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JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES

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JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES

Synopsis

Japanese strategic planning is conducted within the framework of Article IX of the Constitution, and the 1960 Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and companion Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Recent increases in Japan's defence budget (necessary to provide increased host nation support for American forces deployed in Japan) have been criticized by China, South and North Korea, and debates in Tokyo over possible Japanese participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations are viewed suspiciously and commented on disparagingly by many countries in Asia Pacific.

The deconstruction of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of a near to mid-term strategic threat has robbed Japan of the raison d'être of its defence policy. Under the gaze of suspicious and fearful neighbours, Japan will have to design a national security policy which contributes to regional security and stability while making clear to domestic and international observers that Japan has no intention of replacing the United States as the guarantor of regional stability.

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Introduction

The strategic situation in Asia Pacific has undergone change as momentous and far reaching as that in Europe. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the related redeployment of American forces, the political resurrection of China, the settlement of the Cambodian conflict and indications of progress in inter-Korean relations have led policy makers in many Asia Pacific states to reconsider their political and strategic interests and to formulate appropriate policy responses.

While no other country in Asia Pacific has the capability to play a stabilizing role as well as Japan, a regional Pax Nipponica could well include components not in Western interests. Racially homogeneous and often wary of outsiders, bound by its own codes and united by its own myths, Japan has no tradition of cultural linkages and intercourse with its neighbours.¹

A half century later, the Japanese continue to view the events leading to the Pacific War as a conspiracy by the great powers to deny them freedom of economic manoeuvre necessary for sustained development. There is no popular sentiment in Japan that admits the brutal behaviour of the military throughout Asia Pacific during the war, and official expressions of regret by Tokyo have provided no comfort to those whose countries were invaded, conquered, or annexed by Japanese Imperial forces. Japan's economic prowess has now captured the markets of Asia Pacific. "Predatory capitalism" has triumphed where bayonets failed, and the result is a Japan that is envied, respected, feared, and at times loathed throughout the region.

The Reestablishment of the Japanese Military

Following its surrender in 1945, Japan was totally demilitarized by the United States which assumed responsibility for national defence. In 1950 most American garrison forces in Japan were deployed to Korea, and the Occupation authorities in Tokyo established a 75,000 man National Police Reserve to assist in maintaining civil order. The following year, Japan and the United States signed a bilateral security treaty which provided for American forces to cooperate with Japan in repelling any major foreign attack. In 1952, the paramilitary National Safety Force (land) and Coastal Safety Force were formed. These were under-staffed and under-equipped, and it was soon realized both in Washington and Tokyo that Japan could not defend itself from any serious form of external aggression.

In 1954 the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) was established. To ensure civilian command of the military, the Director General of the JDA (the de facto defence minister) was given a Cabinet position reporting to the Prime Minister.² In conjunction with this, the Ground (GSDF), Air (ASDF), and Maritime (MSDF) Self Defence Forces were established.

Japan's basic defence policy was adopted by the Kishi Cabinet in 1957 and called for the enhancement of national security through domestic political stability, the gradual buildup of an effective defence capability and the maintenance of defence arrangements based on the Japan-United States security treaty. In 1968, the basic defence policy was amended to commit Japan to the "three non-nuclear principles" of neither possessing, manufacturing, nor introducing nuclear weapons into the country. These principles led, two years later, to Japan's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 1976, under pressure from the United States to increase defence spending, the Japanese Government introduced the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) which called for the systematic expansion and modernization of the Self Defence Forces over a five year period. Anticipating opposition parties' and international criticism, the Cabinet simultaneously announced a decision to limit defence spending to one percent of GNP. This spending limit had detrimental effects on NDPO procurement policies and led to renewed American criticism of Japan's commitment to equitable burden-sharing. In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone introduced the Mid-term Defence Plan (MTDP) designed to achieve NDPO force levels within five years. In 1987, after a lengthy debate in the Diet, the defence budget was set slightly higher than one percent of GNP. The JDA continued to enjoy preferential funding with respect to other government departments, and with the dramatic increase in the value of the Yen following the G-5 Plaza Accord, Japan soon had the world's third largest defence budget when measured in US dollars.

Constitutional Restraints on Defence Policy Making

Article IX of the Japanese Constitution reads:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of the use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

The post-war Constitution was drafted by Occupation authorities, and its legitimacy has at times been called into question by Japanese governing and opposition parliamentarians. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has a formal policy advocating the revision of the Constitution, but there is little real political support for constitutional reform and revising Article IX would be a particularly divisive issue. During almost 40 years of LDP rule, the Government has expanded the interpretation of Article IX

to reflect changing defence requirements and the evolving relationship with the United States.³

Interpretations of Article IX vary, from belief that it prohibits Japan from possessing any means of, or potential for, military power to arguments that Article IX permits the possession of arms - up to and including nuclear weapons - for national defence.⁴ The current Miyazawa Administration eschews both extremes, but continues to impose the following restrictions to ensure that the Self Defence Forces are kept non-nuclear and their operational roles limited solely to national defence:

- the legitimacy of collective defence (permitted under the United Nations charter) is not recognized, although acceptance of the concept of "mutual security" ensures the continued legality of the Japan-United States security treaty;

- given the continuing overwhelming Russian/Commonwealth strategic capability, well-remembered horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and anticipated domestic and international outrage at a possible Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons, the three non-nuclear principles continue to enjoy wide support. United States policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons, and the view of the Japanese Government that the United States would not violate Japanese policy, ensures the three non-nuclear principles do not have an adverse effect on the bilateral security relationship;

- there is a continuing "umbrella" prohibition on the dispatch of the Self Defence Forces abroad for military purposes (including participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations and disaster relief). Those who support this prohibition fear that such assignments could lead to the Self Defence Forces risking exposure to combat and that the dispatch abroad of the SDF would involve "the exercise of military power offshore", which is forbidden under both the Constitution and the Self Defence Forces Law. It is uncertain whether the Government will be successful in its continuing attempts to secure Diet approval for participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, or whether the recent dispatch of MSDF mine clearing vessels to the Gulf will be repeated.

The Japan-USA Strategic Relationship

The major factor contributing to the stability and prosperity enjoyed by Japan since the end of the Pacific War has been the smooth functioning of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and Treaty of Security between Japan and the United States (the so-called old security treaty). This treaty was concluded in 1951, during the Korean conflict, when Japan's foreign interests were limited and when American forces enjoyed overwhelming global and regional air, naval, and qualitative ground superiority.

The old security treaty placed emphasis on the United States right to deploy forces in Japan. In the late 1950s, Japan proposed revisions with a view to matching treaty provisions to current circumstances which led, in January 1960, to the Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This new treaty came into force in June 1960 and, although revised, remains the legal basis and framework for bilateral defence cooperation.

A significant element of the new treaty is Article Five which states that, while the United States is to provide assistance to Japan in times of threats to national security, there is no reciprocal obligation on the part of Japan to come to the aid of United States forces in Japan (USFJ), or to respond in any way to an attack on United States territory. The treaty is not one of collective defence, but of cooperation for the protection and security of Japan.⁵

American withdrawal from Viet Nam, the evolution of "detente", and the Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s led many observers in Japan to comment on what was then perceived as a "strategy gap" between the two countries - with Japan emphasizing the political and economic aspects of East-West relations while the United States stressed the need for its allies to enhance military preparedness. There was also a lack of clear understanding of the bilateral security treaty by both the American and Japanese publics: many in the United States argued that Japan received security benefits while giving little in return; many Japanese viewed USFJ as a means to bolster American regional interests and only by extension contributing to Japanese national defence.⁶

The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier:

In the early 1980s, officials in the Reagan Administration began to criticize Japan not only for its failure to shoulder a fair share of the defence burden but for Japan's seeming unwillingness to adhere to a hard-line (or realistic) approach to Soviet military adventurism and expansionism. American doubts were somewhat placated by Prime Minister Nakasone who, when visiting the United States in 1981, announced that Japan would serve as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in cooperation with Washington to ensure regional stability.

The 1983 Williamsburg Declaration on Security⁷ allied Japan even more closely with the security policies of the United States and NATO. The Williamsburg Declaration caused Nakasone and the ruling LDP great difficulty in the Diet. Opposition critics complained that Nakasone had committed Japan to further involvement in America's renewed global containment strategy and to a greater Japanese military role in Asia Pacific. However unpopular at home, Nakasone's comments were welcomed by Reagan Administration officials and convinced many in the United States that Japan was committed to developing the military capability necessary to defend itself against the Soviet threat.⁸

From the United States perspective Japan, with its recent high defence budgets and more vigorous espousal of its community of interests with the West, more fully shared Washington's strategic appreciation of Asia Pacific issues and accordingly continued to play a strategically important role. In practical terms, Japan-United States joint planning expanded in several areas, the most commented on being the defence of Japan's vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to 1000 nautical miles offshore.

Japan continues to be of central importance to Washington's Asia Pacific strategy which continues to stress forward deployment (although at reduced levels) and the requirement for secure bases, especially in the absence of stability in the Korean Peninsula and the uncertain situation in China, the growing influence of India, and the question of finding effective substitutes for American naval and air bases in the Philippines.

While current Japan-United States defence cooperation is based on a concurrence of views of changing strategic realities, there are longer term problems of burden-sharing in Japan and the role of the Self Defence Forces within Asia Pacific. The Japanese response to these questions will largely shape their defence posture and their military mission in the coming years.

A review of the Japan-United States security relationship illustrates that, even in periods of tension arising from the political or economic dimensions of the bilateral relationship, Japan never entertained an alternative to maintaining the American security umbrella. From the early 1980s until the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, there had been little divergence between Japanese and American assessments of the nature of the threat to Japanese and regional security.⁹

Threats to National Security

For Japanese defence planners, Russia now poses the principal potential military threat to Japan and to East Asia. The JDA estimates that the Russian Federation/CIS¹⁰ maintains one fourth to one third of its strategic missiles, one sixth of its ground troops, one quarter of its aircraft, and over one quarter of its naval forces in the Far East. In addition, Backfire bombers capable of carrying nuclear armed air launched cruise missiles (ALCMS) have been deployed in the region. The JDA views Japan's strategic position, denying the Russian Pacific Fleet free access to the open ocean, and astride air and sea lanes which link eastern Russia with North and East Asia, as providing a geographic basis for a possible Russo-Japanese military confrontation.¹¹

The strong negative public reaction to the old Soviet Union by the Japanese and, in the current global resource supply situation, the lack of interest by the business community in Siberian development leave only a small (if growing) domestic Japanese constituency pressing for improved bilateral relations. Gorbachev's early arms reductions

initiatives enjoyed relatively little credibility in the face of massive Soviet conventional and nuclear forces deployed near Japan. At the core of Japan-Soviet hostility lay the seeming insolvable problem of the disputed Northern Territories.¹²

Japanese and Soviet initiatives in the late 1980s to resolve the territorial issue were designed to convince Japanese domestic opinion that progress was possible. Such exercises benefitted both the Soviets - who continued to court Japanese investment and economic assistance, and the governments of Prime Ministers Takeshita, Uno, and Kaifu - which had staked its reputation on the eventual reversion of the islands to Japan.¹³

The boundary dispute was, however, directly related to the USA-USSR strategic balance of power, over which the Japanese had very little influence (and which still effects how Moscow, Washington and Tokyo approach the issue). The Northern Territories continue to provide Russia with naval and air facilities necessary for defending Soviet ballistic missile submarine bastions in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.¹⁴

But there is no longer a Soviet Union, and a small but growing number of Japanese policy makers are of the opinion that there is no direct military threat to Japan from Asia Pacific. Russian/CIS SSBN bastions are viewed by these officials as defensive measures subject to future strategic arms limitations negotiations. The question of reversion of the Northern Territories is now being pursued vigorously by Tokyo, and the remaining obstacles are political and economic, not strategic. The rationale for Japan's alliance with the United States has disappeared as unexpectedly and as thoroughly as the old Soviet threat, and the resulting policy vacuum has yet to be filled.

The Future of Japanese National Security Policy

It is unlikely that Japan will drastically alter its security policy in the near to mid-term. Many in the LDP, the JDA and the Foreign Ministry are highly sceptical of Yeltsin, and argue that the formal end of the Soviet Union does not change the geopolitical fact that Russia remains the main potential antagonist for the United States, Europe, and Japan. Japanese strategic thinking will continue to be based on the absolute necessity of maintaining strong defence links with the United States. These links are not important only because of any perceived or potential military threat to Japan but also as a means of bridging those aspects of the Japan-United States relationship which have been undergoing such strain over the past decade.

The Japanese are well aware of the continuing strategic importance of Asia Pacific to the United States, and consider it inconceivable that Washington would significantly withdraw its conventional forces or nuclear umbrella from Japan.

The Japanese have responded to American pressure to increase their defence budget and Tokyo's recent agreement to increase further its financial contributions in support of USFJ,¹⁵ while alleviating to some extent bilateral tensions, still has not answered a fundamental question: to what extent should Japan assume responsibility for its own and regional security?

It is not lost on the Bush Administration, Congress - or the Japanese - that the United States has to borrow from Japan in order to ensure American security, a situation which is untenable in the long run. Yet, the historical baggage and latent anti-militarist sentiments within the Japanese electorate are also strategic realities. The result of these contradictory tendencies is that the Japan-United States security relationship, while indispensable to both, will become more complex in the face of increased bilateral trade friction and a growing (if grudging) realization of the changing nature and sources of Asia Pacific instability.¹⁶

There is no evidence to support the theory that Japan will increase significantly its military posture and scope of operations in Asia Pacific. The concept of "defence for defence" will continue to guide force deployments and procurement. While a significant increase in Japan's military commitments in the region might be viewed favourably by the United States (although there would also be some criticism), this would be offset by the adverse reaction of others in the region, especially - but not limited to - those countries which had suffered invasion and occupation by Japanese Imperial forces. By the same token, any drastic cutback of American military capability in Asia Pacific would be viewed with concern by regional states as lessening the ability of the United States to exercise a "restraining" influence on Japanese power.

Japan's contribution to regional stability and security will focus on the disbursement of Official Development Assistance funds, with emphasis on those countries which are essential to regional stability and where there are Japanese economic interests to bolster and protect, and to ensuring that all aspects of Japanese defence planning and budgeting are as transparent as domestic political practices permit. This, and agreement to discuss security matters with other Asia Pacific states in the context of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Dialogue¹⁷, will somewhat lessen suspicion of Japan in the eyes of its neighbours which, in itself, will be an invaluable and far-reaching regional confidence building measure.

END NOTES

1. This is perhaps what most differentiates Japan from Germany in post-war dealings with former adversaries. For all the barbarism of the European war, the centuries old "habit of dialogue" among European peoples eased German re-integration into Europe.
2. Defence policy making in Japan is not the sole responsibility of the Japan Defence Agency; in effect it resides within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and - to a greater or lesser extent depending on the incumbent - in the Prime Minister's Office. The large number of secondments to the JDA from Foreign Affairs and Finance ensures these ministries a leading role in defence policy developments and initiatives (often well before the JDA has developed issues to the point where formal interdepartmental discussions are required).

At their inception, the Self Defence Forces (SDF) were objects of public and media antipathy - later apathy - for the stated reasons of their being in violation of Article IX of the Constitution. Most outside observers would agree that the real reason for this early antipathy was public resentment of Imperial forces' conduct in the years leading up to 1945, and their responsibility for the subsequent humiliation of surrender and occupation.

3. The Government's current interpretation of Article IX prohibits the provision of war materiel or support to other countries. However, under the Japan-United Nations Status of Forces Agreement, were the cease fire situation in Korea to deteriorate to such an extent that United Nations activities would be significantly increased, specific U.S. bases in Japan - designated as UN Command (Rear) bases - would be used to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Korea.
4. Continued mainstream opposition in Japan to nuclear arms virtually rules out this option for the foreseeable future. The Japanese Supreme Court has declined to provide an authoritative interpretation of Article IX, preferring to leave the question to the legislative and administrative branches of the Government.
5. A product of the post-war policy of containment, the treaty has been interpreted to allow USFJ to be deployed elsewhere to enhance regional security (specified in Article Six, and most recently exercised when U.S. Marines based in Okinawa were deployed in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm).
6. The physical presence of United States forces in Japan (USFJ) is impressive. There are 188 USFJ military installations of various sizes, seven of which are under the joint auspices of USFJ and United Nations Command (Rear), and approximately 54,000 USFJ personnel. Components of USFJ are:

Army: 2,400, mainly deployed as part of 9th Corps Headquarters at Camp Zama;

Air Force: elements of the Fifth Air Force (16,600), including the Fifth Air Force Headquarters (Yokota Air Base), a tactical airlift group (Yokota Air Base), a tactical fighter wing and a strategic air wing on Okinawa, and two tactical fighter squadrons at Misawa Air Base. These forces are equipped with F-15 and F-16 interceptors; RF-4C, C-130, and HC-130 logistical support aircraft, and AWACS units;

Marines: 26,000, consisting of two air groups at Iwakuni, an air group, a logistical support group, and the Third Marine Amphibious Force based in Okinawa;

Navy: 7,400 personnel are stationed in Japan with headquarters in Yokosuka, a maritime air patrol group at Atsugi with detachments at Misawa and Okinawa (Kadena).

U.S. naval and marine forces in Japan are part of the Seventh Fleet, responsible for patrolling the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, with assets including three aircraft carriers (carrying 250 aircraft), 23 surface combat ships, 18 support vessels, seven ocean-going amphibious attack vessels, and approximately eight submarines. In addition, large supplies of war reserves and operational project stocks supporting the Korea-based U.S. Eighth Army are stored at the Sagami General Depot.

7. The Williamsburg Summit Declaration on Security reads in part:

"As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. Our arms will never be used except in response to aggression.

"We wish to achieve lower levels of arms through serious arms control negotiations. With this statement, we reaffirm our dedication to the search for peace and meaningful arms reductions. We are ready to work with the Soviet Union to this purpose and call upon the Soviet Union to work with us."

8. The allegiance of Japan to American arms control and disarmament (ACD) policies had tangible benefits, most dramatically in American insistence (and in line with the Williamsburg statement) that the USA-USSR INF treaty include the elimination of

Soviet Asia-based SS-20 missiles which were at the time stationed within targeting range of Japan.

9. Various U.S. Administrations, and Congress, have over the years taken issue with the relatively small budgets the Japanese have devoted to defence. Congressional critics have also linked trade issues with defence. While both Governments have sought to keep trade and security apart, the 1987 Toshiba-COCOM scandal, the FSX imbroglio, and the ongoing Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) talks suggest that the two areas are no longer separable. The recent rise in Japanese defence budgets and increased Japanese financial contributions to support USFJ have been welcomed by Washington, and both countries continue to work quietly (and closely) to increase joint efforts to enhance Japanese and regional security.
10. For the purposes of this paper, the Russian Federation is deemed the successor state to the Soviet Union for Asia Pacific issues.
11. Prior to the dissolution of the USSR, Soviet ground forces in the Far East numbered about 390,000 (500,000 if troops deployed along the Sino-Russian border were included) and had undergone continuous qualitative improvements in tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, surface-to-surface missiles, assault helicopters and multi-rocket launchers. Over 2,300 of the Soviet Union's 8,840 combat aircraft (strategic and tactical bombers, fighters, and patrol aircraft) were deployed in the Far East. The Pacific fleet, with 908 ships including 95 principal surface combatants and 140 submarines, was the largest in the Soviet Navy and is now the principle fleet of the Russian Federation and CIS forces.
12. In the closing days of World War II, Soviet forces occupied the Japanese "Northern Territories" of Kunashiri, Shikotan, Etorofu, and the Habomais. In early 1990, Soviet ground strength in the Northern Territories was estimated at one division (15,000 troops) armed with tanks, amphibious personnel carriers, helicopters (redeployed from Afghanistan), and long range artillery (130mm cannon). In addition, 40 MiG23 Flogger fighters were deployed in Etorofu.
13. Despite regular official consultations in a number of areas an overall improvement in political relations continues to be hampered by Russian possession of the disputed Northern Territories which, with the reversion of Okinawa in 1970, is the last significant territorial issue left unresolved from World War Two (a peace treaty would be the last political issue, although the deconstruction of the Soviet Union will have unpredictable effects on negotiations).
14. Soviet military doctrine considered Asia Pacific to be a major potential area of conflict. Soviet plans called for a defensive force posture designed to defend the USSR and to allow the concentration of forces in other regions for offensive purposes. Secondary military objectives included:

- protecting strategic strike capabilities (specifically SSBNs);
- conducting strategic and theatre-nuclear strikes;
- neutralizing Japan and South Korea to prevent them from supporting American forces;
- controlling ocean areas contiguous to the USSR,;
- preventing offensive action by American naval forces and seeking out and destroying these forces at sea;
- containing China;
- controlling key straits in the region;
- attacking allied sea lines of communication (SLOCS) throughout the region.

These missions highlight the strategic importance of the Northern Territories and the Kuriles and explained the Soviet rationale for placing them in a "sea control zone", control of which would have facilitated the movement of Soviet naval forces between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, including the resupply of Petropavlovsk.


In the event of hostilities, control of the straits adjacent to Japan would have been seriously contested. The Soviets could have provided a credible naval and air defence of the Northern Territories, the Kuriles, and the western Pacific. Soviet planners realized that American and Japanese naval units would have been capable of causing substantive damage to Soviet vessels in confined waters, and Soviet attack submarines and strike bombers would have attacked allied naval and air forces, specifically U.S. carrier battle groups, before they could reach within striking range of the USSR and before they could have contributed to the air battle over the Northern Territories, the Kuriles, and Hokkaido.

15. While Japan will continue to increase its share of maintenance costs for American forces stationed in Japan (as a means to easing the burden-sharing concerns expressed by the Administration and Congress), overall Japanese defence spending will continue at its current rate but will be adversely affected by any decrease in the value of the Yen and by any shrinkage in government tax revenues.
16. See Policy Planning Staff Paper No. 92/3, "Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: Recent Trends", External Affairs and International Trade Canada, January, 1992.
17. Japanese views of various Asia Pacific security proposals have been almost uniform in their disapproval. Initiatives from Mongolia and Korea were commented on favourably but not pursued. Tokyo dismissed Soviet proposals as self-serving and hollow, and criticised Australia and Canada for their naïveté in appearing to follow the Soviet's regional agenda or to impose European models on Asia. The

revolutionary approach taken by ASEAN in the leadup to the 1991 PMC obliged Japan to reconsider its attitude towards discussion of regional security arrangements.

By the time news of ASEAN's intentions had reached Tokyo, much rethinking had already been done, and a decision was taken to support calls for a multilateral forum to discuss security. To ensure that the Soviet Union would continue to be isolated from the region, it was decided to support ASEAN's proposals but with the proviso that the existing PMC be the preferred forum. This would allow discussions on "regional reassurance" to take place among like-minded countries while deferring participation by the Soviet Union.

Having launched the "Nakayama initiative" at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC, Japan appears to have committed itself to participation in a multilateral dialogue on regional security issues. It remains to be seen, however, whether Foreign Minister Watanabe will continue to support this approach.

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