancing the claims of any other locality. The elevation in question is shown upon the right front of the position occupied by the invading army, when ordered to charge the enemy.

It is interesting to note that no copy of this superbly executed plan had ever been made, until the production of that now in our possession.

So conclusively does the King's Map indicate the scene

of Wolfe's fall, that it would be superfluous to dwell upon the facts that all the plans agree as to the exact position of Bragg's Regiment and the Louisbourg' Grenadiers, when they received the French assault and responded with their death-dealing fire, and that Wolfe was at their head, and had barely started upon the advance he had ordered, when he fell as already described.

The visitor of to-day, to the famous battlefield, will find this historic ground near the west side of what is now a fenced-in field, about a hundred yards north-east of the Quebec Observatory building, and some three hundred yards to the east of the monument which marks the sheltered hollow where the wounded General was carried back to die.

In a fragmentary manuscript of the period, now in Washington, the wounds and the subsequent removal of the dying hero are thus described :—

“ While the French were moving on the English lines, General Wolfe stood at the head of the Louisbourg and Bragg's Grenadiers : his excited spirit was pouring itself forth in animated exhortations and fiery eloquence—which springs from that deep emotion which none but warriors can feel—which when “ the noise of battle hurtles in the air ” none but heroes can utter and contending nations are about to grapple in mortal fight. A bullet from a Canadian marksman struck his wrist : he bound a handkerchief over the wound and his exertions were not relaxed. A few moments afterwards, another bullet passed into his groin, his manner was not changed, his exertions were not relaxed. His voice was still heard amidst the din of the

fight and his men knew nothing of his wound. At the moment of the recoil of the French another bullet struck him in the breast ;—lest his soldiers should see him fall he called to an officer to support him, but life was ebbing fast from his wounds and exhausted nature yielded. He sank to the ground, and as a surgeon was in attendance he reluctantly permitted himself to be removed behind the ranks."

The accounts of his last moments differ. That when disabled, the troops he personally led were quite near the opposing French column and were commencing the charge which Wolfe had just ordered, admits of no doubt. The essential disagreements relate to his dying words. Then, again, some authorities have recorded only one of his wounds, some two, and others three ; but as the three we have already mentioned were received on different parts of the field, they could not all be known to most of the individual writers of contemporary journals of the siege ; few, if any of whom, accompanied the General in his movements from one part of the battlefield to another. Hence the necessity of comparing the observations of men stationed upon different parts of the scene of conflict, just as in the case of the previous operations against Quebec, it would have been far from conducive to historical accuracy to have trusted to a contemporary authority who was stationed at Montmorency, for the details of the operations on the other side of the river, or to have depended for the incidents of the siege occurring at the Isle of Orleans, upon the journal of an observer on the Côte de Beaupré. There is nothing surprising in the statement of the Washington manuscript

above quoted that "his men knew nothing of his wounds" after he had been struck for the second time, for it must be remembered that Wolfe made special efforts to conceal them from the army.

Of what followed his removal from the scene of the struggle to that of his peaceful death, there are several versions.

It is quite clear that he survived his removal to the rear of the army but a few minutes. The battle itself was very brief; Wolfe expiring in the moment of victory, while his forces were completing the rout of the enemy and falling vigorously upon their rear, in their flight towards the city and the valley of the St. Charles.

Robert Weir, the master of a transport, said "that he was in the river two miles above and that he took out his watch, when the firing began and held it in his hand until it ceased, which was but ten minutes."

Much that is of very human and pathetic interest was crowded into those last few moments of Wolfe's life. Tradition has it that he sought to mark his gratitude to Doctor Edward Tudor, the surgeon, whom it is claimed attended him as he lay dying, by giving him his pistols. It is worthy of note that Wolfe's pistols had not been previously disposed of by the provisions of his will. It has been claimed that shortly before his death Wolfe gave his gloves to General Price "his aide-de-camp." Price was not an aide-de-camp, however. According to another tradition, an attendant brought him a draught of water from a well, which was only a few feet north of the spot where he was carried back to die.

He was already passing under the shadow of death and the final darkness grew apace. "Finding himself going," says a contemporary chronicler, "he leaned on Captain Curry, of Bragg's, and complaining that his eye sight and strength failed him, desired to know how the day went." An officer who knew of the General's fall, ran back, it is said, to take him the news of the flight of the French army. Wolfe caught the mention of a rout and enquired who ran, and being told, briefly expressed his satisfaction, both with victory and death, and almost imperceptibly passed from the one to the other.

His dying words have come down to us in several slightly differing versions.

By one authority it is related that when his own eyes failed, he asked the fortune of the day of an officer who stood near; that he was told that the French lines seemed to be broken; that soon the cry was heard, "They run! They run!" That with trembling eagerness he inquired "Who run?" and on being answered that Montcalm was utterly routed, he said in a faint, but composed tone: "Thank God! I die contented."

Another writer states that under all the agonies of approaching dissolution when informed that the French fled on all sides, his countenance expressed joy, and that his words "Then I am satisfied," were uttered in exultation.

A third recounts that when the shout "They run", met his ear, he was leaning on the shoulder of a lieutenant who kneeled to support him; and that simply asking "Who?" he exclaimed "Then I die happy."

Still a fourth relates that the officer was seated, and that

the exclamation was "What! do the cowards run already? Then I die happy."

Yet again, that on receiving the last wound, he cried "Support me; let not my brave fellows see me drop;" that water was brought to quench his thirst; that when assured the French were giving way everywhere, his sentiment was "What! do they run already? Now God be praised, I die happy."

Very similar to this is the statement in *Genuine Letters from a Volunteer with the British at Quebec*, that "Crowned with conquest he smiled in death. . . . Support me", he said, to such as were near him, "let not my brave soldiers see me drop; the day is our's,—Oh! Keep it!—and he died."

And, differing from all these, in the account, that, informed of the total rout of his foe, he earnestly demanded, as if to ascertain positively, "Who fly?" and when assured, he did but say "I am satisfied."

So, too, we are informed that he himself first discerned the wavering and the breaking of the opposing lines; that, addressing the officer who sustained him, as he gazed on the battle, he said "Tell me, Sir, do the enemy give way there? tell me for I cannot see;" that, after his sight became dimmer and more confused, and was about to be extinguished forever, and while he reclined his head on the officer's arm, fainting, barely breathing, he was roused by the cry. "They run" and enquiring "Who? Who?" he received the answer "The French; they are beat, Sir, they are flying before you" to which he replied "I am satisfied, my boys."

Again it is narrated, that he lay upon the ground, and lifted his head to gaze on the conflict from time to time, until his eyesight failed, when, for some moments he was motionless, with no other signs of life than heavy breathing or a stifled groan; that suddenly an officer who stood by exclaimed "See how they run". Wolfe, eagerly raising himself on his elbow, cried "Who?" that, receiving the answer, "The enemy, they give way in all directions;" he paused a little, and then said "I shall die happy;" fell back, and turning upon his side, as if by a sharp convulsion, expired."

In an account written soon after the battle it is stated that, supported by a grenadier and a particular friend, his servant, who had long attended him, announced the flight of the French; and that, when thus informed, he barely opened his eyes, and in trembling accents uttered "Then I die contented."

Knox describes the closing scene, as he claims to have had it from one of those who assisted in carrying the General to the rear. He says:—"After our late worthy general of renowned memory was carried off wounded, to the rear of the front line, he desired those who were about him to lay him down; being asked if he would have a surgeon? he replied "It is needless; it is all over with me." One of them cried out "They run, see how they run." "Who runs?" demands our hero, with great earnestness, like a person aroused from sleep. The officer answered "The enemy, Sir; Egad they give way everywhere." Thereupon the General rejoined "Go one of you, my lads, to Colonel Burton; tell him to march Webb's



*Major General Wolfe*  
*From a Sketch made at Quebec by Cap<sup>t</sup> South. A. D. C.*




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*Major General Wolfe*  
*From a Sketch made at Quebec, by Cap<sup>t</sup> Smith, A D C*



regiment with all speed down to Charles' river, to cut off the retreat of the fugitives from the bridge." Then turning on his side, he added "Now, God be praised, I will die in peace."

Lawrence Drake, in his *Heroes of England* tells a very similar story. He says—"While they (the surgeons) were engaged in examining his wounds, he continued to raise himself from time to time to watch the progress of the battle. His eyesight beginning to fail he leaned backwards upon one of the grenadiers who had supported him from the field, and his heavy breathing and an occasional groan alone showed that life remained.

"See how they run", suddenly exclaimed an officer.

"Who run?" exclaimed Wolfe, instantly raising himself on his elbow, and looking up as if life were returning with full vigor.

"The French", answered the officer, "they are giving way in all directions".

"Run one of you", said the General, speaking with great firmness, "run to Colonel Burton, tell him to march Webb's regiment down to Charles' River with all speed, so as to secure the bridge, and cut off the enemy's retreat".

His orders were obeyed, and after a short pause he continued, "Now, God be praised, I shall die happy".

In a letter quoted by the *Literary Gazette* of London on the 11<sup>th</sup> December, 1847, from the pen of a daughter of General John Hale, who, as Colonel, commanded the 47<sup>th</sup> Regiment at the battle of the Plains of Abraham, it is stated that "Wolfe's words were, after receiving his mortal wound, "I am aware that it is the *aide-de-camp's* privilege

to carry the dispatches home; but I beg as a favor to request that my old friend, Colonel Hale may have that honour." This version differs so materially from all the others, that special efforts have been made to ascertain whether it has any other foundation in fact than the extremely unreliable one of family tradition. Investigation has utterly failed however, to bring to light any contemporary authority for the story, notwithstanding the mass of anecdotal and other matter dealing with the last moments of Wolfe's life, or any indication that a matter of such comparative indifference to a dying General, as the selection of a bearer of dispatches, occupied his mind during the few minutes of life that remained to him after having been struck down, mortally wounded.

Quartermaster-Sergeant John Johnson of the 58<sup>th</sup> Regiment, who was present at the battle, wrote — "No sooner did the officer who supported General Wolfe perceive the enemy give way but he immediately cried out they run they run, but the Gen'l in an ecstasy, as if awoke out of a sleep enquired who run. The officer answered hastily The enemy, what, said the general, do they run already. Then I shall die happy and immediately expired."

Colonel Hale, who was on intimate terms with Wolfe and his chief officers, no doubt expressed the wish to be the bearer of the good news to England, but we find no evidence that he ever made the claim that Wolfe recommended him for the honour. The suggestion seems to have been made by Monckton, in a letter to Townshend on the 16<sup>th</sup> of Sept. "Col. Hale for many pressing reasons " would be glad to be the bearer of this good news, and I

"should be glad if he did. If therefore you have no objection, be pleased to tell him he may."

If Wolfe, in his last moments, had requested Col. Hale to take the dispatches. Monckton would surely have mentioned the fact in his letter.

The author of a letter from an officer at Quebec, to a friend in England, published in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of December 1759, says, after describing his fatal wound,—"He then went reeling aside but was soon supported by an officer, of whom he enquired if the enemy were put to flight? and being assured they were, and that our troops were in pursuit, he smiled, and said, he died with pleasure on the spot he ever wished to die on, and then closed his eyes. Thus died this great young general. . . ."

Nathanial P. Willis, speaking of Wolfe's dying moments, says: "The purple stream of life was ebbing—the eye that but a few moments before became bright with glory, waxed dim, and he was sinking to the earth, when the cry of "They run! they run!" arrested his fleeting spirit. "Who run?" exclaimed the dying hero. The French! returned his supporter. "Then I die contented!" were the last words of a Britan who expired in the arms of victory."

Admiral Holmes reports Wolfe's last words to have been "Since I have conquered, I dye satisfied."<sup>(1)</sup>

A writer in the *British Magazine* of 1760, the year after the battle, states that when the gallant commander had asked "Who run?" and had been answered "The enemy,"

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(1) Vol. IV, page 298.

"he said What? do the rascals run already? Then I die happy. So saying this glorious youth expired."

General Townshend, in the Journal in his own handwriting, hitherto unpublished, says of General Wolfe's death: "In the first of the engagement he received a wound in the hand, and a few minutes after, another in the right breast, he was carried off the field and died before they got him to the water's side."<sup>(1)</sup>

Thomas Wilkins has stated that he was the only surgeon on the field of battle, that he spoke to Wolfe about ten minutes before he received his mortal wound, and that his last and dying words were "Lay me down; I am suffocating."

One account, in striking contrast to all the others, says his last words were "Ah! poor Moncton, he must die very soon—or I shall be—in the other world before him. And—do—our troops—waver?"


"No, Sir; they rush on like tigers, to avenge his fall. Right, centre, left everywhere the enemy flies. It is one of the most complete and total routs I ever heard of. There is not, along their whole line, throughout their post, as far as I can see,—and my vision embraces every important point of the field of action—a single Frenchman who, at this moment, offers resistance."

"Then I am—satisfied;—I die contented."

"His head fell upon Ligonier's bosom, and he expired without a struggle," adds the same authority. Finally, we have the version of James Henderson of the 28<sup>th</sup> Regi-

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(1) Vol. V, page 269.





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
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(1) Vol. V, page 269.



General Wolfe killed at the Siege of Quebec September 13<sup>th</sup> 1759

Printed by W. L. Murray, London, 1840



ment, one of those who claim to have carried the dying General from the field of battle. As usual, we quote textually, retaining all the original peculiarities of spelling. His letter was dated at Quebec, October 7<sup>th</sup>, 1759, and was addressed to his uncle. After referring to the two armies "drawn up in the line of battle within a small distance of each other," he continues "the general viewing the position of the two armies he tooke notice of a small rising ground between our right and the enemy's left which concealed us from that quarter—upon which the Gen'l did me the Honour to detach me with a few grandieers to take possession of that ground and maintain it to the last extremity, which I did till both armys was engaged. And then the General came to me and took his post by me.—But, oh ! how can I tell you, my dear Sir—tears flow from my eyes as I write—that great and ever memorable man whose loss can never be enough regretted was scarce a moment with me when he received his fatal wound. I myself received at the same time two wounds—for I was close by him—one in the right shoulder and one in the thigh—but my concern for him was so great that I did not at that time think of them. When the General received the shot I caught hold of him and carried him off the field. He walked about one hundred yards and then begged I would let him sit down which I did ; then I opened his breast and found his shirt full of blood at which he smiled, and when he seen the distress I was in "My dear," said he "don't grieve for me I shall be happy in a few minutes—take care of yourself as I see you are wounded,—but tell me, tell me how goes the battle there?"

"Just then came some officers who told him that the French had given ground and that our troops were pursuing them to the walls of the town. He was then lying in my arms fast expiring. That great man whose sole ambition was his country's glory raised himself up on this news and smiled in my face. "Now," said he "I die contented." From that instant the smile never left his face till he died."

Thus died Wolfe, at the early age of thirty-two years; the winner of one of the most eventful, most decisive, and most far reaching in its results of all the great battles of the world's history. In the brief unadorned words of Pitt to the House of Commons, when describing the moment that victory was announced to the dying General "he put his hand upon his brave heart, looked up and expired."

His brain was evidently the last to go, for though the keepers of the house had trembled and those those that look out of the windows were darkened, the mind preserved to the end a rational cognizance of the condition of the body and of all its surroundings.

A writer in the *Quarterly Review* has said that the so-called agony of death can never be more formidable than in just such cases as this. Yet he considerably reminds us that persons so situated commonly attest that there are few things in life less painful than its close. Such having been the declaration of many of those whose lives have been passed with more than the ordinary immunity from pain, what is more natural than the satisfaction expressed by the dying Wolfe, with the approaching close of a life of incurable disease and suffering, in the moment of the



*Revolver of General Wolfe*

*(showing Mechanism)*

*From a Photograph taken by permission of Messrs. F. Strong & W. W. R. Fisher*

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*Pistol of General Wolfe*

*(showing Mechanism)*

*From a Photograph taken by permission of Mr E. T. Strong & Dr W<sup>m</sup> R. Fisher*





brilliant victory to which he had deliberately sacrificed it, the summit of his highest ambition attained, the gratification of his dearest wish assured?

How strangely akin to his dying words were those of Nelson, uttered under singularly similar circumstances. "Thank God, I die happy," cried the gallant Wolfe, in the hour of victory that presaged the fall of French power in the New World. "Now I am satisfied. Thank God, I have done my duty," moaned the dying Admiral, at the moment of the great triumph in which the naval power of France was broken.

The author of an address delivered before the New England Historic Genealogical Society in 1859, in commemoration of the centennial of the taking of Quebec, draws a comparison between a passage in Wolfe's final address to his troops, written on the eve of the battle, and Nelson's memorable signal, forty-six years afterwards. The very thought, nay, the complete idea of that famous signal, are certainly conveyed in these inspiring words of the English general: "The officers and men will remember what their country expects."

After the many versions above quoted of the incidents that marked the closing moments of Wolfe's life, the reader will doubtless be quite ready to agree with Knox that "Various accounts have been circulated of General Wolfe's manner of dying, his last words, and the officers into whose hands he fell: and many, from a vanity of talking, claimed the honour of being his supporters, after he was wounded." His own version of the General's dying words, already quoted, were furnished him, he tells .

us " by Lieutenant Brown, of the Grenadiers of Louisbourg, and the Twenty-second regiment, who with Mr. Henderson, <sup>(1)</sup> a volunteer in the same company, and a private man, where the three persons, who carried His Excellency to the rear; which an artillery officer seeing, immediately flew to his assistance, and these were all that attended him in his dying moments. I do not recollect the artillery officer's name, or it should be cheerfully recorded here."

Knox is very explicit in the statement that the four attendants for whom he accounts were the only parties that assisted the dying General. Two of these he names, Henderson and Brown, and there are letters from both, corroborative of the story of their presence at the closing scenes of Wolfe's life. This is not to be wondered at, so far at least as Brown is concerned, considering that Knox admits that he furnished him with his facts. Moreover, both Brown and Henderson claim to have been the individual who carried the wounded General, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, who assisted him, off the field, for Henderson distinctly states, after claiming to have carried him from the battleground, that Wolfe walked about a hundred yards. Henderson's relation of the occurrences attending the death of Wolfe has been already given. Now for Brown's. In the *Montreal Star* of March, 1888, Mr. George Murray, F. R. S. C., published the following:—" A letter dated Louisbourg, November 17<sup>th</sup>, 1759, from

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(1) In a memo received from the War Office we find that general Amherst gave Henderson a Commission as Ensign in Bragg's regiment on the 25th of Sept. 1759, and in 1762 he was named Lieutenant.

Henry Brown to his father John Brown, M. P. for Castlebar, who subsequently became Earl of Altemonte, was lately printed (for the first time) in the London *Times*, and has been republished in many Canadian journals. In it we read: "I gave you, dear father, as distinct an account as I could of our action on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, and of the taking of the town of Quebeck. I must add a little to it by informing you that I was the person who carry'd General Wolf off the field, and that he was wounded as he stood within a foot of me. . . . The General did our company the honour to lead us in person, as he said he could depend upon our behaviour, and I think we fully answered his expectations. . . .

The poor General, after I had his wounds dressed, died in my arms. Before he died he thanked me for my care of him. Upon my assuring him that we had killed numbers, taken a number of officers and men prisoners, he thanked God, and begged that I would let him die in peace. He expired in a minute afterwards without the least struggle or groan."

Who are the two parties mentioned by Knox, in addition to Brown and Henderson, as attending upon the dying General; namely the "private man" and the officer of artillery? Is it possible that any of the other claimants to the honour of assisting the wounded General, whose names have come down to us, will answer these descriptions?

An authority already quoted states that Wolfe's head "fell upon Ligonier's bosom, and he expired without a struggle." Who was Ligonier? Was he either the private man or the artillery officer? Clearly not the latter, for no

such name occurs on the list of officers engaged in the action. Might he then have been either Wolfe's "particular friend," or his servant, who had long attended him, both of whom, according to one version of the scene, supported the General in his dying moments. Four of his servants are mentioned by Wolfe in his will, two of them by their christian names, the other two being simply referred to as footmen. The portion of the will referring to his servants is fully one-third of the entire document, and is quite in keeping with the consideration which he ever exhibited for the condition and comfort of those serving under him. It reads as follows:—"My servant François shall have one half of my cloaths and linen here, and the three footmen shall divide the rest amongst them. All the servants shall be paid their year's wages, and their board wages till they arrive in England, or till they engage with other masters, or enter into some other profession. I leave fifty guineas to François, twenty to Ambrose, and ten to each of the others."

Was François a Frenchman, and was his other name, Ligonier? While the question must remain unanswered, nothing is more reasonable than to suppose that one, at least, of Wolfe's servants, was near enough to be of service to him when wounded and carried to the rear, and François was evidently the most highly esteemed of the number by his master.

We have already seen that one story pictures the General as leaning on Captain Curry of Bragg's while dying. Differing materially from this are the statements printed by *Notes and Queries*. One of these is authority for the

following, that "The soldier who supported Wolfe after he received his death wound was named James; he was in the Artillery; he likewise served at Louisbourg and Quebec, and survived till 1812, when he died at Carlisle Castle, where he was stationed for years as bombardier, aged 92." The other story appeared in the number of the 24<sup>th</sup> of May, 1856, and is to the effect that James McDougall, a Highland sergeant, supported Wolfe on this sad occasion, and at page 47 of Cannon's History of the 67<sup>th</sup> Regiment, he is styled "the faithful Highland Sergeant who attended him when dying."

In a work of fiction founded upon the Battle of the Plains, the writer, a party named Haverill claims for himself the honour of having carried the wounded General off the battle-field, while West's well-known picture of the death of Wolfe, depicts General Monckton, Dr. Adair, <sup>(1)</sup> Captain Hervey Smith, <sup>(2)</sup> Major Barré, Colonel Williamson, Colonel Napier and others grouped about the dying hero. West's picture is, however, absolutely valueless as a historic representation. It is a well-known fact that most of those represented in it were not with Wolfe at his death, some of them not having been at Quebec at all on the day of the battle, while the Indian figure standing by, with ornaments of feathers in his hair, is certainly a piece of pure imagi-

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(1) For reference to Dr. Adair by Captain Montessor, see Vol. IV, p. 334.

(2) Captain Smith survived Wolfe some fifty-two years, and died a baronet. The *Examiner* of October the 20th, 1811 contained the following reference to his death:—"Lately, at his farm, at Elmswell, in Suffolk, Sir Harvey Smith, Bart. He was one of the Pages to George the Second, and Aide-de-Camp to Gen. Wolfe at the taking of Quebec."

nation on the part of the artist. West has more than imagination to answer for, however. He stands charged with misrepresentation of historic facts for a money consideration. A daughter of Colonel—afterwards General—Hale, who commanded a regiment under Wolfe, says, in a letter printed in the *Literary Gazette* of December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1847—“General Hale’s portrait is not inserted in that fine print of Wolfe’s death, and why? Because he would not give the printer the sum of £100, which he demanded as the price of placing on a piece of paper what his own country knew so very well, viz.: that he (General Hale) fought in the hottest of the battle of Quebec, whether the printer thought fit to record it or not.” The fact mentioned by the General’s daughter, that her father fought in the hottest of the battle, which was being waged at the moment of Wolfe’s death, is convincing evidence enough that he was not just then with the General. Since West was prepared, for a financial consideration, to paint into his so-called historical picture an individual who was somewhere else at the time, it is surely not difficult to account for the presence in his painting of the portraits of others, who were absent from the scene which it purports to represent.

There was reprinted from *The Scot’s Magazine*, in the *Quebec Gazette* of the 11<sup>th</sup> January, 1816, the following obituary notice:—“Died, April 24, 1815, at Galway, aged 102, Thomas Wilkins, M. D., many years surgeon of the county of Galway Infirmary. It was in his arms the immortal Wolfe breathed his last, on the 13<sup>th</sup> October, 1759.” The tradition may also be recalled here that Wolfe was attended in his last moments by Dr. Tudor.

Summing up, therefore, the claims of those who pretended to have assisted the dying General, it will be found that Henderson, Brown and Haverill, each claimed to have carried him off the field; an artilleryman named James, and James McDougall the Highland Sergeant are each said to have "supported" him; it is declared that he leaned upon Captain Curry of Bragg's, fell upon the bosom of Ligonier and expired, and died in the arms of Dr. Wilkins, according to one authority, and in those of Lieut. Brown, if that officer's statement is correct. In addition to these nine people, we have at least seven others represented by West, in his picture, as attending upon Wolfe,—most of them, as we have seen, without any justification,—besides the Grenadier, the particular friend, the servant, and Dr. Edward Tudor of other authorities, and the private man and the artillery officer, of Knox. Yet the latter insists that four people only were with the General and assisted him in his dying moments. It is only right to point out, however, that the number of those claimed by various authorities as having attended the wounded General, may not really be so large as it at first sight appears, since the Ligonier of one authority may have been the "servant" mentioned by another and perhaps the "private man" of a third, and the grenadier of one account was in all probability one of the officers mentioned by name in another.

Knox was not present, himself, at the memorable scene, and was one of the first to direct the attention to the difficulty thrown in the way of the historian by the vanity of many who claimed the honor of having supported Wolfe



after he was wounded. His own informant was Brown, who may have been tinged with the same vanity that was so repugnant to Knox. Whether or not the story he told of himself was true, it seems very probable that he misled Knox as to the number of those who attended upon the dying General, between the moment of his fatal wounding and that of his death. And if he told Knox the same story that he wrote to his father, namely that he was "the person" who carry'd General Wolfe off the field, it does not seem to have been altogether credited, since Knox says that three persons carried His Excellency to the rear,—Brown, Henderson, and a private man. And if "vanity of talking" led Brown to claim for himself the honor which belonged equally the two others, of carrying the wounded General off the field, it may equally have induced him to seek to deprive several others of the credit of having assisted Wolfe in other respects.

He tells his father that he had the General's wounds dressed, and this statement presupposes the presence of a surgeon, which is natural enough under the circumstances. Knox, it is true, states that being asked if he would have a surgeon, Wolfe replied. "It is needless, it is all over with me," and immediately afterwards, the author of the journal goes on to say that only four people attended him in his dying moments, neither of whom appears to have been a surgeon. It is scarcely conceivable, however, that Knox could have been right in this particular. There must surely have been a surgeon to attend to the wounded General, when carried to the rear, and his own statement that one could do nothing for him, would certainly not

Septane at Sea 8<sup>th</sup> June 1789

I desire that Miss Scudder's Picture may be set in  
Jewels to the amount of five Hundred Guineas, and  
returned to her.

I leave to Col. Dighton, Col. Carleton, Col. Howe, & Col.  
Wade, a thousand Pounds each.

I desire Admiral Saunders to accept of my Regt  
saviour of Plate, in remembrance of his Guest.

My Camp Equipage, Kitchen, Turnstons, Table Linens,  
Linen & provisions, I leave to the Officer who  
succeeds me in the Command.

All my Books & Papers both here & in England, I  
leave to Col. Carleton.

I leave Major Barré, Capt. DeLaune, Capt. Smyth,  
Capt. Bell - Capt. Leflie & Capt. Calverle each  
a hundred Guineas, to buy swords & rings in  
remembrance of their Friend.

My servant Trauco's, shall have one half of my  
Clothes & Linnen here, and the three Foot-men  
shall divide the rest amongst them.

All the servants shall be paid their years Wages, and  
their board Wages till they arrive in England, or till  
they engage with other Masters, or enter into some  
other profession. Besides this, I leave fifty Guineas  
to Trauco's, twenty to Ambrose, and ten to each  
of the others.

Every thing over and above the Legacies I leave to my  
good mother, entirely at her Disposal.

Witness my

Hand

Wm DeLaune

Jam: Wolfe



deter him from attending, nor the other attendants from seeing that he was summoned.

The body of General Wolfe is said to have been carried from the Plains of Abraham in the plaid of Sergeant Donald McLeod. But there is still preserved in the Tower of London the soldier's coat upon which Wolfe died, and which forms the subject of one of our illustrations; and it is extremely improbable that he was carried off on another plaid. One account states that he was wrapped in the banner of the Guienne Regiment, which had just been taken from the French. This story is more dramatic than probable, however.

Nor is there any valid evidence to support the claim advanced in the middle of the last century, by a gentleman in Maine, that he possessed the very sash worn by Wolfe when killed.

The bullet which killed Wolfe is, it is stated, in the possession of King Edward, and forms part of a curious collection of death messengers which have changed the whole aspects of history, and which includes also the fatal missiles that caused the death of Lord Nelson, of Sir Geo. Cathcart, General Burgoyne and others.

Every imaginable relic of the hero of Quebec seems to have aroused discussion, so extremely prized is their possession.

In a letter from Miss Armstrong, great-great-granddaughter of Wolfe's tutor, the following passage occurs:—"Wolfe's lace ruffles were sent by my aunt, Mrs. Pearson, to be cleaned, some years ago, in Brighton, and stolen by the lady's maid. My cousin, Mrs. Edgecombe Venning,

has one of the Wolfe diamonds set in a ring, and another cousin, Mrs. West, has the other."

Some ninety years after Wolfe's death, a sword, believed to have been his property was found upon that part of the field where he breathed his last. When discovered, it was taken to a Montreal gunsmith, and by him sold to Mr. Stewart Derbishire, for many years Queen's Printer in Canada. Shortly afterwards, the 100<sup>th</sup> Regiment was raised in Canada to proceed to the Crimea and the sword was then presented to Major Dunn, in the hope that he would, to use Mr. Derbishire's own words "again make it terrible to the enemies of our country." It is believed to have been used by Major Dunn in the charge of the Six Hundred at Balaclava. From Messrs. Sotheby and Hodge, into whose hands it subsequently fell, this excellent specimen of an officer's sword of the period, with a hilt of silver and a three-cornered blade, was purchased in 1894, by the Hon. J. C. Patterson, Dominion Minister of Militia.

The experts of the Royal United Service Institution in London, claim that the genuine sword worn by the hero of Quebec at the battle of the Plains, is in their museum. It is a small weapon, about two feet in length, and is very like a hanger such as British officers were in the habit of carrying, together with a rifle. This sword has been in the museum of the Institution since 1836, or fourteen years before the Dunn weapon was unearthed on the Heights of Abraham. It claims an excellent descent, the label relating that it was "the sword worn by General Wolfe when he fell at Quebec, 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1759; presented by George Warde Esq." This same George

Podick's

Camp of Westmoreland

29<sup>th</sup> July 1779

When I made my will, I did not exactly know  
the situation of my affairs - the following  
additions therefore to the Legacy shall be made  
I give a thousand Pounds to Major Walter  
Wolfe, and a thousand Pounds to Captain  
Edward Goldsmith.

Jam: Wolfe

Witnesses

Thos Long  
Jacob Barr

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Warde was a direct descendant of General the Hon. George Warde, who was Wolfe's friend during life and to whom the sword came direct from the mother of Wolfe.

Of his other relics it may be mentioned that his seal still adheres to a letter written by him to his friend Rickson, <sup>(1)</sup> on the 12<sup>th</sup> of January, 1758, and consists of the figure of a human head, with a fillet of laurel, gathered into a knot behind. <sup>(2)</sup>

Some of the hero's china tea service is still preserved at the mansion of T. T. Kyfton Esq., Uphill, near Weston, Somerset, (Sheriff), whose mother, a Miss Cridland, was connected with the Wolfe family.

The body of the dead hero was carried to the river side on the afternoon of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September and taken across to Levis where it was embalmed and conveyed on board the Stirling Castle. The precious remains were subsequently transferred to the Royal William, on board of which they were conveyed to Portsmouth, in charge of the invalided Drill Sergeant of the 42<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Donald

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(1) So many references have been made in the course of this work to Wolfe's bosom friend that it is interesting to note the fact that he survived the General eleven years and died at Edinburgh. He was interred in Restalrig churchyard, and on the tomb erected over his remains, the following inscription may still be seen, recording the worth of him whom Wolfe honoured with so large a share of his confidence, and who shared so much of that brave man's sincere regard :

" Here lies the body of Lieut.-Col. William Rickson, Quartermaster-General of North Britain, who died the 19th July, 1770, in the 51st. year of his age, and 31st. in the service of his king and country. He was an officer of much experience, excellent judgment, and great bravery—at same time humane, agreeable, generous, friendly, affectionate ; in memory of whose superior worth, and in testimony of great love and esteem, this tomb is erected by his disconsolate widow."

(2) See *Naval and Military Gazette*, July 15th, 1851.



MacLeod, of whom we find an interesting account in a letter dated August 26<sup>th</sup>, 1889, from Sheriff Ivory of Inverness, which was contributed to *Canadians* by Mr Geo. Murray F. R. S. C. Its reads as follows: . . . . "Sergeant Donald MacLeod referred to, as he was a cousin of my mother, and his history, being a somewhat extraordinary one, attracted my attention. His father was a grandson of Sir Roderic MacLeod, of MacLeod, of Dunnegan. Sergeant MacLeod's uncle was sheriff MacLeod, who was sheriff of Skye in 1773. His, Sheriff MacLeod's brother John eloped with his wife Isabella Macdonald, of Sleat, from a public school at Inverness when they were sixteen and seventeen respectively. As can be easily understood, Sergeant MacLeods father's fortunes after this were not very bright and he and his family fell into poverty. Donald, his son, the sergeant, on attaining his majority, enlisted, and turned out a good soldier, and skilled swordsman. His regiment was the Royal Scots, then commanded by the Earl of Orkney. Fought under the Duke of Marlborough, between 1704 and 1712, having been engaged at Blenheim and Ramillies. He was also at Sheriffmuir in 1720. He left the Royal Scots and became recruiting and afterwards drill sergeant to Simon, Lord Lovat, in the raising of the independant companies, subsequently formed into the 42<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. He afterwards fought at Fontenoy, at Louisbourg in America, and at the siege of Quebec, under General Wolfe, though then in his seventy-first year. At Quebec he was sorely wounded, and was invalided home in charge of the body General of Wolfe to Britain in November, 1759. Twelve of his sons,

he having married three times, joined the army and navy."

In a subsequent chapter we shall read of the honors paid to the remains of General Wolfe, upon their arrival in England.

At Quebec, General Monckton issued an order desiring "That all officers of the army will please to wear mourning for General Wolfe, their late Commander in Chief, such as is usual in the field."

The illness under which Wolfe labored during the siege of Quebec was a severe disease of the bladder. Only a few days before his death he said to his surgeon "I know you cannot cure my complaint but pray make me up so that I may be without pain for three days and able to do my duty. That is all I want." He was in an extremely delicate state of health a year before, and we have seen in the preceding account of his life, that this was one of the principal reasons for which he desired to return to England at the end of that season's campaign. He was a very bad sailor, and his letter to Pitt, of the 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1758, shows that his constitution was much impaired by the voyage home.

Not very long before his final assault of Quebec and when still suffering from the fever which attacked him at Montmorency, he complained again of his indisposition. "My ill state of health," he says, "hinders me from executing my own plan. It is of too desperate a nature to order others to execute." And further on in the same letter,— "I hope I shall have strength to lead these men to wherever we can find the enemy."

Many men so circumstanced would have been utterly

cast down. Wolfe's character ran in a different mould. He was not even discouraged. "Don't tell me of constitution", he said, three days before his death, in answer to the statement made in his hearing, that a certain sick officer had but a puny, delicate constitution. "Dont tell me of constitution ; that officer has good spirits, and good spirits will carry a man through everything." The authority for the story, very reasonably remarks that the reference to the sick officer's puny, delicate constitution, "struck His Excellency, it being his own case."

Bodily infirmities, and even the physical sufferings that they entailed, but served as further fuel to the fire of his unquenchable ambition. Their excruciating pain, their tendency to divert attention from the all-important work he had in hand and to unnerve him for further effort, and even the dread,—as we have just heard from his own lips, that they might rob him of the strength necessary to the accomplishment of his purpose, were powerless to affect either his own physical exertions or his particular attention to the minute details of his daring strategy, for his was a mind long and successfully trained to triumph over matter.

Ten years before he fell in the arms of Victory, racked with a disease that would have incapacitated many a man from active service of any kind, he had declared that "while a man is able to do his duty, and stand and hold his arms, it is infamous to retire." In the tenacity of purpose thus expressed, is furnished the keynote of his character and remarkable achievement. He had something more, however, than mere tenacity of purpose. Inflexible in resolution, he possessed to an uncommon degree, the

perfect self confidence so essential to a successful steadfastness of determination.

It is related under date of July 16<sup>th</sup> 1759, that the bearer of the last flag of truce from the enemy said to General Wolfe: "We do not doubt but you will demolish the town, but we are determined your army shall never get footing within our walls." To which the General replied: "I will be master of Quebec, if I stay here until the latter end of November next." The point of his reply lay in the real or supposed danger to the fleet, in remaining in the St. Lawrence as late as the beginning of a Canadian winter.

Wolfe's own enthusiasm and confidence in the success of his plans was infectious, and the extent to which it was shared by his officers is illustrated by an anecdote recorded in a contemporary journal.

"Sept. 10. General Wolfe, being informed of the indisposition of two officers on board a ship, of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Regiment, expressed the greatest tenderness and good nature towards them, and desired they would not continue on board, to endanger their constitutions; for that he would lend them his barge with pleasure, to conduct them to Gorham's post, whence they should have an escort to Point Levi camp. The gentlemen politely declined the offer, assuring the General that no consideration could induce them to leave the army, until they should see the event of this expedition."

The thrilling romance of Wolfe's death and the marvel, the historic importance and the wonderful consequences of his dying victory, are apt to overshadow much else that is of real interest in the brief but busy life of the hero of

Quebec, and much, that it is only fair to say, has only been dragged to the light of day as a result of recent investigation.


He is popularly known as the victor of an assault of exceptional daring and valor, who counted not his life dear when the success of his country's cause was at stake.

He was all this; but he was much more. He gave to Britain a new dominion, but he gave her much other valuable service as well.

The tale of the great achievement of his life is one that stirs the blood of every school boy whose mother tongue is that of Wolfe, but the exceeding lustre of it throws almost everything else of his noble and generous life into the shade.

The guiding principles of his life, his eager pursuit of knowledge, the triumph of his self stimulated genius over the constant annoyance of limited means and the depressing effects of a feeble constitution overburdened with disease, coupled with the splendid service that he rendered in various campaigns seem to call for a brief review, in this place, of the life, already treated in biographical form, of which the culmination and crowning act upon the Plains of Abraham has just been fully described.

The two points in his character which stand out in boldest relief from the story of his early youth are his filial affection and his craving for his father's calling, — that of the army. His letters to his mother furnish assurances of the boy's love and devotion, and it surprises no body who has read them to learn that his first act upon visiting England for the last time and rejoining his regi-



*The Coat upon which General Wolfe died.  
From a Photograph taken by permission of General  
Sir Hugh Gough of the Tower of London.*

*Bull from the spot where General Wolfe fell.  
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
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ment, was to ask for leave of absence that he might hasten to pay his filial respects to the aged General and Mrs. Wolfe.

The youthful ambition of the future conquerer of Quebec, for a military career, which was gratified by the receipt of a commission as second lieutenant, ere he had attained his fifteenth birthday, ripened, as the years sped on, into a passionate attachment to the profession of his choice. His early maturity of judgment assisted him, in the light of the high standard of excellence and devotion to duty, which he had set for himself, to a ready discernment of the failings and shortcomings of his professional contemporaries. These, notwithstanding the tendency of youth and its accompanying allurements, he studiously and conscientiously avoided; and despite the depressing influences of a weak and sickly constitution, he so devoted himself to the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties, and to a thorough mastery of the art of war, as to earn the admiration of all succeeding ages. It is impossible to follow him through these struggles of high endeavour, painful and discouraging as they often were, without feeling ourselves in the presence of one possessing all the elements of greatness. Nor are the circumstances attending his death and dying triumph his only claim to the title of hero. His entire life was one of heroic resolve and performance, and warrants the claim that in the profession of arms, James Wolfe was the man of his age.

The confidence of his superiors in his ability and judgment is shown by the facts that at sixteen years of age he was made acting adjutant of his regiment, that in the fol-

lowing year he became adjutant by royal commission, that a few days later he received his lieutenancy, and that he became captain at the age of seventeen. At eighteen we find him acting as Brigade Major at the indecisive battle of Falkirk, in Scotland, and adversely criticising the action of the English artillery drivers in leaving their carriages and running off with the horses, thus causing the loss of several guns. He was present at Culloden and bitterly condemned the " succession of errors and train of ill-behaviour " produced by the campaign in Scotland. We have seen, too, that he was wounded at the battle of Laffeldt, and publicly thanked by the Commander-in-Chief for brilliant and valorous conduct upon the field; and that before his twenty-second year he had passed through seven campaigns, had been singled out by the Duke of Cumberland as a man of experience and judgment, meriting promotion, had been led to expect a lieutenant-colonelcy, and was striving unsuccessfully for the necessary leave of absence to enable him to go abroad and perfect himself in the science of war. His love of learning is illustrated by his devotion of so much of his leisure time to the study of Latin and mathematics. He made up, too, as largely as possible, by private study, for his failure to gain military experience with foreign armies. His reading was most extensive, as shown by the formidable list of works upon the science of war with which he was familiar, and which he recommends in one of his letters to the study of a young officer.

That his own study stood him in good stead was strikingly illustrated at the siege of Louisburg, and it is impos-

sible to read the evidence produced at the inquiry into the conduct of the ill-fated expedition against Rochefort, under the command of Sir John Mordant, without coming to the conclusion that the plans voluntarily suggested by Wolfe "would, in all human probability, have resulted in a great national success, had his superior officers, although too incapable to form them, been possessed of enough good sense and courage to carry them out." Lord Anson thought so highly of them that he reported them to the King, and it was less than two years later, that the brilliant young Quarter-Master General of the Rochefort expedition was selected by Pitt for the supreme command of the expedition against Quebec, — a proof that that astute and far-seeing statesman had formed the estimate of General Wolfe herein claimed for him.


To his personal valour, eminent military skill and intimate knowledge of the principles and science of war, many admirable qualities are to be added which belong to the equipment of a really great and successful commander. His love of virtue and discountenance of vice in the army is shown in both his private correspondence and regimental orders.

His own rectitude of conduct and strict conscientiousness, is illustrated, not only by the many instances of his stern devotion to duty, but by his peremptory refusal, even at the request of his dearly-loved mother, to recommend for a commission in the army, a relative who lacked what he believed to be the necessary character and qualifications.

To his paternal consideration for the safety and comfort

of the men serving under him, convincing testimony is borne by the title they applied to him ; namely " The Officers Friend ; The Soldiers Father ". He was always ready, not only to accompany his men wherever they were ordered, but also to show them the way. An instance was furnished at Louisbourg, where he advanced towards one of the enemy's posts with an advance guard of only eight or ten men. At the unsuccessful attack upon Montmorency, he was in the first boat. And he received his death wound at the head of the right division of his army, two previous wounds in the same engagement having failed to deter him from occupying an exposed position.


Horace Walpole, in his *Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Third* testifies that " He gave the most minute attention to the welfare and comfort of his troops ; and instead of maintaining the reserve and stateliness so common with other commanders of that day, his manner was frank and open, and he had a personal knowledge of perhaps every officer in his army. We recollect a respectable veteran, who, after having served under him at Louisburgh and Cape Breton, commanded one of the first detachments that scaled the heights of Abraham. In that exploit, Captain—was shot through the lungs. On recovering his senses, he saw Wolfe standing by his side. Amidst the anxieties of such a critical hour, the General stopped to press the hand of the wounded man—praised his services, encouraged him not to abandon the hope of life—assured him of leave of absence and early promotion ; nay, more, he desired an aide-de-camp to give a message to that effect to General Monckton, should he himself fall



*Portion of Sash worn by D'Edward Tudor  
In whose arms General Wolfe is believed to have died.*


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in the action ; and, to the credit of General Monckton, the promise was kept. No wonder that these qualities, coupled with brilliant success, won the hearts of the soldiery : a sort of romance still clings to his name. He is the only British General belonging to the reign of George the Second who can be said to have earned a lasting reputation."

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## CHAPTER XIII.

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### AFTER THE BATTLE.

THE scene of carnage on the Plains of Abraham upon which the noonday sun of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1759 looked down, offered a strange contrast to the brilliant spectacle presented upon the same heights less than two hours before, when the bright, warm rays of the sunlight, bursting through the rifts in the scattering clouds, were reflected from the arms and accoutrements of two warlike hosts, facing each other in battle array.

Shortly after ten o'clock, Montcalm had stood face to face with his distinguished rival, separated by a distance of only four hundred yards. Each was flushed with the assurance of victory, each impressed with a thorough consciousness of the important results that hung upon the issues of the day, and confident of the approaching success of his efforts for upholding the glory and the renown of his native land.

Then came the advance, with its fatal collision, — only eight to ten minutes of a violent clash of arms, — followed by the flight of the French, the pursuit of the British, and the deadly slaughter of the foe by the bayonets of the Grenadiers and the broadswords of the Highlanders.

Far and wide over the field of battle, the blue and white uniforms of the heroic dead bore mute testimony to the havoc that followed in the wake of victory.

The French were vanquished and their gallant leader wounded. The British had been victorious, but the eyes of their noble commander were closed in the sleep of death.

The battle had been fought and won, but much remained to be accomplished ere the red cross of St. George could replace the lily-bedecked banner of the Bourbons upon the heights of Quebec.

The dogs of war had been withdrawn from the chase, the pursuers recalled from the tracks of the fugitives, and the army which had been so sorely stricken in the death of the illustrious Wolfe, and so divided and widely separated while following after the foe, was now reunited and reformed through the exertions of Brigadier-General Townshend, who with Brigadier Murray, went to the head of every regiment, thanking the men for their good behaviour, and congratulating the officers upon their success.

The first thought of the British at this time was to establish their camp upon the ground where the decisive battle had been fought, which was about a thousand yards from the walls of the city. To have formed it nearer to the town would have brought it to the summit of the rising ground at Claire Fontaine street,<sup>(1)</sup> or upon the slope facing the fortifications of Quebec, where it would have been within open range of the guns of the French batteries.

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(1) See *Modern Plan of the City of Quebec* in this volume.

Although Townshend has been informed by a letter from the Marquis de Montcalm received early on the morning of the 14<sup>th</sup> of September that the French troops were obliged to surrender to the British arms, he took every means to strengthen his position and to protect his army from any sudden attack. As soon, therefore, as the army had partaken of some well-earned refreshment, the fortification of the camp was commenced. Immediately after the action, a portion of the intrenching tools had been brought ashore, and the men set to work to throw up redoubts, not knowing but that next morning they might be subjected to another attack from the enemy. Before night they had finished about twelve of these redoubts,<sup>(1)</sup> so arranged as to protect both the front and the flank of the camp.

Every house, tree or fence that might afford protection to the enemy was destroyed and the materials were employed in erecting barricades and in strengthening the camps. The necessity for these operations appeared very urgent, if the British were to retain their position upon the heights and the advantages they had already gained. The enemy's army was virtually surrounding them. The batteries of the town and its garrison were in front, Vaudreuil and his command were off their left flank, and Bougainville in their rear. Townshend might well have been harrassed with doubts and fears and grave anxieties for the future. The woods upon the flank and rear of his camp might harbour and conceal the foe and facilitate a

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(1) Vol. VI, page 145.

disastrous surprise. The work of strengthening and fortifying the camp was therefore hurriedly carried on. More intrenching tools were brought up from the fleet, and a number of men were employed in repairing a slanting path that ran from the neighbourhood of the landing place at l'Anse de Foulon towards the crest of the cliff near the height upon which the Quebec jail is now situated, for the bringing up of artillery to form batteries against the town. Supplies for the army had also to be brought up to the heights as well as the camp equipage. The protection of the camp was of so much greater importance than the comfort of the men, that little was done that day towards the bringing up of tents, and the greater part of the army slept upon their arms during the few hours that were left them after their cessation from work.

As soon as he was assured of the British victory Admiral Saunders sent up all the boats in the fleet to the landing place with artillery and ammunition. <sup>(1)</sup> As they passed in front of the town they were subjected to a heavy fire from the French batteries, which caused them no damage however. This timely assistance of the navy in hastening forward the landing of the artillery, ammunition and supplies, and its cordial co-operation with the army throughout the siege, were gratefully acknowledged by General Townshend, who later testified, in his official dispatches, to the constant assistance and support received from "y<sup>e</sup> Admirals and y<sup>e</sup> Naval Service, . . . . . and to y<sup>e</sup> perfect harmony and immediate correspondence which has pre-

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(1) Vol. VI., page 121.

vailed throughout our operations in y<sup>e</sup> uncommon difficulties which y<sup>e</sup> nature of this country in particular presents to military operations of a great extent, and which no army can in itself solely supply." He added. "The immense labour in artillery stores and provisions, y<sup>e</sup> long waitings and attendance in boats, the drawing up our artillery by y<sup>e</sup> seamen even in y<sup>e</sup> heat of y<sup>e</sup> action, it is my duty, short as my command has been to acknowledge for that time how great a share y<sup>e</sup> Navy has had in this successful campaign".<sup>(1)</sup>

Admiral Saunders, on his side, testified in his dispatches to the Admiralty, to the harmony between the different branches of the service which so eminently distinguished this eventful campaign. "I have the pleasure, also," he said, "of acquainting their Lordships that during this tedious campaign, there has continued a perfect good understanding between the Army and Navy. I have received great assistance from Admirals Durell and Holmes and from all the Captains. Indeed everybody has exerted themselves in the execution of their duty; even the transports have willingly assisted me with boats and people, on landing the troops and many other services."<sup>(2)</sup>

Only a few hours after the battle, the Admiral had written to General Townshend as follows:—

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(1) From a copy of the original in the Public Record Office, London. It will be observed on comparing even these few lines with the printed versions of Townshend's letter, that several alterations were made by the editor at the time it was published. Two pages of this dispatch are reproduced as an example of the writing of Townshend.

(2) Vol. VI., page 121.



“ On Board The Sterling Castle,

September 13<sup>th</sup> 1759.

“ Dear Sir,

“ The loss of our friend General Wolfe gives me the greatest concern which in some measure is taken off by the great victory of to-day ; as I have not heard how you are situated, I have sent all the 24 pounders with the ammunition that I had boats for till those are cleared that are now above.

I heartily wish you farther success, and should be glad to know what I can do to promote it. I have the despatches General Wolfe sent me to go with the great ships. They are not gone and I shall keep them till I have yours. I beg my best compliments to general Murray and that you will believe me most sincerely yours,

“ CHAS. SAUNDERS.”

The boats that brought artillery and supplies from the ships did not all return empty. The British had taken thirteen French officers and three hundred and thirty men prisoners, and these were sent on board the vessels of the fleet.

There were heavy hearts on board one of the boats that afternoon. It bore across the river from the landing place to the opposite shore, the mortal remains of the heroic British General, which had been reverently carried from the spot where he died happy and victorious, to the water's edge, wrapped in a soldiers coat, and covered with the flag which he had died to save. At Levis, the body was em-

balmed, and on the following day was taken on board the "Sterling Castle,"<sup>(1)</sup> where it remained until it was removed to the "Royal William" which conveyed it to England.

The other British dead were decently interred upon the battlefield, and the same last offices were performed for those of the enemy's killed who lay upon that part of the ground then covered by the British camp. Not many years ago, a portion of this ground, lying between the Franciscan Church and DeSalaberry street, was levelled for the purpose of forming a theatre of miniature trials of strength and prowess, for the use of the descendants of those who met there in grander but more sanguinary combat, more than a century and a quarter before. The excavations made in levelling these lands for athletic purposes, brought to light fragments of bone and dozens upon dozens of cannon balls, bullets, military buttons, ornaments, etc., grim relics of the sanguinary conflict of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1759. The arms that were found upon the dead warriors on the day of the battle were thrown all together into a pond or marsh that is shown upon the old plans to have been situated a little in rear or to the north-west of the present Franciscan Church.

The position of the British camp after the battle is plainly indicated upon the coloured plan accompanying this work, which was drawn by three officers of Wolfe's army. It occupied much of that position of the battlefield lying between the St. Louis and the St. Foye roads. The redoubts thrown up to defend it were erected in the direction

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(1) Vol. IV, page 294.

of the cliff of the Cote Ste. Geneviève, as well as in the front towards the city and also in the rear. Others commanded communication with the landing place. In one of them, situated near the mill at the summit of Cote d'Abraham, the two pieces of cannon already on the Heights had been placed during the afternoon and brought to play upon the two armed vessels in the River St. Charles, between the chain at the mouth of the stream and the bridge of boats.

It had been a long and eventful day for the British army, which had spent the greater part of the previous night in the flat bottomed boats on the river, had clambered up the precipice in the darkness that preceded the dawn, had withstood the French assault, had pursued the flying foe, had spent the remaining hours of daylight in intrenching their camp and had now to sleep under arms if they slept at all on the bare ground, during the cold September night, with only the blue canopy of heaven over them, and the starry firmament for a covering. Only a portion of the troops slept at all most of the others taking post in the newly formed redoubts <sup>(1)</sup> while some were sent to guard or to reconnoitre the various avenues of approach. At midnight, a special detachment detailed for the purpose, made its appearance at the General Hospital to take possession of it. <sup>(2)</sup> Such of the enemy as had been wounded that day and removed there were made prisoners, the hospital being considered a part of the field of battle. <sup>(3)</sup> The detachment

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(1) Vol. V., page 189.

(2) Vol. IV., page 209.

(3) Vol. V., page 54.

had been taken from Fraser's Highlanders; the same doughty warriors, "whose bright claymores glittered so terribly as they pursued, down the hill side, Montcalm's routed forces," in full view of those who stood at the windows of the General Hospital. It is not at all surprising that the sudden appearance of a body of these same sanguinary soldiers, at the hospital, at the hour of midnight, should have caused momentary terror to the Nuns of the institution, and to their guests, the Reverend Ladies of the Hotel Dieu and of the Ursuline Convent, who had taken refuge with them some weeks before, when the cannonading of the town by the British demolished a good portion of their own homes, and rendered them uninhabitable and dangerous to life and limb; their fright was only temporary, however. The attitude of the Highlanders, as the annalist of the Ursulines hastens to record, was not then hostile. Their commander, Captain McDonnell, had explained, in a brief interview with the three Superiors, the necessity he was under of investing the place, in order to prevent a surprise. He pledged his word that no harm should befall the inmates of the institution, and claimed their benevolent services for the wounded of the English army, who were taken in indiscriminately with the French, from the battle field.<sup>(1)</sup> Among the wounded so brought to the Hospital, it not infrequently happened that the good sisters recognized the familiar form of a father, a brother, or some other relative. Yet so faithfully did they exert themselves in the execution of the duties to which they had devoted

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(1) *Glances of the Monastery*, Part III, page 65 and 66.

their lives, that it is on record that they found themselves unable to do more to soothe the dying hour of their own relations, than they were called upon to do for the strangers committed to their charity.

From the pen of one of the inmates of the General Hospital that night, we have a brief though picturesque description of the appearance at that time of the battle ground and the French camp.

“The remnants of the French army,” says, the good sister “after turning many times upon their pursuers, had completely disappeared. Their tents were still standing along the plains of Beauport; but their batteries and trenches were silent and solitary; their guns, still pointed, were mute. Along the battlefield of the Plains, still reeking with gore and covered with the slain, the victors were opening the turf, to hide from view the hideous effects of war; bearing off such of the poor victims as still survived, and hastening to intrench themselves, to secure their position so fortunately gained.”<sup>(1)</sup>

Leaving both the General Hospital, by the side of the St. Charles, and the battlefield, on the Heights above, to the stillness of the September night, broken only, in the one case, by the tread of the sentry without and the groans of the wounded and dying within, and in the other by the movements of the different guards and the sound of the intrenching tools, in some cases plied all night long,—it is time that we should again turn to the French camp, which we left while the last of the fugitives from the

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(1) *Glimpses of the Monastery*, Part III, page 66.

scene of the engagement were about crossing the bridge of boats into the hornwork.

Chevalier Johnstone, the friend and confidential adviser of Montcalm, after returning from his successful efforts to prevent the mad destruction of the bridge of boats, found M. de Vaudreuil closeted in a house in the inside of the hornwork, with the Intendant and some others. Suspecting that they were busy drafting the articles for a general capitulation, Johnstone walked into the room where they were assembled, just in time to see the Intendant, with a pen in his hand, writing upon a sheet of paper. This circumstance seemed to fully confirm all his suspicions, while his own probable stand upon the matter under discussion, was evidently distasteful to the Governor, who no sooner set eyes upon him than he told him that he had no business there. Knowing that as aide-de-camp, he had neither command nor voice in any Councils of War, he simply admitted that what Vaudreuil had said was true and immediately withdrew, "in wrath," as he tells us himself, "to see them intent upon giving up so scandalously, a dependency, for the preservation of which, so much blood and treasure had been expended." Upon leaving the house, Johnstone met Colonel Dalquier, Cammander of the Regiment of Bearn, and informed him of what was going on inside. He told him that those within were debating the giving up of Canada by a general capitulation, and hurried him in to stand up for the cause of his king and country. He then went in search of Colonel Poularies, the Commander of the Royal Roussillon Regiment, whom he met only a few hundred yards from the hornwork, coming from Beau-

port. Poularies, upon learning what was going on, clapped spurs to his horse and hurried to the hornwork, declaring that he would shed the last drop of his blood rather than submit to a capitulation. Johnstone continued sorrowfully on towards Beauport, having been told by Poularies to make use of his table and lodgings as if they were his own. He was heavy at heart over the events of the day, and especially over the death of his good friend General Montcalm and the apparent determination of Vaudreuil and Bigot to capitulate; but knowing the zeal of Colonels Dalquier and Poularies, he had every confidence that they would frustrate the design. About two o'clock in the afternoon Poularies returned to his quarters with the gratifying intelligence that the project of a capitulation had been converted into a retreat to Jacques-Cartier, awaiting the arrival there of M. de Levis.

The minutes of this Council of War were signed by De Vaudreuil, Bigot, Dalquier, Poularies, Pontleroy, Dumas, Duchat, Manneville, and Duparquet. The Chevalier de Montreuil, who had been invited, either did not attend or failed to sign. De Vaudreuil having asked the Council to consider whether it was possible to attack the enemy, it was resolved that the weakness of the army, the scattered and exhausted condition of the troops, the superior strength of the enemy, the insecurity of an unprotected camp, the distance from a base of supplies, the danger of interrupted communications, compelled the troops to fall back upon the River Jacques-Cartier, where the only depot of provisions was located.

One of the French officers who kept a Journal of the

Siege reports that Vaudreuil expressed the opinion "that the troops should take their revenge the next morning and endeavor to wipe out the stains they had contracted", (1) and adds "this proposal which seemed to carry a true Sense of Honour with it, ought never to have been rejected by those Gentlemen who receive their Sovereign's pay in order to maintain the Spirit of Honour; but so, however, it happened, and the united Voice of all the members gave as their sentiments, that there was an absolute necessity for the army to retire to the River of Jacques Cartier, and the sooner it was done the better, there being no time to lose."

De Vaudreuil seems to have urged another attack upon the foe when he found that almost the entire Council of War was opposed to it, and that his bravery would not be put to the test. More faith would be placed in his protestations, had he refused to sign the minutes of the Council.

In deserting the camp at Beauport and leaving the town to its own resources, Vaudreuil well knew that the garrison was without provisions. There was neither any attempt to supplement its supplies, nor yet to strengthen the garrison itself. For the defence of the fortress only three hundred and forty-nine men of the regular troops were left in it, composed of five pickets of forty men from the different regiments, a hundred and thirty marine troops and nineteen artillery men. The surplus of the garrison was composed of seven hundred and fifty sailors for the batteries, and a number of militia of the town of

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(1) Vol, IV., page 257.



Quebec, which swelled the total to two thousand and sixty men. An aide-de-camp in the French army speaking of the Quebec militia says that they were practically useless in the case of a siege, having no experience whatever in war, and being composed of workmen of all classes, traders, and others guided by personal interest. <sup>(1)</sup>

M. de Foligné is authority for the statement that the then approaching death of General Montcalm, seemed to have caused his successors in the command of the army before Quebec, to lose their heads, <sup>(2)</sup> and to think of nothing but flight, so terrorized were they lest the British should make the attempt, on the following day, to force their intrenchments. They even left behind them their large stock of provisions <sup>(3)</sup> in the camp at Beauport, without notifying the starving garrison of the town of the fact. Had the Commandant of Quebec been informed that all these supplies were within reach, he would certainly have sent to bring them to the city, and this might well have enabled him to sustain the siege for some days to come, or at least until General de Levis could have come to his aid. Foligné was commanding one of the principal batteries of the town at the time, and bitterly complains that Bigot forgot to notify M. de Ramsay that the army was leaving such a large stock of provisions behind it in the

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(1) Note at Vol. V, page 239.

(2) Vol. IV, page 206.

(3) These provisions included 398 barrels of flour, 33 quintals of fresh bread, 80 of biscuits, 182 barrels of pork each of 200 lbs and 246 tubs of the same, each 50 lbs, 16 line oxen, 10 line cows, over 100 barrels of brandy and 14 of red wine.

Beauport camp, when he knew so well that the garrison was starving. It must not be forgotten that outside of the two thousand and sixty men composing the garrison, the Commandant of the town had also to feed the large number of clerks employed, and fully two thousand six hundred women and children, besides about 1,600 sick and wounded. It is by no means surprising that the strange conduct of Vaudreuil and Bigot in this connection should have drawn from Chevalier Johnstone the remark that it really seemed as if a certain class of men, from interested motives, were determined upon giving up the country to the English, as soon as a plausible pretext should offer itself, by first gradually lopping off all its means of defence. This idea is strengthened by the style of the letter Vaudreuil wrote to de Ramsay that afternoon, to the effect that he might capitulate forty-eight hours after the departure of the army from its camp at Beauport, and also by the disgraceful manner in which the evacuation of the camp and the retreat of the army were affected. If Vaudreuil had desired the rear of the army to be cut off by the foe, and either destroyed or made prisoners, he could not have more effectually planned it than by the arrangements made for the flight of his troops. When darkness set in, Vaudreuil and the right wing of the army simply marched out of camp without either notifying the rest of the troops or giving them any instructions. After waiting all the afternoon for orders, the commanding officer of the Royal Roussillon Regiment sent his adjutant for them to Vaudreuil at eight o'clock in the evening. The officer returned with the tidings that

the right of the army had gone away with M. de Vaudreuil, without leaving any message at all for the remainder of the troops. As one of the officers of the army says, such stupid conduct scarcely appears credible to the most ignorant military man. Colonel Pouliares immediately passed the word along to the different regiments on his left and started to follow the right wing of the army. <sup>(1)</sup>

Johnstone clearly shows that there was no necessity at all for this hurried flight; that even if the English had desired to interfere with an orderly daylight retreat of the French army, they could only have done so by attacking the hornwork and attempting the passage of the River St. Charles,—a very difficult and dangerous affair,—where they might easily have been repulsed, and so exposed to lose the fruits of the morning victory.

The army halted at a point between Lorette and Cap Rouge, where Bougainville joined it with his command at daylight. That evening Pointe-aux-Trembles was reached, and there the night was passed.

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(1) From the pen of Chevalier Johnstone we have a remarkable picture of this famous retreat. While the entire British army was busy at work on the heights above, quietly intrenching and fortifying its camp against the town and the possibility of attack from de Vaudreuil's command, the latter rushed helter-skelter into the country from the camp, at Beauport, in the most terrible confusion as though the Highlanders were at their heels, brandishing their broadswords over their heads. To quote Johnstone, "It was a march entirely in the Indian manner: not a retreat, but a horrid, abominable flight, a thousand times worse than that in the morning upon the Heights of Abraham, with such disorder and confusion that, had the English known it, three hundred men sent after us would have been sufficient to destroy and cut all our army to pieces. . . They were all mixed, scattered dispersed and running as hard as they could, as if the English army was at their heels." Johnstone appears to be the only writer who has left details of the retreat.

Before setting out upon his retreat from the camp at Beauport, Vaudreuil wrote to the Chevalier de Levis, informing him of the disaster to the French arms and of his approach to Jacques-Cartier, where he urged him to hasten to meet him and to take command of the army in place of General Montcalm who was dangerously wounded and had gone into the town.

That same night some French deserters who came to the British army brought the news that Montcalm was dying in the town, and reported that Quebec was likely to surrender in a few days.

Vaudreuil had written to Montcalm at six o'clock on the afternoon of the 13<sup>th</sup> telling him that he was grieved to to hear of his wounds, and that he would have attacked the British himself that day were it not for the representations of the commanders of the different corps to which he had yielded. "They are of opinion," he said, "that our diminished numbers and the strong position held by the enemy, necessitate an immediate retreat on our part. Being of the same opinion myself, I have determined to take that course." He enclosed for Montcalm's information, the letter he had written to de Ramezay, together with the proposed articles of capitulation. In the letter to de Ramezay, Vaudreuil had said that the enemy's position was becoming more advantageous every moment, and that he deemed it his duty to effect a retreat. He urged de Ramezay's compliance with his instructions concerning the proposed capitulation, which were also enclosed. When the supply of provisions in the town ran short, de Ramezay was told that he was not to wait for the enemy to take

the place by storm, before putting up the white flag. The letter of Vaudreuil to de Ramezay, together with the enclosed memorial of instructions and proposed articles of capitulation were handed to him by M. Marcel, aide-de-camp to General Montcalm, after he had read them to the dying commander. Montcalm approved of the contents of the letter, and at ten o'clock that night, M. Marcel wrote to Vaudreuil to that effect, informing him at the same time that the Marquis was hardly any better, though his pulse was then a little stronger. The circumstances attending the death of General Montcalm, a few hours later, are described in another chapter.

He had declined to proffer any advice as to the future movements of the French army. When his opinion was asked, he had merely replied that there were three plans to pursue: the first, to make another attack on the enemy; the second to retire to Jacques-Cartier, and the third to capitulate for the Colony.

From Levis, General Townshend received a letter on the evening of the 13<sup>th</sup>, in which the writer, Colonel S. Fraser, congratulates him "on the agreeable part of this day, at same time that I sincerely condole with you the loss of General Wolfe." (1)

On the 14<sup>th</sup>, a letter reached the British General from de Ramezay, who asked him to use his good offices on behalf of the French wounded and prisoners.

The day following that of the battle brought fine September weather, which facilitated the work of the troops

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(1) Vol. V, page 275.

in bringing up artillery and ammunition to the heights. In this they were materially aided by a number of men from the fleet.

In the morning the following Orders were issued to the army by General Townshend :—

“ The remaining General Officers, fit to act, take the earliest opportunity to express the praise which is due to the conduct and bravery of the troops ; and the victory. which attended it, sufficiently proves the superiority which this army has over any number of such troops as they engaged yesterday ; *they wish that the person who lately commanded them had survived so glorious a day, and had this day been able to give the troops these just encomiums,* The fatigues which the troops will be obliged to undergo, to reap the advantage of this victory, will be supported with a true spirit, as this seems to be the period which will determine, in all probability, our American labours ; the troops are to receive a jill of rum per day, and will receive fresh provisions the day after to-morrow. The regiments and corps to give returns of their killed and wounded yesterday, and the strength of their corps. The pioneers of the different regiments to bury the dead : the corps are to send all their tools, not immediately in use, to the artillery park. All French papers, or letters found, are desired to be sent to the head quarters. No soldier to presume to strole beyond the outposts. Arms that cannot be drawn are to be fired into the swamp, near the head quarters. The Admiral has promised the continuance of all the assistance which the naval service can spare, to ease the troops of the fatigues which the farther operations

will require of us. General Townshend has the satisfaction to acquaint the troops, that General Monckton's wound is not dangerous; the Commanding Officers of the corps will order the rolls to be called every half-hour, to prevent marauding, &c., &c."

Several officers and men were wounded in the British camp during the day by shots and shells from the town, some while working at the intrenchments, others while engaged in burying such of the dead as had not been interred on the previous day and were within reach of the army.

In the afternoon, a flag of truce came from the garrison requesting permission to bury their dead. This was agreed to, and the work of interring the remains of those of the dead which were under the guns of the town was proceeded with.

Brigadier Monckton took advantage of this cessation of firing to pass by the town to his tent at Point Levis accompanied by other wounded officers, of which notice was sent beforehand to the Governor of Quebec and also to the British batteries on the south shore. M. Lusignan, second Major of the Languedoc Regiment was sent out from the town and it was agreed that the French might send two surgeons to attend to their own wounded.

Admiral Saunders came ashore, and after a consultation with General Townshend it was agreed that more artillery should be brought ashore to strengthen the camp and the batteries in course of erection against the town. To aid in the bringing up of the guns and ammunition, the Admiral agreed to furnish more men from the fleet.

At night a number of French deserters came in and gave information of the existence of a magazine in the suburbs of the town. The General sent a detachment to burn it, but the men found, upon their arrival, that the enemy had succeeded in removing all the powder.

The British pressed forward their line of fortification, and opened a trench within half the range of a musket shot of the city walls. Some members of the garrison took this action for a feint, since the batteries being erected by the British were directed against the strongest of those of town: they dreaded that on account of the weakness of the town force, the British would attempt to scale the walls.

The French had cut the bridge of boats on the St. Charles, and a British detachment descended to the valley and drew away a quantity of powder that had been stored in a house near the mill.

The burial of General Montcalm, which is fully described in another chapter, took place the same night in the chapel of the Ursuline Convent, his death having occurred at four o'clock in the morning.

The Governor of the town had held a review of the garrison during the day and had taken account of all the provisions at his disposal. He found that they would not last the inhabitants for more than five or six days, even if all were placed on half rations. Only twenty-five cattle, including calves, eighteen barrels of flour and some rice and Indian meal, remained to feed the entire garrison and the women and children.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> the weather was again wet. Colonel Burton, Colonel Frazer, who was just recovering from a wound,



and Colonel Walsh, were appointed to act as Brigadiers. More French deserters came over to the British camp during the day, stating that De Ramezay and the principal officers of the Garrison were settling the preliminaries for a capitulation, and that the Indians had robbed one of the best store-houses and had gone off to their respective districts. They also brought the intelligence that the citizens and the Canadians in general were much dissatisfied at the manner in which they had been left to their own resources, and impatient to have the town delivered up to the English. The enemy had brought up a mortar to their south west bastion, to bombard the British ships above the town, but its shells, which were thrown in considerable numbers during the day, had no effect.

The British troops were kept busy, intrenching, and landing more battering cannon and stores for the batteries, two thousand men being employed this day,—Saturday, the 15<sup>th</sup> inst,—in making fascines and gabions to assist in the carrying forward of the approaches to the fortress. Those in the camp were considerably annoyed by the shots and shells from the town, although they continued their work with considerable spirit.

About ten o'clock at night, the sound of a chamade beaten by the enemy was the cause of a disappointment to the British camp. In view of the notification that the town was compelled to surrender, which General Montcalm had sent to Townshend on the night of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, they naturally flattered themselves that the invitation to a parley signified the offer of a capitulation. When the French envoy from the city reached the British head-

quarters, however, it was found that he only came to ask permission to send their women and children over the St. Charles River into the country. The request was granted, but the cessation of hostilities was taken advantage of by the British to advance a large detachment, with a covering party, nearer and opposite to St. Louis Gate, to clear the ground of bush, take post and throw up a spacious redoubt suitable for the erection of a battery.

On the same day, the Highlanders made a curious arrest. In the bushes to the left of the road leading from the Cove, they found a Canadian concealed, who said he had been there since the evening previous to the British landing. Though famishing with cold and hunger, he was afraid to attempt his escape from his hiding place, lest no quarter should be given him. The weather cleared up at night, the wind having shifted to the north-west.

On Sunday, the 16<sup>th</sup>, it was cloudy with strong wind. The Highlanders distinguished themselves by bringing in more prisoners, amongst them being the second in command of the Marine Department, a priest and thirty Canadians.

Sunday brought no rest to the troops on either side. Still more artillery was brought up by the British, and large parties were employed in cutting fascines. The most determined efforts were made to hasten the reduction of the town and the hope was expressed that in a day or two at the most the British would be able to open a formidable fire upon both the Upper Town and the works facing the heights. The latter, it was remarked in the British camp, did not seem calculated to bear much battering.

The French relaxed none of their efforts against the invaders. In fact they were more lavish of their ammunition than ever, keeping up a vigorous fire both upon the camp on the heights and also on the south shore batteries.

An officer of the Twenty-Eighth Regiment, sitting at the door of his tent, had one of his legs so shattered by a shot from the town that he was compelled to undergo immediate amputation. This occurred on the 17<sup>th</sup> inst.

Information having been brought to General Townshend of interference, on the part of some of his men, with some of the Canadians from the surrounding country, he issued the following orders :

“ Complaints have been made that great disorders have been already committed, in the neighbourhood of the camp, by the soldiers ; which has obliged the country people, who were coming in with fresh provisions, to return. General Townshend takes the earliest occasion of declaring to the troops, that, whilst he has the honour to command them, he thinks it his duty to indulge them in no acts of licentiousness, the only circumstance which can sully the glory they have acquired, and prolongs the reduction of this country ; *he has determined to preserve the same good discipline kept up by their late General, and, like him, to grant every proper indulgence, which the good of the service and good discipline dictates.* One Field officer four Captains, twelve, Subalterns, and four hundred men with arms, to parade this afternoon, at four o'clock, for work : the Engineers will order tools for them, and will conduct them. Neither Officer nor soldier to be allowed to go near the French general hospital ; the guard there, and that in

Major Dalling's redoubt, to be attentive that this order be obeyed. Three Captains, six Subalterns, and five hundred men, to parade to-morrow morning, at day-break, for fascine-making. The piquets and working parties to parade, for the future, at four o'clock in the afternoon. The Brigadier of the day will dispose of the piquets in the following redoubts :

Advanced redoubt.....	1	Dalling's redoubt....	1
Field-artillery redoubt..	2	The hospital post....	1
Right redoubt.....	1		

The rest will be disposed of by the Brigadier of the day, where he shall think proper ; all out-posts and piquets to send a guide to the parade at four o'clock in the afternoon, to attend the relief."

General Monckton had so far recovered from his wound that he was able to write a short letter to Mr. Pitt, referring him to General Townshend's dispatch for details of the battle of the Plains. At the same time he addressed the following note to Townshend :—

Camp at Point Levi.

Sepbr y<sup>e</sup> 16 1759.

Dear Townshend,

As notwithstanding my wound I am so well to sit up— and never in better Health, I have wrote a short Letter to Mr. Pitt referring him to yours for the Particulars of that Day—As I was obliged to Quit the Field just as the French gave way—Col. Hale for whom I have a great esteem ; for many pressing reasons, would be glad to be the Bearer of

this Good News—And I should be glad he did—If therefore you have no objection to it, be pleased to tell him he may—you will greatly oblige one who is very deserving of any favour that Can be done him. Cap. Bell is collecting the Public Papers—I shall send you such as may be necessary for you—I hope you keep your Health and that everything goes on as you Could wish—, Pay my Compliments to Murray and Believe me

Yours Most Sincerely

ROBT. MONCKTON.

“Hussey who is major of the 47<sup>th</sup> may be very well “spared from the Light Infantry.”

The official dispatch of Townshend to Pitt, to which the above letter refers, was not then finished, but it was understood that it would be prepared and sent by Townshend by the first ship that sailed. It was dated September 20<sup>th</sup> 1759, and therefore recorded the capitulation of Quebec, as well as the details of the Battle of the Plains. This letter was commenced in “Camp before Quebec,” but as it was only completed on the 20<sup>th</sup> the British were then within the walls of the town. Several versions of this official dispatch have been printed from time to time, evidently copied from the text of Jefferys, Knox, Hawkins and others, but these do not agree with the original in the Public Record Office, London. A *fac simile* of the first and last pages of this dispatch are given in this volume.

From the 13<sup>th</sup> of September until his departure for England in October, Townshend occupied a house in St. Louis suburbs.









Deserters continued to arrive in the camp from the garrison, and the reports they brought of the condition of affairs within the walls left no doubt of a successful issue to the assault, or an early capitulation.

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## CHAPTER XIV.

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### THE CAPITULATION OF QUEBEC.

**W**ITHIN the walls of Quebec, the enfeebled and half starved garrison had awaited in vain the provisions and reinforcements promised by Vaudreuil. For over two months the town had been almost daily bombarded. One hundred and eighty houses had been destroyed by fire, and almost all the others had been riddled by shot and shell the total number destroyed being five hundred and thirty-five. In the Lower Town, only one had been left standing. Walls six feet thick were unable to resist the cannonading, and vaults in which valuables had been stored, had been shattered and destroyed with their contents. The Cathedral was entirely consumed. The buildings of the Seminary were so seriously damaged that no part of them but the kitchen was habitable. The Bishop who had taken refuge at Charlesbourg, was compelled to use that apartment as a residence on his return to town. The little old Church of Notre-Dame des Victoires, in the Lower Town had been destroyed, and those of the Seminary, of the Recollets and of the Jesuits were rendered unserviceable by reason of the damages they had sustained. All the convents and the Jesuit College were

much injured, and only one habitable room was left in the episcopal palace. So many houses had been destroyed that many of the citizens found themselves without shelter for the coming winter.

No fewer than nine hundred members of the garrison had deserted, fearing the coming attack of the besieging party, and the starvation that threatened the town. The British had no less than thirty pieces of cannon,—32 pounders,—in position against the city, and were daily making a closer investment of the fortress. All hopes of succour failed the inhabitants, and general discouragement pervaded the entire population. The women and children, suffering with hunger, cried for bread. The merchants and other citizens of the town, already impoverished by the bombardment, which had destroyed their shops, their homes, their merchandise and their household effects, viewed with anxiety the preparations which the enemy were making for a general assault of the city by both land and water, which they were absolutely without means of opposing. There were not now sufficient regulars to man the defences of the town, some of which were mere palisades, and a few hours, at the most, must see the foe in forcible possession of the fortress, if their ineffective resistance was persisted in. It was natural for them to suppose that the continuance of their impotent opposition would neither tend to conciliate the victorious rivals into whose hands they were bound to fall, nor yet to ameliorate their own condition, and that of the members of their families, after the British were in a position to deal arbitrarily and unconditionally with them.

Self preservation is the first law of nature, and no blame is to be imputed to the citizens of Quebec for the joint action taken by them on the 15<sup>th</sup> of December, 1759, for their own protection and that of their property, and of those dependent upon them. Headed by their Mayor, M. Daine, the *bourgeois*, or leading men of the place, signed a request to the Commandant and officers of the garrison, who despite Vaudreuil's instructions to capitulate, still held out begging them not to expose them to the rigours of assault and famine by prolonging their opposition to the siege. They said that it had required the disastrous and decisive engagement of the 13<sup>th</sup> instant to make them think of their own safety and of the preservation of their property; that a bombardment of sixty-three days had failed to intimidate them; that anxiety and watching and military service had not disheartened them; that if short and indifferent rations had sapped their strength, their courage and the hope of triumphing over the foe had supported them, and that even the loss of their goods had not affected them. They were unconcerned about all these things in their desire to save the town. This flattering hope had been sustained by the fact that they had been protected by an army which commanded a free passage to and from the city and assured them a communication for a regular supply of food.

Unfortunately for them, this had now disappeared, and they saw, with the greatest pain, that the slaughter, the flight and the dispersion of three-quarters of their number would not prevent the other quarter from falling under the yoke of the enemy and becoming victims of their fury.

“What a spectacle, they added, for this small remnant of the people to see their wives and children at the mercy of the enemy! There was surely nothing then left to them they said but to render their yoke as light as possible, and they urged that the time had arrived when it was imperatively demanded of them that they should seek an honourable capitulation. The prayer of their petition was supported by three principal arguments; the almost entire absence of provisions in the town, the blocking of the avenues of communication, which, if the the capitulation was further delayed, would place them in the humiliating position of having to beg their bread from the enemy on the very day of their submission, and the imminent danger of the town being taken by force, and the hostile troops permitted to wreak their vengeance upon all the inhabitants, without distinction of quality, age or sex. They flattered themselves, too, that their fate would be more endurable if they yielded now to the inevitable, instead of uselessly resisting to the bitter end.

For all these reasons the petitioners begged de Ramezay and his staff to cast a glance of compassion upon those remaining in the town, to endeavour to preserve them for the wives and children who were now separated from them, to look to the preservation too, of the women and children still within the walls, and to save for themselves the little of their possessions which the fire of the enemy had left them. They concluded that there was neither shame nor dishonour in yielding to the inevitable when defeat stared them in the face, and victory was an absolute impossibility.

This appeal to the “humanity” of the Commandant and

his officers was signed by the Mayor, M. Daine,—who had faithfully served his king and country for forty-four years,—by M. Panet, attorney for the King, and by Messrs Tachet, Johannes, Ch. Morin, Boisseau, Voges, Riverin, Dubreuil, Chabosseau, Larcher, Cardeneau, Fornel, Moreau, Meynardie, Jeune, Monnier, Gautier, J. Lassale, L'Evesque, Fremont, Grellaux, Lée, Boissey, Jean Monnier, and Malroux.

Such was the piteous appeal made to de Ramezay by the principal citizens of Quebec. Foligné has placed on record how the situation appeared to him at this time. The town, he says, had put forth, in vain, its last efforts, in the heavy fire which it maintained upon the British camp. It was a sad situation, he continues, for a brave man to find himself, defending such a place, with only two day's provisions, split up into small allowances, which it was necessary to diminish in proportion as a larger number of women sought refuge in the town after the battle, amounting in all to four thousand. He was without hope of assistance from the army, and was compelled to appear deaf to the cries of the populace for bread, besides being sorely tempted to close his ears to the representations of the merchants and principal citizens, who urged upon him the expediency of treating with the enemy for an honourable capitulation, for the security both of the citizens and of their property, which they believed would not be refused in view of the two months during which the siege had already been resisted; while they knew that it would be impossible to hold out more than three days longer, and that if they attempted to do so, they would at the end of

that period be unable to obtain the conditions of capitulation that they believed themselves entitled to ask and to receive at that time.

There were still no signs of either provisions or reinforcements from de Vaudreuil, but there were abundant indications of a closer investiture of the town, and many preparations for its final assault, when de Ramezay, on the evening of the 15<sup>th</sup> of September, assembled a Council of War.

Those present at it were M. de Ramezay, president, in his quality of Lieutenant for the King at Quebec, and Messrs C. de Bernetz, Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry, Chev. D. Lestangcelles, D'Aureillan, D'Aubrespy, St. Vincent Parfourne, Bigot, Marcel, Captain of Infantry, Fiedmont, Cinge, Pellegrin, Captain of the Port, Joannès, Captain-Adjutant of the Languedoc Regiment, Town Major. The orders of de Vaudreuil, the Governor-General, addressed by him to de Ramezay on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September were read, and the facts were then made known and verified that the town " little capable of defense being enclosed partly by a mere palisade, might, with its artillery and warlike stores, hold out, sometime, against the efforts of the enemy, if provisions were in sufficient abundance, but the returns produced by the contractor-General's clerk and the exact investigations made at the houses of the different private inhabitants of the town, have proved that there are remaining, of all sorts of provisions, only about fifteen or sixteen thousand rations, said rations being reduced about one-half, and even to one-fourth, to feed more than six thousand people, whereof two thousand six hundred are women or



children, one thousand to twelve hundred men, in the hospitals, servants or prisoners of war, and two thousand two hundred fighting men, soldiers, Militia or sailors."

With the solitary exception of Fiedmont, those present strongly urged Ramezay to capitulate on the best terms he could secure. Fiedmont was of opinion that the rations should be still further reduced and the defence of the place persisted in "to the last extremity."

At least one of the members of the Council-of-War knew of the existence of a letter bearing upon the surrender of Quebec, scarcely secondary in importance to the written instructions of Vaudreuil addressed to Ramezay.

It was doubtless to M. Marcel himself, General Montcalm's Secretary, that the dying General, on the night of the eventful 13<sup>th</sup> of September dictated the letter printed in the chapter on the *Death of Montcalm*, addressed to Brigadier-General Townshend, and commencing with the decisive word "Being obliged to surrender Quebec to your arms." Though he does not seem to have mentioned it to the Council of War, it may reasonably have influenced him in advising an immediate and honourable capitulation.

After receiving the written advice of all the members of the Council of War, Ramezay signed and gave out the following decision: "Considering the instructions I have received from the Marquis de Vaudreuil and the scarcity of provisions, proved by the returns to me furnished, and the searches I have made, I conclude to endeavor to obtain from the enemy the most honourable capitulation."

It was not very long before the Commandant was called upon to carry his decision into effect. In accordance with

the resolution of a British Council of War, the three Admirals,— Saunders, Holmes and Durrell,— who had all along co-operated with the army in its efforts, with the utmost vigour and resolution, had completed preparations for a strong naval attack upon the Lower Town, simultaneously with a land attack from the heights, by General Townshend.

In view of these preparations on the part of the English, and because of the desperate condition of affairs in the garrison, and of Vaudreuil's commands to de Ramezay to capitulate without waiting to be reduced to the last extremity, the Commandant of the town would undoubtedly have been justified in immediately raising the white flag. Even the decision to that effect of the Council of War did not influence him to capitulate, however, until he had exhausted all the means at his disposal for deferring and if possible for avoiding what he evidently considered a humiliating action. He sent to the deserted camp of Vaudreuil at Beauport to see if the fleeing army had left any provisions behind them. Had the Governor, or his friend Bigot, only notified de Ramezay on the 13<sup>th</sup> that they were leaving their supplies at Beauport, the town would have been relieved of its pressing needs. As it was, by the time that the Commandant, finding that the promised supplies from Vaudreuil were not forthcoming, had sent to search the camp by the side of the St. Charles as a *dernier ressort*, the inhabitants of the parish and of the neighbouring settlements had left nothing in the shape of food worth carrying away. The barrels of flour had been broken and everything was found in disorder.

The tents which Vaudreuil had left standing were still there, and de Ramezay sent Major de St. Laurent to strike them, in order to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy. M. LeVasseur had also been sent from the town to bring in some of the tents, and while at the camp met M. de Bellecourt with twenty troopers who, he said, had told him that they had been sent by Vaudreuil to inform the garrison of the approach of de Levis and of Vaudreuil's intention of relieving the town. M. de Bellecourt, who was seen by M. Joannes, did not tell him the same story, but equivocated a good deal.

Anxious for definite information, de Ramezay dispatched M. Joannes, on the 16<sup>th</sup> inst, to Vaudreuil's headquarters, to learn exactly what he might expect and to urge the absolute necessity of immediate relief, exacting from him the promise that he would return the same night. When he reached Lorette, nine miles from the town, Joannes found that Vaudreuil was still thirty to thirty-five miles distant from him, and that it would be impossible for him to reach him and to obey the orders of Ramezay to return to the garrison the same night. He therefore wrote a letter from Lorette to Vaudreuil, telling him that he had endeavored to reach him, and that failing the receipt of positive instructions from him before ten o'clock on the following morning, the garrison would treat for a capitulation, in accordance with the unanimous advice of the troops and of the citizens; adding that the extreme scarcity of provisions was the excuse for an act which would otherwise be dishonourable. Moreover the surrender would if possible be deferred till night.

During the absence of Joannes, Ramezay received a rather indefinite letter from Vaudreuil, promising assistance.

The Governor's own correspondence, however, shows that he had taken a long time to send it. It was only at seven o'clock on the night of the 16<sup>th</sup> of September, the day of Joannes mission, that Vaudreuil wrote to Bougainville, who was at Pointe-aux-Trembles, stating that he had instructed M. de St. Rome to go to St. Augustin, obtain carts, and convey sixty barrels of flour to the town, and asking Bougainville to supply him with an escort. It is quite clear that these orders could not have been executed in time to throw the flour into the city by the hour fixed for the capitulation.

Meantime, within the walls, things were going from bad to worse. Writing to Bougainville on Monday the 17<sup>th</sup> of September, the Chevalier de Bernetz declared that the promised aid to Ramezay and the garrison could not arrive too promptly, since the militia had lost both their courage and their energy, and that most of them, had already laid down their arms. The desertions had been so numerous, he added, that there were scarcely men to man the batteries; there was hardly enough food for four days, adults as well as children were crying for bread, and he declared that he saw no remedy for the existing condition of affairs unless three hundred regular troops, with provisions, could be thrown into the city to assist in the defence of the place and to revive the drooping courage of the inhabitants. The works of the enemy, he said, are close to the town and they have a battery between St. Louis and St. John's gates.

He piteously appealed for the sending of engineers and prompt assistance, since he said that there was not a moment to lose, and that failing immediate relief it would be necessary for Ramezay to allow the town to be carried by assault and the people to be sacrificed.

The cannon from the the town were unable to play satisfactorily upon the British battery near St. Louis gate for the want of embrasures in that part of the wall between St. Louis and St-John's gate.

In addition to the promised aid from Vaudreuil, Bougainville had written Ramezay during Joannes' absence from town on the 16<sup>th</sup> mentioning some localities where he might find provisions and certain parties who probably possessed a stock of supplies, and when Joannes, who had been instructed to hold himself in readiness at ten o'clock on the 17<sup>th</sup> to offer the articles of capitulation, had been informed of the letters from Vaudreuil and Bougainville, he with drew the advice he had tendered at the Council of War for an immediate capitulation, undertaking to supplement Ramezay's searches for provisions, by following himself, the directions indicated by Bougainville.

All his efforts to discover supplies, and thus to defer the evil day, seem to have resulted in failure, however, while in the garrison, even in broad daylight, says Ramezay, troops continued to desert in considerable numbers. Some left to join the army, others escaped to the country, some, again, went over the enemy, which was thus made aware of the distress within the walls. A sergeant, who had charge of the defences in one of the weakest parts of the town, not only deserted, but took with him the key of one

of the city gates which he handed over to the British Commander. Several batteries were abandoned, and some of the weakest portions of the fortifications were left quite undefended. Ramezay had not enough officers to execute his commands, and after they had urged him to capitulate he could no longer depend upon the support of the militia officers.

In the course of the afternoon of the 17<sup>th</sup>, twelve line of battle ships were advanced by the British into the Basin facing the town, and it was clear that a desperate assault was impending. Towards evening, word was brought to Ramezay that an English detachment was about landing from a number of barges in the Lower Town. The ships approached nearer to the shore, and a body of English soldiers, in column, advanced towards the town by Palais Hill, by which it had an uninterrupted approach.

Ramezay sounded the general alarm, giving orders that every body was to take his proper post. As he conversed with some of his officers, a Major came up and reported that none of the militiamen wished to fight, and at the same time some of their officers approached him saying that they were not in a humour to withstand an assault, particularly as they knew that such resistance was contrary to the orders received by the Commandant. They notified him that from that moment they were going to consider themselves as simple citizens and not as officers, and that they were returning their arms into store, so that being found without them by the enemy, who would shortly enter the town, they would at least escape being put to the sword. They declared that if the army had not

abandoned them, they would have continued to give evidence of the zeal which had actuated them throughout the siege ; but that seeing they were now without resources, they could not bring themselves to believe that it was their duty to be massacred in vain, since the sacrifice of their life would not defer the taking of the town for a single hour.

Joannes, who did everything that was possible in support of Ramezay's attempted resistance until the arrival of relief, renders very strong testimony as to the mutinous conduct of the garrison. "It is true," he says, "that the greater number of the militia and sailors composing the garrison of Quebec were as badly disposed as possible. The evil designs of the officers of these troops almost led me to fall with the sword upon a couple of their number. They threatened nothing less than to abandon their posts and to cause a similar abandonment on the part of their troops. From this we may judge of their bad disposition. Several of them had already deserted.

Ramezay hastily sought the advice of several officers who were near him, including that of his lieutenant, the Chevalier de Bernetz, and in accordance with their views he ran up the white flag and sent M. de Joannes into the British camp to arrange terms of capitulation, sending the memorandum of conditions which had been addressed to him on the 13<sup>th</sup> by the Marquis de Vaudreuil and approved of by Montcalm. The capitulation was only to be binding if concluded before the further relief of the garrison, Ramezay having taken this precaution, in view of the promises made to him by Vaudreuil.


Upon receipt of Ramezay's proposition, Townshend sent for Admiral Saunders, who immediately came ashore to consider with the General the terms asked by the enemy. The only condition to which the British were not ready to accede was that the troops in the city should be sent back to the army. They told Joannes that the garrison would have to become prisoners of war, and to be sent back to France. This objection had been foreseen by Vaudreuil, who had instructed the Commandant in writing, on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, that this was not the time to insist; the garrison must consent to be prisoners of war and to be conveyed,—officers, soldiers and sailors,—to France, on condition of not serving there until exchanged.

Notwithstanding this, of which the English were naturally ignorant, M. Joannes still feigned opposition to the proposed change in the terms of capitulation, alleging that he was unable to agree to it without first submitting it to Ramezay. His object was simply to gain time.<sup>(1)</sup> He had led Vaudreuil to believe that the garrison might be able to hold out till night, and he was anxious to delay capitulation in order to afford an opportunity for the relief of the town. The British were not disposed to dally very long over the matter, probably anticipating the real motive of Joannes. At all events they only allowed Ramezay four hours within which to capitulate. The Admiral and Generals gave Joannes to understand that at the end of that time the assault upon the town would proceed. It was then seven o'clock and they insisted upon an answer by eleven.

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(1) Vol. IV., page 209.









The envoy returned to the fortress, where the acceptance of the change in the conditions made by the British was accepted as a matter of course, and Joannes was ordered by the Commandant to return at once and conclude the capitulation.

Meanwhile, the utmost alertness prevailed in the British camp. When the flag of truce first came out with the proposals for a capitulation, the men of the working party which was constructing the advanced battery were paraded, and rested for some time upon their arms, awaiting the outcome of the proposition. Between five and six o'clock they were ordered to the left of the line, to cut down all the underbrush and other cover which stood within half a mile of the flank and rear of the camp. This work, which occupied them until nearly nine o'clock, was to prevent a surprise from the French army, from which the town was known to be expecting relief. The watchfulness of the British outposts and sentinels was increased by a knowledge that the French would endeavour to break the negotiations for the capitulation, if the army succeeded in evading English vigilance and in throwing reinforcements and provisions into the town.

Joannes emerged from the fortress and re-entered the British camp a little before eleven o'clock, carrying with him the signature of the Commandant to the articles of capitulation, in virtue of which the possession of the old capital of New France passed, for all time, out of the hands of its former masters. Nothing now remained to complete the arrangement on the part of the French. The British Council of War had already agreed upon the

conditions since signed by Ramezay, and General Townshend and Admiral Saunders were waiting to add their signatures to the famous document as soon as it would be presented to them by Joannes. The affair was therefore concluded on the night of the 17<sup>th</sup>, so far as Ramezay was concerned, though it was so late when Joannes reached the camp that he remained there all night and submitted the articles of capitulation to the British General and the Admiral next morning, who signed them about eight o'clock. General Monckton, who was still in hospital in his tent at Levis, was not consulted in the matter at all.

Not long after Ramezay had affixed his signature to the articles of capitulation and sent them into the British camp by Joannes, a party of Rochebeaucourt's cavalry reached the town with a hundred bags of biscuits, and promises of further assistance. The Commandant was, of course, compelled to inform them that the promised aid would be too late to save the town, since he had already signed the articles of capitulation, and M. Joannes was at that time with the British Generals, arranging the final details. Nothing could then be done to avoid the catastrophe, said Ramezay, unless the English should refuse to accept any of the articles he had agreed to, and should thus release him from the obligation to which he had pledged himself. Should this occur, however, he declared that he would break with them, but on condition that he receive reinforcements, next day, to the extent of four or five hundred men with their provisions. He immediately wrote to the same effect to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, telling him that the extreme scarcity of provisions in the

town, the insufficiency of the means of defence, and the general desire of the population had induced him to make overtures for capitulation.

The English general had verbally accepted all but one of the conditions asked, and M. Joannes was still in the British camp. It would of course, he said, be impossible for him to withdraw from the negotiations if an agreement was arrived at, and he expressed his regret that Rochebeaucourt had not arrived sooner. Later in the day, after the capitulation had been finally signed, Ramezay again wrote to Vaudreuil, telling him that he would have been very glad, in conformity with his wishes, not to have concluded the capitulation had not things gone so far that it was impossible for him to withdraw. Vaudreuil, whose chief aim in life appeared to be the blaming of others for the disasters which he might himself have prevented, replied to Ramezay that so prompt a capitulation had very much surprised, not only himself, but the whole army.

In view of the part which the Governor had played since the battle of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, this letter is altogether inexplicable. His desertion of the camp at Beauport and flight into the country were utterly indefensible acts. In his letter of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September to Ramezay, he had the presumption to say of his retreat "no other alternative being left to maintain ourselves in the Colony." He might have said "no more effectual means can be taken for ensuring the final loss of the colony."

The defences of the hornwork were such that the British could not have attacked it without serious loss. It has been seen that the whole army fled in a state of terror into

the country, while the enemy were busy on the heights, quietly intrenching themselves, and not even thinking of attacking or pursuing them. In their mad flight, which was under the immediate command of Vaudreuil, they had left behind them almost all their supplies. Vaudreuil had told de Ramezay that the absolute want of supplies obliged him to retreat though he had left behind him 398 barrels of flour, 182 of pork and 246 tubs of the same, besides 33 quintals of fresh bread, 80 of biscuits, 16 line oxen, 10 line cows and a quantity of other provisions.

The town, invested by a hostile army, was left to its fate, much worse off, so far as provisions were concerned, than the army had been, its inhabitants having been virtually on the verge of starvation and the troops on the point of mutiny, before Ramezay proposed terms of capitulation. It is true that relief was again and again promised by Vaudreuil, but the promises all remained unfulfilled up to the time that the capitulation was proposed, and Ramezay, who had been instructed by Vaudreuil himself not to wait for the final assault of the town, or the exhaustion of his supplies, before securing honourable terms, was not justified in supposing that the promised relief was nearer to him than it had been for several days previously. He had been told to wait forty-eight hours after the departure of the army before proposing the capitulation.

As a matter of fact he waited double that period. He had offered a gallant and persistent resistance to the foe, as long as his dilapidated defences, the obedience of his officers and men and the existence of supplies would

permit with the whole force of the enemy intrenching itself against him, while de Vaudreuil was engaged in a disorderly flight with nobody in pursuit. He had succeeded, too, in obtaining from the enemy, much more favourable terms than those which he had been authorized by Vaudreuil to accept. Though the Governor had sent to Ramezay the conditions which he was to ask, he fully realized, at the same time, that they might not be granted, and therefore supplied him with written observations, indicating those which ought to be accorded and those that should not be insisted upon. Ramezay succeeded, not only in obtaining from the British all that Vaudreuil suggested ought to be granted, but also some of the favourable conditions which the Governor had told him were not to be insisted on. Vaudreuil had observed, for instance, that "this is not the time to insist" upon the honours of war for the garrison, while Ramezay succeeded in arranging that "the garrison of the town, composed of the land forces, marines and sailors, shall march out of the town with arms and baggage, drums beating, matches lighted," etc. To the second of the proposed articles of Capitulation "That the inhabitants shall be preserved in the possession of their houses, goods, effects and privileges", Vaudreuil had added this remark for Ramezay's guidance, "Should the enemy make any difficulty in consenting, let there be added to the first article:—'until the possession of Canada be determined by a Treaty of Peace'; and give him to understand that this is for the interest of his B. M." Here again, Ramezay succeeded in overcoming the difficulty foreseen by Vaudreuil.



Much injustice has been done Ramezay's memory by the hasty conclusions of historians who have based their attacks on him upon Vaudreuil's unmerited censure of his capitulation of Quebec, apparently written in the heat and excitement of the moment, since he fully atoned for his injurious action of a year and a half before, when in May, 1761, he affixed his signature, in Paris, to an important statement of Ramezay's services to his king and country. This memoir, after relating that in 1749 Ramezay was Major of Quebec, and that "his exactitude in fulfilling all his duties was exempt from the least reproach", goes on to say, "In 1758 he was made Lieutenant of the King at Quebec. There, in 1759, he sustained a siege of 66 days, in a town devastated by the bombs and cannons of the enemy, up to its capitulation, which was compelled by the lack of provisions and of men; the few of the latter remaining to him being completely discouraged, badly disposed towards the defence of the place and frightened by the menaced assault: added to this, the place was open on all sides, so that it could not be protected against the slightest attack. This, with the reasons of which he has rendered an account to the Court, necessitated the holding of a Council of War, to deliberate upon the action called for by the circumstances, of which the result was a decision to secure the best capitulation possible." Vaudreuil attested the truth of this memoir by writing immediately under Ramezay's signature.—"We, Grand Cross of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, certify that the Sieur de Ramezay, heretofore Lieutenant of the King at Quebec, has in the memoir conformed to the truth; that he has given

at all times and in all places, evident proofs of his value, sagacity, prudence, care, exactitude, vigilance and capacity. In faith of which we give him these presents in order to render him justice. At Paris, the sixth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and sixty-one. — (Signed) DE VAUDREUIL."

Could any justification be more thorough and complete than the foregoing, coming as it did from the Governor himself, the supreme chief of French authority in Canada at the time of the capitulation, after mature reflection for nineteen months, upon all the circumstances of the case, including the hasty words uttered by himself, in the confusion and excitement attendant upon that important event?

Though further testimony on this point is quite unnecessary to the perfect justification of Ramezay, that of M. Daine, the Mayor of Quebec at the time of its capitulation, furnishes some interesting details. He wrote to the Marshal de Belle Isle on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October, 1759, telling him how Ramezay had been induced, by promises of relief to postpone the capitulation, and how after waiting several days in vain "he finally determined to capitulate with the unanimous consent of those who composed the Council of War, and on the reiterated demands of all the officers who had a perfect knowledge of the resistance so poor a place was capable of, with so much the more reason, as to feed 800 men employed at the Upper and Lower Town batteries, 500 to 600 fighting men, the majority of whom were worn out and unwilling, and 2,676 persons, women and children, according to the information I took in my quality

of Lieutenant-General of Police in the town ; it had only 18 barrels of flour, 23 of Indian corn and 25 of rice, a little pork and some other refreshments, so that there was at most, only provision for one day and a half, even by reducing the ration.

In this extremity, and in order not to expose the garrison and the people to general assault, and thereby to the fury of the avenger, according to the laws of war, the Commandant judged that hesitation was no longer excusable. He then concluded the most honourable capitulation that was ever made. As I have already described in one of my preceding letters, I shall not again dwell, my Lord, on the defect of the fortifications of that place, open on all sides, it being enclosed at different points only by a simple palisade. In such a position, can it be said with justice that the Commandant was in too great a hurry, and might have waited? No, without doubt, unless to expose his garrison and the people to be put to the sword, which would have been indubitably the case."

The discovery of General Montcalm's letter to Townshend, declaring that Quebec was compelled to surrender, was itself sufficient to fully acquit Ramezay of the blame which the Governor cast upon him at the time, in connection with his capitulation of the town, altogether apart from the other justifying circumstances of the case. These leave no doubt that further delay on his part in proposing it, would either have enabled the enemy to enter into forcible possession of the town, or would have led them to exact conditions of very much greater severity, from a feeling that the garrison had unreasonably delayed the surrender

which had been signified in writing by the late commander of the forces.

The British would never have agreed to Ramezay's conditions had they fully appreciated the grievous stress to which the inhabitants and the garrison of the town had been brought. Notwithstanding Montcalm's admission that Quebec was obliged to surrender, and despite the stories of suffering told them by the deserters from within the walls, they never properly realized its extent until they saw it for themselves. Of this no better evidence is required than that afforded by Major Moncrief, who states in his *Journal*,—" We found the buildings in general in a most ruinous condition, infinitely worse than we could have imagined ; for, besides those burned, there was hardly a house in the town that was not hurt by either shot or shells, and scarce habitable without some repairing.

The fortifications which consisted of only the fronts towards the land, were little more than half finished, and could have held out but for a very few days after opening our batteries ; for there being neither ditch, covered way, nor outworks, the scarp-wall was seen in many places from the top of the parapet to the foundation. The inside was equally imperfect, and its defence in many places impracticable even for small arms.

There remained but a small quantity of provisions, scarcely enough to serve the garrison for four days, and that was distributed to the women and children of the poorer inhabitants. . . . This want was undoubtedly one the principal causes of their sudden capitulation, for they had but little hopes of its being supplied."

The British, on their side, flattered themselves that their government would approve the terms, because of the inclemency of the season, the advance of the enemy in their rear, the danger, from the equinoctial gales, of delaying the fleet too long in the St. Lawrence, and the desirability of getting into the town before the winter. <sup>(1)</sup>

A copy of the capitulation, sent by Ramezay, was handed to Vaudreuil by Captain Daubrespie, at St. Augustin, on the evening of the 18<sup>th</sup> of September. Vaudreuil's army had been joined by General de Levis on the 17<sup>th</sup>, and marched immediately with him in the direction of Quebec. That night it slept at Pointe-aux-Trembles, and on the night of the 18<sup>th</sup> at St. Augustin. Upon receiving there the copy of the articles of capitulation, it was decided by de Levis and Vaudreuil that it was useless, then, to continue on to Quebec, and the whole army retraced its steps to Jacques-Cartier.

General Townshend took possession of the town on the afternoon of the 18<sup>th</sup> of September, General Murray marching with the Grenadiers into the Upper Town; while Captain Palliser landed with the seamen and took possession of the Lower Town. Early that day, the following orders were issued:—

“The capital of Canada having this day surrendered to his Britannic Majesty's arms, upon terms honourable to our victorious army, all acts of violence, pillage, or cruelty, are strictly forbidden. The garrison to have the honours of ware; the inhabitants to lay down their arms,

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(1) Vol. V, pages 109, 218.

and, are, by the capitulation, intitled thereupon to his Majesty's protection. The soldiers ought therefore to consider, that Quebec belongs to his Britannic Majesty, and not to the French King; that it may be a garrison to the troops, and must be preserved with that view; that its early submission, *even before a gun was fired against it*, has saved the troops from much fatigue, and perhaps, illness; that the submission of the whole colony, on this occasion, may depend upon the behaviour of the soldiers; that our supplies this winter will be effected by it; it is consequently the highest offence against the King's service to infringe an order, which, by the articles of war, is death. After this warning no person can expect mercy upon conviction before a court-martial. This order to be read at the head of every company."

The ceremony of replacing the lily-bespangled flag of France by the Union flag of Great Britain upon the most conspicuous part of the garrison occurred about four o'clock in the afternoon. After the gates had been taken possession of by Lieut.-Colonel Murray and three companies of Grenadiers, fifty of the Royal Artillery with a proportionate number of officers, followed by one field piece, with a lighted match, marched to the Grand Parade, in front of the Chateau St. Louis, followed by the commanding officer and the party sent to take possession of the town, to whom all keys of the fort were delivered. From this party, officers' guards were immediately sent to take possession of all the outlets of the town. All artillery, stores, provisions, etc., in the town were handed over for His Majesty's use, and while signed lists of these were delivered to the

English Commissary, the commanding officer of the artillery hoisted the Union flag upon the Citadel, and the flag gun, with the British colours hoisted on its carriage was left on the Grand Parade, fronting the main guard. Captain Palliser, who had taken possession of the Lower Town, as already related, hoisted similar colours on the summit of the declivity leading from the Lower to the Upper Town, in full view of the Basin and of the surrounding country.

On the same day, a noted rebel named Long, a Briton by birth, was taken prisoner and sent in irons on board one of the ships. He is described as having been quite a thorn in the sides of his countrymen in Nova Scotia.

That afternoon witnessed an attack by some of the French soldiery intrenched on the north bank of the St. Charles, upon the British detachment, opposite to them; these parties of the enemy pretending that they were not included in the capitulation. General Townshend immediately notified M. de Ramezay that he must withdraw his men from under the guns of the town, under pain of having the capitulation disannulled and the siege prosecuted with the greatest vigour, since all the territory understood as being in the immediate district of Quebec and controlled by its guns was comprised in the articles of capitulation. This message had the desired effect, and M. de St. Vincent was sent to notify the French officer at the St. Charles to withdraw his men. <sup>(1)</sup>

At dusk on the same day, Major Robert Elliott crossed

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(1) Vol. IV, page 213;

the St. Charles, <sup>(1)</sup> in accordance with instructions to go with a detachment of five hundred men, to take possession of the enemy's intrenched camp at Beauport and to disarm the inhabitants of the village.

The river was only forded with very great difficulty, the water being high from the late rains. One of his men was carried off by the stream and lost, another being lifted off his feet by the current, and only saving himself by catching hold of a rope hanging from a *bateau*. The people on the Beauport side of the river gave a pleasant welcome to the soldiers, expressing the utmost satisfaction at their arrival and treating them to wine and provisions. The detachment took possession of the enemy's redoubt after a few scattering shots, and found three pieces of cannon there which had been spiked, two of which were immediately unspiked. A party of fifty men was sent out next morning to an encampment near the redoubt, where no one was found except an Indian Squaw who was asleep in a tent. Subsequently the Major and his men proceeded to Beauport, where they found a large quantity of guns, ammunition, etc. They brought off with them several barrels of small arms, shot, tools, etc., in their flat-bottomed boats, and returned to Quebec in the evening.

During the 19<sup>th</sup> of September the British ships took up a position in front of the town, in a long line extending from opposite the Falls of Montmorency to Sillery. They disembarked a body of twelve to thirteen hundred men who encamped at Cote d'Abraham.

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(1) Vol. V, page 279,



Ever since the battle of the 13<sup>th</sup> deserters from the French army had continued to find their way into the English camp, and after the capitulation whole families of Canadians began surrendering to the British. On the 21<sup>st</sup> of September, almost all the farmers and other inhabitants of the country for nine miles round Quebec, came to the city to take the oath of allegiance. The ceremony lasted from early morning till three o'clock in the afternoon, when permission was given by General Townshend for the inhabitants of the town and surrounding parishes to freely come and go upon matters pertaining to their business affairs, and to remain in peaceable possession of their properties.

The soldiers of the garrison, composed of land forces, marines and sailors, who had marched out of the town with all their arms and baggage, their drums beating, etc., in accordance with the terms of the articles of capitulation, embarked on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September, on board the vessels that were to convey them to France, which set sail the following day.

The British colours which were hoisted over the heights of Quebec on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September 1759, have never ceased to float over the old French capital from that day to this, and have no more zealous defenders than the descendants of those loyal Canadians who took the oath of allegiance to Britain in the stirring days of September, in that eventful year when the Chevalier de Ramezay so gallantly resisted the besiegers' assault, and obtained such honourable terms of capitulation for the garrison and inhabitants of Quebec, before making the surrender

of the town that the dying Montcalm had indicated in writing to the British General, and that the Marquis of Vaudreuil had ordered by his written instructions of the 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1759.

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## CHAPTER XV.

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### AFTER THE SIEGE.

THE old capital of New France was brought immediately under British rule by the capitulation of Quebec on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September, 1759, which was signalised by the ceremonies described in the concluding part of the last chapter, when the Bourbon lilies were lowered to make way for the meteor flag of England. The account of the Siege of Quebec would be incomplete without a glance at the conditions produced by the ascendancy of the new flag. So also it might be premature to proceed to a description of Quebec under British rule, without a brief review of those remarkable tactics of the 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1759, which compelled the change of allegiance.

The attempts which have been made to rob the victorious British General of the honour due him for the triumph of his country's arms, both upon the Plains of Abraham and in the fall of Quebec, are simply so many illustrations of the fact that no talents, however exalted, and no successes, however great, can expect to escape the shafts of malice and envy. There have been efforts to claim for others the credit due to Wolfe alone for the plans of the British victory of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September, while some have attempted

to show that faulty and illadvised tactics on the part of his gallant rival were responsible for the French defeat, rather than any special mark of genius on the part of Wolfe himself. The ungenerous treatment of the British Commander by those who would steal his laurels for another is only exceeded by the utter lack of generosity and fair play accorded to Montcalm's memory by many of those in whose cause he yielded up his life. The idea of genius,—whether on the part of Wolfe or of any of his brigadiers,—having had anything to do with the victory, is seriously scouted by others, who gravely declare that “if” anyone of ten or twelve different occurrences had never happened, Wolfe's victory would have been turned into a defeat and his reputation as a General completely ruined. Such futile attempts to rob the hero of Quebec of his great military repute are simply puerile, and in order to complete the *reductio ad absurdum*, it only remains for those advancing such claims to maintain the position that if Wolfe had never visited Canada at all, the French army would not have been defeated by him upon the Plains of Abraham.

A reference to a letter written by the British General to his uncle on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May, 1759, furnishes undoubted proof that the plan of attack by which Quebec fell into the possession of his army, was altogether his own, since he announced it more than four months previous to putting it into execution. In this letter, which contains a description of Quebec, these remarkable words occur,—“I reckon we shall have a smart action at the passage of the River St. Charles, unless we can steal a detachment up the

River St. Lawrence and land them, three, four or five miles or more above the town and get time to entrench so strongly that they won't care to attack."

Wolfe, it will thus be seen, had a definite plan in view from the commencement of the campaign, from which he did not deviate in spite of the many offers of advice. To him the profession of arms was a serious one, and in his letters he often expressed regret that the regulations of the service did not permit the young officer to obtain a more ample knowledge of the art of war. In his own case he made up for this deficiency by making as deep a study as possible of the nature of the country which was about to become the scene of his operations. It was thus that he was enabled, a month before the fleet and army appeared before Quebec, to indicate, not only the exact method by which Quebec was eventually taken, but also the place where his daring plan was carried into effect on the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September. He expected to be able to land at Montmorency and force his way into the town by the River St. Charles. His operations at Montmorency were unsuccessful, and it was only his ill health that prevented him from earlier carrying out his second plan, which he considered too dangerous to entrust to others. <sup>(1)</sup>

Again, on the 18<sup>th</sup> of July, Wolfe reconnoitred the north shore above the town from the opposite side of the river, and seemed to think a landing possible. Major Dalling

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(1) "My ill state of health hinders me from executing my own plan; it is of too desperate a nature to order others to execute."—From letter of August 30th, 1759, addressed by General Wolfe to Admiral Saunders.

went up three miles that afternoon in order to took for the most convenient places on the north shore for the ascent of the troops. <sup>(1)</sup>

The efforts to take from Wolfe the credit of the original plan of his great achievement was thought, no doubt, to be facilitated by his official secretivness regarding it. This reticence was one of the most remarkable features of his tactics and was, in fact, essential to their success. Those who have striven to rob him of the honour which is his due have attributed to mere luck the circumstance that his scheme of drifting down the river in boats and landing at the Foulon was not known to the deserters who left his army for the French camp on the day before the battle. There was no luck about the affair at all. Wolfe's success was altogether due to his own carefully considered precautions. But for his admirable discretion in keeping all the details of his plan to himself until the very last moment, his project might have been revealed to the enemy and disastrously foiled. Even his brigadiers were in ignorance of the place of attack and landing until a few hours before the attempt was made, and never seem to have understood the appearance of instability and irresolution which Wolfe's studied reticence constantly gave to his tactics. On October 5<sup>th</sup> we find General Murray dwelling upon this feature of his Commanding Officer's policy in a letter to General Townshend. <sup>(2)</sup> If the successful plan had been that of either of the brigadiers instead of being that


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(1) Vol. V, page 172.

(2) Vol. V., page 206.








of Wolfe himself, it would have been unnecessary for them to have united in a joint letter to the General, asking for details concerning it, on the very eve of assisting to put it into execution.<sup>(1)</sup> It is true that at Wolfe's request the Brigadiers had drawn up a plan of attack on the 29<sup>th</sup> of August, which he acquiesced in on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September. This, he dropped on the 10<sup>th</sup> of the same month and went back to his own original one, which, in all probability, he had always determined in his own mind to put into execution, even when, in the end of August, he drew up a tentative plan, which the Brigadiers opposed. By these means he succeeded in concealing the tactics upon which he had decided in the previous month of May, and at the same time was able to assure himself that there were no more promising ones to be suggested.

Wolfe's plan of maintaining his camp at Lévis throughout the siege was successful in leading Montcalm to believe that it was his intention to attack the French camp at Beauport; while if he had adopted the Brigadiers' plan of the 29<sup>th</sup> of August, Montcalm would undoubtedly have moved up his army from Beauport, and thus the British General would have been foiled in the execution of his own scheme. As it was, Wolfe's tactics so deceived Montcalm that a deserter from the French camp on the day before the battle reported that the commanding officer still believed the flower of Wolfe's army to be below Quebec.

Contrary to the pretensions of his critics, Wolfe had left nothing to chance. He selected the Foulon for his land-

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(1) Vol. VI., page 59.



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(1) Vol. VI., page 59.

ing place because the difficulties which it presented were certain to cause the neglect of its proper defence, and because, too, he had positively ascertained that the Regiment of Guienne was not upon the heights, and that Vergor's post was very inadequately protected. Had it "chanced" to have been otherwise, his tactics would doubtless have been changed accordingly.

He had adopted the brilliant plan of sending a number of the larger vessels of the fleet up the river from Cap Rouge, in order to draw Bougainville and his command still further from the scene of his intended attack, at the very moment that the attacking army, which had been quietly disembarked from them under shadow of the darkness, was starting to drift down with the tide in their small boats on the opposite side of the river, out of the range of Bougainville's vision. The latter believed the troops to be still on board the ships and followed his instructions by keeping them in sight, as he accompanied, on shore, their passage up the stream.

With an equally consummate tact, Wolfe had kept Montcalm and his command fully occupied in expectation of an attack from Admiral Saunders' fleet in the Basin off the mouth of the St. Charles, which was threatened by a feint of so realistic a character that those engaged in it ran the risk of a certain loss in men and boats in order to produce the desired effect.

Even if any one of his carefully laid plans for the landing of the troops and the scaling of the cliff had miscarried, no great disaster could have occurred during these operations to the main body of the British troops, who were

kept in the boats until it was certain that they ran no risk.

Great honour is due to the valour displayed by the British troops upon the battlefield, but the selection of the most advantageous ground, the disposal of the army, the splendid discipline of the men, and above all the magnificent generalship shown by the order to the entire line of battle to stand firm while receiving the coming onslaught of the foe, without attempting to return its fire until the assailing party was within a few paces, must be credited to the heroic commander, who

" Where'er he fought,  
Put so much of his heart into his act,  
That his example had a magnet's force,  
And all were swift to follow whom all lov'd."

These, supported by the British pluck and coolness in the ranks, decided the issue of the day, and the ultimate fate, not only of Quebec, but of the whole of Canada.

If the tactics of the immortal Wolfe were such as to call forth the admiration of military critics in all succeeding generations, those of his great rival have been most unjustly censured.

The close intimacy which existed between Vaudreuil and the notorious Intendant Bigot was no doubt viewed with suspicion by Montcalm, whose severe arraignment of Bigot's dishonest methods seems to have embittered the Governor against him. Vaudreuil had thenceforth nothing but fault to find with Montcalm while living, and nothing but slander of his good name after his death. In this nefarious work he was even exceeded by Bigot, who in the

memorial presented in his own defence, when about to be convicted and punished for malversation of office, preferred the infamous charge against the memory of the dead General, that he had made such representations to the French Government respecting himself and the Marquis de Vaudreuil, as to warrant them in considering him a simple informer. Montcalm's resentful foes doubtless supposed that they were perfectly safe in attacking the reputation of one whose lips were sealed in death. They had failed, however, to take into consideration the bravery and determination of two noble and chivalrous women jealous of the good name of the dead Commander. The mother and the wife of Montcalm, each in her own name and the latter on behalf of her children as well, intervened in the trial of the graceless scoundrels who had so largely contributed to the fall of New France, for the purpose of asking that all the terms in Bigot's memorial injurious to the memory of the Marquis de Montcalm, and notably the word "informer," be suppressed as slanderous. Their application was granted and judgment rendered in full and complete accordance therewith, on the 10<sup>th</sup> day of December 1763, the very day upon which Bigot and several of his co-conspirators were condemned to perpetual banishment and to restitution of their ill-gotten gains.

The peculations of these dishonest officials were so notorious, and their sudden acquisition of wealth the cause of such general public comment in Canada that they could not fail to have come to the notice of the Governor. It is most surprising that no official action was taken by him, either to put an end to the system of organized corruption

that was feeding upon the very vitals of New France, or yet to bring it to the notice of the French Ministry. This inaction on Vaudreuil's part, coupled with his continued intimacy with Bigot, was deemed suspicious enough in Paris, to warrant his indictment for malversation of office along with the former Intendant and his accomplices. Either the lack of evidence to connect him with the stealings at Quebec or the potent influences that surrounded the Court gained him his acquittal of the charges of complicity in Bigot's frauds, and leaves posterity to guess as to the nature of the Intendant's influence over him. Though personal corruption was never proved against Vaudreuil, there is no doubt that questionable methods were permitted for enriching at least one of his family connections. A memoir of Chief Engineer de Pont le Roy is on record respecting the utter uselessness of the fort erected by the French at Carillon, and Commissary General Doreil, endorsing M. le Roy's memoir, says; "Fort Carillon is worth nothing and costs the king as much as Brisack. An ignoramus constructed it — a relative of M. de Vaudreuil, whose fortune 'twas desirous to make and who has made it."

From the same authority, we glean some idea of what Montcalm had to contend with from the government of the Marquis de Vaudreuil. In his letter to the Marshal de Belle Isle of the 31<sup>st</sup> of July 1758, M. Doreil writes;— "Ineptness, intrigue, lies, cupidity, will in a short time destroy this colony, which costs the king so dearly. If it escape this year, which is not yet certain, as the enemy can return in greater strength and with more precaution,



'tis absolutely necessary to conclude peace this winter, my lord, or the colony will belong to the English next year, whatever M. Vaudreuil may write or cause to be written or to be said; it is of the greatest importance to change the entire administration when peace is made; should the making of it be delayed, change this moment the general government, otherwise the Marquis de Montcalm will have sustained this machine, always threatening to tumble, in order to see it perish at last, and perhaps be the unjust victim of it. For two years he has not ceased talking of the expedition and descent the enemy may effect at Quebec. There is no disposition either to foresee or to order anything; he uses his ruined health, his purse; sees all the evil, is penetrated by it, unable to remedy it or to do any good. He demands his recall, and in the meanwhile serves as usual. He will owe ten thousand *ecus* on the first of January. His desinterestedness excites criticism and jealousy and attracts enmity. He has had a great deal of trouble in quieting the French officers and soldier, who at last, after more than three years' sufferering have exploded; the latter during the action of the eighth have made several remarks worthy of being collected; here is one among the rest: "M. de Vaudreuil has sold the country, but we will not suffer him to deliver it up. He has sacrificed us in order to have our throats cut. Let us defend them. Long live the King and our general."

The undeserved blame imputed to Montcalm in connection with the fall of Quebec, by Vaudreuil and his friends and admirers, was principally based upon the allegations that he had removed the Guienne regiment from the

heights, that he was wrong in leaving Vergor in charge of the post at the Foulon, and that he erred in attacking the British army on the Plains without awaiting the arrival of Bougainville and his forces and of Vaudreuil with the balance of the army from Beauport.

It will be seen however from a study of the Bougainville correspondence that Vaudreuil himself was responsible for the withdrawal of the regiment of Guienne. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of September Montcalm dispatched this regiment to Bougainville for service between Cap Rouge and l'Anse des Meres, leaving him sole master of their movements. Vaudreuil, however, on the 7<sup>th</sup> of September suggested to Bougainville that the regiment of Guienne should be returned to camp, and further urged that it was impossible for it to remain at l'Anse des Meres because of the absence of wood. Bougainville apparently objected to this change, but Vaudreuil was unwilling to use the regiment between Cap Rouge and the City, as Montcalm had suggested. He would, however, consent to have it sent to St. Augustin or Pointe-aux-Trembles. It will be seen therefore that if Vaudreuil had not interfered with the orders of Montcalm, the regiment of Guienne would, in all probability have been in the vicinity of Sillery on the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September.

The attempt to shift upon Montcalm the sole responsibility for entrusting to Vergor the defence of the post at the Foulon is quite as unfortunate as the effort to blame him for the removal of the Guienne regiment from the Plains. In Vaudreuil's letter to Bougainville of the 6<sup>th</sup> of September, occurs the following passage,—“ After having

conferred with the Marquis of Montcalm, I strongly approve of leaving the same officers in the posts from l'Anse des Meres to Cap Rouge, as they know them ; namely Anse des Meres and the Foulon, M. de Vergor, who has replaced M. de St. Martin." Whatever reasons existed for doubting Vergor's probity and for suspecting him of treachery in the giving up of Fort Beausejour were better known to Vaudreuil than to anybody else, since he presided at the court martial by which Vergor was tried for his part in the affair and declared innocent. Either Vaudreuil had unjustly acquitted him, and was not justified in recommending him for the command of the important post at the Foulon, or he was well aware that there was no good reason for the blame imputed to Montcalm for agreeing to his retention.

Montcalm has been blamed for the precipitancy of his attack upon the British line on the heights. The Chevalier de Montreuil, Adjutant-General of the French forces, writing to the Marshal de Belle Isle, says "Had the Marquis de Montcalm postponed one instant marching against the enemy, they could not have been attacked, in consequence of the favorable position which they were going to take up, having even begun some intrenchments in their rear. . . . . People will not fail to inform you, as well as the Minister of Marine, verbally or in writing, that he was too precipitate in attacking ; that he ought to wait for M. de Bougainville's reinforcement, and dispute the ground by a running fire. All these means would not have prevented the enemy establishing themselves on Cote d'Abraham the moment they would have had time."

We have what amounts to equally strong approval of Montcalm's tactics upon the heights from a hostile military authority. General Murray had the fate of Montcalm before his eyes, when, in April 1760, he marched out of Quebec and found a French army advancing towards the heights. Yet this did not deter him from giving instant battle to the foe. "It was now impossible" he writes, "for me to intrench myself on the heights of Abraham; the fascines and my other requisites had been provided long ago. I could not hesitate a moment about giving the enemy battle, as every one knows the place is not tenable against an army in possession of the heights."

The fragment of a journal in the library of Congress at Washington pays this tribute to Montcalm's tactics:—"He anticipated a simultaneous attack from the whole English fleet and army on the lower and upper towns of Quebec; an attack which could be prevented only by a battle on the Plains; for this without faltering he made prompt and skilful preparations, evincing the calm wisdom and firm purpose of a veteran general. Montcalm has been blamed for leaving his works and risqueing a battle in the open fields, and it has been said in excuse that he did it in the hope of meeting the English before they could avail themselves of their whole force. Various motives might have concurred to induce him to take the field, but his course was probably determined by what he deemed an imperious necessity. Throughout the whole siege, no hasty impatience for battles has been discovered, and his conduct had been marked with extreme caution: not one rash or even imprudent step could be imputed to him,—

and he was regarded by friends and foes as an accomplished soldier."

A criticism of the *Relation du Siège de Québec* says "everybody murmurs that Montcalm did not attack the enemy before it had assembled in such force, while here the complaint is made that he charged too soon. But it is necessary to say something."<sup>(1)</sup>

Vaudreuil himself declared at six o'clock on the evening of the 13<sup>th</sup> that "the enemy's position is becoming more advantageous every moment". This was equally true of that position from the moment of Wolfe's arrival on the heights; yet while Montcalm took the only practical course which presented itself, of endeavouring to crush the foe with his superior numbers, before they had time to entrench themselves, Vaudreuil defeated his hopes by refusing a large part of the army permission to march to the Plains, and by delaying his own departure from camp to go to Montcalm's assistance, until he had taken time to write and dispatch his flippant letter to Bougainville, and heard from the heights beyond him the roar of the battle which was even then deciding the fate of New France.

The most competent military critics of the time, both French and English, approved the tactics of Montcalm as the only reasonable ones that presented themselves, and those of succeeding ages have not failed to endorse their views, notwithstanding the tendency in all times to lay the blame for military reverses at the door of the defeated commander. That Montcalm did the best that was possible

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(1) Note to page 322 of Vol. V.

to him under the difficult position in which the successful strategy of Wolfe, the incapacity or negligence of Vaudreuil and the undisciplined character of his troops had placed him, admits of no doubt. He realized the difficulty immediately upon learning that the enemy had "got at last to the weak side of his miserable garrison", and was fully impressed with the desperate character of the task before him, which was being momentarily increased by the active intrenching operations of the British. The disregard of his orders to encamp the Guienne Regiment upon the heights had defeated his plans for preventing the enemy's appearance there, and his gallant attempt to crush the foe before it could still further strengthen its position was doomed to a failure to which Vaudreuil had in no small degree contributed, by his inaction and delay in the camp at Beauport, and by countermanding Montcalm's order to the left division of the army to march thence to his support.

Whatever opportunity of saving Quebec from falling into the hands of the English still remained to Vaudreuil after the battle of the Plains was deliberately thrown away by him when he took his memorable flight with his army from the camp at Beauport, instead of attempting to dislodge the victorious troops from the heights. He has endeavoured to convey the impression that Montcalm might have gained the day had he only awaited his arrival with the balance of the fifteen hundred men from Beauport, yet on the day following the battle, or even on the afternoon of the same day, Vaudreuil himself might have attacked the British army with Montcalm's troops, reinforced, not only by the whole of his own forces from Beau-

port, but also by those under the command of Bougainville, which he described as the *élite* of the army. He chose rather to leave the garrison and city of Quebec to their fate and to seek safety to his person in flight and for his reputation in complaints of his "diminished numbers" and "the weakness of the army."

Such were the successful tactics on the one hand and the tactical blunders on the other which were mainly responsible for the passage of Quebec under British rule.

Colonel John Hale and Captain James Douglas, sailed on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September from Quebec, by the man-of-war *Leostoffe*, the former charged with the dispatches from Generals Monckton and Townshend to Mr. Pitt, containing the glorious news of the fall of Quebec.

On the 26<sup>th</sup> of the same month, most of the troops which composed the late French garrison were embarked for France. They consisted of the King's lieutenant, nine captains, thirteen first and second lieutenants, three cadets, twenty-seven sergeants, twenty-two drummers and five hundred and forty rank and file. Other prisoners were sent to Europe at a later date, including the crews of two Spanish ships. Some of whom approached the British Admiral, in a boat flying Spanish colours, and asked leave to bring down their vessels and to return to their own country. They were promptly told that they would be sent home themselves, but that their ships would be seized, having been engaged in the service of Britain's enemies.

Though the town had capitulated and had been taken charge of by a small British garrison on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September, it was the 29<sup>th</sup> before the bulk of the army

marched within the walls to take up their winter's quarters. The delay was due to the necessity of fitting up proper accommodation, most of the available buildings in the town having been more or less damaged by the heavy artillery fire of the British during the siege, especially those along the summit of the cliff extending from the Bishop's palace to Cape Diamond, which fell to the lot of the Royal Artillery, and the Thirty-fifth and Forty-third battalions. The Forty-eighth, by choice, remained encamped upon the field several days longer, until the Intendant's Palace, which was assigned them, was completely fitted up for their reception.

While at work upon the magazine or storehouse of the Intendant, quite a quantity of supplies of various kinds were found, including fire-arms, hardware, hosiery, haberdashery wares of every description, clocks, watches, and a variety of trinkets; also gold, silver and copper, laces, furs, skins, wine, salt, sugar, spare clothing and moccasins.

General Monckton found a good many shoes and a quantity of coarse cloth in the public stores, and directed Brigadier Murray to distribute some of both to the soldiers, to keep them warm in the winter; the cloth in order that they might make themselves waistcoats.

A curious commentary upon the nature of the military rewards which were deemed to be generous less than a century and a half ago is furnished by Monckton's report to Pitt that he made this distribution of waistcoat cloth and shoes to the troops "as a reward for the great spirit with which they went through the campaign, and their gallant behaviour on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September," and by his



half apologetic remark that "my doing this, I hope, Sir, will be approved of."

General Townshend's Journal, printed in the fourth volume of this work, furnishes a complete list of the iron and brass guns, mortars and ammunition found by the British in the fortress of Quebec. <sup>(1)</sup>

One of the first cares of the British after obtaining possession of the city was to secure quarters for their sick and wounded, the General Hospital being overcrowded. General Murray, called upon the Superioress of the Ursuline Convent and expressed his desire of sending a number of his wounded to be nursed in that institution.

The nuns agreed to receive and to care for the unfortunate soldiers, and workmen were employed by the troops in repairing the buildings of the convent and in fitting up the chapel of the institution so that divine service could be celebrated there for the troops. The members of the community who had sought shelter for seventy days of the siege with the Reverend Ladies of the General Hospital, returned to the convent almost immediately after the capitulation. They found the building formerly used as a public school in ruins, while the "sacristy, the Chapel of Saints, and the church had been pierced by cannon balls and bomb shells." Eight of the Sisters had remained in the institution throughout the siege, at the imminent risk of their lives, and succeeded in saving most of "the statues, paintings, tabernacles and altar furniture."

On Thursday, the 27<sup>th</sup> of September 1759, exactly a

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(1) Vol. IV., pages 276, 277.

fortnight after the victory upon the Plains of Abraham, the troops attended a triumphal thanksgiving service in this Ursuline Chapel, when a sermon, specially prepared for the occasion was preached by the Revd. Elie Dawson, chaplain of H. M. S. Stirling Castle, on board of which the Vice-Admiral hoisted his flag during the siege. (1) The grandiloquence of the language indulged in by the preacher is illustrated by the following reference to the exploits and death of the British commander:

“ But whence these Tears in the Day of Triumph?— Pardon no — I blame them not.—The venerable Image of your deceased General rises to your Imagination!—They gush spontaneous from an honest Fountain! — They are the tears of Piety and Gratitude:—the natural Tribute due to his illustrious Merit.

But remember he is greatly fallen. Tell how he fell ye proud Towers!—Ye Ramparts!—were ye not witnesses?— Speak with what a Blase of Glory you saw the Heroe surrounded!—Tell how ye shock to your Foundations at the presence of the Conqueror! Tell how you saw your numerous Hosts, like the Dust, scattered over the Plain!— Tell how vainly they sought Shelter amidst the ghastly Ruins!—Ye Mountains of Abraham, decorated with his Trophies, tell how vainly ye opposed him, when he mounted your lofty Heights with the Strength and Swiftnes of an eagle!—Stand fixed forever upon your rocky Base, and speak his Name and Glory to all future generations!

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(1) This sermon was subsequently printed in London with a dedication to the mother of General Wolfe. A copy of it is preserved in the British Museum, from which that now in our possession has been made.

Ye Streams of Lawrence and propitious Gales, speed the glad Tidings to his beloved Country, and let Britannia soon receive the last, and richest Pledge of her hero's filial Duty and Affection! Ye Heralds of Fame, already upon the Wing, stretch your Flight and swell your Trumpets with the Glory of a military Exploit through distant Worlds! An Exploit, which, for the Fineness of Address in Stratagem, the Daringness of the Attempt, and the Spirit of its Execution shall take Rank with the choicest Pieces of ancient or modern Story in the Temple of Fame, where it remains immortal."

Ten days later, the sick soldiers were brought in, several apartments having been put in readiness for them. Not only did the venerable Superioress and the other Nuns cheerfully accept the duties of their new position and attend to the necessities of their late foes with all the compassion that was natural to them, but having their pity aroused by the suffering from the cold which the coming winter had in store for the Highlanders whose regiment was quartered upon the Convent, and whose peculiar costume still further aroused their compassion, they set to work to provide substantial hose "to cover the limbs of the poor strangers".<sup>(1)</sup>

On the other hand the convalescent officers and soldiers were eager to show their gratitude by rendering every out door service in their power, clearing, the paths around the Convent from snow, bringing, as far they were allowed, burdens of every kind, wood and water and the daily pro-

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(1) *Glimpses of the Monastery*.—Part. III, page 79.

visions which were ordered from the Commissariat or from the bakery. The strictest rules were enforced by the British authorities for ensuring to the good Sisters the respect and protection that was their due, and the perfect privacy and freedom from invasion, of their cloister.


A tenderness, equal to that shown by the Ursulines, was manifested towards the British wounded by the Ladies of the General Hospital. Thus the *British Magazine* for 1760 is authority for the statement that Madame de Ramezay, Superioress of that institution behaved towards Captain Ochterlony who was taken there wounded, "with all the tenderness of a mother, and after the reduction of the place, could not help shedding tears when his name was mentioned."

From the moment of entering into possession of the city, the British did everything in their power to conciliate and ensure even-handed justice to the inhabitants of the country. Hearing that some of the natives had been robbed and plundered a few days after the battle of the Plains, General Townshend offered a reward of five guineas for the discovery of the culprits, and issued new orders, assuring the army that all plundering would be punishable by death. Mention has already been made of the British manifesto, allowing the inhabitants to return to their farms and reap their harvest, upon condition of laying down their arms and taking the oath of fidelity. Special provision was made, not only for the protection of their property, but for a due and proper respect for their religious observances. Thus we find it stated in the General Orders of the 4<sup>th</sup> of November that "the French

inhabitants of Quebec, by the capitulation, being intitled to the possession of their effects, and His Majesty's proclamation for the free exercise of their religion, it is determined to punish all robbing and plundering, or insult offered to their persons, in an exemplary manner ; and when any of their processions are made in the streets, it is ordered that the Officers pay them the compliment of the hat, because it is a civility due to the people who have chosen to live under the protection of our laws ; should this piece of ceremony be repugnant to the consciences of any one, they must retire when the procession approaches."

Another instance of the consideration shown for the conquered people is furnished by the action of General Murray in ordering one day's provisions to be stopped weekly from each officer and soldier and to be distributed amongst those of the inhabitants who had taken the oath of allegiance, many of whom were in the deepest distress. Out of compassion for their suffering fellow creatures, the soldiers willingly acquiesced in this order, though they suffered exceedingly in thus parting with their allowance, which at best was much too small for them, many of them being reduced to mere skeletons by the heaviness of their duties, the severity of the weather and the want of provisions and proper nourishment.

There was scarcely anything to be bought for money, and what was offered commanded excessive prices, while the troops had scarcely funds for any purpose, since there was no means to obtain remittances from England for giving them their pay. At General Monckton's desire,



Par son Excellence Monseigneur Jacques Marry,  
Secrétaire General & Remarquier en chef des Voyes de la Reye  
Soubventoyeur sous le Règne de S<sup>te</sup> Catherine, Gouverneur de la Ville de  
Paris, &c. &c.

Il y a de la difficulté de faire passer les lettres de la Cour de la Ville de Paris, &c. &c.

Il y a de la difficulté de faire passer les lettres de la Cour de la Ville de Paris, &c. &c.

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Il y a de la difficulté de faire passer les lettres de la Cour de la Ville de Paris, &c. &c.

Il y a de la difficulté de faire passer les lettres de la Cour de la Ville de Paris, &c. &c.

Copy-right By A. G. Daughy 1906.

Per Monseigneur  
J. Marry

the Admiral sent a sloop of war to New York for a supply of money, but there was very little hope of her return during the same season, and the troops had only been paid up to the preceding 24<sup>th</sup> of August. General Amherst's intentions were that six month's subsistence for the troops and a proper sum for the contingencies of the army should have arrived by way of the St. Lawrence before the close of navigation. Yet the total amount obtainable for these purposes was only £19,700, and as it was absolutely necessary that as much cash should be kept in the town as possible, not only for the purpose of procuring fresh provisions from the inhabitants for the sick, but also to prevent such supplies being furnished to the enemy, the Admiral collected from the officers of the several ships of war, by way of a loan, upwards of £3,000, for the repayment of which, General Monckton drew upon the Paymaster-General in favour of Admiral Saunders, for £3,365, and informed Mr. Pitt of his action. <sup>(1)</sup>

The inhabitants of the parishes surrounding the town of Quebec took so much advantage of the scarcity of provisions that General Murray issued an order fixing the price of wheat and flour, though the inexorable law of supply and demand soon proved itself superior to the orders of the Governor of Quebec.

Murray became Governor by appointment of General Monckton, who was ordered south by the Doctors on account of his wound, while Townshend sailed for England in the month of October. It is interesting to note the

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(1) See Monckton's letter of October 8th.



exchange of courtesies which occurred at this time between some of French and English officers. Thus we find by a letter of Bougainville's of the 11<sup>th</sup> of October that he expressed his thanks to General Townshend for a loan of money, necessitated, he says, by the requirements of 'the wounded in his command, and which, under other circumstances, he should have deemed it indiscreet to ask. He also mentions that having heard that Townshend was about to sail and knowing that it was almost impossible to obtain fowls in Quebec, he sends a few for his acceptance.

Townshend was longer in reaching home than he had expected, for while in the channel, he learned from the Juno frigate that the Brest fleet had sailed out of Toulon with twenty or twenty-two ships of the line, and in consequence he declined to be landed. After having written to Pitt, he at once proceeded with Admiral Saunders to join Admiral Hawke in the Bay. This was certainly not the action of a man who, as some of his enemies pretend, was eager to rush home in order to claim unmerited laurels. Townshend appears to have had many enemies and to have been the object of continuous attack, which was aggravated by the issue of a number of abusive pamphlets, representing that he had claimed for himself the credit of Wolfe's victory. Many later day historians appear to have accepted these charges as true without taking the slightest trouble to investigate them. Thus Kingsford says, "It will be fortunate for his memory if he is only remembered as the signer of the treaty of capitulation with Admiral Saunders on the part of the British Crown, for there is little else in his career to call for respect." Wright says

that "he never,—in any sense above animal courage,—was a soldier. His leading passion was ambition, and so that he arrived at power and station, he cared little for the means by which they were acquired," Parkman speaks of his disposition as "perverse and envious," but admits that he "had both talents and energy." He says, too, that "Townshend went home to parade his laurels and claim more than his share of the honours of the victory."<sup>(1)</sup>

In a series of letters contained in a cleverly written work entitled *Fugitive Pieces of Irish Politics*, (London, 1772), vague charges are made against Lord Townshend, particularly as to his action after the death of Wolfe. It may be that the explanation of these charges is furnished by another writer who takes up his pen in the same work, in Townshend's behalf. "I am pleased," says this latter, "to find that a writer of no despicable talents, is obliged to resort for the materials of invective to the stale refuse of newspaper anecdotes, and the exploded calumnies of vulgar detraction. You have collected the remnants of both, with a malicious industry and tricked them out in the tinsel of antithesis and the second hand frippery of imitated periods. You have kept a reverend eye upon the Great Homer of defamation, Junius, and like your master,

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(1) See also *A letter to an Honourable Brigadier-General, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in Canada*, which was supposed to have been written either by Mr. Charles Lee or by the author of the *Letters of Junius*, though Townshend attributed it to Lord Albermale, whom he answered by a challenge to a duel. Friends interfered and a meeting was prevented. The *Refutation* to the letter, which appeared shortly afterwards, was probably written by Charles Townshend, the celebrated wit and orator, a brother of the General.

have created a monster of your own imagination, in order to show how ingeniously you can rail at it."

In another place the same writer adds, "While the yet undecided fate of Canada and of a British army were depending, the General who succeeded to the command, had no leisure to cull such flowers of rhetoric to deck the grave of the departed conqueror: but being himself a soldier, he paid a more judicious tribute to the merit of his colleague, by publicly testifying that his intrepidity and skilful operations had ensured the victory."

A careful study of all Townshend's letters and journals, and an examination of the accusations made against him fail to reveal any evidence that he ever claimed for himself the honour of Wolfe's victory, or sought to defame the memory of his Commander-in-Chief. The four chief points made against him may be briefly stated as a charge against Townshend of signing the act of capitulation and appointing the staff of the garrison without the consent of his superior officer, Monckton; of cowardice or at may rate of a *prudent* desire to keep away from danger; of opposing the plan of operations, and finally of having expressed no regret at the death of Wolfe.

It is perfectly true that in his capacity as Commandant Townshend signed the Act of Capitulation and appointed the staff of the garrison without sending to ask his superior officer Monckton, but it must be remembered that the latter was lying in hospital in his tent on the other side of the river, and that time was pressing, as nobody knew at what moment the French relieving expedition might make its appearance, so that prompt action was required in

order to counteract the efforts of Joannes who was employing every possible artifice to delay the signing of the Act, until the expected relief was at hand. Monckton, himself, did not blame Townshend for either of these acts, though he did express surprise that he had not been shown the Act of Capitulation before it was signed. The charge of cowardice, or even of "a prudent desire to keep away from danger", is too absurd to require further refutation than that already supplied in those of the foregoing pages that tell of his conduct throughout the Canadian campaign, and of his evident desire to expose himself to further dangers off the French coast, and that without orders, when he learned that his country's foes threatened a new danger. It is true that he opposed Wolfe's plan of operations, but it is equally true that when it had been finally resolved to execute it, he was so far from guilty of attempts to thwart it, that he loyally carried out instructions, and that after he learned that he was in command of the army he acted with prudence and with good military judgment in restoring his disordered lines and in making Wolfe's victory secure.

There is every reason for believing that the memory of the Brigadier has suffered from the zeal and excessive admiration of his friends. Even before he had left England on the expedition to Canada, they could see him returning, covered with victory and glory. And after the news of the battle had reached home, the Rev. Robert Leeke wrote a letter of congratulation to Lady Ferrers, Townshend's wife, in which he speaks of those who see the General "*at the head of his victorious troops enter the enemy's great capital,*

and see him send word to *His Majesty* under his own hand, that the *Victory* was thus Concluded by his own Policy and under his own direction." Now Townshend never wrote anything of the kind, and in his official dispatch he did not even claim that the Capitulation was signed by himself. To use his own words, he simply says "the 17<sup>th</sup>, a flag of truce came out with proposals of Capitulation about noon, before we had any battery erected. . . . He returned with the terms of Capitulation, which, with the Admiral, were considered agreed to, and signed on both sides by eight o'clock of the morning of the 18<sup>th</sup>." And in a letter to his wife, where he might have been pardoned for enlarging upon his personal share in so glorious a victory, his language is remarkably modest, not even claiming the merit to which he was entitled. He says "We have gained a great day, the particulars of which you will read in the *Public Gazette*. Though I was not in the warmest part of the action; yet I had more shots near me than in any other action I have seen." The absurd claims made for him by his friends placed him in a very false position. Perhaps they were pleasing to his vanity. Possibly he dreaded wounding their feelings by repudiating their flatteries. At all events he maintained a silence concerning them, which was scarcely more discreet than it was honourable, and which indirectly contributed, no doubt, to the vehemence of the attacks made upon his memory. Nor has this eagerness on the part of his friends to claim for him what he never claimed for himself, been confined to those of his own times. In 1901, a descendant of his family, Colonel Townshend, published a life of the first

Marquess, in which he endeavours to prove that the plan by which Quebec was taken was that of George Townshend. Notwithstanding that the author had at his disposal a vast number of unpublished papers relating to the siege, in the handwriting of Townshend, yet he has been unable to adduce therefrom a single statement in support of the claim which he makes for his kinsman. On the contrary the only passages in Colonel Townshend's book, which give the credit of the taking of Quebec to Townshend, are by the Colonel's own admission taken from the writings of Warburton. Brigadier Townshend nowhere makes the claim that the plan was his, but on the contrary acknowledges that he was ignorant of it up to the very last moment.

After the departure of Monckton for New York and of Townshend for England, General Murray entered upon his new duties as Governor of Quebec, with Colonel Burton, second in command, as Lieutenant-Governor, and the following staff:—a Town Major, two Town Adjutants, one for the upper and one for the Lower Town, a Secretary, a Paymaster of Public Works, a Barrack Master, a Boat Master to take care of the flat bottomed boats and floating batteries, with some few others of inferior rank.

Townshend took home with him to Mr. Pitt, a draught of the enemy's intrenchments from the River St. Charles to the Falls of Montmorency, and a plan of the field of battle, which were not finished in time to be sent with the first dispatches. A little later, an exact plan of the fortifications was also forwarded, the Engineers having been too much hurried with the necessary repairs about the Garrison to complete its preparation earlier.

Some interest naturally centers in the life of the first British garrison of Quebec, during the hard winter of 1759-1760, rendered more bitter by the ruined condition of the houses in the town, the absence of fuel and fresh provisions, the scarcity of warm clothing, and the constant dread of attack from the enemy.

Captain Montresor wrote to his father as late as the 18<sup>th</sup> of October that he was still "quartered in a house that has no roof, not a single board". If such was the fate of an officer, what must the quarters of the men have been like? A volunteer officer describes himself as writing his letter "in the midst of ruin"—in some merchant's dining-room, whose present ornaments are two pier and one chimney glass, shivered with their frames on the floor; a marble slab and a turkey ice-jar, a fretted ceiling and pannelled cedar wainscot, in the same shattered condition; manifestly the effect of a bomb, that had fallen thro' all the upper rooms of the house, into the kitchen on the second floor."

Considerable light is thrown upon the manner of life in the town during this first winter of the British occupation by the annalists of the various conventual establishments and also in the Standing Orders for the Garrison, of which we have had copies made from the originals. From these latter we learn of the precautions taken in the event of fire alarms, "that all chimneys were ordered be swept once a fortnight," that all the troops were served out with creepers, rackets (snowshoes), snow shovels and mogosans (moccasins), and that the snowshoes were to be hung up to prevent them from being eaten up by the rats and mice.

Orders were also issued to the effect that the water of the river was to be used in preference to that of the wells in town, one of the contemporary journalists going so far as to say that it was reported that the French had poisoned the water of the latter, and that it was suspicious, to say the least, that they did not use the water of these wells themselves.

As an instance of the danger which threatened any member of the garrison venturing alone outside of the fortress, it may be mentioned that a soldier of the Twenty-eighth Regiment, who had been missing for some time, was discovered on the 29<sup>th</sup> of October, in the coppice to the westward of the General Hospital, killed and scalped. A number of other members of the garrison met a similar fate during the winter. As the season wore on, scurvy made great ravages among the troops, causing, together with other diseases, the death of no less than 682 members of the Garrison, from September to April. In fact, so many and so great were the difficulties faced by the troops during this memorable winter, that at one time it had been thought doubtful by some whether it would be more advisable to keep the place, or to demolish and abandon it. <sup>(1)</sup>

It was not until the 16<sup>th</sup> of October that the news of the fall of Quebec was received in England. Wolfe's dispatches had reached London only two days previously, giving an account of the difficulties met by the troops in the siege of the fortress. Their tone was so discouraging that the triumphal news brought by Colonel Hale and

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(1) Vol. V., page 57.



Captain Douglas, on the very day upon which Wolfe's letters of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September appeared in the *Public Gazette*, gave rise to all the greater rejoicing. In the words of the Russian ambassador in London, "Nobody, not even the British Court, could expect or hope, after the reports published on Tuesday last, that it would be possible to take Quebec during the present year." Prince Galitzine, the writer of this despatch of the 18<sup>th</sup> of October 1759, to the Empress Catherine II., at St. Petersburg, adds that the arrival of the two officers from Quebec astonished everybody, because no body expected them. <sup>(2)</sup>

It must have taken the news almost as long to reach Halifax as to arrive in London. Governor Lawrence, writing on the 7<sup>th</sup> of October, said "this moment has arrived the great and glorious news of the submission of Quebec to His Majesty's arms." In the early part of the same letter, the Governor laments the result of the expedition, though he was writing twenty days after Wolfe's victory upon the Plains.

Wolfe's last dispatches, though disappointing in their general tenor, elicited admiration in England for the elegance of their style. The historian Smollet says that they were written "with such elegance and accuracy as would not have disgraced the pen of a Cæsar." The editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* for the month of October 1759, in his introduction to the dispatches, well and truly said—"The letter from Major-General Wolfe,

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(2) See Documents relating to the Siege of Quebec, 1759, in the Archives of Moscow, Vol. IV, page 149.

by Lieut. Percival of the Rodney cutter to Mr. Sec. Pitt, that relates the former part of the expedition, is perhaps the best written performance of the kind which has appeared this war. This letter, tho' written eighteen days before the taking of Quebec, arrived at Court but two days before the news from Brig. Townshend of that city's capitulation. The clearness with which it is written, the difficulties that are foreseen and represented, the manly fortitude that is, notwithstanding, expressed, in order to surmount these difficulties, and the resignation with which the General persists in risking the greatest dangers for the honour and interest of his country, will leave a monument to his memory more durable than marble and more splendid than titles. His death, in leading on his valiant troops in the last action that determined the fate of war in that country, is a circumstance greatly to be deplored".

It is no part of the plan of this work to repeat the oft told tale of the public rejoicings throughout the length and breadth of England, which followed the reception of the good news, or the tributes paid to the memory of the hero of Quebec in both Houses of Parliament, and generally throughout the country.

The arrival of Wolfe's body in England is thus described in a letter from Portsmouth, dated Nov. 18<sup>th</sup> 1759, and published under the heading of *County News* a few days later: Saturday morning at seven o'clock, his Majesty's ship, Royal William, (in which his corpse was brought from Quebec to Portsmouth) fired two signal guns for the removal of the remains of the ever to be lamented General Wolfe. At eight o'clock, the body was lowered out of the

ship, into a twelve-oared barge, towed by another twelve-oared barges, and attended by twelve others, to the bottom of the point, in a train of gloomy, silent pomp, suitable to the melancholy occasion, grief shutting up the lips of the fourteen barges' crews. Minute guns were fired from the ships at Spithead, from the time of the body's leaving the ship to its being landed at the Point, which was one hour. The regiment of invalids was ordered under arms before eight, and being joined by a company of the train in this garrison, marched from our parade to the bottom of the Point, to receive the remains.

At nine, the body was landed, and put into a travelling hearse, attended by a mourning coach, (both sent from London), and proceeded through the garrison. The colours on our fort were struck half flag-staff: our bells were muffled, and rung in dismal solemn concert with the march: minute guns were fired on our platform, at the entrance of the corpse to the end of the procession; the company of the train led the van, with their arms reversed; the corpse followed; and the invalid regiment followed the hearse, their arms reversed. They conducted it to the land-port gates, where the train opened to the right and left, and the hearse proceeded through them on the way to London. This concluded the little ceremony. Although there were many thousands of people assembled on this occasion, not the least disturbance happened; nothing to be heard but moans and broken accents, in praise of the dead hero. At this said sight who could refrain from tears? In the 20<sup>th</sup>, at night, his remains were deposited in the burial place belonging to his family at Greenwich.

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 1759, the House of Commons adopted a resolution for the erection of a monument to Wolfe in Westminster Abbey. More than three quarters of a century elapsed before a monument marked the scene of his victory and death. Some years later, the first monument which had been defaced, was replaced by that now standing upon the spot where he had died victorious. His memory had already been honoured, however, in the New World. A few years after the battle, a simple granite monument was erected in New York, bearing the inscription "To the memory of General Wolfe."<sup>(1)</sup> On the 26<sup>th</sup> of October 1759, the assembly in Boston voted a marble statue to be erected in King Street, or near the east end of the town house, in memory of the late General Wolfe. We are unable to state whether this project was carried out.

Wolfe's mother, in administering his estate, found that it was insufficient to cover the bequests which he had made in ignorance of the state of his affairs, and appealed to the Government for assistance to enable her to carry them out. It is not to the credit of the Government of the day, that this demand was refused. Mrs. Wolfe's own will puts to shame the conduct of the British Government. She left the residue of her estate, after providing for certain special legacies, to the necessitous widows and families of officers who served under her distinguished

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(1) This obelisk is shown on a map of the city of New-York, by Captain John Montresor, dated 1775, to be in the centre of a piece of ground about five hundred feet square and surrounded by a fence, which was situated about a mile and three quarters north of the site of the present Post Office.

son. After her death, a notice was published in the *Whitehall Evening Post*, a copy of which is in our possession, calling upon those desirous of sharing in this bounty to make proper application therefor. <sup>(1)</sup>

Wolfe had given all that man holds dear, to his native land. She claimed and received his best services while living. It is even related, that together with Lord Frederic Cavendish, of the Devonshire family, General Monckton, his first Brigadier at Quebec, and Admiral Keppel, he had made an agreement, at the commencement of the seven years war in Germany, not to marry until peace had been proclaimed, nor yet to be interrupted by domestic affairs.

He had cheerfully risked his life at the call of duty; he had given to Britain a vast empire in America, and he had sealed his devotion with his blood, and yet the few obligations created by his will were allowed to become a burden to his tender hearted mother!

In the heart of the people of England, however, the name of Wolfe is enshrined as one of her greatest sons, and here, under the shadow of the walls of old Quebec, the significance of his achievement is perpetuated in that noble monument to the victor and the vanquished—Wolfe and Montcalm.

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(1) For this interesting notice I am indebted to Miss Edythe Newman, of Montreal, who during a visit to London kindly made a copy of the item, and sent it to me. A. D.

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RETURN OF THE KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

REGIMENTS.	KILLED.												WOUNDED.												GENL. & STAFF OFFICERS.							ARTILLERY.					MISSING.													
	Colonel	Lt. Colonel	Major	Captains	Lieutenants	Ensigns	Adjutant	Qr. Master	Surgeon	Mate	Serjeants	Drummers	Rank & File	Colonel	Lt. Colonel	Major	Captains	Lieutenants	Ensigns	Adjutants	Qr. Master	Surgeons	Mates	Serjeants	Drummers	Rank & File	Majr. General	Brgr. General	Adjt. General	Qr. Mr. General	Brigade Majors	Aids de Camp	Asst. to Qr. Mr. Genl.	Engineers	Capt. Lieutenant	Gunners		Bombardiers	Matrosses	Rank and File										
Major Genl. Amherst's										1	2	13			1	2	5	2						8	1	87																								
Lieut. Genl. Bragg's					1						3	18				3	3	2						4	2	98																								
Lieut. Genl. Otway's				1	2						3	35				3	6							2	1	73																								
Major Genl. Kennedy's												12				1	1	2						2		29																								
Lieut. Genl. Lascelles's					2						2	18				3	6	2						3	3	56																								
Colonel Webb's					1							16		1		1	2							2		51																								
Colonel Anstruther's						1					1	16				3	3	1						5	1	121																								
Brigr. Genl. Monckton's				1	2						1	25				2	8	4						6	1	166																								
Brigr. Genl. Lawrence's											1	2				1	2	1						4		39	Killed	1																						
Colonel Fraser's				1	2						2	42	1			6	7	2						5	2	192	Wounded		1	1	1	2	2					4	1	1										
Louisbourg Grenadiers					1						1	14				2	5							2	1	111																								
Rangers				1	1						1	22				1	1							4		27																								
Total				4	12	1				1	17	233	1	1	1	27	49	16						47	12	1050		1	1	1	1	2	2				4	1	2	1	6	4								

Regts.	Officers' Names.	Killed or Wounded.	Regts.	Officers Names.	Killed or Wounded.	Regts.	Officers Names.	Killed or Wounded	
15th.	Major Erwin	Wounded	47th.	Lieut. Elphinstone	Wounded	78th.	Capt. Ross	Kill'd	
	Capt. Loftus			Lieut. Mountain			Lt. Roderick McNeil		Kill'd
	Capt. Smyth			Lieut. Gwinnett			Lt. Alexr. McDonald		Kill'd
	Lieut. Maxwell Senr.			Lieut. Ewer			Col. Simon Fraser		
	Lieut. Maxwell Junr.			Lieut. Henning			Capt. Simon Fraser Senr.		
	Lieut. Rutherford			Ens. Dunlap			Capt. John McDonald		
	Lieut. Ross			Ens. Faunce			Capt. McPherson		
	Lieut. Skeen			Lieut. Percival			Capt. Simon Fraser Junr.		
	Ensn. Worth			Lt. Colo. Ralph Burton			Capt. Lt. Hugh Cameron		
	Ensn. Barker			Capt. Willm. Edmeston			Lt. Randal McDonald		Wounded
.... Rigby Surg. Mate	Lieut. John Hathorn	Lt. Charles McDonald							
Lieut. William Cooper	Lieut. Thomas Webb	Lt. Archd. Campbell							
Capt. Ralph Corey	Ens. Tottenham	Lt. Hector McDonald							
Capt. Thomas Shan	Capt. Nuttal	Lt. Alexr. Fraser							
Capt. Alcomb Milbank	Capt. Byrd	Lt. Alexr. Campbell							
Lieut. Charles Ruxton	Capt. Leland	Lt. Douglass							
Lieut. William Evans	Lieut. Grant	Ens. McKinnzie							
Ens. Essex Edgworth	Lieut. Hayes	Ens. Gregerson							
Ens. Willm. Henry Fairfax	Lieut. Kemptie	Lt. Humphry Jones	Kill'd						
Capt. Fletcher	Ens. Dainty	Capt. Hamilton							
Capt. Mawnsell	Capt. David Achteloney	Capt. John Cosnan							
Capt. Ince	Lieut. Walter Kennedy	Lt. Jones							
Capt. Gardiner	Lieut. Peter De Will	Lt. Samuel Bradstreet		Wounded					
Lieut. Hamiton	Capt. Lt. Robert Brigstock	Lt. Collingwood							
Lieut. Mason	Lieut. Simon Escuyer	Lt. John Penhorne							
Lieut. Gore	Lt. James Grandidier	Lt. Hugh Nevin							
Lieut. Mathurin	Lt. George Archbold	Genl. & Staff Officers							
Lieut. Blakeney	Lt. James Calder	Major Genl. Wolfe			Wounded				
Lieut. Allen	Lt. James Jeffery	Brigr. Genl. Monckton							
Lieut. Cockburn	Lt. Henry Howarth	Adjt. Genl. Majr. Barrie							
Lieut. Field	Lt. Alexr. Shaw	Qr. W. Genl. Col. Carleton							
Capt. Richard Maitland	Lt. Henry Peyton	Capt. Maitland Major of Brigr.							
Lieut. Henry Clements	Ens. Richd. Fahie	Capt. Spital " " "							
Ens. Jones	Ens. Samuel Johnson	Capt. Smith Aid de Camp							
Ens. Nugent	Ens. Charles Cameron	Capt. Bell " " "							
Lieut. Seymour	Ens. Willm. Snow Steel	Engineers							
Lieut. Matheson	Major Prevost	Capt. Lt. Williamson	Enginrs. Wounded						
Capt. Gardiner	Lt. Willington	Lt. Benzel							
Capt. Spital	Lt. Shaw	Capt. Holland							
Capt. Smelt	Ens. Mackey	Capt. Green							
Lieut. Peach									

ROBT. MONCKTON,  
Brigr. Genl.

endorsed: in B. G. Monckton's of Oct. 8th. 1759.





## NOTES TO ILLUSTRATIONS.

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### SIR GUY CARLETON.

The excellent portrait of Sir Guy Carleton, one of Wolfe's personal friends who served under him in the expedition against Quebec, is from a steel engraving in the possession of Mr. Phileas Gagnon, of Quebec.

Sir Guy Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester, is so closely identified with Canadian history that any further mention of his eminent services is unnecessary.

### CUIRASS OF THE MARQUIS DE MONTCALM.

It is a cause of regret to the descendants of the Marquis de Montcalm, that the sole relic possessed by the family is the cuirass of the hero of Carillon. Of his illustrious rival Wolfe, many souvenirs are preserved. Investigation is being prosecuted in France, and it is possible that in the course of time something else may be discovered.

Montcalm's watch, which he is said to have given to one of his attendants during his last hours was known to have been in existence until recent years, but all trace of it at present is lost. The Marquis de Montcalm the lineal representative of the illustrious commander in chief of the French Forces in Canada, kindly had a photograph taken of the cuirass for reproduction in this work.

### TOWNSHEND'S OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.

Several versions have been published of the official despatch addressed by Brigadier General Townshend to the Secretary of State on the 20th of September, 1759, but an exact copy of the original is not to be found in any history of the Siege. Knox, who is generally accurate, has omitted passages, and made alterations, probably with an idea of improving the orthography and the construction of certain phrases. Jefferys, one

of the first to publish the letter, has also departed from the text of Townshend. Later historians appear to have copied the errors of these two authorities.

A manuscript copy of the original was obtained by the authors, and in order to verify this copy a photograph of the document was taken, the first and last pages of which are reproduced as an illustration to this volume.

JOHN JERVIS (1)

*Earl of St. Vincent, G. C. B., Admiral of the Fleet.*

" Swynfen Jervis, the father of John Jervis, was a barrister of an old Staffordshire family long resident at Meaford. His wife, Elizabeth, was sister to Sir Thomas Parker, lord chief baron of the Exchequer, who was a connection of Lord Anson: it was therefore in this direction that the naval interest of the family lay. John Jervis was the second son, and was born at Meaford on the 9th January, 1734-35. He was sent to school at Burton-on-Trent, whence he was transferred in 1747 to a private school at Greenwich, on the occasion of his father becoming treasurer of Greenwich Hospital. The naval atmosphere in which the boy found himself warped his inclination from the law, for which he had been destined, and turned his thought to the sea, and on the 4th January, 1748-49, he was entered as A.B. on board the *Gloucester*, wearing the board pennant of the Hon. George Townshend and then under orders for Jamaica. He was rated midshipman in 1752 and moved into the *Severn*, Captain Henry Dennis, with whom he came home in the *Sphinx* two years later. Falling, as it did, between the wars, there is nothing remarkable about Jervis' early service. On the completion of his six years, in January 1755, he passed his examination, and a month later was appointed lieutenant of the *Royal George*,

(1) Extract from a paper entitled "Admiral of the Fleet, The Earl of St. Vincent, G.C.B. by the Viscount St. Vincent and L. G. Carr Laughton, United Service Magazine, July 1899.

A copy of this magazine was kindly sent to the authors by Lord St. Vincent.

For further particulars concerning the life of the Earl of St. Vincent, the reader is referred to the paper before mentioned, to the Dictionary of National Biography and to the works of Captain Brenton and J. S. Tucker.

“ from which ship he was immediately transferred to the *Nottingham*  
 “ forming part of Boscawen's fleet for Louisbourg.

“ After a year in her he joined the *Devonshire*, but three months  
 “ later was appointed to the *Prince* and in her went out to the Mediter-  
 “ ranean. Rear Admiral Saunders, one of Anson's old Centurions, hoisted  
 “ his flag in her, and the interest he showed in Jervis seems to point to  
 “ more than an appreciation on his part of the connection between his  
 “ lieutenant and his old chief. For some years after this date, Jervis  
 “ followed the fortunes of Saunders. He moved into the *Culloden* with  
 “ him ; he was lent by him to the *Experiment*, whose captain was inva-  
 “ lided, and commanded her in a sharp action with a French privateer  
 “ off Cape Gata in March 1757. He returned to the flag ship in June,  
 “ followed Saunders to the *St. George*, and in May 1758, when Saunders  
 “ was superseded, he returned to England in the *Foudroyant*, 80, a prize  
 “ and, both then and for many years after, one of the finest two-deckers  
 “ in the British navy. Jervis we have seen was not without interest, and  
 “ 1759 was no time for a man with a friend at headquarters to be un-  
 “ employed. On the 15th January, he joined the *Neptune*, flag-ship of  
 “ Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders in his memorable expedition to Canada.  
 “ He was appointed by the commander-in-chief acting commander of the  
 “ 14 gun sloop *Porcupine*, and in her on the 9th July led the transports  
 “ past the batteries of Quebec. Wolfe himself, who had been a school-  
 “ fellow of Jervis at Greenwich, went up with him in the *Porcupine*. He  
 “ was much struck with the ability and character of the young seaman,  
 “ to whom, as the story goes, he imparted his last trust. He had a  
 “ strong presentiment that he should fall in the coming battle, and to  
 “ Jervis he confided a message to the lady he was to have married : as  
 “ Jervis was shortly afterwards transferred to the *Scorpion* and sent  
 “ home with despatches, there is every probability that he delivered the  
 “ message in person. (1) ”

#### MONTCALM'S TOMB.

A view of the interior of the Chapel of the Ursuline Convent is given  
 in which the remains of the Marquis de Montcalm were deposited on the  
 24 of Sept. 1759.

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(1) It would appear that the message was delivered by Captain Bell.  
 See note to portrait of Miss Lowther.

Montcalm was buried in a grave which had been partially excavated by a shell from one of the British batteries. On the right of the view of the chapel may be seen the marble tablet to his memory.

The chapel has recently been demolished, but it is being rebuilt at present upon the same site.

A page from an album kept by the community is reproduced in this work as it records the burial of the Marquis.

#### WOLFE'S WILL AND CODICIL.

The danger of placing too much reliance upon family traditions is strikingly exemplified in the case of General Wolfe's will.

Reference is made in several well known works to the executor's named by Wolfe as being his particular friends, and also to those who were beneficiaries under his will. With the hope of facilitating research a copy of the will and probate was obtained from Somerset House, but unfortunately for tradition, no executor was named by the General, and in consequence the will was administered by his mother.

In the extract made from the will it was observed that no punctuation was observed, which it appears was the legal custom of the time, if it is not also at the present.

Permission was therefore obtained from the Registrar to have a photograph taken of the original documents, and we are therefore able to give an excellent fac-simile of a late example of Wolfe's hand writing, and also of the signatures of some of his intimate friends who signed as witnesses.

Wolfe made his will at sea immediately after he embarked from Louisbourg on the expedition against Quebec, and the codicil was added thereto on the eve of the Battle of Montmorency.

This document contains the sole reference to Miss Lowther we have been able to find, in Wolfe's handwriting.

#### THE HOUSE OF SURGEON ARNOUX.

To Mr. Wurtele, the Librarian of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, we are indebted for this interesting souvenir of the last hours of Montcalm.

After the wounded general had been greeted by his sorrowing friends at St. Louis gate, he was conducted to the house of the surgeon Arnoux where his wounds were dressed, and the few remaining hours of his life

were spent. Some years ago when this house was about to be demolished Mr. Wurtele took a photograph of the building, and thus preserved a valuable memorial of the days of the Siege.

#### ACT OF CAPITULATION.

The three pages forming this interesting document have been reproduced with great care by Mr. James Hyatt, from a photograph taken of the original by permission of the Colonial Secretary and Mr. Cartwright, of the Public Record office. The printed versions of the act in standard works on the Siege appear fairly accurate, although there are a few slight omissions.

#### DEATH OF WOLFE.

The most famous representation of the death of Wolfe is undoubtedly the painting by Benjamin West, but it has been so often reproduced as to be familiar to all students of Canadian history.

Two engravings have been copied for this work, one from the large engraving in the Archbishop's Palace Quebec, and one from an engraving in the possession of Mr. Phileas Gagnon, of Quebec.

#### PLANS OF THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC AND OF THE BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM.

More than fifty plans of the operations of the Siege have been engraved and published.

The earlier plans appear to have been based upon a drawing made by a naval captain before Quebec was actually in the possession of the British.

In "The Natural and civil history of North and South America" edited by Thomas Jefferys, the plan of the naval captain is employed, and in the works of several historians it is copied with slight alterations. A somewhat more accurate plan was made from a survey by Captain Gleig, and another by Captain Carver, both of which have been often reproduced.

The official plan of the battle from actual surveys made by the engineers of the British army does not appear to have been copied since the date of its publication in 1760, until it was reproduced for this work by Mr. Hyatt.

This plan was prepared for the British Government and sent to the Secretary of State on the 8th of October 1759, by Brigadier Townshend.

It is the most complete engraved plan that we possess and contains over seventy references which are embodied in a small quarto journal of sixteen pages.

The difficulty and expense of reproducing this plan with its second plate overlying the first, are probably among the reasons why it has not been included in later works, if it is not due to the fact that it is still comparatively unknown.

The journal and plan are considered by competent authorities to be amongst the most scarce works relating to the siege and it is seldom that a copy is offered for sale. There does not appear to be an example of the plan and journal in the British Museum nor is it to be found in the Library of Congress at Washington.

The late Abbé Verreau, an eminent authority on Canadian history, after having carefully examined the journal and plan in the possession of the authors, pronounced it to be a work of exceptional value, and quite unknown to him. Mr. Phileas Gagnon, of Quebec, whose opinion on such matters is of the highest value, stated that he was not aware of the existence of such a plan. It is therefore of particular interest to students of Canadian history.

The most perfect manuscript plan of the operations of the Siege is undoubtedly the "King's Map" preserved in the British Museum. It is superbly executed in colours and measures 14 ft. x 5.

Mr. Hyatt, after having examined the plan, estimated that thirty printings would be required to ensure a faithful reproduction.

The plan, however, is too large to be included in a work of the present form.

A fac-simile in colours for the purpose of reference was made of that portion of Quebec which lies between the walls of the city and Sillery, and also a photograph of a part of the plan which shows the actual battlefield.

Several details are found on this plan which are not to be obtained elsewhere. The place where Wolfe fell is clearly marked, and the exact number of men in the line of battle is also given.

Another fine manuscript plan of the Siege in colours, 5 ft. 10 x 2 ft. 4, is preserved in the British Museum. It is the work of three engineers of Wolfe's army. As the plan had not hitherto been copied, a reduction

of it was made and printed in six colours, by the Forbes Company, of Boston, for this work.

The surveys, as stated on the face of the plan, were made by Captain Holland, Captain Delbeig, and Lieut. DesBarres. These three engineers were with the army during the whole of the Siege and their names appear on the monthly statements signed by Wolfe and Monckton. They therefore had a personal knowledge of the details they were recording.

The Royal Engineers at one time possessed a plan made by the same officers, of a similar size, although it was not nearly so complete in its details. A copy of this plan was made for the late Francis Parkman in 1854 for reference during the preparation of his work on "Montcalm and Wolfe" and it was again copied for the authors in Feb., 1900. A reduction of this plan was engraved for the Royal Engineers in 1847 and published by them with a Journal of the Siege. A copy of this publication, including the plan, is in our possession.

Brigadier Townshend also made a plan of the battle, which is mainly important as showing the route taken by the army to the site of the battle. In other respects it is not as detailed as some of the other plans.

A small plan about 22 inches in length was beautifully executed by Samuel Holland. There are numerous letters and figures on the plan, but the references which were presumably on a separate sheet, are not preserved with the original.

A fac-simile of the original in colours was made for the authors for reference during the preparation of this work.

"A fine manuscript of the defense and attack on Quebec," 27 1/2 x 80 inches is found in the Archives of the Library of Congress at Washington. This plan contains an extension showing the French works above the Falls of Montmorency as far as Repentigny's post.

The small manuscript plan of the Battle of the Plains, a reproduction of which is given in the second volume of this work, was made by Mr. Hyatt from the original in the British Museum.

An interesting plan of the Siege was published in Edinburgh in 1759, from an engraving by Phinn. This plan has been engraved on Stone by the Forbes Company, Boston, for this work, from a copy in the possession of Mr. Phileas Gagnon, of Quebec.

Major J. E. Monckton, of Brewood, Staffordshire, has in his possession a neatly engraved plan of the Siege, giving more references than Jefferys plan. It is probably based on Gleig's work.

A photogravure of this plan 10 x 6 was sent to the authors, by the Right Honourable the Viscount Galway.

Two small plans of the Siege of Quebec are preserved in the Archives of the Department de la guerre in Paris. One is a copy of Jefferys plan with a few manuscript notes added thereto, and the other gives the operations up to the 12th of August, a photogravure of which is given in the first volume of this work. Photographs of both plans were taken by permission of the Ministre de la guerre.

The hitherto unpublished manuscript plan of the Camp at Montmorency, which is given in the second volume, is copied from the original in the British Museum.

In order to indicate the exact site of the battle, the position of the contending armies during the engagement of the 13th of September, 1759, have been transferred to a modern plan of the city. This plan will enable those who are familiar with the Quebec of to-day to readily locate the scene of the famous contest.

A plan of the ground owned by Abraham Martin, after whom the Plains of Abraham were named, is given in the third volume of this work, from a copy sent to the authors by Lieut. Col. Blackburne, R. E., of the Fortress, Gibraltar.

Photographs of many other plans have been examined during the preparation of this work, but as they all confirm the accuracy of those reproduced herein further mention is unnecessary.

For a further list of plans the reader is referred to the Bibliography in the sixth volume, and also to an excellent work on "Maps of America" by R. Lee Phillips, F. R. G. S. (1137 pages, 1901).



