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# The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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## Success in Vienna: CFE Treaty Signed



The Canadian delegation to the CFE negotiation with the completed Treaty. Standing, from left to right: Mr. Ian Mundell, Mr. Andrew Rasiulis, Mr. André Ouellette, Col. William Megill, Ms. Yolande Thibault and Mr. John Bryson. Seated: Ambassador David Peel.

On November 19, 1990 in Paris, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed by government leaders representing each member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty. This concluded the first phase of an arms reduction process designed to enhance security and stability in Europe. Although a significant accom-

plishment in itself, the signature of the Treaty marks just the end of the beginning and sets the stage for the negotiation of even further conventional arms control measures in Europe.

The dramatic changes that swept Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-1990 tended to overshadow the CFE negotiation. The bilaterally-negotiated withdrawals of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the rapid move towards a

**Treaty marks end of the beginning.**

united Germany in NATO, may have left some with the impression that CFE had been overtaken by events. Such a view was valid, however, only if one assumed that the unilateral removal of the potential threat to Western Europe posed by Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty forces provided a sufficient guarantee of long-term stability and security.

NATO's leaders had earlier concluded that the only stable alternative to military stand-off was a negotiated, cooperative and verifiable security arrangement in which members of the WTO — particularly the USSR — were actively and intimately involved. The form that

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External Affairs and International Trade Canada

Canada



*M-113 armoured personnel carriers of the Royal 22nd Regiment take part in NATO manoeuvres in southern Germany. This type of equipment is limited under the terms of the CFE Treaty.*

Canadian Forces photo by Sgt. Rick Sanschagrin

this new arrangement might take has been, and remains, the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the past year, however, it became clear that before new frameworks could be fully defined, the old order based on military confrontation between two opposing blocks had to be buried. When fully implemented, the CFE Treaty will achieve that goal.

Anyone who ventures to read the Treaty text will rapidly be immersed in a

framework for the negotiation — the CFE mandate — had lasted 23 months, from February 1987 to January 1989. In addition, the experience of 16 years of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks had bred scepticism about Soviet motives and intentions, as well as doubts that Moscow was capable of taking decisions regarding force parity and verification that were required to secure agreement. Even the most sanguine among western negotiators expected that it would be two or three years before minimum results were forthcoming.

The negotiation was scarcely under way, however, before that assessment demanded revision. The comprehensive proposal tabled by Canada on behalf of NATO members on March 9, 1989 introduced, besides overall and regional limits, two measures aimed primarily at the USSR: a so-called "sufficiency rule" designed to limit the size of the armed forces that any one state could maintain within the area of application; and a ceiling on

forces stationed outside of a state's territory. The goal was to lower the level of confrontation in central Europe by forcing some redeployment of forces to the rear, and by constraining the USSR's ability to mobilize massive quantities of additional forces on its own territory for an attack on the West.

While essential to Western security, these two proposals were viewed as show-stoppers: measures which, on past experience, the Soviet leadership could not easily accept. When these were in fact accepted by the USSR just two months later, the West was provided with the most striking evidence available that CFE was to be a serious negotiation with realistic prospects of an early agreement. Despite this evidence, the call by NATO Heads of Government at the Brussels Summit in May 1989 for the conclusion of a treaty in 1990 appeared overly optimistic.

Events in late 1989 led to a virtual collapse of the WTO and essentially removed the threat of surprise attack from the East. As far as the West was concerned, this fulfilled one key objective of the CFE mandate. At the same time, these developments seriously complicated the negotiation. NATO's opening proposal had been based on the concept of a collective responsibility for collective ceilings and thresholds and, by implication, on the continued existence of two military alliances. It was feared that the effective dissolution of one of the alliances could potentially upset the entire framework of the negotiation. Fortunately, the new governments of Eastern Europe saw their long-term security interests served by continued cooperation with one another and the Soviet Union, at least for the purpose of implementing a treaty.

The CFE Treaty is composed of four elements: limitations and the means of achieving them; an exchange of information; verification; and follow-up. The following is a brief assessment of each element.

### **Limitations**

The Treaty establishes ceilings, both Europe-wide and regional, for five categories of armaments. Overall ceilings per side are: battle tanks — 20,000;

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### ***Treaty fulfils objectives of the CFE mandate.***

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highly complex and detailed document, employing arcane language and a plethora of cross-references. Despite this appearance of impenetrability, the Treaty fulfils the objectives of the CFE mandate.

That the CFE negotiation could be concluded so rapidly was not apparent when it began in March 1989, nor believed possible even in early 1990. After all, negotiations to establish a

artillery – 20,000; armoured combat vehicles – 30,000; combat aircraft – 6,800; and purpose-built combat helicopters – 2,000. NATO will reduce armaments by over 13,000 pieces of equipment and Warsaw Treaty countries by over 36,000 to reach these ceilings. The Treaty's Protocol on Reductions sets out detailed procedures for fulfilling the destruction requirements.

The sufficiency rule (Article VI) is of particular importance to the limitations provisions. It establishes the general principle that no state party should possess more than approximately one-third of the armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, and sets out specific figures for each category of Treaty-limited equipment. That measure, along with regional sub-limits, will seriously constrain the ability of any one state to initiate large-scale offensive action. The concept of national ceilings, although initially avoided by NATO, was introduced in the course of the negotiation as a means of identifying potential violators of collective responsibilities. It represents, along with limited mutual inspections by members of the same groups of states, an important step away from the bloc-to-bloc approach to security.

### **Exchange of Information**

The CFE mandate called for an exchange of information in sufficient detail to allow a meaningful comparison of capabilities and to provide a basis for verification of compliance. Although some would argue that the Treaty does not go far enough, particularly concerning information on Treaty-limited equipment held by paramilitary forces, the exchange will provide the most comprehensive, detailed and — it is expected — reliable read-out of the order of battle of European forces ever obtained. It will also provide a basic road map for verifying compliance.

### **Verification**

Achievements in this area provide detailed procedures for verifying compliance with Treaty obligations, although at present it is not clear how well these procedures will work in practice. For example, some would argue that the numbers of inspections should be

higher. In addition, the challenge inspection measure, while important, could have been strengthened by increasing the amount of territory to which each inspection will be keyed. More importantly, each challenge inspection will be at the expense of a declared site inspection.

Aerial inspections were regarded as being important to the CFE verification regime, but there was insufficient time to conclude negotiations on the modalities for this process. Instead, the issue will be pursued in follow-on negotiations in time for implementation during the residual period (see following articles). Thus it will be possible to corroborate with a reasonable degree of confidence the data provided by an inspected party in the information exchange, and to subsequently make informed judgements concerning Treaty compliance. However, NATO will retain considerable dependence on information derived from sensitive national technical means to detect non-compliance outside declared sites.

### **Follow-up**

As the text makes clear, the CFE Treaty is not the final word on conventional arms control in Europe. The Treaty establishes a Joint Consultative Group to facilitate implementation and, on the basis of consensus, to propose amendments. Furthermore, Article XVIII states that parties to the Treaty shall continue negotiations "with the goal of building on this Treaty" through agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe. The follow-on CFE I(A) negotiation opened in Vienna in November 1990. Some delegations have already indicated measures for pursuit in these talks. Portions of the Treaty were applied provisionally from signature on November 19; the Treaty enters into force when all 22 states indicate that their national ratification procedures have been completed. It is obvious that the CFE Treaty is the beginning rather than the end of a process.

The CFE negotiation was conducted during a period of the most rapid peaceful change Europe has known since the first Congress of Vienna, 175 years ago. Begun in a climate of scepticism and

suspicion as a diplomatic contest between members of NATO and the WTO, the negotiation concluded as a joint effort by 22 countries to secure the best common, collective advantage from the changes that were taking place, and to provide a solid basis for the elaboration of new, pan-European security arrangements.

As Soviet Ambassador Grinevski observed at the November 15, 1990 plenary session: "Unbeknownst even to themselves, negotiators have, over the past few months, turned from being adversaries to being partners in a common cause — the building of a new Europe and of new relationships throughout the world. The CFE Treaty, by overcoming the bloc-to-bloc approach to security in Europe, can be likened to the destruction of a second Berlin wall." ■

## **The CFE Treaty: A Summary**

The CFE Treaty consists of a main text (containing a preamble and 23 articles), eight protocols and two annexes, all of which constitute an integral part of the Treaty. Throughout the text there are references to specific, complementary time frames that will occur in the following sequence once the Treaty comes into force: a 120-day baseline validation period; a 3-year reduction period; a 120-day residual level validation period; and the residual period.

**The Preamble** sets the tone of the document and describes the framework within which negotiations took place as well as the participants' objectives in agreeing to CFE.

**Article I** broadly commits the signatories to carry out the undertakings of the Treaty, in particular with regard to battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters, which collectively are referred to as TLE, or Treaty-limited equipment.

**Article II** provides specific definitions of terms and language used throughout the text, including "area of application,"

the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region (known as the ATTU), within which signatories are obligated to apply Treaty provisions. A "group of states parties" means either the members of NATO or the six remaining states parties, which signed the 1955 Treaty of Warsaw.

**Article III** provides counting rules to enumerate TLE and defines exceptions for identical equipment that is not to be limited (e.g., museum collections, the holdings of paramilitary forces, pieces awaiting disposal following decommissioning).

**Article IV** places ceilings on the total number of TLE that may be held by either group (and, for some types of TLE, maximum sub-ceilings on the numbers held by active units). The limits are:

- Tanks — 20,000 (16,500)
- ACVs — 30,000 (27,300)
- Artillery — 20,000 (17,000)
- Combat aircraft — 6,800
- Attack helicopters — 2,000.

Pieces not held by active units are retained in designated storage sites. Additional sub-ceilings place regional limits on active (and stored) TLE that may be deployed within portions of the ATTU.

**Article V** places additional constraints on the levels of TLE that might be held in a specific component of the ATTU.

**Article VI** establishes a "sufficiency rule," which places a ceiling on the levels of TLE held by any one signatory. In general, no state may have more than an average of one-third of the aggregate holdings of both groups of states parties.

**Article VII** obligates signatories not to exceed the national levels of TLE that are apportioned within each group of states parties and which collectively for each group must not exceed Treaty ceilings. National levels of holdings must be declared at Treaty signature.

**Article VIII** defines procedures and a 3-year time frame for reducing levels of declared TLE holdings to Treaty-imposed ceilings. Procedures include destruction, conversion of limited numbers of pieces to non-military purposes, and use as static displays or ground tar-

gets. (CFE verification provisions permit unlimited inspection quotas to verify TLE reductions.)

**Article IX** permits temporary holding sites for storing decommissioned TLE prior to ultimate disposal.

**Article X** allows states to designate permanent storage sites for holding TLE not with active units, and imposes conditions concerning the temporary removal of such TLE.

**Article XI** imposes a ceiling of 740 on the aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs) held by active units within a group of states parties. All other AVLBs must be retained in permanent storage sites, from which limited temporary removal is permitted under certain conditions.

**Article XII** exempts states from counting the first 1,000 armoured infantry fighting vehicles (a defined type of armoured personnel carrier) held by paramilitary forces. Units in excess of this ceiling will be counted in national holdings subject to numerical limitations.

**Article XIII** obligates states to provide notifications and to exchange information concerning the structure of their conventional armed force and holdings of TLE.

**Article XIV** provides states with the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, inspections to verify the compliance of other parties with numerical limitations on TLE, or to monitor TLE reduction and conversion procedures. Inspection teams may be multinational in character. Following completion of the residual level validation period, aerial inspections will be permitted.

**Article XV** endorses the use of national or multinational technical means to complement the Treaty's verification procedures and obligates states not to use abnormal concealment practices to impede the use of such surveillance techniques.

**Article XVI** establishes a Joint Consultative Group for several purposes, including discussion of compliance or circumvention of the Treaty provisions, resolution of technical questions, consideration of measures designed to im-

prove the Treaty, and consideration of disputes.

**Article XVII** requires states to provide notifications and information in written form.

**Article XVIII** obligates states to continue to negotiate on conventional armed forces in Europe, with the goal of building on this Treaty. States will endeavour to conclude these follow-on negotiations no later than the next CSCE review conference, scheduled to be held in Helsinki in March 1992.

**Articles XIX through XXIII** pertain to administrative details concerning withdrawals from the Treaty, amendments, review conferences, ratification, and entry into force (10 days after the last signatory has indicated its ratification procedures are complete). The Netherlands will serve as the Depositary to give effect as required to administrative procedures.

The following Protocols and Annexes provide explicit guidance, interpretations, procedures, formats, and provisions to implement the Treaty:

- Protocol on Existing Types and Annex
- Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification
- Protocol on Reduction
- Protocol on Helicopter Reclassification
- Protocol on Information Exchange and Annex
- Protocol on Inspection
- Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group
- Protocol on Provisional Application. ■

## Outline of CFE Verification

The verification package established by the CFE Treaty is perhaps the most complex ever negotiated for an arms control agreement. Its extensive provisions will require an extremely high degree of cooperation among all the parties to the Treaty, which only a short

time ago might have been difficult to achieve.

The verification package has five basic components:

- notifications and information exchange (Articles XIII and XVII and the Protocol on Information Exchange);
- ground on-site inspections (Article XIV and the Protocol on Inspections);
- national or multinational technical means (Article XV);
- aerial inspections (Article XIV [6]); and
- the Joint Consultative Group (Article XVI and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group).

### **Notifications and Information Exchange**

It is largely on the basis of the extensive procedures for notifications and exchanges of information that verification will be conducted. In terms of detail, scope of coverage and national security sensitivity, this data exchange is unprecedented. Not all the information exchanged, however, will be subject to explicit verification, particularly by ground inspections.

The information to be exchanged includes data on:

- the structure of each party's land and air forces;
- the overall holdings of conventional armaments limited by the Treaty;
- the location, numbers and types of conventional armaments in service and not in service;
- objects of verification and declared sites; and
- the location of sites from which conventional armaments have been withdrawn.

The foregoing is to be exchanged upon signature of the Treaty, 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force, December 15th of each year following entry into force, and following completion of the 40-month reduction phase.

In addition, parties are to provide information within specific time frames and other parameters concerning:

- changes in organizational structures or force levels;
- entry into and removal from service of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE); and
- entry into and exit from the area of application of conventional armaments.

Inspections, reductions and certifications of armament reclassifications also have their own specific notification requirements.

Information exchanges and notifications are to be carried out through normal diplomatic channels or through the computerized communications network being established among the 34 states of the CSCE as part of the Vienna Document (see article elsewhere in this *Bulletin*). This latter alternative is a significant innovation.

### **Ground Inspections**

The most complex component of the CFE verification package involves the procedures relating to ground on-site inspections. The purpose of inspections as outlined in the Treaty is to verify numerical limitations using the information exchanged among the parties, to monitor the process of reduction, and to monitor the certification of recategorization of certain types of helicopters and aircraft. Reflecting this purpose, there are essentially four kinds of inspections:

- declared site inspections;
- challenge inspections within specified areas;

- reduction inspections; and
- certification inspections.

Of these, the latter two are not limited by quotas. For declared and challenge inspections, a party has "passive" and "active" quotas. A country's passive quota is the maximum number of inspections it must receive, while its active quota is the number of inspections it can conduct. The size of each type of quota will vary during the phases of Treaty implementation.

Parties have the right to inspect any other party, but they cannot conduct more than five inspections of another party belonging to the same alliance. It is the responsibility of each alliance to determine the allocation of the active quotas for each of its members. A party's entitlement to conduct inspections can be transferred to another party within its alliance.

The focus of declared site inspections and quotas is a party's "objects of verification." An object of verification (OOV) is essentially a military formation, such as a brigade or air wing (holding TLE), as well as certain kinds of storage sites. A declared site may include a number of OOVs, each of which is subject to inspection. However, the number of inspections charged against quotas will depend on the number of OOVs inspected, not on how many sites are visited. Common facilities (e.g., training areas) shared by several OOVs can be examined whenever one of these OOVs is inspected. Inspections can be conducted sequentially by the same

## **Symposium Looks at CFE Verification**

The Seventh Annual Ottawa Symposium on Arms Control Verification was held October 3 to 6, 1990 at Montebello, Quebec, on the subject of "Implementation of the CFE Verification Package." Some 40 participants from Canada, the United States and Europe, including civilian and military officials as well as selected academics, addressed the technical, organizational and operational issues associated with CFE verification. CFE aerial inspections and Open Skies, CFE and the CSCE, the estimated costs of a CFE Treaty, and future verification issues were also discussed.

Participants concluded that the work on verification in Europe is far from over. The verification measures adopted for CFE I will require implementation and assessment. Follow-on agreements are likely to produce new requirements and pose new problems for verification. The Symposium was sponsored by EAITC and organized by the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies.

## Some Characteristics of CFE Inspections

	DECLARED SITE INSPECTIONS	CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WITHIN SPECIFIED AREAS	REDUCTION INSPECTIONS (INCLUDING CONVERSION)	CERTIFICATION INSPECTIONS <sup>1</sup>
RIGHT OF REFUSAL?	No <sup>2</sup>	Yes	No	No
QUOTA?	Yes <sup>3</sup>	Yes <sup>4</sup>	No	No
<b>PASSIVE QUOTA DURING:</b>				
<b>A) BASELINE VALIDATION (first 120 days after entry into force)</b>	20% of a party's OOVs	Up to 15% of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
<b>B) REDUCTION (first 3 years after baseline validation)</b>	10% per year of a party's OOVs	Up to 15% per year of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
<b>C) RESIDUAL LEVEL VALIDATION (first 120 days after reduction)</b>	20% of a party's OOVs	Up to 15% of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
<b>D) RESIDUAL (period after residual level validation)</b>	15% per year of a party's OOVs	Up to 23% per year of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
<b>NOTIFICATION</b>	Minimum of 36 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit	Minimum of 36 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit	Minimum of 96 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit	Minimum of 96 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit
<b>DURATION</b>	Maximum of 48 hours at a declared site <sup>5</sup>	Maximum of 24 hours within a specified area <sup>5</sup>	Throughout one or more calendar reporting periods <sup>6</sup>	Two days
<b>GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE</b>	All territory on a site belong to the OOV being inspected, including separately-located areas where TLE belonging to that OOV is located plus territory on the site shared with other OOVs	Maximum of 65 square km, with no straight line between any two points in the area exceeding 16 km	To observe the reduction process, including armaments before reductions and remnants after destruction	To inspect helicopters and aircraft subject to certification

**Acronyms:**

OOV = object of verification  
 ETA = estimated time of arrival  
 TLE = Treaty-limited equipment  
 N/A = not applicable

**Notes:**

1. Certification of recategorized multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft.
2. The inspected party can, however, refuse inspectors access to "sensitive points" and can shroud objects.
3. For quota calculation, the number of OOVs does not include reduction sites or certification sites.
4. Challenge inspections also count against passive declared site inspection quota.
5. The total time an inspection team that is conducting sequential inspections can spend continuously in one country is a maximum of ten days.
6. A "calendar reporting period" is the period, defined in days, during which a planned number of conventional armaments is destroyed or converted.

inspection team, provided it spends no more than ten days within the inspected state.

Challenge inspections do not focus on a declared site or declared OOVs, but are intended to provide a means of checking for unnotified equipment or movements in other areas.

The duration of inspections varies with the type of inspection, as do the requirements for notification and responses. There are also limits on the number of simultaneous inspections a party is obliged to receive, and on the proportion of inspections a party is obliged to receive from any single party.

Inspection teams can be composed of up to nine inspectors. Multinational inspection teams are expressly permitted, though one country must be responsible for leading the team and, in the case of declared site and challenge inspections, the inspection is charged against the quota of one country.

Inspectors must designate in advance whether they will conduct the inspection on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by some combination of these. The inspected state is obliged to provide the helicopters for such inspections within certain specified parameters. Use of the inspecting state's cross-country vehicles is possible.

Only challenge inspections can be refused. Inspectors of declared sites have the right of access to all structures capable of holding TLE, except sensitive points from which they may be barred. However, in such cases there are obligations on the inspected state to demonstrate that the Treaty is not being violated. During their work, inspectors have the right to use a wide variety of their own equipment, including cameras.

At the end of an inspection, an inspection report is prepared by the inspecting team and signed by both the inspection team leader and the escort team leader.

### **NTM/MTM**

The third component of the CFE verification package is the right to use national or multinational technical means (NTM/MTM). These are not defined in the Treaty but generally can

be assumed to include surveillance satellites as well as aircraft, ships and ground-based sensors operating from outside the monitored country's borders. The Treaty also, importantly, obliges parties not to interfere with the use of NTM/MTM for verification nor to use concealment measures that impede such use. These provisions are similar to those in several bilateral agreements between the US and the USSR. What is new and noteworthy, however, is the explicit mention of a party's right to use multinational technical means. While such MTM do not yet exist, several possible multinational systems have been suggested, including Canada's PAXSAT concept.

### **Aerial Inspections**

The fourth pillar of CFE verification — aerial inspections — is not yet in place. However, the Treaty states that each party shall have the right to conduct and be obliged to accept an agreed number of aerial inspections beginning after the completion of the residual level validation period, i.e., approximately 44 months after entry into force of the Treaty. The modalities of such aerial inspections are to be worked out in the follow-on negotiations to the CFE Treaty. Aerial inspections will involve the use of specialized remote sensors (such as aerial photographic systems, radars, etc.) on aircraft that fly within the territorial boundaries of the inspected state, unlike NTM/MTM. The introduction of an aerial component to CFE verification will provide a powerful additional verification method to complement and reinforce other components of the verification package.

### **Joint Consultative Group**

The final, though not least important, component of the CFE verification package consists of the methods for seeking clarification concerning exchanged information, resolving ambiguities relating to compliance, and handling difficulties with regard to implementing the verification provisions. In this regard, the main provision in the Treaty is Article XVI, which establishes the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a body composed of representatives from each party. While the scope of the JCG

is broader than verification, its functions include addressing questions relating to compliance and resolving ambiguities of interpretation concerning how the Treaty is implemented, which would encompass the verification provisions.

### **Alliance Cooperation**

These, then, are the five components of the verification system established by the CFE Treaty. Another essential element exists, however, which is not explicitly referred to in the Treaty itself: the cooperation and coordination procedures established within NATO. The alliance has created a Verification Coordinating Committee together with a small Verification Support Staff to assist in verification by establishing a shared database and procedures to coordinate inspection efforts of the NATO parties, and by providing for other inspection support such as training.

### **Summary and Assessment**

The negotiation of the CFE verification package proved long and arduous, in part because of the detail involved and in part because of the number of parties and their varying political interests. It is a major accomplishment. However, it must be acknowledged that the effectiveness of the package will be subject to considerable attention. At this early stage, the package may best be described as satisfactory, with some significant qualifications.

To begin with, it is disappointing that aerial inspections could not be incorporated into the package at an earlier point in the implementation of the Treaty. This powerful technique would have made a significant contribution to the "layered" approach to verification (involving multiple, complementary methods) that has long been advocated by Canada. Other methods, too, such as entry/exit points, portal/perimeter monitoring and tagging may warrant further consideration as part of the CFE follow-on talks. Their utility may depend on how well the existing CFE verification system operates in practice.

While the situation is still unclear, there is considerable concern that NATO countries may have significantly fewer ground inspections in the USSR than they had anticipated because the

USSR has reported an unexpectedly low number of OOVs. This question of active inspection quotas is particularly important to Canada. Because we have relatively few troops stationed within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, our active quota is expected to be low. Though Canada's quota is not yet finalized and may be augmented by transfers from other NATO members, we are committed to making a significant contribution in this regard. Canada views its participation in CFE verification operations, including inspections, as an important demonstration of our continuing involvement in European security matters.

A significant difficulty for CFE verification may be managing the extensive data deriving from information exchanges and inspections to produce meaningful results. The armaments being monitored will not be stationary and may well be moved around frequently. This is particularly true for aircraft and helicopters. This movement, combined with some potential weaknesses relating to notification thresholds, incomplete monitoring of certain conventional armaments (notably those associated with paramilitary forces), and low inspection quotas, may make monitoring the numbers and locations of TLE difficult. Whether the armaments "accounting system" will work in practice to detect militarily-significant anomalies remains to be seen.

The cost of verifying the CFE Treaty has been a concern to some. Canada, like other parties to the Treaty, wants to ensure that verification will be cost-effective. We recognize that effective verification is not necessarily cheap. At the same time, effective verification does not mean applying every conceivable verification method to the fullest extent possible. Trade-offs between enhanced effectiveness and cost are inevitable. The cost-effectiveness of CFE verification will require regular evaluation by the parties.

Despite the above caveats, it is clear that the CFE verification package sets a historic precedent. Particularly in terms of the level of cooperation required among the 22 parties, the Treaty's verification provisions represent a truly significant accomplishment. ■

## DND Trains CFE Verification Inspectors

In anticipation of the verification provisions included in the CFE Treaty, the Department of National Defence's Directorate of Arms Control Verification Operations (DACVO) developed during 1990 a series of courses designed to train prospective CFE inspectors. This includes an on-site inspector and team leader course, an aerial inspector course, an inspector assistant course, an inspector escort course, and a destruction inspector course.

Priority is placed on the on-site inspection course as the test-bed for inspector training. The aim of this course is to train selected officers to conduct on-site inspections of WTO garrisons, plan a verification inspection and report inspection results. The course includes a detailed study of: the CFE Treaty inspection protocol; recording and reporting procedures; the use of cameras and tape cassettes; identification of WTO equipment, organization, training and garrison layouts; and the planning and conduct of on-site inspections.

The course consists of two phases: a two-week theoretical phase in Ottawa and a one-week practical-exercise phase in Europe.

During the first phase, course participants progressively develop skills and practice procedures in small, local training exercises. The second phase incorporates all aspects of an on-site inspection, with a period of planning and preparation at a staging base, a move to a point of entry, a move to a target site or sites, a site briefing, an inspection of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE), submission of an initial report, a return to the staging base and submission of a draft final report. Canadian Forces Europe units in Germany (at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen) provide the target TLE, site briefing and inspector escorts.

The use of Canadian Forces Europe units in the exercise provides several benefits. The inspected units are exposed to the CFE Treaty and its ramifications, and can exercise the support requirements for receiving inspections. The inspector escorts have an opportunity to practice their duties. In addition, the Canadian TLE data is verified by each course.

As of January 1, 1991, DACVO had conducted two courses, qualifying a total of 25 inspectors. Course participants were drawn mainly from Canadian Forces Europe personnel, but also included National Defence Headquarters staff officers and EAITC officials. Planned courses are expected to provide a nucleus of approximately 50 on-site inspectors for the near future. Additional courses will be designed and conducted based on the training specifications already developed and lessons already learned.



*Verification inspector trainee photographing a tank.*

Canadian Forces photo

## Vienna Document on CSBMs Adopted at Paris Summit

### Package Supersedes Stockholm Document

The Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) reached a milestone in November 1990 with the adoption of a significant package of measures by the 34 participating states at the CSCE Summit in Paris. The package, known as the Vienna Document, came into effect on January 1, 1991. It supersedes the Stockholm Document of September 1986, which provided for the circulation of annual military calendars, prior notification and observation of certain military activities, and on-site inspections.

Some of the measures in the Vienna Document appear for the first time while others augment those found in the Stockholm Document. Divided into ten sections, the Vienna Document includes provisions for: the annual exchange of military information; risk reduction; improved contacts; prior notification of certain military activities; observation of military activities; circulation of annual exercise calendars; constraining provisions; compliance and verification; improved communications; and the establishment of an annual implementation-assessment meeting.

The section on the annual exchange of military information requires participating states to exchange information concerning the military organization, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems of their forces within the CSBM zone (the whole of Europe). This includes information about whether a unit is active or non-active, its normal peacetime location and strength, and numbers of armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, battle tanks, helicopters, etc. The participating states will also exchange information about plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems within the zone, including information concerning the types and total numbers of weapon systems, and whether the equipment will add to or replace existing equipment. In addition, participating states are required to exchange information on their military budgets for the forthcoming fiscal year.

The section on risk reduction establishes a mechanism whereby participating states will consult and cooperate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled militarily-significant activities of their forces outside of normal peacetime locations. Any participating state with concerns about such an activity may transmit a request for an explanation to the state where the activity is taking place. An explanation must be given within 48 hours.

In the interests of improving contacts between countries, the participating states will, as appropriate, promote and facilitate exchanges, visits and contacts between academics, military personnel and military institutions. As well, the Vienna Document requires each participating state with air combat units to invite representatives of other participating states to visit one of its normal peacetime air bases. This will provide the visitors with the opportunity to view activity at the air base, and to gain an impression of the approximate number of air sorties and types of missions being flown. No state will be obliged to arrange more than one visit in any five-year period.

As an enhancement to the Stockholm Document's provisions on compliance and verification, the Vienna Document allows for information provided under the annual information exchange provisions to be subject to evaluation (similar to a mini-inspection). Each participating state is obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every 60 military units (brigades, regiments) stationed in Europe. No participating state is obliged to accept more than 15 visits per calendar year.

The section on communications provides for the establishment of a network of direct communication among the participating states for the transmission of messages relating to agreed CSBMs, such as information exchange and notification of unusual military activities. The network will complement the existing use of diplomatic channels.

The Vienna Document also requires participating states to hold an annual meeting at the Conflict Prevention Centre (established under the CSCE Charter of Paris, described elsewhere in this *Bulletin*), to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs. Discussion will extend to: clarification of questions arising from implementation; operation of agreed measures; and implications arising from the implementation of agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the CSCE. The first implementation-assessment meeting will be held in 1991.

The Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures opened in Vienna on March 9, 1989 and will continue under the present mandate until the next CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, which is scheduled to be held in Helsinki in 1992. Canada expects that the Helsinki meeting will see the adoption of a document that expands the Vienna Document and includes a package of new measures to increase transparency about military organization and predictability about military behaviour, with the purpose of more firmly establishing confidence and stability. The Helsinki meeting should also result in a decision concerning the future of the CSBM negotiations: their mandate should either be extended or revised, possibly to incorporate a broader scope.

Canada actively participated in the successful negotiation of the Vienna Document. Canada's experience in the field of verification enabled us to make a special contribution to the design and implementation of a means to evaluate information exchanged. Similarly, Canada's expertise in telecommunications facilitated the development of the parameters for the communications network that will be used for data and information exchange involving both CSBM and CFE issues. Canada will continue to play an active role in the CSBM negotiations, and in the confidence-building process as a whole. ■

## CSCE Summit Results in Charter of Paris for a New Europe



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (seated at right) with US President George Bush (centre) and US Secretary of State James Baker (left) at the CSCE Summit in Paris.

Bill McCarthy, PMO

From November 19 to 21, 1990, leaders of the 34 participating countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gathered in Paris for a summit meeting to mark the end of the Cold War and inaugurate the new Europe. In addition to providing opportunity for the signing of the CFE Treaty and the Joint Declaration of 22 (see articles elsewhere in this *Bulletin*), the Summit resulted in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which enhances and strengthens the CSCE to meet the challenge of building a cooperative security framework in a dramatically-changing Europe.

The Charter celebrates the merging of two Europes into one that, in the words of French President François Mitterand, shares the same vision of the world. It expresses a sense of solidarity among the CSCE countries and starts the process of putting into place machin-

ery to reflect that solidarity and give it greater substance, so that the end of a bipolar Europe does not bring with it another era of interstate or intrastate conflict.

The Charter has three sections. The first contains a commitment to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy; pledges a new era of friendly relations among the participating states; endorses a substantial new set of confidence- and security-building measures; looks forward to further progress in negotiations on military security; defines the broad lines of future cooperation in order to build a "new European unity"; and concludes with a declaration of support for the UN and for global solidarity.

The second section of the Charter sets out the future course for the CSCE. It defines the arms control and disarmament agenda over the next year and a half; suggests expert meetings to dis-

cuss cooperation in strengthening democratic institutions and protection and promotion of national minorities; and reaffirms commitments regarding the elimination of racial or ethnic hatred (including anti-semitism), the protection of human rights, and cooperation in the cultural, economic and environmental spheres.

The third section deals with the development of the structure of the CSCE process and consists of a list of decisions regarding: regular consultations at the political and senior officials levels; the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, a small secretariat in Prague and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw; work programs regarding other possible institutions (such as a CSCE Assembly); and experts' meetings on minorities (Geneva, June 1991) and democratic institutions (Oslo, November 1991).

The Summit thus met Canadian aims in recommitting CSCE states to the still seminal principles of the Helsinki Final Act and in taking the first steps towards institutionalizing the CSCE. As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney noted in his address at Paris on November 19, the Summit "launches a...structure that stands for liberty and democracy and justice and opportunity."

The Summit also reinforced the transatlantic link, affirming in very clear terms that "the participation of both North American and European states is a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE; it underlies its past achievements and is essential to the future of the CSCE process. An abiding adherence to shared values and our common heritage are the ties which bind us together..."

The CSCE, begun in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, brings together Canada, the United States and all European countries (except Albania) in a cooperative forum to discuss the full range of issues affecting their mutual relations. ■

## CFE and Open Skies

*The CFE Treaty commits parties to negotiate an aerial inspection regime for verification of Treaty measures, which would go into effect at the beginning of the so-called residual phase of implementation, i.e., after the reductions mandated by the Treaty have been completed. The relationship between the proposed CFE aerial inspection regime and Open Skies, as well as the future of Open Skies in light of CFE, are discussed in the following excerpts from a statement made by Ambassador David Peel, head of the Canadian delegation to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in Vienna on December 6, 1990.*

A number of speakers last week noted the complementary nature of Open Skies and aerial inspections. There is indeed a good deal of overlap

and any attempt to elaborate the two regimes must strive to avoid duplication, particularly the sort of duplication that would lead to an excessive burden of overflights within the CFE area of application. In our view, however, the two regimes are qualitatively different. Open Skies is and must remain a confidence-building measure, while aerial inspections should be geared to detecting and identifying armaments and equipment in the context of the CFE Treaty. This implies rather different modalities in our approach to these two undertakings...

The signing of the CFE Treaty has altered the negotiating landscape and increased the attractiveness of an early Open Skies agreement. A solid basis for an agreement has been provided by the work done at the Ottawa and Budapest conferences. More important, however, is the political will to see this exercise brought to early fruition... In this regard, we were encouraged by statements made in this forum last week and also by discussions our Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark, had in Moscow three weeks ago. Although we originally preferred parallel development of Open Skies and aerial inspection regimes, we now see a definite advantage in a sequential approach, with priority being given to Open Skies.

We therefore would welcome the resumption of the Open Skies conference here in February in Vienna, in order to facilitate coordination with our aims in CFE and make full use of resident expertise. We would add only one small condition — a caution rather — which is that delegations come prepared to negotiate seriously with a view to concluding an agreement in a matter of weeks. At the opening of the Ottawa conference, the hope was expressed that an Open Skies treaty might be signed in Budapest on the anniversary of President Bush's proposal. I would like to reiterate that hope, the only difference being that it would be signed on the second, rather than the first anniversary — that is, on May 12, 1991.

*As this Bulletin went to press, negotiators were discussing when and under what conditions to resume the Open Skies negotiations.* ■

## Joint Declaration of 22 Signed

*In Paris on November 19, 1990, the 22 member countries of NATO and the WTO issued the following Joint Declaration.*

1. The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship.
2. They recall their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirm all of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. They stress that all of the ten Helsinki Principles are of primary significance and that, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the other. In that context, they affirm their obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force, and from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of those documents. None of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. They recognize that security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4. They undertake to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence. They will bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines.
5. They reaffirm that every State has the right to be or not to be a party to a treaty of alliance.
6. They note with approval the intensification of political and military contacts among them to promote mutual understanding and confidence. They welcome in this context the positive responses made to recent proposals for new regular diplomatic liaison.
7. They declare their determination to contribute actively to conventional, nuclear and chemical arms control and disarmament agreements which enhance security and stability for all. In particular, they call for the early entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and commit themselves to continue the process of strengthening peace in Europe through conventional arms control within the framework of the CSCE. They welcome the prospect of new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.
8. They welcome the contribution that confidence- and security-building measures have made to lessening tensions and fully support the further development of such measures. They reaffirm the importance of the Open Skies initiative and their determination to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.
9. They pledge to work together with the other CSCE participating States to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can make an even greater contribution to security and stability in Europe. They recognize in particular the need to enhance political consultations among CSCE participants and to develop other CSCE mechanisms. They are convinced that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreement on a substantial new set of CSBMs, together with new patterns of cooperation in the framework of the CSCE, will lead to increased security and thus to enduring peace and stability in Europe.
10. They believe that the preceding points reflect the deep longing of their peoples for close cooperation and mutual understanding and declare that they will work steadily for the further development of their relations in accordance with the present Declaration as well as with the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act.

## UNGA 45 First Committee Holds Productive Session

The 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 45) was held in New York from September to December 1990. As usual, issues related to arms control, disarmament and international security were considered in the First Committee, where national delegations make statements about, debate and then vote on the resolutions introduced. Resolutions passed by the First Committee are forwarded to the UNGA plenary, where they are officially adopted. At UNGA 45, the First Committee recommended for adoption to the plenary over 50 resolutions and four draft decisions.

In keeping with a trend evident during the past several years, the First Committee conducted its work in a business-like manner with a minimum of

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### *Committee shows greater willingness to look at issues lying outside the East-West context.*

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ideological rhetoric. This set the stage for serious and constructive debate on the issues at hand, and contributed to the successful adoption of about half of the resolutions by consensus. Another encouraging development was that of placing several previously perennial resolutions on biennial or triennial cycles. This helps to reduce the number of resolutions under consideration at any one session, thereby allowing more focused discussion and negotiation of the draft resolutions that remain.

The Canadian delegation was also pleased with the fact that the First Committee no longer seems disinclined to deal with issues lying outside the East-West context. There was greater willingness to allow the consideration of regional arms control and disarmament measures, as evidenced by the wide support accorded to Belgian and Pakistani resolutions on regional disarmament, including from states in conflict-prone regions.

Led by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, the Canadian

delegation monitored and participated in the debate on all issues dealt with by the UNGA 45 First Committee. Canada provided leadership on four resolutions in particular.

One of these was the resolution on the subject of verification (see article elsewhere in this *Bulletin*). As a result of all sides demonstrating flexibility, it was possible to reach agreement on a single verification text that the First Committee adopted by consensus. Canada was highly satisfied with this outcome, particularly in light of the fact that there exists a range of views among UN members on this issue, which made seeking consensus a considerable challenge. In a manner consistent with their approach to a number of areas of the First Committee's work, member states demon-

strated a willingness to focus and build on their common views and concerns about a UN role in verification

rather than to dwell on their differences. The resolution that emerged from this process (45/65) requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action on the recommendations of the Group of Experts' study on verification. These include the establishment of a UN consolidated data bank of published material on verification and the organization of exchanges between experts and diplomats on issues related to verification.

Resolution 45/65 also requests the Secretary-General to report back to the General Assembly at its 1992 session on progress made towards the implementation of the recommendations. Canada looks forward to contributing to the consolidated data bank and to assisting the Secretariat, where appropriate, in its endeavour to respond to the other recommendations.

As in the past, Canada introduced to the First Committee a resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This resolution calls for the Conference

on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage in its work, to "pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons." This resolution again received overwhelming support, with 146 votes in favour, one opposed and six abstentions.

The issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) maintained a high profile in the work of the First Committee. The early conclusion of an effective and verifiable CTB treaty being a fundamental Canadian arms control objective, Canada was active as one of the six countries drafting one of the two resolutions adopted on this subject. This resolution (45/51), urges the Conference on Disarmament to continue its substantive work on issues related to a CTB treaty, and was adopted in plenary by a vote of 140 in favour, two opposed and six abstentions.

Each year Canada, jointly with Poland, sponsors a resolution on the subject of a convention to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. At the 1990 session of the First Committee, Poland assumed the lead on this initiative. Canada worked intensively with the Polish delegation and others in an effort to achieve a text that would attract unanimous support. This goal was met, and the resolution adopted strongly urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to resolve outstanding issues and to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

Positive as the trends and atmosphere were at the UNGA 45 First Committee, Canada is convinced that this forum has the potential to play an even more productive role in contributing to global and regional disarmament. The First Committee is unique as a disarmament and international security forum in that its membership is nearly universal. In Canada's view, the First Committee must seek to intensify further its efforts to fulfil its potential in encouraging disarmament and fostering international peace and security. ■

## UN Verification Study Completed

The year 1990 saw the conclusion of a UN study in which Canada played a key role. On December 7, 1988, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 43/81B, which authorized the creation of a Group of Governmental Experts to "undertake a study on the role of the UN in verification." Specifically, the Group was to:

- identify and review existing UN activities in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements;
- assess the need for improvements in existing activities as well as explore and identify possible additional activities, taking into account organizational, technical, operational, legal and financial aspects; and
- provide specific recommendations for future UN action in this context.

Canada was instrumental in the adoption of the resolution and, as a reflection of Canada's high international profile on verification issues, the Group chose Mr. Fred Bild — then Assistant Deputy Minister of the Political and International Security Branch of EAITC — to be its Chairperson.

The Group's 20 members, who acted in their own capacities rather than as representatives of their respective governments, undertook a thorough examination of verification issues. The resulting study is arguably the most comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the UN's involvement in verification — and of multilateral verification in general — in existence. Over the coming years, the chapters exploring the underlying generic, conceptual and technical aspects of verification may well prove to be the most useful of the entire exercise, as the absence of an agreed survey of this material has long contributed to misunderstandings of the terms and concepts involved.

The section of the study most likely to generate immediate interest is the final one, which contains the Group's recommendations. These were the subject of intense discussion among the experts — discussion that reflected essentially two different conceptions of the most

productive future role for the UN in verification.

According to one view, the UN's primary importance in verification lies in its ability to disseminate information and to act as an equalizer of opportunities. All experts agreed that the UN could and should play a useful role in activities designed to promote this end, such as compiling and maintaining an up-to-date verification database and sponsoring a series of practical workshops on verification intended to bring together diplomats, technicians and academics.

According to another view, the UN could more valuably involve itself in actual verification activities through the creation of a standing verification agency. On this point, there was wide disagreement. Some were of the opinion that a standing UN verification agency should be created immediately. Such an agency, they argued, would provide a ready-made mechanism for the verification of future arms control and disarmament treaties. Others took the opposite view. They reasoned that the UN could not create an agency, and endow it with sufficient technical and personnel resources to verify potential arms control and disarmament agreements, in the absence of a treaty-related mandate for such services. Quite apart from the considerable costs involved, it was suggested that the question of what the agency would do in the absence of a specific need for its expertise could not be adequately answered.

In the end, the Group agreed to differ on this question. Their extensive discussions on the subject are fully reflected in the study. The Group did agree that an immediate, hands-on verification role with respect to certain arms control and disarmament agreements does exist for the UN, in terms of the Secretary-General's "fact-finding" powers. The Group recommended that these powers be strengthened.

The Group's study was forwarded to the Secretary-General on July 13, 1990. The Secretary-General, in turn, forwarded the study to the General Assembly for consideration in the First Committee. Canada, acting with its traditional partners (France and the Netherlands), drafted a resolution welcoming the study and calling upon the UN Secretariat to implement its recommendations. The resolution was adopted by consensus.

Now that the study has been officially welcomed by the General Assembly, the task of implementing its recommendations can begin. Although the main responsibility for action rests with the UN Secretariat, the Group recognized that individual member states could render invaluable assistance. Canada has already pledged to cooperate with the Secretariat in this regard. For example, the considerable research holdings of EAITC's Verification Research Unit will be made available to the Secretariat as it strives to establish the data bank called for in the recommendations. Canada will be examining other ways in which it can assist the Secretariat in the months ahead. ■



*The UN Group of Experts on Verification at a workshop in Canada in July 1989.*

# Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 45

## Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
45/8 (Costa Rica)	Tenth Anniversary of the University for Peace	Consensus
45/14 (Mongolia)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace	Consensus
45/48 (Mexico)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco	141-0-3
45/51 (Australia)*	Urgent need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	140-2-6
45/52 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
45/53 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	114-3-28
45/54 (Bulgaria/Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	145-0-3
45/55A (Egypt)*	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	149-0-1
45/55B (Argentina)	Confidence-building measures in outer space	149-0-1
45/56A (Sierra Leone)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	145-0-4
45/57A (Poland/Canada)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57B (Austria)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57C (Australia)*	Chemical and biological weapons: measures to uphold authority of Geneva Protocol	Consensus
45/58A (Yugoslavia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
45/58C (China)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consensus
45/58E (Sweden)	Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons	Consensus
45/58F (Germany)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
45/58G (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58H (UK)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	99-0-50
45/58I (France)*	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
45/58J (Hungary)	Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities	141-1-11
45/58K (Sierra Leone)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	144-0-9
45/58L (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	146-1-6
45/58M (Belgium)*	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
45/58O (USSR)	Defensive security concepts and policies	148-0-5
45/58P (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	142-0-10
45/59A (Nigeria)	UN disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services program	Consensus
45/59C (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
45/59E (Brazil)	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
45/61 (Germany)*	Science and technology for disarmament	Consensus
45/62A (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus

\* Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

45/62B (Indonesia)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
45/62F (Germany)*	Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Consensus
45/62G (Sri Lanka)	Tenth anniversary of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research	Consensus
45/64 (Sweden)	Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consensus
45/65 (Canada)*	Study on the role of the UN in the field of verification	Consensus
45/66 (Egypt)*	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	Consensus
45/79 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus
45/81 (Poland)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	Consensus

### **Resolutions Opposed by Canada**

<b>RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead Sponsor)</b>	<b>RESOLUTION</b>	<b>VOTE Yes-No-Abstain</b>
45/59B (India)	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	125-17-10
45/59D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	126-14-12
45/62C (Yugoslavia)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war	132-12-9

### **Resolutions on which Canada Abstained**

<b>RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead Sponsor)</b>	<b>RESOLUTION</b>	<b>VOTE Yes-No-Abstain</b>
45/49 (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-17
45/50 (Mexico)	Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference	116-2-28
45/56B (Sierra Leone)	Nuclear Capability of South Africa	118-4-27
45/58B (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	131-0-22
45/58N (Sweden)	Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment	138-3-12
45/60 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	133-3-16
45/62D (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	128-8-16
45/62E (Mexico)	Comprehensive program of disarmament	123-6-22
45/63 (Jordan)	Israeli nuclear armament	98-2-50
45/77 (Yugoslavia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	128-4-17
45/80 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	123-1-29

### **Draft Decisions**

*In addition to the above resolutions, there were four draft decisions adopted by the First Committee. These were all supported by Canada and dealt with the following subjects:*

- International arms transfers (Colombia)
- Naval armaments and disarmament (Sweden)
- Conventional disarmament on a regional scale (Peru)
- Information on arms control and disarmament agreements (UK)\*

\* Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

## Canadian Statement to First Committee

The following is the text of the statement made by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the First Committee at United Nations Headquarters in New York on October 16, 1990.

We gather at a time of great hope and unprecedented expectations. The Cold War is over. The disarmament process between the superpowers and in the broader East-West context is unfolding at a pace that none of us could have imagined only a few short years ago. States that for decades viewed each other with mistrust and suspicion are now engaged in constructive dialogue and negotiations aimed at mutually beneficial cooperation and enhanced security for all at drastically lower levels of armament.

There is, I believe, a momentum in place that, with the continued commitment of all parties, can enable us to build on the results of ongoing negotiations to produce further important milestones on the road to disarmament, and to firmly establish the spirit of trust and cooperation among the states concerned.

Unfortunately, however, there remain difficulties and situations that impede our quest for a world whose citizens may feel secure from the threat of ruinous armed conflict. Particularly alarming is the recent and brutal Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, a sovereign member of the United Nations. In addition to the tragic consequences of the invasion itself, this blatant disregard for the most fundamental norms of international relations seriously undermines any efforts to reverse the destructive build-up of arms and achieve a just and lasting peace in that troubled region of our planet.

There are other disturbing trends that contrast with the positive developments in the East-West context. Canada is particularly alarmed at the unabated proliferation of modern weapons and their delivery systems. The introduction of chemical, biological, nuclear and ever-more sophisticated conventional weapons into regions, particular those characterized by chronic political ten-

sion, can only exacerbate regional arm races and, ultimately, threaten the future of the people whose interests they were intended to protect. In Canada's view, states in all regions where tensions persist must focus their efforts on negotiating resolutions to their differences and on seeking ways of building mutual confidence. Such a course of action offers prospects of genuine security for the peoples concerned. The acquisition of new and sophisticated weapons, on the other hand, offers only a costly arms race and increases the risk of death and destruction.

In this regard, in his statement to the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 26th last, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, underscored the importance of the parties to the conventional force reduction talks in Europe taking steps to ensure that weapons affected by that agreement not end up as contributions to potential conflicts elsewhere in the world.

In Canada's view, if this Committee is to fulfil its unique and irreplaceable role, it must, in the coming weeks, take into full account the realities, both positive and negative, to which I have referred. More specifically, my delegation would expect our deliberations to appropriately recognize the important progress that is currently taking place in the fields of arms control and of disarmament. But given that much remains to be done, we should also encourage the states concerned to redouble their efforts towards the early conclusion of even more dramatic measures. Equally, we should seek to stimulate considera-



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (centre) with Mr. Jai Pratap Rana, Chairman of the First Committee (left) and Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Secretary of the First Committee (right) at UNGA 45.

tion of arms control and disarmament measures in areas where substantial progress has yet to be made.

I wish to briefly elaborate on Canada's perspective regarding some recent developments in arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Canada commends the perseverance demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in negotiating a START treaty that will substantially reduce their arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons. The forthcoming signing and implementation of this treaty will represent a significant achievement in the process towards nuclear disarmament. Canada welcomes the commitment of both sides to follow up the START I treaty with negotiations on a START II treaty that would further cut the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.

On nuclear testing, Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties and that these two agreements will soon be ratified. While this step, in the eyes of many, was overdue, we believe that it represents an important basis upon which further restrictions on nuclear testing can be negotiated. In his

plenary statement, my country's Secretary of State for External Affairs welcomed the joint American and Soviet commitment to a step-by-step approach to further restrictions on nuclear testing. He then went on to state Canada's belief that "that commitment should be followed up immediately..."

Another positive development on this subject was the re-establishment — after a long hiatus — of an ad hoc committee on nuclear testing at this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament. This committee has initiated substantive consideration of issues related to a CTBT. The upcoming Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference will provide an additional opportunity for parties to exchange views on all aspects related to this fundamental issue. It is Canada's hope that it will also provide fresh impetus to the CD's consideration of nuclear testing.

Parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty recently held their Fourth Review Conference in Geneva. As a staunch supporter of that Treaty, which we regard as a vital security instrument for the entire international community, Canada played an active role in the review and was very satisfied with progress that was achieved, particularly in the areas of full-scope safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Despite a rigorous review of, and much agreement on, the disarmament aspects of the Treaty, Canada greatly regrets that no overall consensus was possible on Article VI-related questions because of differences of view over the nuclear testing issue and its relationship to the future of the NPT. In this regard, I would like to reiterate the deep concern expressed by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs at the tendency of some states parties to threaten the continued existence of the NPT by seeking to make its extension conditional on the achievement of a CTBT. In his words, "it is Canada's firm view that both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage one to the other."

Turning now to conventional weapons and forces, another landmark

achievement that will become reality in the very near future is the agreement to drastically reduce the current levels of conventional forces in Europe. As an active participant in the CFE negotiation, Canada takes great satisfaction in the highly positive outcome of this process. We look forward to future stages of these negotiations to consider even further reductions of conventional forces and an eventual CFE II agreement. The CFE process complements continued observation of the terms of the Stockholm Document. It will benefit further from the implementation of the next set of confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed in the ongoing CSBM negotiations in Vienna.

The Helsinki process, which has provided the impetus for so much good work in the area of cooperative security, as well as human rights, will take a historic step forward when the leaders of Europe, Canada and the United States meet next month in Paris to declare the end of the Cold War and to celebrate the beginning of a new era of cooperation among the 34 countries of the CSCE. With its unique transatlantic and pan-European membership, Canada believes the CSCE can make a major contribution to the new European architecture. Thus, we would like to see the Summit begin the institutionalization of the CSCE by, inter alia, establishing a secretariat, regularizing political consultations and by providing CSCE participating states with a Centre for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict. Such a Centre could support the implementation of agreed CSBMs and play

a key role in using other mechanisms — political, legal and technical — in the prevention and resolution of conflict.

Canada believes that other regions of the world characterized by high levels of armament or by tension would likewise benefit from the negotiation and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. In this regard, we note the important role that the UN may play, as exemplified by the recent Kathmandu meeting on "The

Security-Enhancing Role of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures."

In the area of chemical weapons, efforts have been intense over the last year towards overcoming differences in order to conclude a treaty on a world-wide ban. The bilateral US-USSR agreement on chemical weapons destruction, signed in June, represents an important achievement that gives us all encouragement that verifiable disarmament in the area of chemical weapons is possible and, indeed, about to begin on a bilateral level. Nevertheless, we have a long way to go towards the global elimination of chemical weapons. Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament this year confronted challenging problems that must be overcome. While not diminishing the complexity of the outstanding differences, Canada is convinced that a determined effort by all states involved in the negotiations both can and must succeed in concluding — at the earliest possible date — a treaty acceptable to all sides.

Canada looks forward to actively participating in consideration of the full range of items on the agenda of this Committee. I wish to comment briefly on four items of particular interest to my delegation.

Verification is an area where Canada has a long tradition of both expertise and leadership in the multilateral context. We were therefore delighted that a Canadian, Mr. Fred Bild, was selected

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### *Regions outside Europe could benefit from the negotiation and implementation of CSBMs.*

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to chair the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts' study on the Role of the United Nations in Verification. On behalf of Mr. Bild, I will introduce the final report of that Group later this week.

In Canada's view, the study provided an excellent opportunity to exchange views on a number of proposals concerning how the United Nations might make a contribution to the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

## The Canadian Position at the PTBT Amendment Conference

This *Bulletin* went to press just as states parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) were gathering at United Nations headquarters in New York to consider an amendment to convert the PTBT into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). Canada was represented at the Amendment Conference — which was scheduled to last from January 7 to 18 — by a delegation headed by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament.

The next issue of the *Bulletin* will feature a full report on the PTBT Amendment Conference. In the meantime, we offer the following summary of the Canadian position as the Conference began.

Canada initially opposed the convening of the Amendment Conference because it did not regard this procedure as an appropriate or realistic way to achieve a CTBT, which remains a fundamental Canadian arms control objective. Nonetheless, after the required number of states parties to the PTBT requested the convening of the Conference (according to the terms of the PTBT, a conference must be held if requested by one-third of the parties), Canada announced that it would attend and participate constructively.

The Canadian delegation goes to the Amendment Conference optimistic that the Conference has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to ongoing efforts towards the conclusion of a CTBT that could attract universal adherence. Canada looks forward to participating in a thorough exchange of views among PTBT parties regarding their different perspectives on this important issue. A focused debate on issues related to a CTBT could help define where areas of agreement exist and identify where differences remain to be overcome.

Canada believes that the Amendment Conference also offers an opportunity for detailed consideration of the verification regime that would be necessary for any CTBT to be effective. Having considerable expertise in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, Canada welcomes the opportunity to participate in discussions on verification issues. The Canadian delegation includes an expert on seismic verification and Canada hopes to circulate at the Conference a document outlining the Canadian experience in research applicable to CTBT verification.

Canada will work for a Conference outcome that contributes to the ultimate achievement of the CTBT goal. Such an outcome would entail the Conference giving detailed consideration to all aspects of a CTBT and channelling its findings to the Conference on Disarmament, which is the most appropriate multi-lateral forum to address this issue. Canada believes that a constructive approach to the Amendment Conference by all participants can give significant impetus to the ongoing work of the CD towards the conclusion of a verifiable and effective CTBT.

We were particularly pleased that the Group succeeded in reaching a consensus final report that included a number of specific recommendations for further action. Again, as indicated by the Right Honourable Joe Clark in his plenary statement, Canada plans to introduce a draft resolution on verification into this Committee that would lay the basis for appropriate follow-up action on the consensus recommendations of the Group.

In particular, the resolution will call on the UN to take appropriate action on the recommendations of the Group, including the establishment of a consolidated data bank of verification research material and the promotion of increased dialogue between experts and diplomats on verification issues.

Jointly with Poland, the Canadian delegation will introduce to this Com-

mittee a draft resolution designed to give impetus to the Geneva negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As we are all aware, that negotiation is currently proceeding through a critical stage and we hope to see the General Assembly adopt a strong and unequivocal statement in support of the Conference on Disarmament's early conclusion of a convention by providing, as in previous years, consensus approval of this resolution.

Canada continues to attach importance to the negotiation of a verifiable agreement on the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, at an appropriate stage, in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation will again introduce a draft resolution calling for such a ban.

Another issue that Canada will be following very closely in this Committee's work is that of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. As the conclusion of an effective and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty is a fundamental Canadian arms control objective, my delegation will join others in co-sponsoring a resolution urging steps and recommending measures that would contribute to the early conclusion of a CTBT.

When Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs addressed the 45th UNGA, he spoke of cooperation as the new realism and pragmatism as the only path to progress. The weeks ahead offer us the opportunity to seize the spirit of cooperation and compromise that has allowed parties in other arms control and disarmament fora and in various negotiations to make impressive strides forward.

Canada firmly believes that the First Committee has a unique and vitally important role to play in finding common ground and in providing direction to the international community, in both the global and regional contexts, in our collective efforts to achieve meaningful disarmament and to strengthen the security of all. We look forward to a serious consideration of the agenda at hand with a view to further advancing towards these goals. ■

## Horizontal Proliferation Focus of Consultative Group Meeting in Saskatoon

Members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Saskatoon on October 4, 1990 to discuss a range of arms control and disarmament issues. In addition to Consultative Group members, the consultation included several others from the region who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and the Department of National Defence.

The consultation focused in particular on the theme "Beyond East-West Arms Control: Horizontal Proliferation." Ambassador Mason gave a brief overview of the Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. She outlined the Conference's accomplishments, such as the elaboration of language on full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and on the extension of export controls on nuclear materials to include tritium, and expressed Canada's regret at the lack of a final document. While the Conference's advances can be built on by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the Ambassador observed that non-parties to the NPT are already using the fact of no final document to undermine developments they dislike.

Dr. Ron Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan's Department of Chemistry spoke about the control of chemical and biological weapons. He opened with a discussion of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, noting the inadequacy of the Convention's verification provisions and cautioning that advances in biotechnology make verification of the Convention even more difficult. Turning to chemical weapons, he observed that negotiators are close to reaching a chemical weapons convention, although negotiations are currently in a state of waiting while differences on several "soluble" problems — related mainly to verification — are being worked out. Dr. Sutherland addressed the problem of chemi-

cal weapons proliferation, noting that an estimated 15 to 20 states possess or would like to possess chemical weapons. He argued that while export controls imposed by chemical suppliers can halt proliferation in the short-term, the only real solution to the problem lies in a verifiable, global chemical weapons ban.

Dr. Jim Fergusson of the Program in Strategic Studies at the University of Manitoba gave a critique of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He argued that the MTCR is not likely to be effective in stopping the proliferation of missile technology, since several technology transfers took place before the regime was established and since several key suppliers remain outside the regime. Insofar as the MTCR does make it more difficult for states to acquire missile technology, it is likely to freeze existing regional asymmetries, which may be destabilizing and may push countries towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability to compen-

sate for inaccurate delivery systems. Dr. Fergusson argued that a more responsible approach would be to promote the creation of relative balances in missile capabilities — in other words, to promote systems of stable regional deterrence. He observed that arms control in the East-West context followed, rather than preceded, the acquisition of missile technology and the achievement of relative equality in these systems.

During the subsequent discussion, there was some disagreement with Dr. Fergusson's assessment, although the opinion was also voiced that weapons systems are not necessarily destabilizing and that promotion of regional deterrence may be desirable. Some participants noted that many less-developed countries may start to want to acquire their own sources of intelligence and will try to enter the satellite-launching business for this purpose, which could complicate implementation of the MTCR. The creation of an inter-



At the Consultative Group meeting in Saskatoon, from left to right: Dr. Peter Lockwood, Defence Research Establishment Suffield; Dr. Jim Fergusson, University of Manitoba; Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason; Major-General John Sharpe, Department of National Defence; Dr. Ron Sutherland, University of Saskatchewan.

national intelligence-gathering agency, with a common satellite launch facility, was proposed as a solution. The absence of a "trigger list" was cited as a problem with the MTCR. Canada was encouraged to explore and identify items that might fall within this category (e.g., gyroscopes) and develop controls for them. It was noted that dual-use equipment could pose a problem for the

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### ***Canada encouraged to develop an MTCR "trigger list."***

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MTCR and other supplier regimes in the future and that, to circumvent controls, countries may try to bring military specifications into line with civilian requirements.

There was general agreement that an effective, global chemical weapons convention will be difficult to arrive at. While one participant criticized the Department of National Defence's Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) for its research into protective measures against the effects of chemical weapons, another noted that DRES has taken many positive steps to respond to public concerns about its activities.

Although there was some sentiment that the general problem of horizontal proliferation is best dealt with on a

regional basis by addressing regional security problems, other participants were of the opinion that the problem could better be solved by the West (or North) making greater efforts to reduce its own arsenals, particularly its nuclear arsenals.

Participants spent some time discussing Canada's approach to events in the Persian Gulf. While several were pleased at the coordinated UN response, they also expressed extreme reservations about the military situation in the Gulf, in particular about the danger of use of chemical or nuclear weapons. Many argued strongly that there should be efforts to move towards a diplomatic solution, and encouraged Canada and its allies to think of a "face-saving" way for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. One participant urged Canada to promote the development of UN mechanisms to deal with potential crises before the fact and cited, as examples, Palme Commission proposals for a joint military council, Secretary-General fact-finding missions, and UN intelligence-gathering.

On other topics, the government was encouraged to promote arms transfer transparency and control; to consider the possibility of using aircraft under multinational control for Open Skies

overflights; to pursue the idea of an Arctic Zone of Peace; to establish a UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in this country, which could also serve as headquarters for a Conference on Arctic Security and Cooperation; to insist on a mandate for the CD to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; and to redirect resources from military purposes towards alleviation of poverty and protection of the environment.

Some participants argued that anticipated reductions as a result of START or CFE agreements, although welcome, would be of negligible value given the overall number of weapons in the world. The concern was also expressed that qualitative improvements in weaponry would negate the benefits of any reductions. Several participants called on Canada to inject a sense of urgency into its security policy and to demonstrate greater "vision" in its approach to security questions.

Consultative Group meetings provide occasion for informed debate among people who approach current arms control and disarmament questions from very different perspectives. They also offer government representatives a chance to hear the most persuasive arguments in favour of and against various policy alternatives. Both governmental and non-governmental participants were pleased that the Saskatoon meeting continued this valuable tradition. ■

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## ***Curbing Proliferation: What Canada is Doing***

Recent events in the Persian Gulf have again forcefully drawn the world's attention to the danger that an increasing number of countries may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, as well as vast quantities of conventional arms. The following provides a brief summary of Canadian efforts to discourage the proliferation of various types of weapons.

### ***Chemical Weapons***

Canada has placed a number of chemicals under export controls because of the items' potential use in the production of chemical weapons. In

1985, Canada joined with other Western countries that had taken similar action in the "Australia Group," which now consists of 20 countries. The Australia Group has since expanded its area of concern to the general problem of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. It meets every six months to address this problem and to review the effectiveness of measures taken. Canada has a total of 14 chemicals under export controls and is making a significant contribution to Australia Group activities.

In addition, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Canada has as-

sumed a lead role in the negotiation of a multilateral chemical weapons convention that would ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons on a global basis. Such a convention provides the only effective means of dealing with the threat posed by chemical weapons proliferation.

### ***Biological Weapons***

Canada is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which bans the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons. Canada is one of the few parties to comply

regularly with the undertaking to report annually on research centres and laboratories active in the field.

Canada is currently preparing for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference, scheduled for September 1991, and will work at that Conference to improve the Convention's effectiveness.

### **Nuclear Weapons**

Canada remains one of the strongest supporters of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Canada worked intensively at the Treaty's Fourth Review Conference, held in August-September 1990, to ensure progress in several areas related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear trade and safeguards. Canada regularly makes its views on the importance of joining the NPT known to non-parties and will continue to encourage the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

### **Missile Technology**

Canada participates with 13 other countries in a coordinated policy to control exports that could contribute to the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. This endeavour is called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Canada hosted a meeting of MTCR partners in July 1990 to review the effectiveness of the regime and prepare the way for new adherents.

### **Conventional Weapons**

Canada enforces strict and effective controls on the export of conventional military goods and technology. Multilaterally, Canada is represented on the UN Group of Experts (established under resolution 43/751) that is studying ways and means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers. Because Canada believes that transparency can contribute to the building of confidence, it will be releasing for 1990 and future years an annual report on its exports of military goods. Canada hopes that the current situation in the Persian Gulf will encourage both supplier and recipient nations to re-examine their arms export and import policies, with a view to increased restraint. ■

## **Canada-Netherlands Trial CW Inspection: Exercise ACID BREW**

During the summer of 1990, EAITC and National Defence officials initiated discussions with the Netherlands about conducting trial chemical weapons (CW) and CFE inspections with a view to developing techniques and methods. The parties reached an agreement whereby Canada would host a trial CW inspection at the Canadian Forces Base in Lahr, Germany from November 25 to 28, 1990. Commander Canadian Forces Europe was formally tasked to host the inspection — nicknamed ACID BREW — in mid-October 1990. The protocol for exercise ACID BREW was based on the "rolling text" of the CW convention currently under negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and was designed to: test the challenge inspection procedures; determine whether sensitive information might be divulged during the course of an inspection; and gain experience in the planning, conduct and hosting of challenge inspections.

In addition to CFB Lahr units and personnel, participants included two arbiters (one Canadian and one Dutch), 15 inspectors/inspection assistants (four Canadian and 11 Dutch), one Dutch observer and two German guest observers. The inspection team arrived at Lahr by Dutch aircraft on November 25. Although link-up with the escort team and inspection of equipment was done on arrival, the inspection itself did not begin until the morning of November 26. The inspection ended at 8:30 a.m. on November 28, and was followed by a debriefing, "hot wash-up" and luncheon.

The initial impressions of both parties were that the trial inspection was very successful. The inspection team and observers fulfilled their respective functions and roles professionally and thoroughly. Their detailed knowledge of the inspection protocol, and the manner in which they discharged their duties, made the task of the escort officers challenging and satisfying. The two arbiters provided guidance when required and ensured that all participants remained within their respective roles, thus contributing in large measure to the success of the inspection.

Planning is currently underway for the CFE trial inspection in the Netherlands. Based on the spirit of cooperation developed during exercise ACID BREW, the CFE trial should prove equally beneficial.



*Canadian and Dutch inspectors audit unit data.*

## UNIDIR Expert Group Meeting on Verification Held in Canada



Experts at the Montebello meeting.

The first meeting of a newly-established United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Expert Group on verification was held October 24 to 27, 1990 at Le Château Montebello in Quebec. The meeting was organized by the York Centre for International

and Strategic Studies under the sponsorship of EAIRC's Verification Research Program.

Canada has been a firm supporter of UNIDIR's work since the Institute's inception. This support has taken several forms, including budgetary contributions, the provision of Canadian experts for selected research tasks and the provision of other assistance, as in the holding of meetings.

The Montebello meeting brought together a total of 16 experts from eight countries to discuss a new UNIDIR research project entitled "Verification: Proposals and Prospects in the Context of Current Negotiations on Disarmament and the Limitation of Armaments." The project is a follow-on

to an earlier UNIDIR study, now completed, on "Verification of Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements: Ways, Means and Practices." The purpose of the follow-on project is to assess new problems for and approaches to verification as they appear in current disarmament negotiations and/or discussions. The project will include agreements that are likely to be signed in the near future, such as START. It will not, however, cover arms control and disarmament agreements that have already been signed.

The experts assembled at Montebello defined the issues to be covered by the project, discussed the contents of each submission, and developed a timetable for the Group's work. A second meeting will be held in the USSR in June 1991, with a third meeting to follow in late 1991 or early 1992. The Group's study is scheduled for completion and publication in 1992. ■

## Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1, 1990 - January 1, 1991

### CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Peace Education Centre of British Columbia, Vancouver — 1990 "Youth for Global Awareness Conference"	\$3,000
2. John Guy, University of Calgary — participation in Ninth European Nuclear Disarmament Convention	300
3. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	1,000
4. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa — conference on "The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World"	10,000
5. Centre québécois de relations internationales, Laval University, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — conference on "The Germanies in a New Europe"	5,000
6. Mouvement Option Paix, Hull, Quebec — publication of a special issue of the magazine <i>Option Paix</i>	1,000
7. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — symposium on the environmental consequences of increased nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlya	10,000
8. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — conference on "Canadian-Soviet Arctic Cooperation"	5,000
9. Charles Van Der Donckt, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — research on "The Naval Arms Race in South-East Asia: Regional and Strategic Implications"	5,000
<b>TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS</b>	<b>\$40,300</b>

### GRANTS

1. Stormoway Productions, Inc., Toronto — production of documentary on UN peacekeeping	\$10,000
2. Albert Legault, Laval University, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — research comparing the arms control regimes of outer space and chemical weapons	6,000
3. Alex Morrison, Toronto — study of the verification issue at the United Nations	5,000
4. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva — verification research	25,000
5. United Nations World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund, New York — communications activities	25,000
<b>TOTAL OF GRANTS</b>	<b>\$71,000</b>

**TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS**

**\$111,300** ■

## Focus: On Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament

*Focus is designed primarily for secondary school students. We welcome your comments and suggestions for future topics.*

When people think about arms control and disarmament, they usually think first about nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons known to humankind. They have the capacity to cause widespread death and destruction in a single blow and, if used in large quantity, could threaten life on the planet as a whole. For this reason, nuclear weapons have been the main subject of arms control discussions, negotiations and agreements since 1945, like the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty discussed in the last issue's *Focus*.

However, nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945. All of the wars since that time — over 150 of them — have been fought mainly with another category of weapons, known as conventional weapons. It is hard to say for certain how many people have lost their lives in these wars, but the United Nations estimates the death toll at over 20 million.

A conventional weapon can be defined as any weapon that is not a nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapon. Conventional weapons include the things we usually think of as weapons, such as guns, tanks and fighter aircraft. They can be delivered to their targets from land, sea or air. When people speak of conventional "weapons," they often mean conventional "means of warfare" in the widest sense. Thus, conventional weapons include armed forces, actual weapons and weapon delivery systems, as well as other conventional military equipment and facilities.

The world arsenal of conventional weapons includes approximately 140,000 main battle tanks, some 35,000 combat aircraft and 21,000 helicopters, about 1,000 major surface warships and some 900 attack submarines. Approximately 80 percent of the world's total military expenditure goes towards conventional weapons and armed forces.

Even for the nuclear-weapon states, conventional weapons make up the bulk of military spending.

Conventional weapons have become more destructive since 1945. New types are being produced that use highly sophisticated technologies to help them reach and destroy their targets with greater accuracy and effectiveness. Certain conventional weapons, such as cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, have the potential to cause death and destruction on a scale comparable to that of chemical weapons or a very small nuclear weapon.

The United Nations has considered the question of conventional arms control and disarmament several times since 1945. In 1980, at a UN-sponsored conference, a number of countries agreed on a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. In short form, this is known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The Convention prohibits and restricts the use of especially cruel and inhumane conventional weapons, such as those that leave fragments in the human body that cannot be detected by X-rays, incendiary weapons (e.g., napalm), land mines and booby traps. Over 30 countries are parties to the Convention and its Protocols. Canada is a signatory to the Convention. Until recently, this was the only international conventional arms control agreement in effect.

The world's greatest concentration of conventional weapons is found in Central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) forces face each other directly. Beginning in 1973, the two alliances held negotiations known as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, aimed at reducing and limiting their forces and armaments in Europe. The MBFR talks ended without agreement in February

1989, but immediately after that, in March 1989, the members of NATO and the WTO opened a new set of talks known as the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE for short.

The goals of Canada and its allies in the CFE negotiation were to: establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at considerably lower than existing levels; eliminate any inequalities between forces that made the balance unstable; and eliminate the capability to launch a surprise attack or to begin large-scale offensive action. Helped by the recent improvement in East-West relations, the CFE negotiation progressed very quickly and ended successfully in November 1990 with the signing of a treaty that achieves these goals.

The CFE Treaty sets equal levels in Europe between NATO states and members of the WTO for those weapons that are most suitable for surprise attack and offensive action.

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***All wars since 1945 have been fought mainly with conventional weapons. The CFE Treaty makes a start in reducing such weapons.***

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These include tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. In addition, the Treaty limits the amounts of these weapons that can be held by any one country. The Treaty also has strong provisions for checking to make sure that countries live up to their obligations. Any equipment above and beyond that allowed in the Treaty must be destroyed or irreversibly converted to civilian use, so there is no chance that it will be sent to countries in other parts of the world. Other articles in this *Bulletin* describe the CFE Treaty in more detail.

Canada helped to negotiate the CFE Treaty and will play a role in verifying that its provisions are carried out. However, since the Treaty does not apply to North America, and since Canada's



*A Leopard main battle tank rolls through a West German farm village during a NATO exercise. It is from the Royal Canadian Dragoons based at CFB Lahr. Tanks are among the weapons controlled by the CFE Treaty.*

Canadian Forces photo by Sgt. Margaret Reid

military presence in Europe is relatively small, the Treaty is not expected to have a significant effect on the size of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The CFE Treaty will result in the large-scale reduction of conventional forces in Europe, primarily on the WTO side. Once the Treaty is fully put into effect, the chances of a conventional war in Europe will be much less than they have been. Since the signing of the CFE Treaty, the 22 members of NATO and the WTO have opened another set of negotiations aimed at further reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Although disarmament progress is being made in Europe, other regions of the world, such as the Middle East and South Asia, remain heavily armed. Canada hopes that now that East and West are beginning to reduce their conventional forces, countries in other areas will start to consider how they too might reduce such weapons to levels that provide greater security and less risk of war. Canada is looking at ways in which it might assist this process. ■

## Forecast

*A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through May 1991.*

**Ongoing:** CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

**Ongoing:** CFE I(A) Negotiation, Vienna

**January 7-18:** PTBT Amendment Conference, New York

**January 22 - March 29:** CD in session, Geneva

**January 29 - February 1:** Canada-Netherlands trial CFE inspection in the Netherlands

**April:** Preparatory Committee meeting for the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (to be held in September), New York

**April-May:** UN Disarmament Commission, New York

**May 14 - June 28:** CD in session, Geneva ■

## Acronyms

- ACV — armoured combat vehicle
- ATTU — Atlantic-to-the Urals region
- AVLB — armoured vehicle launched bridge
- CD — Conference on Disarmament
- CFB — Canadian Forces Base
- CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- CSBM — confidence- and security-building measure
- CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
- CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)
- CW — chemical weapons
- DACVO — Directorate of Arms Control Verification
- DRES — Defence Research Establishment Suffield
- EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
- JCG — Joint Consultative Group
- MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (talks)
- MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
- NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- NTM/MTM — national/multinational technical means
- OOV — object of verification
- PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
- START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
- TLE — Treaty-limited equipment
- UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
- WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization ■

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