



CANADA

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 64/27

From a Speech by the Honourable Paul Martin,
Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the
Thirty-Seventh Biennial National Convention of
the Zionist Organization of Canada, Montreal,
October 26, 1964.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am deeply honoured by the invitation you have extended to me to speak to you on this occasion. As our preparations for the centenary of Canada's nationhood go forward, I have been reflecting on the fact that Canada's Jewish community has only recently passed a centenary of its own and will, within a year of the anniversary of Canadian Confederation, be celebrating another one. Indeed, these are not merely centenaries; they are bicentenaries. For it is just over 200 years ago that Aaron Hart settled permanently in Canada, the first Canadian of the Jewish faith to have done so. And it was only a few years later, in 1768, that the first Jewish congregation was established in Canada. In fact, as you know, it was established right here in the City of Montreal.

In these intervening two centuries, Canada's Jewish citizens have made a rich contribution to our national life and heritage. In business and industry, in the professions, in the academic sphere, in the arts and sciences, in the public service and in the realm of government, Canada's Jewish citizens have contributed out of all proportion to the size of their community. We look forward to the continuation of that contribution in the tasks that face us as a nation. We are determined to ensure in future, as we have in the past, that Canadian attitudes and the organization of Canadian life are such as to permit all segments of our people, irrespective of language, race or religion, to make their distinctive contribution to the greater Canadian community. We believe that this is the right approach for Canada. We also believe that it represents the right approach towards co-operation in an increasingly interdependent world.

I am also glad to have this opportunity of saying something to you about Israel, whose welfare and security are, I know, close to your hearts and at the centre of your deliberations at this convention. As many of you know, I had the privilege of visiting Israel in 1958. I have the warmest memories of that visit and of the generous reception and hospitality which were accorded to me on that occasion. I also continue to have deep admiration for the achievements of Israel, its amazing economic progress and vitality, its forward-looking social experiments and the imaginative way in which it has been able to absorb many diverse elements into its broad national life. These pioneer achievements

of Israel cannot but strike a sympathetic chord in this country, even though our last frontiers are delimited by snow and not sand. We have also been impressed by the way in which Israel -- itself a nation that has only recently emerged into the constellation of nations -- has proceeded to share its experiences and the fruits of its research and development with some of the other new nations that stand in such great need of the resources and techniques that will enable them to strengthen their economic and political independence.

The role which Canada played at the United Nations in assisting the emergence of the new state of Israel and the restoration of peace to the Middle East is one that needs no rehearsing to an audience such as this. It is a role we are proud to have played and one which, I am sure, subsequent developments have justified. Since those early days, Canadian links with Israel have broadened and multiplied. It is just a decade since a Canadian Embassy was opened in Tel Aviv and a little more than that since an Israeli Embassy was opened in Ottawa. Over that decade or so, many distinguished Israelis have represented their country in Canada. And many Canadians have had an opportunity of witnessing at first hand the great Israeli experiment which has consisted in welding the remnants of the Diaspora into a proud and self-conscious national community. All this has played a part in deepening the bonds of understanding between our two countries. The impressive pace of Israeli economic development has also resulted in a situation where Israel is now our largest export market in the Middle East. This is quite remarkable for a country with a population of only two and a half million and an area that would allow it to fit comfortably into the confines of Lake Erie.

Canada has, of course, a keen interest in the whole of the Middle East. This is not surprising, considering that we have, from the beginning, played a major peace-keeping role in the area. This role has not always been easy, and it has involved a considerable commitment of Canadian manpower and funds over and above our assessed share of the costs incurred by the United Nations. One thousand of about 4,600 men serving with the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East are Canadians and 17 of about 100 officers serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Israel and its neighbours are likewise Canadians. We are happy, however, to continue our participation in these peace-keeping assignments in the knowledge that the Emergency Force and the Truce Supervision Organization play an essential part in maintaining stability and deterring conflict in the Middle East, a part which, I know, is fully recognized and appreciated by both Israel and by the Arab states in the area.

We very much hope that the time will come when these peace-keeping duties will no longer be necessary. We have, from the beginning, sought to support and encourage realistic and constructive initiatives looking towards a just and abiding settlement of the Palestine dispute. Pending such a settlement, we are concerned that nothing should be done which would not be compatible with the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East. It is part of that concern that there should be no recourse to threats aimed at the existence of Israel or any other state in that area. Canada's ability to play a useful role in the Middle East, whether as peace-keeper or as peace-maker, hinges,

of course, to an important degree, on our maintaining a policy of friendly and co-operative relations with all Middle Eastern countries. I am confident that such a policy, which carries with it the duty and responsibility of weighing and balancing the problems of the area on their merit, is one which commends itself to the Canadian people and which is understood by all our friends in the Middle East.

At your present convention you have been discussing the theme "The Zionist Programme in a Changing World". In selecting that theme, you have obviously been conscious -- as all of us are bound to be conscious -- of the very significant way in which our world environment is changing and of the need to take these changes into account in our approach to the problems that face us. The pace of change in our world environment could hardly have been brought home to us more graphically than by two recent events of far-reaching significance: the sudden and dramatic change in the Soviet leadership and the first explosion by Communist China of a nuclear device. Since this is the first occasion I have had, outside the House of Commons, of speaking to a Canadian audience since these events took place, I am sure you would wish me to comment on some of their implications, as I see them, for Canada and for the world at large.

I should like first to say something about the developments in the Soviet Union. It is instructive, I think, to compare these with the change of government which took place in Britain at almost the same time. In Britain this change came about as a result of an election, conducted openly and in accordance with the due processes of democratic practice. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, we witnessed the removal from the seat of power of a man who had for many years exercised a dominant role in the leadership of his party and his country with a suddenness and secrecy which surprised and astonished even the closest allies of the Soviet Union. Since this change was brought about, the world has not been allowed to know exactly what happened to Mr. Khrushchov or what, if any, role he might be allowed to continue to play in his own country.

It is inevitable that a change of government in a totalitarian regime should involve elements of surprise, perhaps particularly to the leader who loses power. It is equally inevitable, I think, that such a change of government should bring in its train certain consequential developments, the nature and extent of which it is not easy to foretell in advance. For, although the Soviet system has evolved a good deal since Stalin's time and is not likely to revert to his methods and policies, it remains true that, once the great log of the Soviet state starts rolling, it is difficult to know where and when it will come to rest and who may fall off in the process.

What we can say for the moment -- and it is a matter of some significance -- is that a relatively orderly transfer of power seems to have been accomplished in the Soviet Union on this occasion. The actual circumstances in which these events took place are still shrouded in a curtain of secrecy, as we would expect them to be in a system such as that prevailing in the Soviet Union. Until we have very much more information than we have at the moment, therefore, any attempt at an analysis of these events must, of necessity, remain in the realm of speculation. Nevertheless, the impact which a change in the Soviet leadership could have on world affairs is so important that, with the necessary reservations, such an analysis should be attempted.

We have been told officially that Mr. Khrushchov resigned his high posts because of illness and age. If his resignation had been voluntary, one would have expected it to be accompanied by paeans of praise and some preparation of the Soviet public for such a momentous event. Moreover, a short time after it occurred, we began to hear assertions from Moscow denouncing Mr. Khrushchov, without naming him directly, for various shortcomings, including what was alleged to be the very personal and arbitrary character of his diplomacy and decisions.

It is easy to surmise that there must have been disagreements within the Soviet leadership on certain important policy issues, but whether these related mainly to domestic affairs or to relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe or to relations with China or to relations with the free world is not yet clear. There are, of course, great problems for the Soviet Union in all of these areas which remain to be resolved.

In the domestic field there have been, notably within the past few years, deep-rooted differences within the Soviet leadership regarding the allocation of resources and priorities. I regard it as significant that, only a few weeks ago, Mr. Khrushchov once again vigorously defended his policies and views on these matters at an important meeting in Moscow widely attended by officials from all parts of the country. On that occasion, Mr. Khrushchov asserted that the needs of heavy industry had by now been largely met and that priority should henceforth be given to the well-being of the people and to the production of consumer goods. This public appeal over the heads of his colleagues may have seriously disturbed several members of the Soviet Party Presidium and of the Soviet defence establishment. It is an illuminating commentary on the Soviet system that an appeal of this kind, which was bound to evoke a welcoming echo among an overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, did not, in spite of the great popularity he enjoyed among the Soviet people, save Mr. Khrushchov from the censure of the Presidium. Under their system, a power struggle need have nothing to do with the contenders' ratings on any kind of Gallup Poll.

Mr. Khrushchov's policy towards Germany and its implications for Soviet relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other East European countries, for the basic Soviet defence posture and for Soviet policy towards the West seems to me to have been another possible area of disagreement within the Soviet leadership. As a result of the Cuban crisis, Mr. Khrushchov, I think, realized that the achievement of expansionist Soviet aims in Germany and Berlin by a policy of confrontation with the West had become too dangerous a course to pursue. It is possible, therefore, that his desire to visit Bonn and to meet with Chancellor Erhard reflected a new and potentially significant departure in the Soviet attitude towards Germany. If that is an accurate reading of what lay behind Mr. Khrushchov's plans, more substantial adjustments in the course of Soviet policy towards Germany might have loomed on the more distant horizon. It can be assumed that such a prospect would have been far more disturbing to many of Mr. Khrushchov's colleagues than the policy which he had followed towards Germany in the past.

While the two policies are, of course, interrelated, Soviet relations with China must have played at least as significant a part as the German perspective in the decision of the other Soviet leaders to remove Mr. Khrushchov from office. His policy of moving towards a confrontation with China, at least at the party level, has already had a profound effect in helping to loosen the monolithic unity of the Soviet bloc and to weaken Soviet control over their former satellites in Eastern Europe. It has also affected the unity and strength of the Communist Parties in countries where they do not hold power and their attitude towards the Soviet leadership in Moscow. These corrosive effects of the dispute and the anxieties of other Communist Party leaderships on this score were dramatically brought to the attention of the world in a memorandum written by Signor Togliatti, the Italian Communist Party leader, which was published shortly after his death last month.

There has obviously and inevitably been deep perplexity and concern among all Soviet leaders about how to handle problems posed for the Soviet leadership by the challenge from Peking. This challenge had important implications not only for Soviet policy towards the West but also towards the non-aligned parts of the world, particularly in terms of Sino-Soviet competition for influence among the Afro-Asian countries. For the Soviet leaders, too, the situation must have been further complicated by the implications for the Soviet Union itself of the Chinese nuclear programme. There has been speculation about whether the timing of the Chinese nuclear explosion had any influence on the removal of Mr. Khrushchov. We cannot speak with any certainty about its effect. If the other Russian leaders were aware beforehand of the exact timing of the explosion, this may conceivably have been one additional factor in prompting a decision by the other members of the Soviet Party Presidium to oust Mr. Khrushchov immediately. For it would be a matter of importance to them to have Mr. Khrushchov replaced before rather than after the dramatic news of the explosion in China lest the impression be created that Mr. Khrushchov's replacement was a victory for the Chinese Communist regime.

As for the future, here again we are necessarily in the realm of conjecture. In domestic affairs the new Soviet Government does not apparently intend to abandon the policy of de-Stalinization, although it may tend towards a more cautious and traditional policy than that advocated by Mr. Khrushchov. There may be some changes in the priorities of allocation of scarce resources, including possibly less emphasis on consumer goods. Towards Eastern Europe there may be certain cautious modifications of Mr. Khrushchov's policy, with the aim of removing any impression that Moscow is going to be "soft on capitalism". I would expect no immediate overt abandonment of Soviet criticism of Chinese policy, but I would not be surprised if some attempt were made to lower the temperature of hostility and bitterness which now prevails in relations between the two big parties. However, the deep-seated and almost inevitable basic rivalry between the two great Communist and national power centres will almost certainly continue to affect their relations in one form or another for some time to come, above or below the surface.

In the relations of the Soviet Union with the West, we need not, I think, expect any dramatic developments but rather a continuation of the present situation. On the great questions of peace and war, the aims and the inhibitions of the new leaders may not prove to be very different from those recently demonstrated by Mr. Khrushchov, who, since the Cuban crisis, has shown considerable

realism and restraint on vital issues. Indeed, the new Soviet Government has seen fit to assure us officially that there will be no change in Soviet foreign policy either in its pursuit of peace or its policy of peaceful co-existence or its support for the United Nations. We have also been assured that the new Soviet Government will pursue the same policy towards Canada, seeking to improve bilateral relations in our mutual interest. May I say that Canada -- and, I am sure, other Western countries -- will be prepared to continue to explore with the Soviet Government all avenues that offer promise of yielding peaceful and equitable solutions to the vital issues outstanding between us.

We must expect that the new Soviet leaders will be concerned primarily to consolidate their new power and position and to feel their way forward very cautiously. The sharing of the top posts in party and government leadership between Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin has been traditional after the death or removal of every supreme leader in the Soviet Union from Lenin's day on. In each case it was some years before the posts of Prime Minister and First Secretary of the Communist Party were again combined. Whether this pattern will be repeated again it is too early to tell. What we do know is that, throughout Russian history, there has been a tendency toward the concentration of power in a single ruler. This was as true under the Czars as it has been under the Soviet system. On the other hand, the Soviet people are rapidly becoming more educated and more sophisticated and these trends may well, over the longer term, lead to changes in the traditional pattern of political leadership. Meanwhile we can assume, I think, that there will be some uncertainty surrounding the position of the top leadership in the Soviet Union for some time to come.

I turn next to the explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China, which, I am sure, is a matter of deep concern to all of us. This test will probably be followed by others, increasing the level of radioactivity in the atmosphere at a time when, thanks to the partial test-ban treaty, hazards to health from that source had begun to decline. I deplore the fact that Communist China has in this way affronted the hopes of the world community as evidenced by the overwhelming adherence of countries to and support for the partial test-ban treaty, and has thus further isolated itself from world opinion.

The isolation of Communist China on nuclear questions has, of course, been evident since the signature of that treaty, to which the Chinese refused to adhere and which they have repeatedly denounced as a fraud. Probably because the Peking regime recognized that this stand tended to alienate world opinion, they proposed even then the holding of a world conference of heads of governments to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. Now the Chinese have renewed this proposal, presumably in an effort to ward off, or at least to mitigate, world criticism of their nuclear test.

This is not to say that the Chinese proposal for a summit conference on complete nuclear disarmament should necessarily be dismissed out of hand. But we should not forget that the question of nuclear disarmament, important as it is, cannot be considered in isolation from the broader disarmament picture and, in particular, from the problem of conventional weapons and the need to reduce armed forces to safe proportions. As for the Chinese undertaking never to make first use of nuclear arms, while this is at present of little practical

significance, it is worth noting as a solemn commitment for the future and as a pledge given by Communist China to the non-nuclear countries of Asia.

What we will be watching for in the months ahead is an indication that Communist China is reacting with sober responsibility to the implications of having joined the "nuclear club". While as yet only a very junior member of that club, the Chinese should show themselves willing to assume some of the political responsibility and restraint in world affairs which characterizes the nuclear powers in their awareness of the terrible potential which they control.

For the immediate future, we may expect the Chinese posture on the international scene to be even more aggressive and arrogant than hitherto. Two contradictory forces could play upon the thinking of the Chinese leaders as their realization grows of the significance of this first step towards nuclear capability: one, an initial and not unnatural reaction of national pride and increased self-confidence, would incline them to greater truculence; the other, a gradual growth of apprehensive respect for the source of destructive power which they are acquiring, could lead them towards restraint, responsibility and prudence in the conduct of their policies. I would hope that, as time goes on, the urgings of pride and truculence will give way to a more sober assessment of the dangers of a world conflagration, an assessment which I am confident the Chinese are fully capable of making. Since their nuclear test, the Chinese have again said, in their picturesque phrase, that the atomic bomb is a paper tiger; closer contact with nuclear realities should make them realize that it is the beast of a possible Armageddon.

The aspects which I mentioned a moment ago as being grounds for regret and disappointment in connection with the Chinese nuclear test should not give rise to exaggerated concern. In my view, Chinese tests will have no immediate effect on the overall strategic balance. There is a wide gap between the ability to detonate a nuclear device and the possession of an effective nuclear capability. These facts of life will, I am sure, contribute to Chinese restraint.

I believe that the limited strategic implications of the Chinese test are generally understood. News of that test has been received with relative calm and restraint by the non-nuclear countries of Asia, and in particular by those countries which might believe themselves to be most directly threatened by a Communist China armed with nuclear weapons.

When we say that we deplore the fact that Communist China has seen fit to take the first step towards the development of nuclear weapons, we should, as a corollary, recall the position taken by other countries who have the technical and scientific capability to develop such weapons but have decided, as a matter of deliberate policy, to refrain from doing so. Canada is one of the countries to have taken that decision. India is another, and I should like to pay particular tribute to the Indian position in this matter. Only recently, and in the full knowledge that a Chinese test explosion could be expected in the near future, the Indian Prime Minister reaffirmed that position when he stated that India stands committed to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes, and that Indian scientists and technicians are under firm orders not to make a

single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In my opinion, the exercise of such wisdom and restraint reflects a true understanding of the interests of the Indian people no less than those of the world community at large. It also represents a real contribution to the maintenance of world peace.

Let me say this in conclusion: we are all concerned, in different ways, with the implications of a changing world. A changing world tends to be an uncomfortable world, one which confronts us with new perspectives and new problems. What is of major significance, however, is not so much the fact of change, which is part of the scheme of things, as its direction. And some of the important directions of world change over the last decade or two have surely, on balance, been beneficial. We have come to recognize the overriding importance to all nations of enlarging the area of peace and security. We have also come to recognize the importance of achieving a more equitable distribution of the benefits of material prosperity in the world. Above all, we have come to recognize that the interests of any single nation can no longer be artificially divorced from the interests of the world community at large. And we have acted on that recognition by co-operating over a very wide area in the framework of international organizations and institutions. These are solid achievements, and I am confident that they provide a sound basis on which to build for the future.

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