




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


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**OBSERVATIONS**

ON THE

**IMPORTANCE**

OF THE

**NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES**

TO

**GREAT BRITAIN.**

BY

**AN OLD INHABITANT**

**OF BRITISH AMERICA.**

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**LONDON:**

**JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.**

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**MDCCCXXXI.**

LONDON:  
Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES,  
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## OBSERVATIONS,

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THE following observations were printed at Halifax, in Nova Scotia, in the end of the year 1825, and a few copies of the pamphlet containing them were circulated among the writer's friends and acquaintances there and in England; but, although some extracts from it appeared in the Quarterly Review for April, 1826, the pamphlet itself was never submitted to the public, as the writer had not the vanity to suppose that he could excite sufficient interest to induce any to read it, who had not previously turned their attention to colonial subjects.

But in revisiting this country, after an absence of thirty-two years, he finds that opinions which, in the year 1825, were merely hazarded by anonymous writers, are now promulgated from very different quarters.

He has seen a proposal to relinquish our dominion over our North-American colonies, and to erect them into an independent *monarchy*, gravely submitted to the public through the medium of a letter addressed



by Sir Alexander Malet, Bart., to Lord Viscount Howick, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The grounds of this proposal are, 'That the possession of the Canadas' (by which name Sir Alexander Malet designates the whole of British North America) 'is onerous to Great Britain;' and 'that the 'domination of England is unpopular and unsuited 'to these colonies' (p. 11); and the proposal is addressed to Lord Howick, because Sir Alexander 'imagines that on the main question of the eventual 'retention by Great Britain, or abandonment of these 'Colonies, his sentiments are in unison with those 'which have been expressed by his lordship.' (p. 10.)

He has also read in a work on Financial Reform, which comes before the public with the recommendation of the name of Sir Henry Parnell as its author, that the public derives no commercial advantages from the Colonies, which it might not have without them (p. 246); and that, with respect to our North-American possessions, 'No case can be 'made out to show that we should not have every 'commercial advantage we are supposed now to 'have, if they were erected into an independent 'state.' That 'neither our manufactures, foreign 'commerce, nor *shipping* would be injured by such 'a measure.' (p. 250.)

These views of the subject have already made so great an impression upon the minds of many per-

sons, that it has become a subject of frequent discussion whether the Colonies are a burthen or a benefit to the mother country. It may therefore be presumed, that the public attention is now sufficiently directed to them, to enable even an humble advocate to obtain a hearing on their behalf.

In considering the positions which have been advanced by Sir Alexander Malet and Sir Henry Parnell, it should be noticed that they are very distinct. Sir Alexander asserts, ' That Great Britain ' is no gainer by its commercial intercourse with the ' Canadas.' (p. 13.) Sir Henry contends that we should have every commercial advantage we are supposed now to have, if they were made an independent state. (p. 250.)

If either or both of these positions were true, it would not follow, as a mere matter of course, that it would be politic in Great Britain to relinquish her North-American possessions. An attempt has been made in the following little pamphlet, to show that they are of great importance to her in a maritime point of view ; and if they are so, we may hope that the country is not yet so reduced as to abandon the empire of the seas, which has been her proud boast for ages, or to relinquish any possession or pursuit which contributes to the support of her naval power.

But as it respects Sir Alexander's question, whether Great Britain is or is not a gainer by its commercial intercourse with British North America, it

should be remembered, that commerce is pursued by individuals for their personal benefit, and none would persevere in any such pursuit unless they derived some profit from it. Particular periods of depression may at times occur, and loss ensue where gain was anticipated ; but if the cause which produced such effect is not temporary, that pursuit is soon abandoned.

As the merchants in this country, who trade with British North America, have continued that trade for many years, and the numbers who engage in it do not diminish, but increase, it is fair to conclude that, upon the whole, the individuals concerned in it are gainers ; and if that is the case, it may be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that the community also gains by a commercial intercourse, from which the numerous individuals who conduct it acquire profit.

If we compare the proportion of goods which the inhabitants of British North America consume per person, with those of the inhabitants of the United States, or of the north of Europe, we shall be induced to suppose, that the trade carried on with the former is peculiarly advantageous to Great Britain.

In a pamphlet recently published by Sir Howard Douglas, who has laid the inhabitants of those colonies under a lasting debt of gratitude for his able and manly defence of their interests, it is stated that, ' in the year 1828, the amount of British manu-

' manufactures consumed in British America, was about  
 ' 2,000,000*l.* value; so that these provinces take  
 ' about 40*s.* each person per annum of British goods.  
 ' The amount of British manufactures imported into  
 ' the United States from the United Kingdom, in  
 ' 1826 (see Watterston's Statistics), was 5,876,975*l.*;  
 ' the population of the United States for that year  
 ' year being 12,000,000, it follows that the people  
 ' of the United States do not take, per person, one-  
 ' fourth so much of British goods as the people of  
 ' the British Colonies.'

Mr. Bliss, in a very able pamphlet in vindication  
 of the system of protection which is afforded by the  
 existing laws to the North-American timber-trade,  
 has made it appear very clearly, that where the  
 inhabitants of the north of Europe import British  
 goods, at the rate of 1*s.* per person, the inhabitants  
 of British America consume them at the rate of about  
 33*s.* 4*d.* per person. So great is the difference be-  
 tween the two latter countries, that Russia, Sweden,  
 Norway, Denmark, and Prussia, with a population  
 of 47,000,000, do not, in their *whole consumption* of  
 British cottons, linens, woollens, leather, earthen-  
 ware, iron, steel, hardware, and cutlery, nearly equal  
 the gross amount of the same goods consumed by  
 1,200,000 of our fellow subjects in British North  
 America. (See the tables in Mr. Bliss's Pamphlet  
 on the Timber Trade, pp. 54—6.)

Of course the exportation of these goods to British

North America would not be continued unless they were paid for in a manner that occasioned an ultimate gain to the exporter. Sir Alexander contends that the payment made by the importation of North American timber into this country is solely owing to the injudicious encouragement given by the Legislature in the protecting duties, which, he says, compels the consumers of timber here to pay a higher price for an inferior article, than they would do if these protecting duties were withdrawn. That subject has been so ably discussed by Sir Howard Douglas and Mr. Bliss, that it is not intended to enter upon it here: those who peruse their observations upon it will be satisfied that it is quite as much for the interest of this country, as of the Colonies, to continue that protection.

But the timber exported from North America, valuable as that trade is to those Colonies, scarcely pays for one-fourth of the British manufactures which is imported, and it requires the utmost exertions of the inhabitants to make those payments from other sources. It may be said, that the greater part of the profits of their industry, in all other trades, centres in this country, from whence they derive so large a portion of their supplies.

The inhabitants of British America, then, are excellent customers, for their numbers, to Great Britain; those numbers are continually increasing, and while they continue British subjects, their demand for

British goods will increase in the same ratio. Until Sir Alexander Malet, therefore, adduces something more than mere assertion, he cannot expect his position, that Great Britain is *no gainer* by its commercial intercourse with a people who are such consumers of its manufactures, to be ceded to him.

If, however, Sir Henry Parnell is correct, it would still be the interest of this country, as far as mere money is considered, to relinquish these Colonies. Under the most rigorous system of retrenchment, they will still cost something; and if we can rid ourselves of the expense and retain all our commercial advantages, we must be gainers by the measure, in the pounds, shillings, and pence view of the subject.

But it does appear surprising that Sir Henry should have used the expression, that *no case* can be made out to show that we should not have every commercial advantage we are supposed now to have, if the northern Colonies were erected into an independent state.

How could Sir Henry have overlooked a case so directly in point, as that of the United States of America? They were once Colonies of Great Britain, and have now become independent; while they were Colonies, they could pass no law inimical to the interests of this country. The imperial Parliament regulated then, as it does now, the trade of the whole empire. And what is at present *the case* with them?

For the express purpose of encouraging their own manufactures, in preference to ours, they have imposed duties upon the most valuable of our exports, to the amount of 45 per cent. *ad valorem*. And from the manner in which *the value* is calculated, those duties, in some cases, amount nearly to 90 per cent. ; for a yard of woollen cloth, which cost 51 cents in this country, pays a duty of 45 cents on its importation into the United States\*.

These duties are avowedly not levied for the purpose of revenue, they are imposed with a prohibitory view ; and if persisted in, as will probably be the case, must ultimately drive British manufactures out of the American market.

While then, as Sir Howard Douglas has observed, the British North American colonists (who can impose no such prohibitory duties) consume British goods at the rate of 40*s.* per person, the inhabitants of the United States consume not more than one-fourth of that quantity, and he justly adds,—  
 ‘ this market (the United States) must diminish  
 ‘ under the influence of the American system, by  
 ‘ which the United States are manufacturing very  
 ‘ extensively for themselves, and actually beginning  
 ‘ to rival us in many articles in foreign markets.’

\* It is still more astonishing that Sir Henry should repeat this assertion in the third edition of his work, published in 1831, without taking any notice of the ample refutation of it in the Quarterly Review for March, 1830.

It is not intended to enter into the labyrinth of political economy upon this subject. Whether the Congress of the United States acted wisely or unwisely in following the example of almost every other country in the civilized world, by giving this preference to their own productions, is not the question: they have followed it; and in so doing they have deprived Great Britain of some, at least, of the commercial advantages which she enjoyed before they became independent States.

Is it not probable, then, that under circumstances so very similar, the North American Colonies, if they became independent, would pursue a similar course? If, on separating from this country, they became incorporated, as they most probably would, with the American confederation, they must adopt it; and can Sir Henry contend, that neither our manufactures, foreign commerce, nor *shipping* would be injured by such a course? Our manufactures would necessarily be injured by it, our foreign commerce (if Sir Henry means our commerce with our North American Colonies by this expression) would fail in an equal degree, and our shipping would be banished from the ports which they now crowd. If Sir Henry would visit New York, and the other ports of the United States, he would see a solitary English flag flying among many hundreds of stars and stripes; and if he proceeded to the St. Lawrence, or any of the shipping ports in the British Colonies, he would



there witness the very reverse of this scene ; but if those Colonies became independent, they would, they must follow the example of their neighbours ; and can it be said that *British shipping* would not be injured by the loss of a trade which now gives employment to so many hundred British ships ?

Our North American Colonies are capable of maintaining many millions of inhabitants, their increase is most rapid, and, as has been before observed, so long as they continue British subjects, they will continue to consume British manufactures in the same ratio that they now do. If they become American citizens, their consumption of those manufactures will annually diminish ; for notwithstanding Mr. Cambreleng's report of the Committee of Congress, of February, 1830, cited with such approbation by Sir Henry (page 86), too much capital has been embarked in the American factories, and there are too many influential persons in that country who think that it is its interest to pursue the existing system, to afford any hope that it will be abandoned.

Many persons, indeed, in America, say that the very arguments which are urged to induce other nations to abandon protecting duties, should influence them to adopt them. Admitting the truth of Mr Jefferson's doctrine, cited by Sir Henry (page 87-8), that ' could every country be employed in ' producing that which Nature has best fitted it to

' produce, and each be free to exchange with others  
' mutual surpluses for mutual wants, the greatest  
' mass possible would then be produced of those  
' things which contribute to human life and human  
' happiness,' they say that, while the rest of the  
world are pausing to consider how far the conflicting  
existing interests of different independent nations  
can be so reconciled as to enable them to act upon  
the principle recommended, they have a world of  
their own, containing every variety of soil and cli-  
mate, capable of producing everything that man or  
woman can require for use, ornament, or luxury ;  
and that it is peculiarly the duty of the legislature  
of confederate States possessing such capabilities to  
cement the confederation, by encouraging inter-  
course founded upon reciprocal convenience, and to  
make each State feel that, as long as they preserve  
their union, they may be independent of foreign  
nations, and supply the whole of each other's wants  
by an exchange of the various articles which the  
different States produce.

What America comprises upon her vast continent,  
Great Britain possesses in her numerous Colonies  
scattered over the whole globe ; and if it is wise in  
America to encourage that interchange of produc-  
tions among the several States, which will eventually  
render them independent of the rest of the world,  
and enable them to look with indifference upon the  
squabbles of the nations of Europe, would it not

also be wise in us to encourage that communication between the different portions of the empire, which will place almost every production we require under our own control? Their separation from us and from each other by the ocean, so far from diminishing, enhances their value to a maritime state, and obliges them to contribute to the support of our commercial marine, upon which our naval power must ever be founded.

It will be obvious to all who reflect upon the subject, that those who reside in our Colonies must pay the expense of transporting our manufactures thither, just as those who, in this island, reside at a distance from our manufacturing towns, must add the cost of the carriage to their places of abode to the original price of the article they consume. And as, in the one case, the latter support our waggoners, our wheelwrights, our farmers, and all the persons employed in constructing waggons and breeding horses, so the former give employment to our seamen, and to the numerous host of tradesmen and artizans necessarily connected with ship-building.

When the time shall arrive in which 'the lamb shall lie down with the lion, and nation shall no more rise up against nation,' mankind may become disposed to act upon those liberal principles which Sir Henry Parnell would now recommend to our adoption; but as it appears hopeless to prevail upon the governments of the several nations of this earth at

present to dismiss all selfish views, is it not incumbent upon our rulers to take care of the people more especially committed to their charge, and not to sacrifice either our commerce or our Colonies to mere abstract principles?

Whether M.' Colbert acted judiciously or otherwise in introducing protecting duties, is not the question; they have been introduced and so generally adopted, that no commercial country can safely abandon them, without a general compact on the part of the other nations to relinquish them also.

It is hoped that those in whose hands the destinies of this mighty empire are now placed, will come to a different conclusion from Sir Alexander Malet and Sir Henry Parnell; and that they will see that the Colonies conduce, in a very important degree, to the maritime power and commercial wealth of the country, and that those advantages could not be retained if our foreign possessions were relinquished.

It is stated by Sir Alexander Malet, as one among the reasons for relinquishing them, that 'the domination of England is unpopular in and unsuited to these Colonies.' (Page 11.)

The writer of these Observations has resided for the greatest part of his life in British North America, and never heard it even insinuated in that country that the domination of England was considered either unpopular or unsuitable to it.

Differences of opinion upon their local govern-

ments and their local interests do occasionally arise, and are expressed with the freedom which the descendants of Britons will ever exercise ; but even those who are most dissatisfied with the measures of this or that Colonial Administration, always express their attachment to the mother country, and their desire to continue British subjects.

This is *not* a mere matter of *inclination*: all reflecting persons in those Colonies see that it will be their *interest* to continue their connexion with this country, so long as they are considered as subjects, and not as foreigners, by the British government.

If, indeed, they are viewed in the former light on this side of the water, for the mere purpose of controlling them, and compelling them to pay the heavy duties now imposed by the Imperial Parliament, for the protection of the British merchant, upon all foreign articles imported into the Colonies, while colonial productions are to be denied similar protection in Great Britain, they will probably take a different view of the subject ; and it is idle to suppose that any feeling of attachment would long overpower the dictates of interest in any community.

But they do not anticipate that such a course will be adopted, and, as all are convinced, that, if they separate from Great Britain, they must merge in the American confederation, they are not desirous of such a change.

While the North American Colonies continue

British possessions, independent of other advantages which the inhabitants derive from their British character, their intercourse with each other is beneficial to all. Fish, which forms a very important article of export in the Colonies on the Atlantic, and all the productions of the Canadas are exchanged in the islands for West India produce. During the winter months, when the navigation of the St. Lawrence is closed, Halifax in Nova Scotia, and St. John's and St. Andrew's in New Brunswick, become the entrepôts for this trade. Their vessels find employment, and their owners acquire profit by it.

But if the whole northern Continent belonged to the United States, New York would become the entrepôt instead of Halifax, St. John's, and St. Andrew's; the wealth acquired in this trade would centre there, and the three last-mentioned places would dwindle into insignificance.

Let those who doubt this, look at the course which commerce has been taking in the United States for many years past, and particularly since the great canal was opened between the Hudson and Lake Erie.

They will see that not only no commercial town of importance has risen to the northward of New York, but that even the old-established cities of Boston and of Salem can scarcely hold their own. Most enterprising young men, as soon as they have acquired some property in Massachusetts or in Maine,

leave their business in that quarter to be conducted by a confidential clerk, and remove themselves with their capital to the great commercial mart at New York. So strongly does the tide of commerce set in that direction, that the Boston merchants, who are extensively engaged in business, find it necessary to visit New York almost every month. If then the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Lower Canada became American citizens, their enterprising young merchants, as soon as they had scraped together a few hundred pounds, would fly to a country, which would hold out to them more golden prospects, and leave their little business in the hands of some confidential agent, who, as soon as he became able, would follow their example:—thus these northern portions of the union would become mere hewers of wood and drawers of water to the wealthy State of New York; for it is not merely the *towns* that would suffer by the constant drain of men of capital from them,—the farmers and tradesmen would find that their best customers departed with them.


But while these Colonies continue British possessions, their inhabitants are *aliens* in the United States; and even if they removed to New York, they could not carry on from thence that intercourse between the West India Islands and the northern Colonies, which is so well calculated to enrich British America.

It is the interest of all, then, who own property in those Colonies, to retain their character of British subjects so long as they are really treated as such by Great Britain.

It is hoped that they will receive such treatment, and that our statesmen will see that it is the interest of both countries to continue their present connexion with each other. It is true, that difficult questions respecting the Colonies frequently arise, to harass the government at home ; but those who think this renders the prospect of retaining them hopeless, should recollect that the management of our own internal affairs has become more intricate and perplexing as our national resources have been developed and our commerce and wealth have increased.

*London, July 31st, 1831.*





## OBSERVATIONS.

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### CHAPTER I.

It should afford great satisfaction to the inhabitants of British America to observe, that the attention of our statesmen is every day called, more and more, towards the Colonies of this continent, not only by those who have an opportunity of expressing their opinions in Parliament, but by numerous writers in the public prints and periodical publications of the day.

The minds of his Majesty's Ministers have been so much occupied by the important events which have occurred in Europe during the last five-and-thirty years, that they have been unable to allow themselves time to inquire into the real value of these Colonies, and we should therefore rejoice, if this subject is brought to their consideration even by those who deny our importance.

It is contended, by some writers of the present day, that the North American Colonies are not worth the expense which it will cost the mother country to maintain and defend them. These writers do not say that the Colonies are positively mischievous, or that Great Britain would sustain any injury from retaining them if they cost her nothing; but they

lay down this position—‘ that no Colony is worth retaining, unless the mother country derives a *revenue* equal to her expenditure upon it.’

But may we not ask the advocates of this opinion, whether pounds, shillings, and pence should alone engross a statesman’s mind?—and if the adjustment of an account of profit and loss is the whole duty of a politician?

It behoves those who would wish to form a correct opinion of the propriety of retaining or discarding these Colonies, to consider well the present situation of the United States of America. During the long contest which so recently distracted Europe, the feelings of a large portion of the population of that country were decidedly hostile to us; and their government chose to declare war upon us at a time when the freedom not only of Great Britain, but of the whole world, might be said to have depended upon the event of the invasion of Russia by Buonaparte.

Circumstances may again occur, to excite a similar disposition, and it may be roused into action at a period still more inconvenient than that which has just been alluded to—Should not our statesmen then reflect upon the means by which this hostile disposition may be best averted; and how it may be rendered least formidable should it unfortunately be excited?

When we look to the United States of America, we see a people of British descent—who speak our language, adopt our laws, and who inherit our love of freedom and our spirit of enterprise.

We see this energetic people rapidly spreading

themselves over an immense continent, containing every variety of climate, and capable of yielding the richest productions of the earth—we can set no bounds to the population which such a country may in future maintain—and we cannot refrain from asking ourselves if they are not destined to become formidable rivals to the nations in Europe; and, whether it does not behove the statesmen of that portion of the world to keep a watchful eye upon their growing power.

Now it may be safely asserted, that no circumstance would have so great a tendency to increase that power, as the surrender of these Colonies to the United States; nay, we may go further, and declare that is almost the *only* measure that can render these States formidable enemies to Great Britain.

Separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, they can only become formidable to nations of that continent as a maritime power. This truth is so obvious, that it cannot have escaped those who direct the affairs of the present mistress of the sea: but it ought not to be taken for granted (as it unfortunately is by many) that America *must inevitably* become a great maritime power: many predict that she will be so, because she possesses a great extent of coast, has the means of supporting an immense population, and abounds in rich productions, with which she can carry on an extensive foreign trade.

It must be admitted, that a country so situated may become very powerful upon the ocean; and it is highly probable that the navy of the United States will very soon be a valuable addition to the fleets of any of the European powers in future wars. But

let it be recollected, that France and Spain possess all the advantages which have been enumerated, and yet their united naval force has ever been unequal to overpower that of Great Britain. And to what is it owing, that thirty millions of Frenchmen, aided by ten millions of Spaniards, are unable to equip and man fleets sufficiently powerful to destroy the navy of an island which does not possess half that population? Principally to this: that the inhabitants of the inland parts of France and Spain, which form so large a portion of their population, reside in a country which affords them the means of subsistence, without obliging them to seek it abroad, and they are therefore indisposed to encounter the hardships of a seaman's life; whereas Great Britain is everywhere surrounded by the ocean; the most inland parts of the island are not very distant from the sea; and as the productions of the soil would not support a very numerous population, a large proportion of its people are compelled to seek their subsistence by engaging in the fisheries, or in the coasting and foreign trade; and it is from this hardy and enterprising portion of her subjects, that Great Britain derives the means of establishing and maintaining her superiority upon the ocean.

Now it is evident, that the United States of America, even now, resemble the countries of France and Spain, in this particular, more than Great Britain; and as their people recede from the ocean, and plant themselves in the valleys beyond the Alleghany mountains, the resemblance will be still greater: by far the greater part of the inhabitants of those distant regions will live and die without ever having

placed their feet upon the deck of a ship, and will consequently add nothing to the maritime population of the country: the rich productions of their fertile valleys will find their way to New Orleans\*, and there provide abundant means of carrying on foreign trade; but the carriers of these productions to the foreign market will either be foreigners, or natives of the Atlantic States.

It is to these States then that America must look to provide the seamen who are to man her navy, and among these New York and New England will stand pre-eminent. The southern states of Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia, it is true, carry on an extensive foreign trade, but, independent of their being destitute of any very commodious harbours for ships of war of the larger classes, their climate, and the nature of their population, equally unfit them to produce hardy and enterprising mariners. They have few, if any, vessels engaged in the fisheries, and are therefore destitute of that first great nursery for seamen. The mercantile sea-ports to the southward of the Delaware would doubtless produce a very respectable number of sailors at the commencement of a war; but as it is notorious that merchants usually navigate their vessels with the smallest possible number of hands, the employment of these men in the navy, in a country where the labouring classes cannot provide substitutes for them, will not only be productive of great inconvenience to the mercantile

\* It may be observed here, that the exclusive use of steam-boats upon the Mississippi will even lessen the number of *fresh water* sailors which must otherwise have been employed upon that immense river.

interest, but will render it difficult, if not impracticable, for the American navy to procure further recruits from the Southern States after it made its first sweep from the ships of the merchants; for surely those who are destined to wrest the sovereignty of the sea from Great Britain will not be selected from the indolent slaves of the southern planter.

I submit it then to the consideration of those who will reflect seriously upon this subject, whether the maritime population of the United States of America must not be principally derived from New York and New England. I do not deny that seamen will frequently be met with from other portions of the Union, but I mean to contend that these are the only States in that Union, who possess a population which, by their habits and pursuits, are calculated to raise America as a naval power. Let us then view their present situation, and consider whether there is much probability of their increasing the means they now possess of adding to the naval strength of their country.

The States of New York and New England are now old, settled countries: the population of the former may become more numerous in the back parts of the country, but an increase in that quarter will add but little to her maritime strength. But New England, and the south-eastern parts of New York, are already so fully peopled, that frequent emigrations take place from them to the inland States. Massachusetts does not, and we believe we may say cannot, raise within herself bread to support her pre-

sent population, and therefore can never expect to increase her numbers very rapidly; while the western territory offers to her youth the tempting prospect of obtaining a livelihood in that rich country upon easier terms than they can procure it within her limits.

Let it not then be deemed chimerical to say, that America has no immediate prospect of becoming a great naval power.

If the confederation of these States continues, they will no doubt become rich and powerful to a degree that may defy all aggression; but it does not follow, that they will acquire a naval force that will prove formidable to the powers of Europe. Germany has been among the most powerful nations of Europe, and Austria and Hungary now produce valuable articles of export; but these countries, from their geographical situations, cannot produce a maritime population; other nations have therefore become the carriers of their productions, and they have never possessed any power upon the ocean. The inland States of America are precisely in the same situation: and I close these observations by repeating, first, that the sources of the naval power of America must be principally derived from the States of New York and New England; and, secondly, that there will be no great increase of the maritime population of those states until the western territory is fully peopled. When these fertile valleys are all occupied, and no longer hold out a temptation to the youth of the Atlantic States to remove thither, then they must follow the example of their ancestors in Great



Britain: and if the soil of their native country will not yield them a subsistence, they must seek it from the sea which washes its shores. But that day, I think it will be admitted by all, is far distant: ages must elapse before that vast country, through which the Ohio, the Missouri and the Mississippi roll, will afford no further room for the enterprising emigrant.

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## CHAPTER II.

IF there is any truth in the preceding observations, that the United States of America can only become formidable to the nations of Europe as a maritime power—that their maritime strength must spring from the maritime States, and can only increase with the increase of the maritime population of these States—it follows inevitably that the addition of other maritime States to that confederation must increase their maritime resources, and accelerate the period when they will become formidable upon the ocean.

I have before ventured to assert that no circumstance would have so great a tendency to increase that power as the surrender of these Colonies to the United States; and I shall now endeavour to prove this assertion.

America would thereby gain an immense addition to her sea coast, and of a description, too, very superior to the greater part of that which she now possesses, for the formation of a maritime population.

This coast may be divided into three portions. The first, commencing at the Bay of Passamaquoddy, where the American line now terminates, and running from thence round the Bay of Fundy, along the shores of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, to Cape St. Mary's.

The second, running from Cape St. Mary's, along the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, to Cape North.

The third, running from Cape North, along the western side of Cape Breton, to the Gut of Canso—thence along the northern shores of Nova Scotia, to the Bay of Verte, and from thence along the coast of that part of New Brunswick and Canada which lies upon the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to the mouth of the noble river from which that Gulf takes its name.

Each of these three divisions contains an extent of coast equal to that which runs from New York to the Bay of Passamaquoddy ; which may certainly be deemed the most formidable part of that now possessed by America, for naval purposes.

In the first section, we commence with the fine Bay of Passamaquoddy, containing several islands, whose inhabitants, from their situation, will always be sea-faring persons ; the town of St. Andrew, in this bay, is already rising into mercantile importance, and is resorted to by numbers of European fishing and coasting vessels. At no great distance from St. Andrew's is the town of St. John, situated at the mouth of the fine river of the same name, which supplies it, and will for years continue to supply it, with immense quantities of timber : many hundred vessels are engaged in carrying this timber to Great Britain, and bringing out the supplies of British goods which the wants of a rapidly increasing population annually demand : ship-building is carried on to a great extent up the river, as well as in many other situations farther up the bay, on the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia shores ; and, as the capital of the country increases, more attention is paid to the construction of them, and they will very

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soon bear a high character. As we proceed round the Bay of Fundy to the counties of Westmoreland, in New Brunswick, Cumberland, Colchester, Hants, King's County, and Annapolis, in Nova Scotia, we meet with a country, the greater part of which can scarcely be exceeded in point of fertility. The upland is of an excellent quality, and thousands of acres of most valuable marsh have already been reclaimed from the sea, and are capable of maintaining ten times the number of people which now inhabit these districts.

This section of the coast has no good harbours, but it has numerous rivers, inlets, and creeks, into which the rapid tides\* of the Bay of Fundy enable vessels of large size to enter; and when those tides recede, the soft muddy bottoms of these inlets and creeks render it perfectly safe even for heavy-loaded vessels to rest upon them.

Great numbers of small craft, owned and navigated by the inhabitants of the country, are now met with on this bay, carrying from the places I have mentioned, gypsum and lumber (in which the country abounds) and agricultural produce, to the ports of St. John and St. Andrew; and if these Colonies were possessed by the United States, it would be filled with vessels of a larger description, conveying, not only such articles in much greater quantities, but coals also (which are found in abundance at the head of the bay), to the populous towns of Boston,

\* These tides rise in some parts of the bay, 30, in others 40 or 50, and in some from 60 to 70 feet.

New York, Philadelphia, &c., where their cargoes would meet with a ready sale. The navigation of the Bay of Fundy is at all times difficult, and in particular seasons of the year it is dangerous; but the people who reside upon its shores are a hardy, enterprising race; and you can scarcely enter the house of a farmer in that part of the country, in which you will not find some member of the family quite capable of taking charge of one of these small vessels, and conducting her in safety up or down the bay; the difficulty and the danger, therefore, will only tend to make more expert seamen of those who undertake to convey the productions of that country to market.

At Cape St. Mary's, the fishing-coast, as it may be termed, commences, and runs without interruption along the whole southern and eastern shores of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, to Cape North. This line of coast is peculiarly adapted to produce hardy and enterprising seamen. With the exception of the small county of Lunenburg, which lies about forty miles to the westward of Halifax, no part of this coast can support an agricultural population. The land upon these shores is, generally speaking, rocky and barren, containing many spots capable of affording the fisherman potatoes to eat with his fish, but few which can repay the man who devotes his labour exclusively to the cultivation of the soil. But perhaps no part of the world is more favourably situated for carrying on extensive fisheries: it abounds with numerous and commodious harbours,

accessible at all seasons of the year \*, and capable of affording shelter to the largest vessels. The shores swarm with fish, and, notwithstanding the injurious effects of the restrictions upon our commerce, which the liberal policy of the mother country is now about to remove, the natural advantages of this part of Nova Scotia have induced many enterprising merchants in the settlements along the coast, not only to carry on the shore fishery to a great extent, but to employ vessels in the Labrador and Bank fishery also. Now that these restrictions are removed, and the commerce of the world is laid open to us, there cannot be a doubt that our population upon this coast will most rapidly increase—the numbers of the fishermen will very soon be more than doubled—and the supplies which these fisheries will require will increase the coasting trade in the same ratio that the fisheries themselves increase—thus producing, in a vigorous and healthy climate, a most extensive nursery for hardy seamen.

At Cape North we commence the third section ; and although it is true that the navigation of this part of the British possessions in America is closed during four, or, in unfavourable seasons, during five months of the year, yet during the other seven or eight months, the whole gulf may be said to be whitened with the canvas of vessels engaged in the timber trade, in the Labrador and coasting fisheries, and in carrying supplies of European and West

\* As I wish not to mislead any one who may favour these observations with a persual, I must except the harbours of Cape Breton, lying between Scatari and Cape North.

India produce, not only for the consumption of the inhabitants of this coast, but of the rapidly increasing population of Upper and Lower Canada. Seven hundred sail of vessels annually proceed up the river St. Lawrence—upwards of three hundred go to Miramichi, and as many more may be divided among the ports of Merrigomish, Pictou, Tatamagushe, Remsheg, Richibucto, and other harbours, between the Gut of Canso and Miramichi.

It may be said, that by far the greater part of these vessels are owned in Great Britain, and that if these Colonies were ceded to America, their inhabitants would still wish to dispose of their timber, and would continue to require the same supplies which they now receive from the mother country, and would, therefore, afford the same employment to British shipping.

We will admit that this *might* be the case during a state of peace; I say, *might* be, because it is certainly more probable that American vessels would be substituted for British, to carry what would then be the productions of an American country to market, and also to bring back the supplies which that part of the country would require. But, in a state of war, all communication would cease, and, in the event of a mischievous alliance between America and the northern powers of Europe, where, we may ask, would Great Britain obtain those supplies of timber and other articles which these Colonies are capable of producing, and which she may command as long as she retains them in her own possession?

The supply of timber is almost inexhaustible in

the immense forests of this part of British America, and, as the forests are cleared, the land, particularly along the western side of Cape Breton, the whole of Prince Edward Island, the Gulf Coast of Nova Scotia, and the greater part of that of New Brunswick, is well calculated for cultivation, and is capable of maintaining an immense population. Numerous settlers are already established upon the shores, some of whom devote themselves to agriculture, others to the Gulf and Labrador fisheries, and some engage in the coal trade and in foreign commerce. When this part of the country is more fully peopled, the inter-communication of the numerous ports and harbours in the Gulf must create an extensive coasting trade, which will be carried on exclusively by the vessels of the power that owns the surrounding country.

I do not proceed to describe the coast northward, from the river St. Lawrence to the straits of Bellisle, and from thence along the western side of Newfoundland to the entrance of the Gulf, because, although the first part of that coast is British, yet it affords *no home* for fishermen, and, as visiters, during the fishing season, it is open to American vessels as well as to our own, and the remainder belongs exclusively to the French.

Under existing circumstances, therefore, the coast of Labrador may afford equal facilities for forming seamen, both to Great Britain and America; but if the whole of the British possessions in North America should be surrendered to the United States, it may be doubted whether they would then be equally



complaisant to us. It is not improbable that they would soon deem both the French and ourselves to be intruders on any part of the coast of North America. The President of the United States stated to Congress, upon a late occasion, that he had availed himself of the opportunity to which he then alluded, to intimate to the powers of Europe, that the continent of North America was no longer subject to colonization from that side of the water; and if Great Britain were once expelled from it, the slight hold which France has would soon be loosened.

Let us here pause and behold this young gigantic republic in possession of this vast addition to her sea-coast, a great part of which would deny to the people who inhabited it a subsistence from the soil, but would afford to them not merely a subsistence, but the means of acquiring wealth from the sea; and the remainder capable not only of supporting a numerous population, but abounding in minerals of various descriptions, in inexhaustible forests of timber, and other means of supporting an immense foreign and coasting trade.

Let us contemplate the numerous inhabitants of this extensive coast, who, from their pursuits, their habits, their laws, their language, their religion, and their feelings, bear a greater resemblance to the inhabitants of Great Britain than any other portion of the known world, and who are now well disposed to continue her subjects. Let us, I say, view these persons ranged upon the side of her enemies; let us see them manning the fleets of hostile America, and engaged in endeavouring to subvert that power

which they are now desirous to support ; let us see the treasures of Great Britain lavished to carry on a maritime war with America, into which, but for this accession of strength, the latter would not, perhaps, have engaged ; and then let us ask ourselves if it would be wise in those who can retain them as subjects of Great Britain, to relinquish them to America, merely because they do not *directly* pay into her treasury a revenue equal to the expense of their establishments.

Are all the wholesome principles which formerly regulated the conduct of British statesmen to be forgotten ? When France endeavoured to establish a nursery for seamen on this side of the Atlantic, Great Britain viewed her proceedings with the most jealous eye ; and the city of London was illuminated for three successive nights, when the news of the capture of Louisburg was announced : was it the acquisition of this small town, which is now reduced to ruins, that occasioned this burst of joy ? Nay, were the rejoicings which took place on the reduction of Canada itself, owing to any positive advantages the nation expected to derive from this addition of territory ? No, it was the blow which these events gave to our natural enemy ; it was the diminution of her means to do us further harm, in our future contests with her, that excited our exultation ;—and it was then thought that the money which the reduction of these places cost, as well as that which the retention of them would require, would be well expended in wresting and preserving them from the hands of France ;—and shall we now, for the sake of

saving a few pounds, abandon a much more important country to a nation who, when she once obtains possession of the coast which I have described, will become more formidable upon the ocean than France has ever been?

That nation has already evinced a disposition to rank herself among the enemies of Great Britain; and the events of the last short war had a strong tendency to increase the national vanity of the Americans, and to induce them to believe, that they alone are capable of coping with Englishmen upon the seas; nor let us conceal from ourselves that there is some foundation for this idea—they are descended from Britons; they have the spirit and the energy of freemen; the climate of the northern portion of their country is calculated to make them hardy; and it must not be supposed that they are even now contemptible foes.

It remains for Great Britain to decide whether the maritime population of the country which I have described shall add to her own strength, or to that of this growing rival.

The inhabitants of British America have no desire to change their national character, and will feel disposed to cling to the mother country as long as she fosters and protects them. Does not sound policy, then, require that she should do so? Should a country which will be capable of adding so much to her own maritime strength, and the loss of which would add so much to that of another, and a rival nation, be voluntarily abandoned by Great Britain?

## CHAPTER III.

It may be said, by those who are unfriendly to the retention of these North American Colonies, that the very arguments which I have adduced to prove how much they would add to the naval resources of the United States show their value to that country; that the retention of them, therefore, must lead to contests with the Americans, and that if they were once surrendered to them, all subjects of dispute between Great Britain and America would be removed.

These two positions, that the retention of these Colonies must lead to contests between Great Britain and America,—and that the cession of them to the latter would remove all causes of future difference,—appear to be very plausible; but let us inquire if they are sound.

I admit, that if America were governed by a monarch, or even if that country consisted of one vast republic, that the acquisition of these Colonies would be so great an addition to their maritime strength, that those who administered their affairs would never rest until they had achieved a conquest which, under either of those forms of government, sound policy would urge them to make; but, instead of being one entire republic, they consist of a confederation of republics, and the Congress is composed of persons who receive a delegated power from various states, that are not only destitute of common

interest upon many essential points, but whose interests frequently clash with each other.

The southern States on the Atlantic have no desire to increase the political influence of New York or New England. The Virginians, who take the lead among the former, look with great jealousy upon Massachusetts, which State has twice wrested the presidency from their hands ; and the inhabitants of the western territory begin to look upon both as usurpers of that power and influence in the general government, which their growing importance teaches them to believe should belong to them.

Under these circumstances, neither the representatives from the western territory, nor those from the southern states, would be very desirous to engage in a war which would interrupt the safe transmission of their valuable productions to market, merely to acquire a country which would add so much to the political weight and influence of New England.

If the coast, which I have described, were added to the American possessions, its interests and those of New England would be precisely the same, and the *citizens* of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick would certainly enlist under the banner of Massachusetts in all political contests, either in congress, or for the presidential chair.

Mr. Jefferson, the former leader of the politicians of Virginia, was so well aware of the influence which foreign commerce was calculated to give to the States concerned in navigation, that he invariably endeavoured to instil into the minds of the inhabitants of the southern and inland states, that they

had no interest in encouraging the American carrying trade—that it only tended to embroil them with foreign nations ; and that it was their best policy to remain at home, and sell their native productions to the foreigners who came to their own shores in search of them. This policy was indignantly resisted by the New England States, who saw that it must prove ruinous to them ; but it had numerous advocates to the southward, and in the states beyond the Alleghany, until the French influence, which prevailed in the American cabinet, involved that country in a war with Great Britain.

The unexpected brilliancy which attended some of the American achievements at sea, during that war, enlisted the national pride on the side of the seamen, and we have recently heard but little of this doctrine of Mr. Jefferson ; but the principles upon which it was founded still subsist in, and are perhaps inseparable from, the American confederation. We cannot, therefore, expect to see the same earnest desire to make this conquest, on the part of the American congress (with whom the power of declaring war is solely vested), that we should witness in a government, where these conflicting interests did not exist.

It is, therefore, very probable, if Great Britain manifests a resolute determination to retain her possessions in North America, that the representatives of the southern and inland States, who form a vast majority over those of New England, will not subject their property to spoliation, by engaging in a contest with the mistress of the sea, for the pur-

pose of adding to the power and influence of a portion of the Union which both consider as a rival.

But, secondly, will it follow that if these Colonies were ceded to America, all causes of difference would be removed between the two countries? It must be admitted that this measure must increase the power of America; and in politics it is too often deemed that *power is right*—for those who have power to assert a claim which it is their interest to make, generally conclude that they have the right also so to do; and, therefore, in all the differences which may hereafter arise between the conflicting interests of two commercial nations, America, when her power is thus increased, will assume a higher tone, and feel more disposed to support her claims by arms, than she will do if she should not acquire this accession of maritime strength. It may be also observed, that while the inhabitants of these Colonies remain subjects of Great Britain, it is their interest that she should retain her possessions in the West Indies, on account of the advantage which their character as British subjects gives to them over the Americans in those islands.

But as soon as they became American citizens their interests would be directly the reverse, and they would join with all the Atlantic States in America, in urging the American government to seize the first opportunity of possessing itself of those islands; what the result would be I do not attempt to predict, but I think it will not be denied that the augmentation to her naval force, which the possession of these Colonies would give to America, and her vicinity to

the scene of contest, would enable her to become a much more formidable enemy to Great Britain in that quarter than France or Spain have ever proved; and the natives of the British West India Isles (who have frequently manifested a sufficient portion of republican spirit) would feel much less repugnance in yielding to the dominion of America, than they would to that of any of the foreign governments of Europe.

They would recollect that a large proportion of the rulers of that country are themselves interested in guarding the *rights* (as they consider them) of the proprietors of slaves, and might, perhaps, think that their interests as slave-holders would be taken better care of by the American Congress than by the British Parliament, with whose recent proceedings upon that subject the West India planters are very generally dissatisfied.

These things should certainly be maturely considered before it is decided that the North American Colonies are of little or no importance to the mother country.

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## CHAPTER IV.

THE preceding observations have been directed against those writers who have assumed, as a general position, 'that no Colony is worth retaining ' unless the mother country derives from it a revenue ' equal to her expenditure upon it;' and an humble attempt has been made to induce his Majesty's ministers to think that the North American Colonies are valuable appendages to the British crown, independently of all considerations of pecuniary profit and loss.

The writer of these pages does not boast of that intimate knowledge of the principles of political economy which would enable him to unravel all the intricacies of that perplexing science, and to prove to demonstration that, although these Colonies do not directly pay into the treasury of Great Britain a sum equal to that which is annually issued from it for their support and defence, they do indirectly increase the commerce and manufactures of the mother country in a degree that renders her no loser by them upon the whole; yet he thinks, that might well admit of proof from the pens of those who have devoted themselves to the consideration of such subjects.

Indeed, the Edinburgh Reviewers, who are strong advocates for ridding Great Britain of the incumbrance of her Colonies, do not deny that she derives advantages from her commerce with them, in com-

mon, however, with that which she carries on with the rest of the world; but they are of opinion that she would derive the same advantages from them which she now does, if they were independent of all connexion with her.

They contend that as long as the manufactures of Great Britain are superior to, and cheaper than, those of other nations, she will ever experience the same demand for them that she now does; but they gravely tell us that it will be of little importance whether these manufactures are carried to market, or the returns from them are brought to Great Britain in foreign or in British ships; that it is erroneous to suppose, 'that an extensive *mercantile* ' is necessary to the possession of a great warlike ' navy;' 'that all that is required for the attainment ' of naval power is the command of convenient har- ' bours, and of wealth sufficient to build and man ' ships;' and 'that, however paradoxical it may at ' first sight appear, it is nevertheless unquestionably ' true, that *the navy of Great Britain might be as ' formidable as it now is, or, if that was desirable, ' infinitely more so, though we had not a single ' merchant ship.*'

These sage reviewers proceed to tell us very gravely that the merchant service is a very '*round about method of breeding sailors*' for the navy, and that it would be a much better plan to '*breed up sailors directly in men of war:*' to effect which, these advocates for discarding the Colonies, *on account of the expense of maintaining them*, propose that Great Britain should always keep afloat a sufficient number

of men of war, manned wholly *during peace* with able-bodied seamen, to enable her, on the breaking out of a war, with the addition of the proportion of landsmen and boys allowed by the admiralty, to equip a fleet worthy of the mistress of the sea!

Had the wise gentlemen who conduct this Review had the conduct of the affairs of the nation during the last ten years, those rows of floating castles which have so long been lying in idleness at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, would not have excited the anxiety which John Bull so lately felt lest his bulwarks were mouldering with the dry rot—they would have been ploughing their own element; contending with, and, of course, sometimes suffering from, its fury—filled with the choicest seamen, who would have been withdrawn from the servile task of adding to the nation's wealth in the employment of humble individuals, and would have been nobly occupied in consuming the revenues of the country, and cruizing in quest of a non-existing foe; for I take it for granted, as these sailors are to be *trained up* in men of war, that the fleets in which they are *to be trained* are not to lie like guard-ships, at their moorings—No, these costly nurseries, with their full complement of able-bodied seamen, whose services will only be obtained by paying to them the highest rate of wages, must proceed to sea, and there encounter the dangers of the ocean, and such of them as escape from it will return into port to refit, and give ample employment to a numerous host of carpenters, shipwrights, ropemakers, blacksmiths, &c. &c. &c. who would all be rescued from the degrada-

tion of looking up to private persons for a subsistence, by procuring employment in the ship-yards of our merchants, and become respectable salaried servants of their king and country.

But this is really too serious a subject for badinage, and at the same time it is difficult to bring oneself to answer people seriously who hold the monstrous position that a nation, whose greatness is founded upon her naval power, should be indifferent to her mercantile marine; who tell us that convenient harbours, and wealth sufficient to build and man ships, is all that is requisite for the attainment of naval power.

Has not France, has not Spain, convenient harbours, and have they not each had ample revenues in the days of their prosperity, to build, and to pay for the manning of fleets; have they not also been animated with the most earnest desire to crush the naval power of Great Britain? and have they not been unable to do so, because, although they had abundance of *men* to place upon the decks of their ships, they were destitute of *seamen* to manage them?

That great statesman, Mr. Burke, laid it down as an axiom, that experience was our surest guide either in political or private life, and until these gentlemen can point out to us an instance, in which a nation, possessing commodious harbours and abundant wealth, has attained to permanent naval power without a respectable maritime population, let us pursue the beaten track\*.

\* I hope the Edinburgh Reviewers will not refer us, in support

Let us leave our merchants, who are engaged either in foreign commerce, in the coasting trade, or in the fisheries, to devise schemes for the cheapest and most effectual mode of procuring those seamen in time of peace, which their respective pursuits require, and we may depend upon it, that individual interest and sagacity will effect the object of creating and preserving a maritime population more effectually, and upon better terms, than the government can do. Let us not, by the adoption of this scheme, withdraw from their service thousands of the best of seamen, to eat the bread of the nation either in idleness or in unproductive activity; and increase the expense of navigating our merchant ships, by raising wages in the degree that this demand, or rather this unnecessary employment of seamen, would inevitably occasion; and thus drive those whose interest it now is to give bread to British seamen, to carry on their business in the ships of foreigners.

Let us not too hastily adopt the opinion, that as long as British manufactures are better and cheaper than those of other nations, that we shall always enjoy the same share of commerce that we now do, and that it is unimportant whether this commerce is carried on in British or in foreign vessels. While all things flow smoothly, the *individuals* of every country will naturally seek to supply their wants upon the best terms, and will therefore resort to

of their position, to the fleets of boats, of ancient days, with their three banks of oars, armed prows, and legions of *soldiers* to fight them.

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to that country which can supply them with the best and cheapest articles : but governments may take a different view of the subject, and control the wishes of their people in this respect. Great Britain is equally hated and feared in Europe ; and the governments of that Continent would willingly see the sceptre of the ocean transferred to this side of the Atlantic. Distant America might not interpose that barrier, which the naval power of Great Britain has so often enabled her to do to European ambition ; and if that power were once lost, where should we find a counterpoise for that of France, whose ambition has so frequently threatened the *liberties* of the Continental nations, and the *destruction* of our own ?

Let us remember the declaration of the greatest politician and warrior that France has possessed for ages : that all he required, to render that country powerful upon the ocean, was *Ships, Colonies, and Commerce* ; and as the result of his observation upon the wants of France is confirmed by experience of the advantages which have resulted to Great Britain from such possessions, let us support and cherish them with the most anxious care.

Let speculative politicians amuse themselves with their discussions upon minor subjects, but let them not be encouraged to

SPORT WITH OUR PALLADIUM.

*Halifax, Nova Scotia, December, 1825.*

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