




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

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
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
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Naval Defence of Canada

A Paper Read by Mr. H. J. Wickham
before the Toronto Branch of the
Canadian Navy League



Naval Defence of Canada

A PAPER

READ BY

MR. H. J. WICKHAM

BEFORE THE TORONTO BRANCH OF THE
CANADIAN NAVY LEAGUE.

TORONTO:
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1896.

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Naval Defence of Canada.

The following address on "Naval Defence for Canada" was delivered recently before members of the Navy League branch formed in this city:—

Some time has now elapsed since the formation of the Toronto branch of the Navy League. The objects for which the parent league in England is established, as laid down in its constitution, are obviously in a large measure addressed to the people of the United Kingdom, and the expression "to spread information showing the vital importance to the British Empire of naval supremacy," although very comprehensive, leads at once to the question, How is it proposed that the colonies shall assist in the work of the parent league?

Branches which started in some parts of the empire began by advocating direct contributions on the part of the colonies to the British navy; the delay which has taken place in Canada has been caused by correspondence which has been going on, between this branch and the head office, in which it was pointed out that owing to constitutional difficulties which are as yet in the way of direct contribution on the part of the colonies, it was necessary that the parent league should define for the information of the branches, more precisely than had heretofore been done, the lines upon which colonial branches might work in order to forward the general cause of the league. In consequence of this correspondence a circular has been issued in which suggestions are made by the parent league as to the manner in which the colonies may thus assist. This circular will be referred to hereafter.

One great effort which the Navy League should make is to impress upon the public mind the necessity for each part of the empire looking beyond its own limits, and realizing that each is only a part of a great oceanic empire, held together by the command of the sea, and that should Britain's naval supremacy be successfully challenged in any part of the world the disaster will be felt equally by all parts of the empire, wherever situate. We live in an age of organization and consolidation. We find that in all business matters it pays to be methodical. The man who has his business best organized is, other things being equal, the one who succeeds best. We all recognize these principles in everyday life, and yet when we come to apply them to national affairs we are apt to let what is everyone's business be no one's business. Events, however, are crowding upon us, and unless we desire ourselves to be compared with the proverbial ostrich, we, in common with our colonial brethren the world over, must be up and doing. In view of recent expressions of public sentiment there can be no doubt that Canadians have fully made up their mind to remain an integral part of the British Empire. If we desire to reap the benefit of this wise conclusion, we must cease to confine our mental vision to matters purely local and Canadian, and we must take a survey of the entire empire to which we belong, and shape our policy in matters of defence, and

generally having regard to our position in that empire.

The United Kingdom has in the transaction of her own business heretofore acted upon tolerably well-fixed principles, one of which is, that to secure her trade, she must be supreme at sea.

The merchants and financiers of England are a hard-headed lot, and they recognize as a business principle, that money spent upon the British Navy and everything necessary to retain the command of the sea, is money laid out to the best advantage. In fact they regard it as nothing more or less than national insurance, and therefore as such, is as much essential to their business requirements, as the insurance of houses or goods against risk of fire, they consequently insist upon their sea-going interests being adequately protected. The financiers of Great Britain are constantly looking about them for new fields in which to invest their surplus capital. We all know that large sums have been invested in various enterprises in the United States; we also remember the "tumble" which these securities took not long ago. What English capitalists want is a field for profitable investment, having due regard to the safety of the security. That being the case, and if we try for a moment to place ourselves in the position of the money lenders in England, does it not seem reasonable to suppose, that granted a desire on the part of the British people to-day to draw closer to the colonies in commercial matters, the financiers of the old country will be apt to invest their money more readily, in the developing of such of her colonies, as in a practical manner recognize the soundness of Great Britain's policy of national insurance against risk from war by following her example in that respect. Thus it may be demonstrated, that every dollar spent by Canadians in placing

their country in an adequate state of defence is, from a national point of view, the very best investment they can make. It will draw to this country, on the best possible terms, exactly what we most want, namely, the means of developing our immense natural resources. We do not need to be reminded that in England, as elsewhere, politicians are ever apt to practise economy at the expense of national security. It is this tendency, in fact, which has called the Navy League into existence. It would seem that in Canada there is ample room for an Army League as well as a Navy League. In December last upon a well-defined war scare presenting itself, it was found necessary to send our Quarter Master-General scurrying to England to buy rifles, which should have been on the spot. It has been clearly shown that there is plenty of work for the Navy League, both at home and in the colonies, and that our organization should serve a useful purpose, but in order to do so we must recognize that there is a limit to our sphere of action, and that by overstepping that limit, we shall be probably doing more harm than good.

The Navy League in Canada should first ascertain what are Canada's requirements from a naval point of view, and, having made up our mind on this matter, we must set to work to impress our views on the public at large, and particularly on men occupying public positions. To begin with, it must be remembered, that Canada has already, in establishing and maintaining a militia, acted upon the principle that some measures of local defence are necessary. The circular to which I shall refer points out that it is not proposed to establish separate colonial navies. It is true that in the case of Australia a local navy has been established, but it is thought by many that the principle is vicious, involving as it does, some degree of divided con-

trol. No doubt it would be best if we could jump at once into the position of maintaining an Imperial army and navy, in which the colonies, as contributaries, should have a voice in the control; but although our minds are open as to the possibility of our ultimately achieving this desideratum, we think that in the meantime there are many ways in which Canada, as a colony, may and should strengthen herself by the application of naval science without in any way creating the difficulties incidental to a divided control of the forces employed.

It will be necessary, pending the working out of a complete Imperial system, for each colony to improvise such local means as may be useful, so that, as indicated in the league's circular, each may add to the naval strength of the whole. In devising such means we must look as far ahead as possible, so that the means employed may hereafter be capable of being expanded into a comprehensive Imperial system. In illustration of what I mean by this I will say that I believe it will be found necessary, owing to inherent defects, in the near future to completely reorganize the present system of Royal naval reserve. The present force will be employed, but under changed conditions to suit a more Imperial system, by which the trade routes of the empire will be directly protected by, as it were, an auxiliary navy, composed of naval reserve cruisers (improved "Teutonics"), manned and officered exclusively by naval reserve men. In organizing a naval reserve force for Canada regard should be had to such a contingency. The regulations as to age and fitness upon entry should be as stringent and great attention paid to matters of discipline, so that our reserve may be fully able to take its place in an Imperial system and be an improvement upon the existing force of the Royal Naval Reserve.

If we look at the frontier and coast line of Canada, which we should have to defend in case Great Britain should become involved in war, with any maritime power capable of detaching raiding cruisers, it does not need the knowledge of an expert to see that purely military, as distinguished from naval science, would be wholly inadequate for our protection.

Those who have studied the question at all must realize the danger to which the seaport towns and coasts of the colonies generally would be exposed to improvised cruisers, which would no doubt be sent against us at the first outbreak of a maritime war, and, notwithstanding the immense fleet which Great Britain possesses, it would be simply impossible for her, having regard to the number of mercantile interests and trade routes which she would have to guard in different parts of the world, to spare a sufficient number of men-of-war to patrol our coasts. All European countries have realized the necessity of providing complete systems of coast defence by means of torpedo warfare. The knowledge that Canada possesses such a system would have a decidedly deterrent effect on would-be raiders. At this point I will set out that part of the circular above referred to which deals directly with the duties of the colonial branches.

"How can our colonies best assist the attainment of a condition essential to the existence of the British Empire? The Navy League does not presume to more than suggest what can be done by them. It does not urge direct contributions towards the cost of the Imperial navy, nor the creation of independent colonial fleets. The direction of naval affairs, and the control of our fleets must be under one authority. A number of separate organizations would have the weakness which has ever been observed in the temporary alliance of foreign powers at sea. There are, however, other ways in which our

colonies may sensibly augment the naval strength of the empire, and support the objects of the Navy League. The operations of modern fleets are much facilitated by the possession of good harbors, with moderate local defences, and the necessary appliances for rapidly coaling and refitting ships of war. Adequate docks are an important adjunct to all ports used as naval bases. When ships of war put into port during hostilities to replenish and refit, perhaps disabled after an action, it is essential that the completion of what is necessary should be carried out in the shortest possible time, without a great demand upon the crew, probably much in need of rest, and perhaps seriously diminished in numbers.

"The question of how to replace men killed and wounded in ships on a foreign station at short notice has not yet been considered. It might be feasible for our colonies to train the seafaring population on that coast, and so afford a valuable naval reserve of this nature.

"A training ship, with staff and boats for such a purpose, at the principal ports, would be a useful contribution to Imperial defence. Men might be enrolled as a naval reserve under conditions appropriate to each colony, with a liability to serve in the fleet on the station when required. Such a body could also provide for local defence

"For this to be efficient, the various weapons which it comprises—guns, mines, and torpedo boats—should form one organization under a single head. To meet an attack from the sea, such weapons as are best served by seamen who can discern the character of approaching vessels.

"These are only a few indications of the methods by which the colonies can contribute to our maritime strength. The first thing is to form branches of the Navy League, which should devote themselves to spreading

and maintaining sound opinions on defence and its real source, a preponderating navy. The more active measures would follow, and, acting in concert with the Imperial Government, our colonies would thus become a valuable source of naval strength, and be more closely connected with the great work of Imperial defence."

I now propose shortly to discuss these suggestions, bringing to bear some information which I have been able to collect, as affecting the questions we now have under consideration, and I shall also submit certain propositions which I hope to hear discussed, so that we may be in a position to base appropriate resolutions defining the objects sought to be attained by this branch of the Navy League.

In considering what steps should be taken to supplement our present military organization, with appropriate naval forces, we may profitably take into account the experience which other countries have had in providing and maintaining naval reserve forces. Our main object should be, as business people, to see that for any money we may expend in this direction, we get the best possible results, and that any force which we may provide shall be, so far as it is possible to make it so, an efficient force. For the sake of convenience I will set out under separate heads the proposals which it has occurred to me should be made, so that these proposals may be discussed clause by clause :

(1) The appointment of a naval officer (preferably a torpedo officer) to a position analogous to that of the Major-General commanding the forces in Canada, to consult and co-operate with the latter.

(2) Providing necessary material for coast defence, such as torpedo boats, systems of mines and a few gun boats for coast and lake defence to be used by the reserve men for target practice.

(3) The establishment of torpedo schools on both coasts with a limited number of duly qualified instructors. These establishments to train a force limited in point of number, to be used for the torpedo defence of the coast and water frontier, and to be analogous to our Royal Schools of Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery.

(4) The establishment of a naval reserve force analogous to our militia, and the means whereby the same may be trained to a state of efficiency.

(5) Adapting our present system of coast signal service and our present fisheries protective service to the requirements of coast defence.

(6) Providing training ships for boys in different parts of Canada, so that Canadian youths may be trained and qualified to take positions in the British Navy and in the British Mercantile Marine.

(1) In reference to the first suggestion, that a naval officer should be appointed to act with the Major-General commanding the forces, I would couple it with the remark that it would be well if the Canadian Government should in the first place appoint a commission consisting of duly qualified naval and military officers, who, in conjunction with officers of our own departments, should inquire into the whole subject of naval defence for Canada and make a report thereon with recommendations based on the results of their inquiries. It is impossible for a country in Canada's position to prosecute experiments in naval science necessary to keep abreast of the times. Happily it is not necessary for her to do so; the appointment of a naval officer to be replaced every three or four years, would ensure our naval requirements being looked after by an officer with the most recent technical knowledge.

(2) With regard to material necessary for coast defence, we may pro-

bably follow with advantage in our general arrangements the examples of France and Germany by supplying ourselves with a sufficient number of (a) torpedo boats for operation on both coasts. To this I would add a limited number of (b) torpedo gun vessels of great speed, capable of choosing their own distance in attacking by daylight any war vessels of the enemy in our own waters. (c) The buildings, etc., necessary for a torpedo school on each coast. (d) Naval barracks and batteries at St. John, Halifax, Vancouver, Victoria, Quebec, Montreal and Toronto, in which Canadian Naval Reservemen may be drilled. (e) Such fixed defences in addition to those already in existence as may be necessary to command the entrances to our principal harbors.

(3) It has been found that only picked men, trained to a high state of efficiency, can be used for torpedo warfare to man torpedo boats. I would, therefore, recommend that in the first place a limited number of properly qualified torpedo instructors should be engaged by the Canadian Government for service at the torpedo schools to be established on each coast. Great care should be exercised in selecting candidates for the torpedo service; they should be engaged as continuous service men for a term of years after having qualified. In order to secure the best results it will be necessary that these men receive the same pay and benefit as those who occupy similar positions in the British navy.

Canadians should be encouraged more and more than they are at present to enter the royal navy as officers, and in this way they would be able to fill the positions of command which would be created by such a force. In the meantime we should have to rely upon obtaining the services of retired torpedo officers of the royal navy.

(4) In approaching the question of a

naval reserve force for Canada, I may say that it is possible within the limit of this paper to fully describe the various systems which are adopted by the different European countries. I cannot more than briefly give the result of my investigations. Great Britain is the only power who relies exclusively on volunteers. France and Germany demand the services of every able-bodied man between certain ages, to serve the country, either in the army or in the navy. For this reason both France and Germany have a reserve force of men largely in excess (proportionally with their requirements) of those of Great Britain. I shall, however, deal with the subject of the Royal Naval Reserve, as at present existing in England, because in any system which we may adopt for Canada we should have to see that it harmonizes with existing conditions within the empire.

In a paper which I read before the Canadian Military Institute about eight months ago, I drew attention to the fact that colonial seamen were excluded from enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve. Through the press I have also agitated for an extension of the privileges to colonial seamen, pointing out the abundance of good material we have to draw from. It may be a coincidence, but I have recently received a copy of an act now before the British Parliament permitting the Admiralty to enroll men for the Royal Naval Reserve outside of the British Isles.

The present system of Royal Naval Reserve came into being in 1859. Until 1870 it was composed exclusively of men who had served in the mercantile marine, but since that time there has existed a second class, composed of men who are engaged in fishing, coasting, and other seafaring pursuits. Still later a third class, composed of boys of the mercantile training ships, has been allowed: also a class of firemen.

In order to secure the services of Royal Naval Reservemen the British admiralty pay a premium to such officers and men who come up to the standard of qualifications laid down in the regulations, which will be found in the navy list. Both officers and men put in about a month's drill each year at whatever battery or naval reserve drill ship may happen to be convenient. It is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to give full details, but a careful consideration of the system leaves no room for doubt that it has many and grave defects.

Naval officers have stated to me that when naval reservemen come on board a man-of-war they have to be put among the idlers. Their qualifications as able seamen find no scope, for the modern fighting ship is mastless, and requires, in addition to the engine room force, only the men to direct the ship and operate the gun torpedo and electric armament. Their training is of little value for they have no permanent organization, no permanent officers whom they know and to whom they are accustomed. No uniform system of instruction has been given them, and the weapons with which they have been in the habit of going through their annual drill are mostly obsolete. The short periods of training with strange comrades, strange officers, varied weapons and unfamiliar surroundings, owing to their constantly changing the place at which they take their drill, cannot possibly give them the discipline and systematic way of performing their duties so necessary to the fighting efficiency of that complicated machine, the warship of the present day. The full strength of the corps can never be available on short notice, for it is much scattered, not only over the United Kingdom, but over the face of the world, and it would be a liberal estimate to state that within a fortnight after being called out not more than one-third of the enrolled strength could

present themselves at the rendezvous, and these might find themselves drafted to a class of vessel with which they were totally unfamiliar and stationed at a type of gun they had never seen.

In case I should be misunderstood I desire to emphasize the fact that it is the system, and not the material, which is at fault. It must be obvious that there is no opportunity for the creation of that esprit de corps which goes so far towards making efficient a fighting force, whether naval or military. This esprit de corps can only exist where men are banded together, and the circumstances under which the British Naval Reserve men acquire what little training they now get prevent them from being associated with each other to any extent. In outlining a scheme for Canada I have sought to correct this defect by having the force localized. In this way the reserve belonging to each seaport town or city would have its separate existence and entity. The other defect in the R. N. R., which is caused by the men being detached all over the world, and the impossibility of their being collected in a short space of time at one rendezvous. I have sought to obviate by drawing upon the fisherman rather than the sailors of the Mercantile Marine. It may be said that I have not indicated in any way the number of men I would propose to have in such a force as I have outlined. The only answer which can be made to this is that it must be dependent upon the funds appropriated for the purpose, and in any system which may be adopted care should be taken to have a force small in number, but efficient, rather than large in number and correspondingly inefficient.

I shall briefly notice another force which has (1st April, 1892) been disbanded. The "Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers." This force was composed of men not professionally seafaring,

but with a taste for and a certain familiarity with nautical pursuits. In 1888 it numbered 1,477 men and 55 officers. The late Sir George Tryon was the chairman of a commission appointed to inquire whether this force could be relied upon to fulfil duties in connection with naval defence. And after a careful and exhaustive inquiry in which all the commanding officers were examined, the commission reported that whilst they appreciated the zeal which ran through the entire force they were forced reluctantly to come to the conclusion that their continued existence did not warrant the expenditure of public money. It may here be remarked that the United States, in organizing their present force of local naval militia, have largely adopted the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers as a pattern.

Looking, then, at the matter of a Canadian naval reserve as a practical question, we should seek to steer clear, as far as possible, of the defects which have been found to exist in other systems.

A force chiefly drawn from our fishing population would have the advantage of being always close at hand. It has been shown that seamanship, in the sense of a practical knowledge of handling sails and spars, is no longer essential to the fighting sailor. The statistics show that in 1894 70,719 men were engaged in the fishing industry; of these about 30,000 received the bounty.

It is not necessary to analyze these figures. There is no doubt whatever that we have ample material to draw from. The winter affords an excellent opportunity for drills. I would favor the erection of naval reserve barracks at the principal seaport towns, at which during the winter a certain number of enrolled men should qualify in gunnery. It would not be necessary that they be instructed in the use of every class of weapon with which a modern man-of-war is equipped. Each station

should have a 4.7 or 6 inch Q. F. gun. This gun should be so located as to defend the entrance of some harbor, so as to be of practical value in time of need. It should be housed so that men could drill at it in cold weather. All its appointments should be the same as on shipboard. Each station should also be supplied with a few machine guns; also rifles, cutlasses, and a drill shed, with a competent staff of instructors. The force should be commanded by officers from the Royal Navy on the retired lists. These appointments should not be permanent, but should be changed every two or three years to ensure a proper standard of technical qualification being maintained. To commence with, a certain number of gunboats, of a size allowable under the agreement with the United States for the upper lakes, should be provided, so that each summer a certain number of men should have an opportunity of target practice and of obtaining an extra degree of efficiency, for which a premium should be paid. The reserve should consist of two classes. Upon enrollment a man to belong to the first class, in which he should remain for a period of five years, putting in at least two months' steady drill each winter under pay. In this way a certain number of our fishermen would find remunerative employment at a season of the year when they are unable to follow their usual avocation. Every year a number equal to one-fifth of the whole force should after the completion of five years' service go into the second class for another period of five years, doing a limited amount of drill each winter. Both classes should be liable to be called out in case of war. Upon declaration of war the entire force should be placed under the direct control of the British Admiralty.

Time and space forbid my going into any more details, but I have endeavored to sketch in outline an organization for naval defence, which I believe to be suited to our requirements.

Another subject which should engage public attention is the establishment of suitable training ships for boys, so that Canadian youths may be facilitated in acquiring an early training, which will make them fit either for the Royal Navy as seamen or for service in the mercantile marine in a similar capacity. It has often occurred to me, and I am sure to all those who have thought upon the subject, that there is a want of some tie of a personal nature, which will make for the unity of the empire. I cannot conceive a stronger bond of union than would result from Canadians entering both the British Navy and Army as sailors and soldiers. The fact of Canadian parents having their sons serving as blue jackets all over the world in British men-of-war, would give the whole people such a personal interest in the British Navy as would go very far in cementing the empire. I do not think too much stress can possibly be laid upon this point.

Shortly after the establishment of the Toronto branch, I communicated with the Secretary of the League in London, requesting him to furnish me with full particulars, so that I might be in a position to answer the inquiries which are from time to time addressed to me by parents, as to what they are to do in order to get their boys into the Navy. In response to my request, the Secretary of the League in London, has, in conjunction with the Colonial Committee, been at very great pains to procure and formulate information upon this head. These gentlemen have also communicated with the Admiralty, and as a consequence of their representations the Admiralty have issued a circular dated April, 1895, entitled, "Pay, Position, and Prospects of Seamen and Boys of the Royal Navy." This circular presents in a condensed form, the conditions, etc., which have to be complied with by those who wish to enter the Royal Navy as boys, and

also, as its title indicates, gives a full outline of the prospects held out by a career as a seaman in the Royal Navy. A glance at this circular will serve to show that the life of a blue-jacket to-day, is very different from the popular idea, which associates "Jack" with rum and tobacco, and the squandering of his money when "paid off." A few copies of this circular have been sent to me for distribution.

In England most of the training ships for boys are maintained as private institutions. Amongst those of which details have been furnished to me are the Grampian at Belfast, the Warspite in the Thames and the Mercury at Hamble on Southampton water. I have been furnished with full details as to the expense of maintenance and the general scheme of government regularizing these vessels. They do grand work in furnishing seamen for the British navy. It seems to me that the question of training ships for boys should come under the head of education, and as such be forwarded to a large extent by the various Provincial Governments. For instance, I think that a training brig in connection with the Industrial School at Mimico, like those used at Portsmouth and Plymouth for training boys in seamanship, would be a step in the right direction on the part of the Provincial Government. A brig for the training of boys in seamanship would in no way affect the question of agreement between the United States and Great Britain as to the maintenance of war vessels on these lakes. It would not be necessary that they should carry guns at all. They might be simply used for the purpose of instruction in seamanship. At Plymouth

and Portsmouth these brigs get under way at daybreak and cruise outside the harbor each evening and anchoring for the night. The strict discipline of a man-of-war is rigidly enforced on board, and thus the boys receive an early training which leaves its stamp upon their lives. A similar vessel fully equipped with the necessary staff, upon which a certain number of boys from the Industrial School at Mimico should be trained, would not be a very heavy matter of expense. In fact, the expense would be a mere bagatelle in view of the great benefit which would be done by opening up, as it were, a new channel of employment to Canadian youths.

The Grampian at Belfast was formerly H.M.S. Gibraltar. I served in her as a midshipman in her first and only commission in the Mediterranean from 1863 to 1867. She was a sister ship of the Duncan. These two vessels were the largest two-deckers ever launched in the British navy, and they were about the two last in the commission.

I would suggest that a sub-committee be struck to draft such resolutions as may be considered by the branch best calculated to express our view as to the manner in which Canadians should act in supporting the general policy of the Navy League.

I have communicated with the Mayors of various maritime cities in Canada, and have received assurance of the support of these cities just as soon as we formulate a definite line of action. I think we should call upon the Government to appoint a commission to inquire into the whole subject and report with as little delay as possible.



OBJECTS OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

IN CANADA.

Why the League should be supported by all loyal Canadians.

The Navy League is in no sense a political organization. It works for the welfare of the Empire, the preservation of peace, and the prosperity of the British Community.

Here in Canada its objects are :

1. To bring home to Canadians a sense of their dependence on and interest in the naval strength of the Empire.
2. To press upon public attention the need for a Canadian Naval Defence force.
3. To show how Canada can best help the Royal Navy—locally—in time of war.
4. As “knowledge is power,” so want of knowledge is weakness. This League seeks to remedy the prevailing lack of information on naval matters by distributing literature on the subject to its members and the public press, and by promoting the teaching of Naval history in schools.


Address for further information the Hon. Secretary,

H. J. WICKHAM,

Room 81 & 82 Canada Life Bldg,

TORONTO.

Annual Membership Fee for Toronto Branch, \$2.00.



THE NAVY LEAGUE IN CANADA

[*Toronto Branch.*]

At the Annual Meeting of this Branch held at Toronto, on Monday, 21st March, 1898, the following resolution was unanimously adopted :

“Resolved, that whereas the sailors and fishermen of the Dominion of Canada form excellent material from which to recruit men for the Royal Naval Reserve :

“And whereas, under the Imperial law as it now stands, Canadian seamen and others are debarred from enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve unless serving on board vessels registered in the United Kingdom ;

“Therefore the Toronto branch of the Navy League are of the opinion that it would make for the strength and unity of the Empire if the said law were amended so as to permit of the enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve of seamen employed upon Canadian registered vessels or in the fishing industries of Canada.

“This branch of the Navy League are further of opinion that, for the purpose of enrolling and drilling Canadians for the Royal Naval Reserve, at least two sea-going cruisers of modern type of the Royal Navy should be permanently stationed, one on the Atlantic and the other on the Pacific coast of the Dominion.

“And this Branch of the Navy League are further of the opinion that in consideration of an annual sum to be paid by the Dominion of Canada to the Home authorities, the aforesaid vessels should be available for the purpose of training and drilling a local Canadian naval force to be raised under the provisions of the Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865.”

