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

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
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THE DEFENCE
of Our
EMPIRE

1902

With
Special Reference
to Canada

BY
Colonel Falkland Warren
Late Royal Artillery, C.M.G.

1902

1902

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Reprinted from the Daily "News-Advertiser," Vancouver, B.C.

The Defence of Our Empire

By Colonel Falkland Warren, late Royal Artillery, E. M. 9.

I.

The war in which the British Empire has been involved during the last two years and a-half, considered together with the tremendous issues which have been at stake, makes it a duty for every citizen to study the danger we have been in, and to take such steps as are possible to prevent a repetition of so dangerous a crisis. The question is not one as to the safety, progress or prosperity of that one particular portion of the Empire in which we may have our home, but it is a question of the safety and prosperity of the vast unit of which we form a part. The openly declared hostility of most of the foreign Powers, shows us, as Lord Salisbury says, that "We have no security except in the efficacy of our own defence, and the strength of our own right arm." Everyone of our great leaders has warned us of the danger which we stand in, and even so cold and dispassioned a man as Lord Kimberley tells us: "Never was there so unfriendly a feeling all over Europe towards this country as there is now."

This storm of hostility does not threaten Great Britain alone; it endangers all branches of the British Empire alike, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, British India, every continent or island where the British colors fly. Let the power of our Island home be broken, and but a short time would elapse before the other portions of our heritage would be struggling to maintain and defend their independence. The British Empire must stand as a whole, and each part of it is identified with the necessity of maintaining the pre-eminent position of that portion which is the heart of the whole organisation. I allude to that

"One Isle, one Isle,
That knows not her own greatness: If
she knows
And dreads it we are fallen":

that "ocean empire with her boundless homes—our ever-broadening England."

I propose in a few chapters to point out the inadequacy of our present system to meet the hostility of a possible combination of our enemies, whose military strength I will put before you. I will endeavor to show that it rests with ourselves to make our defence sufficient to meet any possible strain, and I hope to be also able to make you understand that it is our duty and also to our advantage that we should share the burden of a great national obligation.

THE NAVY.

The British Empire has increased in population from 25,000,000 in 1800, to 502,000,000 in 1898. Its area has increased in that period of time from 1,500,000 to 11,400,000 square miles. Its revenue has risen from £37,500,000 to £116,000,000. The exports and imports from £67,000,000 in 1800, amounted in 1898 to £764,000,000, while the tonnage of British shipping, which in 1800 was 1,856,000 tons, was in 1898 10,325,000. To protect our first line of defence is the British Navy—and here at once I enter my first plea, that it is the manifest duty and it should be the willing duty of every portion of the British Empire to bear its share of the burden in guarding the interest of this vast possession and trade, and to take its proportionate share in the maintenance of the Navy, which gives security to the whole Empire.

It is the opinion of our highest political and naval authorities that our fleet must be kept up to a strength not less than will equal the possible combination of any two other Powers. Such a balance of naval power we now possess and there is no reason to believe that any government which may come into power will be allowed to neglect the maintenance of our naval

strength. It is in the matter of the men to man our fleet and the reserve behind them that our great difficulty lies. In 1901 our naval reserve was only 23,000, whereas 80,000 was necessary. Continental Powers by means of compulsory service command a full supply of highly trained seamen with which to man their fleet and to fill up the waste caused by war.

Connected with the difficulty of establishing a sufficient naval reserve is the ever increasing proportion of foreigners in our mercantile marine. This proportion has risen from 9 per cent. in 1860 to 40.1 per cent. in 1899, and to 45 per cent. in 1900!! To show how inadequate our present naval reserve is it may be necessary to state that when it was urged that "There should always be an effective reserve squadron absolutely confined to home waters, sufficient to hold the Channel and protect the coasts and commerce." The Lords of the Admiralty replied, "This would be impossible."

Enough will have been shown to prove that, according to our present voluntary system, we are unable to maintain our naval reserve in sufficient and effective strength to insure an ample supply of seamen to man all the vessels of war we may desire to equip, and to have besides a sufficiency of well-trained seamen to fill up the casualties and waste of war.

THE ARMY.

Before considering the strength of what may be deemed our necessary military organisation for defence, it is in the first instance necessary to take note of the armed strength of those nations, some of whom might be led into taking part in a hostile demonstration against us, and we must compare their numbers with the army which Great Britain can put into the field, first for home defence and secondly, to protect any distant part of our widely scattered Empire.

Armed Strength of European Powers.

Austria-Hungary.. . . .	3,900,000
Belgium.. . . .	155,000
France.. . . .	4,666,000
Denmark.. . . .	53,000
Germany.. . . .	6,213,000
Italy.. . . .	3,325,000
Netherlands.. . . .	130,000

Russia.. . . .	4,000,000
Sweden and Norway.. . . .	399,000
Spain.. . . .	750,000
Switzerland.. . . .	249,000
Turkey.. . . .	800,000

The British army of 713,000 is exclusive of the native army in India, but includes 10,000 European volunteers in that country. But before accepting the numbers of 713,000, it is advisable to look into the details which go to make up this total, for we will see upon examination that very large deductions will have to be made from those particular items which make up the most effective numbers of our regularly trained forces:

The Regular Army at home and abroad, including India, &c. . .	232,340
The Reserve is estimated at. . .	78,839
The Militia, including the militia reserve.	110,950

Or a total of soldiers who have undergone regular training of 421,139

The regular army has always been kept up on the voluntary system, and it can be most confidently stated that this voluntary system has invariably been found to fall in time of greatest need, whenever it became necessary to increase the army or in time of war. On such occasions it has been found necessary to resort to offers of bounties to attract soldiers into enlisting. The wages given to the soldier have always been inadequate to induce men to quit the more advantageous prospect of civil life. The bounties offered to recruits have varied from £3 in 1743 to £16 in 1803, and £8 to £10 in 1855. In 1900 as much as £22 was offered to men in the reserve battalions for one year's engagement, and £10 had then to be offered to recruits for the Militia.

But it has not only been found necessary to offer money inducements; it was besides necessary to reduce the physical standard and the limit of age on enlistment, so that mere weeds of boys were allowed to enter the ranks of our fighting army. Even these means are insufficient to keep up our establishments, for Gen. G. S. Clarke says in 1900 that the Militia was 27,830 below strength, the Yeomanry 1,739 and the Volunteers 34,276. In 1901-1902 the army establishment of 898,452 had a deficiency of 142,870. Recruits cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers, and

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notwithstanding the impetus given to recruiting by the Boer War, the actual numbers in 1900 were 241 less than in 1899, and this in spite of the standard of height having been reduced by half an inch. The Inspector of Recruiting regretfully reported that "Recruiting for the Infantry of the Line cannot be considered satisfactory." Desertions have besides steadily increased from 6.4 per cent. in 1896 to 8.0 per cent. in 1900.

Whenever the strain of war comes upon us the voluntary system, based as it is now based upon a low and unloving rate of wages, breaks down, and our generals in the field find themselves obliged to report again and again upon the unsatisfactory material that is sent to them to fill up the gaps made by disease, wounds and death. Lord Raglan, writing from the Crimea, said: "Those last sent were so young and unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies." Personally I can speak of many hundreds of young soldiers sent to India in 1858, and can testify to the truth of the statement that "During the Indian Mutiny men were sent out who were at once put into the hospital." History has repeated itself during the Boer War, and we know of Imperial Yeomanry and others who had to be sent back to England from South Africa as quite unfit for any military duty whatsoever.

To give a general idea of the effectiveness or otherwise of our regular force I may state that in 1873 there were, out of 53,465 men stationed at home, no less than 15,220 under 21 or over 40 years of age. In 1898, out of 62,830, there were 29,044 in the same category, and in the latter year there were 27,642 men in the ranks who would not have been passed as fit for service in the Continental armies of Europe on account of age only, 37 per thousand being actually under 17 years of age!

The standard of height and chest measurement has been repeatedly reduced; in January, 1898, it came down to 33 inches chest measurement, but even less than that reduced condition was allowed in so-called "special" cases; those amounted to 23 per 1,000 in 1899. In this latter year 18,268 recruits joined who weighed under 125 lbs., and 26,017 out of 40,701 were under 130 lbs. in weight. So deplorable has been the

result of the present voluntary system of enlistment that Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Douglas, V. C., M. D., cannot be contradicted in his statement made at a lecture delivered in the R. I. S. Institution, when he said that "the great majority of our recruits are shallow, overcast, nondescript youths." But the it would be strange if it were otherwise, as the pay offered to the recruit is insufficient to tempt the better class of our sturdy youth to follow the temporary profession of arms. It necessarily takes time and care to fill out and strengthen this raw material, and it requires on an average two years before this recruit is fit to take part in the labor and trials of a campaign; in the meanwhile if soldiers are imperatively required at the front, the necessary material has to be sought for in the Militia, of which service we will next treat.

II. THE MILITIA.

This force, including the Militia Reserve, was in 1899 a nominal strength of 110,960 men. But there are very large deductions to be made from this. In the first instance it is officially admitted that 10,000 of these enlisted into the line and have been counted twice over. Next the Militia Reserve is not a reserve to the Militia at all, but a part of the Army Reserve; thirdly, there were no less than 8,716 deserters to be deducted, and, finally, the Militia is always many thousands short of the establishment (no less than 19,054 in 1898). Thus it resulted that in 1898, out of an establishment of 132,493, only 113,439 were enrolled, and 98,042 only were present at the month's training, and from this number we have to deduct:

Militia Reserve.....	31,905
Enlistment to Line and Navy.....	15,063
Double enlistment and men from	
Reserve.....	2,000
Deserters.....	8,716

Total deductions .. 57,684

So that the public who believed they possessed in 1898 a body of 132,493 Militia for the home defence, should the soil of their Island home be threatened by invasion, had really only something like 40,000 men of this class actually to depend upon. Was Mr. Arn. 'd Forster, M. P., very far wrong when he

called the Militia as a system "A patent and recognised fraud?" I ought to mention here that I have so far mostly taken my facts and figures from Mr. George F. Shee, M. A., and his brochure, "The Briton's First Duty," written two years ago. It would be a matter of satisfaction if we could see a change for the better had taken place in the above described state of affairs, but this is not the case; the blame is with the system itself; it is vain to hope for amelioration until the whole "system" is changed. The Active and Regular Army has not a sufficient reserve to fall back upon, its number of effectives is depleted by having to turn a body of weak, underfed recruits into strong, well trained soldiers, so that the Militia becomes the only source from which the Army can be fed whenever a more than ordinarily severe strain is put upon it. Hence we find that in moments when the Empire is fully taken up with some great war over seas, at the very time when an enemy or combination of enemies are most likely to put pressure upon us, then, at that momentous instant of anxiety and danger, we find that we are most unprepared to protect our own shores and the heart of the Empire is exposed to hostile attack.

On this subject I cannot do better than quote from the words of Colonel Lonsdale Hale, a military writer and critic of the highest order: "It so happened that from two sources I was approached with a request to write articles on the invasion of England. For me to have done so would have been, as I wrote in answer to one of the requests, the act of a traitor. My correspondent concurred in my opinion when I informed him, to his utter astonishment, that we had not forty field guns left in England to bring into the battle-field. I visited our large camps, and I privately intimated to high authorities on both sides of the War Office my opinion that taking into account the deficiency of guns, the complete absence of organisation of the troops in England for Home Defence, and their defective shooting and training, a hostile force of 50,000 well equipped and trained regular soldiers could walk through England from one end to the other. * * * This terrible risk must not be run again."

A war with Great Britain is no doubt a war with the British Empire. The British Empire is not a mere combination of independent and friendly states, as many foreign Powers would desire to view us and induce us to view ourselves. If such were the case it would indeed become impossible to organize the defences of the Empire. We are one and indivisible. The sea power of Great Britain is as necessary to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa as the resources, the energy, and manhood of Greater Britain are necessary to the Mother Country.

RESOURCES OF GREATER BRITAIN.

That portion of the British Empire beyond the seas may, for the purpose of Imperial defence, be divided into two categories. One represented by the great self-governing Colonies and the other belonging to colonies, possessions and protectorates not included in the former category. I will first enumerate those self-governing Colonies which, if not "nations" now, in the full significance of that term, are so far assured of their individual independence and future potentialities that they can be given a place under that heading. When enumerating these I will append the revenues, the value of their imports and exports, and their respective populations, as these populations will have to be taken into consideration when apportioning their values in the balance of Imperial defence:

Revenue.

Canada..	£10,020,600
Newfoundland..	450,000
Australia..	5,908,000
South Africa..	12,243,000

Exports and Imports.

Canada..	£76,000,000
Newfoundland..	3,200,000
Australia..	120,000,000
South Africa..	60,000,000

Population.

Canada..	5,339,000
Newfoundland..	198,000
South Africa (whites)..	1,920,000
Australia..	5,000,000

I have taken these figures from

Whitaker's Almanack for 1902, and we may accept them as probably approximately correct. From the large volume of the commerce here shown we can see how all important it is that the trade of our fast growing oversea countries should be guarded; and it does not need any argument to show that these self-governing countries are directly and vitally affected in the maintenance of our sea power—that is in the safe guarding of the property which is carried under the one flag of our Empire. As we have given the figures which make up the power and wealth of our great Colonies, it is well here to give similar particulars for the United Kingdom: Revenue, £114,774,000; exports and imports, £877,450,000; population, 41,600,000.

Since commencing this series of letters on "The Defence of Our Empire," I have seen in a paper published in London, England, a reference to a publication issued by the Imperial Federation Defence Committee, by a Mr. Bignold, of Australia, called "The Burden of Empire," in which calculations are made of the cost of defence based on the statistics of 1899-1900. The author has had access to books and authorities not within my reach here in Vancouver or British Columbia. Mr. Bignold gives the cost of defence of the Empire in that year as £53,000,000, and states that the expenditure of the four great self-governing Colonies during that period, including local defence, amounted to sums as under:

Cape Colony.....	£250,000
Natal.....	87,000
Canada.....	491,000
Australia.....	713,000

He further states that the direct contribution of these four countries to the Imperial forces was £162,000.

It appears reasonable and logical that the cost of the defence of our Empire should be based on the revenue, population and sea-borne trade of each portion of that Empire. If the wealth of each component part were proportionately equal. If wealth were equally distributed the burden to be borne would work out with the following result:

On a basis of revenue, the four-named colonies would be charged an annual sum of £16,000,000; on a basis of population they would pay £10,000,-

000; and on a basis of seaborne trade they would pay £13,000,000; or taking a mean of revenue, population and seaborne trade, an annual payment of £13,000,000, in place of £162,000. I have not the exact data on which Mr. Bignold has based his calculation, indeed, I have only read a short review of his book, but the Australian writer is not likely to publish such a statement without fairly correct figures to work upon, or to err on the "wrong" side. I may here state that an appeal for the self-governing Colonies to pay a share of the defence of the Empire, calculated on such a basis as given above, however logical the reasoning may be, is not likely to be put forward by the Mother Country. We have an example of the use of policy that the Parliament of Great Britain has adopted, by the taking upon the United Kingdom of the payment of all expenses connected with the colonial contingents serving in the South African War. It will rest upon the self-governing Colonies themselves to declare whether or no they are prepared to share the "Burden of Empire," as well as sharing in the advantages which connection with the Flag gives them.

The possessions of Great Britain, other than those of the great self-governing class referred to, may be regarded as armed links in the chains of communication which bind the Empire together; Malta, Gibraltar, Aden, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bermuda, Jamaica and others which are fitted at enormous cost to afford repairs to vessels of war and trade; places fully armed to oppose even a serious attack. The other group is composed of islands and territories affording markets for the produce of all parts of our Empire, or so placed as to be necessary acquisitions in order to prevent their occupation by other possible hostile Powers. Thus, the Pacific Islands, British New Guinea and Fiji are subservient to and natural appendages of Australia and New Zealand; while Bermuda and the West India Islands are sentries to our trade with the British American countries, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Ascension and St. Helena, if not under the British flag, but possessed by any other nation, would cut asunder the lines of trade between South Africa and the other British territories on the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

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Professor Seely, in his work, "The Expansion of England," says: "With us Empire building has taken the form of pure evolution, little heeded in the process and almost wholly without guidance." If this is the case, a kindly Providence has taken a very careful supervision of our affairs, for as far as human judgment goes, the builders of the British Empire have founded colonies and forged chains of communication which give us powers of offence and defence of incomparable strength. The struggle between nations in the future and the certain cause of future wars will most certainly be due to commercial competition, and the search for markets. In this matter we find that Britain has not been lagging far behind, for we find the following British "protectorates" lately formed, opening vast areas to unrestricted trade:

Southern Nigeria, Northern Nigeria, Somaliland Protectorate, East African Protectorate, Uganda Protectorate, Witu Protectorate, Zanzibar Protectorate, British Central African Protectorate.

All these lately organized territories, added to the newly opened and rich South African Transvaal and Orange River Colonies offer great fields to the industry and commerce of our race. But they must be guarded, or they might fall into the hands of those hungry nations who by protective tariffs drain the earnings from unindustrial and subservient races, so as to enrich alone their own manufacturers and merchants, and to do so bar out anything like open or alien competition. It will thus be seen that the benefits to be derived from the acquisition of new countries and markets are not benefits to the Mother Country only, but are shared by all of the Empire alike, and if the cost of acquisition falls upon the United Kingdom only, it is only fair and reasonable that the cost and burden of maintaining and guarding should fall upon every portion of the Empire which shares in the benefits.

There is a restlessness growing among Britons beyond the seas that the children should bear a share in the trials and the honors which belong to a mighty Empire; there is a longing to bind the scattered fragments of our power into one harmonious and mighty bond. The freedom of the press and speech, the action of our courts of law, the particular mode of carrying on municipal and public affairs, thousand points peculiar to Anglo-Saxon civilization—all these lead us to that particular conduct and attitude which make us hateful to other nations, and force us into ever-tightening bonds of alliance for mutual protection. The time must soon come—indeed, every incident in the life of the Nation shows that the hour has come—when the Empire shall be made one for the defence of each separate and individual part.

III.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR AND HIS PROPOSALS.

At the present time the first duty of every citizen is to make sure that the vital centre of our Imperial power is secure, and the second duty is to assist to carry out an organization for the defence of every part of our great Empire. The combined resources of our Nation are so vast that it is not to be credited that any statesman of any nation upon earth would dare to hazard a war against us if—we were thoroughly organized for defence. We must, however, always bear in mind that the vast extent of surface of the earth which is covered by our flag and the great distances which divide different portions of our domain render some part of it always likely to be involved in disagreement with a foreign Power, and dangerously open to sudden attack at a distance from the seat of our power. For guarding our distant points the Navy is of course of paramount importance, but it is easy to see that our Navy, even if it were of double the strength it is at present, would yet be unable to ensure every portion of the Empire against attack, and we must besides remember that our land frontiers, bordering possible nations, enormous in extent, are probably greater than the land frontiers of any other Power. To defend them we must have land forces, well equipped, well trained and perfectly organized—forces not necessarily confined to the defence of their own immediate frontiers, but ready to move at an instant's notice to give assistance in the defence of any other portion of the Empire whose integrity and interests are threatened. The war in South Africa has proved

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that there is a solidarity of interests binding the different parts of the Empire into one bond. If all our forces were united into a reasonable and powerful organization, it would be a happy thing for the British Empire and a happy thing for the peace of the world. I have shown that the voluntary system which has been in force in the past, and on which the present Secretary of State now continues to depend, is quite inadequate for possible exigencies. The inter-dependence of the Regular Army and the Militia, one intended for service abroad, the other for defence at home, and both strictly limited in the number of effective men, is wrong in principle and untrustworthy in practice. The changes sketched by the Secretary of State for War in his late announcement, are undoubtedly an improvement on the present state. He gives three army corps of the Regular Army at Aldershot, Salisbury Plain, and Colchester respectively, and three other army corps for Militia and Volunteers at York, one in Scotland, the third in Ireland. Should the whole three army corps of Regulars become necessary in the operations of war abroad, it is quite certain that the other army corps of Militia and Volunteers will be called upon to strengthen the forces in the field. This result is as certain as that the sun rises, and once more will we see the Home Defences weakened at the very time when danger will be most imminent. When the best of the Militia are removed from their own ranks and fill the thinned battalions in the field, it will become once more necessary to pick up the weak immature recruit and feed him and teach him at the moment that our enemy will be most likely to be knocking at our gates. Mr. Brodrick also proposes to raise eight British and five Indian battalions for garrison duty: that is good, but it does not meet the difficulties which are pointed out: indeed, it makes it so far the more difficult that we will have to find the reserves for the eight additional British battalions, if they are seriously engaged, and suffer loss by battle or disease. Mr. Brodrick also proposes to give additional pay of 4d. to the soldier who has completed Army, Color or Reserve service, for joining the Militia Reserve. That also is good, but is still inadequate for a full measure of defence. The best part of Mr. Bro-

rick's scheme is the proposal to raise 15 field artillery and 40 heavy batteries of Volunteers. All this is excellent, but the scheme does not in the very least come up to what will be necessary should he become involved in a war such as that in which we are still engaged, unless of course we are prepared to risk the safety of our Home defences in much the same way as we did in 1900 and 1901. Let us examine the case as it will be if Mr. Brodrick's measures are accepted.

Our Home forces are estimated to be:

Regulars	155,000
Reserve	90,000
Militia	150,000
Yeomanry	35,000
Volunteers	250,000
Total..	680,000

Of the 155,000 Regulars we may count upon 35,000 as being under 21 years of age, short of establishment, sick or deserters, leaving 120,000 men available; of the Reserve we may count upon 80,000, giving a total of 200,000. Now, considering that we have had over that number in South Africa for the last two years, it shows that in a war of no greater dimensions than what is taking place there, we would at once have to fall back upon our Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers; that is, we must weaken the very inadequate force which we have for the necessary defence of our shores. I accept the numbers given for our Militia (150,000), Yeomanry (35,000), and Volunteers (250,000) without for one moment believing that more than one-half would be found available, if we judge by the past. With our best endeavors, we know and feel that the equipment, training, and organization of the one-half left will be such that they ought not to be thrust against an equal numerical force of highly-trained regular troops, if such should be landed for the invasion of England. When we consider the certainty with which an army can be concentrated, the facilities now available for the transportation of troops, the rapidity with which transports can move, and the complications which may attend concentration when a combination of hostile enemies is directed against us, it seems madness to entrust the safety of our Island to a less force than 250,000. And these should be

trained troops, thoroughly organized and in the highest state of discipline and efficiency. The reader may judge for himself by the study I have given of the past, whether or no the Mother Country could count upon an effective defence, if we were engaged in a war abroad similar to that of 1900 and 1901, when her Militia (the very heart of our Home defence) would be called upon to supply the Army in the field, and when we bear in mind the history of the effective strength of our Regular Army and Militia, as given by me in the earlier portion of my writing. I maintain and repeat that this voluntary system in spite of the changes proposed by the Secretary of State for War, is totally inadequate to ensure our safety or to satisfy the desires of the citizens of our Empire. We can run no risks; we are able to make our safety certain; it is our duty to do so, and we should never rest till our full responsibility is realized and our Empire safe beyond question or doubt.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE OUR ONLY SAFEGUARD.

I have said that it rests with ourselves to make our defences sufficiently strong to meet any possible strain, and this method lies in the adoption of the principle that "It is the inherent duty of every citizen to defend his country."

Every able-bodied British citizen throughout the Empire, between the ages of 18 and, say, 21, should be made to undergo a period of military (or naval) training, and earn certificates of efficiency in drill and shooting. Only such as are in possession of such certificates should be entitled to enter the Regular or Active Army; all others to pass into the Militia Reserve, which Militia Reserve could be divided into three categories: the First or Active Reserve, the Second or War Reserve, and the Third or Home Reserve.

Comparing our population with that of France, this would give the United Kingdom, an army when on a war footing, of over 3,000,000 men. It would allow the recruit to undergo his full training before entering the Regular Army; it would ensure the Regular Army receiving into its ranks highly efficient men, and it would give an opportunity to all classes to enter the military service as a profession; a de-

sire that burns strongly in the bosoms of our countrymen to-day as it did in the bosoms of our forefathers.

The same system would and should be adopted throughout the Empire (indeed, it has already been partially introduced into New Zealand and Australia) in a more or less modified form as may be best suited to the particular circumstances existing in each country.

The arguments commonly used against universal military service are based on false assertions and improper pleas. The cases are different as regards home defence and foreign service, and it is allowed that foreign service must be kept up by voluntary enlistment into the Regular Active Army. The Militia Billot Act shows that universal personal service is agreeable to the Constitutional Law of England. The State has the right to demand the services of every able-bodied citizen in defence of the country. Mills says in his "Essay on Liberty" that society is justified in enforcing, at all costs, that each person bear his share of the labors and sacrifices incurred in defending society. When Hampden refused to pay ship money, it was admitted that "defence against invasion lay as a burden upon all." In the time of Charles I the law recognized "the obligation of every citizen to bear arms." By the Statutes of Winchester, 1285, "every freeman between 15 and 60 was obliged to be provided with armor to preserve the peace." In Henry VII time the duty of every subject was "to serve and assist his sovereign at all seasons where need shall require." As late as 1806, the principle of the Levy-en-Masse Bill rested "on the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to call upon the services of all liege subjects." In 1807 Lord Sidmouth asserted without contradiction "the right of the State to demand military service of all or every member of the community for the purpose of domestic defence." The law of England is clear on this point, that universal military service can be enforced for the defence of the country.

Let us next deal with the arguments used against compulsory military service. It is urged that it is an infringement of the liberty of the subject. But the foundation of our liberty is resistance to an invader; our personal and social freedom depends upon the liberty which goes with the defence of our country. Another one-

urges that universal military service would injure business and trade. But that this is not the case is shown by the result in Germany, where increase in trade and commerce has gone hand in hand with increased strictness in military universal service; indeed employers have universally stated that the habits of discipline and punctuality inculcated by military training have proved of the greatest benefit. Inasmuch as universal military service means a better insurance against possible national ruin, it is advantageous to every man, woman and child who has an interest in the maintenance of our Empire. Others urge that universal military service would prove an intolerable burden. But why? and upon whom? Tens of thousands bear the burden voluntarily now, and these are men of business and activity employed in civil affairs. No! the burden is so described most generally by men who are constitutionally lazy and opposed to even so short a restriction upon their comfort and idleness. This so-called burden would be gladly bought off by the continued maintenance of an expensive and inefficient standing Army.

Universal military service may be a sacrifice to many, but is it not a proud privilege to be allowed to offer sacrifice for the maintenance of our heritage and for the defence of our homes? Surely all classes are agreed that the protection of our families and properties is not only a duty laid upon every able-bodied man, but is the proudest duty upon which he can be employed. Our nobility has shown its readiness to share in the risks and hardships of a foreign war. Our middle classes have given up comfort and safety to protect the boundaries of the realm. The "common soldier," Thomas Atkins, has once more borne himself not only as a brave but as Lord Roberts calls him a "gentle" man. The spirit to dare and to suffer, to bear and to endure, is as paramount in the Briton of to-day as it ever was in the Briton of the past. Should occasion show that universal military service is necessary for the defence of the Empire, there can be no doubt as to the response which the Nation will give when the question is asked.

I believe I have shown that such a course is necessary. I believe that this great question will shortly be put. To

prepare for such a contingency, I have ventured to put forward facts and figures so as to prepare the minds of those among whom I am now placed. In my next letters I will venture to deal with the military question under universal military service, and offer suggestions as to how our defensive position may be bettered without imposing unreasonable strain upon our economic resources, especially in Canada.

IV.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

The nations of Europe who make universal service the basis of their military power, call upon their manhood in following proportion:

Austria-Hungary, about one man for every 20 of population.

Belgium, about one man for every 30 of population.

France, about one man for every 11 of population.

Denmark, about one man for every 20 of population.

Germany, about one man for every 16 of population.

Italy, about one man for every 24 of population.

The United Kingdom, with her population of 38 millions, could, therefore, easily raise 2,000,000 men, but her insular position does not render such a force necessary, and exemptions might be allowed to classes who are not exempt in such countries as France and Germany. Besides it is reasonable to believe that the voluntary spirit which has taken such a hold upon the British race would lead a very large proportion of our young men to voluntarily acquire a military training, which would exempt them from the annual course of training to which others would become liable.

The Regular Forces, inasmuch as they have to serve abroad, must continue to be composed of volunteers. At present it is estimated that 55,000 recruits are required to maintain the effective strength of the 232,500 which composes the Regular Army. Now, if the regular forces are supplied only from men of the Militia who have completed their annual training, who have acquired certificates of having passed in drill and shooting, and who are of

good character and physique, then these 55,000 men can step at once into the ranks as fit and fighting material, and we need no longer fear the scandal of our ever-increasing percentage of desertions, nor contemplate the long rolls of death and disease caused by the immature youths. We would be saved the humiliation of seeing about one-third of our Regular Army classed as unserviceable, and the staff of our battalions would be saved the time and worry of feeding up a weakened body to undergo the tedious study of being made into a soldier.

The different counties of the United Kingdom would receive their annual contingents at specified centres to undergo the first annual training, which need not be more than for a period of six months. In the second and subsequent years the drill could be carried out at the headquarters of the Militia Army Corps—of which the Secretary of State for War states there are to be three, one in England, one in Scotland, and one in Ireland—for as long as the militiaman is in the First or Active Reserve, say for a period of five years.

The militiaman would then pass into the Second or War Reserve; he would then be liable to attend manoeuvres for a shorter period of time, and after say five years, he would pass into the Third or Home Reserve, and be exempt from military service, except in the event of the country being threatened or invaded.

In Switzerland it is the law that all men who are exempt from military service on account of some legal disability, should be subject to special taxation, where such are taxed at the rate of per man, and Is. 6d. on each £50 of net income; it would appear only fair that exemption from a national duty should be paid for in all countries.

The Artillery and Cavalry branches of the services require a longer training than does the Infantry, and the full proportion of these arms must be maintained in the Militia as much as in the Regular Army. It is well to mention here that it is only fair and reasonable that all retired officers of the Regular Army should, if they receive pensions, be liable for service in the Militia Forces. The enormous non-effective list caused by the retirement of officers who are still in the vigor of life, is becoming a severe burden

upon the public, and there is no justification for it. Besides the employment of able professional officers will be not only a benefit, but almost a necessity when the Militia system is extended.

The duties at the Militia depots and centres will require a large staff of able non-commissioned officers and men. These can be found by employing men of the Regular Army when these have fulfilled their full service with the colors. It may be urged that such employment may weaken the Reserve, but this loss will be more than compensated for by the great inducement which lengthened military service will hold out to men who desire to make the military service their profession. With the advanced rate of pay which Mr. Brodrick proposes to introduce, and the increased prospects of permanent employment, there need be little fear of the 55,000 men who are required annually for the Regular Army not being obtained from the Militia who have completed their annual training.

I do not dwell further on, or enter into the details of a possible organization which may be necessary on the introduction of universal military service into the United Kingdom, except to state that the seaboard countries should provide a contribution to the Naval Reserve on the same principle as obtains now in France and Germany; which countries have at command a large and well-drilled body of seamen to man their navy in the event of war, and to fill up casualties during its continuance.

UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN CANADA.

Canada has a population of 5,338,000 people, and a revenue of \$51,000,000; a frontier of about 60 degrees of longitude divides her from a people counting over 70,000,000, and possessing a revenue of \$670,000,000. If Canada were a nation free and independent, without any claim upon and not forming a part of a great and mighty Empire, she would in case of disagreement with the United States fall within the fullest scope of the Monroe Doctrine, and await with mixed feelings the slow but sure progress of the law of attraction by cohesion. The peoples north and south of this arbitrary boundary are alike in civilization, race and religion, they mix freely, they intermarry, and carry on business with-

out questioning or considering their nationality. The sole difference in opinion lies in the questions of tariffs and customs duties. Sweep away these artificial cobwebs, and the two people would be one within a few years. I say they would be one, and so they would be but for a seemingly slight divergence of opinion—the northern portion worshipping a crossed flag called the Union Jack, while the southern portion falls down with the same devotion before another flag called the Stars and Stripes. Each flag is dear to its people, and represents, in our opinion, all that is glorious, free and progressive upon this planet on which we live. Once, long ago—thank God, long ago!—those flags stood opposed in deadly antagonism, and hatred ensued. We have seen them entwined here and elsewhere to the delight of all who were wise, thoughtful and discriminating of either people. Long may our friendship last! But though that is my most earnest prayer, I am bound by the love I bear to this country of my adoption to ensure myself, and this Canada of which I am an humble citizen, against any wild and unexpected attack from those who are now our nearest and dearest friends.

Canada, in case of attack upon her on the part of the United States, would have to put forward her fullest strength until Great Britain and the sister colonies pushed their shields between the unequal combatants, and lifted their spears to join the war. I say that Canada would have to put forward her fullest strength, and that means the whole manhood of her warlike race. No half measures would do. The numbers which the United States could put into the field, backed by a courage and skill which is unsurpassed by any other nation, would sweep over the plains, and could only be checked by natural barriers which would give our outnumbered citizens a chance to stem the tide.

What could Canada do in the way of military defence? Her best and only protection against an unlikely and improbable, but still a possible attack, would be universal military service. With a population of over 5,000,000, she could doubtless at a stretch put 350,000 armed men into the field; but as her people are scattered over enormous areas, it may be better to count upon 200,000, or one-seventeenth of her

population as a possible maximum. Canada possesses a very great advantage in military strength over the countries of Europe. Her sons are hardy in constitution, accustomed to live in the open air, able to turn their hands to many kinds of work, to use rifle or gun, to ride and manage horses—all this to an extent that is unusual in older countries. Robust in body, ready of resource, they are a material from which can be formed an exceptionally fine body of fighting men, who on their own ground would man for man be impossible to beat, by even the best disciplined troops. Their principal requirement is discipline, an artificial product which would be readily acquired by good organization and a certain amount of drill.

It would require no driving, or very little, to get the martial (for it is martial) male population of Canada to adopt a universal military organization. A tax upon all who do not fire a certain number of rounds at rifle practice, and thus prove themselves efficient to defend the country, would do much, or else an exemption from some general tax for those who do attend. Again, if the law states that a man should be a military efficient in order to defend his country, it would be reasonable to allow the franchise to those only who have acquired a certificate of military efficiency. Once the principle was established that universal military service was the law of the land, there would be little difficulty in carrying the principle into effect.

The method of carrying out the defence of our frontier is a different matter, and to be treated separately.

V.

THE DEFENCE OF CANADA.

If there is one portion of the British Empire Beyond the Seas which requires to be prepared for war, it is the Dominion of Canada. The Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand are so far away from any possible dangerous enemy, that the adventure of an attack against them carries with it too many hazards to be undertaken unless the British fleet has first been destroyed. A combination of Powers which gave a temporary supremacy on the sea to our enemies would not suffice to justify the despatch of an invading host against these distant British

possessions. But it is far otherwise with Canada. The Navy of Great Britain can give no protection, and the Army of the whole Empire would take time to array itself for the defence of Canada should the United States of America determine to invade our land. It is certain that the United States could, and would, if she so desired it, put an army into the field which Canada, unprepared as she is at present, could not resist at any part of her boundaries between the Great Lakes and the Rockies. From the Great Lakes eastward the line of defence is stronger, and the population there is so dense that a waiting race might be fought out against fate. Similarly the passes of the Rockies, of the Selkirk and Coast ranges of mountains would present military positions which could be held by hundreds against thousands. This resistance might possibly be permanently successful. But I see no means by which the result of an invasion of Canadian dominion between the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains can possibly be more than temporarily arrested, until such time as aid comes from those parts of the Empire which lie beyond the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

We may assure ourselves in case of war, that the Eastern and Western provinces of Canada would be threatened so strongly that all the available forces belonging to those parts will be held for their own defence, and that a centre column would cross the prairies in order to seize the Canadian Pacific and any other railways, thus cutting lines of communication from East to West. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how, with the military forces at our disposal, the success of this plan of a campaign can be averted. It will, therefore, be evident to even the humblest of non-military critics, that it is imperatively necessary that the organization and provisions for defence of the West should be independent of the organization and provisions for defence of the East. I allude more particularly to the magazines, arsenals, workshops, and stores upon which, not only the preparations for war, but also its maintenance are dependant.

It would be well that Canada should at once establish a military organization throughout every province, which would allow the manhood of the country to be put on a war footing without

any further preliminaries than a call to arms. Such an organization would naturally be a territorial one, each province being divided into districts. No better arrangement could be instituted than to make these the ordinary electoral districts; but these, where rural, should be massed into groups, over which, at all times, there would be the necessary staff. This staff would be responsible for, and carry out the annual training and be a record office as to the classification of the different classes of Active, War and Home Militia, and have in charge the arms, ammunition and accoutrements for the districts forming the particular group.

The mobilization of the urban populations would be founded on the basis of the present military, or rather Militia organization, but it would appear advisable that the cities should furnish the artillery and cavalry, as also such infantry as may be deemed to require a more thorough drilling than could be given to the rural levies. The artillery particularly could be more thoroughly taught in the cities where guns and stores can be kept, and where there would be more highly trained officers available. It is in the rural districts where we would count upon forming that very valuable arm of the service, the mounted infantry. The Militia men of these agricultural portions would mostly possess horses, they are nearly all good riders, they are accustomed to the rifle and gun, and they would possess a thorough knowledge of the country in which operations were carried on. It is impossible to reckon too highly the importance of this magnificent material.

The arrangements necessary for carrying out such an organization as that indicated would of course take time to perfect, and it would have to be supplemented by the establishment of stores for arms and accoutrements; as also by the erection of central and local magazines for ammunition. At the present time none such exists, I believe, for the whole distance between the Pacific Coast and the Lakes. This is a state of unpreparedness which can only be accounted for by an absolute faith in the pacific intentions of our friends and cousins across the line. It is true that these may be similarly unprepared, but then they can afford to wait. Our population is relatively so small, and our weakness is so great,

that we are much like a lamb feeding on one side of a chalked line with a lion roaming on the other. The lion is the most peaceful of lions—but still, he is a lion.

It is now time to summarize what the armed strength of Canada might become if universal service was introduced:

British Columbia, with a population of say 177,000, will turn out 10,000 men, of whom 5,000 could be mounted infantry.

Manitoba, with a population of 251,000, could supply 12,000 men, of whom 8,000 would be mounted.

New Brunswick, with 331,000 population, could furnish 20,000—3,000 of these mounted infantry.

Now, Scotia, with 459,000 population, could furnish 27,000 men of these 4,000 would be mounted infantry.

Prince Edward Island, population 110,000, could furnish 6,400 men.

Ontario, with a population of 2,182,947, might turn out 128,000, and of these 12,000 might be mounted.

Quebec, with her 1,648,000 population, could furnish 100,000 and of these 8,000 might be mounted.

The North-West Territories has a population of 159,000; she would no doubt supply 9,000 men, and of these as many as 6,000 would probably form an incomparable mounted arm.

I do not think that this would be an excessive number to count upon, if universal service was put into force. It gives an armed strength of about 313,000 men.

We will now look at the existing state of Canadian military affairs.

The Permanent Military Force of Canada consists at present of the following: 109 Dragoons, 60 Mounted Rifles, 229 Field Artillerymen, with 12 guns, 209 Garrison Artillery, 397 Infantry.

The Active Militia has the following establishment: 2,876 Cavalry; 96 guns of Field Artillery, with 1,628 men; 2,219 Garrison Artillery; 212 Engineers; 597 Mounted Rifles; 29,766 Infantry, including the Rocky Mountain Rangers.

The efficiency of the permanent force cannot be questioned, and it is a proof of what could be done with the material at the disposal of the country; but when we come to look into the efficiency of the Active Militia, we find that the cavalry are unsuitable, as shock

tactics are unsuitable to any body which has but a limited training, and they would undoubtedly be better utilized as mounted infantry; that the field artillery have no second line of wagons, so absolutely essential for field service, and no magazines from which to draw supplies, to say nothing of the pattern of their guns; that the garrison artillery have no modern ordnance to practice with to make themselves conversant with their duties; that the infantry are never exercised in bodies under their district commanders, are grouped without regard to their organization for war, are wanting in staff, in modern arms, in equipment, in requirements for camping, for mobility, for supply, for rationing—are in fact an immobile, inert, well-nigh unarmed body, without every essential which is known to be necessary to support, feed and supply an army in the field.

Let me give one example of this state of unpreparedness. I have said that the line of advance which our supposed enemy will most certainly take is that striking across the prairies to cut the line of the Canadian Pacific Railway at some point between Winnipeg and Medicine Hat. The force to meet an enemy consists of the 10th District Command and consists of one field battery one, company of mounted rifles, one battalion of infantry, and one bearer company. There is no organization for a levy of any other portion of the Militia, no staff which could call such an organization into existence, no arsenal where arms could be obtained and necessary stores supplied in the emergency, no magazines from which ammunition can be drawn; and worst of all there is no supply base of any kind to the West, so that the blow which destroyed resistance in the centre of our line, would, for a time, paralyze the West also. Yet Manitoba and the North-West Territories could, under universal military service, put 21,000 men into the field, of which some 14,000 might be mounted, a body of mobile sharpshooters who would so harass an invading force of three times their number, as to seriously threaten the enemy's lines of communication unless these were most carefully and strongly guarded. The difference between the present condition and that which might be, is so great that the most indifferent mind is bound to pause before he accepts

the former as being either sufficient or satisfactory.

VI

The cost of the maintenance of the armies of the Continent of Europe levied under laws of universal military service is as under:

	Peace.	War.
Germany, cost per man..	£51 4	£8 10
France, cost per man....	46 0	8 10
Russia, cost per man....	34 2	8 14
Austria-Hungary, cost per man..	33 15	6 8
Italy, cost per man.....	44 0	7 0

In the United Kingdom under the voluntary system the cost per man is £123 and £49 respectively. Taking into consideration the better class of rations, the superior clothing, higher rates of pay and pension enjoyed by British troops, the cost per man under universal military service is not likely to fall to less than £70 in peace and £12 in war, if it can be brought to as low a point as this. If we assume such a rate it must be understood to be one as a minimum in any calculation that we may arrive at.

Should Canada adopt the scheme of universal military service in a practical form (not theoretically as she does at present), her 300,000 on a war footing would cost her at the rate of \$60 per head, a sum of \$18,000,000 per annum. This is exactly one-third of her revenue, and would undoubtedly be a severe strain upon her resources; yet it would be less than the strain which the United Kingdom has borne during the period which has elapsed since the outbreak of the Boer War, for Great Britain with a revenue of £114,000,000 has expended in 2 1-2 years a sum of £223,000,000 upon her navy; the benefit of these enormous forces is equally shared by Canada and the other portions of the Empire. I submit therefore that the expenditure of a possible sum of \$18,000,000 or even double that amount in a war for our very existence is not too high a price to pay in the way of insurance.

When we come to estimate the strength which our forces should possess upon a peace footing, we should first of all estimate the cost and personnel of the staff which is to carry out the organisation of this militia force, and secondly the cost of erection and maintenance of the arsenals, mag-

azines, stores, and barracks throughout the Dominion. I hope I make myself understood in the matter. I repeat that the permanent force, that is the army of Canada on a peace footing, should be, and must be, the skeleton upon which is to be built up the army when called out on full war footing.

There should be a central war office at Ottawa, there should be head quarters and staff at each Provincial capital, and there should be a permanent staff and corps at the local centres where the annual levies are assembled and drilled. The strength of the staffs and of the permanent corps must vary in proportion to the population of the Province, and the material which is to be formed, whether into artillery, cavalry, mounted infantry or infantry. In such a short space as I can be accorded it would be idle for me to attempt a detailed statement of such an organization as I have indicated above; but as an example and a practical illustration I would say as regards Vancouver, with a population of 20,000, this city would supply 1,500 men on a war footing. Of these 550 would be in the active class, 500 in the war class, and 450 in the home class. The 550 on the active list would in my opinion be best formed into three field battalions and a corps of mounted infantry, which field battalions with guns and equipment complete would be maintained here, as also the magazine necessary for the reserve ammunition for the whole Mainland. The mounted infantry would be an escort for the guns when ordered into the field. At Victoria, which has a population of 21,000 souls, there would be about 450 on the first or active list, 400 on the war and 350 on the home category. These 450 men of the active list would seemingly be best utilised as garrison artillery to man the guns at Esquimalt and garrison the works at that place. The towns of Rossland and New Westminster would apparently also be suitable places for the organisation, drill, and storage of artillery, while those constituencies where the population is more widely scattered would be best suitable for mounted infantry and rifle regiments.

ORGANISATION FOR DEFENCE OF CANADA.

I have dealt with the probable cost to Canada, should her forces of 300,000 be placed upon a war footing, but I

Preparing for

have delayed to the end before dealing with the cost which practical universal military service, a reorganisation of her militia forces and the necessary preparations for war would entail. The reorganisation of the personnel and especially of the staff of her army would have to be very thorough, but the most expensive duty which would befall, would be the erection of magazines, arsenals, stores and perhaps barracks. Canada must make up her mind to carry out these necessary works. The Minister of Militia has already intimated that the militia will be rearmed and rifles manufactured within the Dominion; but there must be provided for a complete supply of arms and stores within reach of the forces when called out, if not in each Province, yet so placed that the distribution can be made within short notice. Large magazines for gun and rifle ammunition and for explosives must also be built, and these should be placed where they cannot be readily reached by an invading army; smaller magazines must be maintained in all districts. The larger magazines and arsenals must be connected by rail with the different railway lines. The Western Provinces must have their supplies intact, and independent of those in the East. The artillery guns, stores, and ammunition must be of the latest pattern and sufficient in amount for 18 months expenditure. Harness, saddlery, clothing and accoutrements will also have to be furnished, and the essential necessaries connected with the hospital and commissariat departments are important factors to be provided for. A skeleton organisation capable of great and sudden expansion has also to be provided for the transport and remount branches of the service.

It will thus be manifest that the calls upon the Government of Canada to provide for a possible war, and to be prepared in every way to meet such a calamity are of a most onerous nature. They represent an initial expenditure of large amount, and it would be well that the taxpayers should prepare himself to bear a burden on this account, somewhat analogous to what the people of the United Kingdom have to bear. It would be folly to attempt to impose an addition of one-fifth to the present taxation, but it is an equal folly, indeed it is a worse folly, to con-

tinue on the lines of the past and the present military system.

A thorough and complete organisation of the military forces of Canada based upon compulsory military service would require not only a permanent war office staff, but also a permanent staff at the headquarters of the different Provinces. For some years to come and until the military system approached completion, the full strength of these offices would not be necessary, but when the whole manhood of the Dominion was on the armed strength we might expect to see such establishments as the following:

WAR OFFICE STAFF.

- The General Commanding and Staff.
- The Adjutant-General, Staff and Office.
- The Quartermaster-General, Staff and Office.
- The Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines, Staff and Office.
- The Commissary General, Staff and Office.
- The Surgeon-General, Staff and Office.
- The General of Transport and Army Remounts, Staff and Office.
- The Inspector-General of Artillery and Mounted Services and Office.
- The Auditor and Accountant-General, Staff and Office.
- The Judge Advocate-General, Staff and Office.

HEADQUARTERS STAFF OF PROVINCES.

- The Officer Commanding and Staff.
- The Assistant Adjutant-General and Assistant Quartermaster-General and Office. (These two offices would at first be combined.)
- The Officer Commanding Royal Artillery.
- The Officer in Charge Commissariat and Transport and Office.
- The Assistant Auditor and Accountant-General and Office.

In 1900 the sum of \$1,850,000 only was voted by the Parliament of Canada for the maintenance of the Dominion Forces; it is manifest that such a sum

is totally inadequate for all practical purposes of defence—but the great evil of the present so-called military system is that this vote can be utilized for political purposes only, at the absolute discretion of the Minister of Militia. The hands of the General Commanding are, to all intents and purposes, tied, even in such matters as discipline and the efficiency of the officers of the forces. The powers of the Executive Officers will have to be clearly defined, so that there need be none of those innumerable discussions which have marked the past relations of the Civil and Military chiefs. The military forces must have no relations with political parties, and there must be no payment of political support by promotion and appointments in the army.

As long as the General Commanding the Militia is an officer of the Imperial Army, there will be a tendency to patronage being exercised by the Minister of Militia himself. When the General Commanding and the Ottawa War Office officials are men of the country, things will soon right themselves, so the sooner the government of the army is taken over by Canada herself, the better it will be for the efficiency of the Forces. It is idle to say that there are no officers of ability and knowledge sufficient to perform the duties in a perfectly satisfactory manner.

It has been shown that the United Kingdom provides about one-fifth of its revenue for the Land Forces only, quite independent of the sum she expends upon the Navy. Canada might reasonably commence by setting apart a sum of say one-tenth her revenue for her military services. This would amount to \$5,000,000, and would serve as a fund on which to build up the skeleton of her future organization. It would, however, be necessary to initiate a programme which would allow of an annual increase in this item of her public expenditure until the total sum necessary for the completion of the programme is reached. Her first requirements are a supply of guns, rifles, ammunition and stores. With these the present unorganized citizens could make some show of a defence—without these and without organization, the country is as helpless as a stalled ox.

We have seen how the nations of Europe, with little exception, have

bailed our country during the South African War. Fortunately they feared to close with the Empire in fight, but other days and other reasons might hearten up our enemies to attempt what they lately would not dare. The United Kingdom might have to use her every man and every ship in defence of her own shores. At such a moment how would Canada be able to deal with an enemy? She has shores to defend against a hostile fleet, and many ports which could be seized and laid under contribution. When the British fleet is called off, the struggle to maintain her land inviolate will fall entirely upon the Land Forces. Let us beware lest any enemy believe that such an adventure as the seizure of our ports is an easy thing. The silly statement which is given out that Canada possesses a Reserve of Militia of 1,000,000, is of no more value than were the painted wooden guns on Chinese fortifications. The armed nations of the world know to a gun and a man what the military strength of every country is, and our unpreparedness and our weakness are well gauged and perfectly understood. We can, however, now satisfy ourselves that the world has learned what the stubborn courage and soldierlike capacity of the Canadian soldier are, and once we take up the matter of armament and reorganization, we may rest assured that respect for the Dominion of Canada will grow more and more, giving weight and emphasis to what our diplomatists may urge.

The present is a most excellent time to inaugurate such a change as is necessary in our military system. There are many officers who have served with marked ability during the war in South Africa, and have that experience so necessary for the matter in hand. These officers are in the prime of manhood and full of zeal and energy. We may expect that they will closely study the details of the organization of the particular service that will fall under their charge, and they will take a particular pride in building up the solid edifice on which will stand the safety of their country and people. It is quite impossible that the state of dependence of Canada upon the Fleet and Army, and also upon the resources of the Mother Country can continue much longer. Canada is bound to prepare herself for maintaining her claim

to be a "nation." No people can justly claim such a title unless they can maintain or hope to maintain their independence against hostile attack. A "nation" also must be in a position to oppose force to force, if her interests or the interests of her people are threatened. Canada in these matters is absolutely and helplessly dependent upon the power of the Mother Country. We should bear in mind the outcry against the Bay of Fundy Fishery Arbitration, and the difficulty experienced in the Behring Sea Arbitration. She must see that questions requiring delicate yet firm handling are always cropping up, which in little or no way directly affect the interests of the rest of the Empire. It is therefore reasonable to expect that we should be pre-

pared to assert our rights, with some hope that the plea of our helplessness will not hurry the decision of a possible hostile people against us in the first moments of popular clamor. What sacrifices are made by other countries, such sacrifices are we prepared to make. The growth of this Dominion in population, commerce, wealth, and in the pride of race, warrants us in preparing for a great future. If the interests of this country and the interests of the British Empire demand that we should bear a greater burden in defence of these interests and rights, it may be accepted that the people at large will cheerfully answer the call of those who have the honor of the Dominion in their charge.



