The Legal News.

Vol. XIV. AUGUST 8, 1891. No. 32.

Mr. Uttley, in the *Law Journal*, refers to a trial for bigamy at the Manchester Assizes, in which a case of hardship against the prisoner was felt to exist under the law. "According to the present state of the law," he says, "a man who is being tried for bigamy must prove, if possible, that he has not heard of his first wife for a period of seven years, or else that he has reason to believe she was dead, before he married a second time. Curiously enough, however, the law will not permit him to give evidence himself, nor yet allow him to call his wife as a witness for himself. This is, of course, an undoubted hardship on a prisoner if innocent, and well merited the strictures of the learned judge. It appeared that a clogger was charged with bigamy, and to the woman with whom the bigamous marriage was celebrated the prisoner represented that he was a widower, that his wife had been dead nine years. The supposed wife subsequently learned that his real wife was living, and she gave information to the police. Counsel for the prosecution pointed out that if a prisoner had never heard of his wife for a period of seven years, or had reason to believe that she was dead when he went through the marriage ceremony, then the existing law demanded that on the prosecution should rest the onus of proof that he knew she was alive at the time. The judge asked how the prisoner was to prove what the law said he had to prove when he was not entitled to give evidence nor allowed to call his wife. Counsel for the prisoner naturally pointed out that it was an extreme hardship, that while the burden of proof rested on the prisoner, he could neither be put in the witness-box nor call his wife. The judge agreed that the prisoner was under a hardship, and said it was due to a shocking and barbarous state of the law. He hoped the law would soon be altered, but meanwhile they must act in accordance with it. The prisoner was found guilty, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Meanwhile, it is to be hoped the suggested alteration will be carried out."

At the recent Bedford Assizes, a prisoner on his trial for rape, after giving evidence himself in denial of the charge, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, proposed to call one of the jurors as a witness to his character. Mr. Justice Williams declined to allow the juror to be sworn, but said that he might give his fellow-jurors the benefit of his knowledge in deliberating on the verdict, and this having been done, the jury acquitted the prisoner. The *London Law Journal* doubts whether the course pursued on this occasion was in accordance with precedent. "It appears," says our contemporary, "to be a settled rule (see 'Best on Evidence,' 7th edit. p. 193) that a juryman may be a witness for either of the parties to a cause which he is trying, and 'it is essential that this should be so, as otherwise persons in possession of valuable evidence would be excluded if placed on the jury panel, and might even be fraudulently placed there for the purpose of excluding their testimony.' It is said, too, (see 'Starkie on Evidence,' 3rd edit. p. 542), that if a juror know any facts material to the issue he ought to be sworn as a witness, and if he privately state such facts, it will be ground of motion for a new trial. The rule was applied to a criminal trial in *Regina* v. *Rosser*, 7 C. & P. 648; and though we can find no instance of its being applied to a witness merely to character, we cannot but think that it ought to be applied to such a witness, on the ground that the test of cross-examination cannot be properly employed to testimony privately given in the jury-box. It is true, no doubt, that witnesses to character are seldom cross-examined, but their liability to cross-examination is undoubted. Moreover, if evidence as to character be given privately in the jury-box, there will not be the same facility for the prosecution, under 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 111, giving evidence, if they should happen to possess it, that the prisoner has been previously convicted of felony."

BENCH AND BAR.

A "Practising Barrister" writes to the *London Law Journal*, complaining bitterly of interruptions of counsel. He says:—

"When I was called to the bar, over twenty years ago, it was the custom for the bar to talk and the bench to listen. We have changed all that, and it is now the custom for the bench to talk and for the bar to listen.

"In these days counsel are not even usually allowed, when they are arguing *in banco*, to state their case, but it is extracted from them by cross-examination, with the result that what would be a clear, consistent statement is rendered too often confused, while important matters are kept in the background, and those which are quite unimportant are dragged prominently forward.

"Can anything be more deplorable than the scene which constantly takes place in Appeal Court I, where it frequently happens that counsel, having carefully got up their arguments, are not allowed to deliver them?

"To use sporting language, it is an even chance that at any moment one judge will be talking, it is a six to one chance that two will be talking, while it would be practically safe to bet fifty to one that all three judges are talking together.

"I only mention this Court as affording the most flagrant instance; but this degradation of manners has unhappily spread to nearly all the Courts that sit *in banco*.

"Such scenes as take place now would have been impossible twenty or thirty years ago, when four judges usually sat together, in grave, dignified, courteous silence, carefully considering the arguments addressed to them, and no more capable of rudely or unnecessarily interrupting counsel than they would be capable of such conduct towards any other gentleman who was speaking to them.

"I am not one of those who think that the judges of to-day are inferior to the judges of old times; and I look upon the incessant talking which takes place on the bench as a bad habit which has spread from one judge to another.

"I am, however, convinced that the fact that an enormous number of cases are overruled is due to the habit which judges have got into of forming a hasty conclusion, sometimes without having given counsel a chance of properly stating the case; that instead of listening to counsel they spend their time in talking and arguing themselves, and that they frequently snub and brow-beat counsel, who are as able as themselves, and frequently decide cases without giving counsel an opportunity of addressing a real argument to them. I write this letter not with the mere intention of finding fault, but in the hope that the bench will learn from your columns what is the feeling of the bar on the subject, and that they will take to heart the lesson that it would be a great saving of time, and conducive to decency, propriety, and justice, if the bench would learn to listen and would cease talking."

COUR DE CIRCUIT.

MONTRÉAL, 6 avril 1891.

Coram PAGNUELO, J.

LEFEBVRE v. PAQUIN et PAQUIN, opposant.

Opposition—Arts. 588*a*, 664, *C. P. C.*

JUGÉ:—*Que les articles* 588 *a et* 664 *du Code de Procédure Civile ne s'appliquent pas à un tiers qui fai opposition à la vente de ses biens meubles, mais seulement aux parties qui sont déjà dans la cause.*

(P. D.)

PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION.

LONDON, June 21.

LAWRENCE v. LAWRENCE (OTHERWISE AMBERY.)

Contempt of Court—Report of Case heard 'in Camerâ.'

In this case there were two motions by the respondent to attach the responsible editors of two country newspapers for reporting the result of a suit for nullity heard *in camerâ*.

JEUNE, J., refused both applications. Although cases of this kind, if mentioned in print, should be referred to in the barest possible way the publication of the result might be desirable. These two paragraphs were merely the result slightly expanded. Whether in good or bad taste was not the

question. If any part of what transpired *in camerâ* had been published, that would have been a gross contempt of Court. Under all the circumstances, the apologies tendered by counsel would be accepted and the motions dismissed, but without costs.

THE NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EDUCATION.

THE Council of Legal Education have, in their new scheme, made alterations in the system of instruction and examination of those who wish to be called to the bar which we do not hesitate to say are of the greatest importance. The scheme, in fact, forms a new departure in the study of English law, the consequences of which it is difficult to foresee. We do not here desire to consider whether the new system will have the effect of making the instruction of the students more thorough, or whether more will in the future avail themselves of the lectures and classes of the readers and assistant-readers than in the past resorted to the lectures of the professors, though this is a matter of considerable moment. What we wish to point out is that the council have, for the purposes of study and examination for call to the bar, adopted a classification of English law which, so far as we know, has never been adopted before, and which certainly is not the one used for practical purposes by practitioners in the Courts of this country. The subjects of legal instruction are, under the new scheme (see the new 'Consolidated Regulations,' par. 28), divided into three heads—viz. (1) Roman law and jurisprudence and international law, public and private; (2) constitutional law and legal history; (3) English law and equity. The latter subject is divided into five subsections, which are (*a*) law of persons, including marriage and divorce, infancy, lunacy, and corporations; (*b*) law of real and personal property and conveyancing, including trusts, mortgages, administration of assets on death, on dissolution of partnerships, on winding up of companies, and in bankruptcy, and practical instructions in the preparation of deeds, wills, and contracts; (*c*) law of obligations, including contracts, torts, allied subjects (implied or *quasi*-contracts), estoppel, &c., and commercial law, with especial reference to mercantile documents in daily use, which should be shown and explained; (*d*) civil procedure, including evidence; (*e*) criminal law and procedure. It is intended by the council that readers and assistant-readers should be appointed in these subjects and examinations conducted on these lines.

It will be seen that under this classification the body of English law and equity is to be treated of in four main heads; (1) the law of persons, (2) the law of property, (3) the law of obligations, and (4) procedure. This corresponds with the division of Roman law in the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian into (1) *jus personarum*, (2) *jus rerum* (subdivided into (*a*) *jura in rem*, and (*b*) *jura in personam*), and (3) *jus actionum*. Now, undoubtedly, for a useful study of any body of law some systematic division of the subject-matter is essential, and the division adopted by the Roman institutional writers was a good one, and useful for an intelligent appreciation of the principles of the *corpus juris*. It has, however, been demonstrated that it was not a strictly logical division nor strictly adhered to by the Roman jurists themselves. (See Austin on 'Jurisprudence,' lectures xl. xli. xliii.) But whatever the merits or demerits of the Roman classification of law may be, it has never, so far as we know, been applied to the practical study of English law, which is not founded on the civil law, and does not naturally fall into the same divisions. English law has been usually studied in what may be called its natural divisions—that is, according to its sources and to the main divisions which obtain in actual practice. These are well known to be—we must apologize for stating them—common law, the law of real and personal property and conveyancing, equity, and ecclesiastical law (including probate and divorce). The leading text-books, not only for students, but also for practical purposes, have been written with reference to this system of classification, which has also been used in examinations for the bar and in examinations for admission as solicitors by the Incorporated Law Society. The Council of Legal Education propose to drop the old classification and introduce a new

one. They create a new head of English law —the law of persons—and leave out of consideration equity as a separate field of study, it being intended, we presume, that the student should acquire its principles incidentally in his study of the law of persons, the law of property, and the law of obligations.

Looked at from the point of view of jurisprudence, there is no doubt that the old classification of English law is not strictly logical or scientific. Yet, as we submit, it is far more convenient for the practising lawyer, which is what the student aims at becoming, than any new system that can be devised, because it corresponds with the divisions into which the law of this country has naturally fallen. With the adoption of a new and artificial system founded on Roman law the value of many of the present text-books for students will be more or less destroyed; and we doubt if it will be possible to find competent teachers of such a subject as 'the law of person,' which comprehends what must seem to the English lawyer the heterogeneous topics of marriage and divorce, infancy, lunacy, and corporations. The new departure of the Council of Legal Education is a bold step; and, even though it may be a theoretical improvement, we venture to doubt if it will commend itself to practical lawyers.—*Law Journal, (London).*

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AMONG THE JEWS.

In a work on the 'Criminal Code of the Jews,' Mr. Benny gives an interesting account of the various modes of punishment of those convicted under the Hebrew law of capital offences. In accordance with the Mosaic code four kinds of death were inflicted, each appropriate to a distinct series of crimes. These were stoning, strangling, burning, and decapitation. Nothing can be more absurd, says the author, than the notions generally current respecting the manner in which these punishments were carried out among the Jews. The stoning of the Bible and of the Talmud was not, as commonly supposed, a pell-mell casting of stones at a criminal; the burning had nothing whatever in common with the process of consuming by fire a living person as practised by the Churchmen of the Middle Ages; nor did the strangling bear any resemblance to the English method of putting criminals to death.

The stoning to death of the Talmud was performed as follows: The criminal was conducted to an elevated place, divested of his attire, if a man, and then hurled to the ground below. The height of the eminence from which he was thrown was always more than fifteen feet; the higher, within certain limits, the better. The violence of the concussion caused death by dislocating the spinal cord. The elevation was not, however, to be so high as to greatly disfigure the body. This was a tender point with the Jews; man was created in God's image, and it was not permitted to desecrate the temple shaped by heaven's own hand. The first of the witnesses who had testified against the condemned man acted as executioner, in accordance with Deut. xvii. 7. If the convict fell face downward, he was turned on his back. If he was not quite dead, a stone, so heavy as to require two persons to carry it, was taken to the top of the eminence whence he had been thrown; the second of the witnesses then hurled the stone so as to fall upon the culprit below. This process, however, was seldom necessary; the semi-stupified condition of the condemned, and the height from which he was cast insuring, in the generality of cases, instant death.

It may be well to mention, in this connection, that previous to the carrying into effect a sentence of death, a death draught, as it was called, was administered to the unfortunate victim. This beverage was composed of myrrh and frankincense (*lebana*) in a cup of vinegar or light wine. It produced a kind of stupefaction, a semi-conscious condition of mind and body, rendering the convict indifferent to his fate and scarcely sensible to pain. As soon as the culprit had partaken of the stupefying draught the execution took place.

A criminal sentenced to death by burning was executed in the following manner: A shallow pit some two feet deep was dug in the ground. In this the culprit was placed, standing upright. Around his legs earth was

shovelled and battered firmly down until he was fixed up to his knees in the soil. Movement on the part of the condemned person was, of course, impossible; but care was taken that the limbs should not be painfully constrained. A strong cord was now brought, and a very soft cloth wrapped around it. This was passed once round the offender's neck. Two men then came forward; each grasped an end of the rope and pulled hard. Suffocation was immediate. As the condemned man felt the strain of the cord, and insensibility supervened, the lower jaw dropped. Into the mouth thus opened a lighted wick was quickly thrown. This constituted the burning.

Decapitation was performed by the Jews after the fashion of the surrounding nations. It was considered the most humiliating; the most ignominious and degrading death that any man could suffer. It was the penalty in cases of assassination and deliberate murder. It was incurred by those who wilfully and wantonly slew a fellow-man with a stone or with an implement of stone or iron. It was likewise the punishment meted out to all persons who resided in a town the inhabitants of which had allowed themselves to be seduced to idolatry and paganism.

Strangulation was a form of death by suffocation. It was effected as in burning. The culprit stood up to his knees in loose earth. A soft cloth containing a cord was wound once round his neck. The ends being pulled in opposite directions, life was soon extinct. This mode of death was the punishment of one who struck his father or his mother; of anyone stealing a fellow Israelite; of a false prophet; of an elder or provincial judge who taught or acted contrary to the decision of the Great Sanhedrin of Jerusalem; and of some other crimes against public morals.

These four deaths, as above described, were the only modes of execution in accordance with Hebrew law.—*The Green Bag.*

ENGLISH CAUSES CÉLEBRES.

Reg. v. Palmer.

Till the middle of the present century strychnia was, forensically speaking, all but unknown. Prussic acid, antimony, opium, and above all, arsenic, served the purposes and seemed to exhaust the ingenuity of the poisoner, and retribution followed swiftly and surely in the footprints of crime.

On the night of November 22, 1855, John Parsons Cook, a young gentleman of means, once a solicitor's clerk, but at the date in question only an *habitué* of the turf, died suddenly in convulsions at the Talbot Arms, in Rugeley, Staffordshire. Little more than an hour and a half before his death his friend, betting companion, and medical adviser, William Palmer, of Rugeley, had administered to him two pills, which purported to be merely sedative, and to have been sent from the laboratory of another medical practitioner—a very old man—whom Palmer had called in to see the case. Cook had been ailing for some time. Violent vomiting had followed every attempt that he made to take food, and a few days before the 22nd he had been seized with an attack similar in character to, but less intense than, that which destroyed him. A number of strange circumstances soon came to light. It was known that Cook had won a considerable sum of money shortly before his death at Shrewsbury races. His betting-book was nowhere to be found, and it turned out that Palmer had realized the winnings and applied them in part payment of his own debts, which were instant and overwhelming. Again although Cook's stepfather, Mr. Stevens, was on the spot, Palmer took upon himself to order a coffin, and eagerly pressed forward the funeral arrangements. Suspicion was aroused. Witnesses were forthcoming who said that it was only when Cook's food was prepared under Palmer's supervision that it made him sick. Men remembered that other persons, too, from whose deaths Palmer would derive pecuniary benefit—his brother, his wife, and at least one of his children—had died as mysteriously as Cook. A coroner's inquest was ordered. Palmer forthwith proceeded to manufacture most damaging evidence against himself. He misplaced and tried to overturn the jars that contained the stomach and intestines for chemical analysis. Although this effort failed, someone succeeded in slitting the skin of the stomach so that the larger portion of

the contents escaped. He attempted to bribe the postboy that was to drive the jars to the railway station to upset the coach, and he induced the local postmaster to open the letter that contained the report of the experts, Dr. Taylor and Mr. Rees, and to acquaint him with its terms. He sent presents of game to the coroner. These artifices produced the result that was to be expected, and the sporting surgeon of Rugeley was fully committed for trial for the murder of John Parsons Cook. Rugeley, and, indeed, Staffordshire, had no doubt as to his guilt, and it was obvious that, if he was tried in his own county, the result of the trial would be a foregone conclusion. So the Legislature intervened to protect this blackleg from his neighbours, and an Act of Parliament was passed, which is sometimes described as Palmer's Act (19 Vict. c. 16), and which provides for the removal of a criminal prosecution to the Central Criminal Court when, for some cause personal to the prisoner, a fair trial cannot be had in the appropriate venue. The *cause célèbre* of *Regina* v. *Palmer* was heard at the Old Bailey in the beginning of May, 1856, before three Judges—Lord Chief Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Cresswell, and Mr. Baron Alderson. It lasted for twelve days, and resulted in the jury unanimously finding the prisoner 'guilty as libelled.' The Attorney General (Sir A. E. Cockburn), Mr. Edwin James, and Mr. Huddleston appeared for the Crown. Mr. Serjeant Shee—*vice* Mr. Serjeant Wilkins, who was prevented by illness from conducting the defence—Mr. Grove, Q.C., whose scientific knowledge was considered valuable, and the unfortunate Kenealey appeared for the prisoner. The points of legal and medical interest connected with this trial are almost innumerable. We shall deal with a few of them and leave our readers to grapple with the rest. (1) *Regina* v. *Palmer* dissipated the delusion that poisoning by strychnia can be effected *with impunity*. When Dr. Taylor and his brother expert reported that they found no strychnia in the stomach of Cook, it was hastily assumed that this deadly alkaloid could not be detected, and a half-witted farmer in the Midlands, named Dove, poisoned his wife with it on the strength of this assumption. But the trial conclusively established (*a*) that the failure of the experts for the prosecution to detect strychnia was due to the conditions under which their experiments were conducted; (*b*) that strychnia does not defy chemical analysis; and (*c*) that even if *post-mortem appearances* prove deceptive, the *symptoms* of poisoning by strychnia are unique and cannot be confounded by the practised eye with those of general convulsions, epilepsy, or tetanus, whether traumatic or idiopathic. (2) In the course of his powerful speech for the defence, Mr. Serjeant Shee said that he believed 'in his soul' that the prisoner was innocent; and Sir Alexander Cockburn in his reply was, with less excuse, betrayed into hinting that *he* held a contrary opinion. Lord Campbell directed the jury to disregard both of these observations entirely, and to confine their attention to the evidence. The feather thus plucked from the wings of counsel has never been replaced, and it is not now the practice, even in criminal cases, for an advocate to tell the jury his personal opinion as to the merits of the issues before them. (3) *Regina* v. *Palmer*, following *Regina* v. *Macnaghten*, 10 Cl. & Fin. 211-212, is an authority for the proposition that an expert will not be permitted to state that *upon the facts proved at the trial* he is of a certain opinion. But he may be asked what inference he as an expert would draw from certain facts or symptoms, *assuming them to be proved*. (4) In the course of Palmer's trial Mr. Grove was proceeding to cross-examine a medical student who had assisted at the *post-mortem*, upon the appearances caused by strychnine poisoning, when one of the judges stopped him, saying, 'When you have here all the medical men in England, you had better not put such questions to an undergraduate of London University.' This is the nearest approach that we are aware of in any medico-legal case to the assertion by a judge of his undoubted right to reject the evidence of any expert who appears from his own statements incompetent to give an opinion upon the matter in question. Upon the histrionic features of this remarkable trial we shall not dwell. Sir James Stephen and, *longo intervallo*, Mr. Harris have made them familiar to all English lawyers. But a bibliographical note

may be of some interest and value. The best report of the *whole* trial is the unillustrated reprint from the *Times*. The illustrated *Times* edition is curious and entertaining, but inaccurate. Messrs. Barnett and Buckley's shorthand notes of the *evidence* are admirable. The pamphlet literature on the subject fills pages in the catalogue of the British Museum and is written in English, French, German, and even Greek !—*Law Journal, (London).*

INSOLVENT NOTICES, ETC.

Quebec Official Gazette, July 18.

Curator Appointed.

Re John Otto Osler, Beaver Steam Laundry, Quebec, —N. Matte, Quebec, curator, July 14.

Dividends.

Re Chs. Caron, trader, Isle Verte.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 4, H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Re Jos. Bellavance, trader, St. Fabien, Rimouski.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 4. H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Re Desaulniers Frères & Co., Montreal.—First dividend, payable Aug. 4, David Seath, Montreal, curator.

Re Lindsay, Gilmour & Co., Montreal.—First dividend, payable Aug. 6, Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator.

Re John McIntyre, machinist, Montreal,—First dividend, payable Aug. 3, A. F. Riddell, Montreal, curator.

Re J. Fraser Stuart, trader, Montreal.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 3, A. F. Riddell, Montreal, curator.

Re Sèvère Thibault.—First dividend, payable July 26, Bilodeau & Renaud, Montreal, joint curator.

Separation as to property.

Rosalie Brulotte vs. Alexandre Brochu, trader, Village Lauzon, July 10.

Aglaée Patenaude vs. Francois Xavier Montchamp, farmer, St. Constant, District of Montreal.

Appointment.

Auguste Ross, physician, appointed coroner for the district of Rimouski.

Quebec Official Gazette, July 25.

Judicial Abandonments.

Hyman Levius, Waterville, July 17.

John McLean &Co., Montreal, July 22.

John Murison, carpenter, Montreal, June 16.

Joseph Benoit Quevillon, Coaticook, July 2.

Curators Appointed.

Re Andrew Fayette Beatty, livery stable keeper, Stanbridge East.—M. Boyce, N. P., Bedford, curator, July 18.

Re Craig & Sons, Ste. Cunégonde.—W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator, July 18.

Re Perras Feinglass.—W. Radford, Montreal, curator, Feb. 7.

Re L. Lanoie &Co.—Bilodeau & Renaud, Montreal, joint curator, July 18.

Re Maclean, Shaw & Co., Montreal.—W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator, July 21.

Re John Murison.—Henry Ward, Montreal, curator, June 23.

Re Quevillon & Lamoureux, Coaticook.—Millier & Griffith, Sherbrooke, joint curator, July 18.

Re J. Theo. Robinson, Montreal.—J. McD. Hains, Montreal, curator, July 18.

Dividends.

Re Frs. Bouchard, trader, St Félicien.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 10, N. Matte, Quebec, curator.

Re J. B. Doré & frère.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 12, C. Desmarteau, Montreal, curator.

Re C. G. Glass, Montreal.—Second & final dividend, payable Aug. 10, W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator.

Re E. M. Haldimand & Co., Montreal.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 10, W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator.

Re John Heney et al.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 11, Millier & Griffith, Sherbrooke, joint curator.

Re Z. Pilon.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 11, C. Desmarteau, Montreal, curator.

Re Percy J. Thompson, Montreal, doing business under the name of the Henderson Manufacturing Company.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 11, A. F. Riddell, Montreal, curator.

Separation as to property.

Josephine Archambeault vs. Antoine Archambeault, farmer, township of Dunham, June 3.

Marie Gélinas vs. Joseph Bégin, trader, Three Rivers, July 20.

Evelyn Hovington vs. Napoléon Maher, trader, Ste. Croix de Tadoussac, July 9.

Emma Langlois dite Lachapelle vs. Edouard N. Blackburn, Montreal, July 10.

Quebec Official Gazette, Aug. 1.

Judicial Abandonment.

Elie Lachance, St. Praxède de Beauce, July 23.

Curator Appointed.

Re Antoine Paquet, Quebec.—H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator, July 28.

Dividends.

Re Hormidas Barrière.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 11, Bilodeau & Renaud, Montreal, joint curator.

Re Mederick Bouchard, Les Eboulements,—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 18, H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Re Willie Burque, St. Hyacinthe.—First dividend, payable Aug. 7, J. O. Dion, St. Hyacinthe, curator.

Re Cree, Scott & Co., shirt manufacturers, Montreal.—First dividend, payable Aug. 17, A. F. Riddell, Montreal, curator.

Re Arsène Gaudreau, Les Eboulements.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 18. H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Re Omer Lamontagne, Quebec,—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 18, H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Re F. X. Létourneau & Co., Quebec.—First and final dividend, (4½c.), payable Aug. 11, D. Arcand, Quebec, curator.

Re Napoléon Morin, Chicoutimi.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 18, H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Re Adjutor Morissette, Quebec.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 18, H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.

Separation as to property.

Mary Delaney vs. John P. Seybold, trader, St. Henry, July 20.

Léocadie Morel vs. Octave Gilbert, contractor, Montreal, July 23.

Quebec Official Gazette, Aug. 8.

Judicial Abandonment.

Napoléon George Lemyre, trader, Maskinongé, July 31.

Curators Appointed.

Re H. Levius, Waterville.—Royer & Burrage, Sherbrooke, joint curator, Aug. 4.

Re J. B. Quévillon.—Millier & Griffith, Sherbrooke, joint curator, Aug. 4.

Dividends.

Re George Bradford, Chatham.—Dividend, W. J. Simpson, Lachute, curator.

Re Aimé Dion, Ste. Barbe.—Dividend on part of privileged claims only, payable Aug. 15, L. Marchand, Valleyfield, curator.

Re J. O. Labbé & Co., Quebec.—First and final dividend, (19c), payable Aug. 21, D. Arcand, Quebec, curator.

Re James Watkins.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 25, J. E. Girouard, Drummondville, curator.

Separation as to property.

Mary Elmire Rita Labbé vs. Louis Achille Berti, stationer, Quebec, July 31.

Marie Lumina Gélinas, vs. Thomas Mercier, trader, Three Rivers, July 3.

Zoé Roy vs. Joseph Savoie, blacksmith, Plessisville, Aug. 1.

Antonia Seindon vs. Louis Collard, joiner, St. Henri, July 30.

Elizabeth Wilson vs. James Dick, carpenter and contractor, Montreal, July 21.

Quebec Official Gazette, Aug. 15.

Judicial Abandonments.

George Bertrand, trader, Montreal, Aug. 6.

Dame Sarah Ann Cartwright, *marchande publique*, Montreal, doing business under the firm of "G. Lepage," Aug. 6.

J. B. Hutchins & Co., dealers in whitewear, Montreal, Aug. 12.

Curators Appointed.

Re John McLean & Co., Montreal, A. F. Riddell, Montreal, curator, Aug. 11.

Re Onésime Pauzé.—Bilodeau & Renaud, Montreal, joint curator, Aug. 10.

Dividends.

Re Desaulniers, freres & Cie., Montreal.—First dividend, payable Sept. 1, David Seath, Montreal, curator.

Re Pierre Fleury, jr.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 31, Millier & Griffith, Sherbrooke, joint curator.

Re Remi Fortin,—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 31, Millier & Griffith, Sherbrooke, joint curator.

Re P. Patenaude.—First and final dividend, payable Sept. 5, G. H. St. Pierre, Coaticook, curator.

Re Marshall Wallace Ralston, manufacturer, Montreal.—First and final dividend, payable Aug. 25, N. P. Martin, Montreal, curator.

Re James S. Wilson.—Dividend, payable Aug. 31, J. M. M. Duff, Montreal, curator.

Quebec Official Gazette, Aug. 22.

Judicial Abandonment.

Robert J. McNally, hotel-keeper, Montreal, doing business under the name of R. J. McNally & Co., Aug. 12.

Curators Appointed.

Re George Bertrand, Montreal.—A. L. Kent and J. M. Marcotte, Montreal, joint curator, Aug. 14.

Re Wm. Francis Bower, Malbaie.—J. T. Tuzo, Percé, curator, Aug. 10.

Re Dame Sarah Ann Cartwright, trading at Montreal, under the name of G. Lepage.—Bissett & Barry, Montreal, joint curator, Aug. 14.

Re J. B. Hutchins & Co., Montreal.—J. R. Fair, Montreal, curator, Aug. 19.

Re Auguste S. Langevin, Montreal.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, Aug. 14.

Re Offéré Leblanc.—Bilodeau & Renaud, Montreal, joint curator, Aug. 14.

Re R. J. McNally & Co., Montreal,—W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator, Aug. 19.

Re Joseph Arthur Viau, Hull.—Nérée Tétreau, N. P., Hull, curator, Aug. 11.

Dividends.

Re P. Gallery, Montreal.—First and final dividend, payable Sept. 7, A. W. Stevenson, Montreal, curator.

Re Alexander J. Morrison, Montreal.—First and final dividend, payable Sept. 7, W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator.

Re James O'Gorman.—First and final dividend, payable Sept. 7, J. R. Fair, Montreal, curator.

Separation as to property.

Delima Forget vs. Daniel Riopel, contractor, Montreal, July 31.

Emma Riopel vs. Fabien Rodolphe Riopel, contractor, Montreal, July 31.

Quebec Official Gazette, Aug. 29.

Curators Appointed.

Re Thomas Ashworth.—John McCrory, Montreal, curator, Aug. 18.

Re Dame Emérance Poirier.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, Aug. 21.

Re Alexander Fisher, Montreal, plumber.—J. A. Hope, Montreal, curator, Aug. 21.

Re N. G. Lemyre, Maskinongé.—H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator, Aug. 14.