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TOWARDS A WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION

By Elisabeth Mann Borgese

INTRODUCTION

The proposal for a World Space Organization presents an exciting new challenge for the United Nations. Put on the agenda of the UN General Assembly by the Soviet Union, the proposal envisions a new UN agency which would coordinate activities in outer space. Included in the work of the agency would be the use of outer space for the purposes of disarmament and development. Satellites under international control would monitor arms control treaties and provide to the developing nations information which would be relevant to agriculture, flood control, drought prediction and the like. In addition, enterprises which contributed to industrial expansion, scientific research and technological development could be fostered under the new agency.

The new initiative for the internationally controlled use of outer space has many elements in common with the Law of the Sea proposal, and the negotiations might follow a similar course. This paper explores those similarities with a view to predicting the kinds of difficulties which the deliberations may run into and ways of avoiding the pitfalls of the Law of the Sea negotiations.

The paper also outlines the ways in which Canada would benefit from active support for and participation in the establishment of a World Space Organization.

On 15 August 1985, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, requesting that the question of the non-militarization of outer space be included on the agenda for the Fortieth General Assembly. He also proposed that the Assembly convene an international conference to discuss setting up a World Space Organization to promote international co-operation in peaceful outer space activities. He pointed out that specific actions aimed at creating 'space strike weapons' were already under way, and if the process were not stopped, the arms race

would intensify and broaden in scope, consuming still more resources and creating insurmountable obstacles to joint peaceful space activities.

Annexed to his letter was a draft resolution by which the Assembly would call on states to do everything possible with regard to stopping the arms race in outer space, thereby creating conditions for wide-ranging international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. He also suggested that the Assembly should decide to convene an international conference on cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space not later than 1987. The conference would consider practical arrangements for setting up a World Space Organization, once agreement had been reached to ensure effectively the non-militarization of outer space.

In an accompanying memorandum the Soviet Union listed the advantages that would result from international cooperation to prevent an arms race in space. Such cooperation would not only be in the interests of world peace, but would also make possible a sharing of the scientific benefits obtained from space exploration, which could be applied in biology, medicine, weather forecasting, environmental studies and communications. Remote sensing of the earth by satellites could yield global data for geology and agriculture, for exploration of seas and oceans, and for locating and rescuing disaster victims.

As envisioned in the Soviet memorandum, the new space agency would ensure the equal access of all states to the scientific and technological benefits derived from the exploration of outer space. It could promote the pooling of international resources in joint space projects for peaceful purposes and assist developing countries in that field. It could also help to monitor the observance of international agreements for the non-militarization of outer space.

On 24 September, the Foreign Minister formally introduced the proposal in the General Assembly and said that in order to counter the sinister plans of 'Star

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Wars,' the USSR was putting before the international community a concept of 'Star Peace.' On 14 October the Soviet Union introduced the draft resolution under the title "International co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization" (A/C.1/40/L.1) embodying the principles proposed in the Foreign Minister's statement. The resolution was subsequently modified by replacing the date of 1987 for the calling of an international conference with a much vaguer reference.

At the request of the Soviet Union itself, no action was taken on the draft resolution. While inserting itself into a long line of previous initiatives at the General Assembly [among which the French proposal for the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (1978) deserves particular mention] the Soviet initiative remains unique in the history of space law in that it addresses at the same time the issues of both *disarmament* and *development* and provides for one single institution, the World Space Organization, to deal with both.

For anyone who had followed the Law of the Sea negotiations, the 1985 Soviet proposal for the establishment of a World Space Organization had a familiar ring. The motivation, conceptual basis, substance and proposed procedure were almost identical.

SIMILARITIES WITH THE LAW OF THE SEA

In August 1967, the Ambassador of Malta, Dr. Arvid Pardo, requested the inclusion of an item on the agenda of the General Assembly, entitled, "Questions of the peaceful uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond present limits of national jurisdiction." In introducing this item he talked about development and the arms race and anticipated the arguments. He proposed the same substance and procedure with regard to the deep seabed, or "inner space," which Eduard Shevardnadze was to propose another eighteen years later.

He drew the attention of the Assembly to the vast riches hidden on the deep floor of the world's oceans which technology was rapidly making accessible to exploration and exploitation, and which did not belong to any nation. He pointed to the dangers of military competition to dominate the deep seas and of a race to carve up the no-man's land of the ocean floor, which would give rise to acute conflict and pollution. He explained how the old law of the sea, based on the premises of the sovereignty of coastal states over a narrow belt of ocean along the coasts and the freedom of the seas beyond this, was being eroded and how it should be replaced by a new concept: the common heritage of mankind. He stressed the ecological unity of

ocean space and the interactions between all areas and all uses of ocean space. He concluded by suggesting that the United Nations General Assembly declare the seabed, and its resources beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction, a common heritage of mankind; elaborate a set of principles to govern activities relating to the seabed; and then proceed to negotiate a treaty which would both clearly define the limits of the international seabed and create a new type of international organization to administer and manage its wealth for the benefit of all mankind. The seabed would be used for peaceful purposes only, thus excluding the arms race from an area that comprises over two-thirds of the surface of the globe.

The fundamental weakness of the Seabed Authority, as it emerged from the negotiations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, are twofold. First, the part of the convention establishing the Authority is overburdened with detail which was obsolete even before the coming into force of the convention. This was largely due to the suspiciousness of the industrialized countries; they did not want to leave any discretionary power to the Authority which, they feared, would be dominated in its decision-making by the majority of the developing countries.

The second fundamental flaw is the so-called 'parallel system' of exploitation. That is, the Authority is to explore and exploit the common heritage of mankind in either one of two ways: through a system of licenses issued to private companies and states, or directly through its own Enterprise.

Another possibility was much discussed during the negotiations but it was embodied in the final text only in a couple of very sketchy articles which allow the Authority or its Enterprise to enter into joint ventures with companies or states. This would have been the logical way to proceed because ocean mining, in this case, would have been carried out on the basis of cooperation between the private sector, states, and the Authority, whereas the "parallel system" is a system of competition between the established industry and the Authority's Enterprise. This caused insoluble problems with regard to the financing of the Enterprise, and the transfer of technology to it, at the cost of its competitors.

Unfortunately, in the case of the Law of the Sea negotiations, disarmament and development, though both intrinsic in the concept of the common heritage of mankind, were quickly separated. Disarmament was to be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, and development entrusted to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Only the most fleeting consideration was given to the possibility of uniting both functions in one institution, the Seabed Authority. This came when Canada's Alan Beesley introduced a working paper on the

International Seabed Regime and Machinery (A/AC.138/59) to the Seabed Committee in 1971 which, in paragraph 8, reads as follows:

The area shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, without prejudice to any measures which have been or may be agreed upon in the context of international negotiations undertaken in the field of disarmament and which may be applicable to a broader area. One or more international agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible in order to implement effectively this principle and to constitute a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race.

This principle could be included virtually verbatim in the future seabed treaty with appropriate modifications reflecting the endorsement by the General Assembly of the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor. A difficult question that arises here is whether the international seabed machinery should be granted at least the same powers of verification of suspect activities as are granted to states parties under the seabed arms control treaty.

The inclusion of such a provision, on preliminary consideration, would appear appropriate and desirable.

This Canadian suggestion was never taken up, and the total separation between the disarmament and the development aspects of seabed activities continues to pose problems.

There are striking similarities between attempts to establish the Law of the Sea and to set up a World Space Organization in terms of procedure. Ambassador Pardo proposed establishment of a committee to examine the question, the adoption of a resolution embodying the principle of the common heritage, and the calling of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to adopt a Convention on the Law of the Sea, which could be universally agreed upon. The United Nations followed this course of action and, in 1982, adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which by December 1984 had gathered 159 signatures. Thirty-four states have ratified the convention. Sixty ratifications are needed for the Convention to come into force, and until then a Preparatory Commission (Prep. Com) is to prepare for the setting up of the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and regulate seabed exploration through an interim regime.

The procedure initiated by the Soviet Union in 1985 is identical and projecting the analogy into the future, one would obtain the following sequence of possible events:

OCEANS

1. Placing item on GA Agenda
2. Introduction of item in address to GA
3. Creation of Ad Hoc Committee
4. Adoption of Declaration of Principles
5. Preparation of Agenda for UNCLOS III*
6. UNCLOS III
7. Adoption of Convention; establishment of Prep. Com to set up Authority

SPACE

1. Placing item on GA Agenda
2. Introduction of item in address to GA
3. Creation of Committee of Members of Conference on Disarmament and COPUOS**
4. Adoption of Declaration of Principles
5. Preparation of Agenda for UN Conference on World Space Organization
6. UNCOWSO
7. Adoption of Convention; establishment of Prep. Com to set up World Space Organization

* Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea

**Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space.

SCENARIO FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION

Declaration of Principles

A Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction was adopted on 7 December 1970. In the style of all UN resolutions, this declaration first recalls precedents, then points out that a *delimitation* of the international area and areas under national jurisdiction was needed. It then states that there is, at present, no legal regime for the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area beyond national jurisdiction, and that this should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole. For this purpose, an appropriate international machinery should be established as soon as possible. These points are almost entirely applicable to the situation in outer space.

The Declaration of Principles Governing Outer Space, the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies undoubtedly will make reference to Resolution 40/89, to the Outer Space Treaty, to the Moon Treaty, to the Code of Conduct on Remote Sensing of Earth from Space, and to some other agreements and resolutions. It will affirm that outer space is beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and will recognize that the existing legal regime of outer space does not provide substantive rules for regulating the exploration and exploitation of its resources. Most emphatically it will express the conviction that outer space shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the exploration and exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole; in particular, it should establish that *knowledge* acquired from satellites is to be shared by all countries. It will state the belief that an international regime, including appropriate international machinery, should be established as soon as possible.

Just as in the case of the Law of the Sea, the declaration might state that this international regime should be established by an international treaty of universal character, to be generally agreed upon. The regime should, *inter alia*, provide for the orderly and safe development and rational management of space exploration and the utilization of its resources, and should ensure the equitable sharing by all states in the benefits derived therefrom, taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries. As with the Law of the Sea the declaration should contain provisions for cooperation in research and training and it might also urge states to take appropriate measures to prevent pollution and contamination of outer space and preserve its natural resources.

Just as on the deep seabed, so in outer space, every state should have the responsibility to ensure that activities, including those relating to resources, whether undertaken by governmental agencies, or non-governmental entities or persons under its jurisdiction, should be carried out in conformity with the international regime to be established; the same responsibility should apply to international organizations. Damage caused by such activities should entail liability. Finally, the parties to any dispute relating to activities in outer space and its resources should resolve such dispute by the measures mentioned in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations and by such procedures for settling disputes as may be agreed upon in the international regime to be established.

Adoption of Agenda

The next step would be the adoption of a resolution analogous to Resolution 2750, deciding to convene a conference on space law which would deal with the relevant issues.

In the case of the Law of the Sea negotiations, the preparation of an agenda for such a conference turned out to be a task fraught with political problems which took almost three years of work. It is likely that the negotiations leading to the adoption of an agenda for a United Nations Conference for a World Space Organization will be no less complex and difficult. The following items most likely will have to be taken over and adapted from the "List of Subjects" prepared by the Seabed Committee:

1. International Regime for the reservation of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes and cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of its resources;
2. The Atmosphere;
3. Preservation of the Environment;
4. Scientific Research;
5. Development and Transfer of Technology;
6. Artificial Satellites;

7. Responsibility and Liability for damage;
8. Settlement of disputes;
9. Peaceful uses of outer space;
10. Enhancing the Universal Participation of States in the relevant multilateral conventions.

Such a complex agenda would ensure that the Convention establishing the World Space Organization would contain parts corresponding to Parts I-X of the Law of the Sea Convention, codifying and updating all existing air and space law, which now is fragmented in a number of treaties, corresponding to the situation that existed in sea law prior to UNCLOS III.

The Functions and Powers of the World Space Organization

The functions of a World Space Organization have been indicated in a number of documents, the most important of which are the 1985 statement by Eduard Shevardnadze to the General Assembly; a TASS Interview with Academician Anatoly Alexandrov, President of the Academy of Science of the USSR, of 20 December 1985; and the Study on the implications of establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency: Report of the Secretary-General of 6 August 1981.

In his statement the Foreign Minister describes the functions with a very broad sweep of the brush. The important point, however, is that, contrary to those of the Seabed Authority, these functions cover both *development* (peaceful uses, cooperation with developing countries) and *disarmament* (monitoring of compliance with disarmament and arms control agreements). The development part is spelled out in greater detail in the interview with the President of the Academy of Science USSR, while the disarmament part is contained in the Secretary-General's Report.

The Soviet Foreign Minister proposed the establishment of an organization which would harmonize, coordinate and unite the efforts of states in respect of peaceful space activities, including the provision of assistance in that field to developing countries. It would also facilitate the necessary monitoring of compliance with agreements which have already been concluded or will be concluded with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space.

The President of the Academy of Sciences, on the other hand, provided a list of functions concerning cooperation in information and research. The organization would, for example, give warning of natural disasters, and help developing countries to make practical use of data obtained through its auspices.

The Secretary-General's report, was prepared in response to a request for a study on the technical, legal, and financial implications of establishing the International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA). If the

tasks of the World Space Organization include the monitoring, by satellite, of compliance with the provisions of disarmament and arms control agreements, then it would have to take over the functions proposed for ISMA.

The report stresses throughout the *dual-purpose character of satellite technology*: the same satellites, equipped with the same sensors, can be used for development purposes and to check violations of disarmament and arms control agreements. It notes that "in the United States there is a recent trend to incorporate sensors for both military and civilian missions on the same satellite . . ."

In the future, considerable progress may be expected which could bring the performance of civilian satellites close to military ones used for area surveillance. Such a development, the report points out, would be of great importance for the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (or Space Organization) since it would make available necessary data from sources other than military surveillance satellites which would be of significance in the field of verification.

The difficulty is to distinguish a satellite used for peaceful purposes from a spy satellite. The only way to solve this problem is to combine both aspects, to carry out both peaceful research and monitoring of military activities with the same satellites under the control of the World Space Organization, and to make all data available to that organization. A number of useful functions of a satellite agency, or space organization, are contained in the Secretary's Report.

They include the monitoring of compliance with disarmament/arms control agreements, the monitoring of crisis situations, the strengthening of international confidence-building measures, and the observation of the use or threat of force.

In the case of the Law of the Sea negotiations, many countries, especially developing ones, wanted a broad range of functions and requisite powers for the Authority. Others, mainly among the industrialized countries, basically distrusted the Authority which they feared would be dominated by developing countries, and accordingly tried to limit its functions and powers as narrowly as possible. Finally, the maritime powers insisted on a separation between peaceful uses, over which the Authority was to have jurisdiction, and military uses, which were to remain a prerogative of the national state. It is likely that a similar alignment will emerge in the negotiations on the World Space Organization.

It is important that the negotiations should in no way touch the basic structure of the United Nations System. The functions of the Authority will be development and control — management, monitoring and surveillance — not decisions on retaliatory measures in case of treaty violations. The latter role remains the responsibility of the Security Council.

It is also obvious that provocative manoeuvres

during the negotiations are to be avoided. A voluntary moratorium on certain military tests in space while the negotiations are in course would go a long way towards fulfilling this condition.

The Structure of the World Space Organization

The Secretary General's Report suggests that membership would be open to all members of the United Nations. There would be three types of membership: regular membership, associate membership and observer status (for non-governmental or inter-governmental organizations). The legal nature of the World Space Organization would be that of an independent body. It would have an "international legal personality," enabling it to conclude treaties, enjoy various privileges and immunities in member countries, own property, and enter into contracts with states and other entities. Its principal organs would be an Assembly of states members, with broad policy-making and electoral responsibilities and the power to approve the budget, etc.; an Executive Council, which should be small in order to be effective but large enough to be representative of all regions; and a Secretariat, consisting of a Director General and a staff of international civil servants. Financing would be provided through membership fees and, additionally, through voluntary contributions and funds contributed in return for services rendered.

An interesting feature of the organization would be its dispute-settlement machinery. This would be a panel of arbitrators nominated by member states, appointed by the organization's council and approved by the Assembly from which parties to a dispute would select the agreed number of arbitrators for each dispute (an arrangement comparable to that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration). The award of the arbitration tribunal would be final and binding, with no right of appeal.

The Secretary-General's Report also contains a detailed list of technical machinery needed by the organization for the effective conduct of its monitoring and surveillance activities. These would include systems specifically designed and adapted for the needs of the organization by member states; the organization could also have its own research and development facility.

These systems, it is to be assumed, would function under the direction of the Executive Council, through technical commissions similar to those to be established by the Council of the Seabed Authority. One of these technical commissions would also be responsible for the monitoring of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements.

The functions of the World Space Organization are more comprehensive than those of the proposed International Satellite Monitoring Agency, with the latter's emphasis on police action. Since the focus of the

World Space Organization is on both control and development, it will need other institutional arrangements to be able to cope with its development functions.

In performing their functions, both the Seabed Authority and the World Space Organization will have to deal with (a) member states; (b) inter-governmental organizations; (c) non-governmental, often multinational entities such as consortia or multinational companies. Thus, they straddle the spheres of private and public international law. Both, therefore, must combine features of a political international organization and of an operational business; both must have decision-making structures large enough to be representative and 'participatory,' yet small enough to be efficient. They must have an operational arm or Enterprise system, as well as the power to tax and to generate an income independent from membership contributions.

As noted above, there are some basic flaws in the design for the International Seabed Authority which should be avoided in the negotiations for the World Space Organization. One is the overburdening with details with built-in obsolescence; the other is a structure which sets established industry and the international organization on a course of competition and conflict rather than harmonization and cooperation.

To avoid overburdening with details, negotiations should aim at a framework treaty leaving the decision-making organs of the organization sufficient discretionary powers to adapt to changing circumstances.

To meet the second challenge the international community will have to come up with an alternative to the 'parallel system.' There are three possible precedents which should be studied. One comes from Space Law itself: the INMARSAT Convention. (INMARSAT, the international maritime satellite organization, is the marine counterpart to INTELSAT.) The second is the current experience of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission. The third is the emergence of new cooperative systems for organizing and financing high technology research and development, as exemplified by the Eureka projects in Western Europe.

The World Space Organization will have to deal with exactly the same entities — states, inter-governmental organizations, and the space industry — as INMARSAT, which distinguishes between 'States Parties' and 'Signatories.' A Signatory is an entity or enterprise, public or private, existing or to be established for the purpose, designated by a State Party to operate within the framework of the Convention. The State Party provides guidance and instructions to its Signatory, but is not normally liable for financial obligations assumed by the Signatory. The INMARSAT Convention provides for an organization consisting of an Assembly, a Council, and a Directorate. The Assembly, which is the policy-making or 'legislative'

organ, is composed of representatives of States Parties, each having one vote. The Council, which is the executive and operational arm of the organization, is composed of Signatories in a way which takes account of just geographical representation.

The World Space Organization will have far broader functions and responsibilities than INMARSAT, including those dealing with international security. One might suggest, therefore, that political questions be dealt with by a political body, whereas technical and economic matters be dealt with by an operational arm, or Enterprise, as was done in the case of the Seabed Authority, albeit not entirely successfully.

For the World Space Organization one might suggest a model taking elements from both the Seabed Authority and INMARSAT. For instance, there might be a Council of 36 Members, as in the Seabed Authority, but they might simply be elected on the basis of regional representation. The Council will be responsible for a wide range of functions, including those related to international security.

The operative arm of the World Space Organization, which is a technical enterprise in which the aerospace industries will make investments, might be composed, not of international civil servants, but of 'Signatories,' and they should be represented in proportion to their investment shares. There might be established, furthermore, not one giant enterprise but a series of decentralized enterprises or 'projects.' Each one might be directed by a board composed of members half of which would be signatories who made the largest contribution to the project or enterprise, while the other half might be elected by the Assembly in such a way as to ensure fair regional representation and full participation by developing countries. The investments would be divided along similar lines.

Under the Eureka scheme, projects adopted by the Conference of Ministers are financed half by the industrial enterprises that made the proposal and half by the governments of participating states and by the European Economic Community (EEC), in those projects in which it participates. Resulting technologies are accessible to all member states and participating industries.

Adapting this model to the requirements of the World Space Organization, industrial space enterprises would submit joint project proposals to the signatory designated by their Government, who would make the selection, which would then be discussed and refined by the meeting of all signatories and, finally, through them, submitted to the Council of the World Space Organization where the project would be finally adopted or rejected. Projects adopted would be financed half by the industrial enterprises that made the proposal and the governments of participating states, and half by the World Space Organization or, through it, by public international funding agencies.

A scheme like this provides the only possible alternative to financing by the military as in the case of 'Star Wars.' This is the practical shape 'Star Peace' might take. It would benefit the industrialized countries, who would save up to 50 percent on their investments in research and development, and the developing countries which would be given an opportunity to participate directly in the management of an enterprise in high technology research and development, with beneficial spin-off effects on domestic development. By removing these technologies from military control and internationalizing them, it would also enhance peace and security.

In the past, industrialized countries have objected to such schemes, and preferred an international "free enterprise" system, leaving them full independence and wider profits but, with the cost and risks of high technology and experience with such undertakings as Eureka, have begun to modify this attitude.

CANADA AND THE WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION

Space technology, comprising micro-electronics, lasers, particle beams, materials technologies and others, has been developed largely under military auspices. However, it has also been commercialized, and Canada is one of the leaders in the industry. Canadian companies are studying a variety of space-based projects including one involving capsules of insulin-producing cells, and others concerning production of semi-conductors. Canada is also a leader in telecommunications and remote sensing. Products of Canadian technology, particularly image processing systems, are prominent on international markets.

Canada's advanced technical position, coupled with the actual and potential importance of space technology to the Canadian economy, is duly reflected, nationally, in the recent establishment of a Canadian Space Agency with a budget of 2 billion dollars, and, internationally, in Canada's position in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the special Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, to which the Canadian Delegation has already submitted two important working papers.

In 1986 the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, pointed out that Canada had established a Verification Research Programme with a budget of about one million dollars annually. This was Canada's response to the principles expressed at the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament. He stressed the importance of developing a space-based verification and referred to the Canadian PAXSAT A study which examined the feasibility of the practical application of space-based civilian remote sensing techniques to verify an outer space treaty.

CONCLUSION

The experience with the Law of the Sea suggests that a more comprehensive approach may succeed where attempts at partial solutions fail and the time may have come for a comprehensive approach in outer space, along the lines proposed by the Soviet Union. A verification system would be part of it, but Canada's interests in the rational management of the uses of outer space are far broader.

The Canadian space industries are faced with three problems: lack of investment in research and development, a scarcity of launching facilities, and an inadequate legal regime covering the economic uses of space. All three problems could best be solved by a Convention establishing a World Space Organization and harmonizing, unifying, and updating all aspects of space law, much as the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea has done for ocean space. Canada would appear to have a vital interest in such a development, from an economic, political, and security point of view. Economically, a World Space Organization, conceived along the lines here discussed, would offer the best hope for Canadian space industries to 'get off the ground.'

In assuming leadership in building a synthesis between the various proposals now before the United Nations — especially the French and the Soviet proposals — and moving towards the establishment of a World Space Organization, Canada would make an important contribution towards strengthening the United Nations system.

Canada has been one of the leaders in the Conference on Disarmament and has made important contributions to the discussions on international law relevant to arms control and outer space, which, obviously, is of crucial importance for Canadian security. The task ahead would be to link the disarmament aspect with the development aspect; Canada has an equal stake in the advancement of both.

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The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and should not be taken to represent the views of the Institute and its Board.

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