




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

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
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PUBLIC CONSIDERATION

I N

The Present State of Affairs.

In a LETTER

T O

A NOBLE DUKE.



L O N D O N :

Printed for G. KEARSLEY, at the Golden-Lion, in
Ludgate-Street.

M.DCC.LXIII.

1870

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Political Disquisitions.

My LORD,

IN Obedience to your Commands,
I here send your Grace, drawn
together into one View, those
Thoughts, which I have occasionally had
the Honour to mention in Conversation
with you, on the present State of Public
Affairs.

I dare not flatter myself with an Hope
of their being of that Consequence, which
your kind Opinion assign'd as the Motive
for prescribing me the Task. If they can
in the least contribute to set Matters of
such great Moment in a juster Light, than
they seem to stand in at present, my high-
est Ambition will be answered.

B

The

The only Thing, which I shall presume to say, in Respect to the Execution of this Attempt is, that I shall deliver the Dictates of Reason, with the most inviolate Regard to Truth, nor ever strive to influence the Judgment of another, by Arguments inconclusive to my own; and the Voice of Reason deserves Attention, however insignificant the Person, who utters it.

The Causes of that universal Gloom, which overcasts the Joy of every thinking, and unprejudiced Man, in these Kingdoms, in this Time of apparent Triumph and Happiness, are these: They apprehend, that *the Office of A PRIME MINISTER is inconsistent with the Principles of this Constitution*:—And that *the Manner in which that Office is executed, AT THIS TIME, is also inconsistent with the Principles of good Policy, and the essential Interests of these Kingdoms*.—Apprehensions, which, if well-founded, must be allow'd sufficient to justify the deepest Discontent.

In Disquisitions of such Delicacy, and Importance, it will be necessary to recapitulate

tulate many Things, known to your Grace. But this is unavoidable! The Premises must be laid down, to support the Conclusions drawn, and prevent the Cavils of real or pretended Ignorance,

I shall not trespass long, upon your Grace, in proving the first Position, as it is already given up; the most specious Advocates for *the Minister*, being forced to confess, that “ the Term (and consequently the Office) is entirely unknown to “ our Constitution *.”

To demonstrate the Inconsistency of this Office, with the Principles of the Constitution, it will be sufficient just to shew the Nature of it, and trace it to it's Original in other Governments, from which it appears to have been “ very improperly borrow-
“ ed,” † among us.

You will observe, my Lord, that I use the Words of the Writer just quoted. I shall not only continue to do so occasional-

* *Political Considerations at the present Crisis,*

† *Ibid.*

ly, but shall also take the same Liberty with his Arguments, as the Method most likely to avoid being misunderstood; and this I mention once for all, to obviate the Charge of Plagiarism.

In those unhappy Countries, where Despotism rules with a Rod of Iron; where the End of Government is inverted; and the People seem to have been created only for the Pleasure of the Prince, *Indolence* and *Pride* dictate to the Latter, to delegate his Power into other Hands, in order to avoid the Trouble of exerting it himself, and shun every Kind of Intercourse with his Subjects, that may lessen the artificial, blind Respect raised by Mystery and Distance.

Hence the absolute Monarch almost always employs a Person to stand between him, and his People, who, under the Appearance of delivering his Master's Will, too often consults only his own, and literally enjoys the Sovereign Power in all its Plenitude; *and this is A PRIME MINISTER.*

With

With Indolence it is vain to reason: But would the proudest Prince take the Trouble of a Moment's Thought, he must see that this Indulgence of his Pride disappoints itself. Such a Delegation of his Power is an implicit Acknowledgement of his own Inability to use it, which necessarily lowers him in the Estimation of his own Subjects, and of every Foreign Power with whom he may have Intercourse.

History confirms this by innumerable Examples. The *Emirs* of the *Caliphs* of *Bagdat*, and the *Sultans* of those of *Egypt*, and (to come nearer Home!) the *Mayors of the Palace* to the Kings of *France* scarcely left those Princes the Shadow of Sovereign Power; (the last disdaining even a subordinate Name, at Length assumed that Shadow too, along with the Substance, and actually deposed a Race of Kings, who had long been their Slaves.) And *all these were originally PRIME MINISTERS*. And in our own Times, what Figure have the Kings of *Spain* made in *Europe*, from the Reign of

of *Philip II.* to this Day, *under the Government of PRIME MINISTERS.*

The Wisdom of those, who form'd the *British* Constitution, saw this Evil in the strongest Light; and being equally attentive to the Honour of the Sovereign, and the Liberty of the Subject, tacitly precluded the Institution of an Office, equally prejudicial to both, by making no Provision for it.

An express Prohibition was not necessary, as it was clearly implied in the fundamental Principles of the Constitution; if it was not rather omitted from Respect to the Idea of rational Sovereignty, such as was established at the Head of this Government; to which it seem'd an Affront to apprehend even a Possibility of its being capable of such an Error.

This Custom, therefore, which may be only absurd in those Countries, where the Will of the Sovereign is the Law of the Subject, and must not be controverted, deserves another Epithet in a Government,
founded

founded on the Principles of Liberty, and where all Power is limited by fixed and known Laws, such as is the Glory of *Britain*, the Birthright of her happy Sons, if they will but know their own Happiness.

I am aware, my Lord, that to many this will at first seem a baseless Fabric of my own Fancy; a Theory contradicted by Facts, in numberless Instances. Argument against Fact is certainly the grossest Sophistry; but there is also no Sophism more apt to deceive, than this of concluding from particular Instances against general Rules.

I am now, my Lord, entering upon a Topic, as difficult, as it is important; but I rely on your Grace's Candour, which will overlook any undesigned Error, and judge only from the Purity of the Intention. I can assert, with the Confidence of Truth, that there is no Subject of *Britain*, who has a more exalted Notion of the Sovereign Power, as established at the Head of this Government, than myself; and this, because my Notions of it are founded on Reason. I respect it, because I know it's
 Excellence!

Excellence! And if I do not blindly adore it, as the *Indians* do their Idols, for Attributes existing only in my own Imagination, I presume the solid Respect of Reason is a more worthy, and acceptable Offering, than the groundless Worship of Ignorance.

All the Instances of the Delegation of the Power of the Crown, into the Hands of *one Subject*, which have ever been regularly admitted by the other Estates of the Government, have evidently received their Sanction from Necessity, on some *known Incapacity* in the Sovereign to execute that Power himself.

The Reason of these Instances, (and I challenge Experience to produce any other!) incontestibly excludes the Sovereign himself from choosing the Person proper to be entrusted with such a Delegation. Though if it did not, I imagine that the most sanguine Advocates for *the Prime Minister* will scarcely assert any such Necessity for one, at this Time.

For

For such unhappy Cases, it would have been most imprudent to attempt making any express Provision in the Constitution, as the particular Circumstances must determine the Remedy, and the other Estates, which are exempt from any such Incapacity, must also be the proper Judges how to apply it.

As for any other Instances, where the Prince has thought proper to commit his Power into the Hands of some *favoured* Subject, I think I can safely venture to appeal to the whole Tenour of the *English* History, that such a Delegation has never once met the Approbation of the other Estates, in such a Manner, as to establish a Precedent for the Future; though they may have borne with it for a Time, rather than embroil themselves with their Sovereign, till something should open his Eyes to the Impropriety of a Measure, always unhappy in it's Consequences. On the contrary, they have never failed to declare their Dissent to such an Innovation, in the strongest Manner; and often have carried it so far,

as to obtain the Dismission of *Ministers*, who imagin'd themselves so firmly establish'd in their Master's Favour, as to be above their Reach. Particular Instances, therefore, in either of these Cases, (which occur invariably, and in the Latter too often) only prove the Truth of that general Maxim, to which they are Exceptions, *that the Office of A PRIME MINISTER is inconsistent with the Principles of the British Constitution.*

The other Position, *that the Manner in which that Office is executed, AT THIS TIME, is also inconsistent with the Principles of good Policy, and the essential Interests of these Kingdoms,* is now to be considered.

The Nature of this Part of my Undertaking, makes it most disagreeable to me: I disclaim all personal Prejudice against the noble Lord, whose Conduct I must now examine. I admire the Accomplishments, I revere the Virtues of his Character; and I admit the Favour, with which his Master honours him, in so eminent a Degree,

to be a Proof of his possessing them ; but still I must obey a stronger Impulse, and shut my Eyes to every private Regard, that would interfere with my Duty to my Country.

But, at the same Time, that I admit this Favour, as an implicit Proof of his Accomplishments and Virtues, I cannot allow it the same Weight to prove his being qualified for the Exercise of that great Power, to which it has evidently, and solely raised him.

The Force of a first Impression is sufficiently known. He who has the Forming of a tender Mind, who will watch it's Motions, and accommodate himself to them, may not only give these Motions almost what Direction he pleases, but will also establish an Ascendency over the Mind itself, hardly ever to be over-turned. An Ascendency though, that is gained in this Manner, cannot be said to have the Sanction of Judgment: It is literally *Prejudice*, and is always justly looked upon with a suspicious Eye.

I thought it necessary, my Lord, to observe this, in order to shew, that objecting against an Influence *thus obtained*, by a Servant, can not justly be imputed to Want of due Respect to the Master. On the contrary, it is an indispensable Duty to use every possible Means to remove such a Prejudice ; a Duty most difficult indeed to be performed, as one of the first Exertions of that Influence is to poison his Mind, with bad Opinions of every one, who might undertake it ; and when, by this Management, they are excluded from his Presence, surround him with Persons, who shall stop every Access of Information, and keep him, in the most unhappy Sense, “ *A Prisoner to his own Servants.*”

The Conduct of *a Prime Minister* (to follow the present Mode, and admit the Execution of an Office, acknowledged to be illegal !) is to be considered in two distinct Points of View ; that is, *with Respect to his Management of Affairs with other Powers, and at Home* : Or, as I may say, *his foreign and domestic Policy*. I shall begin

gin with the former ; but in order to make a proper Judgment of it, it will first be necessary to look back for a Moment to the Situation of Public Affairs, when the present *Prime Minister* took the Management of them entirely into his own Hands.

At the Accession of his present Majesty to the Throne, *Great Britain* was engaged in the most extensive War it had ever waged. That War was carried on, in all its Extent, with a Success scarce to be paralleled in the History of any Nation. The Government and the People were united by a mutual Confidence, which (humanly speaking) ensured the Continuance of that Success. The former planned the greatest Enterprizes, secure of the Support of the latter ; as these poured out their Wealth for that Support, in a Manner not conceived to have been possible, till it was proved so, equally secure of it's being applied to the best Purposes. The Naval Power of the Enemy was destroyed ; their Trade ruined ; their Colonies all conquered ; and the Spirit of the People broken, by the Weight of an unfortunate War : All which Successes were
obtained

obtained under the Conduct of a *Ministry*, where the Power was *constitutionally divided*; and every Servant of the Crown, really executed the Business of his own Department, without being subject to the Command of any other Person, beside his Sovereign. There remained only to preserve in the Cabinet, that Superiority which had been gained in the Field, and establish the Advantages of so glorious a War, by a firm and judicious Peace; the Terms of which, it is natural in such Circumstances to conclude, must have been in the Power of the Victors to prescribe.

In this Situation Affairs stood, when the Favour of the Sovereign offered the sole Management of them to the Ambition of the present *Prime Minister*.

To prepare the Minds of the People for a Change, which, however high his Opinion might be of himself, he must foresee would alarm them; it was judged necessary to arraign the Measures of *the Ministry* then employed, and brake, if possible, the Confidence placed in them.

For

For this Purpose, a most specious Attack was made upon a particular Part of the War*; in which the most disingenuous Art was exerted to blazon every Objection to it, in the highest Colours, and place every Argument in it's Favour, in the most disadvantageous Light.

It has ever been the Method of Faction to aim at some particular Part of a System, without attending to it's intimate, and, perhaps, inseperable Connection with the Whole! I say, my Lord, of *Faction*; for any Scheme of Politics, which is carried on against the real Interest of the Nation, literally deserves that Name, whatever Authority may be prostituted to give Sanction to it.

A particular Discussion of the Motives for entering into the War in *Germany*, would lead me beyond the Limits of this Letter. I shall therefore only observe, that it appeared at the Time to be undertaken on Principles of good Policy, by the

* *Considerations on the GERMAN WAR.*

unanimous

unanimous Approbation it received from all the Estates of the Government; as the People, *who are never mistaken in their own Interest*, were so well convinced of the Advantages resulting from it, that all Attempts to prejudice them against it, and brake their Confidence, confirmed by Experience, in the Abilities and Integrity of *that Ministry*, proved in vain.

I am not afraid, My Lord, to say, *the Advantages resulting from the War in Germany*, unfashionable as the Phrase is endeavoured to be made at present! They were repeatedly acknowledged by both Houses of Parliament, and authenticated from the Throne, by the Voice of him, who never deceived his People: And it will require something more than specious Arguments, and positive Assertions, to over-turn in the Opinion of the Candid, a Credit so firmly established.

The Arguments, urged on this extraordinary Occasion, were a general Insult upon the whole Nation. They accused the People of Folly, their Representatives
of

of Prostitution, and the late King (of Memory ever dear to *Britain*) of Weakness, Partiality to his *German* Dominions, and Breach of public Faith; and this in Terms which raised the honest Indignation of every *Britain*, who knew the Virtues of his Heart, and had a Sense of Gratitude for the Blessings of his Reign.

But though this Attempt failed, the Lust of Rule (*cacoetbes dominandi*) could be restrained no longer.

From a sincere and prudent Desire to avoid the Burden of another War, the Partiality and Insults of *Spain* had been borne, till it would have been Weakness to bear them any longer. In these Circumstances it was proposed, with a Spirit, truly *British* to declare War against the *Spaniards* directly, and attack them in a Manner that would have soon brought them to Reason.

Every Law of Nature, and of Nations, justified this Counsel. *Spain* had been the Aggressor in numberless, and most flagrant Instances; and this Return would have

D

been

been considered as no more than what was consistent with the Dignity of the People so provoked.

But *the Person* who gave this Counsel, and who from his great Abilities was reputed to take the Lead in *that Ministry*, was to be opposed at any rate; and this was looked upon to be a favourable Occasion, as it afforded an Opportunity for making an ostentatious Display of Oeconomy, Prudence, and Justice. The Scheme was successful! The greater Part of *the Ministry* acceded to such specious Reasons, and the proposal was rejected.

The Motives of this Opposition could not escape the Penetration of him against whom it was levelled. He resigned an Office, in which he found he had no longer any Authority, as did also the noble Person *who alone had supported his Opinion*; and that Power, which before was constitutionally divided between *many*, was immediately united in the Hands of ONE, who now absolutely *governed* those, who had affected to take the highest Offence,
at

at the other's presuming to *guide* them. I say, my Lord, of *One*, for though some of the former *Ministry* were permitted to Retain their Places a little longer, it is well known, that from the Moment of that Resignation, they lost all Power, and were in reality no more than Cyphers, in their several Offices, without any Importance of their own, but barely to add to that of their new Leader.

The apparent Motives for the Opposition which had produced this Change, were soon beheld in a proper Light. The Treasure, which *Spain* expected from the *American* World, arrived in Safety, and the Necessity for dissembling her Designs being, by that Means, removed; she pulled off the Masque, and avowed the Injustice she had committed in Terms of Insult, peculiar to the Haughtiness of that vain-glorious Nation.

On this it was impossible for the new *Prime Minister* to avoid declaring War against the *Spaniards* any longer: But the proper Moment had been let slip; and

those Treasures, which, in Pursuance of the first Proposal, would have been intercepted and turned against themselves, were now in their Hands; and not only enabled them to make better Preparation for the War; but what was more immediately prejudicial to *Britain*, to afford that Assistance to *France*, which had been her Motive for drawing *Spain* into the War; and without which, she would have found it extremely difficult to have continued it any longer.

Though Necessity compelled *the new Minister* to give this Testimony to the superiour Judgment of the Person, whom he had thus wormed out of his Way, he thought himself obliged to deviate from his Measures, in something, to save Appearances.

Consistently therefore with his Professions of Oeconomy, and the Sentiments he had so publicly declared of the War in *Germany*, the first Exertion of his Power was, to discontinue the Treaty of Subsidy with the King of *Prussia*.

It

It is wrong to antecedate Misfortune, by gloomy Apprehensions; I shall not therefore enlarge upon the Consequences of this Measure, though Reason cannot look forward to them, without the most anxious Boding.

The same prudential Reasons, which were given for this Desertion of the King of *Prussia*, were also alledged for entering immediately into a Treaty of Peace with *France*; which was now become as necessary to the *Prime Minister* to support him in his Power, as it was to the Enemy, under all their Losses. For he soon had the Mortification to find that the Confidence of the People, which had supported the late *Ministry* so liberally; and was still ready to support them, was denied to him; and therefore he prudently resolved to make a Peace, rather than hazard his Credit in attempting to raise the Supplies, necessary for carrying on the War; at the same Time that he attributed this Disinclination in the People, which arose from personal Dislike to himself, to their Inactivity; and with equal Candour and public Spirit, strove to conceal his

his own Disgrace under the Appearance of his Country's Ruin; without any Regard to the Consequences, which must necessarily attend such a Representation. It is unnecessary to make any Remarks on this Conduct. Reason and Indignation will suggest them too strongly.

Between Parties so disposed, a Treaty was easily set on Foot, in which *the* British Prime Minister was so far from *prescribing* the Terms, as it may be presumed he had it in his Power to do, that he met the *French* more than Half-way, sending a Minister to their Court, to treat with them, *as if they were Conquerours, and BRITAIN under a Necessity of begging Peace.*

There are certain Points of Ceremony, which, however insignificant in themselves, Custom has made of real Consequence, by the Ideas annexed to them. One of the most important of these is the Method to be observed in treating of Peace, as it affects, in the strongest Manner, the Reputation of the Parties concerned; and in
all

all Matters, which relate to War, *Reputation is an artificial Strength.*

For this Reason it is an established Rule, between Powers, who treat upon equal Terms, that the Advances made by all shall be equal; therefore the Expedient of Meeting at an indifferent Place, out of the Territories of both was appointed, where an evident Superiority did not give one of the Parties a Right to insist upon treating at Home.

There can few Instances be alledged, where this Right was more indisputable, than in the present Case, for having the Treaty carried on in *England*. The Honour of the Nation required it; and the great Advantages of treating on the Spot, where immediate Advice could be had on any Difficulty that might arise, and *could correct, before it was too late, any Mistakes which might be committed*, made it an indispensable Duty to insist upon that Honour. I mention not Caution against undue Influence, though Prudence will guard against the most improbable Dangers.

But

But instead of insisting upon this Right; instead of appointing even an indifferent Place, where the Disadvantages of Distance from their respective Courts, should be equal to the Ministers of both, a Minister was sent from *Britain* to *France*; the inequivalent Formality of letting the *French* Minister at least come over to *England*, as soon as the *British* went to *France*, being also neglected, and the latter going thither first. Nor was this occasioned by any unforeseen Accident. It was agreed to be so; as a Proof of which, the very Vessel, which carried over the *British*, was appointed to bring back the *French*, Minister.

With the same Eagerness were the Preliminaries of Peace signed; though, perhaps, not quite so soon, as could have been wished by those who signed them; and as they would have been, could the Pride of *Spain* be prevailed upon to quicken its Pace.

To prove this, it is sufficient to observe, that the *British* Minister set out for *France*, at a Time when an Account of the Conquest

quest of the *Havannah* was expected every Hour; and when the Situation of Affairs in *Germany* and *Portugal*, made speedy Accounts of other important Successes morally certain; and though the Conquest of the *Havannah* was (through the dilatoriness of the *Spanish* Ministry) known before the Preliminaries were signed, yet the *British* Minister was too generous to take any Advantage, or rise in his Demands on that Score; for the Evacuation of *Portugal* was agreed upon before; and the *Cession* of *Florida*, which it was not in the Power of *Spain* to hinder the *British* Forces from taking Possession of, whenever they pleased; and whose Value, in Comparison with that of the *Havannah* is below the Reach of Computation, deserves not to be mentioned; as he was also too eager to finish the *blessed* Work of *Peace-making* to wait for an Account of the other great Events, which happened critically at that very Time; and had they been known, might have merited Attention; at least they would have made some Part of the Preliminaries unnecessary to be inserted; and obliged the *French* to look out for other *Equivalents*

to give in Return for the Places restored to them, if any such should be required.

These Events were the Reduction of *Cassel*, by Prince *Ferdinand*, before whom the *French* were retreating out of *Germany*; and the Disappointment of the Attempt of *Spain*, and *France*, upon *Portugal*, where their Progress was stopp'd, and their Army obliged to turn back, naked, starving, and greatly diminished by Death and Desertion, the Consequences of these calamitous Circumstances: (I have not mentioned the taking of *Schweidnitz* by the King of *Prussia*, and the Defeat of the *Saxon* and *Imperial* Armies, by Prince *Henry*, his Brother, as the Affairs of that Monarch may be thought to have no very great Weight with the *Prime Minister*;) but by this judicious Haste, all Difficulties which might have arisen on these Events, were avoided.

If it be said that the indiscriminate Restitution of whatever Conquests should be made by the *British* Forces, then sent against the *Spanish* Settlements, was the
Basis

Basis of the Treaty entered into with *Spain*, and the Evacuation of *Portugal* agreed to on that Account; and therefore that the Taking of the *Havannah* could not justly make any Alteration in the Preliminaries, I apprehend it will be difficult to reconcile such an Anticipation of Successes purchased at so great an Expence of Blood and Treasure, to the Steadiness and Resolution, indispensibly necessary in the Conduct of public Affairs, or the whole Expedition to the Principles of Humanity and Oeconomy, of which such pompous Professions were made.

If no more was really meant by the Expedition, than a Parade, *in terrorem*, surely it should have been directed against some Place, naturally less destructive to the Lives of *Britons*; or at least, if this Place was unavoidably pointed out by the general Voice of the People, it should not have been delayed to so destructive a Season; and a proper *Hint* should have been given to the Commanders to consume the Time in Preparations, till it should be too late to make an Attack, in which so much Blood

must be shed to no national Advantage; and if the Commanders, who were sent, were thought improper to be entrusted with such an Hint, or to execute so humane a Commission, *from the Character of the Person, who recommended them*, Experience would readily have directed them to others, who had given eminent Proof of their Abilities, in such Warfare, and who were personally not disagreeable to *the Prime Minister*.

The melancholy Returns from the Fleet and Army, sent upon this Occasion, abundantly prove the Justice of this Remark.

I say, My Lord, *to no national Advantage*, for the Treasure taken is private Prize; and as to the Damage done to the Enemy, I fear it will be found to be overballanced, by the Losses of the Conquerours, in this fatal Affair; especially as the Fortifications, the Reduction of which occasioned so great a Part of that Loss, were given up without demolishing. Had they been treated like those of *Cberburgh*, in the *late Ministry*, (and it does not appear that there

there was any more Design of retaining one, than the other;) or as the *British Minister* complaisantly agreed to treat our's at *Honduras*; the Stroke would have been of Consequence, and required Time to repair it, in which *Britain* might have established herself in the Possession of her important Acquisition of *Florida*:—if it should be found upon Experience to be her Interest to retain it?

To the same peaceful Haste it must also be attributed, that in Return for interfering so effectually in Favour of *Portugal*, as to save her from Ruin, otherwise inevitable, there were no commercial Advantages demanded, which in such Circumstances could not have been refused by the *Portuguese* themselves, nor taken Exception to by any other Nation; and which the Generosity of *the Prime Minister* had scorned to stipulate for at first; if indeed he ever thought of them at all! But all the Return to be made for so great an Assistance, and at such an inconvenient Time, is left to their Gratitude and Honour, the very Points, in which *Britain* had too just Reason

son to complain of them, before this Event, not being yet adjusted.

As to the Preliminaries, they have been ratified by the King, whose indisputable Prerogative it is to make War, and Peace; and they have been approved in the great Council of the Nation, wherefore I shall not presume to enter into any Discussion of them.

One Thing, though, I must beg Leave to Remark to your Grace, which the *Prime Minister*, in his great Haste, seems to have forgot; and this is, that the Liberty of *fishing* and *drying Fish*, on the Coasts of *Newfoundland*, which was given to the *French*, by the 13th Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and is now confirmed to them by the 13th Article, of these Preliminaries, (*of Paris*;) was also the 13th Article, in the *Impeachment of the Earl of Oxford*, the PRIME MINISTER, who made that Treaty, and for making it, was impeached of *High Treason*, by the *Commons of Great-Britain*; though it had been approved of by two successive Parliaments; and the
Principles

Principles of that House of Commons, who voted that Treaty prejudicial to the Interest of Great-Britain, and impeached him for making it, will, as I imagine, scarcely be called in Question, by any Friend of THE HOUSE OF HANOVER.

I must also observe, My Lord, that it is most unjust to assign a Fear of encreasing the Debt of the Nation, by the Expence of continuing the War, as a Reason for being in such haste to make a Peace; and at the same Time, by that very Peace, give up Advantages obtained in the War; the Retention of which, would not only reimburse that Expence, but also put it out of the Power of the Enemies of *Britain*, to involve her in the like again.

I shall here, My Lord, conclude my Remarks on the *foreign Policy* of the *Prime Minister*, which was the Point of View, I proposed to consider it in first. I have stated Facts fairly; and traced them to their Motives, with the most impartial Regard to Justice; and the Conclusion is obvious.

Into

Into the other Part of his Conduct, *his domestic Policy*, I shall not attempt to make so minute an Enquiry. It is for many Reasons, a most ineligible Task. I shall, therefore, only propose a few general Questions, to which every Reader's own Knowledge will suggest such Answers, as shall direct his Judgment.—

—Has the present *Prime Minister* always paid proper Respect to the several Branches of the Royal Family, and never presumed on the Support of present Favour to give them Offence?—

—Has he ever insulted the ancient and superiour Orders of the Nobility, by an affected Familiarity with their Sovereign?—

—Has he ever, to indulge a private Resentment of his own, removed any of the Servants of the Crown of proved Abilities and Integrity?—

—Has he ever shewn any Partiality in the Distribution of Offices, or filled all
Places

Places of Honour and Profit, with his own Dependants, making an implicit Attachment to himself, the only Means of obtaining his Master's Favour?—

—Has he ever made an ostentatious Display of Oeconomy, in Trifles, disgraceful to Royal Dignity, and at the same Time, lavishly applied the Revenues of the Crown, to establish his own Interest?—

—Has he ever trampled on the long and faithful Services of any Rival, or made his Master appear Ungrateful, to gratify his own Ambition?—

—Has he ever hired prostitute Writers to defame the most sacred Characters?—

—Has he ever attempted to estrange his Sovereign from his Subjects, by representing their Disapprobation of the Minister, as leveled at the Master?—

And lastly, if he should find himself hated by the Universal People, has he that Fidelity to his Sovereign, that real Regard

to his Interest, to resign his obnoxious Office, and not run the Hazard of injuring him in the Affections of his People, by supporting *a Minister* against their Judgment?——

A Minister, who cannot lay his Hand upon his Heart, and Answer these Questions to the Satisfaction of the People, must be condemned by his own Conscience, and given up by his most sanguine Advocates.

Having thus, My Lord, proved the Justice of the Objections *to the Office of A PRIME MINISTER*; and *to the Manner of it's Execution*, IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE, I shall now lay before your Grace, one of the strongest Nature, which is made to *this Minister personally*, by the universal Voice of the People, and *this is his being A SCOTCHMAN*.

There is no Man more sensible of the general Injustice of national Prejudices, than I am; however, as there is no Rule so general, as to be without some Exceptions, I shall shew the Grounds on which such
an

an Exception is made in this Case, and submit it to the Decision of Reason, whether it is not strictly just.

It will be necessary, My Lord, on this Occasion, to look back to the Commencement of our History; but this shall be done with the greatest possible Conciseness.

It is known, that from the earliest Accounts of the Island of *Great Britain*, there subsisted an hereditary Animosity between the Inhabitants of the *Southern* and *Northern* Parts of it. This arose from the insatiable Rapacity, and Ravages of the barbarian Invaders, who had established themselves in the latter, and from whom it has taken it's Name.

After the Secession of the *Romans*, the Invasion of these *Scots*, gave Occasion to the Conquest of the *Southern* Part of the Island, by the *Saxons*, who were called by the Inhabitants, to their Assistance.

When the *Norman* Monarchy was established on the Ruin of the *Saxon*, the *Scots*, animated by the same Principles, but sensible of the Disparity of their Strength, and apprehensive of the Vengeance due to their past Conduct, immediately entered into the closest Alliance with the *French*; an Alliance dictated by Reason for their mutual Advantage.

The Assistance of *France* was indispensibly necessary to preserve *Scotland* from falling under the Subjection of her too powerful Neighbour *England*; as the Assistance of *Scotland* was also of the most essential Service to *France*, in the Wars, which the latter was almost constantly engaged in, with *England*: And accordingly as soon as ever *England* attacked *France*, the *Scots* never failed to invade the former, with all their Force, and commit the most horrid Ravages, till they were repelled, in order to make a Diversion in Favour of *France*, by which Means many an important Enterprize of the *English* was disappointed.

Sensible

Sensible of the Importance of this Service, the *French*, to confirm the Attachment of so useful Allies still more strongly, granted Honours to the *Scots*, above any other People in *Europe*. The immediate Guard of the King's Person was entrusted to them, in Preference to the Natives of the Kingdom.

On the Accession of the King of *Scotland* to the Throne of *England*, the public Effects of this Alliance ceased of Course; but that the Inclinations of the *Scots* remain'd unaltered was too strongly proved, by the Readiness with which they entered into the Schemes of *France*, to embroil the unhappy Son of that King, with his People of *England*, though he was their natural Sovereign, and born among themselves; as their Conduct through the three succeeding Reigns shewed them steady in the same Principles.

A Desire to be delivered from the Trouble of Watching such a dangerous Inmate, made the Ministry of *Queen Anne* labour to bring about an Union, between the two Kingdoms, in Hopes that the evident and
great

great Advantages, which the *Scots* must reap from it, would conquer their Prejudices, and bind them firmly to *England*.

How well these Hopes were answered, the Events of the Years *fifteen* and *forty-five* are a sufficient Proof. If it be objected, that the *Scots* have behaved in a different Manner, during this War, it must be remembered, that almost all, who were able to bear Arms, and consequently to give Disturbance were taken into the Service of *England*, and separated in her different Fleets and Armies; where the much greater Numbers, among whom they were mixed, may *possibly* be thought to give an Appearance of Necessity to the Fidelity of a People, whose characteristic Virtue is Prudence.

I do not mean to insinuate, that every Individual of the *Scotch* Nation is still actuated by the same Attachment to *France*. Many of them have nobly proved the contrary by their Actions; many, very many more have professed it; and all have been well rewarded.

But

But still, My Lord, the People of *England* think that prudential Reasons require a longer Time of Probation; that Half a Century is not sufficient to eradicate Principles confirmed by many Centuries; and in a Nation (to it's Honour) remarkably tenacious of its Principles; and that at least the Generation, which saw them a distinct People, should pass away, before they ought to be entrusted with the Government of those, whom they themselves may possibly have been taught to esteem their Enemies; as their Ancestors for very many Generation most certainly did; and especially at a Time, when the Interest of *England* and *France* are in a Balance, to which the least Breath of that national Bias may give a Turn most essentially prejudicial to the Former; a Bias still endeavoured to be kept up by the *French*, who continue the same Honours to the *Scotch* Nation, which were conferred upon it, when in a Capacity of shewing its Gratitude in a more open and direct, though not more dangerous, Way, than it now can.

For

For this Reason, it is the Sense of the universal People of *England*, that even if there must be a *Prime Minister*, the *Present* is a most improper Person for that great Charge.

I must not, My Lord, from this Research, be charged with attempting to revive a deadly Feud, and renew Animosities, happily effaced! The Impatience shewn by the universal People of *England*, at being ruled by a *Scotsman*, too plainly proves that this has been done already by the imprudent *Ambition*, which gave Rise to these Disquisitions; and, it is to be feared, that to cool the Heats raised on this Occasion, and restore that Cordiality which began to subsist between the two Nations, before this Event, must be the Work of much Care, and a considerable Length of Time.

I Repeat, My Lord, *the universal People*; for though the Sense of *the Majority* is legally the Sense of *the Whole*; in this Case, that Majority is so great, as entirely to drown every Murmur of Dissent, it being

ing a most incontestible Truth, that if the Sentiments of every *Englishman* alive, who is not evidently influenced by Motives of private Interest, were to be taken this Day, *Ninety and Nine in every Hundred*, would be found to desire the Dismission of the present Minister; and it is to be hoped that the Voices of any other People, however incorporated among them, and Ambitious of sharing in their Rights, shall never have more Weight in *England*, than is given them by that Union, which gives them any Weight in it at all.

I will grant that he has all the Abilities, so lavishly ascribed to him by his interested Retainers; yet still the People of *England* are not content that he should Rule over them. Let him remain *the Servant of the King!* Let him enjoy his Confidence, and Favour, and administer to him "*the Comforts*" of his Conversation; but let him no longer continue *the Servant of the State!* He is weighed in the Balance, and found light; and the Sentence of Reprobation is gone forth against him.

If it should be objected to this, that the King has a Right to chuse his own Servants the Answer is ready.

In the Constitution of the *British* Government, the *executive Power* is vested *solely* in the King.

As this Power is too extensive to be exerted *personally* by him, he has arranged the Objects of it in several Departments, which he delegates to the Care of Servants, but under his own Inspection, the Power still remaining virtually in his Hands; and every Transaction of theirs being in the Intendment of the Law, performed by him.

The Necessity of this Delegation being evident, it is acknowledged in the Constitution, and Provision made for the Payment of such Servants, who thus become the Servants (though not immediately) of the *State*; and are implicitly subject to it's Authority, if not for actual Appointment,
or

or Amoval, yet most certainly for Approbation and Continuance.

This is so clear, that it scarcely requires Proof. The Business, which the King employs those Servants to execute, is, immediately the Business of the State; (that is, *of the People*) and the Revenues with which that Business is transacted by them, under him, are also the voluntary and conditional Gifts of the People, granted to the King, expressly, for that particular Business, and the Application of them to be accounted for, to the Granters, by him. Would it not then be an Affront to Reason, to assert that the People have not a Right to object to Servants entrusted thus with their most important Concerns, and to whom they literally pay the Wages of their Service?

To appoint his Servants is the undoubted Right of the King; nor do the People pretend to interfere with it; but it is also as undoubtedly the Right of the People to object to any of those Servants, whom they find improper for such a Trust;

a Right which they have often exerted with Success, and can never lose but with the Loss of their Liberty ; and, I may boldly add, a Right, the indispensable Obligation on the King to observe which is proved by this ; that it has never been infringed in a single Instance, and A Minister supported by the Sovereign, in Opposition to the Sense of his People, without making the Reign of that Sovereign unhappy at Home, and inglorious Abroad.

In Opposition to these plain, and conclusive Proofs, the Advocates for *the Prime Minister* alledge only a palliative Appeal to the Passions, to give Weight to which they confound, by the most disingenuous Art, Characters absolutely distinct from each other.

* “ If a King of *Great Britain* (say
 “ they) is not to be permitted to chuse his
 “ own Servants, or to discard them ; to
 “ be grateful for their Fidelity, and Acti-
 “ vity in the public Business ; and to judge
 “ of their Inclinations and Abilities for
 “ serving himself, and his People ; and to

* *Political Considerations.*

“ honour

“ honour with his Countenance and Pro-
 “ tection those, who merit his Favour, his
 “ Condition must be the most miserable
 “ upon Earth, to be deprived, merely be-
 “ cause he is King, of every Comfort a
 “ private Man holds dear to his Happiness
 “ and Interests.”——

These, My Lord, are their own Words;
 but plausible and affecting as this Appeal
 may appear, it will lose all its Force, as
 soon as the Fallacy on which it is founded,
 is exposed to View.

There are in the King of *Great-Britain*
 two distinct Characters, his *Political*, and
 his *Personal*. In the Latter, he most un-
 doubtedly has a Right, “ to chuse his own
 “ Servants, or to discard them; to be
 “ grateful for their Fidelity and to judge
 “ of their Inclination and Abilities for
 “ serving himself.”—But to argue from
 this to his *Political* Character, and con-
 found *the Servants of his Person*, with those
 whom he employs to do *the Business of the*
State; or in other Words, the Servants of
the King, with those of *the Crown*; is a
 manifest

manifest Sophism, and intended only to deceive.

With the former his *private* Happiness in his *personal* Capacity may very possibly be connected; and to interfere in the Authority, here claimed over them, would be to break in upon the natural Rights of Humanity; but in Regard to the Latter, the Case is quite different. They are not within the Verge of that domestic Familiarity, which in the necessary Intercourse of *Personal* Service in some Respects seems to restore the Sovereign and Subject, to the Equality of their common Nature, and constitutes *the Comforts*, whose Loss is so pathetically (and modestly) lamented in this Appeal.

The strongest and most recent Instances may be brought to support what is here advanced, of the essential Distinction between *Personal* and *Political* Service, if self-evident Reason can require any Support.

There have been *Servants of the King*, who have held the most lucrative, and honourable Employments *about his Person*,
and

and *enjoyed his Favour* in the highest Degree, without giving any Offence to the People, though they were known to be unqualified for the more complicated Business of the State, *because they interfered not with that Business*; as on the other Hand, there have been *Servants of the Crown* who have transacted the most difficult Affairs to their Master's Honour, and the Satisfaction of the People, at the same Time that it was too evident, *they were personally disliked by him*; and can Impropriety or Hardship be alledged in either Case?

That the King should have a grateful Sense of the Fidelity of his Servants is but natural, and argues a Virtuoufness of Disposition, which it would be the highest Misfortune to all his Subjects, that he should want; but this Gratitude must not be carried too far nor mislead his Judgment so as to make him think them qualified to be *Servants of the Crown*, because they please him in their Service *about his Person*. AN ERROUR THAT HAS OFTEN BEEN ATTENDED WITH THE MOST UNHAPPY CONSEQUENCES.

To

To *the universal Voice of the People* the Advocates for *the Minister* oppose *the Determination of their representative Body*, by which, according to their Way of Reasoning, the People is so absolutely concluded that it is a Violation of the Constitution for them to attempt interfering *Personally*, by offering their Opinion, in any Matters, relating to the Government; and therefore as the Conduct of *the Minister* has been approved of by that Representative, it is not necessary for him to pay any Respect to the Sentiments of the People themselves, which constitutionally have no just Weight, nor are entitled to any Regard.

In Order to make a just Estimate of the Force of this Argument, it will be necessary, My Lord, to trace the Constitution, from it's first Principles, to it's present Form.

In Disquisitions of this Nature, Freedom is indispensibly necessary to the Elucidation of Truth! the Principles of Religion are examined

examined by divine Command to confirm Faith.

In the Confusion of Times of continual War, when Kingdoms were the Reward of Conquests, it was the Policy of the conquering Powers to divide their Acquisitions among their military Chiefs, to keep the Natives in Subjection, and have their own Forces always collected, and ready for any sudden Occasions, which Forces consisted of the Followers of those Chiefs, whom they armed and brought into the Field, at their own Expence; for War was not then a particular Trade, but every Subject was a Soldier, going from the Plough to Battle, and returning again, when it was over, to the very few Arts of such an unsettled State.

These, and some personal Services to their Kings, were the Titles by which the Chiefs held their Lands, and comprized the greatest Part of their Duty of Subjection.

H

Under

Under these Chiefs the Lands were again subdivided between their own Soldiers, and Officers of inferior Rank, and the Natives; but on very different Terms.

The Former held them of the Chiefs, by Services of a similar Nature, to those which the Chiefs paid to the Kings, and were *free* from every other Kind of Subjection to them; the Latter on the Contrary, were in a State little differing from Slavery, tilling the Ground for their Masters, and following them to the Wars, for a bare Maintainance, which was all that was allowed to themselves, without any Right to acquire private Property or possibility of recovering Liberty, but by the express Consent, and actual Concurrence, of their Chiefs, except in some extraordinary Cases, and descending from Generation to Generation with the Lands as Part of the Inheritance. These Chiefs were called *Lords*, and the others *Villeins*.

In the rude Original of the *British* Constitution, these Lords had an hereditary Share

Share in the Government, in Right of their Lands, and made an Estate, which has since been improved into the present *Peerage*.

The great Influence, which such an unlimited Authority over the People gave to the Lords, often produced the most dangerous Consequences, by enabling them to resist indiscriminately the Authority of their Sovereigns, as Views of private Interest or Ambition urged them.

To remedy this, Reason suggested it to the governing Powers to restore the People to the Rights of Nature, and give them a Share in that Government, of which they were the Strength; that they might form a proper Balance to the Lords.

To obviate the Inconveniencies, which must inevitably attend the People's exercising this Share in the Government, in their *collective* Body, it was instituted that they should *elect* a certain Number from among themselves, to *represent* the Whole,

and whose Determinations should be conclusive upon them.

That this *representative* Body should answer the Intent of its Institution, it was indispensibly necessary that it should consist only of such Persons as were *free* from the Authority of the Lords.

As the most effectual Provision to secure this *Freedom* of the Representatives, it was appointed that they should be *elected* only by those, who were themselves *free* also; as it could not be supposed that *free* Men should ever intrust their most Sacred Interests to the Care of those, who were not *free*, as by this *Election* they evidently did to their Representatives.

These *free* Men, who at first consisted almost solely of the Soldiers, and inferiour Officers of the Conquerours, to whom Lands had been granted under the Lords, as has been observed before, were now in a Course of Years, considerably increased in Number; many of the Natives having recovered their
Freedom

Freedom on various Occasions ; but still this Number was greatly inferiour to that of those who were not *Free*.

As Property alone could give that *Independency*, which was evidently the Reason for *limiting* the Right of Election to *free* Men ; and as all Property then consisted in Lands, that Right was annexed to a certain Amount of such Property, as in those Times was esteemed sufficient to support the Possessor, in the necessary Degree of *Independency* ; and to certain *Qualifications*, which were esteemed equivalent to such Property.

In Consequence of these Institutions, no Man was admitted to join in electing a Representative for a *County*, who did not hold Lands in that County, to that Amount, by a Right, which was not determinable at the Will of another, or at any known Time ; nor for a *Burrough*, who did not either hold such Lands, within the Precincts of that Burrough, or was acknowledged to enjoy his *Freedom* in it, by an authentic Record ; which latter Privilege was given to Burroughs

roughs (*or Towns*) to encourage Peoples living together, for the Advancement of Industry and Trade; and it was not to be supposed, that this Acknowledgement would be given to any, who had not a visible Probability of Living in a State of Independency. The Former of these were called *Free Holders*; the Latter simply *Free Men*.

These wise Precautions had the desired Effect, and the Representative of the People soon arose to that great Importance in the State, which their Strength naturally entitled them to.

But as the Wisdom of Man is not capable of making any Provisions, which shall invariably comprehend all the various Changes, wrought by Time, it can not be imputed to want of Respect to the Constitution, to enquire whether these Precautions are sufficient to produce the same Effects at present, when the Circumstances, on which they were principally formed, are so essentially altered.

The

The Improvements of Industry, in more settled Times, the Acquisitions of Commerce, and the Discoveries made in the Pursuit of it, have introduced a new Kind of Property, unknown to the Modellers of the Constitution, and which, therefore, they could make no Provision for ; at the same Time, that the Increase of Money has diminished its Value, and the Luxury inseparable from Opulence, multiplied the Wants of Mankind to such a Degree, as to make the present Appointment of Charity calculated for the bare Subsistence of a *Parish-Beggar*, amount to many Times the Sum, which was then judged sufficient to establish the Independency of an *Electer*.

When these Circumstances are considered, can it be unreasonable to suppose, that if the sage Legislators, who fixed the Value of the Property, necessary to support that Independency at such a Sum of Money, could have foreseen this Change, they would have made some Provision for enlarging that Property, in Proportion as the

Causes

Causes above - mentioned diminished it's Value, and consequently it's Effect; and have judged the Possessors of this new Property sufficiently *free*, and *independent*, to have shared in the *Right* of *electing* Representatives, and of sufficient Consequence to merit being *represented*?—That 40,000*l.* for Instance, lent to the Government, should make a Man as independent of all undue Influence, as Forty Shillings a Year, in Free-hold Estate; and that a Gentleman, who should expend an affluent Income in Hospitality; or a Merchant, who should afford Support to the several Trades in a Town, and add to the Wealth of the Community, should be as proper to join in electing the Representatives of that Town, as one of those Tradesmen, whose utmost Industry could barely earn him a Subsistence; and, who after a Life, worn out in Poverty, might possibly be brought to the Place of Election, from a Work-house, where he had been long supported by public Charity?

Or would it have been consistent with that Equity, which so evidently appears to
 have

have been the Foundation of all their Institutions, that those, whose *Independency* (the original and sole Motive for limiting the Right of Election) was established on Property, in many Instances, many Thousand Fold greater than that appointed by this Institution, should be made to *depend* for the very Enjoyment of that Property, on the Determinations of a Representative, in the electing of which, they were not permitted to share?

And might not their Wisdom have apprehended, that this very Limitation might, in these Circumstances, be a Means of destroying that *Independency*, which it was appointed to support; and give an Opportunity of gaining an Influence, as unconstitutional, and dangerous, as the Authority of the Lords, over a *few indigent Electors*, which could never be attempted with any Prospect of Success, over *the opulent and numerous Body of the whole People*.

That to preserve this *Independency*, was the *sole Motive* for *limiting the Right of Election originally*, is incontestibly proved,

(if what is intuitively evident to Reason can require Proof?) by this, that in the Charters granted to several Burroughs, where the Lords, at the Time of granting them, had no such Power, as it was designed to guard against, the Right of Election was given to all the Inhabitants in general, without any such Limitation to *Free-holders*, and *Free-men*.—Why the same Liberty is not extended to the Inhabitants of all, (due Regard being had to all Disqualifications particularly appointed) now that the Reason against it is universally removed, I do not presume to inquire.

I must not from this be understood to presume at finding Fault with the present Form of the Constitution. As I have said in another Instance, I revere, because I know it's Excellence; nor has any Subject of *Great-Britain*, an higher Sense of the Dignity, and Authority, of the Representative Body of the People, than I have. All I contend for is, to shew by this candid Discussion of the Principles of that Constitution, that a considerable Part of the People, which is now excluded
from

from all Share in the Government, was not in the true Spirit and Reason of them intended to suffer any such Exclusion, and that, though it is *legally* bound by the Resolutions of the present Representatives, yet in Consequence of that Exclusion it can not justly be said to be *represented*, or to have it's Sense expressed by them.

That these *Non Electors* are really a considerable Part of the People will not be denied by any one, who is acquainted with the present State of these Kingdoms, and knows the Disproportion between them, and the *Electors*, in any one Burrough or County in *Great Britain*, in which the *Non Electors* make so great a Majority, that they may almost be said to be the whole People.

And shall such a Body not be permitted to speak their Sentiments, as they are excluded from electing Representatives to speak for them? — Shall they be set at nought by Servants, whose Wages are paid out of their Property? — And does this

this *legal* Incapacity of *Electing* sink them entirely beneath the Attention of a Government, of which they are the Strength?—

I have thus, My Lord, proved, as I humbly conceive, both the Positions advanced in the Beginning of this Letter, “*that the Office of a Prime Minister is inconsistent with the Principles of this Constitution,*”—And, “*that the Manner in which that Office is at this Time executed is also inconsistent with the Principles of sound Policy, and the essential Interests of these Kingdoms.*”—And in the Course of the Arguments alledged for this Purpose, have likewise evinced, on the Principles of the Constitution, *the Right of the People, in their general Body to declare their Sentiments in Matters of public Concern; as well as shewn the indispensable Obligation on their Governours, to pay regard to that Right!* Will your Grace now give me leave to trespass on you for a Moment longer, while I presume in the overflowing of my Heart, to point out the proper Means

Means of redressing the Evils here complained of.

As *uniting* the Efficacy of all the great Offices under the Crown, *unconstitutionally* and *improperly* in the Hands of ONE, is the Cause of the People's Discontent, the natural Way to remove that Discontent is to *divide* that Power between many.

Nor are there a sufficient Number of Persons wanting, to whom these Offices may be intrusted, with Safety, and Satisfaction; whose Abilities have been found equal to that Charge; and their Fidelity tried, in Days of Difficulty, and Doubt; who have not changed with the Seasons, nor dissembled their Sentiments, to serve their Interest; and who are ready to support with their Lives *the Principles of that Revolution*, in accomplishing which, their Fathers had the Glory to share; and from whence are derived the greatest Blessings, now enjoyed by *Britons*.

For some Offices in particular there are certain Persons, who seemed marked out by Heaven.

There

There is one, whose Genius has directed him to seek for Glory on that Element, which Heaven has made the peculiar Scene of *Britain's* Triumphs; and whose opening Abilities fill the Hearts of all her faithful Sons, with the happiest Presages! Let the Navy be assigned to his Care! Let *Britain's* Thunder shake the trembling Shores, from Pole to Pole, under his Command!

There is another, who has led her Armies, with immortal Honour in the Field; who proved the hereditary Courage of his Soul, and sealed his Attachment to the Liberties of Mankind with his Blood at *Dettingen*; who gathered Lawrels at *Fontenoy*, which made the Victors blush; and whose Conduct at *Culloden* fixed the Foundation of his Father's Throne so firmly, that Faction or Rebellion could never shake it more, on that important Day, when many, who have now crept into its Shadow, and bask in the Smiles of Favour, watched, panting with impious Hope for its Fall. Let the Sword be given into his experienced Hand again! Let him command that Army,
which

which was formed by his Care, and confessedly owes its Triumphs in every Quarter of the Globe, to the Excellence of his Institution !

Thus shall the Military Power of *Britain*, entrusted by its Sovereign to the Conduct of those, whom Nature has bound inseparably to his Interest, and Heaven made strong for his Service, be a Terrour to her Enemies, and a Safeguard to her happy Sons.

By this *constitutional* Distribution, all Jealousies will be removed, and that Harmony between the *Governours*, and *Governed*, which blessed the happy Evening of the late Father of his People, and made their Hearts bleed for his Loss, he restored ; while *the Supreme Power shall be exerted SOLELY by the King himself* ; and all the Emoluments of Government flowing regularly from his Royal Hand, bind the Souls of his Subjects in the Adamantine Chains of Gratitude to the Sacred Dispenser of their Happiness ; nor will any Minister have an Opportunity to strengthen himself in his
Power,

Power, by bribing the Representatives of the People, with the prostituted Favours of the Crown, till he shall think himself able both to despise the People themselves, and insult his Sovereign.

To make some Attonement for the Errors which may be in this Letter, I shall conclude it with a Prayer, in which I am sure there is none, and know I shall be sincerely joined by your Grace, and every faithful Friend of *Britain*.

May evil Counsellours be removed from before the Throne, and the Power of the King, be established forever in the Confidence of his People! And may his Sacred Family, always united in itself, be planted in these Kingdoms, as firmly as the Foundations of the Hills, and flourish to the End of Ages, like the Green Bay-tree! And let all the People say, A M E N.

I am, My Lord, &c.

POST-

P O S T S C R I P T.

SINCE I wrote the above, I find, My Lord, that the Advocates for *the Minister* endeavour to evade the Objection of *General Dislike*, in one of it's most striking Instances, by alledging that, if several Persons of high Rank have resigned the most honourable and lucrative Employments, rather than serve under so *unconstitutional* an Office, executed by so *exceptionable* a Person, others of equal Rank have accepted of them, so that the Weight in the general Balance is equal.

The Force of this Reasoning will soon appear. *Private Interest* is confessed to be too generally the Motive of human Action. Where a Person, therefore, acts consistently with this Motive, it cannot be unjust to ascribe his Actions to it; whereas on the Contrary, where a Person acts deliberately in direct Opposition to his private Interest, Justice demands that such Actions should be ascribed to an higher Motive; and consequently those Resignations, which could

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proceed

proceed only from Principle, prove a fixed Dislike, while the Sincerity of the Approbation argued for from the Acceptance of the others, is justly to be doubted, and it's Continuance not to be depended on; as *Interest* may change, but *Principle* can not.

If it be said, that the great Fortunes of some, who have thus lifted themselves under *the Minister*, raise them above the Influence of so mean a Motive, it must be remembered, that where Avarice has taken Possession of the Soul, it's Force increases with the Increase of it's Acquisitions, and grasps still at more; or let *Ambition*, which too often over-balances Reason, in youthful Minds, be substituted in the Place of *Interest*, in the Argument, and the Conclusion, will be the same.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

P. 7. l. 15. *for difficult, read delicate.*

P. 30. l. 18. *for 13th, read 3d.*

