

No. 64/3 Statement by the Permanent Representative of Canada,  
His Excellency Mr. Paul Tremblay, to the Working Group  
of 21, on October 1, 1964.

The Canadian Delegation has been impressed by the statements at our opening meeting of our Chairman and of the Secretary-General. We agree completely with the essence of these statements. In particular, we share the view of the Secretary-General that the common objective of all member states is to see our organization strengthened and made a truly effective instrument for the performance of functions outlined in the Charter. As the Secretary-General pointed out, there is, unfortunately, a wide divergence of opinion as to the means for achieving this objective. The inevitable consequence has been drift, improvisation and reliance on the generosity of the few rather than the collective responsibility of all. The task of reconciling strongly-held and widely-shared views of member states to find a remedy for this situation is one which many have called hopeless. But as we all know, the United Nations has shown a particular capacity for extracting itself from hopeless situations.

We start from the assumption that all member nations, having adhered to the Charter, are desirous that its aims and purposes be given full and effective expression. A logical consequence of this assumption is that, when differences of opinion arise about the fulfilment of the United Nations' aims and purposes, the membership of the organization, individually and collectively, will seek energetically, conscientiously and in a spirit of reconciliation to find solutions which will commend general support.

The maintenance of peace and security is undeniably a primary purpose of the organization and, in the view of most member governments, the constructive measures that have been taken by the United Nations to give substance to this purpose through such peace-keeping actions as UNMOGIP, UNTSO, UNEF, ONUC, and now Cyprus, have brought great credit to it. But it cannot be denied that the United Nations' accomplishments in the field of peace keeping have also resulted in difficult problems and grave dissension, involving particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, which have a special responsibility in these matters and which between them pay at least two-thirds of the costs of the organization.

At this moment, these differences have set the membership on a collision course, which, if not diverted, can only have very grave consequences for the organization, whatever the outcome. It follows, therefore, that it is in the interest of each of us to make superhuman efforts to formulate a modus vivendi for the future to which we can all subscribe. If our search for such a modus vivendi is to be made in good faith, then we must recognize that each of us will have to accept some modifications of previously-held positions and make concessions to the points of view of those who differ with us, concessions made freely as a contribution to the common objective of finding an acceptable solution.

The issues which confront us involve the strongly-held views of sovereign nations - no solution that relies on intimidation will work. On the other hand, if we are to make any progress, we must count on the readiness of each Delegation, when confronted with the hard choices which inevitably will arise, to weigh very carefully the consequences of failure to reach agreement. It is the hope and expectation of my Delegation that, when such tests arise,

each member government will decide in its own interest that the importance of maintaining the United Nations as an effective organization for peace and security outweighs other considerations which may previously have seemed to be of overriding importance.

In this connection, it is perhaps useful to recall the deliberations in the Working Group a year ago which resulted in the adoption of Resolution 1874 at the fourth special session of the United Nations General Assembly. This resolution contains certain features which my Delegation, for one, considered to be unwise but which we accepted because we believed that, even with these features, it represented an important and constructive forward step in our search for a new modus vivendi. Conversely, the Canadian Government concluded that the consequences of failure to reach agreement were far more objectionable than any of the paragraphs in the resolution which it didn't like.

Basic to the search for a new modus vivendi, in the view of my Delegation, is recognition of the fact that we are in what Ambassador Stevenson recently referred to as the period of "limited peace, cease-fire and peaceful change". The Charter has the capacity and flexibility to cope with these changing circumstances if we will only allow it to do so. In particular, we must recognize that the United Nations' use of the military forces of its member states has not been as an ultimate sanction against an aggressor but rather as an extension of the United Nations presence interposed with the agreement, and often at the request, of the parties to a dispute in order to further the peaceful resolution of their differences.

In making the case for a viable and constantly-evolving United Nations, adapting itself to the needs of the times, we do not intend to ignore or detract from the provisions of the Charter. In particular, we believe that all member states subscribe without reservation to the statement of the functions and powers of the Security Council contained in Articles 24 to 26 of the Charter and to the conference on the Security Council of primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In our view, however, the corollary of these provisions is that the Council has a responsibility to address itself effectively to the tasks assigned to it and the requirement for great-power agreement must not result in impotence when constructive action is imperative. If this responsibility is met, there will be no occasion for the Assembly to concern itself with specific disputes or situations unless requested by the Security Council to do so in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter.

The fact that the United Nations General Assembly has conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security does not absolve the whole membership of the organization of its collective responsibility to support the actions of the Council. This obligation applies particularly to the financing of duly authorized peace-keeping operations. The provision of peace forces, just like the services of a fire brigade, should be available without limitation by reason of the lack of ability of the disputants to pay. The maintenance of peace is in the interests of the international community and that community must, therefore, be prepared to supplement to the extent required the resources of those directly concerned.

My Delegation cannot subscribe to the view expressed by a speaker at our last meeting that our Working Group faced no problems. My Government has just recently decided to continue to contribute to UNFICYP, following the very recent unanimous decision of the Security Council to continue the force in being. This was not a decision which was easy for the Canadian Government to take. As members of the Working Group will be aware, the Canadian Government has undertaken to cover the full cost of the Canadian contribution to UNFICYP. Canada's contribution in monetary terms alone will therefore amount to several million dollars. While a country which has not contributed financially to any major peace-keeping operations and has recently ceased covering its share of the cost of observation missions may perhaps take the view that present

arrangements are satisfactory, it is clear that the application of this approach by all members of the United Nations would completely paralyse the organization.

The Canadian Government holds strongly to the view that present arrangements are most unsatisfactory. There is an urgent need for the elaboration of principles for the financing of future peace-keeping operations to permit an equitable sharing of the cost of peace-keeping operations. This is the central task of our Working Group. And I agree with my Indian colleague that we should concentrate on this, rather than on the wider controversy over who has the right to initiate operations.

Canadian support for Resolution 1874 at the fourth special session is evidence of our belief both in the principle of collective responsibility for United Nations peace-keeping operations and acceptance of the view that there should be some adjustment so that the burden of major peace-keeping operations would not fall so heavily on those member states whose capacity to pay is limited. We consider that it is feasible and desirable that our Working Group should in the next few weeks build on Resolution 1874 and reach agreement on a scale which could serve as a guide for the allocation of expenses for future peace-keeping operations.

It is a cardinal principle of democratic government, to which all our nations subscribe, that taxation should be based on representation. I doubt that any member of this Working Group would wish to dispute that principle. We therefore agree with the Representative of Brazil that the United Nations General Assembly is responsible under the Charter for allocating among the membership the expenses for any duly authorized peace-keeping operations except to the extent that the authorizing organ has specifically provided otherwise. In the case of operations approved by the Security Council, let us be clear that the General Assembly's responsibility is financial. Political authority remains vested in the Council itself, which can exercise continuing overall supervision of the use of techniques such as the imposition of a time limit on the duration of an operation's mandate. I cannot understand, therefore, ... why it should be necessary for any member of this Working Group, including permanent members of the Security Council, to oppose the principle that the United Nations General Assembly shall decide on how expenses for operations approved by the Council shall be allocated among the membership. My Government, as I mentioned before, strongly supports the principle of collective responsibility for United Nations peace-keeping operations and, therefore, the view that such operations should, as a matter of principle, be financed by assessing the membership of the organization. It seems to me that other members of the Working Group holding a similar view would wish to demonstrate their support for this principle by agreeing on a special scale of assessments for financing such operations. I suggest the same scale could apply as in the case of Security-Council-approved operations. If we fail to come up with a recommendation for apportioning the cost of peace-keeping operations, it will seriously undermine the principle of collective responsibility, and the organization's ability to establish and maintain peace-keeping operations will be greatly weakened.

The working paper presented by the United States Delegation includes an interesting suggestion that a special finance committee be established to review financing arrangements for peace-keeping operations. This is a suggestion worthy of careful consideration. If such a body were to be established, it might, for instance, in cases where the Security Council had taken a decision to establish a peace-keeping operation to be financed by United Nations membership, review the operation and recommend to the General Assembly the application of the special scale which we hope we shall be able to establish at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. In cases where a peace-keeping operation was established by the United Nations General Assembly, my Delegation considers that the special finance committee would have a similar responsibility for recommending financial arrangements.

...Our task is formidable and little time remains. We have now heard from most of the members of our Working Group. We should like to hear from the members who have not yet spoken. But if they are reluctant to speak at this stage in our proceedings, perhaps it might be opportune in the near future to enter a new phase. This might, for purposes of clarification, be regarded as a meeting of the committee of the whole. It might even be conducted in closed session, as this might diminish the element of confrontation and produce a better atmosphere for finding a consensus. In such an atmosphere, in the view of my Delegation, our aim ought to be to seek the widest measure of agreement possible.

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01047544 3