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**A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE  
CIRCUMPOLAR ARCTIC**


Calgary Working Group

February 1998

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








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A Report and Recommendations for Canadian  
Foreign Policy in the Circumpolar Arctic

An Assessment of the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign  
Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the Circumpolar  
World: Policy Options for the Twenty-First Century"

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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE  
CIRCUMPOLAR ARCTIC**

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By the Calgary Working Group

Supported by the

Walter and Duncan Gordon Charitable Foundation  
Toronto, Canada

Hosted by the

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**Hosted by the**

**Canadian Arctic Resources Committee  
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K1N 7B7**

**February, 1998**







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## Introduction

From October 3-5, 1997, fourteen Arctic specialists<sup>1</sup> met in Calgary to review the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade titled, *Canada And The Circumpolar World: Meeting The Challenges Of Cooperation Into The Twenty-First Century*. Hosted by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and supported by the Walter and Duncan Gordon Charitable Foundation, the Calgary Working Group (CWG) assessed the report and identified a number of further initiatives that it believes would serve Canada's circumpolar Arctic interests and foreign policy for the region.

The CWG applauds the Standing Committee for the breadth and depth of its report. The report identifies important policy needs and its many recommendations are, on balance, constructive and forward looking. As the Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee notes in his "Forward", issues concerning indigenous peoples, environment, and economies have been addressed previously, but, "largely from a domestic perspective". Given the effects of human activities in distant regions on the Arctic, its people, and their shared traditions and visions, it is timely to pursue efforts to focus attention on Canada's foreign policies for the circumpolar Arctic. The CWG believes that the report of the Standing Committee can be an effective tool in promoting public discussion on Canada's obligations and opportunities in the Arctic. In making its own views public, the CWG hopes to stimulate a national discourse on Canada roles in the future of the circumpolar Arctic.

In spite of the many strengths of the report and its good intentions, it could have spoken more forcefully to the need to improve our ability, in both domestic and international policy spheres, to imagine, to design, and to act as a society that is uniquely northern and to do so with coherence, reciprocity, mutual respect, and a sense of self-reliance rooted in interdependence. It is time to create a vibrant and meaningful sense of "connectedness" amongst all those for whom the Arctic/North is important. Connections give rise to consciousness, identity, and shared experiences, all essential in charting purpose, policy and practice. There are clear signs of strengthening north-to-north connections within Canada and between northern Canadians and our circumpolar neighbours. There are fewer signs of novel north-south linkages - not the centre-periphery or the metropolis-hinterland traditions - but new relations focused on our northernness, on new models of governance, and on shared values and the innovative opportunities that await. A wider consciousness is needed in which northern institutions and organizations, especially those of Aboriginal societies and public governments, exert an upward and outward reaching momentum. The combination of

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<sup>1</sup> A list of the members of the CWG is found in Appendix 1 of this report.



comprehensive land claims, or "treaty-making", devolution, Aboriginal self-government, and new economic arrangements (e.g. impact and Benefit agreements) provide a truly northern platform for governance, both domestic and international.

Northern nations share values, cultures, economies, and ecologies. Circumpolar issues are intertwined with national ones. If we are to be successful in our international obligations and opportunities, then our domestic house must be put in order. The CWG believes that the building blocks for sustainable futures are to be found in the efforts of Northerners to advance the sustainability agenda, to re-shape northern governance, and to insist on knowledge-based policy,

The CWG believes Canada is, and is looked to, as a centre of innovation. These innovations are often a product of three of Canada's distinctive and prominent areas of concern, namely, Aboriginal initiatives, environment, and the North. Taken together they provide much of the basis for a credible approach to sustainable development. A number of our domestic, bilateral, and multilateral initiatives are setting standards for future cooperative action. Now is the moment to build on the "good news" and forge new foreign and domestic policy that will ensure sustainable futures across the circumpolar Arctic.

There is an inclination among the other Arctic states to expect a strong role by Canada in circumpolar affairs; this is a result of what is seen as a "natural" consequence of its significant territorial presence in the North. An understanding of this by Canada could help to adopt less constrained postures in circumpolar affairs, without in any way jeopardizing its ability to continue to be a fair, sensible, and sensitive Arctic neighbour to the remainder of the Arctic Eight. Instead, the current reality of a Canada that seems perplexed and unsure in its otherwise natural Arctic prominence is a situation that erodes its credibility in various circumpolar fora.

In spite of our accomplishments however, important objectives remain unmet. The CWG is concerned that the level of effort on the part of the Government of Canada with respect to the Arctic Council, and circumpolar policy more generally, has lagged - circumpolar affairs have not received due regard. The group is also concerned with the lack of attention and support for the "upward guidance" initiatives of Aboriginal and territorial government organizations in the Arctic with respect to governance, sustainable development and circumpolar cooperation. The CWG explored this concept in some detail and its views are found both in the body of the report and its appendices.

Discussion also focused on the Canadian treaty making experience, one which is being widely discussed in other parts of the circumpolar Arctic. Modern



comprehensive land claim agreements, or "treaties", are seen as successfully resolving many inter-societal conflicts in the North. Where decades of conflict have characterized Aboriginal - Euro-Canadian relations, contemporary treaties are fostering a new order of mutual respect, trust, and cooperation. As successful as these initiatives are, it is important to remember that they are new and often fragile. The CWG believes it is essential for the realization of sustainable futures that these upward reaching initiatives be supported and strengthened. In doing this, the focus should be upon practical matters - how organizations are engaging themselves in sustainable development on a day-to-day basis. This is not a time to argue over vague definitions. It is a time to accept sustainable development as an evolving process, guided by principles, and learning by doing.

For these reasons the CWG would have preferred to see greater emphasis in the report of the Standing Committee on the nature of changing governance in the Arctic, on the action orientation to sustainable development and on an emerging Arctic and circumpolar consciousness among northern peoples themselves. All have significant implications for Canada's foreign policy in the circumpolar Arctic.

The report of the CWG begins with a discussion of themes that it believes need more emphasis and attention. These include;

- Sustainable Development;
- Governance: Perspectives on Treaty- Making, Devolution, Globalization, and Security;
- Arctic Science;
- Arctic Council;
- Canadian Polar Commission; and
- Ideas for Action

These discussions are followed by the CWG's assessment of most of the recommendations in the report of the Standing Committee. The CWG report concludes with appendices that elaborate on some of the themes, issues, and opportunities.



## Sustainable Development

The Calgary Working Group (CWG) views sustainable development in the Arctic as a multi-faceted and evolving set of actions, informed by principles, and drawing predominantly on regional and community visions of the future. As traditions and opportunities across the Arctic vary, so too will the specific action pathways of those seeking current and future well-being for people, economy, and environment. There is no single state that having been attained we can say, "We now have sustainable development". Instead, sustainable development is seen as a process of continually designing, acting, evaluating, and adapting, guided throughout by agreed upon principles. The discussion on sustainable development focused on the following points.

- Sustainable development is a process of becoming, and as such it requires that we preserve the capacity of both societal and ecological systems to change. While there continues to be a great deal of discussion and debate over the definition of sustainable development, and many decry its vagueness and the ease with which meanings shift depending on whose interest is at issue, what stands out in the experience of the CWG participants is the focus of Northerners upon opportunities for action that promote sustainability. An aid to clarity in the planning of these actions is to continually ask the questions, "For whom?" and "By whom?" Answering these can provide a valuable understanding of the power relations that can affect the sustainability process.
- The discussion of "on the ground action" in the report of the Standing Committee, deserves more emphasis. While encouragement to establish networks across the Arctic is desirable and important, networks alone will not suffice. Local and regional organizations have made significant gains in pursuit of sustainable development. This is especially so in Canada and Alaska where the institutions and organizations established through comprehensive land claims settlements have "breathed" practical, action-oriented life into sustainable development. For many Northerners, sustainable development is more than just a vague and pliable concept; it is a dynamic, tangible set of activities - indeed, an evolving way of life. And in the process they are building capacity - that essential human component that will ensure a creative balance of self reliance and interdependence. The view of the CWG is that in both domestic and foreign policy, greater acknowledgment and support of the action-based capacities for local and regional initiatives is needed.
- Sustainable development is both a framework, or "architecture", and a process to guide activities. And those activities are informed by the overall sense of purpose and direction. The CWG suggests that national sustainable development policies should build upon the "upward guidance" of regional and local initiatives. This is consistent with many



of the principles of sustainable development, outlined in the report of the standing committee. And to this list we would add a number of suggestions based on "Principles of Sustainability" from Robinson, et. al. 1990. (See Figure 1: Principles of Sustainable Development)

### Figure 1: Principles of Sustainable Development

The report of The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade identifies the following as guiding principles of sustainable development (Box 7 - Arctic Sustainable Development Principles, p. 102):

- subsistence preference;
- co-management;
- subsidiarity;
- precautionary principle;
- primacy of prior rights and clear responsibilities;
- true cost accounting; and
- environmentally appropriate technologies and practices.

Robinson, J.B., et. al., (Alternatives, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, p.44). suggest two types of sustainability principles. They are adapted as follows:

#### 1. Principles of environmental/ecological sustainability:

- life support systems must be protected;
- biotic diversity must be protected;
- maintain and enhance the integrity of ecosystems;
- adopt preventive and adaptive strategies to ecological threats

#### 2. Principles of socio-political sustainability include:

- keep scale of human activity below carrying capacity of the biosphere;
- minimize energy and materials use per unit of economic activity;
- promote human rights and equity;
- enhance effectiveness of environmental institutions;
- greater public involvement in translating principles into action;
- decision making at level of environmentally meaningful jurisdictions to promote greater local and regional self reliance;
- open, accessible political processes;
- creative and self-directed participation in political and economic systems



- In advocating greater attention to "upward guidance" in domestic policy processes, the CWG recognizes the need for broad-ranging, multi-interest alliances across the circumpolar Arctic. International issues are now on the agendas of local and regional bodies. Business and trade organizations have important roles to play in promoting sustainable practice in the Arctic. The recent Barents Region Conference in Finland<sup>2</sup> demonstrated this very clearly. Both private and public organizations are playing key roles in emerging relationships throughout the region. Aboriginal interests span the circumpolar North and their organizations are exerting increasingly greater influence through a variety of decision making processes. The CWG supports the call for a "made in Canada" northern policy with both foreign and domestic dimensions. The foreign policy perspectives must be rooted in the reality of existing east-west connections among regional and sub-regional organizations. Furthermore, national and circumpolar perspectives must be dynamic, evolutionary, and adaptive with each perspective informing the other. The CWG suggests this as the perspective in which to proceed on the Standing Committee's recommendations for a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework (Rec. No. 1), and an Arctic Region 2000 Strategy (Rec. No. 2).
- In centring northern development in a sustainable development context, the CWG is mindful that there are those who view sustainable development as an impediment to economic growth. For conventional, growth-oriented decision makers, sustainable development rules out, or significantly challenges large-scale resource projects. Current national policies in a number of countries, including the United States, reflect this view. For them, sustainable development "is off the radar screen". In some quarters the Arctic Council is seen as a potential focus for sustainable development and is thus, suspect. It was noted that several of the recommendations in the report of the Standing Committee promote sustainable development and therefore reflect an anti-development bias. For some, global relationships for sustainable development are means by which national interests can be compromised, reinforcing their reluctance to participate in multilateral arrangements.
- Within the broad mix of Canadian policies, sustainability often conflicts with those that are more growth-oriented and centralized. The demonstrated commitment in many Arctic settings to practices aligned with the principles of sustainability underlies the view of the CWG that to effectively provide the foundation for sustainable development in the Arctic more attention to, and support for, regional and sub-regional initiatives is required. To be sure, there are vital roles for federal agencies. But, the national interest is not to be construed as the federal interest.

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 2 The Barents Region Today - Dreams and Realities: A Conference Report.



Rather, the national interest should be a synthesis of obligations and opportunities from the community to the federal levels. Viewed in this way, sustainable development with strong local and regional roots should infuse a truly Canadian foreign policy for the circumpolar Arctic.

The challenge is also to connect Arctic issues, places, and people with the rest of Canada. North-south relations are changing through devolution and treaty-making (land claims) while east-west (circumpolar) relations are strengthening. Individual people often bridge these many levels in their daily lives, as a result of the residents of northern communities becoming directly engaged in global social processes (for example in the recent sequence of UN-sponsored global conferences, i.e. UNCED-Rio). The popular use of the Internet is increasingly facilitating this important trans-level activity. At the same time our nation-to-nation relations around the circumpolar world need strengthening if we are to be effective in our efforts to promote Arctic sustainability.

## Conclusions

Sustainable development is most appropriately viewed as an evolving set of actions that are informed by agreed upon principles. In the circumpolar region, experience indicates that regional and sub-regional sustainable development initiatives can provide the kind of "upward guidance" that will inform policy at the national and international levels. By focusing on actions, and accomplishments that bring economic, social, and cultural benefits, detractors of sustainable development may be persuaded to support (or at least not interfere) such initiatives.



## Governance: Perspectives on Treaty- Making, Devolution, Globalization, and Security

### Treaty- Making: Canadian Leadership

Around the circumpolar Arctic the structure, functions and processes of governance are in flux. What is increasingly clear is that Aboriginal rights and realities, the shift of authority and responsibilities from the centre to the regions and communities, and remarkably broader or inclusive notions of what constitutes security, are re-defining the very nature of who governs what, where, and how. The CWG made the following points.

- The historic two solitudes of the Arctic - Aboriginal and settler - are giving way to new relationships, in part because of the strengthening of the Aboriginal community through modern treaties. As these treaties bring a new look to governance in the Arctic, the institutions and organizations of the Euro-Canadian culture are adapting. This is especially so in the Canadian North where comprehensive land claim agreements - modern treaties - are breaking new ground almost daily and lead the world in resolving inter-societal conflicts. The Canadian experience demonstrates the emergence of a "new consciousness" amongst all Northerners, and indeed many other Canadians, as the process of building responsive and effective Aboriginal organizations and institutions, and with them strong linkages to all sectors of northern society, moves forward. The Canadian approach is inspiring other circumpolar societies where Aboriginal people seek greater measures of self-determination and self-reliance. The example of the role that the vision of Nunavut played for the Canadian Inuit is helping Aboriginal people elsewhere to find their own visions for overcoming the despair and apathy that often threaten their communities. Modern treaty making moves us beyond merely the affirmation of rights and frameworks for assimilation. It provides for the design and construction of increasingly self-reliant and self-determining societies which lend a vibrancy to the whole society - Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal.
- Treaty-making is having a profound impact on all aspects of governance. It promotes a level of competence at the community and regional level that is giving rise, as we noted previously, to imaginative sustainable development initiatives, partly because the treaties themselves contain many of the elements of sustainability. Canadian treaty-making is the engine of "upward guidance"; innovations in governance are leading to better solutions to many issues. In recognition of this the CWG believes that a framework for Canadian foreign policy for the circumpolar Arctic should reflect the regional and sub-regional realities and the visions they bring for the future. This means among other things, less "top down" governance.



- While the CWG finds much to commend in modern Canadian treaty-making arrangements, it is quick to point out that the very newness of it all carries with it a kind of fragility. Expectations are high, capacities are limited and evaluations of efforts to date are needed. What would be timely now is an examination of the Canadian treaty-making experience in re-structuring governance and promoting sustainability, and all of this considered further in terms of its applicability to the broader circumpolar arena.

### Devolution and Globalization

Throughout the Arctic, authority and responsibility is being shifted from the centre to the regions. At the same time however, the forces of globalization draw nation states into increasingly broader international arrangements that link economies and legal regimes, and in the process, make capital even more mobile than in the past. We are therefore faced with managing contradictions - initiatives designed to enhance and protect unique local economies and cultures versus multilateral trading and investment arrangements. With this backdrop the CWG noted the following.

- In Canada, territorial and federal governments are negotiating the devolution of powers in several policy sectors. Some funds from the European Union are, in some cases, being routed directly to Northern Scandinavian regional governments, by-passing entirely the national governments.
- The emergence of the Northern Forum as a player on the circumpolar scene is further evidence of the rise of regional and sub-regional interests, connecting east to west, to promote shared interests. Other contributions being made by sub-national organizations are seen in sustainable development agendas for the North. To date no national level government has put forward such an agenda, but a number of northern organizations have, including Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council, the Northern Forum, and the State of Alaska. One of the key challenges here is to design and implement rules, practices and technologies that promote, protect, and enhance sustainable development. In education, initiatives such as the Arctic Council's feasibility study into the University of The Arctic, a virtual institute of higher learning, which is being coordinated by Outi Snellman of the University of Lapland and the circumpolar Universities Association, could become a powerful tool in teaching the processes of sustainability.
- The impacts of human activities, particularly industrial development, around the globe continue to affect daily life in the Arctic. The efforts of anti-harvesting and animal rights groups still threaten livelihoods and



cultures throughout the Arctic. Industrial contaminants continue to find their way into Arctic ecosystems and constitute serious public health and environmental issues. Yet all too often, regional and sub-regional institutions, a number of which are Aboriginal, do not have a voice in international forums. For example, ICC has only observer status at the LRTAP negotiations on a POPs protocol. Exceptions to this include the re-negotiation of the Migratory Birds Convention (MBC) between Canada and the United States and the Rio Conference on the global environment. In the case of the bilateral negotiations on the MBC, Canada included three Aboriginal people as members of the negotiating team, which reflected both their constitutionally guaranteed rights and the knowledge they brought to the discussions. In the case of Rio, indigenous peoples from around the world including the circumpolar Arctic were a part of the multilateral discussions and negotiations. Aboriginal and northern governments were not party to the negotiations on GATT, NAFTA, or WTO. Yet it is the effects of these latter arrangements that impact on life in the Arctic. The CWG urges Canada to support the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous peoples in their efforts to enhance indigenous cultures and economies.

- The CWG supports Recommendations 8, 9, and 31 in the Standing Committee report inasmuch as they provide for significant roles for Aboriginal, regional and sub-regional organizations in the affairs of the Arctic Council and national policy making processes.

## Security

With the demise of the "cold war" has come a broadening of the concept of national security. No longer is it taken to refer just to matters of defending one's territorial sovereignty or national interests. Now people everywhere, including those in the Arctic, think about economic security, cultural security, social security, linguistic security and environmental security. In this wider meaning of security we find added emphasis on what is shared or common, be it threats or opportunities. And in the notion of cooperation, circumpolar and domestic, is the basis of what Franklyn Griffiths suggests, as "civil security".

- For some the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy is seen as a crucial step in promoting environmental security which in turn may evolve into economic and cultural security as environmental strategies develop into strategies for sustainable development.
- Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) between resource developers and Aboriginal organizations are a reflection not just of the recognition of Aboriginal rights, but a sense that development at the community and regional levels prospers to a greater degree when these constituencies are



economically secure. This recent form of financial transfer grows out of past "socio-economic agreements" previously negotiated between governments, acting on behalf of Aboriginal peoples, and private sector resource developers. With Aboriginal peoples themselves at the negotiating table (and governments absent) a mix of socio-economic benefits, of which financial transfers are only a part, are being successfully concluded. These are widely seen as bringing legal certainty - security - to economic, social, cultural, and environmental affairs.

- The emergence of large international trading blocks, along with initiatives by the major trading nations and multinational private sector interests to negotiate a "Multilateral Agreement on Investment", may have important impacts in the circumpolar Arctic. Whether at the level of multinational plans for resources development (e.g. BHP; INCO) or sub-regional and regional ventures (e.g. Baffin Region commercial fisheries projects) , the economies of the "bottom up" actors may be jeopardized. As the foregoing analysis suggests there is a "fragility" to these sustainable development initiatives and in the absence of national level commitments to sustainability the security of this kind of future is by no means assured.

- While for the time being, issues of military security remain outside the ambit of the Arctic Council (due in large measure to U.S. reluctance) concerns for both environmental and economic security are being linked to military activity, past and present. Scandinavian interests are keen to make such links given the threat to their environments and economies of past waste disposal practices of the Russian military, in particular, the sea disposal of radioactive wastes and the presence of nuclear power generating stations as part of a military-industrial complex on the Kola Peninsula. .

## Conclusions

Treaty making, devolution, and security issues are re-shaping the nature of Arctic governance. These efforts are marked, however, by a fragility that requires sensitive support, opportunities to adapt, and acceptance at the centre of a process that builds the upward guidance of regional and local initiatives into national and international policies.



## Arctic Science

The CWG came out strongly in support of the need to re-affirm and re-juvenate Canada's scientific efforts in the circumpolar Arctic. Dramatic and rapid changes in lifestyles and cultures, economies, ecosystems, technologies, politics, and institutions call for an Arctic science policy that is broad and holistic, organized and inter-related, continuous rather than intermittent, and communicable. Significant gaps in our knowledge of the Arctic make sound policy making difficult. The interdependence of societies and ecologies in the circumpolar Arctic calls for a much greater level of international coordination and cooperation. Moreover, the science of the Arctic must be more explicitly interdisciplinary if we are to address, with any success, the complex issues with which we are confronted.

- Canada's record in Arctic Science is spotty at best - a disappointment given this country's significant Arctic territory and its opportunities for Canadian leadership in circumpolar affairs. Too little of the discourse on Arctic science involves those with sufficient appreciation of the nature of the Arctic itself, and what needs to be known. As a consequence, scientific priorities, plans and projects are victims of the vagaries of ad hoc decision making on programs, priorities, and resources, resulting in significant gaps in our understanding of crucial issues and opportunities.
- The CWG is particularly concerned about the dearth of Canadian social science research in the Arctic. Our record compares unfavourably with that of Alaska where, for some time now, social scientists have made numerous contributions to Arctic issues. Too little funding and too little value for Arctic social science has put us in the position where major public policy choices involving sustainable economies, environmental assessment, protection and mitigation, and socio-cultural change cannot be made from even a moderately informed position. To add to this, the CWG noted that a growing amount of what social science research is being done, is conducted by foreign scholars, often much better funded than Canadians, and in some cases with Canadian funding. This raised questions in the CWG about the familiarity of foreign researchers to many of the subtleties of complex relationships among stakeholders, cultures, institutions, organizations, issues, and themes in the Canadian Arctic and thus, the extent to which such research is able to effectively address important issues.
- A number of research needs were identified by the Working Group.
  - basic knowledge of ecosystem functions, carrying capacity and integrity in the context of climate change, contaminants cycling, and industrial impacts;
  - a scientific base for public policy on Arctic haze;



- interdisciplinary teams to review international agreements;
  - policies and management for circumpolar oceans/seas and coastal zones;
  - multiple issues links; e.g. contaminants as environmental and public health research areas;
  - multi-theme research; sustainable development versus economic expansion-mega resource development project research; damage control, damage prevention, damage remediation;
  - incorporating social science research in all relevant policy areas;
  - conducting net benefit research for sustainable development;
  - research on communication strategies for public information and policy making;
- Several phases of the science process need to be more explicitly connected to regional and sub-regional interests - problem identification, priority setting, project design and implementation, interpretation and evaluation - all should include "bottom up" approaches. The institutions of land claim agreements, devolution, and self-government are positioned to contribute to an Arctic science agenda. The east-west connections among these organizations suggests that multilateral "bridges" already exist on which to build science agendas. There is a role here for the Canadian Polar Commission in convening all Arctic science stakeholders to assist in the developing strategies and priorities, all in publicly approved processes.
  - The CWG is particularly concerned about the links - or lack thereof - between science and policy. Major gaps in scientific information notwithstanding, the group's view is that too little attention is given to what information we do have in formulating Arctic policies. Distinctive Arctic impacts have so far not been adequately recognized in such international policy issues as climate change agreements, and heavy metals and persistent organic pollutant protocols. In part, this echoes the need for a greater presence and recognition of the significance of the Arctic in global decision making forums.
  - The growing documentation on traditional or indigenous knowledge adds considerably to the knowledge base upon which policies and practices can be based. Increasingly, Aboriginal communities are seeking scientific information to link to their own understanding of themselves and the environment around them. As well, some scientists are now forging relationships with traditional knowledge holders to provide more detailed foundation on which to develop their own research agendas. Improving on ways to link these two knowledge systems and then extending this to policy making are areas of both research and dialogue that should be supported. By linking these knowledge systems and their extended time and scale components, significant insights into cycles, waves, trends - change of many kinds - can be gained.



## Conclusions

Canada's science efforts in the circumpolar Arctic are not adequate to meet the challenges of planning and managing for sustainability. It is essential that a more strategic approach be taken to needs, priorities, plans, and programs. While several areas of research are in need of greater effort, the dearth of social science research in the Arctic is a particular concern. It is important that regional and sub-regional interests be genuine participants in the process of identifying needs and setting priorities. Policy must take greater note of scientific information. Traditional knowledge must play a significant role in public decision making.



## Arctic Council

The CWG is concerned that progress to date on substantive agendas and procedures for the Council is insufficient; activity proceeds at a "glacial pace". While there are significant hurdles, even roadblocks, along the route, the view of the CWG was that insufficient levels of political will, administrative interest, and financial and human resources have been made available for development of the Arctic Council by the Government of Canada during its tenure as Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) Committee. The challenge of animating the implementation process is considerable. In part this is due, some think, to the notion that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is not an entirely hospitable habitat for Canada's efforts to build the Arctic Council. While years of experience in other regions have created understanding and capacity, the Arctic is not a region in which officials possess a great deal of experience, knowledge and know-how. The Arctic must become more central to the overall foreign policy objectives of the Government of Canada.

- Earlier enthusiasm for Arctic Council seems to have been replaced by drift, in part because officials of the United States have held up the development of an agenda for Council. The view of the CWG is that too little effort is currently going into the discussions, and that which is, is not adequately supported with administrative, technical, legal, and policy acumen. Dissatisfaction amongst some of our circumpolar partners over Canada's handling of the discussions and negotiations to date has surfaced.
- But the "disconnectedness" of the South from the North in Canada, and elsewhere, also contributes to slow progress. Discussions to date are not addressing the hopes and concerns of Northerners. This country lacks "made in Canada" northern policies, both foreign and domestic. One suggestion would have a national body in Canada modeled after the Arctic Council to provide a forum for a truly "civil society" from which Canada could then responsibly argue for a circumpolar counterpart.
- There is a growing awareness in the European Union of its Northern Dimension. this awareness is being emphasized by the fact that there are now three EU states in the Arctic Council, implicitly giving the EU the opportunity to become a more active force in it. Although this is still a largely dormant potential, Finland, for one, is actively pursuing a policy of awakening the EU to this eventuality.
- Mixed views in the CWG characterized some of the discussion on Council membership. For some, the reality of northern organizations with legislated mandates, does not appear to have been adequately taken into account, and Aboriginal, regional, and sub-regional organizations should



be formally included within the various designations of Council membership. For others, international Aboriginal organizations should be at the table, but not their respective individual members. While Inuit societies are represented by Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Indian and Metis people in the North have no such corresponding international structure. Aboriginal governments, northern public governments, and the Northern Forum were identified as key parties to a sustainable future and should therefore be integrated into the Council.

- The Calgary discussions suggested a number of matters for the Council's agenda, including:
  - setting environmental rules across the circumpolar Arctic;
  - establishing and promoting communication links and cooperative institutions amongst Aboriginal, economic, scientific, technical, environmental, and academic interests;
  - identifying and encouraging comparative research and exchanges; e.g. a program of comparative research on the Barents, Beaufort, and Bering Seas regions; linked perhaps to such groups as LOICZ, CAMMLR and the NSF project in Alaska, Yukon and NWT;
  - Council to act as a policy umbrella over environmental, technological, and scientific initiatives;
  - providing a linkage point for several cooperative and collaborative scientific associations
  - promoting interdisciplinary research;
  - using its entrees to international forums to ensure that the Arctic is put on the global agenda;
  - focusing the political, scientific, technology, and environmental communities on nuclear wastes in the Arctic;
  - promoting a circumpolar-wide, pollution-from-land-use program of research mitigation and remediation;
  - encouraging the documentation and use of traditional knowledge in policy making, planning management and monitoring;
  - establishing Internet web sites for traditional knowledge, and scientific information;
- The CWG believes it will be essential for the Arctic Council to develop a communication strategy that will ensure it's concerns are made apparent in key international and national decision making centres. The CWG believes the Council should also have an extensive outreach program that brings the circumpolar Arctic to the rest of the world.
- The CWG applauds the creation of the Office of the Arctic Ambassador, the appointment of the Ambassador, and the efforts of her office to date. What is clear to the CWG, and others, is that Canada's initiatives to lead the Arctic Council have been hampered by a lack of resources. If Canada is



to take leadership on circumpolar issues, the Government of Canada must immediately commit the necessary resources to do the job well. The Ambassador's Office must be able to reach out consistently over time to our own Northern people and to others across the circumpolar Arctic. The Ambassador must have the resources to be able to engage highly capable personnel, and enough of them, to make Canada's leadership effective.

## Conclusions

Taken together these several comments suggest that the Arctic Council should have as one of its most important objectives the creation of an "Arctic consciousness" that builds solidarity across the circumpolar North, connects with "Souths", and insists that the rest of the world consider its effects on the Arctic as matters of human and environmental rights. It is essential that the Council becomes the vehicle of circumpolar Arctic consciousness and an articulate voice for the region.



## Canadian Polar Commission

At the time of the CWG meeting, the federal government was reviewing the record of the Canadian Polar Commission (CPC) and considering what its future should be. With its previous mandate and programs under review it was timely for the CWG to revisit the mission of the CPC and offer the government its views on the role of the Commission.

- As it has evolved, the CPC is not a creature of its own clientele. It finds little favour among either northerners or the scientific community. The report of the Standing Committee elaborates the views of people from these constituencies. And by the Commission's own admission, it has little impact in Ottawa among political and administrative officials.
- The CWG believes it is timely to revisit and re-direct the vision and mission of the CPC. The Commission's programs over the past few years, while focusing on current issues, did little to advance the cause of science itself and often duplicated efforts being undertaken by others. The opinion of the CWG is that the original purpose, and means of achieving that purpose, remain as valid and important today, as in 1991 when the CPC was established. If Canada is to play a significant role in circumpolar affairs, its science must be as good as any, and a vital "Canadian Polar Commission" will be needed to make an effective case for support of focused, balanced and imaginative approaches to Arctic science.
- In addition, we should expect of the Commission that its voice in Ottawa genuinely reflects the needs of the North and the Canadian scientific community. In advocating for the needs of the North, the CPC was never intended as a top down organization. Rather, it was expected the Commission would listen, and on reflection, be a voice for northerners. Similarly, the Canadian scientific community requires an understanding ear and a spokesperson that will, with passion, advocate on its behalf a well thought out program of Arctic science.

### Conclusions

As Canada stands poised to join in Arctic Council discussions about circumpolar issues and opportunities, we will need to present the very best in science. This will require a forward looking strategy that links diverse kinds of knowledge and interdisciplinary frameworks needed to inform policy choices. The CWG believes that a renewed Canadian Polar Commission is essential to accomplish this and therefore, supports a revitalized and re-directed Commission. To do this it will be necessary to properly fund the Commission and ensure that it is committed at all levels to its fundamental purpose. Its 1991 mandate should be updated, but still offers a sound basis for an effective CPC.



## Ideas for Action

The federal election call of 1997 put much of the government's legislative and investigative agenda on hold. This included the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada and the Circumpolar World. At the time of the CWG meeting in early October, 1997 and through the next two months there was little response to the report and essentially no public opportunity in the parliamentary schedule to offer comments. The Standing Committee expects to convene meetings in early 1998 to receive the government's response to the report and to hear from interested parties. The CWG discussed a number of action possibilities.

- The record of the CWG should be distributed widely. Organizations and individuals should be encouraged to use the report for their purposes and make their views known to the Standing Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other federal ministers and ministers of territorial governments, members of Parliament and northern legislatures, administrative officials in Ottawa and the regions, other interest groups, and the media.
- Organizations and individuals should be encouraged to participate in the 1998 National Forum on Canada's International Relations. The theme for the forum will be Circumpolar Relations and the report of the Standing Committee will be a key background document for the Forum's agenda. This will be an important opportunity to build a public case for strengthening Canadian initiatives in the circumpolar Arctic.
- In attempting to influence national policy on circumpolar issues it will be important to encourage the flow of ideas between interested groups and thus enhance prospects for a broadly based, efficient, and effective advocacy. There must be a kind of "porosity" between organizations that links jurisdictional, scientific, technological, cultural, political, and environmental interests in order for there to be substantial, collaborative, and effective responses from across the country.
- On the matter of support for circumpolar and northern research in Canada, the record of corporate Canada in this regard leaves much to be desired, especially in those cases where very large revenues and profits are won in resource development. Whether this comes in the form of new corporate research initiatives or from royalties and taxation, passed through governments or some combination of the two, is a matter to be decided. This is not about research to serve purely corporate agendas. It is about paying a fair share towards publicly agreed on research needs. Sound knowledge is always a wise investment. The current round of profit taking in the North should be the springboard to a deeper and broader understanding from research for the ventures of the future.



- In May 1998 Whitehorse, Yukon, will be the site of the Circumpolar Conference and Workshop, *Sustainable Development in the Arctic: Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead* . This will be an important opportunity to promote policy perspectives on a wide range of circumpolar issues. An international gathering such as this is an opportunity to develop public and stakeholder support and encourage political and administrative leaders here in Canada to be open to innovative approaches to meeting circumpolar needs on into the future.
- As Senior Arctic Officials' discussions move (albeit too slowly) the Arctic Council towards its inauguration, there is a need to begin the process of linking the Arctic environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) to the Council. Research and analysis on ways to link the two is required in the near future. Both the National Forum on Canada's International Relations and the Sustainable Development Conference in Whitehorse present useful opportunities to develop a strategy publicly. Such an initiative should be accompanied by complementary advocacy initiatives with officials in Canada and through networks in the other parts of the circumpolar world, officials there too.
- What Canada lacks at the present time is a permanent forum in which northern and circumpolar issues are dealt with on an on-going basis. Too often in government one or another agency "takes the lead" and in many cases captures the agenda. Single-mindedness may ensue, but so too may lethargy and neglect. What is needed as we head towards a regional commitment in the circumpolar Arctic is a mechanism that links the interests of DIAND, NRCan, DOE, DFO along with such agencies as CIDA and IDRC. A forum in which these agencies intersect and are required to focus on joint problem-solving, opportunity-taking, and responsibility-bearing is clearly in the interest of shared visions, thematic and interdisciplinary approaches and collaborative enterprise.



## Recommendations of the Calgary Working Group

What follows are the assessments and suggestions of the members of the CWG for many of the recommendations in the report of the Standing Committee. The CWG did not discuss all of the report's recommendations, and those it did were not all considered in the same detail. The Parliamentary Committee's recommendations receiving most attention were the ones most closely linked to the themes discussed immediately above. In each case the recommendation of the Standing Committee is reproduced and followed by a summary of the views and conclusions of the CWG.

### *Recommendation 1*

*The Committee recommends that the Government, in making a comprehensive response to this Report, elaborate an explicit international policy framework in which Canada's objectives in pursuing circumpolar cooperation and the proposed means for their achievement are systematically set out. In order to build public awareness and seek additional input, we further recommend that such a "Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework" be considered by a national public forum, with representation from all regions, especially from northern Canada, and from interested provincial and territorial governments, to be held during the period of Canada's chairmanship of the Arctic Council.*

The CWG supports this recommendation, though a greater degree of involvement is warranted for "representation" from the northern regions of Canada. The CWG recommends that the May 1998 Sustainable Development conference in Whitehorse be a "national public forum" at which development of a "Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework" is the main purpose. Similarly, the 1998 National Forum on Canada's International Relations should be a venue for the development of such a framework.

### *Recommendation 2*

*The Committee recommends that the federal Government lead in devising an "Arctic Region 2000 Strategy" that would establish a coherent set of Canadian priorities for the next century, including pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the context of Recommendation 1 for a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework. The process for developing and carrying forward this strategy should fully involve provinces and territories whose interests are affected, but should also be more than just interdepartmental and intergovernmental. In particular, provision should be made for direct public*



*and parliamentary input, participation by NGOs and, especially, northern-based and aboriginal groups. To that end, we recommend that a continuing consultative mechanism be attached to the Strategy which would promote consensus-building around long-term solutions and advise on policy evolution and implementation issues. As part of that mechanism, a circumpolar foreign policy working group should be established to focus on effective ways of achieving Canadian interests through international initiatives and through leadership in multilateral cooperation bodies, notably the Arctic Council.*

In supporting this recommendation, the CWG recommends that the Whitehorse conference and the National Forum, referred to immediately above in the commentary on Recommendation 1, should be explicitly designed to assist in developing an "Arctic Region 2000 Strategy" We recommend further, that such a strategy include provision for support for, and communication and exchange of, scientific information and traditional knowledge in addressing regional and transboundary issues. While the CWG recognizes the need for an organizational centre of circumpolar affairs, care in establishing additional administrative mechanisms such as "consultative mechanisms" and "working groups" is recommended. A proliferation of bureaucracy does not always produce more effective policy making and implementation.

### *Recommendation 3*

*The Committee recommends that a Division for Circumpolar Affairs be established within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to support the work of the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador in spearheading and coordinating the Government's role. In addition to managing the external dimensions of circumpolar relations, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should also be enabled to increase outreach activities within Canada to ensure that all interested constituencies are kept abreast of circumpolar developments and are provided with opportunities to contribute to international Arctic policy processes. To this end, existing resources within the Government should be reallocated and consolidated, and increased as necessary Northern governments, organizations and research institutes should be consulted first about the best ways to improve information networks and communications with the Ottawa office.*

While the intentions behind this recommendation are laudable, there was only conditional support in the CWG for the proposal for a Division of Circumpolar Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Some preferred a new institution with direct representation, informing an energetic Interdepartmental Committee on Circumpolar Affairs. Still others commented that any mechanism



established to spearhead and coordinate government activity should be sure that outreach includes the scientific community, that responsibilities are truly bi-polar, and that information and communication networks include scientific information.

#### *Recommendation 4*

*The Committee recommends that the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador consult with northern governments and aboriginal organizations on cost-effective means to link Arctic communities with Canada's activity at the level of the Arctic Council. In addition to and independently from the office of the Secretariat serving Nunavut through Iqaluit, other permanent liaison offices could be established in the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavik in northern Quebec with continuing responsibility for channelling regular input from all of Canada's Arctic regions into the Ottawa-based structures. Consideration should also be given to having the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998 held in a Canadian Arctic community.*

The CWG remains guarded about the value added by regional offices of the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador. Layered bureaucracy is seldom seen to provide an effective relay function. More often it impedes such exchanges.

#### *Recommendation 5*

*The Committee recommends that Canada, as chair of the Arctic Council Secretariat, collaborate closely with Council partners to ensure that Canadian ideas to consolidate the Council are tested multilaterally as well as domestically, and are therefore capable of attracting broad circumpolar support beyond the period of Canada's initial chairmanship.*

#### *Recommendation 6*

*The Committee recommends that Canada work closely with Arctic Council counterparts to ensure that the Council's formal mandate is carried out so as to integrate environmental protection with sustainable human development goals, without thereby jeopardizing existing AEPS activities. Canada should also interpret the mandate sufficiently broadly that any important issue affecting Arctic quality of life can be brought on to its agenda, even if this entails a lengthy process of consensus-building. In particular, matters affecting human security and prospects for peaceful cooperation within the circumpolar region should not be excluded from consideration over the longer term.*



### *Recommendation 7*

*The Committee recommends that, within Canada, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should lead in identifying concrete applications of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate, in order to advance Canadian Arctic interests. Furthermore, staff of this office and of the Arctic Council Secretariat should make it a priority to meet with residents of small northern communities to explore how the Council's mandate might be implemented most effectively to respond to their concerns.*

The CWG supports these recommendations with the proviso that science and traditional knowledge components are included. Particular attention should be given to applied natural and social sciences in support of sustainable development.

### *Recommendation 8*

*The Committee recommends that the Government work to achieve inclusion, at the earliest possible date, of additional representation for Canadian aboriginal peoples' organizations based in the North, and for all northern residents through their regional governments (including that of Nunavik in Quebec) within the Arctic Council's formal structures. Interested aboriginal organizations that do not meet the current criteria for becoming permanent participants should in any event be granted early observer status. At a minimum, these groups and the subnational Arctic-region governments should be assured of some representation, in an official advisory capacity, in the development of Canada's positions on all Arctic Council matters.*

The CWG believes it is essential that Aboriginal participation in the Arctic council be expanded. The discussion above, about regional and sub-regional governments and related organizations, and the "upward guidance" they provide, underpins our view about their participation. The CWG urges Canada to show determined leadership on this issue, in view of the fact that the Canadian treaty making experience is being emulated in various ways across the circumpolar Arctic.

### *Recommendation 9*

*The Committee recommends that the Northern Forum, and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, (which should include a representative from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade), be granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. As such, they should have the right to intervene in its deliberations on matters of special interest with the agreement of the Council's members*



*and permanent participants. In addition, NGOs that have developed particular expertise in working on Arctic issues should be granted a consultative observer status with the Council.*

The views of the CWG on this recommendation are mixed. While there is support for regional and sub-regional representation on Arctic Council, the presence of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region as "permanent observers" it is thought would undermine the special position of Aboriginal representatives as permanent observers. If Aboriginal organizations are not to be accorded full member status then they should be the only permanent observers. Furthermore, the CWG questioned having elected officials as members of Arctic Council since their first commitment is to their respective Parliaments, not to the Council. They should, of course, be invited to Council meetings on an "as appropriate" basis.

#### **Recommendation 12**

*The Committee recommends that the Government use the proposed conference on Arctic sustainable development to further the integration of environmental and economic development objectives within the Arctic Council's mandate. Canadian officials should also work closely with northern constituencies to identify priority activities related to sustainable community economic development, and especially to create opportunities for a growing aboriginal population, where international action is required (e.g. dealing with trade barriers, improving transnational communications and transport links). During the remaining period of Canada's chairmanship and beyond, Canadian energies should be focussed on encouraging the Arctic Council to deal with such issues, which are of greatest practical concern to our northern citizens.*

As noted above, the CWG supports efforts to use the Whitehorse conference on sustainable development to further the development of Canada's circumpolar policies. In doing so particular attention should be given to the need for well developed programs of life and social sciences.

#### **Recommendation 14**

*The Committee recommends that the Government reaffirm its claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. In view of the financial and technical difficulties associated with the Arctic Sub-surface Surveillance System, the Committee recommends that the Government review the need for such a system, and explore alternative technical and diplomatic mechanisms for advancing Canada's sovereignty position.*



While the CWG favours initiatives that exercise sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, discussion was divided on the need for sub-surface surveillance systems and alternative technical and diplomatic means to affirm sovereignty.

#### *Recommendation 17*

*The Committee recommends that Canada continue to cooperate with the Russian Federation and the other Arctic states to address the serious nuclear problems in northern Russia. Despite financial constraints, Canada should also extend its cooperation to help address nuclear issues related to the Russian Northern Fleet (see Table 1, page 98).*

The CWG endorses the recommendation to deal effectively with "serious nuclear problems in northern Russia. It is important however, that the recommendation be made more specific and focus on:

- de-commissioning nuclear powered submarines;
- improving or dismantling nuclear powered electrical generating stations;
- upgrading management and disposal of nuclear wastes of all kinds both on land and in the Arctic Ocean;
- developing and implementing strategies for clean-up and remediation.

#### *Recommendation 18*

*The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada, as the first chair of the Arctic Council, restate its commitment to the continuation and strengthening of the environmental protection work of the AEPS under the Arctic Council. In addition, while the specific mechanisms may change, Canada should stress that the Tromso Ministerial should adopt a significant plan for each of the AEPS working groups, to ensure that their work continues. Given the importance of the six years of work carried out by the AEPS, the procedural and other recommendations of the AEPS self-assessment currently being undertaken by Norway should be adopted for use by the Arctic Council.*

The CWG believes it is important to strengthen Canada's commitment to the AEPS and its inclusion as part of the agenda of the Arctic Council. There are serious doubts, however, that a Canadian contribution to the strengthening of AEPS is achievable given the fragmentation and lack of coordination of northern environmental science in Canada. The AEPS will be only as healthy as the national programs that support it. The CWG believes that the AEPS could lose ground under a hesitant, or faltering, Arctic Council. It will



be important for the Council to assert itself strongly on behalf of Arctic science and scientists, and in particular, the AEPS.

#### *Recommendation 19*

*The Committee recommends that the Government initiate a systematic review of existing global environmental agreements to see which contain provisions authorizing special supplements for dealing with the needs of individual regions and determine which of these are particularly relevant to the Arctic. Canada should also move quickly to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, and, as recommended by the AEPS Ministers at Inuvik, the Government should encourage all Arctic states to ratify international agreements relevant to the Arctic.*

The CWG supported this recommendation, but added that experienced Canadian university researchers should be involved in such a review. Interdisciplinary teams made up of legal experts along with social and natural scientists should be commissioned to carry out these reviews.

#### *Recommendation 20*

*The Government should increase efforts to develop common standards for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic, and should ensure that the draft guidelines prepared through the AEPS are adopted for this purpose by the final AEPS Ministerial in Tromso.*

While the CWG supports the idea of shared or common standards for environmental impact assessment (EIA) across the circumpolar Arctic, it will be important to emphasize the need to require scientific information in the review process, and that such information be subjected to peer review during the review. In addition, EIAs must include traditional knowledge, documented by best practices, and in ways acceptable to the knowledge holders. The CWG is also concerned that "common standards" not be interpreted as a "least common denominator" approach to EIA where rigour, comprehensiveness, and fairness are compromised.

#### *Recommendation 21*

*The Committee recommends that the Government renew its efforts, in cooperation with the other Arctic states, to work toward stronger international action on climate change. Given the importance of this issue to the Arctic and the need for an Arctic perspective, the Government should also appoint the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador as a co-chair of the*



*non-government Stakeholders Advisory Group, to be backed up by appropriate environmental expertise within the Circumpolar Affairs Division recommended in Chapter Two.*

The CWG believes this recommendation is unacceptably weak and will do little to either encourage good science or the adoption of meaningful emission standards and a program of national action. A strong commitment to national emission reduction targets to which northern interests have had genuine input is needed now.

### *Recommendation 22*

*The Committee recommends that, in cooperation with other Arctic Council states and aboriginal permanent participants, Canada redouble efforts to conclude LRTAP protocols on POPs and heavy metals and a legally binding protocol on POPs. In the meantime, the Committee recommends that Canada and the other Arctic states continue work to identify those states that are the major sources of pollutants in the Arctic, and to encourage and assist them to phase out the contaminant chemicals of greatest concern.*

The CWG agrees with the need to conclude effective international protocols on POPs and heavy metals. The group also argues that it is essential to place the broader issue of Arctic contaminants in a public health context, not just an economic/trading perspective. The call for Canadian efforts to "encourage" other states to phase out their use of harmful chemicals is thought to be weak. The CWG would prefer that the Standing Committee have identified examples of concrete actions that Canada might pursue in its efforts to support reductions in chemical use elsewhere in the world. The recommendation as worded is unclear with respect to sources within and outside the Arctic. The CWG believes that efforts are needed to deal with contaminants wherever their place of origin.

### *Recommendation 23*

*The Committee supports the recommendation of the Canadian Polar Commission that the Government broaden the replacement for the Northern Contaminants Program so as to focus more clearly on the links between contaminants and human health and to provide for more effective communication of research results.*

The discussion touched on the role of scientists in the communication process. While there is now a better flow of information from scientists to organizations and residents in regional and community settings, there is clearly room for improvement. In particular, more effort is needed to design



communication strategies and effective messages that are culturally appropriate and enhance understanding at the community level. People there want relevant and timely information. The CWG supports many Northerners in their view that Arctic contaminants is a public health issue. As well, there is a need to improve communication between scientists and policy makers at the regional level as well as nationally. Northerners also believe they can learn from each other and want more opportunities to share experiences and communications materials on contaminants and public health. The CWG believes there should be more horizontal exchange of ideas and information across both the Canadian and circumpolar North.

#### *Recommendation 24*

*In order to better protect northern species and habitats, and build on Canadian leadership in the integration of indigenous and non-indigenous knowledge, the Committee recommends that the Government accept and implement fully the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concerning Environmental Stewardship in the North.*

The CWG does not agree that indigenous and non-indigenous knowledge should be "integrated". These are two distinct systems of knowledge and ways of knowing. While one might say they could be "linked", to suggest they can be integrated is to miss critical characteristics of each. They are complementary to each other, and taken together broaden and deepen our understanding of certain phenomena. It is essential that both indigenous and scientific knowledge be used to inform decision making processes. Though Canada's leadership on this issue is acknowledged, even greater effort is needed to realize more fully the benefits of both systems. The CWG supports the call for full implementation of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples on environmental stewardship. As for research, the CWG believes that future programs should provide more emphasis on the public health and communications perspectives.

#### *Recommendation 25*

*The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work closely with northern Canadians and its Arctic Council partners to build consensus on a circumpolar framework for sustainable economic development, incorporating such principles and objectives as:*

*- preservation of the viability and cultural integrity of indigenous economies;*



- \_ diversification of income- and revenue-producing activities that do not harm the environment;*
- \_ participation of local peoples in development and resource utilization decisions;*
- \_ maximum retention of benefits from economic growth at the community level;*
- \_ and application of sustainability criteria to all development activities as a condition for Government approval and/or financial support.*

*Canada should take the lead by integrating these into its own international Arctic-region strategy recommended in Chapter Two. The conference on sustainable development proposed by Canada should lay out a process for negotiating this agreed framework multilaterally, as a prelude to considering the priority programs or project activities that should be undertaken on a circumpolar basis with the aim of approving a substantive joint economic initiative at the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998.*

#### *Recommendation 26*

*The Committee recommends that, within the framework of international sustainable development principles applied to the Arctic, Canada should support the sharing of learning about best practices in the circumpolar countries. This should contribute to the implementation of rigorous sustainability assessments prior to any approval of major resource and capital-intensive projects and, in particular, ensure that in all phases of development the rights to participate in decision-making processes, and the priorities of the affected indigenous communities, are fully respected.*

*The Committee recommends that Canada accord an early high priority in circumpolar cooperation to providing an enabling environment for sustainable community-based economic development, by exploring practical ways to implement established sustainability principles, and giving particular attention to the following:*

- \_ coordinating federal Government efforts, in close cooperation with northern development initiatives by provincial, territorial and local governments;*
- \_ supporting the sustainable utilization of non-renewable resources, especially by indigenous peoples;*
- \_ promoting cultural and other cottage industries;*



- \_ encouraging ecotourism development;
- \_ increasing vocational training and business skills development;
- \_ improving access to micro-credit resources.

These three recommendations, along with Rec. No. 24 are seen as the heart of sustainable development. They establish key principles and offer generic suggestions about actions to achieve the goals of sustainable development. However, the CWG would add to this the requirement for genuine and sustained participation by regional and sub-regional organizations in the North to breathe life into the "upward guidance" dimension of sustainability.

Regarding Rec. No. 26, and the call to "support the sharing of learning about best practices..", the CWG recommends that "best practices" be explicitly underpinned by the best scientific and technical information, and traditional knowledge, and that clear objectives of the practices are stated.

Support of "sustainable community-based economic development" initiatives should be founded on a sound understanding of the resources in question, financial and economic factors, infrastructure and technology, and marketing - all in both the short and longer term.

### *Recommendation 30*

*The Committee recommends further that the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division be given responsibility for encouraging and facilitating Canadian, especially Arctic-based, activities in circumpolar transportation, communications and technological development. A high priority should be accorded to those areas of Canadian expertise and potential strength that are environmentally protective as well as commercially sound. The Government should strive to ensure that in all cases Canadian initiatives in Arctic-region development adhere fully to applied sustainability principles, thereby promoting circumpolar progress in this regard. To this end, the Canadian government and the Arctic Council should undertake a rigorous assessment of the risks inherent in opening northern sea lanes, in particular to tankers.*

The CWG supports greater Canadian involvement in Arctic transportation, communications and technology research and development, but, linked to principles of sustainability. Such initiatives must be founded on scientific research, and as noted previously, this requires greater policy, financial, and logistics support from both private and public sectors. Given the CWG's recommendation to not establish a "Circumpolar Affairs Division", responsibility for the activities outlined in Rec. No. 30 should be assigned to a multi-department mechanism.



### *Recommendation 31*

*The Committee recommends that the Government take steps to deepen the democratic involvement of representatives from all of Canada's northern indigenous peoples in the elaboration of policies on circumpolar sustainable development. To that end, we recommend that an aboriginal contact group be established to provide regular advice to the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs on issues pertaining to her mandate and that of the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs. To promote indigenous peoples' participation in the development of international sustainable development policies for the Arctic, the Government should support expanded international linkages through existing Canadian-based aboriginal organizations, and should also pledge stable, long-term material support for the indigenous Peoples' Secretariat within the Arctic Council.*

The CWG believes that deepening the "democratic involvement of representatives from all of Canada's northern indigenous peoples in the elaboration of policies on circumpolar sustainable development" is vital to establishing sustainability in all its dimensions. The group is not convinced, however, that mechanisms such as a "contact group" to advise the Ambassador are the key to this goal. Rather, the CWG takes the view that democratizing the "upward guidance" functions of regional and sub-regional Aboriginal organizations is required as a first step, after which appropriate mechanisms for advice, collaboration, cooperation, and communications will become apparent.

### *Recommendation 35*

*The Committee recommends that the Government commit to maintain, and seek to increase, support for basic Arctic science and research as an important element of circumpolar cooperation. Given the changing realities in the Arctic, such research must be based on the needs of Arctic communities and include a significant traditional knowledge component. These principles should be stressed in the work on sustainable development and other issues carried out under the auspices of the Arctic Council.*

The CWG strongly supports this recommendation, and would encourage that in addition to "basic Arctic science" there be adequate support of applied natural, social, and life science research. There is a dearth of economic, political, and legal research on sustainability and circumpolar issues. To properly inform circumpolar decision making it is essential that all sciences contribute to the store of knowledge.



### *Recommendation 36*

*The Committee, recognizing the continuing need for stronger representation of Arctic research interests, recommends that the Government reevaluate the future of the Canadian Polar Commission in light of the criticisms that have been made, and taking into account the role of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the organizational changes proposed in this Report. If the Commission is to continue, the Committee recommends that the Government adopt a systematic and transparent process for appointing its Commissioners that includes soliciting suggestions from northern groups, academic organizations such as the Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies (ACUNS), and government departments involved in northern research.*

All members of the CWG were of the view that the Canadian Polar Commission (CPC) has not lived up to expectations and its contribution to polar science and public policy has been limited. Views about the future of the CPC were more mixed. Some believe it should be "decommissioned" and its resources re-focused in ways that more explicitly reflect northerners' needs and priorities.

Others believe that the Commission's original mandate (See, Canada and the Circumpolar World, 1997, p.186) is as valid today as at its inception in 1991. What is needed, they believe, is an organization at arms length from government Arctic science operations and direct funding of Arctic science, that has as its purpose, "to promote the development and dissemination of knowledge in respect of the polar regions ." Profound changes in the Arctic require a national body to be the voice for Arctic science. The shortcomings of the Commission are the result of many factors, some of which are;

- a view of federal governments officials that the CPC is an instrument of federal policy;
- the cutting off of communications and involvement of the broad science community that was responsible for the very being of the Commission; and
- a lack of connection with northern indigenous, business and educational interest and expertise.

The present shortcomings of the CPC could be overcome by a transparent process for appointing commissioners and a vigorous campaign to contact northern and scientific constituencies indicating a willingness to be at their service while taking into account national and international needs and goals.



### *Recommendation 37*

*Given the substantial reductions to the budget for the Polar Continental Shelf Project, the Committee recommends that the Government provide the Project with sufficient funding to carry out its mandate effectively. The Project must also ensure that it is providing support to researchers in all regions of Canada, and should enter into new and creative partnership arrangements where possible.*

The CWG supports the recommendation that the Polar Continental Shelf Project (PCSP) be adequately funded to ensure that it can accomplish its mandate. While the PCSP has been successful in diversifying its sources of operational funding, it still needs proper core support to enable it to perform its vital role in Canada's Arctic science efforts. The PCSP is to be applauded for its success in facilitating exchange and cooperation with other countries in bipolar research. Some believe that the present home of the PCSP in NRCan is not entirely appropriate and consideration should be given to making it a quasi-independent body.

### *Recommendation 38*

*The Committee recommends that the Government make the rejuvenation of the IASC International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic a priority, and support and complement this where possible through the work of the Arctic Council.*

The CWG considers this recommendation to be outdated and inappropriate now. Instead the CWG recommends;

that the Government confirm Canada's full participation in IASC along with support for a suitably senior Canadian scientist on the IASC Council. Support should be given to develop the infrastructure within the Canadian science community so that the Canadian member of the IASC can speak for, or carry forward, the concerns of all Canadian Arctic scientists in northern organizations, governments, academe, and industry to IASC.

### *Recommendation 39*

*The Committee recommends that the Government increase funding for the Northern Scientific Training Program. The Committee also recommends that the Government urge the Arctic states through the Arctic Council to*



*undertake an inventory of educational approaches in the region, and establish a program similar to that of the European Union for fostering academic cooperation in the circumpolar North.*

The CWG supports the recommendations for increased funding to the Northern Scientific Training Program. This program has been vital to the development of generation after generation of northern scientists - all at little cost to government. To ensure that the next generation of scientists is in place to carry out the scientific challenges of the circumpolar Arctic it is essential that current support levels be upgraded.

#### **Recommendation 40**

*The Committee recommends that the Government continue its support for new information technologies in the Canadian North, and ensure that the Arctic Council pursues the use of such technologies to promote cultural understanding and exchange in a circumpolar context. The Government should also ensure stable funding for such important cultural services as the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, and seek to assist it and other services in selling their programming in Arctic and other markets.*

Information technologies are a key part of northern life and it will be essential to provide continuing support for the application of new information technologies in all spheres of Arctic life. The CWG supports this recommendation and the central role that northern organizations must play in the use and adaptation of such technologies if they are to be of service to all northerners.

#### **Recommendation 41**

*The Committee recommends that the Canadian Government continue its current efforts to protect the calving grounds of the Porcupine Caribou herd, particularly by assisting Canadian and Alaskan aboriginals to educate U.S. opinion on the issue. The Government should also take the necessary steps to have the entire area jointly designated as a World Heritage Site under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, if such an approach is supported in consultations with indigenous groups.*

The CWG supports the recommendation and urges the Government of Canada to continue in its efforts to protect the calving grounds of the Porcupine caribou herd. While members of the group endorse the call for habitat protection in the northern Yukon and Alaska, there were varying opinions on what that protection might be. By extension, the CWG would urge the Government of Canada to work with all regional and sub-regional



organizations across Canada with an interest in the future of all caribou herds to ensure that human activity in caribou habitats everywhere is managed within the principles of sustainability.

#### *Recommendation 43*

*The Committee recommends that the Government propose to the United States the establishment of a mechanism to ensure regular meetings of officials to discuss Arctic issues, including, but not restricted to, those that are bilateral. These meetings should be undertaken on the Canadian side through the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division and the Office of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs.*

While members of the CWG support the call for regular Canada - United States and Yukon - Alaska meetings on bilateral and circumpolar issues, there was no clear sense of what mechanism (s) would be appropriate, given the preference of the group to not have a Division of Circumpolar Affairs..

#### *Recommendation 44*

*The Committee recommends that Canada cooperate closely with Norway on issues of sustainable utilization of renewable Arctic marine resources. Specifically, the Government should move to become a full member of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, if such a move is supported in formal consultations with northern indigenous groups.*

The CWG is of the view that a significant investment in oceanographic and marine biological research is needed if we are to be in a position to manage the resources of the oceans with the confidence that we are well informed. As well, the CWG believes Canada should have full membership in international bodies that concern themselves with the future of marine ecosystems and resources, including the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

#### *Recommendation 48*

*The committee recommends that the shared circumpolar aims of preserving the Arctic environment and supporting sustainable human development for northern indigenous communities be made one of the principal objectives of Canada-Russia technical cooperation as carried out through CIDA's Country Programming Strategy, not added only as a "special consideration". Within*



such a bilateral assistance context, particular attention should be paid to the following:

- \_ setting clear, realistic, results-oriented goals that focus on the areas in which comparative Canadian strengths (e.g. cold-climate research and applied environmental technologies, Aboriginal institution-building) have been identified;*
- \_ putting in place feedback/evaluation mechanisms whereby parliament will be able to assess the degree to which targets are being met and learning improvements are taking place;*
- \_ involving Canadian Aboriginal and non-governmental organizations, territorial and provincial governments, private firms, and knowledge institutions which have developed expertise on, or have practical working experience of, the Russian Arctic in the ongoing design of the technical cooperation program, as well as in the delivery of its specific project components;*
- \_ ensuring that Canadian partner organizations are prepared to undertake a long term commitment and that the Russian partner organizations have the credibility to be able to sustain the cooperation activity in question;*
- \_ taking into account what has been learned in other countries about assistance activities in the Russian Arctic (e.g. Nordic and Alaskan experience and that of the Cambridge University Scott Polar Research Institute);*
- \_ utilizing bilateral contributions to the small enterprise financing and investment facilities developed for Russia through the European Bank for reconstruction and Development.*

The CWG agrees with the Standing Committee that Canada-Russia cooperation is essential if we are to tackle some of the Arctic's most significant environmental problems and establish initiatives to promote and protect sustainable development. This should be a major priority for an Arctic Region 2000 Strategy" (Rec. No. 2)

#### **Recommendation 49**

The Committee recommends that the Government take advantage of the period of Canada's current chairmanship of the Arctic Council to work on the unfinished elements in building a stronger multilateral system for promoting circumpolar cooperation. In particular priority attention should be given to the following:



*\_ pursuing global connections to Arctic concerns through other international forums, notably the United Nations, and around international economic as well as environmental and indigenous rights issues;*

*\_ utilizing whatever intergovernmental channels-notably the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Northern Forum-as well non-governmental (especially aboriginal) and inter-parliamentary channels that are available, with the deliberate purpose of fostering bridge-building and common understandings among Nordic, Russian and North American perspectives;*

*\_ undertaking an in-depth study of the ramifications of regional integration regimes in Europe and North America (i.e. EU and NAFTA regulations and processes) for the implementation of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate;*

*\_ providing the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with sufficient resources to coordinate the execution of the above tasks.*

The CWG shares the view of the Standing Committee that our circumpolar relations must be both broadened and deepened. We reiterate that east-west linkages, particularly among regional and sub-regional organizations will be crucial to the establishment of effective regimes that can promote and carry out sustainable development activities. Canada's involvement in various Antarctic bodies provides an important bi-polar perspective from which important lessons can be learned for our circumpolar Arctic responsibilities.



## Research Opportunities

During its discussions the Calgary Working Group (CWG) identified a number of research needs that if undertaken would enhance Canadian foreign policy making for the circumpolar Arctic.

### 1. The Barents, Beaufort, and Bering Seas Regions : A Comparative Study of Development, Environment, and Governance.

These three regions make up a significant part of the circumpolar Arctic. Several parallels characterize the three regions. These include:

- concern for sustainable development;
- significant environmental challenges;
- cultural impacts of industrialization;
- too little northern content and perspective in national and international policies;
- a growing recognition of the opportunities afforded by regional cooperation;
- increasing attention to more symmetric east-west linkages rather than the historic asymmetries of north-south (periphery-centre) relationships;
- the need to see each region in the global context;
- the need for cross-sectoral approaches to policy development; and
- the need for political leadership to enhance policy regimes that are much more a result of "upward guidance".

There are of course, important differences; differences of culture, politics, ideology, ecology, technology, economy, and social structure all of which must be factored into a comparative analysis.

A comparative study of the three regions offers important opportunities to explore ways in which experience with regional and sub-regional initiatives in policy making, program development and more generally in the processes of governance, might be linked to Arctic Council roles and responsibilities. Special attention will be given to projects that focus on cross-sectoral and cooperative arrangements amongst interests in the circumpolar Arctic.

Existing relationships linking the Arctic Centre, a research institute at the University of Lapland, the Northern Forum with members across the Arctic, and members of CARC offer a good basis for establishing a collaborative program of the type outlined here. Over the next several weeks we will be exploring specific project interests with these potential partners.



## **2. Treaty Making and Sustainable Development**

An examination of how modern Aboriginal claims, as social contracts, have entrenched the principles of sustainable development and are therefore a key instrument in the evolution of the practice of sustainable development. The analysis will focus upon local and regional initiatives and the process of "upward guidance" they provide to an expanding repertoire of "on the ground" sustainable development activities. This work will also examine treaty making as a relational exercise in which conflicts are mediated and resolved, and Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests find accommodations in the wider society.

## **3. International Agreements and the Arctic Council**

An analysis of international agreements in the circumpolar Arctic, and outside, but affecting it. The study will identify strengths and limitations along with recommendations for improving such agreements, and suggesting new agreements where none now exist. The analysis will also suggest what roles the Arctic Council might play with respect to international agreements and the issues the agreements are intended to address.

## **4. The Evolution of Traditional Economies**

An examination of growth, decay, change, and adaptation in traditional economies across the circumpolar Arctic. Traditional/subsistence activities remain a crucial part of the circumpolar Arctic economies for many residents. At the same time new pressures and opportunities are leading to various adaptive strategies. This analysis would seek to understand the directions in which such economies are evolving, their contribution to sustainable development, and the roles they play in the various arrangements for governance.

## **5. Arctic Carrying Capacity**

Too little is known about the response capability of Arctic ecosystems to various stressors. With rapidly expanding industrial activity in some areas and a toxic legacy now playing out its effects in parts of the circumpolar Arctic, it is essential to develop a much clearer understanding of adaptive capacity, resilience-stability, integrity, and self-organizing capabilities in Arctic ecosystems. Linked to this is the need for a clearer idea of the nature of cumulative effects of human activity and the means to observe, measure, and evaluate such effects.



Science alone will not provide all the necessary observations or insights. It will be essential to document the traditional ecological knowledge that addresses the questions of carrying capacity and restorative capabilities. This work would attempt to provide a framework to guide scientific research and analysis and traditional ecological knowledge documentation and analysis.

## 6. Re-defining Security

With the end of the cold war and the growth of market economies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the concept of "security" has begun to take on new dimensions. Discussions of security now include economic, environmental, cultural, technological, and scientific conditions along with the traditional military and political perspectives. This redefinition of security from a mostly a military concern to a broad societal perspective on the future will permeate relations among circumpolar neighbours. A study of the changing definition of security and what it may mean in terms of circumpolar institutions and policies is timely.

At the same time membership in NATO is expanding and in doing so creating a new mix of circumpolar interests. This is complicated by the Finnish scenario that envisions a more active role for the European Union in developing its policy towards its Northern Dimension, which in turn could mean its more prominent, some would say more intrusive, profile in Arctic Council.

## 7. NATO Expansion

A study that links the re-definition of security and the effects of NATO expansion on circumpolar relations is timely. Such a study might also include an analysis of the growth of regional and sub-regional organizations and the manner in which they may be affecting circumpolar policy and relations when juxtaposed with institutions taking a more traditional view of security.

## 8. A Primer on Circumpolar Affairs

For many in the North, circumpolar relations and issues are a distant and mysterious reality. While for some there is longstanding (e.g. wildlife) and newer (e.g. contaminants) recognition of transboundary relationships, few have knowledge of the ways in which the circumpolar countries are formally linked and the mechanisms through which they carry out their affairs. A more knowledgeable public constituency is seen as an asset to circumpolar organizations whether they be political, environmental, cultural,



technological or scientific. The proposal here is to write plainly, and in first languages, "a primer" that would describe important features of the circumpolar institutions, economies, ecologies and cultures. As a part of the primer, readers should be able develop an understanding of how to become engaged in, or gain access to, circumpolar organizations.

## **9. Sustainable Development Initiatives in the Circumpolar Arctic**

The purpose of this project is to describe a number of local and regional initiatives that fit with the principles of sustainable development and thus, provide clear examples of the concept in practice. Selection of case studies would be based on a number of criteria including: needs/opportunities being met; approaches to goal setting and strategic planning; resource acquisition and allocation; locus of control; structural-functional analysis; type and scale of activity, criteria for measuring effects/outcomes. Cases would be selected from the various regions of the Circumpolar Arctic to reflect a variety of economic, cultural, environmental and administrative settings. A document of this kind would be an appropriate contribution to the May 1998 conference on Sustainable Development in Whitehorse

## **10. Northern Science and Technology Strategy and the Canadian Polar Commission**

A discussion paper on a Northern Science and Technology Strategy prepared by DIAND will circulate for comment in November 1997. It is important that there be a substantial and informed response to this document, for among other things, it will set out the future of the Canadian Polar Commission (CPC). The CWG believes Canada requires a strong body, at arms length from government, to promote sound, policy relevant and basic science, and its wise use by policy makers. The founding principles in the 1991 Act of Parliament that established the Canadian Polar Commission remain relevant, and should form the basis for renewal of the CPC. Examples of areas of scientific study that need particular attention and support include:

- all disciplines in social science research;
- continuation of the Northern Contaminants Program;
- various climatic studies including Arctic haze, ozone depletion, warming/cooling.



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2. The Barents Region Today - Dreams and Realities: A Report of a Conference, by Tony Penikett
3. New Forms of Northern Governance; Devolution, Treaties and the Arctic Council, by Tony Penikett
4. Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of Chapter 4 - "Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security." Omitted Arctic Security Issues, by Prof. Robert Huebert
5. A Proposal for an Arctic Biogeochemical Research Strategy for Canada, by Dr. Leonard Barrie
6. Canadian Priorities for the Arctic Council, by Prof. Franklyn Griffiths



## Appendix 1

### Participants in the Calgary Working Group

October 3-5, 1997

- The Hon. Tony Penikett, Chair
- Prof. Nigel Bankes, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary
- Dr. Leonard Barrie, Atmospheric Environment Service, Environment Canada
- The Hon. Stephen Cowper, President, Northern Forum
- The Hon J. Hugh Faulkner, Executive Chairman, Sustainable Project Management
- Dr. Terry Fenge, Director of Research, Inuit Circumpolar Conference
- Dr. Franklyn Griffiths, George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto
- Dr. Robert Huebert, Dept. of Political Science, University of Calgary
- Dr. Robbie Keith, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee
- Ms. Christine Lee, Executive Director, Walter and Duncan Gordon Charitable Foundation
- Mr. Kevin O'Reilly, Director of Research, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee
- Dr. Fred Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, Environment Canada
- Mr. Lindsay Staples, Environmental Consultant, Whitehorse
- Mr. Douglas Urquhart, Environmental Consultant, Whitehorse



## Appendix 2

### The Barents Region Today—Dreams and Realities Conference Report

by Tony Penikett

Monday, September 15, 1997

#### The Political Forum

##### Hannele Pokka & Esko Riepula

The hosts, Lapland's Governor and the University's Rector opened this by invitation-only conference with short welcoming speeches.

Governor Hannele Pokka described the previous evening's river-boat ride as an introduction to the Arctic environment. Dr. Esko Riepula welcomed participants to the splendid new Arktikum building, the forum for this exchange between political, business, and research leaders about sustainable economics, sustainable environments, and sustainable communities.

##### Paavo Lipponen

Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen made a major statement about the need for a northern dimension in European policy. He emphasized that Finland, in becoming more aware of its own northern dimension, realizes the need for EU to develop its northern dimension. This was diplomatically argued in two respects. The first, that Finland fully supports the EU's strong initiatives to strengthen its Mediterranean, or southern, dimension, and thus, thinks it is likewise only fair and reasonable that EU see a similar balancing logic in its policy for a northern dimension. The second, that Finland will be emphasizing this perspective when it takes over the Presidency of the European Union in 1999. That this in turn would and should make EU more strongly involved in the Arctic Council, an obvious outcome of this orientation. In effect, this EU-related chain of reasoning was what was most talked about in the lobbies afterwards; Finland was giving EU advance warning of its intentions.

All northern areas, Lipponen said, have scarce populations, harsh climates and resource riches. These common factors create opportunities but they are also associated with serious problems. The addition of Finnish and Swedish forests to the EU economy means that there are now 3 million workers in this



European sector. At the same time, the environmental, economic, and social problems in the Russian parts of the Barents region were all too obvious. The region needs investment in roads, Baltic harbours, and telecommunications. Finland will respond to these needs, but it will always be mindful of its national and regional interests.

The guiding principle must be that all economic activity must be sustainable. Cooperation on nuclear safety is not enough. Faulty plants must be repaired or shut down. Finland supports a review of environmental cooperation initiatives between Russia and the European Union. To close the social gap between Russia and Europe, we need investments in health, housing, more student exchanges, the rule of law, protection of human rights, in short, a better coordinated policy with clear priorities.

The main forums for these discussions are: The Council of Baltic Sea States, The Barents Council, The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, The Arctic Council, The Baltic Sea Prime Minister's a task force on organized crime.

A comprehensive EU program is needed. The Arctic Council is a new forum that needs to build on the success of the AEPS initiative and arrangements like that between Dartmouth College and the University of Lapland.

Financing cooperation should be the job of national governments; separate funds should be directed to the northern regions; funding should be better coordinated with international agencies. The EU must become more active in this area. We need a regional approach to supplement national polices because one billion dollars (ECUs) does not go very far.

Iceland Air has opened a direct route to Helsinki. Things are moving. Finland will become the business centre for the region and create global opportunities.

The EU must play a larger role in the Barents Region.

Andre Kozyrev (former Russian Foreign Minister, a godfather of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Cooperation, member for Murmansk of Russian Duma used his excellent English to be both charming and light. "Please don't misunderstand when they say I am a godfather of the Barents Region... I will follow the usual procedure for former government officials by trying to take credit for the good things done by others and blame others for the bad." Thousands in Murmansk are now involved in contacts throughout the Barents Region. Russia has ceased to call for 100% foreign financing of projects and is now more realistic. We need more demonstration projects, more activity from INTEREG. Russian Oblasts can see the great potential in regional arrangements.



If the reform process had not stalled in the last two years, there might be more economic growth. We need more time to make the Barents dreams a reality. In Murmansk it is cold, but remember, in Yakutsk it is much colder.

Kozyrev developed a clear distinction in the way that Barents collaboration was working. The literally thousands of increased contacts between individuals and between small groups, whether businessmen, students, researchers, local officials, sports teams, and so on—in other words, the processes of civility—were concrete evidence that impressed him deeply. This was at the day-to-day level, where most of the real hard work is being done, and where the collaboration appears to be making a real impact. It is at the higher levels that things are going slowly: absurdly complex tax laws, corruption, poor transborder transportation corridors, immigration policies, and so on.

Thorvold Stoltenberg (former Norwegian foreign minister, Ambassador to Denmark) agreed that we need cooperation, and patience, yes, but we also need a conference like this to draw the attention of politicians and the media. All of us involved have to see both the hopes and the inevitable disappointments.

Taking advantage of his status as one of the godfathers of the Barents cooperation, he gave his personal impression of what the early Barents efforts were about. "Let me try to put the Barents Region into perspective," he said. The long-term context was the objective of peace and stability. After the Berlin Wall came down, we had sterile moments. What could I tell my grandchildren?" Do we look north for possibilities and opportunities? Should we try to contribute to a new international order, without the usual war. Remember: the Barents, the Baltic and the Balkans have been the scenes of violence and battles throughout European history. This we must change. We must avoid having a hunger curtain replace the Iron Curtain from the Barents to the Balkans. We need to see the Barents Region in the global context.

Margaretha af Ugglas (former Swedish Foreign Minister) recalled Lapland Governor Lassinantti introducing her as a young MP to the northern perspective. She made a distinction between the Baltic Region, where the national level of interaction is most important, and the Barents Region, where the interaction is more between the sub-regions of each country. She also emphasized above all the importance of NW Russia.

Paavo Vayrynen, (MEP) claimed that the problem with the Barents Region is mostly Moscow. He also pointed out the opportunity for Finland in having the Presidency of the EU in 1999 and added that Finland will also have the Secretariat of the Barents Council.



Timo Summa (Director General, European Commission, DG IA) reminded the conference that cross-border instruments are the slowest instruments available.

Pentti Malkki (Director, Finnish Institute of Marine Research) outlined a science policy agenda for the Barents Region. He based his agenda on an analysis of what we know and do not know. We have the AMAP overview.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that humans are influencing the environment, for example winter temperatures are up. This has implications for social sciences, human services, and health programs. The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) now advises the Arctic Council. Can we have global climate change and sustainable development? Can we forge cross-sectoral links between the Calotte Academy and the Northern Forum Academy. Do we need a Northern Journal, an international scientific network?

### **The Business Forum**

Speakers included Jaakko Ihamoutila (Chairman & CEO, Nest Oy), Anders Sundstrom (Minister of Industry, Sweden), Boris Nitikin (RAO Gazprom), Fred Grasso (Russian Development ENRON Capital & Trade), Mikko Hyytiainen (Vice President Marketing, ABB Oy), I.A. Blatov (AO-GMK), Annti Potila (President & CEO, Finnair Oy), Tormod Hermanses (CEO, Telnor AS, Norway).

### **Reception**

A reception hosted by Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Lappia House was followed by dinner at the Hotel Pohjanhovi.

**Tuesday, September 16, 1997**

### **Research Forum**

Northern Research—Arctic Climate, Natural Resources, Environmental Challenges, Economy, Technology, Indigenous Peoples, Institutions and Northern Policy

Olli Ojala (Director General, Ministry of Environment, Finland International Affairs Unit) surveyed Environmental Actions in the Barents Region. The Barents Region is a region with numerous possibilities, however we must not be blind to the potential for damaging effects in southern-based policies



towards the north. Strategies of sustainability must be based on realities not dreams. We need political leadership.

The Barents Region has the biggest concentration of radioactive materials. We have airborne pollutants and aquatic pollution both. We have 50 projects of technical assistance, a regional environmental committee, and our main priorities are Northwest Russia and cross-border cooperation. Grant funding tends to lower the threshold of public financing. Even basic drinking water is not available everywhere. Environmental work is frustrated by limited budgets. Both the Nordic Investment Board and the Nordic Economic Fund are vehicles for cooperation. And, one year ago, the Arctic Council was created; we need to build a connection between the Barents Region and the Arctic Council.

Olav S. Stokke's (Research Director, Fridtjof Nansen Institute) topic was The Regional Dynamics for Protection of the Marine Environment. He emphasized: that the marine dumping of nuclear wastes should be an urgent priority for the Barents Region, that the Barents Region is also a set of bilateral relationships, and that environmental issues require linkages to bilateral, regional, European and international processes.

Professor Manfred Lange (University of Munster, former Director of the Arctic Centre) showed slides to illustrate his talk about Global Changes and Global Change Impacts in the Arctic: New Challenges for The Barents Region.

Lange argued that the Arctic is particularly prone to rapid climate change. He has modelled two scenarios of forest growth: one in the current climate and the other with the predicted changes in climate. He also referred to the International Arctic Science Committee-supported Barents Sea Impact Study, or BASIS, a broadly interdisciplinary research programme that will take into account the interactions between natural and social systems.

Lassi Heininen (Senior Scientist, Arctic Centre) compared the policies of the Arctic nations. "Nations, regions and co-operative forums may all be in conflict, Heininen said. "We need a northern policy for Europe." Significantly, he noted the importance that Norway traditionally, ascribes to the Barents Sea, to the point that it is even considered by some to be a Norwegian Sea. Although his text may contain more detail, the spoken version of Heininen's presentation devoted little time to Canadian policy.

Pekka Aikio, (President of the Sami Parliament in Finland) provided a gentle reminder not to ignore Sami interests in debates about the Barents region. He said the Sami are an indigenous people and who have made sustainable use of the Arctic's renewable resources for thousands of years. However, the Sami lack the political power to influence development decisions.



They suffer oppression but still the Sami culture is flourishing. Lapp villages comprise the units of Sami self-government. Legal arguments about Sami rights go back to the Lapp Codicil of 1751—an annex to a border agreement between Sweden and Finland. This codicil still has some weight in reindeer herding questions between Sweden and Finland. Nowadays, the Sami invoke international covenants on indigenous peoples, UN declarations, and arguments about land rights.

Oran Young (Director, Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College) discussed a range of Arctic issues, the variety of structures emerging to deal with them, and offered a model for appropriate arrangements in his paper: *International Regimes for Achieving Sustainable Development*.

1. What are the tasks?

- a) regulatory—prohibitions, requirements, permissions;
- b) procedural—one shot vs. requirement choices, collective chores?
- c) programmatic—joint coordinating regimes;
- d) generative—guiding discussions (agreements based on discourses such as 'maximum sustainable yield' or 'biodiversity.')
- e) Types of Arctic Regime

Types of Arctic Regime	Geographical Coverage	
	broad	narrow
Functional Scope wide	Arctic Council	BEAR
limited	Polar Bears	Bilaterals

2. What is the division of labour? (identify comparative advantages)

- a) Comparative Advantages of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements:
- b) Regional arrangements (i.e., Arctic Council)
  - . bioregional (landscape, local perspective);
  - . comparative approach;
  - . direct links to national governments;
  - . voice of the Arctic region.
- c) Sub-Regional arrangements (i.e., BEAR)
  - . sensitivity to local variations in biophysical systems;



- . bottom-up approaches;
- . ties to local stakeholders;
- . functional focus.

### 3. What is the Arctic Council's role?

A distinctive niche for the Arctic Council:

- a) management regimes for living resources;
- b) transboundary impacts of industrialization;
- c) a voice of the Arctic in outside forums.

This struck several attendees as a very useful proposal, although one researcher called the exercise mere typology.

### Comments

In general, *The Barents Region Today—Dreams and Realities* canvassed both the largely Nordic dreams for the region and the harsh reality of the limits to effective Russian participation. As the organizers hoped, the conference certainly raised the political profile of the Barents Region, with Prime Minister Lipponen's call for a northern dimension to EU policy generating much comment. Previous conferences I have attended have hinted that the Barents Region might be a somewhat artificial concept, there being no regional economy, common culture, or secure transportation links between the Nordic north and the Russian North West. However, this notion surfaced only occasionally at this conference and Thorvold Stoltenberg effectively dealt with this criticism by putting the Barents Region initiative into a historical and strategic context.

Although Russian participants might think it focused excessively on the problems of lawlessness and environmental degradation in their country, the Business Forum must also be counted a considerable success. It was so well attended that on the second day of the conference the Research Forum was forced to trade venues with the Business Forum because that the latter event had run out of space. As a result the first speaker in the Research Forum had to begin his presentation in one room, then begin again in another. Nevertheless, the content of the research forum probably has the greatest relevance for Canadian observers interested in Arctic issues. Participation was made easy by the fact that all proceedings were in English—even the speeches of the politicians. However not all the politicians had the fluency or vocabulary of Lipponen or Stoltenberg, so some of the subtleties of their messages may have been lost. One also noted the extent to which North America discourse about Aboriginal Rights and self-government coloured the presentation by the Sami leader, Pekka Aikio.



Throughout, the mood of quiet optimism about this project was evident. My only disconcerting moment came when John Pearce of the Canadian Embassy complained to Dr. Richard Langlais and I about our articles which he thought criticized the Canadian government. This was a quite bizarre since the articles (both of which were published by the Arctic Centre in time for the Barents Region Conference) were almost embarrassingly pro-Canadian.

At Sunday's pre-conference meeting of the ad hoc research group, Pentti Malkki, (Director, Finnish Institute of Marine Research) suggested that the researchers present ought to try framing a research agenda, and advised that his speech to the conference would outline such a plan. Lassi Heininen (Arctic Centre, University of Lapland) identified a role for his group in systematically following up this idea. Given the proliferation of conferences on the Arctic environment, indigenous development issues, and intergovernmental contacts. Tony Penikett (CARC) suggested that, to be useful from here on, the work of entities like the Arctic Centre, like bodies in North America, and possibly CARC, might need to be more consciously cross-sectoral. Oran Young (Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth) strongly supported this position. Lassi Heininen later picked up on this theme in his closing remarks to the conference.

The Arctic Centre will publish the conference proceedings this fall.

*BEARING the European North: the Northern Dimension and Alternative Scenarios,* Edited by Lassi Heininen & Richard Langlais, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 1997 (ISBN 951-634-563-8).



### Appendix 3

## Northern Governance: Devolution, Treaties and the Arctic Council\*

by Tony Penikett

The novelist, Hugh MacLennan, famously described the relationship between French and English Canada as "two solitudes." However, in the northern territories and the northern parts of the provinces, from Labrador west to British Columbia, Canada's two solitudes are not French and English but rather the Aboriginal and settler communities.

Many northern Aboriginal communities still depend in part on renewable-resource-based subsistence economies. Their political tradition is that of consensus decision making. They identify with the Arctic and Subarctic environment, seeing themselves as "Part of the Land, Part of The Water" (McClellan 1987). The settler population, on the other hand, has traditionally promoted industrial development. Settlers imported Euro-Canadian colonial and parliamentary practices to the North. And, after decades of neglect, settler governments now seek to "manage" the northern environment. Thomas R. Berger perfectly captured these competing northern visions in his book on the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, "Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland" (Berger 1977). For the settler, the North is a frontier; for indigenous peoples, the North is their homeland.

Canada's preeminent Arctic environmental scientist, E. F. Roots, said: "For at least one thousand years, there have been two economies in the Arctic: an indigenous economy, small scale, attuned to local needs and responses, fluctuating with changes in natural conditions, and although with many ups and downs, providing the people within it with a culture and society that by any world standards must be considered successful; and an economy directed from the outside and designed to satisfy the needs, business demands, and political motives of non-Arctic areas. This external economy has been mostly based on the exploitation of resources considered valuable by the outsiders - ivory, whale oil, gold and other metals, petroleum - but not, in the main, resources that were seen as particularly useful to the internal economy" (Roots 1993).

When their usefulness as allies or guides ended, the northern natives became politically invisible. For Sam Steele, who ruled the Yukon Territory as policeman, magistrate and legislator during the Klondike Gold Rush, Aboriginal people hardly rated a mention in his autobiography (Steele 1915). The Canadian Parliament established a legislature for the Yukon Territory in 1898 but not until 1978 did any Yukon Aboriginal person win election to this



body--although Aboriginal residents represented at least a quarter of the territorial population throughout the eighty-year period of their exclusion.

The images of homeland and frontier continue to exemplify the attitudinal poles of thought about the Canadian North. Much of recent Canadian northern and Aboriginal policy and, to a large extent, new foreign policy initiatives such as the Arctic Council are coloured by the need felt by decision makers to bridge the two northern solitudes. Now, as then, representation in British style parliaments has been but one of the vehicles for reconciling settler and Aboriginal points of view. More important vehicles were the instruments of devolution and treaties.

In the years since elected members of the legislative council first joined the Yukon Cabinet in 1970, devolution has transformed the governments north of sixty from colonial administrations to powerful regional entities accountable mainly to local populations. Today, after almost three decades of program transfers from Ottawa to Whitehorse and Yellowknife, the Yukon and Northwest Territories exercise most of the powers of provincial governments, as will Nunavut come 1999.

In a region whose economy is notoriously vulnerable to fluctuations in the value of its exports, political stability was provided by an important federal innovation known as formula financing. Formula financing guarantees a certain level of revenue for the territorial governments by committing the federal government to fill the gap between locally generated tax receipts and territorial government expenditures. While not perfect, this formula has been a highly successful element of Canada's northern policy. Without it devolution might have been a much slower process and many recent innovations in northern governance might have been impossible.

The devolution of power from Ottawa to Whitehorse, Yellowknife and Iqaluit, was preceded by statehood in Alaska in 1959 and paralleled Home Rule for Greenland in 1979. Nowadays regional governments throughout Russia are coming into their own. So too are the regional governments in the Nordic countries.

When the regional governments throughout the circumpolar world founded the Northern Forum, the Canadian members were surprised to discover that the governors representing northern Scandinavian regions, like the Commissioners who until recently had ruled Canada's northern territories, were appointees of national governments. But things are changing even in the European North. For example, with Finland joining the European Union, Lapland's Governor of Lapland, for example, suddenly seems to be losing power to locally elected officials. European Union policy allows regional development funds to bypass national capitals and flow directly from Brussels to the regions, which has considerably empowered



locally elected authorities. Europe's northernmost institute of higher learning, the University of Lapland has skillfully brokered such EU transactions, much to the benefit of both the university and the region. Since the Cold War ended, Lapland has also played a leading role in the formation and operation of several international bodies, including, the Circumpolar Universities Association and the Barents Region Council and the Northern Forum.

The Northern Forum, which is headquartered in Anchorage now includes among its members: Lapland, Alaska, Dornod, Heilongjiang, Hokkaido, Evenk, Kamchatka, Khanty-Mansiysk, Komi, Magadan, Nemets, Yamalo, Sakha, Sakhalin, Northern Norway, Norrbotten, Vasterbotten, Alberta, the NWT and the Yukon. When Canada's provincial premiers closeted themselves with the Prime Minister to conjure up the Meech Lake Accord, it appeared to many northerners that the South had forever frozen the North out of discussions about Canada's constitutional future. Consequently, the opening of dialogues with regions to the east and west seemed a highly attractive development for a jurisdiction like the Yukon, which already enjoyed positive relations with its immediate neighbours in Alaska and the Northwest Territories (Keith 1991). Long before the Arctic Council found favour in Washington or Ottawa, Alaska, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories were engaged in international relations around the circumpolar world. These relationships included trade missions to Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia, official visits from those countries, and numerous bilateral agreements.

Devolution has transformed the territorial governments, from colonial or settlers administrations to popularly elected governments of what one federal judge called "infant provinces" (St. Jean 1988). Even more significant for the North's future have been the treaties between Canada and the region's indigenous peoples which effectively reconstructed relations between Aboriginals and settlers. Devolution mainly changed local political and administrative structures but the treaties altered basic constitutional arrangements and changed the historic pattern of settlement history. Modern treaties between the nation-state and northern Aboriginal nations have arguably been the principle instrument for mediating between the often polarized interests of the Aboriginal and settler communities.

As Canada's Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Royal Commission, 1996) recently affirmed, the Aboriginal, or Indian, treaty remains a vital and evolving instrument for resolving inter-societal conflicts. Europeans frequently associate Indian treaties with the 19th Century, the settlement of the American West and the humiliation of the Indian reservation, but that is a mistaken impression. In the Americas, treaty-making is not only a very old practice, but one that continues to this day.



Elsewhere, I have suggested that Aboriginal treaty-making in the Americas has occurred in three historical stages (Penikett 1997). The first stage began soon after the Spanish arrived in the Americas, the most important of the early peacemakers being Bartholomew de Las Casas, the son of one of Columbus's shipmates. A New World plantation and slave-owner until he suffered a crisis of conscience, Las Casas became a Dominican priest and then spent the rest of his life petitioning the Spanish Crown about the enslavement and slaughter of millions of Maya, Incas and Aztecs.

In 1550, the Spanish monarch Charles V summoned Las Casas to defend his views before the Council of the Indies at Valladolid. In the debate that followed, Las Casas argued that Indians had the right to their own lands, religions and governments, that they could not be brought to Christ by force, or subjected to Spanish rule without their consent. As Lewis Hanke observes, this was the first time an European power had ever examined the justice of its empire building (Hanke 1974). More astonishing is that the priest from the distant Mexican province of Chiapas won the argument. Charles V temporarily ordered a halt to the Spanish conquest, but the slavery and slaughter did not stop. Las Casas had won only a moral victory, and his countrymen blamed him for creating the "black legend" of Spanish cruelty.

Las Casas had his admirers, even in England. However, self-interest not moral considerations normally motivated English policy in the Americas. After the British and their Iroquois allies beat the French army at the Plains of Abraham in 1759, Britain decided to reorganize its American colonies, and King George III issued The Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation established two important principles. First, colonists could only obtain land for settlement from the Crown, after the Crown had obtained it from Indian nations by way of treaty; thus the British government recognized Aboriginal title to American land. Second, the requirement to make treaties established the legitimacy of Aboriginal governments in British North America.

The Royal Proclamation marked the beginning of the second stage of treaty-making, which continued for two centuries. George Washington viewed the Proclamation simply as a temporary pacifier of the Indians, but Thomas Jefferson cited it as one of the causes of the War of Independence. Later, Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court judged that, even in post-revolutionary America, the obligation to make treaties with the Indian nations remained. Marshall's rulings led to the negotiation of hundreds of treaties as the new country expanded westward. Many of these treaties were violated by American governments, which, like Washington and Jefferson, saw the agreements as necessary for the pacification of Indians but also as an affront to settlers. To these governments, treaties were acceptable only as vehicles for land acquisition and the assimilation of the Indian Nations. The Indian signatories saw things differently: they honoured the treaties as expressions of their sovereignty and distinctiveness.



When Canada became a nation state in 1867, the federal government saw treaty-making as practically a closed chapter--at least until the national dream of transcontinental railroads required a series of new treaties to extinguish Aboriginal title in Western Canada. Government agents appeared to have drafted these late nineteenth century treaties in advance of the negotiations. The treaties crowded the Assiniboine, Blackfoot, Cree and other Indian nations onto reservations, granted the Indians small annuities and recognized limited hunting and fishing rights in the nation's former homelands. As instruments of assimilation, these treaties advanced a policy that sought not just to extinguish title but also to extinguish the Aboriginal identity. Under this policy, the government sent Indian children to residential schools to learn English and Christianity, while outlawing traditional religious practices such as the sun dance and the potlatch.

This practice of expropriation and assimilation continued well into the twentieth century. Vast areas in British Columbia and the Canadian North were still without treaties, and treaty-making was not a priority but, whenever a megaproject loomed, government lawyers began to worry about Aboriginal title. This was true of the United States as much as Canada. With the discovery of oil in Alaska in 1968, the U.S. Interior Department immediately sought a settlement with the state's Natives.

On paper, the 1971 Alaska settlement was the most generous ever made with Aboriginal people. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act gave 45,000 Natives 44 million acres of land and almost a billion dollars. Yet the settlement was blatantly assimilationist. It abolished ancient forms of tribal government and traditional hunting and fishing practices, and then tried to convert Alaskan Natives into business people and land speculators. In its wisdom, the U.S. Congress gave control of Indian, Inuit and Aleut lands and monies to newly-created Native Corporations, most of which were not initially profitable.

The Alaskan experience proved highly instructive to Yukon First Nations as they started to negotiate their own treaty in 1973. Yukon First Nations and Alaska Natives speak related dialects, have similar subsistence economies and share ancient traditions of tribal or village governance. Their tribal homelands straddle the borders between Canada and the United States. They have many things in common, but a corporate model treaty was not to be one of them. Yukon First Nations insisted on negotiating a treaty that respected, not rejected, their cultural traditions. For this reason, the negotiations in the Yukon were difficult and protracted. The settlement took over 20 years to complete but, at the end of the day, 7,000 Yukon Indians won title to 41,000 square kilometres of land and a new legally-recognized form of tribal self-government.



In 1867, Canada's Fathers of Confederation wrote a constitution that divided all governmental powers between Ottawa and the provinces. Practically nothing was left for the Indian nations with whom Britain and, later, Canada made treaties. By 1992, it was clear that the Yukon treaty would carve a new piece out of that constitutional pie and transfer powers to First Nations from both the federal and the territorial governments. This settlement covered more than questions of land and money. First Nations and the territorial government would from now on share powers in fields such as education, economic development, the environment, health, welfare, wildlife and land management. Given the territory's uncertain constitutional future following Patriation in 1982, and the Meech Lake Accord in 1987, the Yukon government sought to consolidate its position by becoming a full party to territorial land claims settlements. It is a nice historical irony that some Yukon politicians believed Ottawa could not forever deny to settlers what it had recognized for Aboriginals in the Yukon land claims and self-government agreements.

As the result of another settlement between Ottawa and the Inuit of the eastern Northwest Territories, the new territory of Nunavut will come into being in 1999. The important thing about Nunavut is that in North American history it is the first regional government with an Aboriginal majority ever created by a settler state. Never before has either Canada or the United States allowed for the creation of a new regional government until settlers outnumbered the indigenous population. In the next century, resource developments could cause the Inuit to be swamped by southern migrants but in the near term at least Nunavut will be a homeland administration.

It reflects of the confidence the Inuit feel about their ability to determine their own destiny in the region that Nunavut will have a public government, a very different arrangement from the form of tribal self-government provided for in the Yukon treaty. As the first of its kind, the Yukon self-government agreement attracted much attention during the 1992 constitutional negotiations, and similar arrangements found their way into the text of the Charlottetown Accord. Perhaps because the Charlottetown Accord was defeated in a national referendum, no other Aboriginal group has yet been able to achieve the same kind of self-government arrangements, although negotiations are in progress in northern British Columbia and northern Saskatchewan.

Anatol Rapoport, the game theorist, has identified three kinds of conflict: "fights, games, and debates" (Rapoport 1988). In some ways, these descriptions fit the three stages of treaty-making. Las Casas tried to end the Spanish Conquest, a fight in which the Indians were the big losers. For the next two-hundred years the treaties made were mostly of the "peace and friendship" variety. Then, in 1763, George III sanctioned a more serious



treaty-making game, a process of assimilation with ultimately few winners. Only in the current third or "debates" stage are negotiators making a real effort to understand the other parties' points of view and to create win-win scenarios for both the settler and Aboriginal constituencies. The authors of the Yukon and Nunavut settlements might be forgiven for thinking of them as two of the events that marked the beginning of third-stage treaty-making.

It is far too soon to judge the success of the Yukon model but some problems are already apparent. One problem touches on the issue of globalization, which everywhere has been a negative experience for indigenous peoples. At exactly the moment the Canadian government was negotiating the Yukon treaty, it was also negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Mexico. The Yukon treaty provides considerable protection for tribal lands and the Aboriginal subsistence economy. NAFTA on the other hand caused Mayan peasants in the Chiapas province to rise up in rebellion because they claimed it ended historic state protection of their communal land and subsistence farming rights. The Yukon treaty is protectionist, NAFTA is anti-protectionist. The two treaties seem to be based on radically different principles. When they come into conflict, which shall prevail? The history of broken treaty promises in North America should not make Aboriginal people optimistic about the outcome.

Concerned about the apparent contradiction between the two treaties signed by Canada, I wrote a letter to Prime Minister Chretien asking him to clarify Canada's intentions. In January 1995, Jean Chretien replied denying that NAFTA had undermined the rights of indigenous peoples (Chretien 1995), but the fact remains that NAFTA is plainly the logical outcome of a long process of economic liberalization in Mexico--a process which had the effect of seriously eroding the traditional rights of the Maya. So, the treaty-making begun by Chiapas's first bishop, Bartholomew de Las Casas, remains unfinished business in Central America today.

Yet, there is some good news for the Maya. Guatemala, one of only two American countries with a majority Aboriginal population, recently signed a treaty ending its 36 year long civil war, a horror story which cost 100,000 lives. To their credit, several European powers, including Spain, have injected millions of dollars into negotiating and implementing this treaty. Central America may seem a long way from the Arctic, but the point is that Canadian economic and trade policies both have Aboriginal aspects. This may be important for several reasons, not least one identified by Will Kymlicka, in his book *Multicultural Citizenship*: "[T]he single largest cause of ethnic conflict in the world today is the struggle by indigenous peoples for the protection of their land rights" (Kymlicka 1995).

So, treaty-making with Aboriginal peoples in the Americas continues today. In the Canadian North it has become a highly-evolved instrument of inter-



societal accommodation. No longer is the Canadian government trying to impose one model of treaty on all Aboriginal groups. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, The Inuvialuit Final Agreement, the Gwich'in, Sahtu, Nunavut and Yukon settlements are each in their own way quite distinctive. It may be difficult to understand current Canadian northern policy without appreciating the extent to which the country's policy-makers have over the last 20 years tried to make a just peace with northern Aboriginal peoples.

This wish to accommodate the Aboriginal interest is also influencing Canada's Arctic foreign policy. Among Canada's objectives in working to establish the eight-nation Arctic Council may be: the promotion of sustainable development; the active participation of northern peoples in circumpolar international relations; and the extension of the peacemaking or dispute resolution experience into new venues. These are all matters affecting Aboriginal and Northern interests.

Canadians strongly supported the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. We are increasingly conscious of the Arctic environment as fragile and powerful, hard and beautiful, strange and near. Symbolically, it is our Brazilian rainforest. The April 1997 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report puts "pursuing sustainable development priorities as the centrepiece of circumpolar cooperation" (Standing Committee, 1997a), and the first major public event announced at the September 19, 1996 launch of the Arctic Council was a conference on sustainable development to be held at Whitehorse in April 1998.

The Bruntland Report greatly influenced Canadian public opinion. Sustainable development, or the balancing of environmental and economic considerations, has become an extremely popular idea, especially the round table concept. For Canadians, the round table has become a metaphor for the inclusion of all interested stakeholders' interests, not least Aboriginal peoples. Before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Oran Young proposed several principles of sustainable development, including: subsistence preference, co-management and subsidiarity (Standing Committee, 1997b). These principles have already found expression in Canadian law in the land claims treaties worked out with northern Aboriginal groups over the last decade. They might even have been derived from that source.

Although the question of participant funding remains a major unresolved problem, the Canadian government seems genuinely serious about involving Aboriginal people in the work of the Arctic Council. In several recent statements, Foreign Minister Axworthy has noted that the Council is unique among international bodies for involving northern indigenous peoples as Permanent Participants. The appointment of Mary Simon, an



Inuk politician, as Canada's first Circumpolar Ambassador can be seen as further evidence of this commitment.

Having both Russia and the United States as neighbours in the Arctic, makes Canada, like the Nordic states, very interested in security questions. Unfortunately, the Americans have tried to keep issues of military security off the Arctic Council agenda. Still, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has noted the urgency of "completing the transition to a new understanding of security that incorporates human and environmental dimensions and promotes cooperative endeavours, especially in regard to the serious contamination and nuclear safety issues in northern Russia" (Standing Committee, 1997a). As a country with a proud tradition of international peacekeeping and a considerable recent experience in domestic peace-making, Canada may be keen to apply its experience in dispute resolution to a wide range of Arctic issues (Standing Committee, 1997b).

Canada is an Arctic state, a multicultural society, a consciously northern nation. Over the last two decades, the country has been slowly coming to terms with the Aboriginal dimensions of its national identity. This fact is now at last finding expression in Canada's official foreign policy. Oran Young believes that multiplicity of actors, including Aboriginal organizations, regional governments and environmental advocates, will make coordination difficult (Young 1996), but Aboriginal entities like the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and regional groupings such as the Northern Forum have illuminated the possibilities of Arctic internationalism. As the first chair of the Arctic Council, Canada's representatives should ensure that the work of this new international organization is informed by the country's experience and innovations in northern governance, devolution treaty-making. Canada and the other Arctic nation states need to make the Arctic Council a relevant and vital organization, not just for the diplomats and politicians, but also for the peoples of the circumpolar world who wish to end the solitudes of Aboriginal and settler communities, indigenous and external economies, industry and environment, East and West, South and North.

\*(Updated version of April 26, 1997, Presentation to the Calotte Academy in Rovaniemi, Finland : Northern Solitudes: Canadian Policy, Aboriginal Actors and the Arctic Council)



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## Appendix 4

### **Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of Chapter 4 - "Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security." Omitted Arctic Security Issues**

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The House of Commons Standing Committee has provided a detailed and nearly exhaustive examination of the problems and potential of circumpolar cooperation. The Committee's Report, specifically Chapter Four, is a rare consideration of Arctic security concerns in the current international system. The Committee focused primarily on the impact that the end of the Cold War has had on the nature of security in the Polar Region. The Report of the Committee argues that the nature of security concerns have been dramatically altered. The Report repeatedly makes the point that the nature of security has expanded from traditional notions of military issues to a much broader and expanded version of security, encompassing topics such as environmental security. As such, there is little to criticize this aspect of the Report. Rather, the Report should be commended for contributing to current discussions of Arctic security. For example, its discussion of the need to respond to the Russian Government's efforts to decommission its older, nuclear-powered submarine fleet raises several important points about Arctic security. The argument that the western states should be doing all that they can to assist the Russian efforts is a message that is well worth considering. After all, if NATO had been willing to spend billions to develop its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to hunt down and destroy these submarines during the Cold War, it stands to reason that NATO should now be willing to spend millions to assist the Russians as they peacefully destroy large numbers of these vessels.

The arguments about the new nature of expanded security concerns in the Arctic notwithstanding, there remain some issues that the Report did not fully address that warrant consideration. The current effort to transform the security debate from a narrowly militaristic definition to a much broader definition is laudable. But in expanding the definition, it is still necessary to avoid the trap of examining only the "newer" elements of security while pretending the traditional elements are now irrelevant. This critique posits that the Standing Committee has indeed fallen into such a trap. The



definition of security must include the traditional elements when at least one of two conditions exist in the Arctic region. The first is that a traditional military threat still exists. There is no doubt that the Cold War has greatly reduced the risk of conflict between Russia and NATO. But the questions remains as to whether or not the threat has been completely eliminated. The second condition is that there is a perceived military threat. Even if Russia has completely eliminated and repudiater-reactions of the Russians. In both instances, there are policies that Canadian policy-makers need to take that differ from those that would be necessary if all military threat and/or perceptions thereof in the Arctic regions had been completely eliminated.

Evidence of the first condition is minimal. There is little indication that either the Americans or Russians currently threaten each other. With respect to the second condition however, some recent Russian actions, including missile testing and the submarine procurement program, suggest that the Russian Government believes that some military threat to its security still exists.

With the end of the Cold War, the Russians no longer pre-aim their nuclear missiles at western targets. Furthermore, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties are substantially reducing the number of nuclear arms that both sides possess. However, in spite of the end of the Cold War, the Russian Government has been testing its missiles much closer to Western territory. Questions remain as to why the Russians believed it necessary to test launch one of their submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) 500 kilometres off the coast of Baffin Island in August of 1995. (1) Equally troubling is the apparent repudiation by the Russians of Brezhnev's pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons. Mary Fitzgerald, of the Hudson Institute, testified before the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development of the US House of Representatives that the official Russian military doctrine revoked the no-first use doctrine in 1993. She explained that the revocation was due to the growing gap between Russian and American military technology. As a result, the Russians believe that their increasing vulnerability requires a more "brutish" strategic doctrine. (2) Such a drastic policy realignment indicates that the Russians are continuing to view security in traditional terms.

Likewise, there is evidence that the Russians intend to continue developing more advanced nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The keel of the fourth-generation strategic missile submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruky (Borei class), was laid on November 2, 1996. (3) This new class of submarines is to replace the Russian Typhoon and Delta classes and is expected to be operational by 2002-2003. It is estimated that cost of each of these submarines will exceed \$1 billion (US). This clearly illustrates the seriousness of the Russian's perceived military threat. Given the fact that Murmansk is one of three remaining SSBN ports, the construction of these vessels guarantees that the Arctic will



remain an area of continued military activity for Russia, and therefore the United States, well into the 21st century.

The potential for an accidental nuclear war remains as a threat to the Arctic regions. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" when Russian radar detected a rocket launch from somewhere off the Norwegian coast. The rocket was first thought to be headed towards Moscow, but eventually veered away from Russian territory. The rocket was in fact an American scientific probe sent to examine the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed the Russians of the launch, but miscommunications had resulted in the failure of the message to reach the proper Russian officials. (4) This incident, while hopefully rare, indicates that the potential for nuclear misunderstanding remains as real as ever.

In addition to the Russian Government's perception of a military threat posed by the United States, as evidenced by the continuing weapons programme in Russia and the continued threat of accidental nuclear war, some American policy-makers are perceiving an increased military threat from Russia. In particular, they are questioning the assistance provided to the Russians for the purpose of decommissioning their older nuclear submarines. (5) They are concerned that such programmes are subsidizing the Russian modernization of their submarine fleets. However, the current administration does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the American leadership is bound to be disturbed if, on the one hand, the Russians continue to plead poverty when decommissioning their older submarines while, on the other hand, they continue to build the Borei class.

The Americans have also demonstrated with their recent actions that they have every intention of pursuing Arctic security issues on a multilateral basis, but only of their choosing. As the Standing Committee Report correctly points out, the Americans refused to join the Arctic Council unless it was specifically precluded from addressing issues of security. Accordingly, a footnote was included in the Council's declaration which stated "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security." Such a requirement would seem to indicate that the Americans do not want to take any action that might hinder their ability to define security issues in the Arctic. However, at the same time that they were insisting that the Arctic Council not deal with security issues, they were signing another agreement with the Russians and the Norwegian to do precisely that. The Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) calls for the three partners to work together to address environmental issues caused by military activity. (6) The agreement provides that six projects will be conducted to transport and clean up radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants from military sites. While such a move is laudable, it is not clear as to why the United States would agree to undertake such actions under the AMEC but not under the Arctic



Council. It would appear that the Americans have a specific agenda that they wish to follow, but it is not clear as to what this may be. The objectives of the American Government are particularly confusing given that the Arctic Council Declaration was signed on September 19, 1996 while the AMEC was signed on September 9, 1996. (7) Speculating as to the motives of the American Government, the most logical explanation is that the three partners of the AMEC did not want the other five members and three permanent participants of the Arctic Council involved in the process. Why this would be the case is currently unknown.

The questions that arise is what these factors may have to do with Canadian security issues in the Arctic and why the Standing Committee should be concerned. Two main issues need to be addressed. First, these factors demonstrate that the Canadian Government still needs to be wary about military security issues. As much as the end of the Cold War has reduced these threats, they have not been completely eliminated. The development of a new class of Russian ballistic missile submarines, entailing the provision of scarce resources to an expensive project, demonstrates the Russians current belief in nuclear deterrence despite the end of the Cold War. Many of these submarines will inevitably be stationed in the Northern base of Murmansk upon completion.

Secondly, even if the Russian actions do not pose a real threat to Canada, there is cause for concern if the Americans perceive these actions as a threat. The warnings of Professor Nils Orvik, formerly of Queens University, need to be recalled when he wrote about the "Defence against help". (8) Canadians may decide that there no longer are military threats in the Arctic, but if the Americans do not share this view, then Canada has to respond to American fears. Thus, it is important that a full appreciation of American northern security apprehensions be understood. A concern for Canada is the possibility that the Americans are beginning to worry about a reemerging Russian threat in the form of its nuclear force modernization. At this point, the anxiety of some American members of Congress are not shared by the U.S. Administration. But if this or any future administration begins to adopt such concerns, Canada will inevitably be involved. It is imperative that Canadian officials take a proactive position rather than simply being caught up in such a set of circumstances. What then can be done?

There are a number of options. First, Canada needs to promote a frank and open debate among the Arctic nations in order to determine what security issues remain as a source of problems. While it is much more politically acceptable to focus such a discussion on only environmental issues, it avoids dealing with the complete picture. Why is it necessary for Russia to build the Yuri Dolgoruky? If the belief is that such projects are necessary to protect Russian ship building capacity, can other less threatening project not be found? Why does the United States refuse to allow the Arctic Council to



address military security, even though it has signed another agreement with Norway and Russia to deal with such issues? What can be done to eliminate American concerns about Russian submarine building programmes? While answers to these questions are not immediately apparent, solutions can only be attained through discussion.

Another option is that Canada take the lead in developing additional safeguards against the dangers of accidental nuclear war in the Arctic. Hopefully the Russian reaction to the 1995 rocket launch is a single aberration. However, only one such aberration is necessary for massive destruction where nuclear weapons are concerned. If the Arctic Council is not allowed to deal with such issues, other mechanisms need to be put in place. A central registry for all missile launches, open to public scrutiny, would serve as both a central coordinating function as well as a confidence building mechanism.

Furthermore, consideration should also be given to Canadian policy if tensions should re-emerge in the North. To ignore such concerns in the hope that they will simply go away is not the optimal policy for Canada. Canada should do all that it can to promote improved cooperation and peaceful cooperation, but options need to be available to restore relations in the event that they deteriorate among the Arctic states. At the very least, such options would provide Canada with a modicum of preparedness. Failing to do so will simply repeat past practices in which American perceptions of the threat dictate Canadian northern security concerns.

In summary, there is no doubt that the Arctic is now a much safer place than it was during the Cold War. The authors of the Standing Committee Report are correct in focusing on the new and expanded definition of security in the Arctic regions with its emphasis on environmental security. However, in accepting an expanded definition of security, it is important to remember that traditional aspects of military security still need to be considered.

#### Notes

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## Appendix 5:

### A Proposal for an Arctic Biogeochemical Research Strategy for Canada

Dr. Leonard Barrie,  
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Knowledge forms the basis for wise policy making. Canada's past record in organizing and coordinating scientific efforts has been both brilliant and ineffective. Essential elements of a coordinated science effort in the Arctic are;

1. An experienced, focused, and well organized group that can host multi-agency and multidisciplinary initiatives in a productive and non-adversarial atmosphere;
2. Funding to "seed" strategy development and adequate support from appropriate federal agencies including DFO, DOE, DIAND, NRCan, Health Canada, DOT, etc., and other institutions;
3. Multistakeholder ownership of the strategy; and
4. An effective communications component to the strategy.

Arctic environmental issues important to Canada in a regional and international context include;

1. Contaminants - long range transported; affecting marine and terrestrial ecosystems;
2. Climate change in the Arctic and the role of Arctic atmospheric systems on global climate patterns;
3. Stratospheric ozone depletion and Ultraviolet-B radiation;
4. Lower atmospheric ozone depletion and mercury inputs

Each of the above requires a focused, centrally funded and guided research program of five years duration to achieve substantial results. The model for such programs is the Northern Contaminants Program (NCP) which had many of the elements needed to carry out a successful program. This Canadian program has been instrumental in shaping the AMAP program and the UN-ECE initiatives on protocols for persistent organic pollutants.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Next Steps

1. Fund the NCP for five more years to follow through on newly identified science needs and to track the effectiveness of international accords on contaminants.
2. Create an Arctic Environmental Research Council with broad stakeholder membership to provide overall direction and review.
3. Establish new programs for climate change and Ozone-UV-B.



## Appendix 6

### CANADIAN PRIORITIES FOR THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Franklyn Griffiths

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2. Funding to "seed" strategy development and adequate support from appropriate federal agencies including DFO, DOE, DIAND, NRCan, Health Canada, DOT, etc. and other institutions;
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1. Contaminants - long range transported affecting marine and terrestrial ecosystems  
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
2. Climate change  
University College, University of Toronto
3. Stratospheric ozone depletion and UV-B radiation  
31 March 1997
4. Lower atmospheric ozone depletion and mercury inputs

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

Canada needs urgently to strengthen the Arctic Council as an institution. To this end, the following is recommended:

Recommendation 1: for the Circumpolar Ambassador and DFAIT to produce an Arctic Council Action Plan by the end of May 1997 for the use of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in upcoming bilaterals with his Arctic counterparts.

Recommendation 2: for the Action Plan to consist of scoping, knowledge-gathering, and priority-setting by Arctic Council working groups to be set up on some or all of the following themes, the results to be reviewed at the fall 1998 Ministerial meeting when the Council's sustainable development programme is formally to be launched:

(a) focus on the children of the Arctic in launching the Council's sustainable development programme (Canada to take the lead);

(b) the role of the Arctic in global climate change (United States to be invited to lead);

(c) international cooperation to ensure that Arctic marine transportation of oil and natural gas is environmentally and socially sustainable (Norway and the Russian Federation to be invited to lead jointly);

(d) abatement of Arctic food contamination from long-range transport of pollutants;

(e) codification of basic principles for the sustainable use of renewable and non-renewable resources in the Arctic; and

(f) an Arctic communications strategy to meet the information and cultural needs of northern communities, and to enhance global awareness of the region.

Recommendation 3: for Canada to offer leadership in associating interested and capable non-Arctic states and the European Union with the sustainable development programme of the Arctic Council; and

Recommendation 4: for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to apply the Arctic Council formula for northern and interested non-northern representation in a new Canadian procedure for the making of policy on circumpolar affairs.



## CANADIAN PRIORITIES FOR THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Action is urgently required to ensure that the Arctic Council gets off to the best start possible during the remainder of the period to fall 1998, when Canada hands over the chair of the Council to another state, possibly to the United States. Measures should also be taken now to impart greater strength to the Council and to Canadian participation in it over the long haul.

The Arctic Council was established in September 1996 without an agreed agenda, corresponding working groups, or terms of reference and rules of procedure. It had to be done that way, owing principally to the restrictive attitude of the United States to multilateral Arctic cooperation, or not be established at all. As of March 1997, terms of reference will not be set until the senior Arctic officials' meeting in September 1997, if then. As to an agenda and working groups, they are nowhere in sight. Indeed, it appears to be U.S. policy, set by lower-echelon officials, that no substantive action be considered by the Council until the Ministerial meeting and rotation of the chair in 1998. To get the Council moving and to hand it over as a going concern that cannot readily be constricted no matter which state next has the advantages of the chair, Canada has no choice but to act at the political level again.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is to have bilaterals with his U.S. and Russian counterparts at the G-7 meeting in June, and with the Danish and Norwegian Foreign Ministers at the NATO summit in July. He is also in a position to meet with or write to the Finnish and Swedish Ministers, and to have discussions with the three permanent participants on the Council's work. Given his willingness to use these encounters to drive the Arctic Council forward into substantive activity, there is an opportunity to generate ministerial marching orders for the senior officials' meeting in September, instructing them to set up a series of Arctic Council working groups on priority themes which would also be open to discussion by permanent participants at the September gathering. If the Minister is to succeed in this, he will need to have in hand a strong set of proposals for priority action by the Arctic Council by the time of the G-7 meeting, if not earlier. In effect, we are talking about a circumpolar element in the preparations for Denver.

Recommendation 1: for the Circumpolar Ambassador and DFAIT to produce an Arctic Council Action Plan by the end of May 1997 for the use of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in upcoming bilaterals with his Arctic counterparts.

Recommendation 2: for the Action Plan to consist of scoping, knowledge-gathering, and priority-setting by Arctic Council working groups to be set up on some or all of the following themes, the results to be reviewed at the 1998 Ministerial meeting when the Council's sustainable development programme is formally to be launched.

*Focus on the Children of the Arctic in launching the Council's sustainable development programme.* Sustainable development, the agreed priority concern of the Arctic Council in close conjunction with environmental protection, is sufficiently amorphous and contradictory to yield



an unmanageable profusion of proposals for understanding and action. We badly need a way of getting to the heart of the problem that imparts clear meaning and symbolic appeal to the Council's work. Since sustainable development is widely understood to mean decision-making today that takes full account of its effects on future generations, the Arctic Council can do no better than to begin by focusing its sustainable development programme on the next generation, the children of the Arctic today.

Environment, resource use, health, education including distance education, culture, communications, employment, human rights, local self-government, community development -- everything we might wish to consider under the heading of sustainable development comes vividly into focus when we address the condition of the Arctic's children and the need to improve their well-being. The same applies to the communities in which they live and to all the things that eat out the heart of communities and the prospects of the child. The status and welfare of children is now an increasingly prominent global theme of Canadian foreign policy and a personal priority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As well, the Nordic countries are heavily committed in this area domestically.

Canada should move boldly to commit the Arctic Council to focus its sustainable development programme on the children of the Arctic. Senator Landon Pearson, the Minister's Advisor on Children's Rights, has been consulted and could be asked to assist in the elaboration of a proposal. If the proposal is accepted by the Minister, Canada should key the forthcoming Whitehorse conference to sustainable development as it relates to the children of the region.

*Role of the Arctic in global climate change.* Madeleine Albright will seek advice from Tim Wirth. If we are to have more than a momentary respite from the lower-level bureaucratic naysaying and reluctance of the United States, the Arctic Council must be made of continuing relevance to Wirth. But Wirth is reported to have little interest in the Arctic as such. His primary concern is with global environmental issues, particularly climate change, biodiversity, and also sustainable development. To interest Wirth more actively in Arctic affairs and the work of the Council, we must make clear to him the Council's potential to assist in the understanding and where possible the mitigation of global environmental threats. The suggestion here is for the Arctic Council to address the role of the region in climate change (methane release from permafrost, effects of ozone depletion on Arctic ocean-atmosphere dynamics, the Odden effect, and so on). It could also be particularly valuable for the Council to sponsor an investigation of possible interconnections between climate change and the role of the Arctic as a sink for pollutants: findings here could readily be used to bolster the case for global action to abate the long-range transport of pollutants into the region.

On its own merits, therefore, and in order to sustain U.S. interest in the Arctic Council at the political level, Canada needs to make the case for a climate change priority in the Council's work. Equally important, when the case is ready, not only should the Minister invite the U.S. to lead a working group, but the argument should be brought to Wirth's personal attention through the use of intermediaries such as Maurice Strong. E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus for Environment Canada, could provide invaluable assistance to those in DFAIT charged with putting the case together.



*Arctic marine transportation.* This is an up and coming issue as the Russian Federation moves to exploit its Arctic offshore oil and natural gas reserves and is faced with continued deterioration of its pipeline system. Norway, Russia, and also Japan have financed a multi-million dollar programme of research into the intensified use of the Northern Sea Route for bulk transportation between Europe and Asia, and from the Russian Arctic to western markets. Chernomyrdin has expressed interest in the Arctic Council as a forum for international cooperation and support of new ventures in this area. For its part, the Greenland HRG has granted offshore oil exploration permits in concessions west of Nuuk and in Jamison Land and adjacent waters, all with an eye to eventual transportation by marine mode. Economics and politics may also conspire one day to open the way for U.S. offshore oil shipments westwards from the Beaufort Sea. Meanwhile, PAME is actively concerned with Arctic shipping developments, and Transport Canada has been leading IMO-sponsored talks on the harmonization of Arctic ship rules with a special regard for environmental protection.

The Arctic Council clearly has a pro-active role to play here. The role is both to ensure that precedents set in the evolution of marine transportation in one or more subregions of the circumpolar North are consistent with the wider requirements of sustainable development at the regional level, and to facilitate the coordination of national assets to assist the Russian Federation in particular as it puts together the necessary infrastructure, environmental and social impact assessment included, for safe bulk transport by marine mode. Norway and Russia could therefore be approached to co-chair an Arctic Council working group on marine transportation. John Karau, who is with Environment Canada and heads the PAME effort, could be of particular assistance as DFAIT starts to flesh out a proposal in this area.

*Abatement of Arctic food contamination.* The Canadian Polar Commission has recently identified human health threats resulting from long-range transport of pollutants as the prime issue in Canada's North. AMAP has progressed to the point where a region-wide assessment of food contamination is within reach. The time is ripe for the Arctic states and permanent participants in the Council to start building a two-pronged long-term abatement strategy. On the one hand, there is the need for coordinated health risk assessment and mitigation on a region-wide basis. Health risks to children in particular could well provide an initial point of departure as for example in regard to genetic damage, birth defects, and behavioural disorders. Secondly, a long-term science and communications strategy will have to be devised to address the problem at source by tracing pollutant origins and raising global awareness of the special vulnerability of the Arctic as a geophysical repository for pollution generated by world-wide practices of unsustainable development.

But before the first step is taken, we need to remind ourselves of the need to consult and to hold forth the prospect of consultation with northern inhabitants even in the initial formulation of a proposal here and in regard to other initiatives being discussed in this report. After all, an abatement strategy for food contamination will require the collection and study of human blood and tissue samples. These are likely to be given freely, but certainly not if the initiative were somehow handed down as a priority from on high by the Eight or, in Canada, by well-intended Ministers.



Denmark/Greenland could be invited to lead an Arctic Council working group on the theme of food contamination. David Stone of DIAND, who is AMAP chair and who has been spoken with very briefly, would be the first person to contact for guidance in the coordination of a Canadian proposal.

*Basic principles of sustainable development in the Arctic.* The Arctic Council is in need of a bridging procedure to help manage the transition from environmental protection to sustainable development as the overall framework for its activity. As matters stand, there is an inclination among attentive NGOs to regard the transition in terms of a move from environmental protection to a priority for development. Further growth of this attitude will not serve the Council well, particularly among opinion-makers in Washington. In addition, among officials around the region sustainable development has been regarded as something of a non-starter in that it connotes considerably more ambitious, expensive, and possibly unworkable commitments than are suggested by environmental protection. In effect, there is a problem not merely of coherence but of faith in the Council's transition to a sustainable development programme. The solution to the problem is not merely to give due regard to environmental protection, but to develop confidence-building principles for collective action in the use of Arctic resources.

Basic principles of sustainable development will have to be tailored to the particular ecological and also the cultural and socio-economic conditions of the circumpolar North. They should be keyed substantively to an ecosystems approach, and procedurally to an understanding that ecosystems are more likely to be respected when resource users closest to the effects of collective action are directly associated with the decisions that give rise to it. Specifically, there is need for an Arctic Council working group to codify and help standardize national experience on the use of (a) renewable and (b) non-renewable resources throughout the region. Basic principles for the regulation of activity in these two fields should contribute greatly to the practice of sustainable development in the Arctic, while also lending strength to collective action within the Arctic Council itself.

Sweden could be invited to lead a working group on basic principles of sustainable development if indeed groups were to be apportioned to all members of the Arctic Council.

*An Arctic communications strategy.* The proposal here is for member states to deploy their existing cultural, scientific, education, and telecommunications assets in order to sustain their Arctic communities, to affirm their common identity as northern countries, and to project a world-wide image of the Arctic as a unique region and global showcase of sustainable development. At the community level, the strategy would aim to develop region-wide interactive networks on matters such as the status of the child, distance education, telemedicine, consolidation and use of traditional ecological knowledge, food contamination, on-site observation and discussion of climate change, special health and social concerns of non-aboriginal northerners, artwork and the dissemination of artistic creations to southern markets, tourism, democratization and local self-government as they applied in the Russian Federation in particular, and so on. Regionally, a communications strategy would seek to enhance shared understandings of the circumpolar North and of sustainable development there among



influentials and others in southern centres of decision in the Arctic countries. Opportunities would be exploited for industrial participation in telecommunications alliances. Indeed, the potential to create an Arctic equivalent of TV-5 could be explored and associated with the Canadian International Information Strategy (CIIS), either as an add-on or as a free-standing circumpolar venture. Globally, a coordinated communications effort would see the Eight project to worldwide audiences an understanding of the Arctic as a singular and creative but vulnerable region with much to offer in the evolution of a world practice of sustainable development.

Where Canada in particular is concerned, collaboration in the Arctic Council on the culture and communication of sustainable development would serve to enrich and enlarge the third pillar of our foreign policy. It would do so by multilateralizing Canadian activity in the field of international cultural, scientific, and educational activity, and by extending third-pillar operations into the realm of sustainable development at the regional and community levels. We would be in a position not only to present Canadian values and Canada's northern identity to others, but over the long haul to assimilate the northern identities of other Arctic countries, Russia foremost, to some of the Canadian way of seeing and doing things.

The Arctic Council is ready-made for multilateral third-pillar interaction among the countries of the region. It should be used for this purpose. Although Canada is especially well endowed to lead in this area, responsibility for a working group on communications could well go to Finland which is now the most wireless country in the world. Robin Higham of DFAIT's International Cultural Relations Bureau, who has been consulted, could assist in the development of a proposal for the Minister in this area. The CIIS project could also be asked to report promptly on the Arctic communications potential of the CIIS strategy.

Whether or not each of the foregoing proposals for substantive activity by the Arctic Council is moved forward by the Minister -- we should take care not to overload the Council with working groups when it will also have to determine the outlines of a sustainable development programme for adoption in the fall of 1998-- there is no shortage of project themes to develop for the Minister's consideration and for discussion with his circumpolar counterparts.

A set of detailed proposals should now be worked out by the Circumpolar Ambassador and the Department in consultation with other federal agencies and, to the extent possible between now and the Denver G-7 meeting, with other interested parties and sources of expertise. Taken together, working group themes such as those recommended here should readily be presented by the Minister as a means of advancing the sustainable development agenda of the Arctic Council. If asked to state which are the most promising and pressing, in my opinion it would be (a) *climate change* so as to address the particular preferences of the United States, (b) *children of the Arctic* to launch a regional programme of sustainable development, and (c) *communications strategy* to help knit it all together and project the Arctic interest outwards.

To turn now to a longer-term perspective, the Standing Committee's draft report on Canada and the circumpolar world is replete with recommendations that bear on the Arctic Council and Canada's performance within it. The report should give a strong uplift to the Canadian effort to make the most of the Council. Two matters of particular importance have not



however been addressed by the Standing Committee. The first concerns the resources required to make a success of the Arctic Council in the long haul.

The AEPS has been based on the coordination and redeployment of existing national assets. With very few exceptions, it has not seen the injection of new money. The March 1997 meeting of senior Arctic officials has confirmed what most expected for the Arctic Council: that there will be no new money for it either, notwithstanding the commitment of the Eight to broach the more challenging and potentially costly agenda of sustainable development. The projects proposed here for Arctic Council working groups should not entail any early requirement for significant new resources. Piggy-backing and recombination of available assets should do the job. But new resources including new money will have to be found if the Council is to move beyond study and standardization to action and especially pro-action on sustainable development. Now is the time to start strengthening the Arctic Council's capacity for action.

Even if the Eight were to become more liberal in the provision of resources as the affairs of the Council acquired greater standing at the political level in some or all of the circumpolar countries, there is sure to be a continuing gap between the ends and the means of sustainable development in the Arctic. To help narrow the gap over time, the EU and non-Arctic states such as China, Germany, and Japan could now start to be drawn into the work of the Council. Already the EU and within it Germany has a growing presence in the network of regional institutions, most notably in the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional Council. Japan has interests in Arctic marine transportation, and could well be associated with the work of the Arctic Council in this and other areas. China, which has extensive permafrost in its northern regions, is already a participant in the International Arctic Science Committee. It is also looking ahead to superpower status in the coming century.

In each of these instances there is an opportunity for Canada not merely to build a circumpolar dimension into its bilateral relations, but to help bring new resources to the Council in due course by starting now to encourage significant extra-regional actors to join in the work of sustainable development in the Arctic. There are difficulties here that extend well beyond a reluctance within the Eight to admit others into the affairs of what some still regard as a private preserve. Above all, there is the potential for non-Arctic actors with highly focused objectives not only to skew the priorities of circumpolar institutions, but to accentuate the development side of the sustainable development equation. Nevertheless, the Arctic is not and cannot be regarded as a region apart. On the contrary, it is linked in countless ways with its extra-regional and global surround. And its problems will not properly be addressed without reference to the surrounding environment.

The privileged status of the Arctic states and permanent participants in the Council's structure, combined with an informal and possibly an explicit understanding of basic principles of sustainable development in the region, will serve to ensure the prevalence of a circumpolar perspective that is attuned to the particular ecological, cultural, and socio-economic conditions of the Arctic. Accordingly, for Canada to offer leadership to the Arctic Council in associating non-Arctic actors with the institution would be not only to generate downstream resources for



collective action on sustainable development, but to integrate the handling of Arctic issues into the wider world which so heavily affects the physical and human processes of the region.

Recommendation 3: for Canada to provide leadership in associating interested and capable non-Arctic states and the European Union with the sustainable development programme of the Arctic Council.

Just as the Minister finds it necessary to act on the political level to advance the Arctic Council's agenda, within Canada there is also a need for more active political involvement in circumpolar affairs if Canada's participation in the Arctic Council is to match its potential to make a contribution. As matters stand, the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the Interdepartmental Committee on Circumpolar Affairs are Canada's prime means for priority-setting on Arctic international matters. Both are in need of support, particularly but by no means solely from DFAIT where, as is the case with the U.S. State Department, the Arctic is generally viewed as "remote for many" (Russell 1996: 8). The Standing Committee's report comes as a breath of fresh air in its offering of many new and useful recommendations for increased participation and activation in Canadian policy-making for Arctic international relations. Granted the resources required to act on the Standing Committee's suggestions, it could nevertheless take considerable time to put them into effect. All the while, we may expect a continued deficit of substance and backing in Canada's participation in the Arctic Council. After all, the Minister can provide political energy and a sense of direction only so many times. A greater measure of boost and substance can however be had fairly simply and inexpensively by practising in the Interdepartmental Committee on Circumpolar Affairs what we preach for the Arctic Council.

Canada's vision for the Arctic Council has been utterly consistent in its commitment to the empowerment of northern residents, first and foremost the aboriginal peoples of the region. Stirred by the belief that collective action in an Arctic setting may be made more sustainable if those closest to and most knowledgeable of the scene are enabled to take part in the framing and resolution of Arctic issues, Canada has persisted in championing the role of permanent participants in the Council's work. Indeed, it is difficult to image a worthwhile Arctic Council without international aboriginal participation. We would be left with yet another forum for inter-governmental cooperation, but this time for cooperation among southern-based governments for whom the Arctic broadly remains a remote concern and whose activities there are all too likely to be ill-adapted in the absence of strong northern input.

If this is what we hold to be true for international policy-making on Arctic issues, it is also true for equivalent Arctic-related activity within Canada. The implications are obvious for the Interdepartmental Committee on Circumpolar Affairs, Canada's interagency mechanism for regional policy-making which is only now beginning to move beyond departmental show and tell among less than senior officials.

A political commitment should be made to widen the basis of stakeholder participation in the Interdepartmental Committee's work, renaming the committee in the process. Mirroring Canada's conception of engagement in the Arctic Council, the new institution should become a



forum for direct representation of northern and other relevant Canadian stakeholders in a transparent policy-making process keyed to sustainable development and possibly also to human security. As with the Arctic Council, the new forum would function by means of a consensual process of decision in which federal government agencies alone would state a consensus that had nevertheless been actively informed by the views of those most directly affected. Certain stakeholders would be accorded permanent participant standing in the forum -- the two territorial governments, interested provinces, the Nunavut Implementation Commission, national aboriginal associations such as the ITC, the Assembly of First Nations, the Metis Council, and the Arctic Parliamentarians Committee. Others, including interested environmental NGOs and industrial associations, would take part as observers with rights of intervention. The effect within Canada would be to create a new and potent instrument for sustainable development and human security in the circumpolar Arctic, the Canadian Arctic very much included. Somnolent interdepartmental coordination and active outreach by the Circumpolar Ambassador would be superseded by a live policy process that should energize Canadian participation in circumpolar affairs including those handled by the Arctic Council.

Internationally, the effect of Canadian innovation in Arctic policy-making would be to improve the outlook for sustainable development, and for the Arctic Council itself, by setting a precedent for the adaptation of national conduct to the particular conditions of the circumpolar North. As of now, U.S. officials are using the process of drafting rules of procedure for the Arctic Council to diminish the participation of international aboriginal associations. While there is little that Canada can do about this in a consensual negotiation, it is within our power to counter the effect of U.S. actions now and over the long haul by creating and advertising a circumpolar policy process within Canada that more than substantiates everything we have been urging on the other Arctic states.

Recommendation 4: for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to apply the Arctic Council formula for northern and interested non-northern representation in a new Canadian procedure for the making of policy on circumpolar affairs.

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