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


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





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
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# THE CRIME

VOLUME I

THE BISHOP OF LONDON says :  
" If I am not mistaken 'J'Accuse,' in  
years to come, will be an accusing finger  
of the civilised world, pointing to Germany,  
as Nathan pointed to David, saying :  
'Thou art the man!'"

## J'ACCUSE

BY A GERMAN

Translated from the German by  
ALEXANDER GRAY

" This is the most powerful indictment  
of Germany."—*The Times*.

" This is the most remarkable book that  
has been written about the war."—

JAMES DOUGLAS in *The Star*.

" Of the many books on the war I doubt  
whether any will have a greater signifi-  
cance."—*Punch*.

HODDER AND STOUGHTON  
PUBLISHERS, LONDON, E.C. 4

# THE CRIME

(DAS VERBRECHEN)

BY THE AUTHOR OF

"J'ACCUSE"

(*F. Richard Grelling*)

TRANSLATED BY

ALEXANDER GRAY

VOLUME I

*"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy."—"J'ACCUSE."*

HODDER AND STOUGHTON  
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

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*This book was written as a memorial to the countless dead,  
and as a mark of their murderers' infamy.*

*May it be a token to their sons, their brothers and their  
fathers—a beacon revealing to them the pathway from the  
darkness of night to the illumined temple of stern Justice.*



## PREFACE

*The Crime* was written between August, 1915, and November, 1916. It was entrusted to the printers in December, 1916.

The important events which supervened after the completion of the work, and which may possibly represent the beginning of the end of the sanguinary struggle of the nations, could only be considered in part in the concluding chapter on *War Aims*, and in various footnotes inserted throughout the book at the appropriate passages.

The substance of my arraignment will in no way be affected by the later course of events, whatever may be in store for us in the near or more distant future, whether it be the continuation of the contest or its conclusion so much desired by all the nations. The perpetrator remains responsible for his deed, even although sooner or later an end may be put to its consequences. Only the settlement of the vast account will reveal the guilt of the guilty in its true magnitude; not until the curtain falls will the authors of this, the most ghastly of all human tragedies, be delivered for judgment into the hands of the critics.

THE AUTHOR.

December, 1916.

#### NOTE

*Footnotes added in the course of translation are indicated in square brackets.*

*It should be explained that the page references to "J'ACCUSE" refer to the first British Edition.*

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## PRO DOMO

"I have ploughed up the stubborn German soil; let each one draw his furrow as I have done . . ."—BÖRNE.

My previous work, *J'accuse*, was written in the months of December, 1914, and January, 1915, and appeared in the bookshops at the end of April, 1915.

The sensation which it caused, the applause which it evoked were due, not to its merits as a literary work, nor to its qualities as an inquiry into historical events, but to the fact that the author was a German, the first and the only one who had dared to struggle against the stream of falsehood which had inundated the whole of Germany since August 1st, 1914; the only one who had dared to arouse the German people from the lethargic slumber into which they had been criminally plunged by the skill of their hypnotisers; the only one who had dared to hurl in the face of the rulers and leaders of Germany the accusation: "The war which you represent to your people as a war of defence, you yourselves have willed, prepared and brought to pass."

The whole world hoped and expected that the alarm-cry of the accuser would be attended by success, that when the truth had been documentarily proven, the German people would recognise it, and would govern their actions accordingly. The revolution in Germany—so it was hoped—would be the first step in preparing the way to an enduring state of peace and law in Europe.

It was inevitable that what the whole world regarded as a ray of hope for a better future should be looked upon as a grave danger by the rulers and leaders of Germany,

## THE CRIME

the guilty authors of the war. The penetration of the truth had to be prevented at all costs, since the truth might be dangerous to the guilty, and might indeed crush them beneath its overwhelming weight. In battling against truth they were first of all battling for their own power and position.

Consequently resort was made to all the available means of violence and oppression which are at the disposal of an unscrupulous Government, with the object of rendering innocuous the truth thus perilous to the State. All the defensive artillery of the censorship and of the state of siege were set in motion against the pamphlet's threatening approach.

Professors of history in close touch with the Government were employed to brand the accuser as a "slanderer." The reptile crew have been hounded against him to tax him with corruption and treachery. Since the work could not be killed, they endeavoured to compass the author's moral death.

But in vain! "The word they shall not move."<sup>1</sup> The word of the accuser has remained unimpugned; all the violent assaults have been powerless to loosen a single stone in the securely founded structure of impeachment.

\* \* \* \* \*

Notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of all the attacks, I had already resolved, a few months after the appearance of my book, to examine and refute in a later comprehensive work all the objections urged against my arraignment; in particular, I had decided to test all documents published at a later date with the object of ascertaining whether they were in a position to modify in any way the proof of guilt which I had produced, or the sentence of guilt which I had pronounced. In criminal procedure, a case may again be re-opened on the ground of new facts and new evidence, and thus, in spite of the unjust treatment which my arraignment had received from them, I could not deny to the accused Governments of Germany and Austria the right to demand that the case against them should be re-opened on the ground of any new facts and evidence

<sup>1</sup> [Luther: "Ein' feste Burg."]

which might be produced in their favour. The more scrupulous the treatment afforded to the accused by his accuser, the more certainly will his indictment receive general recognition.

This new book, the result of more than a year's arduous labour, has thus been written as a detailed amplification and completion of *J'accuse*; supported by even more comprehensive and compelling arguments, it has once more become, in an even more cogent form, an annihilating arraignment against the Rulers and the Governments of Germany and Austria.

#### THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN MONOGRAPHS

Circumstances have thus demanded that the new book of accusation should offer not so much a historical and dogmatical account of the more immediate and more remote historical antecedents of the war—such an account is already contained in my first book—as a polemical confutation of those authors who have undertaken the task of defending Germany and Austria, and of laying on the Entente Powers the guilt of war. Beginning with Herr Dr. Helfferich, the present German Secretary of the Interior, and going down to Herr Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the English-born leader of the German chauvinists, the most eminent defenders of German innocence, with their principal arguments, will be passed in review, and the value, or rather the worthlessness, of these arguments will be tested. I venture to hope that my first and second arraignments, taken together, will at last incontrovertibly decide, even in the eyes of the German people, the question of the guilt of this war, which for the rest of the world is to-day already a settled matter.

Since my second book is merely a continuation and a completion of the first, I must assume in the reader a knowledge of my first work. Only such a knowledge will enable the reader to understand what I have now written, and to draw from it the profit which I have designed for him.

Whereas in the second and third chapters of my first book ("The Historical Antecedents of the Crime" and

"The Crime") I gave a connected account of the more immediate and more remote diplomatic events before the outbreak of the war, I propose in this my second book to take up, in the form of monographs, certain of the more conspicuous chapters in these events, and to extend and go more deeply into the investigation of the incidents in question, and in doing so I will examine all the considerations advanced by the leading apologists of Germany and Austria with a view to the acquittal of the Central Powers, as well as the considerations produced with the object of incriminating the Entente Powers.

It has not been possible, as was the case with my first book, to base this volume on a situation which came to a conclusion on a definite day, August 4th, 1914; it has been necessary to follow step by step the discussions which took place, and the successive new orientations of facts which emerged, and it is therefore to be expected from the manner in which the book has come into being that the same subjects should be treated backwards and forwards, regarded from new and different points of view. I have intentionally refrained from pruning such repetitions, in order not to deprive my work of those original and stimulating qualities inherent in what is written down at once under the impressions of the moment.

I have approached this new investigation with the same impartiality and the same freedom from prejudice as in the composition of my first book. If my final judgment on the Rulers and Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary is as damnatory as on the first occasion, the reason is to be sought, not in me, but in the facts themselves.

To the documentary investigation of the actual incidents I have added in each chapter a polemic against the most conspicuous apologists of the Central Powers, and have endeavoured to show that their view, where it is at variance with the results of my investigations, is erroneous, or, as the case may be, dishonest or falsified. This manner of polemical treatment was found necessary in this second book; it was indeed the chief motive in leading me to undertake the composition of the work; it was the chief end of my new task. In the war-literature dealing with

the more immediate and more remote antecedents of the European conflict both sides have adopted a convenient practice, whereby every man argues in his own way without troubling about his opponent; no one discusses with another or against another, but both parties talk past each other. Each one counts upon his own special public, upon his monopoly of speech in his own country, where writings on the other side are as a rule forbidden; everyone avoids giving the tabooed works on the other side such advertisement as would be involved in their discussion; and though his own pamphlet may be friendly to the Government, everyone fears lest, by such involuntary advertisement, he may provoke its prohibition. In consequence, public discussion is replaced by monologues which are entirely lacking in cogency. Open debates, such as were customary in the time of the German Reformation, are ousted by one-sided representations in which utter disregard is paid to the principle enunciated by Luther:

“ Not one man’s speech :  
Give ear to each.”<sup>1</sup>

This habit of soliloquising is the more reprehensible and unprofitable when authors of the same speech and nationality are opposed to each other, as is the case with me and my opponents.

\* \* \* \* \*

Under many difficulties and by many a secret path, my book has penetrated, in spite of its strict prohibition, into the holy places of the German and Austrian civil truce<sup>2</sup>; and, since forbidden fruits are proverbially sweet, it has perhaps exercised an even stronger influence by reason of the very secrecy of its dissemination than by its contents. The revolutionary currents which the book of accusation has put in motion by its ruthless and inexorable unveiling of the truth are hissing and boiling under the placid surface of internal peace.<sup>2</sup>

As a matter of course, any favourable or even serious

<sup>1</sup> [“ Nicht eines Mannes Rede,  
Man muss sie billig hören alle Beede.”]

<sup>2</sup> [Burgfrieden.]

discussion of *J'accuse* has been mercilessly suppressed in Germany and Austria. Nevertheless, my opponents could not deny the fact that *J'accuse* has been the most read, the most widely disseminated, the most translated book in the whole war-literature. Professor Hans Delbrück, the editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, who, of course, like all German Professors, is an opponent of the book of accusation, gave it quite recently an unmerited advertisement in observing that: "a translation of it is said to be found in the house of every Norwegian peasant." If this flattering compliment is founded on truth, it merely proves that Norwegian peasants are higher in intelligence than German Professors.

Directly and indirectly, the accusatory theses of my book have been attacked; the book of accusation has been accused, but neither the book nor the author can defend themselves before the public opinion of Germany. Nought then remains for me but to seek refuge in the wider publicity of foreign countries, neutral as well as enemy; nought remains but flight from within the frontier-posts bearing the German and Austrian colours, to the great public of the world. Here on this far more conspicuous forum, I challenge the defenders of Germany and Austria to enter the lists; I challenge them to open disputation, and I await in composure the impartial judgment of public opinion in all countries as to who emerges victorious, as to who is worsted in the duel.

#### POLEMIC AGAINST THE DEFENDERS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

I hope and believe that the polemical form which my second book has assumed in these circumstances will increase rather than diminish its attractiveness; it introduces some salt and pepper into the literary dish which perhaps might otherwise appear to many to be dry and insipid. It enlivens the severely ponderous gait proper to such an inquiry by introducing from time to time a lively attack or a passage of arms. The stern duel fought by pistol or sabre is thus varied at times by a well-directed thrust of the foil which titillates and grazes the opponent

before he receives the mortal wound. This duel between the accuser and his various opponents, continued in serial form, will, I hope, frequently afford the reader a measure of stimulation and amusement, and thus conduct him by a friendly path through the arid wilderness of research into diplomatic sources.

I have been obliged to devote special attention and a relatively large amount of space to five of my opponents. These are Dr. Karl Helfferich, the German Secretary of the Interior, Professor Dr. Theodor Schiemann, Professor Dr. Hans F. Helmolt, Herr Paul Rohrbach, and last but not least, Herr Houston Stewart Chamberlain. These gentlemen represent, each in his own sphere, the leading types of German apologetic literature. Each represents a special tendency, a special system of defence. Each of them, moreover, is at the same time a personality, and their pronouncements carry great weight in Germany, and even receive due attention abroad, as the expression of the tendency of German thought—even the Englishman, Chamberlain, is well known as a German super-patriot; I have therefore selected the five gentlemen mentioned as leading examples of German historical investigation into the more immediate and more remote origins, as well as into the aims of the war, and I have by preference chosen their writings as the object of my polemical treatment.

#### HELFFERICH

Dr. Karl Helfferich was formerly Director of the German Bank, and soon after the appearance of his pamphlet, "The Genesis of the Great War in the Light of the Official Documents Published by the Governments of the Triple Entente" (Berlin: George Stilke, 1915), he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury in the Imperial Service, and he has now been promoted to the office of Secretary of the Interior and Deputy of the Chancellor. He belongs to that class of investigators who, it is true, trace where the immediate guilt of the outbreak of war lies, but nevertheless restrict their researches to a part of the events and a part of the documents only. I dealt in detail in the second chapter of *J'accuse* with the more remote historical ante-



cedents of the war, because they laid the foundation for a *prima facie* case against the Central Powers of desiring war, and this *prima facie* case then became certainty through the manner in which the war was brought about; for Herr Helfferich, however, these more remote antecedents are simply non-existent. But even the immediate antecedents, the critical days which began on July 28rd, 1914, exist for him only in part. Even in his introduction he has already declined "to follow in all their details the extraordinarily complicated and tortuous series of diplomatic events preceding the outbreak of war." Rather he takes as his task, "to lay before the world the most important occurrences which brought about the war, by reference to the evidence published by the Entente Powers themselves." He then particularises his task as follows:—

"For this purpose those steps which were the immediate occasion of the war will in the first place be established. From this starting point the threads will be followed backwards, and, as far as possible, disentangled.

#### *The Incendiary.*

No doubt can exist as to the immediate occasion of the outbreak of war. The occasion was the general mobilisation of the Russian forces by land and sea, ordered by the Tsar early in the morning of July 31st, and the refusal of Russia to cancel this measure in accordance with the demand of Germany."

This in itself characterises the method of Helfferich. He begins the story at the end, somewhat after the manner of the Jews, who also write and read their books from the back; whereas, however, these at least arrive at the beginning although they start from the back, Herr Helfferich in his crab-like motion scarcely gets as far as the middle of the story, and allows the first and most important part, the origin of the whole affair, simply to vanish out of sight. For him the Russian general mobilisation of July 31st is the occasion of the war. Consequently, the

fact that Russia instigated the war, that she played the part of the incendiary, is for him demonstrated, and all the preceding incidents, so far as they exist at all for Herr Helfferich, serve only to illustrate the guilt of Russia, which he has already established on the second page of his pamphlet. For Herr Helfferich the judicial proceedings begin with the declaration of the president of the Court: We have passed sentence that the accused is guilty; let us now seek to follow the threads backwards, and as far as possible disentangle them. If only this peculiar judge would take the trouble really to follow back the threads to their first origin, to the issue of the Austrian Ultimatum, and thus disentangle them! But of this there is no suggestion. The Austrian Ultimatum, the Serbian answer, the request of the Entente Powers for a prolongation of the time-limit, the breach in the diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia, the declaration of war against Serbia, the readiness of the Serbian Government to submit the question in dispute to the Hague Tribunal or to the mediation of the Powers, indeed even the proposal of the Tsar of Russia, put forward on July 29th, to dispose of the whole question by submitting it to the Hague Tribunal, all these and many other facts are simply non-existent for the German Secretary of State; for him the whole conflict, which had been acute ever since July 23rd, begins as we have said on July 31st, and his fairness does not go beyond the investigation of the question: "on what grounds the general Russian mobilisation was occasioned. It is but fair to those who bear the responsibility for the decisive measures to examine shortly the grounds which they themselves advance."

As such, he examines the Russian assertion that Austria in her military measures had preceded the corresponding Russian dispositions; that Germany also had made military preparations against Russia; and lastly that Austria had refused to accede to an intervention of the Powers, and that this diplomatic attitude, in conjunction with the military situation, had been a ground for the Russian mobilisation.

In the course of my investigation I shall go into all these points in detail. Here, in the Introduction, I am only

concerned with illustrating Helfferich's method, which from the outset furnishes evidence of the worthlessness of the conclusions arrived at. What would Herr Helfferich have said if, instead of calling my book *J'accuse*, I had entitled it "The Self-accusations of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Light of Their Own Publications"? "What is the meaning of this restriction of the evidence?" is the question I would rightly have been asked. Why do you restrict yourself to the self-accusations of the party whom you desire to impeach, without taking into consideration the documents of the other side, which might perhaps reveal something in exoneration of the accused? Anyone who has read *J'accuse* will admit that I could quite well, better even than Herr Helfferich, have constructed an overwhelming arraignment against the German and Austrian Governments out of the German White Book and the Austrian Red Book alone: in fact I described both these publications as the severest impeachments of Germany and Austria that could be written. Nevertheless, I refrained from availing myself of evidence thus restricted, since self-accusation might have been discounted by exonerating evidence from the other side. I made use equally of all the material then extant, and did not pronounce the sentence of guilty until the involuntary confessions of the accused were found to be in agreement with all the other facts and documents. How would we describe the conduct of a public prosecutor who should reject a suggestion made in exoneration of the accused by his counsel, on the ground that it had already been contradicted by his own self-accusations? It is a well-established rule in criminal procedure that a confession can only be admitted in evidence when it is corroborated as correct by other circumstances. Self-accusation, in itself, without support from other quarters, is in no way sufficient to prove guilt. Even then if we assume that what Herr Helfferich maintains is correct, and that the publications of the Entente Powers contain their own confession of guilt—the assertion, however, is so flagrantly opposed to the truth that it cannot be conscientiously maintained by any man of intelligence—it would still have

been the duty and the obligation of the Secretary of State in his rôle of public prosecutor to take into consideration any exonerating evidence in favour of the Entente Powers which might be found in the publications of the Central Powers, instead of expressly and exclusively restricting himself to the alleged self-accusations of the Entente Powers.

Herr Helfferich, however, has already found disciples to adopt his system. A young Swiss historian has published a small tract entitled *A Contribution to the History of the Outbreak of the War* (Berne: Ferdinand Wyss, 1916), with the express addition to the title page: "According to the official records of the British Government." This work, which seeks to establish the guilt of England from the records of the English Government, and from these only, has been, as is also observed on the title-page, crowned by the Faculty of History in the University of Berne. Thus Helfferich's method of construing historical facts exclusively out of self-confessions has been granted scientific and official credentials, and promises to furnish highly gratifying results in the future. Historical inquiry will no longer be based on the correspondence of diplomatists or princes, or on documents of State comprising the explanations and the records of both sides; instead, the results of research will be built on the utterances, the correspondence, the documents, the State papers of one side only. Minister X., Prince Y., Diplomatist Z., have said or written this or that; they have thereby charged themselves and are to be condemned. What the other side answered, did, declared, or wrote is a matter of indifference. That was not contained in the documents and . . . *quod non in actis, non in mundo*.

But there is more in the case of Helfferich than this limitation of evidence. He also restricts the facts of the case which he subjects to his investigation; he begins from the end and in his process backwards he remains stuck somewhere in the middle of the story. Do these gentlemen not realise that the complicity of their method must in itself awaken the gravest suspicions with regard to their ingenuousness and impartiality? He who has a

clean conscience, and purposes being an honourable servant of the Truth, will follow the natural course of events from the beginning to the end, as I did in my book. He who chooses a circuitous, crooked and devious route inevitably arouses the suspicion that he shuns the straight path, that, like a will-o'-the-wisp, he will guide the reader into the gloomy quagmire of falsehood, not to the illumined temple of Truth. It is only guilt that requires subterfuges for its defence. The guiltless will always advance by the straight way until they attain their deliverance and acquittal.

By adopting the device of beginning the history of a dispute in the middle, and thus suppressing its origin and its initial stages, I could undertake always and anywhere to whitewash the guilty and to condemn the innocent. A husband, whose passions have been inflamed by a thousand pin-pricks and acts of malice on the part of his wife, is guilty of an act of cruelty in an uncontrolled moment. He who regards only the act of cruelty will condemn the husband; he who thinks of the pin-pricks will acquit him. A traveller is attacked on the highway; in defence, he draws his knife and wounds his assailant. He who ignores the assault will condemn the man who was attacked; he who investigates the incident from the beginning, will acquit him.

Exactly the same thing holds in the consideration of the Russian general mobilisation. The essential point is not this military action in itself, neither is it the reason for this action, so ingeniously and briefly stated and so summarily dealt with by Herr Helfferich. An understanding of this question requires an accurate historical account of all the military and diplomatic occurrences between July 23rd and July 31st, as they appear in the collected diplomatic correspondence of the Powers concerned. Only such a coherent historical account can explain the urgent reasons which compelled Russia to her general mobilisation of July 31st. Such a recital is lacking in Herr Helfferich's arraignment, and consequently its structure collapses in the nature of things owing to its architectural design, without taking into account the thousand internal flaws and fissures.

## HELMOLT

Professor Dr. Helmolt cannot be charged with having circumscribed the scope of his inquiry nor with having made a limited use of the available evidence. In his volume, *The Secret Historical Antecedents of the War, Clearly Stated on the Basis of Official Material* (Leipzig: Köhler, 1914), he discusses the more remote as well as the more immediate historical antecedents of the conflict. The former he treats on the basis of the material customary among political writers (newspaper-extracts, pamphlets, certain known documents, etc.), accompanied by a careful avoidance of facts resting on official papers as, for example, the Hague Conferences to which I attached special weight in my chapter on historical antecedents. The latter, the immediate antecedents of the war, he discusses, making use of the diplomatic documents so far as they had then been made public. To the method of Herr Helmolt less exception can be taken than in the case of any other writer of the same tendency. Against his honesty and impartiality, however, there is for this very reason all the more to be said, and I do not propose to mince matters in dealing with this in the appropriate section of my investigation.

## SCHIEMANN

Professor Dr. Schiemann, on the other hand, has produced an entirely peculiar method for his own special use. The history of the crime he does not deal with at all; in fact, he expressly declares: "We do not propose to enter into a polemic against his (the accuser's) exposition of the official publications of documents dealing with the period which elapsed between the murder of the Archduke and the outbreak of war." In so far as the immediate guilt of the Triple Entente is concerned, he cheerfully transfers to other writers the task of providing the proof, and in the sixty-eight pages of the pamphlet which he has specially directed against my book, *A Slan-*

*derer, Comments on the Antecedents of the War* he restricts himself to subjecting to his investigation of guilt only the more remote historical antecedents of the war—in the light naturally of the Schiemann school of historical inquiry. I will illustrate in detail in a somewhat lengthy chapter the manner in which this is done. This method of circumscribing the subject to be proved, as practised by Herr Schiemann, is incriminating to the demonstrator in the same way as Helfferich's double method of circumscribing the subject and the evidence.

#### ROHRBACH, CHAMBERLAIN, E TUTTI QUANTI

If in addition to the three gentlemen whom I have mentioned I further select Herr Rohrbach and Herr Chamberlain out of the infinite wealth of German apologetic literature, the explanation lies in the fact that each of these is a typical representative of a whole category of literary phenomena. Herr Paul Rohrbach is the German Imperialist and colonial fanatic of the first water. Herr Chamberlain, the true-born Englishman, the naturalised German—*risum teneatis amici!*—is the unadulterated type of German jingoism, of the conception of the German superman, of the idea of the spiritual and physical superiority of the Germans over all other nations, and accordingly of their call to world-dominion. It cannot be denied that both writers, Rohrbach and Chamberlain, are possessed of a certain mental distinction which raises them above the customary level of Pan-German and imperialistic spellbinders and newspaper-writers. On account of their typical significance and their personal worth I have considered it obligatory on myself to deal with these gentlemen at some length. Both discuss the question of responsibility. Both in their way take into consideration the more remote as well as the more immediate historical antecedents of the war. A critical analysis of these writers, as well as of the others whom I have mentioned above, therefore falls within the framework of my book.

All the remaining literary and political Pan-German

phenomena will be used merely as mosaic stones in the completed picture.<sup>1</sup>

### MY METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

My point of view and my method of investigating the question of guilt have often been unfavourably judged by my opponents. And yet not only the Press of all bel-

<sup>1</sup> When I had almost entirely finished the first draft of *The Crime*, the most recent product of German apologetic literature, *Anti-J'accuse* (published by Orell-Füssli, Zürich), came to my notice. To deal with this blood-thirsty, amateurish work of a political schoolboy along with the writings of serious and distinguished men like Helfferich, Schiemann and their fellows would strike me as an undeserved insult to deserving men. Further, I had no occasion to make "tant de bruit pour une omelette" and to enter at a later date the inarticulate noises from the political nursery in the well-articulated minutes recording the serious debates of men.

The German Government have exerted themselves to breathe artificial life into this stillborn child of a callow politician by a so-called sequestration of this pamphlet against *J'accuse*, which in reality is merely a tract in favour of the German Government, and at whose cradle the gentler en of the Wilhelmstrasse have obviously stood with hands of benediction.

That this sequestration was ordered solely with the object of advertising the entirely ignored anti-accuser is evident, not only on a consideration of its contents, which are friendly to the Government, but from the fact that the sequestration was withdrawn a few weeks later, and both these facts, the sequestration and its withdrawal, were noised abroad throughout the entire German Press by means of pompous notices.

The result of all these convulsive exertions has been deplorable; in spite of all artificial attempts to induce life on the part of its god-parents, the stillborn child has not come to life. I have all the less reason for showing to the defunct the last honour of including him in this book in the ranks of the quick.

After the indigestible *pièces de résistance* of my main work, it is but fitting that I should offer my friendly readers, for their refreshment and mine, a light and palatable savoury. As such—with a capricious cruelty like that of Salome, the daughter of Herodias—I will serve for them the severed head of the anti-accuser on an extra plate, that is to say, in a special pamphlet. For the present, as an agreeable interruption in the serious investigations of this work and for the amusement of my hearers, I shall content myself from time to time with expiscating from the stunted brain of my opponent some of his more specially humorous aphorisms. The rest will remain for later. After the tragedy comes the satyr.



ligerent countries, but the Governments themselves, and above all the German Government, have for more than two years been making use of what is exactly the same method in order to shift the odium of the guilt of war to their opponents, and to exonerate themselves before their people and before the world. The speeches of all the leading statesmen, all the official and semi-official pronouncements on the question of guilt, follow the method applied by me in *J'accuse*—the method, that is to say, of proving on the lines of criminal procedure, from the diplomatic documents of the twelve critical days,<sup>1</sup> their own innocence and the guilt of their opponents. By what right, then, do my German critics reproach me for having adopted a method which their own Government and the entire German Press incessantly apply in order to prove the conclusion which *they* wish?

It is, moreover, not open to the opponents of my book to point out, as many of them do, that the time is not yet ripe for a definitive judgment on the question of guilt. The various Governments, in publishing their diplomatic correspondence shortly after the outbreak of war and in constantly extending these publications later on until the present day, have themselves given it to be understood that the time for judgment has come and they have indeed directly invited such a judgment. If this is not so, what purpose other than this were the publications supposed to serve? Even others who have passed censure upon me concur with me in this, that the time has come, and that even to-day it is in no way premature to pass judgment on the world-shaking question, the question which affects in the profoundest manner, not merely the present and the past, but also the whole future of Europe—the question: Who is responsible for the European War? One would have to enumerate the whole apologetic literature of Germany, which is at the same time a literature in arraignment of the Entente Powers, if one wished to mention the names of those who have to-day already ventured to pass judgment on the guilt and the guilty.

<sup>1</sup> It has become customary to speak of the *twelve* critical days, although there were really *thirteen*, from July 23rd to August 4th.

These German critics, it is true, all stand on the other side, but what is allowed to those who defend must be granted to him who accuses!

Let us take only a few examples.

Chamberlain entitles one of his *New War Essays* (Bruckmann: Munich, 1915) "Who is Responsible for the War?" In this essay we find:

"So far as the more remote and the more immediate causation of the war is concerned, we know accurately and in detail all that we need to know; the Truth, so far as it matters, we hold as our possession, and we can regard and study it from all sides" (page 36).

In another place we read:

"I do not indeed know what the future can bring us of interest, so far as the great main facts are concerned—at the most, industrious compilations of documents. A fact as certain as that the sun stands in the heavens is that the politically authoritative circles in France, Russia and England have for years planned and prepared for war against Germany; first by systematic manipulation of public opinion; secondly by an incessant increase of military resources and of war material; thirdly by means of diplomacy. When that is said, all is said; for when three nations nourish for years the idea of war as a dream, a wish, a hope, in time the will, the resolution, the act will be realised. Such a development is inevitable" (page 38).

In contradistinction to Helfferich, Helmolt and many others, Chamberlain represents the policy of Sazonof as pacific and sincere, and as favourable to an understanding with Austria; for him the oldest and most stiff-necked sinner is France. "For exactly a hundred years," he writes, "she has incessantly dreamed of a war of revenge against Germany." This hundred year old dream is an idiosyncrasy of the true-born English leader of the German chauvinists: with that confidence and assurance which is peculiarly his own he has no hesitation in dating back for a further half century that rage for revenge which all the other German chauvinists are content to date from the war of 1870, and thus he contrives to give his assertion that France was the originator of the war a greater air of assurance. And if, in the course of arriving at his conclusions, he sprinkles about, as in all his writings, a fair number of inaccuracies or nonsensicalities, why should he care! What an incredible idea is this, which

we find thus expressed by one who, in Germany and elsewhere, is still over-estimated, that the *revanche* idea is to be dated, not from Sadowa or Sedan, but from Waterloo.

So he would have us believe that the Bourbons, the House of Orleans, and the Republic of 1848 have dreamed of nothing but revenge for the defeat of the great Napoleon! Everything that France has done in conjunction with the other European Powers in the course of the last century has been undertaken only with the hidden thought of preparing for the long-desired war of revenge against Germany—against Germany, the innocent country, which after all did not even defeat the great Corsican alone, but did so in concert with the present Allies of France, with Russia and with England!

To collect all the pithy observations of this German-minded Englishman would be a task which would require the space of several volumes, even if we were to confine ourselves to his war pamphlets which, unfortunately, with their circulation running to hundreds of thousands, offer a very unflattering picture of the present critical level of the German public.

Thus Chamberlain also is of the opinion that we are already in a position to determine the truth with regard to the origin of the war, and he declares, and in this view I concur, that it is the duty of every thinking German to frame his own judgment on the question whether this war is morally necessary, whether it is a holy war:

“No war, other than a holy war, is henceforth possible in Germany. If ever an Attila were really to sit once more on the Imperial throne of Germany, neither prince nor peasant would humour his passions. Ernst Moritz Arndt, certainly a Pan-German of the first water, gives us this exhortation: ‘Give expression to the great principle, and teach it to your children and your children’s children, that you will never conquer foreign peoples.’ It may well be that in peace German Imperial policy must keep much secret—how, otherwise, without secrecy could far-reaching statecraft be possible?—but as soon as the menace of war arises, one course only is open to the Government: it must be ruthlessly frank, it must acknowledge everything, even its weaknesses and failures; otherwise the whole machinery of State comes to a standstill. Millions of citizens do not leave their calling; they do not track over every sea to reach their

home ; all the women of a nation do not sacrifice their husbands, all the children their fathers, all the parents their sons, without knowing why, without being in assured possession of the certain knowledge that morally they may and must, that this, the highest sacrifice, is offered to God Almighty in satisfaction of the holiest duty. Apart from those called up, two million men volunteered in Germany. Is it credible that they would have taken this step unless each of them had known in his innermost being that he was menaced, unless each of them had possessed a well-grounded confidence in the absolute truthfulness of their princes and of the Imperial Government ? The two speeches of the noble Chancellor, just because they proclaimed the unvarnished truth, are in their unoratorical simplicity imperishable documents " (pages 34 and 35).

Chamberlain does not expect much from later revelations :

" The degree of truth—by which we understand the clearness, the purity, the certainty, the persuasive power of truth—does not continuously increase more and more in proportion to the increase of material, or to the increasing number of investigations which are carried out ; such increase of material does not imply that man thereby becomes ever more sure in his judgment, or that he constantly grows in wisdom. Rather there is here, as everywhere, what is called in Science a maximum, a point of highest saturation, and when this point is passed, by increase of knowledge our judgment is increasingly dimmed. In the bold expression of Pascal : ' Too much truth cripples the understanding . . . ' Now the nature and the copiousness of the truth which we possess in Germany to-day with regard to the causes of the war is completely sufficient for a detailed and definitive judgment. Time with its horde of witnesses, competent and incompetent, honest and dishonest, will not alter this fundamental truth. We shall know more, but we shall not be more understanding ; we already stand near the ' maximum ' " (page 37).

In another passage, in discussing the " innermost circle "—by which Chamberlain understands the immediate occasion of the war as shown in the books of diplomatic correspondence—he again repeats :

" We know enough, more than enough, to pass a certain and final judgment, and I would urgently impress upon every serious-minded man that he should not fail to acquire such a clear knowledge and such a clear judgment. Only then will he be armed against the brood of lies, more mischievous than in any former war, whose endeavour is to pervert everything and produce universal confusion " (page 63).

I must refrain at this point from dealing further with the " certain and final judgment " passed by this most infatuated of all German chauvinists, nor can I deal here

## THE CRIME

with his argument, which extends to twenty pages. Chamberlain's authorities are Helfferich and Helmolt. The only addition for which he is responsible is his demonstration that Grey's message of peace of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 101) is either a subsequent invention or mystification. I am not here concerned with the results of this superficial war pamphleteer's researches, but only with his admission that the facts and documents which are now available are more than sufficient for a judgment on the question of guilt.

THE FACTS AND DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE ARE SUFFICIENT  
TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF GUILT

They were in fact already sufficient on the appearance of the first four volumes of diplomatic correspondence, published by the German, English, French and Russian Governments. These four books in themselves gave so complete and so connected an account of the immediate antecedents of the war, that they made it possible even then to pass judgment on the guilty conduct of Germany and Austria, and on the innocence of the Entente Powers with such certainty that the subsequent publication of the Belgian and the Austrian books were ineffective in modifying in any way the conviction based on the previous publications.

A sufficient illustration of this is furnished by the fact that my book, in which the decree of guilt was pronounced and proved against Germany and Austria, was written before the appearance of the Austrian Red Book. The contents of the Red Book, which I was obliged to discuss in an appendix, in no way affected the judgment at which I had arrived; on the contrary, it furnished corroborative evidence.

In the same way the publication of documents bearing on the negotiations with regard to an Anglo-German understanding, a matter which was only fully and extensively discussed as a result of my book, has added nothing which has rendered it necessary to modify the conclusions drawn from the negotiations which were previously known.

Unusual emphasis has been laid by the German Govern-

ment and their semi-official organs on the revelations found in the Belgian archives. I was already in a position to discuss these revelations in my first book, in so far as they concerned the alleged Anglo-Belgian plot, and I propose to return to the question in this work. In a special section I shall treat of the ambassadorial reports from 1905 to 1914 which have been published at a later date, and it will be found that these reports also are of no effect in invalidating or weakening the truth with regard to the origin of the war, once it has been recognised and proved.<sup>1</sup> He who, as I have done, has approached the study of the events which led to the war with the sincere and candid purpose of the searcher for truth, without prejudice for either side, possessed by one passionate desire, to clear his native country of this dread responsibility; he who then, agitated by grief and smitten by dismay, has been constrained to recognise the appalling truth that the Rulers and the Governments of Germany and of Austria have willed, have instigated, have brought to pass this insensate murder of the nations; he who, not content with this appalling revelation, has followed the tracks of this, the greatest crime in the world's history, pursuing its smallest and finest side-issues, and has everywhere met the snaky-headed nightmare of this monstrous blood-guiltiness; he who has endured the mental labour and the spiritual agony of this arduous and racking investigation and has finally arrived at conviction—such an one may with composure look forward to all further publications, to the issue of new material, to revelations from archives, to all the deductions and demonstrations of his opponents. He will not be shaken, he cannot be shaken, in his belief in the rightness and the righteousness of his verdict, in his belief in the guilt of the guilty.

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As the diplomacy of each individual country is accustomed to make use of a language concealed in cipher

<sup>1</sup> The inquiry into the Belgian ambassadorial reports, taken in conjunction with the Belgian Grey Book, is so important and has assumed such large dimensions that I have resolved to publish this section as a special study immediately after *The Crime*.

which can only be understood by a knowledge of the corresponding key, so the diplomatic correspondence of the various countries taken in its entirety represents, in the incredible multifariousness of its complications, a document in cipher which can only be deciphered by means of the right key. He who toils with a false key will never succeed in elucidating the individual incidents and their inner connection in a way capable of convincing himself and others. Everywhere in the general conspectus there will be left corners and angles, uncertainties and incongruities which cannot be explained from the erroneously chosen point of view of the inquirer in question, and which do not fit in, of themselves, with the fundamental lines of the picture, but must first be forcibly bent straight, worked into position and smoothed down, before they can be artfully pressed into the general picture. Many examples of such coercive Procrustean operations on the part of my opponents will come to our notice in the course of our investigations.

On the other hand, to him who approaches with the right key the ciphered history of the critical twelve days and of their antecedents, there will be unveiled a picture of the whole, complete in itself, developed without crookedness, free from distortion and ambiguity. The events preceding the war, those which occurred during the critical days as well as those more remote in date, will be unrolled before his eyes from a definite starting-point in a logical sequence which will, in itself, confirm the rightness of the chosen key.

The key which alone resolves all the difficulties involved in deciphering and in introducing order into material which is apparently so chaotic, the key which illumines and clarifies as though by a powerful searchlight the meaning and the significance of all the diplomatic occurrences is this: the design entertained by those in power in Germany of bringing about a European War, and the premeditated realisation of this design at the end of July, 1914. To approach the study of the documents provided in advance with such a key would be unfair and one-sided, and a grave reproach could rightly be urged against any investigator who should act in this manner. Such a

one-sided and partial historical inquiry could never lead to certain and just conclusions. But he who in the first place has approached the study of the documents without the aid of any key, without any preconceived guide—on the contrary with a passionate desire to exonerate his own countrymen—who, then, in the course of his studies, finds reason to believe that he has found the key to the events, and then, looking backwards, testing and measuring the events by the standard which he has found, finds that all the sealed doors are open, all that has been dark is illumined, all that has been confused is unravelled, all that has been hidden is revealed—such an one will have rendered a good and honourable service and will have convinced himself and others of the truth of his view.

This is the method which I adopted in approaching the study of the more immediate and more remote antecedents of the war. This is the method which led me to the discovery of my key, which convinced me of the correctness of my key and of my conclusions.

He who has attained with regard to past events this secure point of view, rooted in itself, will never be made to hesitate or falter by any later revelations which have already come, or which may yet appear. Just as the key, when found, was able to unlock all that was known up till then, so all that may yet become known in future will be deciphered in the same way, with the same ease and certainty. Throughout this, my second book, I shall have occasion to speak of many "revelations" which the German Government, in amplification of their very laconic White Books, have subsequently produced in defence of their innocence. The publications drawn from the reports of Belgian Ambassadors, the announcement in slender instalments of Bethmann's instructions to the German Ambassador in Vienna, the insinuations with regard to the attitude of England during the earlier Balkan crises, the memoranda with regard to the details of Russian mobilisation and many other similar matters which the German Government has produced, in the course of the last two years, to implicate their opponents—all these charges and insinuations melt like butter in the sun, as soon as one has found the key to the cupboard



in which the European records are stored, and by one's own earnest and impartial study has gained an insight into the secret places of European diplomacy. In the course of this, my second work, we shall find that none of the so-called revelations of the Berlin Foreign Office, issued in the course of the last two years, modify so much as a line in the view of events delineated in my first book a few months after the outbreak of war. Critically examined, all that has been produced at a later date fits in admirably in the general view, leaving no angularities or inconsistencies. The fact that my arraignment cannot be shaken, that it has successfully resisted all later documentary assaults, is precisely what proves to me that I have found the right key, and that I can look forward with composure to all further revelations.

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Helmolt, the historian, is also of the opinion that the facts are sufficiently elucidated to justify an apodeictic judgment on the question of guilt, the judgment, as a matter of course, being against the Entente Powers; indeed, he was of this opinion as long ago as the date of the publication of his book in the end of 1914, shortly after the outbreak of war. The enormous importance to the German people of the inquiry into the truth with regard to the origin of the war, its importance for their development at home, for their justification abroad, is rightly emphasised by him. "This book is dedicated to Truth, and is written in her service; it seeks the Truth; it essays to find the Truth." So begins the Introduction to Helmolt's book. The destiny and the future of the nation are in his view involved in the investigation of the question whether Germany is, in fact, defending her national existence against the onslaught of the enemy in a state of defence forced upon her, whether she has in fact a clean conscience and an untarnished escutcheon. The author, of course, believes this:

"But this is not sufficient; this belief must also be brought home to the others. We must shift to the enemy the guilt of the war. In the task of producing convincing evidence of this fact we dare not grow languid; it is an undertaking in which we are by no means without prospect of success. For by pursuing this course of action we not

merely defeat the constantly renewed attempts to place Germany and Austria-Hungary in the wrong, because they were obliged to begin the war with the violation of Belgian neutrality, but we also indirectly shift to our enemies the enormous responsibility for all the misery which, along with so much that is glorious and uplifting, this world-wide conflagration has had, and will have, as a consequence." (Helmolt, page 4)

Thus Helmolt, the great historian, is also of the opinion, and indeed was of the opinion two years ago, that the question of guilt is ripe for decision, and that no more evidence need be called for.

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Helfferich goes even further in the same direction. Relying on the Yellow Book, the Blue Book, and the Orange Book, without any regard to the more immediate or the more remote antecedents of the war, indeed without any discussion of the Austrian Ultimatum and its consequences, without in any way entering upon the accusations written by Germany and Austria against themselves in the White and the Red Books; in short, on an arbitrarily restricted selection from the facts and documents available, the German Secretary of State believes that he can give a strict proof of guilt against Russia the incendiary, and against England and France, her accomplices:

"On the ground of these indisputable facts, which are confirmed by the official publications of the Governments of the Triple Entente themselves, the assertion that Germany willed and caused the war will completely fall to pieces before the judgment-seat of history. Russia is proved to have been the incendiary; France and England are shown to have been her accomplices." (Helfferich, *The Genesis of the War*, page 47.)

With this categorical judgment Helfferich brings his demonstration to a close. We shall ascertain later in the course of our inquiry what value is inherent in this judgment and in this demonstration. Here I am only concerned to show that even the most authoritative among German apologists considers that a limited part of the whole material used by me, a mere section of the actual events, form in themselves a sufficient groundwork on which to base a sentence of guilt.

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It need occasion no surprise that Schiemann in his

modesty even contents himself with much less. He goes so far in his self-restraint that he is indeed content with nothing at all. For this man of the "method of scientific inquiry," the diplomatic books simply do not exist. For him the historical antecedents (which, according to the requirements of the moment, he suppresses, falsifies or supplements) are completely sufficient to give his verdict on the indictment. For him the proven criminal is the man in whom he believes he has demonstrated the existence of criminal inclinations; for him the incendiary is the man who likes to play with fire; for him the poisoner is the man who keeps in his cupboard, amongst many drugs, some which are poisonous. The man who has a suspicious past is, in his eyes, guilty of the deed; and in arriving at his conclusion he further takes the liberty of blackening the past life of the one, but that of the other, which is much blacker and more suspicious, is depicted in pure and dazzling white. But let us leave Herr Schiemann for the present; the necessity of dealing in detail in a later section with this juggler in history has sufficiently taxed my self-control. At the present moment he is of interest to me only from the general point of view, in that he also states that even to-day the responsibility for the war is so incontrovertibly demonstrable, so easily demonstrable, that for the purpose of proving guilt one need not even take the trouble to consider the actual history of the conflict, the history of the twelve days.

After all I have said I believe I may regard it as demonstrated:

That my method of answering the question of guilt from the more immediate and the more remote historical antecedents of the war is unexceptionable;

That this method is followed by my opponents, in particular by the Governments themselves;

That, as the material in existence suffices for my opponents for the purpose of exonerating the Central Powers, so it must be sufficient for the charges I bring against them.

## WILL MY BOOK ADDUCE NEW MATERIAL ?

It has indeed been urged against me that my book can be of no value, since it adduces no new material, but is restricted merely to a restatement of the arguments in favour of the Entente.

It is true that I was not, and am not, in a position to adduce new material, other than what is universally accessible. I have no relations with any Government, either among the belligerents or among neutral countries. I do not enjoy the good fortune and the honour of being under the patronage of the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse, and of seeing my manuscript submitted to my publisher through their mediation. If you will allow me to say so, gentlemen, I am one of those "upright spirits" whom you overwhelm with your eulogies, if they chance to live on the other side of the channel or beyond the Vosges, one of those "upright spirits" of the German nation who, fearlessly and independently, without regard to what is above or below, untroubled by insults or slanders, careless about all manner of material and imaginary injuries, go their own way, the way of truth, the way that leads to the awakening of their people from deceit and darkness. Unlike the literary aspirants and creators of public opinion who write against me, I have at my disposal no official or semi-official resources emanating from either side. To this is to be attributed the lack of new material, a defect which in me is venial, in them is unpardonable; they have indeed failed to suggest, even in the most superficial manner, the material already in existence. In view of their good relations with the people whose trumpets they are continually blowing, it is on my opponents that the obligation rests to produce new proofs of innocence to rebut the overwhelming old proofs of guilt. These proofs of guilt I compiled, winnowed, grouped and published after gaining, in the course of an entirely unprejudiced study of the documents, an overwhelming conviction of the guilt of Germany and Austria. It was not the arguments of the Entente Powers but my own head of which I made use in arriving at this conclusion; it is not to foreign sources that my arrangement owes its inception and its cogency; it

has *itself* become the source, or at least one of the most productive sources, of the conviction which has gradually filled the whole world that the Rulers and the Governments of Germany and Austria, and they alone, are guilty of this war.<sup>1</sup> *Pectus est quod facit disertum.* The conviction of the author has been conveyed to the reader.

In consequence, the book has contributed much to the dissemination of the truth throughout the world, or as Professor Delbrück expresses it, it has inflicted "immeasurable harm on the German cause." For which we should no doubt substitute "German lies." For, alas! the sun of truth has not yet risen in Germany. Germany still is sunk in gloom and twilight, under the stifling pressure of the poisonous gases disgorged over the unfortunate country ever since August 1st, 1914, by ambitious dynasts, unprincipled governors and their corrupt myrmidons; not even to-day, after the lapse of two years, has Germany awakened from her stupefaction. But even for Germany there will one day come the day of the great *réveille*, and my books are intended to be the trumpet signal to arouse the sleeping conscience of the nation, to awaken its slumbering revenge.

#### WHY IS THE QUESTION OF GUILT OF AS MUCH INTEREST TO-DAY AS FORMERLY? THE ENLIGHTENED

In many quarters the view has recently been expressed that after two years of war the question of guilt, that is to say the question: "Who is responsible for having brought about the European War?" is no longer of the same interest, as when my arraignment appeared. Various

<sup>1</sup> Of foreign books which have come to my notice, that is to say, books by non-German authors, the two works which appear to me to be the best on the question of responsibility are *The Evidence in the Case*, by J. M. Beck, and *The History of Twelve Days*, by J. W. Headlam. Both books are known to me only in the German translation; the former appeared in March, the latter after the completion of my book in October, 1916. In some passages I was still able to refer to Mr. Beck, whereas owing to the completion of my own work I was unfortunately prevented from making use of Mr. Headlam's distinguished work, which rests on a most careful study of the sources. I recommend both works to the reader who may desire to examine and check the arguments contained in my books.

reasons are advanced in support of this view. On the one hand there are those who might be called the group of the "enlightened," a class which has many adherents in the Entente States and in neutral countries. In the opinion of these men the guilt of the Central Empires has already been so conclusively demonstrated, that any further discussion of the question appears superfluous. On this point it may be observed that the Governments of the belligerent countries themselves clearly entertain a different opinion; they consider it a matter of necessity to recur constantly to the question of guilt; all without exception attach so much importance to this question that they are continually coming forward with new publications of diplomatic documents, and incessantly seeking, through the utterances of their leading Ministers or the writings of their inspired authors, to transfer to their opponents the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. To this stream of eloquence on the part of the Governments there is a corresponding expenditure of ink by their paid and unpaid hacks. The literature on the question of guilt increases incessantly, and any new fact which emerges, anything that sheds new light on well-known facts, is eagerly devoured by the public and by the Press, and is forced into the service of both sides to support the arraignment against their opponents. The Governments, therefore, as well as the peoples themselves, do not regard the question of guilt as in any way "outstripped," or rendered uninteresting.

But not only the present generation, history also has a right to inquire into the truth, and to determine the truth with regard to the greatest crime in the world's history. He who to-day investigates the question of guilt in the spirit of the scholar, and with reference to the documentary evidence, renders a service, not only to the present generation, but also to historical truth, an end which in itself is worthy of pursuit.

#### THE INDIFFERENT

Certain people, the indifferent in all countries, have to-day no longer any desire to hear about the question of

guilt because, as they say, the thing has now happened and cannot be mended, and therefore it would be better to let bygones be bygones, and think only of the future; they sit with folded hands, and wait patiently for better times. We may leave severely alone these worshippers of destiny who, with unruffled minds, cross their legs and survey the world conflagration at which they lazily light their pipes.

A terrible crime has been committed. The Gallios exclaim: "What do we care for what has happened? It cannot be cancelled; let us guard ourselves against a recurrence of similar actions."

A devastating pestilence has broken out. The Gallios exclaim: "What is the good of seeking remedial measures against the pestilence? The thing is there. Let us guard ourselves against an outbreak of new pestilences of the same sort."

A boiler explosion, a shipwreck, a railway disaster has taken place. The Gallios exclaim: "What is the good of finding out who was to blame? Let us see to it that in future no boilers will ever explode, that no ships will ever sink, that no railway trains will ever collide."

Equally foolish is the argument of those who would now avoid the investigation of the origin of the war, and who merely think of the prevention of wars in future. To these I reply: "You will only be able to prevent wars in future when you have first determined who is guilty of this war. Protection for the future is in every sphere made possible only by a knowledge of the past. First of all determine who has been the criminal, and then take counsel how such criminals can be rendered innocuous, how such crimes can in future be prevented. First of all determine whence, and by what gateway, the miscreant has penetrated within the peaceful precincts of Europe and then provide barriers and bolts to prevent his entrance in future. A peace based on law, which will prevent such misdeeds in future, can only be founded on the bases of an investigation into the question of guilt and of an indictment established against him who committed this enormity. First comes diagnosis, and then therapeutics. First comes therapeutics, and then hygiene. Only then will Europe be healthy, when

the germ of the disease is recognised and killed for all time."

### THE DOCTRINARIANS

To a third group, who might be called the war-doctrinarians, belong a large number of pacifists; it consists, however, chiefly of Radical Socialists in belligerent and neutral countries. This class avoids on grounds of principle any investigation into the immediate causes of the war: the one section, the pacifists, looks upon the anarchy of the nations as the offending cause; the other section, the Radical Socialists, finds it in the capitalistic organisation of society. They regard the war as a necessary product of the existing economic and international system, as an inevitable explosion of combustible material that has long been piled together, and they betray no interest in discovering the incendiary who laid the match to the powder-magazine. They are content to indicate the fostering soil from which the devastating plague of war has proceeded; they decline to look for the bacillus which has caused the plague. They are not concerned with the task of determining and branding the guilty author of the present war; their only interest is in removing for the future the economic and international conditions from which such catastrophes can arise. Thus these middle-class and Socialist theorists arrive, in most cases against their will, at very much the same negative point of view on the question of guilt as the imperialists, the party to which they are ordinarily diametrically opposed: they are in agreement with this party in endeavouring to avoid all inquiry into the immediate causation of the war; like them, they ride about unwearingly on their hobby-horse, which in their case is the "System," and they gallop airily over the concrete occurrences and the actions of the human will by which the war was occasioned; instead of exposing the true criminals in the nakedness of their guilt, they cover them compassionately with the cloak of general imperialistic tendencies, the guilt of which rests equally on all the States of Europe. It is remarkable how the views of social



imperialists and of the "internationalists"—that is to say, of Socialists of the Extreme Right and Left—coincide in this system of dilution and suppression; although actuated by entirely contradictory motives, both groups equally avoid discussing the question of the incidence of the guilt of the war. Once the German social imperialists have begun to descend the slippery slope, they can no longer free themselves from the enervating embrace of German imperialism, and therefore it cannot be expected that they should dare to accuse their Rulers and Governments of having criminally begun the war, or hold them guilty of an offensive war, since the attitude which they have assumed rests entirely on the doctrine that the war is one of defence. Any accusation brought against their own Government would necessarily cut away the ground from under their own feet. Consequently, while most of them vary their tactics according as the circumstances demand, they either level their charges against the opponents of Germany for having attacked them, or they consider that the responsibility for the catastrophe rests on the imperialism of European States in general, not on German imperialism in particular.

The social patriots thus come to a stop before they arrive at the one who is really guilty. Their antipodes, on the other hand, the so-called "internationalists," who profess to be specially radical but in reality are merely unusually doctrinaire, leap over the guilty altogether, and descend on the other side, on those Elysian fields where all the promises of the socialistic state of society are already fulfilled, and where pigeons, but only roasted pigeons, fly into the mouths of the hungry nations. "Socialism alone can help suffering humanity; capitalism alone is guilty of all the evil. To discover inside the capitalistic society the criminal who occasioned the present catastrophe is of no interest, and can be of no interest, to the true Socialist." Such is the theory of the internationalists, a theory which represents a break with the whole teaching of the founders and the old masters of Socialism concerning the necessity of a historical judgment on each individual war. Such is the latest doctrine which leads straight to the abandonment of every investigation into the question of

guilt, and to the refusal of the citizen to defend his country when attacked. Thus the guilty Rulers and Governments find protection in both the extreme wings of Socialism. The social patriots pause respectfully before the guilty Rulers and Governments. The internationalists leap disrespectfully over the guilty. The result is that neither party touches so much as a hair of their heads.

Here also the true path lies in the middle: the arraignment of a system must be united with the arraignment of men. The latter has reference to the past, the former to the future. For a Socialist no proof is required that a remote future, transforming human society in conformity with our Socialist conceptions, will automatically render wars impossible. The near future, however, the future immediately after the war, will scarcely bring for us the realisation of our ideals, either in matters economic or political. Does anyone, indeed, seriously believe that the institution, which we are constrained to regard as the most dangerous drag on every forward development as well within the State as between States, that monarchy—and above all, *the* monarchy which matters—will forthwith be swept away as a result of this carnage? There is unfortunately no prospect of such a rapid development, much as we might be tempted to make our wish the father of our thought. We must, therefore, resign ourselves to a mournful echo of the words of the trumpeter of Säckingen:

“How fair had been life's vision!  
The thing should ne'er have been.”<sup>1</sup>

Disagreeable as the thought may be, we must take into our calculations the provisional continued existence of certain factors which make for war, of which Capitalism (in the form of military imperialism) and the monarchical form of government are only the most conspicuous. We are therefore obliged to seek for remedial measures against the plague of war so far as the immediate future is concerned, and dare not allow our therapeutics to range in the remote distance.

<sup>1</sup> [Es wär so schön gewesen.  
Es hat nicht sollen sein.]

The remedies to be applied in the near future depend in the first place, however, on a true perception of the malady. The malady has sprung up on the soil of the political and social organisations hitherto in existence, and we must in the first place seek for the means to combat it on this soil; for the nations cannot defer their salvation until another political and social organisation has arisen in place of the present, until the monarchical form of government is replaced by the republican, until Capitalism is superseded by Socialism. These future aims endure; but the present also, indeed the present in the first place, demands her rights and insists on protection against catastrophes such as we are now experiencing. There is no room for reasonable doubt that on the conclusion of peace, or immediately afterwards, it will be possible to create an international European organisation, such as has been aimed at by the Hague Conferences, which will be in a position to restrict armaments in accordance with treaty agreements, and even to establish a coercive force—resting on sanctions of an economic character or based on political intercourse—to give effect to its decisions. No one, however, would be so hardy as to maintain that it will be possible on or after the conclusion of peace forthwith to introduce Socialism generally, or to dispense with the monarchical form of government. Should we, relying on the watchword "all or nothing," resign the less, because the greater cannot at once be attained? Are we to allow the nations to continue their existence under the pressure of armaments, under the Damoclean sword of war, because they cannot be freed at one blow from the domination of their kings and their capitalists? The acutest of all maladies is the plague of war. This can be attacked by pacifist therapeutics. When this first step is taken towards healing the most urgent evil, the struggle against other great evils will be easier to carry on, and will have greater prospects of success.

It is in the distinction between offensive and defensive wars that we must look for the basis in theory and practice of the pacifist remedial and prophylactic system, and on this point middle-class and Socialist pacificism meet.

The offensive war is a criminal action; the defensive war is legitimate. The nations must combine to render the aggressor innocuous, and to make aggression impossible, to countenance and support the defender in his legitimate struggle. It is for the purpose of carrying out these principles in practice in each particular case that it becomes necessary to investigate the question of guilt: Who is the aggressor? Who is the defender? It is this point which makes the inquiry into guilt of cardinal importance at the present time in connection with the pacifist efforts to be made in the immediate future. He who would overleap this next stage in the development of Europe, and at once reach the far distant future land of "the United Social Republics of Europe," falls into the same error as the man who wishes to rise at once to the top of the ladder, while he is still on the lowest rung. He only will reach the top who quietly rises step by step. The man who leaps up will fall with the ladder to the ground, and will verify the proverb: *Qui trop embrasse mal étreint*.

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The recognition of the truth in the question of guilt has therefore for the nations concerned, for Europe, and for humanity, an eminently practical as well as a moral and historical value. The discovery of the germ of the disease is the first condition on which depends the prevention of an outbreak of the malady in future. Correct therapeutics depends in the first place on a correct diagnosis. It is not enough merely to recognise the fostering soil. It is necessary to kill the bacillus which has luxuriated on this soil, and which is the cause of the European disease to-day.

It is to the German people that the most important task is assigned in preparing the way for this healing process, and in rendering possible its advent. On that day, which it may be hoped is not too far distant, when the German people will awake from their cataleptic slumber—on that day of judgment which will inexorably dawn, it will be not abstract ideas, but very concrete persons, it will be not war, capitalism or imperialism which will stand in the dock, but the Rulers, the Ministers, the

Generals, the fire-eaters, on whose shoulders rests the responsibility for the greatest carnage in the world's history. His own especial book of guilt will be opened for each, and each will have to settle his own account. On that day it will no longer be a question merely of systems, on which the people will sit in judgment, but of the embodiments of these systems, of men of flesh and blood, who will be called upon to give an account of their actions. The arraignment of a system, making no distinction of persons, will not inflame the people to that vigorous action which is needed to prepare the overthrow of a political and social system which has made such catastrophes possible. But the charge against specific men, directing the thunderbolts of an indignant people against the heads of the truly guilty, will supply the power which we shall need in our efforts, after the end of this carnage of the nations.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ORIGIN AND THE AIMS OF THE WAR

From another point of view the present discussion of the question of guilt has an importance which is not merely theoretical, but in the highest degree practical; I refer to the close connection between the origin and the aims of the war. I propose to treat in detail of the connection existing between these in a special chapter entitled "War-Aims," and in this introductory chapter I shall restrict myself to the following brief reference to the point at issue.

The train of ideas to be found in all German rulers, statesmen, and leading politicians is as follows :

- (1) In the summer of 1914 we were attacked by enemies, who long ago had schemed to attack us.
- (2) We must protect ourselves against new attacks of this nature in the future.
- (3) The only possible and effective means of doing so is by such an increase of Germany's power on the

<sup>1</sup> From my book, *The Salient Point*, by "Germanicus."

east and the west as will offer us real guarantees in the future for our political, military, and economic security.

This structure of ideas is reared entirely on the basis of a hostile attack in the summer of 1914. It is, in itself, unsound, since, even on the assumption that the premises in (1) and (2) are correct, it is still possible to dispute the conclusion in (3) that such occurrences can be prevented in future *only by an increase of Germany's power*. The whole edifice explanatory of the aims of the war crumbles away, however, as soon as the fundamental premise of an attack by the enemy is removed. When this notion is removed, the ground is cut from under the feet of the doctrine of security, and all plans of conquest, all schemes for the extension of power are revealed in their true colours as naked imperialistic expansion; the war for defence and security is unmasked as an offensive war, a war for the furtherance of power. In showing that Germany was not attacked, but that she herself was the aggressor, we furnish proof that her annexationist war-aims do not serve the purpose of securing her against attacks, but are merely in the interests of an enlargement of her power. The German war-aims, which are already notorious throughout the whole world, are thereby stripped of the pretence that they look merely to security, and are unveiled as what they indeed are, aims of conquest. Thus by the investigation of the question of guilt, taken in connection with the aims of the war, we gain further incriminating evidence of great substance for the conviction of Germany as the deliberate author of the war. While the German Government retains so much as a scrap of professed evidence which can be used to prop up the lie that this is a war of defence, it will be possible for it to circulate these pestilential ideas of conquest under the guise of legitimate security for the future. For this reason it is imperative to follow the Government into all the hidden recesses of its self-defence, and to wrench from it even the last scrap of paper which can be produced before the judgment seat of the world in exoneration of this war and of the German war-aims.

## THE THREEFOLD GUILT

The inquiry into the cause of the war, taken in conjunction with the aims of the war, thus leads us to an entirely new question of guilt, to a question of guilt relating to the future, the formulation of which is already of great historical importance. Up till now there have existed only two questions of guilt :

The question of guilt from the past, that is to say, from the more remote antecedents of the war ;

The question of guilt from the present, that is to say, from the immediate antecedents of the war.

To both questions I gave in *J'accuse* a plain verdict of guilty against Germany and Austria.

The third question of guilt which becomes more acute the longer the war lasts, and the more, as is to be hoped, it draws to a conclusion, is the question of the shape which Europe in the future will assume. The question is this : Is Europe in the future to continue its existence under the anarchy of nations which has hitherto prevailed, under the competition in power between the leading States, under the ruinous condition of an armed peace, which is no more than latent war ; or is a state of law guaranteeing the peace and the security of all, by means of organised institutions, to assume the place of this state of force ? Germany is endeavouring to secure a continuation of the anarchy which up till now has reigned, and within this it hopes to increase its own security by increase of its power.<sup>1</sup> Germany's opponents are

<sup>1</sup> These sentences, written in September, 1916, are in no way affected by Herr von Bethmann's recent and surprising conversion to pacifism (November, 1916). It is impossible to view without suspicion the sudden dawn of pacifism which has broken so abruptly on the German Chancellor, who, during his seven years' tenure of office has, both in word and in action, consistently revealed himself as an unrelenting anti-pacifist, and who has hitherto proclaimed in all his war-speeches that the aim of the war is merely the future security of Germany's power. The honesty of his conversion is already disproved by the fact that ideas of the increase of power, both on the East and the West, continue to exist as before, and these ideas have indeed already received practical exemplification in the formation of the so-called "independent" kingdom of Poland. I have discussed in detail Bethmann's speech of November 9th, 1916, in a chapter of some length entitled, "Bethmann the Pacifist."

striving for a state of law. The question whether Germany, in view of the ends which she is pursuing for the future, is in addition taking upon herself a third heavy load of guilt, depends on the preliminary question whether or not she was in fact attacked by her opponents in the summer of 1914. If Germany were attacked, while the thought of a one-sided security in future would still be mistaken, since the means adopted do not correspond to the end in view, such an idea could not be regarded as criminal, and it would not therefore add to the existing items of guilt another of equal significance. If, however, Germany was *not* attacked, the idea of a German peace resting on force and conquest is a crime against the future, a crime as great as that which she has committed in the past and the present. In throwing light now on the question of guilt and in tracing it into its remotest recesses, we are at the same time preparing the brief on which the twice-convicted criminal will also be convicted of a third crime. And here it may be observed that it is irrelevant whether he will in fact commit this third crime, or whether he will only be able to do so if the military position permits.

The criminal who by *force majeure* is prevented from giving effect to his criminal plans, is not thereby less worthy of damnation. Had Germany been victorious—which, fortunately for Europe and for Germany, has not happened, and will not happen—she would have set up in Europe a new condition of force worse than the old; she would have dictated to the other nations a peace resting on victory, and by annexations on all fronts would have created for herself a position of preponderating power which would have borne within it the seeds of new armaments, of new unrests, and of new wars. If the will and the power of Germany had prevailed, peace would have brought us a Europe worse than before. As things stand to-day it would appear that a kind fate is willing to save the unfortunate nations from such a destiny. Yet it remains true that he whose will it was that Europe, and with Europe the whole world, should be plunged anew into such a chaos, into such inevitable catastrophes, has already rendered himself



guilty of a new crime, the crime against the future by virtue merely of his will to do the deed, by virtue of the attempt, even if fortunately it has miscarried. This third verdict of guilt, like the first and the second, presupposes that Germany's opponents neither intended nor in fact carried out an attack by arms in the summer of 1914. Thus this verdict also rests on the determination of the question: Who desired war, who prepared it, who brought it about? If the investigation of the question of responsibility leads us to the result: "Germany with her ally desired the war, Germany prepared the war, Germany brought it about," there follows, automatically, a three-fold sentence of guilt:

Germany has sinned against the past, against the present and against the future.

" A LIGHT AND AT TIMES WITTY STYLE "

Many of my critics, who are not in a position to deny the strong impression produced by my book and the great influence which it has exercised throughout the world, ascribe this effect, not to the power and the persuasive force of the truth demonstrated—God forbid! it is, after all, but a book of lies,—but to extrinsic qualities in the treatment of the subject, to the "moral pathos," which of course is depicted as hypocrisy, to the aggressive sarcasm which does not shrink from directing its arrows even against thrones, to "the light and at times witty style" which winds itself into the easy-hearted man, and hugs him into snares.

This last discovery, as well as its author, are at any rate entitled to the credit of reaching the utmost limit of absurdity. A light and at times witty style! What manner of man must this be, who finds nothing worthy of mention in this, the most earnest, the most bitter, the most revolutionary, and it is to be hoped the most fruitful of all war books, than that it is distinguished by a light and witty style? Here is a jackass who does not perceive the lashes showered on the heads and backs of the great criminals under the castigation of the accuser. He neither

marks nor sees the fiery lava-stream of revolutionary determination which pours along the lines of this book, burning and demolishing the existing order of things in Germany. The biting satire is for him merely light wit; and until the flames leap up to the heads of the guilty rulers and statesmen, and of their contemptible hacks, he will assuredly remain ignorant of the conflagration.

We may be permitted to quote what a neutral, Frederik van Eeden, the distinguished Dutch author, writes of *J'accuse* in his introduction to the Dutch edition:

A book like *J'accuse* thus resembles the break of the first ray of light in the darkness of the gloom. It indicates a turning-point in the portentous drama. It is the first dawn of understanding amongst those who have been most grievously deceived.

The best among the German people desire freedom and independence, just as we do. So long as they live in the delusion that they are fighting for right and freedom, no solution will be possible. They are strong and well ordered and prepared for a life and death struggle. Given a just cause, no defeat could break them.

We dare not hope for an enduring peace until the German people returns to its right mind. . . .

In *J'accuse* a true picture of the position is given for the first time in an entirely clear and incontrovertible manner by one of the deceived themselves. Karl Spitteler, the great German-Swiss poet, says of the book: "I have read *J'accuse*, and have derived very great pleasure from the masterly and persuasive arrangement of the facts, and also from the clear demonstration of the truth which it contains."

I also have shared in this pleasure, for we may be sure in our innermost convictions that war, after all, continues to be a ghastly drama, in which we breathe with relief at any sign of a change for the good.

This book is such a sign, and indeed a very strong and unmistakable sign. It represents more than a material victory. The Prussian military autocratic régime may conquer on the battlefield; its destruction is inevitable, when the truths contained in this book penetrate to the German people. It is from within, by a change of the spirit, that Germany's humiliation and restoration will come, not by powder and iron.

This book is a terrible book, because it points to spiritual unworthiness, because it points to moral misery and corruption among men who have borne too great a power without responsibility. For it is now an assured fact that the German rulers have lied and deceived, and their consciousness of the fact. They have lied so boldly that to us in Holland, with our implicit confidence in the integrity of our Government, the thing appears incredible.

This book signifies a revolution. It may be forbidden, confiscated,

suppressed. That will not matter. . . . The burning word will not be extinguished, and will endure until the flames leap up. And I can only look forward to a series of events among all the nations of the world, which will continue and complete the work of 1792 and of 1848.

That is the book with the light and at times witty style! Yet it cannot appear to the German Government to be quite so light and witty, as it does to their fatuous and vapid apologist. Otherwise they would not commit the inordinate folly—in itself a most solemn confession of guilt—of anxiously keeping *J'accuse* away from the German frontier and from the “defenders of the German Fatherland,” while at the same time they hound on to its attack all their company of reptiles, from Schiemann down to the last penny-a-liner. Could anything be more ludicrous than this cowardly fear on the part of those in the Wilhelmstrasse, when we consider the moral and material weapons at their disposal, their gigantic Press-funds to appease their hungry haeks, the channels whereby it is open to them to influence public opinion, their censorship and the “state of siege” which enables them to suppress forthwith any opinions that may be inconvenient, when we reflect on their staff of voluntary and involuntary collaborators in the Press, who are ready at any time on the merest hint to fall like a pack of hounds on any stricken beast? Is it not at once ludicrous and shameful to see that the thought of a few pages of printed matter can throw so mighty a Government into such a mortal funk, that for the love of God they dare not let the devil’s work inside the country?

The book, then, must not only be light and witty, it must also be grave and impressive—more grave and impressive than all the counter-writings to which free ingress is given, and which, moreover, are encouraged and disseminated by every means at the disposal of the Government.

The “anti-*J'accuse* literature” is constantly increasing. The indestructible vital force of the book is, however, made manifest by the very fact that, much as they may wish forcibly to slay it, the task is yet beyond their power. All these attempts at assassination take place in the absence of the *corpus delicti* and of the *persona delinquentis*.

It is merely a dummy that is subjected to contumely, as happens in the picture palaces, where a man is apparently thrown from the top of a cliff into a yawning pit, when in reality it is only a stuffed dummy which has taken the place of the man. They seek to throw the author of "that libellous book, *J'accuse*," like a traitor, from the Tarpeian rocks; they do not, however, succeed in killing the author, still less his work, but merely a phantom which they present to the ignorant and credulous public as the accuser and as the book of accusation.

It is only natural that my opponents should consider it as a matter of course that *J'accuse* should be forbidden and seized in Germany, whereas their writings are allowed to be circulated without let or hindrance. They report with satisfaction that its arrest "set very narrow limits" to the circulation of the book, and also that the Press, owing to the censorship, cannot but express its repugnance. The majority of German readers would, they say, have judged the book at its true value. "Nevertheless, there are even among us some who have been taken in by *J'accuse* . . . and certainly not the dullest fellows either." To my regret I am unable to return this compliment to my opponents. It is no doubt true that their books also are appreciated by their readers at their true value, but those who have been taken in by them were certainly not the brightest fellows. Meanwhile, gentlemen, would you explain to me how the unfortunate German reader can be expected to test, compare, and decide, when he is unable to obtain the book which is attacked, the one that chiefly matters in the controversy, and only your distortions, perversions, falsifications and omissions are at his disposal? I know people in Germany who have carefully collected the whole of the "anti-*J'accuse* literature," but who, notwithstanding all their efforts, have so far failed to obtain a single copy of *J'accuse*. Herein lies the contemptible speculation of all this tribe of anti-writers; they make use of the arresting title of *J'accuse* in order to advertise their miserable booklets; they are sure of the protection of everyone in authority in Germany; they know that unfavourable criticism of their writings will not be allowed by the censor, since public opinion

in Germany has had firmly imprinted upon it the innocence of the German Government and the "war of defence." They are sure that the national Press—and in these times of war everything is national—will zealously and enthusiastically adopt their demonstrations, be they never so inconsequent and fatuous, and will exalt, not only their "right-or-wrong-my-country" patriotism, but also their keen insight and dialectical skill. So brandishing their flails courageously and in the fear of God they shower their blows on the unarmed and defenceless dummy of the accuser, while the accuser himself, with his book in his hand, a man of flesh and blood, stands beyond the frontier, and dare not at the risk of being shot defend himself at the bar of public opinion.

It is the melancholy humour of these fearless Germans to run full tilt against a book and its author who are unable to present themselves, much less submit their defence, before the German people. They know that they will always have the last word, or, to be more accurate, that they only will be allowed to speak; that they will be able to transform into a more or less corrupt libel the fiery appeal of the true patriot who, however, does not identify Germany with Prussianism, nor with the Junkers, nor with the Hohenzollerns; they know that in a book of 400 pages, which had for its task to sift and arrange in a very short time an entirely new and incredibly difficult mass of evidence, they will be able to detect four or five alleged errors of an insignificant nature, and that thereby they will be able to prove the prejudice, the partiality, the levity of the author; they know that they can suppress and omit the most important links in the chain of proof without being convicted of their conscious falsification—in short, they know that the way is open to any manner of folly or turpitude which they may consider expedient for the purpose of whitewashing their employers, whereas in the case of their opponent, the accuser, they know that his mouth is stopped, his tongue is lamed, his pen is broken. No doubt it is also open to the accuser to speak in foreign countries, in so far as the Prussianising influence of their mighty neighbour, the fear of her rattling sabre, has not

been instrumental in gagging there also the liberty of the Press and of speech. But in Germany, where more than elsewhere free speech is called for, where it is needed for the enlightenment of the people, there the defenders of the German Government alone are allowed to speak. Their opponents are reduced to silence, and in many cases, if they have not timcously sought security abroad, they now sit behind lock and key.

## ANONYMOUS

But the best of it is, that all the cowards who in Germany attack the defenceless author, and so acquire reputation and wealth and forge a career for themselves, nevertheless upbraid their victim because he had not the courage to name himself openly. Throw open the barriers, let the book of accusation enter, as they who accuse the accuser are allowed to pass unhindered. Give the accuser free conduct to discuss the question of guilt with his opponents in open speech and counter-speech, in writing and counter-writing. Guarantee him his life, his freedom, and his possessions; grant fair play on both sides, and he will lift the veil, he will raise the visor, he will challenge his opponents to open tourney in the lists. But so long as these conditions are not satisfied, it is *you* who are the cowards,—you who upbraid the accuser for his lack of courage! To attack the defenceless is but cowardly murder; to challenge the opponent to combat with equal weapons is a chivalrous duel. Procure in the first place these equal conditions of combat and if the man who, though unnamed, makes greater sacrifices for his upright conviction than you weathercocks can ever measure or understand, then refuses to appear in equal chivalrous combat—then, and only then, dare to reproach him with what already stands written on the blanched foreheads of each of you: Cowardice and fickleness.

It would no doubt be a welcome occurrence to the ruling powers in Germany if they could draw the teeth of the troublesome accuser, who has ruthlessly torn the mask from their face before the whole world, and has drawn a sharp line of division between the brave German people

and their criminal leaders and misleaders, if they could once and for all stop the mouth and the pen of this pestilential seeker after the truth, this "enemy of the people" (in inverted commas, like Ibsen's Doctor Stockmann). That would, indeed, suit their plans. But I do not propose to meet their wishes in this matter. I will keep my freedom and my independence for the task which I have set before me—the task of exorcising the curse of falsehood, in which they have consciously and intentionally entangled the German people, of unmasking the "war of liberation," and revealing it in its true colours, as a Hohenzollern war of violence and conquest, and, so far as my weak strength will permit, of liberating the German people once for all from such "liberators." To fulfil this task I myself require elbow-room, and, that I may enjoy this, I do not propose to give my persecutors the pleasure which would be theirs, if I delivered myself voluntarily into their hands.

The right of self-preservation is the most elementary right possessed by the weak individual against brutal force. Only he who lives and is free can work. The old satirical song on the hangmen of the Prussian-German reaction, the Hecker-song, will hold for me also :

And when they ask, as ask they may :

Is Hecker still alive ?

O, never doubt that you may say

That Hecker's still alive.

Think not that he hangs on a hempen rope,

Nor yet that he hangs on a tree ;

But he hangs on the great and glorious hope

Of German liberty.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [Und wenn die Leute fragen :  
Lebt denn der Hecker noch ?  
So mögt ihr ihnen sagen :  
Der Hecker lebet noch.

Er hängt an keinem Baume,  
Er hängt an keinem Strick,  
Er hängt nur an dem Traume  
Der deutschen Republik.

Hecker, born in Baden in 1811, died in America in 1881, was concerned in an attempted rising in Baden in 1848. The "Hecker-Lied" became a kind of "Marschallaise" among the revolutionaries of Baden.—*Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie.*]

Again I say : Give me a safe conduct, security for my life and my chattels, freedom to fight with equal weapons ; then you will learn who and what I am ; then we shall see who carries the day before the German people.

#### THE " SLANDERER "

A thousand poisonous slanders have been set in circulation to tarnish the honour of the author of *J'accuse*. Pan-Germanism, struck in its vital point, has given vent, in impotent rage against the dragon slayer, to a whole dictionary of abusive terms. Slanderer, knave, coward, traitor, corrupt, degenerate—these are but the mildest epithets which have been slung in the face of the accuser, although they have been without power to make him wince. Not so much as a grain of unclean dust has stuck to his immaculate white vest ; the dust has returned to dust, the stink-bombs have recoiled on those who threw them. As his arguments cannot be refuted, they have sought to bespatter his character and throw doubts on his moral integrity. The mildest reproach urged against this German is the " anti-German sentiment " which has inspired his pen, the reproach that he should stab the German people in the back *precisely now*, at the very moment when they are engaged in a struggle for existence.

To this I reply that it is not Germany that is fighting for her existence, which no one has threatened. No, this war, for which the people must bleed and pay, has been provoked by powerful rulers, who, however, desire to be more than powerful, by covetous and avaricious classes of society, who are not content with their preponderance in well-being and power. To make this clear to the German people, to shriek it into their ears, to rouse and incite them to free themselves from those criminals who have corrupted them, that they may thereby become a truly free, peaceful and happy people, living in union with other peoples—that is the patriotic aim which I have had in view in writing my books.

I foresaw that I should be reproached with doing this



"precisely now," and I already answered this in anticipation in the epilogue of my book :

"Not now—later," you exclaim. "Precisely now—*only* now," I tell you. What is later but a word, an unavailing word, is now an act, an act of salvation. Hundreds of thousands could be saved from death, the German people could be saved from destruction—even now, even at this very moment—if Truth could but force her way into the German people, for Truth would mean a pause, but Falsehood is an advance on the path that leads to destruction.

Nothing will deter me from advancing on the path on which I have once entered, until the end is reached, until the German people have grasped the truth and made it the guiding line of their conduct.

If the results of my inquiry are appalling, horrifying, overwhelming for every German, this fact is to be attributed, not to the inquirer, but to the facts which he had to investigate. The thought that there can be men on earth who have devised in cold blood so enormous, so unparalleled a crime, men who then with even greater nonchalance have denied it, the thought that such men should still go unpunished, that they should even "wander under the palms" (but not the palms of peace) amongst the applause and exultation of their own people, that they should be glad in their life, in their glory as conquerors and warriors, that they should pursue their work of carnage in undisturbed health, without sleepless nights, without remorse of conscience, that they should be allowed to sacrifice to their murderous frenzy ever new millions of men—the thought that these greatest criminals in the world's history are Germans, must appear so monstrous to German minds and hearts, that it is quite comprehensible that the majority of Germans should reject the accusation without examination, and condemn the accuser in place of the accused. And yet the appalling thing is true, the apparently impossible has become possible, the sheer incredible insists on belief. Let any one read my two books of accusation, and then judge if the accuser is a witness of truth or a liar.

## THE "TONE" OF MY BOOK

Exception has also been taken to the "tone" of my book. It has been called, not a book of accusation, but a book of reviling, and this title of honour has become a well-established and constantly recurring designation.

I do not revile, I accuse.

I do not abuse, I prove and convict.

My judgment, at any rate, I express in terms which are sharp, clear and undisguised. I claim the right to speak in plain terms to my own people. No one expects that the public prosecutor, who is asking for a verdict of guilt in a case of murder, or that the judge who is pronouncing the verdict, should clothe their motions and their judgments in polite and conciliatory forms, that they should veil the naked facts in gracious rhetorical phrases. What should we say if the man in the dock were to accuse the judge, who had condemned him to death, of rudeness, impoliteness, and lack of good breeding?

No, the tone of my book corresponds to its subject-matter. The phraseology of the accuser corresponds to the course of action adopted by the accused—in so far, indeed, as the German or any other human language contains forms of expression capable of characterising the gigantic guilt of the guilty.

The word lags far behind the deed.

Even the imagination of man cannot attain to the scenes of horror which every day and every hour are being enacted on all the battlefields of the world, on the seas, on land, in the air. Anyone would be bereft of speech, rendered insane, driven to suicide, who should see together the bodies of the slaughtered and the maimed, and contemplate the ailing and the afflicted, who are the heritage of these two years of carnage, or ever if he should but see in serried ranks or heaped together all the contortions and convulsions of death, the millions of dead, exceeding in number the population of the whole of Switzerland, from the hoary head down to the babe in the cradle. No, there is no word, no thought, no stretch of the imagination which is sufficient to conceive the inconceivable, to comprehend the incomprehensible, to express the inexpressible.

And in the light of this gigantic crime you dare to reproach me with my tone, with my "revilings"! No mediæval torture, whether it be quartering, the wheel, mutilation, or the slow fire, no punishment in this life, no hellish tortures in the next, such as Dante described, are sufficient to punish and atone for such human guilt. And you dare, you credulous defenders of evil criminals, to take exception to the tone of my accusation!

Oh, that I could but thunder forth this accusation with the far-reverberating force with which you hurl your giant shells over remote stretches of country! The "tone" of your cannons, also, is no music in the ears of those whose task it is to fire them, unless in the ears of the wretched men against whom they are directed. So, also, my accusation will be no music in your ears. With unrelenting finger it will knock at your heart and conscience—if such exist, which I, for my part, doubt. Like the trump of the Judgment Day, it will awaken your people against you, the seducers and the corrupters of your people. It will pierce you to the marrow, like the shrill noise of the sharp knife hissing downwards on the uncovered neck of the condemned miscreant.

\* \* \* \* \*

The knowledge of my two books of accusation cannot, after all, be indefinitely withheld from the German people, notwithstanding all manœuvres to suppress them. If, after reading them, they do not return to reason and reflection, if even then they are unable to rouse themselves to the resolutions which their situation demands, if even then they fail to develop the "passions" which "in Governments are a sign of weakness, but in nations a sign of strength," then they deserve the collapse which sooner or later will inevitably threaten them, if they continue to pursue the path they have hitherto followed. Then they will deserve the rulers who have transformed a people dowered with the most brilliant qualities into the best-hated nation in the whole world. Then the saying of Joseph de Maistre with reference to weak and badly-led nations will be justly applicable to them: "Every nation has the Government it deserves."

November, 1916.

## CHAPTER I

### GREY'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE

#### ITS OBJECT

ON the occasion of the first anniversary of the outbreak of war the King of England addressed a telegram to President Poincaré, in which the following sentence occurs: "On the occasion of the anniversary of the day when my country was forced to take up arms against the Power which preferred War to Conference . . . . I desire to express to you my firm conviction that our united efforts will lead to success, and to assure you of my unfailing co-operation and of my determination, as well as that of my countrymen. . . ."

In these few words the question of the Conference is rightly emphasised as of paramount significance in arriving at a judgment on the guilt of Germany. In *J'accuse* I have demonstrated in detail how Sir Edward Grey, at the very beginning of the conflict, put forward the proposal that the Ambassadors of Germany, Italy and France should meet under his presidency in London—as had been done so fruitfully during the Balkan Crisis—in order to find out ways and means of bringing about a reconciliation between the conflicting points of view of the Governments of Austria and Russia by means of simultaneous representations in Vienna and Petrograd. It is a matter of common knowledge that the idea of a Conference was at once welcomed by France and Italy. At the same time, Russia declared that she "would be quite ready to stand aside, and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany and Italy" (Blue Book, No. 17).

Germany and Austria, on the other hand, declined to entertain the idea of a Conference, and did so on different grounds: Germany because it would be impossible for her to place her ally before a European tribunal in the settlement of her dispute with Serbia, and Austria because Grey's Conference-proposal had been outstripped by events, having regard to the state of war (with Serbia) which had meanwhile arisen.

I have further shown in detail in my previous work (page 176) how the Entente Powers made it clear to the German Government times without number that the question was in no way one of a European Tribunal, but merely related to the good services which the four disinterested Powers might be able to offer to the two parties chiefly concerned. I have shown how the suggestion was repeatedly put to the German Government that they on their part should indicate the form of mediation agreeable to them, which the other Powers undertook to accept forthwith; how, nevertheless, all these exertions came to naught, and how Germany never submitted a positive proposal in the sense of Grey's suggestion, to the tendency of which Berlin professed to give approval.

The idea of a Conference runs like a thin red line through the whole of the diplomatic negotiations from July 24th to August 1st. The most diverse pretexts were advanced by Germany and Austria in order to render it futile:

On July 27th Herr von Bethmann declined to place his ally before a European Tribunal (White Book, Exhibit 12).

On July 28th Austria declined the proposal because it had been outstripped by the state of war which had arisen (Red Book, No. 41; White Book, page 409).<sup>1</sup>

On July 29th Count Pourtalès remarked to M. Sazonof that the Russian attempt to move Germany to participate in a quadruple Conference amounted to demanding from Germany in regard to Austria what Austria was blamed for with regard to Serbia, and was thus tantamount to an infraction of Austria's sovereignty (White Book, page 409). We are thus to understand that a friendly consultation between the four Powers not directly concerned, two being

<sup>1</sup> [The pagination of the White Book is throughout adapted to *The Collected Diplomatic Documents.*]

allies of Austria and two of Russia, is equivalent to a European Tribunal and to an infraction of sovereignty.

On December 24th, 1914, Herr von Bethmann again repeated the reason for refusing the Conference which had been advanced by Count Pourtalès to M. Sazonof, adding that it had been required of Austria that she should give way under military pressure. Grey's proposal had never involved anything that could be interpreted as a demand that she should give way; it was merely a matter of friendly mediation. And still less was there any suggestion of military pressure, for the proposal was put forward by Grey as early as July 24th (Blue Book, No. 10), and in Grey's circular telegram of July 26th (Blue Book, No. 36) it was communicated to the English Ambassadors in Berlin, Paris and Russia in the most formal manner for the information of the Governments in question, and for the purpose of eliciting their views. Apart from the mobilisation of Austria against Serbia, there was, however, on July 26th, no question of any act of mobilisation by any of the Great Powers.

How remote Grey's Conference-proposal was from any tribunal, or indeed from any idea of military or diplomatic pressure on Austria or Russia, is shown by all the English, Russian and French documents which bear on the question of the Conference. It may be sufficient in this place to refer to Grey's circular communication (Blue Book, No. 36) in which the Conference is represented as having for its purpose that of "discovering an issue which would prevent complications." In the same way Goschen, the English Ambassador, in a conversation with Herr von Jagow on July 27th, took the opportunity of defining the object of the Conference, which, he said, had nothing to do with arbitration; on the contrary, its object was that the representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation (Blue Book, No. 43).

In fact it was intended that resort should be had to the procedure which is provided for in the Hague Conferences as the appropriate means of avoiding wars: friendly Powers were to offer their good services for the purpose of adjusting the conflict—an offer which, according to the

findings of these Conferences, is never to be regarded as an unfriendly act.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE REFUSAL

In spite of the fact that the conclusions of the Conference would thus have been in no way binding, that it would have been open to Austria and Russia, the Powers concerned, to accept or reject its proposals entirely as seemed good to them, Grey's proposal was coldly refused by Germany and Austria, whereas Russia, as has already been observed, had unconditionally accepted it on July 25th, and had declared herself ready to stand aside, and leave the decision of the question to the four Powers not directly concerned (Blue Book, No. 17; Orange Book, Nos. 31, 32).

The telegram of the Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky, in which he declined the proposal, may be taken as characteristic of German diplomacy (Exhibit 12 of the German White Book). It is, in itself, a remarkable fact that this telegram of July 27th (Exhibit 12) is printed before the telegram from Bethmann to Lichnowsky, dated July 25th (Exhibit 13). Is this intentional, or is it merely the result of carelessness? I believe it is intentional. The telegram of July 25th emphasises the famous and intelligent distinction drawn between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict, a distinction which had become untenable after the declaration of the Russian Government on July 25th that the Austro-Serbian conflict could not leave Russia indifferent; a distinction, moreover, which from the outset could not in reason be put forward in view of their own confession in the White Book ("We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude," etc., page 406). In his telegram of July 25th, Herr von Bethmann declared that he did not, indeed, wish to interpose in an Austro-Serbian conflict; on the other hand, he was prepared, "in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other Powers." This contingency, foreseen on July 25th, had now, on July 27th, supervened. Austria had declared the Serbian answer to

<sup>1</sup> [Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Art. 3.]

be unsatisfactory, she had recalled her Ambassador, and the declaration of war against Serbia was expected every moment, and was in fact announced the next day (July 28th). Russia had declared on July 25th that she could not remain indifferent in the event of an Austro-Serbian conflict. In the two days between July 25th and 27th the conflict had thus already developed into an Austro-Russian dispute; this development, moreover, was one as to which no doubt could in any circumstances have been entertained by any thoughtful man in Europe—and for this purpose I include among the thoughtful men the Government of Germany (page 408). If, then, Herr von Bethmann were willing to abide by the readiness to accept European mediation to which he had given expression on July 25th, the presupposition postulated, that is to say an Austro-Russian conflict, was satisfied on July 27th. The refusal of this mediation in the telegram of July 27th is in flagrant contradiction to the readiness expressed in the telegram of July 25th. To this must be attributed the inversion of the telegrams in the White Book, which is designed to render less glaring the inconsistency between the two declarations of the German Government. When we find that the telegram of July 27th again insists that "our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict," it is difficult to know what to make of such a sentence, written at the very moment when the European danger was becoming acute. Was it blindness which failed to see the menacing approach of European tension, or wantonness which would not see it, because a further accentuation of the danger, and a solution of the conflict by the sword, appeared the more desirable issue? From the first, the sole object of the Conference was, in fact, to avoid *European* dangers which threatened to arise out of the Austro-Serbian conflict. As early as July 24th, when Grey first put forward the proposal for a Conference, he clearly emphasised the fact that if the Austrian Ultimatum did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, he would not concern himself further about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian Ultimatum which probably any Power interested in Serbia would take, then in his view the only way left by which the



peace of Europe could be maintained was by the simultaneous exercise of mediating or moderating influence in Vienna and Petrograd by the four Powers not directly interested (Blue Book, Nos. 10, 11, 17, 24, 35, 36, 42, 43, 51, 53, 67). The express purpose of the Conference proposed by Grey was from the very first to prevent the Austro-Serbian dispute widening into one of European dimensions. This extension had come perilously near on July 25th; the German Government, however, which on July 25th had accepted in principle the mediation of the Great Powers in the event of an extension of the conflict, declined on July 27th the method of mediation proposed by Grey, because in their view the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict had not yet arisen.

Even if on July 27th the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse seriously believed in this ground for refusal,—a supposition which it is impossible to accept in view of the European situation on that date—the proposal for a conference, which was constantly renewed by Grey, was nevertheless one which they would at any rate certainly have been bound to accept, when at a later date the opposition between Austria and Russia became constantly more acute and more threatening. On July 28th Austria declared war against Serbia. On July 29th, as a result of the Austrian mobilisation of eight army corps against Serbia and two “to the North,” Russia undertook a partial mobilisation of its four southern army districts. The partial mobilisations were followed on July 31st by the general mobilisations of Austria and Russia. Europe was already in flames; but even yet the Government of Berlin failed to see the glow of the conflagration, and refused to be moved from their point of view that mediation between the Great Powers could only take place in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict.

When at last the flames had mounted so high that even a blind man could not but recognise the danger of the universal conflagration, when Austria and Russia had already partially mobilised their forces, when it was no longer possible even in Berlin to deny the existence of an Austro-Russian conflict, even then Germany still declined the quadruple conversation which, in a friendly manner, was intended to move Austria to forgo those demands

which infringed the sovereignty of Serbia. Participation in such a conversation was, however, no longer refused because the presupposition of an Austro-Russian conflict was not satisfied, but for the new reason that it could not be required of Austria "that she should give way under military pressure. Under these circumstances the Conference idea could not possibly be sympathetic to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Notwithstanding this, Germany declared in London that she accepted in principle the proposal for the intervention of the four Powers, but that it was merely the form of the Conference which was disagreeable to her" (see the Circular Note of the Chancellor dated December 24th, 1914).

The position, accordingly, may be summed up as follows : So long as Austria and Russia had not armed against each other, an Austro-Russian dispute did not exist so far as Germany was concerned, and there was therefore no occasion to accept the idea of a Conference. But when both States had armed, and when Austria in addition had begun war against Serbia, then Germany was even less able to accept the idea of a Conference, because Austria could not be expected to give way under military pressure. On July 27th the dispute had not advanced far enough to justify a Conference; on July 29th it had advanced too far for a Conference still to be justifiable. There still remains July 28th—the day before the Russian partial mobilisation—as an intervening day, on which even on the German view a Conference would have been in place; owing to the Austrian invasion of Serbia on July 28th the conflict between the two Great Powers had certainly progressed far enough to justify at least a conversation between the four Powers with a view to friendly proposals for mediation. On this day, however, there could still be no question of military pressure, since Russia only began her partial mobilisation on the following day (July 29th).

Why, then, did the German Government allow July 28th to glide past without accepting Grey's Conference-proposal, which they had approved "in principle," and of which the form alone was disagreeable? Why did they never—this question I must constantly repeat—why, in the long

interval of time between July 24th and August 1st, did they never suggest a form in which the Conference would be agreeable? Any form of Conference between the four Powers which might be proposed by Germany had been accepted in advance by England, France, Russia and Italy. Why did Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow put forward no manner of proposal as to the form the quadruple conversation should take, even if, as we must assume, it appeared to them fitting to make the fate of hundreds of millions of men dependent on this miserable question of form? In my previous work I have already put this question with all possible emphasis. I am still awaiting an answer.

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The introductory sentence of von Bethmann's telegram of July 27th is also of interest: "We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple Conference in London." So, then, on July 27th the Wilhelmstrasse was still in complete ignorance of the proposal for a Conference! Grey had already communicated it to Prince Lichnowsky on July 24th, that is to say, before the expiration of the Austrian Ultimatum (Blue Book, No. 11). The fact that it had been so communicated Grey at once announced to Rumbold, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, in a telegram giving full details. Since July 24th Grey's proposal had been going round all the Chancelleries of Europe. It had been accepted by Russia as early as July 25th (Blue Book, Nos. 17, 53, 55). On July 26th Grey's proposal had been welcomed by di San Giuliano, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. On July 27th France accepted the proposal for a Conference (Blue Book, Nos. 42, 51, 52). But in Berlin they still professed, on July 27th, to be completely ignorant of this proposal which for three days had been in the air, a proposal which Russia had already accepted two days previously! The proposal must have reached the German Government at the latest on July 25th, through Prince Lichnowsky and the British Chargé d'Affaires; for Grey expressly instructed the latter (in his telegram of July 24th) to bring the proposal to the knowledge of

the Secretary of State: "You should," he says, "inform the Secretary of State."

The loss of two precious days was apparently a matter of indifference in the eyes of the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse; they were obviously resolved in advance to avoid every form of mediation which might serve to keep the peace, and in ignoring peace proposals they served their ends better by allowing the conflict to develop to a more acute stage.

#### PROBABLE SUCCESS

The view that the London Conference of Ambassadors would also have preserved peace on this occasion, as it had done in the infinitely more difficult Balkan crisis, cannot seriously be contested by anyone. I have dealt with this question in detail in my former work, and need not return to it here. The points in dispute between Austria and Serbia (essentially only Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note), which I shall discuss individually in a later section, were ten thousand times more easy of solution than the Balkan questions which had been submitted for decision at the earlier London Conference. Serbia had further declared herself ready to accept the decision of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. Russia was prepared to give her assent to all the points in the Austrian Note which did not infringe the sovereignty and the independence of Serbia. Russia, England and France had expressly promised the Austrian Government every support in obtaining from the Serbian Government her justifiable demands. The more acute the situation became, the more ample were the assurances given by the Entente Powers to the Austrian Government. On July 31st Grey declared in favour of the proposal that the four disinterested Powers should see that Austria obtained *full* satisfaction of her demands, provided only that the sovereignty and the integrity of Serbia were not impaired. He said that he would support any reasonable proposal put forward by Germany and Austria for the maintenance of peace, and in the event of it being rejected by Russia and France, he would have nothing more to

do with the consequences (Blue Book, No. 111). Sazonof went constantly further in tolerating the military action of Austria against Serbia, until finally, on August 1st—that is to say, after the issue of the German Ultimatum, but before the declaration of war—he unconditionally accepted and recommended the London Conference. This he did unconditionally; that is to say, Austria was not even to be under any obligation to withdraw her troops from Serbia; indeed, she was not even obliged to stop her further advance, but it was merely to be urged upon her that it was very *important* that “she should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Serbian territory” (Blue Book, No. 133).

Nor were other expedients lacking, whereby it might have been possible to attain to a solution of the points in dispute, which were constantly being reduced by the conciliatory attitude of the Entente Powers. The chief matter in dispute between Austria and Serbia was with regard to the collaboration of Austrian representatives in the suppression of the anti-monarchical movement and the participation of Austrian officials in the investigation relating to the judicial inquiry; this dispute could easily have been disposed of by the proposal put forward by Cambon for an International Commission of Inquiry, which in the discharge of its functions would not have infringed the sovereignty of Serbia. In short, the London Conference held out the promise of a most favourable issue, and even if, belying expectation, it had been found not to afford the Austrian monarchy sufficient satisfaction, it would still have been open to Austria to take the course that seemed good to her. The object of the Conference was to make proposals, not to arrive at decisions. Whoever frustrated the Conference, by that very fact, and on that ground alone, bears the chief responsibility for the war, even if nothing further were added to the debit side of the account. The Conference represents the crucial point of the whole of the negotiations in the critical days, the point to which the Entente Powers constantly returned, the path of salvation which Germany and Austria continually rejected by the most threadbare pretexts.

## BETHMANN'S GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL

I have already pointed out in my former work, and in the preceding discussion, that the refusal of a Conference on the part of Germany was not a refusal on principle, but was directed merely against the proposed form of a Conference. This point is so decisive for a determination of the question of guilt that in amplification of what I have written in *J'accuse* (pages 176 *et seq.*, 309 *et seq.*), I feel constrained to return to the question at greater length here.

Even in the White Book (page 409) the German Government declared that they approved the tendency of Grey's proposal. In the Chancellor's circular letter of December 24th, 1914, the declaration made by Germany in London is defined in the following words: "that Germany accepted in principle the proposal for the intervention of the four Powers, but that it was merely the form of the Conference which was disagreeable to her."

In the telegram mentioned above, which was addressed by the Chancellor to Lichnowsky on July 25th (White Book, Exhibit 13), Herr von Bethmann expressed his readiness "in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as Allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other Powers."

In his telegram, dated July 28th, addressed to Goschen, Grey expressly observed that the German Government had accepted the principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers (Blue Book, No. 68).

The objections which were urged against the Conference-proposal by Herr von Bethmann in his conversation with Goschen on July 28th were merely of a formal nature—they were also, it is true, entirely untenable, and clearly indicative of disfavour. After the agony and the horror of two years of war, it is not now possible to read these hair-splitting arguments on questions of form without experiencing difficulty in finding words to express detestation of this kind of diplomacy. One is constrained to describe the pedantry of these exalted men as the highest expression either of folly or of crime that has ever been

attained—of folly, if their scruples as to form, on which the fate of the world depended, were expressed in seriousness; of crime, if they were but a pretext in order to arrive at the war, already resolved on. Let us hear how Herr von Bethmann explained his reasons for declining the Conference. It is, indeed, only one example taken from the many incredibilities contained in the volumes of diplomatic correspondence, but it is in itself sufficiently characteristic. Herr von Bethmann said to the English Ambassador that he was most anxious that Germany and Great Britain should work together for the maintenance of general peace, as the two Governments had done in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept Grey's proposal for a Conference of the four Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a Conference would, in his opinion, have had the appearance of an "Arcopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers. Nevertheless, it was not to be inferred from his inability to accept the proposed Conference that he did not entertain a very strong desire for effective co-operation. Herr von Bethmann took advantage of this opportunity to repeat his assurances that he was doing his very best to move Vienna and Petrograd to discuss the situation directly with each other in a friendly way. On the same day on which Herr von Bethmann gave this assurance, it is known that Count Berchtold declared to Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador, that he could neither recede nor enter into any discussion about the terms of his note [Blue Book, No. 93 (1)]. It was also on the same day that Austria declared war against Serbia. What, then, are we to make of the wise observations emitted by Bethmann on the evening of July 28th? (Blue Book, No. 71). He declined the Conference:

(1) Because he did not believe that it would be effective. That was a matter which could only be determined by its issue. The experience derived from previous ambassadorial Conferences, the triviality of the points at issue between Austria and Serbia, to which I propose to return later in detail, the very accommodating attitude adopted by the Entente Powers, the possibility, assuming the

presence of any good-will at all, that not one but a choice of several lines of agreement might be found—all these were circumstances definitely guaranteeing success. In any case it was preposterous to reject, on the preconceived ground of its ineffectiveness, a pathway to the maintenance of European peace which had often been followed with success, and especially in a case in which refusal might involve the most appalling consequences.

(2) Herr von Bethmann rejected the Conference for the further reason that it would have had the appearance of an "Areopagus," consisting of two Powers of each group, sitting in judgment on the remaining Powers. Seldom has a more imbecile reason been advanced in so grave a matter from so authoritative a quarter. Even on the assumption that the Conference would have had the character of an "Areopagus," and that its purpose was to sit in judgment on the dispute between Austria and Russia, which had arisen out of the Serbian question, it would not have been beneath the dignity of Austria to accept arbitration when Russia on July 25th had already declared without hesitation that she was ready to stand aside, and leave the decision of the question at issue to the four Powers not directly concerned (Blue Book, No. 17). The acceptance of arbitration can have as little effect in impugning the dignity of a State as of a private individual. It is well known that in the course of the last century hundreds of disputes, including disputes between Great Powers, have been decided by arbitration, and hundreds of wars have thereby been averted. It may be urged in objection that in the case of these arbitration proceedings questions of national honour and dignity have never been at stake, but the objection is in fact invalid. Most delicate questions of this nature are to be found among those which have been decided by arbitration to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. This objection, moreover, is quite inapplicable to the case of Austria in the instance now in question, for Austria's prestige in the Balkans had already been secured and heightened to a point never before reached, owing to the humble and plaintive answer of Serbia, the declaration of war which had none the less ensued, and the readiness



of the Entente Powers to meet the demands of the Austrian Monarchy to the utmost point compatible with Serbian sovereignty and independence. If any State could complain that its prestige among the Balkan population would suffer by the decision of a Conference, it was Russia and Russia alone. Russia had not merely tolerated the submission of Serbia; she had even exercised her influence in that direction in the interests of European peace. Russia had been a spectator of the Austrian declaration of war, and of the entry into Serbia; Russia was even prepared to allow the Austrians to remain for the time being in Serbia—provided only that they did not advance further. Each of these facts represented a blow to Russian prestige, a discomfiture to Russian diplomacy—and, notwithstanding, Russia was prepared to accept the conclusions of a London Conference. Austria was playing the welcome part of the diplomatic and military aggressor, and had already gained a complete diplomatic victory; Serbia, and consequently Russia indirectly, were the parties attacked; they had already been defeated in diplomacy, and they were content to ask that the military attack should but come to a standstill, not that it should be withdrawn. Yet, notwithstanding all this, Russia was prepared to submit her cause to the "Areopagus" which Herr von Bethmann rejected on behalf of the aggressive and victorious Austria!

And now consider the entirely incomprehensible objections urged by Bethmann against the composition of the "Areopagus"! The greatest advantage of its composition was that two States not directly concerned, drawn from each of the groups of Powers, were represented—a fact which afforded the best guarantee of the impartiality of the "Areopagus," yet this was precisely what was pointed out by the Chancellor as a drawback in the Conference. This may appear inexplicable. Grey, Goshen, Viviani and Jules Cambon impressed on Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow times without number the obvious advantages inherent in just such an impartial composition. On one occasion Jules Cambon, in conversation with Herr von Jagow, rightly pointed out that this Conference would realise in its composition what all

earnest friends of peace had long desired and what had already been tested in the last Balkan crisis, namely, an approximation between the two groups of Powers for the purpose of maintaining the peace of Europe, a realisation of the thought that alongside of, and in the midst of, the groups of Powers there existed, nevertheless, a European spirit (*esprit européen*). What better composition of an "Areopagus" could Herr von Bethmann desire than precisely that proposed by Grey?

But in reality, as is indeed notorious, it was not intended to be an "Areopagus"; no one was to sit in judgment on another. It was intended that a private and informal discussion should take place in London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers for the purpose of discussing the question at issue, and eventually of submitting in Vienna and Petrograd simultaneous proposals with a view to arriving at an agreement—proposals, be it observed, which were in no way to have binding force:

It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement (Blue Book, No. 37);

To discover an issue which would prevent complications (Blue Book, No. 36);

To discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation (Blue Book, No. 43);

To work together to keep the peace of Europe (Blue Book, No. 88);

To use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria (Blue Book, No. 107).

It would be possible to multiply indefinitely the quotations from the diplomatic correspondence of the Entente Powers, confirming the fact that the purpose of the Conference was restricted to friendly discussion and advice. There was absolutely no question of an "Areopagus," or of anyone "sitting in judgment." Friendly discussion of the situation, the discovery of methods of *rapprochement*, which would satisfy Austria and Russia alike and be prejudicial to neither party, the simultaneous transmission to both Powers of such non-obligatory proposals of agreement—these were the express objects

of the Conference, and these Herr von Bethmann declined because it would have the appearance of an "Areopagus" sitting in judgment on Austria and Russia!

I have intentionally dwelt at some length on this point (Blue Book, No. 71) in order to present to the reader a striking example of the intelligence and the honesty of intention of the leaders of German policy. The qualities manifested by Herr von Bethmann in this conversation with the English Ambassador are revealed everywhere at this stage of the negotiations by all German diplomatists, with the solitary exception of Prince Lichnowsky. Everywhere we find stupidity or disingenuousness, or a combination of both. These are the ensigns under which the German Ship of State was steered into the whirlpool of danger.

#### FAILURE TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE MEDIATORY PROPOSAL

Since the German Government approved the principle but not the form of the Conference, nothing was more natural than that the diplomatists of the Entente Powers should finally request that the German Government themselves should suggest a form in which the Conference would be acceptable. I have already referred in my former work (pages 176, 309) to this interesting and highly significant incident, which as may be expected is passed over in complete silence in the literature published in defence of the German cause. Herr von Jagow, like his superior, was constantly emphasising his readiness in principle to accept common mediatory action with the three other disinterested Powers, but, also like Herr von Bethmann, he had always taken umbrage at the form of Conference; the idea of pinning down these gentlemen, and of asking them to propose a form for any kind of common action by the four Powers emanated from Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, acting in concert with his English and Russian colleagues, Goschen and Swerbeiev. This idea was first brought forward on July 28th. It is well known that on that day war broke out between Austria and Serbia, and that Count Berchtold had categorically

declined any further negotiation with Russia in the Austro-Serbian dispute. Now, at any rate, it was high time to translate into action the platonic readiness for mediatory action with the other Powers, which had been expressed to satiety by Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow. Now that a brusque interruption had taken place in the Austro-Russian negotiations, which up till then had at any rate held out the promise of a satisfactory continuation, now at last one would have thought that the game of hide-and-see in the Wilhelmstrasse would come to an end, and seeing that the way of a direct understanding between Vienna and Petrograd was blocked, that they would at last enter on the only other remaining path to the maintenance of peace—the path of a Conference. As from July 28th it was no longer any use putting forward the excuse that they desired in the first place a direct understanding between the Austrian and the Russian Governments, and only in case of necessity a mediation of the Powers. At last it was necessary for them to speak out, to take their stand resolutely on the ground of a common action in the interests of peace, or to allow events to take their baneful course to war.

The idea of leaving to the German Government the determination of the form and the method of mediation appears for the first time in the telegrams from Jules Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin (Yellow Book, No. 81) and from Goschen to Grey (Blue Book, No. 60), both dated July 28th. From this time forward it recurs as a constant *leitmotiv* in all the utterances of the Entente diplomatists; it was constantly urged by Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani on their accredited Ambassadors, as well as by Goschen, Jules Cambon and Swerbeiev on Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow. In addition the Italian Government, in Rome as well as through their Ambassador at Berlin, joined in the chorus. All of them repeated incessantly and indefatigably: "Suggest to us any form of common action in the interests of peace, anyone you like. We accept it blindfold: only show us that you, like ourselves, are anxious for peace."

The incredible and unparalleled system of falsification

pursued voluntarily and involuntarily by the hacks of the German Government renders it necessary to demonstrate this point by adducing the relevant passages in the diplomatic correspondence. The citation of all the passages bearing on the point would demand as much space as a small pamphlet, and I must therefore content myself with certain examples :

*Blue Book, No. 60.*—Goschen reports to Grey, as a result of a discussion with his French and Italian colleagues, that, while Jagow had intimated to all three his refusal of the proposed Conference, he had nevertheless declared that he desired to work with the Entente Powers for the maintenance of general peace. The three Ambassadors, therefore, conclude that if he is sincere in this wish, he can only be objecting to the form of the proposed Conference. It might therefore be possible to induce him to suggest lines on which he could consider it possible for the Powers to work together in the interests of peace (July 28th).

*Yellow Book, No. 81.*—Jules Cambon reports to Bienvenu-Martin that he has supported the efforts of Goschen to obtain Jagow's assent to a Conference, but that the latter had replied to him, as he had done to his colleague, Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a Conference of Ambassadors in London, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. Jagow had used the same language to the English and Italian Ambassadors, accepting in principle the idea of action in common with England, France and Italy, but rejecting any idea of a Conference. In these circumstances it might be advisable if Grey were to put the German Secretary of State in a dilemma by asking him to suggest the form which might be taken by diplomatic action of the Powers in the interests of peace ("le mettre au pied du mur, en lui demandant de formuler lui-même comment pourrait se produire l'action diplomatique des puissances pour éviter la guerre," July 28th).

*Blue Book, No. 68.*—Grey writes to Goschen that as the German Government had accepted the principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, he is ready to propose that the German Secretary of State

should himself suggest the lines on which effect should be given to the principle approved by him (July 28th).

*Blue Book, No. 78.*—Buchanan reports to Grey that now that direct conversations have been definitely declined by the Austrian Government, Sazonof proposes to urge on the German Ambassador a return to Grey's proposal for a Conference, or at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors (of France, Germany and Italy), with Sir Edward Grey, and also with the Austrian Ambassador in London, if Grey thought this advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to the Russian Minister, and he did not care what form such conversations might take. No time was to be lost. The only way to avert war was for Grey to succeed in arriving by means of conversations with the Ambassadors concerned, either collectively or individually, at some formula which would be acceptable to Austria. . . . Buchanan asked Sazonof whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome on July 27th by the Marquis di San Giuliano were carried out (*Blue Book, No. 57*). (This proposal was to the effect that Serbia might even then be induced, on the advice of the Conference of the four Powers, to accept *all* the demands of the note, and thus, while affording complete satisfaction to Austria, she would at the same time save her national honour, since she would have yielded to the demand of Europe and not of Austria alone.) Sazonof did not even withhold his consent to this proposal of Buchanan, which represented the utmost point to which it was possible to go—for, indeed, one could not go further than to acquiesce in all the Austrian demands. On the contrary, he declared that he was ready to agree to anything arranged by the four Powers, provided it was accepted by Serbia: he could not be more Serbian than the Serbians. Some supplementary statement or explanation would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum (July 29th).

*Blue Book, No. 84.*—Grey had just been informed on the morning of July 29th that Count Berchtold had on the previous day, July 28th, broken off direct negotiations with Russia. In consequence, he again drew Prince

Lichnowsky's attention to the fact that the German Government had shown themselves favourable in principle to mediation between Austria and Russia, and had only objected that the particular method of "conference, consultation, or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre*" in London was too formal a method. Grey urged the German Government to suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be made available in the maintenance of peace. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method suggested by Germany, if that proposed by Grey was not acceptable. The only thing required was that Germany should "press the button" in the interests of peace (Morning, July 29th).

*Blue Book, No. 88.*—Reporting a conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky on the afternoon of July 29th. Grey had meanwhile been officially informed by Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, of the rupture in the negotiations between Austria and Russia, the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, and the ensuing partial mobilisation of Russia. He emphasised to Prince Lichnowsky that, in view of the constantly increasing tension, the mediation of the four disinterested Powers was now becoming more and more a matter of urgency, and he asked the German Government to propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. In addition to emphasising the idea of a Conference, Grey put forward on this occasion the well-known proposal for an agreement, that Austria should occupy Belgrade and the adjacent territory until she had received complete satisfaction, and that the Powers should in the interval undertake mediation between Austria and Russia. In my book I have already dealt in detail with this formula of agreement suggested by Grey, and here I merely mention it in passing, as we are obliged for the moment to restrict ourselves to the discussion of the question of the Conference.

*Blue Book, No. 107.*—Goschen reports to Grey that the German Government had not yet had time to suggest the method which they desired should be taken by the mediation of the four Powers. Jagow, in reply to an inquiry from

the French Ambassador, had said that in order to save time he had communicated direct with Vienna, asking what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned. Herr von Bethmann maintained, in conversation with the English Ambassador, that he had pressed the button in Vienna as hard as possible, but he was not sure whether by urging moderation in Vienna he had not rather precipitated matters (July 30th). The behaviour of Jagow and Bethmann as portrayed in this number of the Blue Book calls for no comment. It speaks for itself. The form of the Conference did not suit these gentlemen, but they refrained from suggesting another form. Instead they write to Vienna, and ask for information as to what Austria really wants (still unknown to them on July 30th !). Berlin expresses no views on the method of mediation ; Vienna expresses no views with regard to her wishes ; Herr von Bethmann presses the button and recommends moderation in Vienna, but achieves, as he fears, exactly the contrary result : Vienna becomes more and more immoderate. The game is, indeed, too transparent to induce anyone to believe in the integrity and sincerity of the diplomatists of Germany. Yet in Germany, after the lapse of two years of war, nothing has yet shaken the legend that Germany and Austria desired peace, but that the Entente Powers chose war.

*Yellow Book, Nos. 108 and 109.*—Grey asks Prince Lichnowsky if he is now in a position to communicate the German formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interests of peace. Prince Lichnowsky is not in a position to give any reply (July 30th). Jules Cambon asks Herr von Jagow the same question. Jagow avoids the question, observing that "to gain time" he had asked the Austrian Government direct to tell him on what ground conversations might be opened with her ("sur quel terrain on pourrait causer avec elle").

In contradistinction to the attitude assumed by the German and Austrian Governments, the Russian Government had not only from the very first agreed to the Conference and submitted to its conclusions, but they had also accepted in advance any form of conference, conversation, or mediation without reserve. This attitude on the part



of Russia appears in innumerable passages in the diplomatic correspondence of the Entente Powers (see, *inter alia*, Blue Book, Nos. 17, 78; Orange Book, Nos. 31, 32, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55). On July 29th Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador, who is represented as one of the leading war-intriguers, reports a very animated conversation between Viviani and Baron von Schön, in which the latter trotted out the old litany that the words "conference," or "arbitration," had an alarming effect on Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. At this point, however, the wisdom of Herr von Schön gave way, and he avoided further pressure from Viviani by observing that it was necessary in the first place to know what Austria really demanded of Serbia (Orange Book, No. 55).

The result of all these prevarications and subterfuges on the part of German diplomacy was inevitably that no answer was ever given to the question of the form of mediation which would be acceptable to Germany, and consequently the Conference-proposal definitely dropped. It is impossible for any fair-minded, thinking man to doubt that the Conference would have preserved the peace of Europe. Germany's refusal of the Conference shipwrecked the efforts to maintain peace which were made by the Entente Powers.

#### HERR HELFFERICH AND THE CONFERENCE

How, then, do the defenders of the German Government, Herr Helfferich and Company, deal with the question of the Conference? To this question, which is very properly regarded throughout the whole world as the cardinal point in all investigations into the question of guilt, Herr Helfferich devotes in all twenty-two lines in his book of forty-eight pages. He disposes of it in the following way:

"Sir Edward Grey in the first place received the suggestion of a Conference from Paul Cambon. It originally took the following form: the British Cabinet were to ask the German Government 'de prendre

l'initiative d'une démarche à Vienne pour offrir une médiation, entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, des quatre Puissances non directement intéressées' (to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Serbia, of the four Powers which were not directly interested) (Yellow Book, No. 32). The proposal was from the outset doomed to failure; for apart from the fact that it assigned to Germany an initiative with regard to her ally which France strictly refused to adopt with regard to Russia, it was well known that the Austro-Hungarian point of view was that an intervention or mediation of third parties in an Austro-Hungarian-Serbian dispute was not acceptable. Further, by accepting the proposal of Grey and Cambon, Austria would, *eo ipso*, have recognised Russia as a 'Puissance directement intéressée' in the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian dispute, which was directly opposed to the views and the intentions of Austria-Hungary. But in thus entrapping Sir Edward Grey, Paul Cambon secured, on the inevitable rejection of the proposal by Germany, a change for the worse in the temper of the English Cabinet in relation to Germany."

This cavalier manner of leaping over an inconvenient obstacle is almost without parallel in the whole literature of the war. It is only excelled by the method of Professor Dr. Helmolt, the great German historian, who in his *Secret Historical Antecedents of the War* (page 182) devotes six lines only to the eulogy of Grey's Conference proposal and its fate. He writes :

"And thus Grey's proposal for a Conference was buried. Its concealed purpose was detected; that purpose was to submit the undoubted justifiability of Austria's grievances against her neighbour to an inquiry prolonged for months in London, an inquiry which, as certain experiences have taught, would have mortified every sensibility of a Great Power."

Apart from the eminent positions which they occupy as Secretary of State and as professor of history, Messrs.

Helfferich and Helmolt are regarded in Germany as authorities on the antecedents of the war. If the events leading to the war are treated in this way "in a green tree" it is easy to imagine what happens "in the dry."

To take an example, let us go into the details of Helfferich's demonstration.

I. It is not true that Grey received the suggestion of a Conference from Cambon. The proposal came spontaneously from Grey on July 24th, after he had received information of the Austrian Ultimatum. On the same day Grey communicated his proposal, first to Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, and then to Prince Lichnowsky (Blue Book, Nos. 10 and 11). Cambon sent to Bienvenu-Martin a report on his conversation with Grey (Yellow Book, No. 32). No doubt Lichnowsky also furnished a report to Berlin on this important interview. As in so many other matters, however, we gather from the German publications nothing about his report or its reception in Berlin. The first mention of it in the German White Book (page 408) is the reference made to the English proposal when it was formally repeated in the circular telegram of July 26th (Blue Book, No. 36), and it is maintained that up to the time of the reply from Berlin, dated July 27th (White Book, Exhibit 12), nothing was known of the whole matter.

It is in the first place surprising that Helfferich does not quote the English proposal in the English text, as given in the English Blue Book, but in the French text, as given in the French Yellow Book. On close examination the reason for this surprising procedure is at once recognised. It is that Cambon's report repeats the conversation of July 24th in a closely compressed form, in which the views expressed by Grey are given only incompletely, and in a manner likely to occasion misunderstandings. It suits Herr Helfferich's purpose to exploit these misunderstandings, and this would not have been possible had he quoted Grey's original expressions. Seeing that Cambon writes: "Nous (*i.e.* Grey and Cambon) avons été d'accord," Helfferich maintains that Cambon suggested the idea of a Conference to Grey, and all manner of devilish intentions are ascribed to the French Ambassador: with this sug-

gestion of his he had entrapped Grey, he had confidently anticipated its rejection by Germany, and he had sought to bring about, as a consequence of this rejection, a change for the worse in the temper of the English Cabinet in relation to Germany. Herr Helfferich would not have been able to ascribe this devilish plan to M. Cambon if, as fairness demanded, he had based his discussion on the English notes (Nos. 10 and 11) instead of on the French. The idea of a Conference emanated from Grey and not from Cambon, and the agreement between them consisted merely in this, that Cambon unhesitatingly expressed the ready concurrence of his Government in Grey's proposal.

It was only with regard to the precise time at which the action of the four Powers should come into operation that the views of Grey and Cambon were not in agreement. Grey indicated as emphatically as possible in his conversation with Cambon, as well as in his subsequent interview with Lichnowsky, that the mediation or moderating influence of the four Powers should only come into operation if the unusually harsh tone of the Austrian Note, the short time-limit granted in the Ultimatum and the far-reaching nature of the Austrian demands should bring about trouble between Austria and Russia—that is to say a European danger—but not if the question in dispute continued to be restricted to Austria and Serbia.

*Blue Book, No. 10.*—"I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this Ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it."

*Blue Book, No. 11.*—"I said (to the German Ambassador) that if the Austrian Ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it."

*Blue Book, No. 25.*—Again, on July 25th, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, Grey returned to the question of the mediation of the four disinterested Powers, and he once more repeated on this occasion that such a mediation would only be appropriate if the Austro-Serbian conflict should extend to one between Austria and Russia, and thereby affect the peace of Europe. In such mediatory action the participation of Germany would, of course, be essential ;

England alone could do nothing. Prince Lichnowsky expressed himself personally as favourable to Grey's proposal, and indicated that, in his opinion, it would not compromise Austria's dignity if, in the event of an extension of the dispute, the Powers were to mediate between Austria and Russia.

*Blue Book, No. 36.*—Official inquiry addressed by Grey to the Governments in Paris, Berlin and Rome. "Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy and Germany and myself to meet here in Conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?" Should this course be agreed to, "when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and Petrograd should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of Conference."

Grey's proposal, therefore, did not contemplate an intervention in the Austro-Serbian conflict so long as it remained restricted to these two States, but merely aimed at measures which would prevent this conflict assuming European dimensions. Since this appears in an incontrovertible manner from the preceding quotations from the English documents, and indeed is obvious on a review of the whole contents of the English Blue Book, but is not entirely clear in Cambon's brief summary of July 24th, the official defender of the German Government considers it fair to make this one French document the basis of his censorious judgment and to ignore the true source, the English Blue Book.

II. The Conference proposal, according to Helfferich, was from the outset doomed to failure. Why?

(A.) Because it assigned to Germany an initiative with regard to her ally, which France strictly refused to adopt with regard to Russia.

I have endeavoured in vain to grasp the deep meaning of this oracular utterance. What was the initiative, then, which it was suggested should be assigned to Germany to adopt with regard to her ally? None whatever. It was in no way proposed that Germany, acting alone, should

bring influence to bear on Austria, but merely that she should associate with the other three Powers for the purpose of common action. This common action, however, was to be brought to bear, not on Vienna alone, but at the same time on Petrograd, with a view to producing moderation on both sides and for the purpose of preserving the peace of Europe. In both documents (Nos. 10 and 11 of the Blue Book) there is almost verbal agreement that the four disinterested Powers should work *together* and *simultaneously* at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of moderation, in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening. It was expedient and necessary that Germany should take part in the common action of the Powers, because it was her participation alone that held out any prospect of success in Vienna; but it was not suggested that she should in any way be entrusted over and above this with a special mission or initiative ("It would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it"). Where, then, is the initiative which was maliciously assigned to Germany with regard to her ally?

To continue the argument, France, according to Helfferich, is alleged to have strictly declined the same initiative with regard to Russia. What, we ask, can this mean? It can clearly only mean that France had declined to ask Russia's consent to Grey's proposal for a Conference. If Herr Helfferich had taken the trouble to read the whole of No. 82 in the French Yellow Book, so dear to his heart, from which, however, he quotes only the one sentence that suits his purpose, he would have found that this very document makes it clear that the Russian Ambassador in London had concurred in Grey's proposal for a Conference. Paul Cambon states that he had communicated Grey's proposal to his Russian colleague, that the latter had indeed expressed grave doubts as to its success, since Austria would certainly not have dispatched her Ultimatum without the concurrence of Berlin, but nevertheless he thought it right to attempt the *démarche* on which Grey and Cambon had agreed ("cependant le Comte Benckendorff croit bon de tenter la démarche sur laquelle je me suis mis d'accord avec Sir Edward Grey"). Thus on the








# MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

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very day on which he learned of Grey's proposal, the French Ambassador had taken with regard to his Russian colleague the initiative "which France strictly refused to adopt with regard to Russia."

For the rest, I have already observed that it is as inappropriate to speak of an initiative to be taken by France with regard to Russia, as of one by Germany with regard to Austria. In the case of both Powers the initiative was to emanate from the Conference of Ambassadors in London, not from Germany or France. The necessity of a French initiative with regard to Russia was all the more excluded, inasmuch as the Russian Government, as has already been pointed out, officially confirmed on the following day (July 25th) what the Russian Ambassador in London, speaking for himself, had already declared on the previous day to be the right course to adopt. As early as July 25th Sazonof gave Buchanan, the English Ambassador, a positive statement that Russia would stand aside and leave the decision of the question to the four Powers (Blue Book, No. 17). During the whole course of the dispute, the Russian Government frequently gave expression to their willingness to adopt this course. What, then, I again ask the Secretary of State, are we to understand by the statement that France declined to undertake an initiative with regard to Russia, which it

1. had in fact undertaken (Yellow Book, No. 32) and which

2. was in no way necessary since Russia from the very outset had willingly accepted Grey's Conference, and agreed to acquiesce in its conclusions?

(B.) A further reason for the view that the Conference was from the outset doomed to failure is, according to Helfferich, that the Austrian Government had declared that an intervention or mediation by third parties in an Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict would be unacceptable. To this I reply:

1. There was no question of any intervention in an Austro-Serbian conflict. Any such intervention was expressly declined by Grey. The behaviour of Austria, unexampled in the history of diplomacy, was, however,

from the first fraught with the danger of an extension of this conflict to one affecting Austria and Russia, and consequently the whole of Europe, and it was this danger that Grey wished to avoid by his proposal for a Conference. Mediation was proposed, not between Austria and Serbia, but between Austria and Russia, with the object of averting a European war. It was inevitable that the dispute between Austria and Serbia, out of which the conflict between the two great Powers had arisen, should come up for discussion and settlement. But this was to be, not the aim of the Conference's activity, but merely the presupposition of its success.

2. If the fact that one of the parties concerned may have taken up a point of view were to be regarded as a reason for refusing mediation, it would follow that any attempt to mediate either in private or public affairs would be impossible. The logic of Helfferich, carried to its conclusion, would imply that in private lawsuits the judge would be compelled to refuse any attempt to arrive at an agreement, on the ground that he was aware of the conflicting points of view adopted by the two parties. It is precisely because the parties have adopted conflicting points of view that a settlement is advisable. If they took the same point of view, there would be no occasion for an agreement. Even the fact that one of the parties may assert that mediation is not acceptable to him would not deter the honest intermediary from attempting to mediate. And this would be all the more so, where consequences of so portentous a character depend on a friendly agreement as was the case in the Austro-Russian conflict.

So far we have been arguing against Helfferich's principle that the brusque refusal of mediation by one of the parties must from the outset deter the mediator from even attempting to arrive at an agreement. But even the supposition as to fact which underlies Helfferich's consideration of the question is erroneous in this particular case, at least in so far as Germany's participation in the mediatory action is concerned. As I have explained at some length in my former book, it is quite true that the Austrian Government refused to entertain any discussion of their Note and any mediation by the Powers from July 28rd to

28th, that an interval of two days then followed in which all the threads between Vienna and Petrograd appeared to be sundered, and that it was only as from July 31st that the Austrian Government, subject to all manner of reservations, announced its readiness to discuss the contents of their Note and to accept mediation by the Powers. All this is true, looking at it from the Austrian side of the question. From the side of the German Government and of their official defenders, this mulishness on the part of Austria cannot, however, be regarded as a reason for declining a Conference, for the Government of Berlin indeed maintain that they struggled against this Austrian mulishness by all the means at their disposal to the very limits of what was consistent with their duty as allies. Herr von Bethmann constantly repeats that he had again and again urged Vienna to enter into negotiations on the contents of the Note.<sup>1</sup> He and Herr von Jagow declare expressly in the White Book (Exhibits 12 and 13) and in many negotiations carried on in London (e.g. Blue Book, Nos. 25 and 46) that in the event of the conflict developing into one affecting Austria and Russia, they were prepared to participate in the mediation of the Powers. If the account given by the German Government is to be accepted, they professed to be desirous of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, as well as of the mediation of the Powers, as soon as an extension of the conflict had in fact arisen. The Conference was intended to satisfy this latter wish. How, then, can the defender of the German Government declare that the Conference which Berlin desired in principle, and only refused from scruples as to its form, was doomed from the outset to failure, since Vienna did not share the wish of Berlin? It was precisely because Germany was alone in a position to press successfully in Vienna the wish for an understanding which was professed in Berlin that the participation of Germany in a Conference was desired and

<sup>1</sup> The first attempt to furnish a proof of this assertion appeared in the Chancellor's speech, August 19th, 1915; a second attempt of the same kind was made in his speech of November 9th, 1916; in later sections I propose to return to these in detail (chapter: "Russia the Incendiary," Vol. I.; chapter, "Bethmann the Pacifist," Vol. II.).

regarded as an essential condition of success. In short, Berlin was prepared, on principle, to participate in mediation; Vienna, on principle, declined mediation, and Herr Helfferich accordingly draws the conclusion that any attempt to mediate was therefore doomed to failure. The true inference is in reality exactly the reverse of this. Vienna was powerless without the support of Berlin, and unless Berlin's sympathy for the mediation of the Powers was affected and purely platonic, as indeed in my view it was, she alone had the power and therefore the duty of breaking the stubbornness of Austria, thereby creating a prospect of success for the Conference which we are now told was doomed to failure. The argument thus advanced by Helfferich against the Conference is therefore also illusory.

(C.) Most grotesque of all, however, is the third reason which the German Secretary of State, in the twenty-two lines which he devotes to the subject, has the courage to urge against the acceptance by Austria and Germany of the Conference-proposal:

“Further, by accepting the proposal of Grey and Cambon, Austria would, *eo ipso*, have recognised Russia as a ‘Puissance directement intéressée’ in the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian dispute, which was directly opposed to the views and the intentions of Austria-Hungary.”

Thus, then, it was not open to Austria to accept the Conference, because thereby, in opposition to her views and intentions, she would have recognised Russia as a directly interested Power! Indeed, was there ever room for the slightest doubt that Russia was the only Great Power directly interested in an Austro-Serbian conflict—a conflict, moreover, provoked by the most insolent demands ever addressed by an insolent Power to a helpless and tiny State—a conflict in the course of which it had become manifest that it was intended that military humiliation should be added to an almost complete diplomatic victory, and that, under the pretence of obtaining “full guarantees” for Serbia's promises (see the Emperor William's telegram to the Tsar, dated July 29th) the small

Slav State should in fact be degraded to the level of an Austrian vassal? To believe that Russia was not an interested Power was only possible to purblind diplomatists who refused to see the truth, who, in the teeth of all the teaching of history, and apparently also against their own better knowledge, asserted that Serbia had always belonged to the Austrian sphere of influence (see the expression of Count Mensdorff to Grey, Blue Book, No. 91, July 29th). What, then, was the meaning of all the Balkan conflicts which throughout a whole generation, ever since the Congress of Berlin of 1878, constantly assumed a more menacing form, which after the annexation of 1908 and during and after the Balkan Wars of 1912-18 had already brought about the danger of an Austro-Russian and consequently of a European war? What was the meaning of the perennial storm-cloud in the South-east, which threatened to burst in a raging storm over Europe? What was the meaning of the mobilisations of Austria and Russia against each other in 1908 and 1912 (see the Austrian Red Book, No. 17)? All these symptoms of unrest, all these dangers, sprang, indeed, from nothing but the conflict of interests of the two Great Powers in the Balkans, for indeed there existed no other conflict of interests between them.

The hacks of the German Government are frequently concerned with the discussion of the question whether Russia had a *right* to intervene in an Austro-Serbian dispute. The *Kölnische Zeitung*, which did my book the honour of devoting to it on the principal page two long columns of discussion in the form of a communication from Amsterdam, allowed a Dutch professor to express his views, since the editorial staff had themselves nothing to urge against the convincing documented demonstration contained in my work. The Dutch professor, for his part, avoided the cardinal point in the question of guilt, and seized on a number of subsidiary ones. In the first place he criticised me for skimming too lightly over the question of the justification of Russia's action in intervening on behalf of Serbia, objecting that in one passage I had spoken of a historical connection between Russia and Serbia extending over a hundred years, whereas in another

place I had spoken of it as extending to two hundred years, and also that I had been guilty of historical blunders in asserting the existence of a community of religion and race. It may be enough to answer :

(a) That it was neither my intention, nor within the scope of my book, to write a history of the relations between Russia and Serbia.

(b) That I have as easy access to books of reference as my critic, and that it would have been an easy matter for me to make as much of a parade of historical knowledge on Russo-Serbian questions as the professor of Utrecht.

(c) That the use of the phrase "a hundred years" or "two hundred years" connotes, in the ordinary use of language, a very long period, without committing myself to definite figures. It might be 99 years; it might be 150 years; it might be 180 years.

(d) That the whole statement of the question, as given by the professor, is erroneous. In such matters there can be no question of a *right*, but only of a *fact*. A question of right never arises in conflicts between national interests, apart, of course, from those cases where the question at issue is the execution and construction of international treaties, as, for example, a guarantee of neutrality. Russia had as little right to extend any special protection to Serbia as Austria had to consider that country within its exclusive sphere of interest. Russia's *interests* required her to maintain the policy of "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples," proclaimed by Sazonof in the Duma as late as May 28rd, 1914, just as America's interests require her to maintain the Monroe Doctrine of America for the Americans. When to the political interest there are added historical and religious considerations and community of race or kinship, the political interest will thereby be powerfully reinforced; nevertheless, these particular points of view are not authoritative and decisive. The best proof of this is to be found in the interest which Germany constantly claims to have in the maintenance of Austria in her present position. Historical, religious, or racial points of view are in no way the basis of this interest. The greater part of the population of Austria-Hungary consists of non-Germans; only a small proportion are Protestants, whereas Protest-

ants constitute the majority in Germany. There can certainly be no question of a historical connection; for Prussia attained the imperial position in Germany in opposition to, and in conflict with, the Hapsburg monarchy, and in the end she was able to complete this development only by ejecting the Hapsburgs out of Germany. Without the Seven Years' War and without the War of 1866, Prussian Germany would not have been what it is to-day. So far as historical relations exist between the Hapsburg Empire and what is to-day Germany, they represent opposition and war, not friendship and community of interests. This community of interests was, unfortunately, first established by the Bismarckian alliance between Germany and Austria, but it was again weakened by Bismarck in the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. A comradeship in life and death, the consequences of which we see before us to-day, especially a comradeship against Russia, would certainly not have been foreseen by a Bismarck as among the changed European conditions. This, however, is merely in passing. In the present discussion what interests us exclusively is the fact that even the alliance between Germany and Austria rests on no deep community of nationality, on no historical development, on no kinship of race or religion, but solely on political interests, which, unfortunately, are falsely understood.

The same thing holds good of all European alliances, ententes, spheres of influence, etc. It is, therefore, an entirely superfluous and false statement of the question to inquire whether Russia had a well-founded right to intervene on behalf of Serbia, viewed from the standpoint of national psychology, or resting on ethical, religious, or historical considerations. Russia had an *interest* in the maintenance of the absolute independence of the Balkan peoples, especially that of Serbia against Austrian efforts to gain supremacy; Russia had constantly proclaimed that this interest was the guiding motive of her Balkan policy. This was a *fact* known to everyone in Europe, and this fact had to be reckoned with, and was in fact reckoned with, not only in the rest of Europe, but above all in Berlin and Vienna. Evidence to this effect is contained in every line of the German White Book and the Austrian



Red Book ; the revelations of Giolitti confirm it. It is, indeed, grotesque that the official defender of the German Government should justify the rejection of the Conference proposal on the ground that they could not recognise a Russian interest, which, in fact, they had never denied. I can only designate the explanation given by Helfferich as a fatuous game of hide-and-seek, in which one takes refuge in a glasshouse in the foolish hope of not being seen by others.

\* \* \* \* \*

The diplomatic books of all the Powers, but especially the White Book and Red Book themselves, are full of proofs that from the first all the Powers recognised Russia as a *puissance directement intéressée*. I must content myself with indicating only some of the more striking instances from the wealth of material available.

*White Book, page 406.*—"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duties as allies."

*White Book, page 407.*—"Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation."

*White Book, Exhibit 2.*—A communication from the Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. "Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's, actively to become a party to Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. . . . If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Serbia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European War."

*White Book, Exhibit 3.*—A conversation between Berchtold and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on July 24th con

taining an elucidation of the standpoint of Austria with regard to Serbia.

*White Book, Exhibit 4.*—A conversation between Count Pourtalès and Sazonof on July 24th, in which the Russian Minister stated that Russia could not possibly permit that the Serbo-Austrian difficulty should be settled between the parties concerned alone.

*White Book, Exhibit 5.*—A conversation between Count Szápáry and Sazonof, on July 26th, at which the latter gave expression to his objections against certain points in the Austrian Note.

*White Book, Exhibit 10.*—A telegram from the Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky, dated July 26th, which reports the explanation given by Austria in Petrograd with regard to her intentions.

The telegrams from Herr von Bethmann to the German Ambassadors in Paris and Petrograd, dated July 26th (*White Book, Exhibits 10A and 10B*) are substantially to the same effect.

*White Book, Exhibits 12 and 13* contain the telegrams which have already been mentioned, dated July 25th, which contemplate participation in mediation in the event of a dispute between Austria and Russia.

*White Book, Exhibits 14, 15, and 16* (July 27th and 28th) report the alleged efforts of Herr von Bethmann to mediate between Vienna and Petrograd.

*White Book, Exhibit 20.*—(The first telegram from the Emperor William to the Tsar, dated July 28th.) "On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia."

*White Book, Exhibit 22.*—(Telegram from the Emperor William to the Tsar, dated July 29th.) Gives the Tsar information with regard to Austria's endeavour to obtain full guarantees for the execution of the Serbian promises, and states that a direct understanding between Petrograd and Vienna is possible and desirable.

All the alleged mediatory efforts on the part of Germany proceeded on the obvious assumption that Russia was a Power directly interested in the conflict between Austria and Serbia. But Austria herself was also from the outset clearly conscious that in her action against Serbia she would have to deal with Russia, as the Power chiefly interested. Only it was calculated in Vienna that Russia, having regard to her internal and external situation, having regard especially to her defective military preparations, would not allow matters to proceed so far as to engage in a war on account of Serbia. They took the risk of a European war, if it should be found that their calculations with regard to Russia's restraint or incapacity were erroneous. But in Vienna no doubt was ever thrown on the fact that Russia was the party most seriously and most dangerously concerned in the dispute between Austria and Serbia. Whatever reproach may be urged against the Austrian diplomatists, they did not at any rate render themselves guilty of the foolish game of hide-and-seek in glasshouses with which Herr Helfferich credits them.

The clearest proof of this is found in the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd on the contents of the Ultimatum which were opened on July 31st, and were continued after both States, Austria and Russia, had mobilised, apparently indeed after the German declaration of war on August 1st. The last conversation between Count Szápáry and Sazonof, found in the Austrian Red Book, dates from August 1st (No. 56). The Austrian declaration of war against Russia, as is well known, was only delivered in Petrograd on August 6th (No. 59).

All the negotiations and all the attempts to arrive at a settlement between July 28rd and August 1st, in which Germany at any rate participated, if only in appearance, turned round the question of finding a dividing line between the Austrian and the Russian points of interest—a futile endeavour if, on principle, the existence of Russian interests had been denied. Germany in her co-operation, even if it was ineffectual, was hypocritical, as well as Austria in finally entering into direct negotiations with Russia, unmistakably taking up the standpoint, which was in reality incontestable, that Russia had interests of her own to

defend in the Serbian question. And now Herr Helfferich comes along and disowns his leader, the Chancellor, in giving as the reason for declining the Conference the fact that Russia could not possibly be recognised as a directly interested Power. Every word in the White Book and in the Red Book, every action undertaken by Germany and Austria in the critical days demonstrate that this fact was recognised in principle, although, it is true, they were not disposed to concede the consequences of the principle. For Russia was considered to be neither willing for war nor ready for war, and, on the other hand, they were convinced in the folly of their infatuation, that if war should come, they were better situated than their adversaries, that they occupied a more favourable position from the moral, the diplomatic and the military point of view.

Thus, then, this last reason for refusing the Conference, which is advanced by Helfferich in five lines, collapses like all the others. It has been necessary to give an analysis extending to many pages in order to reduce to absurdity the few lines in which Helfferich disposes of the idea of a Conference. But here, also, the proverb holds good, that a fool can assert more in five minutes, than a wise man can refute in five days. And in quoting this proverb, far be it from me to claim wisdom for myself, and to assign folly to Herr Helfferich. I have the honour of knowing Herr Helfferich, not only from his writings but also personally, and I know that, so far as wisdom is concerned, he is quite a match for me. The difference between us in the present dispute is that he writes to order, on the mandate of a higher power, while standing on the springboard from the Behrenstrasse to the Wilhelmstrasse, whereas I write only as an unpretending private person, to no man's order, merely following my conscience, and although I, too, act on the mandate of a higher Power, to wit the truth, it is not my object to vault into more lofty regions. My sympathies go out to so intelligent a man as Herr Helfferich, when I see him compelled to transcribe such unintelligent sentences as those which appear on page 28 of his pamphlet, written for the salvation of a cause which, after all, is not to be saved, all helpers and all Helfferichs notwithstanding.<sup>1</sup> But I am

<sup>1</sup> [Trotz aller Helfer und Helfferiche.]

even more sorry for a Government which, after the most momentous of all events in history, after pursuing a course of action which can only be described as madness or crime, has not even enough *nous* of its own to clothe its actions with a more or less decent cloak, but must hire bank directors for the purpose, and reward them with posts in the Ministry, although even they, with all their industry and talent, are unable to conceal the shameful nakedness of the Government. Poor Herr Helfferich! Poor Herr von Bethmann!

The best of all, however, is yet to come. In the course of the long (but not, it is hoped, wearisome) discussion of Helfferich's reasons for declining the Conference, the patient reader will already have asked himself the question: But what has become of the *real* reasons for refusal, the reasons which the Governments of Vienna and Berlin officially urged against Grey's proposal? Where is Bethmann's famous "European Tribunal"? Where is Berchtold's ingenious plea that the Conference was "outstripped by events"? What has become of the "form" of the Conference, the rock of offence which prevented Jagow from accepting the principle? Herr Helfferich has not a word to say on any of these points. His grounds for rejecting the Conference are quite different from those of Bethmann, Jagow, and Berchtold. Which explanation, then, are we to accept as right, that of the statesmen whose actions are in question, or that of the bank-director who writes pamphlets about them? The reasons adduced by Herr Helfferich were not advanced by the statesmen; the reasons which they advanced are not adduced by Herr Helfferich. What are we to think of a cause in which such a violent contradiction exists between the accused and their defenders?

#### HERR HELMOLT AND THE CONFERENCE

A few words are still necessary on the manner in which Helmolt, the distinguished historian, disposes, in six lines, of Grey's proposal for a Conference, as illustrated in the passage already quoted.

After telling of Berchtold's categorical refusal to recede or discuss the Austrian Note (July 28th), Helmolt exclaims in triumph (page 182): "And thus Grey's proposal for a Conference was buried. Its concealed purpose was detected; that purpose was to submit the undoubted justifiability of Austria's grievances against her neighbour to an inquiry prolonged for months in London, an inquiry which . . . would have mortified every sensibility of a great Power." The justifiability of her grievances against her neighbour was disputed by no one in Europe. The attempt to enforce these grievances against Serbia by the adoption of measures of unusual harshness, and even, if need be, by resort to military operations, would have found no opposition in Europe, if the crushing of Serbia had not amounted to a provocation against Russia and a violation of Russian interests in the Balkans. From the moment that Russian interests came in question, the sensibility of one great Power was opposed to that of another, prestige was pitted against prestige. The friction of these iron masses against each other was bound to produce sparks and flames—a conflagration, not of a local, but of a European character, in consequence of the alliances on both sides. To this are to be attributed the despairing English efforts, zealously supported by all the great Powers, except Germany and Austria, to lessen the friction and to obviate the great holocaust. To this is to be attributed the proposal for a Conference in London, which, however, was not intended to be an "inquiry" (as Herr Helmolt knows just as well as we do), nor did it need to last for months. To find a middle path of accommodation between the haughtiness of Austria and the humility of Serbia, which exceeded all expectation, would have been a matter of child's play, granted the least good-will on the part of Austria and Germany, if Count Berchtold had prevailed on himself to send delegates to the Conference, and had there interpreted Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note, almost the only remaining points at issue, more or less in the sense of his telegram to Szápáry of July 25th (Red Book, No. 26) and his later official explanation of the Serbian Note on July 27th. Had he furnished this interpretation in direct negotiations with the Serbian

Government before he recalled his Ambassador and declared war, the question of a Conference would, it may be presumed, never have been raised. Had such a course been adopted, the dispute would have been settled directly between Austria and Serbia. When this most obvious opportunity of avoiding further complications had been allowed to slip past—because Austria was consciously and intentionally anxious, not for a settlement, but for war with Serbia—the London Conference offered a further opportunity of explaining the alleged Serbian “misunderstandings” as to the range of the Austrian demands, and of obtaining from Serbia the acceptance of these demands, when clearly defined in their restricted form. All the Powers, including Russia, had declared themselves ready to support in every way the claims of Austria at the Conference, and Serbia herself was inclined to give subsequent acceptance of even the hardest demands of the Austrian Note (Articles 5 and 6), if Austria would give certain explanations with regard to the range of these articles. I have already discussed this point in various places in my book (see page 320) and I propose to return to the subject later; I should like, however, to draw attention in this place more especially to No. 64 of the Blue Book in which Sir R. Rodd, the English Ambassador in Rome, acting at the express request of the Marquis di San Giuliano, informed his chief, Sir Edward Grey (July 28th), that the Serbian Chargé d’Affaires considered it possible that Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian Note, if some explanations were given by the Government in Vienna regarding the manner in which Austrian agents would co-operate in Serbian police and judicial investigations. The Italian Foreign Minister, who, it may be observed, used the word “childish” in describing on this occasion many of the Austrian complaints and quibbles about the Serbian answer, added to this communication from the Serbian Chargé d’Affaires the very reasonable proposal that as the Austrian Government would presumably refuse to give any explanation direct to Serbia, they might furnish such explanation as was necessary to the united Ambassadors of the four Powers in London, and the Conference of Am-

bassadors might then advise Serbia to accept the Austrian demands unconditionally.

This was one of the many expedients for a speedy settlement of the question which would have been open to the Conference of Ambassadors. The sessions of the Conference would presumably have lasted, not for months, but for days or at the most weeks, and there need not have been the remotest possibility of a "mortification" of Austria's sensibility as a Great Power. On the contrary, as in 1909 and as in so many other Balkan disputes, Austria again would have gained a brilliant victory along the whole line, a victory in which ink only, and not blood, would have been shed.

But apparently Messrs. Helmolt, Helfferich, Bethmann, Berchtold, Jagow and Company view with indifference a certain amount, more or less, of spilt blood. According to fairly reliable reports, the number of men left dead on the field, in the first two years of war alone, amounted to five millions, but it is better that a million men should die than that Austria's sensibility as a Great Power should be mortified—a sensibility which would no doubt have been more severely outraged by assenting to the London Conference of Ambassadors than it is at the present moment in the war as a result of the offer of complete provinces, the renunciation of wide spheres of interest, the readiness to discharge forthwith all Austrian soldiers of Italian nationality, and other suggestions contained in the final Austro-Italian negotiations. All these sacrifices, even the renunciation of Trieste, were acceptable and compatible with Austria's sensibilities as a Great Power, if it had been possible to purchase thereby the neutrality of Italy. The discussion of the few remaining articles in dispute in the Austrian Note was a demand which outraged in the gravest manner the honour of the Imperial State, and which had to be disdainfully rejected even at the risk of a European war.

This is the standpoint of the German defenders of Austria. Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,<sup>1</sup> who has meanwhile retired to enjoy his *otium cum dignitate*, one of

<sup>1</sup> He has meanwhile been taken back into favour as the grand steward of the heir, now the Emperor.



those chiefly responsible for the world-drama, would no doubt exclaim if he heard such pleas: "Lord, protect me from my friends!" For him all these noble ideas which the Helmolts and the Helfferichs prate about, "national honour, prestige, the sensibilities of a Great Power," were only cloaks and pretences for the purpose of clothing Austria's efforts to attain supremacy in the Balkans. The industrious men of learning, however, who have undertaken the task of defending the Governments of Berlin and Vienna, endeavour to deceive an incredulous public into the belief that this threadbare pretence was the living reason for the fatal action of the Central Powers. It is and must remain an attempt resting on futile methods. The Conference was declined by Germany, as well as by Austria, because it would assuredly have brought peace, and because it was not peace but war that was desired.

#### GREY'S CONFERENCE AND THE GERMAN PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS

To justify the refusal of Grey's Conference, agreement has recently been arrived at in Germany to adopt the following formula: "In the critical days of 1914 Grey himself recognised that the German counter-proposal of a direct expression of views between Vienna and Petrograd was preferable to the Conference." In his speech of November 9th, 1916, delivered to the chief committee of the Reichstag, Herr von Bethmann declared that Grey's Conference proposal was a matter of secondary importance, put forward in order to divert attention from the main issues. "As I have repeatedly shown in the Reichstag, Lord Grey himself put his own Conference proposal aside in favour of our mediation." For Herr von Bethmann, this disposes of the Conference.

This threadbare pretence has, in fact, been repeatedly advanced by the Chancellor, amongst other occasions in the interview which took place in May, 1916, with Wiegand, the American journalist. It is one of those legends which have been habitually and systematically created by the German Government and their defenders in recent times, whenever German diplomacy is charged with having

taken upon itself the guilt of the war in declining Grey's Conference-proposal, and when it is urged that this guilt rests on it in virtue of this alone and apart from every other fact. (Bethmann's idea had not occurred to Herr Dr. Helfferich !) On such occasions German official and semi-official writers at once answer in a chorus, as Herr von Bethmann does on this occasion : " It is only now that so much importance is attached by England to the Conference, in order by so doing to make good a charge against Germany ; at the time Grey himself recognised that a direct exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd, such as Germany proposed, was preferable to a Conference of the four Powers, such as Grey proposed."

This falsification of history demands a reasoned refutation. What are the facts ? I may refer to *J'accuse* (pages 151, 327), where I have already touched on this point, and in order to avoid repetition I would invite the reader to turn to these passages. Grey's idea of a Conference appeared for the first time as early as July 24th, in the Note which he addressed to Bertie, his Ambassador in Paris (Blue Book, No. 10). Even at so early a date Grey had already expressed the aim and the object of such a Conference of the four disinterested Powers with a lucidity that could leave no room for doubt in any reasonable or honest mind as to what were the intentions of the English Minister.

From that day forward Grey's Conference-proposal never lapsed from the diplomatic negotiations. The English Government, supported by the Entente States, constantly reverted to the proposal, and never grew tired of disclaiming the interpretation put upon it by Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow, involving as it did an intentional misunderstanding, nor did they grow weary of recommending the remedy which, in the form of a Conference of the mediating Powers in London, had during the last Balkan crisis attained so pre-eminent a measure of success.

It is well known that Germany and Austria declined Grey's Conference, and on what grounds they did so. The reasons advanced were different but equally threadbare : Germany stated that she could not place her ally before a

European tribunal, Austria that Grey's proposal had arrived too late. Anyone who reads what I have written in more detail on this subject in my book (pages 326-331) will there find it demonstrated that the German ground for refusal rested on a misunderstanding, born of malice, as to the significance of Grey's Conference-proposal, a misunderstanding which had, in fact, long been cleared away, and that the Austrian objection, that the proposal was "too late" and had been "outstripped by events," apart from its logical inanity, was directly contradicted by the proved facts of the case. Grey's proposal dated from July 24th, the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia from July 28th. There was thus an interval of four days between the two events; nevertheless, Count Berchtold has the audacity to assert "that Grey's proposal for a Conference appears, . . . in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events" (Red Book, No. 38). Simultaneously with the refusal of Grey's Conference, Germany is known to have proposed the initiation of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, but these were bluntly refused on July 28th by Count Berchtold, as Austria "could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note" [Blue Book, No. 98 (1)].

We thus arrive at the incredible result: Germany declined the Conference, but on the other hand proposed direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd; Austria, however, bluntly refused these negotiations. To this procedure, taken in conjunction with the fact that the German Government, long before they proposed a discussion, knew and must have known Austria's disinclination to entertain the idea of such a discussion, I have referred in my book in the following words (page 328):

"If of the hundred proofs of guilt only this one existed, it would suffice to lay upon Germany and Austria alone the responsibility for the war."

Here I can only refer the reader to the fuller discussion of these points contained in my book. At the present moment I am merely concerned with the mendacious objection urged by the German Government and their

tools: "In the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey himself recognised that my (Bethmann's) counter-proposal of a direct discussion between the Cabinets of Vienna and Petrograd was more calculated to arrive at a settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict than a Conference."

Even if the interpretation of the views then held by Grey, which is involved in Bethmann's statements, were as correct as it is false, the reference to the expressions used by the English Minister would nevertheless be completely pointless; for Grey, at any rate, presupposed that the direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd would take place, not that they would be bluntly declined by Count Berchtold. That the proposal was thus declined is clear beyond all doubt from the German White Book, as well as from the Red Book and all the other documentary collections, and there are countless documents which may be quoted in verification of the fact. The discussions desired and accepted by Grey, whether in the form of a Conference of the four Powers or of a direct exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd, are defined more closely in the German White Book in the following words: Grey had proposed either that the Serbian reply should be regarded as "sufficient or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations." Immediately after this sentence the White Book reports the failure of Grey's proposal, which, "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declaration of war," must be regarded by Vienna as "belated" (White Book, page 409, and Exhibit 16).

The counter-proposal of Germany had thus completely failed. This is an incontestable fact, confirmed by the harmony found on this point in all the documents. What, then, are we to say when the German Government and their defenders even yet continue to make a parade of their counter-proposal, and upbraid Sir Edward Grey with the fact that he had himself been of the opinion that this proposal was better conceived than his own Conference?

What was it that Grey really said at the time? No. 67 in the Blue Book, Grey's Note to Goschen, the Ambassador in Berlin, furnishes us with unambiguous information on

this point. On July 27th Goschen had reported to London Jagow's proposal simultaneously with his refusal of the Conference; Jagow had expressed the view, "that it would be best before doing anything else to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments" (Blue Book, No. 48). To Goschen's report Grey replies as follows on July 28th (Blue Book, No. 67): Notwithstanding the enlightenment already given on the subject, he first explains the meaning and the purpose of the Conference, "which would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies." Grey then continues:

"But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you" (Goschen).

The telegram to Goschen, to which Grey here refers, is No. 46 of the Blue Book, in which Grey defines the object of the conversation between Vienna and Petrograd in the sense given above; that is to say, that Austria should at least treat the Serbian reply as a basis for discussion and pause. Grey's meaning in thus recommending direct negotiations was clearly that which I have described in my book (page 150) in the following words: "Grey was at once prepared to withdraw his proposal for a Conference

of the four Powers until the direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd had led to a result, whether positive or negative. If the result were positive, the Conference would then be superfluous. If it were negative, the Conference could still seek to attain what direct discussions had been unable to achieve."

The success of the German counter-proposal, accepted by England, that direct discussions should take place between Vienna and Petrograd, was, however, not only negative in its results; it was even negative in its very earliest stages: Austria declined negotiations of any kind whatever. The presupposition postulated by Grey in expressing his concurrence in Bethmann's proposal ("if Austria accepts") had therefore failed to materialise. Austria had not accepted. Consequently Grey's Conference-proposal at once resumed its position in the first line as the only means of bringing about an understanding between the two conflicting great States between which, owing to the action of Austria, all direct connections had been interrupted.

Is it not an unparalleled perversion and falsification of historical facts, which are established beyond dispute and confirmed by the whole substance of the German and Austrian documents, when we find that Bethmann and his defenders still seek to discredit Grey's Conference-proposal by putting into the mouth of its author the statement that he himself considered that the German proposal was preferable? I repeat this in order to stamp out this falsehood once for all: Grey temporarily put aside his Conference-proposal in the hope that Austria would accept direct discussion with Russia on the basis of the Serbian Note, and that this discussion would possibly lead to an agreement. Since Austria declined to enter into discussion, Grey's Conference-proposal automatically resumed the first place amongst all the attempts to give effect to mediation and the continual refusal by Germany and Austria of this, the most propitious of all mediatory proposals, reveals the gigantic guilt of these two Governments which no obliteration or perversion of facts can ever remove.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN-FRENCH CONSPIRACY ?

**THE *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*** made an attack on Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary for the Interior, for having endeavoured to clear England from the guilt of the war in the pamphlet written by him on the Genesis of the War. Against this accusation the Secretary of State defended himself in a communication, addressed in the following terms to the newspaper mentioned :

"It is not possible to point to a single line in my publication which supports the interpretation indicated by you. On the contrary, the contents of my pamphlet are wholly directed to deducing the guilt of the Governments of the Triple Entente from their own official publications. In particular, I believe that in the part relating to England I have furnished documentary evidence of the fatal rôle played by the English Government in the diplomatic negotiations preceding the war; I refer the reader to the account given on page 31 *et seq.*, from which it appears that it was exclusively the overtures made on the morning of July 29th by Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador which gave the Dual Alliance the support which Russia relied on when she found the courage in her general mobilisation on July 31st finally to frustrate Germany's efforts for peace, and to throw the torch in the European powder barrel."

This defence of the arraigned defender of the German Government sets in a clear light the cardinal point in his

accusation against the Entente Powers : England is represented as having given to the French Government, as far back as the morning of July 29th, the certain assurance that France, in the event of her entry into the war, could rely on England's active military support. It is argued that the support thus guaranteed by England, being, of course, at once telegraphed from London to Paris, and from Paris to Petrograd, gave Russia the courage to offer a resistance to all Germany's efforts for peace, and to proceed on July 31st to general mobilisation, a step which, as the Russian Government knew and intended, was bound to lead to a European war. This is the cardinal point of Helfferich's demonstration, which represents Russia as the incendiary, and places England and France in the pillory as her accomplices.

How much force is there in this argument ?

I must confess that when I first read Helfferich's observations on this point, I felt as though I had been thunder-struck. When I wrote my book, I was still unacquainted with Helfferich's pamphlet, and in my innocence I had regarded Grey's conversation with Cambon on July 29th (Blue Book, No. 87) simply as a complete and well-reasoned refusal addressed by England to France with the object of depriving the French Government of any illusion they might entertain that England, as on the occasion of the Morocco crisis of 1911, would unconditionally place herself on the side of France. The *résumé* of the conversation in question, given in my book (page 250), may be repeated here in view of the importance of the subject :

On July 29th Grey had a lengthy discussion with the French Ambassador, Cambon, in which he clearly pointed out the difference between the Morocco question and the existing Serbian difficulty. In the Morocco question the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and the dispute turned about matters which were regulated by a special treaty between England and France. None of this applied to the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Even if this conflict should extend to one between Austria and Russia, England would not feel called upon to take a hand in it. The question whether Teutons or Slavs should hold supremacy in the Balkans had always been of so little interest to England that she had never allowed herself to be drawn into a war on account of it. But Grey went still further in refusing an expression of England's solidarity ; even if France and Germany became involved in the struggle, the



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fact still remained that it was not France's own interests, but in the first place her duties under her alliance towards Russia which had been decisive in determining her action. Even in this case England was free from any engagement, and her action would only be decided by what British interests required her to do.

### No. 87 OF THE BLUE BOOK

In order to make it possible for the reader to judge of the accuracy of this *résumé*, I venture to reprint the whole of this number:

SIR,

After telling M. Cambon to-day how the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have considered. We should then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav, we should not feel called to

intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

From a perusal of this document Herr Helfferich elicits the following as the contents:

France could now be absolutely sure of active armed support by England in the event of her being dragged into the conflict by the force of circumstances. It is significant that the French Yellow Book contains no trace of a report by Paul Cambon concerning this conversation, the most highly important one of all during the entire critical week. And the Yellow Book will be also vainly searched for the instructions which were thereupon hurried from Paris to St. Petersburg. But the bullet which had left the barrel in London in the morning of July 29th hit the mark at St. Petersburg on the same evening: the immediate consequence is the telegram by which M. Sazonof instructs M. Isvolsky to express to the French Government the sincere gratitude of the Russian Government for the declaration of unconditional armed support (Orange Book, No. 58).

The dice had therewith been cast in favour of war. On July 25th M. Sazonof had already declared to the English Ambassador: "If Russia feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war" (Blue Book, No. 17). Now the moment had arrived: Relying on the conviction that the participation of France in the war would call England into the arena, France had promised Russia to support her by force of arms, probably adding that England's co-operation could also be relied upon.<sup>1</sup>

After thus placing the original and the two interpretations, Helfferich's and mine, in juxtaposition, I am perhaps scarcely called upon to offer any further comment. I ask any honest and intelligent reader whether it is possible, even with the extremest malice, to extract from Grey's statements the promise of active military support to be rendered by England to France, the certainty that the entry of France into the war would involve England's "entry

<sup>1</sup> [The version here given is that of the official English translation of Dr. Helfferich's pamphlet; it has not been possible to make use of this authorised translation throughout, as it does not follow the original German sufficiently closely.]

into the arena." It appears to me to be impossible, on a study of document No. 87 alone, viewed in itself, and without any diplomatic accessories, to detect with any good conscience even the remotest suggestion of what Helfferich maintains to be the contents of this document, even if one postulates complete ignorance of all the diplomatic negotiations, of all that was done by Grey, both before and after the statement of July 29th, of all that he undertook on the same day, as well as on earlier and later days in the interests of peace and to avoid war, even if one knew nothing, or wished to know nothing, of all the efforts made by France and Russia to preserve peace. What Grey said to the French Ambassador is precisely the opposite of what Helfferich makes him say. Grey emphasised in the clearest manner the distinction between the circumstances of the Morocco dispute, which occurred in 1911, and of the present issue between Austria and Serbia. The freedom of action enjoyed by France in Morocco had been guaranteed to the French by an Anglo-French Agreement—the reference is to the colonial agreement of April 8th, 1904, which Helfferich erroneously postdates to 1905 (page 28). It had, therefore, been a matter of course that England should have given the French her support against Germany. On the other hand, in the Austro-Serbian question England did not feel called upon to intervene, even if the question should develop into one between Austria and Russia. If, in consequence, Germany and France became involved, even then England had not made up her mind what she should do. France would then have been involved in the quarrel, not on account of her own interests, but only because she was pledged by her alliance with Russia. England was free from engagements, and would have to arrive at a decision solely in accordance with her own interests. As Grey had felt obliged to warn M. Cambon not to be misled by the assumption that England had already decided on her attitude in the event of a Franco-German conflict arising, so, as he explained, he proposed to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to be lulled into false security that England would stand aside, if all common actions in the interests of peace should fail.

The corresponding warning to Lichnowsky contemplated by Grey was conveyed as a matter of fact on the afternoon of the same day. The conversation followed the lines which Grey had indicated, and almost the same words of caution were used as had been addressed to Cambon (Blue Book, Nos. 88 and 89).

#### GREY'S PEACE TACTICS

I have in my book (pages 245-255, 259-261) illustrated in detail Grey's tactics with regard to the two conflicting groups, and to avoid repetition I must refer the reader to these passages. Grey astutely and intentionally bound himself neither to one party nor to the other; what he desired, under all circumstances, was the peace of Europe. Had he given the Germans the assurance which they desired and hoped for, which they had already in past years striven to gain in the negotiations for an understanding with England, which, in Bethmann's bid for neutrality on July 29th, they still aspired to secure for themselves in the conflict which was threatening—had he given the Germans the assurance that England would remain neutral, he would have strengthened their position in the diplomatic struggle, and would have put them in a position to accept with less danger the risk of a European war. On the other hand, if he had promised the French and the Russians the solidarity of England, he would thereby have afforded them such an increase of strength, in the first place in the diplomatic negotiations and later in the war should it arise, that Russia might have been induced to offer a stouter resistance to an agreement with Austria than would have been expedient for Grey's efforts for peace. Further, as Buchanan rightly objected to Sazonof's appeal for solidarity (Blue Book, No. 44), if England were to assume a biased position on the side of the Entente Powers, it might be regarded as a menace against the Central Powers, and might therefore be prejudicial rather than beneficial to the maintenance of peace; it was only by approaching Germany in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace that any hope of success could be entertained. The

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guiding line of English policy was thus to refuse to the one side any declaration of solidarity, and to refuse to the other any definite promise of neutrality. This tendency appears throughout the whole of the diplomatic negotiations from the beginning to the end, from the interview of Buchanan with Sazonof on July 24th (Blue Book, No. 6) down to the interviews of Grey with Lichnowsky, Mensdorff, Benckendorff and Cambon on July 31st and August 1st. It was only on August 2nd, after the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia which was bound to lead to a European war, that is to say, it was only after the shipwreck of all his attempts to preserve peace, that Grey took the first step towards the abandonment of his reserve in his promise with regard to the Fleet (Blue Book, No. 148), a question which I have already discussed in detail in my book (page 274) and to which I propose to return in the course of my second work.

On that eventful day, July 29th, Grey's policy of the "free hand on all sides" appears with special prominence. On that day conferences followed close on each other: In the morning there was a conversation with Lichnowsky (No. 84); in the course of the day with Cambon (No. 87); in the afternoon another with Lichnowsky (Nos. 88, 89, 90); further with the Austrian Ambassador (No. 91) and with the Italian Ambassador (No. 92). It is, however, impossible to find in any of these conversations the slightest indication that Grey departed from the guiding line of his policy, and that he made any kind of advance whatever to either of the parties. When he says to M. Cambon that, as he has warned him, so he was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky against being misled, he at once cautiously adds that Cambon should not draw from this warning addressed to the other side any conclusions in his own favour. When he warns Prince Lichnowsky not to infer from the friendly tone of their conversation that England would stand aside, he at once cautiously adds that this is in no way to be interpreted as implying that England would intervene on the other side. England's effort was devoted solely to the preservation of peace, working in common with Germany

if this were at all possible. If, however, the efforts to preserve peace should fail, so that practically every European interest became involved, it might well be that British interests might require British intervention, and he did not wish to be open to any reproach that the friendly tone of his conversation with Lichnowsky had misled the German Government into supposing that they should not take action, and to the reproach that if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different (Blue Book, No. 89).

\* \* \* \* \*

Whether the tactics adopted by Sir Edward Grey were prudent or imprudent, whether they were expedient or inexpedient, is not here in question. It is easy to be wise after the event. It was open to the English Secretary of State to choose one of three courses. He could

(a) definitely declare in advance that England would remain neutral in the event of a European war; he could

(b) make in advance a declaration of solidarity with the Entente Powers; and he could

(c) maintain his freedom of action towards all sides—which was in fact the course he pursued.

A declaration that she would remain neutral in a European war would have been equivalent to an abdication of England's position as a European Great Power, to an abandonment of her consorts in the Entente, and to a violation of the duties which she had assumed as guarantor with regard to neutral States. She would, moreover, have acted in a manner provocative of, and not preventive of, war inasmuch as she would thereby have removed the danger which Austria and Germany had most to fear as a consequence of their uncompromising attitude.

Quite apart from the sharp criticism to which a declaration of solidarity with the Entente Powers would have been subjected in England, it was quite possible that such an attitude assumed from the outset might also have acted as a provocative of war. It might have produced this effect in two ways, firstly by rendering Russia less pliable and secondly by wounding the pride of Germany, and thereby making an agreement more difficult.

Different views may of course be expressed as to the

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expediency of this or that policy, inasmuch as psychological effects are not capable of being foretold with mathematical accuracy. The opponents of Grey's policy in England are, in part, of the opinion that it may reasonably be presumed that war could have been prevented by a decisive declaration from the outset of solidarity on the part of England with the Entente Powers. During the critical days the same view was on various occasions expressed by the French and Russian Governments and also personally by President Poincaré. The Marquis di San Giuliano, one of the most zealous of Grey's fellow-workers in the cause of peace, in his conversation with the English Ambassador on July 29th (Blue Book, No. 80), expressed the opinion that it would exercise a great effect on Germany if the German Government could be made to believe that England would take common action with Russia and France. Grey and his Ambassadors were of a different opinion; they considered that friendly mediation would be more effective than pressure and superior force. They rightly recalled the effect produced in Germany by England's decisive intervention on behalf of France in the Morocco crisis of 1911, and they were apprehensive lest on this occasion an even graver effect might result, since the question at issue had not been made the subject of an Anglo-French treaty, but was in itself a matter of complete indifference to the English as well as to the French people. Whatever judgment may be passed on the expediency of Grey's diplomacy, no one, outside Germany and Austria, has hitherto ventured to cast doubt on his sincerity or his serious devotion to the cause of peace. Such an attitude has been reserved for the pitiable defenders of the guilty Governments of Germany and Austria, who are now compelled, like Herr Helfferich, to resort to the most incredible devices and perversions in order to change the policy of the free hand into a policy of solidarity, and to transform a refusal on both sides into a promise to one side only.

\* \* \* \* \*

I believe that I have already completely demolished the structure of this declaration of solidarity which it is suggested was given by Grey to the two other Entente

Powers on July 29th (*J'accuse*, pages 245-260), and that I have proved the accuracy of the words contained in the Introduction to the English Blue Book (page xi) :

"Sir Edward Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present Allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. . . . We gave no pledge to our present Allies, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium."

This account of Grey's policy is throughout in complete correspondence with the truth. Helfferich's assertion to the contrary is untrue from the beginning to the end, and I do not hesitate to assert that so intelligent a man as Herr Helfferich must be conscious of the falsity of his own account. In order to erect such a house of cards as the Russo-Franco-English conspiracy against the Central Powers, some foundation, no matter how insecure, was required, and accordingly Helfferich chose, unfortunately for him, to rear his edifice on No. 87, which as the foundation of such a structure is unable to withstand even the slightest attack. Nevertheless, in view of the wide circulation and the almost official character of Helfferich's apologetic pamphlet, it is necessary to enumerate in detail the reasons to be urged against his demonstration.

#### DID THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT PROMISE MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH ON JULY 29TH ?

I. If on the morning of July 29th the English Government had already promised the French Government their



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active military support in the contingency of a European war, how is it possible for Herr von Bethmann in his White Book, laid before the Reichstag on August 4th, to make profuse mention of the English efforts to maintain peace, including those later than July 29th, and to bestow upon them the distinction of his commendation? In my book (pages 245-247) I have quoted in succession the relevant passages of the White Book, and it is unnecessary to reproduce them here. According to the testimony of Herr von Bethmann, England and Germany had laboured incessantly shoulder to shoulder in the cause of peace; an English proposal for mediation (on the basis of the occupation of Belgrade, and the announcement from there of the Austrian conditions of peace) had been forwarded on July 30th to Vienna; English diplomacy had supported the alleged German endeavours for peace made during the period from July 29th to July 31st; England had tried to mediate between Vienna and Petrograd, etc., etc. Indeed, even the declaration of war against Russia bears evidence that England, in concert with Germany, had played the part of mediator between Vienna and Petrograd. (*L'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Pétersbourg.*) What is the meaning of all these eulogies, if on July 29th perfidious Albion had already betrayed the peace of Europe by the promise of assistance extended to France?

Herr von Bethmann will perhaps retort that he was still unaware of the perfidy of Albion when he emphasised on August 4th the efforts made by England in the cause of peace. In that case how does he explain all the English efforts for peace which after all did, as a matter of fact, take place after the morning of July 29th continuing until the afternoon of August 1st, and, indeed, even till a later hour? Were all these merely fairy-tales and hypocrisy contrived to create the fraudulent impression of an inclination to peace, while as a matter of fact the resolution to carry out an attack by arms had already been taken? Are all the actions of the English Government, recounted in the 74 numbers of the Blue Book subsequent to No. 87,—that is from No. 88 to No. 161,—are all the telegrams

from the King of England to Prince Henry, to the Emperor William, to the Tsar, which are all of a later date than July 29th,—are all these but phantoms devised to throw dust in the eyes of Germany and of the world? Will anyone venture to maintain such a foolish assertion? If not, the whole of Helfferich's house of cards collapses, when viewed in the light of the German White Book; Herr Bethmann and Herr Helfferich may in that case be left to settle the matter together. For only one of them can be right, either Bethmann's White Book or Helfferich's yellow pamphlet.

II. Let us, however, consider in somewhat fuller detail all that Grey did for the maintenance of peace after the morning of July 29th, so that not even the slightest loophole of escape may be left to the defender of the German Government.

(a) On the afternoon of July 29th, the day on which Helfferich would have us believe that Grey in the course of the morning gave to the Dual Alliance the support of his active military assistance, Grey urgently asked Prince Lichnowsky that Germany should propose a form of mediation of the four Powers which would be acceptable in Berlin, and further he put forward for the first time his well-known formula agreement (based on the occupation of Belgrade, etc.). Moreover, on the same day, July 29th, after his interview with Cambon, he sent, in the interests of the maintenance of peace, no fewer than three long despatches to Goschen at Berlin, one to Bunsen at Vienna, and one to Rodd at Rome. I invite any impartial person to read these despatches, Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91 and 92 in the Blue Book, and then determine what value is to be attached to Helfferich's statement that Grey had before then already brought about a state of affairs which Helfferich describes in the words: "The dice had therewith been cast in favour of war." In No. 89 Grey conveyed to the German Ambassador the warning mentioned above that he should not be misled by the friendly tone of their conversation into thinking that England would under all circumstances stand aside. Simultaneously, however, he expressed the hope that he would be able to keep in touch with the German Government in working for peace.

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In No. 90 (the fifth despatch from Grey to Goschen on the same day) he returned to the proposal of the Marquis di San Giuliano to obtain from Serbia, through the mediation of the four Powers, complete satisfaction of the Austrian demands, in the form of an acceptance by Serbia of the demands of the Powers and not of Austria, the Powers then conveying this submission to Austria ; there must, of course, Grey added, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria should not press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia. The conversation with the Italian Ambassador, mentioned in No. 92, turned on the question of the concurrence of Italy in the four-Power project ; this had already been " accepted by the German Government in principle," and proposals as to its form had been invited by Grey from Berlin. What was the object of all these negotiations and efforts on the part of Grey, if on the morning of the same day the dice had already been cast in favour of war ?

(b) But to continue the matter ; what was done by Grey, what was done by the French and the Russian Governments on the following day for the maintenance of peace ? How are all these actions to be reconciled with the decision for war alleged to have been taken on the morning of July 29th ? On July 30th King George sent to Prince Henry the telegram in which he expressed his earnest desire " that such a misfortune as a European war, the evil of which could not be remedied, may be prevented." He reiterated Grey's proposal for agreement (Blue Book, No. 88) and expressed his reliance on the Emperor William applying his influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal. He gave an assurance that he, for his part, was doing all he could, and would continue to do all that lay in his power, to prevent an international catastrophe and to maintain the peace of Europe.

What did Grey do on July 30th ? He had meanwhile received information as to the Russian partial mobilisation in the four southern army districts, which, as is known, was the reply, firstly, to the Austrian partial mobilisation against Serbia and Russia ; secondly, to the Austrian declaration of war and inauguration of hostilities against Serbia, and thirdly, to the entirely negative attitude of

Austro-German diplomacy towards all proposals for mediation. (In my book I have already dealt in detail with these three reasons for the Russian partial mobilisation, and will discuss them further in this work so far as may be necessary.) The tension of the European situation had thus become greater since the preceding day, a fact which did not, however, discourage Grey in his efforts for peace; but on the contrary, rather spurred him on to greater zeal.

Further, on July 30th Sazonof had dictated to Count Pourtalès his formula of agreement, which was declined by Jagow on the same day as "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept it" (Orange Book, Nos. 60 and 68).

On July 30th, also, Bertie reported a conversation which he had had with President Poincaré, in which Poincaré repeated the request which, from the beginning of the crisis, had been addressed by the Entente Powers to England, to the effect that she should make a declaration of solidarity with France and Russia, and thereby exercise pressure on Germany in the interest of the maintenance of peace. The same idea was expressed by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in a conversation with the English Ambassador at Rome, as the latter reported to Grey on July 30th (Blue Book, No. 106).

Lastly, various telegrams were received from Goschen in Berlin, from which it appeared that the German Government had invited the views of the Viennese Government on Grey's formula for agreement (to which, as is known, neither Vienna nor Berlin ever gave any answer) and, further, Herr von Jagow, as well as Herr von Bethmann, gave repeated assurances with regard to their famous "button-pressing" activities in Vienna; neither of them, however, was in a position to give any information either as to the form of the Conference, or as to Austria's reply, or with regard to any of the other proposals for agreement (Blue Book, Nos. 98 and 107).

On this day Grey himself sent off two despatches to Goschen, one to Buchanan and two to Bertie. The whole of this copious interchange of communications from and to London on July 30th proves in every detail, in every word, that Helfferich's assertion that a war-

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conspiracy was hatched on the previous day is a flagrant contradiction of the truth. Anyone who wishes to track this stupendous lie, circulated by the defender of the German Government, should read the despatches of July 30th printed in the English Blue Book. Here it is only possible to lay stress on some of the more striking points.

Bunsen's Report to Grey (No. 95).—The Russian Ambassador in Vienna declares that the purpose of the Russian partial mobilisation is to gain an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed. On the other hand, Russia would quite understand if Austria were compelled to exact from Serbia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from hostile propaganda. The German Ambassador in Vienna is, unfortunately, so anti-Russian and anti-Serbian in feeling that sincere intervention in the interests of peace can scarcely be expected from him. He states that he endorses every line of the Austrian Ultimatum.

In a further telegram (No. 96), Bunsen reports on the purpose of the further military measures taken by Austria in reply to the Russian partial mobilisation. He further reports on the readiness now expressed by Berchtold to resume conversations in Petrograd, "although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Serbian reply."

Buchanan (No. 97) reports with regard to Sazonof's formula of agreement (Orange Book, No. 60), and with regard to the preparations for a general Russian mobilisation in the event of this proposal also being rejected by Austria.

Goschen (No. 98) reports that Jagow has not yet received any reply from Vienna with regard to Grey's formula of agreement. Jagow spoke on this occasion of the Russian partial mobilisation and of the alleged military preparations made by France, which would evoke counter-measures in Germany; "he regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war."

Bertie (No. 99) reports his conversation with Poincaré, and it is necessary that we should deal with this report at somewhat greater length, since it may be taken as characteristic in forming a judgment on the whole situation. Throughout the whole range of German apologetic

literature we constantly find the misrepresentation that the efforts of France and Russia to bring England to their side were directed to the creation of a situation in which they might with greater security attack Germany and Austria. Such a view is entirely false. Its falseness is demonstrated by all the diplomatic publications, including those of Germany and Austria. Russia and France, as well as Italy, the ally of the Central Powers, endeavoured to secure from England a declaration of solidarity, solely with the object of impressing on Germany and Austria the dangers which would be involved for them in a European war and thus, by confronting them with these dangers, of deterring them from pushing things so far as to provoke a European war. The declaration of solidarity which England was invited to give was intended, not to bring about war, but to prevent it. This was the exclusive purpose and the aim of the pressure continually exercised on London by Paris, Petrograd and Rome with the object of eliciting a declaration of solidarity with the Entente Powers.

This tendency is clearly manifested as early as the first conversation between Buchanan, Paléologue and Sazonof on July 24th (Blue Book, No. 6): "French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments. . . . We should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France."

The fact that the underlying reason was the prevention of war was constantly reiterated in all the conversations bearing on the question of the solidarity of England, and there is nowhere the faintest indication that it was intended to bring about war, in reliance on England's adhesion. We may quote the words of Poincaré in this connection:

He is convinced [reports Bertie (Blue Book, No. 99)] that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. . . .

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Poincaré expressed the view that such an announcement would be in the interests of peace. France was pacific, she did not desire war. . . . A declaration given by England then of her intention to support France, whose desire it was that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

Two points emerge from this conversation between Bertie and Poincaré :

Firstly, that England was being urged by France, not to participate in the war, but to take up the only attitude which, in Poincaré's opinion, could be efficacious in preventing war.

Secondly, that England cannot possibly have given a promise of active military support to France, on the morning of July 29th, when the President of the Republic on July 30th was still urging the English Government (so ineffectively, in spite of his insistence!) to give a promise of support, should a war arise occasioned by Germany. What purpose could have been served by Poincaré's invitation, if what he desired had already taken place on the preceding day?

I have already demonstrated in detail in my book that no satisfaction was accorded to Poincaré's desires, either on this or on the next day, and that until the outbreak of war, on August 1st, England consistently declined to offer any declaration of solidarity, let alone military assistance. For the purposes of the present investigation we are only concerned with the fact that the continual fruitless attempts made by France and Russia *after* July 29th and the other circumstances of the case demonstrate the frailty of the structure of falsehood erected by Helfferich on No. 87 of the Blue Book.

In his Note addressed to Buchanan, which also dates from July 30th (Blue Book, No. 103), Grey enters into all the details of his formula of agreement (Blue Book, No. 88) in comparison with Sazonof's first formula (Orange Book, No. 60). He suggests a modification of the Russian formula with the object of bringing it into conformity with his own English formula in the following sense; the occupation of Belgrade, the stoppage of the Austrian

advance and an examination by the Powers as to how Serbia could *fully* satisfy Austria without impairing her sovereign rights or independence. Grey adds to this proposal of mediation the hope that if Austria is prepared to consider it, Russia would also consent, and would suspend further military preparations, provided, of course, that other Powers did the same.

*Blue Book, No. 104.*—Grey communicates to Bertie the contents of his previous telegram to Buchanan and expresses the hope that France, in the future as in the past, will urge Russia not to precipitate a crisis. "I hope," he adds, "he may be able to support this last suggestion at Petrograd."

*Blue Book, No. 105.*—A note from Grey to Bertie, conveying to the latter the conversation which took place between Cambon and Grey on July 30th, in the course of which Cambon submitted the correspondence of November 22nd and 23rd, 1912, and at the same time a report on incidents on the Franco-German frontier. I propose to return in another passage to this correspondence and to the report. At the moment we are interested solely in the fact that even on this occasion Cambon was completely in the dark as to what England would do in the event of the outbreak of a European war. "He (Cambon) did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose"—such is the report sent by Grey to Bertie. Cambon, who, according to Helfferich's account, is supposed to have received the promise of England's support on the previous day, must, if Helfferich is right, have had an exceptionally bad memory. Obviously he had, in the course of the twenty-four hours, entirely forgotten Grey's promise of support, otherwise he would have been debarred in conversation with Grey from making the statement we have just quoted. The circumstance contemplated by Cambon was an attack by Germany on France. The answer given by Grey was, now as formerly, evasive, and the Ambassador was put off until the decision of the Cabinet on the following day.

What explanation does the Secretary of State for the



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Interior give of these various occurrences? How does he reconcile them with his assertion that on July 29th England gave a promise of military support? Are all these documents, from No. 87 onwards, mere fictions devised to provide Grey with an *alibi* against Herr Helfferich's charges? Such an explanation would in itself be entirely absurd and would not merit any serious discussion. Moreover, these English documents are but links in the consistent chain of facts represented by the five books of diplomatic correspondence. Every incident, every conversation is reflected from one book into the other, and even the German and Austrian books, in spite of all their efforts to suppress the truth, cannot avoid furnishing confirmation of the actual diplomatic occurrences. How, then, I again ask—and shall be obliged hereafter also to repeat similar questions—how does Herr Helfferich explain the fact that Paul Cambon knew nothing on July 30th of the promises which Grey, as we are told, gave him on July 29th?

### GREY'S PEACE PROPOSAL OF JULY 30TH (BLUE BOOK, No. 101)

*Blue Book, No. 101*, contains Grey's manifesto in favour of a European organisation of peace, now become famous, with regard to the significance of which I have already expressed my views in detail in my book (page 188). I propose to return in a later passage to this manifesto and to the manner in which Helfferich, in his rôle of accomplished steeplechaser, clears even this obstacle in the way of his argument. That Grey should have declined Bethmann's proposal of neutrality fits in, of course, with Helfferich's thesis that the English Secretary had already bound himself to France on the previous day. Helfferich, in consequence, makes triumphant mention of Grey's refusal of neutrality as a sign that England already regarded herself "as the Ally of France." Herr Helfferich, however, omits the most important part of Grey's Note, the part which even so malicious a critic of English policy as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the German arch-chauvinist of English name and extraction,

declares to be the only one of all the diplomatic documents in which intrinsic value is inherent. This he does merely because the concluding part of No. 101, in itself, without any other evidence, completely shatters the German official edifice of falsehood. For Herr Helfferich No. 101 exists only in so far as the first seven sentences are concerned, those sentences which decline to make a bargain with regard to English neutrality on any basis whatever, whether at the cost of France or of Belgium. The Secretary of State, however, suppresses, and does not so much as mention, the two concluding paragraphs which constitute a historical document of the first importance, which in moving words call upon Germany to take common action with England in the cause of peace, which confirm the existence of better relations between England and Germany merely as a consequence of their common action during the Balkan crisis, and which confidently anticipate a further amelioration as a result of their present co-operation in the cause of peace, which offer Germany an arrangement securing her and her allies once and for all against any aggressive or hostile policy of the Entente Powers. Let anyone read in my book (page 184 *et seq.*) the account which is there given of Bethmann's proposal for neutrality and of Grey's manifesto of peace, and then let him compare with that the treatment which Herr Helfferich bestows on this epoch-making document, embodying an idea which must be the foundation of any enduring treaty of peace in Europe. He who has read and compared these will have no hesitation in forming an opinion on the whole of the work which Helfferich was commissioned to write. Suppression was certainly the simplest method of getting over this inconvenient document.

Herr Chamberlain has rendered his task somewhat more difficult; at first he tries to throw suspicion on the passage where the music of peace is heard, suggesting that it is a subsequent invention inserted with the object of impressing the English people and the whole world, and of calumniating Germany in a corresponding degree. As, however, this would not do—for Bethmann had, in fact, received the document and had laid it away in his cupboard—Chamber-

lain, after extending his exertions over a number of pages, arrives at the final conclusion: "The whole thing is at the best a mystification, what the French call speaking to the gallery . . . it is, in any case, a deception." Thus one of the German defenders suppresses the peace passage of Grey's Note, the other represents it as mystification and fraud, perhaps even an invention subsequently inserted. Each author is worthy of the other; it appears to me, however, to be unnecessary to bestow any further comment on their attitude.

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Professor Dr. Hans Helmolt is a worthy companion to Herr Helfferich and Herr Chamberlain, a worthy third member of the league, in their task of falsifying and perverting Grey's noble peace proposals, which, as is known, went back to the English formula for an understanding of 1912. So far as he is concerned, Grey's answer to Bethmann's bid for neutrality is "not the answer of a neutral"; a neutral would have left the two opponents "gallantly to fight out their quarrel." (What, one may ask, was the quarrel which Germany and France had to fight out on July 29th, unless Germany was intentionally out to be quarrelsome?) The offer of a universal league of peace was, according to Helmolt, "nothing but cruel mockery." Herr Helmolt is astonished at the "coolness with which Grey flatly refuses a practical proposal of the Chancellor in order to put him off with a Utopia, of the impracticability of which he must himself have been firmly convinced from the outset." According to Herr Helmolt's interpretation, the perfidious intentions of the wily Englishman were that Germany and Austria should be separated from each other, and that both, one after the other, should then be humiliated.

That is what a German professor of history discovers in the answer of Grey, of whom it can, at any rate, be said that he declined to strengthen Germany in her bellicose intentions, or afford her the support she desired, by acquiescing in any promise of neutrality; that he declined to crush France or violate the neutrality of Belgium in return for the worthless assurance that the European possessions of France would be spared, and that Belgium, if she

behaved herself from a military point of view, would at a later date be restored to her previous integrity. We may well ask Professor Helmolt what he means when he says that Austria and Germany were to be humiliated by Grey's proposal. From the very beginning of the conflict had Grey not recognised and supported the justifiable complaints of Austria? Had he not by his exertions done his part in obtaining Serbia's submissive reply? Was he not ready to afford the claims of Austria every support and satisfaction at a Conference of Ambassadors? Had he not gone so far as to concede to Austria the occupation of the Serbian capital and of the adjacent territory during the negotiations which were to lead to an understanding? Had he not lent his concurrence and support to the various formulæ proposed by Sazonof, to the convocation of the Hague Tribunal suggested by the Tsar, to the direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd—in short, to one and all of the efforts and proposals intended to promote peace? During the whole conflict had he said a single word or taken a single step which could be interpreted as a "humiliation" of Austria? On the contrary, had he not successfully exerted his influence in obtaining the humiliation of Serbia and the pliability of Russia—a pliability which, when contrasted with the uncompromising attitude of Austrian diplomacy and the penetration of Austrian troops into Serbia, was tantamount to a humiliation of the great Slav empire? The proposal of Grey a mockery of Utopia! Every word of Grey's Note breathes warmth and sincerity, reveals the mariner who sees the bark of Europe driving on to the yawning abyss, and seeks by his despairing efforts to save it from plunging in the depths. To appeal to common action in the cause of peace, to recall the success of such a labour during the Balkan crisis, to give a solemn promise that none of the Entente Powers, jointly or separately, would undertake any aggressive action against Germany or her allies, to bridge over the opposition between the groups of Powers by the participation of Germany in a European peace agreement—these are the things which constitute a mockery and a Utopia in the eyes of the German professor of history and the Secretary of State. Unfor-

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tunately, it is so. Unfortunately, Germany (and Austria inevitably in a like manner) is the only country to-day in which the ideas of a future European peace organisation are still proclaimed, after twenty-four months of insensate carnage, to be but a mockery and a Utopia.

### THE PEACE AIMS OF THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES

In none of the authoritative circles, parties, or persons in Germany has there yet dawned the faintest glimmering of the thought that the system of international anarchy, the system of lack of system, has internally collapsed, that it has been weighed and found wanting. Read, amongst countless other similar utterances, the Emperor's manifesto of July 31st, 1915, with its claim for the "necessary military, political and economic securities for the future." Read the speeches of the Chancellor,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the section entitled "War Aims" I propose to treat in detail of the most recent pseudo-pacifist utterance of the Chancellor (November, 1916), as well as of all other questions relating to the aims of the war. From the discussion contained in that section it will be seen that there is no reason why, as a result of the most recent speech of the Chancellor, I should either modify or retract the above description of German war aims, written in the summer of 1916. As has been observed in the introductory chapter, I have been unable to treat of the discussions with regard to the aims of peace and war, inaugurated by the German offer of peace of December 12th, 1916. It is a fact, natural in itself and confirmed by the teaching of history, that in great wars the original war-aims of one or the other, or both parties are often subjected to considerable modification under the influence of military events, or other internal or external circumstances, and indeed that they are sometimes so completely transformed that the initial and final aims are diametrically opposed. He who goes forth bent on conquest may be forced into a position of defence; he who has drawn the sword in his defence may, in order to punish, to avenge or to secure his future, be transformed into a conqueror. These later modifications, so far as the investigation into the question of guilt is concerned, prove nothing in favour or disfavour of either party. The criterion according to which the history of the world, that is, the judgment of the world, will weigh the actions of responsible men, is to be found in the aims which were present in their mind at the beginning of the war, not the conditions which at the end of the war they may impose or may be compelled to accept. From this point of view the present discussions as to the aims of the war, conducted

the war-aims of the Conservatives, of the National Liberals, of the Centre, and even of the "freisinnige Volkspartei," and of many Social Imperialists. Read the effusions of the professors sitting comfortably in their warm studies, and of the other expansionists, "Now there has come the time of our effulgence (expansion) . . . . Will the Orient suffice us? I believe not . . . ." So Herr Kohler exclaims in ecstasy. Read all that is written and printed in German newspapers, all that is spoken in German Parliaments and from German Thrones, and you will nowhere find the remotest perception of the truth that the system of groups and grouplets is outworn, that the time has come for a new Europe, resting in concord on the foundation of law. It does not matter whether the proposal is that there should be created a central European block, or a gigantic structure winding like a snake from Ostend to Baghdad, or a German-Austro-Bulgarian-Turkish quadruple alliance, or anything else of the same nature; it does not matter whether the suggestion is that Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries should be compelled or induced to enter such an organisation; it does not matter whether this or that form of alliance, or of a union of States is selected. Nothing whatever will be gained if groups are again created to stand opposed to each other with conflicting interests, to dispute jealously and distrustfully advantages of an economic, political and territorial nature, to begin once again from fear of aggression or from their own aggressive intentions, the costly dance around the golden calf of armed peace. All these formations and groupings will inevitably lead unhappy old Europe to its destruction, to the sole advantage of the new world. However countries and peoples may be displaced and transposed, whatever groups and between the belligerents and the neutral States, will have to be subjected to a later comprehensive review and judgment. The difficult and elaborate task involved in the treatment of this material, which is not yet complete, falls outside the scope of my book, which was finished before the beginning of these discussions. I reserve this task for a later time, and in this book I must primarily restrict myself to the discussion of the war-aims as they have emerged from the beginning of the war down to the conclusion of my book (November, 1916).

alliances may be formed, the security of the one will always import the insecurity of the other, the strengthening of the one will imply the weakening of the other, the domination of the one will mean the oppression of the other. There can be no German, French or English peace ; there can only be a European peace, potent to secure for the martyred nations a new and a better life on a surer basis of law and to put them in a position to overcome gradually in the course of generations the portentous injuries and burdens of this war.

Such a European peace is the aim of Germany's opponents. The expressed object of the Entente Powers is the assurance of peace for Europe, not the dismemberment of the German Empire, an idea to which expression may have been given here and there at the most by a few irresponsible minds. The security of Germany is the aim of German policy. This security, as interpreted by the ruling persons and parties, is to be established by an extension of the frontier on the east and on the west, by the association of States hitherto neutral, by securing for the German Empire a position of hegemony on the Continent;--in this view all the authoritative circles in Germany concur. And in making this assertion, I leave entirely aside the extravagances of certain industrial unions and imperial fanatics. This security of Germany implies a perpetuation of the danger of war in Europe, and simultaneously a perpetuation of the present war.

This unprecedented struggle of the nations has rightly been described as the birth-pangs of a new age, and in the expectation of this new age there has been found the only consolation for the ghastly present. Millions and millions of men have already perished in the convulsions of this struggle, plunged in misery and in misfortune. Yet no one in Germany appears yet to have realised where the finger of history points. If things go as the Germans wish, it is not a new age that will be born, but the old age which will be renewed with all its confusion and horror. The weapons of murder will again be restored, and in view of the technical experience gained by the experts they will be made more marvellously efficient by all the resources of chemistry, physics and mechanics. The

war of men will be still further developed into a war waged by machines against each other, and man will no longer be regarded as the subject, but as the object of the massacre. What may be awaiting us all, if man's inventive faculty, spurred on and trained by the practical experience gained in this war, continues to devise ever more new and more effective means for the extermination of "human vermin," on land and on sea, above and below the earth? Perhaps the time is no longer far distant when mankind will not only be able to send thoughts and words by wireless throughout the universe, as they now do, but will also be able to produce conflagrations and explosions while operating at a distance. Then fortresses and ships, towns and villages, barracks and powder-magazines—let us also hope the General Headquarters—will be blown in the air from the greatest distance by striking a key, by the pressure on a button exerted by a man sitting comfortably in his room, like the telegraphist of to-day at his Morse apparatus. Then at last modern war will have become a true war of machines, the technician will have taken the place of the strategist and the ideal of the fanatics of destruction will be fulfilled.

Alongside of this development towards the war of machines, there is another which also appears to be approaching, one which leads directly, in the true sense of the word, to bestiality. Hitherto, in reading the heartrending reports from the battlefields, in the moving descriptions of the desperate plight of the wounded, bleeding to death, helpless and forgotten in trenches and on scarps, in woods and in ruined villages, there was still one consolation left; it was still possible to imagine that there were brutes, dowered with reason, in whom human feeling had taken refuge, who discovered the wounded and brought to them the help for which they yearned. What a pleasing picture was conjured up at the thought of the Red Cross dog, the saviour of unhappy men, bruised, mangled, delivered over to death by their fellows. Therein we saw the disappearance from Christian humanity of the Christian love of mankind; therein we saw the brute become the saviour and the helper of the unfortunate—the man become a beast, the beast a man!



It appears that this moving idyl in the ghastly picture of blood is now also about to vanish, or at any rate to be balanced by a horrifying counterpart. It seems that specially strong dogs have been trained to attack the enemy, and where this can be done to lacerate his right hand . . . "Such dogs are veritably wild beasts. They receive tactical training; they creep noiselessly to the enemy and fall upon their victims." (See *Der Bund*, morning edition, Tuesday, November 9th, 1915.) Truly a glorious refreshing prospect is here opened! It may begin with dogs, but it will end with lions, tigers and hyenas. The whole animal kingdom, indeed, stands at our disposal. With the help of a pack of moles the enemy's trenches may be undermined, and then blown in the air; birds of prey, if properly trained, might shower down bombs on the troops and villages of the enemy. Wild animals, such as hyenas, jackals, tigers and leopards, may be let loose in companies on our fellow-men; we may yet go out leading with us complete menageries and zoological gardens. A new field has been opened in which men may display their inventive faculty and their capacity for training the brute creation. Be glad that we have triumphantly brought things so far. "That is war as we love it" (Crown Prince William). Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!

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All these are neither fantasies nor Utopias. If the thought of a Europe united on the basis of peace is not at last realised, the horrors of war will constantly become more terrible, the dangers of war will constantly become more menacing. Every group that may be formed will be useless, however it may be composed, whatever States and territory it may comprise, whether the Western Powers unite against the Eastern Powers, whether Central Europe unites against Eastern and Western Europe, whether the present Entente Powers unite against a new Triple or Quadruple Alliance under the leadership of Germany. All such formations would be vain. They will not conduct us a step nearer to the achievement of our pacifist aims, but will merely create a condition infinitely worse and more pernicious than before the outbreak of

the present war. The formation of groups hitherto in existence had been completed in peace; similar interests, apprehensions, or evil intentions had brought together the partners in the Alliance and the Entente. It was always possible that the circle of interests might be extended; the apprehensions might be allayed; the evil intentions might be given up. It is true that there existed points of divergence and of tension between the peoples of Europe, but the points of divergence could be softened down, the tension could be lowered, as in fact happened repeatedly during the last decades. Such peaceful solutions were possible, because the previous groupings of the European Great Powers had for about half a century, if we except the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, rested, not on military force, but on voluntary cohesion of the groups of States. Until the outbreak of the present war the relations existing between the two groups of European Powers were not embittered by any recollection of mutual carnage, of invasion and devastation, of peaceful towns attacked from the sea or the air, of outrage and plunder and every manner of misdeed perpetrated against the civil population, nor by any recollection of thousands of innocent women, children and non-combatant men callously plunged in the depths of the sea; there was no sad memory of war's horrors endured, no incitement in the mind to hatred and detestation of other peoples. Notwithstanding all political antagonisms the manifold relations existing in trade and industry, in art and learning, linked the two sides, the one to the other. In short, there was a common foundation of culture on which a reconciliation of antagonisms could easily have been achieved, and on which a united Europe could gradually have arisen. This foundation has been destroyed. The promise of an approximation between the two sides is completely annihilated. Political antagonisms have developed into horrible deeds of blood, not to be forgotten in the course of generations. Commercial relations have been abruptly interrupted; spiritual links have been wrenched asunder. In place of the European spirit which until the present conflagration filled at least the *élite* of all nations, and at the same time found powerful

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expression in the proletariat, linking together the nations, there has everywhere appeared a narrow national spirit, which only sees, knows, and cares for its own country, and which would most prefer in things spiritual as well as material to return to the Chinese wall of mercantilism.

A union of the two groups of Powers in the service of a great European unity of peace could easily have been achieved before the war with the slightest good-will on both sides, and appeared to have been in fact achieved in the common work of peace during the Balkan crisis. After this war such an ideal will, however, encounter the greatest difficulties, which for a long time will be insuperable, even if there should exist on every side the same readiness to promote cohesion in Europe. Such a readiness, indeed the bare idea that cohesion is desirable, is wanting, and always has been wanting, on the German side. The thought was a living thought, and was constantly manifested on the English side in word, in writing, and in political action. The history of the Anglo-German negotiations up to 1912, the immediate antecedents of the war, and Grey's proposal of July 30th, 1914, as a brilliant conclusion to this English endeavour for peace, may all be cited in evidence. Even to-day the expressed peace aim of the Entente Powers is not the dismemberment of Germany, as the German people are led to believe, that they may be inspired to renewed sacrifices for this "war of liberation"—no responsible person, no authoritative politician, no serious organ of the Press on the other side has ever given expression to such intentions. Their aim is to crush Prussian militarism, the warlike spirit which, as a result of Prussian infection, has unfortunately laid hold on the whole of Germany, to combat Germany's efforts for world-power and for hegemony, which have brought about this world-wide disaster, and which must inevitably lead to constantly renewed wars and in the end to the ruin of Europe.

The idea of a peace-organisation of the European nations, of a surrender of the former system of separate alliances and of the so-called European balance of power; the idea of a right inherent in the peoples to determine their own destiny, of protection extended to the small States; the

idea of a system of law for the settlement of international disputes, instead of recourse being had to military force—this is the idea which the opponents of Germany have to-day in their minds as their aim in the war. Notwithstanding the horrors of the internal system of government in Russia, it will be the imperishable merit of the Emperor Nicholas that he strove to realise this latter idea. Yet it is this idea which Germany and Austria hitherto have not only rejected, but have even considered unworthy of serious discussion. Hence the unflagging continuation of bloodshed, the prodigal waste of wealth; hence the impossibility of finding such a basis of peace as would, as a beginning, at least make a truce possible. If the question turned round a quantitative difference in the concessions on this side or on that; if the question were one of a greater or less extent of annexations, or of indemnities or of commercial advantages; if the question involved were one of a new territorial arrangement of Europe, as at the congress of Vienna a hundred years ago—a suggestion which, of course, I should condemn—if that were the extent of the problem, negotiations and agreements would be possible by mutual concessions, and attempts could at any rate be made in that direction. But, as things stand to-day, and as they stood in the long years before the war, there is a gulf fixed between the views and the aims on this side and on that.

On the one side, on the side of the Central Empires, the watchword runs: Let there be a continuation of the old system, only with more powerful means, and on a stronger basis on our side; in place of the internally frail Triple Alliance a new Quadruple Alliance is to arise, and wonders are promised with regard to the stability and durability of this new creation—notwithstanding the economic incompatibilities which will soon emerge between Germany and Austria-Hungary; notwithstanding the political and territorial contrasts which brought about the Balkan War between Bulgaria and Turkey, that "crusade of Christianity against the Crescent," and which cannot be overcome by the present *ad hoc* community of interests in the war. The two members of the Quadruple Alliance, Bulgaria and Turkey, will play inside the alliance the same

cat-and-dog *role* which formerly, within the Triple Alliance, devolved upon Italy and Austria. If they are in a position to do so, they will apply the mailed fist in the velvet glove in order to add to the Quadruple Alliance a number of smaller neutral States; some will be drawn in, some will sink in their proper places. Our commercial relations with our opponents and with those neutrals who are disaffected toward us and who will boycott our wares will certainly be interrupted for a long time to come, but the Oriental markets will, it is hoped, offer us compensation for this loss—a harebrained idea, when one considers that the States which will belong to the future Central Europe have already in the past been our customers, and that then, also, they sold us their products; and further, that the deficiency in trade resulting from the loss of enemy countries and also of many neutrals, which may be estimated together as at least the half of all our previous foreign trade, will remain as high as ever in spite of the new political formation.<sup>1</sup>

In short, on the one side, on the side of the Central Powers, the old wine is to be poured into the new bottles; new groups of Powers are to take the place of the old. These new formations are to bring to Germany and Austria, the States occupying a dominant position, an increase in power and in economic advantages—advantages which will be revealed as illusory, but which, even if their realisation were possible, could only be bought at the price of new dangers, of new preparations completely bleeding the nations, and of new wars. On the other side, on the side of the Entente, the object is to make an end of the existing system. The Governments of the Entente have also recognised as defective and fatal the system of armed peace, of alliances, and of the so-called European balance of power, which for more than half a century we pacifists

<sup>1</sup> German foreign trade with Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria amounted in 1913 in round figures to £105,000,000, that is approximately a tenth of our entire foreign trade (£1,050,000,000). On the other hand, our trade with France, England and Russia amounted to more than £375,000,000, that is more than 3½ times our trade with our present Allies, and more than a third of the whole of our foreign trade.

have recognised and depicted as the true danger of war, and which has now, verifying all our predictions, collapsed so miserably at the first test. The pacifist point of view has become the common property of all authoritative and influential persons in England and in France, as well as in the intellectual part of Russian society. French and English Socialism are in agreement with their Governments in the matter of the aims of the war, even if antagonistic views may exist between a section of the English Socialists and the Government as to the necessity or the expediency of England's participation in the war. So far as the aims of the war are concerned, the opponents of Germany occupy a European-pacifist standpoint; Germany and Austria, on the other hand, occupy a Prusso-Austrian national standpoint. If Germany and Austria were ready to occupy a European position on the main decisive question, that of the organisation of Europe on a basis of law, the limitation of armaments, and protection against further wars, it would be possible to open negotiations on the Alsace-Lorraine question, and on the satisfaction of certain Italian Irredentist aims, and points of agreement could be found. To enter into the details of these various questions lies outside the scope of this book. By the grant of plebiscites, on the pacifist socialist principle that peoples have the right to determine their own destiny, by the creation of buffer States, whose neutrality, it is true, must be protected in some other way than Belgian neutrality, by Austrian concessions in the Trentino and on the Isonzo frontier, it would be possible to dispose once and for all of these secondary points of dispute. No compromise, however, can bridge over the great, decisive, abysmal gulf which exists between Germany and her opponents, the gulf which is most briefly designated by the words *Pax Germanica* and *Pax Europaea*. Here there is no alternative but to recognise or reject the principle. Here we must establish the peace of Europe for all time on a firm basis of law, and root out once for all the spirit of conquest and the lust of war, thereby abolishing the profuse mania of armaments. Europe needs a true peace, a peace which will leave to each people its freedom, its independence, its territory and its latent

possibilities ; a peace which will guarantee to each nation security against an aggressive attack, and which will set free at one stroke millions and millions a year for the healing and the reparation of the enormous injuries of the war, for the promotion of the well-being and the civilisation of all nations, for the elevation of the level of life, for the amelioration of the conditions of labour of the proletariat ; indeed, it may be said without exaggeration for the removal of misery and poverty in this martyred quarter of the globe.

Not *Central Europe* but the *whole of Europe* must be the watchword, and it must also be open to States outside Europe to adhere. Around this kernel of peace other States will nucleate. From a chaos the civilised world will become an organism. In the history of mankind no moment was ever so favourable as the present for undertaking the great step needed to bring us to the ideal of humanity, which from time immemorial has appealed to the minds of the wisest among all peoples, and which, beyond doubt, has constituted the aim to which the development of human society has been directed. Is the first step to this end to be taken after this war by the organisation of Europe, or is the opportunity to be neglected ? Is the history of Europe, like the spring procession at Echternach, once more to be three steps forward and two backwards ? Is right to take the place of force ? Is the madness of armaments to be continued or not ? Is the rivalry in power and trade existing between the nations of Europe to give way to an arrangement and an understanding based on peace ? These are the questions which are awaiting decision when peace is concluded in the future. In all these questions the Western Powers stand on the side of progress, and with them the neutrals, who in the struggle between the great are called upon to endure as much as the belligerents themselves ; until to-day Germany and Austria stand alone on the side of retrogression. It is just because we are Germans that it is our duty as Pacifists and Socialists to emphasise this point openly and ruthlessly.

As Germany and Austria took upon themselves the guilt of this war of 1914, so also with their so-called peace-aims they will make themselves guilty of the inevitable

wars of the future. They were the disturbers of the peace of Europe, and they will remain so. That is the reason, the true inner reason, why the whole world is against them, some with arms in their hands, others with antipathy in their hearts. That is the curse which they have brought upon themselves, and will yet bring upon themselves in increased measure if they do not at last turn back while there is yet time, if they do not abandon the dangerous by-paths which seek a policy of alliances and security of power, if they do not turn into the broad highway which leads straight to the illumined temple of European peace, to the source from which there springs the blessing of the nations. If we could but speak with the tongues of angels, if we could but fill the ears of the mighty with the blare of trumpets, and pile up before their stricken eyes the millions of bodies of the dead and mutilated; if we could but pour out before them the oceans of tears shed by the dying and the bereaved, by those who have perished in misery and in need, in order to bring home to their minds the great eternal truth: "Not in the extension of your power lies your glory or the happiness of your people. No, it is in the restriction of your power, in the domination of right over power, in the categorical imperative which so far restricts the freedom of each that the freedom of all others may also continue to exist; therein only lies your happiness and the happiness of your people. Only thus can you exorcise the terrors of future wars; only thus can you atone for the heinous crimes which you have committed with a blasphemous appeal to the all-good God and to your Redeemer, the preacher of love to men."

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A Utopia! Yes, unfortunately, it is, indeed, a Utopia. And because it is vain to hope that Prussian-Germany will renounce her one-sided endeavour for power and turn her thoughts to the future security of Europe; because the Prussian military spirit now as ever will resist every restriction of its military weapons, every hindrance in the way of its military efforts for power—and after a victorious war this will be even more so than before; because those circles in Germany who have for years



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pressed for war and have at last forced it on the German people are already openly admitting that this war is not the last, but perhaps the beginning of a series of wars—it is for these reasons, and for these reasons only, that the opponents of Germany hold out and seek by prolonging the war to obtain what they have hitherto been unable to achieve by their strength. They feel that the future of Europe is at stake, and therefore the leading thought of the Governments and of the people in England and in France is this: "A peace such as Germany wishes will mean a perpetuation of the danger of war. A peace such as we wish will mean an enduring peace."

He who desires and hopes for a higher development of mankind must, whatever his nationality, take his stand on the ground of the peace-aims of the Entente Powers. No hesitation, no compromise is possible. There are, unfortunately, some pacifists in Germany and elsewhere who would say: "Well, let us first of all form large new groups of alliances; then a union between the groups and finally an organised Europe will be possible." A pacifist who would so argue has forfeited the right to be called a pacifist. If the formation of groups had represented a movement towards the realisation of our aim, this aim could already have been achieved even before the war. Groups and alliances were then already in existence; their union to an undivided block was infinitely easier to accomplish before the war than it will be later, after the war. No, the new formation of groups is a perpetuation of the earlier state of force, and since it has developed on the soil of war it will be worse than before. No intermediate step is possible as an approximation to our aim. The decisive step must be taken forthwith or it will be postponed for generations, and will have to be purchased by renewed streams of blood, and by a renewed squandering of wealth. There is no intermediate stage between the former state of anarchy involved in the existence of groups and the organisation of the European nations. Such intermediate stages may have been able to justify their existence at an earlier date in the epoch when the great national States were being constituted, and when alliances and ententes represented

the uttermost that could be achieved in the way of organisation in the midst of the prevailing anarchy. To-day the great national States are in existence, and from this starting-point there can only be one step of progressive development, the step leading from the national State to the international organisation, which would, of course, in no way encroach upon the individuality of the separate States. A modified formation of the groups would, it is true, be something new, but not therefore something better; rather would it be something worse. There is the European programme of peace of the Entente Powers, or the formation of groups aimed at by the Central Powers. There is no third course. He who desires the peace of Europe cannot but decide in favour of the aims of the Entente Powers.<sup>1</sup>

#### GREY'S PEACE ACTION ON JULY 31ST

I have been led to this digression on the peace-aims, to which I propose later to devote a special chapter, by the discussion of Grey's peace proposal of July 30th, 1914. I showed that this proposal of peace in itself completely overthrows Helfferich's thesis that on July 29th England had promised the French Government her military assistance, and that her mind was intent on war. I now return to my demonstration that all the actions of Grey, before as well as after July 29th, give the lie to Helfferich's assertion.

What did Grey do on July 31st in the interests of peace, or, as Herr Helfferich would perhaps put it, what did he do to prepare evidence of an *alibi* to meet the charge that he had pressed for war? For Herr Helfferich will be

<sup>1</sup> I repeat again that this section was written long before the most recent pacifist paroxysms of the German Chancellor. It in no way detracts from the value of what I have said above that, at last, after the war has lasted twenty-seven months, Herr von Bethmann appears to acknowledge views which he has himself combatted throughout, and which he has disowned by the war-aims hitherto proclaimed. On the value to be attached to this "pacifist" confession I have expressed my views at length in the chapter "Bethmann, the Pacifist," already mentioned.

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unable to explain on any other ground all that I shall here put before him. If he becomes in any way articulate, he will be obliged to say with Chamberlain: "It is all mystification, all lies and deceit to throw dust in the eyes of the world"; for on July 29th, so we are told, the dice had already been cast in favour of war. Herr Helfferich will be unable to escape otherwise from his embarrassing situation. But no one who reads the documents will believe him, and in the end the truth will penetrate even into Germany—a consummation to be hoped for and desired, above all in the interests of Germany herself.

The last day of July comprises no fewer than sixteen numbers in the Blue Book, among which are seven despatches interchanged between Goschen and Grey, three communications between Grey and Buchanan, and six between Grey and Bertie. This one day of Grey's activity is thus represented by more than half as many documents as were published in the whole of the German White Book, with its twenty-six exhibits drawn from the whole period of the crisis. It would take us too far to analyse individually the contents of the Blue Book for July 31st. Anyone who wishes to visualise the gigantic efforts made by English diplomacy to maintain peace should peruse the reports of this single day—the day on which Germany by her brutal Ultimata to Russia and France severed at a stroke all the fine spun threads of Grey's diplomacy of peace, and rendered a European war inevitable. I shall only emphasise some of the features of the diplomatic events of July 31st, in order once more to show the weakness of Helfferich's assertions that a conspiracy to force war had already been completed on July 29th.

*Blue Book*, No. 110.—Grey to Buchanan: Grey has learned with great satisfaction of the resumption of discussions between Austria and Russia; he asks Buchanan to express to M. Sazonof his satisfaction, and at the same time his earnest hope that he, Sazonof, will encourage these discussions. Grey defends the Austrian mobilisation of eight army corps, on the ground that it was not too great a number against 400,000 Serbian soldiers; that two more were also mobilised against Russia we

learn for the first time from Herr von Bethmann's adroit speech in the Reichstag on August 4th. Grey had informed the German Ambassador that he could not bring pressure to bear on Russia to suspend military preparations, so long as some limit were not put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia. It may here be observed that on the preceding day Herr von Jagow had, without advancing any reason, declined Sazonof's formula of agreement, embodying the suspension of Russian military preparations.

*Blue Book*, No. 111.—Grey to Goschen: Grey expresses the hope that the conversations resumed between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. In the event of these negotiations being unfruitful, he suggests that Berlin might sound Vienna, and that he, Grey, should do the same at Petrograd to ascertain whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided, of course, that the sovereignty and the integrity of Serbia were not impaired. All the Powers would, of course, suspend further military operations or preparations. Grey, however, goes even further in his report, and in his instructions to Goschen he requests him to ask the Chancellor or the Secretary of State to make any reasonable proposal which would make it clear that Germany and Austria desired peace; he would support such a proposal in Petrograd and Paris, and in the event of it not being accepted, he would have nothing more to do with the consequences. Grey thus put forward two proposals for peace in the same Note; the first a repetition of the mediation of the four Powers, but with the extension that Austria should obtain full satisfaction, the other an appeal to Germany to suggest anything that would be serviceable to peace, and a promise from England to give any such suggestion unhesitating support.

I ask Herr Helfferich to answer Yes or No to the question whether these actions of Grey are to be regarded as efforts on behalf of peace? If, as must necessarily be the case, the answer is in the affirmative, I ask further: How do these efforts on behalf of peace on July 31st tally with Helfferich's assertion that "the dice had therewith been

cast in favour of war" on July 29th? At the same time, I desire to emphasise a point on which I laid constant stress in my book, namely, that the whole of the formulæ of agreement proposed by Grey were considered undeserving of any reply by Germany or Austria. The Conference-proposal and, until their later resumption, the direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd were rejected partly by Germany, partly by Austria, and partly by both. Grey's formulæ of agreement, however, that of July 29th as well as that of July 31st, elicited no reply, and the proposals for peace desired by Grey (Blue Book, No. 111) were never put forward. When Grey sent to Goschen his despatch of July 31st war had already been resolved on in Berlin, but in London peace was still counted on and hoped for. No. 111 furnishes additional proof that Helfferich's "conspiracy of July 29th" is an invention, flagrantly opposed to all the proved facts of the case.

*Blue Book, No. 112*, contains a report from Goschen to Grey on a conversation with the Chancellor in which the Russian general mobilisation and the imminent proclamation in Germany of "Kriegsgefahr" were discussed. Herr von Bethmann took a very pessimistic view of the situation. Goschen, however, urged him, in the interests of general peace, to put pressure on Vienna, to which Bethmann only gave once more the dilatory answer that he had last night (presumably Thursday, July 30th) begged Austria to reply to the last English proposal, but that he had only received a reply that Count Berchtold would lay the matter before the Emperor that morning (*i.e.* the morning of the 31st). This telegram also reveals the urgent efforts made by English diplomacy to arrive at a peaceful solution even at the last moment, and on the other hand the procrastinating treatment with which these efforts were received by the Chancellor.<sup>1</sup>

In his telegram of the same tenor addressed to Berlin and Paris (No. 114) on the question of the observation

<sup>1</sup> I shall return in later passages in detail to the instructions to Tschirschky produced by the Chancellor in August, 1915, and November, 1916, that is to say, a year and two and a quarter years respectively after the outbreak of war.

of Belgian neutrality, Grey still expresses his confidence "that the situation is not irretrievable."

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The two Notes addressed by Grey to Bertie (Nos. 116 and 119) which I have already discussed in detail in my book (page 252) are of exceptional importance and furnish a complete refutation of Helfferich's inference of guilt. These two despatches are, of course, more than usually inconvenient to Herr Helfferich, since they contained with a lucidity not to be misunderstood the very definite declaration, repeated more than once, that England could give no pledge of any kind to intervene in a war. It is interesting to observe how Helfferich disposes of these inconvenient documents. In the case of No. 116 he adopts the approved method of merely passing over the document in silence. There is therefore all the more reason why I should emphasise the contents of this number. Bertie had furnished a report on the subject of his conversation with Poincaré mentioned above, and on the pressure exercised by the President to obtain a declaration of solidarity, in the interests of the maintenance of peace (No. 99). Notwithstanding the personal intervention of the highest officials of the Republic, Grey declined with as much decisiveness as ever to give any declaration of solidarity on behalf of England; he repeated the distinction between the present dispute and the Morocco question. On that occasion France was directly interested, whereas now she had merely been drawn into a foreign conflict. "Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers . . . . We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war."

Grey adds that he has given the same answer to the French Ambassador, who has urged the English Government to reconsider their decision. In the event of new developments, the Government would certainly consider the situation again. It is obvious why Herr Helfferich

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passes over this telegram in silence. This number alone would demolish the whole of the structure he has reared, even if there were not a hundred other pieces of evidence to be urged against his view, which is distinguished as much for its temerity as for its untenability.

*Blue Book*, No. 119, contains an accurate repetition of Grey's explanation found in No. 116, but greater significance attaches to it, in so far as the explanations in No. 119 could claim the support of a formal decision reached at the meeting of the Cabinet which took place that day. The Cabinet had come to the conclusion that England could not give any pledge at the present time. No English treaties or obligations were involved. Further developments might, it is true, alter the situation; the preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be an important factor in determining the attitude of England. In reply to Cambon, who repeated his question whether England would help France if attacked by Germany, Grey replied that England "could not take any engagement." Cambon became more insistent, referred to Germany's rejection of the peace proposals, and to the experiences of 1870, and asked if Grey would not again submit the question to the Cabinet. Grey, however, remained firm, and the conversation came to an end with his statement that the only answer he could give was that they could not undertake any definite engagement.

How does Herr Helfferich deal with this document, which is so damaging to his argument? The truth is that he does not deal with it. He endeavours to deprive it of its decisive significance, by skimming over the flat refusal of July 31st and by casting suspicion on Grey's perfectly natural remark that future developments, and in particular the Belgian question, might lead to new decisions; this, we are told, is an addition "full of promise" intended to reassure M. Cambon with regard to the future. As if on July 31st, the day on which the inquiry with reference to Belgium, couched in similar terms, was addressed to Berlin and Paris, Grey could already have foreseen the development of the Belgian question down to August 4th! Notwithstanding all his attempts to water it down, Herr Helfferich does not, of course, succeed in getting rid

of the decisive significance of No. 119. On the contrary, it is highly interesting to observe how, under the pressure of the truth, he is involuntarily obliged to place this document in its true light. He appeals to No. 110 of the Yellow Book to prove Paul Cambon's dissatisfaction with Grey's communication. Certainly, M. Cambon was in the highest degree dissatisfied with Grey's negative answer, which, if we may judge from the French report, left nothing to be desired in the matter of decisiveness. Cambon's dissatisfaction appears a very natural feeling to us, who know that France had, in fact, up till then and indeed beyond this point, been unable to obtain any kind of assurance with regard to England's diplomatic solidarity or military participation in the war; indeed, even the personal intervention of President Poincaré had been unable to bend the stiff-neckedness of England. Herr Helfferich, however, who maintains that on July 29th England had already promised military support and that the dice had then been cast in favour of war, must find Cambon's discontent on July 31st an entirely inexplicable humour. For two days, we are told, Cambon had had England's promise in his pocket; he must therefore have known that the refusal of July 30th was but a feint, a mystification, part of the preparation of the English proof of an *alibi* in the coming process before the judgment-seat of the world's history.

The Secretary of State is thus caught in his own snare. Pages 32 and 38 of his pamphlet are irreconcilably contradictory. Page 38 corresponds to the truth; and therefore page 32 must be the reverse of the truth. Herr Helfferich, indeed, feels that he has run himself into a trap and in his distress he seeks to find a small loophole. Sir A. Nicholson had met M. Cambon on leaving the room and had told him—in Herr Helfferich's view an epoch-making utterance—that a further meeting of the Cabinet would be held next day, and that Grey would be certain to renew the discussion. This truly world-convulsing information prompts Herr Helfferich to observe: "Here it is scarcely necessary to read between the lines." Thus, merely because a meeting of the Cabinet was again to be held on the following day, August 1st, and because, as was



inevitable on the threshold of a European war, the attitude of England would be discussed in the light of the constantly changing situation, Herr Helfferich reads highly suspicious matter between the lines of Grey's clear and unambiguous declarations of July 31st, and seeks, although in vain, to deprive them of their decisive significance. A cause is, indeed, reduced to sad shifts when it has to be defended by such miserable methods! Moreover, how great must be the contempt felt by a writer for his readers—in this case primarily his own countrymen—when he believes that by such drivel as this he can argue away historical facts. No, Mr. Secretary of State, there is nothing to be read between the lines; everything there is clearly and concisely expressed by all the English diplomatists and, as we shall see presently, by the King of England as well. England declares positively: "We refuse for the present to give any declaration of diplomatic or military solidarity, until possibly the emergence of new facts may demand another attitude in the interests of our British interests." If, however, this is incontestable, and if this is confirmed by Herr Helfferich himself (page 38) in laying emphasis on Cambon's dissatisfaction, it is proved:

That Helfferich lies in his assertion contained in his letter to the *Rheinisch-Westfälische-Zeitung* that "it was exclusively the overtures made on the morning of July 29th by Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador which gave the Dual Alliance the support which Russia relied on when she found the courage on July 31st to . . . . throw the torch in the European powder-barrel."

His assertion is also contradicted by the further occurrences of July 31st.

In *Blue Book*, No. 117, Bertie furnishes a report with regard to the German Ultimatum to France which, as is known, was announced by Baron von Schön to Viviani, the Prime Minister, at 7 o'clock in the evening of July 31st. Bertie conveys to Grey Viviani's question as to "what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England?" What would be the purpose of this question, if the attitude

of England had been determined ever since July 29th? This is only one among many questions to be answered by the Secretary of State.

In No. 118, Bunsen reports on the common efforts for peace made in Vienna by the Russian Ambassador and himself. Bunsen calls the attention of Count Forgach, the Austrian Under-Secretary of State, to the favourable results of the London Conference, but notwithstanding all his efforts, he could obtain from him no suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case.

No. 120 (a report from Buchanan to Grey) deals with the proposed amalgamation of Grey's and Sazonof's formulæ of agreement and reports the result of those efforts, which is comprised in the second formula of Sazonof. To this I return in another place. In the conversation in question between Buchanan and Sazonof, discussion turned on the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and the Emperor William, and mention was made of Sazonof's proposal that the conversations which had meantime been resumed by the Viennese Government should take place in the more favourable atmosphere of London. The conclusion of Buchanan's telegram is of importance for our inquiry, and is here verbally reproduced :

“His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to his Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented.”

How are all these continued efforts of Grey and Sazonof to devise new formulæ of agreement, to make further advances in meeting Austria's standpoint, to be reconciled with Helfferich's assertion that on July 29th the dice had already been cast in favour of war? How are we to reconcile the assertion that Russia from the beginning had striven only for war with Sazonof's expression of thanks for the English efforts to maintain peace and for the success which attended these efforts on July 31st, when a new ray of hope arose as a result of the resumption of Austro-Russian negotiations? Instead of expressing his gratitude for peace on July 31st, Sazonof should rather have conveyed to the English Government, on July 29th,

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a vote of thanks for their military support, if we are to accept Helfferich's theory of a conspiracy.

In a conversation lasting for an hour (Blue Book, No. 121) Goschen most earnestly urged Herr von Jagow to accept Grey's proposals (No. 111), which indeed went to the utmost limit of diplomatic submission, and thus by his acceptance prevent the terrible catastrophe from befalling Europe. Herr von Jagow could not avoid recognising Grey's continued efforts to maintain peace, but entrenched himself behind the question of mobilisation, indicating that, until this was disposed of, any discussion on the question was superfluous. How, I again ask, do these truly desperate efforts on the part of English diplomacy to maintain peace, and their recognition by the German Secretary of State, tally with Helfferich's "conspiracy of July 29th"?

*Blue Book, No. 124.*—Bertie reports a conversation with Viviani which took place late in the evening of July 31st, and adds: "He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible." I thought, Herr Helfferich, that the answer to this had already been given on the morning of July 29th? Perhaps you will be so good as to explain this point also.

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So much for the attitude of the English Government towards the French desire for a declaration of solidarity. But the King of England himself was implored on July 31st, in a long telegram from Poincaré, to give a binding declaration in the interests of the maintenance of peace, but he also declined to give any such declaration of solidarity, merely promising to continue without intermission his efforts to find an amicable solution of the conflict. In my book (page 251) I gave a *résumé* of this telegram, which was first published in February, 1915. These documents in themselves furnish complete proof that on July 31st England had still given no binding promise to undertake diplomatic action in common, much less a definite promise of military support. The documents further prove, clearly and unambiguously—as is indeed

confirmed by all the diplomatic documents—that the co-operation with England which was desired by Russia and France was intended to serve the cause of the maintenance of peace, and not to bring about war. I will quote only some sentences from Poincaré's telegram :

“France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action . . . . From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged ; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken . . . . It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend. We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines. But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace. . . .”

I quote the following from King George's telegram in reply, dated August 1st :—

“ . . . I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement. As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments ; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.”

It will be seen that King George adheres to the standpoint of his Government, that every endeavour should be made for the maintenance of peace, and that all efforts directed to this end should be discussed with France ; but, on the other hand, that no binding pledge should be given with regard to a definite attitude to be assumed by England.

#### GREY'S ACTION FOR PEACE ON AUGUST 1ST

On August 1st, the day on which the King's despatch was sent off, the French Government were still completely in the dark as to the decision of the English Cabinet. The whole history of the conflict, and the rôle played in it by France and Russia, are recapitulated with the utmost justice in the long despatch which was addressed by Viviani to Paul Cambon on this date (Yellow Book, No. 127), and which was sent to London after the issue of the German Ultimatum, but before the declaration of war against Russia. Viviani enters into details with regard to all the actions and proposals of Sazonof in the interests of the maintenance of peace ; he refers to Austria's entrance at the last hour into discussions with Russia on the question at issue, notwithstanding the mobilisation which had taken place, and he emphasises that the danger comes from Germany, which by a policy of ultimata and by its proclamation of “ *Kriegsgefahr* ” has compelled France to

mobilise also. Since, however, mobilisation is not equivalent to war, the Republic would continue every exertion to bring to a favourable issue the negotiations directed to the maintenance of peace. Viviani's note concludes with an expression of his conviction that if war should nevertheless break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons given to Sir Edward Grey by the French Government for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interests of the future of the European balance of power. "Elle (l'opinion anglaise) saisirait les raisons si fortes que nous avons données à Sir Edward Grey pour réclamer une intervention armée de l'Angleterre dans l'intérêt de l'avenir de l'équilibre européen."

Be it observed, "British opinion would see clearly," that is to say, "it has not yet seen." Thus on August 1st public opinion in England had in no way expressed itself in favour of an armed intervention by Great Britain, should war break out owing to Germany's action. As we know to-day, it would never have expressed itself in this sense if the question of Belgian neutrality had not been thrown as a decisive factor into the scales. Viviani's animated plea in favour of English intervention, contained in his note of August 1st, strikingly contradicts, with all the other evidence, Helfferich's assertion that this intervention had already been promised on July 29th.

These are the facts which are beyond dispute, historically established, proved by all the available documents alike; and it is in the face of these facts that Herr Helfferich dares to advance his assertion that on July 29th the dice had already been cast in favour of war by England, France and Russia. I do not envy Herr Helfferich this discovery.

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On the afternoon of August 1st it is known that the German declaration of war against Russia was handed by Count Pourtalès to Sazonof. I may here remark, in passing, that in my book I gave 5 p.m. mid-European time as the hour of the delivery of the note, in accordance with exhibit 26 of the German White Book. The Russian

and the French Books agree in giving the time as 7.10. Which of these data is correct, whether we are concerned merely with a different calculation of time, or whether in fact two different times are indicated, I cannot with certainty determine. In discussing the opening of hostilities (page 207 of my book) I was concerned with the remarkable contradiction contained in the White Book, that, whereas on the one hand the declaration of war was dated 5 o'clock in the afternoon, on the other hand movements of Russian troops which took place "as early as the afternoon of August 1st"—possibly for all we know after 5 o'clock—were denounced as the opening of hostilities on the part of Russia. I did not feel called upon to weaken the striking opposition involved in these two statements in the White Book by taking it upon myself to postpone until a later hour the time of the declaration of war as given by Herr von Bethmann himself. So far as I know, the Berlin Government have not even yet corrected the time given by them, and they have thus in no way withdrawn the charge originally urged against Russia, that she moved troops across the German frontier *after* the declaration of war!

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What was done by English diplomacy in the interests of the preservation of peace on the very day of the declaration of war?

There is, first of all, the celebrated document which appears as No. 128 of the Blue Book, in which Lichnowsky, as we are told, complied with all the wishes of England, without exception, but Grey, hungering for war, declined the German offers and continued to pursue the path of strife. In the course of time this number has become a subject of special study, more particularly in England among Grey's opponents, and an interesting light has also been thrown upon it by more recent German official publications. I propose later to devote a special chapter to it, and in the present connection, where I am merely concerned with the demolition of Helfferich's "July 29th theory," I may restrict myself to indicating that even No. 128 bears complete testimony to Grey's desire for peace. Grey had received the evasive German answer

with regard to Belgian neutrality, and expressed himself in this sense: If Germany could even yet only see her way to give the same assurance as France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension in England. He felt obliged, however, to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral; England must keep her hands free. Thus even here, on August 1st, we still encounter the policy of the free hand, of freedom from obligations to one side or the other.

*Blue Book, No. 181.*—In his telegram to Goschen, Grey still expresses the hope that even yet it may be possible to secure peace, if only a little respite in time could be gained before any Great Power begins war. Information had reached London from Petrograd that Austria was now ready not only to discuss with Russia, but to accept a certain basis of mediation. (The reference here is presumably to the instructions which appear as Nos. 50 and 51 of the Red Book, sent by Berchtold to Petrograd and London on July 30th and 31st.) So long as Austria and Russia were ready to converse the position was not hopeless, and Grey hoped that the German Government would make use of the above Russian communication in order to avoid further tension. "His Majesty's Government were carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."

What purpose was served by all these activities and assurances at the eleventh hour, if the dice had already been cast in favour of war on July 29th?

*Blue Book, No. 183,* contains Sazonof's final proposals for agreement, which I shall consider more fully at a later stage in dealing with the Russian efforts for peace.

*Blue Book, No. 184.*—Poincaré explains to Bertie, the English Ambassador, the necessity for the imminent French mobilisation, as an answer to the military measures taken by Germany on the preceding day ("Kriegsgefahr," which in fact amounted to mobilisation); he complains of Germany's violations of the frontier, emphasises Russia's continued efforts for peace, and renews the assurance that the French Government are sincerely pacific, and do not quite despair even then of its being possible to avoid war. Notwithstanding all this, Herr Helfferich maintains that



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the "bullet had left the barrel in London on the morning of July 29th!"

*Blue Book, No. 135.*—A telegram from Grey to Buchanan which contains a new reference to the disposition of Austria in favour of mediation (the contents of Red Book, No. 51, are clearly indicated). The effect of Austria's acceptance would be that Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, in accordance with Count Berchtold's declaration; that the British Government would urge upon the Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, and that Austria, on the other hand, would naturally cancel her military counter-measures in Galicia. Grey instructs Buchanan to inform M. Sazonof that peace might still be preserved if Russia could put a stop to her mobilisation, having regard to Austria's acceptance of mediation. With this note addressed by Grey to Buchanan should be compared Berchtold's note (Red Book, No. 51) which occasioned Grey's final despairing efforts for peace. I have dealt fully with Berchtold's note in my book (page 334). This is the first occasion on which Berchtold at last refers, if only in general terms, to the Conference idea which had been in the air since July 24th, but which had hitherto been abruptly declined by Germany and Austria; Vienna's willingness, however, was made conditional on so many clauses and reservations that I considered myself justified in describing Berchtold's statement as "a refusal in the form of an acceptance." Count Berchtold is prepared to "entertain" Grey's proposal for mediation. Thus on July 31st, the day of the Austrian and Russian general mobilisations, of the German proclamation of "Kriegsgefahr," of the German Ultimata to Russia and France, the Austrian Government at last professes its readiness to "entertain" the proposal for mediation; it does not state that it will accept the proposal. Austria stipulates that her military action against Serbia should continue to take its course; she demands that the Russian mobilisation should be brought to a standstill, and in return she undertakes to cancel her military measures in Galicia. The essential point is that Austria, untroubled by the thought of any mediation that may be undertaken

by the Powers, insists on continuing her war against Serbia. All these clauses, reservations and impossibilities were of no effect, even at such a time, in deterring Grey from seeking an agreement between Vienna and Petrograd. And all this was done by the man who on July 29th had already sold himself neck and crop to his partners in the Entente!

*Blue Book, No. 187.*—On the same day, August 1st, Grey twice received the Austrian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, from whom he received information of the contents of Berchtold's despatch to Count Szápáry (Red Book, No. 50) and in particular of the resumption in Petrograd of the discussions between Sazonof and Szápáry. Mensdorff renewed the assurance that Austria contemplated neither an infraction of Serbian sovereignty nor the acquisition of Serbian territory. What Austria's desires were in a positive sense was not revealed to the English Secretary, even at this last moment. And even yet the world is ignorant on this point.

*Blue Book, No. 188.*—A long discussion between Goschen and Jagow, containing an exposure of the absurdity that although Germany was not directly interested in the conflict between Austria and Russia, she was nevertheless, by her policy of ultimata, urging matters to war, while the two chief participants were prepared to enter into discussion on the subject of the dispute. Jagow replies that Germany could not wait; she had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and that if Russia did not comply with the demands contained in the Ultimatum, war would be inevitable.

*Blue Book, No. 189.*—Report from Buchanan to Grey on various conversations between the Tsar and the German Ambassador, and between Sazonof and the Austrian, French and English Ambassadors. Sazonof summarises the development of the crisis owing to the action of Austria and Germany, who had rendered all proposals for peace ineffective by evasive replies, or had refused them altogether. Sazonof confirms the fact that his second formula of agreement, representing an amalgamation of Grey's formula and of Sazonof's first formula had been forwarded to the Austrian Government. Sazonof still adhered to this formula, so long as German troops did

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not cross the frontier. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first. On this occasion Sazonof (in the last paragraph of No. 139) made a further proposal for the preservation of peace, which I have not yet mentioned in my book: the war, he thought, might even yet be avoided, if France and Germany were to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia had expressed her readiness to do, while a last attempt was undertaken to arrive at a solution of the crisis.

This last attempt made by Sazonof to reach an agreement is in consonance with Grey's last efforts, to which I propose to return in the special discussion of No. 128. For the present purpose, I am content to make it clear that Grey and Sazonof alike were making desperate efforts in the interests of peace, even on the day on which Germany declared war. Herr Helfferich, however, maintains that as early as the morning of July 29th the dice had already been cast in favour of war—and who knows so well as he?

*Blue Book*, No. 141.—A report from Bunsen on the desperate situation produced by the German Ultimatum to Russia. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has stated that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. The German Ambassador in Vienna is spoken of as having desired war from the first. The French Ambassador intends to speak earnestly to Count Berchtold on the same day with regard to the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered in Vienna. There is great anxiety to know what England would do, etc. Thus it further appears that Vienna also was ignorant of England's decisions on August 1st. Herr Helfferich, however, knows that three days previously the decision had been taken in favour of war.

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I have thus arrived almost at the end of my account of the English efforts for peace. Further discussion might be superfluous. He who wishes to see, has seen enough. Yet it must be confessed that Herr Helfferich himself is not so blind as he affects to be. Occasionally, when confronted with the documentary evidence, he is constrained

to admit the resistance offered by England to a declaration of solidarity with Russia and France. He will, however, concede the continuance of this resistance up to the morning of July 29th only, and he deduces that as from that moment England swung round into line with her partners in the Entente.

At first Sir Edward Grey offered a certain measure of resistance to the pressure exerted by Russia and France for an immediate declaration of solidarity. He gave his entire approval to the explanation given by Buchanan to Sazonof on July 24th (Helfferich, page 27).

Helfferich gives himself away in another passage on the same page, in admitting that Russia and France desired the solidarity of England only for the purpose of avoiding the danger of war :

Russian and French diplomacy endeavoured to influence Sir Edward Grey by asserting that the danger of the situation lay in the fact that the German Government looked upon England's non-intervention as a certainty ; as soon as England took up a resolute attitude on the side of Russia and France, Germany would exercise pressure on Austria-Hungary, and the danger of war would be obviated (Blue Book, No. 117). Sir G. Buchanan met this constantly recurring argument in a very apt answer, which he gave to M. Sazonof on July 27th : Sazonof was, he said, mistaken in believing that such a procedure would serve the cause of peace ; " their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace " (Blue Book, No. 44).

Thus Helfferich, in this passage, expressly admits the contrary of what is the basis of his whole argumentation. This basis is that it was Russia, the incendiary, who, out of lust of conquest and from the " impulse to achieve supremacy in the Near East " (page 47), desired war from the outset. She resolved on war on receiving a promise from France that she would participate ; France's promise was given after obtaining an assurance of England's support. Russia thus endeavoured to assure herself of the participation of France and England *for the purposes of war*. Such is Helfferich's thesis. How does this tally with his confession that Russian and French diplomacy desired the accession of England to exercise pressure on Germany and Austria, and thereby *to remove the danger of war* ? Truly, the power of Truth is so great that even

the conscious defender of untruth cannot always remain beyond her reach.

Helfferich's attempt to render his theory of a conspiracy more plausible by drawing a line of division between what occurred before and after July 29th thus also rests on ineffective means. If up to July 29th Petrograd and Paris desired the accession of London in order to remove the danger of war and were thus themselves disposed to peace, it is not easy to comprehend why, as from the morning of July 29th, their inclinations should suddenly have veered from peace to war, and why, from that moment, the accession of England should have been sought with a European War in view. Thus, even if Grey, in his famous conversation with Cambon (No. 87), had made any promise to the other partners in the Entente (which in fact he did not do), any such promise could only be interpreted in the light of the wishes expressed by the other parties. These wishes, however—as Helfferich admits on page 27—were directed to peace and not to war. Thus here also the Secretary of State is caught in his own snare.

#### ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA

The English efforts for peace up to the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia thus destroy Helfferich's inference of guilt, based on the events of July 29th; this is, however, even more marked when we consider the occurrences between August 1st and August 4th, up to the outbreak of war between Germany and England.

From this point of view consideration is in the first place due to the British promise of the support of the Fleet given on August 2nd (Blue Book, No. 148), and in the second place to the demands contained in the English Ultimatum of August 4th with reference to Belgium (Blue Book, No. 160).

If it is correct, as Helfferich maintains, that "the assurance of England's support which France at this time (*i.e.* before the outbreak of the Russo-German war) endeavoured by every means to obtain" (Helfferich, page

22) had already been gained on the morning of July 29th, it is inexplicable why France, having obtained England's full support, should have had any interest in obtaining from England an assurance of a restricted support by sea only. In my book (pages 274-285) I have gone into this question at considerable length and, as I believe, I have shown conclusively that the English promise of August 2nd was

- (a) A conditional promise and
- (b) A restricted promise.

It was conditional on certain actions of the German Fleet, viewed as possible contingencies, and it was restricted to the assistance of the British Fleet. To avoid repetition, I refer to what I have said in my book ending with the following sentence (page 286) :

“The conditional and restricted promise of contingent naval support is a convincing *argumentum e contrario* in support of the fact that up to August 2nd more extensive promises of military support had not been given to France by England. For this reason the English declaration was greeted with great satisfaction as ‘a first assistance which is most valuable to us.’ The first promise of assistance was thus the conditional and restricted promise given on August 2nd! This is a striking proof that the assertion of the Chancellor that England had promised France her assistance, even before the outbreak of war, is a lie.”

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Equally conclusive is the evidence furnished by the incidents which took place between England and Germany on August 4th, recited in Goschen's report of August 8th (Blue Book, No. 160), and never called in question by the authorities in Germany. On the day in question Sir Edward Goschen had four conversations with German diplomatists, not counting the apologetic visit which Jagow paid late in the evening in connection with the street incidents. On the first visit to the Foreign Office, in the afternoon, he asked Herr von Jagow, in the name of the English Government, whether the Imperial

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Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow answered in the negative, since German troops had already crossed the Belgian frontier that morning, thereby already violating the neutrality of Belgium. Goschen thereupon observed that this *fait accompli* rendered the situation exceedingly grave, and asked whether there was still not time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both sides would deplore. Herr von Jagow replied that this was impossible.

A second conversation between Goschen and Jagow took place later in the afternoon of the same day, about 7 o'clock, after Goschen had received Grey's ultimatum-telegram (No. 159). At this second interview Goschen stated to Herr von Jagow that he had been instructed to demand his passports and to inform him that the English Government would take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium, if Germany failed to give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night, that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and that they would stop their advance. Herr von Jagow regretted that he was unable to give any other answer than that which he had given at the previous interview. The British Ambassador gave him a written summary of the contents of Grey's telegram, and drew attention to the time limit (12 o'clock midnight), and asked the Secretary whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible, even at the last moment, that the answer to be given by Germany might be reconsidered. Jagow replied that, even if the time given were twenty-four hours or more, the answer must remain the same. Thereupon Goschen demanded his passports.

Later in the evening the notorious interview between Bethmann and Goschen took place, when the now famous expression about the "scrap of paper" was first used. Bethmann declared that the advance through Belgium was a matter of life and death to Germany, while Goschen claimed that it was equally a matter of life and death for his country that this neutral country should be defended.

Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the evening an interview took place between Goschen and Zimmermann, the Under-

Secretary of State, when the conversation, so to speak, turned on a question of international law, whether the demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. To this Goschen, having regard to the precise instructions of the English Government, was obliged to give an affirmative answer, at any rate, in the case then in point.

I have purposely devoted somewhat greater length to the account of these occurrences of August 4th, firstly, in order to refute the legend, circulated even in England by the opponents of the Government, to the effect that the English Government would have entered the war in any case, even apart from the violation of Belgian neutrality, and, secondly, in order, from this point of view, to destroy Helfferich's myth that England had already promised the French her support eight days previously. From Goschen's account, which so far has been neither impugned nor disputed from any quarter, it is incontestable that war with England could have been avoided, even on August 4th at 7 o'clock in the evening, if Jagow could have given a declaration which need not have contained even a positive engagement to withdraw German troops from Belgium, but merely a promise to give further consideration before the expiration of the time fixed in the Ultimatum (midnight) to the answer to be returned by Germany to the English demand. If Herr von Jagow had given such a declaration, the German Government would have had until midnight to comply with the English requests, and if these had been satisfied, it would have been impossible for England to enter the war, since every ground for her participation would have been removed. War against France had already been declared on the evening of August 3rd. Had England wished to avail herself of the declaration of war against France as a reason for war against Germany, the English Government would have been bound expressly to adduce this reason as, in fact, has been done in those declarations which have since taken place where existing wars with a friendly or allied State have in most cases been adduced as the reason for hostilities by the party declaring war. In demanding in their Ultimatum merely that Germany should desist from further violation of Belgian neutrality, and in threaten-



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ing war in the event of non-compliance with this request, the English Government was committed to this reason for war. It depended on Germany to see that this reason was rendered nugatory. England's entry into the war thus depended on Germany's decisions; had the German troops evacuated Belgium, there would have been no war with England. This is incontrovertible on a survey of the events of August 4th. How is Herr Helfferich, however, to reconcile this incontrovertible fact with his assertion that the common war of the Entente Powers against Germany and Austria was on July 29th already a settled affair? Had this been so, had France and Russia obtained from England any binding pledge as to her participation in the war, it would have been impossible for England as late as August 4th to make her participation dependent on conditions, the fulfilment of which was left to the free will of Germany.

### THE ALLEGED FRENCH PROMISE OF ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA ON THE EVENING OF JULY 29TH

The Governments of France and of Russia also laboured for the maintenance of peace to the same degree and with the same zeal as the English Government. Herr Helfferich flatters himself that he has forged an inviolable chain of reasoning, in arranging the following dates in sequence :

On the morning of July 29th England promised to give France her military support.

On the evening of July 29th France thereupon promised to give Russia her military support.

From the evening of July 29th the plot was thus complete, and Russia, supported by France and England, was therefore in a position to give effect to her warlike intentions. "The question of bringing about the war was for Russia purely one of opportunity."

As in the case of the English pledge of assistance given on the morning of July 29th, so also Helfferich construes the French pledge of assistance with the same startling

certainty, which is again in inverse ratio to the truth. "On the evening of July 29th, neither sooner nor later, France gave to Russia the express and unconditional promise of armed support" (page 28). We can but admire the manner in which the Secretary for the Interior determines the dates and even the hours of the different phases of the crime with all the accuracy with which the quondam bank director used to work out the final balance in shillings and pence.

Unfortunately, in this case his accounts do not agree.

At the very outset I would observe that the whole inquiry into France's pledge of assistance, and its determination to a definite day and hour, strikes me as entirely otiose. It is a matter of common knowledge that the relation between France and Russia was not an Entente but an Alliance, such as exists between Germany and Austria. Although the wording of the Treaty of Alliance between France and Russia is not known to us, it may be regarded as a matter of course that this treaty, like all treaties of alliance, can impose no obligation to give support in a war of aggression, but only in a war of defence, or at least in a war in which aggression has been provoked by the other side. Even the Austro-German treaty of alliance laid no obligation on the two States to afford each other support in aggressive wars, but only in defensive wars, or in those wars in which the ally may, it is true, have been formally the aggressor, but had been compelled by his opponent to assume this rôle, and was thus still in fact acting in defence. The usual formula inserted in treaties of alliance to meet the latter case is to the following effect :

Exclusion of the duties of alliance in cases of an unprovoked attack on the part of the ally ; on the other hand, assistance when the ally is attacked, or when he is compelled to assume formally the rôle of aggressor by the provocation of a third party.

The answer to the question whether, in a particular case, an action is to be deemed to be an attack or a provocation by a third party, or a wanton attack on the part of the ally, depends on the circumstances at the time.

To obviate this question being answered in an unfavourable sense, it is prudent and customary in the diplomatic preliminaries which may ultimately lead to war for the party concerned to consult her ally as to the steps to be taken, and to govern her actions according to her ally's counsel. It is in the interests of the Government by whom these inquiries are made that this preliminary interrogation of her ally should take place, and that it should be repeated at every decisive stage in order that her ally, should war arise, may not be in a position to retort: "You never consulted me; you have thus undertaken these grave steps on your own responsibility; if you had asked for my advice and taken it, war would not have come about; I am therefore under no obligation to come to your assistance." The procedure thus indicated, of consulting an ally, was followed, to cite one instance, between Austria and Italy, in the summer of 1918, when Austria, as is shown in Giolitti's revelations, already entertained the intention of attacking Serbia, a course of action which might have involved the danger of a European war.

At the beginning of the Austro-Serbian conflict this procedure was also adopted between Berlin and Vienna. "The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception (*i.e.* that they could not view idly any longer this agitation across the border) and asked for our opinion." Herr von Bethmann, as is well known, agreed "with all his heart" with his ally's estimate of the situation—unmindful of Bismarck's dictum that politics should be a matter, not of the heart, but only of the understanding.

Similar action, to which the Orange Book and the Yellow Book bear copious testimony, was, as a matter of course, taken between France and Russia. There could, however, from the first be no doubt as to France's duty as an ally, in the event of the Austro-Serbian dispute developing into a European conflict. The German Government themselves never doubted that a European war, arising out of the Serbian conflict, would find France on the side of Russia. "As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation (*i.e.* of Germany) would be directed against both Russia and France"—so observed Count Pourtalès to M. Sazonof as early as July 26th

(White Book, page 408). This view of the unconditional duty devolving on France in the case in question as a result of her alliance with Russia was in entire agreement with the facts of the case, but it is in marked contradiction to Helfferich's assertion that "the co-operation of France was *a priori* in no way certain." The people in Berlin were absolutely certain of this co-operation, because they were conscious that the diplomatic and military behaviour of Austria towards Serbia constituted an aggressive action, and that therefore all the European consequences which might ensue were to be traced to the guilt of Austria as the aggressor, and of Germany as the accomplice, if not the instigator, in this aggressive act. The character which the war thus bore as a war of aggression on the part of Austria and Germany was naturally strengthened at a later date and placed beyond all doubt by the fact that Germany declared war on Russia and thus provoked the European conflagration.

It follows that when the French Government, in the notes quoted by Helfferich with so much gusto, promised the Russian Government their support, they did something that was merely a matter of course, undeserving of any special mention. Amongst those who have inquired into the diplomatic antecedents of the war there has hitherto been no one who has attached any weight to these inconsiderable statements of the French Government. Herr Helfferich, however, finds that he needs them in order to prove the sequence in time of the English promise to France and the French promise to Russia, and thus to demonstrate the complete guile of England as a conspirator and England's responsibility for the war.

Herr Helfferich has no luck. As I have already been able to demolish the legend of the English pledge of support given on the morning of July 29th, so it is a matter of no difficulty to dispose of the further legend of the French pledge of support given on the evening of July 29th. The French pledge of support, which, as we have seen, was only a matter of course, and, further, was so regarded by Germany, reached Petrograd long before July 29th; in fact, it got there in the very earliest stages of the conflict. The proof of this is found in Blue Book, No. 6,

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in a conversation which Sazonof had with Buchanan and Paléologue :

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. . . . French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments. . . . It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

This document of July 24th proves unambiguously that from the outset France was resolved to fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, that France and Russia were in that "complete solidarity" which they sought in vain to obtain from England, and that they were determined to assume a firm attitude, even if England did not join them. This took place on July 24th. What do you say to that, Herr Helfferich? How does this affect your celebrated causal and temporal nexus in the events of July 29th? All the later statements made by the French Government, expressive of their solidarity with Russia, were merely designed to confirm the standpoint assumed as far back as July 24th, that is to say, before the expiration of the Austrian Ultimatum. These later confirmations were devoid of any substantial importance, and were only occasioned by the fact that the leading French statesmen, Poincaré and Viviani, who were still absent from Paris on July 24th, had arrived home on July 29th.

It is absurd to speak of any connection between these later confirmations of the solidarity between France and Russia and an English pledge of support, which, in any case, I have already proved to have been non-existent. This fable is sufficiently contradicted by turning up No. 101 of the Yellow Book, in which Viviani writes to Petrograd and London, on July 30th: "France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance," but in the preceding sentence he emphasises Sazonof's desire that England should without delay take up her position on the side of Russia and France ("la Russie . . . considère

comme désirable que l'Angleterre se joigne sans perdre de temps à la Russie et à la France.") Thus on July 30th Sazonof still regards it as desirable that England should join the Entente Powers, but on the 29th—and it is Helfferich who says so—England had already done so.

Thus stone by stone Helfferich's édifice can be demolished and levelled to the ground.

For example, No. 58 of the Orange Book is for Helfferich of paramount importance because this note from Sazonof, the last of those dated July 29th and obviously despatched late on the evening of that day, conveys the thanks of the Russian Government to the French Government for their full support, and in Helfferich's view represents the final point of the chain drawn from London to Paris, and thence to Petrograd. "The bullet which had left the barrel in London on the morning of July 29th, hit the mark at St. Petersburg on the same evening! The immediate consequence is the telegram by which M. Sazonof instructs M. Isvolsky to express to the French Government the sincere gratitude of the Russian Government for the declaration of unconditional armed support"<sup>1</sup> (Orange Book, No. 58).

I regret that I am compelled to interrupt the flight of this bullet; for in the first place, as has been proved, no bullet left the barrel in London that morning, and, secondly, what is alleged to have arrived in Petrograd that evening had long before been made manifest there. It was apparent in the statement made by Paléologue to Sazonof on July 24th, and from that date it runs through a series of declarations made by Bienvenu-Martin, the acting Foreign Secretary, and finally it is evident after Viviani's return in the declarations made in Paris in the course of July 29th by the Prime Minister to M. Isvolsky (Orange Book, No. 55):

Viviani has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to

<sup>1</sup> [Official English translation.]

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the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. . . . He added (in his conversation with Baron Schön) that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her Allies and friends and that he, Baron von Schön, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country.

So it was not late in the evening through the French Ambassador in Petrograd that M. Sazonof first received confirmation of French support (Orange Book, No. 58); in the course of the day, at some hour which, of course, is not known, Viviani had already given Isvolsky this assurance, which, it is to be noted, in no way contained anything new, but was merely, as has been observed, a repetition by the Prime Minister of what had already been unambiguously expressed by the Minister acting in his place.

\* \* \* \* \*

A reference to this fact is in itself, I believe, sufficient to catch out Herr Helfferich's bullet. But a further point must be indicated. On what grounds does Viviani explain his unhesitating decision to side with Russia? He explains it by saying that the French Government's declaration of solidarity with Russia is supported by all classes in France, and is approved by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists, who had just addressed a resolution to the Minister expressing their absolute confidence and their patriotic sentiments: The whole country, remarked Viviani to Herr von Schön, warmly approved the attitude of the Government. It is impossible to find anywhere in these or in any of Viviani's further declarations a single word in support of the view that an English pledge of support had influenced the decisions of the French Government. These decisions rested on the obligations involved in her alliance with Russia, on the interests of France, as these were understood by the Government, and on the general approval of the country. France desired peace and laboured for peace. In this respect her action was completely in harmony with that of Russia, but she was resolved to take her stand by the side of Russia, should the common endeavours for peace be shipwrecked on the opposition of Germany and Austria.

This is the meaning of Isvolsky's note to Sazonof of July 29th (Orange Book, No. 55). It is to these declarations of the French Government, which were also expressed by Paléologue, the Ambassador in Petrograd, that Sazonof's telegram (Orange Book, No. 58) has reference. There is not the slightest connection between this Franco-Russian interchange of notes and the decisions of England which at that time were still entirely uncertain. The construction of such a connection is an edifice artfully reared by Helfferich, which pitifully crumbles before the breath of criticism.

When at the end of his telegram (No. 58) Sazonof particularly mentions that the declaration of the French Government "in the existing circumstances . . . is especially valuable to us," the emphasis is to be laid, not on the "declaration" itself, but on "the existing circumstances." The European situation had, in fact, become very acute on the evening of July 29th; war had been begun against Serbia, a diplomatic rupture had taken place between Austria and Russia; Grey's Conference-proposal had been declined by Germany and Austria; Austria had mobilised two army corps against Russia, apart from those mobilised against Serbia, and as a consequence of this mobilisation and of the invasion of Serbia she had occasioned the Russian partial mobilisation. Notwithstanding all the pressure brought upon her, Germany had proposed no form in which the mediation of the four Powers would be agreeable to her, but had threatened Russia that, in the event of her undertaking any preparatory military measures, Germany would proceed to counter-mobilisation (July 26th, White Book, page 408). This threat had been repeated on July 29th by Count Pourtalès (Orange Book, No. 58). On the afternoon of the same day, July 29th, the great consultation between the Emperor and his Ministers and Generals took place at Potsdam, and in the evening, after returning from Potsdam, the Chancellor made his famous bid for the neutrality of England. Thus on the evening of July 29th the situation had become seriously acute, and precisely at such a moment it must have been valuable to Sazonof to receive from Viviani the renewal of the French promise of support. This,



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and nothing else, is the significance of the concluding sentence of Sazonof's note. And this at once disposes of the inference, drawn from this final sentence, that a secret Anglo-Franco-Russian conspiracy existed.

### WHAT DID THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DO FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE ?

Herr Helfferich also seeks to prove this secret conspiracy by preferring the following charge against the French Government :

“ In no document in the French Yellow Book, and equally in none in the Russian Orange Book or in the English Blue Book, is there any evidence that France at any stage ventured to advise the Russian Government seriously in the sense of peace ” (page 22).

This charge had already been brought against the French Government by Herr von Bethmann in his communication of December, 1914, but has been conclusively refuted by me (see my book, pages 298-315) by reference to the diplomatic records. The charge is, indeed, outrageous, and is so flagrantly opposed to the truth that I have no hesitation in calling it a deliberate falsification. That the French Government were slothful in the cause of peace is a lie, the enormity of which could only be demonstrated by transcribing the whole of the Yellow Book from beginning to end, with the exception, perhaps, of the last number, which relates to occurrences after the outbreak of the war. In fact, from the beginning to the end of the conflict she did nothing but work for peace by all the means which her Alliance with Russia and her Entente with England placed at her disposal.

Acting in co-operation with Russia and France, the French Government asked for a prolongation of the time-limit fixed in the Austrian Ultimatum, in order to inquire into the Austrian grievances, and to be in a position to move Serbia to the utmost limit of conciliation. The extension of the time-limit was refused. Nevertheless, the French efforts in Belgrade took place and met with success.

Grey's Conference-proposal was forthwith accepted by France and its acceptance was zealously urged in all

the capitals of Europe. It was, indeed, unnecessary to exercise pressure in Petrograd, since the Russian Government from the outset had accepted Grey's idea in any conceivable form, and had declared themselves ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of the four disinterested Powers.

Direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd received the heartiest support and encouragement from the French Government.

The acceptance of Grey's formula of agreement of July 29th was recommended in Petrograd, and it was by Viviani's efforts that the attempt was made to bridge over the remaining difference between Grey's formula and Sazonof's first formula of July 30th. These efforts were also successful, and led to Sazonof's second formula of July 31st (Yellow Book, Nos. 112 and 113; Orange Book, Nos. 60 and 63; Blue Book, Nos. 120 and 132).

The resumption of direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd was not only welcomed in Paris with the liveliest satisfaction as a new ray of hope for peace, but was most zealously encouraged by the French diplomatists in Vienna and Petrograd (Yellow Book, Nos. 104, 114, 120, 125, 127, etc., etc.)

This active co-operation in all the attempts at mediation was accompanied by the continuous exertion of a moderating influence on her Russian Ally. Anyone who follows the indefatigable activity of Bienvenu-Martin up to July 29th and of Viviani after his return on that day, anyone who reads the notes of the French ministers and diplomatists printed in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of the Yellow Book, will be astounded at the hardihood of those German historians who dare to portray the warm French desires for peace as merely tactical movements devised to deceive and restrain Germany until the final completion of the war conspiracy (see Helfferich, page 22).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [The passage referred to appears as follows in the official English translation: "We should be just as well entitled to suspect that such wishes as were at all expressed tended rather to secure the necessary time and detain Germany until the military help of England could be secured."]

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I have already cited in my book a number of conspicuous instances of the success of French influence on Petrograd (see *Yellow Book*, Nos. 85, 86, 91, 101, 102, 112, 118, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123, 127, etc.). Everywhere the encouragement of practical peace proposals is accompanied by exhortations to the Russian Government to restrain themselves, and to do nothing in the defence of their own interests which might render the crisis more acute and furnish Germany with a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation. "I therefore think it would be well," writes Viviani on July 30th to Paléologue, his Ambassador at Petrograd, "that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces" (*Yellow Book*, No. 101). The success which attended this advice may be traced in Sazonof's communication to Paléologue that the Russian general staff had suspended all measures of military precaution "so that there should be no misunderstanding" (*Yellow Book*, No. 102, July 30th). Sazonof added to this communication disquieting information received concerning German military preparations, but at the same time gave the assurance that Russia would nevertheless continue in her efforts towards conciliation. He concluded with the words: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."

On July 30th Paléologue submitted a report on the subject of Sazonof's first formula of agreement which Count Pourtalès promised to support in Berlin. Sazonof's idea was that the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London. Paléologue's report closes with the words: "The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict" (*Yellow Book*, No. 103).

*Yellow Book*, No. 104.—Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna, reports on July 30th, with regard to the resumption of direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd: Bunsen, the English Ambassador, without considering it necessary to inquire in London, at once declared to the Russian Ambassador Schébéko that the

English Government would entirely approve of the new procedure, and Schébéko assured his English and French colleagues that his Government would take a much broader view of the Austrian demands on Serbia than was generally supposed. Russia had a sincere desire, as he had also declared to Count Berchtold, that an agreement acceptable to the two Empires should be reached.

*Yellow Book, No. 109.*—An interview between Jules Cambon and Jagow. Cambon inquires whether Jagow had in the meantime, in accordance with Grey's wishes, suggested any form of mediation which would be agreeable to Germany. Jagow gives an evasive reply. He refers to Russian mobilisation against Austria, and to the pressure exerted by the Heads of the German Army to secure that mobilisation should also take place on the part of Germany.

*Yellow Book, No. 112.*—A communication from Viviani to his Ambassadors accredited to the Great Powers (July 31st). In my book (page 300) I have already fully discussed this note, which proves beyond doubt that the most energetic endeavours were made by France in the interests of peace and that in this case also (the amalgamation of Grey's and of Sazonof's formulæ of agreement), these efforts were rewarded by success (see *Yellow Book, No. 113*).

It strikes one, indeed, as in the highest degree peculiar when we find the same charge made on the German side, by Herr von Bethmann as well as by Herr Helfferich, that the French Government did nothing in the interests of peace. If the whole of the *Yellow Book* were lost, with the exception of despatches No. 112 and No. 113, these would in themselves prove that the French Government did a hundred times more for peace than can be deduced in favour of the German Government from the whole of the 47 pages of the German *White Book*. I have already referred in my book to the unceasing activity displayed by the Berlin Foreign Office in the capacity of a postman, bearing communications to and fro between London and Vienna. Nowhere in the German or Austrian publications do we anywhere find

a really intensive, exhaustive, detailed discussion of, and co-operation in, the proposals for union which issued from the Entente Powers. Berlin "passes on," Berlin "submits for consideration," Berlin "transmits," at the utmost Berlin "counsels" a certain course in Vienna. But Berlin never *demand*s anything, Berlin never declares that should her demand be refused, she will have no more to do with the matter.<sup>1</sup> Berlin never exerts herself to make positive proposals for agreement, to outline formulæ for an understanding, to propose procedure such as she was requested to suggest on the understanding that it would be accepted in advance. Berlin never actively co-operates, but always and everywhere assumes a purely negative standpoint, receiving proposals and either declining them, passing them on, or simply burying them in silence.

It is curious to trace, in contrast with this, the activity shown by French ministers and diplomatists, such as Bienvenu-Martin, Viviani, Paul and Jules Cambon. Any-one who reads Nos. 85, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 120, 121, 125, 127, and other items in the Yellow Book and compares the wealth of their contents, manifesting activity and energy at every stage, with the barren, threadbare despatches of the German Government, restricted to short formulæ of criticism or refusal, will be persuaded that the really fruitful peace activity, even though, alas! it was unsuccessful, was on the side of France and her partners in the Entente, and not on the side of Germany and her Ally.

Even on August 1st, that is to say after the despatch of the two Ultimata, Viviani, in his circular despatch which covers more than a page, is at pains to refer to the propitious resumption of direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, to Sazonof's proposal that the *pourparlers* should take place in London with the participation of the Powers (*avec la participation des Puissances*) and the obvious condition of these negotiations, namely, that all the Powers should put a stop to their military prepara-

<sup>1</sup> I have already referred above to the instructions to Tschirschky produced by Bethmann in August, 1915, and November, 1916, of which no mention is made in the two German White Books. To these I will return in a later passage.

tion, in which Russia was prepared to acquiesce (puisque la Russie a accepté la proposition anglaise qui implique un arrêt des préparatifs militaires de toutes les Puissances). On the other hand, Viviani refers with much anxiety to the attitude of Germany, which had clearly wished for war; Herr von Schön, in delivering the German Ultimatum on the previous evening, had already asked that arrangements should be made for him personally, and he had already put the archives of the Embassy in safety (Yellow Book, No. 120).

Another document which merits the closest attention is Viviani's circular despatch of August 1st (Yellow Book, No. 125), in which he describes the visit paid by Herr von Schön at 11 o'clock in the morning for the purpose of receiving the French reply to the German Ultimatum. Although at that moment every hope of peace had faded—an hour later the Ultimatum to Russia, to which only a negative answer could be given, was due to expire, and war therefore might follow—nevertheless, Viviani once more put before the German Ambassador the last phases of the peace transactions: the Anglo-Russian formulæ of agreement; the final readiness of Austria to discuss the substance of the question at issue; the concurrence of Russia in the cessation of military preparations, should the Anglo-Russian proposals for agreement be accepted, etc. And as against all these prospects and possibilities of peace, the French Ambassador placed the attitude of Germany, which could not but compromise the cause of peace beyond salvation. Even at this, the most critical of all moments, Herr von Schön was again constrained to empty, evasive answers. Yet this did not prevent Viviani from writing to his Ambassadors: "However, we must not neglect the possibilities and we should not cease to work towards an agreement." (Il ne faut pas les (possibilités) négliger cependant et nous ne devons pas cesser de travailler à un arrangement.)

In his despatch of the same day (No. 127) addressed to Paul Cambon, Viviani can honestly assert that France had never ceased, in co-operation with England, to advise moderation at Petrograd and that this advice had been listened to. (La France n'a cessé de donner, d'accord

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avec l'Angleterre, des conseils de modération à Petersbourg; ces conseils ont été écoutés.) Viviani sets out in detail the Anglo-French activity in Petrograd and the success attributable to their efforts. He explains how easy it would be to reconcile the last formulæ of Grey and Sazonof and the most recent declaration of Austria, and he again gives an assurance that France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of peace. ("La France est résolue à poursuivre jusqu'au bout, avec l'Angleterre, la réalisation de cet accord . . . nous continuerons à travailler, avec l'Angleterre, au succès de ces pourparlers . . . le gouvernement de la République multipliera ses efforts pour faire aboutir les négociations.")

This despatch, written just before the German declaration of war against Russia, is, so to speak, the swan-song of France's efforts for peace, which were inevitably bound to come to an end with the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia. These efforts for peace are a historical fact, documentarily supported. It will be sufficient for anyone who wishes to convince himself of the truth and sincerity of these efforts, that he should read the documents. To deny these efforts is to falsify truth. Seven passages in the Yellow Book supply the petty peddling points which Herr Helfferich rakes out to prove his untenable thesis that France from the outset was concerned not to secure the peace of Europe, but only to gain the military support of England for the purpose of a joint attack on the Central Powers; these seven passages from the Yellow Book may serve the purpose of the official defender of Germany in arranging the facts in a prejudiced light, but they cannot impair the overwhelming convincing power of the complete conspectus of French activity, as revealed in the 129 numbers of the Yellow Book.

In his embarrassment, Herr Helfferich turns to the conversations which took place at the Quai d'Orsay between Herr von Schön and the officials of the Foreign Office, when discussions were first opened on the crisis—conversations which I have already examined in my book (page 295, etc.) The French Government was more than

justified in their refusal to exercise, in common with Germany, any pressure on Russia, so long as Germany refused to exercise a similar pressure on Vienna. Russia had already exercised to the utmost her influence in Belgrade in obtaining the submissive Serbian Note; Russia had remained quiet when Austria, notwithstanding the submission of Serbia, broke off diplomatic relations; from the outset Russia had expressed her readiness to accept the mediation of the four disinterested Powers; Russia was equally prepared to enter into direct discussions with Austria. What more could Russia do? What pressure was it suggested should still be brought to bear on Russia? It was only on Austria that pressure was required—that was the only essential point. This, however, Germany refused, looking at the question from her narrow point of view that the conflict must be localised. The behaviour of Bienvenu-Martin towards Herr von Schön was more than justified, as was also the objection of the Foreign Office in Paris to a Press publication which falsified the facts and feigned a solidarity in the means of peace which in fact did not exist.

It is unnecessary at this stage to inquire whether Germany at that time had still peaceful intentions. I am reminded of the story of the lawyer of whom it was said "Attorney Brown is an entirely honest man—but—it cannot be proved." The peace intentions of Germany are also impatient of any kind of demonstration. Against the existence of such intentions there is the eloquent fact that Germany offered a stiff-necked resistance to all the means proposed for arriving at an understanding. To the remark of Bienvenu-Martin that, if Germany concurred in Grey's proposal, the four Powers could intervene jointly in Vienna and Petrograd, Herr von Schön entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions, and did not go beyond his proposal of common Franco-German pressure on Petrograd (Yellow Book, Nos. 36 and 56), which the French Minister was as a matter of course bound to refuse. It surpasses belief and shows the utter impossibility of getting any evidence of weight that Herr Helfferich should discuss the quite trivial question of the Franco-German Press notice throughout a

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
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es to the whole of the remaining mediatory activity  
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is with a quotation from No. 102 of the Yellow Book  
Helfferich concludes the section in which, as has been  
rved, the French Government is censured for never  
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e after No. 102, especially on the part of Viviani,  
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pare and judge.



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### CHAPTER III

#### GREY'S CONVERSATION WITH LICHNOWSKY ON AUGUST 1st, 1914

(*Blue Book, No. 123*)

GREY'S conversation with Lichnowsky on August 1st, an account of which is given in No. 123 of the Blue Book, has claimed a large measure of attention in all discussions on the question of the responsibility for the war, and perhaps this is even more true of the English than of the German Press. In consequence this document merits fuller treatment than it received in my book. Document No. 123 has received a very welcome amplification in the new German White Book, published in the summer of 1915, under the title "Documents relating to the Outbreak of War" (pages 46 to 49). Other documents and speeches which have an important bearing on the subject are: No. 144 of the Yellow Book, the Chancellor's speech of August 4th, Grey's speech in the House of Commons on August 3rd, Asquith's speech of August 6th, 1914, and Nos. 85 and 101 of the Blue Book.

#### THE GERMAN OFFERS FOR ENGLISH NEUTRALITY

On a survey of all these documents taken together it is possible to reconstruct the offers made by Germany to the English Government to secure their neutrality and the attitude assumed by the English Government towards these offers. In my book I have already indicated that Germany did in fact endeavour by every means in

her power to gain England's neutrality in the present war, and that, acting in conformity with the formula prescribed long ago by the Pan-Germans and the politicians whose aim was colonial and world-power, she endeavoured in the first place to acquire a position of hegemony on the Continent by means of a Continental war, that she might later, as the powerful mistress of Europe, be in a position to settle accounts with England in one way or another. The lode-star of the whole policy of Germany since the beginning of the century had been comprised in this one aim—to obtain elbow-room on the Continent, and for this reason to secure England's neutrality in Continental conflicts. Germany's behaviour at the Hague Conferences and in the later direct negotiations with England with reference to a political understanding and a restriction of maritime armaments had been subservient to this aim. This also was the aim kept in view when the bid for neutrality was made on July 29th (Blue Book, No. 85) and in Lichnowsky's negotiations with Grey up to the outbreak of the Anglo-German War on the evening of August 4th.

I have discussed in detail in my book (pages 90–106) the direct negotiations which took place between England and Germany on the initiative of the former Power after the failure of the second Hague Conference—the failure, that is to say, so far as the most important subjects of negotiation were concerned, compulsory arbitration and limitation of armaments. I believe that I may without presumption venture to state that my conscientiously documented account was a contributory cause in eliciting the counter-publications of the German Government and the explanations given by the Chancellor on August 19th, 1915, and that it thereby informed the public opinion of Europe of these occurrences which are very material in framing an answer on the question of responsibility. In a special chapter I propose to submit these negotiations for an understanding to a fresh examination in the light of the newly published material.

For the purpose of our present inquiry the only point of interest is the fact—the uncontroverted fact, as the Chancellor himself admits—that these negotiations for an understanding were directed to the sole end of securing England's

neutrality in a European war, the same end, that is to say, as was kept in view in the Anglo-German negotiations immediately preceding the outbreak of the European war.

I have already explained in my book that the point of departure of the efforts thus undertaken by German diplomacy was from the outset a mistaken one. By what right did Germany presume to assign to England the rôle of an inactive spectator in any continental conflict that might arise—a spectator who would have been in a position neither to protect her own interests nor discharge the obligations devolving upon her by virtue of treaties into which she had entered? Towards the small neutral States such obligations were in existence and in relation to the greater Powers England's vital interests might be most seriously affected, according to the origin or the purpose of any war that might break out; even if there were no obligations devolving on England towards her friends in the Entente, yet Great Britain's interests might, in certain circumstances, make active intervention imperative, and render the position of a mere spectator a highly dangerous attitude for England herself. What inducement, then, could England have to give to Germany a pledge of neutrality? Even if this neutrality were to be lavishly bought by offers and concessions of every conceivable kind, England would have had no inducement to sell her birthright as a European Great Power for no matter how ample a mess of pottage in the form of German concessions. England, in fact, *did not wish* to remain neutral; in the event of European conflicts arising she wished to make her voice heard, to throw her military and maritime weight into the scale in favour of her own interests; and a policy which was directed towards offering opposition to the will of England, which had always and everywhere been made manifest in this sense, was a policy false in conception and doomed in advance to failure.

What would Germany have said, if throughout a period of ten years England had continuously renewed her approaches to the German Government, submitting proposals designed to secure Germany's neutrality in European conflicts? I imagine that on the first step of this kind

being taken, the English Ambassador in question would have been shown to the door, as happened to Benedetti at the hands of the old Kaiser when he became too insistent at Ems. No one in Germany would have taken such a proposal of neutrality seriously, or would have considered that it merited an answer. Why was it believed that that could be demanded of England which no one would have dared to demand of Germany? In what does the essence of being a European Great Power consist, if not in the right to be consulted, and to assist in deciding on European questions? No conceivable equivalent, whether it be the cession of the whole of Morocco, or of East or West or South Africa, would ever have moved Germany to enter into a binding obligation to observe in European conflicts an attitude of neutrality towards England.

And what was the offer made to England in return for this enormous concession demanded of her—a concession that no Great State could possibly make? In my book I have already analysed the German equivalent. There was to be no alteration in the German naval law, no diminution in the increase in the strength of the fleet contemplated in the later extensions of this law, no promise to dispense with new increases of strength, but at the very utmost—save the mark!—an oral promise, not even put into writing, relating to a certain delay in completing the construction of ships already decided on (see *J'accuse*, pages 98-99). Thus the so-called German return was not even to achieve the real object of the whole of these Anglo-German negotiations demanded in the interests of both parties: the cessation on both sides of naval armaments, which signified the ultimate ruin of both. It gave but a threadbare promise of a certain delay in naval construction, a promise which availed nothing to the suffering and tributary nations, and which was not even reduced to a binding form in writing. The promise which Germany would have refused to give to another State at any conceivable price, the promise of neutrality in European conflicts, England was expected to give in return for a wholly nugatory equivalent. Who has ever seen a policy so conspicuous for its presumption, its folly,

and its fatuity? But more will be said of this subject in a special chapter.

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Thus, for reasons which are obvious, it was not possible to secure the neutrality of England in the past, not only because the equivalent offered by Germany was grotesque, but because England was in no way either willing or able to pledge herself to neutrality. Shortly before the outbreak of war, however, renewed efforts were made to gain this neutrality by every available means. These offers originated in the famous conversation which took place late on the evening of July 29th between Goschen and the Chancellor, after the Chancellor's return from Potsdam. The Chancellor gave to the English Government an assurance that, if England remained neutral, Germany would aim at no territorial acquisitions in Europe at the expense of France in the event of a victorious war against that country, but he declined to give a similar undertaking with regard to the French colonies. With regard to Belgium, Herr von Bethmann made only the indefinite statement that Germany's operations against Belgium would depend on the action of France, but that in any case after the conclusion of war Belgian integrity would be respected, if she had not sided against Germany. Bethmann's declaration was still further amplified in the note addressed by Herr von Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky on August 4th (Blue Book, No. 157), to the effect that even in the case of an armed conflict with Belgium Germany would under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory.

In his speech in the Reichstag on August 4th the Chancellor defined the declaration given to the English Government in the words: "that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium." In all the promises thus made by Germany there was contained the express reservation that Germany was obliged to effect a passage through Belgium, since "France stood ready for an invasion," and that for Germany "it was a question of life or death to prevent the French advance."

Germany was unable to relinquish this act of "defence," the march through Belgium, although she was, as Herr von

Bethmann explained in the Reichstag, quite conscious that she was thereby perpetrating a wrong and committing a breach of international law. This was, however, precisely the point in which England, and with England the whole world and above all Belgium herself, saw the crime which was bound to arouse Belgium in self-defence and could not fail to summon the guaranteeing Powers to action in protection of this neutral country. I have in my book fully explained the moral and political reasons, the reasons from the past, the present and the future, which necessarily compelled Belgium to reject the one-sided encouragement of Germany which would have been involved in allowing a passage through her territory and constrained her to spring to arms in her defence. Every other neutral State would have done the same, because in each case there would have been present the same ideal and material reasons prompting to the same action. Such a tiny country as Luxemburg can, of course, scarcely be considered in instituting a comparison, but Switzerland and Holland would have acted exactly as Belgium did, and would have been compelled to do so, unless they were prepared to forfeit once for all their right to neutrality, and surrender themselves unconditionally into the hands of the neighbour whom they had favoured. Hence the sympathy felt for Belgium in the whole civilised world; hence the condemnation and the brand set upon Germany.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

On the morning of August 3rd, as Grey was starting for the meeting of the Cabinet, Prince Lichnowsky called on him and pressed him to say that the neutrality of England would not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality (*que la neutralité de l'Angleterre ne dépendait pas du respect de la neutralité belge*. Yellow Book, No. 144).

<sup>1</sup> The case of Greece, of which I will speak in another place, is entirely distinct, and is in no way comparable with the case of Belgium. Greece is not a country the neutrality of which is perpetually secured by a treaty of guarantee, and which precisely for this reason is restricted in its political actions. Greece is a State which is unrestricted in the freedom of its actions, like any other which wages war, concludes alliances, etc., and it is therefore exposed to all the dangers of military complications.



Grey declined to enter into any conversation on this point. Thereupon the German Ambassador sent a *communiqué* to the Press to the effect that if England remained neutral, Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*, to which Paul Cambon replied that respecting the coast was not the same as respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German Ultimatum (of the previous evening) already contained a violation of this neutrality (Yellow Book, No. 144, paragraph 2). It is to be observed that on the afternoon of the previous day, August 2nd, Grey had given to the French Ambassador the well-known assurance (Blue Book, No. 148) in accordance with which the British fleet would support France if the German fleet came into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping. It was intended that this presupposition on which the contingent intervention of the British fleet depended should be disposed of by Lichnowsky's communication to the Press, and simultaneously that a kind of neutrality, at least of the Belgian coast, should be guaranteed.

The idea of eliminating the presupposition on which the support of the British fleet rested, also recurs in the Chancellor's speech of August 4th. Herr von Bethmann states that he has assured the English Government that the German fleet would not attack the northern coast of France, and that so long as England remained neutral, they would, upon reciprocity being assured, undertake no warlike measures against French commercial shipping. Thus the German Government, in the knowledge given by Grey to Cambon on August 2nd, obviously endeavoured on August 3rd and August 4th to render this promise ineffective, by pledging themselves to refrain from any attack against the French coasts and commercial shipping.

All this is clear, logical and indisputable.

I have already explained in my book, in opposition to the views expressed by Herr von Bethmann, that Grey's undertaking of August 2nd was very far from signifying England's participation in the war, that this pledge was restricted to the support of the British fleet, and that it

was conditional on naval operations from which it was open to Germany at her own discretion to forbear, especially as they were not of decisive significance for the course and the success of the war, and further as they would certainly not have been undertaken without the menace of English intervention in the background. In my previous analysis, as a result of the inquiry into this subject, I arrived at the conclusion, in my opinion incontrovertible, that England's participation in the European war was still entirely uncertain on August 2nd, and only became an assured fact on the evening of August 4th when Germany uncompromisingly refused to comply with the demand that her troops should be withdrawn from Belgium. If she had been in a position to comply with this demand, and had in fact complied with it, every possibility of intervening in the war would, so far as England was concerned, have disappeared, since England had demanded in her Ultimatum nothing beyond the cancellation of the violation of Belgian neutrality. This violation of neutrality was therefore not the pretext, but the cause of the English declaration of war (a point to which I hope to return in a later chapter); and it was, moreover, the only ground on which it would have been possible to justify participation in the war before the public opinion of England and in Parliament.

Let us, therefore, take Herr von Bethmann's statement in the Reichstag, on August 4th, as the last comprehensive summary of the German return for England's neutrality:

1. Germany will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium; and (as must be added, having regard to Blue Book, No. 157) will not do so, even if Belgium should resort to arms in defence.
2. The German fleet will neither attack the northern coast of France nor, in the event of reciprocity being assured, undertake hostile measures against French commercial shipping.

These comprehensive statements by Bethmann are of the highest importance for what they contain, and still more so for what they do not contain. They do not

contain any assurance that Belgian neutrality will be respected in the sense that Germany is prepared to renounce a passage through Belgium. Such a renunciation they could not, indeed, contain, for the march through Belgium had already begun, and Bethmann himself had declared it inevitable, although admitting it was wrong and a violation of international law. Further, his statements contain no promise that the integrity of France and of her colonies would be respected, but merely an offer not to undertake any hostile operations against the northern coast of France and against the French commercial shipping. Consequently when Herr Helfferich maintains :

“In return for the neutrality of England, Germany had offered the integrity of Belgium, of France and her colonies, in addition to renouncing all naval action against the French coast and against French shipping” (page 40),

he assumes a position which is in obvious contradiction to that of the Chancellor himself, who it is true was also prepared to guarantee the integrity and independence of Belgium (though, of course, after the march through Belgium and the end of the war), but did not say a word as to the integrity of France and of her colonies. The Chancellor, indeed, was not in a position to give such a declaration with regard to France, since by his refusal on July 29th (Blue Book, No. 85) to give a definite assurance in this direction he had reserved the French colonies as a possible booty for Germany. In asserting that a more extensive offer was made Herr Helfferich relies on No. 123 of the Blue Book. It therefore appears necessary to make a searching examination of this document, which contains a report from Grey to Goschen with regard to a conversation which took place with Liehnowsky on August 1st.

#### THE ENGLISH OPPONENTS OF THE WAR RELY ON No. 123 OF THE BLUE BOOK

No. 123 is also assigned an important part by the English opponents of the war in the discussions which have appeared

in the Press. In contradistinction to the German fabrication of an aggressive action on the part of England, a small section of the English opponents of the war assume the attitude that the English Government should have remained outside the European war in the interests of England herself. On the other hand, by far the larger and the more authoritative part of the opposition holds the opinion that the violation of Belgian neutrality necessitated England's entry into the war.

No member of the English opposition proceeds on the assumption that the authorship and the responsibility of the war rest with the English Cabinet. The left Socialist group of the Independent Labour Party holds the English Government responsible for the war in the wider sense in which their own Government is held responsible by every left Socialist group in the belligerent countries, and to which expression was given in the Conference of left Socialist delegates of belligerent and neutral countries, held in September, 1915, at Zimmerwald, in Switzerland. The view there enounced was that the imperialistic policy of government pursued by all the Great Powers of Europe had prepared the soil from which in the end this carnage of the nations was bound to spring.<sup>1</sup> It is in this sense, which is equally applicable to all countries, that the Socialist opposition in England considers the English Government responsible. So far as the more immediate and proximate causes of the war are concerned, there is, however, scarcely any one in England who fails to emphasise and eulogise the indefatigable efforts made by British statesmen in the cause of peace in the critical

<sup>1</sup> The *Error of Zimmerwald-Kiental*, which Grumbach has indicated in his convincing pamphlet under the above title, and which I have made the subject of my pamphlet, *The Salient Point*, by Germanicus, consists in the fact that the emphasis is exclusively laid on the fostering soil out of which war has arisen, whereas the immediate responsibility for the war, the war-bacillus, is completely ignored. In emphasising merely the *causa sine qua non*, the *causa efficiens* is forgotten. The result, unintentionally, is to arrive at an exculpation and exoneration of the true criminals, the Rulers and Governments of Germany and Austria, and in effect to act in concert with the Imperialists and the Social Imperialists.

days from July 28rd to the beginning of August. Even the keenest opponents recognise Grey's efforts for peace, and in an equal measure the necessity of the declaration of war against Germany when Belgian neutrality had been violated. Even so violent a critic of English policy in the last fifteen years as E. D. Morel, expresses the view that "on the inevitableness of an Anglo-German war arising out of a German invasion in 1914 of Belgian territory I imagine there can be no difference of opinion in this country" (*New Statesman*, February 18th, 1915).

Nevertheless there are voices, even in England, which reproach the English Government because, when their efforts for peace failed, they decided to take part in the war, instead of remaining neutral. The opposition thus expressed to England's participation in the war is, of course, fundamentally distinct from the assertion of the German Government and their defenders that the guilt of the war rests on England. The thesis of the English opponents of the war may in essential matters be summarised as follows: "Like all the other Great Powers, you have contributed to the accumulation of the combustible material in Europe by the imperialistic policy of expansion which you have pursued. You have honestly and sincerely endeavoured to prevent the outbreak of the war itself. Nevertheless, when it did break out, notwithstanding your exertions, England's interests demanded that you should stand aside rather than intervene in the war."

Why is it suggested that they should have stood aside? Because—so runs the argument of the English opponents of the war—Note 123 proves that Germany had offered you everything that could reasonably be required from the English point of view; there was a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality; there was a guarantee of France and of her colonies. Further, the German Ambassador himself pressed the English Secretary of State to formulate the conditions on which England would be prepared to remain neutral; but Sir Edward Grey definitely declined to give any promise of neutrality and declared that he must keep his hands free.

Such is the accusation of that section of the English

opposition which finds even in the violation of Belgian neutrality no sufficient ground for England's participation in the war; such is the accusation which rests on No. 123 of the Blue Book, and which is advanced on the same foundation in German apologetic literature and especially by Herr Dr. Helfferich. Inevitably, in the course of his argument Dr. Helfferich at the same time seizes the opportunity of tracing Grey's refusal of any promise of neutrality to an alleged undertaking given to France which, as I have shown elsewhere, was in reality non-existent.

#### THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF NO. 123 OF BLUE BOOK

Both these attacks on the English Secretary of State, the English as well as the German, break down as soon as one examines the fateful No. 123 in the light of the other diplomatic documents, and in particular of those published in the recent German White Book (pages 46 to 49). Such an examination shows the complete correctness of the assertion of Grey and his defenders, that No. 123 does not, in fact, contain any offers made by the German Ambassador of a more or less binding character, but merely certain hypotheses and personal views which the Ambassador uttered in conversation, and which neither invited nor required any formal reply. It must be admitted that the telegram sent to Goschen, which, nevertheless, was published by Grey himself, may give rise to all manner of misunderstandings to Grey's disadvantage. It is all the more deserving of recognition that, notwithstanding this he has published the telegram which has furnished his opponents within and without England with so copious material for attack, instead of simply omitting it, as diplomatists of other countries have done in the case of all inconvenient documents. The publication of the telegram thus evinces a degree of objectivity and sincerity on the part of English diplomacy which is not to be found on the other side, and thereby confers a measure of credibility on their other publications which defies all the assaults of Helfferich and his tribe.

## RESPECT OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY ?

What, then, is the meaning and significance of No. 123 ? So far as the first paragraph is concerned the contents of the despatch are entirely clear and unambiguous. This first paragraph corresponds to the despatch sent to Berlin at 5.30 p.m. on August 1st by Prince Lichnowsky (New German White Book, page 48) and contains in the form of a memorandum the reply of the English Government to the declaration made by Jagow with reference to the respect, or rather the non-respect, of Belgian neutrality (Blue Book, No. 122). The English Government expresses their great regret at Jagow's evasive answer, because the neutrality of Belgium "affects feeling in England." If Germany could see her way to giving the same positive answer as had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension in England. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in England.

While the first paragraph of the Note presents no difficulties, these begin at once with the second paragraph, which runs :

"He (Lichnowsky) asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral."

The third paragraph contains Grey's answer to this question on the part of Lichnowsky :

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone."

That we are here dealing not with a real offer by the German Government, but with what I might call a theoretical hypothesis put forward by Lichnowsky, is clear from all the

diplomatic documents and also from the military situation. Neither before nor after August 1st, the day of the conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky, did Germany at any time ever give a pledge that she would not violate the neutrality of Belgium, that is to say, that she would desist from marching through Belgium. From the conversation between Bethmann and Goschen on July 29th (Blue Book, No. 85) down to Jagow's despatch to Lichnowsky of August 4th (Blue Book, No. 157) the German Government had only given evasive or, in the end, directly negative answers to the question whether Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. The answer was evasive as given on July 29th by Bethmann; evasive as given on July 31st by Jagow (Blue Book, No. 122); directly negative as given on August 4th by Jagow (Blue Book, Nos. 157 and 160). The necessity of marching through Belgium was explained by the German Government by reference to the similar intentions entertained by France, the existence of which, however, was never proved, and by the urgency of anticipating a French invasion (see the Chancellor's speech of August 4th; Blue Book, No. 157; Grey Book, I, No. 20); this passage through Belgium was, however, never renounced, and could not be renounced by Germany, since the strategical plans prepared years in advance had rested on forcing such a passage through Belgium. To march through Belgium was, however, tantamount to the violation of Belgian neutrality, as Herr von Bethmann himself admitted in his speech in the Reichstag, and as is incontrovertible from the standpoint of international law. The day on which this conversation took place, August 1st, was the day of the expiration of the two Ultimata, of the general mobilisation in France and Germany, of the declaration of war against Russia; it was the day before the entry of German troops into Luxemburg; how was it that on that day, when it was no longer possible to stave off the European war, Prince Lichnowsky should suddenly be in a position to promise something which was never promised before or afterwards, and which it was impossible to promise, having regard to the diplomatic and military situation? What he could do was to promise that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected if no



war between France and Germany broke out ; but if war should break out, the promise was impossible, pointless, and impracticable. It was a theoretical hypothesis and not a practical proposal, and therefore it need occasion no surprise that Sir Edward Grey declined to make any definite statement as to the obligations he would undertake on the ground of this hypothetical assumption on the part of Lichnowsky. He naturally restricted himself to the observation that the action of the English Government would to a large extent be determined by public opinion, and that this, again, would be very materially affected by the respect or the violation of Belgian neutrality.

He then considered further Lichnowsky's hypothesis, which, speaking for himself, he considered insufficient to obtain from England a promise of neutrality. He was here obviously making reference to the more extensive interests of England, which, as the English Government had constantly emphasised, prevented Great Britain from being an indifferent spectator while France was being crushed—which might take place quite apart from loss of territory—and while the European balance of power was thereby upset, and a position of hegemony assumed by Germany. In a world-wide conflagration such as at that moment threatened to break out, England, like every other European Power, was called upon not merely to fulfil her treaty obligations towards a small neutral State, but also to safeguard her own interests as a Great Power ; and with regard to the nature or the extent of these interests, she was under no obligation to give an account to anyone but herself. As, on the one side, the German craving for "World Power" led to the European War, as a result of which pan-Germanism hoped in the first place to acquire the leading position on the Continent and thereafter to reach a final reckoning with England the former World-Power, so, on the other side, the interest of Great Britain operated in the contrary direction, and called for the conservation of the European balance, the maintenance of the equilibrium of forces on the Continent, and as a result the continuance of the position acquired by England in a development extending over centuries.

This is the idea, incontrovertible from the English point of view, at which Grey hints when in his conversation of August 1st he declined to enter into any compact with regard to English neutrality, as he had previously done in his celebrated despatch of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 101) and in all the previous Anglo-German negotiations. England had only one interest, the preservation of the peace of Europe. If this interest were thwarted by the bellicose attitude assumed by Germany and Austria, and if war should in fact ensue, a consideration of English interests would be the exclusive factor in deciding the question of England's participation in the war, and no regard would be had to Germany's desire, dictated by Germany's own interests, for English neutrality. If Herr Helfferich chooses to depict England's resolution to keep her hands free in the event of a war as having been a consequence of an agreement made with France, nothing can, of course, prevent him from adhering to his arbitrary inference. That it is arbitrary and in contradiction to all the proved facts of the case, I have, however, as I believe, proved beyond all doubt in the preceding inquiry into No. 87 of the Blue Book, which, according to Helfferich's assertion, is supposed to constitute a pledge undertaken by England as early as July 29th. This assertion is refuted by countless proved indisputable facts to which I need not return here. One of these is the fact that it was not until August 2nd that Grey's first promise of help was handed to the French Ambassador (Blue Book, No. 148), and that even this promise was restricted to support by the fleet, and was conditional on certain German naval operations. How can Herr Helfferich be so hardy as to assert that Grey's statements to Lichnowsky on August 1st were the consequence of an English undertaking given to France ("England is already bound to France"), when it was not until the following day that the first binding act took place, an act, moreover, that was contingent merely, being dependent on Germany's proceedings at sea?

But however Herr Helfferich may explain Grey's behaviour towards Lichnowsky, it remains a fact that Grey declined on August 1st to give a promise of English neutrality on the strength of Lichnowsky's purely theoretical,

and in practice unfeasible, hypothesis that Belgian neutrality would be respected.

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If Lichnowsky had, in fact, offered that Belgian neutrality should be respected in the widest sense—that is, that Germany would disclaim a passage through that country—a promise he was neither willing nor able to give—he would in doing so at once have placed himself in opposition to all the other statements made by German statesmen. If Germany could have waived the passage through Belgium, the request that her neutrality should be respected would not have been decisively rejected by Bethmann on July 29th, and by Jagow on August 4th, in the morning in his despatch to Lichnowsky and in the evening in conversation with Goschen. If the renunciation of the passage through Belgium had been seriously offered as the price of English neutrality, Herr von Bethmann in his speech of August 4th would not have confined himself to the assurance “that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium.” He would certainly not have passed over in silence the fact, so incriminating to England, that Germany was indeed prepared to renounce the passage through Belgium, if England would but remain neutral. Herr Dr. Helfferich also would not have contented himself (page 40) with representing “the integrity of Belgium” as the price, apart from other concessions, which had been offered for English neutrality, if, in fact, the price had been a much higher one, namely, the unconditional observation of Belgian neutrality, that is to say, the renunciation of a passage through the country. This renunciation was never at any time offered and, as things stood, could not be offered. The apparent contradiction between the second paragraph of No. 123 of the Blue Book and all the other demonstrated facts is only to be explained, as Grey and his defenders explain it, by the fact that Lichnowsky’s question was not an official offer by the German Government, but only a personal hypothetical utterance of the Ambassador, void of any practical material foundation.

## THE INTEGRITY OF FRANCE AND HER COLONIES

We now come to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of No. 123 :

“The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.”

From these sentences in Note 123 Herr Helfferich and Grey's English opponents deduce the further grave charge against the English Minister that he was offered a guarantee not only of the non-violation of Belgian neutrality but also of the integrity of France and her colonies, but that he nevertheless refused to enter into any discussion on the conditions of neutrality, and that he thus without reason plunged England into war.

What validity is there in this charge ? If the phraseology of No. 123 may give rise to certain doubts on the question of the integrity of France and her colonies, as well as on the question of the observation of Belgian neutrality, any such doubts are completely resolved by the publications contained in the second German White Book. In the light of these publications, and especially of Lichnowsky's three despatches of August 1st (pages 48 and 49), which have not hitherto been known, it is clear that the German Ambassador never thought, and could not have thought, of giving to the English Government, as the price of their neutrality in a continental war, an assurance that the integrity of France and her colonies would be respected.

Such an assurance would *a priori* appear so improbable, in the light of the other diplomatic records of Germany, that no critical and impartial inquirer could admit an interpretation of the sentences in No. 123 now in question, in the sense attributed to them by Grey's German and English opponents. On July 29th, in conversation with the English Ambassador, the Chancellor had officially declined to give

any guarantee that French colonies would not be annexed. In no other diplomatic document was there ever any mention of such a guarantee. The price offered by Germany in return for English neutrality was restricted to Holland and Belgium; in the case of Holland the undertaking was given in the most general terms, excluding every violation of neutrality; in the case of Belgium in the restricted form of a *later* restitution of Belgium's integrity and independence. According to the clear and unambiguous statement made by Bethmann in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4th, the guarantees given in the case of France were restricted to an assurance that the northern coast of France would not be attacked, and that measures would not be undertaken against French commercial shipping. Prince Lichnowsky himself, in his *communiqué* sent to the English Press on August 3rd (Yellow Book, No. 144), restricted the German return for England's neutrality to the abandonment of all naval operations, and of the use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*. When we bear in mind all these express refusals, restrictions, and limitations, how are we to suppose that Prince Lichnowsky should now have made to Grey such an enormous offer on his own initiative, without the instructions of his Government, in opposition to Bethmann's statements to Goschen, in opposition to the offers which, as set out in the Chancellor's speech, were restricted to subsidiary points? Are we to believe that he made to Grey the comprehensive offer: "If England remains neutral, we shall take nothing from France, either in the way of her European territory or of her colonies"?

If offers to this effect had been made in person by the Ambassador on August 1st (even Grey's note merely speaks of a "suggestion"), they would certainly have been repeated in the critical days between August 1st and 4th, when, as must then have been clear, Germany's fate depended on England's participation or non-participation in the war; the offers would have been officially formulated and submitted to the English Government in a binding form by the Chancellor in Berlin and by the Ambassador in London. Above all, the Chancellor, in enumerating the German offers for English neutrality, would not have

refrained from attaching special emphasis to this, the weightiest and most far-reaching of them all. War had not yet broken out between Germany and England when the Chancellor spoke in the Reichstag. Herr von Bethmann was obviously taking pains to inform the German Reichstag as fully as possible of the efforts made by him to secure the neutrality of England; he paraded all the offers made by Germany, but so far as France was concerned, he was obliged, under the restraining influence of the truth, to restrict himself to the statement that Germany had only given the promise with reference to naval operations against France, of which mention has been made several times. His speech of August 4th was even silent on the question of the non-annexation of French territory in Europe, which the Chancellor had still been willing to guarantee on July 29th. Even the guarantee thus restricted to Europe had in the meantime already dropped out after the actual outbreak of the Franco-German war. For even stronger reasons there could be no question of a guarantee of the non-annexation of French colonies, which had already been expressly declined a week previously. Even if no further explanations as to the meaning of the Grey-Lichnowsky interview had been forthcoming, it would have been impossible after all that had happened to put upon the conversation the interpretation that the German Ambassador had been prepared to guarantee to the English Secretary "the integrity of France and her colonies." Helfferich's assertion in a contrary sense is thus already contradicted by its inherent impossibility, and by its repugnance to all the other records of the German Government. It is, however, completely destroyed by the publication of the new German White Book.

THE PUBLICATIONS IN THE SECOND GERMAN WHITE BOOK  
BEARING ON THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GREY  
AND LICHNOWSKY ON AUGUST 1ST

We have hitherto been acquainted with only five of the telegrams bearing on this incident—those printed in *The Outbreak of War, 1914* (pages 59 and 60). There were the two telegrams from Lichnowsky of August 1st and August

2nd, one from the Emperor William to King George of August 1st, an answer from King George of the same date, and a telegram from Bethmann to Lichnowsky, also of August 1st.<sup>1</sup>

These earlier publications have now been amplified by the publication of three further telegrams from Lichnowsky to Bethmann, all dated August 1st. These first appeared in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of September 6th, 1914, and later in the new German White Book. According to these the position is as follows :

On Saturday, August 1st, at 11 a.m., Lichnowsky reported to the Chancellor that Grey had just called him to the telephone, and asked whether he could declare that in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian War, Germany would not attack France. Lichnowsky answered that he believed that he could assume responsibility for this.

On the afternoon of the same day Lichnowsky reported regarding a visit which had just been paid to him by Grey's private secretary, who had said to him that the Minister wished to make proposals to him for the neutrality of England, even in the event of Germany being at war with Russia and France.

In the afternoon the conversation, to which No. 128 of the Blue Book relates, took place between Grey and Lichnowsky. Lichnowsky reported the subject-matter of the conversation in a very detailed despatch sent to Berlin at 5.30 in the afternoon. This report from Lichnowsky affords a very valuable amplification of Grey's report to Goschen, and incontrovertibly confirms the exposition of No. 128 which I have already given in my book, that is to say, before the publication of the new German White Book, and which I have reproduced in the above discussion. In the light of this it is clear that there was never at any time any question of a guarantee of France and her colonies on the part of Lichnowsky. In reality the conversation took quite a different course from what it might appear to have done judging from the short summary addressed by Grey to Goschen. Lichnowsky's account puts it beyond all doubt that the

<sup>1</sup> [These are printed in Part IX of *Collected Diplomatic Documents*.]

integrity of France and her colonies was neither offered nor even "suggested" by the German Ambassador; his statement, therefore, serves not only to put historical facts in their true light, but also to furnish a complete exoneration of the English Secretary of State from the attacks of his opponents.

What did the Ambassador and the Secretary in fact discuss on the afternoon of August 1st? There is no difference of opinion with regard to the first point dealt with, viz., the reception which the English Cabinet had accorded to Jagow's tortuous statement made in reply to the English inquiries as to Belgian neutrality (Blue Book, Nos. 114 and 122). The statement of the English Cabinet was given in the form of a memorandum to the German Ambassador and in his despatch of the afternoon it is reported by him in exactly the same form as that in which it appears in the first paragraph of No. 123.

The further conversation between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State on the influence which a violation of Belgian neutrality might have on public opinion in England, and consequently on the decisions of the Government, is also in essential matters reported in the same terms by the Ambassador and by the Secretary of State. Mention should, however, be made of certain additions in favour of Grey's devotion to peace which appear in Lichnowsky's report, but are not to be found in the English note.

"For the time," said Grey, according to Lichnowsky's report, "there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part."

Although the point no longer requires any proof for the objective inquirer, these further statements made by Lichnowsky, which are not contained in the English note, prove anew that even in this critical moment, on the very day of the German declaration of war against



Russia, Grey was still seeking by every possible means to avoid a ground for war which might drive public opinion in England, and consequently drive the Government, to war. Lichnowsky's statements prove that it is nothing but clumsy falsification of history on the part of Messrs. Helfferich and Co. when they reproach Grey with having sought and found in the Belgian question what was merely a pretext for entering the war, when in reality, after countless previous warnings, this could not fail in the end to furnish the ground for the English declaration of war. Even the report of the German Ambassador of August 1st, like so many documents already mentioned, shows that the English Government wished, if it were in any way possible, to avoid war and was compelled to it only by the violation of Belgian neutrality.

But to proceed: Grey, according to Lichnowsky's report, continues as follows:

"He had also thought whether it was not possible that we (Germany) and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I (Lichnowsky) asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries; he also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides."

This passage of Lichnowsky's report contains the detailed paraphrase of that part of the conversation which in No. 123 of the Blue Book is reproduced with excessive brevity in the words which might mean, and have been made to mean, so much: "He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed." Lichnowsky's account gives the authentic interpretation of this short English sentence, and leads to a conception of the conversation diametrically opposed to that hitherto advanced by Grey's opponents within and without England.

Grey, in his indefatigable efforts to secure at least a localisation of the apparently inevitable struggle between Germany and Russia and in his attempt to keep France as well as England out of the contest, discussed with the German Ambassador the possibility that France and Germany, notwithstanding the German-Russian war, should remain opposed to each other in arms without taking part in the real struggle. Buchanan expressed the same idea to Grey at the close of his despatch of August 1st (Blue Book, No. 139), and Russia had also, as Buchanan reported, associated herself with the idea, stating that she was prepared to remain mobilised so long as the last attempts to arrive at an understanding were still under consideration, but that she would in no case begin hostilities first. The Tsar's telegram sent at 2 p.m. on August 1st (White Book, page 413) also contains the same proposal, namely, that mobilisation on both sides did not mean war, and that negotiations should be continued.

To Grey's suggestion Lichnowsky replied that he could well believe that Germany would give assent to such an agreement which would secure for her the neutrality of Great Britain, but added the obvious question whether Grey was in a position to make any statement that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As the English Secretary of State had only given expression in the course of conversation to this idea as a possible solution of the problem of avoiding an actual conflict between Germany and France, but as he had received from France neither instructions to make such a proposal nor her consent to the adoption of such a course, he was obliged to restrict himself to the answer that "he would make inquiries." In saying this, however, he did not fail to hint at the military difficulties involved in such a solution.

In the course of the discussion of this solution, in stating the reasons which might induce Germany to concur in such an agreement to remain inactive under arms, Lichnowsky made use of the words: "As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory." It is the words thus used by the German Ambassador which have led to the ambiguous phraseology and the consequent erroneous interpretation of the words of

Note 123 which are quoted above. Lichnowsky advances as the reason why Germany might be prepared to remain under arms opposed to France the fact that Germany did not want either to destroy France or annex portions of French territory. In the English note, however, and in the erroneous expositions of it which have found currency, it is made to appear as if Lichnowsky had promised something in the event of a war and as a negative result of a war, which in fact he had only produced in support of his contention that the intention to make war was non-existent. We are prepared, said the German Ambassador, to refrain from waging war against France, if France on her side does not actively intervene on behalf of Russia but merely remains under arms. We are prepared to do this, because our minds are not bent on conquest. But he did not make the statement, erroneously attributed to him: "If war breaks out with France, we guarantee, in the event of England remaining neutral, that we will take nothing from the French, either within or without Europe." According to his own copious despatch, sent at 5.30 p.m. on August 1st, the German Ambassador did not give such a guarantee, and cannot have done so, as I believe I have proved above. It appears from his own unambiguous account that he did make the former statement—in explanation of the German readiness to concur in an agreement for armed inactivity—and he was in a position to make such a declaration since it was not in contradiction with any other record of the German Government.

There is no room for doubt that Germany would have been prepared to desist from war with France, if France had been in a position and had been willing to break her treaty of alliance with Russia and to refuse Russia her military assistance. This possibility, however, was not open to France, just as it was not open to Germany to abandon her ally Austria. The relation between France and Russia was not merely an Entente, as was that between France and England, but a treaty of alliance, and as in the case of all treaties of alliance, the classic *casus foederis* arose where one of the allies was involved in war with two great Powers. In view of the existing treaty of alliance and France's situation in the political configuration of

Europe, it was impossible that France should refuse her assistance to Russia if Germany and Austria were opposed to Russia in war, and if in addition the declaration of war emanated from Germany. To this is to be attributed Grey's indefinite concluding observation that he would make inquiries,—inquiries, that is to say, on the point whether, in the imminent conflict between Germany and Austria on the one side and Russia on the other, France was in a position to refuse her ally help and was willing to do so. It was on this point that Grey's suggestion finally came to grief, since it was necessarily impossible to carry it into effect in view of France's loyalty to her ally Russia. Lichnowsky's fourth telegram of August 1st, sent off at 8.30 p.m., and his fifth despatch of August 2nd make the situation, as I have represented it, free from doubt. In his telegram sent on the evening of August 1st we read: "As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous."

In Lichnowsky's telegram of August 2nd we read: "Sir Edward Grey's suggestions, which rested on the desire to create the possibility of an enduring neutrality on the part of England, were put forward without previous consultation with France and without knowledge of the mobilisation and have meanwhile been abandoned as entirely without prospect of success."

Grey had thrown out in the course of conversation the idea of a possible preservation of the peace between Germany and France and consequently also with England, without previous consultation with France and without knowledge of the general mobilisation in France and Germany which took place on the afternoon of August 1st. This idea rested, as Lichnowsky expressly telegraphed, on Grey's desire "to create the possibility of an enduring neutrality on the part of England." These words of the German Ambassador on August 2nd are a striking testimony to the pacific intentions and endeavours of the English Secretary of State—the most striking testimony that could be paid to him, worthy of being placed beside the many similar testimonials included in the White Book by the Chancellor himself. Although I possess no authentic

information on the point, I am convinced, merely on the study of the documentary evidence, that if Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, could be asked on oath whether Sir Edward Grey had from the beginning to the end of the conflict sincerely desired and striven for peace, he would emphatically answer the question in the affirmative. This affirmative is already to be found in his despatch of August 2nd. Grey, who, according to Helfferich, had sold himself body and soul to France and Russia as long ago as July 29th, when he had promised them his armed support, was thus on August 1st—in the opinion of Lichnowsky, a more trustworthy authority—inspired by the sincere desire to create the possibility of an enduring neutrality on the part of England. According to Helfferich, Grey had construed the Belgian question merely as a pretext for entering the war; indeed, on Helfferich's view, we are almost led to assume that Grey had directly incited the Germans to violate Belgian neutrality in order that he might intervene in the war with Germany which was so passionately longed for. In Helfferich's eyes Grey was the evil spirit of Europe who had not only conjured up this fearful catastrophe of the nations, but could scarcely await with patience the moment in which to plunge into the conflagration; yet we find that this same Grey at the last moment considers and turns over with Lichnowsky every possibility whereby the catastrophe might be restricted and France and England saved from disaster. What he had already done, before and up to August 1st, to prevent the outbreak of the war need not again be rehearsed here.

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It is particularly when read in conjunction with Helfferich's historical views that Lichnowsky's despatches of August 1st and August 2nd are so extremely instructive. How is the substance of these despatches to be reconciled with Helfferich's inference that in the course of his conversation with Cambon (Blue Book, No. 87) on July 29th, Grey had already spoken the decisive word in favour of England's entry into the war? The fact that on August 1st

Grey was still seeking for means whereby England could be kept out of the conflict proves that at that time, that is to say, four days after the alleged undertaking, England was still entirely free. Until the evening of August 4th England was still entirely free, and would have remained outside the conflict, if Herr von Jagow had given the pledge asked of him, that Germany would withdraw her troops from Belgium, and desist from further violation of Belgian neutrality (Blue Book, No. 160). For the presumption underlying all the discussions which took place on August 1st between Grey and Lichnowsky may be expressed in these words: "If you violate Belgian neutrality, it will be impossible for England to remain out of the war." Should an actual conflict arise between Germany and France, it was evident, from all that was known in Europe of Germany's strategic plans and from the tortuous declarations of the German Government during the last days of the conflict, that a Franco-German War would involve a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. This is the inner meaning of the efforts made by Grey in the course of his conversation with Lichnowsky on August 1st to eliminate the possibility of an actual struggle between France and Germany. Had Grey's efforts been successful, had it been possible for France to withdraw from the duties involved in her alliance with Russia and to remain under arms on her side of the frontier, had Germany in consequence also remained under arms before the frontier, but without proceeding to any declaration of war or any aggressive action, there would, under these conditions, have been no violation of Belgian neutrality and consequently the possibility of England's entanglement in the war would have been eliminated. This is the meaning and the purpose of the idea expressed by Grey on August 1st. The end pursued by Grey is, however, diametrically opposed to that for which he is censured by his German antagonists. His mind was set, not in the first place on war, and in the second place on England's participation in the war; it was set primarily on the preservation of the peace of Europe, and, secondly, on the non-intervention of England, so long as such a course was in any way possible.

## THE "MISUNDERSTANDING" IN BERLIN

After this exhaustive investigation into the significance of No. 123 in connection with, and in the light of, Lichnowsky's despatches of August 1st and August 2nd we are at once fully informed of the meaning of the telegrams exchanged between the German Emperor and the King of England on August 1st, and also of the telegram sent by the Chancellor to Lichnowsky on August 1st. The expression of Grey's views on the telephone on the morning of August 1st, which later on led in the afternoon conversation to a detailed discussion of the topic, produced in Berlin the erroneous opinion that France would remain neutral in a German-Russian war, and that England would guarantee her neutrality. The Emperor William's telegram of August 1st, sent in answer to Lichnowsky's communication, begins with the words: "I have just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain." The Chancellor's telegram to the German Ambassador in London begins with the words: "Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia."

These telegrams show quite clearly that in Berlin the erroneous idea prevailed that England had made a formal proposal of French neutrality under English guarantee. In fact, as we have seen, there had only been a non-committal exchange of ideas between Grey and Lichnowsky, and this conversation had taken place without any previous consultation with France and without knowledge of the mobilisation on both sides. In his telegram dispatched at 8.30 p.m. on the evening of August 1st Lichnowsky at once cleared up the mistake, and pointed out that there was in fact no positive English proposal. He continued his explanation of the mistake in his telegram of August 2nd, and stated on what grounds there could not be any positive proposal, but that there had merely been an expression of Grey's ideas and wishes. The telegrams of the Emperor William and of the Chancellor were thereby

rendered purposeless, and the King of England in his reply of August 1st quite correctly summarises the position when he speaks of a "misunderstanding" in Berlin, in so far as a suggestion made by Grey had been taken for a positive proposal binding on England and France. King George speaks of a "suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how an actual conflict between the German and French armies might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia." The account thus given by the King of England is in almost verbal agreement, and it is entirely in substantial agreement, with Lichnowsky's account given in his telegrams of the afternoon and evening of August 1st and in his telegram of August 2nd. Grey had discussed in conversation the possibility of avoiding an actual conflict between the German and French Armies. This non-committal discussion was understood in Berlin as a positive proposal, and it was owing to this misunderstanding that the telegrams of the Emperor and the Chancellor were sent, and in reply to these an explanation in similar terms was then given by the German Ambassador and the English King.

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This is the interesting story of the Anglo-German negotiations of August 1st, and in my opinion it is not possible to dispute the view here given, resting on No. 123 of the Blue Book and on the eight despatches exchanged between Berlin and London which were published in the second German White Book. The result of this investigation is:

1. England refused to make her neutrality the subject-matter of a bargain.
2. England declared that the violation of Belgian neutrality would evoke so violent a storm in the public opinion of England, that it could be foreseen that the Government would be forced to war.
3. The German Ambassador gave no promise that Belgian neutrality would not be violated, and could not give such a promise.



4. The German Ambassador gave no pledge that the integrity of France and her colonies would be respected in the event of Germany's victory in a Franco-German war, and he was not in a position to give such a pledge. It was merely in explanation of the fact that Germany might be willing to stand opposed to France under arms that he stated that Germany did not wish to destroy France or annex portions of French territory. His utterance had reference to a motive for not going to war; it was not a promise in the event of a victorious issue of a war.

The result of my investigation is in complete accord with the declarations of the Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4th, but it is diametrically opposed to Herr Helfferich and those who argue with him, who, with the object of revealing England's malice in the true light, invent German offers which in fact were never made, and which were disowned by the Chancellor himself and by his Ambassador in London. From this inquiry English diplomacy again emerges untarnished and renewed corroboration is given to the conviction that England's desire was peace, and peace only.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM AND THE SERBIAN ANSWER

#### ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE ULTIMATUM

IN the trifling dissertations of Herr Houston Stewart Chamberlain on the question of responsibility in what he calls the "innermost circle" (*New War Essays*, page 68) I discover for once, by way of exception, a thought the substance of which merits discussion. In the passage in question Herr Chamberlain gives expression to the view that, while it may be admitted that Sazonof wished for peace in a general way, he had nevertheless a mortal horror of the Austrian demands contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Ultimatum, which relate to the collaboration of Austrian representatives in the suppression of the subversive movement and their participation in the investigations undertaken with a view to judicial proceedings against the murderers. This fear is attributed to the fact that the collaboration of Austrian representatives would have revealed the participation of the leading sections of Russian society in the murder of the Archduke. Such a contingency could under no circumstances be allowed, and hence Russia took as her motto: "Let us have peace, certainly, if it is possible; but, for God's sake, let never an Austrian look into Serbia's internal arrangements."

The idea, Herr Chamberlain, is finely conceived, but it completely breaks down when confronted with the facts:

1. That Serbia was prepared to permit the collaboration of Austrian representatives so far as agrees "with the prin-

ciples of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations";

2. That Serbia was prepared to submit to the decision of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers, that is to say, she was ready to accept a decision which would be pronounced by an impartial body on the basis of an objective inquiry which might even assume judicial forms;

3. That the Tsar of Russia had also proposed that the matter should be decided by the Hague Tribunal;

4. That, apart from the solutions offered by a conference of the Great Powers, and the reference of the question to the Hague Tribunal, there was the further possibility, proposed by Jules Cambon, of instituting an international commission of inquiry with judicial authority in order to establish the facts with regard to the murder and its concomitant circumstances.

It is clear from these four authentic facts that Russia had no reason whatever to dread an objective inquiry into the assassination, but that, on the contrary, she proposed or accepted methods of inquiry which facilitated a far more objective investigation than the collaboration of Austrian officials in Serbian police actions, which in practice would have been found unworkable. There is therefore no point in this artful thesis, or rather antithesis, of which Herr Chamberlain may claim the undisputed authorship: "Let us have war rather than an inquiry into the murder."

To Herr Chamberlain, as to all robust pan-Germans of the new type, international law is a thing of naught, and it is therefore inevitable that in his eyes Austria's demand for a *bureau de sûreté* in Serbia, similar to that possessed by Russia in Paris, was "certainly no excessive demand." In view of the Chamberlain manner of demonstration, it need occasion no surprise that this, the most hasty and most superficial of all German pamphleteers, should refer this demand for a *bureau de sûreté* to the sixth paragraph of the Austrian Note, whereas according to Berchtold's despatch of July 25th (Red Book, No. 27) it in fact refers exclusively to the fifth paragraph (and the two are in no way to be confounded). What, however, could reasonably have been asked of him was that he should inform his readers

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that the Russian *bureau de sûreté* in Paris is a voluntary institution, conceded by an international treaty, and possibly also an institution on a reciprocal basis, whereas the Austrian *bureau de sûreté* in Belgrade was intended to be compulsory in its origin and imposed upon Serbia. This is the fundamental distinction for which no analogies exist.

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So far as the rest of Chamberlain's observations are concerned I may observe that a detailed refutation, either on points of fact or of law, is scarcely called for by the few inconsequent and worthless sentences which he devotes to the question of responsibility—sentences whose ingenuousness is undimmed by any knowledge or study of the subject. Indeed, the only treatment they deserve is to be passed by with a shrug of the shoulders and the consolatory thought that every public gets the writers it deserves. If I examine more closely his observations on the exchange of notes between Austria and Serbia, my motive is merely that such a course will afford me an opportunity of submitting paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Ultimatum and the replies given on these points by the Serbian Government to an exhaustive examination from the standpoint of criminal and international law, a subject into which I have not yet entered. The special significance of these points lies in the fact that they were almost the only considerable points of difference remaining between Serbia and Austria, that they therefore became the chief pretext for a rupture in the diplomatic relations between the two countries and for the declaration of war, and that consequently they were the chief immediate cause of the outbreak of the great war.

It is scarcely necessary to point out once more that the Austrian Note, in form and substance, revealed from the outset the intention of provoking war against the neighbouring State, whatever might be the consequences to Europe. If the Serbian Government had gone even further than they did in complying with the demands contained in the Austrian Ultimatum, war would nevertheless have been brought about, as in fact, according to Giolotti's revelations, the intention had been entertained

a year previously of provoking war without the assassination of any archduke or any other particular occasion. At present I propose to leave all this on one side, and will demurely follow the Austrian Government on the ground on which they themselves have chosen to base their pretext for war against Serbia, that is to say, the exchange of notes, from which paragraphs 5 and 6 emerge as the salient points. The question, then, which I have here to answer is as follows :

Were the Austrian demands practicable, and such as could be satisfied in accordance with the principles of international and criminal law ?

How far did Serbia go in meeting these demands ?

Could she have gone any further without nullifying herself from the point of view of international law, and without resigning in favour of Austria her sovereign rights in internal administration and in the administration of justice ?

So far as the fifth point in the Austrian Note is concerned, I have already touched upon these questions above, and propose to return to them later. With regard to the sixth point, the first sentence of this demand, calling for judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot, is unexceptionable, and gave occasion to no differences between the parties. All the more exceptionable is the second paragraph : " Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto." The Serbian Government refused the acceptance of this demand " as it would be a violation of the constitution and of the law of criminal procedure." On the other hand, they declared themselves ready to communicate the result of the investigation to the agents of the neighbouring monarchy, and further, a point not to be overlooked, they offered in the concluding words of their answer to accept the decision of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers in this, as in all other points in dispute.

The Austrian Government, after avoiding all negotiations on the Serbian answer by breaking off diplomatic relations, subsequently published certain annotations on the Serbian Note on July 27th. These were, so to speak, the authentic

interpretations of the demands contained in the Ultimatum but, in practice, as I have already pointed out, they merely constituted an entirely worthless soliloquy, since the possibility of any negotiation on the basis of these interpretations had been excluded by Austria herself, and on the following day war was declared against Serbia. The interpretation to No. 6 begins with the words: "Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinterpretation."<sup>1</sup> It is possible to concur in these words, if "un" is inserted before "clear" and the word "not" is deleted. But listen, now, how this demand is interpreted:

"We desired: (1) The opening of a judicial inquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot. (2) The collaboration of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto (*recherches* as opposed to *enquête judiciaire*). It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Serbian judicial proceedings; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the collection and verification of the material for the inquiry.

If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between *enquête judiciaire* and simple *recherches* must be familiar to them."

On this interpretation I may observe that the subsequent explanation of the original demand contains a limitation, which cannot be deduced from the wording of the Austrian Note. The Note demanded that delegates should take part "in the investigation relating thereto," that is to say, in the investigation having reference to the judicial proceedings demanded in the first paragraph. The Note made no distinction between judicial and police investiga-

<sup>1</sup> I quote from the Austrian Red Book, the text of which frequently deviates from its reproduction in the German White Book—another striking testimonial to German and Austrian diplomacy. And these people, with hundreds of officials at their disposal, reproach the "accuser," who has only himself to fall back on, if at times he is guilty of an error in punctuation, or some other trivial mistake.

tions. The Serbian Government was therefore obliged to interpret, and could only interpret, the Austrian demand in the wide sense in which it was drawn up, in the sense of all the investigations relating to the judicial proceedings, whether these were directed by the police, the public prosecutor or the judiciary. The observation that the misunderstanding on the part of the Serbian Government was deliberate is therefore an insinuation, the odium of which recoils on the authors and the interpreters of the Austrian Note. Any reader with a legal training is bound to "misunderstand" the sixth point of the Note in exactly the same manner as was done in Belgrade. At the same time, whether the misunderstanding was deliberate or not, why, I again ask, did Count Berchtold fail to elucidate it? Why did he not instruct Giesl, his Ambassador, to say to M. Pashitch, that Austria was not really asking so much as Serbia, under a misapprehension, appeared to assume, and inquire whether he would not accept the less extensive demands? Why did Berchtold only give this circumscribing interpretation on July 27th, one day before the declaration of war, and even then why did he not convey to Serbia herself, but deliver in a kind of public soliloquy, this interpretation which, timeously communicated to the neighbouring Government, might perhaps have made an agreement possible? Why? There is only one answer—because he wished for war under all circumstances.

The reader with any training in law must, in fact, feel his brain reel in reading the digression of the Austrian Minister on criminal law, which is quoted above. If Count Berchtold is himself ignorant of the fact, was no jurist available to teach him, when he was composing so portentous a document, that investigations with a view to judicial proceedings may be conducted not only by the police, but also judicially, or by the public prosecutor? If his note was intended only to refer to preliminary police investigations or *recherches*, as he now indicates in his restricted interpretation, then clearly he ought not to have spoken of investigations in general. I am not acquainted with Serbian criminal law procedure, which after all is the only decisive consideration in this question. Generally speaking, however, it will be found not to deviate very far from the principles of

our German criminal law procedure, since these principles are in correspondence with the nature of the subject, and are nearly everywhere applied in modern criminal law. By way of preparation to a public action we are familiar with the process of inquiry conducted by the public prosecutor, in which the officials of the police and public safety operate in subordination to the office of the public prosecutor (with the exclusion of depositions on oath) and at the same time the magistrate can be approached by the public prosecutor for the purpose of judicial examination and depositions on oath. In urgent cases the police may in the first place proceed independently, and must then transmit their proceedings to the office of the public prosecutor. After the conclusion of the inquiries by the public prosecutor and the police, the public prosecutor may either present the indictment to the court, or in appropriate cases (and this is, indeed, prescribed in certain criminal matters) he may propose the preliminary judicial investigation. Moreover, in this preliminary judicial investigation the officials of the police and of public safety again operate in subordination to the judge who is conducting the investigation, just as they did in the inquiry conducted by the public prosecutor (German Criminal Law Procedure, §§ 156-195; for the collaboration of Police Officials, see, in particular, §§ 159 and 187). Thus in German Criminal Law we are acquainted with three kinds of investigation preparatory to criminal proceedings, namely:

(a) Inquiries conducted by the police alone, which must then be forwarded forthwith to the office of the public prosecutor for further action;

(b) Inquiries by the public prosecutor;

(c) Investigations by the magistrate.

In cases (b) and (c) the police authorities serve in subordination to the public prosecutor and the magistrate who is conducting the investigation. In all cases, after the conclusion of the preparatory proceedings, that is to say, of the preliminary inquiry, it falls to the criminal court to decide whether the proceedings in chief should be opened.

After this exposition, which contains nothing new for the jurist, we may return to Berchtold's observations on the Serbian answer and in particular to his arrogant



didactic utterances on "*recherches* as opposed to *enquête judiciaire*," and on "the distinction between *enquête judiciaire* and simple *recherches*" which must be familiar to everyone, etc. Such dicta as these must indeed appear as emanations of a mind whose vision is restricted beyond the limits of all that is tolerable, and of all that has ever been manifested in one occupying so responsible a position at so pregnant a time. The inanities in these sentences of Berchtold outnumber the words.

"Investigations" are not identical with preliminary police investigation, or simple *recherches*, as Berchtold calls the former. Investigations may also be conducted by a magistrate or by the public prosecutor, and *recherches* conducted by the police, by virtue of the fact that they take place on the instruction of the public prosecutor or of the court, may become a part of the action taken by the public prosecutor or the magistrate in pursuing the inquiry. Even if the intention had been clearly expressed from the outset, it would have been quite impossible and impracticable so to restrict the collaboration of Austrian officials in preliminary police investigations in Serbia that they should not, at the same time, encroach on the sphere of activity of the public prosecutor or of the law courts. *Recherche* is not, as Berchtold would fain teach us, "opposed to an *enquête judiciaire*"; on the contrary, the relation between the two is that of means to end. The police *recherche* is one of the means of investigation known to criminal law.

The Serbian Government were therefore entirely correct when they found in the demand for the participation of Austrian officials in the investigations relating to the judicial proceedings a violation of the constitution and of the law of criminal procedure, and it is here a matter of indifference whether the preliminary police investigations, to which Berchtold subsequently restricted his demand, were made by the police independently, or on the instruction of the public prosecutor, or of the magistrate conducting the inquiry. In any case the investigations would have taken place with the object of serving later as the basis for the decision of the criminal court on the opening of the proceedings in chief. The police operate as an auxiliary

authority in the preparation of judicial proceedings, and the enforced collaboration of foreign police officials in this preliminary action is a violation of all the principles of international law, of the internal constitution, and of criminal procedure. The whole of Austria's demand, for which, according to Berchtold, there were "numberless precedents," was in reality without any analogy, and bore on its forehead the stamp of impracticability.

How Berchtold conceived that the participation of the Austrian Police in the preliminary police investigations was to be put into operation, remains his own secret. Were the Austrians to carry on independently on Serbian soil, or were they only to act in conjunction with, and through the instrumentality of, Serbian officials? Were they to lay the results of their inquiries direct before the Serbian public prosecutor or the magistrate conducting the inquiry, or were they to do so only through the mediation of their Serbian colleagues? Who was to compel these Serbian colleagues to accept the rôle of intermediaries? Who was to compel the public prosecutor or the magistrate to have regard to the material amassed by the Austrian police? Who was to test the reliability and the relevance of this material? A moment's reflection on the practical question of giving effect to the incredible Austrian demands at once raises these and countless similar questions. Even assuming that they had been accepted, or could be accepted, they would either become the sure source of constant friction, or the focus of an Austrian tyranny within Serbian police and judicial procedure; since the Austrian police would have refused to take their orders from any Serbian policeman, public prosecutor, or magistrate, they would perforce have had to assume command themselves, in order to execute without friction their police activity on foreign territory. That would have been the beginning of vassalage, the establishment of which was rightly regarded throughout Europe as the object of the Austrian demands. Serbia's resistance to this—if the word can be applied to the reservations most humbly advanced, and to her readiness to accept a decision by arbitration—was more than justified, and was inevitable in a sovereign State.

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It need occasion no surprise that a man like Chamberlain, accustomed to advance and prove his statements with the utmost assurance, but if possible with even greater superficiality, should pass over undaunted the enormous Austrian demands contained in Nos. 5 and 6 of the Ultimatum. There are other German authors who also consider that these demands are "in no way exorbitant." In his observations Chamberlain adopts the very convenient course of restricting himself to the remarks with which the Viennese Government published the Serbian answer on July 27th; he constantly confuses No. 5 of the Ultimatum with No. 6; he quotes by way of comment on No. 6 a telegram from Berehtold to Szápáry, which relates expressly, and in view of its whole meaning can only relate, to No. 5 (in passing it may be observed that he dates this July 27th, instead of July 25th, see Red Book, No. 27). In short, the omniscient author, or rather the author who would fain take all knowledge to be his province—who constantly calls for the reminder: "non multa sed multum make the value of the writer"—does not even take the trouble to study with care the few important sentences of the Austrian Ultimatum, of the Serbian answer and of the Vienna commentary.

The fifth point in the Ultimatum demanded the collaboration of Austrian representatives in the suppression of certain national movements in Serbia, which from the Serbian point of view were just as patriotic as, let us say, the activity of the "Pan-German Union" in Germany, but which were described by the Viennese Government as "subversive" and "directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy." The Serbian Government in their answer are obliged to "confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government"; it declares itself, however, prepared to "admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations."

The Austrian Government, as is known, did not agree to any discussion, nor did they even agree to furnish to the Serbian Government a more accurate interpretation of the demands contained in their Ultimatum with respect either

to the fifth or sixth point, but abruptly broke off diplomatic relations, and three days later declared war. The commentaries and interpretations which Count Berchtold consented to furnish at a later date are therefore of no importance whatever; value would only have attached to them if they had been given direct to the Serbian Government after the receipt of the Serbian answer, and if, on the ground of these commentaries, further negotiations had taken place. If misunderstandings arose and were bound to arise on the other side in consequence of the hazy, unjuridical and loose composition of the Austrian Note, and if the Austrian Minister's purpose was to avoid a conflict and not, as would rather appear, to lead directly to a collision, then it was his clear duty to explain these misunderstandings to his opponents and having done so to put to them the further question: "Now you know what I mean; now state whether and how far you are prepared to comply with my demands." This was precisely the course which the Entente Powers, and above all Sir Edward Grey, were constantly urging on the Viennese Government, that the excessively submissive Serbian answer, which offered an unprecedented example of abasement, should at least be accepted as the basis for further negotiations, either directly with Petrograd and Belgrade, or in the form of a conference of Ambassadors in London. This, however, was the course which Austria bluntly declined until July 30th, that is to say, until a moment when the question of mobilisation (which led on the following day to the Ultimata) was pushed into the foreground by the Berlin Government, and the real issue receded into the background.

In any case the commentaries on the demands contained in the Ultimatum furnished by Count Berchtold on July 25th and 27th were entirely valueless after the breach in the diplomatic relations with Belgrade; they were, as we have remarked, merely a Viennese soliloquy designed to give the attitude of the Austrian Government a show of justification in the eyes of the other Powers and of the world, but neither intended to prevent, nor capable of preventing, the war with Serbia on which Vienna and Budapest had already resolved. These later explanations of Berchtold, therefore, call for no consideration in connection with the question of

responsibility. It is exactly as if, in negotiations between two private persons, A were to make certain demands, B were to accept these demands in part, in part ask for explanations, and in part make reservations, and if A were then bluntly to break off all further discussions, and make his tale known to the whole world that B was responsible for the breach, since he had only meant this or that by his demands. No one would give ear to A's protestations of innocence; if he had really desired that an accommodation should be brought about, he should have explained at the right time what his demands meant, either forthwith at the beginning of the negotiations, or at the latest after receiving the answer which was based partially on misunderstandings.

In the case of the Austro-Serbian dispute there must be added, as a further aggravating consideration against the Viennese Government, that their belated explanations (sent to Petrograd on July 25th, published on July 27th in Vienna) are in substance entirely untenable, and, indeed, if the harsh term may be excused, utterly foolish and unworthy of a statesman and a diplomatist.

An explanation of Article 5 of the Ultimatum is to be found in two places, in the note to Szápáry (Red Book, No. 27) and in the Viennese publication. I ask any reader with any training in jurisprudence or public law to peruse these two commentaries, and then say whether I am not justified in the emphatic judgment which I have expressed. According to Berchtold, in speaking of the question of the collaboration of Austrian officials in Serbian police and administrative matters, "International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Serbia's reservation is therefore unintelligible. . . ." If your Excellency will allow me to say so, almost every one of your words is a crass mistake, on which you could receive instruction from any pupil drawn at random from an upper form. Serbia's reservation is more than intelligible: when a State demands the collaboration of its representatives in the police activity of a neighbouring State, the question involved is indeed a decisive principle of international law (or, as you express it,

of "general international law." What does this mean? Is it implied that there is also a particular international law?) This demand is all the more monstrous when the police functions in which the neighbouring State demands the right of collaboration are aimed at the suppression of a national movement which is in no way distinguishable from the national movements in other countries. It is notorious that the German chauvinists have year in year out hawked about the assertion that there existed in France a movement inciting to war, directed against the territorial integrity of the German Empire, in so far as it had for its object the dismemberment of Alsace-Lorraine. What would the world have said, if one fine morning Germany had demanded the collaboration of German police officials in the suppression of this "subversive movement" in France? With clasped hands the world would have exclaimed: "The people in Berlin must have gone mad." In the Austro-Serbian question the position is exactly the same; it is, indeed, even more favourable for Serbia, since the question here was one of a historical national movement deeply grounded in the people. The exclamation of the world, however, was in this case somewhat different. The world unanimously said: "The people in Vienna are, it is true, not mad; but they are criminals, who intentionally put forward demands which are incapable of being complied with, and are in flagrant violation of all international law, in order at any cost to bring about a conflict with Serbia, even at the risk of a European war."

The collaboration of representatives of the police—so, Count Berchtold, your argument proceeds—is "purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement." In your commentary of July 25th, intended for the Russian Government, you protest that you "in no way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia. By 'collaboration,' in point 5, we are thinking of the establishment of a private '*bureau de sûreté*' at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris, and in co-operation with the Serbian police and administration." And that is what you call purely a matter of State police, having nothing to do with international law. Agreements similar

to those between the French and Russian Governments are known to have existed between the Prussian and Russian Governments, leading to the most ignominious hangman's services rendered by the Prussian reaction to Russian despotism, extending even to the direct surrender of Russian revolutionaries to the frontier officials of Russia (a degradation of which the allied French Government were never guilty). Do not the agreements between the French and the Russian Governments, which permit the existence of the *bureau de sûreté* in Paris and the corresponding agreements between Prussia and Russia, rest on international law? By "matters of State police," if the phrase is to have any meaning at all, you can only mean measures relating to internal police. The moment a foreign State participates in these internal measures the matter becomes a question of international law, since, after all, it is only on the ground of an international treaty that this right of participation can be conceded to another State. Such treaties rest always on a voluntary and nearly always on a reciprocal basis, and if two States voluntarily and reciprocally permit the establishment of such a *bureau de sûreté*, and provide for collaboration with the police authorities on the other side, no objection can be raised from the standpoint of international law and the maintenance of sovereign rights. It then becomes exclusively a question of political convenience. If, on the other hand, as in the Austrian case, one State demands from the other such an intrusion in the powers of a foreign police on a one-sided basis, under the harshest threats, in a form at once undecorous, ambiguous, and liable to misinterpretation, without further explanations, without going into questions of detail and without making any proposal with a view to arriving at an understanding—the later and belated explanations do not count, as I have explained above—in other words, when the one State imposes on the other the collaboration of its police in internal affairs, the matter is not one of State police, but is one of the gravest imaginable breaches of international law. The Serbian Government had therefore at the very least the right to demand more precise explanations with regard to the meaning and scope of the Austrian demands, which in

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form and substance represented the gravest and most momentous intrusion on the sovereign rights of the Serbian State, and it went far beyond the limits of diplomatic conciliation when it expressed its readiness to discuss the Austrian demand, and indeed in a certain measure to comply with it.

\* \* \* \* \*

Even Chamberlain cannot but choose to describe Austrian participation in a Serbian judicial procedure as a demand which would "manifestly" have infringed the sovereignty of the country. In saying this he merely overlooks, in the first place, the fact that the collaboration demanded "in the investigation relating thereto," even if undertaken by the police, represented in fact action subsidiary to judicial proceedings; and further that the compulsory imposition of purely police or administrative action in a foreign country also involves an egregious violation of sovereignty.

I summarise as follows :

1. The collaboration of Austrian officials in action of a police and administrative character on Serbian soil, demanded in the fifth point of the Austrian Ultimatum, represents a violation of Serbian sovereignty.

2. The demand in the sixth point for participation in investigations relating to the judicial proceedings in connection with the conspiracy, represents likewise an infringement of the sovereignty of the Serbian State.

3. It is here a matter of difference whether these investigations were to be conducted by the magistrate, by the public prosecutor, or only by the police. They are in any case investigations which are subservient to a judicial inquiry. Even if the accumulation of material for the inquiry is represented as a matter of purely police and administrative action—which in the present case is certainly an untenable view—it would nevertheless, in accordance with what is said in paragraph 1, constitute a violation of sovereignty.

4. The subsequent interpretation of demands 5 and 6 in no way modifies the view that they represent a violation of sovereignty, since even the interpretation which was given leaves unaffected the forceful intrusion into the police and judicial dignity of the neighbouring State.



5. This belated interpretation, given after the rupture of diplomatic relations (and not even communicated to the Serbian Government), proves that the Viennese Government were not concerned to obtain satisfaction for their demands, but rather were anxious that these demands should not be complied with, and that thus a pretext for war should be created.

#### SOME OF CHAMBERLAIN'S FALSIFICATIONS

As an addition to the important investigation of the fifth and sixth demands in the Austrian Ultimatum, I should still like to put before the indulgent reader, as a dainty tit-bit so to speak, some entertaining minor falsifications which the master of Bayreuth commits in discussing this question of Austro-Serbian relations. These represent only a small selection from the gigantic mass of falsifications and perversions which Herr Chamberlain has the courage to serve up for the credulous German public, and, in translation, for incredulous foreign readers. It is only as examples, and by no means as specially bad examples, that they are reproduced here; other achievements of Chamberlain, of which I propose to speak elsewhere, throw them completely in the shade. I have also selected these examples because they afford an opportunity of discussing some other points which, while less important, are nevertheless of interest:

(A) Serbia, on other points frequently compliant, refused offhand to concede this demand (No. 6 of the Ultimatum; *New War Essays*, page 74).

In this statement Chamberlain makes no mention of the fact that the Serbian Government at the conclusion of their reply had expressed their readiness to accept the decision of the International Tribunal at The Hague or of the Great Powers on all the points in which the Imperial and Royal Government might consider that they had not received satisfaction. There was, therefore, no question of a flat refusal.

(B) But before Serbia had given this negative answer, her Crown Prince had telegraphed to the Tsar, begging him "to come to our aid as soon as possible," and the Tsar had answered, "Russia will

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in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia." From the outset Russia had thus placed herself on the side of the murderers (*New War Essays*, page 74).

That this is a falsification is proved by reference to the telegram sent by Crown Prince Alexander to the Tsar on July 24th (Orange Book, No. 6) and the Tsar's reply of July 27th (Orange Book, No. 40). In his telegram the Crown Prince Alexander, after referring in terms of severe condemnation to the "horrible crime," indicates the impossibility of complying with certain of the Austrian demands, which were unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State (inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie, et incompatibles avec sa dignité comme État indépendant). Among the conditions impossible of fulfilment he makes special mention of the declaration demanded of the Serbian Government, to be inserted in the official journal, which was tantamount to an act of self-accusation before the world and before their own people; he further mentions the admission of Austrian officials to the discharge of certain functions on Serbian territory, etc. The Serbian Regent declared that he was prepared to accept all the Austrian conditions which were compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as all those to which the Tsar might advise him to agree. The time-limit allowed by the Ultimatum was, moreover, so short, and further it was so impracticable to satisfy forthwith the Austrian demands (which in part were conditional on changes in legislation, and which in any case required time) that they had to be prepared for a sudden attack on the part of the Austrian armies concentrating on the frontiers. In this hazardous situation Serbia begged the Tsar of Russia for advice and assistance. The Tsar, in his reply of July 27th, assured Prince Alexander that his Government were using their utmost endeavours to smooth away the present difficulties; he counted upon the Serbian Government supporting his efforts by neglecting no step which might lead to a peaceful settlement, preventing the horrors of a new war.

"So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if, in spite of our

earnest wish, we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia " (Orange Book, No. 40).

This, according to the documents, is the state of affairs which Chamberlain so falsified as to make it appear that the Tsar, in answer to the appeal of the Regent, gave but the one answer: "I will stand by you assassins." That the Tsar's sincere desire to maintain peace found expression not only in words but in deeds also, is proved by the diplomatic occurrences from the beginning to the end, and is not disputed even by Chamberlain himself, who on this point is distinguished from his fellows. It is interesting and noteworthy that one demand is conceded in the Serbian answer which on the previous day (July 24th) the Serbian Regent had correctly represented to the Tsar as one that could not be complied with by an independent State. The demand to which I refer is that bearing on the declaration by the Government to be inserted in the Serbian official journals. Such a demand had in fact hitherto never been addressed by one State to another in the history of diplomacy, least of all in the brutal military form of command: ". . . the royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of their Official Journal of July 18th to 26th the following declaration . . ." and further with the additional demand: "This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal Army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the Army." Even this abasement of the neighbouring Government was insufficient for Count Berchtold; in his commentary on the Serbian Note he indulges in all manner of cavilling remarks on the text of the declaration suggested by the Serbian Government which showed but trifling deviations from the original. Anyone who reads these pettifogging quibbles will have some idea of the desperate imbecile efforts of the Austrian Minister to construe a ground for war, because a dot on an *i* was still left unconceded. One thing is clear, and that is that Russia, in conjunction with England and France, had vigorously exerted pressure in Belgrade, with a view to producing a pliable disposition, and that the success which attended this pressure appears

throughout the whole of the Serbian answer, in its form and substance, and particularly in the concurrence in the declaration in the Official Journal. This is what Herr Chamberlain calls "standing by the assassins."

(C) From the first moment France openly steered for war . . . . the Frenchman who had been sent to Petrograd exclusively as an incendiary, at once launches out, and repeatedly "pleads for a decisive attitude on the part of Russia." . . . . And in the sequel France reveals throughout an increasingly urgent and violent longing for war, so that, as contrasted with her, Russia and England produce comparatively an impression of greater gravity and responsibility (*New War Essays*, page 78).

So France is the incendiary, and not Russia! What has Herr Helfferich got to say to this doctrine? That France from first to last did exactly the opposite of what Chamberlain attributes to her, that the French Government with all its will and power actively participated in the peace efforts of the other Entente Powers, that France accepted the Conference, and brought about the amalgamation of Grey's and Sazonof's formulæ of agreement, that she endeavoured to obtain the declaration of solidarity from England exclusively for the purpose of maintaining peace, that she kept her troops ten kilometres behind the frontier and that she did not abandon her hopes and her efforts for the maintenance of peace even after the German Ultimatum—all these are well-known facts which I need not repeat here: I have already discussed them sufficiently in my first and second books.

I am here considering Chamberlain's cursory observations only with the object of showing once more how little skill these men have in the art of lying, how constantly their tongues betray them, how frequently they are hoist with their own petard. At this point Chamberlain, by way of exception, for once allows himself to quote from a diplomatic document. He does so to his own undoing. The document proves precisely the opposite of what he means it to prove. The point in question is Buchanan's conversation with Sazonof on July 25th (*Blue Book*, No. 17). Sazonof declared that he was prepared to stand aside and leave the decision of the Austro-Serbian question to the four disinterested Powers. Russia had no aggressive

intentions, although Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. Further, he did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but the attitude of that Power would be decided by that of England. Unfortunately, Germany was convinced that she could count upon the neutrality of England. If England took her stand firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war. This last sentence is also quoted by Chamberlain. What does it mean, unless that it was only for the purpose of restraining Germany from any thought of war by the power of the coalition opposed to her that Russia as well as France wished and sought for a declaration of solidarity from England, whereas, conversely, confidence in English neutrality might increase Germany's desire for war? That is identically the same argument as is advanced in my books and supported by a mass of evidence, the argument which emphasises the Entente Powers' devotion to peace and Germany's desire for war. Thus involuntarily Herr Chamberlain confirms my assertion.

(D) Herr Chamberlain, of course, does not observe that his quotation from No. 17 has given him away. On the next page (*New War Essays*, page 79) he imputes to the English Government a firm attitude "against Germany and her uninterrupted efforts for peace." To arrive at this perversion, he is guilty of what can only be described as a revolting falsification of No. 120 of the Blue Book, from which he arbitrarily culls a single sentence while prudently refraining from quoting the document, lest his tricks might be discovered. In No. 120 Buchanan submits a report on a conversation which he and Paléologue had with Sazonof on July 31st, in the course of which the Russian Minister submitted to the two Ambassadors his second formula, which was intended to amalgamate the first English and the first Russian formula. On the day in question direct discussions had been resumed with the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd and at the same time an animated exchange of telegrams was taking place between the German Emperor and the Tsar, and in these circumstances Sazonof considered that the whole situation was more propitious. He returned to his idea that the negotiations should be continued in the more favourable

atmosphere of London, and concluded with an expression of deep gratitude to the English Government which had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them, he said, if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

From this long document the truth-loving Chamberlain quotes only the following nineteen words: "The Emperor, the Russian Government and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain," and in explanation of this he adds: "firm, that is to say, against Germany and against her uninterrupted efforts for peace." Whereupon he breaks out into rhapsodies on Germany's love of peace and the Entente Powers' desire for war. The selection of this one sentence, with the interpretation attached to it, is, as anyone may convince himself by a perusal of No. 120, a deliberate falsification of the contents of the Note, a perversion of it into its opposite. Sazonof thanks the English Government for their energetic efforts in the cause of peace, which on this day appeared to the Russian Minister to hold out once more a greater promise of success. This Chamberlain transforms into an expression of gratitude for English incitement to war against the peaceful Germany. It is impossible for a writer to proceed further on the path of bare-faced falsification and, simultaneously, of contempt for his own public, which must be assumed to be incapable of exercising any kind of check or control.

(E). Herr Chamberlain plays another similar prank with his ingenuous readers on the next page (page 80) in discovering an "unintentional confession" of Germany's love of peace in Grey's despatch to Goschen of July 29th (Blue Book, No. 77), that is to say, in a conditional compliment paid by the English Minister to the German Chancellor.

What is, in fact, the significance of this compliment? In the course of July 29th Herr von Bethmann had a somewhat lengthy interview with the English Ambassador (Blue Book, No. 75) in which the influence exercised by the German Government on Vienna was discussed in the ambiguous and dilatory manner which is known to satiety. Herr von Bethmann confirmed the fact of Vienna's refusal

to allow the Serbian answer to be treated as a basis for further negotiations, but went on to give an assurance that the Austrian Government had no territorial designs and that the action against Serbia "had presumably the exclusive object of securing guarantees." If this view were correct the Chancellor had advised the Austrian Government to say so openly, in order to avoid misunderstandings; as yet he had not received a reply from Vienna; (here we have the celebrated game of hide-and-seek between Vienna and Berlin, as if the one knew nothing of the other, and each was improvising behind the other's back). Out of the advice thus alleged to have been communicated to Vienna (as if, had he only wished, he could not simply have *commanded* instead of *advised*!) Herr von Bethmann fashions for himself such a title to glory that he asks the English Ambassador to communicate this world-shaking fact to London as a proof of how much he, the Chancellor, was doing to support Grey's efforts in the cause of European peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

To this self-laudation of Bethmann, in itself weakly founded and disowned by subsequent events, Grey replies on the same day (Blue Book, No. 77) that he much appreciates the language of the Chancellor, that Germany may rely upon it that England will continue as heretofore to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the most appalling calamity, and that all would join in deep gratitude to the Chancellor as the saviour of peace, if he could induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her.

This is the position as revealed by the documents from which Chamberlain infers Germany's love of peace and England's desire for war. In reality both documents (No. 75 as well as No. 77) only serve to make manifest the English Government's sincere and earnest desire for peace. The Chancellor himself, indeed, expressly acknowledges this in the concluding words of his conversation with Goschen. The praise of Germany's love for peace uttered by Grey was, however, only conditional. It depended on the success attending Bethmann's assurances, which in their vague, double-tongued and ambiguous form, void of any tangible content, were in them-

selves far from deserving the praise of having saved the peace of Europe. If peace could be saved by a certain measure of pliability on the part of Austria towards the Russian Government, induced by the influence of Germany, then Grey was prepared to hail the Chancellor as the saviour of peace. But peace, as we know, was not preserved. We have no kind of authentic evidence that the German Government honourably and sincerely exerted its influence in Vienna to obtain this measure of pliability in the interests of the maintenance of peace. The only despatch from Bethmann to Tschirschky which has been made known after a year of war, that of July 29th or 30th (the exact date has not been given by the Chancellor), is not sufficient to furnish this evidence, as I have shown elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Up to July 30th-31st, Austria remained inflexible and inexorable, impervious to every attempt to mediate and even her last offers (Red Book, Nos. 50 to 56) maintained intact the demand "that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course," a demand which was bound to prove fatal to all negotiations directed to an understanding, even without the interposition of the German Ultimata. Grey's compliment to Bethmann, which was merely a polite repetition of that conveyed by Bethmann to Grey, was therefore rendered entirely pointless by subsequent occurrences. The evidence furnished by Nos. 75 and 77 of the Blue Book is all in favour of England, and in no way in favour of Germany. Chamberlain, however, acting on Helfferich's model, accuses the English Minister of having, on the very day on which the above exchange of Notes took place, turned the scale in favour of war by the pledge of support given to France. I have elsewhere already blown down Helfferich's house of cards. Anyone who reads the above numbers of the Blue Book in connection with his insubstantial structure will gain anew the con-

<sup>1</sup> When I wrote this section the second instruction from Bethmann to Tschirschky of July 30th, 1914, had not yet been made known. The Chancellor produced this revelation to an astonished world with even greater delay than the first, and only published it on November 9th, 1916, two and a quarter years after the beginning of war. I return in detail to these instructions in a later passage.



viction, which indeed is given by a study of all the other documents, that the defenders of Germany conduct their dubious case with but little luck and skill.

#### OTHER POINTS OF THE ULTIMATUM

Although I shall be obliged to return to Herr Chamberlain in a later passage, I leave him here for the present, and at the same time I bring to an end my investigation of the fifth and sixth points in the Austrian Ultimatum.

In my book I briefly dismissed the other and less important points in the Ultimatum and in the Austrian comments with the following observation :

“The pedantic nature of these observations was described by the Italian Minister, Di San Giuliano, as ‘quite childish.’ The expression is, indeed, much too mild, when one reflects that the fate of Europe, and, indeed, of the world, depended on these discussions. A hedge-lawyer would be ashamed to produce in the paltriest case quibbles such as those to which Austria descended in order to find grounds to justify her dissatisfaction with the Serbian answer. It is not worth while to discuss the details of this composition, which is miserable even in style” (page 145).

I still consider that these observations are apt and sufficient to justify an attitude of silent contempt towards the pedantry which Berchtold, the most fatal of all “statesmen,” had the effrontery to produce as the basis of his declaration of war against Serbia. On these miserable formal distinctions between the Ultimatum and the answer the security and the existence of Austria-Hungary, as we still read every day, were alleged to depend. If the demands of Austria were fulfilled down to the dot on the last *i*, Austria’s existence might still continue. But if any limitations were made, which, moreover, might have been further reduced in the course of negotiations, the death of the dual monarchy was assured. The question was one of a “struggle for life or death.” And in such a case the weaker must, of course, go to the wall . . .

I should have been glad on this occasion also to pass contemptuously over all the less important points in the Austrian Ultimatum and the corresponding hair-splitting interpretations given by Count Berchtold. To print the Austrian Ultimatum and the Serbian answer opposite each other, without any commentary, would have sufficed to make clear to the reader the futility of all the attempts of the Austrian Minister to make the Serbian Paul into a Saul and to convince him that Berchtold's observations are, indeed, "miserable quibbles of which the pettiest hedge-lawyer would be ashamed." I should have been glad to follow the example of Mr. J. M. Beck, the late Assistant Attorney-General of the United States, who in his book already mentioned, *The Evidence in the Case*, has simply placed the two texts opposite each other in parallel columns, considering that this course is sufficient "to convince any reasonable man that this Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands, and that the reply of Serbia was as complete an acquiescence as Serbia could make without a fatal compromise of its sovereignty and self-respect." At the conclusion of the reprint of the two texts, Beck, in referring to the Austrian document, makes use of the words: "The ineffaceable discredit of this brutal ultimatum"—a judgment in which at the time the whole world, apart from the Austrian authors of the Note and their adherents, concurred in stupefied horror. Even Herr von Jagow was in no way charmed by this diplomatic masterpiece of his Viennese colleagues. In his conversation with Rumbold, the British Chargé d'Affaires, on July 25th (Blue Book, No. 18), he openly admitted "that the Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands" and that the Austrian Note "left much to be desired as a diplomatic document."

As I have said, I would have preferred to pass over all the less important points of the Ultimatum, apart from the fifth and sixth, or to have dealt with them merely by placing the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in juxtaposition, and I would have considered myself justified in adopting either of these courses. The objection has, however, been urged against me by certain

of my opponents that I avoided the discussion of these formal disputes between Austria and Serbia, merely because I was unable to advance any cogent argument against the Austrian demands. This charge compels me to select at least a few points from the Austrian Note and the Viennese comment for the purpose of showing the intellectual level of the people who composed these documents.

A.—The Serbian Government had quite rightly pointed out that they could not “be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the Press, and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control.” In the first place I would point out that this phraseology, which I have taken from No. 89 of the English Blue Book (French text) and from the German translation issued by the English Foreign Office, does not agree with the wording which the Austrian Government published in Vienna on July 27th with their observations interspersed, and which the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* reproduced on July 29th. Those who presume to construe the smallest verbal mistake or misprint in my large book into a malevolent falsification should ask Count Berchtold why, in a document of supreme historical importance which has become the initial point of the most calamitous catastrophe of war, he has replaced the exact words by an inexact wording, and has submitted the latter to criticism.

Leaving aside, however, the question of the diversity of text, we may ask in what way the Austrian Government takes exception to the Serbian Note on this point. The following passage contains their observations :

The proposition of the Royal Serbian Government that utterances in the Press and the activities of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institution of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to Press and associations; this law has a public character and subjects the Press, as well as associations, to State control.

It is refreshing to find Austria appearing in the rôle of

preceptor in modern democratic institutions. So, then, we know that the Press and associations, even in liberal States, on the doctrine of Count Berchtold, are subject to the supervision of the State, in the sense that the Government may prescribe for them their political and national tendency. This may be the case in Austria, perhaps also in Russia, but it is not the case in democratic States like Serbia and other Balkan countries which, in spite of their constitutional youth, have advanced further on democratic lines than many old and powerful great States. The lecture in public law delivered by the gifted Austrian statesman is inapplicable even to the case of Germany. According to German imperial law, and according to the provisions of the constitutions of the various States bearing on the subject, unconditional liberty is in times of peace accorded to the Press and to associations to express their views both on internal and on foreign politics and the only limit which they must not exceed is that they must refrain from offending against the Criminal Code. The Serbian answer is thus based on modern constitutional law, the Austrian observations are based on hide-bound reaction.

*B.*—A further example of Berchtold's heterodoxy and pedantry may be given. On the demand of the Austrian Government, the Serbian Government had stated their readiness to make the unparalleled concession of publishing on the first page of the Official Journal of July 26th a declaration prescribed verbatim by Austria condemning any propaganda directed to the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and undertaking "to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress." In accordance with the Austrian demand, this declaration was at the same time to be published to the Serbian army in the official bulletin as an order of the day through the King, represented by the Prince Regent Alexander. The Serbian Government conceded all this, adapted with almost complete verbal fidelity the phraseology of the declaration to be published

by the Government and the King to the model of the Austrian behest, and left the Serbian population not the slightest room for doubt as to the consequences of action contrary to the will of the Government.

But all this was not enough for Count Berchtold; from the manner in which the Serbian manifesto is formulated he infers that the Serbian Government are "insincere and disingenuous" and that they "reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on." Has there ever been a parallel instance of quibbling so malicious and simultaneously so idiotic in character? The Serbian Government "sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings"; it condemns "all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it." But all that is not enough. That is all "insincere and disingenuous," it reserves evasions for later use, etc. It is impossible to avoid a feeling of nausea on inquiring more closely into these questions, above all when we keep in view how enormous were the interests of humanity dependent on this criminal quibbling.

The Serbian Government expresses its regret, exactly in the phraseology prescribed by Count Berchtold, that "certain Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of March 31st, 1909." In the prescribed text the Serbian Government had modestly permitted itself to interpolate, after the words which speak of the participation of Serbian officers and officials, the parenthetical observation "according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government." According to Berchtold this interpolation proves that the Serbian Government were here also pursuing the diabolical end of "preserving

a free hand for the future." In reality the interpolation merely proves the almost slavish subjection of Serbia under the Caudine yoke of the powers at Vienna; for up till the evening of July 25th the Serbian Government had no certain evidence of any kind of the participation of Serbian officers and officials in this propaganda, apart from the grounds for suspicions against Commander Tankosic, who had already been arrested on the evening of July 23rd. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence, the King and Government of Serbia were prepared to issue their condemnatory manifesto—on the mere statement, that is to say, of the Austrian Government without any valid evidence, which it may be observed has not even yet been forthcoming. The observation that all this was done "only on the charges made by Austria" is one of those crimes which could only be atoned in Serbian blood and later by the death of whole generations of Europeans.

C.—The Austrian Government had demanded that Serbia should "suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy." In reply to this demand the Serbian Government had declared its readiness at the next convocation of the Skuptchina to introduce a provision into the Press law "providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary." The Serbian Government further promised, "at the approaching revision of the Constitution, to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution." (Quoted after the French text, Blue Book, No. 39.)

This indication of new legislative measures to make it possible to satisfy the Austrian demands quite upsets Count Berchtold. Here is something which the reactionary Austrian quite fails to understand. The Serbian proposals are, in his eyes, "entirely unsatisfactory"; further, it is

not said within what period of time these laws will be enacted, or what will happen in the event of the Skuptchina rejecting these measures. "We wished, therefore, to know that a definite result in this connection was assured. Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result." Truly, a scandalous proceeding on the part of Serbia! In response to Berchtold's demands the Serbian King should have carried out a *coup d'état*; he should have proclaimed a "state of siege," in the midst of peace, created a Serbian section 14, following the famous Austrian example, and suppressed the freedom of the Press, guaranteed by the Constitution. His failure to do so was an offence which could only be expiated in Serbian blood, and later on by the murder of the flower of Europe's youth.

D.—The Austrian Government had demanded the dissolution of the society known as the "Narodna Odbrana," and of other societies of a similar anti-Austrian tendency, as well as the prevention of the continuation of any such societies under another name and form. Serbia declared herself ready to dissolve all such societies. This is not enough for Count Berchtold. As he expresses it, in the language which smacks of the Viennese Chancellery, his demand "is not entirely complied with." Since the Serbian Government does not specifically mention the confiscation of the means of propaganda, and the prevention of the re-establishment of the societies, Austria has no guarantee, "that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the monarchy, especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution." The dissolution, therefore, is insufficient. To satisfy Berchtold "entirely," it would apparently have been necessary to smite dead or deliver to the Austrian reaction the whole company of Pan-Serbs, who after their kind in no way differ from our own Pan-Germans.

E.—The Austrian Government had demanded the elimination from public instruction in Serbia of "everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary," and this was to apply, not only to the teaching body, but also to the methods of

instruction.<sup>1</sup> The Serbian Government undertook "to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary," but modestly added: "Whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda" (Blue Book, No. 39). This is not enough for Count Berchtold. The idea of asking for evidence is monstrous! The Serbian Government must themselves know the "objectionable matter" contained in their school-books. But why did Berchtold not indicate more definitely the "matter" he had in mind? If Serbia's general undertaking was not sufficient, it would have been open to him on this as on all other points to enter into negotiations and produce his special grievances.

But Berchtold has another point on which to animadvert. The Serbian answer—can a greater crime be imagined?—omits the words "both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction." Here is another devilish reservation. The Serbians are prepared to banish from their system of public instruction everything that is anti-Austrian in tendency, but they do not expressly say that under what is "anti-Austrian" they are prepared to comprise things as well as persons. This, again, is a crime which can only be washed out in Serbian blood, and in the sequel by the death of millions of Europeans.

F.—The Austrian Government had demanded the removal from the Serbian military service and from the administration in general of all officers and functionaries "guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy" and had offered to communicate to Serbia "their names and deeds." The Serbian Government had concurred even in this very extreme demand, but had considered it necessary to define more precisely the somewhat elastic Austrian formula "guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary" by stating that it must be proved by "judicial inquiry," and that the officers and officials in question must have been "guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."

<sup>1</sup> [Means of instruction; in the French version, *moyens d'instruction*; in the German, *Lehrmittel*.]



The Serbian Government thus made the very justifiable reservation that officers and functionaries should only be dismissed if

(a) a judicial investigation should prove their guilt, and if

(b) the actions of which they were guilty consisted not merely in a general "propaganda against Austria-Hungary," but in the positive endeavour to injure the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

The unrestricted acceptance of the indefinitely elastic Austrian formula would have made it impossible for any Serbian officer or functionary to take part in any national political activity, and if a corresponding provision had been applied to our Pan-German generals, admirals and civil servants, hundreds and thousands of these gentlemen would have been deprived of their office and their sustenance. In discussing with Szápáry on July 27th the exchange of Notes between Austria and Serbia (Red Book, No. 31), Sazonof had at once pointed out that it would easily be possible to arrive at an agreement on seven of the Austrian demands, but that the others (that is to say, Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note) "were unacceptable in their present form." Among the points unacceptable in form was included, in Sazonof's opinion, the dismissal of officers and functionaries on account of propaganda against Austria.

The reservations which the Serbian Government made with regard to the Austrian demand on this point were absolutely imperative on general principles of justice to their own officials, from the standpoint of the independence of the State in relation to her neighbour, and above all in accordance with Serbian constitutional and criminal law. Here again we encounter the contrast between the reactionary principles on which Austria is governed and the democratic principles which prevail in the Balkan countries. To Count Berchtold it appears to be entirely a matter of course that officers and functionaries should be turned out on the street without any judicial proceedings, merely because of an entirely indefinite state of affairs—which would, moreover, lead in no other country to any dis-

advantageous consequences for those concerned. It appears natural to him that all this should be done by administrative action, and that reliance should be placed on the material to be furnished (but not furnished) by the Imperial and Royal Government as the basis of this violent procedure. The Austrian Minister sees malice and deceit in what is merely a platitude to every democratically thinking West-European, the principle, namely, that proceedings with a view to the dismissal of functionaries and officers can and ought to be taken only after it has been judicially established that there is a situation which calls for punishment, or at any rate for disciplinary action. For him this Serbian reservation is so monstrous a crime that, because of it and other similar "subterfuges," he breaks off diplomatic relations with the Serbian Government, declares war against Serbia, and at the same time plunges Europe in a sea of blood.

\* \* \* \* \*

I may pass over the other points at issue which have not been specially mentioned here: they are all cast in the same mould; throughout slight deviations in the Serbian concessions are magnified into mountains of malice and insincerity; throughout gnats are transformed into camels in the hope of justifying to Austria and to the world the rupture in diplomatic relations and the declaration of war which took place three days later.

It is a vain endeavour! The Austrian Ultimatum in itself bears the desire for war imprinted on its forehead like the mark of Cain. This requires no detailed proof for those who can read and understand. In my book (page 317) I have referred to the report of the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade of July 21st, 1914 (Red Book, No. 6), which stated two days before the issue of the Ultimatum that a reckoning with Serbia by arms was inevitable. Further, the *Militärische Rundschau*, the organ of the Viennese military party, wrote some days before the Ultimatum to Serbia:

The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circum-

stances. At this moment the initiative rests with us ; Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once.

In the middle of July, eight days before the delivery of the Austrian Ultimatum, the *Neue Freie Presse* was already preaching war to the knife against Pan-Serbism and the extermination of the cursed Serbian race, which was demanded in the name of humanity and of general security.<sup>1</sup>

But, as we have said, it is entirely irrelevant to refer to Press extracts, which could be collected by the hundred and the thousand from the Austrian and Hungarian papers of these days. The demeanour of the Austrian Government in itself furnishes the key to their intentions. I have already indicated in my book that unless Count Berchtold had preferred a rupture to an adjustment between his demands and the Serbian concessions, he would have negotiated further instead of adopting the course he did, that of declining to extend the time-limit and then forthwith, on the receipt of the Serbian answer, recalling his Ambassador. The Serbian Government throughout received short shrift ; they were not even informed of the grounds on which their reply to the Austrian Ultimatum was considered unsatisfactory, or the reasons for the recall of the Austrian Ambassador (Red Book, No. 24).

I said that Austria's desire for war appears unambiguously in the actions of the Austrian Government and requires no further proof, based on printed confessions. The long list of comments on the Serbian Note was published at Vienna on July 27th. In the same way Berchtold, in his telegram to Szápáry on July 25th (Red Book, No. 27), gave the Russian Government certain explanations on the fifth point. Why, I ask—as I have repeatedly asked—were these critical comments not submitted to the Serbian Government ? Why were they not made the subject of an inquiry before the Hague Tribunal or before a Confer-

<sup>1</sup> The above quotations are taken from the report of July 15th by Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna (Yellow Book, No. 12).

ence of the four disinterested Powers, if Austria really desired agreement and not the estrangement of war? Even if the differences between the Ultimatum and the answer had been as profound and important as in fact they were shallow and trivial, even if, as we constantly hear in the pratings of our German national writers, "the existence and security of the monarchy" depended on this miserable business of form, Austria would still have taken upon herself an enormous load of guilt, when, "as a result of the unsatisfactory answer," she abruptly broke down all the bridges leading to the neighbouring kingdom, instead of indicating the points regarded as unsatisfactory, and endeavouring to obtain satisfaction of her demands or an approximation thereto, by direct negotiations or by the proffered mediation of third parties.

The substance of the observations contained in the Viennese publication of July 27th might very well have been submitted to the Serbian Government, or at any rate to the Powers who were prepared to mediate, but above all, they might have been communicated to the Hague Tribunal. The omission of every step that might lead to an understanding or an agreement, the refusal of any form of mediation, the rupture in diplomatic relations, prove incontrovertibly that Austria desired war against Serbia and that in this "action of self-defence," as they were pleased to call this war, they could not allow themselves "to be diverted by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be." These are the words used by Szápáry to Sazonof on July 27th, 1914 (Red Book, No. 81), and they serve to confirm from an Austrian source the judgment which I expressed at the end of my section on the Austrian Red Book :

"Like a bull with lowered horns, the Austrian Government plunged on against the red cloth of Serbia, without looking to the right or the left, without troubling about the consequences, which a blind man could not avoid foreseeing" (*J'accuse*, page 858).

All the subtle observations made by certain people on the subject of the "good faith" of Austrian statesmen are utterly irrelevant and are merely love's labour lost.

I do not feel called upon to furnish my opponents with gratuitous instruction on the elementary concepts of jurisprudence. If they wish, they may go back to the lecture-room and there imbibe instruction with regard to the *dolus eventualis*, *culpa gravissima* and similar matters. The consciousness that in all probability Austria's action against Serbia could, would, or must lead to a European war, this consciousness which is found undisguisedly confessed in the German White Book, is enough to justify the verdict of guilty. After the Serbian answer Austria had in reality gained over Serbia and Russia a brilliant diplomatic victory, in the light of which the few points which Serbia still withheld might well have appeared worthless and insignificant; yet even if the Austrian interests involved in the Serbian question had been a thousand times greater than they really were, they ought under no circumstances to have been pursued in such a manner as would in all probability provoke the world catastrophe of a war between the European Great Powers. It is in the glaring disproportion between the Austrian ends, and the means to these ends, imperilling the world, that the inexpressible crime of the Austrian statesmen lies; in the instigation and support of this crime, for their own selfish ends, lies the still greater guilt of Germany.

From this decisive point of view all the petty discussions on this or that Austrian demand, on its justification or non-justification, etc., appear as otiose and trivial. German apologetic literature has from the beginning been at pains to discover precedents for encroachments on foreign administration and justice similar to those contained in the Austrian demands on Serbia. Reference has been made to the Turkish capitulations and similar matters, which offer no analogies with the Austro-Serbian case. The Turkish capitulations rest on agreements between the European Powers and Turkey, which had their particular justification in the backwardness of Turkish institutions, and which are now gradually being abrogated. Other circumstances also are conceivable in which similar arrangements might be made, and there are on record cases where States have accorded to each other on a voluntary and reciprocal basis a certain measure

of assistance in police supervision and investigation, more especially with regard to political offenders. I have already recalled the unforgotten hangman's services which the Prussian Government rendered to the Russian, in the persecution and surrender of Russian revolutionaries, and in the admission of Russian agents on Prussian soil for purposes of supervision and espionage. These have always been friendly services, rendered on a basis of reciprocity. But in the mutual intercourse between sovereign States no precedent can be found for imposing by force a system of collaboration in police and even in judicial affairs, especially in a form so menacing and dictatorial as was assumed by Austria's demand. Such a demand under threat of violence has never been undertaken in time of peace against an independent State. Such an abasement denotes a virtual state of vassalage, and the statesmen of the Entente were entirely correct when they described the extreme concessions made by the Serbian Government as a state of semi-servitude and as an unprecedented humiliation of a sovereign State.

#### LUNACY OR CRIME

On reviewing the whole behaviour of the Austrian statesmen and of their German instigators and abettors in the Serbian dispute, I can only state again the alternatives which I have already indicated in my book in referring to many other steps taken by Germany and Austria during the critical days: that we are here face to face either with irresponsible levity or with the criminal will, either negligence in the highest degree, which the juridical doctrine of bygone days described as "recklessness" (*Frevehaftigkeit*), and as such placed on the same footing as the evil intention, or the evil intention itself, the conscious and intentional misdeed. So far I have left it, and shall continue to leave it, to the guilty persons to make their choice between the two alternatives offered. I refuse to enter into the subtle psychological distinctions drawn by their defenders, who, whenever they cannot get rid of the act itself, summon to their aid the good faith, the patriotism and the defence of national interests to the best of their

belief, on the part of the responsible statesmen, and by so doing seek to excuse their deeds. Under no circumstance are these distinctions of any interest to me. I am myself convinced, immovably convinced, from a study of the documents and of the antecedents of the war :

(a) that Austria was unconditionally set on war against Serbia, even at the risk of a European war being thereby provoked ;

(b) that from a definite point of time Germany, with a full consciousness of what she was doing, deliberately wished for a European war.

In my opinion this is a conviction which will inevitably be borne in upon everyone who passes in review the documents relating to the immediate antecedents of the war, if he is free from partiality and prejudice, hampered by no patriotic trammels, with his vision undistorted by national sentiments. This conviction is superabundantly strengthened by the more remote antecedents of the war, as I have represented and elucidated them in my first and in this my second book.

Nevertheless, I have every confidence in leaving it to each reader and critic to determine whether he will ascribe to the responsible statesmen an unprecedented measure of negligence and levity or the unvarnished criminal intention, in accordance with the tenour of my own convictions indicated above. These are psychological investigations which I am content to leave to the ordinary prattlers who are officially pledged to plead for exoneration. How these apologists of the Berchtolds and the Bethmanns must sweat to get through their task ! They are constantly forced to retire from one point of support to another, till at the end of their retreat nothing is left for them but to excuse the fearful deed by the "good faith" of the agent. We on our side are in the fortunate position of being able to advance without deviation to our goal, and to call black "black" and white "white." These miserable Governmental hacks are reduced to biting their nails and to exuding bitter sweat in order to arrive in the end at the conclusion that what we have before us is neither white nor black, but merely grey : they

are compelled to undertake the hopeless task of allowing the convicted criminals to escape in the nebulous grey of their psychological pleas for exoneration. We say plainly and simply: Even if Austria's own interests could have justified such a diplomatic and military attitude towards her neighbour, the interests of Europe and of humanity, on which, after all, Austria's own interests in their turn depend, should have been placed higher than any selfish aim on the part of the monarchy. My unfortunate opponents, on the other hand, in the collapse of their defences, are obliged to patch together and construct the following complicated exculpation:

The interests of European peace could not be considered, if the matter at stake was the security and existence of Austria. Whether this was at stake, we shall leave aside. In any case, the Austrian Government believed that the existence of their State was involved. When we have conceded that they acted on this belief, there still remains the question whether it was necessary that the security of Austria should be pursued by just these diplomatic and military means. Berchtold and his colleagues, however, believed that these means also were necessary. It follows that they are exonerated from this point of view as well.

Such a method of reasoning, which represents exactly what is to be found in moderate defenders of the Austrian Government, spells the bankruptcy of all objective inquiry. It is the straw at which these unhappy defenders of a lost cause clutch in their desperation, lest they be overwhelmed in the sea of the evidence of guilt. It is the "courageous concentration in the rear" of men who are beaten. It is without value, because it substitutes subjective inquiry into a state of mind for objective investigation into facts, and because it unfolds on the table of history merely so much nervous tissue, which no one wishes to see. If Berchtold believed all these things, which even his own defenders do not believe, then he was a monstrous fool. If, however, such a fool, who, after all, must be conscious of the imperviousness of his intellect,



permits himself to assume a responsible position where his decisions affect the fate of countless millions of men, then the man who placed him there and the man who allowed himself to be placed there can only be described as criminals.

With these observations I propose once and for all to dispose of the psychological inquiries of my opponents. I have no desire to waste my time on such distinctions, which can lead to no sure result. It is to me a matter of indifference whether the Bethmanns and the Berchtolds aided their distinguished masters to provoke this universal carnage in virtue of their phenomenal stupidity or of their gigantic baseness. I have as little desire to inquire into this as into the further question whether and how far each of those who were guilty did the monstrous action on his own initiative or whether he was urged to it by other forces. For my judgment the act itself suffices. If others desire to concede to the criminals the extenuating circumstances of good faith, of patriotism, of the presumed just and necessary defence of national interests, or even of unmerited weakness of intellect, I make answer : The crime is in no way diminished by the fact that restricted intellects are placed in the most responsible positions in the State, that they have accepted these positions, and in their irresponsibility have crushed in the dust the interests not merely of their own countries, but of the whole of civilised humanity.

#### DID THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT KNOW THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM BEFORE ITS DISPATCH ?

I propose here to devote further consideration to this point in the Austro-Serbian dispute, since it is only cursorily treated in my book (page 170). The German Government and their defenders maintain that Germany was not informed of the text of the Austrian Ultimatum before the other Great Powers.<sup>1</sup> In my book I left this question undecided, as in my judgment ignorance of the Note

<sup>1</sup> White Book, page 406. Yellow Book, Nos. 36, 41. Orange Book, No. 18. Blue Book, No. 18.

would have been as little to Germany's credit as knowledge of its contents. I should now, however, like to return to this point in the interests of historical inquiry.

It is obvious that this German assertion is in the highest degree undeserving of credence; the Austrian Government would scarcely have issued a diplomatic document of so unusual a character, the consequences of which were bound to be momentous for the whole of Europe, without making certain of the previous concurrence of their German ally, who would be the first to be called upon to answer for the consequences of Austria's action. There are, however, suspicious indications that the German assertion, incredible in itself, must be a conscious untruth.

The introductory memorandum to the German White Book very naïvely confesses :

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion.

There then follows the well-known passage, which I have quoted verbatim in my book (page 165), in which the German Government expresses their full consciousness "that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duties as allies." Notwithstanding this danger of a European war, recognising "the vital interests of Austria-Hungary" and on account of "the position of the Teutonic races in Central Europe," Germany could not advise her ally "to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity nor deny him our assistance in these trying days."

The paragraph closes with the words which at the moment interest us most :

"We therefore permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations."

The last sentence, the non-participation in Austria's preparations, is the point with which we are here concerned.

This assertion of non-participation was repeated to all the Powers, and even yet, incredible as it may appear, it is maintained by the German Government and their defenders. The reason for this denial is obvious. If Germany had collaborated as Austria's accomplice in the composition of the Ultimatum, or even if she had only had knowledge of the text and had given it her approval, every plausible reason for excluding the other Powers from the dispute and for insisting on the localisation of the conflict between Austria and Serbia would at once have disappeared. In virtue of Germany's co-operation the dispute would already have been extended beyond its local limits and assumed a European character, and it would have been impossible to refuse Russia a voice in council, when Germany had already so energetically made herself heard. This is the reason for the denial of co-operation, a denial which constituted an important link in the chain of the conspiracy against the peace of Europe.

Apart from its inherent probability, what indications are there of Germany's collaboration in the composition of the Austrian Note? The first indication is the contradiction between the opening sentences and the concluding observation in the above quotation from the German White Book. If the Austrian Government before taking any action asked the German Government for their opinion, and if the latter expressly conveyed their approval of any action, whether diplomatic or military, it is quite inconceivable that the gentlemen in the Ballplatz should have withheld from the Berlin Foreign Office a more detailed explanation of the diplomatic action which they intended should be taken immediately, and which in form and substance had in itself the character of an act of war.

A further indication: On the day on which the Austrian Ultimatum was delivered in Belgrade, the Chancellor sent a circular note to his Ambassadors in Paris, London and Petrograd. In this, after referring to the "publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took

place" and the impossibility of viewing "any longer idly the doings across the border," he continues as follows :

With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Serbia does not preclude the fear that the Serbian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a Great Power, but to press its demands with the Serbian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it.

This circular letter is interesting from many points of view ; it illumines, as if by a searchlight, the whole conspiracy arranged between Berlin and Vienna, and foretells in a spirit of cold calculation what consequences and what effects will ensue. Herr von Bethmann fears that the Serbian Government will decline the Austrian demands. In this particular point his calculations were notoriously wrong, as were also the speculations made in Vienna, since the love of peace shown by the Serbians and their counsellors the Entente Powers exceeded the Central Powers' will for war. Herr von Bethmann further fears—in reality, of course, he *hoped*—that Serbia may allow herself to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards the monarchy. This calculation also proved to be wrong ; the party suspected of provocativeness submitted cringingly and plaintively like a cur. Still acting on the assumption that Serbia will refuse and become provocative, Herr von Bethmann finally foresees that Austria may ultimately have to appeal to military measures to enforce her demands.

It is true that the presuppositions in fact on which such a decision was to be made dependent, that is to say the refusal of the Austrian demands and the assumption of a provocative attitude, were never fulfilled. Nevertheless, once the military measures had been agreed upon between Berlin and Vienna, something had to be devised to do duty for the real presuppositions—the Serbian answer had to be branded as a refusal or as a provocation. The contingencies presupposed and calculated beforehand had

not, it is true, supervened, but the actual occurrences were warped until they appeared to resemble the presupposed conditions.

Herein lies the symptomatic importance of the document of July 23rd. The date, however, and this primarily interests us here, is also of importance. The Austrian Ultimatum was delivered in Belgrade on July 23rd at 6 o'clock in the evening. On July 23rd, at an hour not known, we find Herr von Bethmann reporting to his Ambassadors with regard to the contents and the presumable consequences of the Ultimatum. It was not until July 24th that all the other Great Powers were informed of the Ultimatum. Herr von Bethmann thus anticipated them by twenty-four hours. How is this to be explained? Obviously by reference to the fact that the Ultimatum was known to him before its delivery in Belgrade. This in itself refutes one of the points in the evasive assertions of Germany, to the effect that they had in Berlin no knowledge of the text of the Ultimatum before its delivery. And at the same time, it deprives of any remnant of credibility the other point in the Berlin assertion—in itself highly incredible—that no influence had been exercised on the contents of the Note.

We are indebted to Mr. Beck for drawing attention, in his book already mentioned, to a further indication in the same sense. This is to be found in the French Yellow Book, in a report of the French Minister at Munich dated July 23rd, 1914 (Yellow Book, No. 21). M. Allizé reports that the official circles of the Bavarian capital had for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism :

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*), was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but that, none the less, the situation appeared to him to be very serious.

Thus Herr von Hertling had knowledge of the Austrian Ultimatum as early as July 23rd. No one will believe that this was known in Munich earlier than in Berlin. This again proves the falsity of Germany's assertion that she had no knowledge of the text of the Ultimatum

before its delivery. Perhaps my respected opponents will note this point, by no means an unimportant one, on their own debit account and that of their Government.

THE AUSTRIAN PRETEXTS FOR WAR

The defenders of Germany and Austria continue to make a great display of Berchtold's well-known pretexts for war: Serbia, they say, by her apparently submissive answer, merely wished to tune the public opinion of Europe in her favour, and in reality had never sincerely intended to make concessions. She merely wished to protract the negotiations and to bring the Entente Powers to her side. On the very afternoon of the day on which her answer was delivered, Serbia is said to have begun her mobilisation. Indeed, she had even opened hostilities against Austria-Hungary, etc., etc.

I cannot in this place again enter into all this nonsense, and must refer to the discussions in the third chapter of *J'accuse* on "Austria" and the "Appendix on the Austrian Red Book," where I have proved in detail the weakness of all these excuses for war. I am, however, obliged to offer a few observations on this subject in order to meet certain objections of my opponents.

It is suggested that by mobilising before handing in her answer, Serbia had let it be seen that she had "no inclination for a peaceful solution" (Red Book, Nos. 29 and 39). I have already pointed out in my book that even if this Serbian mobilisation were a demonstrated fact, and not merely an *ex parte* Austrian assertion, it could at the worst, in view of the Serbian answer, be regarded merely as a measure of security to meet the possible contingency, which in fact supervened, that the mighty Austrian Empire, notwithstanding the humiliation inflicted on the small neighbouring kingdom, might wish under all circumstances to provoke war (*J'accuse*, page 323).

In discussing this point I advanced the assertion that Austria had taken measures with regard to mobilisation contemporaneously with the dispatch of her Ultimatum. The statement that military measures were taken was in itself self-evident (for no State in the world would ever

issue so peremptory an ultimatum with such a short time-limit attached without at the same time taking military measures). It has, however, been attacked by certain people, and held up as "one of the many undemonstrated and indemonstrable" assertions in my book. It is thus that certain people with ferretting instincts like to seize on any subsidiary observations, which may be quite insignificant compared with the main point at issue, and into which, in view of the gigantic task of winnowing and arranging the difficult material, an error might very well have crept, and from such alleged trivial errors they proceed to draw to my disadvantage the most onerous conclusions. I am, therefore, again compelled to discard the traditional principle of Roman law, *minima non curat praetor* (the judge does not trouble himself with trifles), and follow on the slippery ground which they have chosen my generous opponents who, in contradistinction to Franz Moor, are at all times concerned with "trifles" only.

The proof of the self-evident fact that Austria, simultaneously with her Ultimatum and in all probability long before, took preparatory military measures is to be found, amongst other places, in the documents in the Austrian Red Book itself. In his despatch from Lambach dated July 25th (Red Book, No. 20) Berchtold gives a negative answer to the telegraphic request from the Russian *chargé d'affaires* for an extension of the time limit, but he adds that the Serbian Government "even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands," but that in this case they must reimburse "all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures." Thus before the Serbian answer was received, the Austrian Minister was already speaking of costs and damage caused to his empire by military measures. The self-evident fact is thus documentarily confirmed, and the charge of having put forward an undemonstrated and indemonstrable assertion recoils on my opponents.

\* \* \* \* \*

Count Berchtold has further attempted to demonstrate that the unhappy petty State, deeply exhausted by two

wars, intended to make war against Austria, the Great Power, by inventing the theory that Serbia began hostilities as early as July 27th—an attempt which, in my book, I have described in the terms which it merits (pages 322–328). This invention, indeed, goes somewhat too far even for many of Berchtold's defenders, who otherwise march with their client through thick and thin. One of them even rises so far as to confess—of course in tortuous words—"that in fact Serbia's motive for such a procedure (that is, in opening hostilities) is difficult to understand." Thus, of Berchtold's two grounds for inferring the existence of Serbia's alleged desire for war, the one is invented, and who can say that the other, which, be it observed, is completely unproved, is in accordance with the truth? We know the good old proverb:

It is the liar's deepest pain  
To find he tells the truth in vain.<sup>1</sup>

Either Serbia was mad enough to entertain the intention of making war against Austria—in which case the opening of hostilities, in which Berchtold's defender is unable to believe, is just as probable as the mobilisation which he does believe—or else Serbia would have regarded herself as fortunate to be left in peace by Austria, in which case she had as little occasion to undertake an offensive mobilisation against Austria before the breach of diplomatic relations as to open hostilities before receiving the Austrian declaration of war. One or the other must hold. The reasons which give the alleged Serbian attack an appearance of improbability are equally cogent arguments against the alleged Serbian mobilisation, so far at any rate as it is regarded as an offensive action. But if this premature mobilisation did not take place, or at any rate, if it did not take place in the sense of an offensive action, Count Berchtold is again deprived of one of the chief grounds for representing the Serbian answer as "insincere and disingenuous." With their divisions and distinctions my opponents thus find their way into a blind alley, from which, like a mouse in a trap, they can-

<sup>1</sup> [Wer einmal lügt, dem glaubt man nicht  
Und wenn er auch die Wahrheit spricht.]



not again emerge. They accept what appear to them to be the good reasons given by their client, and reject the bad; but they do not pause to reflect that by thus dividing the sheep from the goats, they depreciate the whole herd and make them barren.

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The "true ground" for the Austrian declaration of war is found by one of my opponents, the "enfant terrible" of the whole of the apologetic literature, in a declaration made by Jagow to the British Ambassador, which may well represent the summit of criminal idiocy or idiotic criminality among all the Austro-German announcements. It is precisely this culminating point of diplomatic imbecility, or moral insanity, which an unhappy wight seeks out to urge in defence of his luckless victims. The point in question is Jagow's conversation with Goschen on July 29th, on the day after the Austrian declaration of war, in the course of which the German Secretary of State assured his hearer:

That he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had in fact now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war (English Blue Book, No. 76).

It may be observed, in passing, that in reproducing Jagow's astonishing declaration, as well as elsewhere, the defenders of Germany and Austria are habitually guilty of the small but quite deliberate falsification involved in the statement that the German Government not only transmitted the English proposal to Vienna but also "recommended" it. There is not a word to indicate any "recommendation" in No. 76, and the German White Book (page 409) also merely reports that the German Government after the failure of the conference-idea were ready "to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna" (the reference is to the above proposal). The Austrian Red Book (No. 48) also merely reports to the same effect: "Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British proposal before the

Vienna Cabinet for their consideration." This transmission "for consideration" these gentlemen transform unostentatiously into a transmission and recommendation, in the hope that this apparently trivial device of falsification will scrape through unobserved—in which, as I have shown elsewhere, they are following the illustrious example of Helfferich.<sup>1</sup>

But now, to come to the main point. Is it conceivably possible within the bounds of normal intelligence that serious-minded people should select precisely this, the most foolish, the most conscienceless of all reasons for war and make this, of all things, the deciding motive which led to Austria's declaration of war? When they read this Herr von Jagow and Count Berchtold may well wring their hands, and cry out in lamentation: "May the Lord protect us from our friends!" Compared with this "only true" ground for war, the reasons invented by Berchtold—the mobilisation and the opening of hostilities by Serbia—are, after all, true patterns of sound human reason. If Serbia had really taken the initiative in hostilities, Austria would have been within her rights in declaring war. But if there is truth in what Jagow, in the course of his conversation with Goschen, attributed to his Austrian colleague as his motive for war; if this defence, which is in reality the cruellest accusation, rests on truth; if the precipitate Austrian declaration of war is in fact to be ascribed to the intention of preventing not merely Europe, but even her own ally, from intervening in any way in the interests of peace, and of placing the world before a most fatal *fait accompli*—then the judgment to be passed on Austrian statesmen must be even more crushing than would otherwise be the case. Are we to understand that, before the dispatch of the declaration of war against Serbia, Germany really entertained the intention of guiding her ally into the peaceful way of negotiation and of discussion on the Serbian answer, and that it was just for this reason that Count

<sup>1</sup> The notes of recommendation from Bethmann to Tschirschky, which appeared later, in August, 1915, and November, 1916, and of which nothing was known until these dates, are discussed elsewhere in my book.

Berchtold resolved: "Now, more than ever, let us have war as quickly as possible, to prevent the Austrian Government being compelled by Germany to a modification of her demands on Serbia! So, then, full steam ahead"? That, according to the compromising interpretation of these defenders of Berchtold, would have been the motive of Berchtold's action! Full steam ahead! It was not only the Entente Powers' desire for peace but the inclinations of their own ally, Germany, to arrive at an understanding, that would thus have been ignored and rejected in Vienna. You want an understanding, you in Paris, in London and in Petrograd, and even you in Berlin? You cannot have it, least of all at the present moment! Keep at it! More than ever, let us plunge into war. This is Berchtold's psychology as his skilful defenders, with Jagow at their head, paint it for us. And by these means they imagine that they have saved their client. They do not realise how irretrievably they have damned him.

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The view which I expressed, that the points which remained in dispute after the Serbian answer were in their nature such as to fall within the peculiar province of the Hague Tribunal, and that therefore the refusal of the Serbian and Russian proposal to this effect was an inexpiable crime, a clear proof of the desire for war of the Central Powers, appears as a "paradoxical assertion" to the same crooked and shallow thinker who has by his defence so seriously incriminated his client Berchtold. Even yet he does not know, and therefore he asks "What material was really to be submitted to the international tribunal?" The "Austro-Serbian problem," my friend, as the Tsar described it in his telegram of July 29th, "la solution de cette question" as it is expressed at the conclusion of the Serbian answer, that is to say, the solution of the Austro-Serbian dispute, in so far as points still remained at issue after the Serbian answer—the discussion of those points in the answer which failed to satisfy the Austrian Government and for which a middle path of agreement was to be found. Since Austria had declared that she did not mean to

infringe the sovereignty and independence of Serbia, the question in fact related to "an investigation from the point of view of public law into the question of the extent to which the Austrian demands, especially those in Articles 5 and 6 of the Note, were compatible with the sovereignty of the neighbouring State." In these words I have in my book (page 150) defined the issue as an investigation from the point of view of public law into the limits which must be prescribed to foreign intervention in the internal political life of a sovereign neighbouring State. Apart from this legal investigation, the question at issue was the examination of the Austrian and the Serbian Notes in the two-fold direction :

How far did the original Austrian demands exceed the limits of what was permissible, when viewed in the light of their later authentic interpretation ?

How far did the Serbian concessions in any way fall short of the permissible limits ?

In all these inquiries and examinations, which, as Grey correctly observed, could have been completed in a very brief space of time, the object would have been to find the line of understanding which would have led to an agreement between Austria and Serbia and thus to the maintenance of the peace of Europe. Perhaps my critic has at last grasped that this would have been the task of the Hague Tribunal or the Conference of the four Powers, a task which, there can be no room to doubt, would have been successfully accomplished. Simultaneously, a Commission of Inquiry, assembled in accordance with the resolutions of the Hague Conference, which would have offered every guarantee of impartiality, could have investigated the assassination with the view of determining how far the Serbian Government, official Serbia, or the Serbian people were implicated in the murder or were in any way concerned in it. Such an inquiry into the connection between the assassination of the Archduke and official or semi-official Serbia, which, after all, constituted the presupposition of all Austrian claims on the Serbian State, could have been conducted by the Hague Commission of Inquiry far more impartially and fully,

and would have commanded more respect from all parties concerned than would have been possible in any inquiry resting on the collaboration of Serbian and Austrian officials. I have already pointed out in my book that such a mixed Austro-Serbian inquiry-procedure, operating on Serbian soil, would have been a monstrosity, and in view of the existing oppositions would never have led to fulness of light, but only to constant friction and to perilous discord. The Austrian demand was therefore not merely an intolerable intrusion into the sovereignty of the neighbouring State, but also, from every practical point of view, a chimera.

All these difficulties would have been avoided by submitting the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, and equally by invoking the conference of the four Powers. This is the "paradox" which I have put forward, and which refuses to appear as orthodox to my honoured opponent. Nor need this cause surprise. He who squints, or has but the sight of one eye, sees all straight lines oblique, and to him all oblique lines will appear straight.

## CHAPTER V

### RUSSIA THE "INCENDIARY" ?

#### SUSPICION OF GUILT AND PROOF OF GUILT

As we have already seen, Russia is, according to Helfferich, the "incendiary"; Russia, without being urged by any compelling reasons, consciously and intentionally provoked the European war. Since "Serbia stood to Russia in no relation which imposed politically or morally the duty of protection"; since, to quote Helfferich again, even "the maintenance of Russian prestige in the Balkans" could no longer be regarded as justifying an appeal to arms after the compliant attitude of Austria, the only other remaining explanation of Russia's desire for war is that it was based solely on the opportunistic reflection: "The opportunity is favourable for the overthrow of those Great Powers which appear to those in authority in Russia to be an obstacle in the way of their policy" (Helfferich, page 18).

The aims of this policy are not more accurately specified by Helfferich. On this point other defenders of the German Government come to his assistance. Herr von Bethmann speaks of "the hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-Slav ambitions . . . the intrigues for war of a small clique, of an irresponsible but powerful group about the Tsar" (speech of December 2nd, 1914). Herr Professor Helmolt sees the reason for the development of the Austro-Serbian into an Austro-Russian conflict in the "unjustified claims of Russia to a position of predominance in the Balkans" (page 313). These ideas, repeated in countless variant forms and supported by a wealth of

Press utterances and alleged political incidents, are constantly recurring in the German nationalist Press: Russia, ousted from the Far East by the unhappy issue of the Russo-Japanese war, is represented as throwing herself with redoubled energy on the Balkans, in order to find outlets to the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas, to unite the Balkan peoples under her protection, to dislodge Austria as far as possible from the Balkans, and as the final goal of her ambition to obtain in the end possession of Constantinople.

I intentionally refrained in my book from entering into any of these far-reaching questions as to the political aims of the countries taking part in the European War, a course which Herr Helfferich also has adopted in his pamphlet. Imperialistic tendencies, endeavours to expand in this direction or that, are no doubt to be found in all the countries concerned—in Russia, England and France, as well as in Germany and Austria. The German Imperialists, whom I discussed in detail in my book only in the person of Bernhardt as the most conspicuous type, are excelled in number and energy by those of no other European country. The attempt is now frequently made in Germany to discount General Bernhardt, who so indiscreetly prattled out of school. It is a fond endeavour. Every time a head is struck from the hydra of incitement to war, ten new heads emerge. The Defence League and the Navy League, the whole of the ginger Press, from the *Kreuzzeitung* to the *Rheinisch Westfälische Zeitung*, the generals who speak and write, the men like Deimling, like Keim and his attendants, the powerful and well paid journalists representing the munition interests, the colonial enthusiasts and the worshippers of war for war's sake (*l'art pour l'art*)—none of these groups and forces whose worst utterances from the period before the war I will produce elsewhere, none of these imperialistic and Pan-German war-intriguers and war-writers are a scrap better than the corresponding groups in neighbouring countries. In our case, however, they became more dangerous and more fatal, because they were more influential and because in the end they succeeded in obtaining a hearing in authoritative quarters.

It is inevitable that imperialistic tendencies from various quarters should lead to friction and conflicts. When in a given space several bodies simultaneously tend to go on expanding, the time must finally arrive when friction will take place, and out of friction fire must arise. Friction and fire may, however, be prevented if efforts to expand are timeously regulated by a reasonable compromise, and if any disputes that may arise are submitted to a prescribed arbitration procedure. Whoever has placed obstacles in the way of such a reasonable settlement is responsible for the explosion. Thus, in investigating the question of guilt, it is immaterial to show that in this or that country there have existed tendencies more or less expansionist in character; the only material point is to determine which of the States concerned was responsible for the fact that a peaceful settlement between the competing interests was rendered impossible. This responsibility may lie in the more remote past or in the events immediately preceding the war. I have discovered it on the side of Germany and Austria, both in the more immediate and in the more remote past; in the more remote past the guilt was incurred by the frustration of any European organisation for the protection of peace and for the reduction of armaments, in the past immediately precedent to the outbreak of war in the frustration of all the peace endeavours of the Entente Powers.

When we thus find countless German writers at pains to explain that the cause of the war is to be found in Russian, French and English efforts to expand at the cost of Germany and her allies, I reply to their arguments as follows: All this is of no importance in considering the question of guilt; such efforts, indeed more potent and influential than elsewhere, were also to be found amongst us, and at this very moment they are ominously present in discussions on the aims of war; they represent the fostering soil of the war-bacillus, they do not themselves constitute the germs of the disease. The guilt of the war is to be found on the side which has rejected every method of removing the fostering soil and of thereby rendering the bacillus innocuous, and has in consequence provoked this devastating sickness of the



nations. No "national" organisation in any other country has excelled or reached what the Pan-German League, with its generals and admirals at its head, has achieved amongst us in inciting the nations against each other, and in depicting the inevitable war—not, however, as a scourge of humanity, but as an instrument for the rejuvenation of the German peoples from its supineness and its æstheticism, from its worship of Mammon and its vapourings of peace. As I have stated, I shall produce elsewhere evidence in support of this statement by compiling an anthology drawn from the speeches and the writings of Pan-German leaders. The dangerous element in our "national" agitation, compared with that in other countries and more particularly in France, is found in the fact that our inciters to war belonged, and still belong, to the dominant classes and cliques, that they are in the service of, or connected with, the military and Junker reaction, whereas among the French the noisy nationalists are almost entirely in opposition against the dominant republican régime. Although Boulangism, with its tendencies not merely to imperialism but to empire, is long since dead, the most conspicuous leaders of French nationalism have nevertheless been the descendants and the offspring of Boulanger's followers, and with their war-cackle they have not merely aimed at military undertakings beyond the frontiers of France, but they have fought within the country for the dominance of the military and reactionary party and have struggled for throne and for altar. Among the French we find a diminishing and impotent opposition to the firmly rooted republican régime; here in Prussian Germany we have an influential and powerful branch of the military and Junker party which still controls the destiny of the country.

The tendencies in Germany making for war, embodied most conspicuously in Treitschke and in his disciples Bernhardi and Company with their illustrious and exalted Protector, I have discussed in my book only in so far as was absolutely requisite for the investigation of the essential question of guilt. There is no crime without a motive, unless the criminal is irresponsible. The motives of the greatest crime in the world's history,

that committed on August 1st, 1914, must be explained if the existence of the crime is to be made credible. I have myself refrained from drawing any inference from the existence of tendencies to the commission of the act itself, as is constantly and illogically being done by my opponents. From the facts collected in the second chapter, *The Antecedents of the Crime*, I was content to infer the suspicion of authorship, but not the act itself. I might also have summarised the contents of the second chapter, in the formula used in mediæval criminal procedure to describe one as "likely to commit the deed" (*tatverdächtig*): in view of their previous diplomatic life the German and Austrian Governments constituted a group of Powers "in whose case one might reasonably anticipate the commission of the act" (that is, the intentional provocation of war). My knowledge of my fellow-men, my training in law and logic, alike prevent me from considering it possible to prove the commission of an act from the past life of the accused. Past life can and should only serve, on a retrospective survey, to assist in arriving at an understanding of the deed after it has been proved; it can never in itself prove the deed. It is only in retrospect that we are concerned with the past life. When the deed is proved—proved out of its own elements—the prudent and wary prosecutor will seek to meet the plea which may be advanced in exoneration: "Your demonstration is untenable, for there is no motive for the action." He will therefore expound the motives. These motives explain the action, but they do not prove it.

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It was for this reason that I undertook in the third chapter the exhaustive study of the diplomatic documents which constitutes the pith and essence of my book, and in itself occupies as much space as the other four chapters taken together. I may admit that, as the logic of law requires in the first place the proof of the commission of the act, and only afterwards the explanation of motives, so I also, by studying first of all the documents, arrived at my verdict of guilty, and only later, after attaining a certainty of the fearful truth, did I inquire into the tendencies and the motives which could have led to this enormous crime.

It was only by the most careful study of the documents that I arrived at the conviction that war was consciously and intentionally provoked by Germany and Austria, and it was this complete and unshakable conviction that led me to subject to a closer inquiry the previous political history of the two countries, well known to me in general outlines, their internal political currents, their external political action during the last decades since the first Hague Conference, in order to lay bare from the point of view of national psychology the motives which prompted those who were guilty to the commission of the deed. It is only thus, by first investigating the action, and then by looking backwards demonstrating the motives, that it is possible to arrive at a just judgment in the great criminal process of the world's history, just as in any civil criminal action. He who adopts the customary procedure of the defenders of the Central Powers and the accusers of the Entente and primarily or almost exclusively inquires into tendencies and motives, treating of the action itself as a subsidiary matter only or even leaving it undiscussed, will never be able to furnish a strict proof of guilt; such a one will always leave the essential point in obscurity, and perhaps it is precisely for this reason that the defenders of Germany have shown such a preference for this method.

It is, however, quite clear that if of two suspects one reveals a shady past and the other has always borne the white flower of a blameless life, this fact in itself does not by a long way prove that the first has committed the deed and that the second is innocent. After all, every criminal has to begin his crimes some time or other. The same innocent past which is now the glory of the gentleman of the white flower was once at some earlier date the possession of the man whose past is now so shady. A spotless past in itself proves nothing either for or against the charge of having committed a crime.

From this it follows, so far as concerns the decision of the question of guilt, that even if it could be proved on the lines incessantly pursued by the whole company of apologetic writers, like Chamberlain, Helmolt, Rohrbach, Schiemann and their fellows, that Delessé

Millerand, Poincaré, Isvolsky, Sazonof, Edward VII., Grey and Churchill had planned long ago an attack on Germany and Austria (which, of course, is in no way proved), such a proof of warlike tendencies would not by any means amount to a demonstration that the war of 1914 had now, in fact, been provoked by these fire-brands. At the very worst such a fact, if proved, could only support the conclusion that there was reason to apprehend that war would be provoked by the Entente Powers. Such an apprehension might be sufficient to justify a preventive war, if one is prepared to regard preventive wars as justifiable, not merely on military grounds, but also politically and morally. The idea of a preventive war is, however, indignantly repudiated in all the official announcements made by the German Government and by all their Rulers and Ministers. The war of defence against a malicious attack is the watchword with which the enthusiasm of the German people has been aroused to the struggle for house and hearth, for home and the fatherland.

The war of defence is in the sharpest contrast to the preventive war.<sup>1</sup> The preventive-warrior says: "We should have been attacked, and therefore it was our right and, indeed, our duty to anticipate matters by striking at the right time." Some of the German nationalists disclose this point of view. Herr Harden, for example, has had no hesitation in owning this theory, not only at the beginning of the war, but has even maintained it down to the most recent date. On the other hand, the official Government Press, the Emperor and the German kings in all their appeals and addresses to the people and to the army, the Chancellor in his speeches and writings, above all Herr Helfferich in his semi-official apologetic pamphlet—all of them have unswervingly adhered to the point of view that this is a war of defence, a new edition of the war of liberation of 1813, a protective war against an Anglo-Franco-Russian attack. This fixed idea—fixed, it is true, only in the heads of the ignorant and the fooled, and not in the leaders and the wire-pullers—achieved

<sup>1</sup> I shall devote later (Vol. II.) a special chapter to the theory and practice of preventive wars.

its crowning expression when the King of Bavaria made use of the following memorable words on the occasion of the celebration of the jubilee of the Bavarian Canal Union:

“The French declaration of war followed that of Russia, and when the Englishmen fell upon us as well, I said to myself: ‘I am glad of it, and glad for this reason that now we shall be able to settle matters with our enemies.’”

In the head of the Bavarian King—(I mean the governing, responsible King Ludwig, not the irresponsible King Otto immured in Furstenried, who has meanwhile died)—muddle-headedness had so far advanced between August, 1914, and June, 1915, in consequence of the everlasting reiteration of phrases about the attacks of the enemy and the “war that was forced upon us,” that in the end he assumed that Russia and France had declared war upon us, although one might have expected that the fact that it was we who declared war against them might at least have penetrated as far as the thrones of kings. The formula about the war that was “forced upon us” has to such an extent become a commonplace in all official and semi-official utterances of the Government that, as I am told, whenever a German compositor has to set the type of Government proclamations or speeches he automatically, and without more ado, adds to the word “war” the adjectives “aufgenötigt,” or “aufgezwungen” (“pressed” or “forced” upon us).

The fact thus remains that the war, in the official German view, is not a preventive war but a war of defence. A war of defence must, however, find its justification in a real attack in the present, not in a possible attack in the future. Such a justification cannot be inferred from tendencies on one side and from apprehensions on the other, but must be based on the facts as they actually existed in July, 1914. This in itself disposes of at least seven-eighths of the whole war literature of Germany, which in essence is nothing but a tendentious literature on enemy tendencies. It is for this reason that I have in the present investigation of the question of guilt, of the “crime,” restricted myself primarily to Helfferich,

who, as befits an intelligent and logical mind, has at any rate assumed the only standpoint which is permissible as a justification for a war of defence: "The enemy attacked us, and we were bound to defend ourselves." Helfferich devotes only a few sentences to a consideration of the motives which led Russia to wish for war and which induced England and France to extend to her their support. Apart from these few sentences his demonstration is not directed to the antecedents of the action, but to the action itself, and assailable as his method may be in other respects (as I have elsewhere shown), I cannot refrain from congratulating him on the fact that in thus directing himself to the only essential point he is advantageously distinguished from most of those who argue on his side.

#### DID RUSSIA ATTACK US?

Let us, then, return to Helfferich. In his view Russia wished for war and intentionally provoked it, after obtaining an assurance of the support of France and England. By the evening of July 29th she was firmly assured of this support and from that moment Russia's immovable desire for war became manifest.

What is the actual position? Let us examine this charge by reference to the facts, that is to say, the same documents on which Helfferich bases his accusation.

It is in the first place a matter which may occasion surprise that the supporters of the view that an attack was made on Germany are not in agreement as to the quarter from which the devilish plan emanated, whether it was from France, from Russia, or from England. While Helfferich describes Russia as the incendiary and the other two as merely the accomplices, the chief criminal in Chamberlain's view is France; for him France is the serpent who seduced the more or less innocent Russians and Englishmen to bite the fatal apple. Russia, according to Chamberlain, really desired peace. As the Anglo-German says on page 75 of his *New War Essays*:

And this (speaking of Sazonof's opposition to the collaboration of Austrian officials in Serbian police inquiries) is all the more surprising

to the careful observer, inasmuch as Sazonof from the outset, and throughout the course of the following days, revealed a real desire and hope for peace, which is very surprising in contrast to the French, who from the first day had blown the trumpet of war, and had constantly rejected every step which promised a relaxation of the tension; in contrast, also, to the insincere and vacillating behaviour of the English, who at first would themselves gladly have stood aside, while doing everything to set the others by the ears. Sazonof—be his motives what they may, I do not know them—was sincerely anxious to avoid war; this is the impression that is gained from the whole exchange of telegrams; up to the last moment, indeed beyond it, he endeavours to arrive at an understanding with Austria.

According to Chamberlain, if an agreement could have been reached between Austria and Russia on the fifth and sixth articles of the Austrian Ultimatum, war could have been avoided, had it not been for the incitement of France (which, as I have already shown in this volume, and in my previous book, was really an unwearying activity in the interests of peace). Agreement was of course possible; it would, indeed, have been a matter of child's play. Serbia had, in fact, from the beginning accepted the arbitration of the Powers or of the Hague Tribunal. Grey's conference, the direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, Grey's and Sazonof's formulæ of agreement, Cambon's recommendation of an international Commission of Inquiry, the Tsar's proposal for a decision by the Hague Tribunal, all these proposals were intended and calculated to bring about such an agreement. It suits Herr Chamberlain better, however, to advance the false assertion that agreement on this crucial point in the dispute came to grief on the Russian fear of unpleasant discoveries of her complicity in the crime, and that thus war was rendered inevitable. Russia wished peace, so argues Chamberlain, but, on the other hand, she had no desire to be discovered as the accomplice of assassins, and so war had to come against Russia's desire, on the instigation of "the French, who rejected every step which promised a relaxation of the tension and from the first day had blown the trumpet of war."

While Russia is here represented as the lover of peace, France as the instigator of war, and England as the

vacillator, other defenders of Germany ascribe the chief guilt to England (see *inter alia* the speeches of the Chancellor of December 2nd, 1914, and August 19th, 1915, as well as his circular note of December 24th, 1914). I have already sufficiently characterised this point of view in my book, which lays at the door of England, "envious" England, "the inner responsibility for the war," and allows Russia and France to act on the theatre of war only as the marionettes of the London wire-pullers, and I have, as I hope, finally demolished the theory in the previous sections of this book. A feeling of peculiar hostility to England and the accusation that England instigated the war are chiefly to be found in German colonial and naval circles, who on their side regard with envy the dominant position of envious England on the seas of the world, and who in their endeavour, in itself justified, to gain for Germany a position of world influence, have merely committed the fatal error of seeking to achieve this by blood and by fire, by destruction of the youthful energy and of the well-being of all nations, instead of seeking it by the slow and more successful labour of the German merchant and captain of industry, on whom in the past success has rested.

\* \* \* \* \*

Herr Helfferich belongs to the third category of German investigators into the war, in whose eyes the real guilt of the world conflagration is to be ascribed to Russia.


If we compare Helfferich's debit account with the action really taken by Russia, as it may be deduced from the diplomatic books, we at once recognise that items of so important a character must be entered on the credit side against the imaginary items on the debit side that the final balance is entirely in favour of Russia. I have already spoken of the artifice whereby Helfferich begins the whole history of the conflict from the Russian general mobilisation of July 31st and on this constructs the proof of Russia's guilt. Russia, supported by France and England, "found the courage, in her general mobilisation on July 31st, finally to frustrate Germany's efforts for peace, and to throw the torch in the European





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powder-barrel." So writes Helfferich in his letter to the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*. This support, according to Helfferich, was assured on July 29th, and from that moment there was no longer any pause; war was bound to come in accordance with Russia's desires:

Relying on herself, Russia would not have ventured on a war with Austria-Hungary and Germany except in defence of her vital national interests; she would never have taken the risk on a consideration of the probability of success. Nothing but the certainty of the active co-operation of other Great Powers could have rendered it possible for the leading circles in Russia to resolve on war. The attitude of the two other Powers in the Triple Entente was therefore bound to exercise a decisive influence on Russia's resolution (Helfferich, page 18).

I have, as I believe, proved beyond question that there is nothing in the suggestion that support was promised by France and England. And if this is conceded, the whole of Helfferich's argumentation would at once collapse.

I have proved:

1. That up to the last moment France and England laboured jointly with Russia in the interests of peace;
2. That in the event of the outbreak of war Russia could without question count on French support on the ground of the treaty of alliance;
3. That on August 1st, on the outbreak of the Russo-German war, English support was still entirely uncertain; that it was not until August 2nd that England gave the French Government an assurance of conditional support by the fleet and that it was not until the evening of August 4th, after the refusal by Germany of any arrangement with regard to the withdrawal of German troops from Belgium, that England definitely placed herself on the side of Russia and France.

If, then, as Helfferich insists, Russia's intentions to make war were dependent on the support of France and England, it is impossible that she can have entertained these intentions before August 4th. But on that day war with Germany had long ago broken out.

## SAZONOF'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE.

Apart from this, however, the whole action taken by Sazonof from July 23rd to August 1st shows that throughout Russia did not desire war. On the contrary—and here I am glad to be in agreement with Herr Chamberlain—it shows that she "had a real desire for peace." In my book (pages 288–292), I have cited under eighteen headings the indefatigable efforts of Sazonof in the cause of peace, and I have supported each of these paragraphs with extensive quotations from the diplomatic books. To avoid repetition, I may refer to the account there given, and I would urge anyone who wishes to realise the truth to study and compare the notes therein quoted, and so to form his own judgment on the question at issue. I must here restrict myself to a somewhat fuller treatment of some of the points in the evidence for the defence than was possible in my book, and to a closer consideration of certain other points which Herr Helfferich adduces in support of his charge against the Russian Government. The exoneration of Russia inevitably proceeds on parallel lines with the incrimination of Germany and Austria, and therefore, although I have already abundantly done this in my book, I shall again be compelled to contrast the guilt of the Central Powers with the innocence of Russia and her allies.

THE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN VIENNA AND  
PETROGRAD

We shall leave aside Russia's fruitless endeavours to obtain a prolongation of the time-limit in the Ultimatum, and also her successful efforts to obtain a submissive answer from Serbia, and proceed at once to the most obvious means of arriving at an understanding, which was desired by all sides, namely, the direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd. I may refer to the detailed account of this point given in my book, pages 150 to 152, 289, 327, and here I need only briefly recapitulate the facts bearing on the question.

As early as July 23rd (Red Book, No. 9) Count Berchtold

gave his Ambassador in London instructions as to the communication which the Ambassador was to make to Grey when handing him the Note on the following day (July 24th). Amongst other things the short time-limit was to be explained by the intention to avoid "the dilatory arts of Serbia." At the conclusion we read :

The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfil . . . . cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise ; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen.

Berchtold's instructions were accurately followed (Blue Book, No. 5 ; Red Book, No. 10). In the conversation of July 24th Grey pointed out that the murder of the Archduke had aroused general sympathy for Austria, but that nevertheless a document of so formidable a character must be called unique in diplomatic history. Grey said that he was interested in the Austro-Serbian question only from the point of view of the peace of Europe. "The terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance" ; in the first place, however, he was to get into touch with the German and French Ambassadors, as the representatives of Powers not directly interested, but allied to those chiefly concerned.

We next come to an interview between Bienvenu-Martin and Count Szécsen at Paris on July 24th (Red Book, No. 11). The French Minister "readily agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Serbian Government made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible." It was Serbia's duty, said Bienvenu-Martin, "to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo." Szécsen's report concludes with the following words :

While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes. The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Serbia.

That France, Russia and England, jointly and severally, gave the most urgent advice to the Serbian Government to comply with the Austrian demands, so far as was in any way compatible with the sovereignty of their state, and that their advice was attended by success, is an incontestable historical fact. (See the Serbian answer, and also Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12; Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 27; Orange Book, Nos. 4, 40, 42, 53, etc.)

On July 24th an interview took place between Sazonof and Count Szápáry (Red Book, No. 14). Sazonof displayed a certain annoyance at the extravagance of the Austrian Note, and at once expressed the suspicion that Austria was engineering a war against Serbia. He criticised certain demands in the Note, for example the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, the participation of Austrian functionaries in the suppression of the "subversive" movement, etc., as being conditions with which Serbia could not comply; the continual intervention of Austrian officials would evoke perpetual unrest in Europe. Further, he pointed out that the dossier on the inquiry, which had been promised, had been rendered quite superfluous by the short time-limit in the Ultimatum. It should here be observed that the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, notwithstanding the doubts felt by Sazonof, was conceded in the Serbian answer.

*Red Book, No. 16.*—A Report from Szápáry, dated July 24th, on a conversation between Sazonof and Count Pourtalès. Sazonof emphasised the European character of the dispute, since the Serbian declaration of 1909 had been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe. "Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal." Pourtalès very definitely took up the Austrian attitude of non-intervention. The German Ambassador did not give a precise statement of what Austria really wished, but expressed the view that "the only object of Austria-Hungary was d'infliger à la Serbie le châtiment justement mérité." The last paragraph of Szápáry's report begins with the words: "The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Germany should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace."

I should here like to lay special emphasis on the fact

that as early as the conversation under consideration the idea of an international commission of inquiry was brought forward by the Russian Minister; such a proposal, indeed, represented the most natural and obvious method of arriving at a just judgment on the extent of the Serbian conspiracy and on the question of who had participated in it. This proposal for the creation of an impartial international Commission runs through the whole of the negotiations. It was already implied in Serbia's readiness to submit to the Hague Tribunal or to a decision of the Great Powers; it again emerged in the interview of July 24th just quoted. It was repeated in the Tsar's despatch of July 29th, which also recommended the convocation of the Hague Tribunal. It was skilfully and energetically supported by Cambon in his conversation with Jagow already mentioned (Yellow Book, No. 92). But it was all to no purpose. With the tacit toleration, if not the encouragement, of Germany, Austria remained immovably insistent on the crazy and completely foolish idea that her representatives should collaborate with Serbian officials in the suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia itself, and should even take part in the investigations which might be held with a view to the judicial inquiry into the conspiracy.

Can any reasonable man deny that this Austrian demand, so preposterous and unparalleled, was bound to prove impossible in practice and destitute of success? Let anyone imagine, if only for a moment, what this collaboration of Austrian and Serbian officials would have meant in practice, when directed to the suppression in Serbia of a movement that was hostile to Austria—a movement which, after all, whatever judgment may be passed on the means it adopted, was subservient in its aims to the same impulse of nationality which inspires all the European peoples of our epoch. Anyone who imagines the representatives of the Austrian reaction and the Austrian policy of suppression acting in concert with Serbian officials against the Serbian national movement, will be bound to concur with M. Sazonof when he foresees that in the event of Austria's demands being complied with, Europe would never again have an hour of peace.

It is to the immovable adherence to this presumptuous, imbecile and impracticable demand, which would have produced a result diametrically opposed to its professed object, that of living in peace in future with the neighbouring State, that we must attribute the fact that the world is to-day in flames, that millions of happy men have been slain, and are still to be slain, that the cultural and material labour of half a century has been destroyed, and that Europe has been brought to the brink of the abyss.

And let no one tell me that the war would in any case have come, if not from this cause, then from some other. These are mere conjectures with which I have already dealt elsewhere. Such a contention springs from the stock of ideas common to the war fatalists, who did not see, or refused to see, the ways leading to a peaceful understanding between the European nations though they were patent to all, who painted war as something necessary and inevitable, because they themselves wished and desired it, who ascribed to others their own intentions, and who now, when the terrible reality has surpassed their own expectations, seek to shift the guilt from themselves, exclaiming: "I am not to blame—I did not wish for war; it was bound to come, it was inevitable." These are but so many phrases, excuses, conjectures—questions to which no precise answer can be given. The one question which can be answered precisely with mathematical exactitude, and which therefore *must* be answered, is this: "Who brought about *this* war, the war of 1914? Who is responsible for it?" In this respect I am in agreement even with my own opponents, at any rate with those who, like myself, do not seek to decide the question of guilt from the historical antecedents, or who do not seek to do so exclusively, but primarily make use of the history of this conflict itself in deciding the question of responsibility. Even writers like Chamberlain and Helmolt consider it of fundamental importance (and Helfferich's whole work also rests on this view) that every thinking German should make it his business to understand the *immediate* cause of the war, that he should



study and test the evidence, that is to say the documents, and that he should arrive at a sure judgment on the question of guilt or innocence.

There are, it is true, people like Schiemann, who avoid the question of immediate responsibility out of indolence or malevolence, because they shun the incredible difficulties and the labour which the study of the diplomatic documents demands, and because they feel themselves more secure behind their hazy insinuations from the past than in the limpid waters of the evidence of the present. With such people, however, the serious and conscientious inquirer into the causes of this war can neither reckon nor expostulate. Schiemann and his fellows rightly deserve to be passed by in contemptuous silence; with their carefully considered restriction to the more remote antecedents of the war they serve not to unveil but to veil the truth. If, notwithstanding, I devote some considerable space to Schiemann in a later chapter, the reason is to be found in the fact that in his pamphlet, entitled *A Slanderer*, he challenges me personally, and I dare not make it possible for him to avail himself of the subterfuge that I avoided meeting him because I could not refute his arguments.

\* \* \* \* \*

After this dissertation let us return to our subject, the direct negotiations between Austria and Russia.

The Note from Berchtold to Szápáry from Bad Ischl, dated July 25th (Red Book, No. 21), contains a refusal to prolong the time-limit, which was regarded by Russia as a "natural consideration" to the other Cabinets, to give them an opportunity "to study the prospective dossier" (as is known, the dossier only reached the other Powers after the expiration of the Ultimatum; the date of its receipt in London is given as August 7th, Blue Book, page v). The desire for an extension of the time-limit was categorically refused, and was represented as resting "upon a mistaken hypothesis." "Our Note to the Powers was in no way intended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by

international courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter concerning us and Serbia alone. . . ."

In the Note from Berchtold to Szápáry of July 25th (Red Book, No. 26) Berchtold acknowledges that he was quite conscious of "the possibility that the Serbian dispute might develop into a collision with Russia" (a new proof of the *dolus eventualis* of the Central Powers as regards a European War). He even takes into account the possibility that "Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived." On the other hand he considers it "conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Serbia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might . . . be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements."

Thus on July 25th, before the Serbian answer had been received, Count Berchtold assumes as a possible contingency the refusal of the Austrian demands, and indicates that in such a case war would ensue. As is well known, the presupposed contingency did not supervene, but its consequence, war, did. Since the premise of war, that is to say the refusal of the Austrian demands, was not, apart from a few points, in fact satisfied, it was necessary in the official Viennese publication of July 27th (White Book, page 417) artfully to construe such a refusal. In his instructions to his Ambassador, Berchtold goes on to speak of the war with Serbia which had been "forced upon them" as "a means of self-defence and self-preservation," and gives an assurance that he aims at no territorial gains, that he has no wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, and that he has "always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia, etc." At the conclusion he speaks of the "peaceful leaders" of Russia, and declares the object of Austrian action to be "the necessary preservation of our position in Europe." (So, then, Austria's European position depended on the collaboration of Austrian representatives in Serbian police and judicial inquiries!)

Berchtold's despatch of the same day (Red Book,

No. 27) elucidates the fifth point in the Austrian Note by explaining that by "collaboration" was meant a private *bureau de sûreté* in Belgrade. An elucidation of Point 6 was not given. I have elsewhere already considered the details of the Austrian Ultimatum, and in this place I would merely ask once more: If the Viennese Government were in fact solely anxious to obtain acquiescence in their demands, and did not have in view much more far-reaching aims which to this day are unnamed, why did they neglect to negotiate with Serbia or with the Powers, or with Russia alone, as to the meaning and the scope of the fifth and sixth points in their Note? Why did they treat the Serbian answer exactly as if it had been as blunt a refusal as Berchtold had in advance anticipated (Note 26)? Why did they recall their Ambassador and declare war?

On July 26th (Red Book, No. 28) Szápáry furnishes a report regarding an interview between Count Pourtalès and Sazonof, which is mentioned in the German White Book (page 408). In the Note from the Austrian Ambassador assurances with regard to Russia's measures of military preparation are erroneously placed in the mouth of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whereas according to the German White Book the expressions were in fact used by the Russian Minister for War, and further, the conversation took place, not on July 26th, but on July 27th. The expressions attributed to the Russian Ministers (not a single horse, not a single reservist called in, preparations only in the four southern army districts, etc.) are in almost verbal agreement in the Red Book, No. 28, and in the White Book, page 408. Even the "word of honour" does not fail to appear in both places, the only difference being that in the Austrian report it was given by both Sazonof and Suchomlinof, and according to the German report only by the latter. According to the White Book it was thus only the Minister for War, according to the Red Book it was both Sazonof and Suchomlinof who broke their word of honour. The difference in date is also noticeable; in the White Book these honourable assurances were not given until July 27th; in the Red Book they had already been given on July 26th.

These differences between the German and Austrian accounts are, all the same, astonishing. Were I to apply the tactics of Herr Helfferich and his colleagues, I should infer that the German and the Austrian reports (being in conflict as regards the date and the persons involved) were "subsequent concoctions." We shall have more to say at a later stage with regard to these tactics. I refrain from forming any such judgment, and in this place I draw attention to the matter merely to prove how little justification there is, in view of the complexity of the diplomatic transactions, for inferring the existence of evil intentions from errors or differences in the reports. An evil intention might also be inferred from the fact that at the conclusion of the German reproduction of the military attaché's report of July 27th (White Book, Exhibit 11) a very important sentence contained in the Austrian version of the same report is omitted. The sentence runs: "The Minister (that is, the Minister for War who broke his word) emphasised repeatedly and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for peace." Clearly the omission of this sentence in the White Book also rests merely on an "oversight," or because, like the Tsar's despatch of July 29th, it was regarded as "unimportant"!

In his despatch of July 26th to Count Mensdorff in London (Red Book, No. 29) Berchtold infers from the mobilisation of the Serbian Army on the afternoon of July 25th that "no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade." I have already drawn attention in my book to the misapprehension under which Europe and the rest of the world labours that Austria made war on her Serbian neighbour. Bless your soul, anything but! In reality—according to Berchtold and no doubt the King of Bavaria shares the view—it was Serbia who wanted war and opened hostilities!

\* \* \* \* \*

We now come to the important conversation between Count Szápáry and Sazonof which, according to the Red Book (No. 31), took place on July 27th, whereas according to the Orange Book (No. 25) it took place on July 26th. By its friend's consideration of the Austro-Serbian conflict

and by its reasonable discussion of the various points in the Austrian Note, this conversation opened the most favourable prospects of an adjustment between the Austrian and the Serbian points of view. The Russian and the Austrian accounts of this interview agree in all essential matters, except that the attitude of Austria appears much more intransigent in its own account than in the Russian, whereas, on the other hand, the attitude of Sazonof is represented in both accounts as eminently pacific and friendly. Count Szápáry reports: "M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the Note which we had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been studying it and if I had time he would like to look it through once more with me." Although the Austrian Ambassador observed that he was authorised neither to discuss the text of the Note nor to interpret it, but that he would receive Sazonof's views with interest, the latter went in detail into the ten points of the Note, and "found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty." He stated that points 4, 5 and 6 were "unacceptable in their present form."

The most important part of the interview is unfortunately omitted in the Austrian account, namely Sazonof's formal wish that the Austrian Ambassador should be authorised by Vienna to enter into an exchange of views with him in order that they might redraft together certain articles of the Note (*aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques articles de la note*); it might thus be possible to find a formula which would be acceptable to Serbia and at the same time give satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands (*acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes*, Orange Book, No. 25).

This formal wish on the part of Sazonof for official negotiations in Petrograd was also communicated to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna as well as to the Ambassadors accredited to the other Great Powers.

What, then, was the fate which befell this request of

Sazonof? Information on the subject, in a most unambiguous and unimpeachable form, is contained in No. 40 of the Red Book and No. 45 of the Orange Book, both dated July 28th. Both contain reports on the weighty, and so far as the question of guilt is concerned, highly significant interview between Berchtold and Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador; both refer to the previous interview of July 26th or 27th between Sazonof and Szápáry, and to Sazonof's wish for an official continuation of the discussions in Petrograd. Although the Russian Ambassador, speaking in a friendly manner, expressed most seriously the desire to consolidate the good relations between the two empires by arriving at an understanding between them, and simultaneously to afford the Austrian monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia; although, as Berchtold expressly reports, he did not deny the existence of a hostile feeling in Serbia, but indicated that warlike action on the part of Austria would merely strengthen such a sentiment; although he drew attention to the dangers to the peace of Europe which might arise from a war between Austria and Serbia, Berchtold nevertheless remained immovable in refusing all negotiations on the Austro-Serbian dispute. Since the attempt is now made in every quarter in Germany to falsify historic truth on this point, I quote verbatim the answer which Berchtold gave to Schébéko, according to his own report (No. 40):

"In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Serbia."

The Russian report summarises Berchtold's answer in a few well-chosen words: "He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government . . . .

could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note" (Orange Book, No. 45). At the conclusion of the interview Berchtold again repeated the ludicrous charge that Serbia by her general mobilisation and by opening "hostilities on the Hungarian frontier" had provoked war.

Apart from the Austrian and Russian reports, which are in essential matters in agreement, the definite refusal on July 28th of all further negotiations with Russia is reported in similar terms in all the diplomatic books (see Blue Book, Nos. 61, 74, 75, 78, 81, 98; Yellow Book, Nos. 82, 83; Orange Book, Nos. 45, 50, 54, 77). Even the German White Book reports (page 409, Exhibit 16) that the Viennese Government "with full appreciation of our action" (what a fatuous addition!) "remarked that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened." (The reference is to Grey's proposal that negotiations should be continued on the basis of the Serbian answer, a proposal in essential matters in agreement with that of Sazonof.) In Tschirschky's telegram of July 28th (Exhibit 16) this "too late" is further elucidated by the addition of the words: "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia (!) and the subsequent declaration of war."

The incident of July 28th is obviously the cause of much discomfort to Herr Helfferich, just as the refusal of Grey's Conference-proposal has certainly occasioned him many a "mauvais quart d'heure." He cannot deny these incidents. Let us hear how he disposes of them:

"It may be recalled that, after Sir Edward Grey's first Conference-proposal had encountered difficulties, M. Sazonof himself took the initiative in favour of direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary, and that his initiative was in the first place declined by Vienna (Blue Book, No. 74). In the conversation of July 30th the difficulties which stood in the way of a direct discussion were removed. According to the report of the French Ambassador, which has been quoted (Yellow Book, No. 104) . . . . M. Schébéko and Count Berchtold had examined the

existing formidable difficulties with equal readiness to find solutions acceptable to both sides."

So, then, the Conference encountered difficulties. I ask the Secretary of State what these difficulties were. They were, indeed, nothing else than this, that Germany and Austria had no desire for this, the most appropriate instrument of peace. If the name or the form did not please them, they were themselves asked a thousand times to propose another name, or choose another form which did please them. Any name or any form would be agreeable to the Entente Powers. Where and how then did the Conference encounter difficulties?

Further, even Helfferich cannot avoid the admission that Sazonof himself took the initiative in favour of direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary. This initiative was on lines parallel to the similar proposal which emanated from Berlin and London. It was, indeed, clear to everyone that if it was possible to reach a direct understanding between Vienna and Petrograd, every other arrangement for mediation would become superfluous. Vienna, however, declined Sazonof's initiative, and did so in the most abrupt form. "Why?"—I must here again ask the Secretary of State. If the conversations had already been begun in an unofficial form on July 26th-27th, why was their official continuation declined on July 28th? Further, on July 30th the "difficulties which stood in the way of a direct discussion were removed." I shall return later to the conversation of July 30th. Here, however, I would ask: What difficulties,—what formidable difficulties indeed—stood in the way of a further discussion between Vienna and Petrograd? What difficulties other than the ill-will of Austria, which under all circumstances wanted war against Serbia? It is true that these difficulties were formidable; formidable, too, the responsibility of those who raised them, formidable the consequences which have ensued.

At the same time, to do Herr Helfferich justice, he does not conceal Austria's refusal not only of the Conference but also of the direct negotiations. What, however, are we to say of the Chancellor, who in his speech of August 19th, 1915, has the temerity to deny the fact of the Austrian



refusal and to represent the occurrence as a "misunderstanding" on the part of Russia? Herr Helfferich speaks of "the discussion of the Note addressed to Serbia, which until then Austria had steadily refused." Herr von Bethmann denies this refusal, and ascribes it to a Russian misunderstanding. According to the report in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of Friday, August 20th, 1915, his actual words were: "Since the Viennese Government had meanwhile declared its readiness to enter into a direct exchange of views with Petrograd, it was clear that a misunderstanding existed." On being appealed to by the Chancellor, Herr von Tschirschky also confirmed this "misunderstanding," which he said existed on the side of Russia. The Chancellor also invokes the Austrian Red Book in confirmation of his statement that there was a misunderstanding. "After an elucidation of the misunderstanding mentioned," the conversations between Petrograd and Vienna are represented as having, in fact, followed their course until they came to a precipitate conclusion in consequence of the Russian mobilisation. The account thus given by Bethmann is in glaring contradiction to the clear and unambiguous contents of the diplomatic records, and this holds of all the records, the English, the Russian and the French, as well as the Austrian and the German. It is also opposed to the account given by Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary of the Interior. It is nothing more than an attempt to mislead public opinion in Germany and abroad, an attempt as foolish as ineffective, which merely damages the cause which, in the view of its author, it is intended to serve.

BETHMANN'S INSTRUCTION TO TSCHIRSCHKY OF  
JULY 30TH, 1914

On this occasion Herr von Bethmann for the first time produced a document, which till then had been awaited in vain for over a year. We had constantly heard of the indefatigable efforts in the cause of peace made by Berlin in Vienna, of the pressure brought to bear on the Viennese Government in the direction of moderation and so on; but there had never been produced the slightest evidence

to prove the existence of these counsels of moderation. The White Book and the Red Book are silent. They incriminated rather than exonerated. The platonic "transmission" of English proposals, the submission "in accordance with instructions," or "the suggestion for consideration" in Vienna—nothing stronger than this!—were bound to arouse a constantly increasing suspicion that Herr von Tschirschky, the Russophobe, exercised at the Ballplatz an inciting rather than a moderating influence, and that the German Government never really made any serious effort to move Vienna to a conciliatory attitude. In my book, pages 339-349, I repeatedly and insistently drew attention to this gap in the Austro-German publications, and exclaimed to Herr von Bethmann: "When your printing press gives us a proof of the pressure you imprinted at Vienna, we will believe you."

Now at last, after more than a year, this omission is in part made good. Why was the instruction which Herr von Bethmann sent to Herr von Tschirschky on July 30th, 1914,<sup>1</sup> not published at an earlier date? If such an incident—the publication after more than a year's delay, of a document of so important a character, hitherto incessantly demanded in vain at home as well as abroad—had occurred in France, England or Russia, Messrs. Helfferich, Helmolt, Schiemann, Chamberlain and Co. would have been in full huc and cry, speaking of falsification and subsequent concoction. Apart from this, these dissertations of the German Government point out in their defensions that only the Notes from one Government to another can be regarded as authentic, not the instructions between a Minister and his Ambassador; the former can be checked by the other side; the latter can in no way be checked and are therefore liable to falsification (see Chamberlain, *New War Essays*, page 66). If such

<sup>1</sup> As is usual with Herr von Bethmann, he omits the date of the instruction, although in these difficult investigations the day and the hour are of supreme importance; he refers to an announcement which arrived from Count Pourtalès, "on the evening of July 29th," and gives the date of Tschirschky's answer as July 30th. The instruction must therefore have been sent to Vienna between July 29th and July 30th.

a suspicion may be expressed with regard to Ministers' instructions and Ambassadors' reports to their own Government when they are published simultaneously and in connection with all the remaining documents, which thus mutually confirm and supplement each other, how much more is it justifiable to entertain such a suspicion with regard to a publication, which makes an isolated appearance after an interval of more than a year, in response to pressure from all quarters, and when its existence has never hitherto been hinted at by those in authority in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

In explaining this astonishing incident, Herr von Bethmann makes use of the mystical phrase, to me at any rate inexplicable: "Shortly before the outbreak of war, when excitement was rising in England and grave doubts were being expressed as to our efforts to maintain peace, I made this incident known in the English Press." I was unaware of the announcement; perhaps it escaped my notice. If, however, it did take place, I ask:

(a) Why was the incident announced in the English and not in the German Press? In Germany, even more than in England, there was a feeling of expectation and of longing for an actual proof of the efforts made in Vienna for peace.

(b) Why was the document of July 30th not published in the original, instead of the "incident" being made known in a general way?

(c) Why was Bethmann's instruction of July 30th, 1914, not included in the German White Book? Why was it omitted from the first and the second White Books alike?

These are all questions to which I can give no answer. Doubts arise which refuse to be suppressed; dark points which for me still await elucidation; for I am unable to make such a light-hearted use of the words "mystification, deceit, subsequent concoction," as Messrs.

<sup>1</sup> After another year and a quarter (November, 1916) Bethmann has appeared with a second instruction to Tschirschky, relating to Grey's formula for an understanding (Blue Book, No. 88). I shall deal with this second instruction in the chapter, "Bethmann the Pacifist" (Section, "War Aims").

Helfferrich, Helmolt, Schiemann, Chamberlain and Co. are in the habit of doing.

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Long after these sentences were written certain further elucidations have been given in the English Press which, however, merely shroud the whole affair in greater obscurity. The *Westminster Gazette* of August 1st did in fact publish Bethmann's instruction to Tschirschky of July 30th. The text is said to have been given by the Foreign Office to the Berlin correspondent of the English journal in question with a view to its publication in England. The incident thus becomes still more mysterious; it is, indeed, a unique occurrence that a Government should secure the publication of so important a document in the foreign Press, but should withhold it from its own people; that it should fail to include it in its first collection of documents published four days later, and omit it likewise from its second collection. What would have been said of Grey or Viviani in Germany if they had omitted from the Blue or the Yellow Book an instruction of capital importance sent to Goschen or Cambon during the critical days, and a year after the outbreak of war had sprung upon an astonished world the fact that the instruction had, indeed, been published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* at the beginning of August, 1914! A tumult of derisive laughter would have accompanied such a revelation, and I would not much care to hear the words of abuse and insinuation which the dutiful German war Press would have showered upon the foreign Ministers.

How is this peculiar and unprecedented incident to be explained? The communication of the document to the English journal was obviously designed to induce in the English public a belief in the sincere efforts of the Berlin Government to adjust the conflict by amicable settlement between Vienna and Petrograd. In these days the supreme concern of the Berlin Government was to secure England's neutrality in the imminent continental war. For this purpose it was essential that the responsibility for the failure of a peaceful solution of the conflict should be shifted to Russia, if this were in any way possible. It was for this reason that Herr von Bethmann in his

instruction to Tschirschky spoke of a "misunderstanding" in Petrograd, whereas in fact there had really been a brusque refusal of any kind of negotiation by the Viennese Government. On July 30th, the day on which Herr von Bethmann professedly urged the Viennese Government so insistently to enter into negotiations with Petrograd, he had through Herr von Jagow rejected Sazonof's first formula of agreement (to be discussed in detail later, Orange Book, Nos. 60, 63), as abruptly as Count Berchtold two days previously had rejected any negotiations with Petrograd. The gentlemen in Vienna declined in general any discussion, the people in Berlin declined in particular the basis of discussion proposed by Russia, which would with absolute certainty have brought about an understanding. Austria said to Russia: "I will not in any way discuss the Serbian question with you." Germany said to Russia: "Your particular proposal for an understanding with Austria is so 'unacceptable' to my ally, that I shall not even send it to Vienna." The net result was that Berlin and Vienna simultaneously made any direct understanding between Vienna and Petrograd impossible.

This incriminating state of affairs had, however, to be obliterated in the eyes of the English public. Germany and Austria must appear innocent of the fatal consequences of Austro-German obstruction, in order that public opinion in England might express itself against participation in the war on the side of Russia and France. This is the obvious aim of the publication of the despatch in the *Westminster Gazette*; it was one of the means by which the deceitful collusion between Berlin and Vienna was to be concealed. For over a year the German Government preserved silence as to "the incident," both so far as concerns the despatch to Tschirschky and its publication in the *Westminster Gazette*. The grounds of this silence cannot be known but only surmised. If the telegram is genuine, that is if it was really sent by Herr von Bethmann to Tschirschky, the manner of its publication (in England alone) arouses the imperious suspicion that it was not seriously intended, and that perhaps it was composed and despatched for the express purpose of publication in England. Apart from all the other demonstrated facts

(the attitude assumed towards Grey's Conference, towards Grey's formula for agreement, towards the Tsar's proposal of July 29th, etc.), the abrupt and unexplained refusal of Sazonof's first formula of agreement, unexplained even to-day, is sufficient to prove that Bethmann had no wish for an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd, but that on July 30th she was already firmly resolved on war. It was for this reason that the Berlin Foreign Office contented itself with the specious success of its pressure on Vienna, which was expressed in Berthold's notes to Szápáry and Mensdorff of July 30th and 31st (Red Book, Nos. 50 and 51) with all their stipulations and reservations, instead of demanding from her ally the acceptance of an effective and propitious basis of negotiation, such as was offered in the English and Russian proposals for agreement, and making it clear that any further support of Austria was contingent on the acceptance of such a basis.

When all is said, Bethmann's despatch of July 30th arouses the suspicion that it is merely a trick intended to throw dust in the eyes of the English public, a trick which is revealed in its true character by the behaviour of the Berlin Government in every other respect. This explains why it was secretly launched in the English Press; this explains why silence was maintained on the subject in both the German White Books, in the official and semi-official Press, and in all the Chancellor's speeches until August 19th, 1915. The whole story constituted a very shady incident in the diplomatic antecedents of the war, which it would have been preferable, after the trick had missed its effect in England, to have allowed once for all to sink into oblivion, but which in the end the authorities were compelled to produce in order to satisfy, to some extent at least, the increasingly urgent demand for evidence of Berlin's pressure on Vienna—a demand which I was the first to advance with emphasis.

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Suppressing all these scruples and doubts, the document of July 30th and its success, even if restricted, proves for me how entirely correct I was in the observations contained in my book that the will of Berlin, if seriously expressed, was bound in every point to have as a consequence the unconditional compliance of Vienna,

that not so much as a word from Bethmann was required, a frown would have sufficed to move Vienna to follow the counsel of Berlin. The incident of July 30th, if it is authentic and was sincerely intended, proves the correctness of what I say in my book: With regard to Vienna, Germany was in a position to give effect to her every wish; the only question was what she wished. All the sugary phrases used by Bethmann and Jagow that they had gone to the utmost limit compatible with their duties as allies, that they had already pressed the button so violently in Vienna, that they had perhaps produced the opposite effect to what was intended, etc., all these evasive expressions are merely falsehood and deceit. If the button were pressed in Berlin, the bell could not fail to ring in Vienna. If Bethmann's warning of July 30th successfully led to the immediate resumption of the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, Berlin could also have prevented the rupture of these negotiations on July 28th. It could have secured the acceptance of Grey's Conference-proposal, of Grey's and Sazonof's formulæ of agreement; it could have prevented the mobilisation of the two northern army corps against Russia, the breach in diplomatic relations and the declaration of war against Serbia and the Austrian general mobilisation in the early hours of July 31st; it could have prevented one and all of the pernicious steps taken in Vienna with the same ease as it achieved the resumption of negotiations on July 30th, which took place as at the word of command. Berlin's responsibility for all the baneful results which flowed from Austria's actions and omissions is immeasurably increased by Bethmann's most recent publication. Hitherto it was possible for the Berlin Government to screen itself behind its powerlessness with regard to Vienna. The game of concealment is no longer possible. As we already knew, but as we now see confirmed, Berlin was everything and Vienna was a cipher. The Berlin Government is the chief criminal, the Viennese is merely her accomplice.

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This judgment is further strengthened by the special circumstances of the situation of July 30th. On that

day the question at issue was the cancellation of a fatal *faux pas* on the part of the Viennese Government (the categorical refusal of discussions with Petrograd). In every other case where Vienna took a momentous step her action could have been prevented before being carried into execution. The Austrian Note could have been examined and moderated in Berlin, the time-limit in the Ultimatum could have been extended, the declaration of war prevented, the acceptance of the various proposals for mediation could have been insisted upon; all these steps could have been determined and controlled in advance by Berlin (and therefore must have been so), and there was no need for Vienna to expose herself by the withdrawal of measures already taken. The incident of July 28th/30th was, however, more difficult; Count Berchtold had declined negotiations with Petrograd, and this refusal was known in all the European Chancelleries on July 28th and 29th. Then the thunderbolt came from Berlin, and Berchtold, whether he liked it or not, had to eat his own words. This was no easy task; it was, if you like, damaging to his prestige; much more so than many another step which Austria had indignantly refused—and yet it happened. It happened, because Berlin wished it so. Think of all that might have happened, if Berlin had but wished!

To cover the Austrian retreat, Count Berchtold built for himself the golden bridge of the "misunderstanding." It is only now, after Bethmann's revelation, that it is possible to understand the inner connection and the purpose of this insubstantial construction. In his telegram to Szápáry (No. 50) of July 30th, Count Berchtold reports on the resumption of negotiations with Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador. On the previous day (July 29th) a conversation between Sazonof and Szápáry had taken place (Red Book, No. 47), in which Sazonof complained on the one hand of the "mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and therefore directed against Russia," and on the other hand of the categorical refusal of a further exchange of ideas. I have already discussed this interview in my book (pages 324, 331)—it turned on the famous and ingenious distinction between Austro-Russian interests



which could be discussed and Austro-Serbian which could not be discussed. On this occasion Sazonof again emphasised "that Russia recognised our (Austria's) legitimate interest and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Serbia." The Russian partial mobilisation of July 29th, as a measure for the protection of Russian interests in the Balkans, was announced by Sazonof. Berchtold's point of view, that there should be no discussion of the Austro-Serbian dispute, as it had been defined to Count Szápáry in the instruction of the preceding day (July 28th, No. 40), was firmly maintained in the Petrograd interview of July 29th.

And now suddenly, at the word of command from the Wilhelmstrasse, it was necessary to strike into a new route; the path of a direct understanding with Russia had to be followed. In this difficulty the assistance of the celebrated misunderstanding was invoked. "That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had taken place between M. Schébéko and myself must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schébéko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before." (July 30th, Red Book, No. 50.) Herr von Bethmann now relies on this alleged misunderstanding, whether on the part of Schébéko or of Sazonof, to persuade the world that in reality there had been no refusal of negotiations on the part of Berchtold. No, Herr von Bethmann, the refusal took place as emphatically and as categorically as your own refusal of the conference, or Jagow's refusal of Sazonof's first formula of agreement. The alleged Russian misunderstanding is, however, merely a shameless attempt on the part of Berchtold to save his face, for he could not very well say straight to the Russian diplomatist: "I say, your Excellency, the night before last I refused all further negotiations with Petrograd, but Herr von Bethmann has given me orders, accompanied by grave threats to negotiate after all, et me voilà prêt." The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs could not thus give himself away, and so he invented the misunderstanding. And now the German Chancellor makes use of this alleged misunderstanding to juggle historically established facts

out of the way. There can be no doubt that here *mala fides* is involved.

The evidence that there was no misunderstanding, but only a harsh refusal, is revealed to all the world in the White Book and the Red Book, and in all the books of the Entente Powers, and is comprehensively gathered together in my book. At the present moment I should merely like to refer once more to No. 44 of the Austrian Red Book, which forms, so to speak, the *sedes materiæ* for this question of the misunderstanding; in this document Berehtold communicates to his Ambassadors the text of a memorandum which he had handed on July 29th to Herr von Tsehirsehky in answer to a *démarche* made by him on July 28th (with regard to this incident see my book, pages 342, 343). The Government of Berlin had risen to the height of resolving not merely to transmit an English proposal for peace but actually to bring it before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration. For their consideration! Until the most recent revelations of Herr von Bethmann this was so far the strongest pressure known to have been exercised by Berlin on Vienna. The English proposal which was thus brought before them for consideration was exactly the same as that to which reference is made in the instructions now unveiled, that is to say, it was to the effect that the Austrian Government should regard the Serbian reply as satisfactory or should accept it as a basis for further discussions (White Book, page 409; Red Book, No. 43). On July 27th the proposal itself had been warmly urged on Prince Lichnowsky by Grey (Blue Book, No. 46) and, as anyone can see, it was entirely in harmony with the Berlin idea of direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd on the basis of the Notes exchanged between Serbia and Austria. It is a matter which may cause the utmost astonishment, and it appears to me to involve an irreconcilable contradiction, that this proposal for an understanding in which England and Germany concurred should have been transmitted to Vienna on July 28th in the more than platonic form of a "submission for their consideration" and that on July 30th, as we are now informed, it should have been most vigorously repeated by the same Herr von

Tschirschky under the threat of a withdrawal from the alliance. If the Government at Berlin really attached so much weight to the successful resumption of negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd as it was then and still is their desire to make the world believe, why did they not on July 28th strike the vigorous note which was sounded on July 30th, and thereby prevent the refusal which Berchtold gave to Schébéko? Between the lukewarm submission of the 28th and the vigorous demand of July 30th, I find a contradiction which, like many other points already indicated above, throws a very peculiar light upon the instructions of July 30th.

The frigid submission for consideration on July 28th was necessarily bound in the sequel to lead to a frigid refusal of any further negotiations on the part of the Austrian Cabinet. The grounds for refusal are laid down in the memorandum already mentioned, and culminate in the sentence that the Imperial and Royal Government

“to their great regret are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Serbian reply in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time of the *démarché* made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Serbia had already arisen, and the Serbian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events” (Red Book, No. 44).

In my book (pages 328–380) I have sufficiently dealt with the logical inanity of this theory of Berchtold's that proposals were “outstripped by events,” and with the falseness in fact of its presuppositions. In the present inquiry I am only concerned with establishing the fact that Berlin was not only, like all other Cabinets, informed of the blunt refusal of any further negotiations, but was also acquainted of the grounds of this refusal by a detailed memorandum dated July 29th. Herr von Bethmann, however, maintains that there was no refusal but merely a Russian “misunderstanding.” In this he assumes a position in flagrant opposition to the truth, and also to his own Secretary of State, who expressly states that “on the afternoon of July 30th the Austrian Government acquiesced in the Russian desire for a discussion of the Note to Serbia

which until then it had steadily refused" (Helfferich, page 18).

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We may confidently leave the Chancellor and his Secretary of State to settle the domestic differences involved in this contradiction; it will be enough for us to note the statement of the Secretary of State, which corresponds to the truth:

(1) Russia had entertained the desire for a direct understanding with Austria, a desire which was shared as a matter of course by all the other Powers, including Germany, as Herr von Bethmann constantly assures us.

(2) Austria had steadily refused to satisfy this desire on the part of Russia, until

(3) She at last declared, on the afternoon of July 30th, that she was prepared to enter into a discussion.

It is possible that this final acquiescence on the part of the Austrian Government is to be attributed to the influence of Berlin. Its defect and the cause of its fruitlessness are to be found in the facts:

(a) That it was too late (Bethold's instructions to Szápáry of July 30th (No. 50) could only arrive at Petrograd for the necessary action to be taken on July 31st (No. 55); on this day, however, the general mobilisation on both sides had already taken place, and "Kriegsgefahr" had already been proclaimed in Germany); and

(b) That it was subject to so many restrictions (to give "elucidations," "in the form of subsequent explanations," "never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the Note," "outstripped by the outbreak of war," etc.).

In consequence it was from the outset more than doubtful whether any success could be expected from the resumption of negotiations (see my book, pages 328 and 335).

A literary defender of the Austrian Government emphasises the stipulations attached to Vienna's readiness to resume negotiation as being specially worthy of commendation: Vienna, he argues, had in no way yielded, she had remained firm to the last moment and even if

the negotiations had proceeded, she would not have departed from her demands. After all that has preceded one might be safe in conceding that this panegyrist of the Austrian Government may be right. Even apart from Berlin's policy of Ultimata, even without the transformation of the Balkan dispute between Austria, Serbia and Russia, into a dispute as to mobilisation between Germany and Russia, it is safe to presume that the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd would have been wrecked on the same malevolent stiff-necked shortsightedness which up till then had been the distinguishing feature of the whole behaviour of the Austrian Government.

If, however, concurrently with the refusal of all other ways of giving effect to mediation or of arriving at an understanding, there was really a desire to maintain peace by the one way of a direct understanding between Vienna and Petrograd, the duty of the German Government under these circumstances would have been to bring to bear on Vienna as early as July 23rd the pressure which they exercised on July 30th, and to prevent the Viennese Cabinet from preparing by its intransigent and militant attitude towards Serbia a *terrain* than which none more unfavourable can be imagined for negotiations with Petrograd. If direct negotiations between Austria and Russia, which Sazonof from the first moment had endeavoured to bring about, were considered by Herr von Bethmann to be desirable or necessary, he was bound to exercise timeous pressure on Vienna with this in view, and he dared not tolerate the action of the Viennese Government in refusing in advance as early as July 23rd (Red Book, No. 9) any direct discussion of the Serbian question with Russia and in renewing this refusal later on from time to time (see my book, page 327). Berlin is responsible for this refusal and its consequences. The pressure exercised on July 30th, even if it is accepted as demonstrated and as sincerely intended, was no longer efficacious to undo the portentous consequences of Austrian shuffling from July 23rd to the 29th.

In considering the question of Russian "incendiarism," decisive significance must at any rate be attached to the

fact that Sazonof was not deterred by the tardiness of Austria from resuming the discussions, so far as he was concerned, with the greatest zeal and the utmost goodwill (see Red Book, Nos. 55, 56; Orange Book, No. 69; Blue Book, No. 123); he screwed his demands down to an even lower point than before; he desired the continuation of the discussions on the neutral *terrain* of London, since "negotiations at Petrograd for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success" (Red Book, No. 56). With reference to Austria's action in Serbia, he also made the very extreme concessions mentioned several times in my book, summarised in what I may perhaps be allowed to call Sazonof's third formula, which I will discuss later in connection with the first two formulæ (Blue Book, No. 133). The discussion between Szápáry and Sazonof mentioned above (Red Book, No. 56) took place in Petrograd on August 1st, on the very day on which the German declaration of war was delivered in the course of the afternoon. In his conversation with Paléologue and Buchanan on the same day the Russian Minister gave the assurance that Russia would in no case begin hostilities first, and that until German troops had crossed the frontier he would regard himself as bound to his proposals for agreement. As has already been mentioned, he further proposed, as a last way of escape whereby the blow of destiny might at least be postponed, that the armies of France, Germany and Russia should remain mobilised on their own sides of the frontiers while a last attempt was made to reach a peaceful settlement (see the two concluding paragraphs of Blue Book, No. 139).

Is there anyone who can with a good conscience maintain that a man whose behaviour even on the day of the declaration of war was that of Sazonof, had from the beginning desired, planned and intended war, and that he had been concerned only to assure himself of the support of England and France before beginning the conflict? In my opinion no one can maintain this with a good conscience, unless in war and in the uproar of war he has completely lost his understanding, his judgment, and his generosity of mind. The language which the documents speak is clear and unambiguous, and even if,

as is done by Helfferich, the publications of the Entente alone are considered to the exclusion of the Austrian and German publications—a principle which, as I have shown, is in itself entirely reprehensible—yet even on this basis these books conclusively demonstrate that Sazonof from the first moment to the last served the cause not of war but of peace.

### SAZONOF'S PROPOSALS FOR AGREEMENT

It was a very remarkable fate which befel Sazonof's proposals for agreement, proposals which in themselves prove his pacific intentions and completely destroy Helfferich's inferences of "incendiarism," even if we disregard all the other actions of the Russian Minister, his advice to Serbia, his acceptance of the Conference, his proposal that the matter should be decided by the Hague Tribunal, his desire for direct discussions with Vienna. I may refer to the detailed treatment of Sazonof's proposals for agreement contained in my book, pages 154-157, 291-293, 346-350, and will here only briefly recapitulate the position.

### SAZONOF'S FIRST FORMULA OF AGREEMENT (*July 30th*)

The day under consideration is July 30th. On the previous day Russia had undertaken partial mobilisation in the four southern army districts. On the previous evening Bethmann had made his notorious bid for the neutrality of England. Two days previously Austria had opened hostilities against Serbia and had bombarded Belgrade. Viviani, who had just returned with Poincaré from his northern tour, was zealously labouring, in conjunction with Grey and with the co-operation of Sazonof, to reach a peaceful solution of the crisis. Grey's Conference-proposal had been definitely declined by Berlin three days before, but the Government of Berlin had not consented to suggest a form in which the mediation of the Powers, approved by them in principle, would be acceptable. Negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd had been interrupted for two days. In short, the tension

of the situation was calculated to awaken the gravest anxiety, and it might be feared that the worst was at hand. On the previous day Count Pourtalès had already threatened M. Sazonof that Germany would mobilise, should Russia fail to put a stop to her military preparations. Sazonof, however, was in a position to explain the Russian mobilisation by reference to the earlier Austrian mobilisation and "Austria's evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia" ("vu l'absence evidente chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie." Orange Book, No. 58.)

In this critical situation even the German Ambassador in Petrograd was deprived of his accustomed repose; he came early in the morning of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 97, states "at 2 a.m."; Yellow Book, No. 103, says "cette nuit") and completely broke down in the presence of the Russian Minister; he urgently pleaded with him to suggest the conditions under which Russia would agree to suspend her military preparations (indiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir à suspendre nos armements, Orange Book, No. 60). Sazonof declared that he was prepared to do this, since he and the Tsar were alike extremely anxious to maintain peace, and he accordingly dictated the following formula to Count Pourtalès:

Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires.

If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations (Orange Book, No. 60; Blue Book, No. 97; Yellow Book, No. 103).

Portalès promises to support Sazonof's proposal at the Foreign Office in Berlin. The proposal was forthwith communicated to all the Great Powers, and this was done in two ways, firstly through their Ambassadors in Petrograd,



and secondly through the Russian Ambassadors in foreign capitals. Thus the Foreign Office in Berlin learns on the same day of Sazonof's proposal both through Pourtalès and through Swerbeiev.<sup>1</sup> And what happens? The proposal, which had also been received from Pourtalès, and which the latter, according to his promise to Sazonof, had supported (Yellow Book, No. 103) is declined by Jagow as "inacceptable pour l'Autriche." That is all. No reason is given. It is inacceptable!

Why was it inacceptable? What did this formula of Sazonof contain which could be inacceptable for Austria? Was it, by any chance, the recognition of the fact that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed the character of a European question? This passage contained only something that was obvious, something that had long been recognised by Germany and Austria. This part, therefore, so far from being inacceptable, was in reality superfluous. All the efforts for peace made by the European Powers since July 24th rested, after all, on the fact—foreseen, indeed, as is proved by their own documents, by Germany and Austria from the beginning—that the Austro-Serbian conflict, in consequence of the antagonism between Austria and Russia in this question, and in consequence of the alliances on both sides, had assumed the character of a European question. The peace-endeavours of the Entente Powers and of Italy, all the proposals put forward by Grey, Sazonof and Viviani, even the German proposal for a direct understanding between Vienna and Petrograd about which the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse are so inordinately proud, all these proposals rested, after all, on the recognition of the undeniable fact that the dispute had become a European dispute, and on the endeavour, on the part of the Entente Powers at least, to prevent the European question from developing into a European war. The instructions from Bethmann to Tschirschky, which have now become known, and all his earlier and later alleged pressure on the button in Vienna, above all

<sup>1</sup> In Orange Book, No. 63, Sazonof's telegram is erroneously dated July 29th, whereas in fact it dates from July 30th (see Orange Book, No. 60). It may be hoped that Herr Helfferich does not find in this mistake evidence of a malicious intention to prevaricate.

the final readiness of Vienna to enter into direct negotiations with Petrograd—what does all this amount to, if not the recognition of the fact that the Austro-Serbian question had "assumed the character of a question of European interest" ? It was therefore impossible that the introductory sentence of Sazonof's formula could arouse the disapprobation of Herr von Jagow.

To proceed ; Austria, in accordance with the formula, was to declare herself ready to eliminate from her Ultimatum the points which violated the sovereign rights of Serbia. What exception could be taken to this statement ? I was under the impression that Austria had not the least intention of violating the sovereign rights of Serbia. It is true that the expressions in which Austria gave assurances as to what she did not mean are different on different occasions (her positive intentions, as is well known, she never announced) ; on one occasion it was Serbian territory, on another her independence, on a third her sovereignty that was to be respected, and all the possible permutations and combinations of these three assurances as to what was to be respected were put forward. Yet, nevertheless, an encroachment on the sovereign rights of Serbia was repeatedly declared by Austria in the course of the diplomatic negotiations to be something which did not lie within her intentions. It could not, therefore, be "inacceptable" to Austria formally to give such a declaration to Europe, especially when in the European Council, to which such a declaration would be addressed, the allies of Austria, Germany and Italy were represented equally with France and England, Russia's partners in the Entente. It follows that this second sentence also of Sazonof's formula could not possibly be unacceptable to Austria ; it merely repeated, precisely as did the first sentence, something that already existed, and it imposed no manner of new obligations upon Austria.

The question as to what points in the Austrian demands violated Serbian sovereignty, and in how far they did so, was left completely open in the Russian formula. This question was reserved for further quiet discussion, which might have taken place in various ways : either by

direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd (since July 30th, the day of Sazonof's formula, Austria was ready for "explanations" and "elucidations" on the contents of her Note, Red Book, No. 50), or it might take place by consultation of the four disinterested Powers, or still better, by summoning the Hague Tribunal, (a course which the Tsar had proposed on the previous day,) or by instituting a legal inquiry conducted by experts, or in any one of a thousand possible ways. The acceptance of Sazonof's formula in no way anticipated the decision on these particular questions of public law; Austria was only to give a formal assurance of the non-violation of Serbian sovereignty which, according to her previous assurances, she had no desire to violate, and all the particular questions flowing from this assurance were to be reserved for later examination and settlement. Essentially the question at issue could be reduced to that of arriving at an understanding as to the fifth and sixth articles of the Austrian Note.

This was all that M. Sazonof asked, and it was certainly no excessive demand. It comprised merely what was obvious, or what had already been promised. And this was unacceptable to Austria! With more insistence than ever I address to Herr von Jagow the earnest demand: Produce your reasons! We do not know whether you consulted Vienna. At any rate you were under an obligation to consult her, for you held no office as guardian of the Austrian Government. But you were bound not merely to ask, you were bound to demand. You should have accepted Sazonof's proposal not merely for yourself, but you ought also to have demanded its acceptance in Vienna, for unless Austria entertained unconfessed intentions of oppression against Serbia, this acceptance imposed upon her no obligation that was either intolerable or new.

And what would Austria have obtained in exchange for this acceptance? What would Europe have gained if Austria and Germany had accepted Sazonof's proposal? Neither more nor less than the assurance of the peace of Europe. The acceptance of Sazonof's formula on July 30th would have preserved peace with absolute certainty; for what did Russia promise in return? "La Russie

s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires." Russia undertook to stop her military preparations. At the moment when Russia was prepared to assume this obligation, and to assume it without any oppressive equivalent being imposed on Austria, no State had yet proceeded to a general mobilisation. Austria had partially mobilised; Russia had done the same; both States stood on the threshold of their general mobilisations. The threshold, however, was not yet overstepped. It would never have been overstepped if Herr von Jagow had not given to M. G. G. the declaration of July 30th. This declaration in itself, apart from everything else, lays upon the head of Jagow and his superior, Bethmann-Hollweg, the enormous responsibility for the war.

There could not be in Berlin the slightest doubt as to the import of the acceptance or the refusal of Sazonof's proposal. On a perusal of No. 60 of the Orange Book, No. 97 of the Blue Book, and No. 103 of the Yellow Book, it is evident that the portentous significance of Sazonof's peace proposal was everywhere emphasised and the destiny of Europe was made dependent on its fate.

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. (Blue Book, No. 97.)

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question. (Orange Book, No. 60.)

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict. (Yellow Book, No. 103.)

In a state of extreme tension Europe awaited the answer of Germany and Austria to Sazonof's proposition, and this answer was—a flat refusal, without any reason assigned.

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The consequence of this extraordinary incident, which merely represented the conclusion and the culminating

point of a series of similar earlier incidents, is to be found in the general mobilisations of the next day and the European war. The Russian general mobilisation of July 31st would not have taken place if Jagow had not declined Sazonof's proposal on July 30th. Russia was prepared to put a stop to her further military preparations, that is to say, she was prepared to abide by the partial mobilisation of July 29th which was exclusively directed against Austria, a country that was also mobilised, and she was prepared to allow no extension of the partial to a general mobilisation. The general mobilisation was, however, bound to follow as soon as Austria, through the mouth of Jagow, declined to give the minimum promise of a respect for Serbian sovereignty demanded by Sazonof. The cup was now full to overflowing. The extension of the time-limit had been declined, the conference declined, direct negotiations so far declined, Grey's formula left unanswered, the proposal to secure arbitration by the Hague Tribunal ignored; no procedure of their own for the mediation of the Powers had been proposed, no initiative on their side with a view to arriving at an understanding had been undertaken by Berlin or Vienna, apart from the Berlin proposal of direct discussions which had been declined by Berchtold on July 28th and even earlier—there had been throughout absolute passivity or resistance to all attempts to arrive at a settlement, and now there was added an abrupt and unexplained rejection of a declaration of principle involving no obligations! This was too much. This could only signify an unswerving desire for war on the part of the Central Powers, and to meet this Russia could only take and was bound to take measures of protection.

These measures were, moreover, not merely justified, but were directly compelled by military action on the part of Austria and Germany, a point to be considered later in a separate chapter. But the diplomatic occurrences alone, culminating in the refusal of Sazonof's first formula, would also have compelled Russia to extend her partial into a general mobilisation. Here, in the incident of July 30th (Orange Book, Nos. 60 and 63), is to be found one of the darkest and most fatal points in the diplomatic

antecedents of the war. Here is one of the main arguments for the guilt of Germany and Austria, and for the innocence of their opponents.

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But it is not merely the incident itself, it is even more the manner in which the incident is treated by the German and Austrian Governments and their apologists which reveals the guilt and the consciousness of guilt of the Central Powers. It will scarcely be credited, and yet it is true, that not a word with regard to Sazonof's proposal of July 30th is to be found in the White Book, nor in the Red Book, nor in Helfferich, nor in the speeches and writings of the Chancellor. I have already pointed out in my book that a consciousness of guilt is expressed in the fact that the White Book and the Red Book and the Chancellor pass over this incident in silence (pages 347, 348). That Helfferich, however, the official defender of the Government, should succeed in simply suppressing this, the most important act of the drama, was a fact which at first I considered beyond the bounds of possibility. Accordingly I perused his pamphlet more than once, and am compelled to affirm that although he does mention Sazonof's second formula of July 31st (Orange Book, No. 67, page 16) the first formula of July 30th is completely suppressed. Not so much as a word is devoted to Sazonof's proposal or to Jagow's answer.

It may be taken as a matter of course that Chamberlain, who for the most part invokes the *verba magistrorum* of Helfferich and Helmolt, should pass over in silence the incident of July 30th. I turned up Helmolt and what did I find there? He reports (page 215) Sazonof's proposal as it is given in No. 97 of the Blue Book, but he suppresses Jagow's answer. Nowhere in Helmolt is there a word or even so much as a hint of this answer. When we bear in mind the complete suppression of the incident in Helfferich and the partial suppression in Helmolt, the silence of the White Book and the Red Book on Sazonof's proposals, which I had already described in my book as a suspicious expression of the consciousness of guilt, becomes, objectively, a certainty of guilt, and subjectively an overwhelming confession of guilt—a confession of guilt

in one of the decisive turning points in the diplomatic antecedents of the war. The cessation of the further mobilisations depended on the acceptance of the Russian proposal; its rejection led to their continuation, their extension and consequently, on Helfferich's own theory, to war.

The section entitled "The Incendiary" (Helfferich, page 4) begins with the precious words:

"No doubt can exist as to the immediate occasion of the outbreak of war. The occasion was the general mobilisation of the Russian forces by land and sea, ordered by the Tsar early in the morning of July 31st, and the refusal of Russia to cancel this measure in accordance with the demand of Germany."

This question of mobilisation I will, as I have said, treat separately. To any one who assumes Helfferich's standpoint the incident of July 30th acquires, just from such a standpoint, a decisive significance. The Russian mobilisation of July 31st, according to Helfferich, provoked the war, but this mobilisation would itself have been prevented by the acceptance of the Russian proposal of the preceding day. It is therefore not to the military measures of Russia, but to the diplomatic action of Germany that the guilt of the war must be ascribed. To the German Government, however, which is incriminated by the methods of suppression adopted by its own defenders even more than it would be by the mere facts themselves, we may with a variation apply the well-known proverb: "Tell me how you are defended, and I will tell you who you are."

#### SAZONOF'S SECOND FORMULA FOR AGREEMENT (*July 31st*).

I have dealt in detail in my book (pages 156, 291, 348) with Sazonof's second formula, the result of the most zealous efforts on the part of English, French and Russian diplomacy to arrive at agreement. Helfferich's observations on this proposal, which in contrast to its predecessor is not passed over in silence, lead me to discuss the question further.

In order to facilitate an understanding of this question I venture to print below the text of Grey's proposal for agreement in the form in which it at first appears on July 29th (Blue Book, No. 88) as well as Sazonof's second formula of agreement of July 31st (Orange Book, No. 67).

*Blue Book, No. 88.*

It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

*Orange Book, No. 67.*

Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance — la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.

If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.

Helfferich appears to find pleasure in demonstrating that there is a fundamental difference between the two proposals by placing that of Grey and of Sazonof opposite each other, and in praising Grey's at the expense of Sazonof's. If this praise be merited, I venture to ask the Secretary of State why the German Government contented themselves with transmitting Grey's proposal to Vienna (White Book, page 409), but neither recommended it nor answered it. Vienna also, as we know, returned no answer to the proposal.

Herr Helfferich, it is true, expresses the opinion that the proposal was recommended by Germany to Vienna



(page 10), but no proof is offered in support of this statement. Had Grey's proposal been seriously recommended, it would without doubt have been accepted in Vienna. Austria would then have occupied Belgrade and "some" Serbian territory, she would then have put an end to her further advance and would have communicated to the Powers the conditions which it was desired to impose on Serbia; the Powers would have endeavoured to move Serbia to a "complete satisfaction," and the peace of Europe would have been preserved. When his proposal first appears (No. 88), Grey makes use of the positive expression "complete satisfaction"; further on, in No. 108, he speaks in the first paragraph of "satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria," but returns in the second paragraph to the more extensive expression, "how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria," merely adding "without impairing Serbian sovereign rights or independence." Of the three phrases thus used by Grey, it is natural that Herr Helfferich should quote only the intermediate one, because the more restricted form of satisfaction to be assured to Austria is more in accordance with his purpose. For my part I would point out expressly the double repetition of the more comprehensive form "complete satisfaction" and "fully satisfy."

That Grey's proposal was essentially based on the cessation of military preparations on the part of the Great Powers is incontestable, and is not even contested by Herr Helfferich (page 17). On the occasion of each discussion of his proposal, Grey repeats the obvious presupposition that all the Powers should suspend further military preparations (Blue Book, No. 103, etc.). What more could Austria demand than the "occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war"? These are the exact words of King George's telegram to Prince Henry, reproducing Grey's proposal. Here was a proposal for agreement far-reaching in its nature, urgently supported by the King of England, a proposal which left Austria for an indefinite period of time in possession of the Serbian capital as the victor holding

Belgrade as a pledge until full satisfaction was assured to her, with the proviso, it is true, that Serbian sovereignty should not be impaired; is it credible that such a proposal received from Berlin and Vienna the ill-treatment of being, no doubt, transmitted, but of remaining unanswered? Where, I ask Herr Helfferich, who cannot have been aware of the later "revelations" when he wrote his pamphlet—where does he find in the White Book or the Red Book that Grey's proposal was so much as recommended in Vienna?

And what about Vienna's answer? Herr Helfferich has to get along as best he can with the embarrassed observations: "the answer from Austria was still pending," "the proposal was not yet answered by Austria," etc.—exactly the same phrases of embarrassment with which Herr von Jagow postponed the answer from day to day (see the quotations referred to in my book, page 344, Note 8). The proposal was in fact never answered. Even the German White Book confirms this in the words (page 411): "Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation . . . could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation." Herr Helfferich, however, who has nothing to object to the sincerity and value of this proposal of July 29th—that is to say dating from a time when the tension had not yet reached the breaking point—will be unable to avoid answering the question why the proposal was answered neither by Berlin nor by Vienna, why its acceptance in Vienna was not categorically demanded as a condition of any further co-operation.

What objection could be urged against the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring territory, against the promulgation from there of their conditions of peace which might, indeed, have been formulated in as harsh terms as they chose, against the retention of a pledge until the demands which they had themselves announced were satisfied, against the mediation of the Powers to achieve this satisfaction? Austria, as the *beatus possidens*, in military occupation of the foreign capital as a pledge, would have been crowned with a glory of prestige than which a more brilliant could not be imagined, and all

this would have been gained at the cost of Russia, whose prestige as a Power interested in the Balkans was bound to sink in the scale the more Austrian prestige rose. It is impossible to comprehend the criminal infatuation which refused to be satisfied by such a military and diplomatic victory, which insisted on having more and still more, even at the risk of plunging Europe in the sea of blood in which it is now overwhelmed. Where and how did Berlin recommend Grey's proposal, I again ask? Why was it not accepted? Why did it remain unanswered?<sup>1</sup>

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Keeping in view the actual state of affairs, what value is to be attached to Herr Helfferich's anxiety to represent Grey's proposal as better than Sazonof's, and to make the latter known as "a classical example of naïveté"? Neither of them was ever recommended, or accepted, or even answered. Both remained so much dead paper, a kind of Anglo-Russian monologue! What does it matter that

<sup>1</sup> In his speech of November 9th, 1916, Herr von Bethmann brought forward, for the first time, an instruction to Herr von Tschirschky which is intended to prove that he recommended Grey's proposal. This document, which has suddenly seen the light of day two and a quarter years after the beginning of the war, one and three-quarter years after the appearance of Helfferich's pamphlet, and almost a year after the above chapter was committed to paper, evokes the same doubts and suspicions as its twin-sister, the "pressure"-note to Tschirschky of July 30th already mentioned. I will treat in detail of this second instruction in my chapter on the speech of Bethmann in question (Section, War Aims: "*Bethmann the Pacifist*").

When in the same speech Herr von Bethmann subsequently seeks to represent Berchtold's note of July 31st (Red Book, No. 51) as an answer, or even as an acceptance, of Grey's proposal (Blue Book, No. 88) he is guilty of an intentional transposition of the facts, and I have already produced the evidence in support of this accusation in my book (pages 344-346), and more recently in the above-mentioned chapter, "*Bethmann the Pacifist*." The sentence quoted above in the text from his own White Book in itself gives Herr von Bethmann the lie. Berchtold's note of July 31st (Red Book, No. 51) relates not to Blue Book, No. 88 (Grey's proposal for agreement), but to Blue Book, No. 84 (conversation à quatre in London); further, with all its stipulations and reservations, it in no way contains the acceptance of any form of mediation, but is "a refusal in the form of an acceptance" (see *J'accuse*, page 337).

one of the dead bodies may have been fairer than the other ?

In any case it is simply not true that there was an important substantial difference between Sazonof's second formula and Grey's formula. The originators of the two forms, after all the best authorities, were in agreement on the point that Sazonof's second formula represented an amalgamation of the first Russian formula and of Grey's formula, an amalgamation, be it observed, not a complete verbal agreement with Grey's proposal. Had such an agreement been intended, it would have been unnecessary for M. Sazonof to take the trouble to formulate a second proposal. From all quarters, from Paris, Petrograd and London (see especially Viviani's despatch, Yellow Book, No. 112) the attempt was made to merge together Grey's proposal and Sazonof's first proposal, which had arisen independently of each other, and which, it was proposed, should now be re-edited in order to form a common proposal. In Buchanan's despatch of July 31st (Blue Book, No. 120), which first conveyed Sazonof's new formula to London, we find it expressly stated :

"Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your (Grey's) telegram of 30th July (Blue Book, No. 108), with formula recorded in my (Buchanan's) telegram of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 97 ; Sazonof's first formula). He (Sazonof) trusted it would meet with your approval."

There then follows the text of Sazonof's second formula, as given in Orange Book, No. 67 (with a few entirely insignificant deviations : "consentira" instead of "consent," "troupes" instead of "armées," etc., from which it may be hoped that Herr Helfferich will not infer the existence of malevolent intentions).

The English Ambassador further furnishes a report with regard to the interchange of telegrams between the Tsar and the Emperor William, and makes particular mention of the Tsar's telegram of July 31st (White Book, page 411), in which Tsar Nicholas gives his solemn word

that, so long as the negotiations which had just been resumed with Austria should continue, his troops would undertake no provocative action, since Russia was far from wanting war. True, it was "technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation." The same technical impossibility of suddenly stopping mobilisation in a great State when once begun was also emphasised by the Emperor William in his telegram to the King of England on August 1st (Collected Documents, page 540). Buchanan further mentions Sazonof's suggestion that the further negotiations should take place in the more favourable atmosphere of London, and concludes with the following sentences which, being certainly very inconvenient for Helfferich's theory of "incendiarism," are no doubt for this reason left unmentioned by him :

"His Excellency (Sazonof) ended by expressing his deep gratitude to the English Government who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain."

These concluding sentences of Sazonof, taken in conjunction with the Tsar's telegram of July 31st, and above all the draft of a new formula of agreement comprehending all the Anglo-Franco-Russian peace proposals, prove beyond all doubt to the satisfaction of any reasonably minded person that as a historically established fact the Russian Tsar and his Ministers laboured for peace with all imaginable zeal and with every means at their disposal until late in the evening of July 31st (Buchanan's despatch only arrived in London on August 1st). Certainly they can have had no premonition that in the same night, at 12 o'clock, an Ultimatum would be delivered to them which would necessarily make war inevitable. What becomes, then, of the "incendiary" resolution of July 29th? What was the meaning of all these endeavours on the part of Sazonof? What did he mean by the draft of his first formula, and of his second formula, and by the

cheerful resumption of direct negotiations with Vienna (see Orange Book, Nos. 66 and 69)? Why did he put forward at the very last hour his proposal to transfer further negotiations to London as a more favourable *terrain*? Why did he still further reduce his minimum demands of July 31st until they became the shadowy postulates of August 1st (Blue Book, No. 133), which I have already referred to as Sazonof's third formula of agreement? What was the meaning, I ask Herr Helfferich, of all this effort, all this thought, writing and speech, to which the three books of the Entente Powers bear a hundredfold testimony, if as far back as July 29th the resolution to commit arson in Europe had already been taken in Petrograd?

It will be no easy task for Herr Helfferich to find an answer to these and to all the other similar questions already indicated or yet to be mentioned. "All bunkum, mystification and prearranged evidence of an *alibi*!" No, Messrs. Helfferich, Chamberlain, Helmolt and Company may rest assured that such miserable excuses as these are of no avail here. The whole body of evidence in favour of the guilt of the Central Powers and of the innocence of the other side is too firm, too close, too firmly welded together, too consistent also with the publications of the guilty Central Powers themselves. No later historical investigation will ever dispose of the positively convulsive endeavours, made, not only by England and France, but also by Russia up to and including August 1st. If this is granted, the evidence of guilt inferred from the general Russian mobilisation falls to the ground. I shall prove later that this general mobilisation was occasioned and justified by the military measures of the Central Powers, and in the first place by those of Austria; yet even if this were not the case, the diplomatic activity of the Russian Government and the behaviour of the Russian Tsar would furnish complete proof that Russia desired to maintain peace, even at the cost of a far-reaching diplomatic humiliation before Austria (to which must be added a military humiliation of Serbia) and that her military measures denoted security only, and not aggression.

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While Herr Helfferich omits from Buchanan's note (Blue Book, No. 120) the paragraphs which annihilate his demonstration of guilt, these paragraphs, as well as the formula itself, are directly falsified by Herr Helmolt. Even Helfferich, in his statement of Sazonof's formula of July 31st, is guilty of an inexactitude, which, if it had befallen Grey or Vivjani, would certainly have been jotted down as an item in the prevaricator's ledger account. I refer to his quotation on page 16, where he gives the words: "reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne," whereas it in fact reads: "d'une question d'intérêt européen." (On this point, Orange Book, No. 67, Blue Book, Nos. 120 and 132, Yellow Book, No. 112, are in agreement.) I am not prepared to follow the example of my opponents and regard this slip on the part of Helfferich as a falsification, but it is all the same an unpardonable carelessness in a man who with such assurance accuses others of falsifying history. There is certainly a shade of difference between a European question and a question of European interest, but at this stage I attach no importance to this point. I desire, however, once more to draw attention to the injustice involved in inferring the existence of malicious intentions from trivial errors in dealing with material which is so incredibly complicated.

In any case, the malicious intention, the intention to falsify, is without doubt to be found in Herr Helmolt. He translates (page 249) the words "la Russie s'engage" by "Russia will then endeavour" to maintain her waiting attitude. Helmolt indeed has the temerity to provide the word "endeavour," which he has falsified, with a mark of exclamation in brackets (!), in order thereby to indicate that this Russian endeavour was something entirely trivial and non-obligatory, whereas in fact, according to the original French text, which is everywhere reproduced in the same terms, Russia *pledged* herself, "la Russie s'engage." This is falsification, and conscious falsification. So also is the reproduction of the concluding sentences of Buchanan's note as given by Helmolt, which, following the text of the highly-respected German professor of history, runs as follows: "He (Sazonof) was

of the opinion that the atmosphere of London would have been more favourable to a peaceful solution. In any case, the Russian Emperor, the Government and the people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain." The last nine words are printed by Helmolt in heavy type to awaken in the reader the impression that Great Britain by her firm attitude had encouraged Russia's intentions for war and had therefore merited the gratitude of Russia. In reality Sazonof says exactly the opposite, as is proved by my literal reproduction of Buchanan's concluding sentences: "It would be largely due to them if war were prevented." This sentence Helmolt suppresses, and thereby transforms gratitude for the prevention of war into gratitude for support in war.

In another direction also he is guilty of falsification: he makes Sazonof say that the atmosphere in London *would have been* more favourable to a peaceful solution, and thus, intentionally and in connection with the falsification already mentioned, he represents the position as if the idea of further negotiations in London had already been abandoned, and as if all prospects of arriving at an understanding were already recognised as abortive. As a matter of fact, the position is entirely different. Sazonof in proposing London as the site of negotiations, said that the London atmosphere *would be* more favourable (Orange Book, No. 69; Blue Book, No. 130). He thus hoped for, and counted on, a continuation of negotiations in London, but did not, as falsely depicted by Helmolt, bemoan the failure of the London idea with the old exclamation "Ah, that would have been pleasant!"

The foregoing is only a small example, drawn from the countless number available in illustration of the treatment which Helmolt, the historian, accords to the truth. I am in a position to produce, if need be, dozens of similar falsifications and perversions in Helmolt's book. Helfferich's sentence may well be applied to him: "History could not be treated with a lighter heart" (or, may I add, with a more brazen forehead).



COMPARISON BETWEEN GREY'S FIRST FORMULA AND  
SAZONOF'S SECOND FORMULA.

Herr Helfferich is greatly perturbed because, in his circular letter of August 1st (Yellow Book, No. 120), summarising the negotiations of the last days, Viviani, the French Prime Minister, attributes to Germany the guilt of the war then on the point of breaking out, and does so on the ground that Germany by her Ultimatum to Russia had irretrievably ruined the propitious negotiations between Petrograd and Vienna which had then just been resumed. This, he says, is a falsification of history. In reality, as we are told, Viviani was wrong in asserting that the Russian Government had accepted Grey's proposal for agreement (Blue Book, Nos. 88, 98, 103), whereas in fact they had made a counter-proposal "differing very materially from the English proposal" (Orange Book, No. 57), and their action had thus rendered the negotiations more difficult, if not, indeed, hopeless. Above all, he argues that Viviani is wrong in his statement that Russia was prepared to put a stop to her military preparations. In other words, to put the whole story in a nut-shell, he tells us that Austria had throughout, at the suggestion of Germany, shown a spirit of compliance, whereas Russia, instead of recognising this spirit of compliance and ordering her conduct accordingly, had been content to put forward against Grey's promising proposal a "classical example of naïveté," that is to say, a wholly worthless proposal of her own, declining at the same time to stop her military preparations.

I hold that this account is false from beginning to end, and will prove my contention.

(I) I have already shown in my book (page 336) that the readiness which Austria ultimately showed to enter into negotiations on the substance of the Serbian dispute, whether in the shape of direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd or by the mediation of the four Powers, was so hampered by stipulations and reservations that a successful issue of the negotiations was scarcely to be expected. Count Berchtold's notes to his Ambassadors in Petrograd and London (Red Book, Nos. 49, 50 and 51)

show us all these reservations, which in themselves reveal the quasi-failure of the pressure alleged to have been exercised in Vienna by Herr von Bethmann. In addition to Berchtold's well-known reservations (that there should be elucidation but not negotiation, that explanations had been "outstripped by the outbreak of war," that it was never their intention "to depart from the points in the note," etc.), the Austrian Government insists primarily on the fact "that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course," but that, on the other side, "the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us." In this event, Austria would, of course, "at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia which are occasioned by the Russian attitude."

Russia, then, is in the first place to bring to a standstill her partial mobilisation directed against Austria (the reference is to the partial mobilisation of July 29th, for Russia's general mobilisation of July 31st was clearly not known to Count Berchtold when Note No. 51 was dispatched). Austria would then cancel her counter-measures in Galicia, but in all circumstances the campaign against Serbia was to continue unhampered. In investigating the question of mobilisation we shall later realise the great importance of the sentences from Despatch No. 51 now in question. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is enough to make it clear that, although Vienna stated that she was prepared to enter into a direct "exchange of ideas" with Petrograd, and even to "entertain" Grey's mediation, this was nevertheless accompanied by the ominous and impossible reservation (quite apart from the other conditions) that her military action against Serbia should be continued. This one stone of offence was in itself so immovable a rock that the pathway to an understanding could not but be barred. If Austria's rear were covered by the negotiations in Petrograd or in London, so that, free from the necessity of having regard to a possible Russian intervention, she could direct the whole of her forces against the small neighbouring State, already weakened by two previous

wars, it could confidently be expected that Serbia would be promptly crushed from a political, military and economic point of view. After such an event it would presumably have been a vain endeavour to restrain the imperial State from placing her foot on the neck of her detested and troublesome Slav neighbour. The crushing and abasement of Serbia to the position of an Austrian vassal State was precisely what Russia, as a great Power interested in the Balkans, desired to prevent with the support of her partners in the Entente; but this was precisely what Austria would have been able to achieve, unmolested and unhindered, if Berchtold's proposal of July 30th had gone through. For while Sazonof and Szápáry were negotiating in Petrograd, or while Grey, Liehnowsky, Paul Cambon and Imperiali were united round the table at the Ambassadorial conference in London, the eight Austrian Army Corps let loose against Serbia could have conducted a war of annihilation, not only against the Serbian army, but against the whole hated country, as would appear in fact to have happened later, according to credible witnesses. The last paragraph of Berchtold's note of July 31st thus reveals so curious a kind of compliance, that on this ground, if on no other, is revealed the weakness of Helfferich's antithesis that Austria, and with her Germany, desired peace, but that Russia desired war.

Nevertheless the situation had become brighter than before as a result of Austria's ultimate readiness to enter into negotiations, which at least created the *possibility* of arriving at an understanding; and Viviani in his summary of August 1st (Yellow Book, No. 120) could rightly accuse Germany of having destroyed all the chances of peace by bursting in with her *Ultima* and of having given clear expression to her desire for war.

(II) While, on the one hand, Helfferich is silent as to the difficulties placed by the Viennese Government in the way of a peaceful solution, quite apart from the loss of eight priceless days, he maintains, on the other, that Russia, by bringing forward an impossible proposal for agreement and by refusing to stop her mobilisation, expressed and confirmed her desire for war. In order to demonstrate that Sazonof's proposal for agreement of

July 31st is worthless, that is to say, an inappropriate basis for arriving at an understanding. Helfferich prints Grey's and Sazonof's proposals in adjacent columns and indicates their alleged material differences. I have already ventured to ask the question: If Grey's proposal was so pre-eminently a thing of beauty, why was it neither answered nor amended nor accepted by Germany and Austria? I will continue to repeat this question until it receives a satisfactory answer from the Wilhelmstrasse.<sup>1</sup> This is one of the many items on the debit side of the account of the Central Powers.

But to proceed: Are there then really material differences between the English and the Russian proposals of so important a character as Helfferich would have us believe? In no way. Grey is prepared to stop the advance of Austrian troops in Serbia, just as Sazonof is. Grey is prepared to leave the Serbian territory already occupied in the possession of the Austrians as a pledge for a settlement of the dispute; Sazonof is prepared to do the same, even if he does not expressly emphasise the point. "Arrêter la marche de ses armées" is the contrary of "se retirer." Thus Sazonof also is prepared to leave the Austrian troops in occupation of what they possessed at the moment when negotiations with a view to an understanding should begin. Grey is prepared to give the Powers the opportunity of seeing that Austria should receive from Serbia sufficient or even full satisfaction. Sazonof is prepared to do the same. The latter expressly emphasises that the sovereignty and the independence of Serbia are not to be injured, a reservation which, Helfferich notes, is omitted in Grey's proposal, but which he for his part regards as already satisfied<sup>2</sup> by the declarations of the Austrian Government. As a matter of fact, this reservation was self-evident, as it had been frequently repeated by Grey himself (see Blue Book, Nos. 111, 137, 141, etc.). It is, how-

<sup>1</sup> I have already indicated in the footnote (page 308) that the answer contained in Bethmann's speech of November 9th, 1916, is entirely insufficient; Grey's proposal was never answered, much less accepted, by the Central Powers.

<sup>2</sup> [The English version of Helfferich says the reservation was 'rejected,' -presumably a slip in translation.]

ever, also expressly emphasised—a point which Helfferich overlooks—in the second paragraph of No. 102 in the words: “without impairing Serbian sovereign rights or independence.” So there is here also no difference between Grey and Sazonof.

As a further point of difference, Helfferich emphasises the fact that the Russian proposal demands the recognition of the fact “that the conflict has assumed the character of a European question” (this is the misquotation of Helfferich’s already mentioned; it should really be “of a question of European interest”), whereas Grey’s proposal does not contain this passage. This passage was, however, entirely self-evident, for Grey as well as for Sazonof. In an earlier passage I have already drawn attention to this childish game of hide-and-seek, according to which, while, it is true, negotiations were carried on with Russia and the other Great Powers on the Austro-Serbo-Russian conflict, the right of the Russian Government to make their voice heard was nevertheless disputed. Is this childishness still to be continued after the publication of Bethmann’s despatch to Tschirschky of July 30th? Even from the earliest stages in the European negotiations this trick of localisation was grotesque and indefensible. From the first moment the conflict was in danger of becoming a European question, a point on which Germany and Austria themselves, as I have shown, were never in doubt. The danger of a European conflict had become actual with the declaration of the Russian Government of July 25th, with the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, with the Russian partial mobilisation of July 29th, and with all the other correlated incidents. If the question was not a European one, why did all the European Governments negotiate about it feverishly by day and by night? Why did Germany seek freedom of action in a continental war by the proposal for neutrality which she addressed to England? Why did Austria and Russia order a general mobilisation, and Germany proclaim the “state of war” on July 31st, the same day on which Sazonof sent his second formula to all the European Governments? What, in view of these facts, is the meaning of Herr Helfferich’s observation: “Sir Edward Grey had not asked for such

an acknowledgment (namely, that the conflict had assumed the character of a question of European interest), and the Austro-Hungarian Government had always declined to allow her conflict with Serbia to be regarded as a European question"? According to Helfferich, the formula thus embodied in the Russian proposal to secure the recognition of this point represents an essential difference as contrasted with the English proposal. In reality, the utmost that could be urged against it is that it was superfluous, for whether it was recognised by Austria or not, the Serbian conflict had long ago developed, not merely into a question of European interest, but even into a vital European question. Here, also, there is therefore no substantial difference between Grey and Sazonof.

Lastly, Herr Helfferich draws attention to the observation in Grey's proposal that the territory occupied would, of course, be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. That Sazonof was in agreement with Grey on this point is also self-evident; for it may be presumed that Sazonof was even less inclined than Grey to leave Austria permanently in possession of Serbian territory. Herr Helfferich might also have drawn attention to the fact that Sazonof's concluding words: "*La Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante,*" do not appear in Grey's proposal. He appears, in fact, to consider that even this addition to the Russian proposal detracts from its value, since he places opposite Sazonof's final words as a luminous example a blank space in the column devoted to Grey. In reality, if this method of juxtaposition in columnar form has any meaning, the Russian proposal must be regarded as going much further than the English, since the Russian proposal, although this is a point which Herr Helfferich does not appear to notice, represents at least a bi-lateral agreement (an Austrian obligation against a Russian), whereas the English, as it is printed by Helfferich, contains purely a one-sided obligation on Austria, without any Russian equivalent.

The contrast thus instituted by Helfferich leads to a conclusion diametrically opposed to that which Herr Helfferich himself draws: the Russian proposal in all essential matters confers on Austria the same rights while imposing at the same time the same limitations as the

English proposal, but, on the other hand, it concedes a Russian equivalent which is not contained in the Grey-Helfferich proposal. I intentionally make use of the phrase "Grey-Helfferich." Grey himself would never have committed, nor did he commit, the folly of putting forward a formula of agreement imposing duties exclusively on Austria. Unlike Sazonof, he never summarised the whole of his ideas in a short formula ; instead of this, he fully reproduces his thoughts in various notes (Nos. 88, 98, 108, etc.), but in varying words. It is with the object of showing that Sazonof's proposal is inferior to Grey's that Herr Helfferich seizes at random a few sentences from the various notes in which Grey expressed his views at more length, and these he reproduces as a precise formula. In the process, however, he has the ill-luck—or is it intention?—to point out that Grey has omitted stipulations which, as a matter of fact, do appear elsewhere in Grey's notes, and on the other hand the Russian equivalent, which had, of course, been fully present to Grey's mind, quite escaped his memory. Grey's proposal, also, was based on the presupposition, expressly emphasised by Sazonof in reducing his proposal to a compact formula, that as a return for the stoppage of the advance of the Austrian troops Russia should during the period of the negotiations maintain a waiting attitude.

Herr Helfferich has, indeed, no luck ; not only has he chosen a method of comparison which is in itself entirely untrustworthy, but he has in pursuing this method involuntarily arrived at a result diametrically opposed to the object he had in view. Sazonof's formula, in the form in which he contrasts it with Grey's, is much more far-reaching and better than Grey's, and had Sazonof accepted the latter, he would not have gone so far as he did in putting forward his own.

Thus Herr Helfferich's attempted demonstration (pages 15-17) that Austria was inclined to compliance on July 31st, but that Russia, on the other hand, was intransigent and resolved on war, not only collapses, but is completely refuted. Precisely the contrary is the case ; even if Berlin had not by her Ultimata destroyed all further possibility of negotiation, and made war inevitable, it would, indeed,

have been possible to arrive at an agreement between Vienna and Petrograd on the basis of the declarations on both sides, but such an issue would have been highly improbable on account of the many reservations made by Vienna, which, when all is said, could not have been made without the concurrence of Berlin.

#### SAZONOF'S THIRD FORMULA OF AGREEMENT (*July 31st*).

How far, how improbably far, M. Sazonof really went to meet the presumptuous demands of the Viennese Cabinet never emerges in Helfferich's deceptive account. Herr Helfferich is not above the trick of basing his discussions and his contrasts exclusively on Sazonof's second formula of July 31st (Orange Book, No. 67), whereas, in fact, Viviani's note of August 1st (Yellow Book, No. 120) is founded on Sazonof's more recent and far-reaching proposal, which I have called Sazonof's third formula. This point is of immense importance in arriving at a judgment on the whole question of responsibility, and at the same time in appraising the method of procedure adopted by the defenders of Germany and Austria.

Herr Dr. Helfferich accuses Viviani, the French Prime Minister, of falsification committed in his note of August 1st summarising the situation. In maintaining that Russia had consented to the English proposal, including the stoppage of military preparations, Viviani makes use of the words: "The Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal." Herr Helfferich seeks to demonstrate the untruthfulness of Viviani's assertions by contrasting the valuable English proposal with the alleged worthless Russian counter-proposal. This contrast leads, as I have just shown, to a result contrary to that intended by Herr Helfferich. It is, however, necessary to observe—and this is the new point of importance—that Sazonof's concessions were not even restricted to the formula of July 31st (Orange Book, No. 67), but that the Russian Minister had meanwhile gone still further before the evening of July 31st, and had instructed his Ambassador in London to convey to Grey the communication contained in No. 123 of the



English Blue Book. It is to this communication that an allusion is found in Sazonof's despatch to his Ambassador in London dated the evening of July 31st (the last entry of this date, Orange Book, No. 69). And, as can be proved beyond dispute, it is this message of peace which is the basis of Viviani's circular note of August 1st. Herr Helfferich, however, suppresses this further instance of Russia's spirit of compliance, which may be called Sazonof's third formula. He is silent with regard to an action taken by Russia in the interests of peace in order that his inference of Russia's desire for war may be maintained unshaken.

I have already repeatedly pointed out in what this further peace-action on the part of Russia consisted. The decisive point, which I must here again emphasise, lies in the fact that Sazonof no longer, as in his second formula, demanded that it should be made obligatory on Austria to put a stop to her further advance in Serbia, but merely declared it to be "very important" that Austria should put a stop provisionally to her military action on Serbian territory during the negotiations in London. We know that Sazonof sincerely welcomed Grey's mediation and was thankful for what he had done to enable a new ray of hope to break through that an understanding would yet be reached (Orange Book, No. 69). In these circumstances Sazonof was anxious that the negotiations between Austria and Russia should take place in London "with the participation of the Great Powers" (Orange Book, No. 69; Red Book, No. 66; Blue Book, No. 133; Yellow Book, No. 120). All these documents are in agreement in treating, not of Sazonof's second formula, but of the third, which, on the morning of August 1st, de Etter, the counsellor of the Russian Embassy, communicated to Grey in a precise formula, which was based on a telegram despatched from Petrograd on the previous evening. If this formula is compared with the third paragraph of Viviani's note of August 1st, it will be found that Viviani builds his remarks exclusively on this last Russian proposal, which is in fact quoted almost verbally. This proposal went much further to meet the Austrian Government than Grey's formula (Blue Book, Nos. 88 and 103), for Grey required from

Austria a formal promise not to advance further. Sazonof, however, was content with the very modest formula that a "provisional" stoppage of Austrian operations would be "very important."

This further concession on the part of Sazonof was intentional, and carefully considered; the expression "very important," of which Viviani also makes use in the third paragraph of No. 120 ("très important"), was most carefully chosen to leave open to Austria the possibility of further negotiation, without directly compelling her to stop her military operations. Herr Helfferich, however, either is entirely ignorant, or desires to be ignorant of the whole of this incident; for him Sazonof's third and most extreme formula has no existence; he polemises, again, it is true, with unavailing weapons, against the second formula, and thus fights, not against Sazonof and Viviani, but, like Don Quixote, against windmills. But where is "history treated with a lighter heart"—in Berlin or in Paris?

**SAZONOF'S FOURTH FORMULA OF AGREEMENT (August 1st).**

We may even go further and speak of a fourth proposal for agreement put forward by Sazonof. This he submitted to the English and French Ambassadors in Petrograd before the receipt of the German declaration of war. As we know, his first formula was flatly declined by Herr von Jagow, and his second and third were never answered by Germany and Austria. This, however, did not prevent the Russian Minister from giving to the Ambassadors of the two Entente Powers as late as the morning of August 1st, that is to say, while the time-limit of the Ultimatum was still running, the assurances:

- (a) That Russia would in no case begin hostilities first, and that so long as German troops did not cross the frontier he would be bound to his former proposals;
- (b) That while a last attempt was being made to arrive at an understanding, Russia was ready to keep her troops mobilised on her side of the frontier, and that war might even then be avoided if France and Germany did the same.

I have already mentioned elsewhere that Grey, in the desperation of the last hour, also sought to clutch this straw, unfortunately in vain. This fourth and final proposal made by Sazonof is, of course, like the third, suppressed by Herr Helfferich, for all these desperate efforts of the Russian Minister to extinguish the fire fitted in badly with the picture of the "incendiary" which Herr Helfferich had undertaken to draw.

#### RUSSIA'S OBLIGATION TO PUT A STOP TO HER MILITARY PREPARATIONS.

Herr Helfferich objects to Grey's proposal as well as to Sazonof's second proposal that in neither of these proposals was there any mention of an obligation imposed on Russia to put a stop to her military preparations. Grey, he tells us, had merely (Blue Book, No. 103) expressed the earnest hope that on the acceptance of the proposal military preparations would be suspended on all sides. An earnest hope is, however, not the same as an obligation.

To this the following answer may be made :

On the day on which Grey communicated to Buchanan (Blue Book, No. 103, July 30th) his proposal for agreement (Blue Book, No. 88), Russia had already independently undertaken in Sazonof's first formula of agreement (Orange Book, No. 60) a formal and binding pledge to stop her military preparations (*s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires*). When Grey communicated to Petrograd (No. 103) his formula of agreement of July 29th (No. 88), he already had knowledge of Sazonof's formula, which Buchanan had communicated to him verbatim at an earlier hour of the day (Blue Book, No. 97, received July 30th). Grey's Note (No. 103) contains, in fact, the first attempt to arrive at an amalgamation of the English and the Russian proposals, such as was later realised in Sazonof's second formula. When, therefore, Grey sent to Petrograd the Note (No. 103), on which Herr Helfferich exclusively relies, he knew that Russia was prepared to pledge herself to stop her military preparations if Austria would remove from her Ultimatum those points only which violated Serbian sovereignty. The stoppage of

further military preparations on the part of Russia was promised in a binding manner ; it was also a self-evident condition, since the aim of all these formulæ was to arrive at an understanding, and an understanding was incompatible with a simultaneous advance of military preparations.

The position with regard to mobilisation, to which I propose to return later in a separate chapter, was on July 30th that Austria had mobilised eight army corps against Serbia and two against Russia, whereas Russia had mobilised the four southern army districts against Austria. The military preparations on both sides were to remain at this stage, in the event of an agreement being reached on the basis of one of the formulæ proposed. Should these efforts to arrive at an agreement fail, further progress from partial to general mobilisation was to be expected, and this would be accompanied by a mobilisation of Germany as well (so far as the latter had not already secretly taken place). That the most portentous consequences depended on the acceptance or the refusal of Sazonof's first formula is clear beyond all doubt from Buchanan's note of July 30th (No. 97). Sazonof had spoken to the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers of the open preparations directed against Russia which Germany had made by land and by sea, and he had dictated his formula to Count Pourtalès at his request "as a last hope" for the avoidance of war. This is reported to Grey by Buchanan, who adds in referring to popular sentiment in Russia and to strategic considerations : "Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria and inevitable results will be a European war." These ominous consequences, which were, indeed, decisive for the destiny of Europe, did not, as we know, deter Herr von Jagow from declining Sazonof's proposal for peace with a frigid laugh and without any reason assigned, although it went to the uttermost to meet all the wishes of his opponents—a criminal action for which there can be no sufficient expiation in this world or the next. And now Herr Helfferich comes and tells us that the Anglo-Russian proposals for agreement did not impose any obligation to suspend military preparations. This obligation is clearly stated in black

and white in Sazonof's formula of July 30th. Herr Helfferich, however, suppresses this formula in order to get rid of the statement of this obligation.

It is accordingly a matter of complete indifference whether Sir Edward Grey did or did not emphasise in his note in more or less definite words the suspension on all sides of military preparations. Such a suspension was the immediate and self-evident aim of all negotiations, and it had been formally promised by Russia. Moreover, in nearly all Grey's notes this self-evident condition was repeated. In Note 103, indeed, it occurs twice; it appears in the first paragraph, which Helfferich quotes, and in the third paragraph as well. Reference should also be made to Note 36: "To request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference." Here we have, not merely a hope, but an express request. Note 111, paragraph 1 may also be quoted: "All Powers would, of course, suspend further military operations or preparations." The suspension of further military operations or preparations is here referred to as a self-evident proposition, as indeed it was. Another example is found in Note 135 from Grey to Buchanan: "That the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria." These few examples may suffice. They are, as has been said, quite insignificant in view of the formal obligation undertaken by Russia on July 30th, that is to say, before the general mobilisation.

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As against these proved facts, Herr Helfferich is in the fortunate position of being able to refer to a sentence spoken by Sazonof, clearly late in the evening of July 31st, in a discussion with the English and French Ambassadors. I have discussed elsewhere this conversation, in the course of which Sazonof spoke of the correspondence between the Emperors which still allowed some hope to be entertained and also communicated to them his second (amalgamated) formula; here I need only consider the sentence which, in Helfferich's view, is supposed to prove that Russia's intention to suspend mobilisation was untrustworthy. Sazonof's words run as follows:

"His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress" (Blue Book, No. 120).

These words relate to the Tsar's telegram of July 31st (White Book, page 411) in which the Tsar disclaims any desire for war, and gives his solemn word that, so long as negotiations continue with Austria, Russian troops will undertake no provocative action. The words added by Sazonof, that it is of course impossible to stop a mobilisation already in progress, are no more than an accentuation of an impossibility on military and technical grounds, which is emphasised not only by the Tsar in his telegram, but also by the Emperor William in his despatch to King George of August 1st. It is, however, to be observed that when Sazonof gave a formal assurance of the suspension of his military preparations in his first formula, on July 30th, the partial mobilisation had not yet been extended to a general mobilisation. At that time, on July 30th, the question at issue was that of stopping at the stage of partial mobilisation. In the interval of more than twenty-four hours which had elapsed—fruitlessly, owing to the fault of Germany—between Sazonof's first and second formulæ, the Russian partial mobilisation had been extended to a general mobilisation; and now, as the army chiefs of both the military monarchies emphasise in agreement, it was a "technical impossibility" to bring to a stop a general mobilisation already in progress. "A counter-order cannot be given"—these are the words which appear in the Emperor William's telegram, and they must also have been applicable to Russia. As we pacifists pointed out long ago in warning, this is precisely what constitutes the appalling fatality of armed anarchy. When once the button has been pressed in the gigantic military machinery, there is scarcely any more a possibility of a pause; each side fears to be outstripped by the other, even if it be by but a matter of hours, and in the end the most appalling carnage breaks out for the most trivial of causes, since military considerations upset all reasonable reflection, all calm balancing of means and ends.

From what has been said above it follows that Sazonof, if only on technical grounds, could no longer give on July 31st, after the beginning of the Russian general mobilisation, the promise which he had still been able to give on July 30th (the stoppage of further military preparations, that is to say, the non-extension of the partial to the general mobilisation). This, however, depended, not merely on technical grounds, but on other grounds as well. We shall speak elsewhere with regard to the exact point of time at which the Austrian general mobilisation took place. It is, however, an incontestable fact that this general mobilisation took place on July 31st as well, as did also the proclamation of the "state of war" in Germany. In view of these facts, how could Russia have brought her general mobilisation to a stop on the evening of July 31st, even if this had been technically possible? Sazonof did not demand from Austria a stoppage of her general mobilisation proclaimed on the same day. Generally speaking, Austria and Russia were in no way so nervous of their opposing mobilisations as Germany pretended to be; they had been accustomed in all preceding Balkan conflicts, in 1908-09, and in 1912-13, to stand opposed to each other in arms. Since July 29th, that is to say for two days, they had on this occasion also stood opposed to each other under arms along their common frontier. Indeed, they succeeded, apparently without feeling any particular disquietude, in keeping their weapons directed against each other for another six or seven days, from July 31st to August 6th, without war being declared and without their firearms discharging.

Even after the general mobilisations on both sides had taken place, they continued to negotiate with each other quite cheerfully and without concern, as I have already pointed out in my book, and on July 31st Count Berchtold, without betraying any emotion, communicates this fact to his representatives abroad in the following words:

"As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia . . . . Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and Petrograd

appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and from these it is hoped that things will quieten down all round (Red Book, No. 53)."

As a matter of fact, discussions on the question took place on July 31st and August 1st between Szápáry and Sazonof in Petrograd, and the Austrian Ambassador remained in Petrograd until August 6th (Red Book, No. 55 to No. 59). For Austria there was nothing disquieting, far less a ground for war, in Sazonof's observation of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 120) as to the impossibility of putting a stop to mobilisation and the limitation in the statement of the obligation he undertook, contained in the second formula to the effect that he would maintain a "waiting attitude." As on the occasion of former conflicts, Austria assumed with regard to Russia the familiar and reasonable point of view: If the one mobilises, so will the other; mobilisation is a measure of security, but in no way a ground for war; as we arrived at an understanding in the past in spite of, or perhaps precisely because of, mobilisation on both sides, so the same thing will and can take place on this occasion also. This point of view, as is well known (see my book, page 200), was expressed by the diplomatists of all the Powers, including the Austrian diplomatists themselves, by their demeanour as well as by their unambiguous statements. Germany was the only exception. For Germany mobilisation was professedly tantamount to war, although nevertheless the German Government was so illogical as not to give expression to this point of view in the most decisive document, in the Ultimatum to Russia; instead, they merely threatened to meet mobilisation by counter-mobilisation (White Book, Exhibit 24).

In undertaking to "maintain a waiting attitude" (Orange Book, No. 67), Russia undertook all that she could at that moment still fulfil on military and technical grounds; she also undertook more than Austria demanded or could demand, since Austria herself had meanwhile proceeded to a general mobilisation. And thus there falls to the ground the last argument inferred from the Grey-Sazonof proposals for agreement, which is cited by Helfferich



against Russia's desire for peace and in support of Russia's intentions for war. The sentence with which Helfferich concludes the section entitled "The Incendiary" is correct, if the slight alteration is made of substituting "Germany" for "Russia." It then reads (page 17): "the leading circles of Germany have wanted war, and have striven for it with enforced brutality as soon as the outlook of a pacific solution had appeared."

#### WHAT DID SAZONOF DO TO MAINTAIN PEACE ?

If we look back on the previous discussion, the "incendiary" resolution of Russia, which is assigned by Helfferich to July 29th, appears as an enormous invention which a man of intelligence (and Dr. Helfferich answers this description) can ask his readers to accept only if he is inspired by the deepest contempt for their intelligence or their *bona fides*.

Consider all that Sazonof did to preserve peace, both before and after July 29th up till the afternoon of August 1st, when war was declared. He followed every path that could lead to a peaceful understanding, admittedly without attaining success, but without being chargeable with the responsibility for failure :

He proposed four different formulæ of agreement, one on July 30th, two on July 31st, and finally one on August 1st.

From the first moment he welcomed the conference of the four Powers in London, and declared that he would stand aside and accept its decisions.

He at once began direct discussions with Vienna, and when these were abruptly declined by Berchtold, he endeavoured to secure their resumption. In the end, when they were again resumed, after much trouble and the loss of precious time, he forthwith began negotiations with the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd, and sought to prepare a more favourable *terrain* for these negotiations by the proposal to transfer them to London.

On July 29th, on the day on which, according to Helfferich's fabrication, he definitely resolved on his act of "incendiarism," he moved his monarch to cut or rather

to untie, the Gordian knot in the best, the simplest and the justest way for all concerned, by the proposal to submit the whole question for decision to the Hague Tribunal, a proposal which the Berlin Foreign Office suppressed in their first White Book. Only after it was published by Russia was it inserted in the second edition of the White Book, which appeared in the spring of 1915, and even then it was concealed under a new system of numbering among the correspondence between the monarchs.

He declared his readiness to stop at the partial mobilisation of July 29th and to desist from any further extension in return for the mere promise of Austria to eliminate from her Note certain points which violated Serbian sovereignty (July 30th).

He was not deterred by Jagow's abrupt refusal, as abrupt as Berchtold's refusal of all further discussion two days previously, from combining new formulæ of agreement with Grey and Viviani, and from reducing to a mere shadow the differences between the Austrian and Russian standpoints by proposals of his own which went constantly further to meet the Austrian point of view (July 31st).

On the very day on which war was declared, he expressed his readiness to remain under arms, and to continue further negotiations with a view to an understanding. For six days after the outbreak of the Russo-German war he maintained this standpoint towards Austria; he neither declared war, nor recalled his Ambassador, nor permitted Russian troops to cross the Galician frontier—a point which has by no means been sufficiently emphasised, and which is of consummate importance in considering the question of responsibility.

All this was done by Helfferich's incendiary, a man who wished for war under all circumstances! He did it all, I suppose, as a jest, as mere make-believe, to prove an *alibi*. I have no explanation, and I need give no explanation of this incomprehensible discord between the charge against Sazonof and his real actions. Herr Helfferich, however, is under an obligation to explain this. How does he explain Sazonof's action, if Sazonof's intention was so criminal as he represents it?

SAZONOF'S CONVERSATION WITH BUCHANAN ON THE  
MORNING OF JULY 25TH (BLUE BOOK, No. 17).

It is further necessary that I should here consider a point which is in the highest degree incriminating for Helfferich, although not for Sazonof. The question relates to one of the clumsiest falsifications of which the German Secretary of State is guilty. The accusation which he has built rests on the foundation: "According to her own statements, Russia was from the beginning of the crisis resolved to face all the risks of war if she could count upon the support of France" (page 46). This assertion is supported by No. 17 of the Blue Book, which contains a report from Buchanan on a conversation which took place with Sazonof on July 25th before the expiration of the Austrian Ultimatum. It is impossible for me to quote in this place the full text of Buchanan's lengthy note, which amongst other things contains, even at that early date, Sazonof's positive consent to the Conference of the four Powers on the understanding that Russia would stand aside, but anyone who desires to form for himself an independent judgment on the question of guilt and on the credibility of the most distinguished defender of Germany should peruse this note (No. 17) and then say whether the criminal intention to make war, which Helfferich professes to find therein, is really contained in the document, or whether it does not rather express the warmest and the most intense desire for peace.

It is true that the sentence which is torn by Helfferich from its context (one line out of no fewer than fifty-six) is, in fact, contained in Buchanan's report. But what else does the report contain? What is the fundamental idea expressed by the Russian Minister? It is exactly the opposite of what Helfferich endeavours to ascribe to him by thus dishonestly tearing a single line from the despatch. Buchanan and Sazonof speak in the first place of the endeavours of the Entente Powers to obtain an extension of the time-limit specified in the Austrian Ultimatum—endeavours which unfortunately proved in vain and which had then no longer any prospect of success, since the time-limit expired on the evening of that day.

Sazonof speaks of Serbia's readiness to punish those guilty of the crime, but also dwells on the impossibility of an independent State being able to comply with all the political demands of Austria. In the event of an Austrian attack, the Serbians would presumably abandon Belgrade, withdraw into the interior, and appeal to the Powers to help them. Sazonof declared himself in favour of the question being placed on an international footing in this way, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1909 were given to the Powers. Russia was prepared to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of the four disinterested Powers. On Buchanan observing that he hoped that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising, Sazonof gave him the assurance that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and would begin no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. Austria wished to alter the *status quo* in the Balkans in favour of her own hegemony. There then followed the discussions between Sazonof and Buchanan, of which frequent mention has already been made, in the course of which Sazonof expressed the view that the maintenance of peace would be assured by England taking a firm stand on the side of Russia and France, whereas the English Ambassador, in agreement as is well known with his Minister, anticipated the best results from the impartial mediation of England. From this conversation, as from all the other discussions bearing on the question of solidarity, there emerges the incontrovertible fact that Russia and France endeavoured to obtain from England a declaration of solidarity, not with a view to war, but in the interests of peace.

Finally, in the last paragraph of Buchanan's note, we come upon the one line on which Herr Helfferich rears the insubstantial structure of his charge of incendiarism. Buchanan urgently warned the Russian Minister against a mobilisation which might lead to the mobilisation of Germany and probably to a declaration of war<sup>1</sup>; to this

<sup>1</sup> Buchanan's warning was given on July 25th, before the Serbian answer was known, before Austria had recalled her Ambassador and declared war on Serbia, before Austria had mobilised two army corps against Russia and had proceeded with the bombardment

Sazonof replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans and—now comes Helfferich's sentence—if Russia feels secure of the support of France she will face all the risks of war. The Russian Minister at once added that he in no way wished to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria the situation could be regarded as desperate.

This proves, according to Helfferich, Sazonof's firm and irrevocable resolution to make war; whether this would be carried into action depended only on one question, whether France would or would not lend support to her ally. "The question of bringing about the war was for Russia purely one of opportunity" (Helfferich, page 18). If success could be counted upon with France's co-operation, which in its turn depended on England's support, war was already, according to Helfferich, a settled matter on July 25th. That this is so is proved by one of the fifty-six lines in No. 17 of the Blue Book. In view, however, of the fact that the remaining fifty-five lines are completely opposed to this exposition, I should like to ask this question of the Secretary of State face to face: "Does your Excellency really believe in your own interpretation of Sazonof's words, or do you merely wish to instil such a belief in uncritical readers who, unfortunately, at present constitute the majority in Germany?" I assume that the latter is the case. If on July 25th Sazonof was already unconditionally anxious for war, merely presupposing the co-operation of France, why did he welcome Serbia's intention to appeal to the Powers? Why did he say he was prepared to stand aside, and leave the decision of the question to the four disinterested Powers? Why did he give the assurance that he had no aggressive inten-

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of Belgrade; even at this early date his warning was certainly justified and, as is known, it was acted upon by the Russian Government. The military measures on which Russia had resolved on July 25th were not translated into action until July 29th, after the most suspicious military action on the part of Austria, and after the manifestation of an extremely intransigent attitude by Germany and Austria (see the Tsar's telegram of July 30th, White Book Exhibit 23 (a)).

tions, that he had no desire to precipitate the conflict? Why did he wish to obtain from England a declaration of solidarity in order that "there would be no war"? If he wished for war, why did he concur in every measure intended to prevent war? All this is inexplicable and incompatible with Helfferich's thesis, which—a model of fairness—seizes one line and suppresses fifty-five.

In reality, on a correct interpretation of these lines, the whole despatch is entirely congruous. Sazonof is anxious for peace; he accepts all the means which are proper to maintain peace. But if, notwithstanding, Austria should adhere to her intention of making use of the death of the Archduke in order to crush Serbia and to attain predominance in the Balkans, an intention which was made manifest in the unexampled harshness of her Ultimatum, in the refusal of any extension of the time-limit and of any kind of discussion, then, indeed, assuming that France would support her, Russia would face all the dangers of war. In other words, Russia desires peace in every way, but not at the price of allowing the Austrians to crush Serbia, and of yielding to her a position of supremacy in the Balkans.

Russia's action in fact, from the beginning of the last crisis down to the outbreak of war, is in agreement with this tendency in her policy, a tendency which need surprise no one and which she had expressed in all earlier conflicts. Throughout she revealed an urgent desire for peace and an earnest endeavour to maintain peace, but at the same time resistance to the abasement of Serbia to the position of an Austrian vassal, resistance to Austria's schemes to acquire supremacy in the Balkans. Sazonof's utterances of July 25th, which furnish Herr Helfferich with the basis of his arraignment, are reducible to this commonplace in European diplomacy as Grey calls it; to this constantly repeated formula, which is self-evident so long as a Balkan question exists and which Sazonof, as late as May 23rd, 1914, had summarised in the Duma in the words: "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." I confidently leave it to the reader to pass judgment on the method thus employed, which further invokes the assistance of emphatic type spread throughout several lines

in order to draw the whole attention of the reader to the arbitrary interpretation placed upon these seventeen arbitrarily selected words. Here again the German Government might exclaim: "I ask that the advantage of extenuating circumstances may be extended—to my defender."

## CHAPTER VI

### THE QUESTION OF MOBILISATION

#### GROUNDS FOR RUSSIAN MOBILISATION

"No doubt can exist as to the immediate occasion of the outbreak of war. The occasion was the general mobilisation of the Russian forces by land and sea ordered by the Tsar early in the morning of July 31st and the refusal of Russia to cancel this measure in accordance with the demand of Germany" (Helfferich, page 4).

As ancillary to this thesis, which represents the cardinal point in the whole of Helfferich's demonstration of guilt, the defender of the German Government inquires as to the grounds which, on the assertion of the Russian Government itself, occasioned the general Russian mobilisation. The reasons advanced by Petrograd are, he says, as follows :

1. The Russian general mobilisation took place "as an answer to the military measures of Austria-Hungary."
2. As an answer to "the alleged military preparations of Germany."
3. As a consequence of "the refusal of Austria-Hungary to permit any intervention of the Powers."

The inquiry into each of these reasons for mobilisation inevitably leads Herr Helfferich to the conclusion that none of these reasons is sound, and that the Russian general mobilisation was merely an emanation of Russia's unconditional and clearly conscious desire for war.

With regard to the third point, I may be allowed to be brief, since I have already in my book and in the previous



sections of this work sufficiently portrayed and characterised the attitude assumed by Germany and Austria towards all the attempts made by the Powers to mediate on the question. Even Herr Helfferich cannot, of course, get rid of firmly-established historical facts. At most he can but falsify or suppress them. As he views the question, the assertion that Austria had refused to permit an intervention of the Powers :

produces a curious effect if associated with the fact, on the one hand, that a new proposal at mediation, as suggested by Sir Edward Grey, had been submitted by the German Government to the Austro-Hungarian Government on the previous day, and that Austria's reply to the proposal was still pending; that, further, a conversation had taken place in Vienna in the afternoon of July 30th between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador concerning which the French Ambassador at Vienna at once telegraphed to Paris, signalling it as a conversation of high importance (" un entretien de haute importance ") (Helfferich, page 9).

Here, then, two facts are placed to Austria's credit account as weighty items to counteract the charge implied in the reproach that she declined every proposal for mediation. For this purpose it is necessary to make use of Grey's proposal for agreement (Blue Book, No. 88), dated the afternoon of July 29th, which received from the authorities in Berlin the honour of being " transmitted " to Vienna (without even being recommended by them)<sup>1</sup> and which, in fact, never elicited an answer. " The Austrian reply was still pending," says Helfferich euphemistically. On July 31st, the day of the Russian general mobilisation, that is to say forty-eight hours after the communication of Grey's proposal to Lichnowsky, the answer was still pending. As we know, the answer, which should have come as a result of Berlin's mediation, was postponed on the most varied and empty pretexts from hour to hour and from one day to the next, and in the end was

<sup>1</sup> In the chapter, "*Bethmann the Pacifist*," which is specially concerned with the Chancellor's speech of November 9th, 1916, I will return in detail to the alleged note of recommendation of July 30th, which Herr von Bethmann made public for the first time in his speech above-mentioned, that is to say, twenty-seven months after the outbreak of war (see the Section, " War Aims," Vol. II.).

never received at all. For Herr Helfferich, however, the existence of Grey's proposal and its "transmission" to Vienna is evidence of Austria's readiness to negotiate.

The further fact, set down to Austria's credit account, is in itself correct. Count Berchtold, on the afternoon of July 30th, did in fact resume negotiations in Vienna with M. Schébéko and declared that he was ready for their continuance in Petrograd. We have, however, already seen that this resumption was attached to so many stipulations, reservations and conditions, that it could scarcely be regarded as in any way a propitious step towards an understanding. In particular, Austria's strict adherence to the continuation of her military operations in Serbia was opposed to the idea underlying all the mediatory efforts of the Powers, and in consequence the various methods of mediation, whether by conference or by direct discussions, offered little or no prospect of success. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the step taken by the Austrian Government on July 30th represents at last a departure from the fatal path which the Viennese Government had undeviatingly followed for more than eight days ever since July 23rd. They had refused to extend the time limit; they had declared and begun war against Serbia; they had harshly rejected all negotiations on the basis of their note, whether with Serbia or with the Powers; they had left Grey's formula unanswered; through Jagow as their spokesman they had declined Sazonof's first formula, and they had rejected as belated the proposal of a conference of the four Powers. They had not only assumed an attitude of unconditional refusal towards all proposals for mediation, but they had never put forward such a proposal of their own; on the contrary, up to the afternoon of July 30th, they had steadily maintained the point of view that the settlement with Serbia concerned no one but Austria. By the irreconcilable attitude of Austria, to which that of Germany corresponded, the tension of the European situation had become so acute that the sudden conversion of the Viennese Government on July 30th—a conversion, moreover, with so many angular points and projections—could not at once dispel the threatening storm-clouds.

The Austro-Serbian war had begun and Austria in

tended that it should take its course. The Austrian partial mobilisation had been followed by that of Russia, on July 29th. In other countries as well, in Germany, in France, and in England, military measures of security were already being taken. The danger of war had already approached so near that Herr von Bethmann had proposed to the English Government the notorious agreement as to neutrality. Sazonof's first formula of agreement, which guaranteed the suspension of all Russian military preparations, was declined by Jagow in Berlin on July 30th, on the same day on which in the afternoon, perhaps even at that very hour, Berchtold resumed negotiations with Schébéko. In short, the whole European situation had become so acute, owing to the action of Austria and Germany, that it is really inadmissible to note as items to Austria's credit, her compliance of July 30th and 31st, which was conditional, full of reservations and more apparent than real, and at the same time to overlook all the weighty items in the debit account, which had been accumulated in the eight preceding days, and which had brought Europe to the verge of bankruptcy.

Herr Helfferich himself does not really deny the offences of the Central Powers; he denies neither the refusal of Grey's Conference-proposal nor that of the direct discussions with Austria. He merely seeks to excuse both by the fatuous observations that Grey's proposal had encountered "difficulties" and that the idea of direct discussions had even met with "formidable difficulties" (pages 10-11). What he understands by this must remain his own secret. As I have already pointed out, the only difficulty was the malevolent disposition of Austria, and nothing else. I have, however, found in Helfferich nothing with regard to a "misunderstanding," such as at the time Count Berchtold, and now Herr von Bethmann, endeavoured to construe.

Yet even the most tangled situation may in the end be saved by adroitness and by good-will on all sides. Consequently, when I bear in mind that Sazonof was constantly going further to meet the Austrian point of view and that he was continually reducing his own demands (Blue Book, Nos. 138, 139), when I consider Grey's

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efforts to arrive at an understanding which became more and more conciliatory (Blue Book, Nos. 111, 135, 137), I do not consider, notwithstanding all the difficulties that really existed on this occasion, that the possibility of finding the point of agreement between Vienna and Petrograd would have been by any means excluded had not Berlin burst in with her undisguised war policy. And this brings me to the main point in the present inquiry, the question of mobilisation.

### AUSTRIA TOOK THE LEAD IN GENERAL MOBILISATION.

I believe that I have demonstrated that the irreconcilable attitude assumed by Austria was the diplomatic cause of the Russian general mobilisation, and have proved this by reference to the whole history of the crisis since July 28rd. I shall now proceed to prove that the further reason advanced by Russia for her general mobilisation, that it was "an answer to Austrian military measures," is also sound and cogent.

I have already dealt with the question of mobilisation in my book (pages 157, 191 *et seq.*, 292, 313, 332), and in general may refer to what has already been said there. I have maintained, and as I believe demonstrated, that Austria took precedence, not only in her partial mobilisation against Serbia and against the Russian frontier, but also in her complete mobilisation; and that Russia only followed her lead. As a matter of course, Herr Helfferich violently attacks this assertion, since, if it is correct, it necessarily demolishes the whole of his flimsy demonstration. According to his account, the Austrian general mobilisation, on the contrary, "only took place in the course of July 31st as an answer to the general mobilisation of Russia." He is also of the opinion that the contrary assertion to his own view, namely, that Austrian general mobilisation took place first, was never "sustained" by Russia herself, but was merely put forward by French diplomacy (page 8). This is a demonstrable falsehood. In harmony with the French and English Governments, the Russian Government has constantly expressed with the utmost definiteness the

view that the Austrian general mobilisation took place first (see Orange Book, Nos. 44, 47, 66, 77, 78).

How does Herr Helfferich propose to maintain his assertion in view of these unambiguous passages? In No. 47 of the Orange Book the Austrian order for general mobilisation is, indeed, dated as far back as July 28th. To be on the safe side I have not, in my book (page 158) taken this date as the basis of my discussion, but have rather chosen the later date, July 31st, at 1 o'clock in the morning, which is definitely given by Dumaine, the French Ambassador, in his despatch of July 31st (Yellow Book, No. 115). This statement is in agreement with various references in the English Blue Book, although the precise time, "at 1 o'clock in the morning," is nowhere, to my knowledge, cited in the Blue Book (see Blue Book, Nos. 113, 118, 126, 134). That the Austrian general mobilisation preceded that of Russia is everywhere maintained in the Blue Book wherever mention is made of these mobilisations, and the assertion is made with the same definiteness in the Yellow Book and the Orange Book.

In the first place, then, it is clear that it is not the French Government alone, but all the Entente Governments collectively, who maintain the priority of the Austrian general mobilisation. It may be asked whether their statement is in accordance with the truth. On the basis of a further careful study of the documents, I am now in a position to demonstrate even more precisely than before the correctness of this view. This, be it observed, rests exclusively on a study of the documents. In writing my book I already avoided on principle considering any unauthenticated tales or gossip on the subject of the earlier or later mobilisation of this or that State. The fables on this subject are legion, each more fatuous than the other. At one time we are told that as early as spring, long before the assassination of the Archduke, Russia had concentrated her Siberian regiments on the Prussian frontier. On another occasion, we hear that French troops, long before the outbreak of war, had entered Belgium, and were to be found more particularly in Liège. And there are countless other unsupported inventions—inventions which are generally

put forward in cold blood by the same people who, on the other side, defend the theory and the practice of a preventive war, and who have foreseen that the aggression of the enemy would not take place until later, in two or three years' time. I have not considered, nor do I propose to consider, either on the one side or the other, all these matters, which elude any precise demonstration. On this occasion also I shall restrict myself exclusively to the documents, but from these I shall demonstrate, even more precisely than before, the priority of Austria at each stage in the mobilisations.

*A. Partial Mobilisation.*—It is uncontested that Austria was the first great Power to initiate measures of mobilisation, in mobilising eight army corps against Serbia and two against Russia. The mobilisation of eight army corps against Serbia has always been admitted by Austria, but, on the other hand, the fact that any mobilisation took place against Russia has been vehemently denied. The Russian, the English and the French Governments have constantly maintained that Austria from the beginning, apart from her mobilisation against Serbia, also undertook at least a partial mobilisation against Russia—an assertion against which the Viennese Government have always protested (Red Book, Nos. 47, 48, 50; Yellow Book, Nos. 100, 102, 109, 115, 118; Blue Book, Nos. 71, 96, 98; Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49, 51). As Jagow in his conversation with Broniewsky, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, on July 29th, denied that there had been any Austrian mobilisation on the Russian frontier (Orange Book, No. 51), so also did Berchtold in his conversation with Schébéko on July 30th (Red Book, No. 50). The same denials were given to the English Ambassadors Gosehen and Bunsen in Berlin and Vienna (Blue Book, Nos. 71, 96, 98). And nevertheless it is true that Austria had already mobilised at least two army corps against Russia before the Russian partial mobilisation. And the proof of this is to be found in the evidence of the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.

I have already repeatedly referred in my book (pages 158, 195, 237, 332) to this evidence, which until then had nowhere been mentioned. A critic in the *Kölnische*

*Zeitung* accuses me of having arbitrarily altered the text of the relevant utterances of the Chancellor: "His speech in the Reichstag on August 4th is quoted four times, and on each occasion in a different form." The charge lacks veracity. As I repeatedly referred to this extraordinarily important self-confession of the Chancellor, I could not, of course, on each occasion repeat his words textually, and in later passages I had to content myself with reproducing its sense. To make the position quite clear I shall here again quote the text as it is given in *The Outbreak of War, 1914*:

"Austro-Hungary had mobilised only those of her corps which were directed against Serbia. To the north she had mobilised only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier."

"To the north"<sup>1</sup> can have only one meaning, viz. "against Russia." It is a matter of indifference how near or how far from the Russian frontier this took place. In the same speech the Chancellor brought forward the French mobilisation as a measure fraught with danger, although it was kept ten kilometres from the frontier. I am not, of course, in a position to determine whether mobilisation may not have extended to more than two Army Corps, but the Chancellor himself bears witness that there were at least two, that is to say, he testifies to the accuracy of the Entente Powers' assertion that Austria from the beginning had mobilised against Russia as well.

This merely partial mobilisation against Russia did not, however, forthwith and directly provoke the Russian partial mobilisation. This was occasioned only as a result of all the other incidents enacted up to July 29th: by the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia (July 28th), by the refusal of the Conference on the part of Germany (July 27th) and of Austria (July 28th), by the omission to make any independent proposal for mediation, by the failure on the part of the Central Powers to suggest any form in which the Conference would be agreeable

<sup>1</sup> [Gegen Norden.]

to them (July 25th-29th)—in a word, by the complete passivity or rather the intransigence of Germany and Austria. The suspicion that these Powers desired war which such an attitude aroused was further intensified by the fact that Germany proposed direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd as the only way of arriving at an understanding, whereas Vienna categorically refused to follow this path. All these circumstances taken together, when viewed in connection with the Austrian partial mobilisation against Serbia and Russia which had already taken place, induced, and could not but induce, the Government at Petrograd in the end to give effect on July 29th to the measures of mobilisation which had been decided upon on July 25th, but which had meanwhile been suspended. (See the Tsar's despatch of July 30th: White Book, Exhibit 23A; Yellow Book, Nos. 50, 91.)

Moreover, Herr Helfferich, in contradistinction to the White Book (page 410), does not dispute the fact that the execution of this partial mobilisation was communicated to all Foreign Governments in a correct manner on July 29th, and that there was no violation of any word of honour given by Russia. Herr Helfferich also gives a fair interpretation, in the same sense as is given in my book (page 194), of the remarks addressed by the Chief of the General Russian Staff to the German military attaché: the Chief of the General Staff confirmed the mobilisation of the four southern army districts against Austria, officially announced the same day in Berlin, but denied that any mobilisation had so far taken place against Germany (see Yellow Book, No. 102, and Helfferich, page 9). In this the Secretary of State, it is true, disowns an important element in the evidence which underlies the arraignment directed by his chief, Herr von Bethmann, against the Russian Government. In the official publication we read (White Book, page 412):

“The Russian mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.”



The continued denial on the part of the Russian Minister for War, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Tsar himself, I have already "continually denied" in my book (pages 192-196). I am glad once more to have found a helper in Herr Helfferich, who bases his whole arraignment (the central point of which is the Russian mobilisation) on the foundation that the Chief of the Russian General Staff spoke the truth; whereas Herr von Bethmann's arraignment rests on the assumption that he told a lie.

Herr Helfferich argues as follows: Neither Austria nor Germany by their own military measures in any way occasioned Russian mobilisation. So far as Germany is concerned, this is evident from the expressions used on July 29th by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, who vehemently protested, on his word of honour, that no military measures had been ordered against Germany. Would he, asks Herr Helfferich, have had any occasion thus to protest on his honour, if Germany had, in fact, already taken military measures? It follows therefore that Germany had at that time done nothing of the sort, and this is the conclusion that Herr Helfferich wishes to demonstrate. In proving this, however, and in basing it on the truthfulness of the Russian statements, he repudiates an important point in the charge brought by Bethmann against Russia. This point, which has played a very important part in generating the requisite war sentiment in Germany, is to the effect that Russia not only maliciously and deceitfully mobilised against Germany, but with consummate wickedness "continually denied" this mobilisation. The official English translation of the German White Book elegantly indicates in its sub-title that the Tsar of Russia in his very own person "betrayed" Germany. The German Secretary of State now admits that the Chief of the General Staff did not lie. We may await in composure the later admission that neither the Russian Minister for War nor the Tsar were in any way guilty of an untruth.

It is true that the Austrian Government has constantly denied that their partial mobilisation against Serbia was accompanied by the partial mobilisation of Austria "to

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the north," which is admitted by the Chancellor himself. The fact, however, has from the beginning been maintained by the Entente Powers (see Orange Book, No. 49: "the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army"; No. 58: "in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria"; No. 77: "the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army"; Yellow Book, No. 97: "her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier"; Blue Book, No. 118: "that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia").

The harmony which exists among all the Governments, including that of Germany, on this point makes the priority of the Austrian partial mobilisation against Russia an incontestable historical fact. It is, therefore, clear that it was not merely diplomatic but also military events which impelled Russia to her partial mobilisation, and that, consequently, the summary account of events, given by Sazonof on August 2nd to his representatives abroad (Orange Book, Nos. 77 and 78) is in this point in agreement with the truth.

*B.* Much more important is the inquiry which of the two countries, Austria or Russia, took the lead in regard to their general mobilisations. The matter is indeed one of paramount significance in determining the question of responsibility. Herr Helfferich and all the other defenders of Germany lay on Russia the guilt of having been the first to order a general mobilisation, and as a consequence the guilt of the European war, which they falsely represent as a necessary consequence of Russian mobilisation. I maintain, and shall now proceed to prove, that Austria preceded Russia in her general mobilisation.

### THE ORDER IN TIME OF THE MOBILISATIONS.

The order of the mobilisations, as I shall now prove, was as follows:—

- (1) The Austrian partial mobilisation of at least 8 army corps against Serbia, and 2 army corps against

Russia, which took place *before* the declaration of war against Serbia (July 28th).

(2) The Russian partial mobilisation of the four southern army districts: Odessa, Kief, Moscow and Kasan (18 army corps), which took place on July 29th, and was officially communicated to all the Powers.

(3) The Austrian general mobilisation which took place on July 31st at 1 o'clock in the morning.

(4) The Russian general mobilisation which took place on the morning of July 31st *after* the Austrian mobilisation.<sup>1</sup>

The order in time of mobilisations (1) and (2) is undisputed, as is also the extent of the Russian partial mobilisation. The only differences which arise are as to the extent of the Austrian partial mobilisation. The Yellow Book, the Orange Book and the Blue Book contain communications bearing on this subject; while these do not accurately define the number of Austrian army corps mobilised, they nevertheless indicate that the extent of the mobilisation was considerably greater than 8 army corps against Serbia and 2 against Russia. Orange Book, No. 47 (July 28th), speaks of general mobilisation having already taken place on that day; Orange Book, No. 49, speaks of the mobilisation of the "greater part" of the Austrian army, as also does Yellow Book, No. 95. Orange Book, No. 77, speaks of the half of the Austrian army. An accurate determination of the question cannot be made without access to special sources which are not at my disposal. I must be content to point out the fact that the Governments on the other side maintain that the Austrian partial mobilisation was of materially greater extent than Count Berchtold acknowledged and Herr von Bethmann inadvertently admitted. The disagreement between the statement of Berchtold and Szápáry on the one hand (Red Book, Nos. 47 and 50) and that of Bethmann on the other (see his speech in the

<sup>1</sup> I shall return in later passages of this work to certain points in dispute which have since arisen with reference to some questions connected with the mobilisations. The theses advanced in this chapter, and the foundation on which they are based, are, however, in no way modified.

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Reichstag on August 4th) irresistibly arouses the suspicion that, apart from Bethmann's two army corps, there may very well have been others which were also mobilised "to the north." The Austrian gentlemen who so emphatically protested on July 29th and 30th that Austria had mobilised exclusively against Serbia, and had not mobilised a man against Russia, must at least acquiesce in the same suspicions being entertained with regard to their conduct as are urged by the German Government against the Russian generals; namely, that they mobilised, and offered a "continued denial" of the mobilisation. If, on the strength of this alleged denial, which, in fact, never took place, the portentous charge is at once hurled against the Russian Government that "Russia wanted war" (page 412), what charge must be brought against the Viennese Government, on the strength of the proved denial of facts demonstrated by Bethmann's admissions? If we may not accuse them of having intended a European war, then at least we must infer the guilty consciousness of having contributed by their military measures against Russia—apart from every other cause—to the provocation of war.

\* \* \* \* \*

To proceed now to the most important point: On what do I rely to prove my assertion that the Austrian general mobilisation preceded the Russian general mobilisation, as was also the case with the partial mobilisations? The proof is to be found in the Red Book itself, and there is no necessity to appeal to any of the diplomatic documents of the Entente Powers.

On July 29th Count Berchtold learns through Herr von Tschirschky, who again had been informed by the Russian Ambassador, that the four southern military districts of Russia had been mobilised. M. Sazonof, it was said, had also confirmed this to the German Ambassador. Berchtold asks his Ambassador in Berlin (Red Book, No. 48) to bring this without delay to the knowledge of the German Government and to emphasise that "if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at once." Count Berchtold asks the

Berlin Government, in conjunction with the Austrian Government, to make this declaration in Petrograd and if necessary in Paris as well, and adds "that, as can be understood, in our military operations against Serbia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path." This despatch from Berchtold furnishes the key to the whole question of mobilisation; it contains, so to speak, an Austrian forerunner of the later German mobilisation Ultimatum. While Germany demanded the suspension of the Russian general mobilisation under a threat of a corresponding German mobilisation, the Austrian preliminary Ultimatum threatened an Austrian general mobilisation in the event of Russia failing to suspend her partial mobilisation in the four southern districts.

It is unnecessary that I should again point out that this threat was an action marked by that presumptuousness and provocativeness which had characterised the whole behaviour of Austria up to that day—against Serbia, against Russia, and against the Powers. It is self-evident that the preposterous Austrian demand could not be complied with by Russia. As we know, Russia had postponed until July 29th all those military measures which had been resolved on as early as July 25th; she had waited until war had been declared and hostilities had been begun against Serbia, until Austria and Germany had declined, on the emptiest of pretexts, all attempts at mediation and all endeavours to arrive at an understanding, while they themselves had advanced no independent proposals for agreement; she had waited until Austria had finally mobilised several army corps at least against Russia's frontiers. In view of all these ominous facts, there was no reason why Russia should, at the dictation of the Governments of Vienna and Berlin, renounce her own measures of security. Russia continued to negotiate, put forward her own proposals for an understanding one after the other, remained as before ready to accept the Conference, she desired and strove to attain direct negotiations with Vienna; but she was not inclined to add to her sincere efforts for peace a renunciation of measures of prudence which, as Sazonof on first announcing them expressly pointed out 'in the most official way,'

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were "not intended to attack Austria," but only meant that they were prepared to "stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger." The Emperor Nicholas had found these measures to be justified, since the Austrians, "who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also already so great a start" (Red Book, No. 47).

Berchtold's demand for a cessation of the Russian partial mobilisation was all the more preposterous inasmuch as he added, in the same note to Berlin—what he had, indeed, expressed to Petrograd up to the close of negotiations—that in his military operations against Serbia he would not allow himself to be diverted from his path. Thus Austria arms herself and conducts war in the Balkans in what manner and to what extent suits her; Russia, however, like any powerless petty State with no interest in Balkan conditions, is expected to stand aside with folded arms, not even "standing to arms," and to allow the Austrian gentlemen to pursue undisturbed their interests of power and their lust of vengeance.

Berchtold's preliminary Ultimatum could therefore achieve no success, and in fact attained none. We know that Sazonof, in conversation with Count Pourtalès, urged and constantly repeated all the reasons for Russian mobilisation; simultaneously, however (on July 30th), he laid down in his first formula of agreement the extremely moderate conditions under which Russia was prepared to suspend her military preparations (Orange Book, No. 60). This formula, as is known, was declined in Berlin, and therefore the corollary promised by Russia, the suspension of military preparations, also fell to the ground. Nevertheless, Russia did not at once extend her mobilisation; on the contrary, from July 29th to July 31st she did not go beyond the partial mobilisation of the four southern districts. The alternative course of proceeding, that is to say, the extension beyond the four southern districts, would have been quite explicable after Sazonof's refusal of Sazonof's formula of agreement; for this refusal so enormously intensified the existing grounds for suspecting that Germany and Austria desired

war, that an immediate extension of the Russian partial mobilisation need have occasioned no surprise. Nevertheless, this did not take place, and it has never been maintained by anyone, either on the German or the Austrian side, that Russia proceeded to a general mobilisation before July 31st.

This general mobilisation did not take place until Count Berchtold translated into action his threat of July 29th (Red Book, No. 48) and answered the non-suspension of the Russian partial mobilisation by the Austrian general mobilisation.

That the events were thus correlated is placed beyond all doubt by the note of July 29th (No. 48), but is further confirmed in the clearest manner by the later Austrian notes. Take, in the first place, Note 50; in this Berchtold reports to Szápáry regarding a conversation which he had on July 30th with Schébéko, and which led to the resumption of negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd. For the purpose of the present inquiry we are interested only in the conclusion of the conversation between Berchtold and Schébéko, which touches on the question of mobilisation. Berchtold mentioned the Russian partial mobilisation of July 29th which "had an appearance of hostility against the monarchy," although "there was no dispute between us and Russia" (here we again meet the ingenious distinction between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian dispute which Berchtold still maintained even in resuming direct negotiations). In opposition to the admission of Herr von Bethmann, he then denies, on the usual lines, that Austria had mobilised so much as a man against Russia. Thereafter he continues as follows:

"In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the Russian mobilisation."

Thus, as a counterstroke to the Russian partial mobilisation, Austria extends her mobilisation, which already

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comprised at least 10 army corps. Berchtold does not expressly tell the Russian Ambassador up to what point the Austrian partial mobilisation, which had already been accomplished for a number of days, was to be extended, or whether it was to be expanded forthwith to a general mobilisation. That it was intended, however, that the extension should, in fact, be carried to the extreme limits of a general mobilisation is clear from note No. 48 of the Red Book, analysed above, which unambiguously contemplates a general mobilisation as the consequence of the Russian partial mobilisation, should the latter not be suspended without delay.

The interview between Berchtold and Schébéko, in which the extension of the mobilisation was announced, took place on July 30th. According to Dumaine's report (Yellow Book, No. 115), the Austrian general mobilisation was ordered in the night between July 30th and July 31st at 1 a.m., that is to say, in the night immediately following this interview. The accuracy of Dumaine's report is thus confirmed beyond doubt by Notes 48 and 50 of the Austrian Red Book itself.

\* \* \* \* \*  
The first paragraph of Dumaine's despatch of July 31st (Yellow Book, No. 115) runs as follows :

“General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock.”

One of my opponents, the same dutiful Governmental hack who has made use of my arresting title to call his by no means arresting book *Anti-J'accuse*, professes to quote *verbatim* the first paragraph of Dumaine's note, but omits the crucial word *générale*. His quotation runs : “La mobilisation atteignant tous les hommes . . .” On the quotation this falsified in its essential point he comments as follows : “Even here, however, there is as yet no question of a general mobilisation.” What a piece of jugglery, when he himself suppresses the word “general” ! This one example may in itself suffice to justify the resolution which I have already intimated in my prefatory observations, not to treat along with decent opponents



a man who works with such tools as these. His callow and immature pamphlet, which surpasses in malicious perversions all the writings of mature men, teems with similar suppressions and falsifications. In this place I would merely point out the further fact that a man who dares to call himself a pacifist apparently considers that the Tsar's despatch of July 29th proposing a decision by the Hague Tribunal and Grey's peace manifesto (Blue Book, No. 101) in its most important pacifist section are alike unworthy of being even mentioned in the course of his pamphlet, which nevertheless comprises 140 pages. The most important peace utterances on the other side, which are at the same time of decisive significance in considering the question of guilt, are thus simply ignored by him. Such an opponent does not merit serious treatment, and I have therefore resolved to banish him from this bitterly serious book, and on another occasion in a back room apply the punishment due to youngsters so early corrupted.

\* \* \* \* \*

Let us then return from this "unpleasant contemporary" to our subject, to the self-confessions of the Austrian Government in the question of mobilisation.

We come next to Berchtold's note of July 31st to his Ambassadors in London and Petrograd (Red Book, No. 51). We shall here pass over the diplomatic contents of this note, to which reference has been repeatedly made (the specious readiness of Berchtold in the end under many reservations "to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia," with the addition of impossible conditions); and we shall discuss the concluding sentence dealing with mobilisation, which runs as follows:

"The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude."

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It should be observed that even this concluding sentence does not yet speak of the Russian general mobilisation, which clearly was not yet known in Vienna when this note was written; it merely refers to the partial mobilisation: "the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us." Moreover, the note further speaks of the "defensive counter-measures in Galicia which are occasioned by the Russian attitude." Thus we again meet the admission that the Russian partial mobilisation had evoked Austrian counter-measures in Galicia, that is to say, an *extension* of the Austrian mobilisation directed against Russia beyond the two army corps admitted by Bethmann, going in accordance with Berchtold's threats of July 29th and July 30th as far as a "general mobilisation." Quite apart from Berchtold's confessions, it is in the highest degree improbable, on political as well as on military grounds, that Austria carried out her mobilisation in three stages. Even the defenders of Germany and Austria habitually speak of two stages only: partial mobilisation against Serbia, to which must be added at least two army corps against Russia (the existence of which was betrayed by Bethmann) and the general mobilisation "as an answer to the Russian general mobilisation in the course of July 31st" (Hellferich, page 8). If, however, it is correct that mobilisation took place in two stages, it is proved beyond all doubt from the Red Book itself that the Austrian general mobilisation preceded that of Russia.

It is only by assuming that Austrian mobilisation took place in three stages—an assumption made by none of Austria's defenders known to me—that it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that the Russian general mobilisation was prior to the Austrian. In such a case it would then be necessary to construe the state of affairs as follows: Firstly, Austrian partial mobilisation against Serbia and Russia; following this a Russian partial mobilisation of the four southern army districts; as a counter-stroke an extension of the Austrian partial mobilisation on the Galieian frontier; then the Russian and in conclusion the Austrian general mobilisation. Such a theory, based on three stages would be entirely new, in contradiction to all the previous assertions of the Central Powers and their

defenders ; it would be in contradiction to the " general mobilisation " which Berchtold had already threatened on July 29th, and it would, moreover, be in the highest degree improbable on military grounds. Herr Helfferich is therefore entirely correct, as also are the other German writers who treat of this subject, in assuming the existence of only two stages in the Austrian mobilisation. These two stages, however, are as follows :

First stage : Partial mobilisation simultaneously with the declaration of war against Serbia.

Second stage : General mobilisation in the night from July 30th to July 31st, in answer to the mobilisation of the 18 Russian army corps, and in fulfilment of Berchtold's announcement of July 29th (Red Book, No. 48).

That the course of events took place as above and not otherwise is also completely confirmed, amongst other documents, by No. 109 of the Yellow Book, containing a report of a conversation between Jules Cambon and Herr von Jagow. Cambon again repeatedly urged the German Government to propose a form for the intervention of the four Powers which would be agreeable to them. Jagow replied evasively, and the conversation was diverted to the Russian partial mobilisation which had taken place on the previous day. Jagow expressed his apprehension lest this partial mobilisation should compromise the success of any intervention with Austria, and further gave expression to his anxiety that Austria, in consequence of Russian partial mobilisation, might proceed to general mobilisation, that as a counter-measure Russian general mobilisation might follow and, in consequence, that of Germany also. These expressions used by Jagow are of paramount importance in arriving at a judgment on the question of mobilisation. The French text of Cambon's report of July 30th runs as follows :

Il a ajouté qu'il craignait que l'Autriche ne mobilisât complètement à la suite de la mobilisation partielle russe, ce qui pouvait entraîner par contre-coup la mobilisation totale russe, et par suite celle de l'Allemagne.

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The view which I have deduced from the Red Book as to the sequence of the mobilisations is thus completely confirmed: Jagow feared what Berchtold threatened, and what in fact took place: the Russian partial mobilisation was followed by Austria's complete mobilisation; as a counter-measure to this, Russia's general mobilisation ensued, and as the consequence of this that of Germany supervened.

These words, spoken by the Austrian and German statesmen themselves, also serve to confirm the accuracy of Dumaine's despatch of July 31st (Yellow Book, No. 115), which places the Austrian general mobilisation at 1 o'clock, early in the morning of July 31st.

They also corroborate the correctness of Paléologue's report of July 31st (Yellow Book, No. 118), which represents the Russian general mobilisation as a consequence of the preceding Austrian mobilisation:

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian Army has been given. . . .

This view is also in agreement with the despatches of Buchanan and Bunsen (Blue Book, Nos. 118 and 127), the former of which speaks on July 31st of the movement of Austrian troops against Russia, and the latter on August 1st of the actual beginning of the general mobilisation ordered in the night from July 30th to 31st. The account given by Sazonof in his circular note of August 2nd (Orange Book, No. 77) is also in harmony with the foregoing view of the position of affairs.

The documents of both the belligerent parties thus yield the same result, namely, that the Austrian general mobilisation preceded that of Russia.

### GROUNDS OF THE RUSSIAN MOBILISATION.

How unwelcome this result is to those who in their arraignment accuse Russia of the crime of incendiarism in Europe, is clear from the fact that Herr Helfferich,

the most eminent of these accusers, mentions neither the confessions of Jagow and Berchtold nor even Dumaine's report of July 31st. All these are passed over in silence. On the other hand, Herr Helfferich maintains that the Orange Book will be searched in vain for the grounds of the Russian general mobilisation.

This statement is not in accordance with the truth. Anyone who reads Nos. 47, 49, 58, 61, 66, 68, 77 and 78 of the Orange Book will find that in all these places the subject primarily dealt with is the military measures of Austria, and secondarily and incidentally those of Germany. In No. 47 the decree ordering Austrian general mobilisation is dated as far back as July 28th, a date which, as I have already shown in my book, is applicable only to Austria's partial, and not to her general, mobilisation. In No. 49 mention is made of the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austrian army, which had been occasioned by the Russian partial mobilisation. In No. 58 the sequence of the two mobilisations is likewise emphasised. In Nos. 61 and 62, dated July 30th, mention is made of the report of the German general mobilisation, announced in an extra edition of the *Lokalanzeiger*, but suppressed by the confiscation of the paper (see also Yellow Book, No. 105). In No. 66 of July 31st Schébéko mentions that "in spite of the general mobilisation" (by which probably both the Austrian and the German mobilisations are meant) he is calmly continuing to negotiate with Count Berchtold. In Nos. 77 and 78 the whole antecedents of the conflict are recapitulated by Sazonof, and the grounds for Russian mobilisation which Herr Helfferich seeks in vain in the Orange Book are set out with all the clarity and the fulness desirable.

The reasons are to be found in the diplomatic as well as in the military field. In the field of diplomacy may be mentioned the refusal of all the proposals for agreement put forward by the Powers, the refusal of the Conference, the refusal of direct negotiations with Russia (until July 30th), the refusal or disregard of Grey's and of Sazonof's formulæ of agreement, etc. The military reasons for the Russian general mobilisation are given in the following words by the Russian Minister :

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"Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached Petrograd. All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh. The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures." (Orange Book, No. 77.)

These sentences epitomise the diplomatic and military reasons for Russia's general mobilisation. The Russian proposal which Germany considered "unacceptable to Austria-Hungary" is Sazonof's first formula of agreement (Orange Book, No. 60), declined by Herr von Jagow on July 30th (Orange Book, No. 63). As I have already shown, this formula and its refusal are passed over in silence in German apologetic literature, although (or rather because) this state of affairs has the utmost significance for the question of responsibility. As I am continually constrained to point out, no one has ever given us any explanation as to why this proposal of Sazonof's was unacceptable to Austria, why it was refused in the bluntest manner without inquiry in Vienna. If Herr Helfferich has difficulty in finding the grounds for the Russian general mobilisation, he may wish to subject this point to a careful examination, and give the world the elucidation which it still lacks regarding the mystery of this first proposal of agreement put forward by Sazonof; in view of his intimate relations to the leading actors and the responsible *dramatis personæ*, this should be for him an easy task.

If in his circular letter of August 2nd the Russian Minister had wished to deal with the matter at greater length, he might have cited all the other diplomatic reasons which were bound in the end to compel Russia to decide on a general mobilisation. He confines himself to some of these diplomatic reasons, and then adds, in the sentence quoted above, the important military reason that Austria had taken precedence with her general mobilisation. In fact, as I have demonstrated from the Red Book itself,

the Austrian general mobilisation was ordered in the night from July 30th to 31st as a consequence of the Russian partial mobilisation, and it was ordered in spite of, and as an accompaniment of, the resumption of the direct negotiations in Petrograd on the subject matter of the dispute.

The fact of this resumption of negotiations, to which Herr Helfferich attaches so decisive importance, is disputed by no one. But it is equally beyond dispute that alongside these direct negotiations Austria gave orders for a general mobilisation. It is difficult to determine whether Austria, at the moment of issuing this order, already intended to force a European war. Like Germany, she was aware that a European war could, or perhaps even must, develop out of her action against Serbia and her diplomatic intransigence, which was continued until July 30th. So far as the Austrian Government is concerned, this consciousness is not, however, identical with an intention definitely directed towards a European war. Had Austria been in a position to continue her campaign against Serbia unmolested, to crush and humiliate her neighbour and thereby establish a position of supremacy in the Balkans, such a success would presumably have satisfied her. If, however, it should prove impossible to achieve this by a localised war against her tiny neighbour, Austria was resolved, for the sake of her Balkan interests, to risk even a European war, now that the moment had arrived which appeared to her to be specially favourable. In this resolution she was strengthened by her ally Germany, who was in truth her evil genius; whereas Austria merely took the risk of a European war, Germany went so far as to wish for the "inevitable" struggle for a position of hegemony on the Continent—the struggle which was merely to be the forerunner of the later decisive attack on Great Britain, the ruler of the world. . . .

Thus Austria mobilised in the night from July 30th to 31st, but continued to negotiate with Russia. And what did Russia do? Precisely the same as Austria; she mobilised and continued to negotiate. If, in accordance with the views expressed by Helfferich, Austria's

readiness to negotiate was a sure proof of the Central Powers' readiness for peace, Russia's readiness to negotiate must be allowed to have the same significance. It was, indeed, a much stronger proof of peaceful intentions, since from the outset Russia had expressed her concurrence in all peace proposals, had acquiesced in the decisions that might be arrived at by a Conference, had proposed that the Hague Tribunal should be convoked; she had herself proposed several formulæ of agreement, and parallel with all these peace proposals she had at all times stated her readiness for direct negotiations with Vienna.

Sazonof's attitude in the days from July 30th to August 1st was merely the continuation of the attitude assumed by him throughout the whole period of the conflict from July 23rd. I have elsewhere shown at length how far the Russian Minister went in the last moments before the outbreak of war to meet Austria's point of view, how in addition to his first and second formulæ he proposed something in the nature of third and fourth formulæ (Blue Book, Nos. 133 and 139). Sazonof is quite correct in stating, as he does in his circular letter of August 2nd, that notwithstanding the general mobilisation which had become necessary in accordance with Austria's example, he had not abandoned his strenuous efforts to find a solution of the difficult situation. The telegrams of the Tsar Nicholas, dated July 31st and August 1st (White Book, pages 411 and 413), are also quite truthful in the solemn assurance which they give that, notwithstanding the mobilisations on both sides, the military measures "which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation" were not to mean war, that Russia was far from desiring war, that so long as negotiations with Austria continued she would "undertake no provocative action," and that in the interests of the welfare of the two nations he would continue to labour for the maintenance of peace.



It may be observed in passing that the Tsar's telegram of July 31st, just quoted, also contains the reason for the Russian general mobilisation, which Helfferich is unable to find. Herr Helfferich feels doubts as to which Russian mobilisation the Tsar has in mind, when he states in his telegram received in Berlin in the afternoon of July 31st :





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"It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation." This doubt is quite unfounded. In his telegram of the afternoon of July 31st, the Tsar can only mean the Austrian general mobilisation which took place in the preceding night, and which he cites as the ground for the Russian general mobilisation. It is self-evident that the Russian partial mobilisation against Austria which had taken place two days previously, and of which Berlin had been officially acquainted, could no longer be an object of negotiations between the Emperors on the afternoon of July 31st, when the Austrian and Russian general mobilisations had already taken place. In the Emperor William's telegram, sent to Petrograd at the same hour (2 o'clock in the afternoon of July 31st), mention is expressly made of "serious preparations for war on my eastern frontier." Thus the Tsar's telegram of July 31st is also in agreement with all the other documents in indicating that the Austrian general mobilisation had priority, and that the Russian mobilisation followed it. There is nowhere a hiatus in the demonstration. It is only the bare assertion of the defenders of the Central Powers to the effect that the two general mobilisations took place in the reverse order that can be advanced against my demonstration. Evidence in support of these counter-assertions is nowhere to be found and has never at any time been produced.

\* \* \* \* \*

Finally, in order to give the finishing touch to this argument, I would again draw attention to Nos. 52 and 53 of the Red Book. No. 52, in which Szápáry mentions the order for Russian mobilisation as having taken place "early to-day" (July 31st), assigns, it is true, no definite hour to the decree of mobilisation, but appears all the same to refer to an hour of the day, and not of the night. If, therefore, the Austrian decree was issued at 1 o'clock in the night as Dumaine's reports, the Russian decree which was issued early on July 31st would have been later in time than the former.

Much more important, however, and of decisive significance is No. 53 of the Red Book. Count Berchtold

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reports as follows to his foreign representatives (July 31st):

“As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia.”

There is here no mention of a Russian general mobilisation, but merely of a “mobilisation on our frontier.” If the Russian general mobilisation had already taken place when this circular note was written and when the order was given for military measures in Galicia, Berchtold would certainly have emphasised the point, and would not have confined himself to speaking of Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier. The absence of any stress on the Russian general mobilisation therefore proves that the Austrian military measures in Galicia were only a consequence of the Russian partial mobilisation of July 29th. This is also in precise agreement with the contents of Notes 48, 50 and 51, discussed above, and confirms anew the accuracy of the view which I have advanced as to the order of the mobilisations:

Austrian partial mobilisation against Serbia and Russia—Russian partial mobilisation against Austria  
—Austrian general mobilisation—Russian general mobilisation.

The restrictive description of the Austrian measures contained in the words “military measures in Galicia” is in agreement with the similar words used in despatch No. 51. The interpretation of the words, incriminating so far as Austria is concerned, is, however, to be found in the threat of July 29th (Red Book, No. 48), according to which, as the counter-measure to Russian partial mobilisation, an immediate general mobilisation was contemplated on military grounds. The execution of this threat is confirmed by the despatches of July 31st (Nos. 51 and 53). The “military measures in Galicia” are identical with the Austrian general mobilisation.

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There are also certain reports contained in the English Blue Book which confirm my account of the order in time

of the mobilisations. In his conversation with Goschen on July 28th (Blue Book, No. 71), Herr von Bethmann mentioned newspaper reports, according to which Russia had mobilised 14 army corps in the south; the reference is to the mobilisation of the four southern army districts officially communicated to Berlin on the next day. To this he added that Austria, "who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures." Herr von Bethmann thus foresees what Count Berchtold expressly threatens on July 29th, that is to say, the extension of the former Austrian partial mobilisation in consequence of the Russian partial mobilisation of July 29th. The Chancellor does not say how far this extension would go. He speaks only of "similar" measures, which can only be understood as meaning measures similar to those which Russia had undertaken, that is to say, the mobilisation of a further 13 (or as Bethmann assumes 14) army corps. On this view Austria's army, which already comprised at least 10 army corps when partially mobilised on July 28th to the south and the north, would now have increased in consequence of the extended mobilisation to at least 23 army corps on a war footing. This, be it observed, is the conclusion arrived at on the basis of Bethmann's restrictive words "similar measures," and leaves entirely aside the "general mobilisation" threatened by Berchtold. But even this restriction of the Austrian mobilisation to 23 army corps was bound to compel the Russian Government to an extension of their mobilisation, which was at first restricted to 13 army corps only.

A similar confirmation of my view is furnished by notes 96 and 98 of the Blue Book. In No. 96, Bunsen reports with regard to the interview between Berchtold and Schébéko of July 30th (Red Book, No. 50): "The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must of course do the same." In No. 98, Goschen reports with regard to his conversation with Herr von Jagow on July 30th, in which the latter expressed his fear that the "Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary who has as yet only mobilised against Serbia (this is a

mistake on the part of Jagow) will probably find it necessary also against Russia."

In view of all this, I have not the slightest doubt of the accuracy of the reports dated July 31st from the French and English Ambassadors in Petrograd that, quite apart from the diplomatic action of the Central Powers, the Austrian general mobilisation was the occasion and the cause of the Russian general mobilisation (Yellow Book, No. 118; Blue Book, No. 113).

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Military preparations on the part of Germany without doubt constituted a factor leading to the Russian decision. In various passages in the Orange Book reference is made to these German measures, which, it is true, were directed rather against the West than the East, in accordance with Germany's plan of campaign, which was to crush France with lightning rapidity, and only then to turn in full force against Russia. Helfferich maintains—though contrary to the truth—that the Russian Government never uttered a word with regard to German military preparations during the negotiations. Numbers 60 and 68 of the Orange Book prove the contrary. In No. 60, Sazonof communicates to his Ambassadors in the European capitals, including his Ambassador in Berlin, the formula of agreement dictated to Count Pourtalès on July 30th, and he specially asks Swerbeiev, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, for an immediate telegraphic answer as to the manner in which the German Government had received this fresh proof of his efforts for peace. He adds to his instructions to his Ambassador: "We cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations." In his conversation with Jagow on July 31st, Swerbeiev expresses himself even more unambiguously with regard to German military preparations (Orange Book, No. 68): When Jagow was complaining of Russian military measures, the Ambassador answered that according to sure information in his possession, confirmed by all Russians arriving in Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia.

In the same way, mention is made of German military

measures against Russia at various places in the Yellow Book and the Blue Book (see Yellow Book, Nos. 102, 118; Blue Book, No. 118). I have treated in detail in my book (pages 197, 210, etc.) of the military measures against France, and need not return to them here. It is self-evident that German preparations for war against Russia's ally was bound to produce on the Russian Government the same effects as if they had been directly aimed against Russia. Helfferich's long discussion of the omission of any mention of German military measures in the Russian documents is therefore not merely superfluous, but it also rests on an inaccurate account of the facts. It is, however, incredible, as may be observed in passing, that Helfferich, in discussing this question of mobilisation, should examine the conversation between Sazonof and Pourtalès of July 30th (Orange Book, No. 60 and Yellow Book, No. 108) from this subsidiary point of view—the mention or the failure to mention German military measures—but should succeed in maintaining complete silence on the main point, one of the most important episodes in the whole of the historical antecedents, namely, the proposal of Sazonof's first formula of agreement, which was dictated to Count Pourtalès in the course of this interview. We have already seen that this formula and its refusal have no existence for Herr Helfferich: but to discuss in connection with an entirely unimportant subsidiary point the Note in the Yellow Book in which this formula is proposed and drawn up, in which its support in Berlin is promised by Count Pourtalès, and at the same time to suppress the main point, is a procedure which transcends the limits of all prejudiced historical inquiry, and assumes in the reader an absence of criticism and a spirit of blind acceptance which is scarcely to be expected even in the Germany of to-day.

\* \* \* \* \*

The result of this investigation is, then, as follows:  
Russia's general mobilisation was occasioned:

- (a) By the preceding Austrian general mobilisation;
- (b) By German military measures on the East and West;

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(c) By the frustration on the part of the Central Powers of all the efforts for peace made by the Entente Powers.

Russia's general mobilisation was however carried out, not with the object of attacking Germany or Austria, but solely as a measure of security against all contingencies. This is shown by her unwearied continuation of the negotiations aiming at the preservation of peace, her constant suggestion of new formulæ of agreement, her unaltered readiness to submit the question to the Hague Tribunal or to the mediation of the four disinterested Powers, and, lastly, as late as August 1st, the day of the declaration of war, her willingness to keep her army mobilised within the frontier, while a last attempt was made to find a peaceful solution of the conflict. The whole of Russia's diplomatic behaviour from the beginning to the end of the crisis conclusively proves that Russia did not want war, and that had it not been for the German declaration of war, she would never have proceeded to war. Even if the Russian general mobilisation had preceded that of Austria, this fact would not dispose of the earnest and sincere efforts made by Russia to preserve peace. The Russian mobilisation, even if it had taken place first, would have been characterised, in virtue of Russia's diplomatic action, as a measure of security and not of aggression. It was not, however, the earlier in time; Austria preceded Russia in general mobilisation as well. The alleged debit account of Russia is thus cleared down to the last item, and the enormous responsibility for the war rests exclusively on the shoulders of Austria and her ally Germany.

### MOBILISATION DOES NOT MEAN WAR.

If we have thus arrived at the conclusion that the Russian general mobilisation was merely the consequence of that of Austria, we at once obtain an explanation of the fact already pointed out, which must hitherto have appeared entirely incomprehensible, that Austria drew from the Russian general mobilisation no conclusions



pointing to war, whereas Germany made use of this circumstance to conjure up the greatest calamity which has ever visited mankind. Austria in no way took offence at the Russian general mobilisation, and could not do so, since she knew that the Russian measure was merely a consequence of that of Austria. Count Berchtold, therefore, notwithstanding the mobilisations on both sides, calmly continued to negotiate in Vienna and Petrograd (Orange Book, No. 66; Red Book, Nos. 53, 55 and 56); he expressly desired a "continuation of the former neighbourly relations":

"Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and Petrograd appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and from these we hope that things will quieten down all round (Red Book, No. 53, July 31st)."

Vienna and Petrograd from their previous experiences were, indeed, accustomed to a condition of mobilisation on both sides, and they had already on more than one occasion found the way to agreement in much more difficult questions while each side remained under arms.

In her Ultimatum of July 30th, Berlin demanded demobilisation against Austria as well. Austria herself, however, had never made such a demand, and could not do so; on the contrary, she had desired a "continuation of the pourparlers," and a "continuation of neighbourly relations." As Count Forgach expressly assured de Bunsen (Blue Book, No. 118), Austria did not regard the mobilisation on both sides as a hostile act, and this rested, above all, on the cogent ground that Austria herself had been the first to order a general mobilisation. Russia also saw no reason for war in the Austrian general mobilisation; on the contrary, on the very day of the general mobilisation on both sides she displayed the utmost readiness in entering into new negotiations with the Viennese Government.

Austria's general mobilisation was as remote from signifying war as was Russia's corresponding measure. Notwithstanding all stipulations and reservations on the

part of the Viennese Government, the way to an understanding had been entered upon, and the attainment of the end, even if not probable, was certainly at any rate possible. The end would certainly have been reached if Germany had desired the maintenance of peace; its attainment was impossible because those who held sway in Germany ascribed to the Russian mobilisation ends and purposes which it did not in fact have, in order that they might be free to pursue ends and purposes which they dared not confess to the world and to their own people.

\* \* \* \* \*

While I write these lines the mobilisation of Bulgaria and Greece (Autumn, 1915) has been made public in the Press. The official *Agence Bulgare*, in making the announcement, expressly states :

Bulgaria has in no way any hostile intentions, but she is firmly resolved to protect her rights and her independence while remaining under arms. Following the example of Holland and of Switzerland, who have not hesitated to have recourse to this measure from the beginning of the war, Bulgaria, having regard to the movements of troops among her neighbours, is obliged to assume an attitude of armed neutrality, but in doing so she will, nevertheless, continue to discuss and negotiate with the representatives of both the belligerent groups.

This official declaration of the Bulgarian Government affords new evidence in support of the fact, for which numberless examples can be found in history, that mobilisation is not tantamount to war, but is a measure of precaution intended to meet all contingencies, and that every sovereign State is acting within her rights in adopting such a measure at her discretion. Even if the mobilising State takes the lead in such matters, mobilisation is no ground for war; much less can it be so regarded if a State merely follows mobilisation on the other side and if, at the same time, her whole diplomatic demeanour is such as to exclude the suspicion of warlike intentions.

Greece answered the Bulgarian general mobilisation by adopting the same measure, but she neither addressed an ultimatum to Bulgaria nor did she give expression to bellicose intentions.<sup>1</sup>

Mobilisation against mobilisation—that has hitherto been, and still is, valid international law. Mobilisation equivalent to war—that is Prussian-German international law, reared on the same soil as all similar efflorescences of a militaristic policy of war, such as the attempt to find subsequent justification for the invasion of Belgium in the alleged conspiracy of this hapless country with Germany's enemies, or to vindicate the sinking of hostile and neutral mercantile vessels and the wholesale drowning of enemy and neutral civilians by reference to England's "starvation blockade." The principle newly introduced by the German Government into international law that mobilisation signifies war, rests on purely military considerations; it is, however, entirely opposed to the whole theory and practice of international law. It is from these military considerations of advantage, which at the same time were meant to bring the final fulfilment of the long-standing pan-German efforts for world power, that the Great War has arisen. Diplomacy has degraded herself to be the train-bearer of the generals.

#### THE EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN THE TSAR NICHOLAS AND THE EMPEROR WILLIAM

In connection with the question of Russian mobilisation, which, so far as German apologetic literature is concerned, is identical with the question of responsibility for the war, I propose here to deal at greater length with a point which, so far as I know, has nowhere been adequately discussed, and which is, nevertheless, of great importance in arriving at a decision on the question of responsibility. I refer to the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar Nicholas and the Emperor William.

<sup>1</sup> Greece has just demobilised on pressure from the Entente Powers (Summer, 1916).

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### I

Even when the German White Book appeared, surprise could not but be occasioned by the fact that the telegrams exchanged between the Emperor William and the Tsar were divided in the publication of the Foreign Office: five telegrams between the two monarchs were reproduced in the Exhibits 20-23A of the White Book, whereas four other telegrams, the last of the series, dated July 31st and August 1st, were included in the text of the German Memorandum.

What was the reason for this disseverance of connected documents? It is true that one reason for this unnatural arrangement, and a very important one, has meanwhile come to light: By rendering the survey of the exchange of telegrams between the two monarchs more confused, it was a more easy matter to conceal the omission of the most important of all the documents, that, namely, from the Tsar, dated July 29th, on the subject of the Hague Tribunal. The inattentive reader will experience more difficulty in detecting a hiatus in the royal correspondence if this is scattered about in various parts of the White Book than if it were cited in its chronological connection. Most readers are, unfortunately, inattentive, and especially on the stormy fourth of August, 1914, it was possible to count on a dearth of calm critical examination in the German representatives in the Reichstag. Thus it happened that at that critical moment no one in Germany was surprised by the fact that Exhibits 22 and 23 of the White Book contained in succession two telegrams from the Emperor William to the Tsar, but that between these two something said by the Tsar was missing. The utterance omitted was, in fact, the Tsar's celebrated despatch containing the proposal that the matter should be decided by the Hague Tribunal.

In addition to this mysterious point, which has meanwhile been explained, there is, however, another which still awaits an explanation. The telegrams which are comprised in the Exhibits to the White Book end with Exhibit 23A, a telegram from the Tsar to the Emperor William, dated July 30th, at 1.20 p.m. This telegram

begins with the words: "I thank you from my heart for your quick reply," and is clearly the answer to the telegram from the Emperor William of July 30th at 1 a.m., printed in Exhibit 23. In order to follow the further exchange of telegrams, it is necessary to refer to the Foreign Office Memorandum, which also begins with a telegram from the Tsar to the Emperor William (page 411) dispatched on July 31st at 2 p.m.; the White Book expressly observes (page 412): "The telegram of the Tsar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon," and adds to this (page 411) that this telegram crossed with a telegram from the Emperor also sent off on July 31st at 2 p.m. This second telegram from the Tsar also begins with the words: "I thank you from my heart for your mediation. . . ." <sup>1</sup>

The Tsar thus sent two answers to the Emperor's telegram of 1 a.m. on July 30th, the first on July 30th at 1.20 p.m. and the second on July 31st at 2 p.m., and both telegrams begin with almost the same words. How do we explain this telegraphic garrulousness on the part of Russia, when contrasted with the peculiar silence maintained by Germany? The Emperor William was mute for no less than 37 hours, from July 30th at 1 a.m. until July 31st at 2 p.m.—37 hours, an eternity in those days when the destiny of the world depended on minutes! On the other hand, the Tsar replied to his Imperial friend's telegram of 1 a.m. on July 30th, twelve hours later, on July 30th at 1.20 p.m., and then when no reply was received from the Emperor William, after a further interval of 25 hours, on July 31st at 2 p.m., he sent a further telegram which begins with almost the same words as the first, but announces in the most solemn manner, and in even warmer tones, his desire for peace.

I am unable to throw any light on the question whether, as in the case of the Tsar's telegram of July 29th, there is here an excision which would here mean the suppression of a telegram from the Emperor William. If there has been such an omission, it would furnish a new and by no means trivial element of guilt against Germany, for

<sup>1</sup> In the official translation: "I thank you cordially," etc. The same phrase is used in German in both telegrams.]

the omission could only have been effected with the object of preventing even further emphasis from being thrown on the contrast between the urgent and constantly repeated desire for peace expressed by the Tsar and the immovable and frigidly negative attitude embodied in the Emperor's reference to Russian mobilisation. If, however, no telegram from the Emperor has been suppressed, and the telegraphic interchange actually followed the course shown in the White Book, then it must be allowed to speak in favour of Russia that the Tsar, twice in succession, in the course of twenty-five hours, though meanwhile receiving no answer from the Emperor William, urged so insistently upon him mediation in the interests of peace, and protested with so much warmth his own peaceful inclination. On the other hand, the fact that the Emperor William allowed 87 precious hours to elapse before his telegram of July 30th was followed by his further telegram of the afternoon of July 31st, must be allowed to militate against Germany. In these 87 hours of imperial silence the extension of the Russian partial mobilisation to a general mobilisation took place, the announcement of "Kriegsgefahr" was decided upon in Berlin, the state of tension between Germany and Russia was rendered dangerously acute. Why was the Emperor William's silence so amazingly prolonged? Is it possible that the express purpose of this silence can have been to compel his friend on the Russian Imperial throne to adopt further military measures of security, which could then be represented as a threat, and after the interposition of an impossible demand in an ultimatum, used as a ground for war?

Every kind of suspicion is encouraged by the unnatural separation in the correspondence between the Emperors in the White Book, designed to conceal the Emperor William's long silence and the immediate sequence of two Russian telegrams without an intervening communication from Berlin. Yet even if the suspicion is unfounded, and the telegrams did in fact follow the course represented in the White Book, then this fact also furnishes a new point in exoneration of the Tsar and his Government, and a new point against the Emperor William and those around him.

## II

The last telegrams exchanged between the Tsar and the Emperor on August 1st call for a further and equally interesting investigation.

According to the German White Book (pages 412 and 413) the facts connected with this incident are as follows :

“Two hours after the expiration of the time-limit the Tsar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows :

‘I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply.’

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied :

‘I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.’”

The twelve hours' time-limit allowed in the German Ultimatum of July 31st, midnight, expired at noon on August 1st.

The Tsar's telegram was dispatched two hours after

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the expiration of this time-limit, that is to say, at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st (White Book, page 412), and it can, therefore, at the earliest have arrived in Berlin between 3 and 4 o'clock.

On this the Emperor William drafted and dispatched his reply, which can thus have arrived at Petrograd at the earliest between 5 and 6 o'clock mid-European time.

Meanwhile, at 12.52 p.m. the Chancellor's urgent telegram had been dispatched to the Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd, in which the latter was instructed to hand to the Russian Government the declaration of war at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, mid-European time (White Book, Exhibit 26). Whether this declaration of war was delivered punctually at the hour mentioned or only later on the same day, is a point on which we have no information from German sources. On the other hand, the Russian Orange Book (No. 76) and the French Yellow Book (No. 134) are in agreement in stating that the declaration of war was delivered at 7.10 p.m.

I am unable to determine whether the divergence in the time given is to be traced to a difference in the method of calculating the time or to some other circumstance. For the purpose of the investigation on which I am now engaged this, however, is a matter of no concern. The decisive consideration for the purpose of my present argument is, not the time of the actual delivery of the declaration of war, but the time at which it was to have been delivered according to the instruction of the Imperial Government. This time was 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

How is it possible to reconcile the time thus determined with the summons of the German Emperor to the Tsar to give an immediate, clear and unmistakable reply to the German Ultimatum as the "sole way to avoid endless misery"? When was it supposed that the Tsar or his Government should give such an answer? Under no possible circumstances could the Emperor's telegram reach the Russian capital before 5 o'clock; this, however, was just the time at which it was intended that the declaration of war should be delivered in Petrograd. Even on the assumption that the Tsar had been anxious



to comply with the preposterous German demand for demobilisation as against Germany and Austria, while both these countries were mobilised and intended to remain so, how would it have been possible for him to give effect to his intentions, since his cousin, the Emperor William, did not leave him so much as a minute's time for the telegraphic acceptance of his demand ?

Even if a miracle had now happened, and if the Tsar, notwithstanding all that had taken place, had resolved to give "the clear and unmistakable reply" demanded of him, such a decision would, in any case, have come too late, on the times assigned to the events, inasmuch as the German declaration of war was to have been delivered at an earlier hour, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

This is certainly an astonishing incident ; Germany in effect demands an answer from her opponents, and further states that after this answer has been received she will enter upon the "subject" of the Tsar's telegram ; the Emperor of Russia is, however, not allowed time to reply, but is surprised with a declaration of war. The only meaning to be attached to the Emperor William's telegram was, in fact, that it was a concession of a prolongation of the time-limit allowed in the Ultimatum which had already expired at 12 noon. This concession was restricted to no definite time or period, but in the nature of things it was bound to be sufficiently pro'onged to enable an answer to be received to the last telegram from the German Emperor. At the very earliest such an answer could only reach Berlin between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening ; but the declaration of war should have been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

This and all other incomprehensibilities only become comprehensible on the assumption that the Emperor William's demand for an answer from the Tsar was not sincere and that war, under all circumstances, was already a settled affair in Berlin. What shou'd we say of a man who wrote to someone with whom he had fallen out : "If you do not forthwith retract the libel you have uttered against me, I will send my flunkey to cudgel you," but who had already sent the flunkey to do the cudgelling two hours before the letter was written ? Would

he be believed when he protested that he had sought for a peaceful settlement of the dispute? Exactly the same judgment must be passed on the last telegram from the Emperor William to the Tsar.

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The following circumstance in the Emperor William's telegram is also in the highest degree astonishing. As I have already pointed out his final telegram can only have been dispatched at the very earliest between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The Chancellor's instruction to deliver the declaration of war had already been sent off to Petrograd two hours earlier, at 12.52 p.m. Why does the Emperor William entirely fail to mention this declaration of war in his telegram? Why does he speak only of the mobilisation of his army in indicating the consequence of the Russian refusal of the German Ultimatum, and omits to mention the declaration of war which had already been dispatched? Why does he excite in the Russian Emperor the mistaken impression that war might even yet be avoided by a "clear and unmistakable reply," whereas in fact when the Emperor's telegram was sent, war had already become inevitable, and that on two grounds:

(a) Because the declaration of war, accompanied by instructions that it was to be delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, had already been sent to Petrograd two hours previously;

(b) Because the Emperor of Russia had no longer time before the delivery of the declaration of war to send a satisfactory answer to Berlin, even if he had wished to do so.

After all that has been said, the Emperor William's telegram can only be interpreted as having been meant to awaken at the last moment the appearance of a desire for peace, but as having been in fact meant to make the maintenance of peace impossible.

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The concluding sentence of the Imperial telegram is also significant and characteristic. The Emperor William warns the Tsar against any violation of the frontier by Russian troops. From this it may in the first place be

inferred that between 3 and 4 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st no such violation of the frontier had as yet taken place. The Emperor's warning was, however, clearly intended to prepare for the later assertion that Russia had begun the war by Russian troops crossing the frontier (White Book, page 413). I have elsewhere shown the weakness of this assertion, on which the whole German doctrine of a war of defence is built. The Emperor's telegram of August 1st was the first prelude to the chant of liberation which the German people then took up under the direction of the imperial chief of the orchestra, and which, with swollen cheeks, they still continue to blare out into the world.

#### ON WHAT GROUNDS DID GERMANY DECLARE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA ?

As I have already pointed out, a hopeless confusion prevails in the German publications as to the grounds on which Germany really declared war against Russia. The official declaration of war offers an option of two different formulæ: according to the one Russia had refused to demobilise; according to the other she had failed to answer the German demand. Count Pourtalès had received from Berlin both these formulæ, as the text for a declaration of war, obviously with instructions to delete one of them in the document to be handed to the Russian Government, according as the circumstances might require. The Ambassador, who had either completely lost his head, or, perhaps, proceeded on the principle that it is better to have two strings to your bow, left both the reasons for the declaration of war in the document which was officially handed to the Russian Government (Orange Book, No. 76). *Difficile est satiram non scribere. . . .*

To these two optional reasons, a third is added in the memorandum in the White Book (page 413): "Russia began the war against us."

#### I

I am obliged to devote a few words to the alleged failure of the Russian Government to answer the German

Ultimatum, in order to emphasise one aspect of the question which I have not yet mentioned.

Even if no answer had been given by Russia to the German Ultimatum, it would in no way follow that the responsibility for the outbreak of war devolves on Russia. The responsibility would still rest on the Government, which at so critical a moment had addressed to a neighbouring State so grave a demand, couched in such a presumptuous form. It is the German Ultimatum that is to be censured, not the Russian attitude towards the Ultimatum. Germany's demand was superfluous, since it was open to Germany, as to every sovereign State, to mobilise, as had already been done by Austria and Russia, without addressing to Russia a demand for demobilisation. It was provocative, and was bound inevitably to lead to war, since Russia could not possibly accept an ultimatum which required within twelve hours the suspension of every measure of war against Germany and also against Austria, although Austria had herself proceeded to a general mobilisation, and although Germany had already undertaken the most far-reaching military measures. The mere fact of the issue of the Ultimatum and its inevitable non-acceptance was bound to engender a high degree of tension, even if Germany had not forthwith declared war. It was not the failure to answer this Ultimatum, preposterous even in its details, but the dispatch to a neighbourly State of such a demand with a short time-limit affixed that constituted the fatal step, bringing into immediate imminence the danger of a European war. It is therefore a complete perversion of the facts when the guilt of the war is ascribed to Russia for her failure to answer the Ultimatum, instead of laying it on Germany on account of the dispatch of the Ultimatum.

But to proceed: is it then true, as German writers on the war are constantly telling us, that Russia chose "to give no answer at all to the German Ultimatum," and thus clearly proclaimed her desire to provoke war? As I have already elsewhere observed and as I shall now prove, this assertion is false.

We have, it is true, no information as to an answer from the Russian Government, and we are ignorant

whether such an answer was given, or whether it went astray or was in some way side-tracked. One thing, however, is certain : An answer to the German Ultimatum is, in fact, to be found in the Tsar's answer to the telegram of the Emperor William (of July 31st at 2 o'clock in the afternoon), dispatched from Petrograd at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st, that is to say, two hours after the expiration of the Ultimatum. The German White Book also appears to view the matter in this light, for immediately after the observation : "The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us" (*i.e.* to the Ultimatum sent at midnight, July 31st) it prints the Tsar's telegram of August 1st, 2 p.m. I have repeatedly referred to the contents of this telegram; it describes the German mobilisation as a self-evident measure, which, however, it was hoped would, like the Russian mobilisation, not mean war. The Tsar's telegram was therefore the answer to the German Ultimatum; it was at least the answer in substance, even if the formal procedure of diplomatic intercourse was not observed. This formal procedure had for some days already been amplified, and indeed partially replaced, by a direct interchange of telegrams between the monarchs of Germany, Russia and England. In this the last minute of desperation, when the fate of millions of men was at stake, the choice of a personal friendly telegram with its terms of intimacy, its reference to the "long-trying friendship" of the rulers instead of a cold diplomatic note, which could only have declined such an ultimatum, proves, more than anything else, the peaceful intention of the Tsar and his Government.

The Tsar's telegram of August 1st is not only a Russian answer to the German Ultimatum, but is an answer which in form and substance is eloquent in favour of Russia's desire for peace. The refusal of the German Ultimatum was inevitable, if an answer were given by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and such an answer was obviously replaced, consciously and intentionally, by a personal appeal from one royal friend to another, accepting the German mobilisation as a matter of course, but refusing nevertheless to abandon hope that the two Governments would "continue to negotiate for the welfare of

our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God, it must be possible to our long-trying friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply." These are the concluding words of the Tsar's telegram of the afternoon of August 1st. The Government of a great State could never have replied to such an Ultimatum in this way. An answer from the Russian Government would have been bound to break down all bridges. The Tsar's answer, however, maintained intact all the connections between the two kingdoms, and endeavoured by the invisible chains of the long enduring friendship between the monarchs to restrain the armed hosts in their waiting attitude.

The Emperor William understood quite well the last moving appeal of his Russian friend. And one is certainly not far wrong in assuming that he entertained no doubt as to the integrity and the sincerity of this appeal for peace. But since July 29th—the reasons for assigning this date I have discussed in my book—since July 29th "higher considerations of State" had rendered irreversible the resolution for war taken in Berlin; higher considerations of State induced him to turn a deaf ear to the personal tones of peace and of friendship of his Imperial friend, to recur constantly in his answer of August 1st to the intercourse between the Governments, and to demand an answer from the Russian Government; he added: "Until I receive this reply I am unable to my great grief to enter upon the subject of your telegram." Observe this frigid refusal, this business-like reference to the necessity of a formal answer from the Government to the German Ultimatum, this refusal "to enter upon the subject of your telegram," and contrast it with the moving warmth of the last despairing cry for deliverance from the Russian throne. The Emperor William insisted on a formal settlement of his Ultimatum, and this could not but be fatal to peace. The Emperor Nicholas avoided such a formal settlement, in order to prevent the breach by a personal appeal to the feelings of humanity and of friendship of the German Emperor.

Such is the aspect of affairs in the eyes of anyone whose

mind is not restricted solely to dry letters and to cold matters of fact, but whose endeavour it is to look into the warm soul of men who live and act. Indeed, a right judgment on historical events can be formed only by one who is able by a kind of poetical and psychological intuition to comprehend the spiritual life of man in action and can hear in a recital of the bare facts the beating pulse of human feelings and passions. Only they have been truly great historians who, in addition to a conscientiousness of mind in the investigation of facts, have had at their command sufficient imagination and sensibility to share the spiritual experiences of the men whose deeds they are narrating. The telegrams exchanged between the monarchs of Germany and Russia lay bare to the psychologist the souls of both rulers and also, in the case of the Emperor William, the transformation of his soul during the European crisis. Merely by reference to the interchange of telegrams it is almost possible to determine the moment up to which the Emperor William continued to vacillate and beyond which he was resolved on war. On the other hand, there is in the utterances of the Emperor of Russia from first to last no oscillation or shadow of turning. As in his first telegram of July 29th, so also in his last of August 1st, the object of his longing and of his endeavour is the maintenance of peace, and all means calculated to attain this high end are proposed. The most luminous point, which will for ever outshine the obscurity generated by the German paid hacks, is his telegram of July 29th proposing to submit the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, a telegram which the German Government has suppressed and which the hired journalists of Germany would still, if they could, gladly allow to sink out of sight. All that Nicholas II did during the European crisis may be summarised in the words which he himself wrote to the King of England on the afternoon of August 1st, after the German declaration of war: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." The assurance thus given by the Tsar Nicholas will be confirmed by the verdict of history.

## II

The preceding observations are sufficient to dispose of the failure to answer the German Ultimatum, which is the reason advanced in the German declaration of war, to justify or, indeed, to make apparent, the necessity for the German declaration of war.

Apart from this reason, the memorandum in the White Book (page 413) cites as a further ground: "Russia began the war against us." This further reason, which was rightly considered to be more effective than the official choice of reasons contained in the declaration of war, has been used as combustible material for the glowing flames of popular enthusiasm in Germany, and has further been transferred to their own collection of documents by the Austrian Government, although it is not clear whether this arises from credulous stupidity or from pre-arranged complicity with Berlin. According to Count Szögyény's telegram addressed to Count Berchtold on August 2nd, and according to the Austrian declaration of war against Russia on August 5th, the war between Germany and Russia in no way broke out merely because of the mobilisation of Russia, but because of an actual attack by Russian troops.

These contradictions between the various German and Austrian statements are in themselves sufficient to deprive them of any credibility in the eyes of anyone with a knowledge of criminology and to enable such a critic to recognise the usual excuse of convicted criminals in the statement that Russia occasioned the war in this way or in that.

This conviction is further strengthened by the details given as to the alleged Russian attack, which are alike obscure and contradictory (White Book, page 413). I have already pointed out in my book (page 207) that the alleged passage of the frontier by the Russians "already in the afternoon of August 1st, *i.e.* the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Tsar, cited above, was sent," does not constitute a Russian attack, even if this passage of the frontier did in fact take place; for on the afternoon of August 1st Germany had declared war on Russia,



and the passage of the frontier after the declaration of war was not an attack but a normal act of war. Notwithstanding much strenuous meditation, I have been unable to ascertain the meaning to be attached to the additional words with regard to the "afternoon on which the telegram of the Tsar was sent." According to the account in the White Book, the Tsar's telegram was dispatched at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The declaration of war was to be delivered at 5 o'clock. After 5 o'clock there was therefore a state of war between Germany and Russia. Can any charge against the Russian Government be based on the fact that their troops may really have crossed the frontier at half-past five—an assertion which there is, of course, no evidence to support? Can the charge of unlawfulness be based on the fact that the Tsar sent a conciliatory telegram to Berlin at 2 o'clock? Is it suggested that the Tsar should in any way have been bound to this telegram, even after the German Emperor declared war upon him at 5 o'clock?

The charge that Russia was the aggressor naturally becomes more absurd the greater the interval between the declaration of war and the occurrence of the act of aggression. What are we to say of Herr Helfferich, who, as already remarked, assigns the Russian attack to the "night from August 1st to August 2nd"! In this point the judicious Herr Helfferich is the most injudicious and compromising of all Germany's defenders.

To proceed further. The White Book states: "However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received (the reference is to Pourtalès' instructions to hand over the declaration of war) . . . Russian troops crossed our frontier." This sentence also is obscure, like all the others. Herr von Bethmann's purpose is to prove that an attack contrary to international law had been made by Russian troops. With this end in view, he asserts that Russian troops had crossed the frontier before the announcement of the delivery of the declaration of war had been received in Berlin. This assertion is, however, insufficient to support the conclusion to be demonstrated. In determining whether Russian

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troops crossed the German frontier lawfully or unlawfully, from the point of view of international law, the essential fact is not the time at which the announcement was received, but the time at which the declaration of war was delivered in Petrograd. Such an action did not become lawful from the moment of the receipt in Berlin of the announcement in question, but from the moment when the declaration of war was delivered in Petrograd. Hours might have elapsed between these two points of time. Any military action which Russia might have taken during these hours would have been in accordance with, and not in violation of, international law, and would have given Germany no right to complain of a Russian attack, or of the "opening of hostilities" by Russia.

It follows that in this case also the account given by Herr von Bethmann in no way proves what it is intended to prove: convulsive efforts are made to falsify history, but this is done so unskillfully that on nearly every occasion the argument is beside the point. The assertion that Russia attacked us, and that therefore it was she who provoked war, was only advanced subsequently after the declaration of war *ad usum populi germanici*, and, notwithstanding all the endeavours of the White Book, no evidence in support of the assertion has yet been produced. It is, however, not merely the absence of evidence, but also the ambiguities and contradictions contained in the White Book, added to the inconsistencies between the Chancellor and his Secretary of State with regard to the time of the attack, which must force on every unprejudiced inquirer the conviction that the Russian attack is nothing but a German invention. This is the reason that the German chant of liberation, notwithstanding its world-renowned composer and conductor, has so signally failed to awaken an echo throughout the world.

### THE STORY OF THE FRENCH AIRMEN.

The pretext, of which the German Imperial Government made use in justification of their declaration of war against France, is as untenable as the corresponding pretext urged against Russia. In *J'accuse* (pages 208-212) I

pointed out the unproved character and the improbability of the alleged attacks made by French airmen on German railways, and to the contradictions to be found between the assertions in the declaration of war of August 3rd, in the note addressed by the German Ambassador to the Belgian Government on the same day and in the Chancellor's speech of August 4th. I further instanced the complaint made in Berlin by the French Government, which, in complete opposition to the German assertion, reported with full details aggressive actions taken by Germany before the declaration of war, which were, indeed, in part confirmed by the Chancellor in his speech above-mentioned. I also indicated a number of other circumstances which stamped the German assertion that an attack had been made by France as an invention designed to furnish a basis of fact for the German war of defence.

All this the reader may peruse in my book; in this place I should merely like to mention an interesting fact which has become public in the course of this year (1916) and which furnishes a complete refutation of one important point in the assertions contained in the German declaration of war against France. In the *Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift* of May 18th, 1916, Herr Professor Dr. Schwalbe published a copy of correspondence between Privy Councillor Riedel and the magistrate of Nürnberg in the course of which the latter wrote as follows on April 3rd, 1916:

The Acting-General in command of the Third Bavarian Army Corps has no information that bombs were ever thrown by enemy airmen, before and after the outbreak of war, on the railways between Nürnberg and Kissingen and between Nürnberg and Ansbach. All the statements and newspaper reports bearing on this point have been found to be false.

It is thus officially established by a statement in which the civil and military authorities concur that of the four alleged aggressive actions by French airmen (near Wesel, in the district of Eiffel, near Karlsruhe, and near Nürnberg), the last, at any rate, never took place. How far the other three assertions are credible may be left to each reader to judge for himself after the perusal of my two books of arraignment.

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One cannot but be charmed by the attempt made in the German declaration of war to link together the two charges, firstly, that hostilities were opened by French military airmen, and, secondly, that France was the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. The declaration of war was delivered in Paris on August 3rd at 6.45 in the evening. The time-limit allowed in the Ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government had already expired at 7 o'clock in the morning of the same day. The entry of German troops into Belgium took place on August 4th at an early hour of the morning. The tale of the airmen contained in the German declaration of war against France was intended to prove that Belgian neutrality had first of all been violated by the French, in directing against the airmen the charge that "several of these have openly ('manifestement') violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country." When the airmen dropped bombs at Wesel, Karlsruhe and Nürnberg, it was thus observed that they had clearly ("manifestement") flown over Belgian territory. It is thus that the attempt is made to bring down two or even three birds with one stone: France began hostilities, France violated the neutrality of Belgium, and Belgium forfeited her neutrality by allowing the French to fly over her territory. Even apart from the official proof of the Nürnberg lie which has now been furnished, such a foolish attempt to bring down three birds, or rather three aeroplanes, at once, such an airy construction of a ground for war aroused in the world nothing but hilarity and scepticism.

## CHAPTER VII

### IS RUSSIA TO BLAME FOR THE WAR?

(*Duel between Bethmann and Sazonof, February, 1916*)<sup>1</sup>

IN his speech in the Duma on February 22nd, 1916, Sazonof spoke as follows :

“This war is the greatest crime against humanity ; those who are guilty of it bear a heavy responsibility, and at the present hour they are already sufficiently unmasked.”

The German Government, who rightly felt that this charge came home to them, at once proceeded, in accordance with their usual habits and at the dictates of their evil conscience, to unroll once more the antecedents of the war, and to reveal anew to the world M. Sazonof as “the man who is primarily burdened with this immense responsibility. Certain not only of the help of France, but also of England, it was Russia that provoked the war.” So runs the cardinal sentence in the most recent semi-official defence of the German Government.

It is impossible to refute all the one-sidedness, the omissions and the perversions contained in the semi-

<sup>1</sup> This essay was written in March, 1916, immediately after a lively oratorical and Press campaign between the German and the Russian Governments on the responsibility for the war, but it has not hitherto been published. I include the essay in my second book of accusation, because it again investigates in a more condensed form the question of Russian guiltiness of the war—the central point in all German apologetic writings—and in doing so it also reveals many new aspects of the matter under discussion. (See the article from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, printed in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of February 27th, 1916, and the corresponding Wolff's telegram of February 26th.)

official defence without considering in detail the whole of the immediate antecedents of the war. It is a matter of common knowledge that a knave or a fool can assert more in twenty lines than an honest or a wise man can disprove in two hundred.

The defectiveness and the utter worthlessness of the alleged demonstration given by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* is made manifest by the whole contents of the diplomatic books of all the Governments concerned, including those of Austria and Germany. I must assume in the reader a knowledge of these diplomatic publications and of their critical treatment in *J'accuse* and in the preceding chapters of this book, and in refuting the most recent German proof of innocence, I am constrained to restrict myself to the following points.

I

Following Helfferich's tactics, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* lays stress on the Russian mobilisation, which is represented as bearing the sole responsibility for the outbreak of war; the diplomatic transactions are, however, left entirely aside. It adduces the various conversations which Count Pourtalès had with M. Sazonof, with his assistant Neratof, and with the Tsar (on July 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th and 31st). It emphasises the repeated warnings as to what would be the consequences of Russian mobilisation, but entirely omits the grounds for the Russian mobilisations, the partial as well as the general, and thus as a matter of course it arrives at the conclusion that Russia criminally desired and provoked war.

It is certainly correct that, on July 29th, Russia mobilised her four southern army districts Kief, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, and that she mobilised the whole of her forces on July 31st.

On the other hand, it is also correct :

(a) That no European Foreign Minister laboured for the maintenance of peace more insistently than Sazonof, or showed a greater spirit of compliance from the first to the last moment of the crisis ;

(b) That Germany and Austria made a peaceful solution of the conflict impossible by the adoption of an attitude which was in part one of refusal, and in part was ambiguous and contradictory; and that in this way they compelled Russia to take military measures of security, in view of the fact that mobilisation in her case would be considerably slower and more difficult;

(c) That these measures of security, in accordance with the formal and solemn assurances of the Russian Government and of the Tsar, were in no way aggressive in character;

(d) That Austria, by the form and the substance of her Ultimatum, by the rupture in diplomatic relations and by the declaration of war against Serbia, created the source of the European conflict, and by her mobilisations, first partial and then general, compelled Russia to counter-mobilisations;

(e) That Germany also undertook military measures of preparation, more especially on the western front, dating at the latest from July 25th, the day the Austrian Ambassador left Belgrade, and that on August 1st, the day of the formal mobilisation, she was already standing on the frontier prepared to march into Luxemburg, Belgium and France.

What Sazonof did for the maintenance of peace I must ask the reader to peruse again in *J'accuse* (pages 139 to 353) and in the foregoing chapters of this work. A summary of his peace endeavours is given under eighteen heads in *J'accuse* (pages 288 to 292).

Amongst other things that might be mentioned, Sazonof assisted in obtaining from Serbia an answer so submissive in character that only an opponent who was absolutely decided on war could make such an answer the basis of a declaration of hostilities.

He gladly accepted all proposals of mediation, no matter what their substance or from what quarter they emanated.

He discussed in an entirely conciliatory manner with Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador, the Austrian demands on Serbia, and asked for the official continuation of these

negotiations, a request which was, however, bluntly rejected by Count Berchtold.

When, on July 31st, Austria again showed her readiness to resume these negotiations, he forthwith began these in Petrograd and communicated to London the satisfaction and the hope with which he was inspired by this happy turn in events.

He accepted Grey's conference, and declared that he was ready to stand aside and acquiesce in the peace proposals of the Powers.

Above all—a point on which it is constantly necessary to lay emphasis in view of the German method of falsification—he proposed that the Austro-Serbian dispute should be decided by the Hague Tribunal, as had already been suggested by Serbia in her answer to Austria.

The whole arraignment advanced by the German Government is completely overthrown by this fact alone, which was prudently suppressed in the first German White Book, and only made known in the second, after its publication by the Russian Government. If Russia had wished for war, for which, as we now see, her preparations were very defective, would she have made this peace proposal, which was bound under any circumstances to prevent war?

\* \* \* \* \*

On July 29th, Russia undertook her partial mobilisation and officially communicated the fact to Berlin. As I have shown elsewhere, this mobilisation was the result of four facts :

1. The outbreak of war between Austria and Serbia ;
2. The mobilisation of at least two Austrian army corps facing the Russian frontier ;
3. The refusal of Grey's Conference-proposal by Germany and Austria ;
4. The refusal of all further negotiations on the Serbian question by Count Berchtold.

On July 29th, Count Pourtalès called on Sazonof and had a somewhat lengthy conversation with him which is reported on in the German White Book (page 409) and the Russian



Orange Book (No. 49). Sazonof declared anew that he was ready to accept the decision of the four disinterested Powers, and at the same time to negotiate directly with Austria with a view to arriving at an understanding. Pourtalès, on the other hand, shuffled in every way with regard to both proposals, maintained that the object in view was an interference with Austrian sovereign rights, and asked of Russia that the Double Monarchy "should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Serbia."

Sazonof endeavoured, according to Count Pourtalès' own account

to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia (White Book, page 409).

Portalès, it is true, promised to report their conversation, but stated that

after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.

In the declaration of territorial disinterestedness on the part of Austria, Pourtalès affected to find that regard had already been had for Russian interests—"a great concession on the part of a State engaged in war." Thus the German Ambassador was either unable or unwilling even to give an undertaking that Serbian sovereignty would be unconditionally respected. This is entirely in accordance with the account of the German-Russian interview, which Sazonof gave on the following day (July 30th) to the French and English Ambassadors in Petrograd (Blue Book, No. 97, and Yellow Book, No. 103). We have thus four entirely consistent accounts of this important interview between Sazonof and Pourtalès, on which the present publication in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* also lays stress—those, namely, contained in the White Book, the Orange Book, the Blue Book and the Yellow Book. These accounts show :

(a) That Sazonof confirmed the Russian partial mobilisation, and explained it by reference to the Austrian partial mobilisation ; he disclaimed, however, that there had so far been any mobilisation against Germany, and also denied that the mobilisation against Austria had in any way an aggressive character ;

(b) That Sazonof proposed a double diplomatic action, namely, (i) a conversation *à quatre* to find out in common a method of arriving at an understanding, and (ii) direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd ;

(c) That Pourtalès stated that any exchange of ideas, no matter in what form, would be difficult if not impossible, and had demanded of Russia that she should completely stand aside ;

(d) That Pourtalès undertook that Serbian integrity should be respected, but did not promise the full maintenance of Serbia's sovereign rights.

In other words, the representative of the German Government made no concession of any kind with a view to the diplomatic settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the Austro-Russian conflict which had arisen out of it ; he declined to exercise any influence on the Austrian Government to induce them to make even the slightest concession, and he demanded from Russia, not merely an attitude of complete disinterestedness, but the abandonment of any measures of military security. This is what the German Government in its most recent self-defence calls "the invitation to Russia not to thwart the diplomatic task by military measures."

\* \* \* \* \*

During the critical days, what diplomatic action did Germany initiate, recommend or support ?—None.

She declined Grey's conference.

At every stage she tolerated Austria's action against Serbia.

She left unanswered the Russian proposal that the question should be decided by the Hague Tribunal.

She submitted to the Viennese Cabinet "for their consideration" Grey's proposal that the Serbian note

should at least be accepted as a basis for discussion (Red Book, No. 48).

She neither herself furnished an answer, nor did she elicit an answer from Vienna, on the subject of Grey's formula of agreement (the occupation of Belgrade; and the announcement from there of the conditions of peace.)<sup>1</sup>

She in part declined, and in part left unanswered, Sazonof's various formulæ of agreement, etc., etc.

In the whole crisis the only thing Germany did was to submit for the consideration of the Austrian Government the suggestion of a direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd. Such a discussion was most abruptly declined by Count Berchtold on July 28th, and it was only in consequence of a telegram from Berchtold to Szápáry dated July 30th (Red Book, No. 49), that it was again resumed on July 31st and August 1st (Red Book, Nos. 55 and 56).

On July 31st, however, the general mobilisations had already been decreed in Austria and Russia; in Germany the "threatening danger of war" (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*) had been proclaimed, and the Ultimata to France and Russia resolved upon, and these were then, in fact, delivered to the Governments concerned at 7 o'clock in the evening and at midnight.

Such is the diplomatic action of Germany, which is alleged to have been thwarted by Russian mobilisation. If anything was in fact thwarted, it was the resumed negotiations between Austria and Russia which were thwarted by Germany's Ultimata. Assuming that these negotiations were sincerely intended on the part of Austria and that they were not merely a device prearranged with Berlin to put the blame on Russia, why were they not given a run of at least one or two or three days? Why was a demand, insulting to any Great Power, addressed to Russia in the form of an ultimatum with a short time-limit attached, a demand the execution of which, as was well known in Berlin, was in fact impossible "on technical

<sup>1</sup> I treat elsewhere of the "notes of recommendation" made known by Herr von Bethmann a year and two and a quarter years after the appearance of the first German White Book.

grounds." (See the telegram from the Emperor William to King George of August 1st.)

All the observations of Count Pourtalès, now published, serve merely to inculpate and not to exonerate the German Government. They merely prove what we knew long ago, that Germany barred every propitious path to an understanding which was proposed by the other side, and that she frustrated by her own action the only proposal for arriving at an understanding which she herself advanced; that she put in the forefront the military measures of Russia while keeping in the background the diplomatic issue, and that she demanded from Russia complete passivity, notwithstanding Austrian and German activity in military matters.

In the whole of the conversations between Pourtalès and Sazonof now again published together, the matter under discussion is always merely that of the formal question of mobilisation. Never, or scarcely ever, was there any mention of the real issue, or of the means whereby it could be solved.

## II

With diabolical skill the German Government skims over Sazonof's proposals for agreement (Orange Book, Nos. 60 and 67). If there were not already a hundred proofs of the *mala fides* and the evil conscience of the German Government, the fact that they pass over Sazonof's proposals in silence would in itself reveal the guilt and the consciousness of guilt of the Berlin Government.

What comment are we to make on a method of demonstration which passes in silence over these important decisive incidents, which, moreover, are most intimately connected with the question of mobilisation? It is not merely in the White Book and in the Red Book that this policy of silence is pursued; it is adopted also in the most recent, and unsuccessful, attempt to charge the Russian Government with the authorship of the war. When Herr von Bethmann enumerates with all their details six or seven interviews between Count Pourtalès and Sazonof in the days between July 26th and July 31st,

what reason is to be given for the fact that he entirely fails to mention the interview of July 30th, with regard to which we are in possession of authentic information? (Orange Book, No. 60; Blue Book, No. 97; Yellow Book, No. 103). The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* makes a significant jump over the interval between July 29th and July 31st, which it seeks to fill up by a reference to "the mediatory activity of his Majesty the Emperor and of the German Government." The decisive incident which took place on July 30th and really determined the course of events between these two days is, however, suppressed.

The details of this important diplomatic incident may be read in the documents mentioned above, in *J'accuse* and in the preceding chapters of this book. Here it may suffice to emphasise:

That on July 30th, that is to say, before the Russian general mobilisation, Sazonof pledged himself in a binding form to suspend all further military preparations on the part of Russia, provided that Austria, in recognising the European character of the dispute, should state her readiness to eliminate from her Ultimatum those points which violated the sovereign rights of Serbia.

Like Prince Lichnowsky, Count Pourtalès may have been personally sincere in his endeavours to maintain peace, and he was clearly inconsolable at the imminent prospect of the collapse of his hopes (Blue Book, No. 97); he breathed more freely when Sazonof dictated to him his formula of agreement urging him to transmit it forthwith to Berlin. He promised to support the proposal in Berlin (Yellow Book, No. 103).

The frigid and unexplained refusal of Sazonof's proposal by Herr von Jagow must therefore have appeared all the more incredible and unexpected to all concerned when on the same day (July 31st) Swerbeiev the Russian Ambassador in Berlin was informed that Sazonof's proposal was unacceptable to Austria.

It is to the refusal given in this abrupt form, unalleviated by any explanation, that we must attribute the fact that

on the next day Russia decreed her general mobilisation. Jagow's diplomatic action was supported by the military action of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, as I have elsewhere shown, mobilised the whole of its forces by sea and land, in the night from July 30th to July 31st, *before* the Russian general mobilisation took place. Germany also had proceeded so far with her military preparations before the formal announcement of the "state of war" (July 31st) that the military situation alone would have been sufficient to justify the Russian general mobilisation.

Let us, however, confine ourselves here to the diplomatic question. Why does Herr von Bethmann still keep silent, as he did in both the White Books and in all the speeches delivered since the beginning of the war, with regard to the diplomatic facts which are documentarily set out in Nos. 60 and 68 of the Russian Orange Book, and in the corresponding English and French papers? Why was Sazonof's proposal declined in Berlin? Why was it not even considered worthy of discussion, or even of transmission to Vienna? Was it an excessive demand that Austria should promise to respect the sovereign rights of Serbia? Was such an undertaking not worth the equivalent offered, namely, that Russia would abide by her partial mobilisation, and would discontinue any further mobilisation? And if it was open to Germany and Austria by this obvious concession—professedly in agreement with Austria's intentions—to prevent the Russian general mobilisation, and if this concession was nevertheless refused, how is it possible to regard it as an offence in the Russian Government that they saw in this refusal an intensification of the danger of a conflict, a new manifestation of the desire of the Central Powers for war, and that they took further military measures of security accordingly? Let us suppose that Herr von Jagow, instead of giving the preposterous answer to the Russian Ambassador, which he gave on July 30th, had said to him: "In Sazonof's proposal we recognise the manifest desire of the Russian Government for peace; we will move Austria to give an express promise not to prejudice the sovereign rights of Serbia." If the German Secretary of State had made use of such a pacific, reasonable

and conciliatory form of words, the Russian general mobilisation would not have taken place on the following day, and we would not to-day have been in the middle of a European war—which, after all, as Herr von Bethmann is constantly telling us, is merely the consequence of the Russian general mobilisation.

Who then bears the guilt of the war?—Bethmann or Sazonof? Even if one were to accept entirely the standpoint of the German Government, and regard the question of mobilisation as the only question of decisive importance, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion :

The German Government bears the responsibility for the war, inasmuch as they could still have prevented the Russian general mobilisation on July 30th, by accepting a condition put forward by Russia, which was self-evident and easy of fulfilment, and they could thus have eliminated the ground for war.

It is clear, from the diplomatic documents bearing on the question, how vast was the importance attached by the Entente Governments to Sazonof's proposal, which is still hushed up by Germany and Austria. The text of the proposal dictated to Count Pourtalès was at once communicated by Sazonof to his Ambassadors in all the capitals. His Ambassador in Berlin was asked for an immediate telegraphic answer on the reception accorded to the proposal by the German Government (Orange Book, No. 60).

Paléologue, the French Ambassador, in his report to Viviani confirms the urgent desire of the Tsar that war should be avoided, and the sincere effort of the Russian Government to do everything for a peaceful solution of the conflict (Yellow Book, No. 103).

Buchanan, the English Ambassador in Petrograd, sees in Sazonof's proposal the turning point in the crisis; should the proposal be rejected by Austria, Russia, especially in view of the Austrian and German preparations, could not but extend her partial to a general mobilisation, and the inevitable consequence of this would be a European war (Blue Book, No. 97).

From all that has been said, it is apparent how enormous was the importance which the diplomatic world attached to Sazonof's proposal, and how the fate of Europe depended on July 30th on the attitude assumed by the Berlin Foreign Office. Even if we accept their own point of view that mobilisation signifies war, it is on Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow that there falls the enormous responsibility of having brought about Russian mobilisation and consequently of having provoked the war.

### III

The refusal of Sazonof's proposal is all the more extraordinary, inasmuch as this proposal did not even make it a condition that the Austrians should withdraw from Serbia; indeed, in default of an express prohibition, it admitted the possibility of a further advance in Serbia. In this point Sazonof's proposal coincided with that of Grey, according to which Austria was to occupy Serbian territory, including Belgrade, and from there was to announce her conditions (Blue Book, Nos. 88, 98, 108), a proposal to which, as is known, no answer was ever given by the Central Powers.

Was it possible to show greater diplomatic compliance than is contained in all these English and Russian proposals for agreement? Spread out before Germany and Austria was a whole assortment of methods by which it was possible to arrive at an understanding. They had but to take one at random, they had but to follow any one of these paths, and the peace of Europe would have been saved:

They could have submitted the whole question to the Hague Tribunal, that is to say, the points which were still in dispute after the extreme submissiveness of Serbia's answer.

They could have consulted the representatives of the four disinterested Powers in London with a view to obtaining proposals for arriving at an understanding, which would then have been recommended simultaneously to the Governments of Vienna and Petrograd.



In the course of direct negotiations between the Austrian and Russian Governments, by small concessions on one side and the other in the few points still at issue, they could have found an acceptable middle path between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions.

They could have placed Austrian troops in occupation of Belgrade and the adjacent Serbian territory as a pledge, and from there they could have announced their conditions.

They could have given the merely general statement, without at once agreeing as to details, that Austria would eliminate from her Ultimatum the points which contravened the sovereign rights of Serbia, etc.

Had the Central Powers, at any time up to July 30th, accepted any single one of these proposals, had they not followed the contrary course of refusing or ignoring the whole of these proposals (to which must be added the step taken by her in the proclamation of the Austrian general mobilisation in the night from July 30th to July 31st), Russia for her part would never have proceeded to her general mobilisation of July 31st. Where, then, I again ask, is the diplomatic action of Germany and Austria which is said to have been thwarted by the military measures of Russia? This diplomatic action was entirely negative and passive in character. It was not Russia who thwarted diplomatic action, but Germany and Austria who, on the one hand, wrecked every diplomatic expedient, and, on the other, pursued uninterruptedly their own military preparations. It was this action of the Central Powers, negative diplomatically, but positive viewed from a military standpoint, which compelled Russia to adopt military measures of security; these measures, however, in accordance with the assurances of the Tsar and his Government, and the whole diplomatic demeanour of Russia, neither were designed to exercise military pressure nor contemplated any aggressive action. They were measures of security against the intention of the Central Powers, which became more and more unveiled, to drive matters this time to the bending or the breaking point—to the

bending point, that is to say, Russia was to be a mute spectator of a Serbia crushed by arms and reduced to vassalage; or to the breaking point, the outbreak of the "inevitable" European war, which at one blow would establish Germany's hegemony on the Continent and Austria's supremacy in the Balkans.

IV

If any proof is still required that in undertaking her military measures nothing was further from Russia's intentions than a disturbance of the peace, the evidence is completely furnished by the attitude of the Russian Government after the general mobilisation was complete. On July 31st, the day of the Russian general mobilisation, Sazonof communicated his second formula of agreement to the European Chancelleries (Orange Book, No. 67; Blue Book, No. 120; Yellow Book, No. 118). This formula was devised as a compromise between Grey's first formula and Sazonof's first formula, and was in essential matters in agreement with the English proposal. It could, it is true, no longer renew the undertaking that Russia would put a stop to her military preparations, which had been contained in the first formula of the previous day. The time for such an undertaking had meanwhile passed, since Russia, in consequence of Jagow's refusal of July 30th, had decreed a general mobilisation on July 31st and, as the Emperor William and Tsar Nicholas are in agreement in stating, it is impossible "on technical grounds" for such a step to be cancelled forthwith. (See the Tsar's telegram of July 31st to the Emperor William, and that of the Emperor William to the King of England of August 1st.) Thus a suspension of military measures on the part of Russia was no longer possible, especially as Austria had on the same day proclaimed a general mobilisation. Even yet, however, an unambiguous announcement of Russia's desire for peace was still possible, and this was furnished in Sazonof's second formula of July 31st:

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if . . . she admits that

the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude" (Orange Book, No. 67).

This second proposal for agreement put forward by Sazonof on July 31st, which was then (as explained in earlier chapters) still further attenuated and moderated, with the sole object of obtaining the approval of the Central Powers (see Blue Book, No. 133; Orange Book, No. 69; Yellow Book, No. 120)—Sazonof's cheerful readiness to take part in the direct negotiations with the Government of Vienna which had just been re-opened—his further proposal to continue these negotiations in London, as a more favourable *terrain*—his final proposal of August 1st that all the Powers should remain under arms within their frontiers and that meanwhile a last attempt to arrive at an agreement should be made—all these facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration in connection with the Russian mobilisation, in order to establish the fact that this mobilisation was exclusively preventive and precautionary, and that it was neither offensive nor aggressive in its character.

The German Government and their defenders make constant use of a device whereby the Russian mobilisation is represented as a self-contained fact detached from all the diplomatic events, and in this way they succeed in ascribing to it an aggressive character. With such a fraudulent method it is, of course, possible to prove anything; but the results arrived at will always be false. Military actions appear in their true character only when viewed in connection with the diplomatic attitude of the Government concerned. Even a declaration of war, although it brings about war and thus is, in the strictest meaning of the word, an offensive action, may be in essence a defensive action, evoked by the diplomatic intransigence or by other circumstances revealing the desire for war of the other side. Had Germany made all the peace proposals which she did *not* make, but which in fact emanated from the Entente Powers, had Germany

put forward even the one proposal that the dispute should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal, and had Russia declined this proposal, the German declaration of war would have assumed an entirely different character from that which it now bears; instead of an aggressive action, it would then have appeared as a defensive action.

It is only when viewed in connection with the whole diplomatic behaviour of Germany that her declaration of war against Russia appears as a deliberate and intentional act of aggression.

Contrariwise, even if it had not been evoked by the previous Austrian general mobilisation, the Russian general mobilisation, when viewed in connection with the whole diplomatic behaviour of Russia, appears exclusively as a preventive measure, and as an act of security against the attack which threatened to come from the side of the Central Powers.

This in itself disposes of the whole argument based on the Russian mobilisation. According to the memoranda of Count Pourtalès, which are now published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, he expressed himself early on July 31st to Sazonof's assistant, Neratof, as follows: "The general mobilisation of the Russian army can only be viewed by us (in Germany) as meaning that Russia is determined on war." Such a view could only be entertained by those who were entirely ignorant of all the diplomatic negotiations since July 23rd, and to whom Sazonof's further actions on July 31st and August 1st, up to the moment of the declaration of war, were also unknown. No one who was acquainted with these diplomatic negotiations could for a moment doubt that Russia's mobilisation in no way denoted a desire for war and that its sole purpose was security against designs of war from abroad. This is, indeed, the fatal element in secret diplomaey, that the nations whose weal or woe is at stake learn only so much of diplomatic occurrences as each Government sees fit to lay before them. By the omission or the perversion of true facts, every Government can stamp the mark of deceit on the behaviour of other Governments; a measure of security taken by the adversary can be transmuted into a menace; their

own offensive actions can be transmuted into acts of defence. It is thus that the Russian mobilisation has been falsified in Germany into a menace against the German Fatherland, and even to-day this method of falsification is being pursued without remission.

From this has arisen the " War of Liberation " ; to this cause is to be attributed the fact that the aims of the war have been proclaimed to be security against a future attack, in other words, a policy of annexation ; to this is to be ascribed the interminable continuance of this insensate carnage.

It is the Russian attack which is the basis of all that is thus so devilishly construed.

This also explains the constant renewal of those efforts, which it is true are made in vain, to represent to the German people this Russian attack as the cause of the war.

## V

I may here mention a subsidiary point characteristic, however, of the German method of defence. In the war literature of Germany it is constantly being asserted by one writer after another that the Russian Government, to a certain extent owing to the workings of their evil conscience, only informed their French ally of the general mobilisation after a long interval had elapsed, the object being to reveal Germany to the French public as the disturber of the peace. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* says in this connection :—

It may be presumed that the momentous character of the Russian complete mobilisation explains also why the Russian Government were in no hurry to acquaint their French allies of the fact. It is known that on the evening of July 31st the French Government were still without knowledge that Russia had ordered her general mobilisation in the night from July 30th to July 31st ; we are forced to assume that even the French Minister in Petrograd had not announced it at once, incredible as this may appear. The German counter-measure thus became known in Paris at an earlier hour and in this way it could be more easily represented to the French public as a menace from the side of Germany.

This assertion is contradicted by Paléologue's despatch of July 31st (Yellow Book, No. 118). The French Amba-

sador in this telegram reports the extension of the Russian partial mobilisation to a general mobilisation, and states that this had taken place in consequence of the Austrian general mobilisation and the preparatory military measures secretly pursued by Germany for six days. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* apparently relies on the observation made by Viviani to the German Ambassador Freiherr von Schön at 7 o'clock on the evening of July 31st, when the latter presented to him the German Ultimatum. Viviani stated to the Ambassador that as yet he had no information about a Russian general mobilisation (Yellow Book, No. 117). This observation of the French Premier admits of a quite obvious explanation; we are not informed of the exact time at which Paléologue's despatch was sent off, and clearly it had not yet arrived in Paris at 7 o'clock in the evening, or, at any rate it had not been brought to the knowledge of Viviani. The fact in no way furnishes a proof of *mala fides* on the part of the Russian Government; on the day on which it took place the French Ambassador informed Paris of the general mobilisation, and there is no more to be said on the question.

On July 31st, Buchanan, the English Ambassador in Petrograd, like the French Ambassador, telegraphed to his Government the news of the Russian general mobilisation which had taken place (Blue Book, No. 113). The *Blue Book* expressly notes that this telegram reached London on July 31st. There is thus nothing to indicate that the Russian mobilisation was concealed either from her French ally, or from England, her friend in the Entente.

## VI

Even more insubstantial than this demonstration are the quotations from the *Novoye Vremya* and from Reuter's correspondence which the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* adds at the end to adorn the accusation brought against Russia. The charge which these quotations are intended to support runs as follows :

It is therefore not true to say that Russia was drawn into the war. On the contrary, the Russian Government provoked the war.

Sazonof knew what would be the consequences of Russian mobilisation. He did not stop it, because he wanted war, believing that he was sure of success (Wolff's Telegraph Bureau, Official, February 26th).

This incredible falsification of history is the work of a semi-official bureau of the German Government. I do not ask of this paid hack that he should read the diplomatic documents, or even those of Germany and Austria alone, any of which taken at random would give him the lie. I do not ask of him that he should read the imperialistic literature of the chauvinists in Germany, their newspapers and periodicals, their books and pamphlets, nearly all of which state—with greater or less definiteness—that Russia was not prepared for war in 1914, that it only hoped to complete its military preparations in two or three years' time, that it would therefore at a later date make war upon Germany, but that war in 1914 was highly undesired and inopportune. Almost the whole of the literature written by the intriguers and instigators of war in Germany bears testimony against Bethmann's dictum that Sazonof wanted *this* war "because he believed he was sure of success." So far as this irreconcilable contradiction is concerned, it is for Herr von Bethmann, if he so wishes, to explain matters to his own countrymen. I would, however, recommend the writer of the article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to read the following sentence from Chamberlain, the prince of German chauvinists :

Sazonof . . . . was sincerely anxious to avoid war ; this is the impression that is gained from the whole exchange of telegrams ; up to the last moment, indeed beyond it, he endeavours to arrive at an understanding with Austria ; if Austria had been willing to give up the one demand (that is No. 6 of the Austrian Ultimatum) . . . . he would have been ready to make any concession (*New War Essays*, page 75).

On this point Herr Chamberlain has for once, by way of exception, spoken the truth. The exchange of telegrams between the European chancelleries proves that no one sought peace more passionately than did Sazonof. But if we are to infer the war intentions of the various Governments from newspaper cuttings, as Herr von Bethmann now endeavours to do on the strength of two utterances

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of *Novoye Vremya* and two telegrams from Reuter, then may the Lord help us! What a register of sins could be compiled from the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, from the *Post*, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the *Kreuzzeitung*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* and the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, from a thousand periodicals, books and pamphlets of our pan-Germans and Nationalists, wherewith to convict the Hohenzollerns and their abettor, of having long since intended and planned war. The material for this is so superabundant that it could fill whole libraries.<sup>1</sup> And against this overwhelming evidence the German Government has the temerity to produce four wretched newspaper snippets—of which two are entirely vapid, and the two others are derived from an anonymous English newspaper correspondent—in order with their help to prove the bellicose intentions of Russia! Even if the four newspaper extracts did contain anything that was damaging for the Russian Government, they would be but a drop compared with the ocean of pan-German instigation and incitement to war which for decades has flooded Germany, and which still sweeps away all reason and moderation in the German people.

How lamentably situated must a cause be when it needs in its defence such miserable arabesques devised from the news-sheets!

<sup>1</sup> Later in Volume II. I shall devote a lengthy chapter to this literature of incitement.



## CHAPTER VIII

### BAGATELLES FROM HELFFERICH

HERR HELFFERICH attaches enormous weight to certain trivial disagreements in the Yellow and Blue Books which, so far as their real importance is concerned, stand to the errors, omissions and false representations contained in the German and Austrian publications in the ratio of 1 to 100,000. From the few insignificant errors in editing the books of the Entente, the official defender of the German Government forthwith draws the most extreme conclusions as to the subsequent concoction of the documents, the sinister intentions of Sir Edward Grey to smother the facts, etc.

What would the defenders of the German Government say if similar conclusions were drawn from the crude blunders, omissions, and false and contradictory accounts contained in their books? In order not to repeat myself, I would merely recall the omission of the Tsar's telegram of July 29th, the German declaration of war against Russia with the two-fold reason assigned, Bethmann's telegram of July 27th in which he still professes on that day to be ignorant of Grey's Conference-proposal, the tale of the Russian violations of the frontier and the opening of hostilities by Russia "already in the afternoon of August 1st" (that is to say *after* the German declaration of war, which was delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, etc.)

These and countless other glaring inexactitudes and falsities are to be found in the German publications, and apart from two telegrams from Bethmann to Tschirschky—which have suddenly been produced but not until after one and two years of war respectively—silence is still maintained on almost the whole of the correspondence between Vienna and Berlin, which is decisive for the ques-

tion of responsibility. As against these heinous mistakes and omissions Herr Helfferich produces the following trivialities to enforce his charge against the Entente Powers, although on closer examination they are shown to be entirely insignificant and in no way incriminating.

## I

In the secret report, dated July 30th, 1913, written by someone not named and addressed to Stephen Pichon, then Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yellow Book, No. 5), it is reported of Herr von Kiderlen that he was "last winter" (*l'hiver dernier*) the best-hated man in Germany, but now he begins to be merely thought little of (*commence à n'être plus que déconsidéré*); for he allowed it to be known that he would have his revenge. Herr von Kiderlen died in December, 1912, and therefore—and it must be allowed that the lynx-eyed Herr Helfferich is correct in this—he could no longer have been thinking of having his revenge in July, 1913. This, however, does not prove—and here Herr Helfferich is wrong—that the secret report of July 30th, 1913, was a subsequent concoction for the purpose of publication in the Yellow Book. At first sight it would indeed appear as if the writer of the secret report of July 30th, 1913, had committed the unpardonable error of treating Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter, who died in December, 1912, as still alive seven months later. Such a mistake on a personal matter would in any case be a hundred times more venial than the grave material mistakes of which the German documentary collections are full. On a closer inspection it is, however, evident that the error has not been committed at all, and that it is rather Herr Helfferich who is guilty of an oversight. The title to No. 5 of the Yellow Book runs as follows :

Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on public opinion in Germany according to the reports of the diplomatic and consular agents).

Paris, July 30th, 1913.

The report begins with the words : " From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect

from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that . . . .”

From the heading and the introductory sentence it is thus clear that the report of July 30th, 1913, represents a *résumé* of a number of special diplomatic and consular reports, a compilation intended for the use of M. Pichon, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order to furnish him with a conspectus of the dominating tendencies in Germany since the last Morocco conflict of 1911. Such *résumés* for the use of Rulers and Ministers are customary in the chancelleries of all States, and are intended to spare those in authority the labour of referring to a series of individual reports extending over a lengthy period. The second German White Book (pages 49-57) also contains a series of such secret reports, the most of which, however, are given without a precise date, the month alone being indicated.

Anyone who attentively peruses the report of July 30th and examines the historic account of the constantly growing war tendencies in Germany, which began with the Morocco crisis of July, 1911, and found their strongest and most disconcerting expression in the uproarious centenary banquets in commemoration of the war of liberation of 1813, will at once recognise that this was not written at one stroke in July, 1913, but was in fact, as the heading and the introductory sentence signify, composed out of individual reports which followed the course of events. This explains in an entirely natural manner the apparent error with regard to the date of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter's death—an error which, as in the case of so many other trivial matters, is exalted, although here in the literal sense of the words, to a “question of life and death.”

From the drop of water which such an apparent error represents, it would be possible on Helfferich's example to infer a whole ocean of French lies, subsequent concoction, etc. In reality it is clear that the special report of the diplomatic or consular agent which is made use of on the first page of the summary intended for the use of the Minister was composed between Spring and December in 1912, that is to say when Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter was

in fact still alive, and was in fact, as we know from pan-German literature, one of the best-hated men in the German camp.

The author of the summary of July 30th, 1918, would perhaps have been well advised if he had noted in the margin of his *précis* the dates of the various reports used by him, as has been done in the German *Documents Relating to the Outbreak of War* (pages 49-57). To infer forthwith from such an omission that the author is guilty of falsification and subsequent concoction is, however, a speciality of the German tactics of defence, which is only explicable by reference to the impossibility of shaking by fair means the overwhelming cogency of the diplomatic evidence of guilt against Germany and Austria.

## II

Herr Helfferich again flatters himself that he hits the mark when he points out a mistake in the day of the week, occurring in the third enclosure to No. 105 of the Blue Book (first edition). The enclosure in question, which agrees so far as its contents are concerned with Viviani's note to Paul Cambon of July 30th, 1914 (Yellow Book, No. 106), was handed on the day in question to the English Foreign Secretary by the French Ambassador with the object of proving that German military preparations had already been in full swing for five days, that is to say, since July 25th, the date of the Serbian answer to the Austrian Ultimatum; that German troops had already concentrated on the frontiers from Metz to Luxemburg; that places on the frontier had been fortified, stations occupied by the military, reservists called in, streets barricaded and closed to motor transport, etc.

The third enclosure to No. 105 of the Blue Book, in the edition which is before me, begins with the sentence: "L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire" ("the German army had its advance post on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory"). In Viviani's note to Cambon the second part of this sentence

is expressed in a somewhat different phraseology: "par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire" ("on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory"). Herr Helfferich maintains—and I see no reason to doubt his assertion, although I am not in a position to check it—that in the first edition of the English Blue Book the word "vendredi" occurred after the word "hier." This addition of the day of the week was, however, deleted in the following edition, since it involved a discrepancy; July 30th was in fact a Thursday, the previous day, July 29th, was therefore not a Friday (vendredi) but a Wednesday (mercredi). From the day of the week, thus wrongly given and later deleted, Helfferich concludes, again with the object of establishing the evil intentions of his opponents, that the note of which the date is alleged to be July 30th can only in fact have been written and handed to the English Secretary on Saturday, August 1st. To assign July 30th as the date, he argues, involved in consequence an intentional antedating by two days, with the object of falsely misplacing the alleged provocations and violations of the frontier by German troops to an earlier date, namely, to Wednesday, July 29th.

This is all very ingeniously devised, but the charge of concoction is nevertheless completely without foundation. The simplest explanation of the mistake in the day of the week in the first edition of the Blue Book would be that a printer's error had occurred. The words "vendredi" and "mercredi" each contain eight letters, of which five are identical and only three are different. If in "vendredi" in place of v, n, d we place the letters m, r, c, Friday is at once transformed into Wednesday. If therefore the compositor was mistaken in these three letters, the whole argument collapses.

But to proceed: In the Yellow Book (No. 106) the time given is simply "yesterday," without any designation of the day of the week. Since Viviani's note is dated Thursday, July 30th, it therefore definitely refers to Wednesday as the day of the German violation of the frontier. It is inconceivable that the French Prime Minister in his note to Paul Cambon, his London Ambassador, should have

given another date than in his account of the situation, written on the same day (July 30th) and intended for Sir Edward Grey, which was to be transmitted by this same Ambassador in London. This fact also speaks in favour of the theory of a mere misprint.

The following consideration also furnishes evidence in the same direction: What object can the French Government have had in view in antedating the alleged German violation of the frontier from Friday to Wednesday, from July 31st to July 29th? Would the violations of the frontier on Friday, July 31st, not have been as much a breach of international law and as provocative an action as on Wednesday, July 29th? On July 31st there was still a state of peace between Germany and France. It was not until 7 o'clock on the evening of that day that an inquiry was addressed to the French Government as to the attitude which France would assume in the event of a German-Russian War. It was not until the next day, Saturday, August 1st, at noon, that the time-limit fixed in the Ultimatum expired, and it was not until the evening of Monday, August 3rd, that war was declared against France. I am therefore unable to recognise any distinction between alleged violations of the frontier by German troops on Wednesday and on Friday. Even on Friday, any such violation would have taken place four days before the declaration of war, and would therefore have constituted an action entirely opposed to international law. As no one falsifies for the mere pleasure of doing so, but must always contemplate that some advantage will accrue from his falsification, I ask Herr Helfferich: What advantage could it have been to the French Government to transfer the attack from Friday back to Wednesday?

I should like to draw attention to another point which is passed over in silence by Herr Helfferich, because it reveals the *bona fides* of the French Government. In the second paragraph of the third enclosure to No. 105 an error really occurs in giving the day of the week. This mistake has, however, been left undisturbed in the Blue Book; in fact, it is expressly pointed out and emphasised in a footnote added by the English Government. The French account (Enclosure 3 to No. 105) contains the following sentence:

I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian Note was handed in.

This sentence contains a mistake, inasmuch as the Austrian Note was delivered on Thursday, July 23rd, whereas the Serbian answer was given on Saturday, July 25th. In the above sentence we should therefore read "Serbian Note" instead of Austrian Note. The sentence would then agree with the assertion contained in Viviani's instructions to Paul Cambon, dated July 30th (Yellow Book, No 106) according to which Germany had begun her military preparation five days previously, that is to say, since Saturday, July 25th. The English footnote to the third enclosure expressly draws attention to the error in the French text and points out that it is clearly not the date of the Austrian Note but of the Serbian reply that is intended. The fact that the English Government thus openly draws attention to an error committed by the French Government in indicating the date, disproves the existence of any conspiracy between the two Governments to falsify the documents—which indeed, as I have already shown, would have been entirely purposeless. If the third enclosure had been intentionally antedated or in any other way falsified "for the gallery," the real error involved in mentioning Saturday as the day of the Austrian Note would at once have been removed to avoid the necessity of correcting the French text by an English footnote. The forgers could have arranged for this correction secretly amongst themselves. What good purpose could be served by making it public and drawing particular attention to a mistake made by the French author of the Note, even if the mistake were excusable? Quite apart from all other considerations, the integrity of those concerned, which is manifest in the treatment of the second paragraph, supports the view that there is no manner of evil purpose in the error in the first paragraph, but that there is merely a misprint.

### III

In conclusion, we may mention another item in the register of sins with which Herr Helfferich upbraids the

perfidious English Secretary of State—an example of the incredible industry of the German critic, but at the same time a testimony to the failure of his efforts. On the morning of July 27th a conversation took place between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, in which Grey very properly and emphatically drew attention to the extreme concessions contained in the Serbian answer, to the conciliatory influence of Russia in Belgrade, and pointed out the necessity of some concession now being shown in Vienna, and of the exercise of German pressure in this direction. The Serbian answer, he said, should at least be treated as a basis for further discussion. If Austria put this answer aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, without regard to the consequences which might ensue, other issues might be raised which would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, other Powers might be brought in, and one of the greatest wars ever experienced would break out.

This conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky is fully reported in Grey's note to Goshen of July 27th (Blue Book, No. 46) and is also shortly recapitulated by the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Fleuriau, in a despatch to the acting French Minister, Bienvenu-Martin (Yellow Book, No. 56). Grey's observation that other Powers might ultimately be involved in the conflict is reproduced to the same effect in the English and the French text alike. In English it reads "and would bring other Powers in"; in French "une guerre à laquelle d'autres Puissances seraient amenées à prendre part." Up to this point the matter is therefore entirely clear. But now Herr Helfferich, with his praiseworthy zeal for research worthy of a better cause, has discovered in an authorised English translation<sup>1</sup> of the Yellow Book that the words in question are given as follows: "a war in which all the Powers would take part," Hullo! says Herr Helfferich, more deceit and concoction! The words "other Powers," as given in the Yellow Book (and also the Blue Book), Grey intentionally touches up and produces "all Powers," in order that "a directness and firmness of speech" may be attributed to him "as early

<sup>1</sup> [The translation referred to is the original translation of the Yellow Book issued by *The Times*.]



as on July 27th which in reality he did not employ until several days later." To put Helfferich's idea in plain language, this means that Grey wished the English public to consider that on July 27th he had already looked forward to the participation in the war of *all* the Powers, with the inclusion, therefore, of England, in the event of Austria's attitude of intransigence being continued.

To this trifling, which can scarcely be taken seriously, I reply as follows :

(a) From the philological standpoint the word "alle" is in English not "al" but "all." It follows that a letter has either been omitted or a misprint must have occurred. Probably the word in the English translation is "other," for which "al the" has erroneously been printed. The text of the translation would then be in entire agreement with the Blue Book.

(b) In view of the existence of the original English and French texts, how is it possible to attribute to the shrewd English Minister the folly of wishing to smuggle into the English translation from the French another and a contradictory form of words? The falsification could have been at once detected by comparison with the original texts. Moreover, the most weighty and authoritative document before the English public was the Blue Book, and there the words are rightly given as "other Powers," not "al the Powers." How could Grey on July 27th assert and endeavour to induce a belief, which it is suggested would have been to his advantage, that *all* the Powers would be involved in the war? Even now, notwithstanding the continual extension of the world-conflagration, there are still a number of Powers remaining outside the war. Italy remained out for nine months, Bulgaria still longer, Roumania two years, and other Powers which are strongly interested in the issue are still neutral. Grey's assertion that *all* the Powers would be involved would thus have been too extreme and would therefore have been false.

(c) The purpose which the English Secretary of State had in view in touching with Prince Lichnowsky on what the future might hold in store did not call for such a crudely positive assertion as that *all* the Powers would be

involved. The more diplomatic phrase that other Powers also would be involved was quite sufficient to bring to the mind of Lichnowsky, the diplomatist, the possibility that England also might be drawn in.

(d) How is it reasonably possible to attribute to the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs the intention of defending by subsequent falsification of the texts an attitude which is opposed to his own authentic and public actions known to the whole world? In my book and in this work I have shown that the essence of Grey's policy consisted in binding himself to neither party, in promising neither neutrality to the one nor military support to the other, and that the purpose of this policy was to move both sides to moderation and thus avoid war. Until the outbreak of the Russo-German war Grey consistently followed this policy in agreement with his colleagues and also with the English King, who assumed a similar attitude towards President Poincaré. Even Herr Helfferich, although erroneously, dates a more decisive attitude on the part of Grey "a firmness of speech" in favour of the Entente Powers, only from July 29th (Blue Book, No. 87) and not from July 27th (Blue Book, No. 46). Does Herr Helfferich really attribute to the man whom he accuses the stupidity of surpassing even the charges of his arraigner and of purposely taking upon himself on July 27th a partial attitude which Herr Helfferich himself only dates from July 29th? Thus it will be seen that this perfidy also, inferred from an alleged falsification of the text, collapses like all the other similar charges put forward by Helfferich.

#### IV

As we are at the moment engaged with "bagatelles," I should not like to miss the opportunity of bringing home to Herr Helfferich how his method of drawing vast conclusions from trifling inadvertences would operate to the disadvantage of himself and of his Government. In the course of this work I have already sufficiently detected and laid bare his own large "inadvertences" and those of his client, the German Government, if I may be allowed to

make use of this mild word. I append a few minor errors which are nevertheless of greater importance than those urged against foreign Governments, and which may serve to recall to the defender of Germany the truth of the principle : *peccatur intra muros et extra.*

On page 22, Herr Helfferich speaks copiously of Yellow Book, No. 102, whereas he means Yellow Book, No. 101. Herr Helfferich (page 28) assigns the Anglo-French Entente to 1905, whereas in fact it was concluded on April 8th, 1904.

The German declaration of war against Russia was, as is known, delivered in Petrograd with a double form of words, to afford, so to speak, a choice of alternatives (see my book, page 205). This was certainly a preposterous and probably an unprecedented carelessness in such a document, but just as certainly it was no proof of malice.

A much more serious incident which I have briefly indicated above, and from which far-reaching conclusions may certainly be drawn, is the following : The German declaration of war against Russia is based on the failure to comply with the demand for demobilisation. With the manifest object of strengthening the reasons for war and of making the German people believe that the enemy had fallen upon them, the German White Book proceeds to add the observation that Russian troops had crossed the frontier "already in the afternoon of August 1st." This "afternoon of August 1st" Herr Helfferich transforms into "the night from the 1st to the 2nd of August" (page 14). He thus places himself in opposition to his superior, Herr von Bethmann, and this disagreement between the Secretary of State and the Chancellor serves completely to destroy the legend of the Russian attack. Even Bethmann's "afternoon of August 1st" was a determination of time equally unproved and senseless ; it was senseless because the declaration of war was to be delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and therefore acts of war by Russia at a later hour did not represent an attack. Helfferich's "night from the 1st to the 2nd of August" is equally unproved but much more senseless, since in this night in any case war against Russia had already been declared, even if the actual delivery of the declaration

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of war is placed at 7.10 in the evening, according to the time given by French and Russian documents.

A further example of German inexactitude may be given: the White Book on page 408 reports that Grey had put forward his Conference-proposal on July 26th. This is in itself a mistake, for the proposal dated from July 24th (Blue Book, No. 10). Exhibit 12 of the White Book, however, maintains that even on July 27th nothing was as yet known of Grey's Conference-proposal.

The White Book (page 407) gives July 24th as the date of the well-known Russian *communiqué* that "Russia could not remain indifferent, etc.," whereas in fact it dates from July 25th (Orange Book, No. 10).

\* This is a trivial selection of trivial errors. You will observe, my highly respected Herr Secretary, how easy it is to point out errors made by you and your client in the copious and complicated documentary material. If anyone wished to collect all the similar errors in the German and Austrian publications, in the utterances of the Chancellor, and in your own pamphlet, a large volume would be found necessary for the purpose. What would you say if the grave charge of falsification, subsequent concoction, and incredibility of the whole documentary material were to be based on each such lapse on your part? I am not prepared to follow your example. I regard mistakes in their true light, as mistakes and no more. The charge of falsification, of deception practised on one's own people and on the world I reserve for the great and decisive facts, where such a charge is in place. I have, unfortunately, too often had occasion so to direct the fire of this heavy artillery against those in power in Germany and shall still be called upon to do so in future. Why should I make use of my cannons for the purpose of shooting sparrows?

## CHAPTER IX

### BELGIUM'S CONSPIRACY WITH ENGLAND

AFTER the entry of German troops into Belgium it is notorious that the German Government at first declared that this action was a wrong which they would later seek to make good as soon as Germany's military aims had been attained. Later, however, this admission was withdrawn and transformed into the assertion that the Belgians had been quite properly treated, since they had in fact surrendered their neutrality years ago and ranged themselves on the side of the Entente Powers to meet the contingency of war. So far as France is concerned, the German Government has hitherto produced no evidence in support of their assertion. In the case of England, however, the attempt has been made to deduce from documents found in the archives of Brussels the existence of an Anglo-Belgian conspiracy against Germany.

In my book (pages 217-225) I discussed these charges at some length. In view of the infinite wealth of material, I was, however, unable to consider each particular point, and I was obliged to refer the reader who desired a fuller discussion of the points at issue to the distinguished work of M. Waxweiler, *La Belgique Neutre et loyale*.<sup>1</sup> Herr Helfferich's pamphlet compels me to go back and discuss some points which received in my book insufficient treatment or no treatment at all.

The German charges against Belgium are based essentially on two documents: first, on a report by General

<sup>1</sup> [English translation, *Belgium, Neutral and loyal*.—Putnam.] A continuation of the work has meanwhile appeared under the title, *Le Procès de la Neutralité belge*. I recommend a perusal of both these works to everyone who desires full and impartial information on the Belgian question.

Ducarne, dated April 10th, 1906, on discussions which he had had with Colonel Barnardiston, the English military attaché, and, secondly, on a memorandum written by Count van der Straaten, a director in the Belgian Foreign Office, dated April 23rd (presumably 1912), on a conversation between the Belgian General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, the English military attaché.

According to the assertion of the German Government, these two conversations prove that England, quite apart from any action that might be taken by Germany, had decided to violate Belgian neutrality by sending troops to Belgium, and further they demonstrate that the Belgian Government "was from the outset resolved to adhere to the enemies of Germany and make common cause with them."

How far are these conclusions tenable?

It is in the first place a matter of surprise that Herr Helfferich quotes only the second conversation of 1912, and not the first of 1906. The reason for this is clearly that the first conversation between Ducarne and Barnardiston made it so clear beyond all doubt that the dispatch of English troops was conditional on the previous violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany that there is no possibility of attaching to this document an interpretation unfavourable to England and Belgium. The remark added to Ducarne's report credits the English military attaché, who explained to the Belgian General the plans for disembarking English troops, with having made use of the extremely precise words which admit of no misinterpretation: "L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne." This addition, which represents the entrance of English troops as taking place subsequent to a German violation of neutrality to which it should stand in the relation of effect to cause, is obviously a source of inconvenience to Herr Helfferich. He consequently prefers to maintain a discreet silence with regard to the whole of the conversation which took place in 1906.

For this reason, however, he is all the more forced to rely on the interview of 1912 between Jungbluth and Bridges. According to the report of Count Van der Straaten the English military attaché expressed himself as follows:

The British Government, at the time of the recent events (the reference is to the Morocco crisis), would have immediately landed troops on our territory (Belgium), even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that our (Belgium's) consent would be necessary for this. The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. . . . The general added that, after all, we (Belgium) were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through. (Collected Documents, page 360.)

According to Helfferich, this interview is supposed to furnish conclusive proof that perfidious Albion, which professed to have unsheathed the sword on account of the violation of Belgian neutrality, had unblushingly decided as far back as 1912 to violate this neutrality herself, and further that Belgium "had hopelessly compromised her neutrality by her military agreements with England" (Helfferich, page 45).

I have already pointed out in my book (page 222) that, in conformity with recognised principles of international law, in the case of a collective guarantee, such as was instituted in favour of Belgium, every guarantor State is entitled, in the event of the neutrality being violated by another State, to undertake forthwith in her own right the protection of the neutral State, and indeed is under an obligation to the other guarantors to do so. The Belgian General and the English Colonel were therefore badly informed in matters of international law when they concurred in the assumption that Belgian consent was necessary before England could undertake the protection of Belgian neutrality. Apart from this misconception as to law under which they both laboured, they were, however, in disagreement as to the actual position of affairs. The English military attaché did not consider that the Belgians were in a position to prevent the Germans from marching through their neutral country. The Belgian General, on the other hand, maintained that Belgium was perfectly able to prevent the Germans from doing so. From the concluding observation made by the General, it is clear that Helfferich is incorrect when he asserts that no objection and no reservation was raised by Belgium against the English intentions. The statement appears correct to

Herr Helfferich's credulous readers merely because the author, to keep them in their undisturbed faith, has adopted the simple expedient of omitting the concluding sentence of Straaten's memorandum. The Belgian General expressly disputed the possibility of the actual presuppositions on which the English Colonel based the contingent entry of English troops. Is that not a reservation? If not, what else is it? There is thus in any case no question of consent on the part of the Belgian General, and the charge against Belgium is, under any circumstances, unfounded.

What, however, is the situation so far as the charge against England is concerned? This charge also at once collapses in virtue of the principle of international law that the guarantor of neutrality is justified in protecting, and is, indeed, under an obligation to protect the neutral. It further collapses, however, in view of the fact that the dispatch of English troops, exactly as was contemplated in the conversation of 1906, was intended merely "to prevent the Germans passing through Belgium." This is not a violation of neutrality; on the contrary, it is exactly the reverse, it is a protection of neutrality. This alone is what Colonel Bridges had in mind in his conversation in 1912 as also was the case with Colonel Barnardiston in his conversation in 1906. The plans of the German General Staff, which were based on a passage through Belgium, had been known to all the Powers concerned long before 1906. These plans for effecting a passage were the reason and the presupposition of the Anglo-Belgian military conversations. The object of these was to prevent Germany's passage through Belgium. This purpose was justified and imposed by the collective guarantee of 1839, and no charge can be levelled against England or Belgium if they engaged in military conversations with this object in view.

It is clearly not possible to speak of any binding agreement between the two countries merely because of the bare fact of these military conversations. A military attaché is not a Minister. Consequently, even if the military attachés, Barnardiston and Bridges, had gone further in their undertakings to the Belgian officers than they really went, the two Governments would, as a result,



neither have acquired rights nor assumed obligations as against each other. In the letter from Sir Edward Grey, dated April 7th, 1913, quoted in my book (page 220), the English Government openly and expressly stated that the idea of violating Belgian neutrality was far from their minds, and that they would never send troops to Belgium so long as the neutrality of that country was not violated by another Power. The events which took place between August 2nd and August 5th, 1914, between the German Ultimatum to Belgium of August 2nd and the appeal for military support which was only addressed by Belgium to the Entente Powers on August 5th, demonstrate in the clearest manner that England and France carefully complied with their previous declarations, and that they promised military assistance to Belgium only after the violation of her neutrality, and in response to her express request. The action which was in fact taken by England in 1914 was therefore even more reserved than had been contemplated by the English military attaché on the occasion of the Morocco crisis. This preparatory conversation, as well as the actual demeanour of England later on, in 1914, prove beyond dispute that neither the English Government nor her military attaché had ever thought of anything more than the protection of Belgium against the passage of German troops.

#### GERMAN FALSIFICATIONS OF THE TEXT

I am here obliged to enter into a further point which when my first book was written had not yet assumed a sufficiently distinct form to enable me to subject it to a rigorous treatment.

In two articles, dated October 18th and November 25th, 1914, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published the two documents on which the accusation of an Anglo-Belgian conspiracy is based: the conversation between Barnardiston and Ducarne,<sup>1</sup> as given in the report of the latter on April 10th, 1906, and the conversation between

<sup>1</sup> The German publications call the Belgian General "Ducarne." According to Waxweiler his name was "Ducarne."

Jungbluth and Bridges, as given in the report of Count Van der Straaten, dated April 28rd, 1912.

According to the first article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the report of General Ducarne was found in a portfolio bearing the title *Intervention anglaise en Belgique*. According to the second article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* this report was found in an envelope inscribed "Conventions anglo-belges." This latter title is reproduced in the *German Documents relating to the Outbreak of War (1915)* in facsimile as follows :

Conventions  
anglo-belges



A reproduction of the alleged inscription on the portfolio : *Intervention anglaise en Belgique* is not given in the German documents.

In giving the text of Ducarne's report in its publication of November 25th, 1914, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* had the misfortune to place in the mouth of the English military attaché a request addressed to the Belgian General "that our agreement was absolutely confidential" (que notre convention était absolument confidentielle). The facsimile of Ducarne's report reproduced by the semi-official newspaper distinctly contained the word "conversation" (in place of the substituted word "convention"), and as attention was at once drawn to this falsification on behalf of Belgium, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* was obliged to explain that the substitution of the word "agreement" was a trivial mistake in translation, and to make a subsequent correction in the text, making it read: "that our conversation was absolutely confidential." In this revised form the sentence then appeared in the German *Documents* of 1915.

The difference between the correct and the incorrect text is obvious, and no words need be wasted on the subject. A conversation is something quite different from an agreement. The military experts were acting quite within their rights in entering into a conversation on Belgium's military preparations to meet the contingency of a German invasion. The political authorities were alone competent to make an agreement. The remark apologetically made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* that the error was merely due to a insignificant mistake in translation is on the same plane as the excuse advanced by the German Government that the most important telegram exchanged between the German and the Russian Emperors had been omitted because of its triviality.

True, the envelope in which Ducarne's report is said to have been found is inscribed "Conventions anglo-belges." The handwriting of this inscription, however, appears to be entirely different from that of the report itself. The first point to be determined would be whether the title, which speaks of a "convention," is to be ascribed

to General Ducarne, who in his report merely mentions a conversation. Further, it is a surprising fact that in the double word "anglo-belges" the "g" in "anglo" is written in a latin character, whereas the "g" in "belges" is written "g" as in German script. I have difficulty in imagining that anyone writing in the French language and in Latin characters should suddenly drop into a German "g". Can it be possible that the inscription on the envelope was made by a German official, who was entrusted with the task of arranging the documents found in Brussels and of distributing them into portfolios and envelopes? This suggestion cannot be lightly rejected, especially as the other disagreement between the inscription on the portfolio "Intervention anglaise en Belgique" and that on the envelope "Conventions anglo-belges" has not so far been explained.

In any case, one thing is quite clear: even if the inscription on the envelope were in the handwriting of General Ducarne, the description would, nevertheless, be one not in correspondence with the contents of the document. The document from beginning to end contains nothing beyond a discussion of military contingencies in the event of a German attack on the neutral country. I have above referred to the well-known addition made by General Ducarne relating to the prior violation of neutrality by Germany, but I should here like to emphasise the first sentence in the Belgian report which so far has attracted little attention. In the passage in question the following observation is attributed to the English military attaché at the very beginning of the conversation:

"Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men (un envoi de troupes d'un total de 100,000 hommes environ, était projeté pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée)."

This passage furnishes new confirmation of the fact that the conversation between the two military officers merely contemplated a common defensive action against an attack by Germany, and was in no way directed to any offensive action.

Reference has repeatedly been made to the attempt at concealment made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in connection with Ducarne's added remark: "L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne." Instead of printing this additional note in the margin of the fourth paragraph of the report, where it appears in the original, the German semi-official paper prints first of all the whole text of the Belgian report of April 10th, 1906, followed by a note of September, 1906, and only then continues: "The following marginal note also appears on the document: L'entrée des Anglais, etc." By thus throwing into the background the essential presupposition underlying the whole military conversation, it was intended that the purely defensive character of the conversation should be overlooked, and that thus support should be given to the baseless and foolish lie that Belgium had allied herself with the enemies of Germany to embark on an attack in common.

#### BELGIUM'S UNIFORM ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALL THE POWERS

In support of his assertion that Belgium had made preparations for her defence uniformly on all sides and against all the Great Powers, Waxweiler quotes in his last book, *Le Procès de la Neutralité belge*, page 61, the list of tours undertaken for the purpose of study by the Belgian General Staff during the five years 1906-1910. The subject of these tours of instruction were:

1906	..	..	against Germany.
1907	..	..	against France.
1908	..	..	against England.
1909	..	..	against Germany.
1910	..	..	against France.

The uniformly neutral standpoint assumed by Belgium towards all the Powers, without distinction and without preference of one great Power to another, was constantly emphasised by the Belgian Government and its diplomatic representatives, and whenever rumours were current that this or that Great Power would violate Belgian neutrality in the event of a European conflict, the Belgian Government

were at pains to obtain explanations and assurances from the Governments concerned. Everyone knows of Bethmann's disquieting statement made in 1911, when the Dutch project for fortifying Flushing had again led to the discussion in a very acute form of the question of Belgian neutrality. When all the military and political experts were once more giving expression to the overwhelming suspicion that Germany, in the event of a war with France, would march through Belgium, the Belgian Government asked the German Chancellor to take a convenient opportunity of publicly allaying this suspicion in Parliament. Herr von Bethmann expressed to the Belgian Government his sincere thanks for their friendly feelings, and also assured them that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality; he regretted, however, that he was unable to make a public declaration in this sense, since France by obtaining an assurance that she would not be attacked from Belgium would acquire a military advantage against Germany (Grey Book I, No. 12). The sincerity of Bethmann's statement has been shown in the summer of 1914.

When in the spring of 1913 a suspicion, similar to that entertained with regard to Germany two years before, arose against England, the Belgian Government again sought to obtain a reassuring declaration, and received in reply the entirely unambiguous letter from Sir Edward Grey, dated April 7th, 1913 (see *J'accuse*, page 220; Belgian Grey Book II, No. 100), repudiating any idea of a violation of Belgian neutrality so long as it had not been violated by any other Power.

Six weeks before this, on February 22nd, 1913, a conversation had taken place in Paris between Baron Guillaume, the Belgian Ambassador, and Margerie, a departmental chief in the Foreign Office, in the course of which the same topic was discussed as in London and in Berlin. The Belgian diplomatist stated that the object of the new Belgian military law was to prevent Belgium again becoming, as so often in the past, the cockpit of Europe; Belgium desired to possess a trustworthy and an efficient army to enable her to fulfil in full measure the duty imposed upon her of maintaining her independence and

her neutrality. The Belgian preparations were directed against any one who should dare to invade Belgium. President Poincaré, he continued, had given the Belgian Ambassador the assurance that France would never take the initiative in any such violation of neutrality. Nevertheless, Belgium neither could nor would rely on any calculation of probability, since what was true to-day might, in consequence of new circumstances, be untrue to-morrow; "Our sole object is to prevent within the limits of our strength any violation whatever of our neutrality" ("Notre but est uniquement d'empêcher, dans les limites de nos forces, toute violation de notre neutralité," Grey Book II, No. 1).

Herr von Bethmann carefully avoids publishing in his collection of Belgian documents this report sent from Paris by Baron Guillaume. He produces a report written by Guillaume on February 21st, 1918 (Number 99 of the German collection, page 116) in which mention is made of the reawakened military instincts of the French people. The report of the following day, February 22nd, 1918, which is to be found in the second Grey Book is, however, prudently left unprinted by the German Government, since it strikes a note which is at once favourable both to France and to Belgium.

This is a trifling example of the ingenious tendencious selection of documents which the German Government has undertaken for the purpose of proving its innocence. We shall deal with the Belgian documents in another place in greater detail.

The conclusions of my discussion of the alleged Anglo-Belgian conspiracy may be summarised as follows :

1. No evidence whatever has been produced that Belgium ever had or manifested the intention of taking part in an aggressive war against Germany.
2. The conversations between English and Belgian military experts turned exclusively on the question whether, and if so how far, Belgium was in a state of preparation to offer resistance to a violation of her neutrality by Germany's military forces, either alone or acting in concert with her guarantors of neutrality.

## THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY—GROUND OR PRETEXT OF THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR?

I have elsewhere proved in detail that the violation of Belgian neutrality was not the pretext but the ground of England's intervention in the European war. In support of this statement, I should, however, still like to summon from the camp of my opponents a weighty witness whose competence will certainly be disputed by none. In an article entitled *Our Opponents*, which appeared in his periodical *Greater Germany* of August 11th, 1914, Paul Rohrbach writes as follows:<sup>1</sup>

The demand put forward by England that Germany should under all circumstances respect the neutrality of Belgium is further based on another fact which is rooted in the deepest traditions of English policy. Since the age of Louis XIV. it has been an English principle not to allow Belgium to fall into the hands of any strong Power on the Continent. Under Louis XIV. France throughout a series of decades endeavoured uninterruptedly and with all the force at her disposal to obtain possession of Belgium, and on this ground was confronted by the indefatigable and unyielding enmity of England. Whoever possesses Belgium can at any time bring pressure to bear on Holland. These wealthy provinces, with a teeming population given to manufactures and seafaring, were from a material point of view of even greater importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries compared with the rest of Europe than they are to-day; their perpetual possession by France would have meant so great an increase in French power and more particularly in the trading and maritime power of the French nation, that she would have been in a position to enter with a prospect of success upon a contest with England for the possession of these fields which were claimed by England as her peculiar domain. Such a possibility, however, dared not be contemplated. The same consideration which was applicable as against France exists as a matter of course, so far as Belgium is concerned, against us as well. England's fear is that if the Germans are in Belgium, they will never again leave, and then a part of the German North Sea coast will at once lie very near to Great Britain. We need not dwell further on the consequences which this presents to the English mind.

In another place in the book which we have mentioned, Rohrbach writes as follows:

A hundred years ago England was engaged in the struggle against Napoleon. The essential subject in dispute was Belgium. The

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted in Rohrbach's book: *Zum Weltvolk hindurch*, page 51.



French Republic had proclaimed the principle of the "natural frontiers" of France, and had declared that Belgium and Holland alike were the deposits of French streams. England saw her security threatened owing to the fact that the populous and wealthy territories situated at the southern extremity of the North Sea, so advanced in industry and in maritime enterprise, had thus become French, and she waged war to compel France to restore them. This was the one price for which the English Government would forthwith have made peace with Napoleon. Napoleon closed the whole of the European Continent to English trade with the object of crushing England on the economic side. The losses of the English business world became gradually so great that the City of London besought the Ministry to make peace, even at the price of surrendering Belgium to Napoleon. The men at the head of affairs, however, under Pitt's leadership, remained unyielding. They defended the future of England, and they were, moreover, right in proclaiming at the same time that the cause of European freedom was in the English camp. . . . A hundred years ago right was on the side of the English against Napoleon. To-day it is people like Grey who are themselves anxious to play the part of Napoleon, in making the ruthless pursuit of England's advantage the sole measure of things. It is, however, in our camp that right is to be found, not merely the right of the German people, but the right of humanity. It is in war that we have to defend this; it is in war that England will fall and we shall rise. But while we rise and expand, a new era of history begins.

England's interest in keeping Belgian neutrality unimpaired could not be expressed more clearly than in these two passages. To maintain this neutrality had, in fact, been the guiding motive in English policy for centuries and not merely since the guarantee of neutrality of 1839. From the age of Louis XIV, down through the Napoleonic era to the Franco-Prussian and now to the European war, England had constantly adhered to the principle that for the sake of Great Britain's own safety Holland and Belgium must not be allowed to be in the possession or under the control of a European Great Power. If Belgium by allowing a passage to German troops had sided with Germany, she would, notwithstanding all German assurances to the contrary, have made herself dependent on the future of Germany, and linked her fate indissolubly with the success of German arms. Her neutrality would have been gone for ever, after she had herself broken it by showing favour to Germany. Eng-

land's fear is that "if the Germans are in Belgium, they will never again leave," as Rohrbach rightly observes. Belgium was the centre of the struggle between Napoleon and England ; and Belgium is now the centre of the present war between Germany and England.

Notwithstanding these historical facts expressed by his own comrade with such commendable frankness, Herr Helfferich undertakes to show that the part assigned to the Belgian question by the English Government was merely an ingenious trick designed to obtain possession of a winning trump card to play against the public opinion of England and of the world ! Never surely has a historian endeavoured to solve difficult historical and diplomatic questions of responsibility with less knowledge or regard for historical continuity, with a narrower outlook, or a greater display of partiality. For Herr Helfferich the facts are incredibly simple : the Serbian question and the support to be given to France did not, in his view, afford sufficiently strong grounds to justify to the public opinion of the country the entrance of England into the war.

They (*i.e.* the persons directing British policy, therefore directed their efforts to finding a pretext for war which would be acceptable to English public opinion. This was found in the violation of Belgian neutrality, which had long ago been compromised by Belgium herself and which, according to the declaration of the English military attaché in Brussels, the English General Staff themselves did not intend to respect, should the occasion arise (page 46).

In different passages of his pamphlet Herr Helfferich so frequently and so ingeniously varies these ideas of the "second pretext for war kept in readiness"—the inquiry addressed in similar terms to Berlin and Paris on July 31st is for him a transparent comedy—that we are constrained to be inordinately thankful to him for not straightway declaring that the German entry into Belgium is one of Grey's devilish machinations, designed to gain at last the long-desired concurrence of English public opinion in the war. The assertion that Grey was directly responsible for and provoked the German invasion would not in any ease be more remote from the truth than the theory construed by Helfferich, according to which Grey, on July 29th, had

already undertaken to extend military support to the Entente Powers and from that moment was merely seeking a plausible excuse to give effect to his undertaking. The emptiness, indeed the absurdity, of the theory thus construed, its inconsistency with a hundred proved facts which receive support in the German and Austrian publications as well, have elsewhere been demonstrated.

#### SUBSIDIARY PROOFS OF BELGIUM'S GUILT

I have shown in *J'accuse* and in the course of the preceding dissertations that Belgium had not "long ago compromised her neutrality," as Helfferich maintains, and that it was not the disregard but the protection of this neutrality in case of emergency that was intended by England.<sup>1</sup> After refuting Helfferich's main demonstrations in support of these charges, it is scarcely worth while examining the subsidiary evidence produced by the German Government, if we may so refer to these amplifications of the alleged main evidence.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of November 6th and December 2nd, 1914, produces a series of English maps, handbooks, etc., which it endeavours to represent as so many proofs of the existence of an Anglo-Belgian conspiracy, adding :

Without a willing and far-reaching support on the part of the Belgian Government and the military authorities such a task could not have been achieved. . . . To such an extent had England and Belgium already arranged in time of peace a system of military collaboration. From a political and military point of view, Belgium was nothing more than a vassal of England. (Second German White Book, page 76.)

In reality, all these documents prove nothing more than that England, like Germany and every other nation that wages war, also maintained a well-contrived system of espionage in Belgium, of all lands in the world the most afflicted with spies, the unfortunate prospective theatre of the European war. Did the German General Staff by any chance possess less accurate maps, handbooks, plans, etc.,

<sup>1</sup> My study on the *Belgian Documents*, to appear later, will amplify this demonstration in many directions.

with regard to Belgium? Can any country in the world be compared with Germany in this as in all other military preparations? Does it follow from Germany's precise information on all Belgian conditions, so far as war is concerned, that Belgium from a political and military point of view was a vassal of Germany? Is it not the case that Germany was as well informed on all these conditions in Switzerland as in Belgium, although Switzerland offered much more remote possibilities of becoming the theatre of war than Belgium did? Accusations and inferences of this sort are so feeble that it is not worth while wasting time upon them.

It is, however, worth while to refer to some points which Waxweiler has advanced against the suspicion of conspiracy which has been circulated by the German Government. Is it not notorious that the relations between England and Belgium were unusually frigid just about the year 1906, when, as is alleged, Ducarne and Barnardiston concluded the first aggressive conspiracy against Germany? The consequences of the Transvaal War, the English campaign against the alleged Belgian misrule in the Congo, the protection which had been extended to Belgian Congo interests in Germany against English efforts since the beginning of the twentieth century—all these had been contributory factors in rendering the relations between Belgium and Germany much more intimate at that time than those existing between Belgium and England. And we are to believe that it was just at this time that Belgium sealed a conspiracy with England against Germany!

Waxweiler also draws attention to a further interesting point for the accuracy of which he is in a position to vouch. On July 28th, 1914, when the crisis began to grow acute, the Belgian Government recommended measures of security to the administration of the Congo against the possibility of a blockade by France and England as well as against a violation of the frontier on land by Germany. It was not until a breach had occurred between Belgium and Germany that these instructions were restricted to the latter point.

## ROYAL VISITS

Waxweiler further instances an apparently trivial subsidiary point to disprove the idea that any favouritism was shown by Belgium towards the Entente Powers: since the accession of the present King, the Belgian Royal Family had paid visits to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, but not to the English Court.

I mention this point for the sake of completeness, though I, for my part, do not attach the slightest weight to such manifestations of courtesy between monarchs. So far as the weal of the nations is concerned, it is entirely a matter of indifference whether their kings embrace and kiss each other, whether they speak the language of familiar friendship and display to each other their uniforms and regiments. To such incidents one might apply the old story of the two Polish Jews discoursing, in rags and tatters, of more fortunate men who could afford better food and better raiment. After ascending the scale of bliss till they reached Rothschild of Vienna who changed his clothes three or four times a day, one of them asked the other, "And what does the Emperor of Austria do?" To this the other replied: "Oh, he dresses and undresses; he dresses and undresses." So it is with princely travellers on their visits of courtesy, when they speak exuberantly of peace and the happiness of their peoples, of friendship between the nations and between the royal households, attired in each other's uniforms, to pursue on their return home the suicidal and fatal policy which incites against each other the guiltless nations, who are unconcerned and uninterested in the ambitious plans of their governors, and which, finally, through seas of blood and misery, urges them all to destruction.

The kings dress and undress. The cousin of yesterday will again be the cousin of to-morrow. The European Congress will "dance" as the Congress of Vienna did. The millions of dead and mutilated, the incalculable wealth that has been destroyed, the intolerable burdens which will press on the nations for generations, these considerations will not for a moment restrain our governors in the intoxication of their heroism. Deafened by the jubilation

of their blinded peoples, they will bind the laurel wreath about their foreheads, they will stretch out their hands in reconciliation to their opponents, they will fall into each other's arms and will again begin the old game. They will dress and undress ; they will visit each other ; at the festive board they will speak of peace and friendship among the nations, and will again intrigue and arm against each other—and fight, and all for the petty increase of power which the one hopes to gain at the cost of the other.

Royal visits ! Dust in the eyes of the people. Kisses and embraces ! Judas kisses, with the dagger drawn behind the other's back ! Is it not the case that the rulers of Russia and England visited the German Imperial Court in the spring of 1913 to celebrate the marriage of the Emperor's daughter to the Duke of Brunswick ? Who could have believed that a year later this family feast of the royal cousins would be replaced by the festival of blood and slaughter of their peoples ? Who could have imagined that the genial and amiable imperial host, who led his distinguished visitors through the acclaiming multitude in the streets of Berlin, already carried concealed in his cloak the dagger with which he intended on the next convenient opportunity to fall in the back of his "sincere friends and cousins" ? . . . .

What is the meaning of this slaughter and of this carnage ? This question will, we hope, resound with increasingly menacing tones from the depths of the people until it reaches the guilty, the more the conviction of their guilt is borne home to the masses of the nation.

For what interest of the people has this struggle been let loose ? Will the German peasant, the man of business, the manufacturer, the artisan, the doctor, the lawyer, the artist, the man of learning, will any of them be more wealthy or happy if their great country becomes even greater, if the strength of their State becomes even stronger, if the glory of their kings becomes even more glorious ? Will there be added to a single one of these many millions so much as an atom of happiness, of well-being, of content, if their country is increased by some thousand square miles, and their population by some millions ? Are the

citizens of small States, which are free from the ambitions of a Great Power, the citizens of Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway and of the hapless Belgium (before the German invasion) not at least as happy as, and most of them far more happy than, the citizens of Germany, England, France and Russia, who are crushed by military burdens, and for this very reason live under the continual menace of war? For my part, if I had my choice, I would rather be a citizen in the principality of Liechtenstein and end my days in Vaduz, than be a subject of the Kingdom of Prussia, under the dominion of the Hohenzollerns.

Blessed are the small, unblest the great! Such is the warning that might well be addressed to the German people, and to many others, who are consumed by the same megalomania. Unblest are the great, but most unblest are the greatest of all who, though satiated are never satisfied, who, smitten by unappeasable greed of territory and by incurable kleptomania, snatch from their neighbour's mouth the crumbs of earth, but who, such is the tragedy of imperialism, are unable to devour their booty in peace, since they are constantly compelled under the lash of the furies of distrust to give thought to the completion of their protecting armaments. . . .

Unblest is the overstraining of sound national thought to an unsound nationalistic thought, of the natural effort to attain national unity to the unnatural effort which stretches beyond national unity to world-dominion. To all who are given the power of vision the lesson of this war will and must be this: that the finger of history points in another direction, to higher and more remote ends. It points to the cohesion between small and great nations in an international community where to each nation there will be accorded its own rights and its own place in an assured order resting on law which will exclude any enrichment of one at the cost of another; it points to a peaceful life together of all nations in trade and commerce, in art and learning, in well-being and culture.

## CHAPTER X

### FRANCE'S PEACE EFFORTS AND THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS

THE love of peace manifested by the French Government, which during the critical days before the outbreak of war sought in every way to maintain the peace of Europe, has been sufficiently proved for anyone of unbiassed judgment in *J'accuse*, both in "The Historical Antecedents of the Crime" and in "The History of the Crime" itself (Chapters II and III); in this, my second work, I have further amplified the evidence in various directions. Documents have, however, since appeared which so support the account of the French efforts for peace as given in the Yellow Book, and so prove their inherent truth, that even the most malevolent can no longer doubt the innocence of France in this war.

We have now authentic information as to the energetic and successful manner in which Jaurès and the French Socialist party of which he was the leader, on both its trade-union and its political side, inspired and influenced the action for peace taken by the French Government (in spite of Poincaré and Deleassé, Herr Helfferich!), and as to the complete harmony between them. We now also know how this joint labour of the Socialist leader and of the responsible Government was continued after the death of Jaurès until the moment of the German declaration of war against France, and of the entry of German troops into Belgium, and it was only then, when the maintenance of peace had become impossible, that the Government and the party leaders were compelled to take their stand in unison on the ground of the defence of their country.



## THE WAR AND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

When the Austrian Note to Serbia became known, the social democracies in all countries, with those of Germany and Austria at their head, were in agreement that the Note in itself represented a signal for war, and that it threatened in its ruthless brutality to bring death and destruction over the whole of Europe. The party leaders of German Social Democracy published in *Vorwärts* of July 25th an appeal, which begins with the following fiery words :

The fields of the Balkans are still steaming with the blood of those who have been slain there in thousands; the ruins of plundered cities and devastated villages are still smoking; hungry, workless men, widowed women and orphaned children still wander through the land, and once again the fury of war, let loose by Austrian imperialism, is preparing to bring death and destruction over the whole of Europe.

Even though we may condemn the intrigues of the Pan-Serbian nationalists, the fact remains that the frivolous provocation of war by the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for the sharpest protest. The demands of this Government are, in fact, more brutal than have ever, in the course of the world's history, been addressed to an independent State, and they can only have been designed for the express purpose of provoking war.

German Social Democracy insistently called upon the German Government to exercise all their influence on the Austrian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace, and in the event of the shameful war breaking out notwithstanding, they intimated their resolution that :

Not so much as a drop of blood must be sacrificed by a German soldier to the itch for power of those who hold sway in Austria, and to profit-making imperialistic interests. . . . We do not wish war! Down with war! Long live the international brotherhood of the nations!

When the Austrian Ultimatum became known the section of German Social Democrat representatives in the Austrian Reichsrat also issued an appeal, in which, in the name of the German workmen in Austria, they disclaimed the responsibility for the approaching war, and laid it on those "who have devised, supported and encouraged the fatal step, which confronts us with war." The Austrian Social Democrats declared their solidarity "with the labour-

ing classes of the whole world, and not least with the Social Democrats of Serbia." They protested, not only against the threatening war which had sprung from wanton provocation, and which could achieve nothing which might not have been gained by a peaceful understanding, but they also raised their voice against the systematic violation of the will of the people, implied in the fact that Parliament had not been summoned for months. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Austrian Reichsrat has not yet been convoked during the whole war, and that all the war credits have been issued by decree of the Government. The Austrian reaction has thus shown itself to be worse than that of Russia, which, notwithstanding the persecution and suppression of the opposition, has nevertheless repeatedly summoned the Duma during the war, and has obtained Parliamentary sanction for the war credits.

As the crisis became more acute the warnings of the official organ of German Social Democracy became more sharp and more urgent, and its protests became more fiery.<sup>1</sup> No one in the world—apart from the parties on the right, the Jingoists and the Imperialists in Germany and Austria—no one more especially in the Social Democratic, or even in the merely Democratic camps in any country, had any doubt in these days between July 23rd and 30th that, if the fearful catastrophe should occur, then it was Austria who, by her unprecedented action against Serbia, by her declaration of war notwithstanding Serbia's submission, by her rejection of any form of mediation or decision by arbitration, was primarily the guilty party, and that Germany by her toleration of Austrian provocations was the accomplice if not the instigator. The present-day German "social patriots" were also of this opinion. In these days there was no schism in the views or the action of the Social Democratic party. *Vorwärts* expressed the inner feelings of all "comrades" of the party when it warmly appealed to the German Government on July 30th

<sup>1</sup> For all these historical facts, see the excellent compilation in Eduard Bernstein's book, *The International of the Working Classes and the European War* (Mohr, Tübingen, 1915). See also my pamphlet, *The Salient Point*, by Germanicus.

and even July 31st to avert from the nations the "incalculable shame to civilisation" involved in a European War, when it drew attention to the English and Russian peace endeavours and declared that the negative attitude assumed by the German Government towards all peace proposals was incomprehensible, when it pointed to Austria and Germany as the exclusive instigators of the universal conflagration and as the disturbers of the peace, and laid on them the responsibility for the coming catastrophe—the responsibility before their own people, before foreign Powers and before the judgment seat of history. The organ of the Social Democratic party pointed to the great work done by the Camarilla of war-intriguers, the irresponsible inciters to war behind the scenes, who sought by every kind of influence, by persuasion and by threats, to urge the fatal decision on the mind of the Emperor, who may still have been wavering. It once more warned "the German Government in the most urgent manner not to push matters too far. The German people . . . want peace, they want negotiations, they want a settlement of the conflict." Against the unexampled intrigues of the war-party who "seek to checkmate the Emperor and the Chancellor and unscrupulously let loose the fury of war," *Vorwärts* puts forward the infallible solution: "Clear the way for negotiations, for the assurance of peace! Down with the war-intriguers!"

As a matter of course the Socialists of England, France, Belgium and other countries expressed themselves with equal emphasis as to the instigators and the authors of the coming war. *The Daily Citizen*, the organ of the English Labour Party, drily observed in its number of July 27th:

We regard Austria as distinctly the aggressor. . . . Serbia and Serbian officers have been found guilty by Austria without any show of trial: in this matter of the assassination, Austria claims to be judge, jury and executioner. . . . To attempt to thrust unproved charges down the throat of Serbia at the point of the bayonet is not a policy that will commend itself to civilised people.

The Belgian Labour Party, in their paper published at Brussels, the *Peuple*, dated July 31st, also accused the Austrian and German Governments of the authorship of

the imminent war and in particular it referred to the refusal of the Conference proposed by England, and accepted by the Entente Powers and also by Italy. The appeal of the Emperor Franz Joseph to the peoples of Austria, which had just appeared, was attacked by the Belgian paper for its "senility, lack of conscience and falsehood"; this journal found the only excuse for the man "who wrote these lines and who had not shrunk from provoking the most appalling slaughter" in the fact that he can hardly have been sufficiently conscious of the extent of his action.

#### JAURÈS AND THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY

The attitude assumed by Jaurès, the most ardent of all the apostles of peace, and by the French Socialist party led by him, towards the threatening war is well known and calls for no detailed discussion. We are here only concerned to show that whereas the German and Austrian Socialists had to combat the bellicose tendencies of their Governments, Jaurès and his followers were entirely in agreement with their Government, not only in their inclination to peace, but also in every individual action subservient to the cause of peace, and that therefore the desire for peace of the French Socialists was identical with the desire for peace of the French Government.

The proof of this fact, made possible by recent revelations, is of the greatest importance for a decision on the question of responsibility. It completely demolishes the foundations of the charge which the Helfferichs, the Helmolts, the Schiemanns, the Chamberlains and their fellows have brought against the French Government; it destroys the falsehood which is constantly being advanced authoritatively and unauthoritatively in Germany that this war in the last analysis is a war of revenge on the part of France, prepared and supported by Russia and England, who on their side have exploited the ideas of French revenge in the pursuit of their own selfish ends. If the merest iota of this charge were true, it would be applicable, not merely to the French Government, to Viviani, Millerand and Poincaré, but also to Jaurès and his followers—to Jaurès, who, throughout his whole political life, had pro-

claimed peace among the nations as his highest ideal and as the object of his endeavour<sup>1</sup>; who, having risen from pacifism to socialism, regarded the victory of socialism, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a higher organisation of mankind, based on peace. If the charge that this is a French war of revenge is founded on truth, another accomplice of the war party, alongside of Jaurès, would be Marcel Sembat, the most zealous of Jaurès' comrades in fighting for an understanding between Germany and France, the most energetic speaker at conferences aiming at a Franco-German understanding, the author of the well-known pamphlet "*Faites la paix, sinon faites un roi*," the substance of which was that the time had come when a real peace should be made with Germany, or if this were unwelcome, that a *tabula rasa* should be made of the Republic, and salvation sought in a warlike monarchy. Another of those who share the guilt of the French politicians who have worked for revenge must be Jules Guesde who, along with Sembat, entered the Ministry of National Defence at the end of August, 1914. An orthodox follower of Marx and the most convinced anti-militarist in the ranks of French Social Democracy, Guesde was, like Jaurès, one of the first ruthlessly to denounce the idea of revenge in the Chamber of Deputies as far back as the beginning of the present century.

Vaillant also, the red Communist, the most inexorable opponent of war among French Socialists, must suddenly have become in his old age an inciter to war, if it is true that the Government of the Republic were out for war; for from the beginning of the crisis until his death, which took place in the middle of the war, he also resolutely placed himself on the side of the defenders of the French Fatherland. When a man like Vaillant, who throughout his life had striven for peace and brotherhood among the nations, was compelled in the evening of his laborious days to sound the trumpet to battle, because his country had been attacked and lay devastated and bleeding under the domination of the conqueror; when such a man was constrained a few days before his death to make with

<sup>1</sup> See Jaurès' efforts to realise an understanding between France and Germany: *J'accuse*, page 112-114.

broken voice the sorrowful confession to his friend Dubreuilh: "This war has killed me! To have struggled for forty years to make it impossible, and now to be compelled to bear it in all its terrible hardness! This is the collapse of all I have lived for!"—when, at the end of his days as at the beginning of his career, such an indefatigable and loyal veteran in the struggle for peace placed himself on the side of the defenders of his country, it must indeed be true that France is in fact waging a war of defence and not of aggression, and that those who control the destinies of France have done everything that is humanly possible to keep the horrors of war far from their country and from Europe.

If there is any foundation for the charge that the French Government instigated the war, then these leaders and their followers—men like Renaudel, Bracke, Longuet, Compère-Morel, Pressemane, Dubreuilh and others like them—must all have been suddenly transformed from Socialists and Pacifists into Militarists and loud-voiced clamourers for revenge. For everything that the Government thought, spoke or did was in these critical days devised, inspired and influenced by the French Socialist party; indeed we may even say it was conducted by them behind the scenes. This is a fact which is established by recent revelations. In this is to be found new and unshakable evidence in favour of France's acquittal, and at the same time it constitutes the most overwhelming condemnation of Germany. There can be no choice apart from the two alternatives; either the Government and Social Democracy in France are alike guilty, or they are alike innocent of the outbreak of war.

#### THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY

What, then, are the facts which prove this?

As soon as the Austrian Ultimatum became known, Jaurès drew attention in *l'Humanité* to the extreme danger of the situation.<sup>1</sup> In the French Parliament the Socialist

<sup>1</sup> For the following exposition see the sensational article by Daudé Bancel in the *Internationale Rundschau* (Orell-Füssli, Zürich, October 5th, 1915).

group made a statement on July 28th, in which they called upon the Government to give their energetic support to the English efforts for peace and added: "that that France, which for more than forty years had sacrificed her claims to Alsace-Lorraine to the higher interests of peace, must not allow herself to be involved in a war on account of Serbia." On July 27th, 28th and 29th Socialist manifestoes appeared in *l'Humanité*, which contained, not merely an appeal directed to the French Government to be active in the cause of peace, but also expressly confirmed the clear and sincere desire of the Government to obviate the dangers of the conflict. Now that the task of mediation was facilitated as a consequence of the conciliatory answer of Serbia, the Government was summoned to support every means of arriving at an understanding, and to avoid everything which might bring grist to the mill of the aggressive Imperialism of Germany, which appeared to have chosen the hour for an unparalleled deed of violence.

The tone and the substance of these manifestoes, which were largely written by Jaurès, may again be heard in the speech which the French leader delivered in Brussels on July 29th at the great demonstration promoted by the International Socialist Bureau against the war, and in favour of peace and of the settlement by arbitration of the Austro-Serbian conflict. Jaurès' statements are of paramount importance in answering the question of guilt, and they therefore deserve to be quoted verbatim:

The task which has been assigned to us French Socialists is an easy one. It is unnecessary for us to urge on our Government a policy of peace; they are already in practice pursuing such a policy. I have never shrunk from bringing on my head the hatred of our chauvinists by my stubborn and incessant efforts to bring Germany and France closer together, and I am therefore now entitled to state that at the present moment the French Government desire peace and are labouring for its maintenance.

The French Government is the best peace-ally of this admirable English Government, which has taken the initiative with a view to mediation. And it is influencing Russia by its counsels in the sense of wisdom and patience. . . .

Our duty is to insist that they (the French Government) shall emphatically call upon Russia to restrain itself (from a declaration of war). Should Russia, unfortunately, fail to comply with this

warning, it is our duty to state that we know but one treaty, the treaty that binds us to mankind.<sup>1</sup>

Jaurès' speech received enthusiastic approval from the masses of the nations who were well disposed to peace. His suggestion that the International Socialist Congress, which was fixed to take place in Vienna, should forthwith be held in Paris, "in order to give forcible expression to the desire for peace felt by the proletariat of the world," also fell on fruitful soil; but it was not possible to give it effect, owing to the precipitancy of events, and the murder two days later of the great tribune of the people. The testimony which Jaurès bore to the members of the French Government in this the last great announcement of his life, in what might be called his political testament, cannot be disputed. While the German and Austrian Social Democrats, in concert with the whole International Party, sharply branded the imminent crime and placed the criminals, their own countrymen, in the pillory, Jaurès, the French apostle of peace, whose labours against war had always incurred the hatred and the loathing of French chauvinists, gave the solemn assurance that it was not chauvinism, but the most earnest and sincere endeavour for peace that animated the actions of the French Government, that, in common with England, they were labouring for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and were also influencing Russia in the sense of wisdom and patience.

Jaurès' concluding sentence, which we have quoted above, bearing on the subject of the influence exercised by the French Government on that of Russia has been interpreted in many quarters as meaning that the French leader, in the event of a war involving Russia, Germany and Austria, contemplated that Russia might be refused assistance, that is to say, that France might remain neutral. That, as we now know, is an erroneous interpretation. Jaurès, as his biographer Rappaport points out in his volume, was not opposed on principle to the Franco-Russian alliance. He merely demanded that this alliance should not be allowed to bring in its train a Slavonic retinue concealed behind such tendencies to war and

<sup>1</sup> Bernstein, page 29.



conquest as Russia might entertain. It is in this sense that we must also interpret the sentence introduced by Jaurès into the manifesto issued by the Socialist party on July 28th, which asserted the right of France to refuse to be entangled in a stupendous conflict by the arbitrary interpretation of secret treaties and unknown obligations. This sentence in the manifesto is in entire agreement with Jaurès' speech in Brussels; the intention of the French popular leader was that the Russian treaty of alliance should be renounced only if Russia did not support the Anglo-French efforts for peace, and if she allowed herself to be swept away to the provocation and declaration of war. This condition precedent of a renunciation of the Russian alliance was, however, never satisfied. As I have sufficiently proved in my book and in this work, Russia not only supported in every point without exception the Anglo-French efforts for peace, but she herself frequently took the lead in this direction on her own initiative.

The French manifesto, of which we have just spoken, is dated July 28th, the day of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. Jaurès' speech was delivered in Brussels on July 29th. On the same day the Emperor of Russia, in his telegram addressed to the German Emperor, proposed that the Austro-Serbian conflict should be referred to the Hague Tribunal for decision. On July 30th, Sazonof dictated to Count Pourtalès his first formula of agreement, which, as we know, was then rejected by Jagow. Sazonof's second formula of agreement, the result of the efforts of Grey and Viviani to amalgamate the formulæ of Grey and Sazonof, dates from July 31st. On the same day (July 31st) Sazonof telegraphed to his Ambassador in London the text of an even more conciliatory formula (Blue Book, No. 133), which, in previously discussing the subject, I described as Sazonof's third formula. On August 1st, the Russian Minister went even further to meet the other side, notwithstanding the presentation in the preceding night of the German Ultimatum expiring at noon on August 1st. He stated that he still regarded himself as bound to the second and third formulæ, so long as German troops had not crossed the Russian frontier. He gave an assurance that Russia would in no case begin

hostilities first, and that he was ready to keep his troops inactive within the frontier so long as negotiations with a view to an understanding were still in the air. This I have called Sazonof's fourth proposal for agreement. Only the first of the series was answered, and the answer given was in the negative without any reason being assigned; neither in Vienna nor in Berlin were the other three proposals thought worthy of an answer.

In addition to actions taken on his own initiative, the Russian Minister expressed his concurrence in all the peace proposals of the other Powers, including those put forward by Germany and Austria so far as there were any. He accepted Grey's conference of the four disinterested Powers, and stated that he was ready to stand aside. He began direct negotiations with Vienna and continued them until they were abruptly broken off by Count Berchtold (July 28th). When the Viennese Government were again pleased to resume negotiations (on July 31st and August 1st) he forthwith intimated his concurrence, reduced the Russian claims even further, and proposed that the negotiations should be continued in London as a more favourable *terrain*. The mobilisation of Russia—the partial as well as the general—as I have proved beyond doubt, was merely the consequence of the preceding Austrian mobilisation and also of the military preparations of Germany, and it was above all occasioned by the intransigent diplomatic attitude of the Central Powers.

To-day these are all well-established historical facts. On July 28th and 29th, however, Jaurès and the French Socialists could not yet know what Russia's attitude would be in the further course of the conflict. They could not know whether the pacific Tsar and his equally pacific Minister might not become the victims of any intrigues to war that might be found in their environment, and might thus, apart from the incontestable initial guilt of Germany and Austria, bring upon themselves a consequential guilt. Herein lies the explanation of the reservations made by the French Socialist leaders, which were also designed to serve as a warning to their Russian allies. The development which took place in the following days showed that those reservations and warnings were superfluous. Russia,

like France, was innocently involved in this war, which was willed and designed by Germany and Austria. Like France and England, she laboured unceasingly for peace on the presupposition of a possible renunciation of the alliance which Jaurès at that time still considered within the bounds of possibility, was therefore never realised. The development of events up to and after Jaurès' death, the German Ultimata to France and Russia, the impossible demands contained in the Ultimatum to Russia, the declaration of war against Russia instead of the general mobilisation which had been threatened, the manner of declaring war against France and the reasons assigned, the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, the attempt to purchase the neutrality of England in order more easily to crush France and Russia—all these combined events occurring before and after the death of Jaurès, making it clear beyond all doubt that the desire for war and the authorship of the war were on the side of the Central Powers, would have summoned the murdered French tribune of the people to the side of the defenders of his country, and would have led him to exemplify in practice the principles which in his work, *La Nouvelle Armée*, he had held up as the guiding line of Socialist action in the event of war.

#### OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARS

For Jaurès' attitude one fact would in itself have been decisive, namely, that the Emperor of Russia had proposed that the dispute should be decided by the Hague Tribunal, whereas the Emperor William had ignored or declined this proposal. For Jaurès, as for the whole international Socialist party, the attitude of the Social Democratic party to the war in the various countries was determined by the question: "Which country is waging an offensive war, and which a war of defence?" For the International, as it hitherto existed, until it received recent enlightenment from the Bernese Oberland, the defence of their country was regarded as a natural right and as a self-evident duty of the Socialists of the country attacked. In accordance with its whole outlook on the world, there can be for

international social democracy only one permissible war, the war of defence against criminal attack. In such a war it is the right and the duty of Socialists as well as others to seize arms in defence of their Fatherland. In any other war it is their duty, not merely to refuse military obedience, but even to turn their arms against their own criminal Government which misspends in a war of aggression the wealth and the lives of its people.

Thus for the Socialist the all-important consideration on the outbreak of a war is that he should be able to distinguish clearly which side is the aggressor and which the defender. As every war breaks out, this question must be investigated by the Socialists of the countries concerned, and their behaviour must be governed according to the answer at which they arrive. In defensive wars, Socialists are called upon to support their Government, in wars of aggression it is their duty to resist it, and this duty they have to fulfil not merely passively, by a general strike or the refusal to render service, but in certain cases actively, by revolutionary measures. These principles have been discussed, not merely by Jaurès, but by other Socialist leaders, not only in Socialist but also in Pacifist congresses, even if they have not been framed as formal resolutions.

It is, however, not always so easy a task as it is in the present European War to answer the question: "Which side is waging an offensive and which a defensive war?" Frequently it is necessary to undertake a laborious and wearisome historical investigation of complicated facts in the present and the past, and the results of the inquiry may frequently be extremely uncertain. We have as yet no obligatory international judicial machinery which can pronounce a judgment as to the right or the wrong in international disputes which is binding and capable of being enforced. Moreover, the appeal to the conscience and the views of the civilised world constitutes no sure basis for a decision, since, as in fact happens every day, every barbarian is in a position to attribute to the civilised world views which are intended to justify his own actions which yet set at defiance all civilisation and humanity. Take, for example, the justification of the business-like and habitual wholesale murder of innocent steamship passengers

of all countries, which is based on England's alleged "plan of starvation," which is merely the prevention of the import of the means of sustenance into a besieged fortress (a bloodless method of war, enforced and regarded as permissible from the remotest times, which has certainly often led to the surrender of fortresses, but has never at any time in the whole history of war led to the death by starvation of a human being). I repeat, then, that the views of the civilised world are a somewhat uncertain criterion as applied to States and Governments who place themselves outside these views. Consequently in Socialist and Pacifist literature, at the congresses of International Social Democrats and of Pacifists, the endeavour has been made to find a sure criterion to determine right or wrong on the outbreak of a war, and such an infallible distinguishing mark has been found in the following proposition: the State which proposes that an international dispute should be decided by arbitration is acting correctly; the State which refuses arbitration, and has recourse to arms is acting wrongly.

It is always possible to determine in a manner free from all ambiguity what is the position of affairs from the purely formal point of view. In the present conflict, for example, Serbia first and then Russia proposed that the issue should be decided by the Hague Tribunal. Austria and Germany, on the other hand, did not consider these proposals to be even worthy of an answer. This furnishes the formal criterion of guilt or innocence. The Central Powers would have been guilty of the war even on the supposition that the question at stake was in fact that of their own existence or independence, and was not merely concerned with supremacy and extension of power. Jaurès considered that this method of differentiation between guilt and innocence was so important that he based upon it his whole theory of national defence from the Socialist point of view. The difficult task of deciding whether the one party or the other is right on the merits is replaced by the question of the formal behaviour of the parties to the dispute, in itself an easy matter which can be infallibly determined. Here there is no room for doubt; here we are confronted by an undeniable question of fact which

makes it possible to recognise the desire for war on the one side and the desire for peace on the other. The means of achieving the end decide the question, not the end itself.

From this purely formal point of view Germany and Austria, as already observed, once more stand condemned as the only guilty parties. History has, indeed, furnished a curious parallel in this matter. Germany and Austria were separately responsible for the declarations of war which led to the European war. Germany and Austria separately refused the decision by arbitration which would have avoided the war. It is therefore in no way necessary to consider the actual foundations of the conflict. The formal actions of the two Governments are in themselves sufficient justification for the decree of guilt. That the guilt of the two Governments appears even more gross and more enormous on an examination of the insignificant trivialities, for the sake of which war broke out and an amicable settlement was declined, I have elsewhere sufficiently explained, and need not here repeat.

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In his celebrated speech at Tivoli-Vauxhall Jaurès expounded in an admirably clear and precise manner the attitude which the International would have to adopt towards a future war, and the same point is also dealt with in other speeches and writings. In view of the importance of Jaurès' train of thought and its significance in framing a judgment on German Social Democracy on the one hand, and that of France on the other, I shall here quote a few sentences from the above-mentioned speech of Jaurès :

As soon as a dispute arises, we will cry to our governors : Arrive at an understanding by means of your diplomatists. If your diplomatists fail in reaching an agreement, then go to the arbitrators, whom you have yourself designated (obviously the reference is to the Hague Tribunal). Bow to the judgment which they give : let there be no war, no bloodshed ; let there be the arbitration of humanity, the arbitration of reason. If you will not do this, well then, you are a Government of criminals, a Government of banditti, a Government of murderers. Then it becomes the duty of the proletariat to rise against you, to seize the arms which you have put in their hands, but not . . . (at this point Jaurès was interrupted by uproarious applause, which prevented him from completing the idea that in such a case Socialists must turn their weapons against their own Government).

I tell you that with this rule, with this demand for compulsory arbitration, which the International has put forward at Stuttgart all questions are at once simplified. It is, then, no longer necessary to institute inquiries into complicated occurrences, into the machinations of diplomacy, into the intrigues and mysteries of Governments. All such investigations are now unnecessary to determine who the aggressor is and who the attacked. The aggressor, the enemy of civilisation, the enemy of the proletariat, is the Government which refuses arbitration, and by so refusing impels mankind into the struggle of blood. In such a case the International declares that it is the right and the duty of the proletariat not to squander their energies in the service of a criminal Government, but rather to make use of the weapons with which such a ravenous Government has equipped the nation, not to shoot their toiling brothers beyond the frontier, but by means of a revolution to overthrow their own criminal Government.

These are the principles for which Jaurès fought throughout his life. These are the principles which placed him during the critical days in July, 1914, on the side of the French Government, which led him in the great gathering in Brussels on July 29th to bear honourable testimony to the French Government, that they desired and laboured for peace.

That was on July 29th, the same day on which the Emperor of Russia proposed in his telegram to the Emperor William that the matter in dispute should be decided by the Hague Tribunal. Had Jaurès known when he spoke in Brussels of the Tsar's proposal for arbitration, had he known in advance all the proposals for arriving at an understanding put forward by Sazonof in the days immediately following, he would also have included, and rightly included, the Russian Government in the tribute which he bore to the Governments of France and England. Quite apart from all the other actions taken by Russia in the interests of peace during the critical days, the Tsar's telegram of July 29th in itself evidenced Russia's absolute desire for peace, and was therefore bound on Jaurès' principles to place the proletariat of all countries on the side of Russia, France and England. Had the German Socialists then followed the line of action prescribed for them by the principles of the International and of their most brilliant interpreter Jaurès, had they refused the war-credits and had they, not content with this, offered resist-

ance to their criminal Government by a general strike and by a wholesale refusal of military service, the execution of the crime would have been impossible, the war, even at the last moment, would have been prevented.

It will be seen that it was not correct principles that were wanting, but the correct observance of these principles in the decisive moment. It is not necessary that the International should adopt other principles, in order successfully to combat wars in future ; it is only necessary that it should take the necessary measures to carry out absolutely, ruthlessly and courageously the principles already recognised. This will be the immediate, the most urgent and the most important task of the new International.

#### THE LAST STEPS TAKEN BY JAURÈS

After all that has been said, I have not the slightest doubt how Jaurès would have comported himself, had Fate not preserved him from experiencing the shipwreck of all his ideals in this world-wide conflagration.


After his return from Brussels Jaurès had interviews with various members of the French Government (on July 31st), with Malvy, Abel Ferry and Viviani. He again laid stress on France demanding from her ally a spirit of extreme friendliness towards the mediation suggested by England, and insisted that if she failed to do so, France should follow, not her Russian, but her English friend. Everything that Jaurès demanded of the members of the French Government in this last interview shortly before his death either took place or had already taken place. Jaurès demanded pressure in the direction of obtaining a decision of the dispute by the Hague Tribunal. As is now known, this proposal had already been made by the Tsar to the Emperor William on July 29th, but no answer had ever been vouchsafed. Jaurès demanded that influence should be brought to bear on Russia to accept Grey's formula of agreement. Influence in this direction was most energetically exercised by Paris on Petrograd, and at once led to the desired result in the amalgamation of Grey's and Sazonof's formulæ (Yellow Book, Nos. 112, 113; *J'accuse*, pages 300-301, and the preceding chapters of





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this work). As we know to-day, Grey's proposal was never positively answered either by Berlin or Vienna, notwithstanding the urgent recommendation of the English King himself; on the contrary, its consideration was constantly postponed under the emptiest of pretexts. Sazonof's amalgamated formula (July 31st) never received any answer from the German or the Austrian Governments.

In agreement with French, Russian and Italian diplomacy Jaurès considered that a declaration of England's solidarity with the other Entente Powers would be an excellent method of obviating the danger of war. On the preceding day the same idea had already been urged by President Poincaré on Bertie, the English Ambassador (Blue Book, No. 99). Jaurès considered that the right course was to lay even greater emphasis on this view by submitting it directly to the King of England in the form of a note from the President of the Republic. This exchange of notes took place on July 31st (see *J'accuse*, page 251) and confirmed anew the unanimity existing between England and France in their desire for peace, even if the English Government hoped to attain the end in view by remaining in the position of a mediator rather than by siding with one of the parties. Grey's celebrated peace proposal of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 101) was in agreement with the fundamental ideas which in matters of foreign policy had guided the French Socialist leader throughout his life. In short, everything that was done on the side of England, France or Russia up to Jaurès' death (the evening of July 31st) corresponded with the pacific tendencies of the French Socialist party, and cannot, therefore, have been in the direction of incitement to war, but only of the promotion of peace.

#### THE DECEIT OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL PATRIOTS

##### *Scheidemann*

Since the German Social patriots cannot well deny the peaceful inclination of the leader of the French Socialist party, they seek to construe a divergence between him and the French Government with the object of maintaining their thesis that the French Government, along with England and Russia, are guilty of the war. The weightiest

support of this theory is a letter which Jaurès is alleged to have sent to Vandervelde shortly before his death, on July 30th, and in which he is said to have accused the French Government of warlike tendencies.

This letter—which was for a time run to death in the propaganda of the Social patriots—in addition to other uses to which it was put, was produced by Scheidemann in the Reichstag. Vandervelde, to whom the letter was alleged to have been addressed, disposed of this legend by an unambiguous statement. Vandervelde's statement as reproduced by Renaudel in *l'Humanité* of April 21st, 1916, is as follows :

“Jaurès' letter quoted by Scheidemann is from beginning to end a fabrication. I was with Jaurès during the last two days before his death. He therefore wrote no letter to me. Protest in my name.”

This puts an end, once for all, to the “Jaurès incident.”

#### *Heilmann*

While the German Social patriots seek on the one hand by falsification and misrepresentation to construe a division between the French Socialists and their Government (in the critical days in July, 1914), they are at pains on the other hand to represent the leaders of the French Socialist party as falsifiers and as deceivers of the French labouring classes.

In Nos. 6 and 7 of the *Neue Zeit* (November, 1916), in an article bearing the pompous title : “The ‘Ems telegram’ of 1914, fabricated by French Social Democrats,” Ernst Heilmann, the chief editor of the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, one of the leading organs of the Social Democratic majority, attempts to bring home to *l'Humanité* a falsification which—after the manner of Bismarck's famous Ems telegram—is said to have deceived the French workmen regarding the true origin of the war and the real culprits. Heilmann's so-called demonstration is so ludicrous and testifies to so profound an ignorance of the diplomatic incidents that I regard it as superfluous to devote closer attention to it. In so far as it was necessary to slay this

pathetic defender of German innocence, the operation has already been performed by Kautsky immediately after the appearance of Heilmann's essay (in No. 7 of the *Neue Zeit* of November 17th, 1916). Anyone who wished to lay bare all Heilmann's perversions and misstatements would have to write a long treatise—longer even than his—and it is really not worth the trouble to do so.

Heilmann proceeds from the fundamental error—to put the matter euphemistically—that the Russian general mobilisation had already been decreed on July 30th. *L'Humanité* had, he says, intentionally falsified this general mobilisation into a partial one, in order to wipe out the gravest item in Russia's debit account. Now as a matter of fact it is the case that the Russian mobilisation of July 29th, to which reference is made in the number of *l'Humanité* in question, was a partial mobilisation, comprising the four southern army districts—Kief, Kasan, Odessa and Moscow—and it was not until the morning of July 31st that Russia proceeded to the mobilisation of her entire forces.

A reference to two sentences in the memorandum in the German White Book is sufficient to refute the whole of Heilmann's "tale of murder"—in the true sense of the word a tale of murder—since with indirect words he ascribes the murder of Jaurès to the clique of falsifiers assumed to exist on the staff of *l'Humanité*. The two sentences which suffice for the destruction of the whole of Heilmann's construction of guilt are as follows :

"On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised" (page 409).

"Before this telegram (of 2 p.m. on July 31st) reached its destination the mobilisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the morning<sup>1</sup> of July 31st, was in full swing" (page 412).

These two sentences in the White Book agree with all the other diplomatic documents ; neither in the Austro-

<sup>1</sup> [The English translation of the White Book here says 'noon.']

German Government Press nor in the speeches of leading statesmen has any doubt ever been thrown on these two dates relating to Russian mobilisation, which are officially given by the German Government. *L'Humanité* therefore did not lie; it told the truth. The "Ems telegram" of 1914 does not exist.

For the rest, I would recommend a perusal of Heilmann's arraignment to anyone who desires to pass a pleasant quarter of an hour. One sentence may be sufficient to characterise this type of German Social Democrat, that, namely, to the effect that the Tsar's celebrated telegram of July 29th, relating to the submission of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, was "entirely insignificant"; it was "only rummaged out by our enemies months after the outbreak of war exclusively because it did not appear in the German White Book. The White Book never made any pretensions to give in their entirety all the documents relating to the period of the outbreak of war." This is the intellectual and ethical level on which the whole article of this journalistic leader of the German party majority stands.

The only ray of light in Heilmann's dissertations is to be found in the fact that he recognises that the standard by which the attitude of the Socialists in the various countries must be tested is to be found in the question of guilt, that is to say, the question: "Who was the aggressor in the European war, and who was the party attacked?" This is the thesis which I have advanced with the utmost emphasis and at considerable length in my book *The Salien Point* by Germanicus (Zurich, 1916). This is the thesis which, on a just and impartial investigation of the actual occurrences, leads to the unconditional condemnation of the party majority in Germany and to the unconditional acquittal of the French Socialists.

\* \* \* \* \*

The polemic between Kurt Eisner and Heilmann on the question of mobilisation, which broke out on the occasion of Heilmann's unveiling of the conspiracy in the *Neue Zeit*, brought to light certain interesting facts which deserve to be mentioned here.

Well-known as a zealous and gifted adherent of the

" Social Democratic Union of Workmen " and an unsparing opponent of the social patriotic liars who speak of defence, Eisner was before the outbreak of war, in the summer of 1914, the representative in Munich of the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, conducted by Heilmann. He reports of his own knowledge, supported by absolutely reliable informants, the following events from these days :

1. Immediately after the appearance of the extra edition of the *Lokalanzeiger* on July 30th (Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62) the Berlin representative of the Russian telegraph agency, who was at the same time on the staff of Wolff's telegraphic bureau, telephoned the news of the German general mobilisation to the Russian Ambassador Swerbeiev, who thereupon immediately dispatched his telegram (Orange Book, No. 61) to Petrograd. Herr Markov—this is the name of the Berlin representative of the Russian telegraph agency—at the same time sent a telegram to the agency with the same information. Both telegrams were dispatched without delay by the Berlin telegraph office. When, however, the *démenti* was issued by the Berlin Foreign Office, and the Ambassador as well as the correspondent desired to transmit this *démenti* to Petrograd, " the Berlin telegraph office placed all kinds of obstacles in the way; these telegrams denying war were not expedited so rapidly as those announcing war, but were subjected to a delay of several hours on the part of the officials in Berlin." This pause of several hours between the announcement of the German mobilisation and the cancellation of this announcement may, in Eisner's opinion, very well have occasioned decisive resolutions in Petrograd as a counter-stroke to German mobilisation. The argument advanced by Bethmann against Grey, that the time between the announcement and the *démenti* was much too short for decisive resolutions, would thus be refuted.

In the chapter " Bethmann the Pacifist " (Section " War-Aims ") I shall return in detail to this discussion between Grey and Bethmann, which is a pendant of the Chancellor's speech of November 9th, 1916. Here I would only observe that I do not myself attach any decisive importance to the extra edition of the *Lokalanzeiger*, in

the sense that it was intended to lead, in accordance with the deceitful designs of Berlin, or did in fact lead to the Russian general mobilisation. The decision on which the Russian general mobilisation rested was provoked, and indeed compelled, by the whole diplomatic and military action of Germany and Austria, and not by a Press notice.

2. In the course of the same polemic against Heilmann Eisner produces another very interesting revelation. If his further suggestion is correct the German general mobilisation would already have been decided upon on July 28th, that is to say on the day of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. The *Chemnitzer Volksstimme* circulated information to this effect in an extra edition on July 28th, after Eisner had urgently telephoned the communication in question from Munich to his paper. Eisner does not plainly say from whom he received this important information in Munich, but he expressly observes that Heilmann, the editor, "knows his (Eisner's) authority for this information; that he (the editor) also knows that this authority must, in view of his position, be the first to be informed of Germany's decision to mobilise, and that he could not be wrongly or uncertainly informed." From other information and also from Heilmann's reply it is apparent that Eisner's authority belongs to the highest Bavarian military circles.

If the facts reported by Eisner are correct, it would be proved:

(a) That Germany's decision to carry out a general mobilisation had already been reached three days before the Russian mobilisation was decreed, and that therefore the German general mobilisation was not a consequence of the Russian, but that conversely the Russian was a consequence of the German;

(b) That the Russian general mobilisation was not the ground, but the pretext for the German declaration of war;

(c) That the decision for war which was taken in the Potsdam Crown Council on the evening of July 29th in the presence of the Ministers and Generals had already been anticipated, and carried into effect by decisive military measures on the



preceding day, presumably without consulting with, or obtaining the consent of, the Civil Government.

Whether Eisner's revelations in all their details turn out to be right or wrong, they afford in any case a general confirmation of the proof of guilt which I have given. I have elsewhere proved that the firm "will to war" already existed in Berlin before the Russian general mobilisation, and that in all probability the definite decision to make war was reached in Potsdam on the evening of July 29th. This conclusion, which is supported by the whole course of the diplomatic negotiations, receives a further valuable confirmation if the military decision to carry out a German general mobilisation preceded the decision for war, which was taken on July 29th in the presence of all the civil and military authorities.

As characteristic of the methods of proof adopted by the defenders of German innocence, I would further mention that here again, in his reply to Eisner, Heilmann misplaces the dates of the Russian mobilisations; by way of variety he places the Russian partial mobilisation of the four southern army districts as far back as July 25th, and of the Russian general mobilisation he asserts:

Even on July 29th, when Russia ordered on the German frontier the general mobilisation, which was published at six o'clock on the morning of July 30th, Germany still refrained from seizing the sword.

This surpasses all that has ever been achieved in the way of bottomless ignorance or shameless falsification. All the diplomatic documents, above all the White Book itself, give the lie to these assertions. I challenge "Comrade Heilmann, if he desires to free himself from the charge of intentional falsification, to produce the evidence for the dates given, which are inconsistent even with those of the German Government.

Dr. Eduard David, Deputy in the Reichstag

I

It would be unjust if I did not here keep in remembrance Dr. David, the Reichstag Deputy, one of the leaders of the

Imperialist majority of German Social Democracy, a man who has specially devoted his undeniable intelligence and industry to the thankless task of continuing to strengthen the basis of the so-called "policy of August 4th," that is to say, of constantly producing new evidence that Germany was attacked by her opponents, that she is waging a war of defence, and that therefore the Social Democratic supporters of the German war policy are taking their stand on the recognised ground of the International.

It is a struggle for their own political existence which these German Social Democrats are waging. A party which desires to maintain intact at least the appearance of fidelity to Social Democratic principles would dig its own grave by recognising the war as a preventive war or indeed as an imperialistic war of conquest, a fact which other civil parties may quietly admit, and do in fact admit, without imperilling their political future, without denying their political past. The defence against an existing hostile attack must therefore do service as a covering cloak for the support of the Hohenzollern war of conquest, and the diplomatic events before the outbreak of war must be twisted and bent until they yield the likeness which is desired.

It is to this task of twisting and bending that the deputy David has devoted himself as his speciality. His researches into the sources afford his party friends who travel up and down the country, and primarily "Comrade" Scheidemann, the possibility of beginning and ending all their speeches with the thesis: "Germany is waging a war of defence, and we Social Democrats dared not leave our menaced country in the lurch."

In one of his latest speeches in the Reichstag (on October 11th, 1916) Dr. David again gave a brilliant exhibition of his talent as an investigator into diplomatic history, an exhibition which appeared to me sufficiently interesting and characteristic to accord to it a modest place in my new book of accusation. On the occasion of an interview which took place just at that time with "Homo," the Swiss representative of *l'Humanité*, I conveyed to him, in compliance with his request, my criticism of the results of David's investigations with authority to print

this criticism in *l'Humanité*. It was printed about middle of November, 1916.

The following is the article as originally written :

#### The Errors of the deputy David

The speech which the deputy Dr. David delivered in Reichstag on October 11th, 1916, shows in a special flagrant manner—apart from many other utterances with what tenacity the German Social Imperialists maintain the doctrine of the war of defence when the Social Imperialists, or at least many of them, have long ago admitted in more or less disguised form that it is an aggressive war, with or without preventive aims.

The important sentences from David's speech on the guilt of England and Russia in the war run as follows according to the shorthand report:<sup>1</sup>

I do not propose here to enter into a detailed discussion of the question of guilt. As, however, people in England down to recent days continue to adhere to the assertion that the war was frivolously stage-managed by Germany, and that the attempts at mediation which emanated from England were thwarted, it is necessary to say a few words against this view.

During the various stages in the diplomatic development in the critical days before the outbreak of war there was never a situation in which war could not have been avoided, in which by diplomatic action the outbreak of war could not have been prevented. The last of these situations was on July 30th, 1914. Then a great sense of relief arose throughout the world as a result of information received from London. In London as a result of the collaboration of the English Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, a formula had been devised which had also received the concurrence of the Russian Ambassador in London—a formula which again opened the prospect that the danger of war would be overcome. It ran as follows:

“If the Austrian advance is stopped in Belgrade, the Powers will examine how Serbia can give satisfaction to Austria, without injuring her sovereign rights and her independence.”

This formula made allowance for all that could be demanded by the States immediately concerned. Austria which had already

<sup>1</sup> I based my interview on the report in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of October 12th, which alone was known to me at the time. The report, as Dr. David expressly confirmed in his later reply, “gave a tolerably attentive reader the essential part of his conclusions.”

declared war and which was on the march, was allowed to carry her expiatory crusade as far as Belgrade. To Russia and Serbia it was conceded that Serbia stood under the protection of the Powers, who would regard her sovereignty and integrity as a European question. The point which Grey had always desired, namely, that the decision of the question should be submitted to a Conference of the four Powers, was also contained in this formula. This formula was thus an Anglo-German formula of agreement, which also appeared to have Russian concurrence.

This formula went to Vienna by way of Berlin. On the same day, however, there was also sent to Vienna the telegram which Herr Naumann has already briefly quoted to-day, and to which I would again make reference at this point because in enemy countries this telegram does not appear to be known, or else there is no desire to know it. I refer to the Chancellor's telegram to our Ambassador in Vienna. It was occasioned by a misunderstanding, which had arisen owing to information received from our Ambassador in Petrograd to the effect that the view was held in Petrograd that Vienna refused direct negotiations with Petrograd. Thereupon the following telegram was sent to Vienna on July 30th:

The refusal, however, to exchange views with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty as allies. We must however refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration by Austria-Hungary as a result of her not respecting our advice. Your Excellency will at once express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness.<sup>1</sup>

This was the instruction that went from Berlin to Vienna. Simultaneously on July 30th the formula of agreement which had been devised by Grey and Lichnowsky came to Vienna by way of Berlin. This proposal for an understanding was accepted by Vienna. Once more destiny could have been impeded. Meanwhile, however, while this was the situation, the Russian general mobilisation had been ordered. It cut clean through all negotiations. On July 31st the news was received of the Russian general mobilisation which at a stroke transformed the whole question from a diplomatic into a military one.

The significance to be attached to the Russian mobilisation, which indeed did not begin at that time but had been progressively developing since July 25th, had been intimated to London by the English Ambassador in Petrograd on July 25th when he telegraphed to Grey that he had pointed out to Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, the danger involved in a Russian mobilisation that Germany would then also mobilise on her side and would probably even declare war at once.

Where, now, does the guilt of England lie in this situation? The

<sup>1</sup> This is the telegram which was produced for the first time by Herr von Bethmann on August 19th, 1915.

answer is very simple. The guilt of England lies in the fact that a telegram was not sent by London to Petrograd similar to that which was sent by Berlin to Vienna on July 30th, a telegram, that is to say, to the effect: "We refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration by our Ally as a result of her not respecting our advice."

This is the decisive point in the whole matter. Such a declaration of word was not spoken in Petrograd. There they were certain of England's support, and that fact alone gave the Petrograd intriguers the courage when this formula of agreement was devised when peace was "threatening," to thwart it on July 30th by general mobilisation. All explanations which do not agree with this fact of the priority of the Russian mobilisation can make no claim to be taken seriously. To-day no one can any longer dispute the fact of the total Russian mobilisation in the night from July 30th to July 31st, and in fact no one any more attempts to dispute it.

So far neither has any similar hotch-potch of lying perversions been produced at any German Government banquet, nor has anything like it flowed from the pen of any publicist or German hack. If I desired to refute in detail David's perversions—almost every one of the preceding sentences may be so described—I would have to write a lengthy treatise, and repeat everything which I have already said, and documentarily proved in my book of accusation.

The following is only a summary list of David's "errors"

1. The sentence which states that the last occasion on which the war could still have been averted was July 30th, 1914, is untrue. It could still have been averted on July 31st, and indeed on August 1st, until the time of the delivery of the declaration of war against Russia. It was precisely on July 31st and on August 1st that new proposals for agreement were constantly emanating from London, Petrograd and Paris. It was in these very days that Sazonof proposed the formulæ of agreement which I have designated as Sazonof's second, third and fourth formulæ. Even on August 1st (Blue Book, No. 18) before the delivery of the German declaration of war to the Russian Minister confirmed to the English and French Ambassadors that he still regarded himself as bound to his formula of agreement of July 31st. This formula had been communicated to all the capitals, including Vienna, and was still binding on him if Grey could obtain its acceptance by the Viennese Government before German

troops had crossed the Russian frontier. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

In the same conversation of August 1st, Sazonof again emphasised Russia's readiness to keep her army mobilised on the Russian side of the frontier, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the crisis.

What the English and French Governments did for the preservation of peace during the last three days from July 30th to August 1st inclusive, may be read in the Yellow Book, the Blue Book and in *J'accuse*, and the efforts made by the Tsar of Russia and the King of England will be found in the telegrams exchanged with the Emperor William. Anyone who is unwilling to take the trouble to read the diplomatic publications individually should consider the following figures: the English Blue Book contains no fewer than thirty-five notes (from and to London) in the days from July 30th to August 1st inclusive; the French Yellow Book no fewer than thirty, the Russian Orange Book eighteen notes. All these documents were designed solely to quench the flaring fire of war; all the endeavours of the Entente Governments, however, came to grief on the attitude of the Berlin and the Viennese Governments, and were completely brought to nought by the German Ultimata of July 31st.

The ultimate readiness of the Viennese Government to negotiate with Petrograd on the substance of the Serbian dispute, and also to "entertain" an English mediation between Austria and Serbia (July 31st, Red Book, No. 51), even if it was not a trick conceived in agreement with the Berlin Government, was entirely worthless on account of the many reservations and stipulations which Count Berchtold added to the readiness which he thus expressed at the last hour, on account of his demand that he should continue the military action against Serbia even during the negotiations, and above all on account of Berlin's policy of Ultimata, which pressed the actual subject of dispute into the background, and consciously and intentionally exploited the question of mobilisation for the purposes of war.

From all this it follows that a situation which made it possible to avert war existed not only on July 30th, 1914,

as David maintains, but that it still existed on August 1st down to the time of the delivery of the German declaration of war. It was only the absolute will for war existing in Berlin that made the war inevitable.

2. The formula for an understanding quoted by David does not date, as he maintains, from July 30th, but from July 31st. He confuses—and as David is regarded as a specialist in the diplomatic antecedents of the war among the group of German Social Democrats on the right—I will take the liberty of saying he intentionally confuses, Sazonof's first formula for an understanding of July 30th with the second of July 31st. The first (Orange Book, No. 60) was declined by Herr von Jagow on the same day, July 30th, as "unacceptable to Austria" (Orange Book, No. 63). As I have elsewhere proved, the acceptance of this formula would have prevented the Russian general mobilisation of July 31st, and would thus have taken from Germany every pretext for war. Jagow's action on July 30th is one of the heaviest items of guilt in the account of the German Government.

The formula of agreement quoted by David dates from July 31st (Orange Book, No. 37). The Social Democratic deputy, however, falsifies the text and the meaning of this formula in the most outrageous manner. Anyone who reads the text in the Orange Book, No. 67, and in the Blue Book, Nos. 120 and 132, will be convinced of the justice of the charge which I make. The formula according to the Orange Book, which agrees exactly, down to small distinctions of style, with that contained in the Blue Book, runs as follows :

If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory (*arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire serbe*) and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.

Out of this formula David makes the following :

If the Austrian advance is stopped in Belgrade, the Powers will examine how Serbia can give satisfaction to Austria without injuring her sovereign rights and her independence.

Apart from many other inaccuracies contained in David's reproduction, it must in the first place be pointed out that he completely suppresses the final sentence: "Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." This concluding sentence is the central point in the Anglo-Russian proposal for an understanding. Austria had only to stay her march in Serbia, had only to allow the Powers to examine the satisfaction which Serbia could accord without injuring her sovereignty and independence, and in return Russia undertook to maintain her waiting attitude. Thus it was still possible even on this day (July 31st) that peace could have been preserved, if Austria had decided to concur in the equivalent demanded in return for a concession which, even in David's view, "made allowance for all that could be demanded by the States immediately concerned. Austria, which had already declared war and which was on the march, was allowed to carry her expiatory crusade as far as Belgrade."

8. Now comes David's crowning lie. He maintains that this formula for an understanding of July 31st (which he erroneously assigns to July 30th) was "accepted by Vienna." This assertion is, as I here positively state, a pure invention. There was only too much justification for the "Hear, hear!" which accompanied David's account in the Reichstag. Sazonof's formula of July 31st was not only not accepted by Austria, but no answer was ever vouchsafed to it either by Vienna or by Berlin. If the acceptance of which David speaks really took place, there must at least be something on the subject in the Austrian Red Book. I challenge the deputy David to produce from the Red Book or from any other diplomatic publication the least suggestion of evidence in support of his assertion. Sazonof's formula of July 31st is nowhere so much as mentioned in the Red Book or in the White Book. No. 51 of the Red Book, dated July 31st, which Herr David presumably has in mind as furnishing the desired evidence, relates to the occurrences of July 29th, to discussions which took place on that day between Grey and Lichnowsky in London (Blue Book, No. 84); it does not, however, relate to Sazonof's second proposal for an understanding of July 31st. No. 88 of the Blue Book contains Grey's first



formula of agreement of July 29th; this first proposal for an understanding, put forward by Grey, also received no answer from Germany or Austria. Even Herr von Bethmann (White Book, page 410) devotes to this proposal merely the observation that he "forwarded" it to Vienna.

The result is that none of the proposals for an understanding put forward by Grey and Sazonof was accepted by Vienna. The only one that received an answer was Sazonof's proposal of July 30th, and the answer to this was given in a negative sense by Herr von Jagow. All the other proposals for an understanding which emanated from London and Petrograd came to nothing.

4. David asserts that the formula for an understanding quoted by him was devised "in London as a result of the collaboration of the English Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky," and that it received "the concurrence of the Russian Ambassador." This is a new and a gross untruth. The formula was outlined by Sazonof in Petrograd, and from there it was communicated to the Governments of all the Great Powers (Orange Book, No. 67; Blue Book, Nos. 120 and 132). The formula was designed to amalgamate Grey's first and Sazonof's first formula, and Grey in his note to Buchanan of July 30th (Blue Book, No. 103) had expressly indicated his desire for an amalgamation of the two proposals, and had also made definite propositions in this direction. Grey's desire was satisfied by Sazonof, and it was thus that Sazonof's second formula of July 31st came into being. It was not London, however, but Petrograd that was the birthplace of this formula, and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, in no way acted as godfather at its birth—as indeed the German and the Austrian Governments throughout maintained a passive attitude with regard to the whole of these endeavours to effect an understanding.

Why does David conceal the author and the place of origin of this formula? He does so because he is bringing against the English Government the charge that they took upon themselves the guilt of the war by failing to give support in Petrograd to this formula for an understanding. Were David to admit the truth that the formula came into

being in Petrograd and was communicated from there to the Governments of all the Great Powers, the accusation which he brings against England and at the same time against Russia would at once fall to the ground. This is the explanation of the false account which he gives, which here again, in view of the extreme perspicuity of the occurrences, can only be described as being deliberately false.

5. It is suggested that it was with special reference to the formula of agreement attributed to Grey and Lichnowsky, that the German Chancellor sent to Vienna his famous instruction to Herr von Tschirschky, which, very surprisingly, was revealed for the first time in the sitting in the Reichstag on August 19th, 1915. This is another outrageous falsification. Bethmann's instruction to Herr von Tschirschky had no reference whatever to any of the formulæ for an understanding proposed by Grey or Sazonof, but to the refusal on principle of the Viennese Government to enter into negotiations on the subject of the Serbian dispute.<sup>1</sup> Berchtold, however, had brusquely refused such negotiations on July 28th. On the evening of July 29th—so Herr von Bethmann himself reports in his speech in the Reichstag—Count Pourtalès communicated the unfavourable impression produced in Petrograd by this refusal. Thereupon Herr von Bethmann sent to Vienna the instruction, the text of which was quoted in his speech in the Reichstag on August 19th, 1915. We are obliged to assume that this took place between July 29th and July 30th, for we find Herr von Tschirschky already announcing from Vienna on July 30th that Count Berchtold had stated that the alleged refusal of any negotiations with Petrograd was a misunderstanding on the part of Russia, and that he was now ready "to enter into conversations with Russia."

The formula for an understanding quoted by David

<sup>1</sup> In his reply to my criticism (*Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 31st), to which I shall return later, Herr David subsequently expressly admits the fact that Bethmann's telegram "no doubt did not directly" refer to Grey's proposal for an understanding, but that it was "important for the fate" of this proposal, "because it prepared the attitude of mind for it in Vienna." The reader will plainly observe the convulsive wriggings of the eel desiring to escape the net.

came into being, if the wrong date is corrected, on July 31st. It is therefore impossible that Bethmann's instruction, which was sent to Vienna between July 29th and July 30th, can have related to that formula. It related exclusively and in an entirely general manner to the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd on the subject matter in dispute, negotiations which, in the view of the German Government, were directly opposed to any form of mediation by other Powers. Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were still busily concerned with the distinction that only a direct negotiation between Vienna and Petrograd could lead to an understanding, whereas an intervention of third Powers, a "European Tribunal," an "Areopagus," etc., could not be admitted. And now suddenly, according to David's most recent "revelation," we are to believe that the recommendation of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd was identical with the support of a formula for an understanding alleged to belong to Grey, but in reality devised by Grey and Sazonof! The dates of this formula and of Bethmann's instruction show in themselves that the Social Democratic deputy has committed an egregious "error," that, like an apt pupil, he has wandered in the footsteps of the German statesmen.<sup>1</sup>

The result of this investigation is :

- (a) The formula quoted by David dates, not from July 30th, but from July 31st.
- (b) It owes its origin, not to Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, but to Sazonof and it represents an

<sup>1</sup> In his speech in the Reichstag on November 9th, 1916, Herr von Bethmann, as is well known, produced a new instruction (without date, but at the latest of July 30th) which he says he sent to Herr von Tschirshky in recommendation of Grey's first formula of agreement of July 29th (Blue Book, No. 88). I have elsewhere explained (in the chapter "Bethmann the Pacifist," volume II. of this book) the position with regard to this most recent revelation of Bethmann—made a year and a quarter after the first! Bethmann's second instruction of July 30th has in any case as little connection as the first with Sazonof's second proposal for agreement (Orange Book, No. 67) which was only telegraphed by Petrograd to the various capitals on July 31st.

amalgamation of Grey's first and of Sazonof's first formulæ of agreement.

(c) It was devised, not in London, but in Petrograd; it was, however, greeted and accepted by the English Government as the best possible means of combining the English and the Russian formula.

(d) It was neither accepted nor even answered by the Viennese Government.

(e) Herr von Bethmann did not recommend the acceptance of this formula in Vienna, and on the documents before us he never, in fact, expressed any views with regard to this formula.

(f) There was not the slightest occasion for the English Government to recommend in Petrograd a formula which had emanated as a proposal from Petrograd itself.

These facts are mentioned for Herr David's book of remembrance. By this new and unprecedented perversion of authenticated facts the Social Democratic deputy has again made evident the badness of the cause which he defends. In the first moment of the excitement of war, when the actual course of events was still obscure and difficult to unravel, it may be the case that the German Socialist Imperialists fell into the snare of the German Government; now that all the actual events have been clearly determined and freed from every doubt, the attempts which they now make to transfer the guilt of the war from Germany to the Governments of their enemies constitute a greater offence than their erroneous judgment two years ago; the mistake which they then committed may be excused, if need be, as a "take in"; their present attempts to provide justification are merely deliberate falsifications.

## II

The preceding article (which only differs in a few editorial details from the original version on which the translation of the representative of *l'Humanité* was based) evolved from the deputy David a fulminating counter-stroke published after six weeks of preliminary study in the

*Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 31st, under the beautiful title: "The Accuser in the Dock." David's retort is more distinguished by reason of its length than of its depth; it extends to nearly six columns in the large form of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and by reason of its inordinate copiousness I am precluded from reproducing it here *in extenso*. I must content myself with the following enumeration, given to the best of my knowledge and conscience, of the conclusions as to persons and facts which are contained in the reply of my opponent.

1. Grey's formula of agreement of July 29th was not only answered by Austria and Germany, but was even accepted.
2. Further, Grey's Conference-proposal was not declined by Germany and Austria, but was accepted.
3. Russia consciously and deliberately desired war and provoked it by her mobilisation "in the night from July 30th to July 31st"—in the same night as that in which Grey's proposal for an understanding was accepted in Vienna.
4. My counter-assertions to the preceding theses are merely so many "nails in the coffin of my literary reputation."
5. The evidence produced by David destroys "as with a bludgeon" all my "lying conclusions."
6. My attacks against David "testify to a lack of literary conscience, surpassing the worst that can be imagined."
7. Speaking generally, the great accuser is no more than "a superficial scribbler and a conscienceless slanderer."

I hope that I have not forgotten any of David's conceits and sallies and, for the rest, I would suggest to the gentle reader who is curious by way of variety to see the accuser in the dock that he should procure a copy of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 31st, 1916.

The accused accuser would naturally have preferred to defend himself before the same public to whom he has been denounced as a "conscienceless slanderer," etc. But any attempt to obtain a hearing in Germany would

as a matter of course have been doomed to failure from the outset. The article which I wrote in defence developed into an overwhelming arraignment of Dr. David, the social-patriotic inquirer into sources. It must be classed as one of the "letters which never reached him" (that is to say, my opponent) and must therefore find here in my second book of accusation that sanctuary which in the Prussian state of law is denied to the defence of those who are unjustly attacked—if at the same time they happen to be troublesome accusers.

I would have desisted from publication if the matter had been one that concerned only the *person* of my pitiable opponent, who, as has already been observed above, is under constraint to defend to the point of exhaustion the war of defence, in order to save the political present and future of himself and his friends.

I feel sincere sympathy with those Socialists—in the beginning brave men and true to their convictions—over whose shoulders the fatal Nessus-shirt of the lie of defence was cast on the 4th of August and who now, in spite of their better knowledge, cannot muster up the courage and the energy to free themselves from the enervating trammels. As they have not the courage openly to acknowledge the lie, which long ago they recognised as such, the only other course that remains for their salvation is falsely to transform the lie into the appearance of truth, and in this noble counterfeiting activity Herr David is the recognised master.

As I say, I sympathise with these unfortunate "prisoners of war of Imperialism" who in the first place, no doubt, fell guiltlessly into bondage but who have later guiltily remained therein, since they could at any time have purchased their freedom by the moderate ransom of a manly and open acknowledgment of error. They have thus only themselves to thank for their present servile state and they do not merit the sympathy which otherwise is gladly extended to those who undeservedly fall into distress. Above all, however, the question here is not one of showing or refusing to show forbearance towards individuals; we are here concerned with the weal and woe of the German people, with its whole future and consequently with the future tranquillity of the world. In these circumstances

sympathy ceases to be a virtue and becomes a vice ; in only the pitiless extirpation of that malignant cancer of the lie of defence, it is only a radical surgical operation—the old wives' remedy of plasters and warm-poultices—there can help here. Here no ointment can avail, here the knife must be used—if need be on the “anointed” themselves—and no sympathy with the unfortunate who have fallen into distress of conscience dare deter us from placing in the pillory the death-bringing lie wherever we meet it, if there is a path for the redeeming truth can be opened into the hearts and the minds of the German people.

Considerations of forbearance towards these Social Democratic parrots who prate of the “defence of the Fatherland” are all the less in point inasmuch as a particularly pernicious effect has been exercised by their co-operation in the campaign for the delusion of the people, which has now been continued for two and a half years. The constant repetition by their former intellectual and political guides of the legend of the enemy attack has added the heads of millions of the proletariat, who stupidly see in their leaders the protagonists of the old democratic Socialist ideals, the unwavering defenders of truth and of right. The change which has actually taken place in the political sentiment and attitude of their former leaders appears to the masses to be so impossible that they simply do not believe it. If it were only the Emperor and the Chancellor, if it were only Pan-Germans, Junkers, Priests and Reactionaries who preached that the Fatherland had been shamefully attacked, and that all, even the proletariat, must defend it with their last drop of blood, the working classes to whom these leaders of the nation have for many years been revealed in their true light, who in their own body have often and cruelly enough experienced all the evil and egotistical instincts of these rulers, would have become distrustful, and in the well-sounding exuberant patriotic bombast they would have heard the old familiar dissonances of insatiable thirst for power and plunder. But when men like Scheidemann, Ebert, Heine, David, Lensch, Heilmann, and their fellows also come and preach, and even “prove,” that in fact their Fatherland was menaced and attacked, that their enemies

in the summer of 1914 put into execution a devilishly-contrived plan of annihilation and dismemberment, that Germany was therefore in a state of "defence" and must therefore be defended by all her sons, as their duty required and in accordance with Socialist principles—when such words as these are heard from such men, an entirely different effect is inevitably produced on the masses of the nation, who cannot credit their leading men with the blindness or the dishonesty of hailing to-day with "Hosannah" what yesterday they thrust from them with a "Get thee behind me, Satan!"

The influence exercised by the Scheidemanns is thus a hundred, nay, a thousand times more baleful than that of the Bethmanns and the Bassermanns. It is the latter who brew the poisonous drink, but the former bear it among the people and thereby infect the great masses who were called and, had the torch of truth been borne ahead, would have been in a position to set on fire the rotten framework of the political and social order in this unhappy Germany, and in its place to erect on a firm foundation the building of the new democratic and social order. The leaders of the Social Democratic majority are working to defeat this healthy and necessary development, necessary for the well-being of the German people and of the world. Instead of acknowledging the truth which is well known to them and at the same time openly and manfully admitting their former error, they perform without ceasing menial services to the imperialistic lie, indeed, as in the case of David, they precede it as pioneers, they bridge over the yawning gulfs which exist in the proof of innocence, and open tunnels and exits through mountains of accusatory material.

These new Socialist life-guardsmen who follow behind the imperial triumphal car in civil attire are far more dangerous for the future of Germany than the old Prussian vassals girded with sword and coat of mail who from time immemorial have preceded Hohenzollern militarism in the capacity of heralds. The people timidly and distrustfully avoid these well-known "Bassermann figures," who are appreciated at their true worth, but they follow faithfully and trustfully these tested leaders. It is these people, the



Socialist Neo-Imperialists, who must be made innocuous the deceitful mask of "defenders of the Fatherland" must be torn from their face in order that the people may recognise them as what they are—as men who were deceived and who, fearing to admit that they were the victims of deception, have themselves become deceivers.

In my book I prophesied two years ago that this fearful war can bring the German people no external success, and this fact is to-day patent to everyone. If, however, this severest trial also brings to maturity no advantages for the internal life of Germany, no essential betterment in our still half-absolutist political life, no development to democracy, no progress to Socialism, it is the Socialist supporters of the ruling powers who will be primarily responsible. Had they at the right time informed the masses of the people of the true origin and the true authors of this war, a storm of fiery indignation would have swept across the German land, and would have stripped the leaves off many an old family-tree, *beginning with the one that has grown highest of all*. They have, however, treated the enclosed forests of the great as places not to be entered upon; they have carefully kept away the sharp breath of the wind of truth and more than this, by bringing new soil from the lower strata they have strengthened the roots of the old trees.

The result will be this, that all will remain as before. All the deeply rooted evils will remain more firmly than ever in German soil. Germany will continue, as in Heine's time, to "snore," under the paternal care of a dozen monarchs; it will patiently continue to lead its well-tended submissive existence under the mighty sceptre of the laurel-crowned Hohenzollern family, with its comet-tail of generals, admirals, princes, counts, and barons; it will continue to arm on sea and on land, in the air and in the depths of the ocean. And when one day it again suits these lofty ones, when once again the "languid time of peace" will have lasted too long to please the soldiers, then the second "Punic" war, for which Pan-Germany is already blowing the trumpet, will break out; then once more we shall see "the Fatherland in danger," once more "home and hearth will be threatened," once more after

the flames of patriotism have been appropriately fanned, the great feast of battle will be arranged, in which new millions will perish, but once more the precious lives of the highest and all-highest who have arranged it, their sons, their cousins, their brothers and other relatives, will be carefully spared.

It will all remain as before in Germany unless the truth with regard to this great crime penetrates among the people. And that it does not so penetrate is above all due to the bulwark which the Social Democrats, in fidelity to their Emperor, have erected between the guilty and the truth.

My characterisation of the deputy David, the most distinguished leader of the "Imperial protective troops," is also intended to be of some use in making a breach in this bulwark.

### III.

The following is my hitherto unpublished reply to the article written by Dr. David in his own defence and in my arraignment in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* :

David, the inquirer into sources.

"Comrade" David goes about with the divining rod ; he seeks for hidden sources to prove Germany's innocence in the great war. And behold ! wherever he taps, the desired water trickles forth, the desired proofs of Germany's innocence bubble out to meet him. It is only a pity that on closer examination it is found to be rancid, contagious water, revealing under the microscope a swarm of dangerous bacilli and poisoning all the public springs.

On the occasion of an interview I undertook such a microscopic investigation into one of David's many researches into the sources, and revealed the myriads of poisonous germs which teemed in the turbid pool. Thereupon there ensued tremendous indignation on the part of the diviner which was displayed in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and an attempt was made, relying on futile methods, to place the accuser in the dock with a long speech extending to many columns in the style of an Attorney-General.

I have neither the space nor the time, nor do I consider that I am under any obligation, to enter into "Comrade "

David's reply with that degree of detail which he devoted to my attacks. In the third chapter of *J'accuse* I discuss in no fewer than 180 pages, the diplomatic history of which the war immediately arose by reference and on the basis of, the official documents, and in the supplementary book to *J'accuse* I have devoted to the same questions a whole volume of more than four hundred pages. Herr David, who has the audacity to call me a superficial scribbler and a conscienceless slanderer," has undertaken a much easier task. This authority among the German Socialists of the Right on the diplomatic antecedents devotes in his book *Social Democracy in World War* twenty-six pages in all in pamphlet form to the diplomatic question of guilt, and of these almost half are occupied with matters quite remote from the diplomatic documents. Herr David feels the necessity of displaying his documentary wisdom before the German public to whom I am refused permission to speak, and at the same time he abuses his monopoly of speech in his own land in order to abuse his opponent who is not in a position to defend himself there. I for my part can only must refer to the exhaustive and comprehensive account of the diplomatic incidents which is contained in my books. The material is so copious and complicated and also to such a degree interwoven that it is impossible for the serious-minded and conscientious inquirer to select any single question out of the immediate antecedents of the war without at the same time being compelled to unroll the whole course of events.

Further, my criticism of David's speech, printed above, forms only a small digression in a large book, and presupposes for its comprehension the study and the knowledge of the other parts of this book.

This being postulated, I should merely like to make a few observations on David's article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*:

1. If in his speech of October 11th Herr David had in mind, not Sazonof's formula of agreement of July 31st but that of Grey of July 29th (Blue Book, No. 88), it must at least be said that he expressed himself very ambiguously. In the first place, he omitted to give the correct date. I

speaks of a "situation" on July 30th by which it would still have been possible to preserve peace. Grey's formula, however, goes back to the afternoon of July 29th. Further, the text of the formula cited by David in his speech in the Reichstag, while no doubt representing a hotch-potch of various formulæ of agreement, certainly resembles Sazonof's formula of July 31st much more closely than that of Grey of July 29th, a fact of which any one may easily be convinced by a comparison of Grey's, Sazonof's and David's formulæ.

But let us assume for the moment that Herr David did in fact express himself ambiguously in indicating his formula, and that he really did mean Grey's formula of July 29th; the question still remains how he can possibly select this formula and represent it as the *last* possibility of an understanding, whereas after Grey's formula was put forward there still remained Sazonof's two formulæ of July 30th and 31st, in addition to a series of other concessions which were proposed by Paris, London and Petrograd—concessions which went further and further to meet the intransigence of Austria, and which indicated a continually increasing spirit of compliance on the part of Russia? Why does Herr David still suppress Sazonof's first formula of agreement, which the Russian Minister dictated to Count Pourtaès on July 30th, in this following the habitual practice of all the defenders of the German Government from the Chancellor down to the last journalistic scribbler? This formula demanded from Austria nothing more than the elimination from the Ultimatum of the points which violated Serbian sovereignty and as the Russian equivalent it gave an undertaking to suspend Russian military preparations (*la Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires*). Why is Herr David silent as to the refusal of this formula, which did not even demand a stoppage of Austria's military action against Serbia, and was therefore much more modest than Grey's formula of the preceding day? Why is he silent as to the brusque refusal by Herr von Jagow on July 30th of this Russian proposal for an understanding, a refusal *a limine*, without reasons, without inquiry in Vienna? (Orange Book, No. 68).

It is not Grey's formula of July 29th to which Herr David now seeks to effect a courageous withdrawal—it is Sazonof's formula of July 30th which constitutes the crucial point of the whole history of the conflict in these last days. So far no reason for Jagow's refusal has ever at any time been assigned—a refusal which was all the more criminal inasmuch as Sazonof at once declared on July 30th (as was also reported to their Governments by the English and French Ambassadors in Petrograd) that the rejection of this extremely conciliatory proposal would inevitably have as a consequence the extension of the Russian partial mobilisation to a general mobilisation. All this has been exhaustively treated in *J'accuse* and in the previous chapters of this work, and has been confirmed by the citation of documents. I can only commend Herr David that he should in the first place study with zeal and industry the books of "the superficial scribbler and the conscienceless slanderer," in order that he may at last master the most elementary framework of the diplomatic antecedents; only on the basis of such a knowledge of the subject on his part will it be worth my while to discuss the matter further with him.

2. Grey's proposal for agreement of July 29th is alleged, according to David's assertion, to have been accepted by Vienna. This assertion has also been recently advanced by Herr von Bethmann in his speech of November 9th, 1916.

As against this, I have already documentarily proved in my book of accusation that neither Vienna nor Berlin ever vouchsafed a definite answer to Grey's formula of agreement of July 29th, notwithstanding the constantly renewed and urgent request of England. In David's fine phrase this assertion will be "a nail in the coffin of my literary reputation." In this desperate and hopeless attempt to whitewash incurably black negroes, in this convulsive endeavour to construe even at this day as a war of defence a war which its Pan-German instigators and authors have long ago acknowledged as a war of conquest or at least as a preventive war, in these desperate attempts to achieve salvation I could wish for Herr David that his

literary, and above all his political reputation had remained as untarnished as mine has been by the conviction of guilty criminals.

My assertion that Grey's proposal for agreement of July 29th never elicited from Vienna or Berlin a positive answer, whether acceptance or refusal, is, in the light of all the extant documents, as true and as completely demonstrated as the contrary assertion of David is untrue and undemonstrated. It is only by a dishonest trick, by the perversion of the true meaning of my words, by ascribing to them a meaning which is completely opposed to my views, that this conscientious investigator of history seeks to trip me up, and to invert the truth. He cites with great self-confidence a series of documents which are all quoted in *J'accuse* in the discussion of Grey's proposals and which have probably been fished out of my book by David (see *J'accuse*, pages 153, 155, 177-9, 344-346). These documents, however, prove exactly the opposite of what Herr David endeavours to extract from them; they prove what I desired them to prove, namely, that the Berlin Government no doubt constantly asserted that they transmitted and recommended Grey's proposal to Vienna, but that they have never done to the present day produced a positive answer to the proposal from Vienna. All the numbers in the Blue Book which David quotes, and various others in addition (Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 108, 112, etc.) are also quoted in my book, but as evidence of the fact that a positive answer to Grey's proposal for agreement was never obtained from Vienna or Berlin, but rather that mere pretexts and excuses for delaying an answer were brought forward. Indeed I quote verbatim the relevant phrases from the English reports, e.g., in the following passage (*J'accuse*, pages 155-156):

The peacemakers were put off from day to day. On one occasion Jagow had received no answer from Vienna; on another, Bethmann regrets that he had pressed the button so vigorously in Vienna that he had perhaps gone too far and produced the opposite effect from what was intended. On a third occasion, when Goschen was still urging that an answer should be given and was recommending that an even more violent pressure should be applied to the button in Vienna, the only answer which he got from Bethmann was that

Count Berchtold would take the wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph in the matter next morning. (Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 112.)

Thus three complete days, from July 29th to 31st, glided unprofitably into the past without any answer being received from Austria in reply to Grey's proposal which the English King had so fervently urged on the Emperor William. Three days glided unprofitably into the past while Europe in suspense and in horror watched the approach of the dreaded catastrophe. The diplomats of Germany and Austria were in no haste. They knew what they wanted and with complete composure they prepared the drama behind the scenes, while in front everyone was running to and fro in agitation, calling aloud in terror for the fire brigade.

This is only one of the many passages in which I describe the Berlin game of concealment behind the Austrian screen. Anyone who reads the other passages in my book, referred to above, will be able to appreciate the attitude of deputy David, who has the effrontery to insinuate that I desired to deny every utterance from Berlin or Vienna with regard to Grey's proposal. No, utterances were made in profusion by Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow, but never the utterance which alone mattered, that is to say, whether Grey's proposal was accepted or declined. It is only this omission to give any positive answer—acceptance or refusal—that I demonstrated and denounced in my book. Herr David, however, apparently proceeding on the principle that "No answer is also an answer," confuses the subject to be proved, in order to attack my literary reputation. In reality in so doing he bears his own to the sepulchre.

3. What is the position with regard to David's assertion that Grey's proposal was accepted by Vienna?

This assertion which, as already observed, is advanced also by Herr von Bethmann in his speech of November 9th, 1916, is an illumination which has only quite recently dawned on the defenders of Germany. I have already refuted this assertion in my book, and in a detailed criticism of Bethmann's speech (published in the middle of December, 1916), I have again reduced it to absurdity by reference to the diplomatic documents.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Bethmann the Pacifist" in *Wissen und Leben*, Zurich, Orell-Füssli, number of December 15th, pages 261-268.

And in doing so I have given due consideration to Bethmann's two instructions to Tschirschky which the Chancellor produced for the first time on August 19th, 1915, and November 9th, 1916. Herr David should therefore have had the opportunity, before composing his rejoinder, to master the latter demonstration in addition to studying *J'accuse*. I cannot again unroll this large subject, which has been treated in detail in this second work of accusation, and must content myself with referring to two authorities which flatly give the lie to the assertion that Grey's formula had been accepted by Austria. These authorities are the German White Book and Herr Helfferich.

In the memorial in the German White Book there is express mention of the "forwarding" of the English proposal. We there read as follows :

"Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation could possibly have been received in Berlin . . . Russia ordered a general mobilisation."

Helfferich reports to the same effect (*The Genesis of the World War*, page 10) that the proposal was transmitted to Austria by Germany and was supported by her, and then he continues :

"The proposal had not yet been answered by Austria, and Russia also had assumed no attitude towards it, when the general Russian mobilisation took place."

In another passage (page 9) Herr Helfferich likewise confirms the fact that

"A new proposal for mediation put forward by Sir Edward Grey had been transmitted by the German to the Austro-Hungarian Government on the preceding day and that the answer of Austria to this proposal was still outstanding."

From the passages just quoted it is clear that the alleged acceptance of Grey's proposal by Vienna, which we are now surprised to find asserted with such agreement by the



Chancellor and his faithful Social Democratic opposition, was unknown to the Chancellor on August 4th, 1914, and was still unknown to his deputy at the beginning of 1915. The acceptance of Grey's formula is nowhere mentioned in the White Book or the Red Book. If it had really been accepted by Vienna why, I ask, was this important exonerating fact passed over in silence in both the German White Books, in the Austrian Red Book, and in all the previous speeches and writings of the Chancellor, down to his speech of November 9th, 1916?

As a matter of fact there is, further, a complete absence of any evidence in support of this assertion. Least of all does No. 51 of the Red Book, which is quoted by the Chancellor as well as by Herr David, furnish any shadow of such evidence. In *J'accuse* (pages 334-337, 344-346) and in the study mentioned above (which is reprinted in the second volume of this work) I have proved:

(a) That Berehtold's note of July 31st, 1914 (Red Book, No. 51) does not refer to Grey's formula of agreement (Blue Book, No. 88; conversation between Grey and Liehnowsky on the afternoon of July 29th), but that it relates only to the conversation *à quatre* (Blue Book, No. 84; conversation between the two diplomatists on the morning of July 29th);

(b) That this note, even if it did refer to Grey's formula of agreement, even if it had not been paralysed by the Berlin Ultimata of the same day (July 31st), would be utterly remote from constituting an acceptance of Grey's formula.

On this point, therefore, I occupy the same ground as the White Book and as Helfferich's pamphlet, namely, that Grey's proposal for agreement was no doubt "transmitted" to Vienna, but that no reply was ever received from Vienna or Berlin as to the acceptance or the refusal of this proposal. On this and on other points Herr David is more "chancellorish" than the Chancellor himself, at any rate than the Chancellor of August 4th, 1914. He shares in Herr von Bethmann's evolution, which has now happily conducted the Chancellor from his original asser-

tion that no answer was given to Grey's proposition to the assertion that this proposition was accepted by Vienna.

4. Herr David, however, as we shall now see, is not content with thus following in Bethmann's trail. He precedes Herr von Bethmann in the land of new discoveries; like a daring pioneer he opens out new ways of escape for German innocence. To Herr David belongs the undisputed merit of having reached the Pole of the German voyage of discovery into the history of the war in the following sentence, which occurs in the article directed against me:

"The fact of the acceptance of the 'quadruple mediation,' that is, of the 'European Tribunal,' by Austria as well as by Germany is thus immovably confirmed."

Expressed in other words, this means that Grey's Conference was not declined by Germany and Austria but was accepted, and that all previous assertions and admissions to the contrary are founded on an untruth.

This is the zenith of David's zeal in research. The Fatherland will not be tardy in expressing its thanks. If Herr von Bethmann has read this latest discovery of his faithful Social Democratic defender (which Herr David has certainly at least a right to demand), he cannot fail to be overcome by joyful astonishment, and I should not be surprised if one day we learn that the Chancellor has sent to the member of the Reichstag a letter of thanks to the following effect, perhaps accompanied by the Iron Cross with the black and white ribbon:

MY DEAR HERR DOCTOR DAVID,

I cannot tell you how much pleasure I have derived from the rebuke which you have administered in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to the shameful slanderer who wrote *J'accuse*. I had hitherto always been of the opinion that I had refused Grey's Conference. In my White Book I expressly said: "We could not . . . participate in such a Conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European Tribunal." Since August 4th

1914, I myself in all my speeches and writings, all my official and semi-official writers, all the voluntary and involuntary defenders of the German Government have been fully engaged in constantly inventing new reasons and excuses for that refusal of the Conference, with which I have been reproached by all the world, including many Germans. In the memorandum in the White Book and in the Exhibits, reasons for this refusal are advanced at considerable length. My circular letter of December 24th, 1914, is occupied in a long-winded way with the reasons which made it necessary. My Secretary of State, Dr. Helfferich, on page 28 of his pamphlet produces a series of reasons of his own which made it clear that Grey's Conference-proposal was "from the outset doomed to failure," and which foreshadowed that the German refusal "could be expected with certainty." In all my speeches, writings and announcements I have also confirmed the refusal on the part of Vienna.

How completely have I been on the wrong track all the time! You, my dear Dr. David, have now made it clear to me, indeed you show it to be an "immovable fact," that I did not decline the Conference at all, but that I accepted it. Now at last we know—I and my highly-respected but so vilely-abused colleague, Count Berchtold—what we really did, but never so far knew. And it is from you that the enlightenment came to us!

There is only one reproach, my dear Herr Doctor, which I cannot help bringing against you: Why did you not tell us sooner what you have now made known to us? How many speeches, how many obscure explanations, how many reproaches, how much gnawing of conscience would you have spared us, if you had only revealed to us sooner that the deed, which we always freely acknowledged, which we never denied but merely excused, was never committed at all, and that we are as innocent as unsullied angels.

May you continue, my dear Herr David, in

your laudable and purificatory endeavours. The Fatherland will for ever be grateful to you.

In the agreeable hope that I shall soon be surprised by fresh and gratifying discoveries on your part, I remain,

In sincere thanks and appreciation,

Yours very faithfully,

DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG,  
*Imperial Chancellor.*

Bethmann's thanks to David are richly deserved. It is indeed an extremely unusual occurrence that an accused person should admit the deed, and only plead for mitigating circumstances, while the defender proves to him that he did not commit the deed at all and that therefore he must be acquitted.

The best of it all, however, is that David, the counsel for the defence, the man who now denies that the thing was ever done, declared in his book, *Social Democracy in the World War* (pages 85-86) which appeared in 1915, that the refusal of the Conference was as immovable a fact as he now declares its acceptance to have been :

"The German Government have been censured because they refused it" (Grey's Conference proposal).

Herr David chronicles the censure, without approving it. At that time it appeared to him also that the Conference-proposal was doomed to failure and that it was not seriously intended. But the Social Democratic historian never at any time cast doubt on the fact of the refusal until the present moment when the new illumination has dawned upon him.

No one will ask it of me that I should follow my opponent along the paths into which he has now struck. I confine myself to the David of 1915 and will leave it to him to dispute the matter with his namesake of 1916. I am certainly curious to know to what degree of voluntarily-involuntary servility to a militaristic imperialistic Government these German Social Democrats will yet develop.

To-day they have already advanced so far that they have not merely forgotten all that they said in the last days of July, 1914, against "the frivolous provocation of war on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government," against the "brutal" Ultimatum directly designed for the express purpose of provoking war; they have not only forgotten how they addressed to the German Government, as an imperative summons, the words: "Not so much as a drop of blood must be sacrificed by a German soldier to the itch for power of those who hold sway in Austria, and to profit-making imperialistic interests," but they are to-day already playing the lamentable rôle of having to defend men and things which formerly they cursed and condemned. But not content with this, they have become so unmanly and so degraded, that they now seek to furnish the very men whom they accused to their face of the guilt before the commission of the deed with new grounds of defence after the act has been perpetrated—grounds which so far have not occurred to the perpetrators themselves. They not merely allow themselves to be used by the criminal instigators of this vast carnage as a rearguard for their protection against their own murmuring peoples, but they hasten to render them willing service, and like David apply all their ingenuity to open for them new ways of escape which so far had escaped the intelligence of the chief actors.

After Herr David has arrived at the discovery that Germany and Austria did not in fact decline Grey's Conference but really accepted it, I await in expectancy the further discovery that the Tsar's proposal for a decision by the Hague Tribunal (over which Herr David in the meantime still skims shyly and silently) in reality emanated, not from the Tsar, but from the Emperor William. And, lastly, the moment will come when, like the King of Bavaria, the leader of the German social patriots will furnish us with documentary proof that the decisive declarations of war were issued, not by Austria and Germany, but by Serbia and Russia. Not till that moment is reached will German social-patriotism have reached the culminating point in its development.

\* \* \* \* \*

According to the results of David's most recent researches all the important proposals for agreement, such as Grey's Conference and his formula of agreement, were accepted by Germany and Austria.

Why, nevertheless, did war break out ?

Because Russia desired it, says Herr David.

Why, then, I ask, did this same Russia, forthwith and at the right moment, from the first to the last moment of the crisis express its concurrence in all proposals for agreement put forward elsewhere ?

Why did the Russian Government at once accept Grey's Conference-proposal, and expressly state its readiness to stand aside and submit to the decisions of the four disinterested Powers ?

Why did the Tsar on July 29th propose the reference of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal ?

Why did Sazonof on July 30th and 31st propose his two formulæ of agreement, of which the first was declined and the second was never answered at all ?

Why did Sazonof from the first moment declare his readiness to discuss and settle the dispute in direct negotiation with Austria ?

Why did he at once renew with the greatest alacrity the negotiations which were broken off by Austria, but again resumed on July 31st ?

Why, as late as July 31st and August 1st, did he still further moderate and weaken his conditions of agreement ?

Why was all this done ? Was it by any chance because he desired war ?

No, to all these questions there is only one answer: Russia desired peace. It was Germany that desired war—it was the Emperor and his military counsellors who, still relying on the neutrality of England, considered that the most favourable moment had come for the provocation of the "inevitable" Continental war, in order that they might, with an apparent certainty of success, take the first step, so long desired, on the ladder to world-power. "World-power or downfall"—so runs the watchword proclaimed by Bernhardt. "World-power or downfall"—that was the thought which in the last days of July, 1914, induced those who controlled the destinies of Germany to decide on war.

None of these facts are in any way novelties for Herr David. He knows all this just as well as I. The difference between us consists in the fact that I say it while he pre- serves silence; that I still entertain and represent the views on Prusso-German militarism which Herr David entertained and represented up till August 4th, 1914. For this reason it is he who is the profound student of history and the honourable man, whereas I am the superficial scribbler and the slanderer.

The thunderbolts of this renegade do not touch me. The petty pebbles of *this* David will not destroy the giant Goliath of my accusation.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### After Jaurès' Death.

After this digression on the deceit of the German social patriots I return to my subject, the activity of the French Socialists in the last days before the outbreak of war.

After the death of Jaurès the agreement between the Government and the Socialist party in France still continued. Daudé-Bancel defines precisely the demands put forward by the Socialists and conceded by the Government:

1. In order to avoid conflicts on the frontier, the mobilisation of French troops should take place at a distance of from eight to ten kilometres from the frontier. This condition was already complied with on July 30th, and communicated to the English Government on that day (see Blue Book, No. 105, enclosure 3; Yellow Book, No. 106).

2. In order to facilitate further negotiations for peace, the Government should officially announce that mobilisation did not mean war. This condition was complied with to the letter by Viviani's various statements, by his circular letter of August 1st to his representatives abroad (Yellow Book, No. 125) and by his note to Cambon, the Ambassador in London (Yellow Book, No. 127):

Our decree of mobilisation is then an essential measure of protection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the

present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

8. The French Government should not declare war against the German Empire. As is well known, this condition also was fulfilled. It was left to the German Empire to make a miserably invented tale about airmen the initial point in the greatest deluge of blood in the world's history.

The complete unity of action of the French Socialists and their Government was naturally continued in the following days also, since the aims and the methods of the party and of the Government were identical. On August 2nd, the day on which the German armies entered Luxemburg, a great gathering of Socialists, at which the most eminent leaders were present, took place in the Wagram Hall in Paris. Sembat declared that the French Socialists entered the war neither in the intoxication of the thirst for revenge nor from the insane lust of battle. Owing to the disrespect of the neutrality of Luxemburg (the invasion of Belgium had not yet taken place) and the encroachment of the German Empire, they were compelled to enter the struggle, but they did not in consequence of this war of defence cease to be Socialists or to be faithful to Socialist principles. In this sense the war-credits were unanimously approved by the French Socialists; in this sense Guesde and Sembat entered the Ministry of National Defence at the end of August, and we may confidently anticipate that it will be in this sense, and in this sense only that the further collaboration of the French Socialists in the work of defence will take place—in the sense of the liberation of their country from foreign invasion, the prevention of future imperialistic wars of conquest, the creation of an enduring condition of peace on a compulsory foundation, and on the basis of the right of nations to control their own destinies.

As the French Socialists from the beginning of the conflict down to the outbreak of war were guided in all the steps they took by the recognised principles of the International, so in the continuation and on the conclusion of the war they will not depart from the ground on which



they have hitherto struggled so successfully for the imperishable principles of the great Revolution, for the spiritual inheritance of their great leaders, for the victorious future of their ideas. They will in their actions give effect to the words which Sembat spoke in the Wagram Hall on August 2nd, 1914, and by an order of the day unanimously adopted by the Socialist group in the chamber they have again quite recently, on January 26th, 1917, clearly given expression to their decision to remain true to their Socialist principles even in the *Union sacrée* :

The Socialist group of the French Parliament notes with pleasure President Wilson's admirable message to the American Senate. The idea of a peace resting on the free will of the nations, and not on the force of arms, must become the charter of the civilised world. By his Note President Wilson gives a new and immeasurable prestige to the sanction of the principle of justice which is the inheritance of our Revolution, and the tradition of all our international congresses. And he does so at a time when it is more than ever necessary that the democrats of all nations should rise against the ambitions of imperialists, from what side soever these may come, and against their sanguinary and ruinous consequences (que les démocrates, dans toutes les nations, s'élèvent contre les ambitions des impérialistes, d'où qu'elles viennent, contre leurs sanglantes et ruineuses conséquences).

The group emphatically calls upon the French Government to announce in clear terms its concurrence in the lofty words of reason which President Wilson has spoken.

\* \* \* \* \*

The results of this inquiry are as follows :

The French Government neither strove for war nor provoked it.

Working in common with England and Russia, it sought to maintain peace by every diplomatic weapon.

In this effort it was supported from the beginning to the end of the conflict by the French Socialist party, which has always been a party of peace and of understanding with Germany. It followed in every detail the suggestions, the wishes, and the requirements of the Socialist party in this direction. The French Government is therefore as innocent of the outbreak of the war as is French Socialism.

The majority of German Social Democrats, on the other hand, have approved the means for the German war of aggression. They have followed military imperialism unconditionally on the occasion of every vote, from August 4th, 1914, until to-day, untroubled about the origin, untroubled about the aims of this war of conquest, which they still endeavour deceitfully to transform into a war of German defence. The majority of the German Social Democratic party have thus made themselves the accomplices of the German Government and thus they bear their share of the responsibility for the outbreak and for all the further consequences of the European War.

*End of First Volume.*



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