
START

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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157

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

MG 26 J 4 W. L. M. KING PAPERS

4 Memoranda & Notes

(b) 1922-1932

268 Addresses of Welcome C40551

269 Advertising - Govt. C40556

270 Afghanistan C40566

271 Africa C40583

272 Agriculture C40623

273 Agric. - Equipment C40671

274 Agric. - Prices of Agric. Equipment C40673

275 Ahearn, Thomas C40678

276 Aiyer, Sir Sivaswamy C40688

277 Albani, Madame C40689

278 Albania C40691

279 Alberta Legislation - Disallowance C40699 C40697-8

280 Allen, C. C40703

281 Allenby, Viscount C40706

282 Avery, L. S. C40713

283 Anglo-American Rels. C40721

284 Anglo-American Rels. - Pecuniary Claims C40764

285 Anglo-Can. Rels. C40985

286 Anglo-Egyptian Rels. C40986

287 Anglo-French Rels. C40995

288 Anglo-Japanese Rels. C41117

289 Anglo-Russian Rels. C41355

290 Anti-betting Legislation C41538

291 Apostolic Delegation C41567

292 Arabia C41570

293 Archives - Public Archives of Canada C41614

294 Arts and Letters C41636

295 Astor, John Jacob C41642

296 Athabasca - Co. C41643

297 Auditor-General C41645

298 Australia C41651

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

299 Austria C41661

300 Automobile Industry C41739

301 Aviation - Civil C41742

302 Baldwin, Stanley C41775

303 Bank of Canada C41801

304 Bank of Commerce C41837

305 Banking System C41838

306 Banks C41845

307 Banks - Home Bank C41851

308 Banks - Royal Bank of Canada C41994

309 Banting, Sir Frederick C41997

310 Banting Research Foundation Fund C42013

311 Barron, L. M. C42020

312 Beauchesne, Arthur C42029

313 Beauharnois C42047

314 Beauharnois C42164

315 Beauharnois C42510

316 Beauharnois Investigation C42617

317 Belgium C42779

318 Bell, Graham C42794

319 Bennett, R.B. C42795

320 Bennett, R. B. C42877

321 Bennett, R. B. C43008

322 Bessborough, Lord and Lady C43148

323 Bilingualism C43153

324 Bolivia C43164

325 Bolshevism C43167

326 Bonding Privileges C43171

327 Borden, Sir R. L. C43173

328 B.C. - Prov. Govt. C43185

329 Br. Commonwealth Rels. C43187

330 Br. Empire Exhibition, 1924 C43222

331 B.N.A. Act C43384

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

332 B.N.A. Act - Amendments C43417

333 Br. Preference C43441

334 Brown, Adam C43589

335 Bruce, Stanley C43594

336 Buckley, J. F. C43600

337 Budget C43605

338 Budget C43614

339 Budget C43818 C-43656

340 Budget C43819

341 Budget C43902

342 Bulgaria C44087

343 Burchill, C. J. C44119

344 By-elections C44120

345 By-elections - Bruce North C44206

346 By-elections - Cab. Ministers C44210

347 By-elections - Prince Albert C44249

348 By-elections- Quebec C44326

350 By-elections - Russell C44327

351 By-elections - St. Antoine C44328

352 By-elections - Victoria C44330

353 By-elections - West York C44331

354 Byng, Lord C44332

355 Byrd, Commander C44338

356 Cabinet C44339

357 Cabinet Appointments C44345

358 Cabinet Formation C44356

359 Cabinet Meetings C44367

360 Cabinet Ministers C44372

361 Cabinet Procedure C44423

362 Cabinet Reorganization C44426

363 Cabinet Secrecy C44442

364 Cahau, C. H. C44448

365 Canada - Economic Conditions C44452

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

366 Canada - History C44588

367 Canada - Political Situation C44764

368 Canada - Status C44777

369 Canada House C44890

370 Canadian-Am. Rels. C44891

371 Can. Congress of Labour C45220

372 Can. Council of Agriculture C45230

373 Can. Culture C45310

374 Can. Flag C45313

375 Can. National Exhibition C45333

376 Can. Patriotic Fund C45336

377 Can. Red Cross C45346

378 Can. Rep. to France C45428

379 Can. Rep. to Japan C45508

380 Can. Rep. to the U.S. C45621

381 Canals - Suez C45985

382 Cardin, P. J. A. C45996

383 Carillon Falls C46046

384 Carnegie, David C46091

385 Cattle Embargo C46096

386 Cattle Trade C46170

387 Cecil, Viscount C46177

388 Censorship C46190

389 Census C46191

390 Chamberlain, Austen C46206

391 Chambers of Commerce C46212

392 Chanak Incident 1922 C46234

393 Chanak Incident 1922 C46547

394 Chicago Drainage Canal C46720

395 China C46909

396 Christie, L. C. C47197

397 Citizenship C47201

398 Civil Service C47954

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

399 Civil Service Act C48350

400 Civil Service Appointments C48387

401 Civil Service Assoc. C48392

402 C. S. Classifications C48408

403 C. S. Commission C48409

404 C. S. Dismissals C48450

405 C. S. Economy C48451

406 C. S. Regulations C48572

407 C. S. Reorganization C48590

408 C. S. Salaries C48613

409 C. S. Superannuation C48682

410 C. S. Working Conditions C48692

411 Clark, Sir W. C48705

412 Coal Industry C48909

413 Coal Industry - Maritimes C48940

414 Coal Policy C48952

415 Coates, J. G. C48969

416 Code Communications C48970

417 Combines C48971

418 Combines Legislation C49073

419 Communism C49111

420 Communist Party C49142

421 Companies Act C49149

422 Confederation - Anniversaries C49155

423 Conservative Party - Conv. 1927 C49370

424 Conservative Party - Que. C49386

425 Constitutional Issue 1926 C49387

426 Constitutional Issues C49589

427 Consular Service C49590

428 Consuls - Gen. C49600

429 C.C.F. Party C49602

430 Copyright Legis. C49614

431 Criminal Code C49619

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

432	Criminal Code	C49620
433	Cromie, R. J.	C49622
434	Crows Nest Pass Agreement	C49624
435	Crows Nest Pass Agreement	C49920
436	Cuba	C50256
437	Custodian of Enemy Alien Property	C50263
438	Customs Investigation 1927	C50278
439	Customs Investigation 1927	C50582
440	Customs Investigation 1927	C50795
441	Czechoslovakia	C51050
442	Dafoe, J. W.	C51065
443	Dairy Ind.	C51082
444	Dandurand, Raoul	C51085
445	Deachman, R. J.	C51088
446	Defence Pol.	C51101
447	Dept. of Agriculture	C51124
448	Dept. of Customs and Excise	C51131
449	Dept. of External Affairs	C51144
450	Dept. of External Affairs	C51308
451	Dept. of External Affairs	C51409
452	Dept. of Finance	C51430
453	Dept. of Fisheries	C51460
454	Dept. of Health	C51487
455	Dept. of Immig. & Colonization	C51490
456	Dept. of Indian Affairs	C51505
457	Dept. of Justice	C51522
458	Dept. of Labour	C51523
459	Dept. of Marine and Fisheries	C51594
460	Dept. of Militia & Defence	C51839
461	Dept. of Mines & Resources	C51842
462	Dept. of National Defence	C51844
463	Dept. of National Revenue	C51869
464	Dept. of Postmaster-General	C51875

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

465 Dept. of Public Printing and Stationery C51918

466 Dept. of Public Works C51934

467 Dept. of Public Works - Govt. Bldgs. C51979

468 Dept. of Railways and Canals C51992

469 Dept. of Secretary of State C51997

470 Dept. of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment C52014

471 Dept. of Trade & Commerce C52329

472 Deputy Ministers C52353

473 Disarmament C52355

474 Disaster Relief C52541

475 Divorce C52544

476 Dom. Bureau of Statistics C52545

477 Dom. Experimental Farms C52549

478 Dom. Prov. Conf. 1918 C52559

479 Dom. Prov. Conf. 1927 C52610

480 Dom. Prov. Rels. C53032

481 Dom. Prov. Rels.-Maritime Provs. C53223

482 Dom. Prov. Rels.-N. S. C53471

483 Dom.-Prov. Rels.-P. E. I. C53473

484 Doughty, Sir A. C53497

485 Doukhobors C53501

486 Drury, E. C. C53512

487 Dumping C53514

488 Dunning, C. C53543

489 Economic Pol. C53546

490 Education C53577

491 Education-Ind. Tr. & Tech. Ed. C53581

492 Edward VII C53632

493 Edwards, J. W. C53633

494 Egypt C53641

495 Election of 1921 C53835

496 Election of 1925 C53838

497 Election of 1925 C54160

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

498 Election of 1925 C54335

499 Election of 1925-Alta. C54479

500 Election of 1925 - Campaign C54481

501 Election of 1925 - Results C54505

502 Election of 1926 C54506

503 Election of 1926 - Campaign C54636

504 Election of 1926 - N.B. C54652

505 Election of 1926 - N.S. C54654

506 Election of 1930 C54655

507 Election of 1930 - Campaign C54996

508 Election of 1930 - Candidates C55111

509 Elections - Legislation C55114

510 Election Practices C55153

511 Elections - Prov. - Man. C55171

512 Elections - Prov. - N.S. C55175

513 Elections - Prov. - Ont. C55179

514 Elections - Prov. - Que. C55180

515 Elections - Prov. - Sask. C55182

516 Elections - Redistribution C55187

517 Elections - Single Transferable Vote C55254

518 Elections - Voters' Lists C55285

519 Electoral Reform C55287

520 Emigration to the U.S. C55289

521 Empire Parliamentary Assoc. C55391

522 Eskimos C55393

523 Essex West Co. C55396

524 Estimates C55397

525 Ethiopia C55636

526 European Situation C55700

527 Exports C55751

528 Federal District Comm. C55893

529 Fiscal Policies C55960

530 Fielding, W. S. C55991

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

531 Finance C56012

532 Finance - Anglo-Can. C56190

533 Finance - Govt. Expenditures C56200

534 Finance - Greek Loan C56328

535 Finance - Roumanian Loan C56337

536 Fisher, Sydney C56343

537 Fisheries C56345

538 Fisheries - Can.-U.S. C56353

539 Fisheries Legis. C56769

540 Fisheries - Sockeye Salmon C56770

541 Fishing Ind. C56802

542 Fontaine, J. E. C56812

543 Foreign Pol. C56814

544 Foreign Rels. C56885

545 Forest Conservation C56905

546 Forke, Robert C56930

547 Foster, Sir Geo. C56933

548 Foster, J. G. C56940

549 France C56946

550 France - Occupation of the Ruhr C56952

551 Franchise C57256

552 Franchise Legis. C57263

553 Franco-Can. Rels. C57267

554 Free Methodist Church C57284

555 Freight Rates C57287

556 Freight Rates - B.C. C57366

557 Freight Rates - Lake C57487

558 Freight Rates - Maritime Provs. C57641

559 Freight Rates - Ocean C57645

560 Freight Rates - Ocean - Peterson C57724

561 Fuel C57938

562 Gardiner, J. G. C57968

563 Genoa Conf. 1922 C57969

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

564 Genoa Conf. 1922 C58166

565 Genoa Conf. 1922 C58369

566 George V C58607

567 Georgian Bay Canal C58633

568 Germany C58932

569 Germany C59132

570 Germany C59427

571 Germany - Rhineland Occupation C59574

572 Gordon, G.N. C59654

573 Gouin, Sir Lomer C59760

574 Govt. Appointments C59761

575 Gov.-Gen. C59768

576 Gov.-Gen. - Warrants C59961

577 Grain C59966

578 Grain - Can. Grain Act C59976

579 Grain Elevators C60083

580 Grain - Freight Rates C60085

581 Grain Marketing C60087

582 Grain Policy C60096

583 Grain Routes C60099

584 Greece C60109

585 Greenland C60164

586 Grenfell Mission C60167

587 Guthrie, Hugh C60172

588 Hadow, R. H. C60173

589 Haig, Earl C60174

590 Hampden, Viscount C60179

591 Hanotaux, Gabriel C60180

592 Harbours C60181

593 Harbours - Montreal C60196

594 Harbours - Montreal Harbour Comm. C60199

595 Harbours - Toronto Harbour Comm. C60200

596 Harbours - Vancouver Harbour Bd. C60206

597 Hardy, A. C. C60222

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

598 Haydon, Andrew C60224

599 Health Insurance C60229

600 Heenan, Peter C60231

601 Hepburn, M. F. C60237

602 High Comm. to U.K. C60238

603 Highways C60432

604 Highways - Alaska C60438

605 Highways - Trans Canada C60449

606 Hitler C60451

607 Honours & Awards C60454

608 Hoover, Herbert C60513

609 Hours of Work Legis. C60515

610 H. of C. C60536

611 H. of C. Allocation of Rooms C60539

612 H. of C. Committees C60540

613 H. of C. Pairing Arrangements C60626

614 H. of C. Press Gallery C60628

615 H. of C. Private Members C60632

616 H. of C. Sessional Indemnities C60645

617 Housing Policy C60648

618 Howard, Esme C60650

619 Howe, Joseph C60664

620 Hungary C60707

621 Hydro Electric Power Comm. of Ont. C60743

622 I'm Alone Incident C60758

623 Immigration C60921

624 Immigration Act C61026

625 Immigration - British C61029

626 Immigration - Chinese C61104

627 Immigration - Empire Migration & Settlement C61111

628 Immigration - European C61181

629 Immigration - Farmers C61212

630 Immigration - German C61224

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

631 Immigration - Hindu C61229

632 Immigration - Indian C61241

633 Immigration - Italian C61260

634 Immigration - Japanese C61261

635 Immigration - Jewish C61334

636 Immigration - Oriental C61335

637 Immigration Policy C61601

638 Immigration - U.S. C61802

639 Immigration - Ukrainian C61814

640 Imperial Conf. 1921 C61817

641 Imperial Conf. 1923 C62215

642 Imperial Conf. 1923 C62542

643 Imperial Conf. 1923 - Channels of Communication C63186

644 Imperial Conf. 1923 - Defence C63213

645 Imperial Conf. 1923 - Treaty Making Powers C63362

646 Imperial Conf. 1926 C63375

647 Imperial Conf. 1926 C63637

648 Imperial Conf. 1926 C64005

649 Imperial Conf. 1926 C64207

650 Imperial Conf. 1930 C65643

651 Imperial Conf. 1930 C65788

652 Imperial Economic Committee C65902

653 Imperial Economic Conf. 1923 C65935

654 Imperial Economic Conf. 1923 C66197

655 Imperial Economic Conf. 1923 C66203

656 Imperial Economic Conf. 1923 C66531

657 Imperial Economic Conf. 1923 C66767

658 Imperial Economic Conf. 1923 C66925

659 Imperial Forestry Conf. 1923 C67077

660 Imperial Institute C67081

661 Imperial Preference C67094

662 Imperial Rels. C67201

663 Imperial Rels. C67551

664 Imperial Rels. - Communications C67866

665 Imperial Rels. - Defence C67888

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

666 Imperial Rels. - National Status C68286

667 Imperial Rels. - Treaty Making Powers C68423

668 Imperial Shipping Committee C68551

669 Imperial Trade C68606

670 Imports C68617

671 India C68621

672 Industrial Disputes C68653

673 Ind. Disputes Inv. Act. 1907 C68654

674 Ind. Disputes - Mining Ind. C68667

675 Ind. Disputes - N.S. C68712

676 Ind. Disputes - Postal Strike C68850

677 Ind. Disputes - Railways C68933

678 Ind. Rels. C68940

679 Industry & Humanity C69091

680 Institute of Pacific Rels. C69110

681 Insurance Companies C69113

682 Insurance Legis. C69114

683 Insurance Rates C69154

684 Inter-Allied Conf. 1922 C69328

685 Inter-Allied Conf. 1924 C69359

686 International Boundary Waters C69699

687 Int. Conf. of American Historians C70183

688 International Joint Comm. C70189

689 International Labour Conf. C70272

690 International Labour Office C70299

691 International Rels. C70322

692 Iraq C70399

693 Irish Free State C70432

694 Italian - Canadians C70513

695 Italy C70529

696 Japan C70651

697 Japanese - Canadians C70839

698 Japanese - Canadian Rels. C70844

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

699 Japanese Rep. at Ottawa C70855

700 Johnston, Geo. B. C70870

701 Judiciary C70873

702 Judiciary - Appointments C70876

703 Judiciary - Alberta C71047

704 Judiciary - N.B. C71048

705 Judiciary - N.S. C71049

706 Judiciary - Ont. C71050

707 Judiciary - Pensions C71090

708 Judiciary - P.E.I. C71094

709 Judiciary - Que. C71096

710 Judiciary - Salaries C71115

711 Judiciary - Sask. C71145

712 King, W.L.M. Admin. 1921-1925 C71150

713 King W.L.M. Admin. 1925-1926 C71180

714 King, W.L.M. Admin. 1926-1930 C71194

715 King, W.L.M. Appointments C71209

716 " " " C71211

717 " " " C71271

718 " " " C71293

719 " " " C71467

720 " " " C71584

721 " " " C71793

722 " " " C71947

723 " " " C72060

724 " " " C72219

725 King, W.L.M. - Biographical C72413

726 " " - Chronologies C72579

727 " " - Chronologies C72630

728 " " - Chronologies C72637

729 " " - Chronologies C72649

730 " " - Chronologies C72667

731 " " - Chronologies C72683

732 " " - Chronologies C72711

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

733 King, W.L.M. - Chronologies C72760

734 " " - Chronologies C72796

735 " " - Finances C72805

736 " " - Gifts C72821

737 " " - Honours & Awards C72823

738 " " - Invitations C72861

739 " " - Invitations C73124

740 " " - Invitations C73228

741 " " - Invitations C73344

742 " " - Messages C73417

743 " " - Personal C73470

744 " " - Personal C73807

745 " " - Personal C74118

746 " " - Personal C74632

747 " " - Personal C75054

748 " " - Personal C75396

749 " " - Personal C75788

750 " " - Personal C76239

751 " " - Personal C77005

752 " " - Personal C77326

753 " " - Personal C78092

754 " " - Personal C78965A

755 " " - Photographs & Portraits C79089

756 " " - Prince Albert Cottage C79111

757 " " - Publications C79129

758 " " - Req. for Assistance C79271

759 " " - Req. for Autographs C79274

760 " " - Req. for Interviews C79281

761 " " - Req. for letters of Introduction C79300

762 " " - Req. to Speak C79301

763 " " - Social Engagements C79302

764 " " - Speaking Tours - Maritime Provinces C79331

765 " " - " " - Ont. C79332

766 " " - " " - Que. C79347

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

767 King, W.L.M. - Speaking Tours - Western Provinces C79351

768 " " - " " - Western Provinces C79951

769 " " - " " - Western Provinces C80306

770 " " - " " - Western Provinces C80409

771 " " - Speeches & Addresses C80529

772 " " - Staff C80664

773 " " - Trips C80670

774 " " - Trips to Britain & Europe C80723

775 " " - Trips to Britain & Europe C80735

776 " " - Trips to Britain & Europe C80784

777 " " - Trips to Britain & Europe C81226

778 " " - Trips to U.S. C81708

779 King's (P.E.I.) Co. C81710

780 Kingsmere C81711

781 Knight, Georges Jean C81712

782 Korea C81717

783 Labour Legis. C81733

784 Labour Parties C81756

785 Labour Policy C81757

786 Labour Unions C81822

787 Labrador C81833

788 Labrador Boundary Dispute C81840

789 Lacasse, Gustave C81846

790 Lapointe, Ernest C81848

791 Lake of the Woods C81850

792 Larkin, P.C. C82106

793 Latvia C82168

794 Laurier, Sir Wilfrid C82184

795 Laurier, Sir Wilfrid - Monument Committee C82185

796 Laurier, Sir Wilfrid - Statue C82192

797 Laurier House C82199

798 Lausanne Conf. 1922-1923 C82203

799 Lausanne Conf. 1922-1923 C82337

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

800 Lausanne Conf. 1922-1923 C82534

801 League of Nations C82698

802 " " C82959

803 " " Assembly C83358

804 " " Can. Advisory Officer C83843

805 " " Can. Delegates C83899

806 " " Council C83916

807 " " Disarmament Conf. C83934

808 " " International Economic Conf. C84127

809 " " Mandatory Powers C84134

810 " " Membership C84160

811 " " Sanctions C84168

812 " " Society C84169

813 " " World Economic Conf. C84192

814 Leather Ind. C84196

815 Legations C84198

816 Lemieux, Rodolphe C84291

817 Liberal Party C84297

818 " " Caucus C84318

819 " " Finances C84334

820 " " Leadership C84449

821 " " Man. C84454

822 " " Maritime Provs. C84465

823 " " Nat. Federation C84466

824 " " Nat. Lib. Org. Comm. C84496

825 " " Nat. Office C84526

826 " " Org. C84658

827 " " Ont. C84765

828 " " Programme & Policies C84818

829 " " Publicity C84884

830 " " Quebec C84963

831 " " Western Provinces C84964

832 " " Women C84969

833 Liberalism C85066

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

834 Lieut-Govs. C85087

835 " " Constitutional Position C85095

836 " " Protocol C85101

837 Lieut.-Governorships - B.C. C85110

838 " " - Man. C85112

839 " " - N.B. C85114

840 " " - N.S. C85115

841 " " - Ont. C85118

842 " " - P.E.I. C85119

843 " " - Que. C85121

844 Lindberg, Col. Charles C85127

845 Liquor Control C85132

846 Liquor Legis. C85143

847 Liquor Policy C85148

848 Liquor Prohibition C85178

849 Liquor Smuggling C85299

850 Lithuania C85463

851 Livestock & Meat Packing Ind. C85501

852 Lloyd George, David C85503

853 Lumber Ind. C85505

854 MacDonald, J. Ramsay C85507

855 MacDougal, I. D. C85601

856 McMurray, E. J. C85602

857 MacPhail, Agnes C85603

858 Manchuria C85604

859 Maniere, R. J. C85617

860 Manitoba C85618

861 Marconi Beam System C85640

862 Maritime Provs. C85641

863 Maritime Provs. - Econ. Conditions C85651

864 Marketing C85656

865 Marketing Legis. & Pol. C85661

866 Marler, H.M. C85666

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

867 Massey, W. F. C85671

868 Meighen, A. C85672

869 Massey, Vincent C85713

870 Meighen, A. - Admin. C85796

871 Meighen, A. - Hamilton Speech C85801

872 Mennonites C85832

873 Message of the Carillon C85858

874 Message of the Carillon C86080

875 " " " " C86368

876 " " " " C86601

877 " " " " C86691

878 " " " " C86877

879 Mexico C87151

880 Mining Ind. C87169

881 Mitchell, A. F. C87173

882 Monetary Pol. C87189

883 Moore, Irene C87203

884 Morocco C87452

885 Motherwell, W. R. C87486

886 Mulock, W. P. C87497

887 Munitions C87498

888 Murphy, Charles C87560

889 Mussolini C87561

890 Narcotics Traffic C87562

891 Nat. Council of Women C87568

892 Nat. Research Council C87598

893 National Status C87755

894 Nationalism C87844

895 Native Sons of Can. C87845

896 Natural Resources C87849

897 " " C87908

898 " " - Alberta C87961

899 " " -Alberta C88156

900 " " - B. C. C88269

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

901 Natural Resources - Man. C88324

902 " " - Man. C88591

903 " " - Man. C88959

904 " " - Man. C89378

905 " " - Man. C89573

906 " " - Prairie Provs. C90006

907 " " - Prairie Provs. C90281

908 " " - Sask. C90387

909 " " - Western Provs. C90496

910 " " - Western Provs. C90607

911 Naval Conf. Geneva 1927 C90852

912 Naval Conf. London 1930 C90943

913 Naval Pol. C90979

914 Netherlands C91049

915 N. B. C91053

916 Newfoundland C91055

917 New Zealand C91060

918 Niagara Falls C91061

919 Northwest Territories C91170

920 Norway C91174

921 N. S. - Economic Conditions C91177

922 N. S. Prov. Govt. C91191

923 Obituaries 1930-1931 C91193

924 Oleomargarine C91349

925 Olympic Games C91357

926 Ontario C91358

927 Ontario Associated Bds. of Trade C91368

928 Ontario - Prov. Politics C91379

929 Orange Order C91385

930 Orders-in-Council C91386

931 Ottawa Car Manufacturing Co. C91410

932 Ottawa Centenary C91585

933 Ottawa Improvement Plans C91592

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

934 Oxford & Asquith, Lord C91605

935 Pacaud Lucien C91616

936 Pacific Cable C91618

937 Palestine C91666

938 Pan-American Confs. C91694

939 Pan-American Union C91735

940 Pan-Pacific Union C91771

941 Paris Exhibition C91776

942 Parks - National C91782

943 Parliament - Adjournment C91805

944 Parliament Bldgs. C91806

945 Parliament - Dissolution C91859

946 Parliament - Hansard C91873

947 Parliament - Members C91875

948 Parliament - Opening C91929

949 Parliament - Proceedings C91970

950 Parliament - Sessions C91996

951 Parliament - Speech from the Throne C92375

952 Parliament - Summoning C92693

953 Parliamentary Assistants C92759

954 Parliamentary Procedure C92760

955 Party Govt. C92779

956 Passports & Visas C92803

957 Patents C92806

958 Patronage C92807

959 Patronage - Man. C92827

960 Patronage - Ont. C92828

961 Peace River Development C92830

962 Pelagic Sealing C92883

963 Pensions C93044

964 Pensions - Old Age C93077

965 Permanent Court of International Justice C93418

966 Persia C93566

967 Petroleum Ind. C93705

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

968 Phillips, Wm. C93719

969 Poland C93721

970 Pope, Sir Joseph C93796

971 Postal Service C93799

972 Poulict, J. F. C93806

973 Poultry Ind. C93807

974 Presbyterian Church C93817

975 Press C93841

976 Press - Can. C93953

977 Press - London Advertiser C93970

978 Press - Montreal Herald C93971

979 Press - Ottawa Citizen C93978

980 Press - Toronto Globe C93980

981 Press - Toronto Star C93985

982 Press - U. K. C93986

983 Press - U. S. C93988

984 Prices C93990

985 Prime Minister's Office C93994

986 Prince Albert - Co. C94139

987 Privy Council C94323

988 Progressive Party C94331

989 Progressive Party - Man. C94362

990 Proportional Representation C94363

991 Protocal C94380

992 Publicity - Can. Govt. C94393

993 Pulp & Paper Ind. C94398

994 Purchasing Comm. C94449

995 Radio Broadcasting C94476

996 Railway Amalgamation C94480

997 " Employees C94485

998 " Passes C94516

999 " Policy C94517

1000 Railways C94606

1001 " - Bd. of Railway Comms. C94678

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1002 Railways - Can. Govt. C94733

1003 " - C.N.R. C94736

1004 " - C.N.R. & C.P.R. C94839

1005 " - C.N.R. Directorate C94847

1006 " - C.N.R. Finances C94864

1007 " - C.N.R. Hotels C94871

1008 " - Can. Northern C94881

1009 " - Can. Northern - Finances C94890

1010 " - C.P.R. C94894

1011 " - Grand Trunk C94910

1012 " - Grand Trunk Pacific C94920

1013 " - Grand Trunk Railway Shareholders C94941

1014 " - Hudson Bay C94950

1015 " - Intercolonial C95005

1016 " - Maritime Provinces C95011

1017 " -N. S. C95015

1018 Ralston , J. L. C95021

1019 Religion C95037

1020 Remembrance Day C95052

1021 Retail Merchants Assoc. C95072

1022 Reynolds, J. B. C95089

1023 Riddell, W. A. C95091

1024 Robb, J. A. C95092

1025 Roman Catholics - English Speaking C95096

1026 Roumania C95098

1027 R.C.M.P. C95112

1028 R.C.N. C95114

1029 R.C. on Customs & Excise 1926 C95116

1030 R.C. on Grain C95135

1031 R.C. on Maritime Claims C95168

1032 R.C. on Pulpwood C95235

1033 R.C. on Professional & Technical Services C95236

1034 R.C. on Transportation C95246

1035 Royal Commissions C95494

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1036 Royal Family C95504

1037 Royal Society of Can. C95513

1038 Rural Credit C95541

1039 Saar Valley C95580

1040 St. Lawrence Waterways C95780

1041 " " " C96026

1042 " " " 896138

1043 " " " C96418

1044 " " " C96523

1045 " " " C96773

1046 Sask. - Prov. Pol. C96977

1047 Sastri, Srinivasa C96982

1048 "The Secret of Heroism" C97003

1049 Selekman, B.M. C97006A

1050 Senate C97007

1051 Senate Appts. C97017

1052 Senate Reform C97053

1053 Senatorships C97152

1054 " -B.C. C97273

1055 " -Man. C97274

1056 " -Ont. C97300

1057 " -Women C97403

1058 Separate Schools - Ont. C97436

1059 Shipping C97437

1060 Shipping - Merchant Marine C97551

1061 Shortt, Adam C97597

1062 Siam C97598

1063 Sifton, C. C97642

1064 Sinclair, W.E.N. C97643

1065 Smuggling C97645

1066 Smuggling C97825

1067 Smuts, J. C97945

1068 Social Security C97967

1069 St. American Republics C97975

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1070 Southern Rhodesia C97990

1071 Statute of Westminster C98018

1072 Steamship Service C98022

1073 Steamship Service - West Indies C98025

1074 Steel Industry C98029

1075 Stefanson, V. C98036

1076 Stevens, H. H. C98046

1077 Stuart, Sir C. C98062

1078 Stubbs, L. S. C98064

1079 Supreme Court of Alberta C98068

1080 Sweden C98070

1081 Syria C98075

1082 Takamatsu, Prince and Princess C98077

1083 Tariff Advisory Bd. C98088

1084 Tariff - Agricultural Implements C98423

1085 Tariff Bd. C98438

1086 Tariff - Automobiles C98497

1087 " - Coal C98513

1088 " - Farm Products C98516

1089 " - Fruits & Vegetables C98524

1090 " - Lumber C98627

1091 Tariff Policy C98628

1092 " " C98733

1093 " " C98933

1094 " " C99096

1095 " " C99422

1096 Tariff - Steel C99567

1097 " - Sugar C99570

1098 " - Textiles C99573

1099 " - U. S. C99694

1100 " - Vegetable Oils C99831

1101 Taxation C99832

1102 " - Cooperatives C99949

1103 " - Income C99956

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1104 Taxation - Sales C100030

1105 Telecommunications C100055

1106 Territorial Waters C100062

1107 Textile Industry C100064

1108 Thomas, J. H. C100163

1109 Thornton, Sir Henry C100168

1110 Trade C100193

1111 Trade Agreements C100219

1112 Trade - Anglo-Can. C100230

1113 " Policy C100237

1114 " Can-Amer C100417

1115 " with Australia C100455

1116 " with Australia C100711

1117 " with Caribbean Countries C100712

1118 " with China C100721

1119 " with Germany C100881

1120 " with Greece C100941

1121 " with Japan C100943

1122 " with the Netherlands C100960

1123 " with Newfoundland C100963

1124 " with New Zealand C100969

1125 " with Portugal C100984

1126 " with South Africa C100986

1127 " with South American Republics C100999

1128 " with Spain C101006

1129 " with Switzerland C101011

1130 " With U.S.S.R. C101019

1131 " with West Indies C101056

1132 Trades & Labour Council C101184

1133 Translations - Bureau of Translations C101381

1134 Treaties C101402

1135 " - Boundary (Can.-Amer.) C101481

1136 " - Extradition C101531

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1137 Treaties - Geneva Protocol C101560

1138 " - Halibut Fisheries C101704

1139 " - International Boundary Waters C101762

1140 " - Kellogg - Briand Pact 1928 C101888

1141 " - Lausanne Treaty 1923 C102040

1142 " - Locarno C102303

1143 " - Mutual Guarantee C102418

1144 " - Ratification Procedure C102432

1145 " - Rush-Bagot Agreement C102453

1146 " - Sèvre C102504

1147 " - Sockeye Salmon C102520

1148 " - Versailles C102558

1149 Turkey C102563

1150 Turkey C102758

1151 Unemployment C102959

1152 " & Farm Relief C102977

1153 " Insurance C103100

1154 " - Man. C103153

1155 " Policy C103159

1156 " Policy C103269

1157 " Relief C103506

1158 Union of South Africa C103575

1159 U.S.S.R. C103578

1160 U.S.S.R. - Russo-Can. Rels. C104085

1161 United Church of Can. C104288

1162 United Farmers of Man. C104299

1163 United Farmers of Sask. C104300

1164 U.K. - Defence Policy C104333

1165 U.K. - Foreign Policy C104341

1166 U.K. - High Comm. in Can. C104521

1167 U.S. - Rep. at Ottawa C104676

1168 U.S. C104758

1169 U.S. - Economic Conditions C104815

1170 U.S. - Foreign Policy C104825

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1171 U.S. - Political Sit. C104832

1172 Universities C104836

1173 Universities - McGill C104838

1174 Vimy Memorial C104839

1175 War Graves - Imp. War Graves Comm. C104877

1176 Washington Conf. 1921-1922 C104882

1177 " " " C105099

1178 " " " C105404

1179 Waterpower C105794

1180 " - Export C105797

1181 " - Federal Jurisdiction C105849

1182 " - N.B. C105852

1183 " - Ont. C105860

1184 Waterways C105868

1185 Welland Canal C105910

1186 W. Provs. - Pol. Sit. C105912

1187 Wheeler, Dr. Seager C105913

1188 Willingdon, Lord C105922

1189 Wilson, L. A. C105980

1190 Woodsworth, J. S. C105982

1191 Workmen's Compensation Legis. C105985

1192 World Poultry Congress C105986

1193 W.W.I - Demob. & Rehab. C105997

1194 " - Finance C106011

1195 " - Reparations C106025

1196 " - " C106404

1197 " - " C106725

1198 " - " C106952

1199 " - Soldiers Settlement Bd. C107215

1200 " - Veterans C107219

1201 " - War Criminals C107275

1202 " - War Debts C107279

1203 " - War Memorials C107345

1204 " - War Trophies C107361

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1205 Wrangel Island C107363

1206 York North - Co. C107403

1207 Yugoslavia C107443 - C107453

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Cole - Immigration policy

C 61705

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LIBERAL WOMEN OF CANADA.

The Following is a public Statement issued by the Department of Immigration, January 1st., 1929.

Immigration has occupied an unusually large place in public attention during 1928. An indication of the importance which is attached to this subject was the order of Parliament referring to the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization the general subject of Immigration, including the work of the Department of Immigration and Colonization, for consideration and report. The Committee considered the subject in much detail, heard many witnesses, and presented its report to Parliament in due course.

The recommendations contained in the report were mainly along lines of activity already pursued by the Department. They included special passage rates for British farm settlers, continuance of arrangements for the movement of domestics from the United Kingdom to Canada, the extension of the Assisted Passage privileges to families of all immigrants from Great Britain who had established themselves in Canada prior to June 6, 1928; and that steps be taken with the object of obtaining a reduction in the general ocean rate to British immigrants to approximately £10. The Committee also went on record as approving the extension of tri-partite agreements between British, Federal and Provincial Governments for the encouragement of British land settlers.

The report was at the time, and since, widely discussed in the Press, and therefore perhaps need not be quoted in greated detail in the present article. Its effect has undoubtedly been to further stimulate healthy interest in the subject of immigration, and to promote a recognition that this is a subject involved in many complexities, the best solution of which is essential to the growth and prosperity of the Dominion.

The beginning of the year found the Department actively engaged in immigration work through its organization in the British Isles and the United States and from headquarters at Ottawa. The appeal for immigrants was directed to those who take up life on the land, either as farm owners or labourers, and to female houseworkers who would engage in domestic service. To facilitate the movement of such settlers from Great Britain a system of Assisted Passages was in effect under which the British and Canadian Governments and the transportation companies co-operated in establishing the following rates for adult settlers from the British port to points in Canada:-

To Halifax, St.John or Quebec	£2 0.0
" Montreal	3. 0.0
" Toronto	3.10.0
" Winnipeg	4.10.0
" Regina, Moose Jaw or Saskatoon	5. 0.0
" Calgary or Edmonton	5.10.0
" Vancouver	5. 0.0

Children under seventeen belonging to the classes eligible for assistance received free transportation, paid for by the British and Canadian Governments at a reduced rate arranged with the steamship companies. These rates are still in effect.

In connection with these passage schemes there is an arrangement effective throughout Canada by which any British subject in Canada may nominate a British subject in the United Kingdom for passage assistance. If the nominator in Canada is not acquainted with any suitable person on the other side, he may nominate by description.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

A system for handling women immigrants from Great Britain of the housoworker class had also been developed to a considerable degree of efficiency. Women officers were attached to the staff in all the principal agencies in the British Isles to interview intending women immigrants in order that they might be given help and advice and correct information regarding conditions in Canada. A number of the principal steamship companies in the Canadian Trans-Atlantic Service had adopted the practice of carrying conductresses as ships' officers. Women officers were placed at the Canadian Atlantic ports to receive and assist women and children, and conductresses were employed on the trains to be responsible for such passangers. Women's hostels in some of the principal Canadian centres provided free accommodation for from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after arrival, paid for by the Department of Immigration to women and girls seeking employment as house workers, and the women and girls were placed in employment either through the Employment Service of Canada or by the Women's Branch of the Immigration Department in co-operation with some of the hostels. These facilities for women immigrants are still being provided.

Another class of immigration to which much attention was given is juveniles. Every boy or girl coming within this classification is subject to medical examination and is carefully inspected by Canadian officials to determine his or her fitness for Canada. Employers in Can ada are selected with a view to giving the child a good home and opportunity to acquire a useful training.

A nation-wide system of advice and after-care for immigrants has also been established. The men engaged in this work are in many cases graduates of agricultural colleges and have also had practical agricultural experiences and are able to give first-hand knowledge to the new settler concerning values and the best method of farm operations. The only country besides the British Isles in which active immigration work is carried on is the United States. from which there is an increasing flow of farm settlers.

Such is, in brief, the background against which the year's immigration activities have been carried on. The viewpoint of the Department of Immigration and Colonization has been that Canadians desire neither a drying-up of the streams of immigration nor a flood that cannot be readily absorbed in the country. The activities of the Department have been designed to avoid both of these extremes and to encourage a steady and solid movement of the types who are needed in the development of this country. The movement shows some increase, although not a conspicuously large one, over that of the preceding year, as is by the table of immigration to Canada for eleven months in 1928 compared with the same period in 1927.

Statement of Immigration to Canada, for the Eleven Months ended November 30, 1927, compared with that of the corresponding Months of 1928.

1927.	British	Preferred Countries.	United States.	Other countries	Totals.
January.	899	1,125	905	1,235	4,164
February.	1,180	1,197	930	2,206	5,521
March	4,912	5,184	2,028	8,147	20,271
April	11,803	7,940	2,518	13,180	35,441
May	8,408	6,634	2,503	6,996	23,941
June	7,272	3,412	2,642	4,726	18,052
July	5,032	2,766	2,801	2,389	12,288
August	3,791	2,096	2,623	1,732	10,242
September	3,315	1,737	2,254	1,755	9,061
October	3,575	1,730	2.283	1,845	9,433
November.	1,816	1,004	1,739	1,345	5,904
Totals.	52,003	34,225	22,534	45,556	154,318

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61707

	British	Preferred countries.	United States	Other countries	Totals.
1928.					
January	771	630	1,223	1,068	3,692
February	1,002	846	1,454	1,010	4,312
March	3,150	4,634	2,383	4,498	14,665
April	9,680	5,316	2,927	9,060	26,983
May	7,195	4,583	3,096	8,767	23,641
June	6,820	3,598	3,320	6,565	20,303
July	4,287	2,209	3,044	6,243	15,783
August	12,460	2,886	3,581	6,413	25,340
September	4,434	2,075	2,739	2,415	11,663
October	2,514	1,577	2,667	1,283	8,041
November.	2,059	1,389	1,955	1,441.	6,844
Totals.	54,372	29,743	28,389	48,763	161,267

In addition to carrying on along the well defined lines of immigration activity already indicated, considerable new ground has been broken. During the previous year an agreement was completed between the British Government, the Canadian Government, and the Government of New Brunswick, which provides for the placement of 500 British settlers and their families on improved farms in New Brunswick during the period from Mar. 1, 1928, to Mar.31,1934. Settlement under this plan began in 1928 during which year 100 families were placed on the land. The plan follows the general scheme of the 3,000 British families settlement, which has already met with so much success, except that in this case the Canadian co-operation is given by the Province and the Dominion working together, instead of exclusively by the Dominion Government. The Dominion Government, through its Department of Immigration and Colonization, recruits and selects the settlers in the British Isles and, co-operating with the Government of New Brunswick, locates the settlers in that province and extends settlement service through its Land Settlement Branch. The Government of New Brunswick acquires the necessary farms and sells them to the settler on terms calling for 25 annual payments with interest amortized at the rate of 5 percent per annum. The British Government provides funds for acquiring stock and equipment, and for initial expenses, which sums will be repayable on the same terms as the price of the land. Losses, if any, on account of stock and equipment, will be shared by the British and Canadian Governments. Although as yet this settlement plan has been accepted only by the province of New Brunswick, hopes are entertained that other provinces will decide to co-operate along similar lines.

Extensive negotiations were carried on with the British Government and with other interests concerned with a view to putting into effect the recommendations of the Select Standing Committee already referred to. As a result of these negotiations the Honorable Robert Forke, Minister of Immigration and Colonization, was recently able to announce that the third class passage ocean rate for British migrants coming to Canada has been reduced from £18.15.0 to £10. Any British subject in the United Kingdom who is in the position to pay this rate can come to Canada without any formality other than medical examination before leaving the United Kingdom. Migrants are expected to have sufficient means to provide for themselves until they obtain employment, unless they are coming to friends or relatives who will care for them until they find work. It is believed that this reduced ocean rate will lead to a substantial increase in British immigration coming to Canada without government assistance

Arrangements, in which the British Government participates, have been made for the settlement of wives and children of men who were satisfactorily settled in Canada before June 6th last. Such wives and children will receive assisted passages, at the rate of £3.15.0 for adults with free passages for children under seventeen years of age.

Assisted passages at the rates prevailing last year, that is, from £2 to £3 according to destination in Canada, will be available for women household workers and for families proceeding to work on the land, with free passages for all members of such families under 19 years of age. Boys under 19 years of age accepted under any Government scheme for juvenile farm workers or proceeding under the auspices of a recognised voluntary society, and girls up to 17 years of age proceeding to suitable homes under the same arrangements, will receive free transportation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

There will be no assisted passages under the Government scheme for single men next year. In cases where single men are not in a position to provide the whole of the £10.0.0 rate it has been arranged that the British Government may provide loans to approved agricultural workers.

Completion of the settlement of 3,000 Families on the land in Canada has been extended for another year and 350 additional families will be settled under that scheme in 1929.

Agreements have been made between the British and Canadian Governments and the Governments of the provinces of New Brunswick Ontario and Manitoba which provide for establishing provincial reception and distributing farms in those provinces and for the subsequent settlement of British boys. British boys between 14 and 19 years of age, suitable for a future on the land, will be received and distributed from these reception homes to farm homes selected under the supervision of the Provincial Governments. The minimum wages are to be $19 per month with free board, lodging, washing and mending. This is the first step in a plan for establishing British boys as farmers in these provinces. To enable boys to become farm owners in their own right the British and Canadian Governments have agreed to loan up to $2500 to each applicant when he reaches the age of 21 years, provided he has acquired the necessary experience and has saved approximately $500, the capital thus available to be used to establish himself on a farm of his own. Applications for settlement under this scheme are now being received and settlement will commence next year.

The provinces of Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia will also participate in the scheme for bringing British boys to Canada for farm placement under the joint auspices of British, Dominion and Provincial Governments. The present participation of the Saskatchewan Government will provide for the use of the Agricultural College at Saskatoon as a reception home for British boys and the distribution of the boys to suitable farm homes in the province. Nova Scotia has not yet established a distributing centre, but is co-operating by placing a limited number of boys in suitable farm homes and giving supervision, and has also decided to participate in the Boys' Land Settlement Scheme.

Facilities for the free medical examination of all migrant proceeding to Canada have been extended by providing that the migrant may if he so desires be examined free of charge by one of approximately 500 British doctors or by one of the official doctors of the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government is using every possible means to facilitate medical examination in the United Kingdom without inconvenience to the migrant and so as to provide against the possibility of his being turned back for reasons of health upon arrival at the Canadian port.

To meet the need for housing accommodation for families in rural districts in Canada a scheme for the erection of cottages has been discussed with the Provincial Governments. One hundred cottages are to be erected in the province of Ontario for occupation by British families, the cost of erection being shared by the Dominion, Provincial and British Governments. Other Provincial Governments now have the matter under consideration.

Increased facilities for training single men for farm work are being provided in the United Kingdom by the British Government. On account of the comparative scarcity of farm labourers in the United Kingdom these training farms will be used to supply farm labour not only to Canada, but also to the United Kingdom and the other dominions. Additional centres for providing preliminary training in farm work for boys on the lines of the Newcastle Training Hostel have been established at Liverpool and Bristol, and further centres will shortly be opened in South Wales, in Hull and in Glasgow. A number of the Provincial Governments are co-operating with the Dominion and British Governments in establishing centres for training in domestic work for women intending to settle in those provinces.

The Colonization Department of the railway companies, the Land Settlement Branch of the Hudson's Bay Company, and other agencies including voluntary societies, working in close co-operation with the two Governments, will make increased efforts in regard to migration for land settlement or farm labor under their auspices. Discussions are also proceeding with the interested Governments concerning land settlement schemes in accordance with the recommendations made by the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture at the last Session of Parliament.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61709

Collateral

Immigration Policy

IMMIGRATION

APPENDIX.

1929

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61710

IMMIGRATION

APPENDIX.

			Page
"A"	1.	Empire Settlement Schemes.	1 - 9.
		(a) Dominion-Provincial Juvenile Immigration.	1
		(b) Provincial Reception and Distributing Centres.	2
		(c) Boys Land Settlement.	3
		(d) Canadian Boys.	4
		(e) General Land Settlement.	5
		(f) Cottages.	7
		(g) Household Worker Trainees.	8
		(h) The Trainee Movement.	9
	2.	British Immigration - Assisted Passages and Regular Fares.	10
	3.	Medical Inspection in the United Kingdom.	11
"D"	4.	Reduction in Ocean Rates for British Migrants.	12
"B"	5.	Continental Organization:	13 - 15.
		Europe - Immigration Regulations.	14
		Railways Agreement.	15
"C"	6.	United States Immigration.	16
		Report of Immigration business for the fiscal year 1928-1929.	17
	7.	30% Limitation Placed on the Movement of Farm Labourers from the Railways Area.	18 - 22.
"E"	8.	The Exodus to the United States.	23 - 28.
	9.	British Harvester Movement, 1928.	29 - 32.
	10.	Recommendations in the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization.	33 - 41.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

EMPIRE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES.

DOMINION - PROVINCIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRATION.

Between 1868 and 1928 Juvenile Immigration Societies or other agencies have brought to Canada 87,699 children or an average of about 1461 children annually. Some time ago the Department came to the conclusion that a special effort should be made to encourage the movement of British boys from the homes of industrious families in the Old Land. The Department invited the co-operation of Provincial Governments and as the result of subsequent negotiations, five Provincial reception and distributing centres have been established for British boys.

Reception and Distributing Farms

British 'teen age boys are, therefore, also now being brought forward under Government auspices. These boys are selected by the Oversea Representatives of the Dominion and Provincial Governments and are brought forward to the Provincial reception and distributing centres which are operated under tripartite Agreements, the participating parties being the British, Dominion and whatever Provincial Government desires to co-operate in this work. Under these Agreements, boys are received at Provincial centres and placed in selected farm homes which have been approved by Provincial Governments. The minimum wage is $10 per month plus board and lodging, washing and mending. The farmer undertakes to pay the boy a certain sum each month and to remit the balance to the Provincial Government to be placed to the boy's credit. The Provincial Government selects the home, furnishes aftercare, advice, protection and what supervision is necessary for a boy's welfare for a period of three years after his arrival in Canada.

Selection of Boys

Selection of home

Wage

Supervision

Reception and distributing farms are provided by the Provincial Government and the following cash contributions are made on account of the operation of the farm:-

Grants for Operating Farm

Provincial Government	$10	per boy
Dominion "	10	" "
British "	20	" "
Total -	$40	" "

Cost of Transportation

The British Government and the Dominion Government share equally in the cost of transportation from the port of embarkation in the United Kingdom to the rail destination in Canada.

Operation of Societies

Voluntary societies can co-operate through Provincial Centres by submitting to the Colonization Officials of Provincial Governments the names and addresses of suitable homes and by the Representatives of Voluntary Societies submitting the names and addresses of suitable boys to the Oversea Agents of the Provincial or Dominion Governments. The number of children brought forward under Voluntary Societies appears on page 89 of the Annual Report.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61712

2

EMPIRE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES.

PROVINCIAL RECEPTION AND DISTRIBUTING CENTRES.

Centres have been established at the following points:-

Nova Scotia - The Agricultural College at Truro.

New Brunswick - The Cossar Farm at Lower Gagetown on the St. John River which has been equipped for reception, training and distribution.

Ontario - Vimy Ridge Farm, near Guelph. Last year approximately 400 boys were received and distributed from Vimy Ridge.

Manitoba - The Manitoba Agricultural College. 100 boys arrived and were placed last year through the Manitoba Agricultural College.

Saskatchewan - The Agricultural College at Saskatoon.

Quebec - The British Immigration and Colonization Association have a reception and distributing farm on the Island of Montreal. This Association places boys in Eastern Ontario and in the Eastern Townships.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61713

EMPIRE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES.

BOYS LAND SETTLEMENT.

Boys Land Settlement Scheme

The next step in the program is what is known as the "Boys Land Settlement Scheme". This is a further development of the reception and distributing centres for British boys. Under this Scheme, the British and Canadian Governments propose jointly to loan a total sum of

Total Advance for Ten Years

$5,000,000 over a period of 10 years to assist suitable British youths to take up farming in Canada on their own account. A large number of British boys who come to Canada as farm workers subsequently take up farms but so far they have had to rely entirely upon their own efforts for the necessary capital to purchase and equip a farm and this may take a considerable number of years.

Purpose of Scheme

The Boys Land Settlement Scheme aims at curtailing this period of waiting and under it a British youth at the end of a few years spent in gaining the necessary training and experience in Canada and in accumulating some savings will have the opportunity of being placed on a farm of his own under Government supervision.

Boys eligible

This Scheme is applicable to British boys who have come to Canada under the Empire Settlement Act and preference is given to those who have been trained at Provincial Centres. The Scheme is applicable only to those who have not come to Canada with their parents or to join their parents in this country.

Age eligible

Upon attaining the age of 21, these boys will be eligible for assistance up to an amount not exceeding $2500 for the purchase of a farm and for stock and equipment provided that they have acquired the necessary training and experience by working for wages on a farm in Canada and have saved approximately $500.

Provincial Co-operation

The Scheme provides for the co-operation of the Provincial Governments and the extent of settlement in each Province will depend upon the measure of such co-operation. Farms may be acquired by purchase or on lease with option to purchase.

Advance by Province

The original Scheme provided for a loan of $1250 by the British Government; $1000 by the Dominion Government and $250 by a Provincial Government. The Scheme, however, has been modified so that a Provincial Government may have the

Supervision by Province

alternative of assuming settlement and supervisory service in lieu of the advance of $250 which, under such circumstances, would be made by the Dominion Government.

The Provincial Governments who have decided to participate in the Boys Land Settlement Scheme are, -

Provinces Participating

Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick,
Ontario, and
Manitoba.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61714

4

CANADIAN BOYS.

The Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization also recommended, subject to the completion of satisfactory arrangements with Governments of the Provinces, that assistance equal to that given by the British Government to British emigrant boys be extended by the Government of Canada to the Canadian youth who are trained in agriculture.

The following draft proposals were submitted to Provincial Governments regarding the settlement of Canadian boys,-

1. That (a) the applicant be in possession of ..... $ 500
   (b) the Provincial Government loan a sum not exceeding 1250
   (c) the Dominion Government loan a sum not exceeding 1250
   $3000
   (d) the Provincial Government to provide settlement and supervisory service.

2. It was further suggested that the following general conditions applicable to British boys should also apply to Canadian boys:-

   (a) That the applicant has reached his 21st but not his 25th birthday at the date of application for assistance;

   (b) That he is in possession of savings amounting to approximately $500;

   (c) That he has acquired the necessary experience of farm work in Canada by working as an agricultural labourer for wages or in such other manner as the Department of Immigration and the Province may consider sufficient provided that both the Department and the Province shall be satisfied that the applicant is industrious, economical and capable of managing a farm;

   (d) That the Dominion and Provincial Governments share losses on a fifty-fifty basis;

   (e) That the above Scheme shall be applicable only to a Province the Government of which is participating in the British Boys Land Settlement Scheme.

So far no Provincial Government has agreed to participate in the Canadian Boys Land Settlement Scheme.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61715

EMPIRE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES.

GENERAL LAND SETTLEMENT.

3000 Family Scheme.

Extension of 3000 Family Scheme

Up to the 28th February 1929, 3002 families have been settled under the British Family Settlement Scheme. Of this number there have been 543 withdrawals and cancellations. The Agreement has been extended to provide for the settlement of an additional 350 families to complete the Scheme.

The main purpose of the 3000 Family Scheme was to attract British settlers and to demonstrate the success of directional land settlement wherever land could be obtained at a fair market value.

New Brunswick.

Provincial Co-operation

500 families.

Period of Agreement

Financial Terms

Selection

Losses

On the 4th August 1927, a tripartite Agreement was made between the British and Dominion Governments and the Provincial Government of New Brunswick for the settlement of 500 families on improved farms in the Province of New Brunswick within a period of six years. Under this Scheme, the Provincial Government provides the farm and the British Government advances $1500 for stock and equipment. Repayment is made on a 25 year amortization basis with interest at 5 per centum per annum. The Dominion Government recruits and selects the families and co-operates with the Provincial Government in making adequate arrangements for reception and settlement. Families under this Scheme also participate in the Assisted Passage Agreement. Any loss of interest on the price of a farm during the first two years from the date of allotment as a result of the failure of a settler is shared as follows:-

Dominion Government	25%
Provincial "	25%
British "	50%

Losses on stock and equipment are shared as follows:-

British Government	50%
Dominion "	50%

Families Settled

Under the above Scheme 100 families were settled on improved farms in New Brunswick during 1928.

Nova Scotia.

On the 5th December 1927 another tripartite Agreement was made for the settlement of 500 families on improved farms in the Province of Nova Scotia within a period of six years. This Scheme is similar to the New Brunswick Land Settlement Scheme but is not yet in operation.

The following is an extract from the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization,-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

EMPIRE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES.

GENERAL LAND SETTLEMENT (Continued)

"1. The Committee having heard the evidence in connection with the experiment of the 5,000 Family Settlement Scheme, now almost completed, recommends that time be given to test this form of land settlement before embarking upon extended schemes of this character.

2. The Committee approves of the extension to other Provinces of the tripartite agreement with the British, Federal and Provincial Governments for the encouragement of Land Settlement by the British immigrant."

In accordance with the above Report, the Department has made no new Agreements.

Other Provincial Governments have been invited to participate in tripartite Agreements.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

COTTAGES.

Lord Lovat, Chairman of the Oversea Settlement Committee who visited Canada during the summer of 1928, made proposals to the Department of Immigration, to Provincial Governments and other Organizations, to errect cottages for the use of British migrants while undergoing a course of training preparatory to settlement on farms.

During the month of October 1928 the Minister conferred with the Provincial Governments of the Western Provinces regarding immigration matters and advised them that the Department of Immigration had decided to participate with Provincial Governments in the erection of cottages for the training of British families, the cost of the erection of the cottage to be $1,000 and the cash contributions to be allocated as follows:-

British Government		$500
Provincial	"	$250
Dominion	"	$250
	TOTAL	$1000

the Provincial Government to administer the Scheme. The Ontario Government came to the conclusion that a suitable cottage could not be erected for $1000 and decided not to proceed with the Scheme this year. The Alberta Government also had the matter under consideration but no action was taken.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61718

EMPIRE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES.

HOUSEHOLD WORKER TRAINEES.

Arrangements have also been made with the British Government for the training overseas of household workers for Canada. This arrangement does not mean that the Officials of the Department of Immigration will relax their efforts to obtain experienced household workers, but it means that a more vigorous effort is being made to supply the wide-spread demand in Canada for migrants of this class. Provincial Governments have been invited to participate in this work and the Department of Immigration has already received orders for the following trained houseworkers,-

Ontario	300
Saskatchewan	150
Alberta	200
Manitoba	50

Houseworkers are being trained at the following points:-

London,
Cardiff,
Newcastle,
Glasgow.

These training centres are under the control of what are known as "Migration Committees" composed of the Representatives of the Municipal Authorities, Local Education Committees, heads of local Churches, Farmers' Unions, Juvenile Advisory Committees, Representatives of Local Employers, British Government, Dominion Government, etc. The cost of training is defrayed by the British Government and for each trainee cash contributions are made as follows,-

Dominion Government	$15
Provincial "	$ 5.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61719 9

C

THE TRAINEE MOVEMENT.

The term "trainee" is used to describe British single migrants coming to Canada, who before coming have been given some training or testing at training centres in the British Isles. The training scheme has been developed within the past five years and more particularly during the past two years. The principal training centres are at Claydon in Suffolk, Brandon in Norfolk, Chisledon in Wiltshire and Richhill in Northern Ireland. There are a number of smaller centres in Norfolk, Lanark and Glamorgan. There are in addition five centres at which men are given the short course training. Until the past year the men trained were between 19 and 25 years of age. The age in the past year has been extended to 35.

The Dominion Government has supplied an amount of Canadian equipment, including machinery for use at the training centres, this being our only contribution.

Prior to the beginning of this year, trainees were given approximately three months' training. This year a number have been sent to Canada with one month's training; these are called short course trainees.

In 1928 some 1400 trainees came to Canada and were all placed through Departmental machinery. At the beginning of the present calendar year, we agreed to take approximately 6,000 trainees during the 1929 season. Of these 4,600 were to be placed in Western Canada and 1,400 in Ontario. Of those proceeding to Western Canada, 3,000 were to be here by the middle of May and the remainder were to arrive in July. The Ontario movement was to continue each month between March and July. The arrival of trainees up to the end of May is 1,529 for Western Canada and 1,023 for Ontario.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

BRITISH IMMIGRATION - ASSISTED PASSAGES AND REGULAR FARE.

Fiscal Year	Assisted Passage	Regular Fare	Total	Harvesters who Returned	Net.
1923-24	3639	69280	72919		
1924-25	8558	44620	53178		
1925-26	8442	29127	37569		
1926-27	20248	30130	50378		
1927-28	24889	26663	51552		
1928-29	23575	35305	58880	- 6455	= 52,425.

The increase of approximately 150% of assisted migrants as between 1925-26 and 1926-27 was due to what is known as the £3 Ocean Rate which became effective on the 1st January 1926 and which was subsequently reduced to £2.

The above figures show that during the first three years covered by the Assisted Passage Agreement, the large majority of British migrants paid the regular fare of £18.15.0, and that during 1926-27 when the £3 rate was in effect, there was an increase of approximately 150% of assisted migrants and a corresponding reduction of those who paid the regular fare. During 1927-28 when the £2 rate was in effect, there was a still further increase of those who received the Assisted Passage, and a corresponding decrease of those who paid the regular fare.

N.B.- The total number of harvesters was 8,449. Of this number 6,455 returned. Of those returning 2,107 paid full fare, 1,816 paid part fare and the balance, 2,532, were given return passage at the expense of the British Government who also paid the balance of the fare of those who only paid part.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61721

MEDICAL INSPECTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

The following is an extract from the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization regarding medical inspection overseas,-

> "The Department of Immigration and the Department of Health should, it is considered, make the most exhaustive efforts to see that the new system is perfected so as to eliminate, as far as possible, inconvenience, delay and expense to the prospective immigrant, and to dispel the idea that there is any intention, on the part of the Canadian Government, to restrict or hinder the coming to Canada of British subjects. For this purpose the committee recommends that the present system would be improved and that it would obviate delay and inconvenience to the prospective emigrant, especially those who reside in the rural districts of the British Isles if the examinations were made by British local doctors paid by, and under the supervision and control of, the Canadian medical authorities, who should be located at convenient centres of population."

After consulting with the Department of Health 464 Roster doctors were appointed especially in the rural districts of the British Isles. The Roster doctor medical fees are being paid jointly by the British and Dominion Governments.

The above arrangement is satisfactory to all the companies and organizations interested.

Medical inspection is made under the supervision and control of Canadian Medical Doctors who are located at convenient centres.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61722 12

REDUCTION IN OCEAN RATES FOR BRITISH MIGRANTS.

The following is an extract from the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization,-

> "That measures be taken at an early date to arrange a conference between the Federal and British Governments and the Atlantic Steamship Companies with the object of obtaining a reduction in ocean rates to British immigrants to approximately £10."

After a series of conferences held in London, the Steamship Companies agreed to a general passage rate of £10 for British immigrants. This rate became effective on the 1st of January 1929. The following figures show the number of British migrants who have arrived during the first three months of 1929 covering the period during which the £10 has been in force, in comparison with the number of migrants who arrived during the same period in 1928,-

	1928.	1929.
January -	771	1,133
February -	1,002	1,691
March -	3,150	5,131

It will be noted that there has been a substantial increase under the £10 rate.

The following classes still receive the reduced ocean rate of £2,-

(1) Members of agricultural families over 19 years.

(2) Houseworkers over 17 years of age.

The following receive free passage grants,-

(1) Members of agricultural families who have not reached their 19th birthday prior to sailing when coming to agricultural work.

(2) Boys who have reached their fourteenth birthday and have not reached their nineteenth birthday prior to sailing when proceeding to Canada under the auspices of the Dominion Government, a Provincial Government or an approved Voluntary Society to earn their livelihood on the land.

(3) Girls who have reached their fourteenth birthday and have not reached their seventeenth birthday prior to sailing, provided they are coming to Canada under the auspices of the Dominion Government or of an approved Voluntary Society for house work.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

CONTINENTAL ORGANIZATION.

Immigration Inspectors are located at the following points:-

Antwerp,
Danzig,
Hamburg,
Paris,
Riga,
Rotterdam.

Our Officers at the above ports examine immigrants in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act. Inspectors were stationed on the Continent of Europe for the purpose of reducing the number of rejections and deportations at Canadian ports.

Appeals.

Immigrants who are rejected by our Inspectors on the Continent of Europe have the right of appeal as provided by the Immigration Act. In order to expedite decisions Immigration Inspectors at Continental points submit the appeal to the Director of Emigration in London who has been authorized to decide appeals except in cases which require an investigation in Canada.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61724 14

EUROPE - IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS.

The Regulations governing the entry to Canada of European immigrants may be summarized as follows:-

Northern European Countries:- France,
Belgium,
Holland,
Switzerland,
Norway,
Sweden,
Denmark,
Finland,
Germany.

Immigrants from the above countries are eligible for entry to Canada provided that they

(a) Are in possession of valid passports;

(b) Can pass medical inspection; and

(c) Can maintain themselves until employment is secured.

Other European Countries covered by Railways Agreement:-

Austria,
Hungary,
Poland,
Roumania,
Lithuania,
Esthonia,
Latvia,
Bulgaria,
Jugo-Slavia,
Czecho-Slovakia.

The only immigrants who are admitted from the countries covered by the Railways' Agreement are:-

(a) Farmers;

(b) Farm labourers who have a reasonable assurance of employment on the land;

(c) Houseworkers;

(d) The wife or child under 18 years of age of any person legally admitted to and resident in Canada who is in a position to receive and care for his dependents.

(e) Persons who satisfy the Minister that their labour or service is required in Canada.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61725

15

RAILWAYS AGREEMENT.

The Railways Agreement was made on the 1st September 1925 and renewed for a period of three years from the 1st October 1927 subject to certain modifications. The purpose of the Railways Agreement was to encourage the movement of agriculturists, agricultural workers and domestic servants from non-preferred countries and to expedite the selection and settlement of immigrants of the classes mentioned.

Our investigation showed that in the operation of the Railways Agreement many thousands of immigrants from countries under the Agreement drifted almost immediately upon arrival into non-agricultural work, including industrial employment, in centres of Eastern Canada, thus contributing to the displacement of Canadians. The Railway Companies admitted that many immigrants from the countries under the Railways Agreement drifted from the farm to other more lucrative occupations.

A survey was made of farm labour conditions in Western Canada. This survey was revised by Governments of the Prairie Provinces. As a result of the survey, the Department has now authorized the Railways to bring from the countries under the Agreement 30% of the so-called farm labourers who were brought forward last year. The "30%" is approximately 11,000. There is no limitation from Railway Agreement countries of the following classes:-

(a) Families coming for land settlement;

(b) Household workers;

(c) Relatives of persons who have been legally admitted under the Railways Agreement or otherwise.

The Railway Companies were also advised to exercise greater care in the selection of the type of immigrant likely to accept and remain at farm work. It was suggested to the Railway Companies that they should make a canvas of their requirements for maintenance and construction work and advise the Department at the earliest possible moment what proportion of this demand would have to be met by the importation of labour. It was also suggested to the Railway Companies that there were many men available in the British Isles accustomed to hard manual labour who might be secured and whose services might be utilized for this work.

The following statement shows the immigration from other countries, i.e., from countries other than the British Isles and the United States, during the past three years,-

Fiscal Year	Northern European Races	Other Races
1926-27	30,662	42,520
1927-28	33,702	42,016
1928-29	29,579	48,703

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION.

AGENCIES. The Department of Immigration maintains fifteen Agencies in the United States.

ADVERTISING. Advertisements were inserted in 58 agricultural and national papers, whose aggregate circulation is approximately 12,500,000. Arising mainly from this advertising, 30,084 inquiries were received in 1928-29 as compared with 27,533 during 1927-28, and 18,540 inquiries during 1926-27. At the end of the fiscal year 1928-29 there were 5,912 good prospects outstanding.

PUBLICITY. News and special articles are transmitted direct to agricultural and other United States papers by the Publicity Branch of the Department. The publicity report shows 139,972 lines, the space value of which is $67,819.05, covering a circulation of 106,704,024. Arrangements have been made for translating and distributing Canadian publicity matter in the Norwegian, Swedish and German languages, and a large amount of information dealing particularly with Canadian agricultural development has been published in papers of these languages mainly in the United States.

The following is a statement of Exhibition work in the United States,-

Fiscal Year	Exhibitions	Prospects Established
1927-28	65	951
1928-29	71	1,384

The aggregate attendance at the 71 Fairs during 1928-29 was approximately 3,100,000 persons.

The first column in the following statement shows the number of immigrants who have come to Canada from the United States, and the second column shows the number of Canadians who have returned from the United States, during the last five years.

Fiscal Year	Immigrants	Returning Canadians.	Totals
1924-25	15,818	43,775 -	59,593
1925-26	18,778	47,221 -	65,999
1926-27	21,025	56,957 -	77,982
1927-28	25,007	39,887 -	64,894
1928-29	30,560	33,798 -	64,358
		TOTAL -	332,826

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61727 17.

UNITED STATES

Report of Immigration business for
the fiscal year
1928-1929.

Agency	Inquiries	Settlers reported by Agent -------	Stat.Br.	No. Car-loads	Value of Carloads and effects	Good prospects outstanding.
Fargo	4776	2332-3265	2506	150	$5,141,010	2009
Spokane	3125	1158-2183	3090	20	1,704,775	604
Kansas City	3393	1033-1632	924	9	1,209,705	360
Minneapolis	2292	723-1332	1189	80	755,215	469
Detroit	2083	705-1074	5077	4	1,570,095	300
Great Falls	1691	627-1016	1137	13	917,605	463
Omaha	1611	494- 751	703	43	1,318,175	251
Woonsocket	686	277- 796	897	59	157,000	276
San Francisco	1982	275- 622	1698	1	726,392	19
Syracuse	1056	264- 490	3569	2	410,042	83
Boston	589	251- 757	1759	-	295,950	58
Chicago	1448	211- 384	1436	13	477,200	207
Harrisburg	2268	140- 236	2291	5	129,600	413
Manchester	649	139- 353	1740	2	182,172	91
Indianapolis	1138	105- 195	878	-	581,630	201
Columbus	1297	93- 176	1396	1	124,865	108
Totals 1928/29:	30,084	8,827-15,262	30,290	402	15,701,431	5,912
Totals 1927/28:	27,533	7,496-12,286	25,007	364	14,971,670	5,127
Totals 1926/27:	18,540	-10,590	21,025	337	14,002,375	5,165.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

30% LIMITATION PLACED ON THE MOVEMENT OF FARM LABOURERS FROM THE RAILWAYS AREA.

The limitation was decided upon after a survey of the probable demand for Continental farm labour in Western Canada during the 1929 season. The matter was discussed fully with representatives of the C.P.R. and C.N.R. at a conference held in Ottawa on the 26th December, 1928, and in a letter dated the 2nd January, 1929, the Railway Companies were instructed that the movement of the farm labour class from the Railways Area must be limited this year to 30% of the total movement of the same class during 1928, and further that the 30% was to be brought before the 31st May, 1929.

On the 9th January a Montreal paper carried a despatch purporting to give an outline of the instructions contained in departmental letter of the 2nd January. The statement issued to the Press on the 11th January was the letter of the 2nd January with an introductory paragraph.

The Department's publication of the letter resulted in the issue of a lengthy statement by the Presidents of the two Railway Companies under date of the 24th January. The Department prepared a reply to this which, however, was not published.

The following memorandum was prepared on the 6th February, 1929, dealing with the limitation:-

"1. What the limitation is.

The Colonization Departments of the C.N.R. and C.P.R. were notified by departmental letter of the 2nd ultimo, to reduce to 30% of last year's total, the movement of farm labourers coming to Canada under the Railways' Agreement from the Railways' area of Europe, and to bring the 30% before the 31st May in order to be in time for Spring placement. The farm labourer movement of 1928 was approximately 36,000 men, hence the number to be brought for Spring placement will be between ten and twelve thousand, practically all destined to the Prairie Provinces.

The Railways' area, otherwise known as non-preferred countries, include Russia, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Danzig, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Roumania.

2. What the limitation does not mean.

It has no reference to the immigration of any class from the British Isles, the United States, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Germany and Scandinavian countries. It does not restrict nor limit in any way the immigration from the Railways' area of,-

(a) Agricultural families coming for land settlement.
(b) Women coming for domestic service.
(c) Wives and families or other relatives admissible under the Immigration regulations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

3. What is the Railways' Agreement.

It is an Agreement entered into between the Department of Immigration and Colonization and the two Railway Companies in September, 1925, under which the Railways were authorized to bring to Canada, agricultural families for land settlement, women for domestic service and labourers for farm work. These classes only were to be moved from the countries named in No. 1 above. The Agreement was renewed in October, 1927 for three years, subject to cancellation by any party on a year's notice and subject also to suspension (temporary or otherwise) by the Minister, if conditions required such action - suspension to be after consultation with the Railways.

4. What conditions lead up to the limitation imposed by the Department?

The action taken by the Department grew out of certain Recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee of last Session, which Recommendations were approved by Parliament. The Committee did not favour the Railways' Agreement and recommended against its renewal in its present form. The Committee stressed Federal-Provincial co-operation. The following paragraphs quoted from the Departmental letter of the 2nd ultimo to the Railways, indicate clearly what lead up to Departmental action:-

"Unquestionably there is a very strong feeling against the unduly large proportion of foreign as compared with British immigrants shown in the Immigration statistics of the past few years. The movement under the Railways' Agreement is very largely responsible for bringing about this condition. The Agreement itself was intended to encourage a movement only of the agricultural class, but after three years' experience it has become evident that out of the total arrivals, probably not more than 30% have made aby real effort to remain on the land. It is unnecessary that I more than mention this in passing as the representatives of both Railways emphasized the drift from the farm to other more lucrative occupations.

"You will recall that one of the Recommendations made by the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization was that there should be closer co-operation between the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments, both in regard to farm placement and land settlement. Having this Recommendation in mind the Provinces were approached some time ago regarding plans to increase British immigration and during the discussions it became evident that several Provinces held the view that it is impossible to deal satisfactorily with British immigration until a complete understanding was reached regarding immigration from Central Europe. After describing conditions arising out of the large Continental movement of the past three years, the Provinces stated emphatically that the Federal Government should immediately undertake a survey of the whole farm labour requirements. The Minister promised that this would be done and that the results would be communicated to the Provincial Governments for the concurrence or

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"revision. So far as Ontario is concerned the Provincial Government undertook to make their own survey.

"We have already discussed with you the results of this survey and the fact that the Province of Alberta has definitely stated that while they are anxious to secure a supply of British farm labour and also a supply from preferred countries, they already have in the Province, all the non-preferred country immigrants they require for farm work this year. In view of this situation we will endeavour to carry out Alberta's wishes and the Province is being so advised. Our investigations show that during the period of the Railways' Agreement, many thousands of non-preferred country immigrants drifted almost immediately upon arrival into non-agricultural work including industrial employment, in centres of Eastern Canada, thus contributing to the displacement of Canadians and otherwise filling positions that might have been filled by immigrants from the Mother Country. The survey shows conclusively that the movement of farm labour required this year from the non-preferred countries, is less than one-third of the total movement of last year.

"In view of the above it has been decided that between now and the 31st May next the movement under the Railways' Agreement shall be reduced to not more than 30% of the farm labourers moved by each Company during last calendar year, and since the farmers of Canada are in no way benefitted by a movement of people under the guise of agriculturists who do not follow that occupation in Canada, it is essential that in this year's immigration from non-preferred countries, the transportation companies shall give much greater care to the selection of the type of immigrant likely to accept and remain at farm work. It is to be understood that the limitation of this paragraph does not apply in any way to domestic servants, agricultural families with capital coming for land settlement or to wives and children joining the head of a family already settled in Canada."

5. Why was publicity given by the Department to the limitation imposed upon the Railways, which publicity has resulted in a statement issued to the Press by the Railway Presidents?

The Department published on the 11th ultimo, the text of its letter of the 2nd ultimo to the Railways in order to counteract a newspaper despatch sent out from Montreal on the 9th ultimo in which the following incorrect and mischievous comment was embodied:-

> "Alberta has informed the Federal Government that it has all the settlers it wants from non-preferred European countries and that it is quite willing to take a considerable number of British farm labourers. It is pointed out that seven or eight constituencies in Alberta have approximately 90% foreign born voters. This policy of the Alberta Government and the Federal Government will come in for criticisms when Parliament meets, it is predicted."

The controversy was, therefore, forced upon the Department. Alberta made no such representations as are stated.

6. Are there representations in the statement issued by the Railway Presidents on the 24th ultimo, requiring correction or criticism?

The following should be corrected:-

(a) The Railways' statement quoted the total movement under the Railways' Agreement for 1926-27-28 as 110,795. The correct number is 123,719.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(b) The Railways' statement represented that while the Department has criticised the Railways for moving many thousands of people as farm labourers who did not remain on the land, the Department during the three year period, admitted from the Railways' area, under special Government Permit, 24,806 non-agricultural immigrants, these being unable to comply with the regulations. This statement is quite erroneous. The bulk of the 24,806 immigrants is made up of wives and children admitted to join husbands and fathers who were brought to Canada in advance of their dependents by the Railway Companies under the Railways' Agreement for farm work, but who on applying for the admission of their dependents were found in industrial and other non-agricultural employment, mainly in Eastern Canada. The Department has admitted several thousand dependents of this sort and in not more than 1% of the cases have the heads of the families, resident in Eastern Canada, been found engaged in agricultural work,,though in almost every case the heads of the families were originally destined to Western Canada to be placed on farms. The Immigration regulations provide for the admission of wives and children and certain other relatives, hence the so-called special Permits were mainly Departmental letters issued to facilitate the movement of wives, children and other relatives admissible under the law.

(c) The Railways' statement says that the experience of the Railway Companies shows conclusively that men brought here for agricultural employment and who have left it to take industrial work, return to settlement on the land when they have acquired sufficient capital. The Department has equal if not better facilities for observing this movement if it exists. The Department's experience is that the movement is almost wholly the other way.

(d) The Railways' statement represents that before the advent of the Railways' Agreement it was difficult to secure a movement of agricultural labourers and agricultural families. Departmental records show that prior to the Railways' Agreement every embarkation port in Europe was swarming with immigrants (largely of the same class as those who have come to Canada under the guise of farm workers and have almost immediately taken non-agricultural employment) seeking entry to Canada for non-agricultural work and that these were moving because of unemployment and other post war conditions in Europe. There has always been a difficulty in securing agricultural families with capital for land settlement. There is not now nor has there been in the past, any limitation of this class.

(e) The Railways' statement suggests that in placing a limitation upon a movement of labour, the Minister has in some way ignored the terms of the Railways' Agreement. When the Agreement was renewed in October, 1927, the first clause of the renewal stipulated that the Minister reserved the absolute right to suspend the Agreement if conditions called for that. The Railway Companies were consulted on the 26th December and the officials present assured the Minister that whatever limitation he decided upon would be loyally carried out by the Companies.

7. Does the limitation still allow for the movement of as large a supply of farm labour from Central Europe as at any time since the war, but prior to the Railways' Agreement? Yes, it provides for

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

a movement larger than came to Canada prior to the Railways' Agreement and also larger than every estimate of need in Canada - except the estimate of the transportation companies. The majority of those brought in 1926-27-28 did not make any effort to stay on the land and the limitation means that the movement in future will bear a direct relation to the demand in Canada and thus fulfill the original purpose of the Agreement.

8. Will the action taken by the Department in limiting the movement of labour from Central Europe, have any probable effect in increasing immigration from the British Isles and preferred countries?

This is the Department's desire and expectation, especially if the Railway Companies can find employment for workers from the British Isles. The new flat rate of £10. for British migrants is expected to materially assist in an increased movement from that country.

9. Is there reason to believe that slowing down the labour movement from Central Europe, will result in our being unable to get that labour later if wanted?

None whatever. The Department receives frequent appeals to open the door wider so that more may come. The pressure of conditions in Europe coupled with the pull of relatives and friends in Canada, is ample assurance that the labour movement can be increased by the simple expedient of opening the door. The movement of the class now limited was suddenly suspended in May, 1927, but without any harmful effect when the suspension was lifted.

10. What provision has been made for relief if the present restriction does not allow the movement of sufficient general labour to meet the demands in Canada?

The Railways Agreement was never intended to meet the demand in Canada for general labour and it is a misuse of the Agreement to so apply it. The fear expressed by the Railway Companies of a shortage of general labour as a result of the limitation of the movement under the Railways' Agreement, is virtually an admission that the Agreement has been used for or has resulted in a movement of a class of immigration that was never intended when the Agreement was made.

The immigration regulations empower the Minister to admit any labour from any country that may be required in Canada. If as the season advances it is found that any class of labour from Central Europe is required in excess of those coming in, the additional supply can be secured without difficulty."

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61733 23

E.

THE EXODUS TO THE UNITED STATES.

The United States Immigration Report shows the following immigration to that country from Canada and Newfoundland for the period 1911 to 1928. The figures from 1925 onward, do not include migration from Newfoundland to the U.S.A.:-

1911	56,830
1912	55,990
1913	73,802
1914	86,139
1915	82,215
1916	101,551
1917	105,399
1918	32,452
1919	57,782
1920	90,025
1921	72,317
1922	46,810
1923	117,011
1924	200,690
1925	100,895
1926	91,019
1927	81,506
1928	73,154

A very useful review of the movement from Canada to the United States and from the United States to Canada, was prepared some months ago by Mr. H. H. Wrong of the Canadian Legation, Washington, from which the following extracts are quoted:-

> "The United States Immigration Service does not classify immigrants by the countries of their allegiance and it is not therefore possible to arrive at a figure for the emigration of Canadian citizen. It employs three different systems of classification which are valuable in estimating the nature of the movement of population. These are:(1) Classification by country of last permanent residence which is defined as being the country in which the immigrant has lived for one year before moving to the United States; (2) Classification by country of birth which appears to have been recorded only since the passage of the Quota Act of 1924; and (3) Classification of immigration from each country sub-divided according to race or people of origin. In compiling statistics of racial origin, "Canadian" is not considered as a race of people and immigrants from Canada are classified as English, Scottish, French, etc.; it is thus possible to determine fairly accurately the racial composition of emigration from Canada. By employing these classifications one can construct the following tables:

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"Table A.

Emigration to the United States from Canada since 1920 of persons who had lived in Canada for at least one year.

The figures from 1920 to 1924 include Newfoundland and those since 1924 relate to Canada alone. The statistics since 1924 are probably more nearly accurate than those for earlier years in view of the increasing care necessitated by the Quota Act. The figure for 1928 includes a large number of persons - from 10% to 20% of the total - who still remain domiciled in Canadian border cities, but have been admitted as immigrants to the United States in accordance with the requirements of General Order Number 86 of the United States Department of Labor. All figures are for the United States fiscal year ending on June 30th of the year named.

1920.....	90,025	(including Newfoundland)
1921.....	72,317	" "
1922.....	46,810	" "
1923.....	117,011	" "
1924.....	200,690	" "
1925.....	100,895	(excluding Newfoundland)
1926.....	91,019	" "
1927.....	81,506	" "
1928.....	73,154	" "

"Table B.

Emigration to the United States of native born Canadians since July 1st, 1924.

This Table is specially interesting because of its relation to the operation of the Quota Act, since the movement to the United States of native born Canadians is without numerical limitation, whereas other Canadian residents are subject to the quota restrictions of the country of their birth. The decline in the annual movement since 1924 is therefore specially significant, since it shows that fewer native born Canadians each year are leaving Canada in spite of the drastic limitation of European immigration. In this Table also a considerable proportion of the total for 1928 is due to the special conditions created by General Order No. 86.

1925.....	102,169
1926.....	82,462
1927.....	70,136
1928.....	54,704

"Table C.

Emigration to the United States since 1924 of residents of Canada born abroad.

These figures are the difference between Table A. and Table B. The increase since 1924 is probably due to the fact that many residents in Canada who were born abroad, and who wished to move to the United States soon after the passage of the Quota Act, could not secure quota visas for two or three years because of the heavy demand. Again the total for 1928 is artificially swollen.

1925.....	1,274
1926.....	8,557
1927.....	11,370
1928.....	18,450

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"Table D.

Emigration from Canada to the United States since 1921 by racial origin.

This Table divides the figures given in Table A. into the three main classes of British, French and others. Its chief value is to show the amount of French-Canadian emigration from Canada. The Table is a simplification of the United States figures which go into great detail and are sub-divided into forty different racial headings. The heading "British" in this Table includes Irish, as well as English, Scottish and Welsh. The heading "other races" is made up almost entirely of persons of Continental European origin, except for a small number (196 in 1928) of African, Asiatic or Spanish-American descent. The figures before 1925 include Newfoundland.

Year	British	French	Other races	Total
1921	41,060	15,906	15,351	72,317
1922	27,909	9,625	9,276	46,810
1923	69,028	30,438	17,545	117,011
1924	123,783	43,959	32,948	200,690
1925	65,461	19,261	16,173	100,895
1926	61,986	18,612	10,421	91,019
1927	55,369	15,710	10,427	81,506
1928	48,476	14,227	10,451	73,154

"Table E.

The balance since 1920 considering figures of immigration and emigration alone.

The most obvious way to strike a balance is to deduct from the figures of emigration to the United States given in Table A. the number of persons who have emigrated from the United States to Canada according to the figures of the Canadian Department of Immigration. The figures are not exactly comparable since the Canadian totals are for the fiscal year ending on March 31st, of the year named and the United States totals go down to June 30th of this year; that is, however, of slight importance. Newfoundland is included in the United States figures before 1925:

Year.	Migrated to United States from Canada.	Migrated from United States to Canada.	Net loss to Canada.
1920	90,025	49,656	40,469
1921	72,317	48,059	24,258
1922	46,810	29,345	17,465
1923	117,011	22,007	95,004
1924	200,690	20,521	180,169
1925	100,895	15,818	85,077
1926	91,019	18,778	72,241
1927	81,506	21,025	60,481
1928	73,154	25,007	48,147

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"Table F.

The balance since 1924 taking into account "returning Canadians" as well as immigrants to Canada.

The figures in Table E. afford the only statistical basis of comparison which seems to exist before 1925. A balance which is more favourable to Canada can be struck if we employ additional statistics which are available for 1925 and subsequent years. Since April, 1924 the Canadian Department of Immigration has kept records of the number of "returning Canadians" who had left Canada toreside permanently in the United States, and who later returned to resume their domicile in Canada. This total includes the three classes of native born Canadians, British subjects who had acquired Canadian domicile and naturalized Canadian citizens. The table below uses the same figures employed in Table E. with the addition of this class of migrant. It should be mentioned that no comparable United States figure exists and there is presumably a small movement of United States citizens returning from Canada to the United States; this movement, however, is certainly much smaller than the movement in the other direction:

Year.	Migrated to United States from Canada.	Migrated from United States to Canada.	Returning Canadians.	Net loss to Canada.
1925	100,895	15,818	43,775	41,302
1926	91,019	18,778	47,221	26,020
1927	81,506	21,025	56,957	3,524
1928	73,154	25,007	39,887	8,260

"Table G.

The balance since 1924 taking into account only native born Canadians who have emigrated to the United States on one side and immigrants and returning Canadians on the other.

A figure yet more favourable to Canada can be reached by using the figures in Table B of emigration of Canadian born. The result, however, is not nearly so fair an estimate of the movement of population as that which is shown in Table F. It serves only to demonstrate that Canada is now getting back from the United States a greater number of people of all classes than the number of Canadian born who are being lost. This table has a bearing on the proposal to establish a quota against Canada; and the Secretary of State used these figures before the Senate Committee on Immigration on March 5th, 1928 in opposition to a Bill proposing such a quota:

Year.	Canadian born emigrated to United States.	Immigrants from United States.	Returning Canadians.	Loss (-) Gain (plus) to Canada.
1925	102,169	15,818	43,775	- 42,576
1926	82,462	18,778	47,221	- 16,463
1927	70,136	21,025	56,957	plus 7,846
1928	54,704	25,007	39,887	" 10,190

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"It may be of interest to draw some general conclusions from the figures which have been set forth above.

1. Emigration from Canada to the United States has rapidly declined from the maximum point which was reached in 1924. The figure for 1928 is only 36⅔% of the figure for 1924. The total for 1928 is almost the same as the total for 1913.

2. The emigration of native born Canadians has declined still more rapidly than the general figure. The emigration of Canadian residents who originally came to Canada as immigrants has increased considerably since 1924, probably because of the effect of the Quota Act of 1924 which, for a time after its passage, largely prevented the movement from Canada to the United States of any but native born Canadians.

3. All the United States figures of immigration from Canada for 1928 are swollen by the addition of several thousand persons who, in Canadian eyes, still remain in Canada since they retain their domicile in various Canadian border communities; they are treated however as immigrants to the United States under General Order No. 86 of the Department of Labor.

4. The emigration from Canada of French Canadians has declined since 1924 in about the same proportion as the general decline. During the last four years French-Canadian emigration has been about 20% of the total movement. This shows that the loss of French Canadians to the United States is proportionately less than the loss of all other classes of residents in Canada, since persons of French origin constituted nearly 28% of the population of Canada at the census of 1921.

5. Immigration to Canada from the United States has slowly increased since 1924, but the total for 1928 is still far below that for any of the years from 1902 to 1921. The decline in the balance against Canada since 1924 has been almost entirely caused by the reduction of emigration and not by the increase of immigration.

6. Taking into account the number of Canadians who have permanently returned from the United States during the last two years, loss and gain almost cancel out. The net loss to Canada in 1928 of 8,260 persons can be entirely discounted as having been caused by the provisions of General Order No. 86."

In dealing with the exodus it is well to remember the following:-

(1) That the movement is not new. The Canadian born resident in the United States, in the U.S. Census years indicated, was as follows:-

1850.....147,711
1860.....249,970
1870.....493,464
1880.....717,157
1890.....980,938
1900.....1,179,922
1910.....1,204,637
1920.....1,124,925

It will be observed that the 1920 figures show an actual decrease of almost 80,000 while all the other Census periods mentioned show an increase. Between 1910 and 1920 the U.S. Immigration returns reported a migration from Canada to the United States of almost three-quarters of a million, not all of which, however, would be Canadian born.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(2) Part of the movement is not permanent. The returning Canadians are an evidence of this, the figures being:-

1925.....43,775
1926.....47,222
1927.....56,957
1928.....39,887

(3) The U.S. figures show an important and steady decline in the exodus from Canada. If we keep on making progress at the rate of the past five years, the exodus will soon disappear altogether.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61739

29

BRITISH HARVESTER MOVEMENT, 1928.

Reported detention of harvesters in Winnipeg.

The idea of a British harvester movement to Canada last season originated in the British Isles. As early as May, 1928 the Hon. Wm. Lunn, M.P. an ex-Chairman of the Oversea Settlement Committee, made a public appeal regarding the unemployed and in this appeal said,-

> "Why not an arrangement between the Dominion and Home Governments and all the parties most likely to help for 10,000 Britishers to be provided with work during the coming harvest in Canada?"

On the 27th June Lord Lovat cabled stating that subject to concurrence of the Department of Immigration, he proposed to get into touch with the Steamship Companies in order to ascertain what special rates they were prepared to offer for a harvester movement this year. Lord Lovat inquired whether any estimate had yet been formed as to the supply of labour that would likely be required.

A reply was sent on the 28th June stating that there was not much prospect that a harvester movement would be needed.

On the 19th July advice was received of the labour estimate for the Western harvest and this showed a probable demand of 44,000 from Eastern Canada and the United States. As this number was considerably larger than the annual movement from Eastern Canada and the United States it was agreed that 10,000 British harvesters could obtain harvest employment and that the movement would be approved provided proper safeguards were adopted in, (a) the selection of the right type; (b) an arrangement for placing them in winter employment; and, (c) a special low rate for those who desired to return.

On the 2nd August the Deputy Minister of Immigration sent the following wire to the Premiers of the Prairie Provinces:-

> "Winnipeg Conference disclosed shortage ten thousand harvesters after estimating all other sources supply. British Government have been in communication with Department to furnish up to ten thousand men. Department replied temporary work available this number men accustomed hard manual labour but to avoid hardship insisted Railway Companies must guarantee winter farm employment and special reduced rate to those desiring return. Railways refused guarantee winter farm employment but offered full co-operation. British Government and Railways have undertaken arrange return of those not placed winter employment. Please wire your opinion regarding movement ten thousand British harvesters stating whether you consider we should still insist on Railways guaranteeing winter farm employment we co-operating or approve movement on guarantee of British Government and Railways to arrange return men who cannot obtain winter farm employment. Urgent."

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

To the above the following replies were received:-

MANITOBA.

"Wire of second August received will willingly co-operate with other Governments and Railways to find winter farm employment for harvesters but in our opinion there is little chance of ten thousand men being so employed. Former experience in Manitoba and particularly in City of Winnipeg indicates particular need to require British Government and Railways to guarantee not only return of men unable to obtain winter farm employment but also to arrange for their maintenance while awaiting return."

SASKATCHEWAN.

"Your wire second re harvest labour. Our opinion is that ten thousand Britishers capable and willing to do harvesting can be placed in harvest fields. We will co-operate to fullest possible extent in securing winter farm employment but of opinion all such men cannot be so placed therefore believe essential arrangements be made providing for return of all men failing to obtain winter farm employment."

ALBERTA.

"Absence from city delayed replying your wire second. From our experience believe quite impossible Railways or other organizations to guarantee winter employment this Province to any substantial number. We still feel every effort should be made to recruit help from Eastern Canada and United States as stated my previous communication. If arrangements made bring men from England agree that satisfactory guarantee should be obtained to return men and suggest some form registration as aid to checking over possible applications for relief."

On the 3rd August the following cable was sent to Lord Lovat laying down the final conditions under which the harvester movement might take place:-

"Your cable 31st Manitoba and Saskatchewan Governments state ten thousand men can be placed in harvest fields but add there is little chance of finding winter employment for number mentioned. Both Governments emphasize necessity your Government and Railways guarantee not only return men unable obtain such employment but declare provision should be made for maintenance when necessary pending return. Both Governments substantially confirm our original condition of employment guarantee by Railways. If you are unable obtain this guarantee then movement may proceed under following conditions:-

"First, that responsibility for movement must rest entirely on your Government and Railways.

"Second, that responsibility for harvest and winter farm placement must rest with Railways eliminating original absolute guarantee Department and Provincial Governments giving full co-operation winter farm placement.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"Third, that your Government and Railways undertake return all men short of funds who cannot obtain winter farm employment, misfits and those who cannot pay fare but desire return.

"Fourth, only men accustomed hard manual labour be recruited.

"Fifth, that you take every precaution prevent misrepresentation regarding wages and prospects in advertising propaganda.

"If you agree these conditions proceed with movement but no sailings after eighteenth instant. Advise Walker and reply."

On the 7th August the Director of Emigration for Canada in London cabled the following acceptance by the transportation companies of the conditions above set out:-

"Shipping Companies and Railways at conference British Board Trade Saturday decided five points your cable third August acceptable to them. Macnaghten informs me companies have agreed accept full responsibility conditions set out under five points your cable third. Ministry Labour and Railways and Steamship Companies advertising movement by prominent posters. Volume applicants constantly increasing. Quality applicants accepted reported excellent. Misfits, undesirables, those unable obtain winter work, those refusing same, return Overseas expense, with cheap rate for those who work harvest and subsequently desire return."

The movement totalled 8,449; the special rate for return was $30.00 from Winnipeg. The Dominion Government did not contribute in any way to passage assistance either to Canada or from Canada. 6,455 harvesters returned, of these 2,107 paid their own way home and an additional 1,816 paid full fare. The balance 2,532 were returned free under the arrangement between the British Government and the transportation companies.

There has been much discussion in the Press and elsewhere over the supposed detention at Winnipeg of a number of harvesters about to return to their former homes. The following memorandum dated the 13th February, 1929 was supplied to the Minister by the Department:-

"There appears in the Routine Proceedings and Orders of the Day, for today, a question by Mr. Woodsworth as follows:-

"By whose authority and under what legislation did the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Winnipeg on September 5, 1928 (a) prevent British harvesters from leaving the waiting room of the Canadian National Railways; (b) seek to prevent a Member of the British House of Commons from entering said waiting room?"

"The State Department has queried the Department of Justice (under whom the Royal Canadian Mounted Police operate) and this Department and the reply will, therefore, have to be tabled by the State Department. As the question is one altogether pertaining to the actions of the Mounted Police, there would appear to be no necessity for this Department making any reply.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"For your information I am giving you below, in brief form, the particulars which we have on file with regard to the question referred to. Division Commissioner Gelley under date of September 14th last reported that on September 4th after the steamship companies and the railways had decided to make arrangements to return the British harvesters then in the City of Winnipeg, each railway made arrangements to have the men report at their respective stations. The Canadian National men were required to report at the second-class waiting room, Canadian National Depot, at four o'clock in the afternoon, where they were registered, signing a statement as to their name, particulars of their arrival, and were further required to show their papers establishing that they were British harvesters. They were given a ticket good from Winnipeg to a port of landing in the British Isles. The men were given food at about six o'clock and provided with hampers for the journey. During the procedure and in view of the number of outside people that were continuously going into the waiting room and some of the harvesters wanting to go out, the railway officials closed the gates and allowed no one either to enter or leave. Shortly before the harvesters' train was due to leave, the British Parliamentary Party, then visiting in Winnipeg, arrived at the station and some of the members proceeding to the second class waiting room to interview the harvesters were at first refused admission, but upon making themselves known they were allowed access to the harvesters with whom they were at liberty to mingle at will.

"At a meeting of the Labour Members of the British Parliamentary Party at the Fort Garry Hotel that evening, complaints were made about the alleged treatment of the harvesters. The Division Commissioner was present on request and went fully into the situation, explaining that the British harvesters were not in any way forced to return to the British Isles but were returning on their own request and further that they had been treated with all courtesy and in the best manner possible. The following day at a luncheon given the Parliamentary Party at the St. Charles Country Club by the Board of Trade, Mr. Thomas Johnson, M.P. for Dundee, in a speech complained of the accommodation in the Immigration Hall and also referred to the men as being kept in a cage, there being an armed soldier and two policemen at the door. The Division Commissioner in his report states that shortly after Mr. Johnson's speech several members of the party on proceeding to the Immigration Hall were shown through it and they expressed great satisfaction at what they saw. Mr. Gelley adds that Mr. Johnson has since denied that he made the statements referred to and is satisfied there is no ground for complaint.

"With regard to the question asked by Mr. Woodsworth, this Department is in no way responsible for the presence of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the Canadian National waiting room at Winnipeg on December 5, 1928. We have information on the Departmental file which shows that the officers were placed there at the request of the Superintendent of Investigation, Canadian National Railways Police.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61743 33

RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE REPORT OF THE SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND COLONIZATION.

The recommendations of the Committee are covered by the general memorandum but for the purpose of convenience the action taken on each recommendation is set out in consecative form in this memorandum.

1."Federal Responsibility.

> In the opinion of the Committee the responsibility and control of the selection of immigrants, no matter by whom recruited must rest solely and exclusively with the Government of Canada."

The Railway Companies and other voluntary organizations have at various times pressed for the right of selection. The above Resolution has, therefore, fortified the Department in former decisions to retain control of the selection of immigrants no matter by whom recruited.

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2. "Provincial Co-operation.

> The Committee recommends that special efforts be now made to extend the field of activity of the Provincial Authorities particularly in the matter of placement, settlement and supervision of immigrants, and that, with this in view, the Federal Government consider contributing to defray the cost of Provincial co-operation for that purpose."

During the month of October 1928, the Minister conferred with the Provincial Governments of the Western Provinces regarding immigration matters and invited their participation in the work of British nomination, the reception and distribution of British boys, the Boys Land Settlement Scheme and the settlement of Canadian boys. As a result of the Minister's conference with the Western Provinces, Manitoba agreed to participate in the Boys Land Settlement Scheme. Saskatchewan

agreed

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

agreed to participate in the reception and distributing farm and all the Provinces agreed to co-operate as far as possible in placement work. As a matter of fact the Province of Ontario agreed to control placement and the Department is co-operating closely with the Provincial Government.

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3. "Medical Examination.

> ..... The Department of Immigration and the Department of Health should, it is considered, make the most exhaustive efforts to see that the new system is perfected so as to eliminate, as far as possible, inconvenience, delay and expense to the prospective immigrant, and to dispel the idea that there is any intention, on the part of the Canadian government, to restrict or hinder the coming to Canada of British subjects. For this purpose the committee recommends that the present system would be improved and that it would obviate delay and inconvenience to the prospective emigrant, especially those who reside in the rural districts of the British Isles if the examnations were made by British local doctors paid by, and under the supervision and control of, the Canadian medical authorities, who should be located at convenient centres of population."

Officials of the Department of Immigration and the Department of Health made a thorough investigation into the system of medical inspection, and, acting on the general instructions of the Committee, 460 roster doctors were appointed especially in the rural districts of the British Isles for the purpose of obviating inconvenience and delay to the prospective immigrants. The roster doctor medical fees are being paid jointly by the British and Dominion Governments. This arrangement is satisfactory to all the companies and organizations interested.

Medical inspection is made under the supervision and control of Canadian medical doctors who are located at convenient centres.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

SPECIAL PASSAGE RATES FOR BRITISH SETTLERS.

1. "'Teen Age.

The Committee approves of all previous efforts to promote and encourage 'teen age immigration from Great Britain and recommends that the age limit for boy immigrants be extended to boys 14 to 19 years of age, both inclusive."

The new Assisted Passage Agreement provides that the age limit for boy immigrants be extended to boys 14 to 19 years of age, both inclusive.

2. "Domestics.

That the arrangements now in effect for the movement of domestics from the United Kingdom to Canada be continued."

The new Agreement provides for a continuation of the reduced ocean passage rate of £2 for household workers.

Arrangements have also been made with the British Government for the training overseas of household workers for Canada. This arrangement does not mean that the Officials of the Department of Immigration will relax their efforts to obtain experienced household workers, but it means that a more vigorous effort is being made to supply the wide-spread demand in Canada for migrants of this class. Provincial Governments have been invited to participate in this work and the Department of Immigration has already received orders for the following trained houseworkers,-

Ontario	300
Saskatchewan ...	150
Alberta	200
Manitoba	50

Houseworkers are being trained at the following points,-

London,
Cardiff,
Newcastle,
Glasgow.

These

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

These training centres are under the control of what are known as "migration Committees" composed of the Representatives of the Municpal Authorities, Local Education Committees, heads of local Churches, Farmers' Unions, Juvenile Advisory Committees, Representatives of Local Employers, British Government, Dominion Government, etc. The cost of training is defrayed by the British Government and for each trainee cash contributions are made as follows,-

Dominion Government ..... $15.
Provincial " ..... $ 5.

3. "Family Re-union.

That measures be taken to extend the assisted passage privileges to the families of immigrants from Great Britain who are now in Canada and who have so far established themselves as to have a reasonable prospect of being able to support their families in this country."

An Agreement was made in accordance with the Committee's recommendation. The Assisted Passage privileges for the re-union of families has now been embodied in the Assisted Passage Agreement for 1929. The privileges may be summarized as follows,-

Assistance is given towards the cost of transportation of

(a) Wives;

(b) Children who have not reached their seventeenth birthday prior to sailing of settlers from Great Britain or Northern Ireland who arrived in Canada prior to the 6th day of June, 1928, and who in the opinion of the Dominion Government have so far established themselves as to have a reasonable prospect of being able to support their families in Canada.

A wife eligible for assistance under this Scheme receives a £3 ocean rate and children under 17 receive free transportation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

4. "Reduction in Ocean Rates for all British Immigrants.

That measures be taken at an early date to arrange a conference between the Federal and British Governments and the Atlantic Steamship Companies with the object of obtaining a reduction in ocean rates to British immigrants to approximately £10."

After a series of conferences held in London, the Steamship Companies agreed to a general passage rate of £10 for British immigrants. This rate became effective on the 1st of January 1929. The following figures show the number of British migrants who have arrived during the first three months of 1929 covering the period during which the £10 rate has been in force, in comparison with the number of migrants who arrived during the same period in 1928,-

	1928.	1929.
January -	771	1,133
February -	1,002	1,691
March -	3,150	5,131

There has been a substantial increase, it will be noted, under the £10 rate.

The following dasses still receive the reduced ocean rate of £2.,-

(1) Members of agricultural families over 19 years.

(2) Houseworkers over 17 years of age.

The following receive free passage grants,-

(1) Members of agricultural families who have not reached their 19th birthday prior to sailing when coming to agricultural work.

(2) Boys who have reached their fourteenth birthday and have not reached their nineteenth birthday prior to sailing when proceeding to Canada under the auspices of the Dominion Government, a Provincial Government or an approved Voluntary Society to earn their livelihood on the land.

(Girls -

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(3) Girls who have reached their fourteenth birthday and have not reached their seventeenth birthday prior to sailing, provided they are coming to Canada under the auspices of the Dominion Government or af an approved Voluntary Society for house work.

RAILWAY RATES FOR CANADIAN LANDSEEKERS.

" "The Committee also recommends that measures be taken to ascertain whether the railways will restore the Home Seekers rates in effect prior to the war, making such rates effective East bound as well as West bound."

Pursuant to the above recommendation, the Department wrote to the Presidents of the Canadian National and the Canadian Pacific Railways. The following reply was received,-

"CANADIAN PASSENGER ASSOCIATION

Montreal, Que. Sept. 19, 1928.

HOME SEEKERS EXCURSION FARES FROM EASTERN CANADA TO PRAIRIE PROVINCES AND RETURN.

W. J. Egan, Esq.,
Deputy Minister of Immigration and Colonization,
Ottawa, Ont.

Dear Sir:-

Referring to your letter of July 7th addressed to the Presidents of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways quoting an extract from report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization advocating the restoration of Home Seekers' rates in effect prior to the war, making such rates effective Eastbound as well as Westbound.

As this is a matter that affects all Canadian Railways to a more or less extent, it has been referred to the Canadian Passenger Association for consideration and reply.

Specially low fares for Home Seekers from Eastern to Western Canada were inaugurated, as you will probably recollect, many years ago when it was difficult to secure settlers for the Prairie Provinces and it was necessary from a national standpoint to encourage the movement in every way possible. At that time there was very little business and commercial travel between the East and West.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

As the settlement of the Western Provinces progressed, business and commercial travel gradually developed and the Home Seekers' travel from Eastern Canada steadily decreased. As the legitimate use of the fare gradually diminished, the Railways in order to protect their interests against the advantage being taken of the fare by business and commercial travel gradually raised the charge.

The increase in Home Seekers' fares has not been detrimental insofar as settlement of the West is concerned, inasmuch as the exceptionally low Harvest Help fares authorized each year meet the requirements of the actual land seeker from Eastern Canada far better than the Home Seekers' excursion fares, which is evidenced by the fact that for a number of years the majority of those in Eastern Canada who deisred to settle on the land in the West took advantage of these special Harvest Help fares. This gives them the advantage of working for farmers in the West and earning more than enough to pay their passage fares both ways, and those who decide to settle in the Western Provinces arrange to move their families at the time of the next Harvest excursion, when they have their buildings and home under way and ready to receive them.

Further, we are of the opinion that present conditions in Canada are such as to make it inadvisable to unduly encourage removal of individuals and families from one province to another. All provinces have vacant land and are anxiously endeavouring to not only hold their present population but to secure new settlers. Certain of the provinces have even felt the drain caused by the harvesters excursions and have made protest against the arrangements. Our records indicate that from fifteen to twenty percent of the harvesters who go West each year do not return to the East and that the majority of those who do not return actually settle on the land.

After very careful consideration the Railways are strongly of the opinion that it would not be in the general interest to make any reduction in the present so-called "Homeseekers" Fares".

Yours truly,

(sgd) C.P. RIDDELL

Chairman."

LAND SETTLEMENT.

1. "The committee having heard the evidence in connection with the experiment of the 3,000 Family Settlement Scheme, now almost completed, recommends that time be given to test this form of land settlement before embarking upon extended schemes of this character.

In accordance with the above recommendation, the Department has made no new land settlement agreements.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

2. "The Committee approves of the extension to other provinces of the tripartite agreement with the British, Federal and Provincial governments for the encouragement of Land Settlement by the British immigrant."

ProvincialGovernments have been invited to participate in tripartite Agreements for the encouragement of land settlement by the British immigrant but so far Agreements have been signed only by the Provincial Governments of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

3. "The Committee recommends, subject to the completion of satisfactory arrangements with governments of the provinces, that assistance equal to that given by the British government to British emigrant boys be extended by the government of Canada to the Canadian youth who are trained in agriculture."

The following draft proposals were submitted to Provincial Governments regarding the settlement of Canadian boys,-

1. That (a) the applicant be in possession of ..... $ 500
(b) the Provincial Government loan a sum not exceeding 1250
(c) the Dominion Government loan a sum not exceeding 1250
$3000
(d) The Provincial Government to provide settlement and supervisory service.

2. It was further suggested that the following general conditions applicable to British boys should also apply to Canadian boys,-

(a) That the applicant has reached his 21st but not his 25th birthday at the date of application for assistance;

(b) That he is in possession of savings amounting to approximately $500;

(c) That he has acquired the necessary experience of farm work in Canada by working as an agricultural labourer for wages or in such other manner as the Department of Immigration and the Province may consider sufficient provided that both the Department and the Province shall be satisfied that the applicant is industrious, economical and capable of managing a farm;

(d) That the Dominion and Provincial Governments share losses on a fifty-fifty basis;

(e) That the above Scheme shall be applicable only to a Province the Government of which is participating in the British Boys Land Settlement Scheme.

So far no Provincial Government has agreed to participate in the Canadian Boys Land Settlement Scheme.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

LETTERS OF ASSURANCE OF EMPLOYMENT (PERMITS"- so called)

"Your Committee recommends that letters of assurance of employment shall state the names, addresses, occupations and nationality of the persons to be admitted and that an annual return be made by the Minister of Immigration to Parliament within thirty days of its meeting, giving particulars of all such letters, showing the names of persons so admitted, their addresses, occupation and nationality, the names and addresses of the persons who made the application for each such admission and of any other person who endorsed or made favourable representations in support of such application."

Letters of assurance of employment are being issued in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee and annual returns are also being made in accordance with the Committee's report.

RAILWAYS CONTINENTAL AGREEMENT.

"There was in the evidence, considerable criticism of certain features of the Railways' Agreement. The Committee has some doubt as to the desirability of giving to the Railways special authority to recruit immigrants, but as certain restrictions were imposed in connection with the renewal of the Agreement in October, 1927, the Committee is of the opinion that, in order to ascertain the results of its operation under the new conditions, the present Agreement mightbe continued according to its terms, but with this exception - that the system of nominations of immigrants from non-preferred countries under the Railways Agreement should be confined forthwith to the following degrees of relationship; father or mother, husband or wife, son or daughter, brother or sister - of any individual who is now engaged in farming in Canada, and further that the existing Railways Agreement should not be renewed in its present form."

Instructions were at once issued in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee and nominations of immigrants from non-preferred countries under the Railways Agreement are now confined to the degrees of relationship stated in the Report.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1909

Collateral - Immigration policy
C 61752

I N D E X

	Page
British Immigration.....	1
United States.....	15
Europe.....	17
Medical Inspection.....	20
Hon. R. B. Bennett. Press despatch on.....	21
Hon. Howard Ferguson. Criticism by.....	22
Criticisms. Replies to possible.....	27

.....

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61753

MEMORANDUM:

This memorandum is a brief statement of the present position of immigration from the following sources:-

(a) British Isles;

(b) United States;

(c) Europe.

BRITISH ISLES.

After the passage of the Empire Settlement Act, 1922, efforts were made to promote British immigration by loans under the various Assisted Passage Agreements. Under these Agreements loans were made in whole or in part to farmers, farm labourers and household workers coming to Canada to earn their livelihood at these occupations.

Under date of the 11th December 1925 an Agreement was made between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Dominion Government for the transportation, at greatly reduced rates, of families and single men coming to Canada from the United Kingdom to settle on the land, and household workers. With the introduction of the reduced rate, loans were abolished

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

for single farm labourers. The reduced rate of £2, which is still given to bona fide agricultural families and to household workers was established upon an equation by the British Government of the rebate of £4.10.0 by the steamship companies, the cash payment of £3.10.0 by the Department and aftercare service.

A comparison of the figures for the two last fiscal years shows the effect of the reduced rate, viz., there were 8,442 Empire Settlement migrants came to Canada in 1925-26; 20,248 in 1926-27 and 24,889 in 1927-28. The total immigration from the British Isles during the fiscal year which ended on the 31st March 1926 was 37,569. The total for 1926-27 was 50,378 and the total for 1927-28 was 50,872.

The Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization recommended that measures be taken to arrange a conference between the Federal and British Governments and the Atlantic Steamship Companies with the object of obtaining a reduction in ocean rates to British immigrants to approximately £10. A conference was held and a flat ocean rate of £10 was finally established. The reduced rate of £2 is still applicable

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

to bona fide farmers, farm labourers and household workers who may also receive a loan of the reduced rate whenever it is considered advisable. The Committee also approved of all previous efforts which had been made by the Department to promote and encourage 'teen age immigration from Great Britain and recommended that the age limit for boy immigrants be extended to boys from 14 to 19 years of age, both inclusive. The new Assisted Passage Agreement has been made in accordance with this recommendation.

Tripartite British-Dominion-Provincial Agreements have also been amended so that boys of the ages mentioned may now be received, placed and supervised by Provincial Governments accordingly. Under these tripartite Agreements boys are received at Provincial headquarters farms and then placed in selected farm homes. The minimum wage is $10 per month plus board and lodging, washing and mending. The farmer undertakes to pay the boy a certain sum each month and to remit the balance to the Provincial Government to be placed to the boy's credit. The Provincial Government selects the home, furnishes aftercare, advice, protection and what supervision is necessary for a boy's welfare for a period of three years after his arrival in Canada.

Voluntary societies may operate through Provincial

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Centres by submitting to the Colonization Officials of Provincial Governments the names and addresses of suitable homes and by the Representatives of Voluntary Societies submitting the names and addresses of suitable boys to the Oversea Agents of the Provincial or Dominion Governments.

These reception and distributing farms are provided by the Provincial Government and the following cash contributions are made on account of the operation of the farm:-

Provincial	Government	$10	per boy
Dominion	"	$10	" "
British	"	$20	" "
	TOTAL	$40	" "

The British Government and the Dominion Government share equally in the cost of transportation from the port of embarkation in the United Kingdom to the rail destination in Canada.

The Ontario Government have established a farm at Vimy Ridge, near Guelph, as a reception and distributing centre. Last year approximately 400 boys were received and distributed from Vimy Ridge.

The Provincial Government of Manitoba have designated the Manitoba Agricultural College as a reception and distributing centre. 101 boys arrived and were placed last year through the Manitoba Agricultural College.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

In New Brunswick the distributing centre is the Cossar Farm at Lower Gagetown. This farm was operated for a number of years by Dr. Cossar of Glasgow and, subsequently, by the Craigielinn Boys' Farm Association. It is situated on the right bank of the St. John River and centrally located for the distribution of boys.

The Provincial Government of Saskatchewan is also participating in this Scheme and this year boys will be received and distributed from the Agricultural College at Saskatoon.

A similar farm has also been established by the British Immigration and Colonization Association on the Island of Montreal for the reception and distribution of boys in Western Ontario and in the Eastern Townships of Quebec. During the fiscal year which ended on the 31st March 1928, 766 British boys were brought out under the auspices of this Association.

The next step in the program is what is known as the "BOYS LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEME". This is a further development of the reception and distributing centres for British boys. Under this Scheme, the British and Canadian Governments propose jointly to expend a total sum of $5,000,000 over a period of 10 years in the form of recoverable advances to assist suitable British youths

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

to take up farming in Canada on their own account. A large number of British boys who come to Canada as farm workers subsequently take up farms but so far they have had to reply entirely upon their own efforts for the necessary capital to purchase and equip a farm and this may take a considerable number of years. The BOYS LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEME aims at curtailing this period of waiting and under it a British youth at the end of a few years spent in gaining the necessary training and experience in Canada and in accumulating some savings will have the opportunity of being placed on a farm of his own under Government supervision.

This Scheme is applicable to British boys who have received assisted passages, have passed through the Provincial reception and distributing Centres in Canada and who are between 14 and 20 years of age upon arrival in the Dominion.

Upon attaining the age of 21, these boys will be eligible for assistance up to an amount not exceeding $2500 for the purchase of a farm and for stock and equipment provided that they have acquired the necessary training and experience by working for wages on a farm in Canada and have saved approximately $500.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Scheme provides for the co-operation of the Provincial Governments and the extent of settlement in each Province will depend upon the measure of such co-operation.

The original Scheme provided for a loan of $1250 by the British Government; $1,000 by the Dominion Government and $250 by a Provincial Government. The Scheme, however, has been modified so that a Provincial Government may have the alternative of assuming settlement and supervisory service in lieu of the advance of $250 which, under such circumstances, would be made by the Dominion Government.

The Provincial Governments who have decided to participate in the BOYS LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEME are Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario and Manitoba.

The Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization also recommended, subject to the completion of satisfactory arrangements with Governments of the Provinces, that assistance equal to that given by the British Government to British emigrant boys be extended by the Government of Canada to the Canadian youth who are trained in agriculture.

The Department of Immigration is now in communication

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

with Provincial Governments on the basis of this recommendation.

LAND SETTLEMENT.

The following is an extract from the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization:-

> "1. The committee having heard the evidence in connection with the experiment of the 3,000 Family Settlement Scheme, now almost completed, recommends that time be given to test this form of land settlement before embarking upon extended schemes of this character.
> 2. The committee approves of the extension to other provinces of the tripartite agreement with the British Federal and Provincial governments for the encouragement of Land Settlement by the British immigrant."

Under the original 3,000 Family Settlement Agreement, which was made on the 20th August 1924, 2,669 families, comprising 14,946 persons, were settled on vacant Soldier Settlement farms. Of this number 5,180, including heads of families, were placed in farm and household work. Up to the end of the fiscal year there have been 314 withdrawals and cancellations. The Agreement has been extended to permit of the completion of the Scheme.

The main purpose of the 3,000 Family Scheme was to attract British settlers and to demonstrate the success of land settlement wherever land could be obtained at a fair market value.

On the 4th August 1927 a tripartite Agreement was made

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

between the British and Dominion Governments and the Provincial Government of New Brunswick for the settlement of 500 families on improved farms in the Province of New Brunswick within a period of six years. Under this Scheme, the Provincial Government provides the farm and the British Government advances $1500 for stock and equipment. Repayment is made on a 25 year amortization basis with interest at 5 per centum per annum. The Dominion Government recruits and selects the families and co-operates with the Provincial Government in making adequate arrangements for reception and settlement. Families under this Scheme also participate in the Assisted Passage Agreement. Any loss of interest incurred on the price of a farm during the first two years as a result of the failure of a settler is shared as follows:-

Dominion Government 25%
Provincial " 25%
British " 50%

Losses on stock and equipment are shared as follows:-

British Government 50%
Dominion " 50%

Under the above Scheme 100 families were settled on improved farms in New Brunswick during 1928.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

On the 5th December 1927 another tripartite Agreement was made for the settlement of 500 families on improved farms in the Province of Nova Scotia within a period of six years. This Scheme is similar to the New Brunswick Land Settlement Scheme but is not yet in operation.

PROVINCIAL CO-OPERATION.

The following is a quotation from the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization:-

> "The Committee recommends that special efforts be now made to extend the field of activity of the Provincial Authorities particularly in the matter of placement, settlement and supervision of immigrants, and that, with this in view, the Federal Government consider contributing to defray the cost of Provincial co-operation for that purpose."

During the month of October 1928, the Minister conferred with the Provincial Governments of the Western Provinces regarding immigration matters and invited their participation in the work of British nomination, the reception and distribution of British boys, the Boys Land Settlement Scheme and the settlement of Canadian boys. The representations which were made have been confirmed by letter and negotiations are still proceeding between the Department of Immigration and Provincial Governments.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

COTTAGES.

The Department has undertaken to participate with the Provincial Governments in the erection of cottages for the training of British families. These cottages are erected in accordance with the tripartite Agreements between the British, Dominion and Provincial Governments. The cost of the erection of a cottage has been fixed at $1,000 and the cash contributions are allocated as follows:-

British Government		$500
Provincial	"	$250
Dominion	"	$250
	TOTAL	$1000

Participation is on the basis that a Provincial Government will administer the Scheme. The Provincial Government of Ontario has undertaken to erect 100 cottages and negotiations are still proceeding with the Provincial Government of Alberta for the erection of a limited number of cottages in that Province. Several of the Provincial Premiers expressed a very strong desire that a survey should be made by the Department of Immigration to determine the farm labour requirements in the Western Provinces. The Minister promised to make this survey and to submit the results to the Provincial Government who have reviewed and, in some cases,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61764

revised, the result of the survey. The survey showed a demand for spring placement of approximately 6,000 British farm workers, exclusive of agricultural families, for land settlement. The Department has undertaken to place 3,000 British agricultural trainees during March and April and an additional 1200 up to the 15th of May as well as 1800 during the month of July. It is anticipated that the additional requirements will be met by British migrants who are in a position to pay the £10 rate. The Department of Immigration has undertaken to place these British trainees.

AGRICULTURAL TRAINEES.

Increased facilities have been provided in the United Kingdom by the British Government for the training of single men for farm work. These training centres provide men not only for the Dominions but also for the rural requirements of the United Kingdom. Over 1000 of these trainees were brought to Canada last year. Officials of the Department are keeping in close touch with the situation to determine the value of this overseas agricultural training. Before commencing the course of training applicants are examined by Officials of the Department and passed as suitable prospective farm workers or rejected as the case may be.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61765

HOUSEHOLD WORKER TRAINEES.

Arrangements have also been made with the British Government for the training overseas of household workers for Canada. This arrangement does not mean that the Officials of the Department of Immigration will relax their efforts to obtain experienced household workers but it means that a more vigorous effort is being made to supply the wide-spread demand in Canada for migrants of this class. Provincial Governments have been invited to participate in this work and the Department of Immigration has already received orders for 700 domestics from the various Provincial Governments.

The following statement shows the total emigration from the United Kingdom to British North America, Australia, New Zealand, British South Africa, India and other parts of the Empire, United States and elsewhere, from 1921 to 1927, inclusive:-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61766

	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	Total
British North America	84,145	69,690	121,941	99,717	70,810	49,632	52,916	548,851
Australia) New Zealand)	77,934	56,851	55,156	58,500	55,920	61,078	48,832	414,271
British South Africa	28,138	21,414	18,938	22,452	21,144	8,295	7,572	127,953
India & other parts of the Empire	30,196	24,520	23,748	26,555	28,001	13,301	13,413	159,734
United States	67,499	61,826	101,063	39,057	54,898	28,740	25,662	378,745
Elsewhere	12,208	13,986	16,721	17,199	19,541	5,555	5,110	90,320

N. B. From 1923 to 1927 the figures do not include departures from the Irish Free State.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61767

UNITED STATES.

Another gratifying feature of the general immigration work is the gradual increase of settlers from the United States. In 1925 the number of U. S. settlers who entered Canada was 15,818. In 1926 this number increased to 18,778. In 1927 there were 21,025 and during the last fiscal year there were 25,007. Of the 21,025 who came to Canada from the United States during the fiscal year 1926-27 over 50% or 11,069 were of English, Irish, Scotch or Welsh racial origin.

In the United States, the Department of Immigration has sixteen Agencies known as "Canadian Information Bureaux" in charge of Agents who have a close and intimate knowledge of agricultural conditions in Canada and who are in a position to give accurate and up-to-date information to residents of the United States who contemplate coming to Canada. The Representatives in charge of these Bureaux report not only an increase in the number of inquiries for land settlement in Canada but they also receive a very large number of inquiries from tourists who contemplate motor trips to Canada.

The following is a report of immigration business in the United States for the fiscal year 1927-28:-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

UNITED STATES

Report of Immigration Business for the Fiscal Year 1927-1928.

Agency	Number of Inquiries	Settlers reported by Agent	Settlers reported by Stat.Br.	No. Car-loads	Value of Carloads and Effects	Good Prospects Outstanding
Fargo	4350	2059-2785	2280	154	$4,792,430	1151
Detroit	2030	755-1169	3992	9	1,886,215	223
St. Paul	2667	633-1141	1174	79	975,700	437
Great Falls	1843	751-1036	1035	24	712,835	351
Spokane	1961	543-1020	2854	12	1,591,050	628
Kansas City	2837	532- 952	675	14	1,261,845	485
Omaha	1857	534- 854	728	48	690,650	150
Harrisburg	1952	458- 690	1547	9	289,050	356
Woonsocket	686	189- 537	700	15	119,750	207
San Francisco	1593	188- 465	1383	2	402,120	47
Chicago	1461	188- 368	1407	8	694,100	312
Syracuse	910	185- 300	2779	1	755,075	144
Manchester Portland	551	167- 353	1169	3	205,250	221
Indianapolis	1039	123- 240	685	5	344,700	268
Boston	458	126- 222	1290	-	185,425	108
Columbus	1338	85- 156	1102	1	65,475	39
Alaska, Hawaii and not given			229			
1927-28: TOTAL	27,533	7,496-12,286	25,007	364	$14,971,670	5,127
1926-27: TOTAL	18,540	10,590	21,025	337	14,002,375	5,165
Increase	8,993	-1,696	3,982	27	969,295	---

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The figures giving the value of carloads and effects are given by the settlers to the Canadian Government Agents in the United States.

The Customs Returns for these figures will, no doubt, show a substantial reduction inasmuch as settlers when making entry will give smaller returns.

Another feature to be considered is the fact that many of these settlers do not see our Agents who have to estimate, in many cases, the value of the effects and capital inasmuch as many of these Certificates are issued by correspondence and the Agent does not have an opportunity of interviewing the settler.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

EUROPE

As stated on page 10 of this memorandum, the Minister conferred with the Provincial Governments of the Western Provinces. After describing conditions arising out of the large Continental movement of the past three years, the Premier of Alberta asked that the Department of Immigration immediately undertake a survey of the whole farm labour requirements. The Minister promised that this would be done and that the results would be communicated to the Provincial Governments for their concurrence or revision. So far as Ontario is concerned, the Provincial Government undertook to make their own survey.

The total result of the survey was 12,200 farm labourers. Of this number, the following numbers from Continental Europe were approved by the Provincial Authorities:-

	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.I.C.A.	Total
Scandinavians	-	200	800	300	-	1,300
Other Pref. Countries	300	150	500	300	-	1,250
Non-Preferred Countries	-	200	2000	-	-	2,200
GRAND TOTAL	300	550	3300	600	-	4,750

Our survey included 2000 from non-preferred countries for Alberta. Mr. Hoadley, however, stated that they did not require any from non-preferred countries and the 2,000 was struck out. The Department requested the Railways to bring forward 30% of the non-preferred farm labourers brought forward last year from non-preferred countries, the 30% being approximately 11,000 or over 400% more than the survey. There is no limitation of families for land settlement or household workers and relatives from the Railways area.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Province of Alberta stated definitely that they had already in the Province all the non-preferred immigrants they required for farm work this year. Our investigations show that during the period of the Railways' Agreement many thousands of non-preferred country immigrants drifted almost immediately upon arrival into non-agricultural work, including industrial employment in centres of Eastern Canada, thus contributing to the displacement of Canadians. The survey showed that the movement of farm labour required this year from the non-preferred countries is less than one-third of the total movement of last year.

A Conference was held with the Representatives of the Railways who were subsequently advised that, up to the 31st May next, the movement under the Railways' Agreement would be reduced to not more than 30% of the farm labourers moved by each Company during the last calendar year. The Railways were also advised to give much greater care to the selection of the type of migrant likely to accept and remain at farm work inasmuch as it was admitted by the Representatives of both Railways that large numbers of non-preferred immigrants drifted from the farm to other more lucrative occupations.

The Railways were also advised that the limitation of 30%

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

does not apply in any way to domestic servants, agricultural families coming for land settlement or to wives and children joining the head of a family already settled in Canada.

It was also suggested to the Railway Companies that they should make a canvas of their requirements for maintenance and construction work and advise the Department at the earliest possible moment what proportion of this demand would have to be met by the importation of labour. It was also suggested to the Railway Companies that there were many men available in the British Isles accustomed to hard manual labour who might be secured and whose services might be utilized for this work.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

MEDICAL INSPECTION.

The following is an extract from the Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization regarding medical inspection overseas:-

> "The Department of Immigration and the Department of Health should, it is considered, make the most exhaustive efforts to see that the new system is perfected so as to eliminate, as far as possible, inconvenience, delay and expense to the prospective immigrant, and to dispel the idea that there is any intention, on the part of the Canadian Government, to restrict or hinder the coming to Canada of British subjects. For this purpose the committee recommends that the present system would be improved and that it would obviate delay and inconvenience to the prospective emigrant, especially those who reside in the rural districts of the British Isles if the examinations were made by British local doctors paid by, and under the supervision and control of, the Canadian medical authorities, who should be located at convenient centres of population."

After consulting with the Department of Health 464 Roster doctors were appointed especially in the rural districts of the British Isles. The Roster doctor medical fees are being paid jointly by the British and Dominion Governments.

The above arrangement is satisfactory to all the companies and organizations interested.

Medical inspection is made under the supervision and control of Canadian Medical Doctors who are located at convenient centres.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Criticism of overseas emigration work by

1. Honourable R. B. Bennett;

2. Honourable Howard Ferguson.

The following is a press despatch dated January 16th 1929 from London, England:-

British Paper States Bennett Studied Immigration Situation

LONDON, Jan. 16—(B. U. P.)—"Hon. R. B. Bennett has strong opinions on the need for a greater flow of Britons to Canada, and he feels that the Canadian Government has not done everything it might have," says The Manchester Guardian today, adding that the leader of the Conservative Party in Canada had a very practical purpose on his visit to London apart from private business.

The paper says: "He took the opportunity to investigate the migration position in Britain and collected opinions from representative people about the working machinery. He had some confidential reports prepared for his own use, and he returned to Canada well supplied with facts and figures. It is quite possible that on his return he will apply his knowledge in an attempt to stimulate the Canadian Government to greater efforts."

The Manchester Guardian also remarks on Mr. Bennett's hatred of publicity when in England, and points out that it is possible he will become the next Prime Minister of Canada.

Mr. Bennett has been investigating what he describes as "the working machinery" and has obtained some confidential reports prepared for his own use. It is possible that Mr. Bennett may have obtained his information from Mr. Noxon, who is the Agent-General for Ontario and who evidently contributed similar material to the Honourable Howard Ferguson. It is also very probable that

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61774

Criticism of overseas emigration work by

1. Honourable R. B. Bennett;

2. Honourable Howard Ferguson.

The following is a press despatch dated January 16th 1929 from London, England:-

British Paper States Bennett Studied Immigration Situation

LONDON, Jan. 16—(B. U. P.)—"Hon. R. B. Bennett has strong opinions on the need for a greater flow of Britons to Canada, and he feels that the Canadian Government has not done everything it might have," says The Manchester Guardian today, adding that the leader of the Conservative Party in Canada had a very practical purpose on his visit to London apart from private business.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Bennett obtained additional information from overseas Representatives of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. We do not know what information Mr. Bennett may have but the following are quotations from an article by the Honourable Howard Ferguson which appeared in "MACLEAN'S" Magazine, December 1, 1928. This article was based on a speech made by Mr. Ferguson at the Empire Club, Toronto:-

"The Migration Question

There are plenty of possible migrants in Britain who are anxious and willing to come to a new portion of the Empire. Some of them have cauliflower ears and some of them flat feet - a few here and there. We have fellows of that kind in this country - I see them every day - and they get along splendidly; but unless we take the position that there shall be no more flat feet than what we ourselves produce, of course we are going to discourage migration. Let us be sensible about it. When we brought out those thousands of harvesters and told them; 'You can work at the harvest during the summer, and if you can get a job for the winter, you can stay in Canada,' it was not necessary to ask them to answer more than half a dozen questions which meant, in effect: 'Are you sound in wind and limb, and are you willing to work? If you are, you can go.' Why, then, should we require four or five sheets of family history and technical statistics for the admission of immigrants? This Inquisition has left an unfavorable impression in the Old Country. I do not intend to say it in any partisan way, because I quite believe that when these things are brought home to the Department at Ottawa, as they have been, we are going to have an improvement in the situation. I am interested in my country, and that is why I have ventured to state these things as they are.

Let me tell you one little incident. A chap in a little village had decided to sign up to come with his family to Canada.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

> He had to make two or three trips to see the doctor for examination. Finally he did not go. Now, that fellow occupied a rather important position in his own sphere of life, but he became an object of derision. Everybody pointed a finger at him, saying: 'He was going to Canada, but they examined him; what was the matter with him? Why couldn't they take him? There is something wrong somewhere.' That is an indication of the type of things that occur in the small communities there, just as they would happen here. There are a lot of little irritating things that could easily be removed, and I am quite sure that the Government at Ottawa, having had them brought to their notice, will see to it that they are remedied, and we will get our fair share of the magnificent type of young manhood that is waiting an opportunity to come out here and do their part in building up a home for themselves and helping us to develop this country."

It may be quite true that there are people who have flat or deformed feet in this country, but the question arises as to what extent physical defects of this kind may affect settlement, especially of families, in Canada. Three cases of this kind have recently been brought to the attention of the Department of Immigration. They are cases of children of three families who have been settled under the 3,000 Family Scheme. In these three cases there was a deformity which, it now transpires, would require an operation at some time or another. Officials of the Land Settlement Branch

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

have emphasized the fact that operations in these cases will be necessary; that these operations will involve a considerable expenditure and that they will be a great draw-back in the early years of settlement. The fact that children were admitted under these conditions shows conclusively that every reasonable latitude is given to British immigrants who suffer from such physical defects.

As an example of how the law is administered in that regard, it may be of some interest to give a concrete example:-

In the first year of the 3,000 Family Settlement Scheme an application was received from a migrant who was certified for valvular disease of the heart. This man had a wife and three small children. The application was not accepted because the applicant who had been so certified by the Medical Examiner was the sole bread-winner. If, however, instead of small children there had been one or two adult members of the family who could have undertaken the obligation of maintenance and also the monetary obligation involved in taking over a vacant Soldier Settlement farm, then the application would have been accepted.

The law, on the question of a physically defective person,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61778

is administered so that public monies may not be expended in bringing to this country migrants who are likely to become a public charge upon some municipality.

Mr. Ferguson pointed out that it was not necessary for the harvesters to answer "more than half a dozen questions" and proceeds:-

> "Why, then, should we require four or five sheets of family history and technical statistics for the admission of immigrants?"

Probably the best reply to this statement is a comparison of the forms used by the Department of Immigration and by the Ontario Government.

2 Encs. Annexed to this report is an Ontario Government Form marked "A" which shows 43 questions. Annexed is also the INFORMATION FORM by the Department of Immigration, marked "B", containing 41 questions.

In view of criticism arising last year regarding our INFORMATION FORM, which is used for [redacted] farm labourers, the Secretary of the Oversea Settlement Department and the Treasury

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Official who accompanied Lord Lovat examined and approved this Form, which was also approved by Lord Lovat.

The following is an extract from the Minutes by the Treasury Official regarding this form:-

> "Mr. Plant and I discussed with Mr. Egan and Mr. Little the questions of the INFORMATION FORM of the Department of Immigration and Colonization. We were fully satisfied that every question in the FORM is necessary. Many of them which, at first sight, might appear to be unnecessary are required in the interests of the migrant to enable the Department to place him in suitable work. The only question on which some modification appears to be desirable is No. 21 and it was agreed by Mr. Egan that at the end of this question the following words might be added in order to make it clearer to the applicant that he was not necessarily required to give the name of his present employer as a reference:-
>
> Insert in brackets:- '(not necessarily your present employer)'."

Another important feature is the fact that while not more than half a dozen questions may have been asked the harvesters yet out of 8,500 who came to Canada, 6,500 have returned.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

There may be criticism of the following procedure and replies are, therefore, given:-

1. Last year migrants who received the reduced rate were interviewed by an overseas Emigration Official before sailing. It was decided to have our Officers interview assisted migrants because the Dominion Government was making a cash contribution towards transportation.

2. This year migrants who receive assisted passage will also be interviewed by an Emigration Officer except the following:-

   (a) 100 British families who are coming to be settled on Hudson's Bay land under an Agreement between the British Government and the Hudson's Bay Company.

   (b) 100 British families who are coming to be settled on Canadian Pacific land under an Agreement between the British Government and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

   (c) Migrants who come to Canada under the auspices of the British Settlement Society of Toronto.

   It was decided to leave the interview of the 200 families to the Representatives of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company who were advancing $1200 for the erection of buildings on unimproved land. The British Government is contributing $800 for stock and equipment. We are not interviewing migrants selected by the British Settlement Society who have signed an Agreement to undertake aftercare. The Railway Companies and other Organizations signed an Agreement in 1926 but evinced no desire to renew this Agreement in subsequent years.

3. Migrants who now pay the regular ocean fare of £10 are not interviewed by Emigration Officials before sailing.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61781

20. Are both your parents living_____

21. Name and address of Parents_____

_____

22. Parent's Birthplace: Father_____ Mother_____

23. Trade or calling of Father_____

23. If your Parents are dead, give name and address of Guardians_____

_____

24. Name and addresses of two references (Other than Parents or Guardians) who will vouch for your character.

_____

_____

25. Have you interviewed, or written to, a Passenger or Steamship Agent? If so, give name and address of same. his_____

_____

Agree to remain on Farm employment

AGREEMENT.

I,_____

of_____

hereby declare that, I am accepted by the Government of Ontario, 163 Strand London, W.C.2, I will proceed to Ontario as directed by them, to be placed in farm employment. I fully understand that my wages, beginning after I am placed in farm employment, will be 10 dollars a month, to start, one half to be paid to me, the balance forwarded to the Colonization Dept. Parliament Buildings, Toronto, to be placed to my credit.

I further agree that the approval of my application for a free passage to Canada under this scheme is subject to cancellation at any time, and should such cancellation be necessary, the Ontario Government cannot accept any obligation to take the Applicant to Canada, neither shall Applicant have any claim against the Government or its officials for damages, loss of time, expenses, or any other claim whatsoever.

Signature of Applicant_____ Date_____
(must be signed by the applicant himself)

PARENT'S OR GUARDIAN'S CONSENT.

I_____
must give full name occupation & address.

the (Father) (Mother) (Guardian) of_____

Who has applied for a passage to Canada through the Government of Ontario, 163 Strand, London, W.C.2, hereby consent to the above Agreement, to his proceeding to Canada, if his application is accepted, also to his being placed out in farm work by the Government of Ontario. I hereby certify that the answers to the above questions are correct.

Dated the_____ Day of_____ 192

SIGNATURE_____

Witness_____

Address_____

The Witness must be one of the following, viz. A member or Official of any Banking Firm established in the United Kingdon, and Mayor, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Minister of Religion, Barrister-at-Law, Registered Medical Practitioner, Solicitor or Notary, registered in the United Kingdom.

Applicants are warned against leaving their employment or disposing of their property, until they have been definitely advised that their applications have been finally accepted and sailing arrangements made for them. A birth Certificate may be required at a later date.

A Medical Certificate must also be furnished when asked for, on the official form which will be supplied.

It must be distinclty understood that any person who is found to have contracted a contagious disease is liable to be returned to Great Britain, as admission to Canada, notwithstanding any previous approval, is always subject to terms of the Canadian Immigration Act.

On completion this form should be forwarded to:

THE AGENT/GENERAL FOR ONTARIO, 163 STRAND, LONDON, W.C.2.

or in the case of Boys living in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to the

ONTARIO GOVERNMENT BRANCH OFFICE, 111 UNION STREET, GLASGOW.

OFFICE MEMO.

C 61782

GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, CANADA.

BOY'S APPLICATION FORM FOR FARM WORK IN ONTARIO.

1. Name in full. PRINT IN BLOCK LETTERS, FAMILY NAME FIRST

2. Home address in full

3 If not living at home, present Address

4 Age Full date of Birth Place of birth

5 Are you in good health? Height Weight

6 Religion Where Educated

7 Standard or Form reached at school Date of leaving School

WHILE QUESTIONS 8 to 11 are asked, Farming Experience is NOT Essential for acceptance.

8 Have you ever worked on a farm?
If so give particulars, and how long)

9 With whom (Name and address)

10 Can you milk? Can you plough?

11 Can you harness and drive horses?

12 Are you at present employed?

(A) Nature of employment

(B) Name and address of employer

If Unemployed:

(A) State nature of last employment

(B) Name and address of last employer

(C) When and why did you leave?

13. Do you intend to remain at farm work permanently?

14. When are you prepared to leave for Canada

15. Can you pay 10s. 6d. for a medical certificate, if required?

16. Can you pay your fare to the Port of embarkation?

17. How much money would you have on arrival in Canada?

18. Can your parents supply you with a suitable outfit of clothing, etc. if you are accepted? Blonde

19. Have you any relatives or friends in Canada

Relationship?

Names

Address (if not more than two)

This information is the same as the Government has in use by the Province of Ontario

LG

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

C 61783

Department of Immigration and Colonization
Government of Canada

File No.....

INFORMATION FORM

Date..... 19.....

1. Name in full..... 1a. Age.....
   (Print your Surname in BLOCK LETTERS)
2. Address .....
3. Place of Birth..... 3a. Present Nationality.....
4. Religion .....
5. Married or Single or Widower..... 5a. Age of Wife if living.....
6. No. of Children .....
   STATE AGE AND SEX OF EACH
7. Will your Wife and Children accompany you?.....
8. If not, what provisions are you making for them in this country?.....
9. A medical certificate from a doctor on the Official Roster may be required; therefore state exact condition of mental and physical health of yourself and individual members of family:
   .....
   .....
10. Have you or has any member of your family suffered at any time from insanity, epilepsy or tuberculosis in any form, or any infectious disease?.....
    .....
11. If you or any member of your family has any physical defect, give particulars of it.....
    .....
12. Have you or has any member of family ever been treated in an Institution or Home?.....
    If so, give particulars.....
13. State intended occupation in Canada.....
14. Where.....
15. Is such occupation assured?..... 15a. By whom.....
16. Have you lived in Canada?.....
    (a) Where?.....
    (b) Between what dates?.....
17. Can you pay your own fare to final destination in Canada?.....
    (a) What money will you possess in addition at time of landing in Canada?.....
18. If relatives or friends are providing a home, give name, address and relationship, and state how long they have been in Canada.....
    .....
19. How many years have you farmed? ..... What kind of farming?.....
    Can you milk?..... Can you plough?.....
    How many horses can you handle?..... What experience with other live stock?.....

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Coll - Immigration policy

C 61785

Immigration
1929 Debates

ARE CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS BEING MENACED

BY

FOREIGN IMMIGRATION?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61783

Department of Immigration and Colonization
Government of Canada

File No.....

INFORMATION FORM

Date..... 19.....

1. Name in full..... 1a. Age.....
   (Print your Surname in BLOCK LETTERS)
2. Address .....
3. Place of Birth..... 3a. Present Nationality.....
4. Religion .....
5. Married or Single or Widower..... 5a. Age of Wife if living.....
6. No. of Children .....
   STATE AGE AND SEX OF EACH
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8. If not, what provisions are you making for them in this country?.....
9. A medical certificate from a doctor on the Official Roster may be required; therefore state exact condition of mental and physical health of yourself and individual members of family:
   .....
   .....
10. Have you or has any member of your family suffered at any time from insanity, epilepsy or tuberculosis in any form, or any infectious disease?.....
    .....
11. If you or any member of your family has any physical defect, give particulars of it.....
    .....
12. Have you or has any member of family ever been treated in an Institution or Home?.....
    If so, give particulars.....
13. State intended occupation in Canada.....
14. Where.....
15. Is such occupation assured?..... 15a. By whom.....
16. Have you lived in Canada?.....
    (a) Where?.....
    (b) Between what dates?.....
17. Can you pay your own fare to final destination in Canada?.....
    (a) What money will you possess in addition at time of landing in Canada?.....
18. If relatives or friends are providing a home, give name, address and relationship, and state how long they have been in Canada.....
    .....
19. How many years have you farmed? ..... What kind of farming?.....
    Can you milk?..... Can you plough?.....
    How many horses can you handle?..... What experience with other live stock?.....

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61784

19a. Are you capable of hitching and driving horses?.....

19b. Are you capable of operating the simpler farming implements such as cultivators, discs, harrows and rollers?.....

20. Are you working on a farm?..... If not, state last occupation.....

21. Give names & addresses of **two farmers** for whom you have worked, and **how long with each.** If you have not been employed on a farm state so, and give names and addresses of your last employers.

Name.....

Address.....

Name.....

Address.....

22. Give name and address in the British Isles of parents or nearest living relative (state relationship)

.....

23. When do you wish to leave for Canada? (*If possible give name of steamer, date of sailing and class by which you intend to travel, and rail destination in Canada*).....

.....

24. If you are in communication with a Shipping or Booking Agent, give his name and address

.....

Signature.....

Agent's Remarks:-

In view of criticism arising last year regarding our INFORMATION FORM, which is used for ~~boys and~~ farm labourers, the Secretary of the Oversea Settlement Department and the Treasury Official who accompanied Lord Lovat examined and approved this Form, which was also approved by Lord Lovat.

The following is an extract from the Minutes by the Treasury Official regarding this form:-

"Mr. Plant and I discussed with Mr. Egan and Mr. Little the questions of the INFORMATION FORM of the Department of Immigration and Colonization. We were fully satisfied that every question in the FORM is necessary. Many of them which, at first sight, might appear to be unnecessary are required in the interests of the migrant to enable the Department to place him in suitable work. The only question on which some modification appears to be desirable is No. 21 and it was agreed by Mr. Egan that at the end of this question the following words might be added in order to make it clearer to the applicant that he was not necessarily required to give the name of his present employer as a reference:-

Insert in brackets:- '(not necessarily your present employer)'."

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Coll - Immigration policy.
C 61785
Recu / 30 Oct
1929 Debates

ARE CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS BEING MENACED

BY

FOREIGN IMMIGRATION?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61786

The Truth Regarding the Menace of Foreign Immigrants.

Are Canadian institution being menaced by foreign immigrants?

Rumours have been circulated that Canada is being flooded with southern Europeans and that British institutions are being menaced with the influx of foreigners. On May 5th, 1928 in Toronto, Hon. R.B. Bennett made the following statement:-

> "We are bringing into this country an ever increasing number of non-British immigrants and yet of people who have left this country the major part are of British stock and English-speaking origin. It means this country is rapidly being settled by non-British stock and while the British stock and to some extent French stock are leaving this country."

The Liberal Party objects to this statement on two grounds:

Firstly - It takes issue with those who suggest that carefully selected foreign immigrants cannot and do not become good Canadian citizens.

Secondly - It denies that foreign immigrants have been allowed to enter Canada in sufficient numbers to threaten the supremacy of our native stock.

What are the Facts?

During the calendar year ending December 31, 1929 immigration was as follows:

British Immigrants	66,801
Northern European Races ..	29,968
From United States	31,852
Other races	36,372

So much for the last calendar year. Now take the totals for the three calendar years 1927, 1928, 1929.

British Immigrants	175,589
Northern European races..	95,805
From United States	85,603
Other races	133,661

When these figures are examined it will be seen that immigrants of the Nordic races, that is, those from the British Isles, from northern Europe and the United States total 356,997.

While southern European immigrants amounted to 133,661.

Let Conservative critics of the Liberal Immigration Policy be answered by one of the outstanding Conservative newspapers of the Dominion. The following extract is from the Ottawa Journal of March 18, 1930, and refers to the latest figure published by the Department of Immigration.

> "Good people worrying over Nordic supremacy because of foreign immigrants should take heart from the latest of Government statistics. They show that during the past eleven months British settlers in Canada exceeded those of the same period last year by 7,534. United States settlers increased by 1,000. Those from north-western Europe (favoured races) by 200, on the other hand immigrants from all other countries largely continental Europe decreased by nearly 12,000.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

And observe carefully the next paragraph.

"The truth is of course that talk about the British population of this country being overwhelmed by foreigners is nonsense. There has never been a time in the last fifteen years when there was even the remotest prospect of such a thing happening."

Thus a leading Conservative journal flatly contradicts the reckless statement made by the Leader of the Conservative Party.

* * *

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Coll - Immigration policy.
C 61789 Immigration
1929.

"KEEPING THE RUDDER TRUE."

LIBERAL POLICIES AND THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM.

"Canadians, the future is with you. Do not be in too much of a hurry. Your country is for the virile men; let it be filled with the best. What does one hundred or two hundred years matter before your country is full? Keep the stock you have and the men and women you have and see that your future generations are in no way inferior to them. Time is on your side. Maintain your values and your standards and may your prayer be that of the Greek sailor which has been preserved by Seneca:

> 'Oh God, you may save me if you will, you may sink me if you will, but whatever happens I will always keep my rudder true.'"

(Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61789

"KEEPING THE RUDDER TRUE"

LIBERAL POLICIES AND THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM.

The Year 1922 A Turning-Point.

The year 1922 was a turning-point in immigration. During the war the movement of population from all countries was suspended to a large extent. As a consequence immigration conditions in Canada suffered from the altered circumstances of other countries. In the United Kingdom higher wages for British agricultural workers and the introduction of the dole discouraged emigration on a large scale. In Central Europe, on the contrary, the war had left a great number of dispossessed peoples eager for migration to the new world. At the same time, the United States reversed its immigration policy and adopted a quota system which largely excluded European immigrants and created an artificial labour vacuum which was drawing large numbers of Canadians into the industrial life of that country.

The Principles of Liberal Immigration Policy.

In the face of the abnormal conditions created by the war, the Liberal Government adopted an immigration policy of cautious discrimination. The policy in a word was this - to secure the largest possible immigration of those classes which could be absorbed and assimilated with profit to the newcomer and without loss to the Dominion.

In the development of this policy in succeeding years, it has been recognized:-

(a) That while Canada requires increased population, quality rather than quantity is of the first importance.

(b) That British must always hold first place in importance and that every legitimate effort must be used to maintain and increase the flow from the Mother Country.

(c) That next after British immigration, encouragement must be given to a movement of settlers from the United States and from North-Western Europe of those healthy, hardy people, desirous of establishing themselves in our basic industries, principally agriculture.

(d) That colonization must go hand in hand with immigration and that newcomers whether seeking farm employment or land settlement, must not be left to shift for themselves as strangers in a strange land.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(e) There ought to be the closest consultation and co-operation between the provincial governments and the federal immigration authorities. As the Prime Minister, himself, expressed it, "Any policy respecting immigration which has no regard for the susceptibilities and needs of the several provinces will never serve to maintain the unity of the Dominion as a whole, and it is, as I wish to repeat, upon the unity of Canada more than upon all else that the basis of our present contentment and future development rests".

Propogandists At Work.

In basing its immigration policy upon the principle of selection, the Government has been exposed to attack from a vigorous propaganda carried on sometimes by the opposition and sometimes by special interest for a wide-open door. General McCrae, Chief Whip of the Tory Party proposed that Canada should spend three hundred million dollars in clearing land and erecting homes in the norther portion of the wester provinces in order to increase the flow of immigration. Dr. Manion, another leader of the Tory opposition, speaking in the session of 1929, said, "Our land, I repeat, should be the mecca for all the desirable people from all the over-crowded portions of the earth." At the same time there were those who contended that the doors should be practically shut and bolted in order to protect Canadian labour. Keeping straight to its furrow, the Government refused to be swung to either extreme. The wisdom of its policy has now been abundantly confirmed.

The Immigration Enquiry of 1928.

The underground opposition of the Government policy of selected immigration came to a head in 1928 when veiled charges of incompetence were levelled against the officials of the Immigration Department, and more serious rumours of corruption were circulated in the public press.

Government Welcomes Enquiry.

The moment these rumours reached the Prime Minister, he announced that no effort would be spared to have them sifted by a thorough investigation. The same assurance was given by Hon. Robert Forke, Minister of Immigration. When Parliament met, the Government referred the entire subject of immigration to the consideration of the Committee of Agriculture and Colonization upon which every party and group in the House was adequately represented. There were no reservations in the terms of reference. The Committee was free to summon witnesses and had full access to the Departmental files. After an ex-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

haustive investigation extending over three months, the Committee brought in a report to which all parties had subscribed. The reckless charges of corruption and sinister influences failed to find any substantiation. In broad outline, the report endorsed the main lines of immigration policy which had been followed by the Government. Where new recommendations were made, the Government announced its readiness to adopt them.

British Immigration First.

Among the charges made at the time of the Parliamentary Enquiry was the accusation that the Government was more anxious to encourage Continental immigration from Europe than to secure British settlers. This charge was proved to be absolutely without foundation. It is a matter of record that British immigration is encouraged and assisted beyond anything done in connection with any other class of immigration. This encouragement and assistance is two fold, (1) By Publicity. (2) By Passage Rates.

Publicity.

In the British Isles, Canada maintains ten Emigration Agencies, spends many thousands of dollars annually in advertising, distribution of literature, placing exhibits at agricultural and other Fairs, giving lectures on Canada, and in various other ways brings the opportunites in the Dominion to the attention of the British public. No such propoganda is carried on in Europe. In the figures presented to the Committee of Agriculture the Colonization at the Parliamentary Enquiry in the spring of 1928, it was shown that Canada spent an average of $16.67 per capita on British immigrants and 11 cents per capita on Continental immigrants.

Passage Rates.

There is no scheme of passage assistance for the immigrant from the Continent of Europe regardless of his occupation or the country from which he comes. The cost to a Continental immigrant travelling third class ocean and colonist rail from Antwerp to Winnipeg is $137.50.

Until the beginning of the year 1929, the cost to a Britisher who paid his own way was approximately $112.00 for the same journey from Liverpool to Winnipeg. On the 1st of January, 1929, the ocean rate was reduced for British immigrants paying their own way and coming from Great Britain or Northern Ireland. The present flat ocean rate third class is .10 as

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

compared with the former rate of £18.15. It now costs the Britisher who pays his own way approximately $74.00 to get from Liverpool to Winnipeg as compared with $137.50 for the Continental.

Other Encouragements to British Immigration.

Assisted Passages.

Canada does not contribute anything towards the establishment of the £10 rate, but does make a contribution towards passage assistance for the following classes:-

1. Agricultural families.
2. Houseworkers.
3. Juvenile immigrants.

The ocean rate payable by the agricultural adult or houseworker is £2 with a reduced inland rate. Thus a farmer may travel from Liverpool to Winnipeg for £4.10. Children under 19, belonging to agricultural families, are given free passage. Juvenile immigrants (girls 14 to 17 - boys 14 to 19) receive free passage. All of these special rates, it will be noticed, are limited to British immigrants.

The Empire Settlement Scheme.

The First Empire Settlement Agreement providing passage assistance to British Immigration was made in April, 1923. Under the terms of this agreement provision is made both for reduced rates of passage and for loans for passage assistance. These reduced rates of transportation for selected British settlers, with free passage for juveniles, have been maintained to this date.

The Three Thousand British Family Settlement Scheme.

This scheme was undertaken in co-operation with the British Government in 1925. The project was to move and place on the land in Canada 3000 British families in three years, and was undertaken largely as a demonstration of what might be accomplished by landholders and others in the way of assisting settlement. The lands were supplied by the Federal Government, being lands acquired for Soldier Settlement and either not used or turned back to the Soldier Settlement Board. Funds for stock and equipment were advanced by the British Government. Responsibility for settlement and after-care was assumed by the Dominion Government.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

When Lord Clarendon, then as a representative of the British Government, visited Canada in 1926 to look into this settlement scheme, he expressed the opinion that it was the most successful venture in colonization that had been undertaken by any government in recent years.

Boy Settlement Scheme.

Within the last three years a further effort has been made to secure British settlers through the adoption of a plan for the settlement of British boys in Canada. By co-operation with the Provinces and the British Government boys between the ages of fourteen and nineteen inclusive, who will undertake to engage in farm work for a period of three years, are brought to Canada free of all transportation charges, their fares being paid by the British and Canadian Governments. The boys come in the first place to reception and distributing farms maintained by the Provincial Governments with assistance from the Dominion. From these farms they are distributed by the Provincial authorities to suitable farm homes within the Province where they work for wages while learning to farm. In a number of Provinces, it is also arranged that when the boy has obtained a practical knowledge of farmwork and livestock, has reached the age of twenty-one years, and has saved the sum of $500.00 the three governments concerned, Canadian, British, and Provincial, will grant him a loan of $2500 for the purchase of a farm of his own. Already a substantial movement of British boys has been established under this scheme, which is being developed by the Canadian Government as rapidly as the Provincial Governments see their way to co-operate.

Government Willing to Extend Similar Benefits

to Canadian Boys.

In adopting a policy to encourage the settlement of British boys on Canadian farms, the Government has not been unmindful of the desirability of offering the same opportunities to Canadian boys. All the Provinces have been advised that the Government was prepared to make the same cash contribution towards the settlement on the land of the Canadian boy as was made towards the similar settlement of the British boy. This proposal is now being considered by a number of the Provinces.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Another Example of Co-operation With Provinces.

An excellent example of what is being accomplished by co-operation between the Immigration Department, the Provincial Governments and the British Government is the scheme for the settlement of Five Hundred British families in New Brunswick. An agreement was entered into in 1927 under which it was arranged to settle approximately one hundred families a year on semi-improved farms in the Province of New Brunswick in each of five years. Already this scheme is meeting with success.

Success of Government Policies to Attract British Immigrants.

The emphasis of Liberal immigration policy has always been on British settlement. It was a manifest absurdity to suggest that a Liberal Government could be indifferent to British immigration which contained no less than four Ministers who themselves came to Canada as British immigrants - Motherwell, Forke, Dunning, Heenan - and one of these, Mr. Forke, held the portfolio of Immigration. The survey just made of the policies now in force is sufficient to ridicule this baseless accusation.

Canada Secures Majority of British Emigrants.

But the Government is not only attempting to secure a preponderance of British immigrants - it is succeeding in its efforts. The tables furnished by the British Board of Trade dismiss any suggestion that this country is not receiving its share of British migrants.

For the seven years 1922 to 1928 inclusive, the latest complete figures at present available - emigration from Great Britain to British North America amounted to 519,415 During the same period the British emigration to Australia and New Zealand combined was 370,026; to British South Africa 106,910; to India and other parts of the Empire 143,027; to the United States 333,591, and to all other countries 83,619.

These figures show clearly that Canada occupies a preferred position from the standpoint of the British emigrant. The following table expresses the comparison in a still more graphic form. It shows the average destination of every hundred emigrants from the British Isles in 1922 and in 1928.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

	1922	1928
Canada	28	40
Australia and New Zealand . .	23	25
British South Africa.	9	5
India etc..	10	10
United States	25	16
Elsewhere	5	4
	100	100

Or to bring it still closer home, in the nine months, January to September, 1929 (inclusive) 113,962 British migrants left the Mother Country for various parts of the world. Of the total, no less than 59,595 came to British North America. (A few of these to Newfoundland, but the balance to Canada.)

In other words, in the nine months under review, Canada received more British migrants than Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, other parts of the Empire, the United States, and all other countries outside of Europe. There could be no more convincing evidence of the success of Liberal immigration policies in encouraging British immigration to Canada.

European Immigration.

No effort is made by the Government to obtain immigration from continental Europe comparable with that made in Great Britain, and no financial assistance is extended to European immigrants. At the same time Canada extends a welcome to desirable settlers from the continent of Europe provided they comply with Canadian requirements as to health, character and ability to support themselves in Canada. References are sometimes made to this European immigration as though it were an undesirable addition to Canada's population. Last year immigrants arrived from the following countries:-

Belgium	862	Germany	13,473
Denmark	2,852	Norway	2,549
Holland	1,252	Sweden	3,073
Finland	4,614	Switzerland	510
France	775	Iceland	8

Which of these nationalities would anyone bar from Canada as undesirables?

The Railways Agreement and Its Changes.

The Railways Agreement has been the subject of much controversy. This Agreement was made in the autumn of 1925. Under the terms the Railways were to recruit in certain countries of Europe agricultural familes for land settlement, farm laborers and domestics, whom they were to place on the land

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

and in domestic service in Canada. The countries covered by the Railways Agreement are Russia, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Danzig, Poland, Czechoslvakia, Austria, Hungary, Jugoslvia and Roumania. The result of the Railways Agreement was an immediate and heavy increase in immigration from most of the countries to which the Agreement applies. The movement under the Railways Agreement to date is as follows:-

To December 31st 1926	38,028
To December 31st 1927	38,613
To December 31st 1928	47,078
To December 31st 1929	26,721

At the beginning of January 1929, the Railways were notified by the Government that the movement that year of farm laborers must be reduced to not more than 30% of the 1928 movement of the same classes, and that those brought must be here by the end of May. The 1928 movement of farm laborers totalled 34,242. The 1929 movement totalled 11,385. This reduction was made because numbers of men brought in in 1928 made no effort to engage in farm work.

The Railway Companies have been notified that in 1930 the movement of the farm labor class is to be cut down to a maximum of 8000 or a further reduction of at least 25%. In doing this, however, arrangements have been made so that any European farming in Western Canada who wishes to bring out a relative or friend to help him on the land will be able to do so by nomination.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Committee on Agriculture and Colonization in 1928, the Railways Agreement is not to be renewed on its expiration in 1930.

Immigration, The New Policy of Co-operation.

"Any policy respecting immigration which has no regard for the susceptibilities and needs of the several provinces will never serve to maintain the unity of the Dominion as a whole, and it is as I wish to repeat, upon the unity of Canada more than upon all else that the basis of our present contentment and future development rests." (Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King).

The return of their natural resources to the Western Provinces during the past session has made possible an increased degree of co-operation between the Dominion and the Provincial Governments in the field of immigration.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

With the area available for further settlement now in the control of the Province, it is evident that the interest of the Provincial Governments in immigration has been correspondingly enlarged. In future the Provinces will state the number of immigrants desired from year to year and it will be the function of the Dominion Government to use the facilities of the Department of Immigration in securing the required number as they are requisitioned.

The new policy in a word is this;- Each provincial Government is to be asked to say how many newcomers can be absorbed in its particular province and where they should be sought. This will make an end of what has been called the "dumping" of immigrants. The provincial Government will be responsible for both the numbers and the classes of immigrants who are brought into any province as the result of recruitment abroad by the Dominion Department of Immigration. This will remove a long-standing source of friction between the Dominion and the Provinces and will prevent any recurrence of the charge that the Dominion Government is adding to the embarrassment of the Provincial Government in dealing with the problem of seasonal unemployment.

No barriers are to be placed in the way of people from Great Britain or northern Europe who have the means to come on their own account and take care of themselves after they get here.

The new immigration policy is yet another illustration of the desire of the Liberal Government to co-operate with the Provinces for the maintenance of that national unity which was the vision of the Fathers of Confederation.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61798

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

Saturday,
October 26,
1929

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Sir John Sandeman Allen

I would draw the Prime Minister's attention to an extract from a pamphlet issued by Bishop Lloyd, of Prince Albert, in which he describes his interview with Sir John Sandeman Allen, copy of which I attach hereto.

Harry Baldwin

Secretary.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61799

COPY

Extract from letter of Bishop Lloyd

Immigration

On Saturday afternoon, September 7th, nearly three hours was spent in the King George Hotel, Saskatoon, going over the Canadian Immigration question with Sir John Sandeman Allen. He is the President of the British Chamber of Commerce and also the Imperial Institute in South Kensington, and is keenly interested in the emigration of good British settlers from the Old Country to Canada. Of course he could not understand why there should be such great restriction on British emigration when there was so little on Continental emigration, and none at all on the mixed stream coming in from the United States. There was no use trying to explain this. The only possible explanation is the Government at Ottawa and its Roman Catholic domination. Sir John has bought a place for his married son and duaghter in the district of Royal, close to Prince Albert.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Collateral - Immigration policy.

C 61800

Ottawa, 7th March, 1930.

III. REASONS WHY THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION SHOULD NOT BE ABOLISHED.

(1) The present organization of the Department has been built up over a period of thirteen years. It has agents, inspectors and other officers throughout Canada, the British Isles, the United States and on the Continent of Europe. Its functions are widespread and important. It deals with the admission to Canada and with appeals of those who are refused entry. No sufficient reason has yet been advanced to show why we should scrap this machine.

(2) Surely Canada has not come to the end of immigration. Because we have some temporary unemployment is not sufficient reason for becoming panicky. We have had other experiences of the same sort, particularly in 1907-08, 1912-13 and 1922-23. Immigration will undoubtedly continue to be one of the major problems of this country for many years to come.

(3) It was the Union Government which in 1917 saw the need of creating a separate Department to handle the important problems arising out of immigration and colonization. Anyone who has made a study of the work of the Department will realize the need of retaining an organization competent to handle the problems that arise.

(4) What has occurred to necessitate the change suggested. Have we finished with immigration. Is there no longer need of a policy. Will the co-operation of the Provinces not call for further activity on the part of the Federal Government, seeking to meet the wishes of the Provinces. One of the Recommendations of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization in its Report of June, 1928, was that the responsibility and control of the selection of immigrants, no matter by whom recruited, must rest solely and exclusively with the Federal Government.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61801 L-1509-53
1 of 6

Ottawa,
October 29, 1929

Memorandum for Mr. A. S. Cudmore:

Mr. King asked for a memorandum on Liberal Policy in Immigration from 1921 to date. He asked that it be a very brief survey.

The attached has come in from Mr. Blair today, and, although it is a little shorter than usual, it seems to me it might be boiled down a little more.

As I have not had a moment in which to touch this myself, I wonder whether you might possibly find time to summarize it for Mr. King, so that it will be in the most useful form for him in case he requires it.

94 R L 14

Secretary to
President of the Privy Council.

(H. R. L. HENRY)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61802

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NORTH AMERICA. [November 6.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 4.

[A 6738/1437/45] No. 1.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 1181.)

My Lord, *Washington, October* 27, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 420 of the 23rd October and to subsequent correspondence regarding the recent decision of the United States Government to prohibit the entry into United States ports of all ships carrying supplies of liquor, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the "New York Times" of the 24th instant* reporting the ruling of Judge Learnod Hand in dealing with an action brought by the Cunard and Anchor Lines and ten other companies, including two American, to contest the decision in question.

The counsel officiating on behalf of the steamship companies pleaded that their vessels did not transport liquor within the meaning of the prohibition laws and that the supplies carried came under the heading of ships' stores, and therefore did not fall within the Government regulations.

In considering the first of these two contentions, the judge stated that, even if transportation were defined to involve some delivery, he did not see how that would help the plaintiffs, since there appeared to be no significant distinction in the fact that the place of delivery was the ship itself, and he held that if the title or possession of the liquor had any bearing on the case, such title passed as soon as the liquor came into the hands of the consumer.

In regard to the argument that the prohibition laws did not apply to ships' stores, the court ruled that the statute, inasmuch as it effected a revolutionary reform in the habits of the nation, was to be understood as thoroughgoing in its attempt to accomplish the results desired. It did not specify the extent of its application, but left that to be gathered from the occasion and generality of the words used, and it intended to exercise, once and for all, the complete power of Congress under the amendment. Its very want of particularity seemed a good indication that the amendment was meant to cover a very wide field.

Your Lordship will observe that the court declared itself unable to draw any distinction between the carriage of cocaine or opium and alcohol, and supposing that Chinese vessels were to bring these drugs to American ports for the avowed purpose of serving them to passengers outside the 3-mile limit, denied that it could seriously be argued that a statute designed to prevent citizens from using such drugs did not also cover so evident a means of nullifying the law.

As regards the special stocks carried for the consumption of the crews only, the argument as to the legality of their carriage was much stronger, and, after dealing with the matter at some length, the judge decided to grant an injunction against interference with the maintenance of a supply necessary for the crews' rations during the eastward voyage, but the companies were called upon to give a bond in the sum of 25,000 dollars conditional against the use of such liquor for any other purpose. The remainder of the bills were dismissed, and the question will now go to the Supreme Court in the nature of an appeal.

I have, &c.

A. C. GEDDES.

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* Not printed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61803 E-9000 Back.

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NORTH AMERICA. [November 6.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 5.

[A 6739/55/45] No. 1.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 1182.)

My Lord, *Washington, October* 27, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 1484 of the 30th ultimo in regard to the conditions prevailing on Ellis Island, with particular reference to the case of Miss Nankivell and her niece.

On perusing the enclosure in your Lordship's despatch, I came to the conclusion that little would be gained by making a fresh formal and written complaint to the Secretary of State in regard to a particular case. Representations of that character in regard to this question appear to have the effect of provoking both the State Department and the Department of Labour to put forward the best possible defence of the action taken by their officials and of the conditions prevailing on the island. I have therefore thought it best to try a somewhat different line with the Secretary of State.

In the course of a conversation with Mr. Hughes this morning, I set the facts fully before him verbally and read to him the enclosures to your despatch. I abstained, however, from leaving any written representation. I told him that I knew that if I did I should inevitably receive a complete denial by the officials at Ellis Island of the facts as asserted in these letters, in the same way as I had done on former occasions, and that naturally, and again inevitably, in the absence of a formal enquiry, he would have to accept that denial. I invited him to look at the matter from a more general point of view. He would, I felt sure, be the first to admit that it subjected to an almost intolerable mental strain persons of refinement and education to accommodate them cheek-by-jowl with the sort of individuals who formed the bulk of the immigrant traffic, to whom the habit of cleanliness is almost unknown. This was particularly the case where women were concerned.

Starting from a recognition of that certain fact, was it not possible to do something which would make necessary detentions on Ellis Island less intolerable to the better class of immigrant? Two suggestions occurred to me. The first was that as the American Immigration Law had divided up immigrants into categories according to their places of birth, would it not be possible to place each nationality in separate quarters? Such an arrangement, if ever questioned, could easily be explained by the necessity of controlling the influx of immigrants according to nationality, as provided under the existing Act. Should such a scheme not be feasible owing to lack of accommodation, I urged the Secretary of State to consider the propriety of providing special quarters for those of the immigrants who were able and willing to pay for the luxury of privacy and cleanliness. Even if a system based on payment were impossible, there remained, it seemed to me, the possibility of instituting some elastic, though informal, system of segregation which could be worked by sympathetic officials.

I further invited the Secretary of State to consider the question from the point of view of America's desire to encourage immigration of better-class people. In this connection I had often heard it stated that the immigrants from Great Britain were, as a rule, the most desirable. The present system, however, acted as a deterrent to immigrants of any culture, who, hearing of disagreeable experiences at Ellis Island, would prefer not to expose themselves to that sort of treatment, with the result that their places would be taken by immigrants whose advent it was the purpose of the authorities to discourage.

Mr. Hughes listened carefully to what I had to say, and observed that he could not believe that Ellis Island was as bad as the steerage accommodation on an emigrant ship, but that he was gratified I had approached the question as I had instead of pressing for a reply in regard to the individual case, the circumstances of which I had read to him. He admitted quite freely that on a basis of accusations of bad conditions existing on specified days, now long past, we should get nowhere. He appeared sympathetic in regard to the difficulties experienced by Miss Nankivell and her niece, and promised to discuss the whole matter again with the Secretary of Labour, who, he

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

assured me, was most anxious to do everything in his power to improve the lot of the more respectable class of immigrant.

Before taking my leave of the Secretary I expressed gratification that, following upon his recent intervention, conditions on the island appeared undoubtedly to have improved for a time. There were now indications, however, that things were getting into a bad state again.

I have the honour to add that one of the secretaries of His Majesty's Embassy will take the opportunity of a forthcoming visit to New York to make a further tour of inspection of the island, accompanied by a representative of His Majesty's consulate-general. While it is not anticipated that such tours will throw any further light on the situation, they probably exercise a certain influence on the Ellis Island officials and remind them that we continue to take an active interest in the treatment to which our nationals are subjected.

I have, &c.
A. C. GEDDES.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61805 E-145-1-1

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NORTH AMERICA. [January 2.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[A 64/64/45] No. 1.

Sir A. Geddes to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received January* 2, 1923.)

(No. 1407.)

Sir, *Washington, December* 19, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1265 of the 17th November last, I have the honour to inform you that I have not forgotten the treatment of British subjects on Ellis Island. As occasion has arisen I have, through criticism and comment, kept the subject fresh in the mind of the United States Government. I hope that the result will be as satisfactory as I anticipate.

On Saturday, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State, I called upon the Secretary of Labour. His attitude was most friendly and helpful. He will, within ten days, visit Ellis Island accompanied by the Superintending Architect of the United States Government, with whom he will consult as to the possibility of erecting on the island separate quarters for English-speaking people. If there be no room there, space for the new buildings will be found on Governor's Island.

It is Mr. Davis's belief that Congress will approve the necessary appropriation.

We have now, I venture to think, passed the stage where there can be question of the justifiability of our complaint that proper provision is not made for British subjects detained in New York Harbour, and have entered a new stage, the end of which will be the construction of satisfactory accommodation.

I have, &c.
A. C. GEDDES.

[209 b—1]

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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NORTH AMERICA. [January 29.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[A 533/64/45] No. 1.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 54.)

My Lord, *Washington, January* 18, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1407 of the 19th December, 1922, I have the honour to inform you that on the 18th December I received a courteous invitation from Mr. Davis, the Secretary of Labour, to visit Ellis Island. I accepted this invitation, and on the 28th December, 1922, I visited the island and inspected the institutions there.

Ellis Island consists, as you will see in the attached photographs,* of three islands. On No. 1 stand the buildings of the immigration station, on No. 2 the general hospital, on No. 3 the isolation hospital.

I saw the immigration station thoroughly, and enough of the general hospital to arrive at a fair idea of its state of efficiency. I had time merely to glance at the isolation hospital. I propose to give my impression of these establishments in order.

1. *The Immigration Station.*

(Administrative Officer: Mr. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Port of New York.)

(a.) *Staff.*

Mr. Tod is a gentleman of independent means, who, some fourteen months ago, accepted office as Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New York. He is a sympathetic, kindly, energetic and efficient man, who holds office for patriotic reasons. Any country might be proud to point to him as one of its officials. Mr. Tod has spared neither time, thought nor pocket in his efforts to make Ellis Island humanely efficient.

I met several members of the immigration staff. They seemed to me to be suitable and efficient.

(b.) *Buildings.*

I was not favourably impressed by the plan of the buildings of the immigration station. On this subject, after only one visit, I am little inclined to express a definite opinion. It appeared to me, however, that much space on the ground floor that would be invaluable, if available, was practically useless because of insufficient provision for ventilation. Some of the rooms in use as waiting-rooms for those who had to appear before boards are inconvenient of access. Similarly, some of the sleeping rooms impressed me as unsuitable to house the numbers that in rush times spend the nights in them.

The lavatories, with latrine and urinal accommodation, open directly out of the sleeping and living rooms. This seems to me to be an inevitably unpleasant arrangement, especially in view of the fact that many, perhaps a majority of the immigrants, are unfamiliar with the pattern of conveniences in use in North America. Some of the immigrants are, I was told by the Secretary of Labour, apt to mistake the sanitary hoppers for drinking troughs, and the floor, or some drainage channel in it, for a latrine pit.

The rooms provided for the medical boards are unsuitable and inadequate. No effort has been made to adapt them through structural alteration to their present purpose.

While it is obviously necessary that the drifting crowd of immigrants who have to be handled in the building be prevented from straying and getting lost, I can quite understand that persons of some refinement and intelligence sent to Ellis Island resent the locked doors and wire "cages." These are much in evidence, and inevitably suggest imprisonment. I am satisfied, though, that the work of the

* Not reproduced.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

immigration station could not be done without them. To unlock the doors and leave them open and to remove the " cages " would produce chaos worse confounded.

Something is now being done to renovate the paint-work and to effect minor repairs. This has been too long delayed, and the buildings have been allowed to fall into a bad state. The roof in parts requires attention. This it is to receive. There can, however, be no doubt that the amount of money expended on upkeep has for years been insufficient, even to maintain the property.

My general criticism of the buildings is that they are too small. Further, the immigration laws have been altered since they were built, and, however suitable they may have been at the time of their erection, they do not quite meet the present requirements. The attempt has been made through makeshift arrangements to adapt them to their modified purpose. I understand that the superintending architect of the United States Government is now considering how they can be better adapted. I have no doubt that further improvement is possible. It is difficult to see, however, how anyone can rearrange the buildings and grounds to make them really suitable. The ideal " Ellis Island " would have, I imagine, ground round it so that those whose sojourn there could not be brief would have space to move about and to get away from what must often be a nauseating contact with their companions in detention.

(c.) *Condition of the Buildings.*

Cleanliness must in the circumstances be difficult to achieve. Many of the immigrants are innocent of the most rudimentary understanding of the meaning of the word "clean." I feel sure that a great effort is made to overcome the difficulties this produces. Still, I noticed in many corners impacted greasy dirt that it was possible to say with certainty had been there for many days, if not weeks or months. The impression that I received was that the cleaning is done with long-handled brushes and mops with, at times, aid from a cold-water hose. Nothing but hot water, strong soda and soap freely and frequently applied with a scrubbing-brush will serve if real cleanliness is to be obtained. As a result of the presence of chronic dirt, the buildings are pervaded by a flat, stale smell. This is quite distinct from the pungent odour of unwashed humanity. Both are to be met at Ellis Island. Indeed, the compound smell of old dirt and new immigrants is so nearly universal there that I should not be surprised if it were no longer noticed by the members of the staff. After leaving the island, it took me thirty-six hours to get rid of the aroma which flavoured everything I ate or drank.

(d.) *Arrangements for Immigrants detained on the Island*

Sleeping accommodation for immigrants and detained persons is provided chiefly in two-tiered bunks. These, in most of the sleeping rooms, are arranged in wire cages, the alley-ways being roofed over with stout wire net.

I am sure that it is necessary to encage the bunks to prevent thefts and even more unpleasant outrages. Yet I can understand a certain reaction of annoyed surprise on the part of those whose early experiences were of decent surroundings on being told to go to bed in a cage, even though the cage is necessary and provided for their protection.

The actual surface upon which the immigrant reclines is either woven wire or canvas, supported on metal laths. The canvases that I examined had not been long in use, not more than a few months, but Mr Tod said that they were not regularly changed or cleaned.

I cannot help thinking that it must be very unpleasant to sleep in the lower of these two-tiered berths, when ill-luck places a brutalised sort of creature in the berth above. The Secretary of Labour informed me that cases have been known where the different calls made by nature on the upper berth-holder are responded to without his or her rising from the " bed." In any such instance it seems to me the immigrant in the lower berth has grounds for complaint against the officials who put him there. I cannot believe that instances of this hardship are numerous on a percentage basis.

Five blankets are issued to each immigrant every night. Of these, two are intended to be spread on the wire or canvas and three to be used for cover. These blankets are of satisfactory quality and are sterilised as often as possible. Unfortunately the sterilisation plant cannot deal with all the used blankets every day. As a result, some of the blankets may be used by more than one immigrant between sterilisations. It is not difficult to believe that this may at times produce hardship for the later users.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

A cake of soap and two paper towels are also issued each evening to each immigrant detained overnight. The washing accommodation is good, though, of course, there is no privacy. I have heard this complained of. Such a complaint is merely factious. Similarly, some people do not like paper towels. Personally, I prefer them to cotton or linen towels in public wash-places.

(e.) *Food and Feeding.*

The food is of good quality and well cooked. The dining room is the cleanest room in the building, when meals begin. It is impossible, however, for any staff to keep it clean during meals, owing to what may be incorrectly described as the " table manners " of the guests, who incidentally use the floor as a universal slop bowl and refuse can.

The dining tables are covered for each meal with clean paper " cloths." The table ware is white glazed, thick, but not too thick, and strong. It seemed to me admirably suited to its purpose.

There are special arrangements for the feeding of immigrants of the Jewish faith which, so far as I am able to judge, are satisfactory. I have heard of no complaints with regard to them.

Generally, I thought the arrangements for feeding the best that could reasonably be expected to be made for the present sort of immigrant in the existing building. I attach a copy of the bill of fare for the 28th December, 1922. I personally saw the dinner served. It was excellent.

The kitchen seemed to me to be well equipped and efficiently managed.

That is all, I think, that need be said at this time about the staff and the buildings of the immigration station and the arrangements to board and lodge those detained at the station, except this :—

> Ellis Island is a Government institution, and, like all Government institutions in all countries, it is almost aggressively institutional. It is impossible for anyone on the island, whether on the staff, an immigrant, a " deportee," or even a visitor, to escape from the pervasive sense of " institutionalism."

The essential problem of Ellis Island is not, however, its institutionalism, or its arrangements for boarding and lodging immigrants, or its buildings, or even its staff. It is the immigrants and would-be immigrants who create it. If they were all accustomed to the same standards of personal cleanliness and consideration for their fellows, Ellis Island would know few real difficulties, but they are not. Those who pass through the immigration station range from the highly educated and gently nurtured, now fallen into straitened circumstances, to the utterly brutalised victim of poverty and oppression in some scarce civilised land. They speak many tongues and dialects. They all, lady, prostitute, mechanic, rabbi, and what-not, are frightened, nervous, shy and strange to their surroundings. They are quite ignorant, too, of what is expected of them and have no conception of what is going to happen next, or why anything happens. Anxious and worried old men and women, young men, girls and little children drift about rooms into which they have been put, or crowd round doors which they think may open. The units in this heterogeneous mass of humanity obviously dislike some of their contacts with one another and yet like sheep follow where any leads. Like sheep, too, they have to be herded and, by hurdles, kept from straying.

It really is remarkable to see how well the miserable mobs of nervous human beings, with all their worldly goods, are manœuvred through the legally necessary examinations and are despatched to their destinations. The officials certainly deserve credit for what they do achieve. Still, detention on Ellis Island must be a hateful experience for all of any sensibility who pass its portals.

When a barge-load of immigrants arrives at the island wharf, the crowded people pass on shore and are quickly scrutinised for signs of infectious disease. If a child has developed measles, let us say, he is picked out for treatment in the isolation hospital. The mother passes on with the crowd. Her feelings may be imagined.

The crowd files into the waiting rooms. These are caged with heavy wire net. It is necessary that they should be to prevent individuals straying. Still, the mental effect cannot be added happiness. From the waiting room the men and women are called out in batches, male and female, for examination by the medical officers. It is obviously impossible precisely to synchronise the calling out of the males and females of the same party. Not understanding what is happening, strange and nervous, some of the wretched immigrants believe that they are being separated from their friends

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

for ever. The Commissioner of Immigration told me that this calling of a man into one room and his wife into another, even though they are only to be separated for a few minutes, leads in some cases to pathetic scenes.

However, they are at length shepherded to the appropriate room. There an unpleasant experience awaits them. The rooms were not designed to provide facilities for the sort of medical examination now required by law. The arrangements are makeshift. During the years that I was Director of Recruiting and Minister of National Service I saw many medical boards in Great Britain. Until the whole recruiting medical service had been reformed by Sir James Galloway, many of them were very far from perfect. Still, no recruiting medical board that I saw was quite so badly accommodated as the medical inspection board I saw at work at Ellis Island. No separate dressing rooms or cubicles are provided. The men strip to their trousers in a crowd jammed between coat-racks. They have to pile their things on the racks higgledy-piggledy—the clean clothes of the washed on the foul clothes of the unwashed. Personally, I thought it disgusting for the washed.

There were five doctors at work when I saw the board. Their duty is to ascertain whether or no each man is free from certain scheduled diseases and transient infections. If the existence of a scheduled malady is suspected, the individual concerned is sent to hospital for diagnosis. No attempt at final diagnosis is made by the board. This is the deliberate policy, and I am sure it is perfectly sound and fair to the immigrants. The inspections that I saw were, from the professional point of view, considering their purpose, thorough and effective; from the point of view of a sensitive immigrant distinctly unpleasant, I should imagine.

The line of male immigrants approached the first medical officer with their trousers open. The doctor examined their external genitals for signs of venereal infection. Next he examined the inguinal canals for hernia. The doctor wore rubber gloves. I saw him "do" nine or ten men. His gloves were not cleansed between cases. I saw one nice, clean-looking Irish boy examined immediately after a very unpleasant looking individual who, I understood, came from some Eastern European district. I saw the boy shudder. I did not wonder. The doctor's rubber gloves were with hardly a second's interval in contact with his private parts after having been soiled, in the surgical sense at least, by contact with those of the unpleasant looking individual.

The examinations of the heart and lungs, &c., of the male immigrants seemed to be effectively and expertly made.

The examination of the female immigrants is made by women doctors. The arrangements for undressing are similar to those for the men. There is no examination of female genitalia except in cases suspected of venereal disease, when privacy is provided.

I saw no mental tests performed, but I saw the rooms in which these examinations are made. Their equipment seemed to me effective and adequate.

From the medical inspection rooms the immigrants who are not put back for further examination, proceed to a great central hall. Here, if everything has gone well, the family parties are reunited. Most efficiently the people are organised into groups corresponding to the ship's lists, and pass before the inspectors, who test their capacity to read and see that there is no reason to doubt their eligibility to land. Those that are granted entry, the vast majority of all immigrants, are now done with Ellis Island and at once get away to New York, or if they are going west, pass to the railway booking hall, where they exchange their vouchers for rail tickets, are told when they will start and how they will be taken to the railway station. Their baggage is skilfully and expeditiously handled. They can purchase at surprisingly low cost most excellent food for the journey and then they, too, get away, done with Ellis Island for ever. All the arrangements for handling admitted immigrants are efficient and reflect high credit on those concerned. They are, in fact, a very good example of American business administration.

Apart from the admitted immigrants, there are first the temporarily detained, *i.e.*, those who are admitted, but who for some reason cannot leave the island at once. Possibly they are waiting for money from friends to complete their journeys, perhaps to California. Possibly they are waiting for an hour or two till friends arrive to pilot them to their new homes. Possibly all members of a family but one have been readily passed in, and that one may have had to go to the hospital for diagnosis. Pulmonary tuberculosis may be suspected or mental deficiency, or there may be a suspicion of contract labour attaching to one of the party, or illiteracy.

I feel profoundly sorry for some of the temporarily detained—a mother waiting

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

F-1081-1

C 61810

for a delayed child, or a father with his children anxiously watching for his wife to come to him. The very heart of the tragedy of Ellis Island is in the room of the temporarily detained. It is no one's fault and cannot be avoided, unless immigrants to the United States are to be finally approved for admission in their own land before they set out upon their journey.

Large numbers of the immigrants have to go before a board to determine whether or not they may be admitted. I saw five or six of these boards at work. The proceedings were decorous and seemly; the arrangements for witnesses who come to speak for or against the admission of an immigrant are good. Every immigrant rejected by a board is told of his right to appeal to the Secretary of Labour in Washington.

This arrangement, the theory of which is probably right, is in practice nothing short of diabolic. For days some wretched creature is kept in suspense. The appeal board at Washington, which advises the Secretary of Labour, works on paper records, tempered, I have heard it said, by political pressure. The Secretary of Labour may be busy, overwhelmed, perhaps, with work in connection with some labour dispute, or anything. Days slip by, into weeks sometimes, before a decision is reached. When the doubt affects one member of a family, perhaps a child, the mental anguish must be excruciating. The system is to blame. In my judgment there can be no question that power to decide should be delegated by law to someone on the spot with the facts and the people before him. If the United States Government will expedite the decision of appeals so that the results can be announced within twenty-four hours of the completed collection of the facts, the anguish of Ellis Island will be appreciably reduced.

In addition to immigrants, Ellis Island has to receive stowaways and men and women ordered to be deported. The conditions under which these unhappy creatures and those refused admittance for being in excess of quota spend their time on Ellis Island are perhaps as satisfactory as the building will permit. Personally, I should prefer imprisonment in Sing-Sing to incarceration on Ellis Island awaiting deportation. To add to the mental torments of those sentenced to deportation, well-meaning, kindly people, with heads softer even than their hearts, seek to entertain them with what are called "Americanisation" addresses and cinematograph films. The purpose of these is to tell immigrants how great a country America is and to make them good citizens. A "Red" under sentence of deportation has possibly views of his own on the subject of the United States. So, too, possibly have those who are to deported because they are in excess of their national quota.

As a matter of fact, what Ellis Island needs, in my judgment, is to be relieved of the presence of about one-half of the people who are poured into it. If a deportation station were established somewhere else with suitable buildings and reasonably extensive grounds much would be gained, but there certainly ought to be increased accommodation for immigrants. Before seeing Ellis Island I had imagined that segregation by nationalities might be possible. I am now satisfied that it is not. The flow of immigrants from each nation is too irregular to permit of any satisfactory system of national segregation being devised, and yet some division of the immigrant stream seems to me essential if Ellis Island is not to be abandoned and a new and larger station built elsewhere. After considering the matter with some care, I have come to think that it might be feasible to divide the stream into its Jewish and non-Jewish parts. Persons of the Jewish faith require special food and special utensils, and their being mixed with Christians on the island undoubtedly creates considerable administrative difficulty.

Whether the Jews should be sent to Ellis Island or to a new station seems to me to be a matter of no importance. The fact is that Ellis Island is too small to accommodate in comfort the numbers of immigrants that come to the port of New York. It is also a fact that to divide the stream by nationalities would introduce more administrative difficulties and, I believe, more real discomfort than it would cure. To divide the stream on the basis of its food requirements seems to me administratively feasible. In the dining-rooms that division has to be made in any event. I am well aware that all proposals to separate human beings on a basis of religious belief are certain to meet with opposition, and that failures to meet special religious requirements, as in the case of food, are equally certain to meet with opposition.

I believe that the choice of the United States Government is by circumstances limited to three possibilities: (1) To continue Ellis Island as at present, with such minor improvements as are possible; (2) to build a relief station and to supply at it,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61811

or at Ellis Island, but not at both, food prepared in accordance with the Jewish ritual and to send all immigrant Jews to that station and all non-Jews to the other; or (3) to abandon Ellis Island and build a completely new station somewhere else in New York Harbour or on its shores.

Undoubtedly, to improve Ellis Island is for the United States Government to follow the line of least resistance.

I have not so far spoken of the so-called first- and second-class accommodation on the island. Possibly the best comment on this was made by Mr. Tod when he said: "I am trying to get all the fittings replaced and the rooms painted." There can be no doubt that he accurately appreciates what these rooms need if they are to remain in their present sites in the existing buildings. Rooms lighted by skylights and ventilated from a hall are, however, not really pleasant, especially when the hall itself is in need of ventilation.

2. *The Hospital.*

(Medical Superintendent: Dr. Billings.)

The hospital and medical service are not, I understand, under the Department of Labour, but under the Secretary of the Treasury. This administrative provision seems to create less difficulty than might have been expected. The reason for this lies largely, if not entirely, in the personalities of Mr. Tod and Dr. Billings. The principal medical officer seemed to me to be an admirable official as well as a competent and enthusiastic practitioner of the art of medicine.

His hospital arrangements are good. It is true that the buildings are in need of new paint and minor repairs. Some construction is also needed, and the technical equipment, though not bad, might be improved.

It is difficult to judge in such a matter, but my impression is that the nursing and ward maid (or ward orderly) staff might be strengthened with advantage.

The hospital has to deal with every sort of disorder, ranging from slight injury to obscure tropical diseases. It is at once a maternity home and an asylum for the insane. On the occasion of my visit there was at least one patient there, a young woman, who has spent ten months in the psycho-pathic ward. This real hardship to the patient was caused by her friends maintaining a legal fight to secure her admission. That she was mentally deranged was painfully obvious. Yet there she had remained for ten months in an environment not unsuitable for an insane person detained for a few days, but wholly unsuitable for long-continued residence with a view to cure or recovery.

On the whole, I thought the hospital arrangements good. I inspected the laundry, which I found to be efficient.

3. *The Isolation Hospital.*

I had time merely to glance at the hospital for persons suffering from infectious diseases.

The general lay-out is good, and the kitchen is excellently arranged and equipped. The quality of the food is good. The wards seemed comfortable and decently kept.

Here, as elsewhere, more money for maintenance to the structure is obviously necessary.

The pathological laboratory for the whole medical service on the island is situated at the end of the isolation hospital. I judge it to be efficient and reasonably adequate. It, like every other department on the island, needs more money to spend on upkeep.

After seeing Ellis Island and studying its problems, I believe that it is true to say that it is impossible to administer any immigration station under existing United States laws without hardship and tragedy. If a system could be devised which would prohibit persons desiring to come to the United States from sailing from Europe or elsewhere without the certainty of admission to the United States, the problem would be almost entirely solved.

At present United States consuls, when granting a visa to passports to the United States, may mark the visa with the number of the regulation which they believe that individuals entering the United States would violate. Not only so, United States consuls abroad send communications through the mails to the Commissioners of Immigration saying that they have issued passports to such-and-such persons who are sailing on a particular boat on a specified day, and that, in the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61812

judgment of the United States consul, they should not be allowed to land. I feel quite sure that this does not unfairly bias the judgment of the immigration authority, but, if an individual is clearly not eligible to enter the United States, it would, in my judgment, be kinder to prevent him sailing from Europe or elsewhere than to let him reach Ellis Island and there turn him back.

It is clearly a difficult problem that presents itself for solution. If I were asked to advise the reponsible authorities, I should recommend twelve things :—

1. Put the existing buildings into a thorough state of repair and alter the latrine arrangements.
2. Arrange for these buildings to be maintained structurally and to be kept thoroughly clean.
3. Arrange through structural alteration for proper medical examination rooms.
4. At least refurnish, but if possible replace, the present first- and second-class rooms by rooms with windows looking to the outside, as the third-class rooms have.
5. If possible, through structural alteration, improve the ventilation of the downstair rooms so that they can be freely used in the work of handling the crowds of immigrants.
6. Do everything to expedite the handling of the immigrants, especially in the matter of appeals.
7. Provide a new station for criminal deportees (prostitutes, "Reds," &c.).
8. Provide a new station for those requiring kosher food (or, alternatively, let Ellis Island be the "kosher" station and provide a new station for the rest).
9. Authorise United States consuls to refuse visas to the passports of those obviously prevented by law from entering the United States.
10. Arrange, if possible, for all immigrants to be finally approved or disapproved in their home lands.
11. Abandon the quaint custom of delivering lectures on Americanisation to criminal and other deportees. Strangely, this well-meant activity seems to be more annoying to its victims than any other single detail in the life of Ellis Island.
12. Brighten up the hospital interiors with fresh paint and keep them even still more scrupulously clean.

In conclusion, I noticed a desire upon the part of officials to say that Ellis Island is as good as any immigration station in any land. It may be. Still, it is quite certain that no other nation's principal immigration station has the same problem to solve, for the reason that the laws of the United States are not the same as those of any other nation.

I have, &c.
A. C. GEDDES.

P.S.—I have handed copies of this despatch to the Secretary of Labour, Mr. Davis, and to the Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New York, Mr. Tod.

A. C. G.

Enclosure in No. 1.

IMMIGRANT DINING ROOM.

Bill of Fare for Thursday, December 28, 1922.

BREAKFAST.

Boiled eggs.
Coffee.
Bread and butter.
Milk served to all women and children.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61813

DINNER.

Beef broth with barley.
Boiled beef; vegetables, boiled potatoes; sour pickles.
Tapioca pudding.
Coffee.
Bread and butter.

Milk served to all women and children.

SUPPER.

Corned beef hash with green peppers.
Blackberry jelly.
Tea or Coffee.
Bread and butter.

Milk served to all women and children.

For all women and children, milk and crackers are served in the detention quarters between regular meal hours and are distributed at bed-time.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61814 D-1060 1928

Memorandum for Mr.King: 27th November,1928

Ukrainian protests against Polish attacks.

Attached are two sample telegrams out of nearly a score which have been received the last ten days, together with a copy of the reply which I am sending. These concerted protests illustrate one of the circumstances which tend to make a large solid Ukrainian immigration into Western Canada the most dubious part of our immigration policy. One very large section of the Ukrainian population is ultra-nationalist, absorbed in the struggles of their Ukrainian kinsmen against the Polish and Roumanian Governments and eager to use pressure to bring the Canadian Government into the conflict. Another very large section provides probably 75% of the active Communist movement in Canada,which is rapidly growing in rural as well as urban areas in the West.

So far as the present protests are concerned, it is rather fortunate from one aspect that under the treaty between the Allied Powers and Poland, any minority in Poland has the right of appeal to the Council of the League of Nations. Any member of the Council has the right to bring such a protest to the attention of the League,but it would probably be wiser for us to emphasize the alternative procedure,namely letting the minority in Poland itself bring forward its protest.

I have discussed the question with the Polish Consul-General, whose information naturally differed materially.

O.D.S.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

FORM T.D. 2 X.

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY'S TELEGRAPH

TELEGRAM

CABLE CONNECTIONS TO ALL THE WORLD

COPY

TIME FILED

C 61815

CHECK

J. McMILLAN, General Manager of Telegraphs, Montreal.

Send the following Message, subject to the terms printed on the back hereof which are hereby agreed to.

KENORA, ONT. NOV 16 17 1928

RT.HON.W.L.MACKENZIE KING
PREMIER OTTAWA ONT.

GALICIA THE COUNTRY OF OUR ORIGIN HAS BECOME AN ARENA OF MOST MERCILESS NATIONAL PERSECUTION.ON NOVEMBER THE FIRST THE ANNIVERSARY OF PROCLAMATION OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE A PROCESSION WAS ARRANGED BY UKRAINIANS IN THE CITY OF LEMBERG CAPITAL TO CEMETERIES TO DECORATE THE GRAVES OF FALLEN HEROES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. THE PROCESSION WAS ATTACKED BY POLISH MOBS AND POLICE. MANY PERSONS WERE WOUNDED. POLISH MOBS ATTACKED THEN SACKED AND DEMOLISHED MANY UKRAINIAN HOUSES AND SOME NOTABLE AND VALUABLE BUILDINGS OF UKRAINIAN ORGANIZATIONS ONE UKRAINIAN WOMAN WAS THROWN DOWN BY POLISH MOBS FROM THE THIRD FLOOR OF A BUILDING AND DIED AS A RESULT OF THAT. ALL THIS WAS DONE WITH PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF THE POLISH POLICE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES WHO WERE ARRESTING THE UKRAINIAN VICTIMS OF THE ATTACKS AND THREATEN UKRAINIANS WITH FURTHER ARRESTS AND REPRISALS. WE APPEAL TO CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO STOP INHUMAN PRACTICES UNWORTHY OF ANY CULTURED NATION.

UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
DAN.STERANIK, CHAIRMAN UKRAINIAN LITERARY SOCIETY
MIKE STIUCHINSKI, CHAIRMAN UKRAINIAN RELIEF ASSN.
NICK ATAMANUK, CHAIRMAN.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

W. D. NEIL, Assistant Manager, Montreal, Que.
D. H. BOWEN, Supt., Sudbury, Ont.
W. M. THOMPSON, Supt., Toronto, Ont.
J. MITCHELL, Supt., Montreal, Que.
A. C. FRASER, Supt., St. John, N.B.

W. MARSHALL, Assistant Manager, Winnipeg, Man.
D. L. HOWARD, Supt., Vancouver, B.C.
R. N. YOUNG, Supt., Calgary, Alta.
D. COONS, Supt., Moose Jaw, Sask.
E. H. GOODFELLOW, Supt., Winnipeg, Man.

APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS FOR CANADA UNDER ORDER 162.
DATED MARCH 30, 1916.

It is agreed between the sender of the message on the face of this form and this Company, that said Company shall not be liable for damages arising from failure to transmit or deliver, or for any error in the transmission or delivery of any unrepeated telegram, whether happening from negligence of its servants or otherwise, or for delays from interruptions in the working of its lines, for errors in cypher or obscure messages, or for errors from illegible writing, beyond the amount received for sending the same.

To guard against errors, the Company will repeat back any telegram for an extra payment of one-half the regular rate, and in that case the Company shall be liable for damages suffered by the sender to an extent not exceeding $200, due to the negligence of the Company in the transmission or delivery of the telegram.

Correctness in the transmission of messages can be insured by contract in writing, stating agreed amount of risk, and payment of premium thereon at the following rates, in addition to the usual charge for repeated messages, viz: one per cent. for any distance not exceeding 1,000 miles, and two per cent. for any greater distance.

This Company shall not be liable for the act or omission of any other Company, but will endeavor to forward the telegram by any other Telegraph Company necessary to reaching its destination, but only as the agent of the sender and without liability therefor. The Company shall not be responsible for messages until the same are presented and accepted at one of its transmitting offices: if a message is sent to such office by one of the Company's messengers he acts for that purpose as the sender's agent; if by telephone the person receiving the message acts therein as agent of the sender, being authorized to assent to these conditions for the sender. This Company shall not be liable in any case for damages, unless the same be claimed, in writing, within sixty days after receipt of the telegram for transmission.

No employee of the Company shall vary the foregoing.

DAY LETTERS.

This Company will receive, DAY LETTERS to be transmitted at rates lower than its standard telegram rates, as follows: one and one-half times the ten-word Day message rate shall be charged for the transmission of fifty (50) words or less, and one-fifth of the initial rate for such fifty words shall be charged for each additional ten (10) words or less.

DAY LETTERS may be forwarded by the Telegraph Company as a deferred service and the transmission and delivery of such DAY LETTERS are, in all respects, subordinate to the priority of transmission and delivery of full-rate messages.

DAY LETTERS shall be written in plain English, or in French. Code language is not permitted.

DAY LETTERS may be delivered by the Telegraph Compnay by telephoning the same to the addresses, and such deliveries shall be a complete discharge of the obligation of the Telegraph Company to deliver.

DAY LETTERS are received subject to the express understanding and agreement that the Company does not undertake that a DAY LETTER shall be delivered on the day of its date absolutely and at all events; but that the Company's obligation in this respect is subject to the condition that there shall remain sufficient time for the transmission and delivery of such DAY LETTER on the day of its date during regular office hours, subject to the priority of the transmission of full-rate messages under the conditions named above.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61816

ODS/ET Ottawa, 26th November, 1928

Dear Sir,

I am instructed by the Prime Minister to acknowledge your telegram of November 16th with regard to the treatment of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. Similar representations have been made by other groups in Canada. Reports giving an entirely different account of the origin of the recent troubles in Lemberg have been received from Polish sources.

As you are aware, it is not customary for one country to intervene in the affairs of another when its own citizens have not been directly injured, and particularly so when the facts in the case are in dispute.

The League of Nations, however, affords machinery for dealing in a much more adequate way than any single outside country could do, with any complaints on the part of minorities in the countries of Eastern Europe. The Treaty of June 28, 1919, between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland recognizes certain privileges of the minorities in that country. The Ukrainian minority has the right to draw the attention of the League by petition to any infraction or danger of infraction of the provisions in question. When a petition of this nature is addressed to the League of Nations, the Secretary-General decides if it is receivable as laid down by the Resolution of the Council, September 5th, 1923. If declared receivable it is communicated by the Secretary-General to the members of the Council, and the State against which the complaint is made is given an opportunity of submitting such observations as it may consider desirable. In this way opportunity is given for ascertaining the exact facts in the case and for endeavouring to secure an equitable settlement.

I have brought your telegram to the attention of Senator Dandurand, the Canadian representative on the Council of the League of Nations, so that he will be in possession of your views in case the matter is brought before the League of Nations by the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

Yours sincerely,

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Dan Stefanik, Esquire,
Chairman, Ukrainian Literary Society,
Kenora, Ontario

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61817

IMPERIAL WAR CONFERENCE - 1918 -

From 24th May - 24th August,1918

Sir R. Borden

Mr. L. C. Christie

Mr. Yates

Mr. Boyce

Tabor

Paid from Min Exp a/c.

Order in Council for $3000 for Sir R. Borden - 21st May,1918.
Sir Robert drew $3000.00 and refunded $204.96

Order in Council - 25th September,1918 - payment of $10.00 per diem, living and travelling allowance for Mr. Christie - 24th May - 24th August, 93 days - $930.00.

Peace Conference - 1918

7th November,1918-24th May, 1919.

Sir Robert Borden
Mr. L.C. Christie
Mr. Buskard

Mr. Boyce

Tabor

Mar Exp a/c

Order in Council 7th November,1918 - voting $5000 for expenses

Order in Council 19th April,1919 - voting $10,000 for expenses

Sir Robert-Bill of Exchange -		$2000.00
Sir Robert-we cabled B.of Exchange-	£2000=	$9733.33
Mr. Buskard - cheque -		$ 300.00
Bill of Exchange -		$2700.00
Sir Robert expended -		$4466.96
Mr. Buskard expended -		331.55
Balance refunded		

Mr. Christie - Order in Council 1st July, 1919, living and travelling allowance for 200 days from 8th November,1918 to 26th May,1919, at $10.per diem -$2000.00

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61818

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1921

4th June - 12th August, 1921

Mr. Meighen

Mr. Christie

Capt. Armstrong

Mr. Merriam

Mailhot

June 4th - Advances to Mr. Meighen -	$3000.
	$2000.
To amount of -	$5000.
December Account -	$6018.60
Cheque for balance -	$1018.60
Mr. Christie - advance, 4th June, 1921 -	$1500.00
Expense account- which includes living allowance for sixty-eight days from the 6th June to the 12th August at $10.00 per diem - $680.00 (See Order in Council of 16th September, 1921.)	$ 1070.53

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61819

(Copy)

P. C. 1229.

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 21st May, 1918.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, advise that authority be given for the payment of the sum of $3,000 out of the War Appropriation to meet the necessary expenditure to be incurred in connection with his visit to the Imperial War Cabinet and Imperial War Conference in 1918.

(Sd.) Rudolphe Boudreau

Clerk of the Privy Council.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

M.A.S.

C 61820

(Copy)

P. C. 18/2359

Certified Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, held on the 18th September, 1918, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the 25th September, 1918.

.....:0:.....

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS:-

The Board recommend that authority be granted for the payment of $10 per diem to Mr. L. C. Christie, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, as living and travelling allowance during his absence from Ottawa on duty with the Prime Minister, in connection with the Imperial War Cabinet and Imperial War Conference 1918, from the 24th May to the 24th August, 1918, inclusive, in all 93 days, such amount to be charged to the War Vote.

(Sd.) Rudolphe Boudreau

Clerk of the Privy Council.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

W.L.M.

C 61821

(Copy)

P. C. 2742.

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 7th November, 1918.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, advise that authority be given for the payment of $5,000 out of War Appropriation to meet the necessary expenditure to be incurred in connection with his proposed visit to Great Britain with respect to matters relating to the War.

(Sd.) Rudolphe Boudreau

Clerk of the Privy Council .

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61822

COPY.

S.

P. C. 853

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 19th April, 1919.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 17th April, 1919, from the Acting Prime Minister, referring to Order in Council, (P.C.2742) dated the 7th November, 1918, authorizing the payment of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) out of War Appropriation to meet the necessary expenditure incurred in connection with the proposed visit to Great Britain of the Right Honourable, the Prime Minister, with respect to matters relating to the War, and recommending that authority be given for an additional payment not exceeding Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in this same connection.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation, and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) Rodolphe Boudreau,

Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ont.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

4M

C 61823

COPY.

P. C. 9/1351

Certified Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, held on the 26th June, 1919, approved by the Deputy Governor General in Council, on the 1st July 1919.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS:-

The Board recommend that Mr. L. C. Christie, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, be granted a living and travelling allowance during his absence from Ottawa on duty with the Prime Minister in connection with the Imperial War Cabinet and Peace Conference at Paris, of $10 per diem, from the 8th November, 1918 to the 26th May, 1919, inclusive, in all two hundred days, such amount to be charged to the War Vote.

(Sgd.) Rodolphe Boudreau

Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for External Affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Copy. C 61824

From the Clerk of the Privy Council
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

P. C. 3126

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 16th September, 1921.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that Mr. L. C. Christie, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, be granted a subsistence allowance of ten dollars ($10.00) per day during his necessary absence from Ottawa, for the purpose of his attendance in an advisory capacity at the Conference of Prime Ministers of the British Empire, London, 1921, and that he be reimbursed for transportation charges between Ottawa and London - these expenditures to be charged to Contingencies.

(Sgd) Rodolphe Boudreau,
Clerk of the Privy Council

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for External Affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61825

Revised Hansard p. 564. March 4, 1921.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

*Mr. ARCHAMBAULT:

1. Has the Government been made aware of the date of the next Imperial Conference in London?
2. Does the Government know what questions will be discussed?
3. Has there been any correspondence between this Government and the British Government on that subject?
4. Is it the intention of the Government to communicate its views to the Canadian Parliament on the different questions which will be taken up at that conference, and to fix a date for the discussion of these questions by the House, so that the delegates who will be sent to London might be acquainted with the opinion of the Canadian people on these questions in order to press their views at said conference.

Rt. Hon. Mr. MEIGHEN: No date has yet been fixed for the next Imperial Conference and there is no intention that it shall be held this year. It is anticipated, however, that a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the different parts of the Empire will be held in June next.

2. The agenda for this meeting of Prime Ministers has not yet been settled, but it is expected that among the subjects for discussion will be the question of the renewal of the Treaty of Alliance with Japan of the thirteenth July, 1911, and the question of naval policy based upon the principle of co-operation; while there will doubtless be a review and consultation upon the general course of the foreign policy of the Empire.

3. Correspondence is proceeding upon the subject for discussion at the June meeting of Prime Ministers.

4. Should there be an indication of a general desire on the part of the House of Commons for a discussion, the Government would be prepared to arrange facilities and would welcome expressions of opinion from all quarters; but in view of the fact that the meeting is of the nature of a conference, the Government could not depart from the invariable practice by making commitments in advance of the meeting. Necessarily any proposals resulting from the conference and affecting Canada must be subject to the approval of the Canadian Parliament.

– Despatch Feby 26/21.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61826

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

Hon. CHARLES MURPHY (Russell): Has the Prime Minister observed a despatch stating that the Prime Minister of Australia intends to acquaint the Australian Parliament with the subjects to be taken up at the approaching conference in London and to give that Parliament an opportunity of discussing them? Is it my right hon. friend's intention to give this Parliament the same statement and a like opportunity?

Right Hon. ARTHUR MEIGHEN (Prime Minister): I had not observed any statement by the Australian Prime Minister to the effect described by the hon. gentleman, but I had myself moved in the matter and a little earlier than he. I have already given this House, in outline, the subjects that will probably be discussed. The exact agenda has not yet reached us, but the three important topics that had been suggested were stated in an answer made about three weeks ago to the hon. member for Chambly and Verchères (Mr. Archambault) and the answer to his question went on to state that, should it appear the desire of a substantial number of members that special opportunity be afforded in this House for discussion, it would be provided. Ever since that, at any time on occasions when subjects such as that might be brought up, the subject might have been discussed. Should further information reach us making certain that other important topics would be considered, I will feel it my duty to state those topics or their substance to the House.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

SECRET

C 51827
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

CABINET

NOTES OF MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS & INDIA, HELD IN LONDON IN JUNE AND JULY, 1921.

"E" SERIES.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 61828

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

SECRET.

E. 1st Meeting.

C 2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, JUNE 20, 1921, AT 12 NOON.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., [redacted] C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir EYRE CROWE, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir [redacted] LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Lloyd George.

Mr. Lloyd George: Gentlemen, I bid you all a hearty welcome to Great Britain and to Downing Street. It was only with great unwillingness that I asked you to postpone our first meeting until to-day, and I hope it has not caused any serious inconvenience to anyone. I am deeply grateful to you for meeting my own personal difficulty by postponing the Conference for a few days.

Since we last met, there are some notable gaps in the British Empire Delegation. Our last meetings, I think, were held in Paris at the famous Peace Conference. My old friend, Sir Robert Borden, has laid down the cares of office, after long and sterling service throughout the war and throughout the making of peace, both to his own great Dominion and to the Empire. I relied a great deal upon his sane and ripe judgment. I am glad to hear his health is much restored and I am sure we can count on him still for many years of valuable service in any work which he decides to undertake. In his place we welcome his successor, Mr. Meighen, who is no stranger to our counsels, because he was with us at the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet in the summer of 1918, though this is his first appearance as Prime Minister.

By General Botha's death the whole Empire has sustained a heavy loss. He was a king of men, one of the greatest and most striking figures of our time, and I feel certain that history will endorse our high contemporary esteem of his breadth of vision and nobility of character. South Africa and the Empire are fortunate in that his mantle has fallen on his distinguished colleague, General Smuts, who has already played a great part in Imperial Councils during the war and in the making of the peace.

Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey are very old friends. I believe that we three enjoy the unenviable distinction of being the only Prime Ministers who took part in the war and who, so far, have survived the troublesome years of peace, and I am rejoiced to see both of them looking as young and fit as ever.

Let me also extend a most cordial greeting to His Highness the Maharao of Cutch and to Mr. Sastri, who have come here as representatives of the Indian Empire. We shall, I know, find them wise and cogent interpreters of the Indian point of view in the great questions which we have to discuss.

May I also express our regret that the Premier of Newfoundland has not found it possible to be present at our deliberations.

General Condition of Unrest throughout the World.

The Conference falls at a time of great stress in this country and of serious trouble in many parts of the world. It was inevitable that the nations which had put forth such colossal efforts and sustained such unparalleled losses of life, limb and treasure during the war, should feel all the consequences of overstrain and exhaustion. The systems which perplex the statesmen of all the belligerent countries at the present time are due to the condition in which the nations of the world have been left by the great war. The nerve exhaustion and heart strain which characterise such cases produce a feverish restlessness and a disinclination to steady labour which aggravate the disease and retard recovery. Never did statesmanship in all lands demand more patience and wisdom. The years that followed the Napoleonic wars produced similar or even worse experiences. In this country the distress amongst the population was very much greater after the Napoleonic wars that it is at the present moment. As a matter of fact, in spite of great unemployment and a good deal of labour unrest, there is no actual privation amongst the population, and I attribute that very largely to the self-sacrifices made by the more well-to-do of all classes in order to share their better luck with their less fortunate fellow-countrymen. But still there is no doubt at all that the war has produced a state of things from which it will take years to recover. There are European countries where the poverty and the actual distress is appalling and we are doing our best out of our spare means to assist. But in spite of a good deal that is discouraging, I am confident the world is slowly working through its troubles; there is an increasing disposition to face and accept the facts industrially and internationally. The natural disinclination of human nature to admit unpleasant facts has, at home, provoked industrial troubles, and abroad, fierce outbursts of protest. But gradually the world is passing through its usual experience of first of all denying the existence of palpable realities and then settling down to act upon them. It is a distinctly encouraging fact in the international situation that there is an increasing impatience with those who, from whatever motive, seek to keep the world in a state of turmoil and tension. There is a widening and deepening conviction that the world must have peace, if it is ever to recover health. Some of the most troublesome and menacing problems of the peace have either been settled or are in a fair way of settlement. You must have watched with close interest the developments of the last couple of years in Europe, the series of conferences and

gatherings and assemblies of all kinds where we were trying to carry out the terms of the Peace Treaty, and to settle the various difficulties that arose in consequence. There were two questions that gave us great anxiety. One was the question of the disarmament of Germany and the other was the question of reparation. There were other important questions, but these were the two questions around which most of the controversies centred. The disarmament of Germany, I think, may be stated to be a settled problem. The German fleet has disappeared, and so has the Austrian. The German army has disappeared as a great powerful force. It numbered millions; it now numbers little more than 100,000 men. It had tens of thousands of guns, great and small; it has now got a few hundreds. It had an enormous number of machine-guns and trench mortars; these have gone. Millions of rifles—they surrendered about 30 million rounds of big ammunition—all that has gone. It is true they have still got some rather irregular formations which we have not succeeded in completely getting rid of. It is not so much Prussia that is giving us trouble as Bavaria. That difficulty will, I think, be overcome in a very short time. So that the problem of disarmament, which was a very vital one because so long as Germany had a big army and big armaments there was no guarantee of peace, will disappear.

Opening Speech by Mr. Lloyd George.

German Disarmament.

Reparations.

The other problem is the problem of reparation. No one knows better than Mr. Hughes the practical difficulties surrounding that problem. It is not a question so much of adjudicating claims; it is a question of how you are to transfer payment from one country and make it in another. As Mr. Hughes knows, that problem baffled all our financial experts and the financial experts of all countries in Paris, and it is only after two years that we hit upon an expedient which seems on the whole to have given satisfaction to all moderate and practical men in European countries. So far as we have been able to gather, that is the view of the Dominions. We shall probably hear something about it, because they have a very direct concern in it. Germany has accepted a very practical plan of liquidating her liabilities. France has accepted; Italy has accepted; and the public opinion of this country has also accepted; so that the two most troublesome problems are either settled or in a very fair way of being adjusted.

Other Difficulties.

There are two remaining difficulties, one of which is the fixation of the boundaries of Poland, partly in Lithuania, and now in Silesia. I am not going to anticipate what will be said upon that subject; therefore I am only mentioning it. The second difficulty we have had has been the making of peace with the Turkish Empire. Those are the two great outstanding difficulties, but I am very hopeful in regard to both of them. Once those two are settled, then I think we may say that peace has been made; but until then we cannot say, in spite of the fact that we have signed Treaties of Peace, that peace has been made and established in the world.

Necessary to Stand by Peace Treaties.

The first essential to peace—a stable peace—and reconstruction is that we should stand by our Treaties. There are those who grow weary of these great responsibilities, and who speak as though it were possible to renounce them in this quarter or in that without injustice to other peoples or detriment to ourselves. I venture to say that such arguments are as short-sighted as they are false. The nations and peoples of the world have realised their independence in a measure far greater than ever before the war, and the League of Nations—whatever may be thought of the provisions of the Covenant—stands as witness to their realisation of that truth. No progress can be made towards the rehabilitation of Europe, or the establishment of permanent peace in the world, except upon the basis of acceptance of Treaties and an enforcement of Treaties. There may be relaxations here and there, following the discovery of new conditions, with the consent of all parties. We have had some relaxations of that kind—and I think they are wise modifications of the Treaty—in the matter of allowing more time for payment, and more time for disarmament; and in the prosecution of war criminals we made a concession to German national susceptibilities. There have been questions of that kind where, by the consent of all the Powers, there have been modifications. But the Treaties must stand where such consent is not forthcoming, and no signatory should have the right to override any part of a Treaty to which we are all parties. The British Empire from end to end is bound by honour and by interest alike to the Treaties which it has signed. We have appended our signatures—all of us—and we must honour those signatures. Unless Treaty faith is maintained, an era of disorganisation, increasing misery and smouldering war will continue, and civilisation may very easily be destroyed by a prolongation of that state of things.

I propose to call on Lord Curzon, on his return, to give the Conference a comprehensive survey of foreign affairs, and I will not anticipate his detailed statement

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Lloyd George.

Empire's Relations with United States and Japan.

now. But I should like to refer very briefly to one of the most urgent and important of foreign questions—the relations of the Empire with the United States and Japan. There is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to maintain peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competition of armaments than in the Pacific and in the Far East. Our Alliance with Japan has been a valuable factor in that direction in the past. We have found Japan a faithful ally, who rendered us valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need. The British Empire will not easily forget that Japanese men-of-war escorted the transports which brought the Australian and New Zealand forces to Europe at a time when German cruisers were still at large in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. We desire to preserve that well-tried friendship which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions in the Far East, where Japan has special interests, and where we ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the open door. Not least amongst these questions is the future of China, which looks to us, as to the United States, for sympathetic treatment and fair play. No greater calamity could overtake the world than any further accentuation of the world's divisions upon the lines of race. The British Empire has done signal service to humanity in bridging those divisions in the past; the loyalty of the King Emperor's Asiatic peoples is the proof. To depart from that policy, to fail in that duty, would not only greatly increase the dangers of international war; it would divide the British Empire against itself. Our foreign policy can never range itself in any sense upon the differences of race and civilisation between East and West. It would be fatal to the Empire.

Need for Friendly Co-operation with United States.

We look confidently to the Government and people of the United States for their sympathy and understanding in this respect. Friendly co-operation with the United States is for us a cardinal principle, dictated by what seems to us the proper nature of things, dictated by instinct quite as much as by reason and common sense. We desire to work with the great Republic in all parts of the world. Like it, we want stability and peace, on the basis of liberty and justice. Like it, we desire to avoid the growth of armaments, whether in the Pacific or elsewhere, and we rejoice that American opinion should be showing so much earnestness in that direction at the present time. We are ready to discuss with American statesmen any proposal for the limitation of armaments which they may wish to set out, and we can undertake that no such overtures will find a lack of willingness on our part to meet them. In the meantime, we cannot forget that the very life of the United Kingdom, as also of Australia and New Zealand, indeed, the whole Empire, has been built upon sea power—and that sea power is necessarily the basis of the whole Empire's existence. We have, therefore, to look to the measures which our security requires; we aim at nothing more; we cannot possibly be content with less.

Constitutional Progress of British Empire.

I do not propose to deal in any detail with the agenda for this Conference to-day. We have no cut-and-dried agenda to present. We will discuss that amongst ourselves. The British Government has been under some suspicion in some quarters of harbouring designs against this gathering as a Conference. We are said to be dissatisfied with the present state of the Empire, and to wish to alter its organisation in some revolutionary way. Gentlemen, we are not at all dissatisfied. The British Empire is progressing very satisfactorily from a constitutional standpoint, as well as in other ways. The direct communication between Prime Ministers, established during the war, has, I think, worked well, and we have endeavoured to keep you thoroughly abreast of all important developments in foreign affairs by special messages sent out weekly, or even more frequently when circumstances required. Indeed, at every important Conference either here or on the Continent, one of the first duties I felt I ought to discharge was to send as full and as complete and as accurate an account as I possibly could, not merely of the decisions taken, but of the atmosphere, which counts for so very much. I have invariably, to the best of my ability, sent accounts, some of them of the most confidential character, which would give to the Dominions even the impressions which we formed, and which gave you information beyond what we could possibly communicate to the press.

Minister of Canadian Government at Washington.

Another change, which has taken place since the war, is the decision of the Canadian Government to have a Minister of its own at Washington—a very important development. We have co-operated willingly with that, and we shall welcome a Canadian colleague at Washington as soon as the appointment is made. We shall be glad to have any suggestions that occur to you as to the methods by which the business of the Dominions in London, so far as it passes through our

hands, may be transacted with greater dignity and efficiency, though you will all, I think, agree that the Empire owes much to Lord Milner and Lord Long for their services in the Colonial Office during a period of great difficulty and stress. We shall also welcome any suggestions which you may have to make for associating yourselves more closely with the conduct of foreign relations. Any suggestions which you can make upon that subject we shall be very delighted to hear and discuss. There was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; to-day the Empire is in charge of Downing Street.

Opening Speech by Mr. Lloyd George.

Asks for Suggestions for Conduct of Empire's Business.

On all matters of common concern we want to know your standpoint, and we want to tell you ours.

Mutual Relationship within Empire.

I will give you my general conception of the mutual relationship in which we meet. The British Dominions and the Indian Empire, one and all, played a great part in the war for freedom, and probably a greater part than any nation, except the very greatest Powers. When the history of that struggle comes to be written, your exertions side by side with ours will constitute a testimony to British institutions such as no other Empire in history can approach or emulate. In recognition of their services and achievements in the war the British Dominions have now been accepted fully into the comity of nations by the whole world. They are signatories to the Treaty of Versailles and of all the other Treaties of Peace; they are members of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and their representatives have already attended meetings of the League; in other words, they have achieved full national status, and they now stand beside the United Kingdom as equal partners in the dignities and the responsibilities of the British Commonwealth. If there are any means by which that status can be rendered even clearer to their own communities and to the world at large we shall be glad to have them put forward at this Conference.

India's Status.

India's achievements were also very great. Her soldiers lie with ours in all the theatres of war, and no Britisher can ever forget the gallantry and promptitude with which she sprang forward to the King Emperor's service when war was declared. That is no small tribute both to India and to the Empire of which India is a part. The causes of the war were unknown to India; its theatre in Europe was remote. Yet India stood by her allegiance heart and soul, from the first call to arms, and some of her soldiers are still serving far from their homes and families in the common cause. India's loyalty in that great crisis is eloquent to me of the Empire's success in bridging the civilisations of East and West, in reconciling wide differences of history, of tradition and of race, and in bringing the spirit and the genius of a great Asiatic people into willing co-operation with our own. Important changes have been effected in India this year, and India is making rapid strides towards the control of her own affairs. She has also proved her right to a new status in our councils; that status she gained during the war, and she has maintained it during the peace, and I welcome the representatives of India to our great Council of the Empire to-day. We shall, I feel sure, gain much by the fact that her sentiments and her interests will be interpreted to us here by her own representatives.

Result of the Empire's Unity.

I have given you my view of our relationship. May I just remind the Conference of what our unity has meant. The war demonstrated—I might say, revealed—to the world, including ourselves, that the British Empire was not an abstraction but a living force to be reckoned with. Who would have believed before the war that the Empire outside Great Britain would, in an hour of emergency, have raised two millions and more soldiers and sent them to the battlefield to serve the common cause, side by side with the United Kingdom? Even the ardent soul of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in his most glowing moments, never predicted so impressive a rally to the flag. The opportune revelation of the reality of the British Empire has, in my judgment, altered the history of the world. Those of us who know—and many if not most of us sitting at this table were here during the most critical hours of the war and sat at this same table—those of us who know how narrow the margin was between victory and defeat, can proclaim without hesitation that without these two million men, that came from outside the United Kingdom, Prussianism would probably have triumphed in the West and the East before American troops arrived on the stage, and Lord Curzon, who is at this moment discussing with M. Briand, the Prime Minister of France, the execution of a victorious Treaty, would have been discussing how best to carry out the humiliating conditions dictated by the triumphant war lords of Germany.

The reign of unbridled force would have been supreme, and this generation would have had to spend its days in interpreting and enduring that calamitous fact

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Lloyd George.

in all spheres of human activity and influence. The unregulated unity of the British Empire saved France, Britain and civilisation from that catastrophe.

Our present troubles are bad enough. Victory has its cares as well as defeat. But they are ephemeral and will soon be surmounted. Defeat would have reversed the engine of progress, and democracy would have been driven back centuries on its tracks. If I may venture to quote what I said at the Imperial Conference of 1907 when Sir Thomas Smartt and I first met—I think we two and the present Colonial Secretary are the only survivors—I ventured to say, in reference to the Empire:—

> "We agree with our Colonial comrades of the Dominions that all this unity is worth concerted effort, even if that effort at the outset costs us something. The federation of free commonwealths is worth making some sacrifice for. One never knows when its strength will be essential to the great cause of human freedom, and that is priceless."

I venture to say that that prediction has been gloriously proved by great events.

Empire Based on Goodwill.

The British Empire is a saving fact in a very distracted world. It is the most hopeful experiment in human organisation which the world has yet seen. It is not so much that it combines men of many races, tongues, traditions and creeds in one system of government. Other Empires have done that, but the British Empire differs from all in one essential respect. It is based not on force but on goodwill and a common understanding. Liberty is its binding principle. Where that principle has not hitherto been applied it is gradually being introduced into the structure.

Development of the Empire.

It is that willing and free association of many nations and peoples which this Conference represents. Think of what we stand for in this room to-day. First of all the long political development of the British Isles, with all its splendours and its pains, the crucible from which the framework of the whole great structure has emerged. Canada, British and French; South Africa, British and Dutch—both now great Dominions whose unity is due to the free and willing combination of two proud races in a single nationhood. Australia and New Zealand, British civilisations both, but planted and developed with a genius of their own by the sheer enterprise and grit of their peoples in the furthest antipodes. India a mighty civilisation, whose rulers were known and respected throughout the western world before the first English post was planted on Indian soil. Side by side with these the wonderful varied colonies and protectorates in their different stages of development, which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is here to represent. In all the marvellous achievement of our peoples which this gathering reflects I am most deeply impressed by the blending of East and West—India with her far descended culture and her intensely varied types, so different from ours, present in this room to concert a common policy with us in the world's affairs, and to harmonise, as we hope, still more completely her civilisation and ours. It is our duty here to present the ideals of this great association of peoples in willing loyalty to one Sovereign, to take counsel together for the progress and welfare of all, and to keep our strength both moral and material, a united power for justice, liberty and peace.

Mr. Lloyd George: As to whether there should be a general discussion now or an adjournment till this afternoon or to-morrow, I am entirely in the hands of the members of the Conference, but I think there would be an advantage in having some discussion about our programme, and also if members would make any general observations which they may care to do at this stage, with reference to matters which I have referred to.

Question of Publication of Speeches.

Mr. Massey: Do you intend to publish this speech?

Mr. Lloyd George: That is another matter; the question of publication is a very important one. It is very undesirable that everything should be published, because we will have to discuss some things very freely amongst ourselves. For example, it would not be desirable to publish a verbatim report of our discussions on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, because it is obvious we have to say things here amongst ourselves which might be regarded as provocative if published, and therefore I think this must be done with judgment. We must decide amongst ourselves what we will and what we will not publish.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain: I presume that what we are saying now will not be published, but I think it would be advantageous to publish the statement you have made, with, if the representatives of the Dominions so wish, some observations of

their own on similar lines. Then I suggest we can proceed to more confidential discussions, of which a full account will not be given to the papers. As you say, it is obvious that when you come to a detailed discussion of many of the questions before us it would be quite impossible to deal with all the essential facts if we knew that all that was said was going to be published.

Opening Speech by Mr. Meighen.

Mr. Meighen: I think we might utilise a little more time to-day in hearing statements from some of us of a general character and then proceed to lay down the agenda. As far as I am concerned, I do not think that anything I might say in advance of our discussion of concrete subjects would be of sufficient importance to warrant a day or even half-a-day's adjournment for preparation. I have listened to the illuminating introduction of the Prime Minister, and I cannot bring myself to think that such a pregnant and impressive address will not receive full publication.

It is unfortunate that the obligation of speaking first should fall upon me, the least experienced representative of the Dominions, but it is well that the traditional order of precedence be followed.

Present Situation in Canada.

The Prime Minister referred to conditions in the British Isles, which, of course, we all from the various Dominions watch with great interest. The words of encouragement which he gave were very welcome to my ears. In Canada we do not suffer in the same degree from unemployment, but none the less we have much more than the normal. The extent and proportion of our agricultural population is such that we have in our belief less unrest than in most countries, and we feel also that our comprehensive and reasonably generous policy towards returned men, particularly to those entering upon agriculture, has reduced the evil in that respect.

The information that the Prime Minister has given as to the progress of peace negotiations, or rather the re-establishment of actual peace upon the basis of the peace treaties, is indeed encouraging. I feared myself that he would not be able to make quite so gratifying a report.

Canadian Opinion on Japanese Treaty.

As to the observations he made on the principles to be kept in mind in our deliberations on the Japanese Treaty and its renewal, we cannot over-estimate their importance. Possibly in the outlying Dominions we are not disposed to give the same attention to one feature which he draws attention to, the paramount necessity of seeing to it that no step is taken that leaves out of mind the importance of mitigating racial divisions. What I have to say as to this subject will, of course, be more appropriate later. All I can do now is to assure you that I, representing Canada, approach this question with a full sense of responsibility, and in seeking to interpret what I believe is the prevailing opinion of my country on the subject, I do so with a firm resolve to reach, if it can be reached, common ground with all representatives here.

Canada satisfied with Constitutional Progress.

The Prime Minister referred to suspicions that had been generated of designs on the autonomy of the Dominions, conspiracies to bring about revolutionary changes in our Constitutional relations. I may say that I do not think any responsible representative of any Dominion, I am quite certain of Canada, requires to have his mind cleansed of evil thought in that respect.

Acknowledgment of Tribute of Prime Minister to Services Rendered by Dominions.

It is due to the Conference, and particularly the Prime Minister, that I should gratefully acknowledge here his striking and memorable words in referring to the services rendered by the British Dominions and India during the late war. No finer expression of the feelings of the people of the British Isles has been uttered, and I feel that his valued tribute will be long remembered throughout the length and breadth of the Empire.

Value of Imperial Conferences.

There can be no doubt as to the value of Conferences such as this. The whole progress of the world, particularly since the war, has emphasised the value of conferences. Indeed, it is the method that has been incorporated as the very basis of the new order which the world is seeking to establish whether under the name of the League of Nations, or under some other name or under no name at all. For ourselves, of course, for this Britannic Commonwealth of nations, this method or principle has a peculiar significance. We are united by the history of our being, by a mutual trust, and by a fundamental intention to preserve a common allegiance. We therefore confer under conditions particularly favourable to free and open communication one with another, and in an atmosphere of complete mutual confidence.

Value of publishing Proceedings and need for frequent Conferences.

There are two conditions of success that I think of importance, though perhaps they are only partly under our control. If our conclusions are to be sound, and being sound, to be acted upon, they must be accorded not only general support, but intelligent support throughout the countries we represent. It is therefore essential that

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

we fully inform the public of our proceedings. There may, in respect of some questions, be limitations; we shall indeed at times be bound to respect what may be called the right of privacy of Governments and peoples other than our own. The problem is not a simple one, but I venture to suggest that it is better in the long run to err on the side of publicity than on the side of secrecy. The other condition is that such conferences as these should be as frequent and as regular as the growing necessities of inter-Dominion and inter-Empire relations demand. Time, I know, is important. It is difficult for Canadian Ministers to be absent, and that difficulty is accentuated in the case of Ministers of other Dominions. The expeditious despatch of business while here will assist all round.

I shall reserve any further remarks until we reach the discussion of the definite subjects that are to be brought before us.

Question of Publication.

Mr. Hughes: I am not quite clear what you desire to do. I understand that the suggestion originally was that after you had addressed the Conference, we should have an opportunity of considering what you had said

Mr. Lloyd George: That was my idea.

Mr. Hughes: I think it is a good idea because you have covered a good deal of ground which is all very much to the point. There is a number of questions on the agenda paper, and, if we are going to have a general discussion, it is desirable that we should put a limit on the time to be devoted to it. If we are given time to consider what you have said we shall be able to confine our remarks within shorter limits, so I prefer that we should adjourn. For the same reason I do not think we can gain very much by meeting again this afternoon. Moreover, it would be hardly possible for each of the Dominion representatives and of the representatives of India to make their statements during an afternoon sitting. I think, however, it is most desirable that we should begin and complete what may be termed the preliminary discussions in one day, if that be humanly possible, so that I am in favour of adjourning the discussion until to-morrow.

Recommends as much Publicity as Possible.

As to publicity, I see no reason, Mr. Lloyd George, why your speech should not be published *in extenso*, but there may be passages that perhaps you or some other representative may think undesirable. Personally, I can't think of any, but there may be some. The discussions which will have to be held later fall, however, in a different category; and, further, it may be that the preliminary discussion on the points to which you have referred may have to be treated in the same way; but one can't say definitely beforehand. I take it we are not met here merely to register decisions which may, or may not, be capable of realisation, but to suggest something, and some of the subjects which will have to be considered relate to matters which concern other countries. It is necessary that we should be able to speak quite freely in regard to these subjects, and it is clear that we cannot, therefore, publish full reports. I think therefore that, while the fullest possible publicity should be given, that it should be determined by some machinery set up for the purpose, what is to be and what is not to be given to the press. Perhaps the amount of information made public when we were here during the war left something to be desired, and I think we can give much fuller information now. Personally, I am in favour of the widest publicity which is compatible with our achieving the objects that we have met for. For the moment, I am in favour of adjourning the discussion, of publishing your statement *in extenso*, subject to any excisions you yourself may make, and then following the lines as to publicity which I have mentioned.

Recommends Publication of Prime Minister's Speech.

General Smuts: I think it is a good suggestion of Mr. Hughes that we should adjourn the discussion until to-morrow. Your speech, Mr. Lloyd George, in any case should I think, be published as a general statement made at the opening of this Conference, and I would suggest that to-morrow the other Prime Ministers might make any general observations which they wish to do on the position as a whole, and these might also be published.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think that is very desirable, and, if I may say so, that it would be advantageous if the Prime Ministers made speeches which can be published, because so much depends on the atmosphere that is created.

General Smuts: To let your statement be published by itself without speeches by some other Prime Ministers might again lead to misunderstanding.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is so.

Question of Publication.

General Smuts: And it might be taken that you had given a lead which the others had not followed and that they had taken a different line from you, so I think it would be a proper course that your statement should be published immediately, and that to-morrow the other Prime Ministers should make general statements of such a character as will be fit for publication. After that we might proceed to details and settle from day to day what we are going to publish of our proceedings and what not. It will depend on the nature of the discussion each day.

Mr. Lloyd George: That rather fits in with what I have just heard about Lord Curzon's return from Paris. He will not be ready until Wednesday, so to-morrow might be very usefully occupied as proposed. I think the publication of the statement would create a very good atmosphere throughout the Empire.

General Smuts: A second point. We ought to be able to discuss our agenda and general procedure. I think that might follow the general discussion.

Agrees with Publication of Prime Minister's Speech.

Mr. Massey: I have nothing to add to what has been said by the previous speakers, and I may say I agree almost entirely with what has been said by Mr. Hughes and General Smuts. I am very strongly of opinion, Mr. Lloyd George, that your speech should be published. I look upon it as the most important speech delivered since the end of the war and a speech which to the Dominions will give great satisfaction, and, I believe, to the United Kingdom itself, and great confidence to a number of people and a very large number of citizens who are very anxious about the present position and who feel a little anxiety with regard to what may happen at this Conference. Your speech will inspire confidence and do a great deal of good. As to going on with the business, I am very glad to agree with the suggestion that we should adjourn until to-morrow, and perhaps for a selfish reason, because, not expecting the Conference to go on to-day, I had made an important appointment, so important to my own country that even if the Conference went on I should have to absent myself, but I think the right thing is being done. As regards publicity, we shall have very seriously to consider this matter. My own opinion is that open diplomacy is impossible. I would give the public as much information as possible, but we should consider very seriously what ought to be made public. That is my opinion. I am quite prepared to give way to the majority of the members. I do not think it is necessary to say anything further, and I shall be glad to fall in with the suggestions already put forward.

Mr. Montagu: We shall be very glad if the discussion could be adjourned, as Mr. Hughes suggested, until to-morrow morning, and, if the Conference would agree, I should like to say that, although during the present proceedings the Secretary of State for India may be normally the head of the Indian deputation, it would be a source of great satisfaction to us if the Conference would allow the Indian delegates themselves to assume a leading part in the discussion.

Mr Lloyd George: I would suggest that one member of the Indian delegation should be deputed to speak to-morrow.

Mr. Montagu: That will be arranged.

General Smuts: We have had no discussion yet on the publication of to-day's proceedings.

Mr Chamberlain: I did not take Mr. Meighen's statement as covering the debate which we propose to have to-morrow, but, if he so wishes, the Prime Minister of Canada could have the shorthand report corrected and then it could be taken as delivered at the opening of the discussion to-morrow for publication with the observations of the other Prime Ministers. Because, if Mr. Meighen does not want to say anything more than what he has said to-day, he won't want to repeat it all over again.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Is Mr. Meighen's statement to be published to-day?

General Smuts: No; his speech will appear to-morrow with those of the other Prime Ministers.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is better from the point of the press that they should not get too much material at once and that my speech should go out to-night and yours to-morrow.

Mr. Massey: Yes.

(At this stage the discussion was adjourned until 11 A.M. on Tuesday, June 21.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, June* 20, 1921.

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Mr Meighen

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SECRET

E. 2nd Meeting.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1921, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Hughes.

Mr. Hughes: I desire to congratulate you on the admirable review of the position that you presented to us yesterday. I am sure it was most valuable as well as most interesting. We were all very glad to learn from you, Sir, that though the adjustment of those matters which arose out of the war is not yet complete, all our obligations, and our ex-enemies' obligations under the Treaty, were in a fair way of being fulfilled. We recognise that there are difficulties, and that it is not easy to satisfy those who preach a counsel of perfection, but I think we ought to congratulate you and the Government on having, during these last two years, weathered a great storm full of menacing possibilities, and though it would savour of too much optimism to say that we had yet reached the haven, still, on the whole, we have much to be thankful for. I very sincerely congratulate you as the head of the Government of the United Kingdom.

You have asked us to consider and review the situation as it presents itself to us, and I think we may do this with advantage before we pass on to the discussion of the various questions, or, indeed, decide the order in which we are to discuss them. The circumstances of this Conference are in themselves sufficiently remarkable. This is the first time we have met since the dark shadow of the great war has been lifted, and we are showing to the world and to the various parts of the Empire that those counsels which we took together during the war were not ephemeral expedients, but that we are resolved to continue along that path in company, being guided by each other's counsel and believing firmly that in co-operation and in unity lies the safety of all, and, in no small degree, the peace and welfare of the world.

Need for a means of concerting the Empire's policy.

Well, Sir, we are here—some of us have come very great distances, and all have come at great personal inconvenience. Some of us, like Mr. Massey and myself, have come 12,000 miles. We have each given our views to our representative Parliaments as to what this Conference intends, or hopes, to do. Much is expected from us, and I do venture earnestly to hope that this Conference will do something which will convince the people that we have found a practical and sure way of bridging that apparently impossible chasm which divides complete autonomy of the several parts of the Empire from united action upon matters affecting us all.

That we must do something is essential if this Conference is not to be a last magnificent flare of a dying illumination. I am sure, Sir, you will realise how difficult it is for us to leave a Parliament for five or six months. I shall not, I hope, be suspected of trespassing upon the sacred domain of domestic politics if I ask you just to conjure up in that vivid Celtic mind of yours—as I do in mine—the possibility of your being away for six months.

Now, amongst the great problems that are to be considered three stand out. You referred to all of them yesterday. They are:—Foreign Policy in general, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in particular, and Naval Defence. There are other problems, of course, which are intimately associated with these. If we are to give effect to the principle, which I take it has already been accepted, viz., the right of the Dominions to sit at the Council table on a footing of equality, and to discuss with you and the other representatives the question of the Foreign Policy of the Empire—these also must be not only considered, but settled. I do not think I am misinterpreting the opinions of all my friends here when I say that this voice, this share, in the Council of the Empire in regard to foreign policy must be a real one, must be one of substance and not merely a shadow. This involves the creation of some kind of machinery, and here we come to a very difficult position, to which I shall refer very shortly later.

We are now asked to deal with foreign policy, and in order that we may do this, you have said that Lord Curzon would review the present position of foreign affairs. We shall await that statement with great interest. The whole Empire is concerned in foreign policy, though this was for many years regarded as the sole prerogative of Great Britain. Wars are hatched by foreign policy. No one is able to say that any act affecting foreign nations will not, in the fullness of time, lead to war. No one is able to say that the most apparently trivial and innocent action will not involve us in international turmoil, and in the fullness of time bring us to the bloody plains of war. So, when we see on every side the British line—or, if you like, the line of this Commonwealth of British nations—being lengthened and the line of defence necessarily thinned, the points of potential danger multiplied—we are naturally uneasy. We have seen that a cloud no bigger than a man's hand can cover the whole heavens. And so, Sir—I speak only for myself, of course—I am sure you will quite understand our desire to know the reasons for your policy in Mesopotamia,

in Palestine, in Russia, in Egypt, and your policy in Greece and Turkey. If I have singled these things out it is not because they cover the whole field of foreign policy, but because these matters are perhaps the most obvious. **Opening Speech by Mr. Hughes.**

Now, if we are to have an effective voice in the foreign policy of this country, we must first of all know precisely how we stand, and the reasons for the policy adopted and the extent to which we are committed to it. I start with the assumption that our right to decide foreign policy is not denied. Very well, let us consider the thing under two heads—first, in regard to matters of foreign policy as they now present themselves before the British Government, and second in regard to policy in the future. We can express our opinions, and if needs be modify the present foreign policy by a full discussion and expression of opinion. Decisions can be registered and given effect to. But the position in regard to policy in the future is very difficult. Every day a new situation arises or may arise. How is it to be dealt with? We shall be scattered to the four quarters of the earth. How are the Dominions to have an effective voice on foreign policy when, as things stand, they can only be told after things have been done and are not consulted beforehand? That is a question which we shall have to consider. I stated, Sir, at the outset that other matters than those three of which I spoke—Foreign Policy in general, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and Naval Defence—will arise intimately related to these, and that we shall have to discuss them.

Difficulty of communication.

I come to one now. You yourself said yesterday, Sir, that direct communication between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues overseas had worked well. So it has; that is to say, the principle has worked well; but I think I ought to tell you, Sir, that it is rarely that one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, sometimes more than a day, before receiving your telegrams, a very good imitation of their substance. This arises through the great delay in the transmission of messages.

I am not going into details now—I have set this matter down on the agenda—but I want to say that it is absolutely essential, if we are going to have any effective voice in foreign policy, that we shall be in the closest possible touch with you and with each other, and that we shall know, not when the thing is done, but before the thing is done, what is intended, or what is desired to be done. This is essential because in foreign policy, as, indeed, in many cases in domestic policy, you cannot delay. Action is imperative. A thing that is possible to-day is impossible to-morrow, and action must be taken. So, if we are going to have a real voice in foreign policy, then we must have improved communication—means whereby you will be able to communicate quickly with your colleagues overseas, and they with you and with each other. That is absolutely essential. When we come to that item on the agenda paper, I shall show you, in one or two ways, how some improvement may be made. But I confess that all I can suggest falls very far short of that ideal condition of things which one would desire.

Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

Now I leave foreign policy in general, and come to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Here we are dealing with a matter definite and urgent. It is not a thing to be settled in the future, but now. The British Government has only postponed settlement in order that the matter might be dealt with round this table. It is an urgent matter. It must be settled without delay. The attitude of Australia towards it has been quite clearly stated. We have not a clean slate before us. If we had to consider for the first time whether we should have a Treaty with Japan, the position might be very different. We have not. For many years a Treaty has existed between Japan and Britain. Its terms have been modified, but in substance the existing Treaty has been in force for a long time. No doubt it cannot be renewed precisely in its present form. It must conform to the requirements of the League of Nations. But the case for renewal is very strong, if not indeed overwhelming. To Australia, as you will quite understand, this Treaty with Japan has special significance.

In favour of renewal.

Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal. But there are certain difficulties which must be faced. One of these arises out of the attitude of America towards this Treaty. I am sure I state the opinion of Australia when I say the people have a very warm corner in their hearts for America. They see in America to-day what they themselves hope to be in the future. We have a country very similar in extent and resources, and it may be laid down as a *sine quâ non* that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United States of America. It ought to do this specifically, but if not specifically then by implication so clear and unmistakable that he who runs may read. It is perfectly true that the present Treaty does this

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Hughes.

by implication, but not so plainly as to preclude misinterpretation. In any future Treaty we must guard against even the suspicion of hostility or unfriendliness to the United States. I hope you are not forgetting, Sir, that there are many who seek to misinterpret the intentions of this country, and to confound them we must put in plain words what are our intentions. That being so, and subject to that condition—which is not a new condition at all, because Japan has accepted the position for many years—Australia is very strongly in favour of the renewal of the Treaty. As I have said, the Treaty clearly must conform to the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, and it must have regard to the circumstances of the world to-day, but I think it ought to be renewed; I am strongly in favour of its being renewed. I think from every point of view that it would be well that the Treaty with Japan should be renewed. Should we not be in a better position to exercise greater influence over the Eastern policy as an Ally of that great Eastern Power, than as her potential enemy? Now, if Japan is excluded from the family of great Western nations—and, mark, to turn our backs on the Treaty is certainly to exclude Japan—she will be isolated, her high national pride wounded in its most tender spot. To renew this Treaty is to impose on her some of those restraints inseparable from Treaties with other civilised nations like ourselves. We will do well for the world's peace—we will do well for China—we will do well for the Commonwealth of British nations to renew this Treaty. We want peace.

American Objections.

The world wants peace. Which policy is most likely to promote, to ensure, the world's peace? As I see it, the renewal of the Treaty with the Japanese Empire. Now let us consider America's objections to the renewal of the Treaty. Some of these relate to the emigration of Japanese to America; but the hostility to Japan, more or less marked, that exists in America to-day, cannot be wholly accounted for by this fact. As it is vital in the interest of civilisation that a good understanding should exist between America and ourselves, we should endeavour to do everything in our power to ascertain exactly what it is to which America takes exception in this Treaty. We ought not to give her room for criticism which the world could support. We must make it perfectly clear that the Treaty is not aimed against her, and that it could never be used against her. War with America is unthinkable. As the contingency is quite an impossible one, it need not be seriously considered. Yet it is well that the attitude of Australia should be made quite clear.

Suggests Conference with America and Japan.

Whether it would be wiser to invite a Conference with America and Japan, to ascertain what would be mutually acceptable, is a suggestion which I throw out. If one were quite sure that America desired, or was prepared to accept, what would form a reasonable basis of an Alliance with Japan, then I certainly would strongly press the suggestion. But in any case we ought to try and ascertain precisely what America's views are on this most important matter.

Importance of the question of Disarmament.

Now I turn from the consideration of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Sir, to a question of supreme importance which you raised yesterday, and it is one which is related both to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and to Naval Defence—I mean the question of disarmament. You said, Sir, and I am sure the world will be very glad to read those words of yours, that you would welcome any suggestion and discuss with any Power any propositions for disarmament or limitations of armaments. Yours words come most opportunely. I think this is the psychological moment. We ought not to underestimate the value of this Conference—it is no use denying the fact that in America they do distinguish between England and the Dominions in a very marked way—and a suggestion coming from you backed by the Dominion Prime Ministers, might gain a hearing where the voice of England alone failed. After all, the distinction which Americans draw between us is easy to understand. History partly explains it. They see, too, in us replicas of themselves. They see us struggling and fighting towards the goal that they have already attained. And I think they are right in supposing that, subject to that determination which we have to achieve our destiny in company with each other and with Britain, we resemble so many Americas. We are free democracies. We want peace. We at least are free from the suspicion of Imperialistic ambitions. The world, tired of war, is yet neurotic, its nervous system so disturbed by war that while it cries aloud for peace, force is the first thing to which it turns to redress its grievances. You cannot expect, you cannot hope for any more favourable moment that the present. If you fail to secure agreement for the limitation of armaments now, how can you expect to do so in the years to come? The appalling race for naval supremacy has already begun, although the fires of the great war are not yet cold. It creates interests in the various countries where this suicidal race is run. This vicious rivalry grows by what it feeds on. Every year it becomes more difficult to

stop. Speak therefore now on behalf of this gathering of Prime Ministers. Let us give the world, weary of war and staggering beneath its crushing burdens, a lead. Invite the United States of America, Japan and France to meet us. We cannot hope that the world will beat its sword into a ploughshare, but at any rate it can stop building more ships. Let us stop naval construction and naval expenditure other than that necessary for the maintenance of existing units without prejudice to what may be agreed upon hereafter. In this matter, the first step is everything. If the world resolves to stop making any further preparations for war, everything is possible; until that step is taken, we are only beating the air.

Opening Speech by Mr. Hughes.

Such an invitation issued with such authority behind it would, I think, find great support in America, and I hope and believe in Japan too. In ten years time, in five years time, the position will be that both these countries will be poorer. They cannot continue such a competition indefinitely. If they persist, we and all the great nations of the world must follow their example. What hope does such a prospect hold out to the war-weary world? To stop naval construction pending a permanent settlement of the basis for naval power will not prejudice their interests. The relative strength of each will not be affected by stopping now. I do most strongly urge you to set an example, speaking as you will be able to do on behalf, not merely of England, but on behalf of all those free nations whose representatives are gathered here. Let us show to the world that these young nations gathered round this table have resolved to make their entrance into world politics by setting an example which the world has long wanted. I am not without hopes that such an invitation on your part, and such an example on ours, would be provocative of great good and prove to be the turning point in the world's history.

Need for adequate Naval Defence.

I come now to the last point with which I intend to deal at length, and that is Naval Defence. Whatever may be agreed upon, one thing is clear, that we must have such naval defence as is adequate for our safety. Naturally the amount of force necessary to ensure our safety in a world which has agreed to suspend naval construction, a world in which the three great Naval Powers have, for example, come to such an understanding as would have the force and effect of an alliance, would be much less than in a world which resounds with the clang of hammer beating into shape bigger and still bigger navies. That applies, too, to the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but in any case we must have such naval defence as is necessary for our security. The war and the Panamá Canal has shifted the world's stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the future is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters. Peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world.

With an agreement between three Great Naval Powers—or, at worst, between two—then the force necessary to defend this Empire by sea—and that it rests on sea power is certain, and I am never tired of repeating this most significant fact to those who are apt to forget how the British Empire came into being and has been maintained—would be much less. But whatever it is we must have it.

Part of Dominions in Empire Defence.

And now one word about the part of the Dominions in Empire defence. You, Sir, said some time ago that Britain had paid so dearly for victory and was groaning under such a crushing burden of debt that it could no longer alone be responsible for the defence of the Empire by sea as it had heretofore, and that the other parts of the Empire must do their share. To that doctrine I subscribe without reservation. I think it is the corollary of our admission into the councils of the Empire to determine the foreign policy. The foreign policy determined or approved by us at this Conference may lead to war. In any case the foreign policy of a nation must be limited by its power to enforce it, whether that power be wholly resident in itself, or come from an alliance, or from the League of Nations. The ambitions of men and nations are curbed by their material power. In our case, sea power is, and must always be, the determining factor of our foreign policy. Now we cannot fairly ask for the right to decide the foreign policy of the Empire and say that we will have no part whatever in naval defence, we will not pay our share. If you ask me what is our share, I say frankly that I am not prepared at this moment to indicate it. We can do that when we come to deal with the matter in detail, but one principle seems to emerge and it is this. I do not think that our share *per capita* should be as great as Britain's share *per capita*, because Britain has Crown Colonies, and dependencies, and India to defend. But whatever is our fair share should be borne upon a *per capita* basis by all the Dominions. That, I think, is the only fair and proper basis. If the converse be conceded for a moment, and some pay more *per*

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Hughes.

capita than others, then I do not understand the basis of union amongst us. Dangers to the Empire or to any part of it are to be met surely by unity of action. That is at once the principle upon which the Empire rests, and upon which its security depends. The Dominions could not exist if it were not for the British Navy. We must not forget this. We are a united Empire or we are nothing. Now who is to say from what quarter dangers will come to any one of us? It comes now from the East and to-morrow from the West. But from whatever quarter it comes we meet it as a united Empire, the whole of our strength is thrown against the danger which threatens us. If some Dominions say " we are not in any danger, you are, you pay; we will not, or cannot, contribute towards naval defence," an impossible position is created. I cannot subscribe to such a doctrine. It is incompatible with the circumstances of our relationship to Britain and to each other, it menaces our safety and our very existence, it is a negation of our unity.

I need hardly say that I do not believe that the Dominion quota for naval defence should be expressed in terms of a money contribution, but in terms of Dominion Navies. This is a point upon which the Admiralty has expressed itself very strongly, and the suggestion of monetary contribution is not to be seriously considered. In any case, we shall be able to discuss the matter when naval defence is being dealt with.

Status of Dominions.

I have nothing further to say on those matters to which you referred yesterday, but reference to one other point may be permitted. It is well that we should know each other's views. We ought not to discuss things in the dark. It has been suggested that a Constitutional Conference should be held next year. It may be that I am very dense, but I am totally at a loss to understand what it is that this Constitutional Conference proposes to do. Is it that the Dominions are seeking new powers, or are desirous of using powers they already have, or is the Conference to draw up a declaration of rights, to set down in black and white the relations between Britain and the Dominions? What is this Conference to do? What is the reason for calling it together? I know, of course, the Resolution of the 1917 Conference. But much water has run under the bridge since then. Surely this Conference is not intended to limit the rights we now have. Yet what new right, what extension of power can it give us? What is there that we cannot do now? What could the Dominions do as independent nations that they cannot do now? What limitation is now imposed upon them? What can they not do, even to encompass their own destruction by sundering the bonds that bind them to the Empire? What yet do they lack? Canada has asserted her right to make treaties. She has made treaties. She is asserting her right to appoint an Ambassador at Washington. Are these the marks of Slave States, or quasi-sovereignty? In what essential thing does any one of the great Self-Governing Dominions differ from independent nations? It is true there is a sentiment, a figment, a few ancient forms: there is what Sir F. Pollock calls the figment of the right of the British Parliament to make laws affecting the Dominions. Supposing the British Parliament should make a law to-morrow which would take from me the very position in which I stand, namely, a representative of a Parliament that exists and was brought into being by a British Statute. I suppose that would apply to you, General Smuts, and to you, Mr. Meighen. They could pass that law, and although we might be here as individuals, so far as legal or constitutional status is concerned we should have ceased to exist. But, as Mr. F. Pollock says, this power of the British Parliament is a figment, a shadow. Either it must limit our rights of self-government, or it must weaken the bonds of Empire, or it must simply content itself with asserting rights and privileges and responsibilities that are ours already and that none question. In effect, we have all the rights of self-government enjoyed by independent nations. That being the position, what is the Constitutional Conference going to do? The proposal to hold a Constitutional Conference is causing considerable anxiety, at any rate in Australia. So far from anticipating that it is to give us greater power, some fear it will take away some of the powers that we have, and my difficulty is, and has been, to try and allay those doubts which are very strongly held. I think everyone of us is confronted with the same position. I think even this Conference is surrounded with clouds of suspicion. Our right to a name is in question. If we call ourselves a Conference it is wrong; if we call ourselves a Cabinet it is wrong—a Council is still worse. I am sure between General Smuts and myself there is, in fact, very little difference, if any. But, nevertheless, I say that we are treading on very dangerous ground, and I say this to him. We have achieved this wonderful progress—and it is wonderful progress along certain lines. Is he not satisfied with the progress we have made? The

difference between the status of the Dominions now and twenty-five years ago is very great. We were Colonies, we became Dominions. We have been accorded the status of nations. Our progress in material greatness has kept pace with our constitutional development. Let us leave well alone. That is my advice. We have now on the agenda paper matters which mark a new era in Empire government. We, the representatives of the Dominions, are met together to formulate a foreign policy for the Empire. What greater advance is conceivable? What remains to us? We are like so many Alexanders. What other worlds have we to conquer? I do not speak of Utopias nor of shadows, but of solid earth. I know of no power that the Prime Minister of Britain has, that General Smuts has not. Our presence here round this table, the agenda paper before us, the basis of equality on which we meet, these things speak in trumpet tones that this Conference of free democratic nations is, as Mr. Lloyd George said yesterday, a living force.

Opening Speech by Mr. Hughes.

Opening Speech by General Smuts.

General Smuts: I should like to associate myself with what has been said by the Prime Minister of Australia in regard to the speech which you made yesterday, and, in particular, speaking on behalf of South Africa, I should like to thank you very, very much for the reference you made to General Botha. General Botha was not only a great South African, but a great man, and his name will remain as one of the greatest men in the history of the British Empire, and I think the references made to him yesterday were fully justified. You opened yesterday, Prime Minister, in a speech, if I may say so, of such power and brilliance, that it is very difficult for us, in fact, impossible for me, to follow on, but we agreed yesterday that the Prime Ministers should each make a general preliminary statement, and so I proceed to make a few remarks upon the topics on which we are called upon to deal here.

Need for Peace.

I think a discussion like this may be useful, because it will disclose in a preliminary and general way the attitude taken up by the Dominions on the topics which we have come here to discuss. I shall not attempt to break fresh ground in the few remarks I am going to make. I am going to adhere more or less to the tenor of what I said in the South African Parliament when the subject matters of this Conference were under debate. What I said was generally approved in Parliament and by the public in South Africa, and I shall therefore adhere to what I said there. I said on that occasion that what the world most needs to-day is peace, a return to a peaceful temper and to the resumption of peaceful and normal industry. To my mind that is the test of all true policy to-day. Peace is wanted by the world. Peace is wanted especially by the peoples of the British Empire. We are a peaceful Empire, our very nature is such that peace is necessary for us. We have no military aims to serve, we have no militaristic ideals, and it is only in a peaceful world that our ideals can be realised. It should, therefore, be the main, in fact, the only object of British policy to secure real peace for the Empire and the world generally. Now the Prime Minister stated in his speech what progress has been made towards the attainment of this ideal. He pointed out that some of the matters which gave us the greatest trouble in Paris had been settled. The question of reparations, which was, perhaps, the most difficult and intricate with which we had to deal in Paris, has finally, after some years of debate and trouble, been eliminated, in a settlement which, I ventue to hope, will prove final and workable. That is a very great advance. The other great advance that has been made—and it is an enormous advance—is the final disarmament of Germany. That the greatest military Empire that has ever existed in history should be reduced to a peace establishment of 100,000 men is something which I considered practically impossible. It is a great achievement, so far-reaching, indeed, that it ought to become the basis of a new departure in world policy. We cannot stop with Germany, we cannot stop with the disarmament of Germany. It is impossible for us to continue to envisage the future of the world from the point of view of war. I believe it is impossible for us to contemplate the piling up of armaments in the future of the world and the exhaustion of our very limited remaining resources in order to carry out a policy of that kind.

Such a policy would be criminal, it would be the betrayal of the causes for which we fought during the war, and if we embarked on such a policy it would be our undoing. If we were to go forward into the future staggering under the load of military and naval armaments whilst our competitors in Central Europe were free from the incubus of great armies, we should be severely handicapped, and in the end we should have the fruits of victory lost to us by our post-war policy. Already circumstances are developing on those lines. Already under the operation of inexorable economic factors we find that the position is developing to the advantage

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by General Smuts.

of Central Europe. The depreciation of their currencies, the universal depreciation of currencies, and the unsettlement of the exchanges are having the effect of practical repudiation of liabilities on the part of a large part of the Continent. If we add to our financial responsibilities and have, in addition, to pile on the fresh burdens of new armies and navies I am afraid the future for us is very dark indeed, and we shall in the long run lose all we have won on the field of battle.

Empire's policy should be for Reduction of Armaments.

Armaments depend upon policy, and therefore I press very strongly that our policy should be such as to make the race for armaments impossible. That should be the cardinal feature of our foreign policy. We should not go into the future under this awful handicap of having to support great armaments, build new fleets, raise new armies, whilst our economic competitors are free of that liability under the Peace Treaty. The most fatal mistake of all, in my humble opinion, would be a race of armaments against America. America is the nation that is closest to us in all the human ties. The Dominions look upon her as the oldest of them. She is the relation with whom we most closely agree, and with whom we can most cordially work together. She left our circle a long time ago because of a great historic mistake. I am not sure that a wise policy after the great events through which we have recently passed might not repair the effects of that great historic error, and once more bring America on to lines of general co-operation with the British Empire. America, after all, has proved a staunch and tried friend during the war. She came in late because she did not realise what was at stake. In the very darkest hour of the war she came in and ranged herself on our side. That was, I believe, the determining factor in the victory of our great cause.

Need for close understanding with United States.

Since the war we have somewhat drifted apart. I need not go into the story—I do not know the whole story—it is only known to you here. There are matters on which we have not seen eye to eye, to some extent springing from what happened at Paris and also from mistakes made by statesmen. But these mistakes do not affect the fundamental attitude of the two peoples. To my mind it seems clear that the only path of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk together with America. In saying this I do not wish to be understood as advocating an American alliance. Nothing of the kind. I do not advocate an alliance or any exclusive arrangement with America. It would be undesirable, it would be impossible and unnecessary. The British Empire is not in need of exclusive allies. It emerged from the war quite the greatest Power in the world, and it is only unwisdom or unsound policy that could rob her of that great position. She does not want exclusive alliances. What she wants to see established is more universal friendship in the world. The nations of the British Empire wish to make all the nations of the world more friendly to each other. We wish to remove grounds for misunderstandings and causes of friction, and to bring together all the free peoples of the world in a system of friendly conferences and consultations in regard to their difficulties. We wish to see a real Society of Nations, away from the old ideas and practices of national domination or Imperial domination, which were the real root causes of the great war. No, not in alliances, in any exclusive alliances, but in a new spirit of amity and co-operation do we seek the solution of the problems of the future. Although America is not a member of the League of Nations, there is no doubt that co-operation between her and the British Empire would be the easy and natural thing, and there is no doubt it would be the wise thing.

Far East and Pacific the new focus of world's politics.

In shaping our course for the future, we must bear in mind that the whole world position has radically altered as a result of the war. Europe is no longer what she was, and the power and the position which she once occupied in the world has been largely lost. The great Empires have disappeared. Austria will never rise again. Russia and Germany will no doubt revive, but not in this generation nor in the next; and when they do, they may be very different countries in a world which may be a very different world. The position, therefore, has completely altered. The old viewpoint from which we considered Europe has completely altered. She suffers from an exhaustion, which is the most appalling fact of history; and the victorious countries of Europe are not much better off than the vanquished. No, the scene has shifted on the great stage. To my mind that is the most important fact in the world situation to-day, and the fact to which our foreign policy should have special regard. Our temptation is still to look upon the European stage as of the first importance. It is no longer so; and I suggest we should not be too deeply occupied with it. Let us be friendly and helpful all round to the best of our ability, but let us not be too deeply involved in it. The fires are still burning there, the pot is occasionally boiling over, but these are not really first-rate events any more. This

state of affairs in Central Europe will probably continue for many years to come, and no act on our part could very largely alter the situation. Therefore, not from feelings of selfishness, but in a spirit of wisdom, one would counsel prudence and reserve in our continental commitments, and that we do not let ourselves in for European entanglements more than is necessary, and that we be impartial, friendly and helpful to all alike, and avoid any partisan attitude in the concerns of the continent of Europe. Undoubtedly the scene has shifted away from Europe to the Far East and to the Pacific. The problems of the Pacific are to my mind the world problems of the next fifty years or more. In these problems we are, as an Empire, very vitally interested. Three of the Dominions border on the Pacific; India is next door; there too, are the United States and Japan. There, also, in China, the fate of the greatest human population on earth will have to be decided. There, Europe, Asia and America are meeting, and there, I believe, the next great chapter in human history will be enacted. I ask myself what will be the character of that history? Will it be along the old lines? Will it be the old spirit of national and Imperial domination which has been the undoing of Europe? Or shall we have learned our lesson? Shall we have purged our souls in the fires through which we have passed? Will it be a future of peaceful co-operation, of friendly co-ordination of all the vast interests at stake?

Opening Speech by General Smuts.

Need of friendly Conferences for the future.

Shall we act in continuous friendly consultation in the true spirit of a Society of Nations, or will there once more be a repetition of rival groups, of exclusive alliances, and finally, of a terrible catastrophe more fatal than the one we have passed through? That, to my mind, is the alternative. That is the parting of the ways at which we have arrived now. That is the great matter, I take it, we are met to consider in this Conference. If we are wisely guided at this juncture, this Conference may well become one of the great landmarks in history. It comes most opportune. The American Senate has already made the first move in a unanimous resolution calling for a Conference of the United States, the British Empire and Japan. Japan has been a consistent supporter of the League of Nations. She is one of the great Powers with a permanent seat on the Council, and she has, so far as I can gather, consistently been a power for good in the Councils of the League of Nations. The British Empire, again, is not only one of the strongest influences behind the League, but she is honestly and sincerely feeling her way to a better ordering of international relations. China is not only a member of the League, but has been elected a member of the Council at the last meeting of the Assembly at Geneva. All the great parties concerned in the Pacific and in Pacific policy are, therefore, pledged to friendly conference and consultation in regard to what is the most important, possibly the most dangerous, next phase of world politics. They are all pledged to the new system of conference and consultation, either by membership of the League and its Council, or, in the case of America, by the resolution which the Senate has just passed. It is now for this Conference of ours to give the lead and guide the Powers concerned into a friendly conference, or system of conferences, in regard to this great issue. This, I submit, is the great opportunity presented to this Conference, and I trust that our deliberations will be exploited to the full for the good and future peace of the world. As you said yesterday, Mr. Prime Minister, the British Empire involves the great question of East and West, the relations of East and West. That great question is now coming to a head. There is no doubt that the British Empire is more vitally interested than any other country in this, for she has her feet planted on all the continents. By her great position she is called upon to act as the peacemaker, the mediator, between East and West, and nowhere else has she such scope, such opportunity, for great world service as just here. Great rival civilisations are meeting and great questions have to be decided for the future. I most heartily applaud what you said yesterday on this point, and I trust that difficulties on this most thorny path will not prove insuperable to us. You spoke yesterday most eloquently on the Peace Treaty, the sacredness of the Peace Treaty, and the obligation to carry out the Peace Treaty. There is one chapter in that Treaty which, to my mind, should be specially sacred to the British Empire. That is the first chapter on the League of Nations. The Covenant may be faulty, it may need amendment in order to make it more workable and more generally acceptable, but let us never forget that the Covenant embodies the most deeply-felt longings of the human race for a better life. There, more than anywhere else, do we find a serious effort made to translate into practical reality the great ideals that actuated us during the war, the ideals for which millions of our best gave their lives. The method of understanding instead of violence, of free co-operation, of consultation and conference in all great difficulties.

League of Nations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by General Smuts.

which we have found so fruitful in our Empire system, is the method which the League attempts to apply to the affairs of the world. Let us, in the British Empire, back it for all it is worth. It may well prove, for international relations, the way out of the present morass. It may become the foundation of a new international system which will render armaments unnecessary, and give the world at large the blessings which we enjoy in our lesser League of Nations in the Empire.

I have spoken at length already, Prime Minister, and therefore, I do not wish to refer to the other great matter which we are met here to consider, and which Mr. Hughes touched upon, namely, constitutional relations. We shall come to a very full discussion of that subject, and, therefore, I do not wish to say any more at this stage.

Opening Speech by Mr. Massey.

Mr. Massey: In the first place, Prime Minister, I want briefly to take advantage of what you referred to as our "unenviable privilege," speaking for myself, the privilege of having the longest record as Prime Minister of any of those who sit around the Council Board to-day, and on that account I want to add a few words to what you have said with regard to an old friend General Botha. During the very few months that I was acquainted with General Botha I came to regard him as one of the best men I ever met, a great man, undoubtedly, and, in addition, a great British statesman. If he had been with us to-day it goes without saying he would have been invaluable in assisting to solve some of the difficult problems with which we are face to face. I feel confident of this, that it will be a very long time before his services are forgotten, either by South Africa, with which he was more intimately associated, or with the citizens of the British Empire wherever they may happen to be. I want, too, to express my regret that we have not with us on the present occasion men who did great work in days gone by. I refer to Lord Milner, Lord Long, better known to us as the Right Honourable Mr. Walter Long, and Sir Robert Borden. I hope that their retirement from Empire service is only temporary, but, in any case, I trust, and I know it, that when we require their advice and counsel, their services to the Empire will always be willingly and faithfully given.

I think I ought to say a word of welcome to those who are met in this room for the first time, and I feel confident that they will do credit to those behind them who have honoured them with their confidence, and that their coming here will be an acquisition to the Conference which I hope and believe will make for better things so far as the Empire is concerned.

And now, Prime Minister, in addition to what I said yesterday, I want to refer again, briefly, to the very fine speech which we, the members of this organisation, had the opportunity of listening to yesterday.

Status of Dominions.

I want to say that I look upon it as the most important speech delivered since the war, and a speech which, to the British citizens of the Dominions, will give great satisfaction, and not only to them but to the citizens at the heart of the Empire, the United Kingdom itself. It will give confidence to a number of people and a very large number of citizens who are anxious about the present position and feel a certain anxiety with regard to what may happen at this Conference. The speech was candid, outspoken and well expressed, and it gave the impression, which I have not the very slightest doubt it was intended to convey, that the Prime Minister intends to place the whole of his cards upon the table, take us, who are the representatives of the Overseas Dominions, into his complete confidence and ask for our assistance in settling the difficulties which at present appear to confront us. The speech, in my opinion, struck the right note, and it will give, I am quite sure, more confidence to people overseas and to citizens generally than the Prime Minister himself imagines could possibly be the case. Ever since the signatures of the representatives of the Dominions were attached to the Peace Treaty at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, there has been a feeling on the part of many intelligent men and women that the future of the Empire may possibly have been endangered thereby. What I mean is this, that I have seen it stated repeatedly, as a result of the signing of the Peace Treaty, which, of course, included the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Dominions of the Empire had acquired complete independence, and, in case of the Empire being involved in war—which I say heaven forbid, and I say it with all my heart and soul—any one of the Dominions might refrain from taking part or assisting the Empire in any way. I do not agree with that view, and I go upon the principle that when the King, the Head of the State, declares war the whole of his subjects are at war, and that must be the case if some of the best constitutional authorities are right. That is one of the causes of anxiety at the present time. There is the other as a logical sequence of the first, that any

Dominion—I won't say Dependencies, Dependencies are in a different position—but any Dominion may, on account of what has taken place, enter into a treaty with any foreign country irrespective of what the Empire as a whole may do. I am not now referring to a treaty entered into for commercial purposes, that is quite another matter. As I understand the position, any Dominion may make a commercial arrangement with any foreign country, but the treaties of which I am thinking and of which many other people are thinking are treaties involving war or peace or foreign policy as the case may be. These latter are the treaties which, I understand, in existing circumstances, a Dominion has not the right to enter into. I bring this up now; I had thought of waiting for another year, but one never knows what may happen during twelve months. Personally, I doubt if it will be possible to hold the Conference which was intended for next year, for reasons which may not perhaps have occurred to many here present. I think I am right in saying there will be an election in Australia next year. I am not authorised to say this, but I have heard it said that possibly Canada will have an election next year. That I do not know, but I do know this, that New Zealand must face an election next year.

Opening Speech by Mr. Massey.

Mr. Lloyd George: How many years have you?

Mr. Massey: Three years.

Mr. Lloyd George: How many years have you?

Mr. Meighen: Five years.

Mr. Lloyd George: How many years does your Parliament last?

Mr. Hughes: Three years.

Mr. Massey: We are in the same year, so when Australia has an election New Zealand has an election. I am suggesting that we shall probably have a number of elections next year, and therefore it may not be possible to hold an Imperial Conference for any purpose whatever.

Mr. Hughes: I am glad you mentioned that. That is one of the practical difficulties. I think I told you, Sir, it would be impossible for me to come next year.

Status of present Conference.

Mr. Massey: I was referring to constitutional questions which are causing difficulties at present, and I should like to see them cleared up. I think we are in a dangerous position—a position which may bring friction in a year or two's time or in the years to come. I think it should be faced now, and we should arrive at an understanding as to exactly where we are. There is another point. The Imperial War Cabinet has been referred to on a number of occasions to-day and yesterday, and I read with a great deal of interest an article by Lord Milner in one of the papers yesterday morning, I think the "Times." I may say I agree thoroughly with the opinion expressed by Lord Milner in regard to the Imperial War Cabinet. I believe it did magnificent work and I hoped that it would become a permanent institution, modified, of course, as required by a period of peace. The Imperial War Cabinet was suitable for a period of war. I do not mean to say we should go on the same lines. We are here to-day, and I think I am right in saying we do not even know what to call ourselves, and there is a great deal in a name. A Conference means consultation and consultation only, but a Cabinet also carries with it the right to recommend some definite course to the Sovereign. Of course, behind it all there is the responsibility on the part of each representative of the Dominions particularly, or even of the United Kingdom, to the Parliaments behind us; we must take the responsibility of our actions; but I think most of us, all of us, here to-day are experienced politicians, and I am quite sure that we are not likely to go too far. There is another difficulty. The representatives of the Dominions and India meet the representatives of the United Kingdom in conference, but we have no right to join in any recommendation that may be made to the Sovereign in regard to any course which requires his assent and which may be thought desirable. Now, I am not anxious about this. I have absolute confidence in the good sense of British people and British statesmen, but still there is the anomaly. There is something there that wants to be put right. Using a term which is often used, it is not democratic. I do not know whether these matters can be discussed and dealt with during the present Conference, and I am calling it a Conference for want of a better name. What I object to is what the name Conference implies. I do not know whether we are able to deal with it during the term of the present Conference, or whether we are not, but I do think the matter should be settled, and not left over

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Massey.

indefinitely. We sometimes talk about what we have gained in recent years, and we have gained a great deal. There is no question about that. We have gained in status and in other ways. We stand in quite a different position from that in which the Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire, including India, stood ten years ago, but we have gone back as compared with what was the case two years ago when the Imperial War Cabinet was in existence.

Mr. Hughes: I do not quite follow where we have gone back.

Value of partnership of Nations.

Mr. Massey: We have lost the right which we had then on war matters, and even other matters, to assist in making a recommendation to the Sovereign, the Head of the State, in regard to any course of action which we thought desirable and which required his assent. I may be wrong in the view I take, but I feel so strongly about it, and I have discussed it with my colleagues in New Zealand—though I have not mentioned it in Parliament except by way of a brief hint. I went no further with my own Parliament, but I would not be justified in allowing this Conference to pass without bringing it up. I may say that I believe thoroughly and strongly in the partnership of nations. It does not matter what you call it—a family of nations, a Commonwealth of Nations, or anything else, so long as the partnership is applied. I believe thoroughly and firmly in that; but even a partnership of nations, any more than a nation, cannot stand still. We must either progress or decay. There is no question about that, and I hope those who are entrusted with the management of the public affairs of the Empire itself, and of the countries of the Empire, will see that no decay takes place. There is one point I must acknowledge in this connection, and it is this. While I have called attention to the anomaly, I admit, and am thoroughly of opinion, that there is a far stronger power in the British Empire to-day than any words that may be placed upon paper, either printed or written —that is, the sentiments of the British people, the patriotic sentiments of the British people. I am not merely speaking of Anglo-Saxons or Europeans, or any one race. I am speaking of the British people right through the Empire, including the native races. You cannot go beyond sentiment. And I am quite sure that as soon as they understand what is taking place or its possibility, if only its possibility, they will see that these matters, which may appear small at the time, are rectified without waiting too long.

The Pacific the future storm centre.

I want to say something about naval defence. It has been referred to by Mr. Hughes, and I may say that there is no difference of opinion between Mr. Hughes and myself in regard to the necessity for naval defence. The storm centre has changed undoubtedly during the last few years, so far as it is possible to judge by appearances, and many of us fear that the next war—and I wish I were optimistic enough to believe we had seen the last of wars, but I am not—we fear that the next naval war will be fought in the Pacific. Human nature has not changed very much in the last 5,000 years, and although we have profited by the lessons of the war, and I would like to think that the lessons of the war would prevent war, that the suffering that the people of Europe endured, the tremendous loss of life, the misery they endured, I would like to think that these, taken together or any one of them, would prevent war in the future. I am not looking forward to war in the immediate future. There are clouds on the horizon it is true, some of them perhaps no bigger than the proverbial man's hand, but they are there, and they may bring war sooner than we expect. The wish, however, is not father to the thought.

Naval defence must protect Empire's Communications.

I hope the indications may come to nothing, and no one will be better pleased than myself if they come to nought, but so far as naval defence is concerned—I am speaking of the Empire now, a chain of countries right round the globe, Dominions, Dependencies, and the Empire within an Empire, India, as well as the United Kingdom—whatever may happen in the future, I do hope that there will be a sufficient naval force kept in order to maintain the connections between the different parts of the Empire, and that was where there was a danger of our losing the last war. In connection with submarine warfare in its worst days, about 1917, before the hydrophone and depth charge had been perfected, when the ships were being sunk faster than we were able to turn them out, there was a danger then of the connections being cut between the different Dominions, and the heart of the Empire particularly, or even between the different countries of the Empire outside the United Kingdom itself, and if the connections had been cut we should certainly have lost the war—nothing could have saved us. Fortunately, things turned out as some of us were optimistic enough to expect, but again we have to think of the future, and we have to remember the lessons of the last war. I know, of course, there are great changes

—great improvements, if you can call them improvements—in the instruments of war. Probably different methods, but we can only go as far as our knowledge allows us, and I hope this point will not be lost sight of. If it were possible—for my feeling about war is so strong, and I have no doubt it is shared by everyone present—if it were possible for me by one stroke of the pen to strike out the possibility of war, I would do it without hesitation, but it is not. We know, every one of us, that there are countries in the world to-day, densely-inhabited countries, that are only kept within their own boundaries, and kept from inflicting injustice on their weaker neighbours, by the fact that if they did it would probably bring down on them a stronger Power than themselves.

Opening Speech by Mr. Massey.

New Zealand's share in Naval Defence.

Mr. Hughes referred to the financial side of the question and the upkeep of the British navy of the future. I do not suppose that New Zealand is in any better financial position than any other country. We have not been exactly crippled, but we feel the result of the war expenditure, and we are likely to feel it for some time to come. But for all that—I speak on behalf of New Zealand—I take the responsibility of saying that New Zealand will find its fair share of the money necessary to provide a navy strong enough in comparison with other navies to defend the Pacific in case of attack. I hope it will not be necessary, but it is only right that I should express what I feel, and I feel very strongly after seeing what took place on the last occasion in the Southern Pacific upon the outbreak of war. We have an idea of the possibilities that the future may bring forth, and while I have a great deal of respect for the opinion of General Smuts, I do think it would be unwise to leave the countries of the Empire—which means the Empire itself—absolutely unprotected. So far as America is concerned, I hope that we shall be able to join with America in that friendly co-operation which you, Sir, referred to in your address yesterday. I would go the length of saying that so far as I am concerned, I am prepared to join in any well thought out alliance with America. Personally, I do not think that is possible, but whatever happens I hope the time will come when America and Britain will join together, if for no other purpose and with no other object than that of keeping the peace of the world and preventing war.

Value of Treaties.

General Smuts expressed the opinion that we should do without alliances. I am sorry, but I am not able to join in that opinion. So far as our Treaties are concerned, we must stand by them even if for the time being they do not seem to be to our advantage. With regard to the Treaty which was signed two years ago at Versailles, and which provided that we—I am speaking of the Empire now—should come to the assistance of France in case of necessity—I do not know whether legally that Treaty stands. I doubt it, because America has withdrawn from the position which she then took up. But so far as we are concerned I have no doubt about our moral obligation. Our reputation for fair and honest dealing is one of our best assets and must be maintained at all costs. Then we must ask ourselves this question: We have got through the worst war the world has ever witnessed—I hope the world will never see another like it—but if Britain had been compelled to stand alone in that war, the question that must occur to each and everyone of us would be "Could Britain have been successful?" I doubt it. With all the confidence that I have in the might and power of Britain and the patriotism of her people—and their patriotism was proved by the fact that one million British citizens—the flower of the Empire—gave their lives to save the Empire—I doubt if by ourselves we could have stood up against the Powers of Central Europe and have come out successfully during that war.

Recommends renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

With regard to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, this is probably one of the most important things we have to deal with. I declined even to my own Parliament to discuss details of many matters which I felt confident would be brought up before this Conference comes to an end. I took my Parliament into my fullest confidence so far as the proposed Japanese Treaty was concerned, and I told them that in my opinion, with whatever modifications may be necessary, I was quite prepared to support its renewal. It is only right to admit that, in saying that, I am guided to a certain extent by what took place during the war period. There was one period of the war, very soon after the war broke out, when New Zealand had 10,000 men ready to send to the front, and the ships and equipment ready to send them, and information reached us from an official source—that the Pacific was not safe. I had an instinct that it was not safe, but that information decided me, so far as it was possible for a Prime Minister to decide, and I appealed, perhaps in strong terms and by strong methods which I thought justified at the time, to the British Government to send us protection for these 10,000 men before they were sent out into the Pacific,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Mr. Massey.

knowing that there was a strong German squadron in those waters. The strength of that squadron was proved by what happened afterwards, when they met two quite good British ships—I will not say battleships or even big battle-cruisers, but they met two strong British warships—and sank them with a loss of 1,600 men. The ships were the "Good Hope" and, I think, the "Monmouth."

Mr. Churchill: Yes, that is right.

Mr. Massey: They were there and it was quite impossible to find out, when our transport was ready to sail, where the German squadron was located. I felt that I could not take the responsibility of sending these men off without protection. However, the British Government—I think Mr. Churchill was the head of the Admiralty at that time—acceded to our request, and arrangements were made with Japan to send out a strong battle-cruiser, not a battleship, with 12-inch guns, and a powerful British cruiser, the name of which I have forgotten but which had been the flagship of the China squadron.

Mr. Churchill: It was the "Minotaur."

Mr. Massey: When those two ships came we were perfectly safe. I think our anxiety was justified by the fact—and there are very few men to-day who will not recollect it—that that was the trip upon which the "Sydney" sank the "Emden." By that time, by the way, the Australian ships had joined ours, and in the Indian Ocean there were about twenty-eight ships or more carrying troops totalling probably 28,000 men. I will say that we were justified in New Zealand in our anxiety for the safety of those men. My support of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty does not in the very slightest affect the fact that in New Zealand we stand by our right to choose our future fellow-citizens, and it is only fair to say that our legislation on the subject has never been found fault with by either the Japanese or any other race. Personally I do not think there will be another war during this generation. It is only right to say so, but wars have come up very unexpectedly and it is not well to leave the necessary preparations until the last moment. I trust that so far as naval defence is concerned, and it is on naval defence that the safety of the Empire of the future rests, we shall not be found unprepared. There is just another point arising out of the proposed renewal of the Japanese Treaty and it is this. Supposing Japan had been on the other side? I do not mean to say that is possible, because there was the Treaty, but the Treaty as it is to-day did not compel Japan to come into the war in the circumstances in connection with which the war was fought. But supposing Japan had been on the enemy side, one result would have been quite certain, that neither Australia nor New Zealand would have been able to send troops to the front, neither could we have sent food or equipment—equipment for the soldiers and sailors or food for the civil population of Britain. It would not have been possible. These things have all to be remembered in connection with the renewal of the Treaty. I am prepared to take the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any wrong impression on that point. I am quite prepared, as I said, to join with America to prevent war, but I must put the position as it occurs to me and as my experience dictates, and I do not think any apology is necessary for my doing so.

Position if Japan had been an enemy in 1914-18.

There are several points referred to in the address by the Prime Minister which must come up again before the Conference comes to an end, and I was very glad to hear what was said about reparation. Apparently I missed the report of the negotiations: in all probability the negotiations took place between the time I left New Zealand and before I arrived here.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is so, I think.

Mr. Massey: I should be very glad indeed to hear a statement made—not merely on my own account, for I know it will be of interest to everyone present—of what the exact position is so far as reparation is concerned.

Lord Curzon: If we circulate the short statement upon that question it might save trouble.

Mr. Massey: Thank you, that will be good enough for me.

Lord Curzon: I will certainly let you have it.

Future of the League of Nations

Mr. Massey: I want briefly to refer to some matters which I think should be dealt with. The League of Nations has already been referred to. I do not know what the future of the League of Nations is going to be or what effect it will have

in preventing war. I should like to think it would do all that it was intended to do by its promoters, but we know, most of us, in past history that attempts to prevent war have failed. The Holy Alliance, arising out of the Congress of Vienna, was just one, and had a similar intention to the League of Nations. I do not want to say the League of Nations is beyond hope, because I know better, but the Holy Alliance did fail. I do not want to find fault with the League of Nations—but until we change human nature I am afraid it will be impossible to prevent war, much as we should like to do it.

Opening Speech by Mr. Massey.

Then there is the Imperial Shipping Committee set up in pursuance of a resolution passed at a previous Imperial Conference. I refer to what is termed the Imperial Shipping Committee, but I understand it is only a temporary arrangement. In the first place, I thought it was to be a permanent organisation, but so far it is only temporary. I do not know when its term of office comes to an end, but I do want to emphasise that the matter of communication between different parts of the Empire is probably one of the most vital things that this Conference could deal with. It is the old story of the highways. If we do not have good highways between different parts of the Empire, then we shall find ourselves in very serious trouble, and there is a very great deal of dissatisfaction at present with the manner in which shipping matters between different countries of the Empire are being dealt with or arranged. I do not want to make difficulties, but I think the position should be faced and some better arrangements made. I want to say a few words about the holding of future Conferences. One of the difficulties is, as Mr. Hughes and myself well know, that it is a long journey from Australia and New Zealand to the heart of the Empire, making it almost impossible to attend these gatherings yearly, and I think these Conferences should be held yearly, but if anything is going to be done in that way, we can look forward to improvements in wireless and improvements in the cable system, yet anything that we do at present must be based upon steamships and railways. Something ought to be done, and while I do not want to commit the country to it, it may resolve itself into a question of subsidies so that we may get our mails carried, and passengers carried, and our products carried from one country to the other at the lowest possible rates consistent with fair profits, and so far as mails and passengers are concerned, in a very much shorter time than it is taking at present.

Imperial Communications.

There is just one word I want to say regarding another subject, and I am only going to refer to it by way of emphasising the necessity of something being done. I mean the difficulty in the New Hebrides, where there is a dual form of Government. I am sure most of the members of the Conference understand the position in the New Hebrides and the conditions under which the people are governed at present. The present system is absolutely unworkable, and getting into a worse condition all the time. I do not know what to suggest—except that it might be possible to arrange an exchange of territory so as to provide one Government for these islands; that ought to be a matter to be put before the French Government. There is no question about the fertility of the islands. There is quite a large area, and a large native population rapidly diminishing in number.

Situation in the New Hebrides.

In conclusion, I would like to say a word on behalf of the Dominions. I have the utmost affection for the heart of the Empire. It is the Mecca of every British citizen; but I do think that, in the interests of both the statesmen of the United Kingdom and the people of the Dominions, that meetings should be held periodically in the overseas countries of the Empire. If my suggestion is given effect to, it would give the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill—not both perhaps together—an opportunity of visiting the Dominions. You cannot govern the Empire from the windows of Downing Street. I do hope the opportunity will be taken by statesmen at present in the United Kingdom to visit the overseas countries of the Empire, and they will then understand the views of these countries and the aspirations of their peoples. I do not think that there is anything else I want to say at this juncture. I had no idea that I should take up so much time. I should just like to say this. The people in New Zealand never before seemed to appreciate to the same extent the importance of the Imperial Conference until this occasion. They were perhaps never so enthusiastic on any previous occasions. There was practically no opposition to my coming to London, and the one point that was impressed upon me in Parliament and at the public meetings which I attended a few days prior to leaving the Dominion—the one point that was impressed upon me—was to stand for unity of Empire, and if I stood by that they would forgive all my shortcomings in other directions. I have nothing more to say, Prime Minister, and again I thank the members of this Conference for listening to me so attentively as they have done.

Imperial Conferences should not always be held in London.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Opening Speech by Hon. S. Sastri.

Mr. Lloyd George: (to the Hon. Srinivasa Sastri)—Would you begin now, do you think?

The Hon. Srinivasa Sastri: I will take about fifteen to twenty minutes.

Mr. Lloyd George: We have plenty of time then for that.

India's enthusiasm for the Empire.

The Hon. Srinivasa Sastri: In the memorable speech to which we listened yesterday, you made a striking allusion to the generous enthusiasms and noble ideals for humanity which the war has kindled everywhere. India, let me assure you, is actuated by these enthusiasms and ideals in the same measure as other parts of this Empire. That the British Empire is the most fitting exponent of these enthusiasms and ideals we realise, and it is the peculiar good fortune of India to remain within the British Empire and take part in the work that we need ever increasingly for the realisation of these noble aims and purposes.

The Princes for whom my friend, His Highness the Maharao of Cutch, will speak and the peoples of India whom it is my privilege to represent here to-day, send their hearty allegiance to the Central Council of Empire on this occasion. We made our contributions to the conduct of the recent war; we sent you supplies of wheat, making dangerous inroads on the scanty stocks of our own people. We made munitions for the soldiers to use on the field of battle, we made money contributions out of our poverty and we sent you men to the tune of 1,274,000, which comes up to over one-half of the total overseas forces employed in the war.

Difference in status of India's representatives and the Premiers of the Dominions.

Of these contributions, Prime Minister, you made handsome acknowledgment yesterday, and please accept our gratitude for the honourable mention of that fact in your speech. We, His Highness the Maharao of Cutch and I, consider it a privilege to sit at this table where history is made, and if I may strike a somewhat personal note, not being employed in the service of Government, never having taken a share in the administration of public affairs, I consider it my particular good fortune to sit alongside with statesmen who have for generations moulded the destinies and fashioned the fortunes of their kind; but the Maharao of Cutch and I cannot fail to remember that the position we occupy here is not comparable by any means to the position occupied by our colleagues from the Dominions. They are called here by virtue of their being Prime Ministers. We come by nomination from our Government. We realise that that marks a great difference in our status, although not in the privileges to which we have been admitted at these meetings. We hope that next year or the year after, our successors, who will take our places here, will come by a better right. The person who represents in the place of His Highness more than one-third of British territory in India will probably be chosen by the Chamber of Princes by election, and the man who takes my place may likewise be elected by the Central Legislature of the land. We have not yet acquired full Dominion status, but we realise we are planted firmly on the road to the acquisition of that status.

Progress of Indian Constitution.

The Government of India Act of 1919 forms a great landmark in the growth of Indian constitution. There is nothing in our previous history with which it can be compared, either in importance or in magnitude. The Princes' Chamber, which is going to play a great part in the evolution of India, does not form an integral part within the law of our constitution. The constitution proper of British India, inaugurated by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, not long ago, has shown a sense of responsibility and loyalty to the Empire, which, in my judgment, is second to none of the Parliaments within the Empire. The new Councils have worked better than we expected under the wise and sleepless watch of the Secretary of State for India. The reforms of a political character that have just been started in India are doing great work in placing us alongside the other parts of the British Empire. I must say that we have our troubles. Non-co-operation has only to be mentioned to bring to your mind an idea of the perils in which we have to live. I am happy to say that Lord Reading, our new Viceroy, may be trusted fully, as recent experience has proved, to deal with this great danger.

Interest of Indian Moslems in Turkish Empire.

There are many subjects to which the Dominion Prime Ministers have alluded, to which also, perhaps, I may be expected, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, to say a few words, but I will forbear. There are two topics of high domestic importance to which, perhaps, this meeting will permit me to allude, as they will not take up much time. The first question to which I will draw your attention is one in which the deepest feelings of my Mohammedan fellow-countrymen are engaged. I will not say much on that topic, as all the issues are at present in full vividness in your minds. On the Maharao of Cutch and myself, who are Hindoos, there rests a very peculiar duty of voicing the feelings of our Moslem fellow-subjects on this

occasion. I will only venture on this remark—that in any arrangements that may be made for the future of the Turkish Empire, statesmen of the United Kingdom will have to remember that they must show as much chivalry and tenderness as may be expected from a mighty victor. I have no manner of doubt in my own mind that you will be actuated by these considerations, which are always present to those who have inherited the great traditions of British prowess and the still greater traditions of British sportsmanship.

Opening Speech by Hon. S. Sastri.

Status of Indians in Dominions.

There is another subject of great importance which I must mention—that is the status enjoyed by Indians in the Dominions of the British Empire. In noble words you described this Empire, Sir, as a Confederation of Races into which willing and free peoples had been admitted—willing and free peoples; consent is incongruous with inequality of races, and freedom, necessarily implies admission of all people to the rights of citizenship without reservation. In impressive and far-seeing words the Prime Minister of South Africa alluded to the establishment of everlasting peace. Peace means a stable and unalterable relationship between communities—based on honourable equality and recognition of equality of status. To embody this ideal, there are deductions from it now in actual practice, we are going to submit, I mean our Indian Delegation, for the consideration of this Cabinet, a resolution, the terms of which I understand have already been communicated to you. This is a resolution that will be regarded in India as the test by which the whole position must be judged. I won't say more than that. It is of supreme importance that that subject should be considered and disposed of satisfactorily at this meeting, and it is of the most urgent and pressing importance that we should be enabled to carry back a message of hope and of good cheer. There is no conviction more strongly in our minds than this, that a full enjoyment of citzenship within the British Empire applies, not only to the United Kingdom, but to every self-governing Dominion within its compass. We have already, Sir, as you are aware, agreed to a subtraction from the integrity of the rights of the compromise of 1918 to which my predecessor, Lord Sinha, was a party, that each Dominion and each self-governing part of the Empire should be free to regulate the composition of its population by suitable immigration laws. On that compromise there is no intention whatever to go back, but we plead on behalf of those who are already fully domiciled in the various self-governing Dominions according to the laws under which those Dominions are governed—to these people there is no reason whatever to deny the full rights of citizenship, it is for them that we plead; where they are lawfully settled, they must be admitted into the general body of citizenship and no deduction must be made from the rights that other British subjects enjoy. It is my unfortunate part to have drawn prominent attention to what we consider a great defect in the present arrangements. It may seem to be of comparatively trifling importance to the other issues we have to consider. I only plead that there should be no occasion for small bickerings, no occasion for mutual recriminations amongst us. We have great tasks. Let little things be got out of the way. I only wish that all our common energies should be bent towards realising more and more within the Empire and extending further and further outside the British Empire, those generous ideals of progress to which, Sir, you gave such inspiring and, if I may say so, such alluring expression yesterday.

Mr. Lloyd George (to Mr. Churchill): You have to speak on behalf of the Colonies and Protectorates—there is no time for it now. Shall we have a meeting this afternoon to conclude this part of the business so that Lord Curzon may begin to-morrow on Foreign Affairs? I suggest that we had better meet at half-past four.

Mr. Churchill (to the Prime Minister): I got a message saying you wanted me to do that on Wednesday, so I have not made any special preparations.

Mr. Lloyd George: I thought you would speak on the problem of the Middle East and supplement Lord Curzon's statement. That is what I thought. I thought you would make a general statement on the Crown Colonies.

Mr. Churchill: On the Crown Colonies, yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: Let us meet at half-past four, and then begin to-morrow on Foreign Policy.

Question of procedure in regard to publication.

Mr. Churchill (to the Prime Minister): The point I wanted to raise was one of procedure. I have been struck very much listening to these very important speeches this morning by the fact that there are a good many passages which I think would

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

not be helpful at the present time if they were published in the press, particularly in regard to the whole question of this Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: That you can discuss at half-past four.

Mr. Churchill: I am quite ready to agree to that.

Mr. Lloyd George: Then I hope we shall have transcript ready.

Mr. Churchill: As our discussion proceeds our opinion may be somewhat modified and I think it is rather a pity that so many of the heads of the most important Governments concerned should, as it were, have their views on this subject discussed in the open before we have had a chance of talking it over amongst ourselves. Also, I think it must be rather embarrassing, in a way, to Japan. It is not a question of a Member of Parliament discussing it in a Chamber—it is the heads of Governments. Therefore, I do earnestly hope that the publication of anything in connection with the Japanese Alliance will, at any rate, be kept until we have had a secret and frank discussion on the matter, and then perhaps some general statement may be made when we know where we are.

Mr. Lloyd George: We will discuss that at half-past four.

Lord Curzon: One word on that point. In the interests of my Department I earnestly hope we shall not publish any of these statements at all. We are conversing here with extreme candour. Mr. Hughes this morning made a speech of enormous value and spoke with extreme candour as a friend to friends, and, although what he says may be necessary, if it were published the task of the Foreign Secretary would be made very difficult and it might excite a good deal of attention which perhaps would not be warranted. For instance, can we contemplate going to war with Japan over China? It is far too difficult. Immediately you put in circulation the word war, or anything about war, it is serious.

Mr. Lloyd George (to Mr. Hughes): You do not propose that that should be published?

Mr. Hughes: No; I have been reading this statement through, and with perhaps a dozen excisions it would be quite harmless. I may tell you if you will allow me to make this suggestion, I will censor the statement and then I will send it to you in order that you may see it. You can strike out whatever you think proper. That will be quite satisfactory to me.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, as the Foreign Secretary points out, it is important.

Mr. Hughes: It is not suggested we should give to the press all we say here. I will censor it first and then send it to the Prime Minister, and, if you go through it, it will be quite satisfactory to me however you alter it.

Mr. Massey: I am prepared to omit every reference to Japan.

Lord Curzon: To-morrow, when I make my statement, I trust there is no idea that it should be published.

Mr. Lloyd George: We agreed yesterday, when you were not here, that the general opening discussion should be published but not the subsequent ones.

Mr. Massey: Naturally you must tell us very confidential things which it would be very unwise to publish.

Mr. Lloyd George: It was rather understood yesterday that we should open up with a general discussion, and that the representative of each Dominion and of India should give a general expression of his views about the questions which I raised. I did put in something about Japan, and I think it is essential that something should be said. What Mr. Meighen said was quite inoffensive in regard to the views which I know he has on the subject, and I cannot conceive it will do any harm if it is published. If Mr. Hughes consents to cut out the passage about China and perhaps one or two phrases it will be helpful to the general discussion.

Lord Curzon: Mr. Hughes spoke with great candour about his ideas concerning the proposed Constitutional Conference next year. He condemned the proposal. It is surely undesirable that this should be published.

Mr. Hughes: Of course, I do not know whether you realise that we live in a place where it is far more dangerous to throw stones than it is here, and you may depend upon it I shall be very careful of what is given to the press.

Mr. Massey: I think we can make up our minds about publication to-morrow. If we allow the press to rush us we shall be in a difficulty. We should make no reference to anything which would cause trouble, and I would suggest to Mr. Hughes that before he corrects his proof or sends it on he should eliminate the reference to China.

Mr. Hughes: Japan, no doubt, as well as America, is expecting us to indicate our attitude in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In Canada and the Western States it is a live question, and it is very live with us. We must say something.

Mr. Lloyd George: I really cannot conceive what harm it would do, especially in view of the fact that in your own Parliament you have already expressed freely your views. Nothing that has been said now has not been revealed before.

Mr. Hughes: I shall not say anything more than I have said.

Mr. Lloyd George: Revise your speech and send it to me if you don't mind. We meet at half-past four this afternoon; it need not go to press before 4·30 at any rate.

Mr. Meighen: Speaking on behalf of the Colonies, Mr. Churchill will have a rather narrow field this afternoon.

Mr. Lloyd George: His statement will take some time. We could go on to procedure afterwards. I suggest that we meet to-morrow, but it would be convenient to have Thursday off.

Mr. Hughes: I am available all the time.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should like Thursday to be a free day. Then we will say to-morrow and Friday. We do not as a rule meet on Saturday, but we are quite willing to do so if wished.

Mr. Hughes: It is over-doing it.

Mr. Lloyd George: I quite agree. We over-did our Conferences very much on the Continent until we became perfect wrecks. They always insisted on sitting on Sundays, and you generally met a fresh Minister at each successive appointment. They over-did it and they insisted upon a Sunday meeting. I suggest that Mr. Churchill should make his statement this afternoon and then we can go on discussing procedure.

Mr. Hughes: At what time will the meeting be?

Mr. Lloyd George: This afternoon at half-past four.

(The Conference adjourned for luncheon at 1·45 P.M.)

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
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SECRET.

E. 3rd Meeting.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Statement on the Crown Colonies, &c.

Mr. Churchill: The Prime Minister has asked me to give a brief statement to the Conference, or meeting, however we are to define it, about the Crown Colonies and possessions which are administered directly under the Colonial Office, and I need hardly say that if I were to attempt to give you a picture of the condition of these States I should occupy an enormous amount of time, because each one is a story in itself full of interest and full of romance. In every one of these Colonies there are problems similar to those in larger States, though on a smaller scale. In some cases, indeed, they are more complex than those which are found in great States, because in many of them there are great differences of race. Their finances are also complicated. Some are so exiguous that the sale of postage stamps to those who take an interest in philately is an important feature in their revenue. The production of turtles is in one case almost the staple source of export and of revenue. Others are great, wealthy, prosperous Protectorates, exporting forty million or fifty million pounds' worth of goods to this country, and supplying Great Britain, and to a certain extent the Empire, with the raw materials of some of their essential and vital industries. As long as the war lasted, practically all the Colonies and Dependencies were very prosperous, but with the arrival of the happy conditions of peace a wave of depression has fallen upon almost every one of them so far as their trade is concerned. During the war we got our tin from Malaya, plumbago from Ceylon, wolfram from Hong Kong, mahogany for frames of aeroplanes from Honduras, fine cotton for their wings from the West Indian Islands. The sugar-producing Colonies were prosperous beyond their dreams. The oils and fats of West Africa, which used largely to go to Germany, were useful to us, and their loss was crippling to the Germans. The Falkland Islands industry of whaling was stimulated for war purposes, and they benefited thereby. Moreover, during the war, when human passions were at such a volcanic pitch, we were happily spared the cataclysms of nature. The hurricanes, earthquakes, droughts, which from time to time ruin the economic margin on which some of the Colonies exist, were happily absent, and it almost looked as if Nature were holding her hand to leave the field entirely free for the devastating activities of man. But the creeping paralysis of depression has spread to almost all the Colonial industries which flourished during the war. The tin on which Malaya depends so much cannot now obtain a price which covers the cost of production. Nigerian tin is in the same position. The price of rubber does not cover the cost of production. We have been approached with pressure to enforce schemes of a compulsory limitation of output, but we have not felt able to accept such schemes. From almost every one of the Colonies complaints are coming in that its principal products cannot now be sold at a profit. Even the sugar Colonies, principally Jamaica and British Guiana, are in difficulty about the disposal of their crop. The cotton crops of Uganda and Nyasaland have suffered very heavily from the fall in prices and the same would have been true of West Africa but for the broad-minded action of the British Cotton Growing Association, which, rather than discourage the native producer by a sudden overthrow in the price at which he has been led to hope to produce, have been purchasing cotton at a price which involves a loss to that Association of £400,000 or £500,000 in the present year. We are told that this period of depression is only a temporary phase. I do not know how far that is true. The decline in the consuming power of the world, which is making its effect felt on the highly organised industries of Britain and, I have no doubt, of the Dominions, is by repercussion producing a similar result upon the raw materials which are produced by our tropical dependencies, and practically every one of the budgets of these Colonies and Protectorates is going through a period of extreme financial difficulty and even crisis. The violent fluctuations in the value of money and the changes which affect the greatest States, operate with far more direct and unshielded force upon those smaller organisations, and therefore as far as the immediate situation of the present is concerned, we are passing through a stormy period in the economic and commercial life of practically all the Crown Colonies. But if one leaves the immediate difficulties and turns to their great and undoubted wealth and potential capabilities, one cannot help feeling how magnificent is the asset which the British Empire possesses, and of which, pending the development of more responsible and representative forms of government in these Colonies, we in Great Britain and at the Colonial Office are the trustees. My submission to the Conference is that we must not lose heart in any way about these splendid tropical possessions which we have, but endeavour to secure credit and money for them to give them that essential technical apparatus they require to develop their great resources. In them you find every conceivable product that the

Prosperity during the War.

Present Depression.

Future Development.

world knows of, and every contributing factor even to the most highly organised superfine forms of industry. Nothing is lacking, and now that we see the American exchange is largely turned against us, and we have such great payments to make to them, we ought really more and more to turn our attention to trying to develop these wonderful hot-houses, these great tropical gardens and plantations, so as to be able to purchase as far as possible the raw products that we want from them. How can any money invested in these places go out from the Dominions, or from the mother country? It can only go out in the shape of the products of labour. How can it return—in capital or interest or in profit? It can only come back in these raw materials which we especially and particularly need, and which may some day make us independent in the most remarkable way of many foreign lands. I feel that this is a matter which, although it is confined to the Colonial Office and to this country at the present time, should more and more engage the sympathies and interest of the self-governing Dominions. I illustrate this particularly by the West Indies. In the summer of 1920 a trade agreement was made between the Canadian Government and representatives of all the West Indian Colonies. It is not merely a remarkable instance of Imperial preference, but it promotes unity with the Empire through the development of Imperial communications, which the Prime Minister will remember he and I have always considered one of the most promising lines along which we can advance, ever since the Conference which he, Sir Thomas Smartt and I attended in the year 1907. Two lines of steamers, one entirely new, will now connect all the West Indian Colonies with the Dominion of Canada. I hope Mr. Meighen and the Canadian Government will advance with increasing confidence on this path, because it seems to me that for all the greatness of Canada and its tremendous producing potentialities, it is not a complete entity without connection with these semi-tropical islands. Compared to the United States, Canada lies wholly to the north with northern products, whereas the United States can produce all that Canada can produce, or very nearly all, and yet reaches down to Florida and regions which give her a semi-tropical sphere. But if the association between Canada and the West Indian Islands is developed and goes on, Canada becomes equipped with an immense range of products which makes her, from an economic point of view, a far more complete entity, and therefore I look forward to everything which tends to promote a close association between these West Indian Islands and the Dominion. It is not only from the point of view of commerce alone, but they are among the most beautiful islands in the world. They are salubrious and balmy, and it might be they would be a place of agreeable resort at seasons of the year, when the climate of Canada is sometimes rigorous.

Statement on the Crown Colonies, &c.

Importance to Dominions.

Mr. Meighen: Bermuda is the chief one from that point of view, and Bermuda has declined to ratify the reciprocity agreement.

Mr. Churchill: We shall endeavour to use our influence as far as possible to secure the general acceptance of it. So far as the constitutional developments in the Colonies are concerned, progress has been continuous, and latterly, especially since the war, very rapid. We have every form of government, ranging from benevolent autocracies tempered by Downing Street, to two-Chamber systems, resting upon at least one of the Chambers being fully elected. For instance, the island of Bermuda celebrated its tercentenary of representative institutions dating from the day when the first general assembly of the islands was made, and therefore can boast a seniority which no existing State in Europe or America can disdain. In Mauritius there was a movement to promote an agitation for a retrocession of the island to France, but this movement has received a decisive check at the recent elections, in which all the retrocessionist candidates have been signally defeated. There has been a strong movement in Ceylon for a more popular control over the government of the colony, following upon the movement which Mr. Montagu and his predecessors have driven forward, fostered, and nourished in India, and a new constitution has been granted which gives a majority in the Legislature to the unofficial element. In the Kenya colony a new constitution has been granted giving an elective basis for the unofficial members of the Council, instead of the nominated basis which existed hitherto. Uganda has reached such a stage of development that they have legislative Councils with nominated membership. In Malta a novel experiment has been tried by my predecessor, and we hope it will succeed. Everybody knows the argument against giving Malta a Constitution. It was said you might as well give a Constitution to a battleship. We have arrived at a dyarchical system—two Governments in the island, one elective, dealing with Maltese affairs, and the other dealing with purely military and naval interests.

Constitutional Development.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Statement on the Crown Colonies, &c.

Rhodesia.

General Smuts will no doubt wish to discuss, and Sir Thomas Smartt also, the conditions which prevail in Rhodesia. I hope that a delegation of Rhodesians will arrive in this country before General Smuts has to leave. I have telegraphed about this. Of course, Rhodesia is a young organisation to be trusted with full responsible government. Its population is smaller than Natal, when she obtained responsible government. On the other hand, the settlers are discontented with the present state of affairs. The Chartered Company is passing away, and it therefore has little incentive to spend money on the development of the country. I should like to say, if I may, that the work of this Chartered Company has been a very wonderful work for the British Empire. The shareholders have never received a penny in dividends, and they may never be able to secure more than a portion of their capital. A splendid region has been acquired and developed to a large extent, and it has all been done entirely by the voluntary effort of private capital. I hope, whatever arrangements are made, we shall not be animated by any spirit of prejudice towards this company, who, I think, has rendered enormous service to the British Empire. As an alternative to responsible government, there is the question of the incorporation of Rhodesia in the Union. There can only be one destination for Rhodesia ultimately, and the only question we have to consider—I will not say the only question, but the main question—is, what is the psychological moment. One wants Rhodesia to be at man's estate before she joins the Union, and to join it willingly and as a partner. After all, Rhodesia is an enormous factor in the whole South African situation. We must remember that they are very much inclined to resent anything like an attempt to dispose of their destiny over their heads.

The native question is, of course, a very serious one there, and I think I was quite right to try and get these Rhodesian delegates here at the time when General Smuts and Sir Thomas Smartt are here, in order to discuss the whole position with the Colonial Office. Also, we do not want to have any appearance of dictation. I trust that the conversations we shall have when they are here will result in some arrangement that is satisfactory.

Development of Communications.

We have gone on slowly developing Imperial communications. Of course, we have got very little money. The great expense of Palestine and Mesopotamia has thrown such burdens upon our backs that everything in regard to the Crown Colonies has been very severely pruned. Still, we are developing.

East Africa.

In East Africa, I am hoping at last to make the deep water pier at Kilindini. When I left the Colonial Office in the beginning of 1908, I had already succeeded in getting it settled to make this deep-water pier. It was definitely settled. The Uganda Railway, built at enormous expense by the Imperial Government, stops 40 feet short of deep water. With such a pier you would be able to unload from the ocean steamers on to the railway which runs up hundreds of miles to the great lakes, but these 40 feet intervene, and everything has now to be unloaded from the steamers into lighters and from the lighters on to the railway. All articles are subject to a charge in which local vested interests are deeply concerned. I came back to the Colonial Office after thirteen years' absence, and I found still the same 40 feet intervening. The same lighterage interests are deriving their profits, and the whole of the great transport of the war supplies was handled in this inefficient and wasteful manner. However, we hope now to take that up and give the Uganda Railway what it requires—its deep-water connection. A new line, a feeder line, we hope to develop to the railway from the Uasin Gishu Plateau, which will tap the rich district now being opened up by the soldier settlers, and will form the first link to the Congo Basin. A new line from Chindio to the Zambesi has been constructed. An extension of the existing system to Lake Nyasa is now being considered, and in East Africa generally we are trying not only railways, but all forms of light transport, including road railways. I am not at all sure that the tank has not a part to play in some of these countries. I do not mean the war tank, but a caterpillar vehicle capable of collecting the produce from the scattered estates and bringing it to the railways.

Nigeria.

The Northern Nigerian Railway which we carried through many years ago at the Colonial Office is now a very paying, prosperous proposition, and it is joined up with the Southern Nigerian Railway crossing the Niger by a fine bridge at Jebba. It reaches right up to Kano, with a branch to Bauchi. The bridge across the Benue River will contain a span 800 feet in length and will be the third longest span in the British Empire. The whole of Nigeria is self-supporting. It is moving rapidly ahead. The natives are very prosperous. We have difficulty in getting them to come forward as soldiers, although the force maintained is a very small one, on account of the big wages to be obtained. The cost of export to Lancashire of cotton would be very much less if

Statement on the Crown Colonies, &c.

it were not that the local purchaser was attracted by the idea of being able to wear clothes in increasing abundance. There is no doubt that the two Nigerias will absolutely vindicate the exertions made on their behalf by the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. They constitute one of the most solid and valuable possessions of the British Crown, and will repay handsomely any further support by British credit which they may need. The extension of the Nigerian Eastern Railway, which at present consists of a line of 150 miles, is being taken in hand, and when complete the whole Eastern system will have 600 miles of line and will serve the rich tin mines. There are both coal and tin mines, and these are all capable of being worked, not by shafts but by galleries.

Mr. Lloyd George: Is the coal rich?

Mr. Winston Churchill: Not compared to the best fields of England, but quite enough to run the whole of Nigeria.

Mr. Lloyd George: I mean the quality.

Mr. Winston Churchill: The quality is fairly good, quite good enough. At the terminus of the Eastern Railway on the Nigerian coast an important wharfage scheme has been planned. We are spending on it half-a-million, not of our money, Nigerian money. The most important wharfage scheme is at Lagos, where 1¼ millions are being spent on the terminus of the main railway—1,800 feet of wharves built of concrete blocks, and so on. A deep-water harbour is contemplated at Secondee on the Gold Coast. Thus we are steadily developing, in spite of the difficulties of the present time, our great tropical possessions.

Ceylon.

Coming to the other side of the world, a small but necessary extension of the Ceylon Government Railway has been undertaken to open up rice-growing districts and relieve the Colony from her dependence on oversea sources of food supply. Then we come to the Federated Malay States. Their railways were joined up with the Siamese Government Railways on the 1st July, 1918. The Federated Malay States railway system now comprises 950 miles of line, all built out of current revenue, and loans have been made to Siam by the Federated Malay States on easy terms to enable the connection to be made between the two systems—a through train now runs from Singapore to Bangkok, and a further connection is being made along the East Coast. The Federated Malay States form a most important feature in our administration. The Conference will remember the gift of the battleship "Malaya" in the year 1912 just in the nick of time for it to be ready. It was the most powerful battleship then constructed. It was one of the five fast and powerful battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" type, and cost £3,000,000. Had our dreams of a great sea battle materialised there is no doubt that these ships would have played a very decisive part in turning the head of the enemy's line. In many other ways the Federated Malay States have voluntarily come to our aid. They have given us more assistance than any other part of the Colonial Empire has been able to do. At the present moment they are hard hit on account of the tin and rubber prices prevailing, but I am sure these conditions are temporary. The modern world cannot get on without these commodities. Then I mention the name of the great port of Singapore, that is a matter which the Conference will have brought before them on other days when we discuss Pacific strategy generally, but it will certainly bulk increasingly largely in all our minds as the years go by.

Malay States.

Status of Indian Settlers.

Now, I have only one other topic which I wish to refer to because I do not want to trespass too long on the attention of the Conference. It was raised by Mr. Srinivasa-Sastri this morning, the question of the Indian settlers in some of our Crown Colonies, and no doubt that problem also occurs in South Africa to a certain extent. I think there is only one ideal that the British Empire can set before itself in this regard, and that is that there should be no barrier of race, colour, or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station if he is fitted for it. At any rate I do not feel able to adopt any lesser statement of principle in regard to the Crown Colonies, but such a principle has to be very carefully and gradually applied because intense local feelings are excited, and there is no doubt that extraordinary social stresses arise when populations are intimately mingled in some of these new countries and brought into severe economic competition. The question reaches its most acute form in Kenya.

These matters are now being discussed and I hope to find a means of overcoming difficulties in the application of the broad principles.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Statement on the Crown Colonies, &c.

Tanganyika Territory.

There is one other point which I should mention, that is the Tanganyika territory which was acquired in the war. It was wrecked in the war; and we had to form an entirely new Administration over the whole place. We have endeavoured to equip it with a Government not inferior to the German Administration which it had replaced, with the result, in the present year, we shall have a considerable deficit on the Colony's administration, and I am very sorry to say that of the 1,500,000*l.* which I asked for, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was unable to afford to give me more than 914,000*l.*, and I am afraid that in a year or two the state of the Tanganyika territory will compare unfavourably with its progress and prosperity when it was in the hands of our late opponents. However, we will do the best we can.

I think, Prime Minister, although that is not by any means all I could say, because, frankly, I could go on all night talking of these places one by one—I think that gives the members of the Conference a view of that other enormous section of the British Empire, which, at any rate, ought to be present in our minds for the completeness of the discussion which is now in progress.

Mr. Lloyd George: Now Mr. Hughes, the first question affects you. We have got to decide whether we are going to send these transcripts to the press. I am strongly in favour of it myself.

Mr. Hughes: What?

Question of Publication.

Mr. Lloyd George: We are going to send a full verbatim report, subject to editing, to the press. They are very anxious to get it; they have made the necessary arrangements and I think it will have a very good effect. They want to know what is going on. They are keenly interested—what applies to this country will apply, no doubt, to the Dominions, to the Continent, and to America—and I think it will have a good educative effect throughout the whole world. We have had a very fine discussion and very, very, vital questions have been touched upon from different points of view, and I should have thought it would have been rather helpful to have had this material published throughout the world. You come here expressing your mind very freely, which is good—all to the good—but they will realise, you see, how we are dealing with the matters, and we have got these different points of view to take into account, and it is right that Japan and America and France should know—and the rest of the world should know—that we have got to take into account not merely the state of opinion here, but the state of opinion throughout the whole of the Empire. I should have thought on the whole that that would make it easier for our Foreign Office in dealing with these great problems, and I am strongly in favour of doing so, unless there is real objection to taking the responsibility of sending these reports to the press. Of course I will give Mr. Hughes an opportunity of going through his statement, or if he would give me authority, to cut out certain passages from his speech, which although quite necessary as a contribution to our discussions here, might be misunderstood, in fact, would be misunderstood outside, and if he does not mind my cutting those passages out in bulk. They are merely parts of his speech though they are sentences which I think might be regarded as not being helpful at the present stage if published outside—quite right to put them here, but if Mr. Hughes does not mind—

Mr. Hughes: No, no.

Mr. Lloyd George: If that is agreed, the press are waiting, and I should like to send off such material as is ready.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Does it matter if they are out of order?

Mr. Lloyd George: How long will it take you Mr. Hughes?

Mr. Hughes: About half an hour.

Mr. Lloyd George: If you do not mind, as we have got to go, I should like to say one word about the agenda which I suggest.

I suggest the Conference should meet in future as follows: This week I have already indicated Wednesday and Friday. 11·30 is suggested. It gives you time to go through the despatches and do the pressing work. Monday afternoon at 4·30. That enables you, if you like, to come up to town. Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 11·30, Thursdays at 4·30, Fridays at 11·30. I also suggest the following programme for the next few days.

Mr. Churchill: When you are meeting at 11·30 you will not meet at 4·30?

Future Agenda.

Mr. Lloyd George: The Conference can decide. I do not contemplate that at present we will, but the Conference can decide that. Then I suggest the following programme: Wednesday and Friday—Lord Curzon's statement on foreign affairs; Mr. Churchill's statement on mandates, with subsequent discussion. I think it will occupy the whole of those two days. Those are very important questions. The question of foreign affairs and the question of Palestine and Mesopotamia. On Monday I should suggest there should be a discussion on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. After the Japanese Alliance it is suggested to take naval, military and air defence, but I am very anxious to have a discussion on two other questions. One is the League of Nations. I think it ought to be discussed and if Mr. Balfour will kindly open that discussion on the League of Nations—he represents the British Government there—we can consider the day later on.

Now the relations with France. What I mean there is, there was a suggestion that we should give a guarantee to act jointly with the United States of America for the defence of France in the event of there being an aggressive attack. That agreement has fallen to the ground because the United States of America has not endorsed President Wilson's signature. I should like that discussed here, and more especially the moment this Conference is over there will be a meeting of the Supreme Council, and I should like to get the views of the whole Empire upon these and other problems before Lord Curzon and I go there. Those are the topics—there may be others.

There is also a question referred to by the Hon. Srinivasa-Sastri this morning which will have to be discussed. There is the question put to me also in the House of Commons yesterday relating to marriages. I have asked for a memorandum upon it. It is a small matter, but it is one of those which excite a good deal of attention at moments. I do not know what the point is, but I have promised to bring it to the notice of the Imperial Conference—I am not sure what it is.

Mr. Churchill: What about Egypt?

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes has indicated that he will want to raise the question of Egypt before we separate. That is a thing that might very well come up for discussion at the Conference.

Mr. Churchill: It affects the populations of the Dominions.

Mr. Lloyd George: It affects the Empire as a whole, and therefore we have that subject for discussion. The future Government of Egypt should be put down.

General Smuts: What is the most important question, the Japanese Alliance?

Mr. Lloyd George: The Japanese Alliance, of course. We have got to decide what we are going to do about it—that is an important thing. Mr. Massey pointed out here this morning that we are certainly more than a Conference, you see, because action will follow our discussion. Take the other, the relations with France—action will either follow or not follow upon our decision. For instance, it is a question whether we shall go to France and say, "Here, if you show a little more restraint in certain directions we are prepared to do this for you"—that is the point.

I have something to say about the League of Nations too. I am not sure you can continue the League of Nations with America definitely out of it, and as long as the Republican Party is in power, they will not come in.

If you want a League of Nations at all there must be something done.

Well, then comes the very important question which was mentioned this morning and to which I referred yesterday—the question of armaments. Whether we are to take any action about that or to leave the initiative to America—that is another very important point.

General Smuts: Is not that in one group of problems which might be dealt with together with the Japanese Treaty, America, the League of Nations? If we could make a pool of the set of problems you might come to a solution of all of them.

Mr. Lloyd George: You must have definite views upon each separately.

General Smuts: Yes, of course, we will come into the intricacies of those circumstances. But supposing some specific arrangements could be made with America which would deal both with Japan and America in regard to disarmament, and which involved the League of Nations, and that America were to agree to come in, then you would solve the whole set of problems at once. That is why we should

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Future Agenda.

have an early discussion on these Japanese, American and Pacific questions. It seems to me the most fruitful thing.

Mr. Lloyd George: We are putting it down for Monday—that is the first question.

General Smuts: If we could come to any measure of success there, it would go far to solving a whole lot of problems.

Mr. Lloyd George: Anybody who has got a suggestion to make can add it to the agenda if the meeting approves of this line.

Mr. Churchill: There are one or two minor topics which might be fitted in Emigration, for instance, is not a minor subject, but one which we need not discuss here.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should like to have a general discussion before you come to detail.

Mr. Churchill: I see.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is going to be a very vital matter. I am not at all sure our population is not something beyond what these islands can bear. The question is whether that population is going to emigrate to countries not under the flag or emigrate to countries under the flag.

The Hon. Srinivasa-Sastri: I would ask for the consideration of our subject as soon as possible. I do not wish it to come first, second or third until the very big problems are got out of the way.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, we will put that down. If you will allow us now, we have got to go to the Cabinet meeting. Oh! I am sorry, but Mr. Meighen wishes to say something.

Canadian Representative at Washington.

Mr. Meighen: Mr. Hughes, in addressing you, made a special reference to the course Canada had taken in providing for, although our intention has not yet been realised, a representative at Washington. Unless his remarks were based upon a misapprehension of Canada's action I am not able to understand them. We have not taken this course merely as an exhibition of our national pride or evidence of a new status, or to add to the gaiety of nations, or for any purpose of that kind, but merely for a very practical end in order to get our business done.

The relations between Canada and the United States of America have no parallel anywhere between any British Dominion and any other country. We have a 3,900-mile border line between us and them. Their trade with Canada is greater than their trade with the whole of South America, Central America and Australasia all put together. Canada is their second best customer in the world and it is not a very risky prophecy to say it will be the best. The consequence of these conditions has been that we have had to conduct negotiations continuously. We have had to do so with the machinery which has been in operation, and we have provided supplementary machinery. Our Ministers or officials have continually required to go down to Washington to conduct operations. We have had special treaties; all, of course, negotiated in the regular way. The business of the British Embassy at Washington before the war was, to the extent of over two-thirds, Canadian business, and now I do not doubt it will be a higher percentage than that and increasingly so as the years go on. Under such conditions it did not seem very revolutionary to suggest that a Canadian should especially represent Canada permanently at the American capital. We had no thought, and we never expressed a desire, that our representative there should represent any other Dominion of the Empire. It is true that in the correspondence that took place between the British Government and the Canadian Government provision was made that in absence on leave or in a hiatus between one Ambassador and another, the Canadian representative should act in lieu of the British Ambassador. That was originally the suggestion of the British Government, and it was quite acceptable to us, but we had and have no desire that it should be an essential factor in the arrangement. If there is any objection or reason why such a representative cannot be fully representative during those temporary periods, we certainly could have no objection to somebody else being appointed for that or for any other purpose. If Australia sees fit to send a representative to Washington, Canada would be the last to take exception, but I think it is only right

that Canada's motive and purpose in making provision for a representative there should be fully understood. That is all I have to say now.

Mr. Hughes: If Mr. Meighen wishes me to keep out of the report that part of my speech referring to Canada, I will do so, and then when the time is ripe the matter can come up again, and his statement of the case and mine can go out. That will be the fairest way, because as it is now it will be put in two sections, and it will not be a fair statement of the case for either party. Of course, I know I could not shift him, and I am quite sure he could not shift me, so there the position is. At any rate, we both start level. I should like that to be taken out.

Mr. Lloyd George: Does that meet your view, Mr. Meighen?

Mr. Meighen: Yes.

(The Meeting adjourned till 11·30 A.M. on the following day, Wednesday, June 22, 1921.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, June* 21, 1921.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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SECRET.

E. 4th Meeting.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1, ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Curzon will just make his statement.

Lord Curzon: Prime Minister, I think I will ask that publicity shall not be given to my statement in the press. There is much that I wish to say that could perfectly fairly be published. On the other hand, our colleagues from the Dominions have come here with a right to ask, and, as I understand, every intention of asking, that a full statement should be made to them as to the real facts and history of the foreign policy of the Empire since the time we last met at this table. Foreign affairs, although the papers are very active in their display and sometimes in their manufacture of information, are nevertheless rather a shut book to the world at large, and it seems only right that I should, to the best of my ability, open the pages of that book and show you everything, however intimate, that is written on them. Therefore I think it better that I should speak with the utmost confidence and that nothing should be published.

I am appalled at the magnitude of the task laid upon me; for I have, on the one hand, to sum up to you what has passed since the conclusion of the Peace Treaties at Paris and elsewhere during the past two years, and, on the other hand, the necessities of the case compel me to carry my survey almost all over the inhabited globe. At the same time I have, if possible, to observe perspective. The narrative of what has happened in each area, even in the circumference of small States, might easily occupy half an hour, or even an hour, in delivery. You must pardon me, therefore, if my perspective is not always quite right, and if at any point I fail to give you the information you desire, I hope you will not hesitate to ask me afterwards. I said that the survey which I have to make is world-wide in its extent, and anyone who has had acquaintance with foreign affairs will realise that no situation like this has ever arisen in the history of the world before. My own acquaintance with the Foreign Office here dates back to more than thirty years since I was Under-Secretary to Lord Salisbury. At that time peace prevailed over the greater part of the world's surface, and we were almost excited if here and there there was a patch—it might be the Soudan or Armenia or Crete—in which disturbed conditions prevailed. Now the whole world is still, although the war has ceased for two years, in a state of disturbance. As I sit in the Foreign Office and look out on the scene I am reminded of one of those lava-lakes with which some of you are familiar in the islands of the Pacific, where you observe a great liquid expanse—an uneasy movement trembling the surface, a seething and a bubbling going on; from time to time a violent explosion occurs; here the banks slip down into the mud and are engulfed, while there you see new landmarks emerge. That is a picture of what is going on all over the world at the present moment.

Before I pass on to the various areas in which you will be interested, I should like to say a word or two about the general principles that have guided our foreign policy during this time. I say quite frankly that our foreign policy has been marked by great caution and reserve. There has been no element of sensation or adventure about it, and I think if there had been we should rather have added to than diminished the perils with which we are surrounded. I dare say some of you have been reading lately two books which have attracted a great deal of attention in England. One, the concluding volumes of the "Life of Disraeli," by Buckle. The other, the recently published "Life of Queen Victoria," by a very clever writer, Lytton Strachey. In those books is depicted the foreign policy of this country as conducted by Lord Palmerston in the one case, and Lord Beaconsfield in the other.

You will find there a history of dazzling strokes of policy, of baffled rivals, of discomfited opponents; there is a perpetual shouting of challenges and waving of flags. There is no time or scope for this in our foreign policy. We have, as I read the lessons of the times, to keep what we have obtained, sometimes almost against our will, not to seize anything else; to reconcile, not to defy; to pacify, not to conquer.

Principles of British Foreign Policy at present.

What, then, are the general principles on which we are proceeding? I put aside the first as axiomatic, because it is the duty of every Ministry and Government—namely, to maintain British interests, British honour, British territory, British independence. The second principle was emphasised by the Prime Minister in his opening remarks of the day before yesterday—fidelity to treaties, and by treaties I do not mean all our outstanding engagements of remote periods, but more particularly the treaties concluded at the end of the war; that is an obligation of honour as well as expediency. It is quite true, as many of you know who were in Paris, that these treaties represented a compromise between the divergent views of different nationalities and even of individual men. It is quite true that they are marked by

many, and perhaps, conspicuous flaws. These are little by little being remedied. Some will drop out as they become obsolete or useless. Others will have to be rectified by arrangements and stipulations. But, broadly speaking, the basis upon which we stand is that, the treaties having been signed and having our names at the bottom of them, we treat them as an organic whole which is the basis of the constructive policy on which we are engaged.

General Review of Foreign Relations.

The second principle upon which we move was laid down in language upon which I cannot improve by General Smuts yesterday, and that is the re-establishment of the peace of the world. It is obvious that Europe has no chance of recovery unless the conditions of war and conflict are succeeded by conditions of peace. It is obvious also from the narrower point of view that British interests will best be secured and maintained by the recovery of peace.

But now I come to my third principle, with which I am afraid General Smuts will be in sharp disagreement. It is this; and I regard it as essential and would ask leave to lay stress on it for a few moments. The third principle is that the peace he desiderates can only in present conditions be secured by continued co-operation between the Great Powers, who won the war, and, who are now trying to gain the peace. You know who the Great Powers are. The combination between us was brought about under the pressure of the common danger of the war, and if that combination were now ruptured there is no small chance that the danger itself might revive. The papers are fond of deriding the meetings of the so-called Supreme Council. The Supreme Council is merely a name given to the Allied Conferences held from time to time of the representatives of the Four Great Powers to whom I referred. Believe me, it is no particular enjoyment to those who take part in these Conferences to have to attend them. They break up one's parliamentary and public life, and duties at home; they take one for indefinite periods to foreign countries; they involve long, complicated and sometimes vexatious discussions, but for the time being they are the only means of maintaining the peace of Europe and recovering the lost equilibrium of the world. And let me mention another consideration. This co-operation is all the more necessary because of the dispersal of armed forces which resulted in the first place from the almost too rapid demobilisation into which every country plunged at the conclusion of hostilities, and, secondly, from the lassitude of spirit which has very naturally prevailed in all the fighting countries since the war, and which has set up a definite reaction to the high tension that previously existed. And, secondly, it has been all the more necessary because of the defection, the temporary defection, of the United States. Of the signs of the return to the arena at no distant date of the United States I shall speak presently. And in this combination of powers, the continuation of which I have urged, we find that the combination is seen to depend, in the last resort, in the main, on the continued partnership of Great Britain and France. General Smuts argued yesterday in favour of a reversion to the policy—if I did not misunderstand him—of splendid isolation. He depicted to us Europe as exhausted by the struggle, as the scene of a number of petty squabbles between uninteresting peoples, as no longer of the first importance. He argued to us that we might let these wolves devour each other in their wild forests, while we ought to set sail for the oceans of the Far East and the Far West and build up something new there under the golden skies with which he is more familiar than we are. That is a picturesque account of what I understood to be his thesis.

He would not say that if he were inside the Foreign Office. He is for peace. But peace at this juncture cannot be secured by pious platitudes. It can only be secured by power and by authority, and the only State in a position to exercise that power and authority with great effect in Europe at this moment is Great Britain. It is impossible, I can assure him, to exaggerate the weight which a Great Power, disinterested as I hope in the main we are, and striving for the common end of peace, is capable of throwing into the balance. The influence of a powerful Empire like Great Britain at this moment is most potent for good or evil in the world, and if so, it ought to be used. To refrain from employing it would be not merely to abdicate our leadership, but to lose the direction of events and the power of restraint which it gives. Let me tell you in a sentence the kind of thing to which I refer. There can be no doubt that while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has lasted, whether we continue it or not, it has enabled us to exercise a very powerful controlling influence on the sometimes dangerous ambitions of Japan. At the present moment, I hesitate to think, and the Prime Minister will bear me out—what would happen in Europe if we were not here to maintain the control of affairs, to keep a hand upon

Need for the Empire to take part in European Politics.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

France. I might say a somewhat similar thing about Italy. And suppose you dissolve the Alliance and we all return to our primitive conditions, our pre-war conditions, believe me, it will not be a case of postponing the recovery of peace, it will be a case of the date of the resumption of war. A policy of splendid isolation is no longer possible, is not possible for a country like Britain, geographically situated as we are. We are a country, by virtue of our insular position in Europe and of our Imperial position abroad, with maritime approaches on every side, that make everyone our neighbour; our frontiers are the frontiers of every State, or almost every State, in the world. If you live in the same street or square with somebody in London, you need know nothing about him, you may pass him in the street without even knowing his name; your life is lived in complete isolation from him, because his abode is shut off from yours; he lives in his castle as you do in yours. But if you are a boy at school, at Eton, and live in the same house with 40 or 50 other boys, you know everything about them every hour of the day; you know their character, their lives, their history and their interests. You cannot separate yourself from them. You are moulded by them, and that is precisely the position in which we stand, as I venture to contend, in Europe and the world. Our position in Europe renders it impossible for us to sever ourselves from European politics. If we did so, whatever happened to others, we should sink in a few years to the insignificance of Spain or the impotence of Portugal.

Obstacles to Peace.

Now, in this effort to secure peace we have been hampered by several very unfortunate events or groups of events. To one of those I have alluded—the defection of America. The second has been the failure to conclude peace with Turkey, a failure for which America herself was largely responsible in the first place, but for which, I think, we must take some share of blame. I will come to that later on. The third obstacle to our progress has been the break up of Russia and the substitution for the old autocratic institutions with which we were familar in our youth and during the greater part of our lives, of a form of government utterly unlike anything seen in the world before, framed and carried out on principles which are a menace to civilisation, successful up to date, for reasons on which I need not enlarge at the present moment, but carrying in it the seeds of dissolution and decay, and leaving behind it a trail of misery rarely witnessed since the world began.

Not until we make up for the hindrances caused by the circumstances to which I have alluded will things settle down. Meanwhile, I shall not trouble you to-day by saying anything, unless you want me to, about those smaller areas in Europe where, in consequence of the conditions set up by the Peace Treaty, the smaller States, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, and so on, are, on the whole, justifying and establishing themselves. There, conditions of peace and stability, in spite of the economic difficulties, difficulties of exchange and others, are being restored, and I will pass for the moment from those relatively brighter skies to a rather more sombre picture.

I will turn in succession to the Great Powers with whom we have necessarily been brought into close relations, and will try, in a few sentences, to depict to you the situation in respect of each as I understand it to be.

Relations with France.

First, France. If my words were going to be published I could hardly speak to you about France as frankly as I wish, and think it right to do. I said just now that I thought the union between France and ourselves was the pivot of Continental peace. The difficulties are very great. There are differences inherent in the history, the mentality, the national character of the two peoples. Nothing will ever absolutely overcome those differences. You must have seen them when you were in Paris. We do our best from time to time, in moments of rapprochement to overlay them with considerations of expediency and the like; but at the bottom there is a certain fundamental difference for which we always have to allow. Another cause of weakness in our relations to France is the constant change of Ministries there. Since the war began the Prime Minister and I have, I should think, seen at least six or seven separate French Presidents du Conseil and Foreign Ministers sitting at this table or the tables at which we have met, and always the situation that arose has been complicated by the precarious parliamentary position of the Minister with whom we are dealing. He says: "You must not press me too strongly about this, my parliamentary position is at stake. I shall be turned out if you drive me too hard," and if the Minister is loyal and doing his best to work with you, you have to defer to those considerations. The third source of difficulty just at the present moment—it will pass away in time—is the composition of the present French Chambre des Députés. That Chamber, elected after the war under peculiar conditions, has returned a body of strongly aggressive chauvinists, who, I believe, are

General Review of Foreign Relations.

largely out of touch with the sentiments of the country, but make it very difficult for any Minister, and undoubtedly render our task of pacification in Europe, particularly with Germany, exceedingly difficult. The next difficulty that France has to face, and that we have to face also in our relations with France, is her extreme reluctance to impose upon her people taxation anything like that which it is our duty to enforce, and already has been placed on our people. She has had the almost inconceivable strain of war on her soil, almost within sight of her capital. She has had to ease the burden of her people, and her reluctance to tax France, as she ought to do, is really one of the main causes of her difficult and intransigeant attitude in the question of reparations from Germany. Then we must also, in fairness, remember this. The French view of the German problem is essentially different from our own. What is our attitude towards Germany? I take it we all feel much the same. During the war we were the object of her particular dislike. We cordially returned this feeling, and had every reason to do so, because of the abominable treatment we received at her hands. But we are the kind of people who, although fierce in conflict, are not lasting in resentment or bitter in revenge, and, when the war was over, more particularly when our signatures had been placed to the Peace Treaty and we had a German Ambassador back in London, I believe there was not one of us who was not quite content, to the best of his ability, to wipe out the past, to start again on a new basis, and gradually to build up relations which in time may be those of friendship in the future.

It is quite different in France—absolutely different in France. In the first place she suffered more than we did. She lost more men than we did. You, all of you, have been to the devastated areas and have seen the appalling sacrifice of material and prosperity which she had to endure and which is still before the eyes of her people. And lastly, there still remains, unaffected by the Treaty, the French apprehension of an open frontier on the east. Hence it is that France regards every delay in the disarmament of Germany as a deliberate act of bad faith in the first place, and as a prospective danger in the second. Hence it is that she snatches at every opportunity, and literally manufactures opportunities, for the military occupation of German territory across the Rhine, in order to safeguard herself from a renewal of this kind of peril. In the early days of last year, after some Communist disturbances in the region of the Ruhr, France actually, against our advice and only assisted by Belgium, perpetrated an entirely unauthorised occupation of Frankfort and four towns across the Rhine. Then more recently she persuaded us to agree to the occupation of three towns at the entrance of the Ruhr Valley—Düsseldorf, Ruhrort and Duisburg. There has never disappeared from her imagination the lure of the Ruhr Valley, and one of the objects for which we here, and especially the Prime Minister, have successfully struggled, has been to prevent her from carrying out this occupation of German territory which her military advisers have always had in view. The Ministers present will see at once what her object is—with Lorraine, the Saar Valley and the Ruhr in her occupation, she becomes the mistress of Europe in respect of coal, iron and steel, and with those countries under her military command she would also become the military monarch. Those quite frankly are the ambitions lurking, I will not say in the minds of the French Government, but of a large section of French opinion, with which we are confronted. Furthermore, this apprehension on behalf of France has very wide reactions, which extend to areas where you would hardly expect to come in contact with them. That is her real object in drawing up the mandates for Togoland and the Cameroons for the employment of black troops. It is owing to her apprehension of these dangers, that I have spoken of, that she wants to recruit her possibly depleted forces by the black battalions which she brought successfully into the late war. And the second area where you see the reaction of the same question is Silesia. It is a great industrial area, a great coal-producing country, and she is desperately alarmed lest this area, whatever the results of the plebiscite may be, should go to Germany. She wants to keep it for Poland, because in the first place it will be taken away from Germany, and, in the second place, because she regards Poland as a State owing its revival largely to her influence, more or less perpetually under her control, and, indeed, a certain military ally for herself in any future warfare in that part of the world.

Now you see, if my argument is at all a good one, how supremely necessary it is for us to maintain our Alliance with France in order to keep the check—the control—upon her which I have described. We are at the present moment, believe me, the only moderating influence in respect of France. We go about arm in arm with her, but with one of our hands on her collar, and if we relax that control I myself should be very much alarmed at the consequences that would ensue. I believe

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

that if we had not maintained this position during the past two years, often with great difficulty, but assisted by the good temper and good sense of the French Ministers whom we have met, we might have had another war in Europe by now, and if we were now to relax it, I doubt very much whether the peace of Europe would be maintained for another five years.

Relations with Germany.

I next pass to Germany. The Treaty of Versailles was signed in June 1919; it was ratified in January 1920. From that date until the other day, May 1921, when Germany finally yielded to our last joint ultimatum, there intervened a long period of difficulties, of procrastination, and of attempted evasion of the terms of the Treaty. How far that evasion was deliberate, or how far it arose from the circumstances of the case, I need not now pause to discuss. There was possibly something in both explanations. It is only fair to remember that Germany has had her own internal difficulties.

In the first place, there was the Communist upheaval in Bavaria in 1919 which caused the demand to keep those separate forces, the disbandment of which has been one of our main objects. Then there was the sham revolution of the extreme Right Party, commonly known as the Kapp "Putsch," in March 1920. Then there was another movement in the Ruhr Valley, which was held by the French to justify their advance in April 1920. The German Government has enjoyed a very precarious existence; it has thrown up no strong personalities. The men whom we have met at the Conference table, doing their best under difficult circumstances, I think the Prime Minister will agree, were second-rate sort of people, and there has certainly emerged no towering figure capable of drawing Germany out of the slough into which she has been plunged. There has been a good deal of social unrest in the country, but by now it is fair to say that on the whole the danger of revolution from either of the two extremes—either Bolshevik revolution on the one hand or militarist reaction on the other—is very much diminished, if it has not for the time being altogether disappeared.

Meanwhile, the German failure to execute the Treaty over these long months to which I referred has been the cause of constant dispute and of frequent meetings, sometimes between the Allies, and on other occasions between the Allies and the Germans. The questions at issue have been in the main these. The Prime Minister alluded in a sentence or two to two of them on the first day. The first was the punishment of the war criminals. I daresay those of you who were at Paris remember the high expectations that were entertained in that respect; we were going to lay our hands on all these criminals; we were going to haul them to the bar of justice; and we were going to convict them. We were right in principle, but we were foolish in expecting more than we could attain. When the time came to get the Kaiser, as provided for by the Treaty, he had retired to Holland. We had long communications with Holland, but I am disposed now to think that on the whole the Dutch Government rendered us a service by refusing him and keeping him there. He is, I believe, entirely innocuous, and whatever part may be played by a monarchical rising in the future, I doubt if the Kaiser will play a conspicuous part in it. As regards the war criminals, I think again we proceeded on wrong lines. The different Powers were asked to draw up lists of the Germans who were accused of especially revolting outrages against either the law of nations or the ordinary criminal law that prevails in civilised countries. They drew up these lists, which were preposterous in their numbers. Five or six hundred names appeared in them.

Mr. Chamberlain : More, I think.

Mr. Lloyd George : They included Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Lord Curzon : They did not merely include the men who could be convicted of wicked and outrageous acts, but they put in Field-Marshals and Admirals, and it was absurd to think that these would be tried. We reduced the list to the number of forty or fifty. The preliminary trials of a number of these, for which we were responsible, have taken place at Leipzig during the last few weeks. The guilt of the persons in the majority of the cases was absolutely established. Sentences were pronounced upon them, and I daresay these sentences appear according to our ideas, both of ethics and jurisprudence, to be ridiculously insufficient. But I am told by our Law Officers who were there that, in view of the state of the German law, which is different from our own, and the effect on public opinion, the result is very significant, and we ought by no means to be dissatisfied with what has happened.

The second question with regard to Germany was disarmament. The Prime Minister has already mentioned the considerable results that have been obtained.

But still there remained, until the other day, large irregular forces still existing in parts of Germany—particularly in Bavaria. Several of the fortresses had not been dismantled and big guns were maintained in them. The ultimatum of May has provided for the solution of that difficulty.

General Review of Foreign Relations.

Then there was the question of reparations about which Mr. Massey asked me yesterday and I agreed to circulate a paper. It was a very complicated question because there were three entirely separate issues that had to be resolved. First there was the total liability of Germany; secondly, there was her capacity to pay and the methods of payment; and thirdly, there were the shares in the payment which could fairly be claimed by the Allies.

All these matters have been the subject during the last one and a half years of almost innumerable conferences to which one looks back with a shudder almost of horror. To two of these conferences the Germans have been admitted. The first was at Spa in July 1920, and here the Prime Minister will allow me to say that he deserves exclusive credit for having for the first time pressed for, and secured, the appearance of the Germans at the table. I believe the French would have been ready to go on with the old system of declining to meet them and trying to settle the business by correspondence, which would have taken a decade. The whole situation changed when we got these people at the table before us, and when they saw themselves treated not only as human beings, but as equals. The whole temper changed from that moment. At the Conference at Spa to which I alluded, the Coal Agreement and a Disarmament Agreement were entered into and signed, but the question of reparations was left over until a later date. After a prolonged examination of this question the Germans were again invited to London in January of the present year, 1921. On this occasion, for reasons which none of us have ever been able to explain, the Germans conducted themselves with folly as great as the sound sense and discretion which they displayed at Spa. Accordingly the Conference was broken up, and the subsequent events you know. That Government has disappeared. The ultimatum drawn up in London has been accepted by Germany—in my judgment the greatest triumph of peaceful diplomacy that has occurred since the end of the war—and at the present moment you have in Germany a Government, weak, no doubt—it might fall next week—but at the same time honest, as I judge it, sincere, determined to carry out its obligations, its temper reflected in a report which I saw only yesterday of a speech delivered by the new Chancellor, Herr Wirth, in the Reichstag a day or two ago.

That is the situation as regards Germany, and our policy is frankly the re-establishment of Germany as a stable State in Europe. She is necessary, with her great population, with her natural resources, with her prodigious strength of character, which we realised even when we suffered from it during the war; and any idea of obliterating Germany from the comity of nations or treating her as an outcast is not only ridiculous but is insane. The policy we have set ourselves to has been to give her a chance of economic recovery—not entirely from an unselfish point of view, but because in her recovery is bound up the industrial future of ourselves as well as of other nations. That is, I think, quite candidly the position as regards Germany.

Silesia.

The German position has been affected, just as our relations with France have been affected, by the troublesome question of Silesia of which you have read a good deal during the last few weeks. Under the Treaty, as you will remember, the fate of this disputed territory of Upper Silesia, inhabited for the most part by Germans, but coveted by the Poles, backed up as they have been by the French, was to be decided by a plebiscite. The area was to be evacuated by the German troops who had previously occupied it and an Allied Commission of four officers was set up under the Treaty to administer the area, to conduct the plebiscite, and to determine the frontier at its close. The plebiscite took place in March. It resulted in a majority, greatly to the surprise of the French and the Poles, who expected to win, of over 6 to 4 in favour of Germany. But that did not settle the matter. In the first place there was, and there has been since a dispute as to what the actual terms of the Treaty affecting the plebiscite meant. I need not enter into that. Secondly, the Allied Commission to which I have referred, when drawing up its report about the frontier which it was to recommend to the Allied Powers, failed to come to an agreement and sent in two conflicting reports. Thirdly, early in May, the Polish Commissioner, a man named Korfanty, a very turbulent and dangerous character, organised and led across the Polish frontier into the disputed area an insurrectionary movement, backed by forces of between 60,000 and 100,000 armed men, fed undoubtedly with military supplies by Poland itself, and at every stage sympathised

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

with and tacitly if not openly encouraged by the French; these forces overspread the whole country, ravaged, pillaged, burnt, as they went along, practically put out of commission the authority of the Powers, whose troops were inadequate to the occasion, and were only brought sharply up when they came in contact with the German inhabitants of the western area, who organised themselves for the purposes of self-defence under a German officer named Hoeffer. In this position of affairs, the British Government, who had been compelled, when confronted with serious trouble in Ireland, to withdraw the four battalions we had sent there, resolved to run the risk at home, or at any rate to accept the sacrifice at home, of sending back six battalions. Those forces stabilised the situation. At the present moment we have a very competent Commissioner there, and one of the subjects I went to Paris to discuss was the question of Silesia. The plan is being adopted now of persuading both parties, the insurgents on the one hand and the German forces on the other, to withdraw by progressive stages. We are telegraphing to ask the Commission whether they are likely now to be able to give us an unanimous instead of a divided report, and presently, some time next month, we shall have another meeting of the Supreme Council when the Prime Minister and I will undoubtedly have one of the stiffest problems to solve that has yet occurred. There again, General Smuts, if we had not had our hand on the collar of France in the question of Silesia there would not have been the ghost of a chance of peace in Europe.

General Smuts: But France has had her way, has she not?

Lord Curzon: Far from it. All my narrative has been intended to show that we have succeeded in checking France, and the acceptance by Germany of the ultimatum the other day was a profound disappointment to France and was, I think, the greatest victory for British diplomacy achieved for years. That is the situation in regard to Silesia.

Poland.

You will also expect me to say a word or two about Poland. Poland has been a great puzzle and a great disappointment. When we drew up in this room on one occasion the objects for which we were fighting the war, the reappearance of Poland was one of them upon which we laid great stress. We wanted a new Poland both to repair the gross injuries of the past, to satisfy her historic claims and to build up a barrier on the east of Europe between Germany and revolutionary Russia. Our policy has been consistently devoted to carrying out that undertaking. On the other hand, Poland has made almost every mistake which it was possible for a State, a Government, or a group of politicians to make. Owing to her disintegration, which has lasted for centuries, she had no governing or administrative experience. She had no statesmen either of authority or power, and few of character or intelligence. She took up a most unreasonable attitude towards her neighbours. Instead of building up around her the loyalty and affection of the little States, the Baltic States, by which she is surrounded, she has done her best to estrange and offend them. As regards her boundaries her policy has been marked by a megalomania, which it is impossible too strongly to condemn. Not content with her own ethnographic frontiers, she has insisted at various stages on pushing out on adventurous marches into the east, into Russia. At one period she was over 300 miles beyond her ethnographical frontier, and one of the main difficulties the Prime Minister and I have had on all these occasions has been in curbing the dangerous ambitions of the Polish statesmen in this respect.

In November 1918, when the Germans, who during the war had been in occupation of the country, retired, there occurred a series of movements backwards and forwards between Polish armies and the armies of the Soviet Republic of Russia I need not follow the swaying fortunes of this conflict. Suffice it to say that at one moment the Poles had advanced this immense and as I think, inexcusable distance into the territories of Russia proper; at another moment the Bolsheviks, swinging back again on the tide of victory, found themselves at the gates of Warsaw, and the fate of Poland for the moment trembled in the balance. The Prime Minister will remember the attitude of the Polish Minister who bore the strangely appropriate name of Grabsky, at Spa, an attitude almost of humiliation, in which he threw himself at our feet and implored us to rescue his country from the errors its Government had committed. Peace negotiations went on and were at length completed in March of the present year. By "peace negotiations" I mean between the Soviet Government of Russia and the Poles. That is the present position. Our policy throughout has been to control the military and territorial ambitions of Poland. The French policy, I am sorry to say, has been to encourage them in every respect with a view to setting up a powerful alternative barrier for herself upon the east.

I think the Prime Minister mentioned Lithuania the other day in his speech.

General Review of Foreign Relations.

General Smuts: Yes, he just mentioned it.

Lithuania.

Lord Curzon: I only mention Lithuania in a sentence because it is an illustration of the unwise attitude on the part of Poland to which I have referred. Lithuania, as you know, is one of the small States immediately bordering Poland on the north, included in the group commonly known as the Baltic States. Prolonged disputes have occurred between Poland and Lithuania, Poland always suspecting Lithuania of a tendency to become Bolshevik or German, and therefore becoming a menace to herself, and always wanting to keep hold of Vilna, the natural political capital of Lithuania. Hence there has been a long period of squabble and conflict between the two, accentuated in October of last year by the military occupation of Vilna by the armed forces of the Polish general, Żeligowski, disowned by the Polish Government, but, as we know for a certainty, really sent out by them. The matter was referred to the League of Nations, where Mr. Balfour dealt with it. An attempt was made to hold a plebiscite there, which was not successful. It was then referred to a Conference under the presidency of M. Hymans, the late Prime Minister of Belgium, at Brussels. Whether the dispute will be settled or not it is difficult to say. Our policy as regards Lithuania, as it is towards Latvia and Esthonia, its neighbours, is to do all we can to secure the autonomous existence of these States, which, in my mind, I think is more likely to be secured by a federation between them than by any other means. I do not suppose any of us feel very happy as to the future, or as to what might happen with a resuscitated Russia inspired by militaristic or imperialistic ambitions; but, for the time being, these States, which are not Russian, of course, which have populations and an identity of character of their own, deserve all the encouragement that we and the League of Nations can give them; and that is the policy that we have pursued.

Russia.

Next you will expect me to say something about Russia. I alluded to this a little earlier as, perhaps, the most difficult of the problems with which we have been confronted. How far we have been successful in dealing with it, it is rather hard to say. The Soviet revolution, which brought the Bolshevik party into power, occurred in 1917, and they thereupon concluded the infamous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which you will remember. The British Government then drifted into a position which was easily explained by the circumstances of the hour, and was dictated by the obligations of loyalty and even of prudence, but which turned out in the long run to be false. We were afraid that the still undefeated German armies would penetrate into Siberia. We wanted to rescue the stranded Czecho-Slovakian forces to the number of many thousands who were still in Russia. We wanted to prevent the German invasion of Russia from the ports of the north, and we did not like to abandon those sections of the Russian community who had loyally adhered to the old alliance and regarded with abhorrence the revolution of the elements which had seized the government of the country, and who implored us to continue our co-operation and help.

It was in these circumstances that we found ourselves supporting, one after the other, a series of military movements which, whatever their hopes, all ended in failure. The first of those was the movement of Admiral Koltchak in Siberia—in many respects a fine officer, fighting well for a fine cause—but he failed. We never had helped with troops, but had helped in other ways, and we finally withdrew altogether from Siberia and Vladivostok.

Mr. Lloyd George: We had troops in Siberia.

Lord Curzon: I am wrong. We had troops, but ultimately we had to withdraw. Similarly, we withdrew from Murmansk and Archangel in the Arctic Ocean, and our last protégé, in whom my right honourable friend on my left took a special interest, was General Denikin.

Mr. Churchill: I place on record the fact that every commitment had been made before I became responsible. I tried to carry them out or give effect to them.

Lord Curzon: Well, accepting for the moment, for the purpose of argument, that the Cabinet were the guilty parties and Mr. Churchill the innocent man, we eventually had to withdraw our support from General Denikin. We spent a very great deal of money in sustaining his cause, but the fact was that, in practice, these generals, although they were gallant men, did not, as regards the policy they advocated or the administration they set up, differ very much from the Imperialists,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

who had been turned out by the revolution of the Bolsheviks, or from the Bolsheviks themselves. Anyhow, they never succeeded in carrying the people with them, and even when their armies advanced with a great show of victory they left behind them in the areas over which they marched a population discontented and likely to rise. The whole thing was a failure, and eventually we withdrew. That was between September 1919 and March 1920.

Then came the era in which the question of the Trade Agreement with Russia emerged upon the scene. Its first appearance was in Paris in January 1920, when the Supreme Council held a meeting and decided to open trade with the Co-operative Organisations in Russia for the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, machinery and the like, and the export therefrom to Europe of grain, flax, timber and so on. This was followed by a decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo in April 1920 to negotiate with the Russians to conclude an agreement of this description. M. Krassin, as the representative of the Russians, came to London in May 1920. The discussion with him and his superiors at Moscow lasted for many months, and were from time to time hindered and even interrupted, firstly, by the evidence that reached us from many quarters that the Soviets were conducting a dangerous and hostile propaganda against ourselves, both in this country and outside; secondly, by the difficulty of coming to terms with them about the release of the many British subjects who were kept as prisoners in Russia; and, thirdly, by the question as to the legal title of the Soviets to their trade assets.

The Government here at length laid down conditions under which they would be prepared to enter into a trade agreement. Then ensued the Polish crisis and the advance on Warsaw, which was attended by an act of disloyalty and bad faith on the part of the principal Russian representative, M. Kameneff, who was at the time in London. M. Kameneff was convicted, as the Prime Minister will remember, when he was in this room, although he denied it, not merely of having had various suspicious relations with Communistic parties in London, but of having passed on to them for the purpose of propaganda very large sums of money. I think it took the form of jewels which had been sent to him from Russia for the purpose. M. Kameneff returned to Russia, and was told that it was not desirable that he should reappear in this country, and for the time negotiations hung fire. Later on discussions were resumed, and the principal point of dispute then was the engagement which we demanded from the Russians in return for the trade agreement, that they would desist from hostile acts of propaganda against our interests in all parts of the world, and more especially on the borders of India and Afghanistan. Whether they will carry out that undertaking it is difficult to say. I think it is doubtful if they will, and we are watching closely the progress of their actions in this respect in all parts of the world. If you ask me to tell you what I think that the position of Russia is at the present moment, there is this extraordinary paradox about it. At every stage if you go to the authorities they will say to you: "The Soviet Government is on its last legs, it is on the eve of a complete breakdown." We used to hear that in a military sense. How far it is true it is very difficult to say. The recurrent prophecies of military and political disasters were falsified, because this deplorable Government has remained in power over 3½ years. On the other hand, the evidence tells of an economic exhaustion increasing every day, and I believe no more pitiable spectacle exists in the world than that which prevails in Russia at the moment. People in all parts of the country are starving, the means of transport are hopelessly disorganised and broken down, and anarchy is existing in all parts of that Empire. In the Ukraine at the present moment society is terrorised by undisciplined bandits.

Mr. Hughes: Have you anything to say about the effect upon rural production?

Lord Curzon: I have no figures with me at the moment.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is bad.

Mr. Hughes: Of course it all comes to that—if there is food they can go on.

Lord Curzon: I saw only the other day, Mr. Hughes, from evidence which reached me that there is being imported into Russia at this moment a large amount of food, salt herrings, &c., which are being hastily purchased abroad, and the inference we drew was that these articles of food, which are the natural products of Russia, are being hastily brought into the country because of the complete dislocation of transport, in order to save the workmen and the military powers from starvation, and also from the dangers of revolution.

General Review of Foreign Relations.

Mr. Lloyd George: I would like to say one word in answer to that. What I understood was, the great proprietors do most of the cultivation for export, and practically all the scientific cultivation, while the peasants only scratch up the soil to maintain themselves. Well, you see now the great proprietors have disappeared, and the peasants seized the land and have not cultivated it.

Lord Curzon: That is the reason.

Mr. Lloyd George: Therefore there is no food which is available for export, or for supplying Moscow or Petrograd.

Lord Curzon: The most significant thing that I have seen lately was a message which we happened to secure which came from Litvinoff, who, as you know, is one of their most formidable organisers. This is very confidential. There was talk of an American Senator whose name is France, who apparently has warm sympathies with Russia, and there was talk of Mr. France going to Russia. Special facilities were suggested to the Bolshevik authorities because of the favourable reports which he might be expected to give. But Litvinoff, in the message to which I have referred, refused on these grounds: "We are afraid that acquaintance with our complete collapse and abject poverty will not strengthen his sympathies with Soviet Russia." That was only last week.

As to the future of Russia I will refrain from speculating. I have no right to make a forecast. It is still the great mystery of Europe, the great dark cloud of the world, and what new forces are germinating behind it I do not know.

Mr. Hughes: What trade is actually going on between this country and Russia?

Lord Curzon: From such evidence as I have seen they have been trading a good deal in this country. They have ordered ploughs, locomotives and clothing.

Mr. Lloyd George: Flax is the only thing we are getting from them, chiefly through Esthonia, nothing direct.

Mr. Chamberlain: A little timber is also coming.

Mr. Meighen: Are there any restraints in the shipping of coal or specie of any kind?

Mr. Chamberlain: The arrangement was that they should send a test shipment of gold. That an action should be started here, and if the Courts decided in her favour, then it should go on to America, or they might send it for re-export so long as in this country it was in charge of the Bank of England. It is of no value in this country. It is of no value to us to have bullion unless we can use it to buy things in America. Therefore, for purposes of trade it was necessary to find out whether it was good tender here and also whether it was good tender in America.

Mr. Winston Churchill: The action has now gone to the House of Lords. It has been decided in favour of Russia.

Mr. Chamberlain: The Bank of England does not want to buy it. If it is good tender and it is tendered at the mint price, the Bank of England is obliged to take it, but the Russians do not want to part with it at the sterling legal price, they want the world price, otherwise they want to have it in dollars, unless it is of value in America it is not much good to them.

Greece.

Lord Curzon: There remain two points with which I should deal in a few words. The first is Greece and Turkey, the second is America. I am afraid I am very long, but to cover the whole world in the space of an hour is almost impossible. I will try, however, to cut my remarks as short as possible. This Conference, or Cabinet, or meeting, whichever it be, will want to hear something about the situation, the very troublesome situation, in the East. You will want to hear about the situation, more particularly in relation to Greece and Turkey. At the present moment the fortunes of Greece, both during and since the war, have revolved to a large extent round the remarkable personality of Veniselos. Veniselos, a Cretan by birth, but a man of great power and personality, had fought his way to the front at Athens, where he was Head of the Government, until he quarrelled irretrievably with the King, the King being an ally of Germany, and as hostile to us as he could be during the greater part of the war. Veniselos went off to organise Greek forces at Salonika, and ultimately returned to Athens. The King was forced to leave the country, and Veniselos then assumed power. When the war ended he devoted

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

himself with restless energy and ability to prosecuting the fortunes of his country. He was a man with great convictions as to the future of Greece, a profound and vigorous patriot, and he started going about from capital to capital, and attending Conference after Conference, to push the fortunes of his country. In May 1919, while the Conference was sitting in Paris, when the situation in Asia Minor was very difficult, the Greek forces, which at that time were in a state of great efficiency, were invited by the Supreme Council in Paris to occupy Smyrna. Whether, if that decision had to be taken again now, it would be taken, it is difficult to say. There were great excuses for it at the time, because the Italians, who had occupied the coast of Smyrna, were moving up towards it, and there was every reason on the part of the Supreme Council to believe that the Italians would have gone in. It was in those circumstances that the Greeks were asked to anticipate that action by occupation. That constituted a claim on the consideration of the Powers which has not ceased to exist up to the present moment, but in the consequences the appearance of the Greeks at Smyrna no doubt rendered much more difficult the reconciliation with Turkey and the question of the peace with Turkey ever since. While Veniselos was thus moving about from capital to capital fighting the battles of his country, he did not reck sufficiently as to what was happening at home. He felt bound to maintain throughout this period a strict censorship and martial law in Greece, and he declined to grant an amnesty to his political opponents. The King in exile, a born intriguer, was always in touch with his country. He never lost the influence with his Greek people which he had won in his second and victorious war with Turkey. Regarded as something like a national hero in exile, viewed with great pity and sympathy, he was all the while ceaselessly seeking to recover his ground against the absent Veniselos. Finally, when the elections took place, to the stupefaction of the world or the greater part of the world, Veniselos was hopelessly defeated and the King reappeared upon the scene. The situation was unfortunately complicated by the sudden death, owing to a bite by a monkey, of the King's son. He had been put upon the throne on his father's exile and flight from the country. Had that unfortunate incident not happened, very likely none of these events would have materialised. But King Alexander having died, the results of the election were so favourable to King Constantine that he started to recover his throne. The Powers, regarding him as an enemy prince, as he had been, and viewing his return with profound anxiety and suspicion, warned the Greek Government and the Greek people against this act. It was too late. He came back, and he has been upon the throne ever since. The Powers have had no official relations with him, and the French in particular, owing to the fact that during his reign at Athens during the war there was a conflict in which a number of French sailors were massacred on their way from the Piræus to Athens, they look on him with peculiar distrust and detestation. The fate of Greece then came under consideration in the Treaty of Sèvres, the first draft of which was drawn up here. It then went to San Remo, where it was accepted by the Powers, and was finally signed at Sèvres in the course of last summer—I think it was in August 1920. That was the position in Greece up till recently.

Turkey.

Now I turn to Turkey. I cannot say that I think our treatment of the Turkish question has been a diplomatic success. At the end of the war Turkey was, I believe, the most prostrate and feeble of all our enemies. She had lost, and deservedly lost, all her outlying provinces, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia, and so on. She knew that she could never recover them. Her military forces were exhausted. Her Government was in a state of panic. The Allies were in a position to occupy the capital. If, when the statesmen of the world went to Paris in January 1919, it had been possible for them to grapple at once with the Eastern problem, I believe they could have solved it without difficulty. It was not possible for them to do so. General Smuts will remember the long discussions raised by a project for which he was partly responsible—the League of Nations. That occupied a long time. Then the peace of Europe had to be re-established, and for one reason and another the East, which nobody seemed to care much about——

Mr. Lloyd George: And Wilson asked us not to.

Lord Curzon: Yes, there was the action of President Wilson, who led his colleagues to believe that America might take some action, might even possibly take a Mandate; and for all these reasons Turkey and the East were forgotten. Meanwhile the situation tended to get worse. What is it at the present moment? At Constantinople you have the Government of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, a Government anxious to make terms with us, willing to conclude—it of course signed

General Review of Foreign Relations.

the Treaty of Sèvres though as yet it has not ratified it—willing to conclude an arrangement if come to, but hopelessly weak, exercising authority over very little beyond the confines of the city itself, utterly destitute of resources. Meanwhile, in Angora in Asia Minor you have the rival Government, as it claims to be, of Mustapha Kemal. Mustapha Kemal was an officer originally sent out there by the Sultan himself in a position of importance in Asia Minor, a young man of between 30 and 40. He is an unscrupulous, powerful, intriguing sort of man of very bad personal character, but no doubt a formidable person when appealing to the national sentiments of his country, and of course that is the basis upon which the Angora movement has sprung into being. Angora represents the Sultan as being a helpless puppet in the hands of the Powers, and declares that theirs is the true fount of Turkish nationality. At one time the movement takes the form of pan-Islamism and an appeal to the religious sentiments of the Turks, at another time of pan-Turanianism and an appeal to ethnic unity. Anyhow, by one appeal or the other, Mustapha Kemal succeeded in building up a Government there. A national assembly was founded, Government institutions were started and that Government has persisted ever since in regarding itself as the real Government of the Turkish Empire. They have always appealed as the main source of their national unity to the duty of evicting the Greeks from Smyrna, and their position was greatly strengthened, in the first place by the retirement of the British force from the Caucasus, a subject into which I have no time to enter now, and secondly by the defeat of the French forces down in the south in Cilicia. By these means a body of national sentiment and a body of military strength were created by Mustapha Kemal, and this Government thought itself strong enough to refuse absolutely to accept the Treaty of Sèvres which had been signed by the Government at Constantinople. Since then an uneasy struggle, the actual details of which I will not go into, has proceeded between these two authorities, and at last in January of the present year we endeavoured to face the difficulties by inviting them both to London. A Conference ensued here in which these two authorities sitting side by side at the same table and observing an ostensible amity, nevertheless proved conclusively to us that the real force lay at Angora and not at Constantinople. We proposed various terms, the first of which, intended to bring about a peace between the Greeks and the Turks, was unsuccessful because it was refused by the Greeks. This was a proposal for an Allied Commission to go to Smyrna and another to Thrace in order to report to the Powers regarding the population of these areas. We then made another proposal offering to the Turks many substantial modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres in their interests, with a view to terminating this long dispute.

I ought to have said, but I had forgotten, that at any earlier date, before the Treaty of Sèvres was concluded, the vexed question was discussed here, and after much dispute was decided, as to the retention of the Turks in Constantinople itself. There was a strong party in the Government, of whom I was one, who thought that this question could only be solved by turning the Turks out of Europe—the difficulty, however, would have been to find some one to take their place—and build up a strong Turkish Government in the highlands of Anatolia. There was another party, affected by Indian sentiment—the views of India were expressed by Mr. Montagu with great force on the occasion—who were in favour of retaining the Turks in Constantinople. That party prevailed, and it was decided to leave the Turks in possession.

To refer again to the meetings here, the Turks went back with the revised terms which we had offered them from London, and since then their tone and temper have been worse, they have quarrelled with the French, quarrelled with the Italians, quarrelled with ourselves. Meanwhile, the Greeks resumed—I think somewhat unwisely—at any rate, without sufficient preparation, the offensive in Asia Minor and sustained an initial defeat. They are now, it is said, about to renew the conflict, the King is at Smyrna and is said to be confident of success. I went to Paris the other day with the instructions from this Government to see whether even at the last moment we could not reconcile these two parties and bring about a peace. I have not time to go to-day into the negotiations which I conducted with the French Government. They have so far taken this form, that an appeal has been addressed to the Greek Government to put themselves in the hands of the Allies, and should the Greeks listen to that appeal—which I hope they may, though I am not confident—we have clearly in our minds the terms which we would then propose, both to the Greeks and to the Turks, with a view to terminating the conflict. I doubt really whether it is to the interest of either party to continue it. If Greece were victorious now, I do not think she has the population, the strength, or the resources to maintain

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Relations.

permanently an advanced position in Asia Minor. Neither is it really to the interest of the Turks, to quarrel with the Allies, and, more particularly, with Great Britain. Deep seated in the Turkish mind is a sort of hereditary instinct that we have been their friends in the past, and that we are likely to be their most stable friends in the future, and perhaps at this moment the omens are more favourable than they have been at any time before for a composition. We have had, only in the last twenty-four hours, an indication that the Angora people are not unwilling to discuss matters with us, and therefore I hope that a little light may fall upon this dark and tragic scene, and that before many more months have passed we may emerge from this gloomy pass in which we have been struggling for so long, and may obtain an issue that is honourable to Greece on the one hand, and will relieve the outraged sentiment of our Moslem friends in India and throughout the East upon the other. I could give more details if required, but that is——

Mr. Lloyd George: You are going on to America now?

Lord Curzon: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have had a note from Mr. Meighen that he has to leave for luncheon with the Duke of Connaught. He is especially interested in that, and I am afraid we could not proceed in his absence, and therefore I suggest that we adjourn now. But this is the anniversary of the King's Accession, and those guns we heard being fired will have reminded us of that fact, and I think it would be rather a pleasant thing to send greetings on the Anniversary, greetings to the King and Queen. I suggest:—

> "The Prime Ministers of the Empire and the representatives of India, assembled in conference, send loyal and dutiful greetings to your Majesty and the Queen on the Anniversary of your Accession, and desire to express the earnest hope that your Majesties may long be spared to unite your peoples in a common bond of loyalty and devotion."

If I might send something of that sort in the name of this Conference, it would be rather a pleasant thing to do.

Mr. Massey: Quite right. There is another thing which has occurred to me, since you mention it. It is this, whether we should not take notice of the opening of the Ulster Parliament to-day.

Mr. Churchill: I would wait to see if you get through.

Mr. Massey: I do not think we have done the right thing in connection with the opening of the Ulster Parliament. I think some notice should already have been taken, and the question occurs to me whether it is not too late. It won't do to give the cold shoulder to a very large number of people who have stood loyally by the British Government in a time of difficulty, and who are likely to be a power in the future, so far as it is possible for us to judge.

Mr. Balfour: Do you think they will regard it as giving them the cold shoulder? I quite agree we must not, but will they interpret silence . . . .?

Mr. Massey: I am afraid so, personally.

(The Conference adjourned until 4·30 P.M.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, June* 22, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 5th Meeting.

2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Policy.

Lord Curzon: This morning I brought my survey to the conclusion of what I had to say about Turkey and Greece. I ought to have stated then, and I do now, that I purposely omitted to say anything about Egypt, the League of Nations, or the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For this reason, as I understand we are to have a discussion on each of these subjects on separate occasions, and therefore I did not want to add to the length of my own remarks or to anticipate what may have to be said then by even alluding to them to-day, I added this morning that there remained to be dealt with the subject of America, but when I got back I found that I had said nothing, and I think it would be improper if I did not have a few words to say about Italy and Austro-Hungary. These words shall be very short, but they are required to complete the gaps that I have left in my analysis this morning.

Italy.

In the case of Italy I will speak with precisely the same frankness as I did about Germany and France. We have found Italy to be a difficult and unstable Ally. She came reluctantly into the war; she made a very stiff bargain before she entered. At one stage she was on the brink of a great disaster which might have brought her and the Allies to the ground; she was mainly restored by the endeavours of the foreign forces of Britain and France. When the victory was won, although she has attained spoils incomparably greater than any one thought likely, or than even her own ambitions had covered at the beginning of the war, she has nevertheless persisted at every stage in regarding herself as ill-used and in complaining more particularly of ourselves for her bad fortune in not having done better in the war. The main trouble with Italy has arisen from the terms of the Treaty of London, which was concluded here in London in April 1915, and signed by Great Britain, France and Russia, with a view to bringing Italy into the war. We paid, in my judgment, too high a price. We offered Italy in that Treaty great advantages in Istria and Dalmatia, and we offered her, in a vague phrase which has been the source of much trouble. in the event of our beating Turkey, compensations in the East.

The settlement of Europe at the close of the war was held up, as you will remember, by the despicable incident of Fiume, that port which, after the Armistice, was occupied by Italian troops, having been seized and held for a period of something like sixteen months by the poetical swashbuckler d'Annunzio.

The serious thing was not the rodomontade or braggadocio of d'Annunzio himself, but the effect that this exercised firstly upon the morale of the Italian forces, both the army and still more the navy, and secondly the effect it had in retarding the conclusion of peace. I cannot say how many times during those sixteen months the Allied Conference met to discuss the question of Fiume, and how many hours of valuable time the Prime Minister, for instance, devoted to the object of finding a solution for that very difficult problem. Meanwhile, in Italy itself the internal conditions were difficult. There was an adverse exchange. Great Britain was unable to give financial assistance to Italy in her distress. We were bound to refuse to sell her coal and raw material below their world-market prices. All this added to our individual unpopularity, and we constantly heard that Italy itself was in the throes of revolution. I am bound to say, from my own experience at the Foreign Office—I give this as a tip to my colleagues here—that there are two countries in Europe which are always said to be on the brink of revolution, but where my experience leads me to the conviction that it will never come off. One is Italy and the other is Spain; and I have come to the conclusion that it is in the old stolid, steady countries where such things are not suspected, that you are often nearer to the edge of revolution than you are in these Latin communities, where the institutions themselves have survived many revolutions and are really very stable. However, this is an *obiter dictum* which I give you for what it is worth.

The Adriatic question was ultimately settled by the Treaty of Rapallo, which was concluded by the present Foreign Minister of Italy with the State of Jugo-Slavia in November 1920. Fiume was constituted an independent State. Italy surrendered her ambitions as regards Dalmatia, and she retained in Istria and elsewhere a very ample reward for her own sacrifices and exertions. Therefore there is for the moment peace in that part of the world. Our relations with Italy have been rendered anxious at times, firstly, by her great capacity for intrigue, particularly in the East, and by her ambitions to obtain in Asia Minor and elsewhere an economic outlet which she requires to make up for the depletion of her own internal resources. Coal, oil and other products of Asia Minor are what she wants. There would be no particular harm in this policy were it not that Italy mediates behind our backs and concludes secret agreements, against which we afterwards have to protest, and which leave a rather disagreeable impression on our minds.

General Review of Foreign Policy.

Further, Italy is strongly anti-Veniselist, because her position in the Mediterranean renders her incurably suspicious of dreams of a greater Greece. On the other hand, while I say what I have said in a disparaging sense, it is only fair to remark that, at the Conferences in which we have taken part, the policy of Italy in respect of Germany and the pacification of Europe has been much closer to our own than it has been to that of France. On many occasions she has given us useful assistance, but it is an assistance upon which we can never very definitely rely, partly owing to the character of her people and partly to the apparent inability of her present Foreign Minister to take a strong line.

Austro-Hungary.

Now a word about Austro-Hungary before I pass on to America. Peace with Austria was embodied in the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which was signed in September 1919 and was finally ratified by the Powers in July 1920. The fate of Austria as she was left by the war and by these Treaties is unquestionably pathetic. Here you had a great, although a very heterogeneous Empire, thinly held together by a sort of historic tradition and by the personality of the late Emperor—who died, as you remember, in the early days of the war—irretrievably shattered by the consequences of the war, by its own follies and by the fissiparous tendencies inherent in the structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. You are faced at the end of the war with this position. You have a reduced territory, scarcely the size of a Kingdom, surrounded by jealous, suspicious and hostile States, each of whom has now gained or recovered its freedom and is by no means anxious to do anything handsome by Austria; and then in the centre of this diminished area you have a vast capital, Vienna, with 2 millions of people, created and organised to be the centre of an immense and flourishing Empire, lying there helpless and hopeless, destitute, impoverished, a pitiable spectacle of despair. These are the circumstances in which Austria has almost continuously been hammering at the doors of Europe ever since for relief in her distress. She suffered from a painful lack of food and fuel, financial chaos has reigned supreme, and there has been complete economic disorder in every branch of public life. Mr. Chamberlain reminds me, and, indeed, I was just going to say it, that we have shown a much greater readiness to help Austria in her troubles than any of our Allies, and up to the end of 1920 we had contributed no less than 10 millions—he said 12 millions, but I think it is 10 millions—towards her relief. Meanwhile, the Vienna section of the Reparation Commission—I may say in passing that there is not the slightest chance of getting any reparations from Austria; any prospect of that we have had to wipe off the slate—submitted a scheme to the Allied Powers which practically meant the Powers taking over the financial reconstitution and management of Austria. There was to be a great credit of hundreds of millions and plans on a very large and ambitious scale, which, when they were submitted to the Conference at Paris, attracted very little general support. In substitution for them, a scheme was prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations, called the Termeulen Scheme, from the name of its author, which was a scheme for giving credits to Austria against the gold value of the Austrian assets. We and our Allies have abandoned for a period our liens on these State assets of Austria, and in this scheme lingers some hope of giving help to Austria, although not, I fear, very great, because our assent, which has been willingly given, has not been followed by a similar eagerness on the part of some of the other Powers concerned.

In these circumstances it is not very surprising that a movement should have grown up, and indeed is proceeding rather rapidly at this moment, for union with Germany. This was foreshadowed at the time of the Peace Treaties, and conditions were put into the Treaties, as you will remember, absolutely prohibiting such a junction, which would be a revival of the menace to Europe, to bring which to an end the war was fought. This movement in Austria is known as the Anschluss. It is proceeding in this way. Parts of the still surviving Austrian Empire are holding plebiscites on their own account in order to indicate what are their own wishes as to their future. Two such plebiscites have been held, one in Salzburg and one in the Tyrol, each resulting in an overwhelming majority for union with Germany. Next month, in July, there is to be an all-round plebiscite of the Austrian populations on the same subject, and I must tell you that supposing the result to be, as it will very likely be, a pronouncement by a very large majority in favour of union with Germany, a very serious situation will arise. It will be serious for more reasons than one. I have indicated the main reason why the Allied Powers in general could not accept it, but there is another reason, and that is, the moment this union with Germany is proclaimed, and still more if an attempt is made to act upon it, you

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Policy.

may be quite certain that all the States round Austria, of which I have spoken and who are now gaining in stature and strength, instead of accepting any such situation, will sweep across the borders and snatch still further spoils, and it is by no means unlikely that in such a situation you may have that part of Europe at war again, and the very conditions which we spent such enormous sums of money and such untold treasure of lives to escape from may be reproduced. Therefore, the situation of Austria is one of undoubted anxiety. A new Government of Austria has been formed, yesterday or to-day, headed by a man of probity who means to do his best. I think the Powers must continue to give Austria sympathetic assistance, but for the rest I do not know that we can exercise any particular influence ourselves.

Mr. Hughes: What is the attitude of France, or what would you imagine her attitude to be on this?

Lord Curzon: France is intensely hostile to the idea of any union of Austria and Germany, so much so that in her anxiety to escape any financial responsibility, at the first breath of a plebiscite she came to me and said: "I want you to join with me in refusing financial credits until this peril is overpast." The Austrian Government was doing its best at the time to stop this movement and I thought it cruel and unjust to join with France, but at any rate that mere act is a sufficient answer to you, Mr. Hughes, as to her attitude about it.

Hungary.

Now a word about Hungary. Hungary had declared her independence before the war came to an end in October 1918. She passed, as many of those States did, through a very turbulent and troubled time immediately after the cessation of the war. The situation was complicated by the appearance on the scene of a Transylvanian Jew named Bela Kun, who was let loose from Russia, descended upon Budapest, succeeded in organising there a species of Soviet Government, and in a very short time reduced the country to absolute disorder. The Roumanians, in pursuit of their Transylvanian ambitions, advanced into the country, Bela Kun disappeared, the Roumanians occupied Budapest, and it was with very great difficulty, and by the exercise of no small pressure, that the Allied Powers succeeded in getting Roumania to withdraw. Since that date a succession of Governments has been seen in Hungary, of which the latest is perhaps the most respectable, and is presided over by a sailor, Admiral Horthy, at Budapest, who has been in power now since March, 1920. He seems to be holding his own and to be anxious to do his best, but I will not conceal from you that in Hungary there are old aristocratic traditions, with which you are familiar, and a strong sentiment in favour of monarchy. I do not doubt myself that in two or three years time there may be a monarchy again in Hungary and possibly a return of the old dynasty. It is in the latter respect that the danger lies. Not only are the Great Allied Powers resolved firmly not to allow any member of that disastrous and fatal dynasty again to exercise a real influence in Central and Southern Europe, but none of the surrounding States will tolerate the idea for a moment. You may have read in the newspapers a little while ago of the attempt of the ex-Emperor Karl, living in retirement in Switzerland, to make a dash for the Hungarian throne; it was a ludicrous and stupid performance, indicating the calibre of the man who made it. It resulted in ignominious failure on his part; the Hungarian Government under Admiral Horthy played their part well and Karl was bustled out of the country almost as quickly as he came. But he is still residing in Switzerland and is capable at any time of repeating the attempt, so that his presence is a source of anxiety. At the present time I am engaged in trying to persuade every country in Europe to take him in. I have unhesitatingly declined him in this country to which he is anxious to come. At present I am trying to persuade the King of Spain to accept him; if any Dominion representative here has an unoccupied castle in which he would like to keep an ex-Emperor—most of all perhaps in the sunny islands of the Pacific about which I spoke this morning—I am sure we should be glad to hand him over.

Mr. Massey: We do not want him.

United States.

Lord Curzon: Now I come to my concluding paragraph, about the United States of America. My colleagues know very well, and therefore I need not repeat, the very tragic history of President Wilson at Paris, an explanation of a great deal that has since happened and of the long delays in settlement which have occurred. When President Wilson went back from Paris he found at once an estranged and hostile Senate who looked with great repugnance upon the Treaty to which he invited their assent. He entered, as you will recollect, upon a vigorous personal campaign in defence of the Treaty which he had done so much to shape,

and presently he broke down irretrievably in health and practically disappeared into private life. The Senate declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. A complete breach occurred between the American Senate and the Washington Administration. The President was an invalid in his sick chamber, incapable of transacting business, unseen by anybody, but from time to time exercising a sudden and usually ill-judged interference in public affairs.

General Review of Foreign Policy.

Official relations with the American Government almost ceased to exist, and for ten months we practically did no business with America at all. There was this advantage that we avoided all disputes with her, but undoubtedly it was a source of procrastination in Europe that this great country, which had shared in our sacrifices and helped to win our victory, became, by the foolish policy of her own President, nervous, useless and impotent at the critical period after the war was stopped. Little by little America in these conditions withdrew from the various Councils all representatives, and before President Wilson went out of office, not one of them was left. Meanwhile, the only activity in respect of European affairs which the American Government showed from time to time, by despatch or otherwise, was an interest in the settlement of certain questions in which she was very strongly concerned. The oil of Mesopotamia, the allocation of the submarine cables seized by the Allied Powers, and the island of Yap. At length in March 1921, President Harding came into office, and here it is quite clear to me from information that we possess, as well as from his representative, that America is now entering upon a new and definite course of policy towards European affairs, and towards this country in particular. The new Government has stated in language that cannot be mistaken—it was indeed emphasised in his opening address by the new American Ambassador here—that she will take no part in the League of Nations, no part of any kind at all, although she hopes for an International Association intended to promote peace. What she has in view has not yet been explained, but antagonism to the League of Nations in its present form is undoubted and has to be reckoned with. Secondly, she now proposes to make peace herself with Germany by a Declaration of Congress, and what we shall probably find before long is this: that she will ratify the Versailles Treaty with many reservations in her own interest. President Harding has further stated that while he does not wish to be entangled in the affairs of Europe, yet he is willing to join all nations for the purpose of conference and counsel.

Acting upon these hints, at a recent meeting of the Supreme Council we extended an invitation to the new President to rejoin the bodies to which I referred. This was accepted, and henceforth we shall find again an American at the table of the Supreme Council, of the Reparation Commission, and of the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris. What degree of authority the American representative will be allowed to exercise I cannot at present say. I think the Dominions will agree with me in thinking it a right policy to encourage this participation in every possible way. America is coming back voluntarily. Let us meet her with open arms; her participation will not only be valuable, it will also be a help in the reconstruction of the world, and nothing will be wanting on the part of the Foreign Office to promote and encourage it in every way.

A word or two has been said about—but I am not going to touch upon—naval armaments. America is proceeding upon the execution of a great naval programme, designed in 1916, and intended to provide her, when it was carried out, with the most powerful fleet that the world has known. The Senate has adopted an amendment authorising the President to take up the question of disarmament with Great Britain and Japan. No proposals have yet been received by us in that connection. The American Ambassador has not even mentioned the matter to me, but there seems good reason to believe that before taking official action the American Government desires to have a private conversation with the principal Allied Powers. I think it was Mr. Hughes, or some other speaker yesterday, who suggested that this Conference might perhaps take the initiative itself. Well, that is a suggestion worthy of consideration, but, on the other hand, if we find it a better method of procedure, instead of extending a formal invitation ourselves to America, to enter upon this private and confidential discussion which President Harding, I believe, is willing to undertake, that may be the best way of commencing negotiations.

Mr. Hughes: It ought to precede anything.

Lord Curzon: Yes. There remain one or two other questions in which America is chiefly concerned and which we shall presently be discussing with her. The Anglo-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Review of Foreign Policy.

Japanese Alliance, which we shall take here another day, and the question of the Allied debts to America, about which she has taken a very stiff, and I cannot help saying, a rather ungenerous line in her claims, and, in the background—the eternal Irish question.

The general situation, therefore, as regards America is this. President Harding is, I believe, bent upon rebuilding the close friendship and co-operation between his country and ourselves. He holds, and I respectfully share his belief, that these two countries acting loyally together, have the power to bring order again into a stricken world; and both our national interests and our sense of moral responsibility point in the direction of extending the most friendly welcome to his advances when they are made.

My own belief is that in the troubles and turmoils of the east, if we can look to the west and re-establish excellent relations with America, we shall see a dawning of light in the sky which is so overcast in almost every other quarter of the globe.

Mr. Lloyd George: We will hear Mr. Churchill now.

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Mr. Churchill: Prime Minister, the field to which you have asked me to direct the attention of the Conference is very small compared to the almost world-wide sphere with which the Foreign Secretary has dealt, but the sombre panorama which he has painted finds its counterpart on a small scale in the Middle East. The members of the Conference who were concerned in the waging of the war will not need to be reminded of how it is we are in possession of Palestine and Mesopotamia and what our relations with the Arab races have been, but I must take as my starting point the fact that we availed ourselves in the crisis of the war of the age-long antagonism which existed between the Arab and the Turk, and the Turk having taken the side of Germany, we did our utmost to rouse the Arabs to assert themselves and claim their rights. In this we were successful and the King of the Hedjaz, King Hussein, erected the Arab Standard in 1916, summoned the Arab chiefs around him, and drew the sword against the Turk. A very brilliant young Englishman, Colonel Lawrence, played a vital part as an intermediary in all these critical negotiations. Thenceforward, as we gradually repulsed the Turkish advance upon the canal and drove them into the Southern portion of Palestine, the Arab army, advancing from Mecca and into the desert far to the eastward of the Hedjaz railway, became an important element upon our flank and assisted Allenby's advance throughout 1917 and 1918. The Arab army, with its cavalry and camelry, riding far and fast into the desert, tearing up the railway line behind the Turks and affecting their communications, played what is undoubtedly an important part—I will not say a decisive part—but an important part in all the brilliant series of operations which hurled the Turk from the Holy Land. The French had a small force with us, and it would have been a larger one no doubt but for the fact that they were concentrating on facing the main shock of the enemy's attack in Europe; but in the main it was a British-Indian-Arab army that conquered Palestine and Syria and liberated them from the Turk. At the same time, our armies—the British and Indian armies—with good and evil fortune alternating, but with perseverence, irresistibly drove their way forward in Mesopotamia, up the Tigris and eventually, at the same time that the Turkish army in Palestine was annihilated, that in Mesopotamia was dispersed, and so we got practically complete possession of both these ancient lands.

Arab assistance during the War.

Then came the period of the peace. While fighting was going on, we had made various pledges to the chief races into whose territories we came, and when we advanced into Arab and Turkish territory, we promised the populations that we would not allow them to be put back again under the yoke of the Turk.

In addition we held out to the Arabs high hopes of the reconstruction of the Arab race with a chance to revive again the old Arab culture and national spirit. We also promised the Zionist Jews that they should have a national home in Palestine, and, of course, we have always subscribed to the doctrine that we extend representative institutions to the countries of which we become possessed, and endeavour to guide them rather than to govern them by arbitrary or military force. Such are the circumstances which led us to the acquisition of mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia at the Peace. But since then things have gone ill, very ill indeed, and I could not be sure that I should be right if I predicted with any confidence a happy outcome. I am not without hopes, but I do not feel that a happy outcome can in any way be guaranteed. The first thing that went wrong was the quarrel between the French and the Arabs. In any agreements between the French Government and the British Government, in the negotiations conducted by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau, particular stress was always laid, I think I am right in saying, by

Differences between the French and the Arabs.

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

the Prime Minister on the retention by the Arabs of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, those eastern cities of Syria. Emir Feisal, at the head of the Arab armies, having entered into Damascus and set up a Government, behaving with a certain amount of unwisdom, and pushed on by extremely extravagant Arab Nationalist aspirations, evidently contemplated the erection of a complete Arab State under the protection of Britain over the whole of Syria, and of a similar State in Mesopotamia. A disagreement broke out between Emir Feisal and the French, with many fierce protests and complaints urged by the French against him, accordingly at a certain stage, the French being involved in Cilicia and in fighting with the Turks, General Gouraud marched an army against Damascus, routed the Arabs, seized the city, and is now in occupation of the four towns I have mentioned as well as the whole of Syria. The operations had been conducted very largely by black African troops, and it was extremely painful to British opinion, and to British officers particularly who had served with the Arabs, to see those who had been our comrades such a little time before and our Allies, and who looked to us for protection and to see their wrongs righted, to look on while they were thrashed and trampled down and their cities taken against the spirit of the treaties, if not against the letter, by the French; and that has been a deep source of pain to politicians and to the military men who have been concerned. However, we have these strong ties with the French and they have to prevail, and we were not able to do anything to help the Arabs in the matter, but it has unsettled the whole of the Arab world, and for a time they mingled us in their resentment with the French. At the same time the Turkish situation degenerated. Turkey was at our mercy when the Armistice was signed, but owing to the delay imposed by the vacillations of President Wilson and the absolute hiatus in American Government which ensued, shattering all the hopes we had that they would intervene and take some of the burden of reconstructing the Middle East, the Turks had developed again their strength, a feeble strength it is true, but a remote strength, an un-get-at-able strength, and one which makes its manifestations felt in the Mahommedan world, which carries its repercussions as far as Afghanistan, Persia and India, as the Secretary of State for India and the representatives of India will have an opportunity of testifying at a later stage. So it happened that we became the nation most embroiled with the Turks, at the same time that the French became the nation most embroiled with the Arabs. No one has found it possible to make any satisfactory arrangements with the Bolsheviks, and owing to the fall of M. Veniselos, the Greeks have adopted the pro-German Constantine as their King. Thus the Allies for one cause and another found themselves at enmity or at any rate not in friendship with the Four Powers who exert influence in the Middle East. At the same time our military forces have had to be gradually demobilised and the expense of every kind of service has been rising steadily, particularly, as you may imagine, service in these extremely hot and distant countries. The expense of the occupation of Palestine and Mesopotamia began to be enormous, and although we have been continuously reducing our troops there and consequently reducing the expense from year to year since the fighting stopped, it certainly cost us nearly £40,000,000 last year to maintain our garrisons in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and it is costing us £34,000,000, reduced by recent changes to £27,500,000, to maintain ourselves there this year. You may have noticed since your arrival in this country that there is a certain amount of criticism about the expenditure of money, and that people are evincing more and more a reluctance to continue to be taxed at the present rate. A great deal of the unpopularity due to high taxation and to the idea that the Government is unduly profuse is concentrated upon our position in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and not altogether without reason; and from the tenor of my remarks yesterday in speaking of the Crown Colonies, you will perhaps see that I am one of those who share the great regret that this enormous expenditure has been wrung from us in regard to Palestine and Mesopotamia, when the money would produce such enormously better results if it, or even a portion of it, could be applied to the development of our tropical colonies. Palestine and Mesopotamia are arid countries, where with great difficulties in irrigation you will get a crop, whereas in Africa we have dripping countries, bursting with exuberant vegetation, where your struggle is to keep the jungle from devouring you with its enormous energy of reproduction. In the Middle East the population is of a most difficult and intractable kind; proud, impecunious chiefs, peppery politicians, bitter, hot-headed theologians, who are a large proportion of the ordinary members of the population, in fact, almost constitute the entire population, and all, unhappily, extremely well armed. In the circumstances it is not

General Deterioration of the Situation in the Middle East.

High Cost of the Middle East.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

surprising that we had last year a serious rebellion in Mesopotamia. The whole of the Euphrates rose, and other parts of the country. We had to bring back two divisions from India which had already left and were in process of demobilisation, and to concentrate considerable air forces there. However, after a great deal of marching and fighting, which cost us perhaps twelve hundred to fourteen hundred casualties and wrought very great havoc upon the tribes with whom we were in contact, the rebellion was quelled. At the same time the Government revised their view as to the kind of administration which should be set up in Mesopotamia. At the outset the idea had been to give a good efficient administration of the kind which you see in the settled districts, the highest class districts of India, and a very able man, Sir A. T. Wilson, was in charge of the country; but we found this was too expensive, and also there is no doubt that these turbulent people are apt to get extremely bored if they are subjected to a higher form of justice and more efficient administration than those to which they have for centuries been accustomed. At any rate, we have reverted perforce and by the teaching of experience to more primitive methods.

Present Administration in Mesopotamia.

Mr. Chamberlain: It was our earlier idea.

Mr. Churchill: It was a desire for efficiency. We reverted to our earlier idea, and proclaimed last June our intention to set up an Arab Government with an Arab ruler and an elective assembly and an Arab army. The next question was, who should be the ruler? We had a good deal of trouble about that because of the French, the quarrel which the French had had with Emir Feisal which I have just described at Damascus, and there is also a great division of policy between the French and the British. The French idea is that Arab independence is pernicious and is bound to work detrimentally to Europeans of all kinds wherever it manifests itself. They say it easily turns itself into mere xenophobia; that though they are friendly to the English so long as the English are favouring the national spirit, as soon as they have got powerful they will turn against us as they have against the French, and that we are only raising up a Frankenstein's menace in this Arab Independence which we will live bitterly to repent some day, and they say the more sensible policy and one which derives its origin from classical times is *divide et impera*, to split them up into small parties and do nothing to foster the national idea. They say that such a policy will be attended with greater success. It is what they have done themselves. They have put up a little Government at Damascus, another at Aleppo, another at Beyrout, and two others in the hills of Syria, all small Administrations manned by the local people under direction of French officers, and they avoid anything which can be said to lead to any recognition of the general principle of the Arabs as a race. We do not take that view. We decided definitely that there is no reason why the Arabs should not have a chance. Whether they will succeed in fulfilling all the hopes that are based upon their character cannot be said, but we feel it inherent in our position that they should have a fair chance of showing whether they are capable of carrying on extensive national States and of reviving their own glories and culture, and if that is to happen there is only one structure in the Arab nation according to the advice I have received—I do not pretend to be an expert, but we have good experts at our disposal—there is only one structure I am advised which has within itself the capacity of acting as a basis for such reconstruction.

Mr. Montagu: Is Colonel Lawrence working with you.

Mr. Churchill: He is. I am very glad to have been able to get him to submit to the bridle of official duties which he has always been reluctant to do. This structure is the Shereefian family. The King of the Hedjaz, has four able sons of whom the best known are Feisal and Abdulla. The Shereefs have a remarkable history in that they are neither obnoxious to the Shias nor to the Sunnis, they claim to spring from Islam before the lamentable split between the Shias and the Sunnis and the murder of Hussein, and they have family and traditional connections on both sides. In addition to that they are a cultured, polished class of people, a civilised people, a very able, intelligent, agreeable people. They have fought with us in the war, they are very strongly impressed with the idea that England is their friend and the friend of the Arab race. At any rate we decided we would build upon that and try to erect at the earliest possible moment an Arab Government in Mesopotamia, and leave them with their Arab army, with a certain amount of support and assistance from us, to bear the brunt of the defence of Mesopotamia both from Bolshevik and Turkish intrigue, and the maintenance of internal order. Having that in our minds we decided to set up this Government at the earliest stage. I am greatly indebted to the Foreign Secretary for the clearness and combative energy

Emir Feisal.

with which he dealt with the French on the subject of Emir Feisal, and the arguments which he used left the Ambassador silent in the end, and I am glad to say that that silence has not been broken, I understand, in the visit which Lord Curzon has recently paid to Paris. Although I have now announced practically that we are backing the Emir Feisal in his candidature for the throne of Mesopotamia, the French did not raise it in any controversial manner. That I think is very satisfactory, though of course they do not like it. I may say that I have been at pains to assure the French, so far as I have come in contact with them, that we have no intention of using the Arabs as a means of prejudicing their interests, and I have told the Arab leaders that they must clearly understand that if we had to choose between them and the French, sorry as we should be to do it, we should be with the French against them, and I hope that a loyal spirit on our part will continue to mitigate the dislike which the French have for this Arab policy. We must have some friends, we cannot possibly carry on in these countries with a dwindling military force at an enormous expense, and no friends of any sort or kind. You must pick some out of the scrimmage and have them on your side.

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Mr. Hughes: Are they people who turn on their friends?

Mr. Churchill: Well, they turn on their enemies, too. But I do not know that we should apprehend that, because our intention is to study their interests, and I think they have quite enough intelligence to realise what their true interests are. The Emir Feisal has now started from Mecca to Mesopotamia and he should arrive almost immediately. We have not felt, of course, justified in forcing him upon the people, but we have hopes of his success when he arrives. He undoubtedly now has the *cachet*, or the coupon, which attaches to a Government candidate, and other candidates have withdrawn. One misconducted himself—the Home Secretary—and had to be sent into exile. The Naqib of Baghdad, who was also a candidate, has now decided to welcome the Emir Feisal, and has become the head of the Committee of National Welcome, so that we hope that the Emir will be acclaimed, and that the Assembly, which will be chosen shortly under the impress—this is not for publication—under the impress of his arrival, and the popular rejoicings which will be going on—which we hope will be going on—will be an Assembly which will acclaim the Emir as the ruler, and the good people I have there—Sir Percy Cox, the chief of them, is a brilliant man—are strongly of opinion that this is the course events will take. Still, I can give no guarantee. If it is so, we should have, at the end of this year, an Arab ruler with an Assembly and Council of notables, and an Arab army. In addition to that, there will be native levies, Kurdish and Arab levies, officered by British officers, from which the Arabs will gradually merge into the Arab army at a later stage, and the Kurds will more or less take the position of a frontier force, in Kurdistan, because you do not want Arabs in the Kurdish district. We shall have, behind that, twelve battalions and some artillery and cavalry, and no less than eight squadrons of the air force which we hope to rely upon to give moral support to the Emir Feisal in the early, and necessarily precarious, days of his reign. But the result of this, if it is successful, is that the expense on Mesopotamia will be reduced from approximately 25 millions in the present year to something like 7 next year, and 7 is of course, with the decreased purchasing power of money, only the equivalent of 3 or 4 before the war. If that were so, and we could do that, and no further trouble arose, if there was no further rebellion needing a great reinforcement, and matters settled down on that basis, the expense would not be unmanageable; we could afford to carry on until the new Government takes root, gradually withdrawing our troops more and more, and getting out behind an Arab State which would become more and more a going concern. If that were so, we should have succeeded in having kept our pledges and done the right thing by the country, without either destroying our finances by undue expense or injuring the political situation of the Government by expenditure which is so extremely unpopular while it is maintained at the present height. That is what we are hoping to do. As I say, I can give no guarantee, but people who know best are hopeful, and although we live on a volcano, we live on so many volcanoes that one more or less does not seem to me to make a very great difference; we are used to them. So much for Mesopotamia. I think there is no doubt that it should be clearly understood that it is the duty and desire to carry out our pledges, rather than hopes of immediate profit, which justify our remaining there. It would be a shameful thing for us to do if, having in the war come into these countries and broken up the forms of government that prevailed there, and having made all sorts of promises, and driven out the Turks who were the

Method of Development of Arab Government.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

only form of Government, we suddenly scuttled for the coast, throwing away the Mandate which we had recently received and taken before the whole world, making ourselves a by-word and a mockery in view of our declarations of giving a good Government and good institutions to these people, leaving the great city of Baghdad and other ancient cities to be pillaged by the wild Arab, the Bedouin of the desert, and leaving our name accursed in the whole of this region. It is a duty that we are discharging, and, if it does not cost too much money, we may with patience and perseverance be able to get through it without further serious loss.

Mr. Meighen: But for the responsibilities under the Mandate, would you have been entirely free from obligations?

British Obligations.

Mr. Churchill: If we had never accepted the Mandate for Mesopotamia, we nevertheless should have had, *de facto*, obligations of a very serious kind which would have necessitated our leaving the country in some state of order before we evacuated it, and a very large portion of the expense was quite unavoidable, but, of course, once we accepted the Mandate, we, as it were, re-affirmed all those obligations and undertook to put the job through, and I do not despair that we shall do it.

Mr. Hughes: These obligations were incurred during the war, and it was necessary to incur them, you say?

Mr. Churchill: Certainly, it was unavoidable. At the same time I have always felt that if the expense got too great, or the people continually rebelled, we should, on giving reasonable notice and doing the best we could, be entitled to wind up our responsibilities, but we hope to avoid what would be a very humiliating and painful confession of failure.

Palestine.

Now I come to Palestine. Palestine is complicated by the pledge which was given by the late Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, in the name of the Government, in a most critical period of the war, that a Jewish National Home would be favoured by Great Britain in Palestine. There are 550,000 Arabs, 60,000 Jews and 60,000 Christians in Palestine. The Zionist ideal is a very great ideal, and I confess, for myself, it is one that claims my keen personal sympathy, but quite apart from whatever you may feel for the idea, there is no doubt that during the war we hoped to gain influence and support, among other things, for our cause, and to enlist the aid of Jews all over the world, and that we got, in consequence, support, and we have to be very careful and punctilious to discharge our obligations, if we honestly and legitimately can, without sacrificing other considerations. And therefore, I am in a very difficult position there, because it is not that the Jews in Palestine were unpopular—they were not; it is not that the numbers that are now coming in—7,000 or 8,000 a year—are really introducing a serious or imminent change in the character of the country—they do not; but the Zionists, in order to work up enthusiasm for their cause, have to go all over the world preaching the return of hundreds of thousands of oppressed peoples from the persecuted countries of Europe, Russia, the Ukraine, Poland and so forth, to the Promised Land. This terrifies the Arabs who, although they would not be in the least alarmed if it were a moderate immigration of carefully selected colonists of the kind that have already established themselves there, and done such wonderful work under the care and munificence of, for instance, the Rothschild family during the last twenty or thirty years. They would not mind that at all, but the idea they have in their minds is that they are going to be swamped and overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands of Bolsheviks from Central Europe. That is what they believe and it has raised a most dangerous state of excitement from one end of the country to another. We had a very nasty outbreak at Jaffa the other day at which forty of fifty Jews were murdered, and it was not suppressed until a large number of casualties of one kind or another had been inflicted. Our force in Palestine has been greatly reduced, and I have read a despatch to-day saying it is not large enough having regard to the policy we are pledged to carry out. We have 5,000 fighting men with a ration-strength of 7,000 or 8,000. There would be no difficulty, of course, in governing the country with a much smaller force but for our pledges, but I am of opinion that we are bound to make an earnest effort to give honourable effect to them, and, as I was saying in the House of Commons, we must persuade one side to concede and the other to forbear. We must insist on the door to immigration being kept open, insist that immigrants are not brought in beyond the numbers which the new wealth

of the country, which was created by public works and better agriculture, can sustain.

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Mr. Massey: The character of the immigrants?

Mr. Churchill: Above all, as Mr. Massey so justly interjects, by looking strictly to the character of the immigrants, both at the port from which they start for the Holy Land and when they arrive in the country. The stories of Bolshevism have been much exaggerated among them, the numbers of those who are infected with this horrible form of mental and moral disease are not at all great, but I have given to Sir Herbert Samuel, himself a keen Zionist and a Jew, directions which he is carrying out with vigour, to search the camps for men of Bolshevik tendencies and to send them out of the country with the least possible delay, and this is being done. It is not a question of making war upon opinion, but of not allowing a great experiment, which deserves a fair chance, to be prejudiced by persons who are guilty of a breach of hospitality.

Mr. Meighen: How do you define our responsibilities in relation to Palestine under Mr. Balfour's pledge?

Mr. Churchill: To do our best to make an honest effort to give the Jews a chance to make a national home there for themselves.

Mr. Meighen: And to give them control of the Government?

Mr. Churchill: If, in the course of many years, they become a majority in the country, they naturally would take it over.

Mr. Meighen: Pro rata with the Arab?

Mr. Churchill: Pro rata with the Arab. We made an equal pledge that we would not turn the Arab off his land or invade his political and social rights.

Mr. Montagu: Mr. Balfour's speech guaranteed the rights of both.

Mr. Churchill: I am already in a difficulty because we are giving Mesopotamia an Elective Institution. We have not yet been able to set up an Elective Institution in Palestine for the obvious reason that the first act of the Assembly would be to veto all Jewish immigration. I think we shall find a way, and I hope in the near future to establish an elective body in Palestine, but on the basis that certain things will be *ultra vires*, for instance, interference with immigration so long . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George: I think there is very good ground for distinguishing between them. It is a great international ground.

Mr. Churhcill: It is the home of three great religions.

Mr. Hughes: You must remember that it is a home from which they have been away for quite a long time. Its application to things nearer here is not so very remote.

Mr. Churchill: What do you mean, Mr. Hughes?

Mr. Hughes: What you say in effect is, you are going to send to this home 2, 5 or 10 million Jews. I don't know the number, but I think there are 15 million Jews in the world. Of course, you are going to regulate the flow, but in process of time they will come back.

Mr. Churchill: I doubt whether very much more than 10,000 a year will go in our lifetime, and it should be remembered that wherever they have been they have not only created wealth for themselves but for the Arabs around them. Wherever the footprints of the Jew in Palestine are found you have prosperity, progress and scientific methods of cultivation, and where there was a wilderness you now find vineyards. They are very good, energetic agriculturists, and there is also this one concluding point which I wish to mention. If we succeed in these two difficult tasks in Palestine and Mesopotamia, which I hope we may with patience and a certain amount of force in reserve, if we do succeed in this, at a moderate expense, then we shall have met all our promises. If, on the other hand, things go wrong, I think we ought to have the liberty to resign our mandates.

Mr. Massey: You are speaking of Mesopotamia now?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Mr. Churchill: I am speaking of both, and the United States has lately been coming forward from its long sleep and demanding that none of the mandates shall be ratified by the League of Nations until they have been fully consulted, but if they are under the delusion that we are making a great profit out of these, we might invite them to share our burden with us or relieve us of them altogether. Anyway, I think we ought to have from the Imperial Conference, who represent States, many of which sent troops to take part in this cause, the necessary liberty to make an offer if, and when the time arrives; but I object very much to the accusation that we have got off with a very valuable booty, when, as a matter of fact, we are discharging with great pain and labour a thankless obligation.

Mr. Hughes: Are we to hear anything on Egypt to-day?

Mr. Lloyd George: It is reserved for a separate discussion. I think we had better adjourn now, because we have another Cabinet, until Friday at 11·30, and you will be prepared to lead off the discussion on Friday. We propose to continue the discussion of the general foreign policy of the Empire on Friday, and you will all be ready to take part in the discussion.

Mr. Hughes: I suppose we shall be able to get Lord Curzon's speech?

Lord Curzon: I have just been correcting it, and it will come round to-morrow, or the greater part of it.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, June* 22, 1921.

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 Mr Meighen

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SECRET.

E. 6th Meeting.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir W. H. HERRIES, K.C.M.G.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Lord Curzon: I gave orders for the Foreign Office telegrams to be circulated to the members of the Conference from to-day. I was a little uncertain even as to whether we were a Cabinet, a Conference, a Council or a Meeting.

General Smuts: I hope the telegrams will be confined to those which affect the questions we are discussing, otherwise we should have such piles of them thrown at us.

Mr. Lloyd George: Telegrams from Upper Silesia and such matters.

Lord Curzon: We send you the blue printed document every day. Of course, there are masses of telegrams, 500 or 600 a day. We do not give you those, but there is a printed selection of 30 or 40.

Mr. Lloyd George: The selected important telegrams which are circulated amongst the members of the British Cabinet will be sent to you and they will contain all the important material. They are the telegrams printed by the Foreign Office printers.

Lord Curzon: There are three or four sheets and you will get that document every day.

Mr. Massey: Of course, we have been getting important despatches for some days.

Lord Curzon: That is right, of course.

Mr. Meighen: It is due to the Foreign Secretary first of all that I should say we are very much in his debt for his lucid and impressive review of the conduct of foreign affairs during the last 2½ years. There could be, to my mind, no doubt at any stage as to the meaning he intended to convey, nor as to the frankness and sincerity with which he made his presentation. Similar words apply to that phase of the same subject covered by the address of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I do not purpose this morning to venture upon any line of criticism of the specific moves on this chessboard in these months. I should require to satisfy my own mind by a longer and closer familiarity with the situation here before doing so. There are others from the Dominions, doubtless, who have enjoyed that familiarity and who will take advantage of the opportunity.

Some words are expected at this stage from the Dominion Representatives expressive of their views as to the general trend of policy in foreign affairs as disclosed by the Foreign Secretary, as well as that pursued with respect to obligations under Mandates, and under mid-war commitments as reviewed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. What remarks I have to make will be general in character and applicable to the entire field.

Status of Dominions in the Empire's Foreign Policy.

It first becomes necessary to set forth upon what principles and subject to what limitations, if any, the comment or advice of the Dominion Ministers may be rightly made or given upon such questions at this Conference.

The Dominions, while enjoying full control of their own affairs, inclusive, in many essential phases of their affairs with other countries, are nevertheless nations within the British Empire. While it is quite true that should Great Britain become embroiled in war every considerable country in the world would be affected, the British Dominions would obviously be affected more immediately and vitally than would countries without the Empire. Whatever course any Dominion might decide to take, its liability to attack would be unquestioned, and its whole existence might become at once in jeopardy. The degree of this special peril might vary with the character or location of Britain's enemy, but that it would always exist is beyond argument. Upon the soundness, therefore, of British Foreign Policy, upon the wisdom of the broad principles governing that policy, very important consequences, as respects the Dominions, depend.

Associated with the above consideration is the further fact that there exists no council or body responsible to the Dominions, or to any Dominion, which can advise our common Sovereign in relation to foreign affairs.

One other truth of paramount importance to Canada is that, incident to our very position on the map of the world, our distinctively Canadian relations with the United States, as respects all phases of mutual concern, are in their very nature so vast and so vital to us that the control of those relations has become and must remain a matter incident to our autonomy. The conduct of affairs as between the entire Empire and that Republic is also of far-reaching concern to Canada. We are

interested to a degree very marked indeed in the character and cordiality of the friendship between these two great countries. General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Out of these postulates it would seem the following might be concluded:—

1. There should be regular, and so far as possible, continuous conferences between the responsible representatives of Britain and the self-governing Dominions and India with a view, among other things, of determining and clarifying the governing principles of our relations with foreign countries, and of seeking common counsel and advancing common interests thereupon.
2. That while in general final responsibility rests with the Ministry advising the King, such Ministry should, in formulating the principles upon which such advice is founded and in the application of those principles, have regard to the views of His Majesty's Privy Council in other Dominions and of the Representatives of India.
3. That as respects the determination of the Empire's foreign policy in spheres in which any Dominion is peculiarly concerned the view of that Dominion must be given a weight commensurate with the importance of the decision to that Dominion. Speaking for Canada, I make this observation with particular reference to our relations with the United States.

I may be permitted to say that, added to the above specific conclusions, there is another that it seems to me must be constantly brought forward. The British Empire is now, as it has been for centuries, a union of people under varying forms of connection, spread throughout the world. It has become, of more recent times, a Commonwealth of free nations living under widely diverse conditions. Clearly, any principles underlying the conduct of external relations of such a Commonwealth of Nations must be, more and more, of such simple and understandable character that they will be generally acceptable to the various and widely scattered peoples that comprise the Empire.

League of Nations.

With particular reference to this last, and what I might describe as an overriding conclusion, a few further remarks may be ventured. The erection of a League of Nations was, in some degree, the outcome of a longing among the world's democracies for the bringing about of such diplomatic relations among the nations as would remove the complexities and perplexities of the system of balancing friendships and animosities which had prevailed. In so describing diplomatic proceedings it is needless to add that I do not do so by way of attributing special blame, or any blame, to Great Britain. A nation must define its course in the world as it is. But we have a League of Nations now. What effective part it is to play in the new order, or in bringing improvement to the past order, no one can foretell, and well-informed opinion is naturally divided. But, speaking my own mind and speaking for Canada, the overwhelming determination is that every energy should be devoted, and every caution and restraint exercised, to make possible the success of the League, to help and advance its cause. It seems to me logically to follow that we should now seek to avoid inviting the return of any conditions that would be regarded as anomalous to, or out of harmony with, the general scheme and purpose of the League of Nations, or that could fairly be considered as evidencing distrust in the effectiveness of its organisation. I do not carry the argument further at the present time, but only say that, to my mind, sub-alliances or groupings of Powers, under whatever name, are not easily reconcilable with confidence in, or even fidelity to, the fundamental purposes of the League.

I need not comment at all at present on Conclusion 1, referred to above, as to the necessity of regular continuous Conferences, nor as to the provision of organisation to effect that end. This, I presume, will be debated later.

Present Situation as regards advising His Majesty on Foreign Affairs.

Coming to Conclusion 2, it will be noted that the statement of our present position, as regards the determination of such matters of foreign policy as affect the entire Empire, has reference to conditions as they actually exist. There can be no question but that legally the only body which has up to now advised His Majesty as to the conduct of this Empire's foreign affairs, with responsibility to a Parliament and people, has been, and is to-day, His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom. Methods have been adopted by which such advice can be given best after consultation with responsible representatives of the Dominions, and indeed, in cases where any Dominion has been solely, or almost solely affected, in accordance with the direct recommendation of such Dominion. Nor is it overstating the present position to say that the right of a Dominion in respect of important engagements

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

to have its consent obtained before being bound, and in cases where the interest of a Dominion is paramount to have its voice accepted, has grown into an indefeasible constitutional recognition. Time and good sense and mutual trust will doubtless clarify the difficulties of the position and establish an effective working practice. But there has been and is no body authorised as such to advise His Majesty in relation to foreign affairs except the United Kingdom Government. I make no conjecture as to the durability of the conditions I have described; I merely say they do exist. While they exist, the importance of His Majesty's Government taking into account, and at times indeed depending upon, the special interest of the Dominion concerned, giving effect to the views of such Dominion, can scarcely be overstated. On the care and fidelity with which the views of the Dominions are regarded depend, it seems to me, in large degree not only the continuance of the relations I have described, but the success with which we discharge our mission as a Commonwealth of Nations. I add, and add with emphasis, my conviction that, whatever evolution of these relations time and circumstances may bring about, the unity of our peoples will remain undisturbed.

Relations between Canada and the United States.

In commenting upon Conclusion 3, which calls attention to the paramount interest which in given cases a Dominion, or Dominions, may have in the cause of the Empire's Foreign Policy, and to the imperative necessity of giving heed to such paramount interest in any decision arrived at, I desire to refer, by way of illustration, to the position of Canada as respects the United States. In this connection I was more than pleased with the words that fell at the close of his speech from the lips of the Foreign Secretary. Canada is a neighbour of the United States across a boundary of nearly 4,000 miles. We share with them a great portion of the American continent. Their trade with us is second in magnitude in the comparison of their trade with the countries of the world, and may easily become the first. We have almost every form of international negotiation with them. The course of the United States' policy in every field affects Canada. Their numbers are many times the numbers of the Dominion in population; their decisions, their lines of policy, consequently affect us in profound degree. We live in constant and vital touch with this problem from day to day. The maintenance, and if it is by any means possible, the betterment, of relations between the British Empire and the United States of America should be, as the Foreign Secretary has well said "the pivot of Britain's world policy." To no country does this truth appeal with such tremendous force as it does to Canada.

The heart of the Dominion beats true to-day, as it has always done, to British institutions and to British connection. We believe that there is one thing of first importance to Britain and the other Dominions, and of not only first but vital importance to Canada, and therefore having wrapt within it, in a peculiar way, our future, and that is the continuance and improvement of our relations with the American people. It has developed through the years, not as a matter of sudden departure or acquisition, but as a matter of growth out of the very necessities of the case, that in the determination of questions affecting, not the Empire as such and the United States, but affecting Canada and the United States, the Dominion should have full and final authority. It is well that this development has taken place, and I submit confidently that in similar conditions in other fields of our foreign relations a like development would be desirable for the common advantage.

I am not in these remarks making reference to any specific article of foreign policy—such, for example, as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The time for that discussion will come in due course.

I have endeavoured to unfold our position in a broad and understandable way. I hope my doing so will help in our discussions, subject by subject, later.

Mr. Hughes: Prime Minister, I quite agree with Mr. Meighen's comment upon the review of Foreign Policy presented to us by Lord Curzon. From whatever point of view it be regarded, it was admirable. It left a profound impression in our minds, both of the vastness and splendour of the pageantry of Empire that it unfolded and the competence of those who have charge of the Foreign Affairs of this country. I agree also with Mr. Meighen that that part of Foreign Affairs dealt with by Mr. Winston Churchill left nothing to be desired, either in the completeness of its treatment or the vividness of its presentation.

Situation since the Armistice.

We find ourselves in a difficult position. We are asked to express an opinion on the Foreign Policy of Britain and the Empire during these past two and a half years. But we are confronted with things either already done, or still in the doing, but so far matured that in most cases, no matter what might have been said with

advantage when the moment was opportune, there now remains nothing at all to do but to go on. I am not suggesting by these remarks that anything that has been done might have been done in a different way, because I think we all realise that to a large extent circumstance compelled us to shape our policy in a certain way. We were never quite free to shape our own course over a great part of that spacious arena covered by the Foreign Secretary yesterday. The circumstances of the war and our obligations arising out of it made freedom of action impossible. We may regret that we incurred some of these obligations, but at the time that we did so we thought any sacrifice and any price justified, if it contributed to the safety of our country. To-day we sit round this table in perfect peace and security: we may speak of the Treaty of London as did Lord Curzon. No doubt, if we had to do it all over again, we might act differently. Yet if no other inducement would have persuaded Italy to range herself alongside the Allies, it was right that we should have made the Treaty. I do not think myself competent in any case to criticise the Foreign Policy of the last two and a half years. It is impossible for any of us who are unfamiliar with the details and far removed from that environment in which the Foreign Policy of Europe is moulded to do so. Nor do I suggest for a moment that affairs could with advantage have taken any other course. I think Lord Curzon, whether deliberately or not, conveyed the impression that we were in our present position not entirely of our own free will. The alternative, he told us, was a policy, not of splendid but of dangerous isolation—isolation full of menace not only to ourselves, but also to the world.

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Need for Empire to share in European Politics.

General Smuts was perhaps responsible for Lord Curzon's references to this matter. It had been suggested that we should stand aloof from European policy and follow the example of America. I do not agree with that view. I think Lord Curzon was absolutely right. What would have happened to the world if we had stood aloof? Would it have been well for the world? Sometimes I fancy we do not realise, as Lord Curzon pointed out, the tremendous potency of this Empire for good or evil. Weighing all things fairly, I venture to say that the British Empire has been, and is, on the whole, the most potent influence for good that the world knows or has ever known. No doubt there are spots on the sun; we have sometimes fallen short of a counsel of perfection. But if our courage fail, our hand becomes palsied and we no longer hold the sceptre, who is to do so? I know what General Smuts has in mind. But I do not think, taking a fair view of the position during the last two years or so, we should have been justified in standing aloof and calling upon the League of Nations—which, as yet in its infancy and promising great things to the world, is not yet in a position to fulfil those promises—to take our place.

Value of the Empire to the World during last Two Years.

Now, there are only one or two things I desire to touch upon. It is impossible to grasp or even dwell upon the mere outline of the vast picture presented to us yesterday. We who come here with our minds filled with other matters vital to our countries, need time to consider carefully what we have heard. I shall, therefore, confine myself to one or two observations. I think no useful purpose would be served by any attempts to criticise the Foreign Policy of the past two and a half years, even if I were so inclined and thought that criticism necessary and proper. No doubt, looking back on all that has been done, we can see many things that might with advantage have been done differently. But that applies to most, if not all, things that men do, viewed in retrospect. The Treaty of Versailles imposed upon us certain responsibilities. We should have proved ourselves weaklings had we failed to shoulder them. I agree with Lord Curzon absolutely that the world, distracted and demoralised by war and its aftermath, wants a rock upon which it can stand. The world is in a state of chaos. This Empire alone stands firm. Much has been said, and rightly said, about peace. But we must face the facts, for the peace of the world is not to be secured by mere words. It is proper after this great war to speak in condemnatory terms of force. But we must not forget that the world owes much these last two and a half years to the power of this Empire. It has acted as the world's policeman. And it has, on the whole, performed its duties efficiently and to the lasting benefit of mankind. Its failure to carry out what we conceive to be its clear duty would have produced most lamentable effects upon the whole world. For what to-day is the alternative to this Empire, its alliance with France and the principles for which it stands? The alternative is Bolshevism, the very negation not only of democarcy, but of all law, international and municipal. Though the things that are done are not without flaw, no good can come of criticism. To a large extent we are as much responsible—every one of us who represent the Dominions—for the greater part of the Foreign Policy during

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

the last two and a half years as Great Britain herself, for it has been fashioned to deal with conditions for which the Peace Conference and the Peace Treaty were, if not directly, indirectly responsible. And at that Conference our voices were heard and to that Treaty our names are attached. I desire, however, to say a word or two upon a matter arising indirectly out of the Treaty of Versailles. I refer to the

Greece and Turkey.

state of affairs between Greece and Turkey and our attitude towards the belligerents. The general feeling of the people of Australia, at any rate, and, I think, of the people of this country too, is that we ought not to be involved in this trouble. We ought not to spend one shilling or to risk one life to further the ambitious projects of King Constantine. Lord Curzon has explained how the position arose. I could not help thinking, while he was speaking, how mysteriously the finger of Providence moves. A monkey, we are told, has done this thing. He bit Alexander so sorely that he sickened and died! But why did he stop there? Why did he only bite King Alexander?

I do most strongly urge that as our interests certainly lie in conciliating the Moslem world, we ought not to support the ambitious designs of King Constantine. I do not know that the views of the Australian soldier in regard to this matter are very important, but he emerged from the war with a supreme contempt for the Greek, who was supposed to be his ally, and with a hearty admiration for the Turk, against whom he fought. I must say I share that view entirely, and I would not spend one shilling or move one man on behalf of Greece.

Russia.

Now, I say nothing at all about Russia, because I think those who have said most about Russia have learnt as time goes on that they have had, for the most part, to retract all they said and that silence would have been their most useful mode of expression. We are told by Lord Curzon that the Soviet Government of Russia is almost on its last legs and that it is now buying herrings to feed the people. But, still, there it is. We are told that the commune is honeycombed with internecine strife. Well, internecine strife is not peculiar to Russia. These things go on everywhere. We are told that there is a quarrel between Lenin and Trotsky. Well, what of that? Are we to postulate from that that the end of all things is arriving? Are there not quarrels amongst other leaders, political intrigues and internecine strife in other countries—here and in other parts of the Empire, for example? I do not know how it is with Mr. Meighen and Mr. Massey—General Smuts is in a happy position just now—but I am bound to say that I am so familiar with that sort of thing in Australia that it does not affect me at all. I live in an atmosphere of internecine strife. If there is nothing else to support the theory that the Soviet Government is on its last legs than statements of this kind, the outlook is not very promising for those who do not believe in Bolshevism.

If there is anything further, I hope, Sir, we shall be told what it is. And it is very important that we shall be told precisely what is the policy of Britain in regard to trade with Russia. It is most embarrassing to be asked questions in the House of Representatives in Australia about the trade agreement with Russia, and to say that I have no information whatever about it. I am not suggesting that anything definite has been done about a trade agreement. All I say is, if anything has been done or is to be done, we ought to be told of it.

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

I will turn to just one other matter arising out of the statement of Mr. Churchill. I think we are all very much interested in the picture he drew of Mesopotamia and of Palestine. Mr. Churchill says, and I think he is quite right in saying, that we made certain promises during the war, and we are called upon to fulfil our obligations honourably. But when I heard the Colonial Secretary's speech, the prospects of his policy in Mesopotamia proving successful seemed to justify the expenditure and effort. But when I came to read his speech, I was struck by the manner in which he guarded himself from the charge which might be made hereafter, that he was ready to guarantee that this Arab Kingdom would fulfil the hopes that some enthusiasts held in regard to it. Personally, I do not know how far our promises take us. But I do not think we ought to go one-thousandth part of an inch beyond the letter of the law. Of course, the Colonial Secretary is probably of a more optimistic temperament than I am, at any rate this morning, and he sees a new Arabia. Now, here again my view is jaundiced and overcast by the views of the Australian soldier who fought in this war alongside of our allies, the Arabs. From experience the Australian soldier learned much. In action it was his custom to keep both eyes on our Arab allies, because there was far more danger from them than from the Turks.

There was, however, a silver lining to this dark cloud hovering over the Australian soldier. The Arabs rarely fought in earnest for more than ten minutes,

and then unless victory appeared certain melted away. I hope we shall not endeavour to achieve the impossible in Mesopotamia. Promises must be kept, and I would, if I were a member of the House of Commons, support Mr. Churchill in honourably keeping them, asking him, however, not to interpret them too liberally. No doubt our policy in Mesopotamia has an influence in the Moslem world, and for that reason, if for no other, it deserves support. But when we turn to Palestine and see what is being done there, I am bound to say that I do not understand how to reconcile our present policy there with that pursued in Mesopotamia. Certainly what is being done in Palestine will not tend to help us with the Moslem world. But Mr. Churchill's explanation is that we have made promises, and, of course, must stand by them. But I do hope that both in this and in other matters you will remember that this Empire of ours—particularly in this country—has many enemies. Its every act evokes hostile criticism and is made the subject of gross misinterpretation. There is a widespread suspicion in the minds of very many people, even in the country which I have the honour to represent, that Britain's foreign policy is Imperialistic and directed towards aggrandisement and widening its sphere of influence. I think this ever-lengthening list of foreign entanglements seems to give some colour to this charge. It certainly serves to feed anti-British propaganda. I hope, therefore, we shall, as far as possible, mould our foreign policy on lines compatible with those ideals of liberty, democracy, right, and the peace and welfare of mankind for which we fought in the great war. So far as the Dominions are concerned, we certainly do not desire world Empire. Our ideals do not rest upon a foundation of force or warlike preparation, but upon peace and all that makes for peace.

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Status of Dominions in the Empire's Foreign Policy.

I come now to quite a different question. Mr. Meighen this morning gave a new turn to this debate, for which I at any rate was not prepared. He has said some things which I should like to consider very carefully before I speak on them. I had not anticipated that at this session we should do anything more than deal with what the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for the Colonies had said, deferring our discussion upon the basic principles that are to govern future foreign policy for another day. However, I can quite see that under the heading set out in the notice paper it was quite competent for Mr. Meighen to introduce these questions. But I want to have an opportunity of considering very carefully the terms of his memorandum and where his proposals, if adopted, would lead us to. I shall not now say anything by way of comment, let alone criticism, of his suggestions, save to make it clear that it must not be understood that by my silence I support his views. On the other hand, there may be very little difference between any of us, and the difference, if any, may be in the statement of the case rather than in substance; but I want to be very careful that we should know exactly what Mr. Meighen has said and what his proposals involve, and I shall leave, Sir, anything I have to say on the Representative of Canada's views upon the principles which should govern the Empire in relation to its foreign policy, until I have had an opportunity of carefully considering his statement,

Dangers of Bolshevik Propaganda.

I come now to a point of the utmost importance. I said earlier in my speech that in a shifting world this Empire of ours was the one thing that stood firm, and I entirely agreed with Earl Curzon that Bolshevism was the very negation of all the British Empire stands for. Thus Bolshevism recognises that it is against this Empire that the forces of anarchy and destruction must fiercely rage. It is no use shutting our eyes to the fact that against the British Empire there is a world-wide conspiracy. A virulent campaign of insidious propaganda against us and all we stand for is being carried on in almost every country of the world. We cannot, we dare not, ignore its sinister purpose, its menacing effects. I was very much surprised, therefore, to see a report of a speech delivered, I think, by Sir Robert Horne, in which he said it was no part of the Government's duty to counteract Bolshevik propaganda. Whose duty then is it?

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not think he said that.

Mr. Hughes: It may be that I am mistaken. I do not know. In any case, the fact remains that it is vital that the world should not be left to the mercy of an insidious propaganda which worms its way through the tiniest crevice in the armour of men's minds, appealing to their ignorance, their emotions, interests, superstitions, and religion. Everywhere Bolshevik propaganda wraps itself about a gospel of hatred of Britain and all her works. In our Dominions, in India, in America, all over the world men's minds are being saturated by this poison. So far as the Western world is concerned, the British Empire is the great obstacle in the paths of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Bolshevism. I think it is time that some deliberate and systematised effort was made to counteract this propaganda, and to tell the world the things for which Britain and the Empire stand. Let the people of the world have at least the opportunity of hearing both sides. Here I will leave the matter for the present.

We are very anxious to know what it is proposed to do with regard to trade with Russia. What you propose to do in regard to any recognition of Soviet Russia. I hope you will tell us in plenty of time what you propose to do before you do it.

General Smuts: I was very much struck not only by the ability of the statement of the Foreign Secretary, but especially by its extreme candour, and I think we are all very indebted in this Conference to Lord Curzon for the frankness and candour in which he has spoken. He has not put any case before us; he has not defended the foreign policy of the British Government, but, in a spirit of great frankness, has put all the principles that have guided us in the immediate past. Now, I should be very sorry if anything I said last time, or that I am going to say to-day, should be taken as coming from a critic.

Different points of view of the various parts of the Empire.

I speak in no critical sense at all, but I think it is very necessary that we should all discuss the fundamentals of our foreign policy from the different points of view that present themselves in the different parts of the Empire. The Empire after all is a very big concern, and every subject of international concern is viewed as it were from different angles by our different peoples, and it is the very object of a meeting such as ours here to focus all these different points of view in order that our policy may have a bearing with regard to all of them. I have always looked upon it as a great advantage that those with whom we are dealing in European diplomacy should understand that this is the position of the British Empire. If foreign Ministers in Europe think they are simply dealing with the British Government they might expect too much. They would not expect then to carry this sympathetic and easy-going British Government with them, but they ought to understand that it is a very difficult show and a complex show with which they are dealing, that the British Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary represent a very complex Empire spread over all the world, and matters have to co-ordinated before any concession is made; I think that it would be very helpful to our Foreign Office, and the British Government generally, to make the foreign Governments understand that you represent not only the United Kingdom, not only the British Government but the British Empire as a whole which has to view things from all these different angles.

Indeed, there is no doubt that in the British Empire as a whole the affairs of Central Europe are viewed with a great deal of indifference. I am speaking merely from the point of view of South Africa, but I suppose the point of view of the other Dominions is very much the same. The affairs of Central Europe, such as they have been developing in the last two years since peace, do not affect our people very much. They leave us cold and indifferent, and although we have been very deeply into all these matters and the British Government has taken the greatest amount of trouble—the Foreign Secretary has spoken of all the time that has been spent in conferences to find solutions which these impasses in the relations have necessitated—these no doubt leave us cold and indifferent in the Dominions. This is a far away world. We occupy a position of isolation to some extent which does not make us sympathise very much with these concerns in Europe, and what I have been afraid of is this—watching things as they have been developing the last two years and reading telegrams from the Prime Minister and the papers as to what is happening, and seeing how often we are on the point of a great crisis—what I fear is this, that we might at any time find ourselves very deeply involved, this Government might find itself very deeply involved in a European crisis to which the Dominions are utterly indifferent, and in which they will say, "We will have no concern in these things," and that would lead to a very serious consideration.

Mr. Lloyd George: Would you mind developing that, General Smuts? You do not mind my interrupting because you put that point in your first statement. Just tell me the sort of thing you have in your mind. Give me an illustration.

General Smuts: I will give as an illustration the advance which took place at Ruhrort, Düsseldorf and Duisburg. It was something quite apart from the Peace Treaty, so far as I take it. It was a further occupation of German territory. Of course, luckily for us, nothing happened, but supposing a new crisis had developed over that, what would have been the attitude of the various peoples of the Empire?

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: This is really rather important, and that is why I am pressing you. That advance took place to enforce more particularly two conditions of the Peace Treaty. One was that in relation to reparation, because the Germans were refusing to put forward any practical proposals for that purpose, and the second was because they refused to disarm in accordance with the conditions of the treaty. Supposing they had definitely declined to carry out these conditions. The Dominions are directly interested in reparation, directly financially interested. Would the Dominions have preferred that we should have taken no steps to enforce these conditions?

General Smuts: It is difficult to see what attitude the Dominions would have taken in any particular case. Take the position that was taken at one stage of the Reparation question. The position of the 50 per cent. export duty. I do not know what attitude was taken up by the other Dominions, but when my Government came to consider the question from the South African point of view, and in reviewing what our trade relations had been with Germany in the past, and what we hope our trade relations may be with her in the future, we found it impossible to agree to this policy; and that is the sort of thing we have to guard against. The British Empire regard it from different points of view, and unless we can follow a Foreign Policy in Europe which bears all these things in mind, we may come to a crisis which carries our different countries into difficulties, which would be a very serious thing. The peoples who have been started on their legs at the expense of the lives of our young men and great expenditure—we find these peoples callous and irresponsible in the matters they pursue. It is rather from that point of view—the impression that these things are making on our peoples—that I am afraid of Central Europe, and I think we are being too deeply occupied in the affairs of Central Europe. Do not think I am for a moment in favour of splendid isolation. That does not express my attitude. I do not think America is taking the right attitude in these matters. America, after coming into the war, has backed out of everything. I agree with what has fallen from Mr. Hughes. It is not possible for us to do so unless we want to be selfish and not play our part properly. We must continue to bear our share, but there, too, I have this feeling that I have expressed, that we ought to be very careful as to the attitude of the Empire as a whole in all these matters—careful how far we go, and I am in favour of an attitude of greater independence than we have hitherto assumed, if I may say so. You described the policy, our Continental policy, as that of a sort of Alliance with France, and you said that was the pivot of Continental peace. I am very doubtful about that whole policy. There is no doubt, as you described to us, Lord Curzon, France pursues a different policy from us. France has different aims. Our policy is that of a loyal ally who saw the war through by the side of France, who wants to discharge her obligations to France and to the rest of Europe, but we are working with an Ally who has a policy of her own to pursue. If France succeeds in her policy she will produce a weak Germany and a set of weak States under her tutelage. She has Belgium held in some treaty relation the details of which I do not know; she seems to be working up Poland into a similar State, and we shall have a Continent under the leadership of France, which would be a very dangerous thing for this country. I therefore doubt very much whether it is a wise policy for us to be associated with France along the lines they are pursuing. We have found it difficult to work with her under war conditions; we find it more difficult to work with her under peace conditions. We know her policy is entirely different from ours, and unless we assume the position of semi-independence, unless we assert ourselves and act in a manner that is worthy of the greatness of this Empire, then we are placed in a false position—in a false position in this way because, whilst nominally acting with France, we are almost fighting her. This policy, which Lord Curzon has described to us of keeping a hand on France in order to control her, keeping in with France in order to keep her in check, is a difficult policy. You are always liable to be misunderstood. You are liable to be accused of disloyalty. You put yourself forward as helping her, and you are keeping a check on her all the time; this may lead to continual charges of bad faith and disloyalty.

Recommends policy of Greater Independence in European Affairs.

No, I would submit that we should rather take up a position of independence, and when we are fighting in our own interests, and in the interests of Europe as a whole, say to her "No." Do not try to be an ally and be dragged about by her and have to fight her all the time. It seems to be a policy of independence which is desirable, and that would be a much easier policy for us to pursue and which in the end is going to be much more effective with France too. If you do actually stand

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

up to her then, of course, she will be much more cautious. The immediate past has shown that. I would, instead of being an ally of France, or working with her as ally, and almost disloyal to her in that sense—I would rather assume a position of independence, putting the British Empire entirely aside from all of them, and taking a line of our own, and a strong line if necessary. That would make our position intelligible to the whole world; our position will be intelligible to France. She will know how she stands, and it will make the whole position of the world easier. I do not know whether I make myself understood . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George : It is a very practical problem which we have to consider. I am very glad that you have led off with it, because I think we should consider it, not only as a part of our foreign policy, but consider it separately. That is one line. There is another which is suggested, as you know. Therefore, I am glad to hear the case in full.

Mr. Churchill : I did not understand what General Smuts meant when he said "Let France know where we are with her." That covers so much. Will he make it a little clearer?

General Smuts : So long as we are an ally of France she looks to us for support. I do not want her to look upon us in that light at all. She should know that she is dealing with an independent Britain, who is going to judge impartially of the whole position. The British Empire is going to be guided by her own interests and general world interests, and no longer guided by war interests.

Mr. Chamberlain : Have you considered what would have been the actual results in Europe to-day if we had adopted that policy twelve months ago? I am talking now of since the peace and considering troubles which have arisen out of the war. Having seen the troubles at the meetings of the different European Governments and ourselves, it seems to me impossible to overrate the valuable influence which the British Delegation—and particularly the Prime Minister, greater than any other man, I think—had on those gatherings. If we had made this declaration to France twelve months ago, you would have seen France in occupation of the Ruhr Valley, either alone or with contingents just sufficient to give colour to her operations, and you would have seen France passing over the whole of Silesia through Poland, in spite of the plebiscite which was the direct result of the British Peace Delegation, in which the representatives of all the Dominions took counsel with the Prime Minister in France.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do you mind dealing with that, General Smuts?

General Smuts: I look upon the thing rather differently. France is really in a weak position. Her ambitions are very great, and very dangerous to the world. Really she is a weak country, and unless she knew that she was backed up by the British Empire, I doubt whether she would go into Silesia. Take the occupation of Frankfort. That is necessary to your statement. Here was a case in which France gave way at the moment to her ambitions and occupied Frankfort. You made the position of the British Empire clear at once, so that, I think, is rather an indication that it would be better if we were to assume a strong position—I say it with modesty, and do not think one ought to speak immodestly, but at all events clearly, but we should speak from the position that we do occupy in the world, and we should recognise that we exercise more influence with France and we should not allow her to count so far on us as to pull 10 per cent. to-day, 15 per cent. to-morrow and 20 per cent. afterwards, in connection with her policy. If that is done the rest of the world will look much more to us; the rest of Europe will be guided by us as really the determining factor in European policy.

Lord Curzon: What you are really advocating is that we are to revert to the kind of policy which we pursued before the war. It was the war that brought us into close alliance with France. During the whole of my public life I have been a good deal occupied with foreign affairs under the old régime. What was the old régime when we were independent of relations with France? Did it bring us peace and happiness? No, it was a condition of conflict with her in every part of the world—nothing but pin pricks. We were brought to the verge of war with France on three occasions—over Nigeria, over Fashoda and over Siam; and it seems to me after the experience of the past thirty years that a policy of independence on our part was only attended with grave danger. I might multiply these instances, but so serious did the case become from time to time that every five or ten years there

had to be a sort of sweeping up with France in order to put things on a better basis. When those arrangements came about we gave away much more than we got, and certainly I must emphasise the fact that, although General Smuts represents the present situation as one in which France is pulling us along sometimes 10 per cent., sometimes 15 per cent., and sometimes 20 per cent., in my judgment the proportions are very much the other way about.

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

General Smuts: You are very much in the same position now as the one you described as having existed years ago. We are kept in continual turmoil and difficulty by France even to-day; it is an endless thing, and I have the feeling that, whatever we are going to do, Europe is moving to another crisis. It seems to me this pot is boiling and kept boiling partially by French ambitions, to some extent by general conditions, but the position in Europe is such, financially and economically, that I do not see how we are going to escape some great crisis in the future. All these countries are overburdened with debts; they cannot really get along. France is looking to German indemnities for relief. She will find no substantial relief in that direction. I am very much afraid that in a certain number of years we shall be in a great crisis in Europe, and all the time not in a position of independence, able to assert ourselves and bear our full weight, but involved with France and all the odium which her policy may bring upon us, and not really strong and independent to act according to our interests. That is why I am looking more and more in the other direction, and that is, to America. America, of course, has behaved very badly over this whole business. She came late into the war, she has left us at a very critical stage, and she has simply disinterested herself in the whole business and has withdrawn out of it. But there are many indications that America is profoundly unhappy—very many indications of it. There are many people profoundly unhappy; and while her own present Government will not join the League of Nations—they fought a campaign over that and won their victory over setting it aside—America is groping about trying to find some way by which she may once more do her duty. That presents a very great opening for us to try and get our world relations upon a better footing. If we could get America once more to work with us, even if she were not in the League of Nations, it might alter the whole situation.

Advantages of better Relations with America.

Mr. Lloyd George: You must get her into some sort of Association. You cannot have a League of Nations without America; it would not be of the least use.

General Smuts: I would not go that length. The League of Nations is more an effort, an experiment, a groping as it were of the peoples towards a new organisation and a new international life. It is not in a form that I look upon as final; it may be the whole thing may have to be reshaped.

Mr. Lloyd George: Look at that map, and see what is outside the League; half the world is outside.

Mr. Massey: But look what is inside the League of Nations. There is a weaker tail in the League of Nations than in the British cricket team.

General Smuts: I am strongly for union with America and for coming to some general settlement with America as the basis of our foreign policy.

Mr. Hughes: Would not that involve us in such a policy as America might dictate?

General Smuts: No.

Mr. Hughes: Or, at any rate, as America might suggest or favour. You say we must not go with France, but stand alone, but that with America it would be all right. I see objections to both.

General Smuts: The great difference is this, that America has very much the same position in world affairs that we have. Our Dominions, too, are in very much the some position. Our association with France entails our continual preoccupation with the internal affairs of Europe, whereas America is in a different position. Your country and my country and New Zealand are all developing . . . .

Mr. Hughes: I think, and have always said, that an understanding with America is essential to the peace of the world. Still, I think it is fatal to your argument as you put it forward about France and England. I am quite sure of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

that, but at the same time we cannot have that understanding with America unless we are prepared to give up the course we intended to take, and do what they suggest.

General Smuts: I do not think that we should make any surrender at all. We are exposing a number of surfaces of friction with America quite uselessly. We have had a fight over oil in Mesopotamia. We have heard the story of Mesopotamia. The Colonial Secretary seems to be most doubtful about the whole Mesopotamian business, and told us half a dozen times that there is no guarantee of a future there.

Mr. Massey: The Standard Oil Company think there is oil in Mesopotamia.

General Smuts: Then we have the question of cables and Yap. We have a number of other questions that are surfaces of friction which are developing with America. I am for getting rid of all of them. We have at the back of them all the most serious question of the American loans. America has lent us a lot of money, which I consider part of the war, and the final solution must solve that question too. We have lent to France a lot of money. How we are ever to have peaceful relations with France if we continue in years to come to insist upon payment of that debt I do not know, and I would make every effort to get the people in a better temper, to bring them into a state of mind when we can deal with all these questions. I would not keep talking to America over these questions, because they are not in the proper temper and there is no atmosphere for a fruitful discussion. If we are to come to some general settlement with her and work with her on the lines of a general understanding, the temper would be produced in which we might relieve this country of what is probably the most intolerable incubus resting upon it—the American debt. It is not impossible to deal with the question in that way. America would not look at it now, but if we developed our foreign policy upon the proper lines, if we have this orientation in our foreign affairs, it is very likely that America might fall into line ultimately with us and we might come to a clean settlement of all this big business. Those are the few suggestions I wanted to make. There are many points which arise from Lord Curzon's statement which I will not go into because it seems to me the big thing is the direction of our policy, the direction in which we are going to move in the future in the difficult times we are going to have, which will be as difficult as any that have ever been. The world is bankrupt and half mad, and it must come to a crisis again. There will be a repudiation all over Europe, and the question will be: "How is it going to affect us here?" To some crisis we are certainly moving, and I would therefore, with a view to all these difficulties, dangers and perils that threaten our path, advocate, without asserting it openly, working towards a position of greater independence in Europe and towards a position of greater co-operation and better understanding with America, as the key-note and the fundamental principle of our future policy.

Need for the Empire to associate in European Politics.

Mr. Massey: Mr. Prime Minister, I join the speakers who have preceded me in expressing our gratitude to Lord Curzon and Mr. Churchill for the very lucid and important statements that we have had from them with regard to foreign affairs. I would just like to say that, so far as Lord Curzon's statement is concerned, while he dealt with many important matters, I think the most important point he made was—and I admit there must be different points of view and different opinions favoured by the gentlemen met round this table—when he made it abundantly clear that it is impossible for us to dissociate ourselves from the politics of Europe. We simply cannot do it at present. The politics of Europe are at present chaotic, simply in such a state of chaos that no one can clearly understand them, but I believe that the chaos would be a hundred times intensified if Britain attempted to withdraw. General Smuts expressed the opinion that the affairs of Central Europe were regarded with indifference by the peoples of the Dominions. That, I am bound to say, is not my experience. I can find a dozen men, citizens of New Zealand, here to-day in London who know probably as much, and have studied European politics as closely, as almost any dozen men who are in public life at present, or who represent the different countries, or who are even Ministers of the different countries. So far as my own country is concerned, they have proved their interest over and over again in European politics, and generally the state of affairs in Europe, by sending quite substantial contributions from their own limited exchequer for the purpose of relieving the distress and starvation even of enemy countries, even those which are regarded to-day as enemy countries. That is my experience. As to withdrawal, I do not know whether General Smuts made this point perfectly clear, whether he suggested that we should withdraw from our

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

alliance with France, because morally it is an alliance. Personally, again I say, I do not think it is possible, and if you look at it from only one point of view, and that may be an exceedingly selfish point of view, how are we going to enforce the conditions of the Peace Treaty if we withdraw from our alliance with France? If France by herself attempted to enforce the conditions of the Peace Treaty we should have war right away, a war which would set the whole of Europe in a blaze. I doubt if we could enforce the conditions by ourselves. If I asked the people of the Dominions to send troops to Central Europe—to Germany—for the purpose of enforcing the conditions, while they would be quite ready to come forward in support of Britain, or probably France, I doubt if I could get sufficient forces to be of any value for the other purpose. I think the only chance of enforcing the Treaty is to keep our alliance with France in existence.

There is another point of view. Some day or other there may be another European war. I believe there will be, though the wish is not father to the thought. I believe it will be so, though probably not in our time. There is the possibility of French territory passing into the hands of an enemy of Britain, territory within gun-shot of the shores of the heart of the Empire. That has to be thought of. At all events, I think the risk is far too great. However, that is my individual opinion, and it has got to stand at that so far as I am concerned.

There are two other points in which I am interested and on which I should like to say something. I suppose it is intended later to discuss naval defence?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes

Mr. Massey: I do not think we can avoid it. I think we ought to have an opportunity to express our opinions upon the naval defence of the Empire, particularly because from our point of view the danger centre, as I understand it, has shifted. It is no longer in Europe—I am speaking from the point of view of naval defence only—but in the Pacific.

How do we know what developments are likely to take place in the Pacific during the next few years? I will not follow that, because we have the assurance that an opportunity will be given, but I believe that we are on the eve of great changes in Europe.

Russia and Germany in the Future.

I am not thinking of the possibility of war in the near future; I would like to think all war is ended, but take Russia, for instance. The cablegrams that we have got from Russia and the statements that have appeared in newspapers from time to time, whether they are reliable or whether they are not, I cannot tell, but they seem to indicate that Bolshevism in Russia is tottering to its fall. If so, what is taking its place? I hope it will be something better. I am not going to suggest whether it is going to be an Empire, a Monarchy, a Republic or what it is going to be, and let me say I think that Republics are just about as dangerous as Monarchies. If you look back upon the history of the world, you find that Republics have been at war just as often in proportion to their opportunities as those countries that called themselves Empires or Monarchies. Then take America—even America has been at war many times. As a Republic, it went to war with itself on a very serious occasion in the 'sixties, and American blood was poured out like water. However, I was referring to what might possibly come along in Russia in the course of a few years—the present state of events cannot continue, and I believe that Russia will have a stable Government again. It may be as has happened in France, that a strong man, such as Napoleon was, will come along and reorganise Russia. It is in their interests and in the interests of the world that something better should be done than is happening in Russia at the present time. How that would affect us it is impossible to say, but you have got to think of Germany and Poland alongside Russia. Germany is getting back to peace conditions, and, as far as it is possible for us to judge, very rapidly. Manufactured goods to-day can be produced in Germany and sold to other countries at a very much lower price that they can be produced in England, America or anywhere else. I believe in five years you will have Germany in a strong industrial position—I do not suggest military or naval position—but in as strong an industrial position as she was prior to the war. How that will affect Europe it is impossible to say. I trust that Germany will not attempt to get back to the military position she occupied prior to 1914, but she may, and it will be a long time before Britain is forgiven for the position she took up in the war by the German people. I am satisfied of that.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

There is a difficulty in regard to Poland. The idea of most of us, when the new arrangement was made, was that the new Poland would be a sort of buffer State between Germany and Russia. I have come to the belief that anything of the sort is impossible. Napoleon tried 100 years ago, so did the Congress of Vienna. They attempted to make Poland a buffer State and failed. The plain truth is—and I am sorry to admit it—we cannot rely upon the Polish people. If they do not find trouble outside, they will find it inside, and fight among themselves, and it is my opinion that the future danger of the world is coming from a combination between Russia and Germany, and, if that can be avoided, it will be a very good thing to do.

Insufficiency of the present League of Nations.

But you will want something stronger and far more influential than the League of Nations to prevent danger of that sort, and that is why I think the whole Covenant of the League of Nations should be reconsidered by people competent to do it. I am not reflecting on the present Council of the League of Nations—not in the very least—but I should like to see something much more comprehensive and much more representative done in connection with the League of Nations. If not, it had better go out and let us rely upon a British League of Nations, in which, I believe, everyone of us would have far more confidence than the present League of Nations. I am disappointed, as, at the time, I thought we should have something more substantial before now, although there is time yet, and there is no reason why there should not be more time given. What I am afraid of is that it is leading to a false sense of security. People may rely upon the League of Nations to prevent war, and some day or other we shall find an enemy at the gates. I say "we," but I do not expect it to happen during the present generation.

I should like to endorse what has been said by General Smuts on the point that the re-establishment of Germany is necessary to our peace and prosperity. I quite believe that, and I think we ought to assist in that direction in every way we possibly can. There is just one point that I want to refer to while I am dealing with German matters, and that is the punishment of war criminals. Now, I do not think I am a vindictive man—my friends say I am not—but we were all present at the Peace Conference and we all took part in the proceedings of the British Delegation. I think what has occurred in connection with the treatment of war criminals—or what has been allowed to occur—has been a bit ridiculous. I am speaking of the number of the criminals whose names were placed on record. I think it was absolutely ludicrous to think that we should shoot German criminals by thousands—that was out of the question—it was quite impossible. I am interested in this, because, as the Prime Minister knows, I happened to be on the Atrocities Commission and attended every meeting of the Commission. The majority of the Commission, I may say, were not unreasonable men—very far from it—and they thought the atrocities should not be allowed to go unpunished. They were murders in the worst sense of the term, and murder accompanied in many cases by the most horrible details. We thought we should have had an International Tribunal of unbiassed men, and limited the number of the worst cases which should have been placed on trial. It did not matter how many—whether forty, fifty, a dozen or twenty, yet they should have been tried and punished in accordance with the magnitude of their crimes. I am afraid by what we have done we have established a bad precedent. We talk about preventing war in the future. If you are going to prevent war you must do something by way of a deterrent. Now the criminals have been allowed to escape and I think it is too late to do anything. We cannot go back upon it. We have a precedent that I can think of in the civil war in the United States of America. Those criminals guilty of atrocities were placed upon trial, and I have read that one man, a German, as it happened, was guilty of cruelty to prisoners under his control—the war prisoners—and he was placed upon his trial at the end of the war and shot, as I have no doubt he deserved. As I say, we have allowed these people to get off too easily. I am not going to bring this matter up again, and I am not going to refer to it publicly or privately again, though I think it my duty to express my opinion now.

Punishment of War Criminals.

Relations with Turkey.

Then there is Turkey. Turkey is one of the most difficult questions the Allies—and especially Britain—have to settle. I cannot forget that we are the greatest Mohammedan Power in the world, and I think we should be taking a serious risk if we bundled the Sultan and those connected with him out of Constantinople. I think the right thing has been done as far as that goes. We had these many millions of Mohammedans loyal to us during the war, most of them are British subjects, and we have to think of them as fellow citizens. I believe the Sultan should be left in Constantinople, though I certainly would not

allow him to regain the power which he possessed prior to the war, and if that is done, it is going to prevent him regaining the territory which he held prior to the war, and that is where I think Mesopotamia and Palestine come in.

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

Palestine and Mesopotamia.

I am very strongly of opinion that, whatever happens, Palestine and Mesopotamia must not go back to Turkey. Then, what are we going to do with those countries? We have put our hands to the plough, so to speak, whether right or wrong, but, as we have put our hands to the plough, we cannot now draw back. If we draw back from Palestine and Mesopotamia now it would leave a very bad impression on the Mohammedans there, and the Asiatic people generally, and perhaps certain European people as well. It would be a serious blow to British prestige, and I think we have to go on. I think those two countries have to be held. I know some of the difficulties, and I know there are more difficulties than I can think of, so far as the information supplied to us allows us to do so, and so far as the newspaper reports give the information. But take Palestine. It has been already pointed out that the Arabs were our Allies during the war. We know their peculiarities. Mr. Hughes referred to them, but they are a people of the British Empire to-day; I believe they have a great future and are a great race. It has been said if they were successful in their fights, each one collared his share of booty and went to his home, and was not seen again until it was disposed of. I believe it is possible to improve the Arabs. I had quite a number of conversations with Colonel Lawrence when we were in Paris together, and Colonel Lawrence has more influence with them than any other living man to-day. He had great hopes of the Arabs, and I believe it was by his influence that they were brought into the war.

However, the Arabs are in possession of a good deal of Palestine, and it won't do to remove them forcibly. There is no doubt in my mind about that. We must stand by the usual constitutional principle, that no British citizen may be dispossessed of his freehold unless required for the purpose of the State, and I think we shall have to be careful how we handle these people. They are a dangerous people undoubtedly, and if suffering from a sense of injustice there is no knowing what they may do. At the same time the pledge given by Mr. Balfour must be given effect to on behalf of the British Empire, and I, for one, would not go back upon it in the slightest degree, but there are ways of keeping these pledges.

Mesopotamia.—A very large number of Australian and New Zealand soldiers were engaged in the campaign both in Mesopotamia and Palestine, in both places. They were both engaged in the campaign against the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Those campaigns, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, will not be forgotten. I do not propose to compare them, because in importance they are not comparable. That is not the point at all, but I should be very sorry if I had to tell the New Zealand soldiers, who took part in the Gallipoli campaign and the Mesopotamian campaign and in Palestine—because they are associated in their minds—I should be sorry to have to tell them that the British Government had decided to withdraw from those countries. There may be circumstances which will make it necessary for us to withdraw, but I think the country should be held on to in the meantime. I know nothing about the oil question except what I have read.

Mr. Hughes: We ought to know something about oil.

Mr. Massey: Perhaps we shall, but I know that oil interests outside the British Empire are very anxious about oil being discovered in Mesopotamia.

Mr. Lloyd George: We might get Sir John Cadman here to give us information on the subject.

Mr. Massey: Speaking for myself, I should be very glad. We are depending more and more on oil, and here in the heart of the Empire we are dependent very largely on oil, much more so than in the past, and if there are oil deposits in any country over which we have authority or in any part of the British Empire, I think they should be made available. It is a big subject, and one which we could discuss for hours, but I do not know that we should get any further forward. I want to refer briefly to a point made by Mr. Meighen. Mr. Meighen looks at matters from the Canadian point of view, which is quite right. We have all our rights in this respect, and he must think of the United States. I do not object to that. I think of the United States, too. I think it is exceedingly important that the two English-speaking nations should be able to work together in the future, and if they are able

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

to work together I think it will be well for the history of the world. But the other point I wish to refer to is the point made by Mr. Meighen that at present the Dominions have no say in any representations which may be made, or it might be desirable to make, to the Head of the State, to the Sovereign. I think it is the weakest point in the present arrangements. Many people seem to imagine that the Empire consists only of the United Kingdom and of the four great Dominions and India. That is not the case at all. I think Mr. Churchill mentioned this, but at all events I got the information somewhere, I think correctly. There are over forty of these smaller Governments, Crown Colonies, and Protectorates—there are over forty of them within the British Empire to-day. Now, in this respect they are in a better position than we are. I do not envy them, not a bit, but they are in a better position in this way because, so far as making representations to the Sovereign are concerned, Mr. Churchill speaks for them, and he speaks with authority, but when we go away from here, and I have no fault to find with the attitude of the members of the Government of the United Kingdom, I say during the time I have been coming here they have treated us in a way it is impossible to find fault with, we could not have had better treatment, but still there is the weak point and I think a way out should be found. I know the difficulty. Mr. Hughes and I have a long way to come. Some of the other Prime Ministers have not so far to come as we have, but the fact that we have a long way to come makes it impossible that we should be in consultation with British Ministers the whole of the time unless by cable. Very well, you can do a lot by cable, but in the event of a serious crisis coming along, and one never knows, those who are responsible for the government of the Empire must come face to face. In connection with the declaration of the great European war, it had to be done by cable. There was no other course, and the arrangements worked all right, but there are other possibilities, and this difficulty should be got over somehow or another. If these Conferences—I would like to call them Cabinets—if these Conferences are to be of any value they must be held regularly and the business must be continuous. There must be no gaps such as we have had since we left Paris nearly two years ago. How that is to be avoided I am not able to say. I do not like to suggest a resident Minister because there are difficulties that way. The Minister would only represent the Government so long as it was in office, and when the Government went out of office the chain would be broken, but the intelligence of the men sitting round this table at the present gathering or at some future gathering will be able to get over the difficulty, and if we can get over this difficulty you will strengthen the Empire to a very great extent. I have been attacked in New Zealand about this difficulty. I sat still and said nothing, but I have to admit when I go back that the weakness exists. I do not know how it is to be met, but I must express my opinions there as I have to the members of the Conference and leave it at that, but I do not see any chance of Mr. Hughes or myself coming back next year, and when an election occurs one never knows what may happen, but whether we come back or not it does not matter as far as our interests in the British Empire are concerned. Both of us wish that the connection may be made as strong as it can be made. There is plenty of improvement as far as that is concerned. I will not ask the Conference to listen any longer, but I took the opportunity of expressing an opinion on these points I have mentioned, and I hope in future Conferences some weight will be given to what I have said as coming from New Zealand.

Difficulty of representing Views of Dominions on Foreign Policy.

Mr. Montagu: I wish to say a few words on subjects of special interest to India. Mr. Hughes has spoken to so large an extent, as though he was a representative of India as well as of Australia, that I have not much to say. The two subjects which most closely concern the Government of India to-day are our relations with Turkey and Russia. Our interest in Turkey is based partly on the fact that Indian soldiers are still in occupation of part of the old Turkish Empire, and are very anxious to get home. Secondly, on the fact that, so far as numbers are concerned, Indian soldiers played the leading part in laying Turkey at the feet of the Allies. Thirdly, because about 70 millions of the population of India are Mohammedan in religion, and Turkey has the respect of all sects, and is the leader of one sect of the Mohammedan religion, and the whole of the peace of Asia right from Constantinople to China is affected by the conditions now existing in Turkey. I think the view of India as a whole on the subject will be that after we have insisted upon the payment by Turkey of the just penalty for her share in the war, and I mean by that after the loss by her of the non-Turkish countries, Palestine and Mesopotamia, we hope that real peace will be achieved with Turkey. That Turkish Turkey will be able to live

Turkey.

General Statements on Foreign Policy.

a free and independent existence, and that friendship between Turkey and the British Empire will be restored, and when that happens that fact will have its repercussion right through Asia and one of the greatest anxieties of India will be removed, and what Lord Curzon has told us of what has happened recently between himself and the French leads us to hope very highly that these things will come about. Really, the condition of affairs in regard to Turkey leads me directly to the other problem that is worrying India, *i.e.*, Russia. It may be from different motives or it may be from the same motive disguised, but it looks as if the anxieties which Bolshevik Russia presents are becoming almost identical with those which Czarist Russia presented. That seems to me to be at the bottom of the activities of men like General Brussiloff on behalf of the Bolshevik Government. They are taking an interest in Persia, in Afghanistan, in Turkey, and indirectly in India, just as though they were still possessed of the imperialistic designs of the old Russian Government. There is no doubt of the fact. I think that authorised or unauthorised evidence is accumulating that the Bolshevik Government is pursuing by propaganda, and even, indeed, by preparation for warlike operations, determined action against British interests in the East, and I quite agree with Mr. Hughes when he says that our relations with Russia ought to be discussed and action formulated with a view to dealing with what I think is the accumulating evidence of this sinister purpose on the part of the Bolshevik Government. I have only one other thing, and that is on behalf of India I endorse what Mr. Hughes has said in regard to the Mesopotamian mandate, in regard to the Palestine mandate and in regard to the Greeks. There is no doubt whatever that the Greeks, possibly because of their triumph, are at the present moment showing the fiercest animosity towards any Moslems who happen to be within their reach, and massacres and outrages have been going on recently. As regards Mesopotamia, the view of the Indian Moslem about that is this. That they welcome the determined efforts to form an Arab Government, but they are anxious to avoid seeing a great Moslem country under the domination of a non-Moslem Power, even if that non-Moslem Power be Britain, and therefore the success of Mr. Churchill's efforts to set up an Arab Government is very much welcomed in India.

Russia.

Greece.

Mr. Lloyd George: On the Greek outrages, I think it is fair to say we have a telegram from Constantinople from our representative, that they investigated the Greek and the Moslem outrages and there was no question that the Moslem outrages were worse.

Mr. Montagu: I have seen telegrams from Smyrna, also from our representatives among others, which give terrible accounts of what the Greeks have been doing.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, I know; but this came within the last few days reporting the result of the investigations. I think it is fair that the case should be put for both sides. It is not fair to the Greeks to assume that the outrages were all on one side.

Mr. Montagu: I want to lay stress on the Greek atrocities, because when we talk of Turks in this country we talk of the Armenian massacres and other massacres as if the Turks were the only people who massacred.

Mr. Lloyd George: But it does not put matters right to talk of the Greeks as if they were the only people who massacred.

Mr. Montagu: I certainly did not mean to convey that impression.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think it fair to the Conference that that statement should be made. I am referring to the statement sent within the last few days.

Mr. Montagu: The only other word is in regard to Palestine. The Indian is apprehensive about Zionism, and it affects the susceptibilities of Moslems, but I think they will be reassured by the repeated statements that the rights of the non-Zionist population of Palestine will, of course, be respected as declared in the original announcement made by Mr. Balfour, and my final word is on the subject last raised by Mr. Massey. Under the present Constitution of India the headship of the Government of India, the controlling authority of the Government of India, is still in this country, in the person of the Secretary of State for India in Council, and this is especially true of foreign affairs, but with regard to them I think it only right to say that under the new Constitution the Viceroy and his Government is confronted by an elected Legislature, and it will be essential more and

Status of India in the Empire.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Future Agenda.

more to take stock of the Government of India and its advisers directly when we are discussing foreign affairs in which India is interested.

Mr. Hughes: What is it proposed to do this afternoon?

Mr. Churchill: I should like to say that I was relying on the fact that nothing was set down this afternoon, and I have arranged conferences between Ministers of Canada and the President of the Board of Trade in regard to the very serious question connected with bacon, and later on with General Smuts and Sir Thomas Smartt and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in connection with South African wool, and we thought we should have this afternoon clear to work out these quite important matters.

Mr. Hughes: I did not quite catch all those points.

Mr. Churchill: There is the Canadian question open with the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Food which will certainly take one and a half hours.

Mr. Hughes: I quite see your point, but Mr. Meighan has, in that memorandum of his which he read out, raised points of fundamental importance, which I refrained from saying one word about, but I want to point this out to you, that if they go out . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George: They must not go out. I was going to make a suggestion. I quite agree that this afternoon we cannot continue with our conferences for the reasons indicated by Mr. Churchill, and other business which affects the British Government, and we have more very important conferences this afternoon, which, I am sorry to say, cannot be put off. Questions of the most momentous importance have been raised in the speech of Mr. Meighen, and also by General Smuts, who raises very important points. I think this discussion must continue, as it affects the whole policy of the British Empire, and it would be much easier for us to give the kind of considered opinion we each of us want to give on each of these matters after we have time to reflect upon the statements that have been made.

Mr. Hughes: And I hope also that afterwards you will have a discussion without prejudice; I mean you cannot say what you think of Canada's opinion until you have heard what General Smuts and Mr. Massey and myself have had to say.

Mr. Lloyd George: And that is why I think we should adjourn the discussion of this until Monday afternoon. The propositions laid down by Mr. Meighen go to the very root of the matter; to the very root of the whole question; the relations of the Dominions to the United Kingdom in reference to the control of foreign policy. He has made very practical suggestions, and I think they ought to be considered immediately. I mean by immediately at the very first moment we meet, and there is also the very important issue raised by General Smuts in reference to our general attitude towards the Continent, whether we should continue the old policy as one of more or less isolation, or whether we should seek something in the nature, not exactly of alliances, but what has been known as *Ententes*, more or less co-operation with a particular group. Those are two very important questions, and therefore I suggest that we adjourn until Monday afternoon at 4·30 P.M.

Mr. Hughes: In the meantime, what about publication?

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we had better not publish anything. I think it is very important that we should not publish inconclusive matters.

Mr. Hughes: If that is not done, I shall have to press for an afternoon sitting after an interval has elapsed to enable us to consider this so that a complete report may go out.

Mr. Lloyd George: We are not going to publish it.

Mr. Hughes: That was in case you were.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think they are important enough to take the week-end for consideration. We shall then have certain things raised . . . .

Mr. Churchill: You have said that there are two questions: the constitutional question and the European question. One is the composition and construction of the British Empire, and the other is what ought to be done in relation to what is going on in Europe at the present time. They are very separate, and I think we should not gain a bit if we had them mixed up in the discussion.

Future Agenda.

It would be far better to deal with the constitutional questions at a sitting devoted entirely to them. There are these very broad propositions that Mr. Meighen has put forward, and General Smuts has touched upon, with regard to the Dominions' relation to foreign policy, and there are other constitutional aspects which, I believe, it is desired to touch. That all makes one block of subjects by itself. Quite apart from that is this question of the European situation, which I certainly hope we shall have further discussions upon. I was hoping that they would be kept separate.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think there is a good deal to be said from that point of view, and therefore thought it would be better to bring the general debate to a conclusion before we proceed with the very categorical propositions laid down by Mr. Meighen—to proceed with the general discussion on Monday, because apart altogether from the questions raised by General Smuts, there are one or two important issues raised by Mr. Hughes about Palestine and Mesopotamia, and about Russia. The same thing applies to what Mr. Massey has said, and to Mr. Montagu's statement as to Asia Minor.

Mr. Hughes: On the discussion of Mr. Meighen's points, as Mr. Churchill points out, rests the question of constitutional relations. Now we are dealing with certain matters—defined, concrete, they do not necessarily imply any alteration in the present relations existing between the various parts of the Empire. There is the question of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the question of Naval Defence, what we are to do in relation to it, and other matters. We ought to dispose of these, or at any rate make an attempt to do so before we come to these other things which we certainly cannot now settle around this table. We may come to some sort of an agreement for a future Conference, but we cannot settle the Constitutional question at this Conference. The Angló-Japanese Treaty and Naval Defence are matters which we can settle.

Mr. Chamberlain: That is what the Prime Minister had proposed, and it was accepted by Mr. Meighen and General Smuts, that we should deal with these general questions first and then take up later, when we had had time to consider them, the points put by Mr. Meighen as to our constitutional relations.

Mr. Hughes: I have no objection.

Mr. Meighen: Then on Monday we go on with a further discussion of Lord Curzon's statement.

Mr. Lloyd George: And the issues raised by the Dominion Prime Ministers, and, on behalf of India the specific issues apart from the constitutional proposals put forward by you.

Mr. Meighen: I did not believe that I had been the father of any constitutional proposals. I thought I had merely stated what I believed to be the present position. I may be wrong in my statement of it, but, while made with care, it was not made with the thought that it was going to be attacked. However, we may discuss on Monday what has taken place in the last two and a half years, and suggestions of the nature of those made by General Smuts. I may have something to say or I may not, but I think we should get away from general discussions and on to concrete discussions, particularly upon the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Let us get to them as soon as we can because I do not think we will get very far unless definite subjects are before us. When we have these, all those other things will come on, and if we can regard ourselves now as merely defining the lines upon which the Dominions are prepared that the Government should proceed in the determination of foreign questions, that might be stated as the subject of the present discussion, and let us go through them as soon as we can and get to the concrete, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and from that we can discuss arrangements for carrying on communications between us on this very topic until we meet again.

Mr. Lloyd George: May I say this word—these are very concrete things for us which you have raised to-day. We have got to come to decisions from day to day, and Lord Curzon has actually to send despatches and proposals to foreign Governments based upon the general policy of the British Empire. Therefore, you have raised three or four questions which are of practical importance to us, and it is very important for us to know what the general views of the Empire are, as Lord Curzon's despatches will be fashioned according to what the general policy of the Empire is, and therefore it is not merely an abstract discussion, it is a very

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Future Agenda.

concrete matter so far as we are concerned, and a very immediate one in reference to some matters—the Greek question and the Russian question, and the question raised by General Smuts on our attitude in Europe. They are day-to-day questions with us.

Mr. Massey: And we should arrive at an understanding as soon as possible.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Meighen said "the concrete questions." Does he include the question he brought up this morning? Is that a concrete question?

Mr. Meighen: I do not know that that is a concrete question.

Mr. Hughes: I want to know.

Mr. Meighen: If we are to discuss one of the subjects mentioned by the Prime Minister in his first invitation to this Conference, what I have said has to do with that, and in that respect would be a concrete question—that is a discussion on the mechanism of a continuous conference between now and the constitutional conference.

It is concrete in that respect. I do not know what raised it, but it has to do with that.

Mr. Hughes: Do you mean, Mr. Prime Minister, by concrete questions, questions such as what do we think about your policy in Russia and that sort of thing, or policy in Greece?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, I regard those as concrete questions, as affecting day by day the decisions which we have to come to, and on which Lord Curzon is sent to France and every part of the world.

Mr. Hughes: And on which you wish us to express our opinion on your conduct of the business?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, not our conduct in the past, but what lines we are to take in future. Two or three questions have been partly raised by you and partly by General Smuts, Mr. Massey and Mr. Montagu. Those are very practical questions.

General Smuts: All questions of foreign policy, I take it?

Mr. Lloyd George: It is very important we should carry the Empire along with us on the lines we take.

Will 4·30 suit you on Monday? Perhaps we had better meet on Monday at 3·30. There is nothing further this afternoon here. There are conferences at the Colonial Office, but we will meet here again at 3·30 on Monday. The Anglo-Japanese matter will come up on Tuesday.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, June* 24, 1921.

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SECRET.

E 7th Meeting.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1921, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir W. H. HERRIES, K.C.M.G.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Foreign Policy. Discussion on

Mr. Montagu: I should like, if I may, to make a statement about one of my observations on Foreign Policy last Friday. I drew the attention of the Conference to the atrocities committed by the Greeks in Turkey. You pointed out to the Conference at the time that I had given a one-sided impression because of a telegram which you had received which contained this sentence: "Many atrocities by both Greeks and Turks were discovered by the Commission under Franks and Farmar; latter, *i.e.*, the atrocities committed by the Turks—predominated." I was basing myself upon a previous report of the Commission presided over by Colonel Farmar which had been circulated to the Foreign Office, and I had not seen that telegram. I thought it fair to state the evidence showed that atrocities had been committed by both sides.

Mr. Lloyd George: And that, according to our Commissioners, the latter predominated.

Mr. Montagu: According to that telegram from our Commissioners.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, that shall be put right. I think it was arranged at our last meeting that the three postulates laid down by Mr. Meighen with regard to the discussion on foreign politics, or rather the keeping in touch between the United Kingdom and the Dominions and India on questions of foreign policy, should be discussed separately, and that we should first of all dispose of the discussion on the general principles of our foreign policy before we came either to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or to the three principles laid down by Mr. Meighen. I think that was generally agreed. Therefore, the discussion is now open on the questions raised by General Smuts, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Massey and Mr. Montagu. Do you want to say anything, Mr. Meighen, on General Smuts' propositions about the principles that ought to dominate our conduct of foreign policy in Europe?

Mr. Meighen: General Smuts followed me on that matter.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes, do you wish to say anything about what fell from . . . .

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Meighen?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, we shall have to discuss that separately. Do you wish to say anything on the questions raised by General Smuts about our policy in Europe?

Mr. Hughes: I am afraid I have misunderstood. I have been considering what Mr. Meighen said, supposing you intended to deal with that. I omitted to speak on it at the time, being under the impression that it would be discussed later.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, that is to be taken on a later date.

Mr. Hughes: Unfortunately I have not given that close attention to the report of General Smuts' statement to be able to offer a useful contribution to the discussion.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do you wish to say anything about it, Mr. Massey?

Future of the Dardanelles.

Mr. Massey: Not exactly on what General Smuts said. As a matter of fact I forgot it was coming on this afternoon. There is one point I might have referred to in dealing with the statement by Lord Curzon; that is to say, the position of the Dardanelles. I do not think the Dardanelles were mentioned by Lord Curzon so far as I can recollect; if so, I did not notice it. I do not quite know what the position is to-day myself, but I should like to express the hope, now that the opportunity offers, that the Dardanelles will not be allowed to go back to the Turks, but will be kept open for the commerce of the world. I suppose the Dardanelles will in future be under an international control, but no definite arrangement appears to have been made up to the present.

Lord Curzon: That is not quite the case. Your proposal is axiomatic, and the war would have been fought in vain if it were not to result in an arrangement which would render impossible the shutting of the Dardanelles by Turkey at any time in the future. What happened was this—in the first version of the Treaty of Sèvres which was drawn up, the safety of the Straits in the future was provided for in this way. Forces representing the Allies were to hold both shores of the Dardanelles, Gallipoli on the north, and Chanak on the south, and there was to be a demilitarised zone several miles in width, running along both the northern shores of the

Marmora and the southern shores of the Marmora, within which area the existing forts should be destroyed, no new forts erected, and no new forces maintained. The Allied Powers, with such forces as they chose to keep at Constantinople, would be at liberty at any time to go into this area to see that the conditions of the Treaty were being observed, the whole object of the arrangement being that not only the Straits themselves, but the whole of the adjacent area, as far as Constantinople, should at no time be used for military or hostile purposes by the Turks. Simultaneously, by the Treaty of Sèvres there was set up a Straits Commission on which were represented the Great Powers who fought and won the war, which was to regulate the navigation of the Straits in the future, the levying of dues, and so on. The only change that has been made in the position is this—that when the Turks and Greeks came to London in the month of March, in our anxiety to come to terms with them and to make things a little easier for the Turk, we modified the original provisions of the Draft Treaty to this extent, that we held as an essential the maintenance of the position at the mouth of the Straits, whether it were held by military force or by naval force, but we reduced the demilitarised zone which was to be occupied by international troops on either shore of the Marmora. That is the position as it stands now, and whatever terms are come to with the Turks in the future, I think the Dominions will agree with me that it is axiomatic that the position at the mouth of the Straits should be maintained, and that the awful sacrifices we made in the war should not have been made in vain.

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

Mr. Massey: The forts have not been destroyed yet?

Lord Curzon: No, but they can be destroyed at any moment. We have not liked to do it because it was a rather aggressive act while the peace negotiations were going on.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think I should like to say something myself on the very important points which have been raised in the course of a very remarkable, and very enlightening, discussion on foreign policy. For the moment I set on one side Mr. Meighen's propositions; we must have a separate discussion on those, because they involve the whole of our arrangements for the future. I thought those propositions were very fairly and concisely expressed, and in so far as the main propositions are concerned I think they are very sound. There is one general principle which he laid down upon which I shall have something to say later on, that does not concern so much the arrangements between us as the weight which is to be attached to the opinion of any particular part of the Empire upon a question of foreign policy which more particularly concerns it. That is a doctrine which may be a very dangerous one if it is literally interpreted. It is perfectly true that when you come to questions which, say, affect Canada more than they affect the other parts of the Empire, we must attach greater weight to the opinion of Canada. I can well understand that Canada will take that view with regard to the United States of America, although it is just as vital to us to be on friendly terms with the United States of Amreica as it is for Canada. It is quite axiomatic here, not merely with Governments but with the people, that we must never quarrel with the United States. It is one of those things which are regarded as quite inconceivable. Nobody ever discusses it, and if anybody is indiscreet enough to do so, there is a general feeling throughout the whole of the assembly that that man has committed an indiscretion of first-class magnitude. But when you come to Canada, I think you can well understand their feeling that their position is a very different one from that of either the other Dominions or Great Britain. There they are. They have a frontier of thousands of miles coterminous with the United States of America; they have very special relations in reference to that frontier, in reference to their trade, and also in reference to those great waters that divide the frontiers. The arrangements in respect of these things have been left entirely to Canada; we have never dreamt of interfering, and the arrangements have always been made direct, and I can well understand Canada feeling that there are special reasons why she should be represented at Washington by a Minister, seeing that all the business has been transacted directly up to the present between the two countries. But when you come to the question of one Dominion or of one country, whether the United Kingdom or the Dominions, or India, because there are special interests in regard to a question, having a decisive voice in determining it, that is a very dangerous doctrine, because we are all involved once anything happens. The case of the United States with Canada is only one case. The other case is of India in reference to the Turkish Empire. India has a very special point of view. India has got 80,000,000 Mohammedans. They are very specially concerned because of their religious

Importance attached to the views of Dominion particularly interested in Empire's Policy.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

sympathies with the Turk. That is their point of view. It is a very special point of view, and, as everybody who has heard discussions in this Cabinet knows, it has been taken into consideration in fashioning our policy. Take the question of Constantinople. We have had a very serious discussion at this table as to whether the Turks should be excluded from Constantinople or not. Some of the most influential members of our Government were in favour of the Turk going out of Europe altogether, but I think it would be conceded that the determining factor in favour of retaining him was the Indian point of view.

If we had not got the Indian point of view, we should certainly have turned the Turk out of Constantinople. It was the one argument which, I think, turned us, and Mr. Montagu will recognise that. The same thing applies to other questions in connection with the Turkish Empire, because the Turk was guilty of an act of very deliberate treachery to an old friend, who pulled him out of many difficulties in the Crimea war and in 1878. He has been supplied not merely with money, but by troops repeatedly, by Great Britain, by France and by Italy. The three gave their direct assistance to him at the most critical years in his history, and here, when we were fighting for our lives, the three of us, when it was very doubtful whether we could win, when we had very great anxiety up to the last moment, the Turk slams the doors of the Dardanelles in our faces and by that means undoubtedly prolonged the war by two years. The trouble in Russia is directly attributable to the Turk. We could not get at Russia to help her. If the Turk had been true to us we could have got to Russia in 1915, when we knew she was short of shells and of rifles. But we could not get there. We could not get Roumania to our side because Roumania was afraid, and we could not give her the necessary start, and when Roumania collapsed, we could not get near her, because the doors of the Dardanelles were closed.

Russia would not have collapsed if Turkey had come in, and if Russia had not collapsed the war would have come to an end probably in 1916—certainly in 1917—so that the destruction of the last two years, which has made such a difference in the reconstruction of the world, which added millions to the casualties and which is more directly responsible for the shattering of Europe than anything else—that is directly attributable to the Turk. Well, in dealing with the Turk, we were entitled to deal with him very sternly and severely, and the one thing that has restrained us has been the opinion of our Mohammedan fellow-subjects in India and the consideration we had for them, and the appeals that came from them. I agree with Mr. Meighen. We were bound to take into account their opinion, exactly as we are bound to take the opinion of Canada into account when we come to settle questions with America, but when the Mohammedans of India say, "You must take our opinion altogether on the subject," there I feel we must challenge that. We say you are not entitled to that, but you are entitled to say, "We made a great contribution." You are entitled to say that this especially affects us, but you are not entitled to say because "we have given special contribution, you must defer entirely to it," and, although we may attach special importance to the view which has been taken by one particular Dominion or by India on a particular subject, the Empire, as a whole, has the right to decide the policy, giving due weight to the special considerations that affect one part of it.

Mr. Meighen: I think you have rather overstated my position. I do not think you will find in my remarks anything in regard to the exclusion of the others.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is all right. I only wanted to safeguard that position as a general proposition—that is all. Well, now I come to General Smuts's review of the state of Europe and his statement of what he conceived to be the sound policy for the Empire to adopt. Although he disclaimed anything in the nature of a policy of isolation, I do not quite see where he would establish a dividing line between a policy of isolation and the policy which we have pursued. We have signed a Treaty. Well, we could say," "We have signed that Treaty and we have no further interest in it. Now, then, Poland could break it, the Czecho-Slovakians could break it, France could break it, and Germany could break it, but we are done with it the moment the ink is dry and we have no further interest." I do not think General Smuts went as far as that, although I do not quite follow him in his policy. I do not quite comprehend the extent to which he would go. General Smuts said that we were in danger of being dragged at the heels of France. Well, that is true, and the impression left on his mind was that we were being dragged into Conference after Conference. One Conference, 10 per cent., as he has put it, and the next

Empire's Policy in Europe.

Conference 15 per cent., but percentage by percentage somehow or other being dragged down to the position which France had adopted. I had just that preceding day had a very interesting conversation with the most distinguished of all French statesmen, M. Clemenceau, and he used exactly the same words as General Smuts, but in the reverse sense. He said, "I will tell you why France is so suspicious." "We are talking," he said, "as old friends."

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

Mr. Hughes: M. Clemenceau?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes. He was with me one hour and a quarter, and he said, "I have no official position and I do not want to interfere, but, as old friends, let me tell you the impression in France. Somehow or other, you are pulling down the French, Conference after Conference, by some 10 per cent."—he always used to say it was 10 per cent.—"until we left them with nothing."

Lord Curzon: Now they have been postponing the next meeting of the Supreme Council for the last two months, in order not to be pulled down again—that is what I was told in Paris.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is more like what has happened. If you look at the position taken up by the French, and if you follow the whole of the Conferences step by step, you will find they are gradually being brought down to what I conceive to be a more reasonable frame of mind. Each successive Conference, whether you take Reparations, whether you take the Ruhr Valley, or coal, or disarmament, they have gradually proceeded Conference by Conference to postponement, to modifications, and to alterations. That is the charge brought against French statesmen, that, when they go into Conference with England, they allow themselves to be persuaded out of the position which they have taken up. Take the last Conference of all on Reparations. It is alleged by M. Briand's critics that he gave a definite undertaking that he would occupy the Ruhr Valley on the 1st May whatever happened. He came here having given that pledge, and there was a prolonged discussion. He did not occupy the Ruhr Valley, neither on the 1st May nor since. He reduced his claims very considerably, and we had an agreement which was so satisfactory that even the Germans themselves felt that, as a whole, it was the most reasonable proposition which had been put before them. But you take the bulk of the French ex-Ministers, like M. Poincaré. Their view is that M. Briand has given it completely away, and it was a fact that he had already signed a document, and that they had to decide between quarrelling with the Allies and pressing their own policy. That is the fact that induced them finally to accept Briand's agreement. Therefore, so far from being dragged further and further behind France, we had undoubtedly exercised a very restraining influence upon her. There is a strong feeling in France in favour of occupying the Ruhr. Their policy is to destroy Germany and occupy the Ruhr themselves, and hand over the Silesian coalfields to Poland. When that is done you have practically taken the lungs of Germany away—her right and left lung—and it is a poor anæmic thing left, and only kept alive with such oxygen as it gets from outside.

Well, that is the French conception of the Germany of the future—I don't mean of men like Clemenceau or Briand, but there is a very powerful party in France which would like to reduce Germany to that condition. Well, now supposing we disinterested ourselves in Europe, attended no more Conferences; the French have always now got the answer that Britain and Italy are taking a strong line, and they must carry their Allies along. Well, are we to say to France, "We are not going to take any further interest in the matter?" The French Ministers are face to face with a rather Chauvinistic Chamber led by men like M. Poincaré, who, not having done very well in the war, want to show how courageous they are in peace, and they are constantly prodding French opinion to very extreme and to very violent action. I should, therefore, have thought it was very unwise from the point of view of the peace of Europe that we should withdraw from these Conferences and take away our restraining hand, as it were, from France. Italy would have no influence—none. The French, no doubt, would treat her with great contempt in all these Conferences, and if Italy were to attend these Conferences, the French would barely pay the civility of consulting her, and would just take their own action. Well, that would be a very fatal thing for Europe. Germany cannot strike now, but she will be able to do so later on, and it would be a very fatal step if we simply accumulate causes of future war in the system of Europe. It would be compressing all these wrongs, until one day there would be an explosion and we should be inevitably affected by

Effect of disassociating the Empire from France.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

what happened. I am not going to predict in the least what may happen in Europe, but Mr. Massey said a very shrewd thing when he called attention to the possibilities of a rapprochement between Russia and Germany. After all, when France was beaten in 1871, she looked out for powerful Allies. Up to that moment, she was entirely at the mercy of Germany. Germany was constantly bullying her, even to the extent of dismissing her Ministers—I remember one of their Foreign Ministers being practically dismissed by an edict from Berlin.

Lord Curzon: Because he agreed with us.

Mr. Lloyd George: Just a word from Berlin, and he had to go. So that France was humiliated almost beyond endurance. She was entirely at the mercy of Germany. We could not protect her alone, and then came the Russian Alliance. From that moment, the whole position altered. There were, of course, military advisers of Germany who thought Germany was strong enough to fight both, but still, there was an element of doubt, and Germany showed considerably more restraint and respect in her treatment of France after that Alliance than before. Well, Germany will probably, German statesmen will probably, attempt, will at any rate seek, the same combination, and probably succeed in establishing the same combination. There is one common ground of hatred between the Russians and the Germans, and that is the Poles. They both loathe the Poles, both have a great contempt for the Poles, and the Poles are doing their very best to stimulate both of them to a common hatred, and it is by no means impossible that Germany and Russia—I do not mean the present Russia, but some sort of regenerated Russia, whether it is imperial or monarchical or republican, I do not know, but the present system cannot possibly go on—will seek friendship and co-operation with Germany, and Germany is the only country that can regenerate Russia economically. She is the only country that has the resources, the contiguity, the opportunity for doing it. I do not know of any other country that can do it, and therefore Russia and Germany are bound to each other to seek some sort of partnership, beginning perhaps with an economic partnership, ending with a diplomatic one, and it is not impossible that they may develop into a military rapprochement. That is the story of these friendships. The old causes of quarrel have vanished. They have no coterminous frontiers to begin with. The old trouble between the Austrians and the Slavs, which was constantly provoking hostile diplomatic action in Berlin against Moscow, that is completely gone, and they have no further causes of quarrel; in fact, the Slav, who before divided them, will now unite them, and for that reason the development of Europe may be on the lines of two very formidable groups facing each other, or, if France persists in her folly, France may find herself alone against the most formidable military combination that the world has ever seen. What France does not reckon upon is this. She sees Germany is now disarmed, and as long as she is disarmed she can never strike. The moment she enters into a great alliance with a powerful military empire, that source of weakness completely vanishes because there is no treaty which can prevent Russia from arming. She can raise armies, she can equip armies, and there is only one thing which can prevent her raising armies and equipping them, and that is an unwise economic system that impoverishes the country. The moment that disappears—Russia is a country of infinite natural resources; there is no country in Europe that is comparable to Russia in its natural resources—once you had an energetic race like the Germans applying their mastery to conquering those hidden riches, and if they also apply their brains to organising and equipping armies the mere fact that Germany had got a helpless population would make no difference at all, because there you have a virile race. For at any rate twenty or thirty years there will be millions of men in Germany who would know the use of arms and who are trained. There will be the material. We know perfectly well how armies can be raised here. We had the means that enabled us to raise and train armies—the old non-commissioned and commissioned officers, multitudes of them, who had left the army ten, twenty, thirty years ago, all came back, and all having their old skill and fitted to train perfectly raw material, but good material. You will find the same thing in Germany, and therefore France, in pursuing this policy of driving the Germans into fierce but suppressed hatred, is guilty, I think, of the greatest act of folly which any race has ever perpetrated. It has produced the destruction of Germany, and unless France pursues a much wiser cause in future, it may very well end in a more complete destruction of France than anything that has ever been inflicted upon her.

Probable future course of events in Russia and Germany.

But to keep out of it, not to try and restrain France, is no kindness to France, no kindness to Germany, no kindness to Europe, and no kindness to the world,

because, once war begins, the last war shows you cannot guarantee its frontiers. It was like a prairie fire, and you would find the whole world would be drawn into it, and next time it would be a war of a kind that might very well overthrow civilisation, because they were just beginning, in the last year or two, to get on to devices of such a destructive character that if the war had gone on another year or two you would have had great cities laid in ruins. The Germans were preparing infinitely greater machines to destroy London, and if we had gone on for another three weeks our machines would have been bombing Berlin, because they were quite ready and we were only waiting for the weather. By the next war, all these things will have been perfected. When you get on to the question whether there is any advantage to be gained by giving to France the guarantee we were prepared to give her jointly with the United States of America, that is a question I do not want to express an opinion on at the present moment, because I think we must discuss it separately, but it has been represented to me from very many quarters that from even the French point of view it is not desirable to press it upon them just yet, even if we came to the conclusion that it was desirable at any time. For the moment, however, I will not say anything about that.

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

There was a question put about Russian trade.

General Smuts: May I just say this? I do not want to prolong the debate. Your answer to me is the very thing that makes me afraid. It is the sort of consideration that is running through my mind, that France is building up a system, almost by conscious effort she is building up a system in Europe which has even the danger you fear. By her policy of fostering suppressed hatred with the Germans, keeping Germany weak, keeping Germany in a perpetual unrest and weakness, she is consolidating this great central eastern block that we fear is a nightmare for years. After the war is over her policy is stimulating this to life. What is going to be our position if we attach ourselves too closely to France in this policy of hers? All you see I am pleading for is not isolation, but greater independence, but I am very much afraid if we ally ourselves closely to France while she is pursuing these ends in European politics, we are going to jeopardise the British Empire very seriously in time to come. I know how difficult it is to keep out of a conflagration that may break out, but I would not like to see the British Empire taking wrong sides from the very start, but to see her independent and claim her independence, and speak her independence, let everyone know of her independence; let Russia know it, let Germany know it, that we are not tied to this policy by way of an alliance or *Entente* or any practical co-operation. That is really all I am at. I feel that a new alignment is already taking place in the politics of Europe. There is a development which is going to produce far-reaching results in twenty or thirty years. I see the beginning of the parting of the ways, and it is because of that I am raising this note of warning. I do not criticise the policy of the Government. When I speak of 10 per cent., do not take it as criticism, but it is so important for us to be very wide awake at this stage, and not, out of pity for France, or out of the idea of keeping a controlling hand on her, implicate ourselves too deeply in her policy, and in the end get thrown into what may be the sort of thing you are describing.

Disadvantages of Alliance with France.

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not think there is any essential difference between us on that, but you see, so far from our being drawn into it, the French view is that we are using our position of friendship rather to restrain her and prevent her doing what she wants. I will give you a test. Suppose you said to Germany now, to some German statesman: "Would you like Great Britain to come out altogether?"

General Smuts: I do not think they would.

Mr. Lloyd George: They regard our presence at the Council of the Allies as a guarantee of fair treatment in so far as we can possibly influence the judgment of that body. So it is. Silesia is a case in point.

General Smuts: Undoubtedly.

Mr. Lloyd George: If it had not been for our intervention there the whole of that country would have been taken by the Poles.

General Smuts: But for our intervention Silesia would have gone to Poland two years ago.

Mr. Lloyd George: That was due to the action of the British Empire. We considered the case very fairly. Everybody, you will remember, expressed his opinion individually, and we came unanimously to the conclusion that a case had

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

been made there for a reconsideration of the decision of the Commissioners—the negotiators—in respect of that part of the German Empire.

Mr. Meighen: What advantage is it in this very work walking hand in hand with France and having that comradeship in European policies? What advantage is that over the position you would be in if you stood as you were before there was such a compact? Your strength would be just the same.

Advantages of Association with France.

Mr. Lloyd George: I will tell you the advantage I think it is. I think we have greater influence with the French opinion such as it is. It gets very excited and very abusive, but in the end Briand gets up, as he did in the Chamber, and he says: "If you want to quarrel with Great Britain—he did not mean a war—you had better find somebody else." He instantly converted a hostile majority into a friendly majority for a peaceful settlement. You see as long as we maintain some sort of friendship we do exercise a very considerable influence, I think, upon French opinion. That, I think, is the only reason, whereas if we stood apart—M. Clemenceau was putting this to me on Thursday, "You are making a very great mistake thinking we are a greedy people. No doubt there is a very powerful section of the French opinion which takes that view, but the bulk of the French people are sick and tired of war. They have suffered very severe losses, and they do not want any more fighting, and it is with great difficulty that they can find young men to go to their training institutions for officers. They cannot get the officers. That is even the class who are supposed to be militarists, who have had enough of militarism for some time to come." But when you come to Paris, the journals are so militaristic and there is a very powerful class there which has a considerable influence upon the Government, and I think that is the only answer I can give to that.

Lord Curzon: I will make that even stronger. Being at the Foreign Office I am in daily contact with the thing, and I say our influence is considerable. It is the dominating factor in Europe at this moment. I do not say this at least in the sense of private conquest, but I am impressed at every Conference we go to by the fact that in the last resort the voice of England remains, and I think General Smuts was complaining we did not adopt a policy of sufficient independence. That, I think, is the word he used. There are at the present moment six cases which I have to deal with in which our policy is almost one of complete independence. Now the question of Silesia is one, and I shudder to think if we took away our hand from the helm what would happen in Silesia. The question of the Ruhr is another. We have so far succeeded in keeping France out of the Ruhr. In the Middle East there is another, and if our solution turns out successful, in so far as it is based on the European policy which is profoundly distasteful to France, in that respect we are working on lines independent of her. In regard to the economic rehabilitation of Germany, there on the subject of reparations we have pursued an independent line. The same thing in regard to Russia, and I think our foreign policy constitutes General Smuts' desiderata, that it is coupled with a large measure of independence, and at the same time it is successful. I will add one other consideration which is often forgotten. This is our obligation. We went to Paris and we signed these Peace Treaties. We are the greatest living guarantee for a successful execution of these Peace Treaties, and it is inconceivable from the point of view of ethics of honour, that we should take our hand from the plough now and let the thing go back into chaos, as it would. I think the view of national honour alone compels us to go on.

Mr. Meighen: There is no difference there as I understand it. We cannot take our hand from the plough at all. By having it understood that we are marching closer to France than we are to other countries we are putting ourselves in this position. France expects more of us. If we do not follow France, in France the resentment is all the greater because they feel they have the right to call upon us. We have the same problem in our country in a much minor degree, but that is exactly what I would expect.

Mr. Lloyd George: We can discuss that when we come to the specific question of whether we shall sign that document. There is no doubt at all that the French are acting in such a way as to make it very difficult for Germany not to contemplate vengeance.

Yesterday I heard of a case in Germany where a French officer was passing a German house and heard the music of the "Wacht am Rhein" being sung. There was a wedding ceremony, and festive words were being sung to the tune. He went

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

in there—prosecuted these people for singing that, and fined them 25,000 fr. for singing the music of the "Wacht am Rhein" even inside Germany with words which were applicable to a wedding ceremony. Of course this has gone right through Germany, and there are a good many incidents of this kind. There is the question of the black troops and other questions which have led to this thing.

Mr. Massey: The black troops have been withdrawn.

Mr. Lloyd George: They were withdrawn from Frankfort.

General Smuts: That is one of the worst features in their policy.

Mr. Churchill: No.

Mr. Chamberlain: If we were to withdraw or assert our independence in the point of disassociating from France, France would really stand master of Europe, and Italy or Belgium would never offer remonstrances to France.

Mr. Lloyd George: Everybody who has attended the Supreme Council is aware of that. There is a sentiment on both sides.

There is not nearly the same sentiment as there was a year ago. The thing that started it was the occupation of Frankfort in spite of the British protest. That gave a sharp shock to English opinion and I noticed it again over Poland.

General Smuts: This Korfanty business must have had some influence.

Mr. Lloyd George: The British opinion there was quite unanimous.

Mr. Chamberlain: In a debate in the House of Commons the other day, which was very thinly attended, but all were thinking men, friendship with France was put on the same level for Europe, as friendship with America for the rest of the world, as an essential basis in our foreign policy.

Mr. Churchill: A sudden, violent, brutal casting away of France, leaving her to fend for herself, would, I am sure, produce a revulsion of feeling in this country of a formidable character. There are thousands of graves in France, and the people of this country cannot put their hearts on a cause like this and spin round quickly. They would be quite upset if there was a violent casting off of France.

Reparations.

Chairman: On reparations, I do not know whether Mr. Hughes wants to speak

Mr. Hughes: I asked you to tell us something about what you intended to do with regard to reparations and Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have a note about that. On reparation we can have either a statement made here at this table showing exactly what has happened, or we can have a paper circulated.

Lord Curzon: It is being prepared.

Mr. Hughes: A printed paper, and we can discuss it afterwards.

Mr. Lloyd George: In regard to this, I think it has been a very satisfactory chapter on the whole. It has been a pretty long story—there are a good many chapters in it—but from chapter to chapter we have got to a satisfactory conclusion, and a conclusion which, on the whole, has satisfied financially opinion in all these countries, and I think it is a very good basis upon which to operate.

Mr. Hughes: When is the first payment to be made?

Mr. Chamberlain: The first payment has already been made.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, £50,000,000 has already been paid. That is a very remarkable thing. They are making no fuss about it. £50,000,000 in gold.

Mr. Massey: Mostly to France and Belgium.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do not commit yourself to that altogether. At any rate it has been paid.

Mr. Hughes: How much are you going to pay? After all, we are concerned in this.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are going to have a paper explaining the whole thing and you had better raise the question afterwards.

Mr. Hughes: Quite right.

Groupings of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not want to go into that now, there is another matter going on which might be a very important one, and that is the organisation of the nations in South-Eastern Europe—Roumania, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Poland will be troublesome whichever way matters go. That is another very formidable group, and I never thought the League of Nations would put an end to this. You might just as well expect a Parliament to bring the party system to an end as to expect the League of Nations to put an end to grouping.

Mr. Balfour: It goes further than that. We are contemplating an amendment in the League of Nations in which groupings are encouraged.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is stronger still. In every assembly you are bound to have grouping.

General Smuts: It seems to me that fifty or one hundred countries in a League of Nations is too unwieldy. They must be grouped.

Mr. Lloyd George: They will be grouped. In every assembly you are bound to have groups formed; this is the criticism that you generally have, that any sort of understanding with France is incompatible with the real faith of the League of Nations. I have heard Lord Robert Cecil say that many times. You have this understanding inside the League just as you had it before the League was established. Somebody will get up and propose something, and you feel they will support you. We always felt that Japan was backing us, but you never know where she is. That is what will happen, you will not get rid of this grouping by any League you establish.

Trading with Russia.

Now I come to Russian trading. With regard to Russian trading, up to the present the amount of trade with us is three and a half millions of orders of various kinds. I sent to the Board of Trade for information on this point and this is what I got. The agreement, which dates from the 16th March, has produced three and a half millions. That is not so bad. It is very much better than I anticipated. One of the supreme reasons which dictated that action on our part was that we knew there was considerable unemployment coming, and on every platform you had labour leaders saying that this was due to the fact that we were refusing to take orders from Russia. They said, "Here is Russia with no end of gold and wanting all kinds of goods, and if you would open the door to trading with Russia, you would get orders which would keep you fully employed." I told them at the time they must not expect anything of the kind, but it was of importance to get the agreement signed in order to put an end to that delusion. All the same it has produced more orders than I ever anticipated. It has produced three and a half millions at a time when it is almost impossible to get orders from any part of the world. Orders have fallen off from old customers, and here comes Russia with these orders, and with a guarantee, evidently satisfactory to the firms who have accepted the orders, that payment will be made.

Mr. Hughes: What are the conditions that govern relations between Great Britain and Russia, are there any?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, considerable conditions. As a matter of fact we did send them along immediately, but if Mr. Hughes would like it, we can circulate a copy of the conditions.

Mr. Hughes: When were these drawn up and agreed to?

Mr. Lloyd George: On the 16th March.

Mr. Hughes: When were they sent out? I referred to these in my speech.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am certain we sent out the actual conditions.

M. Hughes: If you did send them, and they arrived while I was there, the thing escaped my memory.

General Smuts: Not only was the agreement sent us, but the British Government also asked us whether we would adhere to it, and I looked through the agreement, and most of the conditions seemed to me to be rather peculiar. We can trade with Russia at any time and adhere to the agreement or not.

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: We will certainly circulate that document. Whoever has got the charge of it shall circulate it. It took a month to go out, and it may not have arrived before you left. It was only on the 16th March that it was signed. I only want to say one or two words about Anatolia. This is going to be one of our most difficult problems; but I should like to recall to those who were present at the Peace Conference in Paris what actually happened. We had a Commission set up—an Inter-Allied Commission—to settle the question of the boundaries. We were represented on that Commission by Sir Robert Borden during the Conference. We have acted in every respect upon his recommendations.

Anatolia.

General Smuts: Did they make a report?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes they did, and I have consulted it since. Sir Robert Borden made recommendations to which France, ourselves and the United States of America agreed. With regard to Anatolia, France and ourselves agreed. Italy refused to come in or even to express an opinion. She said she would express no opinion as to how the future of Anatolia was going to be regulated. We knew what that meant. Italy wanted Smyrna, and therefore would not agree, and then President Wilson afterwards agreed with France and with ourselves about Smyrna; and, as Lord Curzon reminded the Conference, Sonnino then started to occupy one port after another. We took no action. Then he came to Mersina. That was very much nearer.

Lord Curzon: Mersina is right round the corner.

Mr. Lloyd George: No, I do not think it is Mersina; it is Marmarice. That was his next step, they occupied that port. We took no action then.

Then one morning we discovered he had occupied Scala Nova, and there was no point in that, unless he meant to go to Smyrna. He was getting very near. He never consulted his colleagues; he did it without intimating us of it.

Mr. Hughes: How long ago was that?

Mr. Lloyd George: While we were actually sitting. Then the Supreme Council had a talk, and we came to the conclusion that he really meant to occupy Smyrna, and that his troops had been landed there with a view to occupying the whole of that vilayet. It was decided that Veniselos should be asked to occupy Smyrna, seeing that the Commissioners of the Powers, all except Italy, had reported in favour of Smyrna going to the Greeks. Sir Robert Borden was very strongly in favour of it. We consulted him at that time because he was the one who took a special interest in the matter and examined it on our behalf. That is the story. Well, the Greeks now say: "Yes, you used us," and they say it in a document which came to-day, "you had no troops of your own, neither you nor France, the only troops available were Italian troops, and you knew that they would occupy it for themselves. So you used our army, ours being the only army available. You kept us there for two or three years, you reported in our favour, you actually framed a Treaty with Turkey based upon the recommendation of your Commissioners, and now, two or three years after, because it does not suit you, because you are in trouble in Palestine and Mesopotamia, you say: 'Thank you very much, would you mind clearing out.' You do not even say: 'Well, we will pay you for having done our work.' We are a poor people, you have actually stopped our issuing necessary credits even in our own country, and you will not do what is always done in every war, what the Americans did with you when they were neutrals, you will not even allow us to buy material in your country for which we are prepared to pay; you do not give us the benefit which neutrals usually give to a country."

Mr. Balfour: I cannot see why we did that.

Mr. Lloyd George: Neither can I. At any rate, that is the position, which they challenge. Then there is another thing which I think the Conference must know. Our military advisers have taken a very low estimate of the Greek forces, and whenever we have had a report from them coming from Constantinople, the Greek forces have been put at their very lowest in *moral*, numbers, valour, leadership, and in everything else, and this was the position a year ago which we announced to M. Veniselos. On the other hand, Mustapha Kemal, the Anatolian man, had been represented as a man of towering pre-eminence, of an irresistible prowess, and with a tremendous army. Those were the reports we used to get from the East. I then sent for M. Veniselos, and said: "Are you not in a very perilous position? Your

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

armies are there, and Mustapha Kemal is a tremendous fellow, and he has got Turks." M. Veniselos said: "What would you like me to do; if you would like me to clear Mustapha Kemal out of the way, I will undertake to do it in a month." Then we said: "Can you get right through to the Dardanelles?" "Yes," he said, "give me so many days, and I will get through." We said: "This is a military proposition, and we cannot express an opinion about it"; but Marshal Foch happened to be coming over to this country, so we thought the best plan was to get M. Veniselos to meet Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson. I think Lord Curzon and I were there, also M. Millerand, but we cleared out and left him with the soldiers. We said: "This is a military proposition." They came out, having agreed to M. Veniselos's proposition. Veniselos did it in less time than he had undertaken; he scattered Mustapha Kemal, who was supposed to be an irresistible soldier. It is perfectly true, we discover now that he had not very great forces, but we were told then that he had. That is the point. Now, the same thing has happened again. We were told a very short time ago that the Greek army was an army of 47,000, completely demoralised, which was not nearly as good an army as it was a year ago, and that it was very badly led. It is perfectly true they made one attack which was badly led, but I could point to a good many attacks on our part which were not complete successes. That is bound to happen in the history of any army. With the French army the same thing applied. Unfortunately, the German army was the best army at that time, but they also made mistakes. These things happen with much better equipped armies and armies of greater experience. We were told there were only 47,000. We met and decided that perhaps before we took this estimate we had better send somebody over to find out. We left it to the Chief of the Staff, who is certainly not pro-Greek; in fact, I think he would not challenge the statement if I said he were rather Turcophile. At any rate, he is a soldier, and we said: "Choose your soldier," and he said, "I will send Colonel Nairn, who is there on the spot; it would take too long to send a man from this country." I said: "Is he a good soldier?" He said: "Yes, he is a first class soldier, and a very intelligent soldier." He has sent this report, and I think you ought to see it; it contains two pages, and therefore I can only barely summarise it. It turns out that there are 200,000 Greeks. That means that they have got now 100,000 efficients at the least; that, so far from the last mobilisation having been a failure, it has been a great success; that, so far from the *moral* of the Greek troops being low, it was never better, and his report is that they are better than they were last year. There are one or two weak leaders there, but so there are in every army. But his report on the leadership is that it is first rate. That is the position.

Greek Army at the present time.

We have been trying to meet it, and we have asked the Greeks if they would place themselves in our hands. I think if it were purely us they would do so, because I think on the whole they know that we would be fair, but they know that putting themselves in the hands of the Allies means putting themselves in the hands of France and Italy. Italy does not care about the Mussulmans; that is not what she is after, but she hates Greece. As the Foreign Secretary pointed out, there is rivalry between them. She does not like this new Power arising in the Mediterranean, and there is a sense of rivalry. France has got her own interests to serve. We need not dwell upon those interests, but a good many of them are financial. She has a greater financial interest in Turkey than anybody else, and she has got a group of financiers who are very interested in Turkey and who, to a very large extent, dominate the Quai d'Orsay. Although Greece, I think, would trust us, she would not put herself in the hands of a Council two out of three of whose members are hostile. That is my interpretation of it. She is fairly confident that she is going to win, but the man who predicts what is going to happen in a battle knows very little about battles, and we have been too long associated with the direction of war here to predict what is going to happen in any fight. I am not going to say what is going to happen, for I do not know. All I know is that King Constantine—who is a loathsome creature from our point of view, but we have nothing to do with that, he is the choice of Greece and we are dealing not with him, but with the people, the race, the nation—has come to the same conclusion as our Colonel, that is, his army is a better army than Mustapha Kemal's, but I do not know. At the present moment the Greeks say they are not prepared to put themselves in our hands. That puts us in a very difficult position, because if they do not do so there are only two courses; one is that we should compel them to accept our terms, which means blockading the Piræus and threatening to bombard Athens.

Mr. Churchill: No; we need only intercept their communications with Smyrna.

Mr. Lloyd George: One course is to make ourselves disagreeable and use the might of these three great and powerful nations to compel them. The other course is to let these two countries fight it out. Well, there are obvious disadvantages in both. The disadvantages of allowing them to go on is that the Greeks might overthrow the Turks, but that might not be the end of it, and the Turk would be very disgruntled, quarrelsome, sulky and making himself a nuisance to everybody all round, including ourselves. I have always thought that the trouble we had in Mesopotamia was far more due to the fact that the French had broken faith most discreditably with the Arabs, having first of all undertaken to give Homs, Aleppo and Damascus to an independent Arab Kingdom. They have occupied the three and the Foreign Secretary has pointed out in his statement that that was undoubtedly the reason why the Arabs are disgruntled. The Turks helped to stir it up, no doubt, but if you make terms with the Turks you will still have that real Arab grievance which will create trouble. That is one point of view. On the other hand, if you take action to compel the Greeks to abandon what they have conquered by their own right hand, and what men like Sir Robert Borden (who is pre-eminently a fair-minded man, who went most carefully into the whole of the facts) have reported was Greek by every principle that we have adopted in similar cases, then we should be in the position of having antagonised a very powerful little race, a race which is a very vital one to us, being on our most vital communications on the road to India, a race which has the command of what are probably going to be the most important strategic positions in the Mediterranean, should there be any war in the future, because they have got these little islands scattered all over the place, which might be a sheltering ground for every submarine and torpedo-boat destroyer. We should have antagonised that race. Those are the considerations upon which we have got to make up our mind one way or the other. There is a third consideration; that if the Greek finds that he is beaten by Mustapha Kemal, then Mustapha Kemal will be a more formidable person than ever and will be more difficult to treat with. That is for consideration. At any rate, if Mustapha Kemal is beaten by the Greeks he will be more easy to deal with, but the Greeks would be less easy to deal with. All those considerations will have to be taken into account. It is a very difficult problem, but it is a mistake to assume that there is nothing to be said on the other side. From our point of view there is, of course, the consideration that the whole of the Mohammedan race in India would like to see the Greek driven out of Smyrna. There is nothing to demonstrate that the Turk would accept that. He says he will want Thrace as well, and he will certainly want more independence in Anatolia. Personally, I would give him more independence in Anatolia. I think it would be a very great mistake, once you have left Anatolia to him, not to leave it to him to do what he pleases inside his own country. He is now purely the vassal, not of France, but the vassal of French financiers.

Present Situation between Greeks and Turks.

In the interest of French financiers, to whom, more than others, the Turk is kept in a condition of bondage in order to pay the percentages to these gentlemen—well, that is a humiliation which I can understand any self-respecting race protesting against, and I heard a very able deputation from the Mohammedans of India, headed by one of the ablest advocates to whom I have ever had the privilege of listening. He devoted most of his speech to that side of the problem. He dwelt upon the humiliation of the Kaliph, the spiritual head of the whole of these Mohammedans, who are kept in this condition of bondage to these financiers. Well, those are the questions which we shall have to consider, I am afraid, within the next few days, because, as you will observe, the document has come from the East.

Mr. Hughes: You have not told us the views of the British Government.

Mr. Lloyd George: We have only received it this morning. We have not even met to consider it. There are arguments on both sides and it has to be considered. Whatever action is taken, it must be an action which is scrupulously fair between both parties. If the Greek is not to be intimidated and if he is not to be blockaded and his communications intercepted, some pressure must be applied to the Turk if he continues to be recalcitrant. I am anticipating. All this must be discussed later on. I am very sorry for having detained the Conference all this time, but these are the two or three questions which I thought I would impress upon you for the consideration of the Conference. Now, that is all I have to say, I think. Now, I don't know whether Mr. Balfour has anything to say.

Mr. Balfour: No, Prime Minister. You know quite well ever since the Conference in Paris I have been what I suppose has been called pro-Greek. I

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Discussion on Foreign Policy.

remember writing a memorandum, as far as I remember it rather imperfectly now, for the Conference. It was on those lines. I entirely agree with you that the Turk ought to be master in Turkey. By Turkey, I mean Anatolia, which is inhabited by Turks. I want the Turk where he should manage his own people, and I would not allow him, if I could help it, to manage any other race. He has never done it well and never done it even tolerably well, and, therefore, I still think, if it can be done, Smyrna should be Greek. It is Greek by history; it is Greek by its inhabitants, and I am convinced, if you make it Greek again by sovereignty, you will find when that happens there—it has happened everywhere where the Turk has been expelled from any part of Europe inhabited by Christian people—you find an enormous increase in civilisation and in the prosperity of the district.

Turkish Situation.

You may think the Serbians, Bulgarians, Greeks and the Roumanians are not the highest specimens of the Aryan race—I don't argue that, but they are people who will improve their own country as soon as you relieve them of Turkish domination. Therefore, I still regret that it has been found necessary to withdraw from a policy to which we have more or less set our hands. I have not altered that view, and that the Mohammedans of India, when they come to understand the situation, and when you make it clear to them that you want the Turk to be supreme in his own country, and you do not want him to be put under the thumb of the French or other financiers, and you do want him to bear his part in the international work of the world, I don't believe that, when that view has sunk in, it would have the effect our Indian friends think. However, I may be wrong, but whether I am wrong or right this is the important consideration. Looking at the problem of Europe and the near East, and apart from the Mohammedan opinion in India, I should like to see the plan originally sketched out carried into due effect.

Mr. Montagu: Did you not put forward a suggestion of a plebiscite to solve this at the London Conference, a Commission of Enquiry?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, no, we did not. We are opposed to that. I will tell you why. You see the Greek population have been driven out, and a good many of them have been exterminated, and a plebiscite under the present conditions would not be right.

Mr. Montagu: I think of the Greeks and Turks.

Mr. Lloyd George: No, that is not a London proposal.

Lord Curzon: There was to be a Commission as you justly say to advise the Conference before they came to a final decision, taking into account all the various considerations, political, economical, geographical and the rest, but there was to be no plebiscite. We have had enough of plebiscites, have we not?

Mr. Montagu: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: This will be reserved for discussion later on. We have to take action upon that in the course of the next few days. I don't suggest we should take any decision upon it because I don't suppose the members of the Conference have seen it, have they? You ought to see the telegrams on the subject in order to form a judgment upon it.

Mr. Hughes: To what are you now alluding?

Mr. Lloyd George: The Greek question—the Anatolian question. We have to decide what action we are going to take.

General Smuts: I thought Lord Curzon really decided on the policy to apply if the Greeks and Turks submitted to our jurisdiction.

Lord Curzon: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: You see they have refused, and now comes the question what are we to do, and that is why we shall have to come to some decision.

Mr. Chamberlain: I gave them warning in the House of Commons that if they did not accept the good offices of the Allies, they would take the decision at their own risk.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, at their own risk.

Mr. Churchill: As you have asked Mr. Balfour to express an individual opinion on the subject, I hope you will allow me to record in one single sentence the fact that I don't look at it from the same point of view that he does, and if it were fitting or suitable, I should be quite prepared to deploy a considerable argument on the other side. I only say that by the way. I don't wish it to be thought I am in complete agreement.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we shall have to discuss this as the Dominions are in it very directly, because it was a Dominion representative who investigated the matter on my behalf, and I accepted fully his judgment and endorsed it. As the Dominions, as well as India, actually contributed troops to the overthrow of Turkey, they have a very special interest in the matter, but I think they had better get the papers first of all, otherwise they won't be in a position to express an opinion.

Mr. Hughes: I ask now what is the position in regard to the Agenda and the disposal of the various matters that have been set out upon it? **Future Agenda.**

Mr. Lloyd George: I suggest to-morrow we should take the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, if that meets your views, Mr. Massey?

Mr. Massey: We need something in the way of a paper to know when it is coming before us.

Sir Maurice Hankey: I sent out one after the discussion the other day.

Mr. Lloyd George: It was a sort of sketch Agenda. Sir Maurice Hankey has sent round a kind of sketch of the business and the order of the business.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Mr. Massey: I will see presently, but, in addition to everything coming from what we may call the Government Benches, I presume private members will have an opportunity of bringing forward matters.

Mr. Lloyd George: Oh, yes, indeed—that is why it is sent round. If there are any other suggestions, perhaps you will communicate them, either to the Secretary or put them across the table.

Mr. Hughes: I approve that sketch. I do not think it can be improved upon, but I do not know whether you have added to it, Sir Maurice? Whether you have included in it migration?

Sir Maurice Hankey: I will send a new one. I have got that down, and I will send a new one round up-to-date.

Mr. Hughes: All right.

Sir Maurice Hankey: And Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: I only wanted to say that there are two or three questions that concern Mr. Massey—at any rate, they concern me as representing Australia. The most vital one of these is the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, then the question of naval defence, and the other one is the question of migration.

Mr. Churchill: Migration?

Mr. Hughes: That is what has brought me here, and from what one can see there is very little time to spare, because you cannot dispose of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance round this table. You can decide upon some policy, but it may be you will want time to consult the other party, because it is clear you must hear what they have to say. You cannot tell them what we have to say until, of course, we have some settled policy. That ought to be gone on with at once. Anyhow, the question of naval defence to us is vital. It might not be so vital if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is satisfactorily renewed. But, still, it is a very vital thing. Those questions have to be settled, and there is this other matter we must discuss now, after Mr. Meighen's speech the other day—those modifications or alteration in our Constitution which are involved, or may be involved, in what we are doing, or hope to do, in regard to foreign policy. Mr. Meighen has set out his views in regard to that—they carry us a very long way, but before we can discuss the question there is, or ought to be, a Constitutional Conference next year, as we must decide this

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Future Agenda.

question. Mr. Meighen has raised a point which appears to me to be of fundamental importance, and we must express an opinion upon it as a whole. We must know where we are.

Mr. Churchill: Mr. Hughes, you raised the question of migration.

Mr. Hughes: No, No! Mr. Meighen was speaking of what principles he conceived to be desirable upon which it would be necessary and proper to determine the foreign policy of the Empire.

Mr. Churchill: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: It is a very important subject.

Mr. Chamberlain: Mr. Churchill was referring to what you said.

Mr. Hughes: Oh! I beg pardon. What I do suggest, Mr. Churchill, concerns you directly in your official capacity as Secretary of State for the Colonies. You remember a conference was held earlier in the year—early in the year, I think, or last year rather, and since nothing that has to be done necessarily involves detailed considerations, I would suggest that the matter might be brought up, and perhaps referred to a small Committee, and that they may later on make a concrete recommendation to this Conference, which, in turn, could discuss it.

Mr. Churchill: The Cabinet have considered the question of migration, and I am equipped with proper authority to discuss it from our point of view, and as you know, Colonel Amery, the late Under-Secretary for the Colonies, gave profound study and attention to the matter, and what I would suggest is, we should have a committee set up which could meet within a few days in which in the first instance, if the Prime Ministers would meet me and afterwards delegate further details to other colleagues they have with them, I do not think it would mean making any further inroads on their time. At the same time, the matter would be getting on, and we should get to a solution in time to have conclusions formed by the general Conference. Prime Minister, if you would approve of that we might settle it now.

Mr. Lloyd George: There is no reason why you should not set up that committee now immediately.

Mr. Hughes: If I may, I will second that.

Mr. Chamberlain: What I really understand this deals with is the question of assisted migration from the United Kingdom to other parts of the Empire suitable to white men. It is not a general movement of population within the Empire, or anything of that kind, but assisted migration of men and women from this country to other parts of the Empire.

Mr. Massey: I would support the suggestion, but Mr. Churchill should make a statement first, and then we shall know exactly where we are.

Mr. Churchill: Of course, I am quite ready, Mr. Massey, to do that, although not this afternoon. I really think on the whole it would be easier if we had a talk round the committee first, and then probably could present concrete questions to the Conference.

Mr. Massey: Perhaps Colonel Amery would make a statement as well.

Mr. Churchill: I propose that he should be on the committee, because I do not want to take up too much of your time sitting on matters of detail.

Mr. Hughes: Each of the Prime Ministers should attend this meeting, and should have the right of appointing some person.

Mr. Churchill: I think their deputies, and then Colonel Amery could thrash it out.

Mr. Lloyd George: If you would give the names of those who would represent your various Dominions

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Churchill will arrange?

Mr. Lloyd George: If you will arrange it with Mr. Churchill, we will leave it to the Colonial Office.

To-morrow, I suggest at 11·30, we should take the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Lord Curzon will open, and then the whole question can be thrashed out. The next question I have got down for consideration is Naval, Military and Air Defence.

Mr. Chamberlain: They interlock.

Mr. Lloyd George: And disarmament. It is a group of topics. I have got four days down for those great topics. Lord Curzon, to-morrow afternoon, is seeing the American Ambassador, who has some important communication to make. I have no doubt it bears on this. Therefore I suggest we should have our first meeting at 11·30 and the meeting in the afternoon at 4·30, so as to give Lord Curzon and the Ambassador an hour and a half, if necessary, to discuss the question.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*1,
June 27, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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SECRET.

E. 8th Meeting.

2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE of FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir W. H. HERRIES, K.C.M.G.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Chamberlain: The Prime Minister has asked me to express his great regret to the Conference that he is unavoidably prevented from being present this morning. You are all aware that we are in the throes of a coal crisis again, and it has become absolutely necessary for him to attend a meeting of the miners and mine-owners this morning to see if a settlement can be arranged. He has asked me, therefore, to make his apologies and to invite the Conference to proceed with the discussion, which I think Lord Curzon is to open, on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty position.*

Lord Curzon: The question of the renewal, or the reverse, and, if we renew it, in what shape we renew it, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is perhaps the most important, and certainly one of the most perplexing that will come before this meeting, for upon the solution of this question will depend the evolution of our own policy and, to a large extent, the peace of the world during the years that are to come. I have circulated, at different stages, to the members of this Conference, all the pertinent papers on the subject. There were a number of papers that were issued, I think, before you left your own countries to come to England, containing the views of the Imperial Defence Committee, of the Foreign Office, and of various other authorities, upon the question. Since you came here I have circulated to you another set of papers, containing the despatches and telegrams that have passed on the subject in the main with our representatives in the United States and in Japan; and lastly, during the last day or two, there have, I believe, been circulated to you one or two supplementary telegrams on the subject. Thus, I think, you are fully seized of all the available information at our disposal.

Situation since 1911.

Now the position is this. The agreement, in the form which it now bears, was concluded in July 1911 by Sir Edward Grey, who was then our Foreign Minister. This agreement succeeded and superseded two previous agreements which had been negotiated by his predecessor. The object of Lord Grey in concluding it was, broadly speaking, the same as the object which had animated Lord Lansdowne and the Government before, namely, the maintenance of peace in the eastern parts of Asia, and the preservation of the independence and integrity of China, with equal opportunities for the commerce of all nations in China. But events have altered a good deal during the interval since the agreement was first drawn up. The Treaty of 1911 omitted several points that had appeared in its predecessors and included others, notably the well-known Article 4, which was inserted in order to exclude the possibility of war at any time between Great Britain and the United States of America. Article 4 is as follows:—

> "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of general Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force."

Mr. Hughes: That was new, of course.

Lord Curzon: Yes, it was put in then for the first time. It was put in deliberately, because at that time Lord Grey was endeavouring to negotiate, and almost succeeded in negotiating, a Treaty of Arbitration with America, but as you will recollect, that Treaty was thrown out by the Senate in America, and therefore fell to the ground. On the other hand, a little while afterwards, namely, in September 1914, he did succeed in concluding, not a general Arbitration Treaty with America, but a Treaty which is entitled "With regard to the establishment of a Peace Commission." Under the terms of this Treaty, all disputes between the contracting parties, that is, Great Britain and the United States of America, were to be referred to a special Investigation Commission. Although this is not a general Arbitration Treaty, you will realise that it is in practice equivalent to it, and accordingly, this Treaty having been concluded, the then Government took the very wise and proper step of telling the Japanese Government that the Peace Commission Treaty was regarded by them as equivalent to an Arbitration Treaty, and therefore, that the conditions prescribed by Article 4 of the Treaty of 1911, which I read just now, applied.

The Japanese Government recognised the position and deferred to our views, and this is so well known that I am perfectly astonished at the misapprehension that prevails upon the point. During the last few months I have constantly seen statements made, very likely tendenciously, in the Press, notably in America, that

* The Prime Minister subsequently joined the Meeting. During his absence Mr. Chamberlain acted as Chairman.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

the Anglo-Japanese Treaty still contains the seeds of possible conflict between this country and America. Quite apart from our general view of the question, that is wholly out of the bounds of possibility under the text even of the agreements which have been concluded. That, then, was the position up till last year. I should have said, if I have not done so, that the Treaty of 1911 was concluded for a term of ten years; in other words it will expire on the 13th July, 1921, a fortnight from now. When the Covenant of the League of Nations was passed, it was clear to us that if the Treaty were renewed in its present form it would be incompatible in many respects with the provisions laid down in the Covenant, and accordingly in July last year Japan and ourselves made an intimation to the League of Nations that in the event of renewal after July of this year it would have to be done—and we should be glad to do it—in a form compatible with the conditions laid down in the Covenant of the League. I have now come up to the present date. For a long time it has been admitted, and indeed openly stated, that the question of this agreement would be one of the main subjects that we would consider here, and as this meeting was not to take place until the present month of June, and it was clear that we should be running rather near to the date of expiration in July, it was obviously necessary to make some provision for the temporary prolongation of the Treaty. The term of a year was originally proposed, but inasmuch as that might have given the impression that we were needlessly prolonging the matter, and perhaps prejudging the decision of this meeting, it was eventually decided to suggest a prolongation of three months. That was agreed to, I think, by all the Dominions, but as a matter of fact, Japan has not agreed to it at this moment, and as things stand, within a fortnight from now that Treaty wholly disappears. You must not infer from that that they have any objection to prolongation, quite the reverse. There has been a certain difficulty, in view of the communication to the League of Nations to which I have referred, in determining the conditions under which it will be prolonged. That is in course of being overcome, and I think in the next day or two the extension of the Treaty for three months, that is to say until October 13th of the present year, will be agreed to, a communication being addressed to the Council of the League of Nations to the effect that if anything occurs during those three months that may call for action under the terms of the Treaty, action that may be inconsistent with the Covenant, the procedure of the Covenant should prevail over the terms of the original agreement. That is the formal and technical position as regards the agreement at this moment.

Present Situation.

Mr. Meighen: Perhaps it would be convenient to read the clause providing for termination and partial extension. I was under the impression, from that clause, that if nothing was done then the Treaty automatically was extended for a year and could be terminated only on a year's notice. Perhaps such year's notice must terminate with a 13th day of July.

Lord Curzon: It does. The view of our lawyers is that, unless steps are taken to annul it in the course of a few days, the agreement automatically expires on the 13th July, 1921. That is, I believe, recognised by both parties, and no difficulty will arise, I think, for the reasons I have named.

View that Treaty expires on the 13th July, 1921.

I said, at the beginning, that there is a great deal to be said on both sides of this question, and perhaps the Conference will allow me to state the arguments with as much fairness as I can, *pro* and *con*.

I will first state the arguments that are used with considerable force against renewal. It can be pointed out with truth that the main object for which the agreement was originally concluded has, at any rate, in the form in which it was then presented, ceased to exist. The agreement was drawn up in order to meet the menace of Russian ambitions in Northern and North-Eastern Asia. That was a menace which had affected not only our own Dominions in India, but the peace of the Eastern World for many years. It was supplemented by the growing power and ambitions of Germany. Both these dangers may be said to have vanished—at any rate, temporarily vanished. The Russian Empire, in its old form, has ceased to exist, and the whole of Northern Asia, formerly the centre of a powerful military autocracy, is now in a state of relative chaos. Germany, for the time being, has disappeared as a formidable rival in the Far East, and therefore there is force in the argument that the conditions which called the agreement into being no longer prevail. On the other hand, it will be my duty to point out presently that it is not inconceivable that these conditions may revive at no distant date, and perhaps be of a more formidable type.

Arguments against Renewal.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The second and main objection, which has figured in many quarters, arises from the feelings that are entertained with regard to this matter in the United States of America. There is no doubt that in many quarters the existence of the Treaty is looked upon as a source of irritation, and, as I said just now, I am rather surprised myself that the existence of Article 4, and the conclusion of the Treaty to which I referred, have not been more successful in removing the misunderstanding in America than they have. The misunderstanding does not exist in the State Department, but it exists in public opinion, and it is fomented by the Press. In the printed papers which have been circulated to you, Sir Auckland Geddes, our Ambassador in Washington, represented in the latter part of last year that these criticisms, although serious, were not vital, and he recommended the continuance of the Treaty for reasons which you will there read. The Minister has now sent us a series of telegrams which you must have seen, and which throw a somewhat different light upon the matter.

Feeling in America.

Mr. Hughes : The last few weeks?

Lord Curzon : Yes. There are three telegrams, dated respectively the 6th June and two telegrams of the 24th June, in response to an enquiry from me as to whether the situation had changed at all in America. I will just touch upon these telegrams in passing. In the first of them, No. 388, dated the 6th June, he quotes the opinion of the Secretary of State in Washington, not, indeed, given to him but alleged to have been communicated to somebody else, that the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be disastrous. The two telegrams of the 24th June are to this effect :—He says, in the first of them, no doubt American opinion regards even the thought of the renewal of the Treaty as evidence that British protestations of a friendly feeling towards the United States of America are insincere. In the second telegram he writes, after a conversation, although one of an informal character, with the Secretary of State, that he had told him that he viewed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in any form with disquietude, because of the effect such renewal would inevitably have upon American opinion, and he added that even if we specifically excluded the United States from any operation that the Treaty might have, the result would be little less than unfortunate. There was then mentioned in the telegram a discussion with the Secretary of State about a suggestion that in lieu of the Treaty there might be substituted a declaration of policy, embodied in identic notes to be exchanged by the American, British and Japanese Governments. The Secretary of State said that he would consider this suggestion, but we have not at the present stage heard more about it. I quote these passages because I think it is only right that so serious an expression of opinion should be mentioned. It only came into the country three days ago. The 25th was Saturday, was it not?

Sir Maurice Hankey : I did not get them until last night. I sent them out last night.

Lord Curzon : Now you have them.

General Smuts: I will just ask this question. This Peace Commission Treaty with America—was that ratified by the Senate?

Lord Curzon : Yes. Here it is. It was signed at Washington on the 25th September, 1914, and ratifications were exchanged on the 10th November, 1914. So much, for the moment, about the possible or probable state of feeling in America.

View of China.

Another source of possible objection is the point of view of China. There can be no doubt, I think, that the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement has had a somewhat disturbing effect upon our relations with China. China, for reasons which I shall presently name, has some grounds for regarding the ambitions of Japan with suspicion, as long as the agreement exists. China, or, at any rate, some elements in China, undoubtedly hold that great prestige is given to Japan by our backing, and the pressure from which she suffers is sensibly aggravated. You can barely open a newspaper in England at the present moment without seeing a series of articles with the name of Mr. Simpson underneath, and they represent, in tones almost of passion, the alleged state of feeling in China about this matter, and their objections to the renewal of the Treaty. I think I must give you a warning about this. Mr. Simpson is the gentleman who, some years ago, wrote a series of clever and unscrupulous books under the name of Putnam Weale. He is a man—I am speaking confidentially in this room—of doubtful character and antecedents. He is on a sort of roving commission with a very handsome salary paid by the Chinese Government, and is now, through the columns of the Press, justifying his pay by

writing a series of denunciatory articles couched in language of extreme abuse. You must, to a certain extent, discount what you read about it.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Chamberlain: He has been inspiring questions in the House.

Lord Curzon : Yes.

General Smuts : His name is Simpson?

Lord Curzon : Yes. Some of the books he has written under the name of Putnam Weale were about the " Boxer Rising " and the " Dark Skinned Races in the Far East." Now, let us for a moment look at what is at the bottom of the feeling in China, and how far on the broadest grounds it is justified. Let us try to transfer ourselves to the Far East and envisage the rival ambitions and actions of these two Powers. There you have on the one hand Japan, a people possessing great and intellectual gifts, a people orderly and disciplined in temperament, with a fierce patriotism, resolute in determination, but rather unscrupulous in the means they employ. These people inhabit a group of small islands, where they have only a limited area to sustain a population already too large for it—islands which are poor in resources, and which barely support the 50 or 60 millions who live upon them. They are a people who must expand. They have done so, in so far as this was open to them, during the last twenty years, and they have done it, if not with an excess of scruple, with fairly successful consequences. They have annexed Korea, they have possessed themselves of Formosa, and they have acquired the Pescadores. They have, since the war with China, practically made themselves the possessors of Southern Manchuria, where they pursue a definite policy of the " closed door," of exclusive railway construction and mining rights. They have acquired a very powerful control over Shantung, which they have promised to relax, but, at present, have not gone far in doing so. In 1915, as you will recall, they addressed the famous Twenty-One Demands to China, which I need not further particularise than by saying that they were intended to make, and would have made, China a vassal State. Meanwhile, Japan is prevented from expanding in the direction of the Pacific by the fact that most of the island groups there are already in the occupation of Great Powers. The Philippines in particular, on which her eye was fixed, passed into the possession of America, who cannot be expected to show the slightest sign of willingness to surrender. Thus you have this restless and aggressive Power, full of energy, somewhat like the Germans in mentality, seeking in every direction to push out and find an outlet for their perfectly legitimate ambitions. Within sight of their shores you have the great helpless, hopeless, and inert mass of China, one of the most densely populated countries in the world, utterly deficient in cohesion or strength, engaged in perpetual conflict between the North and the South, destitute of military capacity or ardour, an easy prey to a nation of the character that I have described.

That is the phenomenon looked at from the spectacular point of view, and you can easily see how the erosion is constantly going on, and the kind of suspicions that arise. As regards China, I can say this, as I have said to the Chinese Minister when he has been to see me. I think it is out of the question, if we renew this agreement, that we should not take into consideration the views of China. China is a great mart for all our goods, it is a country in which it is very desirable that we should work hand in hand with America; it is a country which, even with the inevitable expansion of Japan, we do not want to see swallowed up, and it is a country which after all was in its origin made and developed, in the main, by British money and British commerce, and in which our influence is still very great. Therefore, if it comes to a question of renewal, I state boldly that I would not propose to renew without taking into very close consideration the fears and desires of China, or without discussing with China, if renewal be decided upon, what precise form renewal should take.

Arguments in favour of Renewal.

Those, I think, are the main arguments which are freely used against the renewal of the agreement. Let me attempt to state the case on the other side, and it is a very strong case. If you look back upon the period since the first form of this agreement was concluded by Lord Lansdowne, as far back as 1902, and if you look more particularly at the last ten years in which Lord Grey's agreement has been in existence, I do not think it can be denied that the agreement has had, on the whole, a steadying and stabilising influence on the political conditions of the Far East. It has certainly been very useful to both parties. It helped Japan most materially in her historic war with Russia. It helped us most materially in the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

recent war with Germany. Papers have been circulated indicating the point of view of the Admiralty about the value of the assistance given by Japan to us in the war. Japan is the kind of party that in giving, and giving generously, never forgets its own interest. I do not think Japan is at all an altruistic power—perhaps there are not many of them knocking about in the world just now; she is, as I read her, scrupulous and honourable in the discharge of her obligations, but at the same time she always directs a very close eye to her own interests and her own future. But, nevertheless, our naval authorities will tell you that in the seas of the Far East, in the China Seas on the one hand and in the Mediterranean on the other, in different ways and to different degrees, Japan was a valuable Ally and assistant in the war, and if you regard what she did from the negative as well as from the positive side, I suppose it is not to be denied that our alliance with her, and the assistance of her naval forces, assured the complete safety of our possessions in the Pacific. The representatives of the Dominions who are here will be in a position to speak, and I think some of them—especially Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey—have already in public speeches given expression to their views on that point.

I may sum up this part of my case by saying that I do not think anybody would dispute that the Alliance was most valuable to us during the war, and has, during the years in which it has existed, had a steadying effect on the politics of the Far East as a whole.

Danger of a probable revival of a Russo-German Combination.

Next I take a point which I touched upon just now. I frankly said that the circumstances which originally called the agreement into being had vanished, but those of you who recall the discussions we have had on foreign affairs generally during the last few days, and the speech more particularly of the Prime Minister yesterday, will, I think, realise that if that danger has temporarily disappeared it is more than likely to reappear in a different and perhaps more sinister form. The Prime Minister spoke yesterday about the possibility of close co-operation between Germany and Russia in the future, and he explained how an impetus might be given to that tendency by the unfortunate policy being pursued by France with regard to Poland. Now let us assume a resuscitated Russia spreading herself over the vast expanse of Northern Siberia. There are already one or two Soviet Governments there. Let us assume that she resumes not only her old strength but her old ambitions; let us assume that she is backed at the European end of the chain by the forces of Germany. You can well conceive what a temptation it might be to Japan, in these circumstances, if we had severed our link of connection with her, to respond to the invitations, the temptations, that would be addressed to her by that party, and I can well conceive—this is no idle dream—if we dropped the agreement altogether, and if Japan were offended and estranged by our action, as she might well be, that she might seek future friends in another quarter, and this in another ten or twenty years' time might alter the whole face of the eastern world and constitute a danger to our position greater than any from which we have hitherto suffered.

What I am saying is, I admit, speculative, but I think it is a speculation based upon probability, based upon serious probability. I should like, while on that point, to read a few words from a letter which I received only a few days ago from the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Eliot, at Tokyo, which throws some light on the possibility of this combination in the future, and the steps Germany is already taking to start it:—

> "If the present alliance is replaced by an Anglo-American understanding, at the expense of Japan, the Japanese will no doubt cast about for new allies, and will for some time find it hard to get any. Neither Bolshevik Russia nor Republican and defeated Germany offer much attraction at present, but Germany may turn into something very different in the future, and Solf, the present Ambassador here—you will recall him as the German Colonial Secretary during the war—spares no pains to ingratiate himself with the Japanese. He is quiet, though very friendly, in Tokyo; he pays frequent visits to other large towns, such as Kyoto, Kobe and Osaka, delivers addresses, and spreads the idea that Japan and Germany were never active enemies, and that, at the present juncture, they have many interests in common."

Therefore, Germany, with her usual subtlety and determination, is apparently already beginning to work.

(At this moment Mr. Lloyd George joined the Conference.)

Lord Curzon: I was giving the arguments for and against the renewal of the agreement, and I called the attention of the Conference to a rather formidable

series of telegrams that came during the last few days from Sir A. Geddes at Washington, reporting an attitude of increasing suspicion and alarm at the possibilities of our action there. I was just at that moment quoting you yesterday as having called our attention to the seriousness of a probable revival of a Russo-German combination in the future to which Japan might easily fall a victim, and I was reading a passage from a letter I have just received from our Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir Charles Eliot, pointing out that the German Ambassador there is already at work trying to lay the foundations of a German-Japanese combination in the future.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have not seen that.

Lord Curzon: It only came to me a few days ago. It is a private letter, but I will give it you afterwards.

Mr. Massey: We knew this man very well in Brazil. He was the German Governor at Samoa for some years.

Mr. Balfour: He is now German Ambassador at Tokyo.

Steadying influence of Alliance on Japan.

Lord Curzon: I said just now that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement had been, I thought, successful in its general effect upon the Asiatic position in recent years, and I think it has been successful in another way. I admitted, quite frankly, a little earlier, the character of the Japanese Imperialism, and yet I am pretty sure, in my own mind, that formidable as it has been, it would have been much more serious had this Agreement not subsisted. I can name quite a number of cases in which a check—a very effective check—has been placed on Japanese ambitions by the fact that she knew we would not accept, or submit to, or tolerate, this or that proceeding on her part. I should say that we had in many respects clipped her wings very effectually, and I will take a striking illustration which has occurred only during the past few months and with which you are familiar. Japan was pursuing a policy of somewhat daring railway ambition in the north-eastern parts of China, notably in Manchuria. The other Powers, France, Great Britain and America, have always held strongly the views which I fought hard for in the Foreign Office, that there ought to be a combination of Powers for the commercial development of China, instead of this absurd and insensate competition between them. I may say, in passing, that the old days, 20 or 30 years old, in which the tendencies of the Powers of the world were, so to speak, to map out different areas in China as their spheres of influence, the British in the Yangtse, and other Powers elsewhere, have disappeared, but nevertheless the era of friendly co-operation had not begun. Last year, however, we succeeded in carrying a measure that is called the Consortium and that was an agreement between the Governments of France, America, and our own—Belgium is to come in—for a common policy of railway, commercial and industrial development in China. When we were negotiating this, Japan, standing out for her own individual and rival ambitions, had to decide whether to stay out of it and be fought by us, or come in, and I think it was largely the pressure that we were able to exercise in England, by virtue of our Agreement with Japan, that brought her in. She is now in the Consortium as one of a group instead of an independent and rather formidable competitor on her own account. That I will give you as one illustration of the way in which we have been able to exercise pressure on Japan.

Mr. Meighen: What is the attitude of China towards that Consortium?

Lord Curzon: China was only too pleased, I think, that there should be a combination of Powers rather than that she should be exposed to the somewhat dangerous embraces of Japan. She would sooner have her State developed by a number of friendly Powers acting all together than she would have a policy of snatch and grab pursued by one against the other.

General Smuts: What is the position in China?

Lord Curzon: The governing position?

General Smuts: Yes.

Situation in China.

Lord Curzon: The governing position is this. The old historic fight between North and South is going on. It is unresolved. In the North you have a Republican Government at Peking. You will remember the Monarchy ceased to exist, the Empire ceased to exist, and the Emperor is in retirement, a small boy with an English tutor.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

A very strong and powerful man, Yuan Shih Kai, became the Head of the Republic. I knew him well and he was a serious and responsible statesman. Whether he acted wisely or not in allowing it to be thought, after the fashion of Cæsar, that he would accept the Crown I do not know. He died shortly after and immediately the country fell back into the old state. From that time the military bands have ravaged the country. Military governors rule the areas around their cities under the nominal system of a Republic, but really a provincial autonomy exists. In the South at Kanton one or two Republican Governments have started. Our old friend Dr. Sun Yat Sen has been elected the President of a Southern Republic. Therefore, at the present moment there is—I will not say chaos—since in the ordinary course China is so orderly a country; there is never chaos. Things go on in their own way, whether there is a Central Government or whether there is not a Central Government. The local Governors collect the revenues and have a good time, and the Chinese go on making their money and so on, but the very conditions to which I have referred render China a very easy prey.

General Smuts: Are there two Governments?

Lord Curzon: There are two Governments. The Government of Dr. Sun Yat Sen does not recognise the authority of the North, and really the provincial Governments are a law unto themselves.

Mr. Balfour: They are actually fighting?

Lord Curzon: There is sporadic fighting.

General Smuts: What part is Japan playing in this North and South business?

Relations between Japan and China.

Lord Curzon: Japan had up to quite recently a very strong influence over the Peking Government, because by her tactics and by the wonderful powers of infiltration which she possesses she came into touch with the military groups in China, and the military groups were pro-Japanese. All that was shattered by the policy at Paris, and the policy of the Twenty-One points which I have mentioned. The Japanese conduct in Shantung produced a feeling in China almost of indescribable, although not unnatural resentment, and since the Paris meetings Japan is conscious of the insecurity of her position, and has been trying to come to terms with China about Shantung. China, however, wrapping herself up in her *amour-propre*, declines to move in the matter, so at the moment the position of Japan is more insecure, or, let us say, less powerful, in Northern China than it used to be.

Views of France and Holland on Renewal of the Treaty.

I might mention in passing a point which produced some effect upon our Cabinet, but which I can dismiss here in a sentence, namely, that I think that the continuance of our agreement would be more than welcome to the other European Powers who have estates in that part of the world, notably France and Holland. The Possessions of both are signally defenceless, and France would, I think, be seriously alarmed at any policy which might let loose an estranged and aggressive Japan in the Far East. The islands that belong to Holland and which are by no means badly governed, are in a similarly defenceless position, and Japan, excluded from the Philippines and with no particular place to turn to, might fall upon them some day in the future with disastrous consequences. I think, therefore, that both of those Powers would strongly favour a continuance of some agreement between Japan and ourselves.

Views of Japan.

Then you have to consider after all the views of Japan herself. You have read in these papers the telegrams and despatches that have come at different times from Sir Charles Eliot, culminating in a telegram which was circulated a little while ago as one of these particular White Papers. There is no doubt whatever that Japan warmly hopes that the agreement will be renewed in some form or other. I must say that her whole attitude about the matter—I am speaking about the Ambassadors and others with whom I have had conversations—has been reasonable. They at once accepted the position that any renewal must be compatible with the terms of the Covenant. They are quite ready to accept the position that the views and position of China must also be taken into account, and also through the mouth of their Foreign Minister, Viscount Uchida, that we cannot possibly renew the agreement except after consultation with America. On the other hand, supposing we were to drop them altogether and to tell them that the situation has changed, that we are much obliged to them for their services, but that the whole position in the Pacific has rendered it impossible for us to continue this agreement with them, I think they would not only be humiliated, and mortified beyond expression, but that that

mortification would presently turn into anger and might not inconceivably be followed by an attitude of resentment and a policy of revenge. That is not my view, but that is the view which is consistently pressed upon me by our Ambassador at Tokyo. Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Churchill: When you say it is not yours . . . .

Lord Curzon: I share it, but for the moment I am resting myself upon the authority of our Ambassador. From the wider point of view I must confess myself that I should feel some anxiety at the position in which you had an Ally for something like twenty years, against whom you have to bring so little in the way of charge, as in the case of Japan, who on the whole has done you so well, who has been faithful to the Alliance, and is anxious that it should be renewed, and for the renewal of which such a good case can be made out, but where I had to be the minister who wiped it off the slate and said: "No, America is so important to us that we really cannot have anything more to do with you at all." I do not think that would be a very strong or a very defensible position to take up.

There was another point which affected us when we were considering the matter here and which the Representatives of the Dominions will be in a position to appreciate. It is this. Supposing you cut off your Agreement with Japan now, you again revive the old position in the Far East—the white men against the dark men or the yellow men. Now our policy during the last twenty years has been to try to remove and obliterate these colour prejudices, and undoubtedly our agreement with Japan has led to an increase in the prestige of the dark races as against the view that Europeans will not have anything to do with the dark races and look upon them from a point of superiority and despise them. When we took Japan on the footing of equality of races we immeasurably increased the sense of self-respect entertained by those races. Mr. Montagu will tell you what a great effect this has had in the countries for which he is responsible, the idea that we are treating them as equals; and if we were to throw away this Alliance I really think you would be throwing away an asset of very considerable value on an international scale and from the widest point of view. I do not want to enlarge upon this because if Mr. Montagu has to speak he will lay stress upon it himself.

Views of the Admiralty and War Office.

There is not very much more for me to say. The Papers you have had circulated to you will have shown you that the Admiralty here are in favour of the renewal of the Agreement with Japan, not necessarily in the same form as now, but in a manner that will safeguard the suspicions of America. I am speaking of the Paper dated the 12th February, 1920.

Mr. Churchill: Looking at it from a purely strategic point of view.

Lord Curzon: I am taking the conclusions at which they have arrived. I am referring to the Paper dated the 12th February. The War Office, in a Paper circulated on the 14th February, 1920, pointed out that the military position in the Far East would be very embarrassing if hostilities occurred with Japan. They attached much weight to the danger of a Japan-Russia combination and much more to a Japan-Russia-Germany combination in the future—and thought that we must not antagonise the United States of America and if a new agreement were concluded it must be made in harmony with the latter. We shall hear the views of the Representatives of the Dominions here.

Views of Dominions.

Mr. Hughes has already told us that broadly speaking he is in favour of a renewal.

Mr. Massey has said the same.

The attitude of Canada is different, and is different for reasons which have not only been explained, but which Mr. Meighen will no doubt lay before us with great fullness. Canada looks at the matter from the angle of the American Continent. It is vital that her relations with America should be as close as possible. She cannot contemplate with equanimity anything that would disturb those relations. She has her own Japanese problem on the Western Coast, although the renewal of the agreement has nothing to do with the immigration question, which must be treated separately. Further, in the course of communications we had with the Canadian Government this year, Mr. Meighen submitted a proposal which, so far from being unacceptable, gained the warmest sympathy from many in this room, and that was for a solution of the Pacific problem by means of a Conference of the Powers concerned. It might be well now, or at some not distant date, to have a Conference such as suggested by the Canadian Government with the American

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Government and the Japanese Government and the Dominion Governments, and any other Powers who might be interested in the settlement of the position. This is a policy which is very well worth considering and which might perfectly well be consistent with a renewal of the agreement in some form should it be considered desirable.

Summary of alternative courses of action.

In conclusion, the Conference may ask me what are the alternatives before us. I think I can summarise them in a few sentences. Of course, we can cancel the Agreement altogether, although I have said that from some point of view there are formidable objections to this, and the Conference will have realised that it is not the course I would, personally, recommend.

Secondly, we can continue it: we might renew it in its present form, but with the modifications required to bring it into harmony with the Covenant of the League, with the omission of any reference to India, and with clauses that made it clear that in no conceivable circumstances would we go to war with the United States. That I do not recommend, because the situation has been very much changed since it was drawn up. The Treaty in its present form is not desirable. The military clauses would excite very great suspicion and alarm in America, and we have gone beyond the stage at which renewal either in its present form or something like it is practicable.

The third alternative is one which was proposed in one of Sir Auckland Geddes's telegrams, namely, to expand the present agreement into a tripartite agreement. In theory this has many attractions, but it seems to be doubtful whether the Senate would pass it, or if American public opinion is prepared for it, while there is always the fear in America, where Administrations succeed each other with violent oscillations, that an agreement adopted by one party might be repudiated by the next, whereas we desire to have continuity in policy in the years which lie before us. Still, the idea of a tripartite agreement is one worthy of consideration.

The fourth alternative is one which, I think, on the whole, the Foreign Office is rather disposed to recommend, always subject to what may be said here, namely, that the Agreement, if renewed, should be renewed in a different form, and after consultation with the United States on the one hand and with China on the other, and with the League of Nations; its renewal being accompanied by an expression of willingness on our part to join the United States Government in an examination by Conference between interested parties of the Pacific problem suggested by Mr. Meighen. It has occurred to me that a slight variation of that situation is also worthy of consideration. A good deal turns upon the order in which you proceed. The kind of Conference Mr. Meighen has in view is a matter that would take a good deal of time, would involve many considerations, and would be, of course, very far-reaching in its consequences. It would be a Conference conceivably held on the other side of the Ocean, in which all the Pacific Powers would be involved. There would be the Dominions and Great Britain, there would be Japan and China, and there would also be the other Great Powers which have possessions in that part of the world.

Mr. Massey: The South American States?

Lord Curzon: Perhaps; and you will therefore see that if we enter upon that sphere we are embarking upon a very big field, and opening out negotiations which could not conceivably come to any issue except in a considerable space of time; and therefore it might be thought desirable, by common consent, to renew the agreement, not in its present form, but in a form brought into harmony with the Covenant of the League on the one hand, and with what we may call the suspicious clauses removed from it on the other, for a time, say for a year, pending the decisions of the other Conference to which I have referred. That is a possible solution, and I think the practical choice lies between the two—between a temporary renewal with a view to a larger discussion and a more complete solution, or the renewal in a different form for a term of years, let us say four, capable of being either extended or dissolved at the end of that time, after consultation with the other Great Powers, principally America, China and the Dominions.

Those are the possible solutions, unless some other solution may be suggested in the course of this discussion. I thank the Conference for having listened to me in making what I conceive to be a fair statement of the position and the consequences involved.

Mr. Hughes: Which alternative does the British Government prefer?

Lord Curzon: When we considered it here, the Cabinet was inclined to favour renewal for a term of years.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Churchill: The situation has been altered by the telegrams from the United States, which were not before us when we considered this. They have since arrived from Sir Auckland Geddes, who reported originally that it would do no harm in America if the renewal took place.

Mr. Lloyd George: Would you like to put any questions to Lord Curzon first, because before you make your statement Mr. Balfour would like to say a word on behalf of the League of Nations and the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Date of Expiry of Existing Treaty.

Mr. Meighen: The Foreign Secretary has stated that the Treaty expires on the 13th of next month, if no step is taken in the meantime for its renewal. Article VI provides for the running on of the Alliance unless the contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the ten years an intention to terminate that Treaty. I am not able to understand how it can be read to bring about absolute termination next month.

Lord Curzon: It arose in this way. The letter, which was written by both parties in combination to the League of Nations in July of last year, is regarded by the competent lawyers as equivalent to an announcement of denunciation.

I could read you our statement to the Japanese Government about our proposal to extend the Agreement for three months. The matter has been studied by our legal authorities, who have definitely advised that the letter of last year does constitute a notification by both parties of an intention to terminate the Agreement on the 13th July, 1921, unless in the meantime a new agreement shall be entered into. It thus follows, in the view of His Majesty's Government, that the Agreement will expire on the last-mentioned date unless it is renewed in the interval.

Mr. Meighen: That means then that the intention to terminate has in effect been given.

Views of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Mr. Balfour: I have to speak in a double capacity, for, while there is present here the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, it so happens that I am the Chairman of the Sub-Committee or the Standing Committee, I think it is called, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which has been entrusted with the work of considering this very important problem. We were clear that, from a strategic point of view, there could be no doubt whatever that it is to the advantage of this country to renew the Alliance. Before the Great War, the Committee of Imperial Defence—of which I was not then an active member, I was in Opposition, and though I took part in certain discussions I was not a constant attendant—but I understand that the fact of the Japanese Alliance was held to relieve the Admiralty of the day of any serious responsibility with regard to the Pacific, that is to say, it was not proposed that we should have to keep a very large fleet there, or take a large fleet there, as long as Japan was our Ally. Then came the Great War. That is over, and we have to consider the strategic position, with Germany and Russia for the moment left out, but undoubtedly with a great, and, I believe, an almost friendly, Navy, but still a Navy that is not our own in the Pacific, as well as the Japanese. America is steadily putting ships in the Pacific, I understand, and although I am not in the least way conceiving a war with America as a possibility, yet if you look at the thing from a purely strategic point of view, and omit politics and sentiment and look at it with an open mind, undoubtedly it is a fact that if we had not Japan on our side we should be second or third Power in the Pacific after a considerable number of years. I hope the last contingency will not occur, but we cannot deny that at the moment we are in a relatively unprepared condition in that part of the world, that is, we have not had time or money to adjust all our defences to meet the situation which the Great War has rendered possible. I do not say the Great War has created this position, but it has rendered it possible. Therefore, in our view, so long as our relatively unprepared condition lasts, it is, from a strategic point of view, of very great importance that the Japanese Alliance should be maintained. Nobody suggests that an alliance is a permanent safeguard, or is an adequate substitute for material force. Alliances may come to an end, quarrels may arise, new situations may dissolve them, and it is necessary to face the possibility that they will not last for the full length of time that was anticipated. Nevertheless, experience has shown, and I think that the speech of the Foreign Secretary which we have listened to this morning has clearly proved, that our alliance with Japan in the past has been of great strength to us in those waters, has been a great protection to British interests, has been a very controlling factor on the policy of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Japan; and as that has been the case in the past, I see no reason whatever to doubt, myself, that it will be the case in the future. Therefore, from a strategic point of view it is the opinion of the Committee of Imperial Defence that a renewal of the Treaty with Japan is a most desirable object. I referred just now to our relatively unprepared condition. What is that due to? It is due, of course, to the actual building of some Powers, and the prospective building of other Powers, but it is also due to another cause to which the Committee of Imperial Defence has devoted a great deal of attention, and in regard to which it has, I think, circulated a statement which is now in the possession of all the Prime Ministers.

The new difficulty, the new situation, arises from this. A modern battle fleet is worked and will more and more be worked by oil and not by coal. It is impossible for a great many reasons, financial and other, to keep the great bulk of the British Fleet in the Pacific. To keep the bulk of the Fleet in the Pacific so far from its base involves a prodigious cost and extraordinary administrative difficulties, and I think that we must assume that in the main it will be in Western waters and in Northern waters that the British Fleet, the main bulk of the British Fleet, will be concentrated in peace time. What is required there is to make arrangements by which the British Fleet can be transferred effectively and rapidly so as to operate in the Pacific. It cannot possibly operate in the Pacific unless it has a place in the Pacific where it can concentrate and where it can refuel. If you send out a fleet from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, the great bulk of such a fleet, if you send it out to the Far East, could get to Singapore, which is the gate of the Pacific, but when it got to Singapore, unless it brought with it an immense number of oilers which are not yet in existence, it would find itself without the power of refuelling. It would be immobile, and if immobile it would be useless, relatively useless. In these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that one of the most pressing needs for Imperial defence is that Singapore should be made into a place where the British Fleet can concentrate for the defence of the Empire, of our interests in the East, our interests in India, our interests in Australia, our interests in New Zealand, our interests in the smaller Possessions there, and that for that purpose it is absolutely necessary to undertake works at Singapore. Those works cannot be finished in a day. They cannot be finished in a year. They must take some time to complete.

Mr. Massey: They are going on.

Mr. Balfour: Not yet. This question has only been taken in hand quite recently. Therefore, until Singapore is rendered the place which we think it ought to be made, a place of concentration, a place of refitting and refuelling, until this is done, we are at a relative disadvantage undoubtedly in the Pacific, and that is a very strong strategical reason, putting all wider considerations apart, why we should remain on the most friendly terms with Japan and why we should continue a policy we have hitherto pursued with such success, which is that of joint action with Japan in the Far East. I imagine we shall have to discuss this question of Singapore more in detail when we come to deal with the naval problem, but it is impossible to give the Committee of Imperial Defence's view upon this question of the Japanese Alliance without referring to it, and without discussing in its main outlines the immense importance which our Naval and Military Authorities attach to the policy I have suggested. Now I think nobody could have listened to Lord Curzon and not have come to this conclusion, that two evil consequences at least will follow from bringing the Japanese Alliance to an end. The first is, that we can no longer count on any assistance from Japan. We can no longer pretend to control her actions or modify her policy in the Far East, but worse than that, we may turn a faithful friend into a very formidable enemy, and to turn a faithful friend into a formidable enemy at a moment when you find yourselves relatively unprepared to meet any attack from the former friend and the present enemy is the very worst policy you could possibly pursue from a strictly military point of view. The First Lord of the Admiralty is there; I do not know that there is any broad consideration in that connection which he thinks I have omitted. I think I have sketched it adequately for this stage of the discussion.

Consideration of the question from point of view of League of Nations.

I therefore come to the second part of my observations, which I shall make very short, in which I speak, not as the Chairman of the Standing Committee of Imperial Defence, but as the British Representative of the League of Nations. I ought to say that the idea, for what it is worth, which I am going to throw out now, I have not had time to discuss, either

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

with the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary, because it only occurred to me yesterday when I was meditating upon the discussion which was probably going to take place to-day. In order to make the idea clear, perhaps my colleagues will allow me to remind them of what happened at Geneva at the last assembly of the League of Nations and since. A good many suggestions for amendments to the Covenant were made at the Assembly. The Assembly remitted them all for consideration and report to the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council of the League of Nations in its turn appointed a Committee to consider them *seriatim*, to offer an opinion upon them and to make any further suggestions which it thought proper. Of that Committee it made me the Chairman, and the Committee met in London. I was not able to go to Geneva owing to public work here. I think it was three weeks ago. It was very representative. I was the only Britisher upon it, but France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Japan, South America, Czecho-Slovakia, and other countries were all represented upon it, and we were unanimous. One of the amendments considered was the Czecho-Slovakian amendment, and the man who I believe devised it, and who, being on our Committee, certainly recommended it, was the ablest statesman which Central Europe in this turmoil has yet been able to produce. It was the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, M. Benes, well known, I think, to everybody here, and everybody, I think, will agree he is a man of great capacity. M. Benes, as I think it was pointed out by the Foreign Secretary, no, by the Prime Minister, is deeply concerned in this new combination of Central European States which is in process. I do not know whether it is to be formed or not, but it is under discussion, a combination of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, and so on. His idea was that such combinations of States, or two or more States, if it was genuinely done for defensive purposes and in the interests of the peace, was not only an object to which the League could take no objection, but it was an object which the League ought to encourage, and that such combinations could be done and should be done with the approval, under the protection as it were, and with the complete knowledge of the League of Nations. He embodied that in a proposed amendment to the Pact. I am sorry I have not the document here. I did not know the discussion was going to take this form to-day, or I would have brought the document with me. I have it at home.

Mr. Massey: Can we have the document circulated?

Mr. Balfour: Certainly; I think it would be proper.

Mr. Massey: I was simply referring to the resolution.

Mr. Balfour: Of course, it should be circulated. I was wondering whether I would circulate it separately or trouble our colleagues with the whole report of the Committee. I think they would like to see the whole report of the Committee which deals with all the amendments.

General Smuts: I think it would be convenient at some stage of the Conference that we should discuss these amendments.

Mr. Balfour: Quite. It turns on Article 21, and Article 21 reads as follows:—

> "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as Treaties of Arbitration or Regional Understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace."

Now we propose on M. Benes's initiative to make the following addition to it:—

> "Agreements between members of the League tending to define or complete the engagements contained in the Covenant for the maintenance of peace or the protection of international co-operation may not only be approved by the League but also promoted and negotiated under its auspices, provided these agreements are not inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant. Special conferences of the members of the League concerned may be summoned for this purpose by the Council or by the Assembly of the League."

The whole argument is contained in this report, but that suggested amendment is the outcome of the discussion. I will circulate the whole of it.

Mr. Hughes: Can we have a typed copy of the amendment after lunch?

Mr. Balfour: Yes, certainly. As you will see, it is an amendment to Article 21.

Mr. Hughes: It has a direct bearing on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Balfour: That is why it has been brought to this meeting. It occurred to me last night if we said to the Japanese: "The old Treaty is over, we think that it should in spirit be renewed, and we think it comes under the terms of this Article 21," (which unfortunately has not yet been accepted, but only recommended), I really do not see how anybody could object. Of course, America is not for the League. America is rather against the League, but you will observe this Article brings in the Monroe Doctrine rather by the shoulders. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, especially if America would join, would be the Monroe Doctrine applied to the Pacific, and whether you look at it from that point of view or not, it is quite clear that the pacific character, the defensive character, of the whole transaction would be patent to the eyes of the world if it were done under the auspices and with the complete knowledge and approval of the League of Nations. It would then be framed with its defensive and unaggressive character patent in every line, with the League of Nations as its godfather, and it would be a very embittered controversialist who could find in such a transaction a menace or threat, or anything else, to any third Power, or indeed anything otherwise than as a controlling influence over any imperialistic tendencies which the Japanese Government or any Party in the Japanese State might be supposed to entertain. That suggestion I simply throw out at the moment as a personal suggestion because it has not only never been discussed by the Cabinet, but I have never had the opportunity of mentioning it either to the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary, who are the people whose opinion will most direct the Government of this country.

Mr. Hughes: Supposing your suggestion was adopted by this Conference, would you now take the steps that have to be taken before any Treaty or arrangement made between ourselves and Japan can adapt itself to, or be in harmony with, the Covenant as amended?

Mr. Balfour: I should think so, because our Treaty with Japan is intended to be a pacific and defensive Treaty, and if a Treaty is really in essence pacific and defensive it ought not to require much ingenuity or much skill in drafting to make it congruous and harmonious to the fullest extent in both the spirit and the letter.

Mr. Hughes: But the amendment has not been accepted yet, has it?

Mr. Balfour: No.

Mr. Hughes: That was what I wanted to know.

Mr. Balfour: But I think it would be accepted. It is proposed by Central Europe. The Chinese did not very much like it at the Conference, but all the other Powers did, and they were very representative people. Switzerland was represented, Holland was represented, in addition to the three Great Powers, and the South American States, so that I should have a good hope that it would be accepted. Nor do I quite see why anybody should object to it. I think I have made it clear, have I not?

The Prime Minister: I think so, very clear. I would suggest that at this stage, if it is convenient to the Conference, the debate should be adjourned, as I should very much like to be present when the Dominion Premiers and Representatives of India state their views upon this subject. I am afraid I must go back to the Coal Conference; I have been sent for, and I am afraid I cannot remain here any longer. Would it be convenient if this Debate were taken to-morrow?

Mr. Balfour: Do we not meet at half-past four to-day?

Mr. Lloyd George: It depends entirely upon this. I am very sorry, but there is great trouble with the miners, although I am hoping we may be able to get through it to-day. Supposing I am able to arrive at an agreement with them, the House of Commons may want to discuss it. In that case I certainly should not be here. But supposing the House of Commons do not, I could be here at 4·30, and so could Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. Churchill: We have arranged a Committee Meeting at 3·30 on the subject of Emigration. That would be over at 4·30 of course.

Lord Curzon: I have to see the American Ambassador at 3 o'clock and I can report at 4·30 what he has said.

Mr. Lloyd George: We shall know at 4 o'clock if the discussion takes place, and subject to that we could meet at 4·30.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Prime Minister, I should like to say this. It is no use our discussing this matter when you are not here.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should like very much to be here, and therefore, if you put it in that way, if there is no Debate in the House of Commons on the subject of coal, I will be here at 4·30.

Mr. Hughes: There is one thing I want to ask the Foreign Secretary through you. Will he have those two alternatives typed for me?

Lord Curzon: Yes, that is what I suggested.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

2. *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., June* 28, 1921.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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SECRET.

E. 9th Meeting.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE of FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am sorry to say that I have received a letter from the Colonial Secretary intimating that his mother died very suddenly this morning, and that he would be unable in the circumstances to be present. He wishes me to apologise to the Conference on his behalf. I am sure you will allow me to communicate to him, on behalf of us all, an expression of deepest sympathy, for he was very fond of his mother.

I regret that I could not be here yesterday afternoon, as it took longer to pull the coal business through than we expected. As a matter of fact, we were not able to settle it all up until nearly half-past six. I am very much obliged to you for putting off the Conference until this morning.

Mr. Meighen: Prime Minister, we have now come to what is undoubtedly the most important subject of discussion at this Conference. I can only say as to the introduction by the Foreign Secretary that it was what all of us knew it would be, ample in argument and admirable in presentation. It is with some deference that one who is far from being as experienced as he with such subjects ventures to follow—particularly when he feels it his duty to turn the argument toward a different conclusion.

Discussion in Canadian Parliament.

You remarked, Prime Minister, some days ago, that there had been free communication in the Parliament of Canada of Canada's position on this question. That is not wholly correct. There was free discussion in the House, requested by members on both sides, but the discussion ended without any commitment whatever from myself or from any member of the Government as to the course we should pursue here. Nor have I made any such commitment, nor has any Government member, publicly or in any way since.

Opposes renewal.

Perhaps it will contribute to rapidity if I say at the outset that I feel compelled to oppose the renewal of the Alliance. I would regret to see the Treaty continued in any form at all.

Lord Curzon's remarks will enable me to present my case more briefly than would otherwise have been possible. He has with fairness presented arguments against the renewal of the Treaty, as well as summed up at the close what he felt were the preponderating arguments in favour of renewal. Referring to the latter, if I caught the full effect, they might be described in these words:—"First, that the Treaty has served its purpose, or, in other words, has been a success, in that it has held the situation in the Far East; in a word, has met the purpose for which the Treaty was originally framed, and the somewhat different purpose for which it was renewed in 1911. My answer is: if the purpose was to preserve peace in the Pacific, possibly in the main, it has. But, at any rate, it did not preserve peace during the period of the Russo-Japanese war. I have no further remarks to make on that phase.

Mr. Chamberlain: It was signed in the middle of that war.

Situation changed since 1902.

Mr. Meighen: It was concluded in 1902. The Treaty, however, had certain ends to serve from our point of view. It was framed admittedly to meet first of all a Russian menace, and secondly, on its renewal in 1911, a German menace. These were the concrete objects that Great Britain had in mind in making the Treaty, and we are told it served those purposes. As we find ourselves now, both those menaces are removed, and consequently, if my mind reasons correctly, there can be no argument for renewal of the Treaty drawn from conditions no longer present. There may be reasons why it should be renewed to meet another situation. I will come to that later. But there is really no correspondence between the speculative possibility of a rehabilitated Russia and the actual Russian menace of 1902; no correspondence between the still more speculative possibility of a Russo-Germanic Alliance and the actual German menace of 1911. In a word, a Treaty framed to meet future contingencies of that character is wholly different from a Treaty framed to meet an admitted state of facts, which state of facts constituted a manifest menace that all the world could see. I do not relish being in the position of saying to the people of our country, nor of answering any criticism from the country to the south of it, that this Treaty is for the purpose of enabling us to meet a possible menace arising from a combination of two potential, or should I say impotential foes, one of whom now is self-smitten and the other of whom is defeated and more or less prostrated—and all this in the presence of the new conditions of world affairs that we are trying to bring about. In fact, to put such a case would be to invite criticism, if not worse.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The second reason is this—that Japan has proved a trusted and a loyal ally, has lived up to her obligations under the Treaty, and that that fact should be taken into account in determining whether or not we should renew the Alliance. Well, I am not intimating even an opinion—Lord Curzon's opinion in this respect is conclusive so far as I am concerned—that in relation to the late war Japan fulfilled her obligations, and that possibly the Treaty enabled Japan to succeed with Russia, which may have been an advantage to us.

Extent to which Japan has observed Treaty.

But it is going very far to say that Japan has proved true to the Treaty. Again the Foreign Secretary's words are conclusive with me. The Treaty was framed—if its language meant what it said—to bring about "The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India," and "The preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China," and "The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in the said regions." In other words, the independence and integrity of China and the "Open Door."

I read the following from the Foreign Secretary's address of yesterday, referring to Japan:—

> "They are people who must expand. They have done so in so far as this was open to them during the last twenty years, and they have done it, if not with an excess of scruple, at any rate, with fairly successful consequences. They have annexed Korea; they have possessed themselves of Formosa, and they have acquired the Pescadores. They have, since the war with China, practically made themselves possessors of Southern Manchuria, where they pursue a defined policy of the "Closed Door" of exclusive railway construction and mining rights. They have acquired control over Shantung, which they have promised to relax, but at present have not gone far in doing so. In 1915, as you will recall, they addressed the famous Twenty-One Demands to China, which I need not further particularise than by saying they were intended to, and would have made China a vassal State."

Against a nation that had covenanted with us to preserve the independence and integrity of China and the "Open Door," that reads to me like a very formidable indictment.

Lord Curzon: It is only fair, Mr. Meighen, that you should remember what I said yesterday. In the agreement concluded between the United States of America, represented by Mr. Lansing, and the Japanese Government, represented by Viscount Ishii, in November 1917, the American Government themselves recognised that Japan had special interests in China, particularly in that part where their possessions are contiguous. That was a recognition of a certain right on the part of Japan and justified, to some extent, the proceedings to which you are now objecting.

Mr. Meighen: What you say might put it out of the power of the United States of America to criticise Japan, but it does not affect the argument that, having made the Treaty for definite objects, Japan has far exceeded her rights, and progressively violated her covenant. It cannot well be imagined how in the short space of less than twenty years she could expect under any conditions to achieve more in the way of aggrandisement, and it is only reasonable to say that if we do enter into another Treaty, we have every ground to expect them, hold the check rein as we will, to succeed in duplicating the performance of the last twenty years in the further invasion of this very independence and integrity of China. In so far as she does that with us walking by her side, it makes us *particeps criminis* and thus affects our standing with all other nations.

China's objection to the Treaty.

I have also difficulty in understanding this: if a real object of the Treaty is the preservation of China's integrity, how does it come that the Government which is the most violently opposed to its renewal is the Government of China itself. There can be no question as to their position. I do not mean, by these words, to dispute the estimate the Foreign Secretary places upon Mr. Simpson. I saw him only once. I do not dispute the Foreign Secretary's judgment at all. But it is not a question of the standing of Mr. Simpson or the character of Mr. Simpson. It is a question of where the Chinese Government is, and no one that I have heard disputes that the Chinese Government is very strong in its objection to the renewal of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

this Treaty. If they actually looked to it for protection it is inconceivable that they would be opposed to its renewal, and it seems to me what we should take into account, as regards China, is the opinion of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people.

Lord Curzon: It is only fajr indeed to say that the protest of the Chinese Government has been directed against the renewal of the Treaty in its present form. I am not aware that they have said anything contrary to the renewal under the sort of conditions that I described yesterday.

Mr. Meighen: Well, their position is revealed in the despatch from our Ambassador there, to the effect that the Treaty must not contain a reference to the preservation of Chinese integrity and independence without, first of all, their being consenting parties. Leave that reference out and tell me on what ground you expect under the Treaty to curb the rapacity of Japan in China. Leave out other things, such as have been suggested, and I really do not see what is left of the Treaty, except window dressing, for all its substantial purposes are one by one relegated to oblivion.

Now, I stated that the avowed object of the first Alliance was to provide against the Russian menace—the danger in that regard has gone; the avowed object of the last renewal to provide against the German menace—that danger has also gone. But we are told we are preparing now against the still greater peril of the two together. If we do so by an Alliance with Japan, is that not going to invite, or at least to hasten, the very Alliance we fear between Russia and Germany? It would seem to me that we are thereby taking the very step that is likely to bring such a menace into being.

Germany's relationship with Japan.

As respects the cultivation of friendship between Japan and Germany, as revealed in the account of Dr. Solf's activities in Japan, I do not see anything objectionable; I do not doubt for a moment that Germany will seek to make friends with Japan. I should think that task was part of the duty of Dr. Solf, acting as he does for his country, and I do not think there can be any objection. We should do the same. We should do towards Japan as Germany, through Dr. Solf, is doing. We should also have such a representative there—I do not say we have not—if we have not, we should have a man of his capacity and skill.

Suggested British Policy towards China.

This further thought I venture. It would seem to me that the proper policy toward China would be, not so much the formation of groups to protect her———.

Mr. Lloyd George: Not so much what?

Mr. Meighen: Not so much groups to protect her, as a policy of encouraging her self-reliance by putting her on her own unhampered resources as to taxation and finance and in a position of responsibility.

Canada averse to Alliances.

Speaking generally as to Alliances, I am quite sure I am speaking the opinion of the Dominion of Canada when I say it naturally is averse to any Alliances at the present time. We do regard the formation of groups and Alliances, even though they are not counter to the Covenant of the League of Nations, as likely to subvert its purpose. The Prime Minister said the other day that it would be impossible to expect that groups should not arise within the League itself; that, forty or fifty nations being represented there, the same thing would occur as happens in a Parliament—certain groups would get together for certain things. That may be, but that is very different from permanent Alliances: I mean ten, fifteen, or twenty-year Alliances. I would be sorry indeed to see all these various nations taking sides as is done in a Parliament, one seeking to prevail over the other and each straining for authority and power. If that course is to be pursued, why, it seems to me there is nothing but despair ahead of us. It is quite natural that, for definite purposes there would be certain of them—I mean all chiefly interested in the purpose—who would group together. That I would conceive to be possible; but if, for example, Japan and Great Britain are, under the shadow of the League, to form an Alliance for the purpose of preventing possible designs of Russia and Germany in the Far East, then, other Alliances would be formed for counter purposes. Alliances will grow, and there becomes really no difference between the situation that results and that from which we have escaped. They are precisely the same. Consequently, we would like, if possible, to start without entanglements of this kind, and we feel that it is safe to do so now. If we come later on to the pass of a combination against us then we will cross that bridge, we will have something then to point to as the reason for what we are doing, but until we come to it we have not any sufficient reason.

Mr. Chamberlain: May I ask one question? Does not that presuppose that if we make any arrangement with Japan now she will still be ready to come in if

danger arises owing to a German and Russian combination? Is not it quite likely that when that time comes she will not be on our side, but will be in the German-Russian combination? Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Meighen: If we start now to guard against this contingency, on the hypothesis that Japan will not then be a friend, what combination could you not justify? You could justify any. Where do you put those who are without the combination? Do you not compel them to make themselves active along certain lines, and in this regard particularly the United States?

Effect in China.

Again, it does look to me as if the friendship of China—and it is worth something—is almost certain to be lost by the course we are contemplating. We are almost certain to lose that friendship, and it is going to bring China and the United States a lot closer together. I think they have the advantage over us even now. I do not pretend to speak with authority on this special point, but such is the impression reading has given me, and reason does prevail upon me to say that, by taking this course, we are going to give the United States a decided advantage in her influence in China. We should not do so. Our interests there are equal to those of the United States; the importance of the Chinese trade and the goodwill of China are very great.

Canada's special interest in British-American relations.

I come now to the subject of British-American relations. Canada does not claim that in the general question of the renewal or the non-renewal of this Treaty her voice must be specially heard. Not at all. The Empire is concerned as an Empire, and so is every part. But as regards this aspect, its effect on British-American relations, we do feel that we have a special right to be heard. We say that because we know, or ought to know, the United States best, and because in the continuance and improvement of our relationship with them we have a vital concern. If from any cause, or from the initiation of any disastrous policy, we should become involved in worse relationships than we are now, Canada will suffer most of all. And if, in the last awful event—God forbid it should ever come!—we reach the penalty of war, Canada will be the Belgium. Consequently, in the preservation and improvement of that relationship we are eagerly, critically concerned. But we view this question not from the standpoint of the United States, we view it from this standpoint, that if, as I believe, the Foreign Secretary is sincere when he says that British-American friendship is the pivot of our world policy, it follows that in determining the wisdom from our own point of view of any engagement a major consideration must be its probable effect on that friendship.

Renewal unsatisfactory to United States.

From the beginning of the discussion I know that the Foreign Secretary has stated that any renewal should be in a form satisfactory to the United States, and that we must carry that country with us in any course that we take. Well, I am going to say this. I do not believe that it is possible to have an agreement in any form at all, however negative, that will be really satisfactory to the United States. I do not say that it will be impossible to have an agreement to which the United States Government would be compelled to admit that it could take no exception, and would say nothing—would stand by. That might be possible, I should think, but that does not mean that the agreement itself is not going to be harmful to our American relations—that it is going to be satisfactory to the American people. I am not intimating for a moment that the United States Government will not speak for the American people. It will speak just as fully as any Government can speak for any people. It will see a certain agreement; it will see that no interest of the United States is affected by the precise terms of the agreement; and it may possibly say: "We cannot take specific exception"; but that any agreement for an exclusive confidential relationship that this country enters into with Japan will not injure our relations with the United States is to my mind impossible, no matter what are its terms. It will be used by every fomentor of strife against Great Britain. The existing engagement has been so used all these years. It had a definite clause in 1911 that it should not involve us in war with the United States, but the very existence of that Treaty has undoubtedly injured British-American relations. Its continuance will do so even more, and for this reason, that the just objects, which were patent to American statesmen before, are not patent to American statesmen now. They may see objects still, and they may say they are good objects—I doubt if they will say they are sufficient—but they are not of the character, the imminence and the strength of those that animated us before. If we now in this new state of affairs renew a confidential and exclusive relationship with Japan it is wholly impossible to argue convincingly, to my mind, that it is not going to affect detrimentally our relations

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

with the United States, no matter how steadfastly the British Government sets its face to keep those relations good.

The American Government as much as, or more than, any Government in the world is affected by popular opinion, by the necessity of carrying their people with them, and American opinion is bound to be affected by the renewal of these relations with Japan no matter what form that renewal takes, and no matter how earnestly we seek to bring that Republic to our point of view.

Lord Lee: You mean an exclusive relationship?

Mr. Meighen: I mean an exclusive relationship with Japan. There is another reason. When the old Treaties were made there were five, perhaps six, Great Powers—you might say more; now there are three Great Powers, powers of the first order and strength, and those are Japan, Great Britain and the United States. Does it stand to reason that two of these can group themselves together in a special relationship in a sphere in which all three have great interests and the third be unaffected, the third look with favour upon it? It does not appeal to my reason, I do not think it is possible. They have interests equal to ours in the Far East, in the Pacific. Why then, for the purpose of protecting common interests, for the purpose of holding in good form the situation in the Far East, why should they be left out of any relationship. I cannot see it. I do not doubt for a moment the sincerity, or even the determination, of the Foreign Secretary, that we shall do nothing to antagonise them. I do not doubt that at all, but I think the reincarnation of this agreement is the first step in a journey that may bring us to that result. Suppose we insert a clause that nothing in the Treaty shall lead us into conflict with the United States. In the first place we have that in the present compact, but the report of the discussions in the Japanese Diet indicated that Japanese Statesmen were very careful not to give the effect to the clause that we intended. They did not give full effect to it. But the fact is it was there. There was a clause that guarded us against that awful fate. They know there is again to be such a clause and yet they want the Treaty. Why? I think their objects are clear. They believe that, in the event of a conflict with the United States, they will have us benevolently by their side. Then it is, from their point of view, a contemplatable contest; otherwise it is not. They look undoubtedly for this country to assume a position of benevolent neutrality, if not better. And the whole course of the Alliance will on their part be so conducted as to bring us insensibly into opposition with America. We may not strike the blow, but we may be brought into a position of opposition to American interests. For example, suppose they pursue the course they have pursued; suppose they do no more than they have done all through these twenty years. Does anyone say that will not bring us into conflict with American interests? Undoubtedly it will. We may restrain, we may do all we can. We say now that we have done so to the best of our ability, but there is Korea, there is Formosa, there is Manchuria, there is Shantung. There are the twenty-one demands. They have done all these things during the twenty years, and strive as we will to have the United States people believe that this is all perpetrated with our hand on their collar, we cannot get them so to believe. They will believe it has been done with the connivance of Great Britain, in order to subvert the purposes of the United States, and to give us a greater hold on and enhancement of our eastern interests. Japan expects benevolent neutrality or better if war should come. Besides she will expect our assistance also at the Peace Table, and that is a vital thing as we all know. These advantages are what she is looking for. The American public understand these things, and undoubtedly industrious efforts will be made by the whole army of Junkers or semi-Junkers in powerful positions to influence opinion, to see that the American people understand them, and they are just waiting to start.

Resolution in American Senate for Conference on Reduction of Armaments.

That country has behaved with scrupulous correctness, at least its Government has, up to now. I think the best people are looking to this Conference to take up a position that will enable them to bring about a better state of affairs. The passing of a recent resolution by the American Senate so indicates. The statements that have gone out to the press from Washington confirm this belief. The Government has said nothing, but I feel satisfied that much that has gone out has been inspired, and that convinces me that they would very much like to see a step taken at this Conference of the whole Empire that will open the way to a better friendship. I do not think they want any better as respects European relationships with Great Britain than that accorded to any other country. But I do think we cannot ignore the passing of that remarkable resolution by their Senate on the very eve of this Conference. It is the resolution asking for a Conference with Japan and Great Britain looking to a reduction of armaments.

Mr. Massey: That has not been turned down.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Meighen: I am saying that the time chosen for the passing of that resolution indicates that they are watching the course of this Conference very carefully.

Now, it is said that we should know first of all before we go into Conference as to the Far East and before we lose the concrete source of strength that we are said to have in this Alliance, what is going to be done about armaments and navies. And, as Mr. Massey says, we have not turned down their proposal. I make the statement that when you enter again into this Alliance you may in effect turn it down. There may be no use talking to the American Government about reducing armaments after you have entered into a special exclusive relationship with their greatest competitor. What position are we in to go to them to discuss reducing armaments? We are in a good position if we do not re-ally ourselves with Japan alone, but if we do, then the race has started. The burden that will as a consequence be on us to secure our possessions in the East will in my judgment be an increasingly heavy burden, and I do not know whether we shall be long able to sustain the competition. They have their programme, and the only opportunity that we shall be likely to have to work in concert with them for a relaxing of this armament burden is the opportunity that presents itself now. What is there to be lost by letting this treaty matter stand until a Conference as suggested is held, or until some sort of arrangement can be made resulting in an understanding? What is to be lost by such a procedure?

No need for Japan to be estranged if Treaty not renewed.

It cannot be argued that unless we renew a faithful and loyal Ally is to be estranged. If so I can only look upon the present state of affairs with despair. If such reasoning is correct, then this engagement is eternal unless terminated by violence or bad faith. We admit that on both sides the objects that we sought are attained. We are on friendly terms. But forsooth under these conditions to suggest non-renewal is to offend Japan and to make a stranger of her and turn her into the ranks of our foes. There is no ground at all for estrangement. It seems to me that there is some reason for America's objection to any exclusive relationship, but there can surely be no valid objection from Japan to a relationship with them but inclusive as well of the United States.

Lord Curzon: I quoted the opinion of our Ambassador. I had to condense my remarks on this point yesterday, but Japan would feel it bitterly and would take real offence in view of what our Ambassador said.

Mr. Meighen: I do not know, and therefore I am not contesting that statement, but any reasons behind such a feeling on her part are not apparent to me at all. I say this, that her position would be unreasonable against a proposal that she and the United States should sit down with us together, so that to whatever is done by one, the other will be a party. That course does not cast out Japan at all. It widens the region of her recognition among the Great Powers. But if she, without the shadow of reason, takes offence, what is to be expected of the United States who are asked to stand out altogether while we renew a special exclusive relationship with Japan? There would be some show of reason behind a sense of estrangement on the part of that country, even though the possibility of antagonism with them is provided against in the arrangement; they are nevertheless out, and they are the same blood as ourselves. I think we should treat Japan just the same as the United States, but no better.

If this renewal is intended to create a combination against an American menace which is to succeed the German menace, which in turn succeeded the Russian menace of 1902, then there can be no hope of ever carrying Canada into the plan.

The claim is sometimes made, sometimes left to be implied, that this Alliance with Japan is to be the pivot of a new world alignment. That only needs to be stated to excite despair in the minds of the people of our country. The future is dark if we have to start now on that path. I can only add that there is no possibility of convincing Canada or making any appeal at all to her with those words in our mouth—none at all. I am not saying that other reasons for renewal may not be adduced, but this implication of providing against a possible menace in America cannot carry conviction. We ourselves have got along with the United States for 100 years, and have overcome many difficulties, and we meet there a spirit which convinces us that we can still get along.

Canadian position.

I addressed a cablegram to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in February last, outlining the position that we felt then this matter was in and the course it should take. I stated that the success of the Alliance, so far as China was concerned, had not been impressive, that the objects for which it was created and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Conference of interested Powers suggested.

continued no longer existed, and that, on the other hand, the objections that had some force at the time of the conclusion of the three Treaties, had now far greater force. I took the stand that it would be wise to seek some other expedient rather than the renewing of the Alliance. I suggested at that time that it would be useful for us in Canada, in a purely informal way, to ascertain whether or not the United States would sit down with the British Empire and with the other Powers having special interests in the Pacific and Far East and seek to come to some understanding as to the preservation of those interests, and as to the principles which should actuate the policy of all. The four Powers mentioned were Japan, the United States, the British Empire and China.

As to the composition of the Conference we should of course be quite ready to hear discussion and suggestions as to who should be there, but those were the four proposed. My suggestion was not acceded to. What we felt and said was this, that if we came to this Conference as we come now, not knowing whether the alternative of such a Conference, looking to a tripartite arrangement (or perhaps even wider), was possible or not, we should find ourselves in the position of having no alternative save to renew or terminate. That pass is just where we seem to be. We have not much time. I did not know before that steps had been taken by way of communication to the League of Nations, or rather by way of communication with Japan and disclosure to the League of Nations, that amount really to a denunciation of the Treaty unless it is by concrete act renewed.

Mr. Balfour: I am not sure that I understand that allusion.

Mr. Meighen: I understand from the Foreign Secretary that Japan and Great Britain have agreed and have informed the League of Nations that any renewal must be in terms that will comply wholly with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that Counsel for the Foreign Office has given the opinion that such arrangement between Japan and Great Britain submitted to the League amounts to a denunciation of the Treaty unless active steps are taken to renew it in some form or other. Therefore the clause that provided that if nothing were done before the 13th July it should extend for another year and be terminable only with a year's notice, does not apply. Unless we act now, so we are told, the agreement falls; thus we are confronted with the difficulty foreshadowed in my cablegram. We have really no time.

Lord Curzon: You have until the 13th October.

Mr. Meighen: I may say in that regard we knew nothing of that extension in Canada.

Question of three months' extension.

Lord Curzon: The arrangements have been going on here and have not been finally concluded, but, as a matter of fact, it is certain that the prolongation of the agreement for three months beyond the 13th July, 1921, will be operative and therefore we have from now until that date within which to decide.

Mr. Meighen: That of course is a prolongation of the Treaty. I have consulted an officer of our External Affairs Department, who states that information that the Treaty had been extended did not reach Canada. Certainly, Canada did not assent to any renewal for three months. He has never seen nor have I seen any notice that such has taken place.

Lord Curzon: The Colonial Secretary is, of course, responsible for communication with you.

Mr. Meighen: Our officer has no recollection of having seen it, nor have I, and I fear the Government of Canada did not receive it. I understood yesterday that Japan has not agreed herself to the renewal for three months, it appears now that that assent will be given. For myself, I would rather see no renewal for three months. In fact, I fear that a renewal will be injurious, injurious to the success of the Conference. I think we should have been in the best position of all, if we had felt out the possibilities and been enabled to hold our Conference prior to the expiry on the 13th July, having made first appropriate communication to all the Dominions and obtained their approval. We should be in much the best position if that had been done. Now I submit it would be better to pursue conversations with the United States at once and with any other nation which the Foreign Secretary thinks should come in, and see if we cannot secure an understanding, or an exchange of notes before the 13th July, or at least before any great time elapses, and before any conceivable harm can result from the expiry of the Treaty. I should think that

Recommends immediate Conference with United States.

would be the wisest course we could take now. It seems to me that it is scarcely approaching the matter in the right way to renew the Treaty for a short time and to say to the United States, we are going right on unless you act. Such a method may end all right, but I think it has not such good prospect of success as if we recognise frankly that a new state of affairs exists, that there are not now the same conditions as existed in 1911, that other circumstances calling for some action may be present, but that the old ones have passed away—it would be taking a more propitious course, I say, if we now recognise these truths and declare to the United States that in the presence of this new situation we clearly recognise their equal interest in the Pacific with us, and we ask them to sit down with us and with Japan and come to an understanding. Let us not say to them first that unless they do, we purpose renewing this engagement to which they are not parties at all. I submit to the Conference that what I have outlined is the right course to pursue and I think if any words are necessary to emphasise its rightness they are the words contained in the last message of our own Ambassador at Washington. It is very significant that the previous messages from Sir Auckland Geddes were to the effect that a renewal of a modified agreement would not be badly received by the United States. Now he has changed and I think he is right, undoubtedly right, in his estimate of American opinion and in his recommendation. It will be noted that he communicates to his Government the words of the Secretary of State of the United States. Can we go beyond the Secretary of State on such a question? There can be no doubt that his opinion is that any agreement with Japan will be prejudicial unless the United States join in. His opinion would be best obtained in an informal conversation. There is no doubt that such is his opinion. Surely the Secretary of State is the proper man to express an opinion and the man whose opinion should be accepted by us on such a point. He says, let me repeat, that any exclusive agreement will injuriously affect relations with the United States. I note in the memorandum submitted this morning by the Foreign Secretary outlining his conversation with Mr. Harvey that Mr. Harvey expresses the opinion that there might be an agreement that would be acceptable to the American Government.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Sir A. Geddes' Opinion.

Foreign Secretary's interview with Mr. Harvey.

The memorandum reads: " . . . . If the Conference now sitting in London decided that it was desirable to renew the agreement in some form or another, and we came to the American Government with such an announcement, would the mere fact of renewal, apart from the form in which it took place, be likely to meet with a necessarily unfavourable reception at the hands of the American Government? My position would certainly be complicated if I were to advance upon a field, my mere entrance into which might be the source of misunderstanding and offence.

" Mr. Harvey hastened to assure me that I need entertain no such fears. In America, as in some other countries, there was a great gap between press clamour and the views of the Government. Whatever the decision at which we might arrive in this country, it would be respectfully treated and examined by his Government.

" Further, I put the question—arising out of the suggestion made by President Harding's Administration that it might be desirable to have a discussion with Japan and ourselves as to naval strength in the Pacific—whether the Ambassador thought this covered the whole of the ground suitable for an enquiry, or whether it might not be possible to contemplate an investigation in which the whole future fortunes of the Pacific, political and economic, as well as military and naval, might be passed under review by the various nations concerned, with a view to arriving at some constructive policy for the future. I understood that America was withdrawing her fleet from the Atlantic, convinced that no danger could arise from British rivalry on this side, and that her naval forces were to be concentrated in the future in the Pacific. This meant that the Pacific would speedily become the centre and pivot of world politics, and that it would play an enormous part in the determination of the destinies of the future. In these circumstances it appeared to me that the Powers would do well to consider how they were to conciliate their several interests, apart from those of defence, in that vast area, and how they were to provide for the development without friction or warfare of the immense resources which it possessed. The problem of China alone demanded an exhaustive investigation. Was it not conceivable that some uniformity of policy might be attained, and that the Pacific might be assured of a future that would justify its name?

" The Ambassador replied without any hesitation that he could not imagine anything better than that discussions initiated between the interested Powers should

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

range over this extended area, and he felt confident that no objections would be raised by his Government should such a proposal be made.

"Altogether, his conversation, although it was necessarily neither detailed nor specific, left me with a favourable impression as to the probable attitude of the American Government, and convinced me that absolute candour between us and them will be the wisest policy to pursue."

Relations with America will suffer from renewal of Treaty.

My comment on that extract is this. If it means anything as reflecting the real opinion of the American Government and people it is opposed to the judgment of their Secretary of State, definitely opposed. There is no reconciling them at all. If it only means that it would be hopeless to ask the assent of the United States officially to it, then the Ambassador may be quite correct, and certainly I am bound to respect his view. But that is very different from saying it would not injuriously affect relations with the United States. He does not go that far. Nor, if he had ventured to, can the Ambassador be heard to say that renewal would be, *in fact*, an agreeable thing to the American Government, because the opinion of the Secretary of State of the United States is a higher one than his in that regard. Consequently out of both communications it must appear that we have everything to lose, as far as American relations are concerned, by renewing the Treaty in any form.

Impression that American Ambassador considered renewal probable.

Lord Curzon: It is very difficult to condense into a few sentences the impression left by a conversation, but I ought to say that the impression left upon me by the American Ambassador yesterday afternoon was not at all in consonance with the view contained in the telegrams from the United States. If Mr. Harvey had desired to represent to me that the state of feeling there was so strong that the renewal of the Treaty would not be tolerated, he had abundant opportunity for doing so. He did not take it. On the contrary, he seemed to think it the most natural thing in the world. We should have friendly discussions in that case. He has come here charged with the policy of closer friendship between his country and ourselves, and had he felt that here in the gateway stood an obstacle, stood an angel with the "sword of flame," he surely would have told me so. He did not say so. He said, "Any time you wish to discuss with me any question, I shall be delighted to do so." I did not push it further than that. But certainly the whole tone of the man, and the character of what he said was far more friendly than anything I had been led to expect, or than Sir Auckland Geddes' telegrams would have caused me to anticipate.

Need for Tripartite Arrangement.

Mr. Meighen: Is that not what I am urging? Their attitude is friendly. They desire to be more so; and this message is most certainly clear that there should be a tripartite arrangement, or perhaps something wider, but something in which the United States is a party. Therefore, pursue that course. But if not, and there is another agreement between us to which they are not a party, it will be unfavourably regarded by the United States. If the Ambassador had intimated otherwise would he not be in direct conflict with the expression of opinion by Mr. Hughes? And in that event are we not bound to take Mr. Hughes's opinion?

Lord Curzon: He did not go so far as that.

Communications regarding three months' extension of Treaty.

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not wish to interrupt you, but I was very disquieted by your statement that we had not informed you of our intention to propose to ask the Japanese Government to prolong the agreement for three months. I felt that it was my fault if that was the case, because the previous communication had come from me, and I felt that I ought to have informed you. I was under the impression that I had, and if I had not I certainly owed you in Canada an apology. But I find on the 26th April I sent you a message, in which I said: "Your Government may rest assured that until the June Meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, the question of renewal in any form of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will be left entirely open. As an act of courtesy to the Japanese Government, and in deference to your apprehensions, the former has been informed that until the future policy of the Empire has been decided upon by the Imperial Cabinet, no decision can be reached; and in our judgment neither promptitude of decision nor freedom of action will in any way be compromised by awaiting this discussion. In the meantime, we propose to ask the Japanese Government, since it would be impossible to communicate the decision before the date of the expiry of the present Treaty in July, to agree to prolong for another three months the present agreement."

Mr. Meighen: I now recall that, and I am sure that we received it. I overstated the matter if I said that we had no communication of the intention.

Mr. Lloyd George: That was in April. I felt that I ought to have informed you, and I was under the impression that I had. Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Meighen: We did not communicate agreeing to a renewal in any form, whether for three months or any time. Neither did that message amount to a submission to us of the question. I remember that was at the end of your reply to my second cablegram.

Mr. Hughes: It was understood that we should come here to deal with it. What is the good of dealing with a thing that has ceased to exist? The question was the renewal.

Mr. Lloyd George: This is what I said: "In the meantime, we propose to ask the Japanese Government, since it would be impossible to communicate the decision before the date of the expiry of the present Treaty in July, to agree to prolong for another three months the present agreement."

Mr. Hughes: That is an extension without prejudice

Mr. Meighen: A statement of intention.

Mr. Lloyd George: It was done in order to give us a free hand here, with a view not to prejudice the decision of the Imperial Conference, so as to give us plenty of time to consider it carefully.

Mr. Hughes: If that had not been done, what would be the position to-day?

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we made it clear. I do not think that there was any objection or protest received from any of the Dominions to the proposed extension for three months.

Mr. Meighen: I want to say a few words in reply. If a proposal had been submitted for our approval, probably we would have objected. Perhaps, as it was, we should have replied and objected, but we did not carry our communications any farther as a matter of fact.

America should have been consulted before three months' renewal.

It would have been much better in my judgment to have ascertained in good time the United States attitude towards a Conference. Where are we now? We have an agreement, say, for three months more. In the meantime, the old Treaty stands and we are in communication, say, with America, in regard to a Conference. What is to happen finally to the agreement if the Conference results in one thing, if it results in another thing? We cannot be in Conference with you to consider what should be done. We may be at the Conference with America; I do not know, of course, whether it will take the form of a Conference at which men will sit round a table, or whether an attempt will be made through Ambassadors to reach identic notes, or what may take place. But there are a dozen different results that may come. Now then, suppose we are in the presence of one of those results, and the question comes, what shall be done? We cannot meet in conference here again to decide it. So it seems to me that the maintenance of the Treaty pending a Conference may mean virtually eliminating the voice of the Dominions from the question, that is to say, in so far as that voice may, as at a Conference, be adequately expressed.

Mr. Balfour: There is one question I should like to ask Mr. Meighen. In one of the most important passages of your speech you have said this: "How can America, which is one of the three Great Naval Powers in the Pacific, Japan and ourselves being the other two, look with favour on a confidential and exclusive relationship—some phrase of that sort—between those two Powers, from which she herself was excluded?" Have you any ground for thinking that America would like to be a third party to an agreement?

Probability of America favouring the Tripartite Agreement.

Mr. Meighen: I hoped to have that ground. That was the object of the communication I made to the Prime Minister, but in deference to his desire nothing whatever was done towards ascertaining the attitude of the United States.

Mr. Balfour: I am thinking of public opinion in America, which is what you especially appealed to.

Mr. Meighen: I have no doubt at all that that is correct and I am confirmed in such opinion by the Secretary of State of the United States. I wish for no better confirmation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Balfour: They would not contemplate a tripartite arrangement?

Mr. Meighen: What I meant to say was that they would not look with favour upon a bipartite arrangement.

Mr. Balfour: Yes; but have you any ground for thinking they would agree to the alternative course of a Tripartite Agreement?

Mr. Meighen: I cannot bring any argument to bear upon that.

Mr. Balfour: But what is your view?

Mr. Meighen: My view is that they would.

Mr. Massey: That they would favour a Tripartite Agreement?

Mr. Meighen: I think the prospect would be quite hopeful for some kind of participation on their part in a broad, inclusive arrangement that need not take the shape of a formal or rigid Treaty; but I cannot say definitely.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Prime Minister. I think we are all indebted to the Foreign Secretary for the very complete review of the position in which we stand in regard to Japan and to a renewal of the Alliance. He has presented with admirable impartiality the position from both points of view and I thought his presentations had exhausted the possibilities of the position so far as his presentation was concerned. But Mr. Meighen has shown that this is not so. Mr. Balfour has explained how the renewal of the Treaty will be affected by the League of Nations Covenant. This morning we have received a copy of a draft telegram from Lord Curzon to Sir Auckland Geddes in which the Foreign Secretary repeated the substance of a conversation which he had had with the Ambassador of the United States on this matter. We have all the facts before us, and understand the position thoroughly. At least, that is what I should have said yesterday. But Mr. Meighen has shown us that there is another side, which he has presented with considerable force, and that side seems, if we are to accept Mr. Meighen's point of view, to exclude even consideration of any other. What, in fact, Mr. Meighen has said is this. He says we ought not to renew this Alliance—I leave his subsidiary arguments on one side for the moment—because America does not desire us so to do. Here, before we consider whether this is a sufficient reason for non-renewal, we naturally ask ourselves how does Mr. Meighen know that this is so? The official information that we have had from the Foreign Secretary does not at all support that view. Mr. Meighen's reply to this is direct and to the point. He says that the voice of the Ambassador, or even of the Government of Washington, is not the voice of America. Naturally we are very anxious to hear the voice of America. But when there are many voices, to which shall we pay heed? Last night, so we are informed in the press this morning, the representative of the State of Virginia, speaking at a function at which Mr. Churchill was present, assured us that the utterances which Mr. Meighen regards as the voice of America should be wholly disregarded.

Difficulty of knowing American opinion.

Mr. Meighen: You have mistaken what I said. I did not say the opinion of the Ambassador was to be disregarded. I said the opinion of the Secretary of State was the highest opinion on that subject I could wish for.

Mr. Hughes: If I misquote you the blame is not wholly mine; but we will leave that. What I intended to say is this, that we are asked by Mr. Meighen to disregard the views expressed by the American Ambassador on a matter on which he is surely entitled to be heard, and to listen to what Mr. Meighen calls the "Voice of America." We are told that if we do renew this Treaty we shall certainly prevent those friendly relations which now exist with America becoming still more friendly, or even turn her from a friend into an enemy, and in short, we shall do a thing which no citizen of any part of this Empire desires to do. If that be the natural and inevitable effect of a renewal of the Treaty, clearly we ought to hesitate and weigh well the position before we act. But is the position as Mr. Meighen put it? I do not think it is. I listened, as well as I was able, to Mr. Meighen's argument. It is quite obvious that his views, as the views of all men, are coloured, like the dyer's hands, by what they work in. We all naturally reflect our environment. Mr. Meighen's most certainly reflect his. The policy he thinks right is one which the "Voice of America" would acclaim. But what we have to ask ourselves is this: Is this Empire of ours to have a policy of its own, dictated by due regard to its own interests, compatible with its declared ideals, of which it has no reason to be ashamed, and from which it has deviated as little as any nation, or is it to have a policy dictated by some other Power? That is what we must decide. Now let me ask Mr. Meighen this very simple question.

Need for Empire policy.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Let us assume that the course that he would have us follow is urged upon the United States of America; that they should mould their policy as the voice of Britain demands; that they should so order their conduct, and have regard to our lightest word, lest anything should offend our delicate susceptibilities, that, in short, they should refrain from saying and doing those things which, although very advantageous to themselves, might possibly offend us. I want to ask Mr. Meighen whether he thinks such a course would find general acceptance in America, whether it would be even accepted by those who he says are not the rulers or spokesmen of America—I mean the Government. I do not think it would. Why, then, should we do so? I want Mr. Meighen to try and put himself in the place of the Representatives of the other parts of this Empire and to remember that we are here trying to evolve a policy for the Empire as a whole. Mr. Meighen said—and I am sure we were very glad to hear him say so—that he did not ask that Canada's voice should be heard to the exclusion of others or above others. We admit willingly and freely that Canada's interest in this question is great, but certainly it is not greater, than Australia's; in fact, I think it would be very easy to show Mr. Meighen that, while with him, the question is: How shall this question be resolved so as not to excite criticism in the United States of America and so affect public opinion in Canada; with us the position is different. It takes on another and more menacing aspect. Mr. Meighen has not suggested for a moment—not directly, at any rate—that one of the consequences to Canada of refusing to renew the Treaty might be to endanger its national safety. He does not suggest that, for a moment, for its borders march for nearly 4,000 miles with those of a nation of 110,000,000 of people. He did not say so, but it is a fact, and one of the most striking proofs of the inconsistencies of mankind, that the nation primarily responsible for that League of Nations which was to banish war for ever, is now committed to the most ambitious naval programme the world has yet seen. By its actions it is clear that it fears attack, and is so doing all that is humanly possible to protect itself against any aggression, from any quarter, but in particular from Japan. It is most important to note this. Mr. Meighen says we should not renew this Treaty with one of the other two Great Naval Powers, and then seek a Conference on the question of disarmaments. We should not go into Court with clean hands. By renewing our Alliance with the most formidable Naval Power except America immediately before we go into Conference, the object of which was the peace of the world, through disarmament or the limitation of armaments, we should prejudice the chances of agreement and be open to the charge of inconsistency. In substance, that is what he says.

Well, what will happen if we do not make this Alliance with Japan? Does Mr. Meighen suggest for one moment that America will be more ready to discuss disarmanent with us? Does he suggest that she will abandon that naval programme of hers? Does he suggest that our refusal to renew the Treaty that has existed now for nearly twenty years, that has never been responsible for a breach of the world's peace during the whole of that period, which, indeed, has done something to preserve it, and which excited little or no attention and no objection in America until the moment when she resolved to be a Great Naval Power, will ensure the cordial co-operation of America in a policy of disarmament? I do not believe so for one moment. Now, I want to put this to you. I speak now, perhaps, for others round this table besides myself—but they can exclude themselves if they so desire. We are ready to talk disarmament with America any day—to-morrow, without reservation or qualification of any sort or kind. She has been invited to discussion with us. The Prime Minister said some time ago that Britain was ready to discuss the matter with America at any time. He repeated that yesterday. And that is the policy, not only of Britain, but of the Empire. I have no doubt that he would repeat it to-day if he thought that such a repetition was called for.

Doubtful whether refusal to renew would help Disarmament.

Now, what has been the response of America to this invitation? No doubt President Harding has said something, but it can hardly be said to have exhausted the possibilities of the situation, and certainly it did not amount to an acceptance of the invitation. On the other hand, the naval programme has gone on. The Senate has approved of the greater part of the necessary expenditure. This, then, is the position which confronts us, and if we are asked, what now stands between us and that positive assurance of the peace of the world for which the world is so anxiously waiting, what must the answer be? It is that America shall accept our invitation and agree with us upon a basis for the limitation of armaments. If America and Britain were in agreement on a practical means which would ensure this, I would not waste the thousandth part of a minute over the question of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Would I prefer the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to an arrangement, which would put an end to the suicidal policy of competing armaments? I say No! a thousand times No! But no such choice is given us. And so we must perforce face the position as it is. Yet Mr. Meighen has tried to create an impression in the minds of the Conference that the renewal of this Alliance was an obstacle to disarmament, and that our renewal would be quite incompatible with our expressed desire for a Conference with America for that purpose. For this reason Mr. Meighen says we ought not to renew it. But even supposing that the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty is incompatible with our invitation to America to discuss disarmament, and I do not admit it—it is certainly not more so than is America's own attitude in regard to this question. Here is a nation responsible—more than any other nation—for the Covenant, that imposing and sacrosanct instrument, which was to ensure the peace of the world and banish war for ever from the earth; yet from which, amongst all the civilised nations, excepting only Bolshevik Russia, she alone has remained aloof, and which she has now condemned with bell, book and candle, thus crowning her contemptuous rejection of the only existing means of preserving the world's peace.

Yet Mr. Meighen not only condones but extols America, and condemns Britain. If the League of Nations which was created at her instance to ensure the world's peace fails, at whose door is the failure to be laid? Not at ours for we are within its fold, but surely at America's for she has rejected it. And as I have said, she says to the nations of the earth who looked to her to lead them into the paradise of everlasting peace, that she proposes to have the largest navy in the world. Contrast then her acts with her words and her policy with that of the Empire. We shall surely not suffer by comparison. Say, if you like, "We desire peace but we are going to have an Alliance with Japan." But do not forget that we invited America to discuss disarmament, to ally herself with us: but in response to these invitations so far she has done nothing. Mr. Meighen says that the renewal of the Treaty will prejudice us when we come to a Conference with America. I do not think so. We should find that the Treaty with Japan would be automatically denounced if the world agreed upon disarmament, or if such an arrangement with America is arrived at as would enable us to take definite steps for the limitation of armaments. But these things are as yet far off: they are dim shadows. It is in such a world that Mr. Meighen has been moving this morning. What does he offer us? Something we can grasp? What is the substantial alternative to the renewal of the Treaty? The answer is, that there is none. If Australia was asked whether she would prefer America or Japan as an Ally, her choice would be America. But that choice is not offered her. As against the substance she is offered the shadow. She calls to America saying "Here are we with a coast-line of 13,000 miles, with a great continent to defend, within three weeks of a thousand millions of Asiatics; will you come to us if we call?" But to the call of our young democracy in its remote isolation, there is no answer. Now then let me speak plainly to Mr. Meighen on behalf of Australia. I, for one, will vote against any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance upon one condition and one only, and that is that America gives us that assurance of safety which our circumstances absolutely demand. Mr. Meighen has that assurance—his geographical and political circumstances are such that he has at his very door a powerful neighbour which for its own sake, if not for his, will defend him. America herself is invulnerable: her coast-line might be attacked, but her hinterland can never be occupied. And it may be said that in this war between Japan and America—this war which some believe must come—neither Power can destroy the other. The geographical position and general circumstances of each are such as to preclude this. Mr. Meighen has not touched upon two facts which stand out; one, that America's real objection to this Treaty in any form is the fear of Japan; and the other, the hatred of Britain by certain sections in America.

Australia's position.

Mr. Meighen: Who are the Asiatics to whom you refer?

Mr. Hughes: Look at the map.

Mr. Meighen: A map is a map. Is it China?

Mr. Hughes: There is China, there is Japan. If you will look at the map you will understand something of the circumstances of Australia.

Mr. Meighen has suggested we ought to postpone the renewal, but we have already done so. There was a postponement originally of a year. Was it not so, Lord Curzon?

Lord Curzon: That was originally suggested—a year was originally suggested, and then we fell back out of deference to this Conference to a suggestion of three months.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: Very well. Ample notice has been given to the whole world of our intention to consider this question at this Conference; ample opportunity has been given to America and to every other nation to express their opinions with regard to it. Lord Curzon has given us the substance of his conversation with the American Ambassador, and has told us that, if we decide to renew the Treaty in any form, that he will commence official conversations with the Ambassador to ascertain what form America desires it should take, or if she can bring herself to approve of it in any form. This brings us to a point upon which Mr. Meighen was very emphatic. He said, if I understood him aright, that there is no form in which it would be acceptable to America. Mr. Meighen may be quite right—his knowledge of that country is incomparably superior to mine, I do not pretend to interpret the opinion of America—but I do pretend to understand something about the opinions of my own country. These are very clear and definite, but no clearer or definite than those of any other part of the Empire placed in similar circumstances. And the policy approved by this Conference, must be one which is best for the British Empire as a whole. Now, first and foremost we have to consider what is necessary for the security of the Empire. It is therefore impossible to decide this question without considering its relation to naval defence. Now let me repeat once more that I desire, above all things, disarmament or some arrangement for the limitation of armaments. But if that be impossible, if having done everything that men can do to achieve this, by a general invitation to the world and a direct invitation to America, to discuss and decide this question, and having failed, what are we to do? If America will neither discuss it, or, discussing it, cannot agree either upon disarmament or some basis for the limitation of disarmament, then we have to face the facts as they now are. And what are they? This Empire rests on sea power, and while sea power exists as the most potent factor in determining the destiny of mankind, we must see to it that the navy is adequate to our circumstances. That, shortly, is the position. I want the Conference to consider it in its application to Australia. If we do not renew this Treaty with Japan, where will Australia stand? If you will look, Sir, at the map you will see the position that Australia occupies. It is a great Continent. We know that the dominant and eternal factor in determining the destinies of mankind is not the ambition of kings or these minor causes to which war has been attributed, but to economic circumstances. Now these circumstances are operating in Japan to-day. She has a rapidly increasing population crowded together in a scattered group of small islands. She must burst the bonds that cramp her natural growth. This is the explanation of her great army and of the ever-increasing strength of her navy. This is the reason she is spending more than half her income on naval and military armaments. But she cannot continue indefinitely, nor for any length of time, this tremendous drain upon her resources. Her ambitious projects must be realised in the near future or the hour in which realisation is possible will pass. What, then, is likely to happen? Will anybody who looks at that map say that, living as we do, remote from Europe, from the Western World, occupying a rich and almost empty Continent, dependent absolutely on sea power, not only for our prosperity, which comes from the sale of goods in overseas markets, but dependent for our very existence on sea power, say that it would be wise for us to alienate by a rude and abrupt refusal to renew this Treaty, our nearest neighbour, a great and powerful nation, whose circumstances compel her to seek new territory for her overcrowded population, and who has behind her effective means of making us feel the full force of her resentment.

Empire Naval Defence and renewal of Treaty interdependent.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes, I think it is very important that Mr. Meighen should hear this, and he has gone off to luncheon with the Prince of Wales, but I think it is very important that he should hear it. I think we had better adjourn here and this last argument I hope you will repeat later. I am sure Mr. Meighen would like to hear it.

Mr. Hughes: I would like to repeat it.

Mr. Lloyd George: So I suggest that we adjourn until—what time would suit?

Mr. Massey: Any time will suit me.

Mr. Lloyd George: If we meet here at 4 o'clock we should have two hours. You will resume then?

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, June* 29, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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SECRET.

E. 10th Meeting.

3

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1921, AT 4 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE of FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Prime Minister, when we adjourned I was dealing with that part of Mr. Meighen's argument which particularly referred to the interpretation of the opinion of America, and that led me to consider in greater detail than I had previously done, the effect upon Australia, as part of the Empire, of a refusal to renew the Treaty. Mr. Meighen being called away, you asked me to repeat what I said during his absence. I have not been able to look over the whole of the shorthand report of what I said.

Mr. Lloyd George: That argument you developed being about what would have happened during the war.

Australia's position if Treaty is not renewed.

Mr. Hughes: Yes. I think I can just read a few short extracts from the transcript of the shorthand notes of what I said, and then develop it further. Mr. Meighen said that there was no form in which the Treaty would be acceptable to America. Perhaps Mr. Meighen is quite right. I do not pretend to interpret the opinion of America, but I do understand something about the opinions of my own country, which are clear and definite. They were formed by the circumstances in which Australia found herself, and were, as I think, the best policy for the Empire as a whole. It is important to remember that this question cannot be considered apart from its relation to the naval defence of the Empire. Let me repeat once more that I desire above all things disarmament, or some arrangement for limitation of armaments. But supposing that we had done everything possible by approaching America, by giving her an open and direct invitation to discuss how this could be achieved, and that she would not confer, or after discussion would or could not agree to some basis for the limitation of armaments, then, in what position should we find ourselves if we had refused to renew the Treaty with Japan, if we had alienated her support, if we had turned a friend into an enemy? Should we have to wait in dangerous isolation, groaning under the burden of ever increasing armaments until the world agreed to a binding agreement of disarmament operating simultaneously on all the great naval Powers, including the United States of America, Japan and ourselves?

We have to face the facts as they are. If we do not renew this Treaty with Japan, what will the position be? Look at the map, and note the geographical position of Australia. A great continent with 5½ millions of population, and Japan a small group of islands, densely populated and occupying a dominating strategic position, as its nearest neighbour. The population of Japan is increasing with great rapidity; the economic pressure upon the means of subsistence is daily becoming more intense. The position is unstable, it cannot continue for any length of time. Japan cannot continue to spend half her total revenue on military and naval armaments. She must expand. She is the strongest naval Power in the Pacific. In the face of these facts is it to be wondered at, that Australia views with apprehension the possibility of the Japanese Treaty being denounced? Australia depends for her prosperity upon the sale of her products overseas. Sea power is the foundation of our existence. What should we gain by this abrupt and rude refusal to renew the Alliance with our present Ally? No hint of any intention not to renew it has been given. It has been suggested, not officially of course, that we propose to renew. Definite opinions in favour of a renewal have been publically made by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand. Yet now it is proposed that we should throw over an Ally of many years standing, who, during the war, played a useful part. It is not so much what she did, but what she could have done if she had, instead of marching side by side with Australia and New Zealand, taken her stand by the side of Germany.

Look at the map and ask yourselves what would have happened to that great splash of red right down from India through Australia down to New Zealand, but for the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. How much of these great rich territories and portions of our Empire would have escaped had Japan been neutral? How much if she had been our enemy? It is certain the naval power of the Empire could not have saved India and Australia and still been strong enough to hold Germany bottled up in the narrow seas.

That, Mr. Prime Minister, is the position with which I was dealing when we adjourned and which you asked me to repeat for Mr. Meighen's benefit.

Position of Australia similar to greater portion of Empire.

I do not know that I can put the position of Australia towards this Treaty, which is one very similar to that of the other Dominions, except perhaps that of Canada, without some reference to the effects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance upon the war. Nothing is more certain than that victory was due in no small measure to the substantial help that the Dominions and India were able to give Britain. So

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

much is generally admitted. But not one soldier could have been brought across the seas but for the service rendered by Japan who interpreted her obligations under the Treaty, on the whole, liberally enough. Without her help it is most improbable that the Allies would have triumphed over the Central Powers. Had she elected to fight on the side of Germany, we should most certainly have been defeated. So if to-day we are here discussing the question of the renewal of the Treaty, we, as victors in a life and death struggle, must not forget that we owe victory to the fact that Japan was our Ally. Now this fact applies to the Empire as a whole, but it applies with greater force to Australia and New Zealand. It is very obvious what defeat would have meant to us, and so it is not to be wondered at that we are a little perturbed at the presentation of the case for non-renewal by Mr. Meighen. Let me repeat once more that which I said in the Parliament of the Commonwealth before leaving for England, that Australia would do nothing which would range her as an enemy of the United States. We desire to be—we are resolved to be—friends with America. That is a clear and definite statement, without any reservations, of the attitude of Australia towards the United States.

We find ourselves, therefore, in a most embarrassing position, charged as we are with the solemn duty of endeavouring to do our best for the Empire, and we must not fall short of doing that which is necessary, even in the most trying circumstances. It is most embarrassing that we have to examine the position from other points of view than those with which Mr. Meighen favoured us, but there is no alternative, it must be done. Mr. Meighen has presented the case from the standpoint of Canada, which as I have said, reflects the opinion, or what Mr. Meighen believes to be the opinion, of America. The circumstances of Australia are very different from those of Canada, and I feel it necessary to set forth our position quite clearly. I hope Mr. Meighen will not think that I pretend to have escaped the effects of my environment any more than he has done. I hope, however, that I shall not lay myself open to a charge of a narrow or biassed view. For I venture to say that the circumstances of Australia, particularly its complete dependence on sea-power, are common to the greater part of the Empire, and that, therefore, the consequences of non-renewal of the Treaty upon Australia would be felt by the Empire as a whole, Canada perhaps excepted.

Renewal not incompatible with League of Nations.

Now Mr. Meighen's argument, which was presented as I have said with great force and ability, turned wholly upon the effect of the renewal of this Treaty upon the United States. But the onus is on those who wish to disturb a state of things which has existed for nearly twenty years, to show why we should change. I submit with all respect to Mr. Meighen that he has not made out his case. Let us consider his argument. Mr. Meighen has not suggested that the renewal of the Treaty in some form is incompatible with the League of Nations. Mr. Balfour has shown us that it need not be incompatible with the Covenant either in its present form, or in the amended form as outlined by him yesterday. I am quite willing that the Treaty should comply with either the Covenant as it is, or as amended, but not that it should depend upon either alternative in particular. That is to say if by any chance the amendment should not be approved by the League then the Treaty should adapt itself to comply with the requirements of the Covenant as it stands. If the amendment is approved then it should comply with the Covenant as amended. That being so, let us see what this involves. The League of Nations stands, if anything does, for all those principles upon which Mr. Meighen has been so insistent this morning. The peace of the world, disarmament, and end of the suicidal struggle for naval supremacy which preceded the great war and which is now being renewed—a policy which has reduced the world to a state of chaos and which, if persisted in, will destroy civilisation—for all these things the League of Nations stands. We are members of the League. The United States is not. The declared policy of the United States is to build the biggest navy in the world. Surely then we are not to be charged, we who are members of this League, we who propose a Treaty which is compatible with the Covenant and of which the League will approve; we, who urge a limitation of armaments, are not, because we seek to renew a Treaty which has been in existence for twenty years, to be charged with something that will disturb the peace of the world or will delay for one day the happy consummation that the whole world desires! If such a charge is to be against anyone, it certainly will not lie against us. The renewal of the Treaty in the form we desire is not inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations, with the maintenance of the world's peace, with still closer friendship with the United States of America, with disarmament, or the limitation of armaments. What

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

reason then is there that can be urged against its renewal? Mr. Meighen would have us believe, that in some way or other, renewal would be a menace to the world's peace. But what are the facts?: for it is no use beating the air. The maintenance of the world's peace is above all things that which we earnestly desire, but how is it to be maintained? There is a general consensus of opinion amongst civilised peoples, that in some way or other the Great Powers should show that they have learned something from the Great War and are worthy of the awful price paid for victory, by coming to some arrangement that will preserve the world's peace. Well we have joined the League of Nations. We are willing to discuss disarmament with the United States of America. We have said to America, "We will discuss with you the question of disarmament, and we will do so quite independent of the League of Nations, or whether any nations join with us, and you, or not." What can we do more than we have done. Mr. Meighen tells us that the renewal of the Treaty will be objectionable to America. I should like to hear from Mr. Meighen, the facts being as I have stated, why this should be so. He says it does not matter in what form we renew it, it will still be objectionable. He does not deny that the Treaty may be so formed that the Government of America may say "There is nothing inimical to our interests in the Treaty." But even so, he says that this nebulous, intangible thing which he calls "the voice of the people of America" will regard it as a hostile act, and evidence of an outward and visible sign of our intention to do something which will militate against America's interests. It is very difficult to deal with such an argument, because in the very nature of things who is able to say what is the voice of the people of America? It is said that the voice of the people is the voice of God.

Difficulty of knowing real American opinion.

Mr. Massey: Not always.

Mr. Hughes: Precisely, you cannot tell whether the God speaks or merely rumbles in uneasy slumbers, or peradventure, speaks with a forked tongue saying many and quite inconsistent things. But against Mr. Meighen's hypothetical voice of America, we have this definite and clear statement by the American Ambassador, who is if anyone is, the voice of America, the authoritative voice of the people, and the Ambassador says that he is willing to discuss the question of renewal with the Foreign Secretary. I submit that his voice is the only one we ought to heed. In any case why should the renewal of the Treaty be regarded by America as an unfriendly act? It has existed twenty years. The Foreign Secretary reminded us yesterday that America has never regarded it as an Alliance hostile to her interests until quite recently. I cannot place my finger just now on the precise terms of Lord Curzon's reference.

Lord Curzon: It was the reference to Sir Auckland Geddes' communication to us in November 1920.

Mr. Hughes: Thank you. There has been as everybody knows an election in America quite recently which resulted in the most overwhelming victory for the Party whose spokesman the American Ambassador is. Yet Mr. Meighen contends that he is not charged with authority to speak on behalf of the people. Of course, it is impossible to have relations or to come to any understanding with regard to disarmament or anything else with a country whose foreign policy is built upon the shifting quicksands of faction or public opinion, resting upon or controlled by faction. I am very much afraid that what Mr. Meighen would have us believe as the voice of America is something very different. We have seen only the other day the clearest possible proof of the fact that America speaks with two voices. One voice assures us—and I reminded Mr. Meighen of this before the adjournment—that the great heart of America beats in sympathy with us; the other voice denounces us and all our works. Mr. Meighen would have us believe that if we will but do this thing, if we repulse and brush aside contemptuously an Ally of twenty years standing who is at this moment the second naval power in the world—I speak, of course, of a fleet in being—if we brush aside this Ally whose stronghold occupies strategic positions as regards our Empire, which we cannot and dare not ignore, we shall turn the hymn of hate which this other voice now chants into loud shouts of eternal friendship. I venture to ask Mr. Meighen what substantial thing can we hope for? Mr. Meighen says "You will get the friendship of the great American people." Frankly I do not believe it. Now, Sir, I venture to say that if we do this thing, if we repulse an Ally who stood by us during the critical days of the war, if we bow the knee to faction, if we attempt to interpret the raucous voice of the faction as the voice of the great American people, we shall not only fail to win their friendship, but shall most assuredly bring ourselves into contempt amongst them. How does a strong nation act? It does that which it thinks

Danger of terminating Alliance owing to Extremist American faction.

to be right. It examines all the circumstances and considers the feelings and sentiments, the ambitions, the desires, and the necessities of all mankind. But it acts. It does not go about begging leave to do this and that and postponing day after day and year after year that which, not being done, will involve its own destruction. That is not the way to gain the respect and the alliance of America. Those who are weak have no Allies. And if they are weak through their own vacillation, they deserve none. They will certainly get no Allies whose support can be compared for one moment with that strength inherent in a Power that, having faith in itself and the justness of its motives, takes its own course, guided only by a due regard for its own security and of those basic principles upon which civilisation rests, and in the very vanguard of which the British Empire marches.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

I say, unhesitatingly, that so far from gaining the friendship of that anti-British faction by refusing to renew this Treaty, America will despise us if we do reject this Treaty. When we have done what Mr. Meighen will have us do, he believes we shall have swept away all those clouds of enmity and distrust that warp the judgments of America in regard to ourselves and every act we do. If I thought that by any act of ours we should make America our firm friend and Ally the position would be very different. But I do not believe this will do what we so earnestly desire. For when we have swept this away there remains another which goes infinitely deeper than any objections a certain section of the American people can have to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Does Mr. Meighen say for one moment that the Irish section, and the hostilities of that section and all those sections that group themselves with it, will be materially modified by anything we can do in regard to this Treaty? Does he say that the venomous hatred against Britain that now inspires it will be lessened by a thousandth part by this latest evidence of our having failed to act in a manner compatible with our position and our interests? They will interpret our act as another evidence of our weakness. They will say, "You have done this thing and now this other remains," and so it will go on. These men can never be brought to be friendly with Britain and it is as well that we should recognise this fact at once. There are in America to-day those who are friendly to Britain, those who are bitterly and irreconcilably opposed to her, and a section which stands midway between, apathetic and indifferent, who may be brought to support us or to favour an alliance or an understanding if we but act justly and firmly. I emphasise this last.

We must not only act justly but it is necessary to act as becomes a great Power. Mr. Meighen tells us plainly that we cannot renew this Treaty in any form that will be agreeable to the American people. My answer to Mr. Meighen is that he cannot be in a position to know. With all respect to Mr. Meighen, he is not in a position to know. No man can know. But I say that in twelve months' time, if we renew this Treaty, the position will not have been altered for the worse so far as our relations with America are concerned. For what course do we propose to follow? We propose to consult America, invite her to express her opinion, to be, if she will, a party to it. And this brings me to the point Mr. Meighen made. He said: "You propose to renew a Treaty when the need for it has disappeared; it arose out of the condition of affairs when there were six great Powers, when the condition of Russia and the growing power of Germany made it necessary for us to conserve our interests in the Far East. But now there are only three great naval Powers, and America would regard the grouping of two of them as an evidence of unmistakable hostility to her." Mr. Meighen says this in the face of our declared purpose of expressing in definite terms that this Treaty is not, and must not, be construed in a way unfriendly or hostile to America. As to his other contention it must be said that if the circumstances have changed, the need for this Treaty has not passed away. Mr. Meighen is wrong if he supposes that the only reason why Britain made this Treaty with Japan was because Russia was then a great Power, and as she is so no longer, the need for the Treaty has passed. The Treaty was made to protect the interests of Britain. Now, although the circumstances have changed, the need for protecting British interests remains. Mr. Meighen pushed his argument further, so far indeed that he brought before us a possibility that I had not contemplated. He said: "If you do this thing you must not omit from your calculations the possibility of America ranging herself with Germany and Russia against you." We are asked to abandon an ally who has stood by us, in order that we may please the anti-British faction or at most serve the interests of a Power which we are now told will, if we do not agree to abandon our Ally, do that very thing which Mr. Meighen condemns, namely, form an alliance, but in this case wholly incompatible with the League of Nations, and the maintenance of the world's peace. But why did not

Need for Treaty still exists.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Meighen push his argument a little further? He told us what the possibilities were if America ranged herself with Russia and Germany, but why did he stop there? Suppose we do spurn Japan, may not America, which as Mr. Meighen says may make alliance with Bolshevik Russia and Germany, ally herself with Japan? We are asked to pursue a policy of dangerous isolation at a moment when we are perfectly incapable of maintaining our interests by such a policy. Turn your friend and ally into an enemy, as you will by a refusal to renew, and where do you stand? What have you done lately? Sir, it is to the eternal credit of Britain that she has taken the lead and set an example to the world in disarmament, while the rest of the world, the other two great naval Powers, were engaging in building greater and greater navies. She has reduced her navy very much below the strength at which it stood at the close of the great war. And even as it stands now, it is too great a burden for Britain to bear.

And yet it is proposed that we should deliberately invite a conflict with another great naval Power on a stage so remote, and at an hour when we are utterly unprepared, when we could not, if we wished, marshal our whole resources—when we could with difficulty hope only just to maintain our own. Does Mr. Meighen deny that this is a possibility which we must face? He tells us that if we renew the Treaty we may have to face an alliance of Germany, Russia and America. Well, if we do not renew does he deny that we may have to fear that Japan either alone or in alliance with other Powers may attack us? I cannot for the life of me understand that those reasons, which Mr. Meighen put forward, are sufficient to compel us or induce us to pursue a policy so fraught with menace to this Empire. When we come to discuss naval policy, we shall see where we are. Look at Hong Kong, Singapore and the East as a whole—look at Australia and New Zealand. We shall have placed before us facts in relation to the naval position to-day: ships, docks, bases, oil and fuel supplies throughout this Empire, and I venture to say that, if nothing else would convince Mr. Meighen, that ought to. We are not to-day in a position to challenge or invite a conflict with a great Power.

Difficult for Japan to continue present Expenditure on Armaments.

Let me emphasise this point; it is impossible that Japan can continue to maintain her present armaments for an indefinite period or, indeed, for any lengthy period. The economic pressure upon her resources grows, and is growing so rapidly that she has everything to gain and nothing to lose, if the blow is ever to be struck, by striking soon. Is it suggested for one moment that the statesmen of Japan would stand idle and wait, while America prepares her great fleet, while she marshals such an overwhelming naval supremacy as would make a conflict impossible, while she builds docks, while she accumulates and stores oil and fuel and prepares for the day? This will take time but in such a race Japan knows very well that eventually she must take second place, she cannot keep pace with America. In the end, she must be overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers and financial resources. Will she then wait or strike sooner and possibly in some other quarter? Japanese statesmen can hardly hesitate between such alternatives. The Japanese people are bearing crushing burdens and it is impossible that these can be increased or be long borne. Now, Mr. Meighen will have us insult, or to put it more mildly, offer a rude rebuff to this proud and powerful nation. He would cast away this substance for the shadow of a better American feeling towards us. It is not suggested for one moment that America will ally herself with us. She will not come into the League; she will not disarm. Now, France and Holland, we have been told by Lord Curzon, regard the renewal of this Treaty in some form with favour. They would regard their position and their interests as being safe under these circumstances.

Opinion of France and Holland.

Lord Curzon: I have had no communication with them, but I believe that to be the case.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, quite so. Very well. Supposing you did not renew it, what is the position of Holland? What is the position of France? Is the world's peace likely to be promoted best by the renewal of this Treaty or its rejection—that is the question.

Japan's ideals not compatible with World Peace.

I have referred to Mr. Meighen's argument that America might conceivably be found ranged against us. I cannot believe that this is possible, but, at any rate, by common consent Mr. Meighen and I are agreed that Japan is a Power whose ideals or ambitions are, or may conceivably be in certain circumstances, incompatible with the preservation of the world's peace. And her circumstances and her power are such that, if a deadly insult like this be offered her, and she finds herself isolated, what is she to do?

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Sir, I certainly think that we shall be building an edifice for the maintenance of the world's peace upon surer foundations if we continue these relations which exist between Japan and ourselves for yet a little while. It may be that, either through the League of Nations, or some arrangement between the Great Powers, the United States, Japan and ourselves may find a simple solution, a basis upon which the world can work for the restoration of normal conditions. At present there is none. I do not hesitate to say that we should be doing an ill turn to Japan if we thus isolated her. How can we best control Japan? The world still shows unmistakable signs of readiness to appeal to force rather than to reason, in spite of the deadly lesson that has been driven home by war and its terrible consequences. We ought either to control Japan as an Ally and friend or as a potential enemy and actual rival. Our interest lies in the preservation of peace. Our circumstances in the Pacific are such that any other suggestion is unthinkable. What are we to do? We are not able to police the Pacific ourselves. Who can and will do so? Who will defend Australia? How is its safety to be assured? Mr. Meighen, perhaps, does not quite appreciate just how Australia stands in this respect, but when I tell him that we devoted to naval and military purposes, including our obligations arising out of the war 70 millions sterling, he will perhaps understand we cannot shoulder any greater burden. If he will look at his own budget and ours he will see what it means to have a great nation like America as his neighbour, under whose wing the Dominion of Canada can nestle in safety.

Continuation of Alliance in some form better guarantee of World Peace.

Australia's current Expenditure on Defence.

Mr. Meighen has spoken about China, and he appeals to us in a way to which we are naturally susceptible. We want to protect the interests of China. It is right that we should respect her integrity and prevent her from exploitation. But how is this to be done? Mr. Meighen spoke as though it was sufficient to wipe away this Treaty, and those interests would be amply safeguarded. But he does not tell us who is going to protect them. Is America going to do it? If so, how? Is she going to do it by appeal to force or to reason? Is she going to have an understanding with Japan? She has recognised that Japan has special interests in China.

Interests of China.

She will not, she cannot, deny that this is so. Well, how is America going to ensure that China's integrity and interests shall be respected? Is she going to enlist us on her side? Is she going to rely on us to coerce Japan if other means fail; to make us, in fact, her Ally for this purpose, or ask us to shoulder the whole burden? There are only two ways by which we or America can exercise some control over Japan; one is through this Treaty. The other alternative is, of course, war. America is not ready for war. We certainly are not. Now, Mr. Meighen ought to have told us how China's interests were going to be advanced by a refusal to renew this Treaty, but he did not do so. No doubt he told us about the rapacity of Japan; about her insatiable ambition. How are these to be checked—by words? Is the "voice of America" going to stand against the Japanese fleets and the Japanese army? Is it going to prevail against the machinations and intrigues of Japan in China, or does he suggest that we should organise in China an army capable of defending China? These things are in the clouds; there is nothing of substance in them. Mr. Meighen has suggested that there should be a Conference of Pacific Powers—he mentioned China, Japan, America and Britain—to solve the problem which he says is insoluble here. But how could a better thing come out of that Conference than out of this? Would America's objection to any arrangement that this Pacific Conference could make be any less than to the renewal of the Treaty? I cannot see it. What is this Pacific Conference to do that this Imperial Conference cannot do? We set out with the express declaration that we will protect China, that we will not only have due regard to the interests of America, but we are prepared to exclude her from it and to protect her interests. I would never agree to a Treaty that did not make it clear that it would never involve us in an unfriendly attitude towards America. As to her trading rights and interests in the Far East, how is the renewal of the Treaty to affect those?

What advantage in Conference of Pacific Powers over Imperial Conference?

Is it suggested that if we do not renew this Treaty, that the policy of Japan in regard to the "Open Door" will be modified? Who is to compel Japan to modify it if she refuses voluntarily to do so? I venture to say that we have been walking this morning—I will repeat what I have said—in a land of shadows. There is no definite tangible thing which we can hold. What is the alternative to the renewal of the Treaty? If I were asked to choose between America and Japan as an Ally I would choose America. But when I am told in the clearest possible way that America will not be an Ally, that she will have nothing to do with European Alliances, or come into the League of Nations, that she will not disarm, that she persists, despite the declaration of ex-President Wilson, in her

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

intention to have the most powerful navy on earth, what are we to do but to continue that Alliance which has been in existence for twenty years and without which we should never have achieved victory?

Recommends immediate renewal of Treaty.

I do not wish to prolong the debate. I must regard Mr. Meighen's presentation of the case as not the case for the Empire, but as the case for the United States of America. I am as warm a friend and as resolute a champion of the Union of English-speaking people as any man. I will yield to none—not even to Mr. Meighen—in my desire to bring this about. But I do not mistake the voice of a noisy anti-British faction in America for the sentiment of that great Republic, and I will not believe that we shall advance the cause of the peace of the world, and promote more friendly relations with the United States of America, by a weakly vacillating policy which seeks always the approval of this faction before we dare pursue a policy founded on justice, compatible alike with the welfare of mankind and the greatness of this Empire. We have been summoned here to formulate a foreign policy which will protect the interests of every part of the British Empire. This we must endeavour to do. I am for the renewal of this Treaty, and I am against delay.

I am for an immediate declaration of our intentions to renew upon terms that will be at once compatible with the League of Nations Covenant, which will give America ample opportunity to be officially consulted and which will exclude specifically and in set terms, the possibilities of our being ranged in hostile array against America in the terms of that Treaty. That is my position, and I venture to say that a further postponement will and can place us in no better position than we are to-day. We have to face the facts as they are. We have to choose between the Ally with whom we have been in close terms for twenty years, who served us well during the war, without whose aid we could not have obtained victory, together with the maintenance of the *status quo* modified to meet the requirements and the proper representations of the Covenant, as against regard for American interests.

As to the course which Mr. Meighen suggests, I for one, see nothing to be gained by delay and since we have come here to do this thing, I want to say on behalf of Australia that I cannot but venture to hope that this Conference will decide to do something quite definite and that without delay.

South Africa not so closely concerned.

General Smuts: Prime Minister, this discussion has become somewhat controversial, but as one understands how deeply these Dominions who have spoken to-day are concerned in this important question, one can quite understand the sort of language which has been used here. My country is almost entirely outside of the area of this great controversy that has been raised, and, therefore, we can look upon this question from the point of view of greater detachment. The subject is one of the greatest importance, and, listening to the language which has been used here to-day by two of the Dominions, language of the most menacing character, one can understand how far reaching the effects of this whole question must be for the future of the Empire. The language used by these two Prime Ministers is such as to frighten a man who stands outside of this great issue; but looking at the question as a whole, I do not remember in the twelve years that I have taken part in these Empire debates a greater or more difficult, or far-reaching issue being raised for the Empire as a whole than this one. It is not a question merely of the continuance of the Japanese Alliance. The question is much bigger, it raises in a very fundamental form many of the great issues on which the future peace of the world depends, many of which are fundamental questions of our future foreign relations; and in dealing with this question which affects the Empire, we should deal with it with all proper proportion and not hurry to a decision. I am not going to discuss all the details of this subject which has been very amply and fully discussed. The discussion raised by the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Balfour has raised a very important aspect of this question, and though they go into a great deal of detail which I shall not touch upon, I want to point only to two great considerations which it seems to me we have to keep before us in dealing with this question. The first is this; I put it first not in the order of importance, but I deal with it first because it is the most convenient—that we must do nothing that appears like an affront to Japan. The question which is raised here is one of such a character, affecting the future peace of the world, that I would go very far to avoid even the appearance of throwing Japan over or putting an affront on Japan. The question of East and West, no doubt, is a great question which lies before this Empire in the future. As I said before our feet are planted both in the East and the West. The British Empire consists of both continents, and it is, therefore, to our interest to keep the two together, as the Prime Minister said, by bridging the divisions between

Japan must not be affronted.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Europe and Asia. And you will not do that if any policy is adopted to-day which seems to throw Japan over and alienates her. We have to look facts in the face. Even Mr. Hughes in his elaborate and able argument which he put before us to-day went on the assumption not that Japan is the real danger and America the friend, and a certain friend, but that Japan is the potential danger, and, therefore, we should control her by keeping up the Alliance.

Mr. Chamberlain: Would it not be true to put it that America was a certain neutral and Japan was a possible enemy?

General Smuts: Yes. If we look to world peace, we must do nothing to alienate Japan or make her think that her time is in the past, that we have had the convenience of her friendship for twenty years, but that circumstances have changed in the world, and we have now finished with her; that we are off with the old love and on with the new. I am anxious that we should avoid that, because Japan is the danger of the future; there is no doubt about that. We will not be solving the cause of world peace by shoving her off, so to speak. At the same time I am equally anxious that we should have the right alignment in our foreign policy in the future, and I agree with Mr. Meighen in what he said this morning, that another generation will see others occupying the position of importance which this Empire occupies to-day. It is quite true to say that America has a vast influence upon the British Empire, and if we want to continue in the future and remain a compact group of States, we have to bear that in mind. We must, in the second place, therefore, avoid any policy which might produce a cleavage between ourselves and the United States. We will break up the Empire if we do adopt any such policy. I am quite sure of that, and we must avoid that by all means. One bright spot in this dark situation in which we find ourselves to-day seems to be this, that a Government has come into power in America which wants to work with us. So far as we can see from public declarations, the President of America has declared against the League of Nations. He will have nothing to do with that, and he would not join the League of Nations, but there are many indications in the documents and in what one sees in the press, that it is really the honest intention of America to work with us, and that America is groping her way towards a closer co-operation with us. Now it is not only this Japanese question that we have to deal with, but with a group of foreign questions. We have some questions with America ourselves, such as Mesopotamia, the question of cables, and so on. Besides that, in the background, there remains the debt which we owe to America, which to my mind it is absolutely necessary to wipe out before we can have good relations established again. There is going to be a revolt if we continue to build up armaments in this race that is taking place between America and Japan just now. Mr. Hughes has just explained to us what they are doing in Australia, and I can see in the economic struggle which is ahead of us in the future that this country is going to be handicapped largely and fatally by the taxation which is necessary for such armaments. Therefore, we have not only the Japanese Alliance, but we have a whole group of first class questions which have to be solved, in the settlement of which America is vitally concerned; and fortunately we have at this juncture an American Administration which appears to want to work with us; and, therefore, I am for dealing with this question as a whole and trying to find a solution, not piecemeal, but of the whole group, if possible. It is quite possible that by a piecemeal solution, by first dealing with the Japanese Alliance and then armaments and other questions, we will get no solution, but with the atmosphere as it is to-day, there ought to be an opportunity and possibility for a solution of the whole group of questions; and I think that we should make use of this opportunity.

Influence of America on British Empire.

Other questions with America which require settlement.

I do not want to go into the details of this matter, I simply want to state my view upon it, and the conclusion I have come to is this, that we should adopt neither of the alternatives "A" or "B" of the Foreign Secretary. (See Appendix.) The first alternative "A" proposed that we should renew the agreement for four or five years after consultation with the United States and China and the League of Nations, so as to bring it into conformity with the views of these parties, and after renewing the Treaty in this form we should proceed to negotiate over the armament and other questions. The second alternative "B" is that we should renew it for a short period—say a year—and in that interval of a year hold these Pacific Conferences, at which these various questions can be dealt with. I do not like either of these solutions.

Disapproves solutions suggested by Foreign Secretary.

I am not sure that you are going to satisfy Japan by these solutions, though, of course, I don't know, but my feeling is that when we go to Japan and tell her that we want to renew this Treaty, but that it will be a Treaty that will specifically

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

exclude America, as Mr. Hughes requires—it will be a Treaty that will exclude all reference to military co-operation as the League of Nations require—it will be a Treaty of so vapoury and watery a character that there is no substance whatever left in it. I am not sure that when you come to Japan and propose that, it would conciliate them; and a renewal of this Treaty in the form which is proposed seems to me neither calculated nor likely to please Japan, and if possible, I would rather avoid the whole of that aspect of the question.

The telegram from our Ambassador at Washington raises an alternative solution which to my mind is feasible and ought to be explored.

American views on renewal.

The Ambassador wired the Secretary of State to the effect that the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in any form would lead to disquiet because of its effect on American opinion. He says that "if the United States were specifically excluded from any operation that Treaty might have, the result would be little less than unfortunate." It was pointed out that the Imperial Conference might decide that it was unable to cast forth Japan as if she was unclean, and the Ambassador indicated that he did not know whether the United States had considered a similar agreement with Japan.

Finally, the suggestion arose that instead of a Treaty, a Declaration of Policy, embodied in identic notes, might be exchanged by the American, British and Japanese Governments, subject to agreement on the essential character of the declaration and the practical application of the principles involved. He said he personally would be in favour of such a line of policy, that is, a tripartite Conference to be held between the three Governments. He said he would be in favour of that, and later on he says that, more than that, this conversation might be communicated to the British Government. I, therefore, take the meaning of this to be that the American Government is prepared, not to enter into a formal Alliance with us in a tripartite Treaty which would include herself, Japan and ourselves, but they are prepared to negotiate with us, and that an exchange of notes between the three should make this clear. In the discussion which Lord Curzon had with the American Ambassador here, it is clear that the American Government is prepared that this should go beyond the question of disarmament—that your exchange of notes and views and Declarations of Policy of the three countries should go beyond disarmament and cover other points at issue.

Mr. Balfour: Are you sure it is intended to include disarmament?

General Smuts: Yes, that was the question put by Lord Curzon to Colonel Harvey, whether it should go beyond disarmament. He said: "Yes, it would cover the whole field." America was waiting for us to take the first move. America did not think she should make the first move, and it seems to me that these two conversations at Washington and in London indicate the lines of the true solution, that we should not go like a bull at a gate and try to renew the Treaty in a form that will please Japan, in a form that will affect American public opinion in a way we should not like, but we should get the three countries together, talk things over and exchange notes, a procedure which would not constitute a formal Treaty or Alliance, but an *Entente*, and later proceed to discuss specific questions as they arise.

Recommends Conferences for dealing with Pacific in future.

I feel convinced that the way of dealing with the Pacific in future is by a system of Conferences, the system which was adumbrated as subsidiary to grouping under the League of Nations. A system like that of Conferences between the Pacific Powers seems to be the only way of getting agreement in future.

The idea of the grouping of nations in a smaller league is one I have always thought consistent with the bigger League of Nations, and as I explained in my pamphlet on the League of Nations, the League would only be workable by such a system of Conferences amongst the nations of the smaller League.

Here is a case in the Pacific where greater and smaller Powers are concerned, and very vital economic, political and strategic questions arise from time to time, and the only solution is that they should be brought before Conferences from time to time, and not dealt with by any Alliance. We have two important conversations, one in Washington and one in London, pointing to the same result as the best solution of this matter—the coming together of these three Powers. America is waiting for us to take the lead, and a discussion of this and other questions and an exchange of notes might well become the best of the whole new system.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do you mind my putting this question? I would rather like to elucidate this point. Is that proposal which you mention consistent with Lord Curzon's second alternative of a renewal for a year pending these

conversations? The conversations will take some time, and meanwhile it is possible that Japan will say that she has been dropped. Why should America object to a renewal for a year pending conversations? **Anglo-Japanese Alliance.**

General Smuts: If it is clearly a necessity, of course, I do not object to the three months' extension. I think we do want time to discuss one of the most important problems in the future politics of the world.

Mr. Lloyd George: The three months is to enable us to discuss it. What objection could there be to an extension for a year in order to enable us to discuss it with America?

Agrees to renewal for a year for discussion of general question.

General Smuts: I feel no objection to that provided it is made plain to both parties, both to Japan and America, what the position is, that we are trying to find a solution of the great question. We have been Allies with Japan, and this is no case of being off with the old love and on with the new, but there is no doubt it must be made plain to Japan that America is as vitally interested in this question as Japan and ourselves, and that it is much better, even from the Japanese point of view and the world point of view generally, that we three should come together; I think Japan might understand that. Whether she understands it or not, however, that seems to me to be the wise course to take in the interests of this Empire. If we do not do that, if we do not come to a solution which includes Japan with America, if we do not do that, then we are up against a terrible problem. This discussion which has taken place to-day warns me as to the future. We are at the parting of the ways, and I think we can avoid it by an arrangement which need not be a renewal of the Treaty in some form or another. The situation has become transformed. It is no longer an Alliance, but the situation has become transformed, so let us devise an instrument which will be adequate to this transformation, to the change which has come about.

Mr. Balfour: You would not include China? I agree to that.

Conferences with all interested Powers.

General Smuts: When we come to Conferences, then I would call in all the others. I would call in France, China, Holland, and all the Powers that are interested. But this great step which has to be taken, the initial step, should be confined to the three Powers. America herself is indicating that line. If we can get Japan to adopt that course we can make an arrangement which would safeguard the British Empire, and which would safeguard the very great interests which Mr. Hughes has at heart. I can understand that his position and the position of Australia is a terrible one. I can understand the serious language he uses about this, but our problem is a bigger one than that, and if we can find a solution which solves the bigger problem I think we should adopt it.

American Ambassador has not put forward American views officially.

Lord Curzon: I should like to make an observation arising out of what you said and arising out of what previous speakers have said. I think we should be careful not to read too much into what the Ambassador said to me yesterday. Remember, the Ambassador did not come to talk to me about this question. I thought he had, but when he came into the room he put forward certain propositions to me about an entirely different matter, to which I need not refer now. Taking advantage of his presence there I then opened a conversation about this. I said: "We are talking about this matter over the way, and you know we are desirous of doing nothing which will possibly offend or estrange you, and I wonder at what stage we can best enter into conversation with you. I should like to know your views about the matter"; and then he gave the reply, which was the inevitable reply: "We cannot take the initiative; we want to hear what you have to say." Then I said: "Don't you think it would be an excellent thing to have a Conference on this," and he said "yes," of course he did; he could not say "no." You must not take that to mean——

General Smuts: It is a good opening.

Lord Curzon: It is a good opening, but speakers have been inclined to take him as the official voice speaking for the American Government, which, of course, he was not.

Lord Lee: Did not the Secretary of State take the same lines?

Mr. Chamberlain: Mr. Hughes was drawing inferences from the Ambassador which were contrary to what was said. I thought the Ambassador's reply appeared to be more favourable to the renewal of the Treaty than Mr. Hughes did.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Massey: I will start by following the good example of the previous speakers and complimenting Lord Curzon and Mr. Balfour on the fine statements they have made leading up to the important matter under discussion to-day; important not only to us particularly in the South Pacific, but to every part of the Empire and to the Empire as a whole. Mr. Hughes has put the point of view of Australia, and put it forcibly and well, and everything he has said applies to the other British countries south of the line just as much as to Australia itself. I do not intend to discuss only the point of view of New Zealand, because, I will just say this, that if it were possible for the point of view of New Zealand and the point of view of the Empire as a whole to come into conflict, I would go for the Empire at once, and I am quite sure that in doing so, my course of action would satisfy the people whom I represent and who sent me here. Just one point has been mentioned within the last few minutes with which I can hardly agree; that is, that the Treaty should be renewed for, say, twelve months and then discussed again, or in the meantime, during the twelve months, Conferences and discussions might take place and we might possibly arrive at an understanding. I cannot help thinking that delay, so far as this matter is concerned, is dangerous; that we shall probably—I am speaking of the world as a whole—we shall probably, certainly possibly, be in a more dangerous position in twelve months than we are at present. I think Japan ought to be informed without the slightest delay whether we propose to renew this Treaty or not; though I want to qualify that by saying that I agree thoroughly with the suggestion that has been made that a Conference should be arranged in which America should take part and present her own views. I am afraid that in this connection I am inclined to take a somewhat pessimistic view of the possibilities, but I have watched Japan and I have watched America for some years past, and I believe there is very serious possibility of trouble as between those two countries. I have watched the propaganda which has been circulated and I heard the reference made by Lord Curzon to it yesterday. I have watched the propaganda which has been going on in newspapers and magazines and on the platform very often. Just before leaving home I read a book, the title of which I cannot recollect; one of the most dangerous books I have ever read, written by an American; I cannot recollect his name, but written forcibly and well. He brushed on one side the negroes and said they were not worthy of consideration. Good fighting men under good leaders possibly, but no faculty of organisation so far as they were concerned. He said that some day there would be a war between the brown man and the white man and that the white man should be prepared for it, and the sooner he was prepared the better. That is exactly where our Empire comes in. We have both white men and brown men in the Empire. We have more brown men than white men for that matter, and we cannot complain of the attitude of the brown men during the war. We should have had much more serious difficulty in winning the war had they not been thoroughly loyal to us, and I think that deserves to be remembered when we are discussing such a matter as this. As for America's future, I consider that the future of America itself is the biggest problem of the world to-day. No one can look at all those mixed races in the United States; 13 million negroes and millions of people from Southern Europe, Northern Europe, all sorts and conditions of men and women, without wondering what the population will be like in another forty or fifty years from now or even a much shorter period, and I say it is quite impossible for anybody to predict the result. I have talked with most intelligent men, Americans who were most enthusiastic supporters of the present Government, President Harding and those connected with him, and they have expressed the opinion to me more than once that sooner or later there must be trouble in America. There is, undoubtedly, the beginning of trouble. A very few weeks ago I was in one of the outposts of the United States, I was there for one day; the steamer on which I happened to be travelling stopped there. I went ashore, as all the passengers did. I met a number of people whom I had met on previous trips and there is not the very slightest doubt there was war in the atmosphere, if I can express it in that way. I did not meet a single individual with whom I was acquainted who did not leave the impression that they looked on war as a certainty.

New Zealand would waive her particular wishes to meet general Empire policy.

Recommends immediate action with regard to Treaty.

Possibility of trouble between Japan and America.

Future of America.

I hope it is only a possibility, but it all pointed to war. That was only at an outpost, a very small part of the United States, but the feeling was there, and when people get that idea into their heads the very fact of their thinking about war is likely to bring war. Something comes along and there is a flare-up, and before the world realises what is happening they are at each other's throats. I cannot help thinking that the crisis will not pass without trouble. There has been a paper read

or forwarded to us during the last day or two, supposed to be from an unimpeachable and authoritative source—I do not know the source and I do not want to know it; perhaps it is as well that we do not know. But, referring to the new policy of America, it says this: "On the other hand, the new policy means that Great Britain must acknowledge, in its turn, the naval superiority of the United States in the Pacific. Australia, New Zealand and Canada must recognise the ground of common interest with the United States and look to this country,"—that is to say, America—"for protection rather than to Great Britain." The sting is in the tail of the sentence, that we must in future look to America. You, Mr. Hughes, and I must look to America in the future rather than to Great Britain for protection.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: I have not been looking.

Mr. Massey: And I have not been looking, but I want to say this, and I say it with all sincerity, that my country will not look to any other country than Britain for protection so long as the British Empire exists. We are part of the British Empire and we look to the British Empire to protect us. We are not going to look to any other country, and we are not going to accept protection from any other country except the Government of the British Empire itself. If another country is allied with the British Empire and it becomes necessary for us to ask for protection, then there is nothing wrong in Britain's Ally coming to protect us, but not a country which is not allied with Britain. As I think I have said, there has been a lot of propaganda about this thing, and instead of making things better, this propaganda is making things worse. I have had letters from no end of people of whom I have never heard, giving me advice about what I ought to do in connection with the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. I do not want advice from anybody on a matter like this. A man came to me the other day, apparently a very decent fellow. He said he had come to talk with me about the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. He said he had been in the East himself. Then he proceeded to tell me about the position he thought I ought to take up. Well, I told him I had not come to England or to London to ask advice from anyone; my mind was made up, in the interests of the people whom I represented, before I left New Zealand. I reminded him that I was very busy and said good-bye. But that sort of thing shows that wires are being pulled, very unfairly and very improperly, as I think. However, most of what I have said is only by the way. So far as the renewal of the Treaty is concerned, Mr. Hughes has mentioned several times that the Treaty has been in existence for twenty years. I am bound to agree with the opinion expressed by Mr. Hughes on this, that if during that time a great deal of good has not been done, a very great deal of evil has been prevented, which is the next best thing. I hold no brief for Japan, but I cannot get away from the fact that they have been loyal to us during the whole of those twenty years and they gave good service during the war period. There is no question about that. If Japan had not been our Ally, but had been Germany's Ally, I do not think we should have won the war. That was one of the factors and a very important factor, that helped us to win. We lost no end of ships by submarines and now and again by a German raider, but if the big fleet of Japan had been against us and at liberty, we could not have maintained our communications for a month and we should soon have had to ask for terms. The Japanese served us well for twenty years. They have been our loyal Ally. We have got through the worst war of history. The Allies, of whom Britain was one and Japan another, have been victorious. Now that we have got through the war and some of our former enemies no longer exist, that is to say, they have been so weakened and crippled that as military nations or naval nations they are negligible, is it the right thing to suggest that we should say to Japan, "We do not need your assistance any longer, we can do without you, and we do not propose to renew the Treaty?" I am not going to use strong language, but I do think this; I hope it will not be considered strong language, but I do think that if we took up that attitude with regard to Japan or any other nation that served us in the same way we should be guilty of the basest ingratitude. It would not be playing the game and we should lose the respect of the other nations of the world. And let me say this, that once Britain loses the respect of the other nations of the world the British Empire is done. We should see to it that we do what is right in connection with Japan as well as in connection with any other nation with whom we are in alliance. I can remember the whole of the details—although I am not going to inflict them upon the Conference—when the Japanese

British Empire must protect Dominions.

Japan loyal to Treaty for twenty years.

Refusal to renew now would show lack of gratitude.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

cruiser "Ibuku" was helping to escort Australian and New Zealand troops to the different threatres of war. There were 30,000 men there and I have been in conversation with a number of them, because there were 10,000 New Zealanders besides the ships' crews, and they have given me the most dramatic descriptions of the actions of the people on board, the officers and men, of the Japanese ship when a wireless message came to hand which indicated that there was an enemy warship within striking distance. They described to me how, after the news had been picked up by the Japanese cruiser, they ran up the great Battle Flag of Japan, the cruiser steamed round right in front of the ships that were being escorted, interviewed, by wireless or otherwise, the British officer-in-command, and insisted that the Japanese ship should have the order to go out and sink the enemy ship of the presence of which they had been told. However, the admiral in charge of the "Minotaur" directed that the Japanese ship should go back to its place. She obeyed, and the "Sydney" was sent to do the work which she did so well. I know that the Japanese are people who make hard bargains and get all they can. But against that there is the fact that they gave us great service, which should count at a time like this. Supposing we said to Japan, "We have done with you, we are not going to renew the Treaty," there is the possibility which has been mentioned and emphasised, and which I want to emphasise. Japan is a proud nation, a very sensitive nation, and a very suspicious nation. We all know it and we may, if we are not careful, turn a nation with a temperament like that from a loyal friend into a very dangerous antagonist.

Danger of Japan forming other Alliances.

Do not let us imagine for a moment that Japan is going to be without an Ally. There is not a nation in the world to-day that would refuse an alliance with Japan if Japan offered it, for the very simple reason that Japan is one of the three Great Powers of the world. I do not know whether she will not be the most powerful of the three in two or three years' time; but it is certainly one of the most powerful of the three Great Nations to-day, and there is not a nation that I can think of that would turn down Japan as an Ally. You can think, of course, of our old enemy Germany, and of Russia.

Mr. Hughes: In eight years Japan must be supreme in those things.

German ambitions.

Mr. Massey: Dr. Solf was mentioned the other day. He was Governor of German Samoa and he used to come down once a year to Auckland. He was very friendly with the people there, they put him up at the Clubs, and made much of him. He was extremely popular and extremely plausible. Even to-day some of them cannot imagine that he would ever turn round upon us. But it has been done. However, he showed his true colours on one occasion when mention was made of what New Zealand and Australia were doing in connection with the war, when he said: "They will have reason to regret their actions when this war comes to an end and we take possession of New Zealand; we want it badly, we are going to have it and make use of its citizens for other purposes than they have been used for up to the present." That was Dr. Solf, but he was not then a guest of the Auckland people. I can imagine how he is working, even with the Japanese, who are pretty shrewd and can reckon up that sort of thing as well as most people. I can imagine his having an influence on them and preparing the way for possibilities in the future.

Supports Conference of Empire, America and Japan.

I think I mentioned that so far as the proposed Conference is concerned, I am quite willing to support it. I think it would be a good thing to get, at all events, the representatives of the three Great Nations together to discuss the position, not only with regard to the renewal of the Treaty, but other matters connected with the possibilities of the future. I believe that self-preservation is the first law of Nature, and our business at present and our duty, as men very near the top of the tree so far as the public affairs of the Empire are concerned, is to do everything that we possibly can to strengthen and to preserve the Empire in a time of serious difficulty. There is no doubt, and we cannot shut our eyes to it, that we are passing through a particularly dangerous time, and there is no man on earth to-day who can tell us what the position will be in two or three years from the present.

So far as America is concerned, I frankly admire the genuine American citizens. I am not speaking of pro-Germans or Bolsheviks, the pro-Sinn Feiners or the Sinn Feiners themselves. I am not speaking of them. There is a big proportion of the population who are against Britain and everything British and will always be against us. We cannot shut our eyes to it. But the great bulk of the right-thinking and intelligent people of America, the old stock, are quite friendly towards Britain to-day, and if it rested wholly with them there would not be the slightest difficulty in arriving at a friendly and amicable arrangement that would probably

stand for a great many years to come. I should like to see that attempted even if we were not successful in connection with it. I am glad the point has been made that the Treaty, even as it stands to-day, is not unfriendly to America—very far from it. Lord Curzon referred to something the other day which was a proof that so far as the British Government is concerned they had not the slightest thought of any antagonism or any unfriendly act.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Japanese and American racial feeling in South Pacific.

But there is this point, and here, again, I must speak from the point of view of the South Pacific and Japan, as I know them. I have been on Japanese ships over and over again at our ports. They are proud and suspicious people, and if these American ships come down to the South Pacific and make their headquarters there, it will be looked upon almost as a challenge to Japan. I have not had an opportunity of expressing my opinion to American citizens or the American Government, but, if they want to avoid war, they should avoid making their headquarters on the South Pacific—I do not mean the Philippines, as it is their business. If they think that is right, it is for them to do so. I know exactly what would happen the first time a Japanese ship and an American ship got into one of the harbours on the South Pacific. There would be a riot between the two crews and things would be done which would, in all probability, provoke immediate war, or be looked upon as portending war.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Massey, I am sorry, but we have a Cabinet, and have to be in the House of Commons at 6 o'clock. To-morrow morning, I am sorry to say, I have also got a series of Conferences. Will a quarter past four to-morrow afternoon suit you, Mr. Meighen?

Mr. Meighen: Yes. I think I should say that I expect I shall have to leave for Canada not later than the 21st July.

Mr. Hughes: I will come, though you have told us Thursday was to be free. I had made other arrangements, but I can put them off.

Mr. Lloyd George: I was thinking of Mr. Meighen's convenience. He has got to be back at that early date and we have a good deal to get through. I suggest to-morrow afternoon.

Mr. Massey: I think we have stuck to our business very closely and if we could avoid the social engagements, very well. Although we appreciate very much the hospitality of the British people, yet it all means time.

Mr. Lloyd George: This is an important decision that we have got to take. I think we ought to go on discussing it at any rate. Mr. Hughes, can you be here at half past four to-morrow?

Mr. Hughes: The whole day?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, Thursday afternoon at 4·30 P.M.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

(The Conference adjourned until 4·30 P.M. to-morrow afternoon, the 30th June, 1921.)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

APPENDIX.

Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

The two alternative plans suggested by me this morning were these:—

(A.) Renewal of the Agreement with Japan for a term of four or five years, after consultation with the United States, China, and the League of Nations, so as to make the new Agreement conform to their general views and to remove the doubtful or suspected features from it.

The renewal might even be in such a form that the American Government might at a later date, if it chose, come in.

This renewal to be independent of an International Conference on the Pacific question, though not, of course, inconsistent with it.

(B.) Temporary renewal of the existing Agreement (brought into harmony with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and with mention of India possibly omitted) for a space of, say, one year from October 1921, so as to provide for the holding of an International Pacific Conference in the interval.

Such a Conference would consist of the Governments of Great Britain, America, Japan, the Dominions (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), China, France and Holland. The inclusion of the Pacific States of Central and Southern America may be a subject for discussion, but would probably be found an encumbrance.

(Initialled) C. of K.

June 28, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 11th Meeting.

3

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT BIRKENHEAD, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE of FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Massey: I had almost concluded my observations when we adjourned last night. To the best of my recollection when we adjourned last night I was about to call attention to the fact that as long as the Treaty with Japan existed we were able to control that restless nation to a certain extent. I recollect that a day or two ago Lord Curzon, referring to another nation whose name it is not necessary to mention and with whom we have mostly friendly relations, suggested that while the present arrangement existed we were able, so to speak, to keep a hand on her collar. I think the same remark applies to Japan. If Japan has one fault more than another I think it is that of a desire for the acquisition of territory. But so long as Japan is connected with Britain I think Japan's inclinations in that direction will be kept under control, to a certain extent at all events.

Position of China, especially Shantung.

With regard to China, I have a very great deal of sympathy with China and the position in which she is placed to-day and especially with regard to Shantung. I am not one of those people who think that in a few years time China will develop into a great and powerful nation. She certainly will not so long as she is left to herself; but with Japan as organiser there is no knowing what might happen. I came across a representative of China not long ago, and because I did not happen to take his point of view exactly he reminded me that in the years to come China will be one of the great nations of the world, and that it was well that smaller nations should cultivate very friendly relations. However, I am not afraid of that, but I do think that where an injustice is being done to China we should endeavour to remedy it as far as we can. I think that British influence should be brought to bear to compel Japan to keep her promises so far as the Shantung Peninsula is concerned, or perhaps in any other direction where promises up to the present have been made, but have not been kept.

Immigration Act of New Zealand.

With regard to the Japanese Treaty there is a point on which Mr. Hughes has interested himself very frequently, not so much perhaps during the present Conference as on previous occasions. That is the danger of migration to the British countries in the Pacific. Personally, I do not feel anxious in the very slightest. We are not in the habit of calling attention to it, but it is as well that the Conference should know that in New Zealand we have perhaps the strictest immigration law in the world which has worked smoothly and without friction. I am not going to quote the Act, but the main provision of the Statute is simply that no foreigner can come into New Zealand without the consent of the New Zealand Government. I expected friction when Parliament agreed to that law and also when it received what we speak of in New Zealand as the Royal Assent, that is to say, when the Governor General expressed himself as willing to sign it and did sign it, but so far there has been no trouble. It works in this way, that no foreigner can come into New Zealand without the consent of the Government, the consent of the Government being obtained through the Minister for Customs. But any foreigner may come in for six months for business, for pleasure, or for health, and if he desires to stay longer than six months and indicates that he would like to become a permanent resident, then if he has conducted himself properly and decently during the six months during which he has been a resident, the Minister for Customs may allow him to remain, and he becomes a permanent citizen if he feels so inclined. That law applies to all foreigners, but we have not applied it to all nations, although it is there and can be applied at any time. Probably after a few more years experience there will be a schedule drafted to the Act specifying the nations which may come in and which may not. But that is the law. I saw an article in the "Times" yesterday contributed by an eminent authority, in which he expressed the opinion that every nation had the right to choose its own citizens. We are simply asserting that right, and as I say it works well, and, so far, without any friction whatever.

Value of Admiralty opinion.

With regard to the Treaty, I am not quite sure whether Mr. Balfour did not call attention to this point. In any event it will not do any harm if I read the paragraphs to which I will refer briefly. I hold in my hand the Admiralty opinion with reference to the proposed renewal of the Treaty, and I may say that I have a great respect for any opinion expressed by the Admiralty. I have always found them reliable. British sailors, any way, go about the world with their eyes open and take notice of what is going on, and their opinions are very often of immense service to the citizens of this Empire.

Referring to the proposed Japanese Treaty—I am not going into the other opinions expressed, because we shall have an opportunity of dealing with them later when we come to naval defence—I will read paragraph 12.

Lord Lee: May I ask to what document you are referring?

Mr. Massey: It is a memorandum by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Sir Maurice Hankey: It is a memorandum numbered E.-15.

Views of Committee of Imperial Defence.

Mr. Massey: "The Committee are advised that one result of the determination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the present time would probably be that a spirit of resentment towards the British Empire would replace in Japan the feeling of friendship now existing there, and in such an eventuality the whole strategic situation in the Far East would have to be reviewed by His Majesty's Government in concert with the Governments of the Dominions and India." Then the document goes on, but I am passing over several paragraphs and coming to another one under the heading of "Conclusions."

> "(*b.*) That, unless it is thought that some satisfactory understanding with the United States and Japan regarding a common policy in the Pacific is within the range of practical politics, thus making war a very improbable contingency, Great Britain has, from a purely strategic point of view, much to gain by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Nothing, however, in this paragraph should be taken to prejudge the political and international complications due to naval rivalries and racial antagonism.
>
> "(*c.*) That, whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is renewed or not, the existing situation, under which it is impracticable for the British fleet to operate in the Pacific within any reasonable time after the outbreak of war, should not be allowed to continue, and that, in accordance with a conclusion reached by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee at a previous meeting and approved by the Cabinet, a development of the naval bases in the Far East is an essential part of British naval policy.
>
> "(*d.*) That, in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined without some such understanding as is referred to in paragraph (*b*) above the whole strategic situation in the Far East will require to be reviewed by His Majesty's Government in concert with the Government of the Dominions and India, and that the provision for the development of the essential naval bases in the Far East will have to be taken in hand not gradually, as might otherwise be the case, but as a matter of urgency,"——

that is to say, if this Treaty is determined—I am using the words of the paragraph—and is not renewed, the whole situation in the Far East will have to be taken in hand at once, as the paragraph says, as a matter of urgency.

Question as to whether a portion of British Fleet could be stationed in the Pacific.

That is a very strong expression of opinion and if I had not been able to make up my mind for other reasons I think the reasons I have mentioned would have guided me. I have almost finished, but before doing so there is just one point arising out of this. We have heard repeatedly during the course of this discussion that there is practically no possibility of war for, I hope, quite a long time to come, so far as European waters are concerned. There is no possibility of any trouble in the Atlantic so far as we can see. Personally, with my limited knowledge perhaps, I am not able to see why some of the great warships that are at present idle in British waters might not be transferred to the Pacific. It is quite evident—I have read this paper right through, and not only the clauses I have quoted—that the Pacific will have to be taken in hand before long, and personally I do not see much difference in the cost of maintenance of warships as between the Pacific and the Atlantic. Oil—yes, oil has to be provided undoubtedly, but you do not get oil in the British islands. I do not suppose you can get it any nearer than Mexico, and so far as Mexico is concerned it could be obtained readily enough for the purposes of the Pacific. There is coal in any quantity. We actually send coal from New Zealand to Singapore. We do it now, and when our troubles come to an end, and I think they are nearly at an end so far as the supply of coal is concerned, the Admiralty, for coal-burning ships, can obtain a much larger supply at the port of Westport than it has been getting for years past. It is a small point, but with the object of enabling the supply of good coal to be increased, not only for our own purposes—I am speaking of local purposes—but also for the purposes of the Admiralty, we have taken over the port of Westport and made it an international port; we are going to increase the facilities there and we are going to spend a considerable sum of money in the near future. That port will have to be fortified, but that is another matter altogether. I am not going any further except to say this. I hope I have

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

made my position clear. It is simply this. I think the Treaty should be renewed, but at the same time I think we should do everything we possibly can to promote a friendly understanding with the Government and people of the United States.

Recommends renewal of Alliance and, if possible, a Tripartite Arrangement.

The Maharao of Cutch: The view I have to put forward before this meeting, as one of the representatives of India, is very much in accord with what I understand to be the general view of the Government here and of those of Australia and of New Zealand. It seems to me it would be very damaging to the prestige of our Empire if we were to refuse to continue to be the Allies of Japan after the loyal co-operation which she has afforded to us throughout the war.

We made the Alliance originally, and on other occasions we renewed it and continued it before the war, because we thought it was necessary for our own ends. We have profited by that friendship of Japan, and I think it would be most ungrateful on our part to show now a change of front.

India is vitally interested in the safeguarding of the Pacific, and we are quite of the view that this should be done by a mutual understanding between the British Empire, the United States and Japan, which would be of enormous importance in the interests not only of the Empire, but of the whole world. Therefore, India would welcome conversations to this end, provided it is not done at the risk of throwing over Japan or of our appearing to hesitate about the value of our friendship with Japan.

I would urge that surely an Alliance is not something which we can thrust aside when there is no immediate need to call for active assistance, and which can be reassumed in dangerous moments. An Alliance to be of any value ought to be treasured, I think, in times of sunshine so that it may be available in times of storm. No doubt the best thing perhaps would be what has been suggested—an understanding between the United States, the British Empire, and Japan; but I would ask, if we are unable to acquire the friendship of a new friend, as we very much want to do, should we discard an old friend, a friend who has been faithful to us? I humbly submit that we should not do that.

Deprecates reference to India in Preamble.

So far I have spoken on the general question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty; now I would beg to add a few remarks with reference to the effect upon India of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. There is one point in the preamble of the Japanese Treaty which is not altogether viewed with favour in India, and, I understand, is not very popular also in Japan. I mean the reference in the preamble to the assistance of Japan for the defence of India. I would ask, on behalf of India, as one of her representatives, that this reference in the preamble may be omitted. It is damaging to the prestige of the British Empire that we should bind ourselves to seek the assistance of an Ally for the defence of our territory. It is not only damaging in that way to the prestige of the Empire, but its moral effect on India is undesirable. It gives India the impression that the British Empire, assisted by India, does not feel that she could hold her own. She has successfully protected her frontiers from the invaders for many years, and I do not think it is desirable to create the impression in India that we find it absolutely necessary to have a Treaty with Japan whereby we should necessarily want her assistance for the defence of India.

Moreover those who are disposed to make mischief—and there are mischief-makers all over the world—construe the reference in the Treaty of the British Empire with Japan to mean that Great Britain and the Government of India may not be able, without the assistance of Japanese bayonets, to maintain the internal peace of India. Obviously this is a very grotesque assertion, but I think the loose wording of the preamble of the Treaty does not exclude the possibility of that interpretation being placed upon it.

The last thing I would refer to is that some sections of the Japanese population in India take a great interest—which we view as an undesirable interest—in the internal affairs of India. They do this on the ground that Japan may be involved in the affairs of India, and it gives them an excuse for acts of espionage. For all these reasons, although India is in favour of the renewal of the Japanese Alliance, we think that the mention of India in the preamble should be omitted.

Japanese interest in China and Tibet.

Now there are one or two more points to which I would invite the attention of this meeting. It is quite apparent that Japan takes a great interest in the affairs of Tibet and in the affairs of China. I would suggest that, if a Treaty is negotiated with Japan, it would be desirable that the Foreign Office, when they come to negotiate the Treaty, may bear this point in mind. In support of what I have said with regard to the omission of any mention of India in the Treaty, I would urge one more point.

Status of India.

India is now becoming a self-governing Dominion. Therefore if India were to be

a party to the Treaty, I presume it would be necessary that a representative or representatives of India or the Government of India should be signatories to that Treaty. Therefore it seems to me that there is no point in the mention of India occurring in a Treaty to which India is not a direct party.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

These are the remarks which I had to submit with special reference to India on the general question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Views of Representatives of Dominions.

Mr. Lloyd George: We have had a very remarkable discussion upon one of the most momentous questions that could be submitted to the decision of any Conference. In many ways, it is a decision which is more likely to affect the future course of affairs than almost any other that could be submitted to this, or any other, Conference at the present moment. Mr. Meighen, in the very powerful statement which he made against the renewal of the Treaty, dwelt upon the importance of friendship with the United States of America and argued that a renewal of this Treaty would, at least, imperil very seriously the prospects of that friendship.

Mr. Hughes, Mr. Massey, and the Maharao of Cutch have urged very strongly the importance of not offending the powerful Empire of Japan, which has been a faithful Ally to us in trouble. General Smuts dwelt upon both those points, and I agree with him that they are not irreconcilable. I think it would be even a more serious decision than that with which we are confronted, if we had to decide between an Alliance with Japan and friendship with America. I do not think that is necessary, and I will give my reasons later on, or rather emphasise certain suggestions which have been put forward. Friendship with America is fundamental.

Friendship with America fundamental.

It is a dominant principle in all British policy, and it is inconceivable that we should embark upon any policy that would involve a breach with the United States of America. That, I think, is accepted as an axiom by all those who sit around this table. Let me put the effect of a non-renewal of this Treaty upon our relations with Japan. I do not accept the statement that a renewal would involve a quarrel with America, but I have absolutely no doubt that the refusal to renew would involve a breach with Japan.

Sir E. Grey's statement at 1911 Conference.

I do not think Mr. Meighen was at the Conference in 1911; were you, Mr. Meighen? Sir Edward Grey made a very important statement on foreign policy to the Imperial Conference. Coming to the question of a Japanese Alliance, he used these words:—

> "The present Alliance must last until 1915. It will only come to an end then if it is denounced, or if notice is given either by ourselves or by Japan a year before 1915. It does not expire unless notice is given by one Power or the other that the Alliance is to be terminated."

Now these are the words I call attention to:—

> "Now, you cannot give notice of the termination of an Alliance of that kind and bring the Alliance to an end and then find yourself in just the same position as if the Alliance had never existed. If we, in 1914, were to give notice to Japan that we did not wish to continue the Alliance, the Alliance having worked so well as it has, and having been no trouble to us, she certainly would infer that that meant some reversal of our policy, and she at once would look, and be bound to look, at whatever arrangement she could make with other Powers to secure her position, feeling that she would be no longer in our confidence and thinking we must have some motive in determining the Alliance with her. In the same way, if she wished to denounce the Alliance with us, in 1914, we should at once be disquieted, because we should feel she was going to make some other arrangement to which we should not be a party, and it might be an arrangement which would be unpleasant to us later on."

Those are very weighty words, and everything that has happened since has given point to them. If we were here now discussing for the first time the question of whether we should enter into an Alliance with Japan, the very cogent arguments of Mr. Meighen would have still greater force, and I think irresistible force; deliberately to conclude an Alliance with Japan, when relations between her and America were not friendly would not perhaps be regarded as an unfriendly act in the diplomatic sense, but it would certainly be regarded in the general sense as rather unfriendly. The suggestion now is, having long enjoyed that Alliance, you will now, because there is a little unfriendliness between Japan and America, refuse to renew it. See what has happened since 1911. Up to 1911, when Sir Edward Grey made that statement, Japan had rendered us no particular service. On the whole, I think the advantage had been on the side of

Course of events since 1911.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Japan, undoubtedly very considerably so on the side of Japan. She was actually at war with Russia, and it gave her a sort of moral support which made a considerable difference to what was really a new country in its present form. But since then, what has happened? We have been at war. We have been in a war which was really a war of existence, and if we had been defeated the consequences are something which are inconceivable. As Mr. Hughes pointed out, and Mr. Massey afterwards, if Japan had not been our Ally we could not have guaranteed that that very fine army which came to our aid from Australia and New Zealand would have reached the West. Neither could we have guaranteed that the great army which came from India would have crossed the Indian Ocean. At any rate, it would have been a strain on our naval resources. It would have involved tremendous losses in the West if we had had to detach cruisers and torpedo boats to protect ships in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean instead of concentrating upon European waters. Here is a service which was vital to us.

Mr. Hughes: Our soldiers would not have come because they would have been wanted to defend their own countries.

Mr. Lloyd George: We should have been deprived of something like 2,000,000 first-class fighting men in our war if we had not had that Alliance with Japan. Why did Japan come in? She had no quarrel with Germany. She had no particular interest in coming into the war. She was not concerned in Belgium. She had no interest at all in France; as a matter of fact, she was much more interested in Germany. German officers had been training her army, and on the whole she was fairly friendly with Germany. She came in purely and simply because she was an Ally of ours. She had no other reason for coming in. It is perfectly true that after coming in she has made the most of it. So have we. Having won the war, she has got some islands in the Pacific. That is equally true of France. That is equally true of us and of Belgium. She came in purely and simply because she was an Ally. What is it suggested we should say to her—"Yes we have been your Ally and bosom friend and you have been very useful to us, in fact, your services were perfectly essential to us only two years ago, but there is a very powerful friend of ours here who will be offended if we continue our Alliance with you, and therefore we mean to drop you." Now I put this—translate that into ordinary social or business relations. What description would anyone give to that? How could you describe it? Somebody comes and helps you in your business relations when in a very tight corner, when you could not have done without him, and then somebody else comes along who has quarrelled with somebody else, who is a still more powerful person, and you say: "Well, I am very sorry I have to cut you in future, because otherwise this very powerful gentleman will not take any notice of me and might scowl." I venture to say that there is not one of us sitting at this table who would behave like that. Why should we like the British Empire to do something that we should not dream of doing in our own personal relations with each other?

Comparison of Diplomatic Relations and Ordinary Relations.

Japan has honoured her Compact.

Now that is my view. We must not insult Japan. She stood by her compact to the very last letter. She has never been at a Peace Conference where she has not stood by us right through and through. In the war she stood by us and she stood by us in peace, and now to drop her is something, I think, which, so far from winning the friendship of America, would win the contempt of America.

Mr. Hughes: Hear, hear.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is my view. The American is not that type of man. If we were beginning from the start, I do not know what we should do, but two years after the war, when this gallant little people in the East backed us through thick and thin, now to drop them—we cannot do it. I think the British Empire must behave like a gentleman. That is one plea I put in for the renewal of the Treaty with Japan.

Need for knowing real American opinion.

I do not think it will lead to a quarrel with America. Let us find out what America is thinking and get behind that. There is a good deal of talk of war between Japan and America, and it is said to look inevitable. We must get out of this doctrine. I remember in my short parliamentary career two inevitable wars. One was between Russia and ourselves. It was regarded as absolutely inevitable. There was Russia, the great iceberg rolling towards all the places we wanted to keep, and we said this means war. It passed away and it is much more remote than it appeared twenty or thirty years ago. I remember a time when a war with France was inevitable.

Mr. Massey: Not so very long ago.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Curzon referred to it in his statement. On three separate occasions it looked as if we were on the point of war with France. I heard Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons say that if France did such and such a thing, it would be regarded as an unfriendly act. That in diplomacy means, if you do it, it means war.

Mr. Chamberlain: She did it at Fashoda.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am not talking of Fashoda. There were three times when we had not merely an inevitable war, but we came right up to the brink. Yet there was no war. Let us remember that now. Is there no common sense left and cannot we render some service by stopping it? We certainly ought to do so. We ought not to allow it to go on. Once a thing like that begins—the late war shows that—no one can guarantee where it will end, and it must be stopped and it can be stopped, and that is why I think something ought to be done. There is another interest which was referred to by Mr. Massey, and I think also by Mr. Meighen, which we ought not to neglect, and that is the interest of China. I am entirely with Mr. Massey in the observations which he made a short time ago, that we ought to see that China is fairly treated, even in the interest of fair play. They are a great docile, kindly people on the whole, and it is monstrous that they should be ill-treated by these great military Powers, whether they are Japanese or any other Powers, and we ought to see they are fairly treated, and I think the fact of our being allied to Japan would enable us to talk as a friend to Japan. When the United States of America begins to talk to Japan about China, Japan says, "Oh, yes, you want to get there yourselves, you want to keep us out." That is the attitude. I saw President Wilson lecturing those two inscrutable envoys of Japan by the hour in Paris. I just listened to him, but I knew perfectly well what was passing behind those very immovable faces—"you want to clear us out and want to get there yourselves." They did not believe he was doing it in the interest of fair play to China. They thought he was doing it in the interests of exclusive control by America of that immense population. We, on the other hand, —Mr. Balfour—talked to them a good deal and they listened to us; two or three times Mr. Balfour talked to them and they were most amenable. They knew perfectly well that he was talking to them as a friend. The same thing applies to Yap. If we say, "We are not going to shake hands with you because the Yankee offers his hand to us, we cannot do it as he will not like it," then in future anything we say will not have the slightest effect on Japan. On the contrary, they will say, "You left me after I had done you a service." We can influence Japan. I am certain in China there is a great people who, I believe, are on the eve of very great things. Somebody gave me a paper the other day showing how they were rebuilding their cities, modernising them, and how they were developing everything. They have, I believe, about 2,000 newspapers, 800 daily papers—of course, I do not know how true this is. This is China. They have great Student Unions of about 700,000 people; and their trade is beginning to develop. He points out that now the trade of China is only one pound sterling per head of the population, whereas the trade of Japan is ten pounds sterling per head. If you had the same thing in China, you would have a trade of about 4,000 millions; and they are under the impression that the Japanese are keeping them down. Their idea is that the Japanese Alliance is designed to keep them down; they do not like it. All that can be cleared up, and I trust that in any conversations you may have China will be brought in. We should not allow China to be left entirely in charge of the United States of America. Let us not allow the United States of America to create the impression in China that she is China's only friend.

China should be fairly treated.

Development of China.

China should join in Conference.

Mr. Hughes: How do the Chinese reconcile President Wilson's attitude towards them in Shantung?

Mr. Lloyd George: He put up the best fight he could for them, but I think we are more likely to put that straight by being friendly with Japan than by breaking with her. Well, here I agree with General Smuts, that these positions are not irreconcilable positions. As everybody knows, you always begin with irreconcilable positions, and the work of a Conference is to reconcile the irreconcilable, and I think the same thing would happen if we had a Conference between the United States of America, Japan and ourselves. It has been suggested that we should renew the alliance for a year, in order to give time for that Conference. I do not believe that is necessary. Mr. Meighen called attention to the terms of the alliance.

Value of Conferences.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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But something was done last year which was tantamount to a denunciation. That has not been the Foreign Secretary's view, and it is not the view of Japan. This morning we decided to submit the question to the Lord Chancellor, who would confer with the Solicitor-General. It had never been submitted to the Law Officers before.

The Lord Chancellor: Yes, the case had been before them.

Considers Treaty does not expire July 1921, but would like Lord Chancellor's opinion.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have not had an opportunity of seeing the Lord Chancellor since, and I would like to ask him to express his view on that subject; but at the present moment you have this position: There has been no formal denunciation of the Treaty; it is purely inferential. Japan does not take the view that there has been a denunciation. In that case, until twelve months' notice is given this thing lasts for twelve months from the date when you gave the notice. There would then be no question of renewal; it would purely be a question of whether we should decide to denounce the Treaty. That would give time for the Conference which Mr. Meighen and all are very anxious to secure, a Conference between all the Powers engaged in the Pacific to clear up the whole situation, and above all to get rid of the inevitable war. You would discuss the question of armaments and all the other various questions. We should have a state of things where we could carry the United States of America with us without insulting a very brave and loyal ally. Whoever may have reason to complain about the conduct of Japan, we have not, and I trust it will be possible to reconcile the whole of these positions, and not only that, but to disperse what is a very menacing cloud in the Pacific.

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Mr. Lloyd George: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: What is best then that should be done now; are we to leave Japan in ignorance of what our intention is?

Mr. Lloyd George: We had better get the legal opinion first of all, and then discuss that afterwards. That will take some time to discuss.

Opinion as to duration of Treaty.

The Lord Chancellor: The Cabinet asked me this morning to give my attention to this matter. The technical side was new to me at the moment, and since then the Foreign Office have placed at my disposal the necessary papers. I have had very little time to put the conclusion which I have reached into suitable language, but I will briefly state what that conclusion is. It is not primarily or exclusively a question of law with which we are concerned; it is a question of the appropriate means to construe diplomatic documents in a matter which is not capable of decision by the Courts, and cannot be pronounced upon by a Judge. It is a matter upon which any representative of any Dominion here or any layman coming from the Home Country is as competent to form an opinion as a lawyer. I will briefly state the facts. We are concerned to construe article 6 of the Agreement. It is as follows:—

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It is necessary therefore to decide what kind of act was contemplated by those who drafted article 6 for the purpose of bringing the Agreement to an end. It is that one of the contracting parties shall notify the intention of terminating it, and the notice that was to be given was a notice that might be properly described as denunciation.

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Following that a notification was addressed to the League of Nations on the 8th July, 1920, by the Governments of Great Britain and Japan, and the language of that must be read. The document is not long:—

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"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 13th July, 1911, now existing between the two countries, though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant which both Governments earnestly desire to respect. They have the honour therefore to notify to the League that if this Agreement is to continue after July 1921 it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant."

The Governments of the two Empires in other words notify the League of Nations that, in their opinion, the Agreement existing between them is consistent with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but requires verbal alterations, and they inform the League that they recognise the principle that if the Agreement is to be continued it must be in a form not inconsistent verbally with the Covenant, and the suggestion is made and was accepted for some time by persons consulted, that the document which I have just read can be construed as being a notification under the terms of article 6 that there is an intention to terminate it or to denounce it, to adopt the other expression contained in that article.

The first observation I have to make as one whose duty it is to construe legal documents is that I should have so read article 6 as to infer from it that the notification contemplated by its terms was a communication addressed by one of the contracting parties to the other contracting party, and while it is not inconceivable that the two contracting parties might adopt what they consider a convenient course of embodying such notification in a communication addressed to a third party, one would require or expect that the circumstances should be very unusual or explicit in character. I detect no explicitness in the document and that document is expressed in quite a different way. There are certain ways in which this instrument could be brought into line with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and it was discovered, not that the spirit of this Agreement was in any way inconsistent with the Covenant, but some verbal alterations might be required in its character, and therefore it was intimated by the two Governments that it was proposed to make these verbal alterations. It seems a remarkable construction to say that the communication made by the two parties, for a reason which is most clear and intelligible, to the League of Nations is to be construed as the denunciation which article 6 requires. If it had ended there, I should have hesitated before I assented to the view that the effect of what was communicated to the League of Nations was a denunciation of the Treaty.

I ought to point out that the matter was presented, in my view, without most of the material facts to the Law Officers. It was presented in a shape which merely raises the issue as one of construction without informing them of those facts which ought materially to be known by them. I should entertain great doubt merely on the point of construction as to the view which they formed, but the other circumstances to which I have called attention now have convinced me that their view could not be supported, and led me to conjecture that, had they had these facts before them, their view would have been different, and the Solicitor-General does not dissent from the view I have mentioned. The facts I have in mind are these: One of the contracting parties, the Japanese Government, has taken the view that that which was done did not mean a denunciation, and was not intended to be a denunciation.

Lord Curzon's opinion.

Lord Curzon, who has had a very great experience in construing these diplomatic documents, though he does not pretend to be a lawyer, was also of the same opinion, and when he was advised by his technical advisers at the Foreign Office that they inclined to the other construction, I understand that his judgment dissented, and he has never taken the view that this was intended to be the effect, or was the effect.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

which they have placed on record in the instruments, but that is a rule which is adopted for general convenience and is recognised to be a rational one because it is found in the ordinary litigations by ordinary individuals that it is a fair guide as to what the intentions of the parties were. But where you have in the construction of a high diplomatic instrument a concurrence of opinion between the representatives of the High Contracting Parties as to that which they intended by a communication to a third party, it is absolutely impossible, in my judgment, even if the matter were abundantly clear, that you are to go by the terms of a communication which we know from the evidence of both parties was not intended to support that construction. I should find great difficulty even if one or both of the parties said it was their intention to have founded a denunciation upon this communication to accept that view, but when I am asked to see in a document of this kind such a denunciation and at the same time am assured by each of the parties to that denunciation that they never intended to make it, I for one have not a vestige of doubt upon these facts. Prime Minister, I make no observations on the policy in the matter, but upon the technical matter on which you have asked my opinion for the purpose of this Conference I have no hesitation whatever in saying that we should adhere to the view that no denunciation has taken place. There is no technical reason whatever why we should not adopt that course, and indeed, it is one I should feel no difficulty in supporting and in vindicating in any legal company. One sentence I should have added. It might be urged that the conduct of the parties had been inconsistent with the view I have just advocated in this respect, that a three months' renewal has been arranged between them during the period of discussion. I should explain the adoption of that course by supposing that inasmuch as the question had been raised, it was raised by ourselves as to whether or not that which had been done amounted to a denunciation, it was necessary while the matter was being discussed and while a decision upon this matter was pending that there should be a period of time which should render these discussions possible and I assume that to be the explanation.

Mr. Lloyd George: That seems to me completely to change the whole situation. You see it is a different proposition now.

Mr. Meighen: The situation is this, as I understand it, between Japan and ourselves things are not exactly in the same position in regard to the Treaty as if no communication had been made to the League of Nations. That is to say, it does not expire on the 13th or until a year's notice of denunciation has been given, but as between Japan and Great Britain on the one side, and the League on the other, Japan and Great Britain are under an obligation to remodel the words of the agreement. Lord Chancellor, is it your opinion that it should end on the 13th July?

Lord Chancellor: No.

Mr. Meighen: I agree.

Lord Chancellor: I am very glad to have your agreement.

Mr. Meighen: Then we are in this position that we are discussing something quite different.

General Smuts: The policy still remains.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, the policy still remains. The Conference certainly is of value.

Mr. Meighen: I should certainly have reconsidered my remarks had I known it. I took pains to find out what the situation was.

Mr. Lloyd George: When I applied my mind to the document, I do not pretend to know much about law, though I have had some legal training, I was surprised at the opinion that has been given and I ventured to invite another opinion, the highest legal opinion in this country, and the Lord Chancellor was good enough, at the request of the Cabinet, to go into the matter very carefully and I understand that Lord Curzon always took that view though he thought the lawyers knew better; therefore, he accepted their advice.

Lord Chancellor: In justice to the Law Officers, it should be said that when they gave their opinion they were not told that Japan and Lord Curzon held that view and I think it should have been done.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Lord Curzon: What it means in practice is this, that the year's extension that I suggested we certainly get anyhow under the terms of the existing document.

General Smuts: It runs on to the 13th July, 1922.

Mr. Lloyd George: It runs until you give twelve months' notice.

General Smuts: Is it going to run on for ever or for the twelve months?

Mr. Lloyd George: That is the issue now.

General Smuts: The only point now is this, Mr. Massey. It is clear if this opinion is correct that this Treaty will run on automatically until the 13th July, 1922, and it will continue to run on further unless it is terminated by a denunciation.

Mr. Massey: It runs on indefinitely as I understand it until denounced by one of the High Contracting Parties and for twelve months afterwards. We are in a greatly improved position from what we were in when the discussion commenced. I think the discussion has done much good and has cleared the atmosphere, and from that point of view we are much better off than we were.

Proposes postponement, to enable Mr. Meighen to reconsider the new situation.

Mr. Lloyd George: You have still the important question of what you are going to do to clear up the situation in the Pacific, and if you intend to alter your Treaty, in what sense? I suggest, and it is only fair to Mr. Meighen to give him time to consider how this affects his attitude and position in the whole matter, I suggest we should take our discussion early next week. A further discussion whether you are going to denounce or whether you are going to invite the parties to come to a Conference without denunciation, and if so, what line you are going to take there.

Need to communicate with Japan.

Mr. Massey: In the meantime, do you propose to communicate with Japan giving them any idea of what is taking place?

Mr. Lloyd George: I think that is essential.

Lord Curzon: We must do it at once. We must put the thing right within twenty-four hours from now.

Mr. Hughes: Prime Minister, I quite agree that the position is altered, and we should postpone the discussion to give Mr. Meighen time for consideration. But I want to know what is in your mind—the mind of the British Government—in regard to the policy of renewal which is not affected by this? Is it suggested, for example, that we should declare our intention to Japan, I mean, publicly?

Mr. Lloyd George: Is that not the point which will be discussed at the adjourned Conference? That is the point, but I thought it would be fair after this tremendous change in the position to give Mr. Meighen especially an opportunity, because that is the question that must be discussed among ourselves.

Question as to whether Japan wishes a Tripartite understanding.

Mr. Meighen: Has any attempt been made to ascertain whether Japan is willing to come to a joint understanding, a tripartite understanding, between herself, America and ourselves?

Lord Curzon: No. I have been waiting. The matter has from time to time been alluded to in conversations between the Japanese Ambassador and myself, but I have always taken the line of saying I can make no proposals to him on behalf of the Government until this Conference met and gave its opinion together. I can at any time renew conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, but I shall not do it until I have received instructions from you that the moment has arrived, and when we have the renewed discussions which the Prime Minister has invited, you will no doubt say to me, go to the American Ambassador on the one hand, and the Japanese Ambassador on the other, and see how the land lies, but in the meantime I am all in favour of the discussion which the Prime Minister has suggested. Mr. Meighen may in the new position be able to give advice which may help me a great deal in approaching one party or the other.

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Curzon cannot discuss the matter with the American or Japanese Ambassador until he knows the point of view of this Conference, and therefore it is desirable that the conversations should be postponed until after our discussion, so that he can go there fully enlightened as to the views of the whole Empire.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
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Mr. Hughes: Does that mean that after the 21st Canada will not be represented here at all?

Mr. Meighen: We may be through by the 21st. It will depend on what remains by the 21st. I think we should be able to get through by that time.

Mr. Hughes: I think we should, too, if we go on in the way we have been going on.

Mr. Lloyd George: If we push along we shall be able to get most of our work done.

Mr. Hughes: I agree with Lord Curzon, it should be settled, and with all respect, Sir, I suggest we return to it on Monday.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Meighen is willing to go on to-morrow, and it affects him more than anybody else, this change of opinion.

Undesirability of publication until definite decision reached.

If I may revert to the other matter, I trust that there will be no report given to any of the newspapers of what has happened here until we come to some definite decision, because there are matters which affect so many countries. America is watching everything that is happening, also Japan and China, apart from the Dominions, and France, and the other countries. It is important, therefore, that there should be no partial revelation of what transpires. There was a rather full account in the "Times" to-day, given evidently by somebody who had heard the discussion, though it was not quite a full account.

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We will adjourn now, and if we get through the Japanese question to-morrow morning we will take Naval Defence in the afternoon.

(*The Meeting adjourned till* 11·30 A.M. *on the following day, Friday, July* 1, 1921.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
June 30, 1921.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

SECRET.

E. 12th Meeting.

PROOF. 2nd Revise. No 2

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The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

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Mr. Meighen: The discussion so far has proceeded on the assumption that, if no steps were taken between now and the 13th July, the Treaty would fall on that date. That turns out to be incorrect. We are now in this position, if no steps are taken, that the Treaty proceeds indefinitely, subject only to the power of either country to denounce it at one year's notice. The other fact that is now understood fully is that both countries are under obligations to the League of Nations to remodel the wording, and if I express my own opinion such remodelling should take effect from the 13th day of July. I observe in Lord Curzon's remarks the suggestion, based upon the assumption that the three months' extension would be agreed to, that instead of changing the terms of the agreement the same terms may be used, and the Council of the League of Nations should be given to understand by a joint note that, should any dispute arise affecting the two Powers, the provisions of the agreement would be subordinate to the Covenant. That, I suppose, is another alternative. Anyway, we find ourselves confronted with a new and material circumstance. I am not criticising Lord Curzon at all—I am sure he gave us what he was informed was the real position according to international law. However, the discussion that has taken place has had this value—it has served to make known generally the opinions of the various Dominions and of the British Government on the broad question of the renewal or the non-renewal of the Treaty. I think I should say a few words on that question and then I will come—and come very quickly—to a discussion of what, in the new state of facts, would be the best practical course to take. The position that Canada took was fairly completely disclosed in the correspondence of last February between myself and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It was fully understood, I can well see, by the Foreign Secretary, and it was very fairly stated by him in his address before this Conference. I did, however, listen to a rather forceful attack, not on the position that Canada really took, but on a caricature of that position stated by the Prime Minister of Australia, and, I am afraid I must say, apparently acquiesced in by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Judging from their speeches I am afraid I failed in the address I made here to improve upon the communications of February. I must indeed have destroyed the entire effect of those communications in my remarks. It has been assumed that we are called upon here to discuss an alternative which involved the waiving aside of Japan, the cutting of that nation, the refusal even to speak to her, and the giving of the hand of fellowship instead to the United States of America. I do not want to overstate, in any degree, the effect of words used round this table. I am prepared to quote at any moment in support of my remarks. Indeed, it was assumed that we had urged upon the Conference a policy which would mean the taking of a course in international affairs, which, if the parallel were taken in private affairs, would be ungentlemanly.

Need to remodel Treaty.

Canadian position.

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Mr. Lloyd George: But that is what they do. In the old days the "Times" would not have done it, but that is another story.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Meighen: The discussion so far has proceeded on the assumption that, if no steps were taken between now and the 13th July, the Treaty would fall on that date. That turns out to be incorrect. We are now in this position, if no steps are taken, that the Treaty proceeds indefinitely, subject only to the power of either country to denounce it at one year's notice. The other fact that is now understood fully is that both countries are under obligations to the League of Nations to remodel the wording, and if I express my own opinion such remodelling should take effect from the 13th day of July. I observe in Lord Curzon's remarks the suggestion, based upon the assumption that the three months' extension would be agreed to, that instead of changing the terms of the agreement the same terms may be used, and the Council of the League of Nations should be given to understand by a joint note that, should any dispute arise affecting the two Powers, the provisions of the agreement would be subordinate to the Covenant. That, I suppose, is another alternative. Anyway, we find ourselves confronted with a new and material circumstance. I am not criticising Lord Curzon at all—I am sure he gave us what he was informed was the real position according to international law. However, the discussion that has taken place has had this value—it has served to make known generally the opinions of the various Dominions and of the British Government on the broad question of the renewal or the non-renewal of the Treaty. I think I should say a few words on that question and then I will come—and come very quickly—to a discussion of what, in the new state of facts, would be the best practical course to take. The position that Canada took was fairly completely disclosed in the correspondence of last February between myself and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It was fully understood, I can well see, by the Foreign Secretary, and it was very fairly stated by him in his address before this Conference. I did, however, listen to a rather forceful attack, not on the position that Canada really took, but on a caricature of that position stated by the Prime Minister of Australia, and, I am afraid I must say, apparently acquiesced in by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Judging from their speeches I am afraid I failed in the address I made here to improve upon the communications of February. I must indeed have destroyed the entire effect of those communications in my remarks. It has been assumed that we are called upon here to discuss an alternative which involved the waiving aside of Japan, the cutting of that nation, the refusal even to speak to her, and the giving of the hand of fellowship instead to the United States of America. I do not want to overstate, in any degree, the effect of words used round this table. I am prepared to quote at any moment in support of my remarks. Indeed, it was assumed that we had urged upon the Conference a policy which would mean the taking of a course in international affairs, which, if the parallel were taken in private affairs, would be ungentlemanly.

Need to remodel Treaty.

Canadian position.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: No, I did not say that. What I said was, a refusal to renew the Treaty with Japan would be contrary to that line.

Mr. Meighen: If I did not in my remarks give cause for the assumption, nobody did, so that the hypothesis was an impossible one. I took the pains to say that I accepted in full the assurance of the Foreign Secretary that Japan had fulfilled her every obligation and behaved as a true and loyal Ally through the war, and I stated that, under those circumstances, you could not cast her aside. Nor did General Smuts say anything that constituted a difference between his position and mine at all. I want to be distinctly understood as assuming that there is no criticism coming from us as regards war support, and I assumed that throughout the whole of my address. What I argued was this. That there is some criticism, and just criticism, due to Japan, not in so far as her support of us during the war was concerned, but in relation to that part of the Treaty which bound her to respect the integrity of China and the "Open Door." I argued that. That, I thought, should be taken into account in determining whether or not very special consideration should be given to Japan now. Such special consideration has been asked by those who support the renewal of the Treaty, whether or no. I expressed apprehension that the next few years would disclose a continuation of that aggrandisement with the inevitable consequence of impairing our good relations with other countries, who look with anything but favour upon the continuation of that policy by Japan. And I urged most strongly this, that the purpose of the original Treaty and of the renewal, having been fully met and having served to the advantage of both Powers, a new world situation now arises, three Great Powers emerge, all three having an almost equal interest in the Far East. It was not wisdom, I submitted, to cast an Ally contemptuously aside, but it was the part of wisdom to request that Ally and the other Powers concerned to meet us, and confer, and come to an understanding as to what should be done in that territory and what principles should govern these three Powers in determining the best course there. I suggested that it would be better—bearing in mind, of course, the assurance given that the Treaty would expire on the 13th July, if nothing were done—it would be better to do nothing in the meantime, except seek to come to this understanding with Japan to meet the United States in Conference rather than renew the Treaty, and in that position go to the United States of America. I felt that if we deliberately renewed the Treaty with Japan, and if we then asked the United States of America to come to the table with us, they might very naturally say: "This Conference is loaded against us. You would be coming to us in a much better position if you came the way we are coming—tied nowhere, anxious only to meet on an equality, and to seek to come to common ground." That is the position I took. I did not even suggest that if, having made that offer under the best of conditions, we should fail through the unreasonableness of the United States of America to reach results, I would not consider coming to an agreement with Japan alone. However, what I want to raise objection to chiefly is this—the misstatement of the course of policy which I have sought carefully to urge upon the Conference. The description given of my argument was wrong in another respect. I was even charged with espousing the cause of the United States of America, and with having argued the whole matter from their standpoint, instead of from the standpoint of the British Empire. That charge has at least the element of novelty as applied to me. I took pains to try to put what was in my mind in this respect in two or three sentences. I assumed that the necessity of friendship with America was, in fact, part of our world policy. It was so stated by the Foreign Secretary. I took his words to mean what they said. That being so, I sought to argue, and, to reinforce my argument, pointed out two things: first, the propinquity of Canada to the United States of America, and secondly, the resulting effect that Canada is able to understand their attitude. I gave my opinion that a renewal in any form under the conditions that presented themselves there would be unfavourable to those relations. I did not say that there would be a breach or a quarrel—not at all. I did not even intimate that. I meant just what I said, that it would prejudice our relations, that it would not conduce to improvement.

China.

British Empire, Japan and United States all largely interested in Far East.

Advisable to have Triple Conference before deciding to renew.

Considers that the policy advocated has been misunderstood.

I referred to the further fact that my opinion was confirmed in practically identical words in the last despatch of Sir Auckland Geddes, quoting the words of the Secretary of State of the United States himself. I venture to state that we should take the word of the Secretary of State of the United States in that regard. It would need overwhelming evidence to warrant us in going behind it. Therefore I assumed that a case had been made to show that to renew the Treaty in any form would tend to lead otherwise than to good relations with the United States. I

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

emphasise the last cablegram of Sir Auckland Geddes the more because it followed a series of others, from the whole course of which it appeared that he himself was reluctant to come to the recommendation which he last expressed. Now then, believing on those two grounds that such would be the result of the renewal, and believing as I did as well that the major factor—I will not say the pivot—although I believe that was the word used by the Foreign Secretary—the major element of our policy is friendship with the American Republic, believing that those words really expressed the policy of Great Britain and were not mere words alone, I assumed that the effect of any steps which we should take upon our relations with that country was something that we had to take into account from our own standpoint, not from theirs. That conclusion surely was inevitable. If American and British concert and concord and friendship is a loadstar at all of foreign policy, then in deciding our course, selfishly from our own standpoint alone, we must give foremost consideration to the effect of that step upon American relations.

Now I will not go into anything further that has been said nor deal longer with the general broad position.

We are now at this point. The agreement, as just revealed, goes on, if nothing is done, indefinitely, subject to the right of either side to denounce on a year's notice. That is the position. Further, as between the two high contracting parties on the one side, and the League on the other, they are under obligations to subject the Treaty to the Covenant of the League of Nations. I am going to assume that that will be done. I do not know whether it is to be accomplished in the one way or the other, whether by a remodelling of the Treaty or merely by continuing the same Treaty and notifying the League that in application its covenants will prevail over the covenants of the Treaty. In my opinion it would be better to remodel and expressly to make the terms such that no exception could be taken from the standpoint of the League or from any other standpoint, such, for example, as was expressed at this table by the representatives of India or as expressed by the Foreign Secretary himself. The whole position is this—the agreement does run on for at least a year. For how long should it proceed? I think we should agree that it should proceed for a year, and in that respect I would give my concurrence to the suggestion of the Foreign Secretary, which appears as "B" (see appendix to E/10th meeting) on the special memorandum which he circulated on the 28th June. Perhaps I should read the whole of "B" before making any comment:—

Necessary to submit Treaty to the League of Nations.

Recommends revised Treaty should continue for one year.

> "B." "Temporary renewal of the existing agreement (brought into harmony with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and with mention of India possibly omitted) for a space of, say, one year from October 1921, so as to provide for the holding of an International Pacific Conference in the interval."

Let me read in connection with that some words of the Foreign Secretary that I think might also be brought to bear and their effect embodied in any renewal. I refer to, first, these words:—*

> "They are quite ready to accept the position that the views and position of China (by 'they' he means Japan) must also be taken into account, and also through the mouth of their Foreign Minister, Viscount Chinda, that we cannot possibly renew the agreement except after consultation with America."

Lord Curzon: That is a misprint. It is Uchida who is the Foreign Minister.

Mr. Meighen: I commend those words.† Then this:—

> "The Treaty in its present form is not desirable. The military clauses would excite very great suspicion and alarm in America, and we have gone beyond the stage either at which renewal in its present form, or something like it, is practicable."

The following as well:—†

> "The fourth alternative is one which, I think, on the whole, the Foreign Office is rather disposed to recommend, always subject to what may be said here, namely, that the agreement, if renewed, should be renewed in a different form, and after consultation with the United States on the one hand and with China on the other, and with the League of Nations . . .

Mr. Hughes: Which fourth alternative is that?

* E/8th Meeting, page 8. † E/8th Meeting, page 10.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Meighen: I think it is the same as "B"—

"should be renewed in a different form, and after consultation with the United States on the one hand and with China on the other, and with the League of Nations, its renewal being accompanied by an expression of willingness on our part"—and this I consider important—"to join the United States Government in an examination by Conference between interested parties of the Pacific problem." (See E/8th meeting, page 10.)

On the same page, the Foreign Secretary says these words,* it is not necessary for me to read the context, but he says, "with what we may call the suspicious clause removed from it on the other, for a time, say for a year, pending the decisions of the other Conference to which I have referred." I know what this involves, but I think it cannot be avoided, it involves going into the Conference as an ally of Japan, but it involves that result under conditions that are wholly different from what would have been the conditions if, facing the fact that the agreement was to end, we took the positive step of renewal. We do not now face that fact. We face the fact that the agreement stands and that, without doing something (which we cannot be called upon to do), we must come to the Conference as an ally to Japan. I therefore would urge this, that the Foreign Secretary does, what I feel sure he is disposed to do, meet the representatives of Japan, China and of the United States, and being frank with them ask them to be just as frank with him. He should seek to find out precisely what each of them wants, what each of them expects. He should make known the position of this country, its friendship for Japan, its friendship for America, its friendship for China, and he should endeavour to get the assent of them all to what he described as the Pacific Conference. He should endeavour to secure concurrence that such Conference be held at the earliest possible date, and that nothing be done in the meantime that will prejudice its success—for I can easily see how many things could be done—but that everything be done to seek to ensure its success so that before this year expires, and as early as all the parties can agree, an understanding among these four Powers arrived at through a Pacific Conference shall be substituted for an exclusive confidential relationship with Japan.

Recommends discussion with Japan, China and United States.

Mr. Lloyd George: Although I am not in agreement with Mr. Meighen's preliminary criticism—I think he has taken a rather too exaggerated view of Mr. Hughes's reply—I have been refreshing my memory by looking up the notes of what I said. I was simply dealing with two alternatives and started by saying they were quite reconcilable. If we were to decide as between the renewal of the Treaty with Japan and friendship with America, that would be very serious, and I pointed out how serious it would be if we had to refuse friendship with Japan. To refuse renewal with Japan, in my opinion, that would be conduct that would not become the dignity of the Empire. On the other hand, I pointed out how very serious it would be if we had a quarrel with America. I think that is very much on the lines on which General Smuts spoke before. I said that how can we reconcile the two positions and the conclusion, and what Mr. Meighen has said before, confirmed by what he has said now, shows that he is of the same mind. It also justifies another observation I made, that in a Conference, although the views may be very conflicting and antagonistic and apparently irreconcilable, in the end with goodwill you generally find an agreement, and I feel sure the Conference will agree with the conclusion of Mr. Meighen that the Foreign Secretary should explore the grounds and by communicating with the representatives of America, Japan and China, find out exactly what the position is. There is only one part of Mr. Meighen's proposals which I think it would be difficult or impossible for us in that form to comply with. When the Foreign Secretary proposed originally that the agreement should be renewed for a year, he was under the impression that the agreement had come to an end, or would come to an end, at the end of three months from July. Now we are in a different position. The agreement only comes to an end after we have denounced it, and twelve months after the denouncement, and in order to carry out the Foreign Secretary's proposals now on the present basis we should give notice to Japan that twelve months hence the agreement would come to an end. That would be very undesirable before we enter into a Conference. There is no reason for delay in summoning this Conference. I am sure America will be delighted to respond to an invitation, and the same applies to China and Japan, and to this country. Therefore, it is much better to leave the thing where it is, subject to such modifications as those indicated by Mr. Meighen, which would adapt the agreement to the League

Recapitulation of previous speech.

Agrees to discussion with America, Japan and China.

* E/8th Meeting, page 10.

of Nations. That is another matter, but we should not give notice to Japan terminating the agreement.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: What would follow from that?

Mr. Lloyd George: What would follow would be this, that things would remain where they are, but we would go into Conference.

Mr. Hughes: Where are they now; what will happen in twelve months from whatever date you take?

Mr. Lloyd George: Nothing happens until you give twelve months' notice.

Mr. Meighen: You must, it seems to me, enter into a new agreement. There must be a new document if we are going to comply with our promise to the League of Nations. Consequently, on the 13th July a new agreement must be made, and everything depends upon what is embodied in such agreement. The terms of the old one will not apply.

New agreement necessary to meet League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are not going to alter the whole agreement; you are only going to alter it in two particulars at the outside.

Mr. Meighen: That is what we are discussing. We enter into an agreement for a year because we could not ask for any shorter time, but we comply fully with suggestion "B" of the Foreign Secretary.

Lord Curzon: I think I can clear the ground as regards the first point. You have been discussing what is or ought to be the consequence of the communication we have made to the League of Nations, which cannot be wiped off the slate altogether. There are two ways of doing the thing. Assuming, as we must, that the original Agreement itself remains in existence for a year, as we take the intention to be, how are we in the interval to bring it into harmony with the provisions of the Covenant of the League? There are two ways, I think, of doing it. One would be by consulting the League as to such remodelling of those parts of the original agreement as may be inconsistent with the conditions of the Covenant. That is, drawing up a new document. The other would be to lay down that in any respect in which the procedure of the agreement is discovered in practice to be inconsistent with the procedure laid down by the Covenant of the League, the latter is to prevail. We can deal with the matter in either of these ways, and probably we should consult the Council of the League as to the method of procedure which they would recommend. Am I clear on that?

Manner of remodelling Treaty to meet League of Nations.

Mr. Meighen: Yes. I am aware that if you conform to the conditions of the League you cannot, except by mutual agreement, do more. I think a year is plenty of time, and we can decide by then; but may I ask whether, in making the Treaty conform merely to the League of Nations' requirements, does that involve the elimination of the clause as to going to war? I gather that to be the intention from your remarks to the Conference.

Lord Curzon: That involves correspondence with the Council of the League. We have said to them that we understand that in certain particulars we agree that the original agreement is not applicable. We are willing to modify it after consultation with them. Mr. Balfour could explain the probable attitude of the League, but in order to escape a perhaps difficult discussion on that point, I make the other suggestion that, without remodelling the original Agreement, in the interval before us, we should agree with the League that if any case should arise in which the procedure laid down in the Agreement is inconsistent with the procedure laid down by the Covenant, the latter should be in operative force.

Recommends that during interim Covenant of League should be operative.

What Mr. Meighen asks will be for the Council to decide. Surely the position is clear. If your advice is taken, as I apprehend it will be, it is my duty to get into immediate communication with the Japanese Ambassador first, the American Ambassador second, and the Chinese Minister third, with a view to suggesting a Conference on these matters between the three Powers, or if possible the four. In the interval the Agreement stands. Notification to denounce could only be given by agreement between Japan and ourselves. It would be an arbitrary act if we were now to commence these operations by notifying our intention to denounce, but later on when the Conference has met and is proceeding to arrive at a solution—as I hope

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

it may, an adjustment of the Agreement can be considered to see if it can be succeeded by something better. That is the course of procedure that will have to be followed.

No denunciation necessary.

Mr. Meighen: I do not think that any denunciation is necessary.

Lord Curzon: That is what I was arguing.

Mr. Meighen: I do not think it is necessary, because you will have to sign a new document and everything depends on what you put in that document. You do not require, do you, to put in Clause 6?

Lord Curzon: That is a matter of legal interpretation.

Mr. Lloyd George: Would it not be advisable to have these conversations before we finally determine this last point? Then Lord Curzon will report to the Conference later on what is the result.

Necessity for clear announcement of British and Canadian views.

Mr. Hughes: Before the matter is argued other views might be heard, because I must confess I should like to understand precisely what Mr. Meighen's proposal is. Very much depends upon that; and I should like to know what the views of the British Government are, and with what qualifications or limitations, if any, it is proposed to follow the course suggested by the Foreign Secretary, and now approved by Mr. Meighen, subject possibly to some reservations which he has outlined.

Let me say a word or two on Mr. Meighen's remarks this morning. He has complained of what I said, and of what the Prime Minister has said, as being caricatures of his attitude. I need hardly say, speaking for myself, that they were not intended to be such, and I am sorry that they should be so regarded; but I would ask Mr. Meighen to read his speech of this morning and compare it with the speech he delivered the other day, and see what a vast difference there is. He will find on comparing his two speeches that they differ on the point of the true attitude of Canada. As he has put the matter forward this morning I could take no exception to it, because he now says we ought to consider America, and America's views as they affect us. Of course we should. In that, I am entirely with him, but, with regard to the world's position and the effect of a non-renewal of this Treaty upon that position, I see no reason whatever to say anything to qualify what I said before.

Japan must be treated as a friend.

One thing is obvious—we must deal with the world problems either by force or by arrangement. We must treat Japan as a friend, and induce her to go that way which we think right and proper in the world's interests, or fall back on force. And where is that force? The answer is that it does not exist, or if it does exist, it can only be marshalled with such consequences to Britain and the Empire as to be absolutely ruinous. That is a fact we cannot ignore, and I asked Mr. Meighen, as I ask him now, to look at the position that Japan occupies in the Pacific, and to remember that Australia is a Pacific Power, and its destiny lies in the Pacific; and at the present we can lean on nothing but the China squadron and our own. When we come to discuss the question of naval defence we shall see what these amount to. It is sufficient to say now that they do not even give us a sporting chance to defend, and adequately protect, the whole of our recent possessions.

Although Mr. Meighen spoke about the League of Nations and the necessity for conforming to the requirements of the Covenant, he did not mention that America had announced her intention of having the greatest navy in the world. He does not suggest that she should conform to the League of Nations from which she steadfastly holds aloof. But we must do so.

Consequences of refusal to renew Treaty.

I am not going to press the matter any further than to repeat once more that Mr. Meighen has not attempted to deal with the consequences that must inevitably arise from our refusal to renew this Treaty. Those consequences are obvious, and they are inevitable. Those consequences, it is true, will not fall upon Canada directly, but she will assuredly suffer if the effects are felt by any portion of the Empire. Naturally, a Power like Japan, if she decides to strike, will select the most vulnerable spot. I explained why, in my opinion, Canada would not suffer. Japan and America both occupy impregnable positions; though they might do infinite harm neither can destroy the other. We may lay that down as an axiom but they can do infinite harm to us and to the world. What you said, Sir, seems to me unassailable. If we alter the *status quo*, we say to an Ally of twenty years standing, "We want you no more," and this at a moment when we have not the means to meet that old

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

friend's just resentment at our cavalier and disdainful treatment. We have not got the force, and we cannot look anywhere in this world for an Ally. I mean an Ally that will, if need be, support us with the sword. Where are we going to look for one? If there is a peaceful solution possible, well, you, Sir, have taken the first step along that road. You say, "Come, let us reason together; we are members of the League of Nations."

Mr. Lloyd George: You cannot say that to America.

Mr. Hughes: No; I am speaking for the Empire, we are members of the League of Nations. That is the first point. Then you have said to a nation that obstinately remains outside the League, "Come, let us have an understanding." Both these invitations appeal to deaf ears. America will not come in, and she will not agree to a limitation of armaments.

Lord Lee: Does Mr. Hughes say that an answer has been received from America declining to take part in a discussion on armaments? On the contrary, I think she passed a resolution to the contrary yesterday.

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Lee's point is that America is prepared to discuss a reduction of armaments.

Mr. Hughes: Yes—of course the whole world is, but I ask Lord Lee, when is this discussion going to begin? Meantime we have a positive—resolute determination on the part of America to have the biggest navy in the world. On the other hand, in Britain, I suppose, two-thirds of the great battle fleet of the Navy is out of commission. This proposal does not seem to me to settle the point I yesterday ventured to put before the Prime Minister. It was this. What is the policy of this Conference in regard to a renewal? Who is to decide it? If we cannot decide it amongst ourselves, are we going to seek counsel elsewhere? And is our decision to be determined—I mean the question of renewal, never mind in what form or what conditions we are tempted to seek—the question is, is it going to be renewed?

This Conference competent to decide the question of renewal.

In any case policy for Empire should be renewal.

Let me ask Mr. Meighen this. He speaks of inviting America to sit down and discuss the question. If an opportunity were given to me to sit down with representatives of America and discuss this great question, no one would accept that invitation more eagerly than I, but I should enter that Conference with my views perfectly clear on the one main point, and that is, my intention to renew that Treaty. As to the form, I should enter that discussion with an open mind. I ask, therefore, what is it you want us to do? We intend to renew. But Mr. Meighen will have us begin again. It is a *tabula rasa* that he proposes to offer to this Pacific Conference. They may write on this slate whatever they please. I do not know whom he has in his mind, but what I want to say is this. We have come—Mr. Massey and I—12,000 miles to settle this question. It is now proposed we should go back and that there should be a Pacific Conference, that the question of whether there shall be a renewal or not, which we came to decide, is not to be settled now. If you say, "We will renew it, but the form will be a matter for discussion at this proposed Conference," then you have an entirely new situation, one to which I take no exception, but about which I should like to say one or two words. But if you mean, "Go back to your country now; we will have another Conference to which we shall invite somebody else," then you will go to a Conference in which we will be in a minority. China, Japan, America, and Britain are to be invited. Apparently the Dominions are not to be represented. In any event, the Empire will not be represented, because under the hypothesis you won't have a policy. You will go there with your policy nebulous. You do not propose to say definitely we are going to renew—that is the policy of the Empire. Until you have decided that, nothing can be done. If what Mr. Meighen really has in his mind is that we should be represented, it means that this Imperial Conference will change its venue, that it shall reassemble, and that it shall ask America, China, and Japan to confer with it a year hence or earlier. The objection which I put forward is in part removed; but only in part, because if we were not invited here to settle this question, what were we invited here to do. If you had intended to postpone a settlement, you could have done it by cable. Mr. Meighen lives a week distant from here. Whenever the Pacific Conference is held, he can attend it. In any case, the views he has put forward could as well be put forward by the United States of America, and there is no need for him to attend, but the views that Mr. Massey and I hold could not be put

If Conference of Powers is assembled, merely form of renewal should be discussed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

forward by anybody else than ourselves, nor can they be put forward by us because we cannot attend. If the Conference is to be held somewhere in the Pacific, that might solve the question for us, but not for you. So I hope, Sir, you will not forget that if you decide to postpone the Conference you merely put off the evil for another day, involving nothing to yourselves, but a great deal to us; you shut us out altogether, and if for no other reason, you ought not to do it. There is no part of the Empire with so direct and so vital an interest in this Treaty as Australasia. India has spoken, and has expressed the same views as ourselves. We are Pacific Powers; our destiny is there, and we simply cannot afford to offend a powerful neighbour. We could not afford to do it even if we so desired, and we have no desire whatever. We are scrupulously careful in our every word to avoid giving offence; we want to live in perfect amity. While we hope that America will walk in terms of warm friendship with the Empire, and while that is an ideal towards which we continuously strive, I think she is more likely to do so if we pursue a policy compatible with the interests of a great nation and a great Empire. What will America think of us if we walk haltingly; if we say to her, "We summoned the representatives of this Empire to discuss this question, but you took exception to it; and so we have postponed it. We are not asking the Empire to settle it any longer; we want you and China to sit round the table." If we do that we shall invite and deserve her utmost contempt.

I cannot agree to postponing the settlement of the terms upon which the Treaty is to be renewed. If it is decided as a definite unalterable policy to renew it, then we know where we are, and what is more, the United States will know where it is. They can have a voice in settling the form it shall take; we shall not be unwilling to listen to anything they have to say, but as to the actual policy of renewal, well, our interests are so wrapped up in the Pacific with Japan that we cannot break with her. We have no desire to break with her. We should not have won the war had she not been our Ally. Not an American soldier would ever have been on European soil; that much is absolutely certain, because the war would have been over long before the Americans arrived. And so in the interests of world peace we ought not to affront this Ally; we ought not to do this incredibly mean and inexcusable thing. I am in favour of a plain, straightforward declaration of our intention to renew. That being the policy, I leave the rest. I am perfectly willing there should be a Pacific Conference, if you like to call it a Pacific Conference. A Conference on which China can be represented. I want her views to be heard; I want the views of America to be heard. There is something else we are asked to settle this afternoon and to-morrow, the question of the naval defence of the Empire. How can we settle that if this dominant factor is still undetermined? Our naval policy in the Pacific is surely governed to some extent by the existence of the Treaty. What is Japan to think, when you tell her that this matter is not yet settled? You cannot tell what you are going to do; all you can say is, "We are going to refer it to a Conference." That will not be satisfactory to her. I shall say no more, but urge that this Conference shall declare unambiguously, in quite definite terms, that it is in favour of renewal; that that is its policy. As for the rest, so far from taking exception to America being called into consultation, I urge it. Far from taking exception to a Pacific Conference, I urge it. Let us tell America what she wants to know; let us tell her where we stand; then she will know she is dealing with a Power which knows what it wants, and she may then be willing to discuss how this can be secured without injury to herself.

Empire's policy in favour of renewal should be announced, and then Conference called to determine form of renewal.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think it is possible to have something to reconcile the views which have been expressed. I think Lord Curzon has some proposals.

Suggested procedure.

Lord Curzon: I have been trying to draw up in a tentative way the course of procedure which I understand the Conference on the whole to recommend. I will just read it. I daresay the language is not perfect. It has been drawn up in a hurry, but it is an attempt to arrive at a solution, and, of course, the object of the Government here is to find a bridge between the views of Mr. Meighen and Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey, which I do not think, on the point of tactics and procedure, are at all irreconcilable. At any rate, I will read my attempt. The procedure which I understand we favour is as follows:—

1. I should inform the Japanese Government that the position is changed by the view that was expressed by the Lord Chancellor and the decision which was arrived at yesterday in consequence, and that no notification to denounce the Treaty has been given; therefore the agreement goes on.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

2. Tell the League, in pursuance of the communications we have already had with them, that we propose to deal with the whole Eastern and Pacific question in a larger spirit; that any new arrangement will be in harmony with the Covenant, and that in the meanwhile we are prepared to state that wherever the Covenant is found to be in conflict with the Treaty the Covenant is to prevail.
3. I am, here in London, to approach the Japanese and American Ambassadors and the Chinese Minister with a view to finding out whether the agreement as affected by what I have said concerning the Covenant of the League still remaining in existence, they will enter into a Conference upon the Pacific question in its largest aspect.
4. After my conversations with them, which could take place in the course of the next few days, I come back here and report to the Conference what is the result of these discussions.

Mr. Hughes: With the American Ambassador?

Lord Curzon: The Japanese and American Ambassadors and the Chinese Minister. That I then come back here during the course of the next fortnight and report to you what is the result of my conversations so that the matter will still be in your hands before we settle it.

5. That we do not notify our intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new suggested Conference, or until a new Treaty has been drawn up by common agreement to replace the existing one. Should the Conference fail to arrive at any new agreement, the existing agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League goes on.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, all right.

Mr. Meighen: I am not in accord with all of that, but I will not say anything for a time.

Interests of New Zealand and Australia identical.

Mr. Massey: I think that what Lord Curzon has suggested will probably end in an agreement being arrived at which will get us out of the very serious difficulty with which we are face to face so far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned. There is no question that our interests in this respect, and I agree with every word that Mr. Hughes has said, are identical. In the event of war, and Heaven forbid that anything of the sort should come along, we stand or fall together. There is no question about that, and if we are not very careful I am afraid there will be all sorts of complications which may seriously affect the Pacific. Mr. Hughes has indicated that in his opinion we have been weakened by the war which has taken place and I think that must be admitted. We are weakened financially and weakened in man power. Perhaps so far as sea power is concerned our position is better than many people imagine, and I would like to think so. Personally, I think it is better than is generally supposed, but all the same in two or three years at the furthest, if Japan and America go on building as they propose to build, or as they are building, we shall undoubtedly be the third Power in the world instead of the first.

Mr. Lloyd George: Unless we build also.

Need for ally in the Pacific.

Mr. Massey: Unless we build, and I can only say that if these two Powers go on building our duty is perfectly clear. I would not hesitate a minute, but we have not come to that. We have come to a stage when it is necessary to have a powerful ally. Where can we look for a powerful ally but in Japan, and we have Japan for an ally now. Why on earth should we attempt to get rid of Japan, put her on one side, and, so to speak, go upon our own? To me it would be an act of supreme folly to do anything of the sort. So far as the proposed Conference is concerned, let us have a Conference by all means. I am not at all certain that America, though we know that America indulges in a good deal of bluff when diplomacy is concerned, would consider this an unfriendly act; and, by the way, I am not using the term "unfriendly act" in the way in which it is sometimes understood in matters of diplomacy. Perhaps it is too strong a term to use. But I am not at all certain that America would raise any serious objection. Why should she object? Personally, I am not able to see it. I know, of course, that there is a good deal of jealousy

No reason why America should object to renewal.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

between America and Japan at present and that there has been for a long time past. Probably that jealousy may continue. Possibly, but I hope not, it may culminate in war. If we can do anything to avoid that, and prevent war coming as between those two great nations, I think we should do it. That is why I think we have to be particularly careful. I may add—and this is all I am going to say, because I do not think it is any use going over ground that has been gone over again and again during the last two or three days—that I read with a great deal of interest the despatch dated yesterday from Lord Curzon to the British Ambassador at Washington. It seems to me to be on exactly the lines that are required. Lord Curzon says there, plainly and explicitly, if words mean anything—and I know he means every word he has given expression to—that he proposes to place our cards—that is to say, the cards of the British Government—on the table and be perfectly candid. I think that is the right line to take. The very last paragraph seems to me to afford a very great deal of hope that we shall get out of this difficulty without any serious trouble. I agree with that paragraph. I have never yet been able to see why America should make trouble over our renewal of the alliance. It is not forming a new alliance, but is a renewal of an existing alliance. The paragraph is this: "Altogether, his conversation,"—that is to say, the conversation of the American Ambassador, and there is no one so well able to speak for the American nation as the gentleman they have appointed to represent them in London—"although it was necessarily neither detailed nor specific, it left me with a favourable impression as to the probable attitude of the American Government, and convinced me that absolute candour between us and them will be the wisest policy to pursue." I do hope that the American people, if they come to the Conference, and I trust they will, will be as candid as Lord Curzon intends that the British Government should be. That is the right policy to pursue. Like Mr. Hughes, I believe in the Conference. Let us have it by all means. But do not let us run any risk of this Treaty being dropped. I do not think it would be of the slightest use to postpone its consideration for a year or anything of that sort. It is in existence now and it should go on until one or other of the high contracting parties sees fit to denounce it, which I hope will not be for a long time to come, for I am convinced that the peace of the world is much more likely to be preserved with the existence of the Treaty, than if all the three Great Powers go upon their own without being allied to one or the other.

Recommends continuation of Treaty and Conference of Pacific Powers.

India should be represented at Pacific Conference.

Mr. Srinavasa-Sastri: Mr. Prime Minister, I have one word to say. I do not wish to divert the attention of the Conference for a moment from the central theme of the discussion. India would be very pleased, as the Maharao has made clear, if this Treaty were renewed, but if the whole matter be deferred until after the Pacific Conference that has been suggested has sat and considered the matter, I think this is a suitable opportunity for my saying that India is also vitally interested in this matter and would like to be represented at the Conference. It has been assumed in this discussion that probably India is outside the range of interest. I think the Government of India would take a different view and would like to be represented at the proposed Conference. I should like India to be considered as one of the Powers deeply interested in the whole question of the Pacific.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes has had to leave us now, and I believe there are others who have engagements. Would you like to say anything now, General Smuts?

Considers that policy of continuation of Treaty should not be announced till after Conference.

General Smuts: I want to say this, Mr. Prime Minister. I agree generally to the course sketched by Lord Curzon in his statement, but as to the last point I doubt whether we have yet reached the stage when we should say that if everything fails we are going to adhere to the Japanese Treaty. It seems to be that it would be dangerous to say that at this stage. I think you should leave that point open for consideration until you have discussed the matter with the other countries. You see that if it comes out that that is the policy we have decided upon, we are entirely in the hands of Japan. Japan may very well say, "I am on velvet; if this negotiation with America fails, my Treaty continues, and I am going to do my best to upset this negotiation with America." Do you not think that that last point should be left open?

Mr. Lloyd George: That is a question upon which Mr. Hughes seems to feel so strongly that I think we must adjourn now and ask you to raise that point after luncheon.

Mr. Balfour: If you said "renew in some shape," would not that satisfy both parties? Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

General Smuts: No. First we make the point that the Treaty stands and is not denounced, and in the last paragraph we declare it to be the future policy . . . .

Lord Curzon: In the event of the failure of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we should not discuss that now, since Mr. Hughes feels so strongly upon it. You are raising an objection to it, and I think Mr. Hughes had better hear it.

(The meeting then adjourned till 3·30 P.M.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, July* 1, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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SECRET.

E. 13th Meeting.

PROOF. 2nd Revise. No 2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON FRIDAY, JULY 1, 1921, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: Let me see, I think General Smuts wishes to speak.

General Smuts: I was speaking before the adjournment, Mr. Hughes, but owing to your absence the Prime Minister asked me to wait until you were back, as you were so deeply concerned in all these discussions. Now, the view I take of the matter is this; we need not discuss the merits any more to-day; we have discussed the merits of this question fully and I think we are practically agreed as to its merits. Now, the question comes of how we are going to carry out the ideas on which we originally agreed. Lord Curzon has drafted a series of propositions (see Appendix (A)) to carry out the sort of discussion which has taken place here, and when you had left, Mr. Hughes, I was saying to the Conference that I agree with all these propositions with the exception of the last. The fifth point of Lord Curzon's memorandum stated that, after we had tried everything, after we had given our notice to Japan, given our notice to the League of Nations, and we had had our discussions with the Americans, the Japanese and the Chinese, if we did not come to an agreement, then the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would stand as our policy for the future. That is how I took it.

Mr. Hughes: Stand as modified by the League of Nations?

General Smuts: The alliance in its modified form.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Inadvisable to announce policy of continuation of Alliance before holding Conference.

General Smuts: Modified in accordance with the requirements of the League, which stands as our policy for the future. What I want to repeat now is this: I agree to the rest of those propositions,* but I do not agree to the last, which, I think is a very dangerous thing to be said at this stage. I am most anxious—as I am sure we are all most anxious—to carry America with us. I take it, after the discussion that we have had on this subject, that no question of greater difficulty or of greater danger could turn out for the British Empire than this matter which we are discussing, and if we could rope America into our policy—if we could keep Japan our friend and bring America within the circle of that friendship—I think that the future of this Empire and of the world is clear, and we must use every effort to do it. Now, it seems to me if, in advance, even before we have spoken to America, even before we have had discussions with her, we affirm the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as our future policy, we would make a great mistake, we would be making a declaration of policy with which I for one would not agree. I do not think Japan would like the inclusion of America if it could be avoided. The position of Japan in the East is such that she would like an exclusive alliance with us, and I think she would prefer that to drawing America within the circle. But that is not our point of view—it is not the point of view of Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes has expressed himself in this Conference more strongly than I have done. He has said, if we have to choose between Japan and America, he would take America.

Mr. Hughes: As an alliance.

General Smuts: Yes, if there is a chance. If we are confronted with that dreadful alternative, he would rather have America.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

General Smuts: If that is the spirit in which we have to approach this question, then I think we must make every effort to get America in. We must make every effort not to load the dice in favour of Japan, and, it seems to me, if, in advance, we are going to declare that the Japanese Alliance, failing everything else, is to be our policy, I am afraid Japan is going to make use of that position: she is then going to force the pace and she will try to prevent an agreement with America being reached, and I think that it is of vital interest, while conserving our friendship with Japan, also to get America into that circle of friendship. Therefore, I am in favour of dropping that last paragraph.

Mr. Lloyd George: You do not object to the others?

General Smuts: The others I agree to at this stage.

Mr. Lloyd George: You do not insist upon our denouncing the alliance as essential?

* Appendix (A).

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

General Smuts: I think at present it would unnecessarily alarm and ruffle Japan, and I think at this stage we must avoid any denunciation. We must give the negotiations which are coming every chance, and we can do so by dropping this point 5.

China.

There is one other point that troubles me, and that is China. Here, again, I come to the Japanese point of view. If we, at this preliminary stage, are going to draw China into the negotiations, will not Japan look upon the position as if we are trying to back the Conference, so to say, by a preliminary discussion with her opponents, because there is no doubt China is the bitter opponent from the Japanese point of view, even more so than the United States of America. I should like to let China know we are her friends, and we are doing our best for her. But, now, looking at it for the moment from the Japanese point of view, we are asking Japan to have a discussion, not only with us, but also with America and China.

Mr. Lloyd George: With Japan?

General Smuts: We are asking Japan to come to a Conference with us which will include two of her opponents, the more bitter of the two being China, and it is just a question with me if we want this thing to succeed—as we are very anxious that it should succeed—whether we should not confine it to the three only. Lord Curzon, I am simply raising the point—I am not in any way dogmatic upon this.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think America would insist. We must not quarrel with China, otherwise we should be in a bad position in reference to China.

General Smuts: Japan is very nervous . . . .

Lord Curzon: I think your alarm is really unnecessary.

Mr. Massey: Read the last paragraph.

Sir Maurice Hankey: The only thing I have done is to convert it into the third person.*

General Smuts: I should not like this document circulated. The less this document gets about the better.

Mr. Lloyd George: We must have lots of documents before we come to the final one, and if we got a provisional document published, it would be fatal to agreement.

General Smuts: This is the most ticklish business possible with which we are dealing now.

Lord Curzon: General Smuts, may I say in reply to your point, I do not think there will be the difficulty which you anticipate about bringing in China. I am under the impression that, when speaking to the Japanese Ambassador, I said some little time ago, "Of course, you will understand quite clearly before we come to close quarters in regard to the renewal of the agreement, we have to consult America and China." Therefore, I prepared the ground and the main reason for bringing China in at this stage is to be found in the preamble of the agreement itself.

General Smuts: Yes.

Lord Curzon: You will see that the agreement as originally concluded was for the express purpose of ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and, therefore, if there is any question either of continuing or refusing the Treaty in any way, China cannot be left out, because she is in the forefront. The words are . . . .

Mr. Hughes: What are you reading from?

Lord Curzon: I am reading from the agreement itself:—

"The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above-mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said agreement, namely:—

"(*a.*) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

* See Appendix (B).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

"(*b.*) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

How can you consider the renewal, modification or revision of this Treaty without giving China an opportunity of being heard?

You see China has asked to be heard, and I have told her she will be heard.

Mr. Lloyd George: There was no Conference in the ordinary sense in 1911.

Mr. Balfour: No.

General Smuts: You don't think the Japanese will deeply resent China being called to such a Conference? Of course, you know what happened, Prime Minister, in Paris between China and Japan.

Mr. Lloyd George: They were seen separately.

Lord Curzon: I will speak to the Japanese Ambassador first upon these lines, and indicate to him our desire to consider the point of view of China in the matter, and that it is the wish of the Conference to consult China. If the Japanese raise serious objection, I can come here and discuss it with you. I think that step ought to be taken at the initial stage.

General Smuts: I won't pursue that.

Lord Curzon: What do you think of that, Mr. Balfour?

Mr. Balfour: That would be all right.

General Smuts: If you proceed on those lines it would be all right.

Mr. Massey: What about the continuation of the Treaty?

Mr. Hughes: Where have we got to now?

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Massey asked about the continuation of this Treaty. Well, that is now left an open question. The Treaty undoubtedly will last for twelve months, at least, and we can leave open for later discussion what the attitude is going to be for the future after that. You understand, Mr. Hughes?

General Smuts: After twelve months. We do not settle that question now.

Mr. Hughes: Unless Mr. Massey wishes to speak, I wish to say a word upon what General Smuts has said because that creates another situation which has to be discussed.

General Smuts: I have finished.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is Mr. Meighen's turn.

Future action proposed. Appendices A and B.

Mr. Hughes: We are narrowing this matter down now. We have come to the last paragraph of the last Clause.* It is to the last paragraph, not to the whole Clause, that General Smuts objects. What General Smuts says is this. He recognises that my desire for the inclusion of America, my desire to see America and the Empire marching hand in hand, is as great as his own. And I lay that down as a principle to be applied not only to the Pacific question, but to all world politics in which America and ourselves are concerned. But he takes exception to this last paragraph, because, in his opinion, America would feel that we did not enter the Conference free to reject this Treaty. That is in effect what he says.

General Smuts: No, I do not say that. I do not think you understand me. What I say is this. If we declare in advance that our policy is the continuation of this Treaty—more or less, the acceptance of Lord Curzon's alternative (A)†—that is the indefinite continuance of this Treaty—we would give Japan a great advantage in the negotiations and Japan would know that that is our policy for the future, and she conceivably would do her best to keep America out of it. That I want to avoid. Our interest is to get America in. Japan's interest is to keep America out, and I do not want to give Japan that excuse or reason for keeping America out.

* Appendices (A) and (B).

† See Minutes of 8th Meeting (June 28, 11·30 A.M.).

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: General Smuts has made the position quite clear, and I understand it perfectly. I ask him however to look at another side of the question. If we follow the course he suggests, will it not give America a very great advantage? Will it not give to those forces which are marshalled against England and which conspire against the interests of the British Empire—won't it give them the opportunity to use every effort to frustrate our purpose, to misrepresent our intentions, and to make it impossible that we can arrive at any agreement at the Conference? General Smuts has not ventured to express the belief that we shall arrive at a conclusion. If you look at all the circumstances you will see how improbable it is that an arrangement can be made satisfactory to Japan, to America, to China and ourselves. But if you say that a satisfactory arrangement can be made, what is there to prevent an agreement being arrived at under Lord Curzon's proposal? You have to look at the whole of the proposals. You must not take this last paragraph as it stands independently of its context. The conditions precedent to the operation of this last paragraph are set out very clearly, and are most important. They are our plain declaration that we are dealing with the whole Eastern and Pacific question with a just spirit, it is to be in harmony with the Covenant, that where the Covenant is in conflict with the Treaty the Covenant is to prevail . . . .

General Smuts: It is only the last sentence in 5* that I object to. Should the Conference fail, the existing agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League goes on. It is only that sentence, you understand, that I am against. I am not against the whole of 5.

Mr. Hughes: As I say it is the last paragraph—I distinguish that. Looking at it now from the point of view of America and the possible effect of our including the last paragraph of Clause 5, what is to be done? The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will approach the Ambassadors in London—the Ambassadors of the United States of America, of China, of Japan—to find out whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as modified by paragraph 2* being still in existence, they will enter into a Conference on the matter, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will report to this meeting later on. No doubt Lord Curzon, under paragraph 3,* will ascertain by conversations what would be acceptable to the United States of America; if there is any modification of this Treaty to which we could agree, to which Japan would or could agree, and which at the same time would be satisfactory to America, and report here to us.

But I ask General Smuts to consider what prospects there are of an agreement at this Conference in which America and China, Japan and ourselves would be represented, if it be, as Mr. Meighen says, that he cannot conceive of any circumstance—I cannot quote Mr. Meighen's actual words—or any modification, either of verbiage or substance, that would be acceptable to America. He can conceive of circumstances that would be acceptable to America, but not to Japan, that is to say, you can modify it so that it would be merely a husk and so make it acceptable to America, but Japan would say "I will not have it," but he cannot conceive of any modification acceptable to Japan and America, and I am sure General Smuts will admit that it is no use considering a modification of the Treaty which would not be acceptable to Japan as well as to America. Very well, what do we gain by reference to this Conference of a Treaty which would not in any circumstances be acceptable to America and Japan? What we lose by leaving in suspense the vital question of what our relations to Japan will be, is so obvious as to be overwhelming. General Smuts has said, and I thank him for it, that he realises that his position and ours differ materially. It is a more vital question to us than it is to South Africa. Let me assure him and Mr. Meighen that I believe that when I plead for some consideration for our young Commonwealth, surrounded as it is by a sea of difficulties, menaced from this very quarter, I shall not do so in vain, and I ask that we shall not be left in suspense for a period which may be indefinite, but that we shall know at once where we stand. Nor can I conceive for a moment that the Japanese Ambassador will be satisfied. We know how shrewd the Japanese are and how far-seeing. We know that they have pursued for many years an undeviating course—they are a people who know what they want, and a nation which will be compelled to do something, for it cannot support an increasing population if bottled. It must have an outlet. I cannot conceive Japan will be content to allow the question of renewal of the Treaty to remain in suspense. If we say: "We are not going to renew this Treaty" or "We are going to refer the matter to your rival, to your enemy," does this not look

* Appendices (A) and (B).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

as though we were not satisfied with them? And, in such a case, what will Japan do? And what is our position?

Mr. Lloyd George: May I interrupt? I do not think, if I may say so, you are quite doing justice to General Smuts's proposition.

Mr. Hughes: Why?

Mr. Lloyd George: I will tell you why I say so. It is a different proposition. He says, "I am not asking you to denounce the Treaty before the Conference. If you denounce the Treaty, then, at once, that is a notification to Japan which she will regard as an affront, and it will look as if you are seeking other alliances and you give her full notice." His proposal is that you should not denounce the Treaty before the Conference. You go to the Conference with the Treaty undenounced and you do not denounce it unless there is some better arrangement made between Japan, the United States of America, China and ourselves. It is quite obvious that if there is an arrangement achieved there that will secure peace between Japan, America, and China, as well as ourselves, it is better than a mere agreement between Japan and ourselves, if it is possible. If it is not, until the Treaty is denounced, the Treaty goes on and you cannot bring it to an end unless we meet afterwards and agree to give notice of denunciation. I cannot understand quite why you object to General Smuts's proposition, because, as you know, I am in general agreement with your view about Japan and I should have thought that was right. May I just say another thing about it? I do not quite take the same desperate view as you, Mr. Meighen—I think I am afraid of quoting Mr. Meighen after his statement this morning—about the possibility of effecting an arrangement to draw America and China in. I am not at all sure if you accomplished an arrangement of that kind that you would not satisfy all the parties, and here I do not quite agree with General Smuts. I do not think Japan would prefer an arrangement with us rather than with us and America. I cannot conceive an intelligent people like the Japanese wanting to quarrel with America if they could get rid of the causes of quarrel. They are not fools, and they know that in the long run America would beat them. There might be a preliminary advantage with Japan, but in the end America would beat them, because her resources are infinite. She is a country that can afford to wait. For a year or so she might allow Japan to have a preliminary advantage, but in the end the resources of America would overwhelm her, and I am sure the Japanese realise that, and they would prefer an understanding with America, provided their own interests are safeguarded. I think this Conference would end in a great international arrangement that would secure the peace of the Pacific for generations.

Mr. Hughes: You may be right, but there is an interval.

Mr. Lloyd George: But in the interval you do not denounce the Treaty.

Mr. Hughes: That is the point. You say that we do not denounce the Treaty, but the time must come when you ask: "Do you intend to renew it?" otherwise the thing drags on, and both parties prepare for the alternative, one for renewal, and the other for denunciation. Do you think that Japan is going to risk falling between two stools?

Mr. Lloyd George: Had we not better find out whether Japan would regard that in the light in which you are regarding it? If they say that that arrangement satisfies them, they will be willing to come in. Then we can go on to discuss afterwards, having ascertained what Japan thinks.

Mr. Hughes: Let the Foreign Secretary ascertain by enquiry where we stand in regard to this matter, and, if possible, others, and then resume the discussion; but I am not prepared to agree to the excision of that paragraph. I consider it vital to the whole question. We cannot have Japan regarding anything we do as an unfriendly act.

Mr. Lloyd George: Supposing we agree upon that and adjourn the discussion until after we hear what Lord Curzon has to say to us?

Mr. Hughes: I am willing to leave these five clauses* alone . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George: No, we cannot do that.

Mr. Hughes: Surely Lord Curzon can be left to find out the position by enquiry.

* Appendices (A) and (B).

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George: But he would want to know what we want. Up to that point we can agree, and then Lord Curzon has something to go to the Japanese Ambassador upon and ask what he thinks of that. You must give him some directions.

Mr. Hughes: That is very different, because then a new situation will arise, the nature of which we cannot foresee. We do not know what Japan will say, and we shall be faced with these five propositions with the last paragraph excised.

General Smuts: There is something to be said for Mr. Hughes' point of view. After all the disclosures that have been made in the press, I do not like these written instructions, so to speak. The Foreign Secretary has heard our discussion and he knows what the discussion has resulted in, and he can surely act in the spirit of the discussion without a written statement of policy, and we should avoid adhering to a written document, which is dangerous. I am only trying to help Mr. Hughes over his difficulty.

Lord Curzon: I do not think it is really a matter of difficulty. I have stated that I did not think I was authorised to proceed until I had instructions from this Conference. I had this morning to attempt to draw up your instructions* to me; to which do you object? No. 1: I am to inform the Japanese Government that the situation has changed, and therefore the agreement goes on. I have to say that to them; therefore, I take it, we are all agreed on No. 1. No. 2: To tell the League that we are dealing with the whole Eastern and Pacific situation in a larger spirit, and that in the meantime we are prepared to state that where the Covenant is inconsistent with the Treaty, the Covenant prevails. I am bound to say that. No. 3: I am to approach the Japanese Ambassador and find out whether the agreement as modified by paragraph 2 being still in existence, they will enter into a Conference on the matter. That is agreed; and No. 4: Report to this meeting later on. You do not withdraw that, do you? No. 5: We do not notify our intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the Conference or a common agreement has been drawn up to replace the present one. Why not pass the instructions up to that point, and leave the last sentence over until I have reported.

Mr. Massey: I do not agree. The last paragraph should be left in. If you strike that out you are simply saying to Japan, "If you don't agree with America and China when they come along, you may be deserted at the last moment." That is the view I take, but with that left in we are saying to America and China, "We want you to state your grievances and give us an idea of the possibilities that may arise from the operation of the Treaty, and if we can put matters right for you, we are going to do it." But by the other way you are giving a tremendous advantage to America over Japan. I do not think it is fair. I think a friendly arrangement can be made without much difficulty. Difficulties may arise which we do not see now, but I think it would be better if that last sentence were left in as a sort of guarantee to Japan that nothing unfair can possibly happen.

Mr. Balfour: Is not the plan we have considered to leave the document as it stands, it being understood that no binding agreement is come to by this Conference until Lord Curzon is heard?

Mr. Hughes: I am perfectly prepared to leave the matter to a Conference, even if we are not present, but in which the Empire is to have a policy, provided that the failure to agree means *ipso facto* that we fall back on the Treaty, but I am not prepared to remit the matter to a Conference where we have no policy. The two things are fundamentally different. You say, "Are you prepared to be represented at such a Conference?" I say, "Yes," because if the Conference does not come to an agreement we fall back on the Treaty.

Mr. Lloyd George: But, Mr. Hughes, speaking as a friend of the Japanese Treaty your attitude is absolutely incompatible. If this stands without the last paragraph, it means that you can only bring that Treaty to an end by another Imperial Conference which will decide to give notice.

Mr. Hughes: That is to say we are to put off from to-day to some other date a Conference at which it is a physical impossibility for Mr. Massey and myself to be present.

* Appendix (A).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Massey: I believe the Prime Minister is acting in perfectly good faith, but Mr. Hughes, General Smuts, Mr. Meighen and myself not being here would make no difference with regard to the Treaty. I know you are doing your best in consulting with us, but we have no power to act with you, and that is one of the things I want to see remedied.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have assumed, of course, that you would be at the Conference. It depends where it is. I assumed that you would be represented there, and then we could decide what to do.

General Smuts: That is all I want, that in the event of failure the Empire should have an opportunity to consider the whole position from that point of view, and we should not prejudice it in advance by saying that in case of failure we go on as before.

Lord Curzon: The last sentence is a truism, because until notice has been given and denunciation takes place the agreement stands. I, therefore, quite agree with the Prime Minister.

General Smuts: It is not really a truism, Lord Curzon; the last sentence means this, in case of the failure of these negotiations the Japanese Treaty is our policy, and we go on with it. If the last sentence is left out, it means this, that the road is open for us to reassemble, discuss the matter again and see whether we are to give notice or not. The last sentence prevents our giving notice, and that I think would be going too far. This is the whole point in issue between the two of us here.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think it ought to be our policy if this Conference fails.

General Smuts: We should leave the decision of that open at this stage. I think the least we can do is to accept your amendment and postpone the consideration of this matter until we know where we stand. That is quite clear, Mr. Hughes. You must meet the other point of view half way. We meet you more than half way, and you ought to meet us also a little distance. All we ask is that this last sentence, whether the Japanese Alliance will be the declared future policy of the Empire, should remain open for discussion after Lord Curzon has seen them.

Mr. Hughes: I have no objection to that, and I do not mind your striking that paragraph out, though I thought that this thing had been put before us in the light that it would be put down in black and white and in view of what has gone before, it would be said that we agreed to the excision of this.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am not opposed to the excision. I proposed that the discussion on these three lines should be adjourned until after Lord Curzon's interview with the Japanese Ambassador, and until he reports to us. I am not opposed to excision, I merely proposed adjournment.

Mr. Hughes: I move an amendment that the whole thing be adjourned.

Lord Curzon: I am ready to go, but you must not shoot me off without instructions.

Mr. Massey: Do you say that the last sentence should be submitted to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. Hughes: If you said to the Japanese Ambassador "What would be your view of our not now declaring our intention in regard to the matter" what would be your view?

Mr. Lloyd George: Surely that would be put as a question to him in order to ascertain his view.

General Smuts: Understand what the question of Mr. Hughes is. He suggests that Lord Curzon should say to the Japanese Ambassador: "Of course, if this association with America fails, we go on with you. That is our policy." That would be most unfair. I do not think that is business.

Mr. Hughes: The converse would be equally unfair.

Mr. Lloyd George: I agree, at this stage it would, and therefore I do not see why you should, but I do not see why you should not find out . . . .

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: Find out what you like in the way you suggest. I leave it entirely to Lord Curzon. He knows what we want. Look at paragraph 3*:—

> "3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will approach the representatives in London of the United States of America, China and Japan in order to find out whether, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as modified by paragraph (2), being still in existence, they will enter into a Conference on the matter."

Well, I do not want to know that, unless I know what the policy of this Government or this Empire is, in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. To go to the Conference without a policy is to invite most serious trouble. I say to Lord Curzon: "Ascertain what are the views of Japan in regard to this matter"

Mr. Lloyd George: Certainly.

Lord Curzon: That is all right.

Mr. Meighen: I want to say a word or two so that my position be not misconstrued. I am very sorry the discussion proceeded at all past the first statement of the Foreign Secretary. Had it ended there, there is no doubt it would have been better than where we are now, it would at least have been nearer my view. I do not want, by inference or specific statement, anything to go to Japan which intimates that this Treaty in its present form, or even after making it subordinate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, is the policy of this Empire. I do not know, I am sure, why we have abandoned the conditions stipulated in the first statement of the Foreign Secretary. We have not abandoned the intention of modifying in one regard, that is to make it conform, the working out of it conform, to the League Covenant. But apparently the Treaty is going to stand as it is, there is going to be no new Treaty at all, only the making its administration conform to the Constitution of the League of Nations. But there are other respects as well which the Foreign Secretary laid down as vital to comply with which the Treaty was to be remodelled. I do not know why those vital modifications are now cast aside. I would like an attempt made to secure them. I would like to secure, even for the one year (during which the Treaty must subsist), the modifications which the Foreign Secretary called our attention to, and one of which, indeed, the Representative of India emphasised as essential.

There is a clause in this Treaty which says that Japan has special interests in the Far East, also that we have special interests, territorial rights and so forth. Now, I think Japan is in a position to say: "Our position in Southern Manchuria is to-day a special interest, we are there by your compliance, we are there with your recognition, and if China disputes our place you are under obligation to march by our side in war." I do not think that obligation should continue, certainly not indefinitely. I do not want to accept that result on behalf of Canada. I would like to see every effort made to modify the Treaty even for this coming year. I do not believe there is any necessity at all of saying what should be our policy after. Our policy must be governed by what we learn at and our experience derived from the Pacific Conference. It must be so governed. I know the Foreign Secretary will have no difficulty in discussing this matter in the light of these remarks with the Ambassadors. As for Mr. Hughes and myself, we are worlds apart, and I cannot conceive how the Foreign Secretary can possibly reflect both of our views in any statement to the Representatives of those other Governments. All I desire is this. I desire that the Treaty be remodelled, that an attempt be made to get Japan to remodel it and to have it last only for a year. If the latter purpose fails I do not see how the former can fail. I think it was in the mind of the Foreign Secretary, when he just spoke, that it would not fail, that is, an attempt to have its objectionable features removed from the Treaty.

To suggest that we should first say to Japan, "If the Conference fails, this Treaty is satisfactory to us and this Treaty is our policy," and, having said that to Japan, that we should then approach the United States and say: "Come with us"—the thing is madness in my mind. Japan would have the key to the situation, they would be the arbiters of the whole Conference. The Prime Minister says it would be better for Japan to have America tied in. Well, I do not pretend to be a judge of that, but I rather doubt it.

Mr. Lloyd George: You do not think Japan wants an understanding with America?

* Appendix (B).

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Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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Mr. Meighen: I would not say that, but I think Japan would prefer to go on the way it is. I do not put my opinion, I certainly would not put my opinion against your considered opinion.

Mr. Lloyd George: I would not myself put . . . .

Mr. Meighen: But I think Japan has got on very well.

Mr. Lloyd George: That seems to be such a blunder in Japanese statesmanship that I cannot conceive them making it.

Mr. Meighen: They have succeeded very well as it is. I do not believe they would feel so confident of succeeding in the same respect in the next twenty years if the United States were tied into the arrangement. They could not possibly expect to succeed any better. Anyway, such an antecedent final commitment would make Japan arbiter of the situation. In a word, I urge that we look and work for real success at the Conference—we are bound now, unfortunately as I think, to regard the Treaty as lasting for a year, perhaps for longer—I would like to see an attempt made to have an arrangement that it continue for a year only. Then we will be free to consider our position.

We are bound to have it subsisting at least while we are at the Conference. Do not let us tie ourselves any further. Let us go to the Conference with our hands as free as under the circumstances we can make them, just as we ask the United States to go. Then we have a right to ask them to do likewise, but otherwise, if we tie ourselves more than is absolutely essential, we are not, in my judgment, so ordering our task as to promote success.

Mr. Hughes: May I ask you this, what those words mean in your opinion: " The British Government (Clause 5*) will not notify its intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new Conference and a new Treaty has been drawn up "? Does that mean the same as if the Clause read as follows: " The British Government will not denounce the Treaty until a settlement has been arrived at by the new Conference "?

Lord Curzon: Yes, it does, because denunciation can only take place by giving a year's notice. That is the form denunciation takes. If you read the Treaty itself you will see that the process of denunciation involves a notification a year before. I am merely stating there what is the process demanded by the terms of the agreement.

Mr. Hughes: It is not a notification of policy, it is an act of denunciation?

Lord Curzon: It is an act provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty. That is all.

Mr. Hughes: Will you answer me this question? What would be the effect of a failure to agree at this Conference, if you struck out the paragraph against which General Smuts has spoken?

Lord Curzon: The Prime Minister and I both argued that the existing agreement stands until it is denounced and then replaced by something else. That is, I understand, the position we have both taken up, and that is why we think the last sentence superfluous, but I understood the Prime Minister to say he was quite willing, leaving the last sentence out, to agree that when we reach the stage provided for in the first four paragraphs, no final decision should be arrived at before another Conference took place.

Mr. Lloyd George: Report what the result of your . . . .

Mr. Hughes: Do you agree with that view?

Mr. Lloyd George: I thought there was great advantage in adjourning for consideration of that, and Mr. Meighen could put his definite views forward and you could put yours, after we had had a report from Lord Curzon. I do not see why we should not take it, for instance, next week. Lord Curzon will see all these Ambassadors in the course of the next three or four days.

Lord Curzon: The Jap would have to refer to his Government. I do not suppose that we should get a reply under ten days or a fortnight.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Meighen is not going back until the 21st, and that gives him time to consider. Meanwhile, the Ambassadors will probably need to refer to

* Appendix (B).

their Governments. You will have the replies of all those three Governments, and we shall have the facts before us, and that is the vital issue involved in the last paragraph, because that raises Mr. Meighen's question as well as yours. Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Mr. Hughes: If that is the view expressed by Lord Curzon, and endorsed by yourself, it is the interpretation which can and must be placed upon Clause 5, after the last paragraph has been deleted. Then this position is created, that if the Conference fail to agree, if the Conference suggested in Clause 3 fails to agree, then there is no denunciation of the existing Treaty.

Lord Curzon: Not unless the Government decides.

General Smuts: Not *ipso facto*. There is no *ipso facto* denunciation. It is a question for us to decide later at another Conference.

Lord Curzon: That is so.

General Smuts: That is where the position is left at.

Mr. Hughes: That raises the whole question. If Lord Curzon is right, then those words are superfluous, and if they are superfluous, whether they are in or out does not matter; and therefore what the first part of that Clause means is, if we do not agree, the Treaty goes on and that is our policy—that is to say, we approve of the Treaty; but if you say they are not superfluous, that the words are an extension and are not merely superfluous or words of limitation—it is quite a different matter.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Meighen can raise all these questions after the report of Lord Curzon. It does not preclude him from raising them. Are you satisfied with that?

Mr. Meighen: I am quite satisfied.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have sent for the naval authorities to come and put the case before us, and they will be here in a few minutes. We might consider our programme for next week until they come.

General Smuts: The defence question and the question of disarmament come together and should be discussed together.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should think so. Will you take the League of Nations before Anglo-French relations?

Mr. Balfour: I think there is some advantage in putting the League of Nations a little late because I shall be glad to have Mr. Fisher's help.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should think we would take the Anglo-French relations after the naval, military and air questions.

Mr. Srinivasa-Sastri: Would it be possible to take No. 8 on Tuesday?

Mr. Lloyd George: That is what is being suggested now. We must try and get reparations. The Foreign Secretary and Mr. Balfour will be absent on Tuesday, and I want to put some question down on Tuesday where they are not so concerned. He is concerned in all these questions, but it is more for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Laming Worthington Evans. We might take reparations on Tuesday if we can get it ready.

(The Conference adjourned until 3·30 on Monday, the 4th July, 1921.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, July* 1, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

APPENDIX (A).

Draft prepared by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The procedure is:—

1. Inform Japanese Government that the position is changed, and that no notification to denounce has been given. Therefore the agreement goes on.
2. Tell the League that we are dealing with the whole Eastern and Pacific question in a larger spirit; that any new arrangement will be in harmony with the Covenant, and in the meantime we are prepared to state that wherever the Covenant is in conflict with the Treaty the Covenant prevails.
3. I am to approach Japanese, American and Chinese, and find out whether (the agreement as modified in paragraph (2) being still in existence) they will enter into a Conference on the matter.
4. I report at this meeting later on.
5. Do not notify intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new Conference, or a new Treaty has been drawn up by common agreement to replace the present one. (Should the Conference fail, the existing agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League goes on.)

APPENDIX (B).

Draft prepared by the Secretary.

1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will notify the Japanese Government that the position is changed and that the British Government are advised that no notification to denounce the Treaty has been given. Consequently, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of the 13th July, 1911, remains in operation.
2. The British Government will inform the League of Nations that we are dealing with the whole Eastern and Pacific question in a larger spirit; that any new arrangement will be in harmony with the Covenant; and that in the meanwhile we are prepared to state that wherever the Covenant is in conflict with the Treaty the Covenant prevails.
3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will approach the representatives in London of the United States of America, China and Japan in order to find out whether, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as modified by paragraph (2), being still in existence, they will enter into a Conference on the matter.
4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will report to the present meeting later on.
5. The British Government will not notify its intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new Conference or a new Treaty has been drawn up by common agreement to replace the present one. (Should the Conference fail, the existing agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League goes on.)

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SECRET.

E. 14th Meeting.

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, JULY 4, 1921, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Admiral of the Fleet EARL BEATTY, O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Rear-Admiral Sir EDMUND P. GRANT, K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member, Commonwealth of Australia Naval Board.

Field-Marshal Sir H. H. WILSON, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Air-Marshal Sir H. M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to The Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Captain B. E. DOMVILLE, C.M.G., R.N., Director of Plans Division, Admiralty.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.M.G., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE. C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

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1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will notify the Japanese Government that the position is changed and that the British Government are advised that no notification to denounce the Treaty has been given. Consequently, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of the 13th July, 1911, remains in operation.
2. The British Government will inform the League of Nations that we are dealing with the whole Eastern and Pacific question in a larger spirit; that any new arrangement will be in harmony with the Covenant; and that in the meanwhile we are prepared to state that wherever the Covenant is in conflict with the Treaty the Covenant prevails.
3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will approach the representatives in London of the United States of America, China and Japan in order to find out whether, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as modified by paragraph (2), being still in existence, they will enter into a Conference on the matter.
4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will report to the present meeting later on.
5. The British Government will not notify its intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new Conference or a new Treaty has been drawn up by common agreement to replace the present one. (Should the Conference fail, the existing agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League goes on.)

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SECRET.

E. 14th Meeting.

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, JULY 4, 1921, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Admiral of the Fleet EARL BEATTY, O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Rear-Admiral Sir EDMUND P. GRANT, K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member, Commonwealth of Australia Naval Board.

Field-Marshal Sir H. H. WILSON, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Air-Marshal Sir H. M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to The Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Captain B. E. DOMVILLE, C.M.G., R.N., Director of Plans Division, Admiralty.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.M.G., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE. C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

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Memoranda & Notes

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CANADA

Naval Defence.

A discussion took place on Naval Defence, statements being made by the First Lord and the First Sea Lord.

Only one copy of the Stenographic Notes taken at this Meeting has been made, and this is in the possession of Sir M. Hankey at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, July* 4, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 15th Meeting.

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JULY 5, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Admiral of the Fleet EARL BEATTY, O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Rear-Admiral Sir EDMUND P. GRANT, K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of Naval Board and Chief of Australian Naval Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir H. H. WILSON, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Air-Marshal Sir H. M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of Air Staff.

Captain B. E. DOMVILE, C.M.G., Director, Plans Division, Admiralty.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to The Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

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Memoranda & Notes

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CANADA

Military Defence and the Air Service.

A discussion took place on Military Defence and on the development and potentialities of the Air Service, statements being made by the Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Secretary of State for Air, and the Chief of the Air Staff.

Only one copy of the stenographic notes taken at this meeting has been made, and this is in the possession of Sir Maurice Hankey at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
July 6, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 16th Meeting.

PROOF. 2nd Revise. No 2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JULY 5, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. F. G. KELLAWAY, M.P., Postmaster-General.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. HUGH GUTHRIE, Minister of Militia and Defence and Chairman of the Air Board, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Major-General Sir F. H. SYKES, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., Controller-General of Civil Aviation.

Sir PHILIP LLOYD-GREAME, K.B.E., M.C., M.P., Director, Department of Overseas Trade.

Sir H. LLEWELLYN SMITH, G.C.B., Chief Economic Adviser to H.M. Government, Board of Trade.

Mr. C. HIPWOOD, C.B., Mercantile Marine Department, Board of Trade.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Secretariat:

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New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
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CANADA

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Only one copy of the stenographic notes taken at this meeting has been made, and this is in the possession of Sir Maurice Hankey at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

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July 6, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 16th Meeting.

PROOF. 2nd Revise. Nos

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JULY 5, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. F. G. KELLAWAY, M.P., Postmaster-General.

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Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

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Major-General Sir F. H. SYKES, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., Controller-General of Civil Aviation.

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Mr. C. HIPWOOD, C.B., Mercantile Marine Department, Board of Trade.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

[redacted]

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

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Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Sastri : Before the discussion is resumed I wish to draw your attention to a matter included in the discussion when I was unavoidably absent this morning. I hear that there was some talk of the business for the next few days. May I suggest that it is of great importance that the subject of the business of India should be taken on Friday?

Mr. Lloyd George : We did not fix Friday; we only got up to Thursday.

Mr. Sastri : There is one reason why I specially urge that after this discussion is done we may have a discussion on the position of each particular Dominion. That may take some time, and as some of our colleagues are expressing the desire to get home quickly, it is better that we should take this matter as soon as possible.

Mr. Lloyd George : It is essential that General Smuts should be here, as it affects him directly. I suppose he will be here by Friday?

Sir Maurice Hankey : He told me he expected to be back for Friday.

Mr. Lloyd George : It can be put down tentatively for Friday, but we can only do it tentatively as General Smuts must be here to discuss that matter. We will stick to that as a tentative arrangement.

Mr. Hughes: Shall we say 4·30 on Thursday if he is back, or, if not, Friday morning?

Mr. Lloyd George : Yes. This subject which Mr. Sastri wants to raise is the status of India in the Dominions.

Mr. Hughes : Yes, quite so.

Imperial Communications.

Mr. Lloyd George : Now, Mr. Hughes, will you open the question of Imperial Communications?

Mr. Hughes : The matter with which I shall deal as shortly as possible is one of the greatest importance to the Empire, and its ramifications are very wide. First of all, I lay it down that the vital need of the Empire to-day is close communication between each Dominion and Britain, and among the Dominions themselves. This is necessary for political, strategical and commercial reasons. A short statement of the position in which we find ourselves to-day may be permitted. The British Empire is made up of a group of nations distributed widely over the face of the earth, and just at the time when the people of these nations find themselves in need of closer association, when indeed rapid and efficient means of communications are essential to their very existence as an Empire, applied science and technical knowledge have placed within their grasp means by which they can communicate with each other not only with greater ease, but at far less expense than hitherto was possible.

The question of communications is not limited to any one avenue. We have to consider communication by sea, by the air, by land where this is necessary for inter-Empire purposes, and by cable and by wireless telegraphy and telephony. I propose, therefore, to consider the question briefly in all its aspects. First, perhaps, it would be well that I should emphasise its importance, particularly in its direct application to the purposes which have brought us together at this Conference. We are to discuss the principles upon which the foreign policy of the Empire is to be governed and to devise means that will give an opportunity for the Dominions overseas to apply those principles to definite questions as they arise which were formerly decided by Great Britain alone. As things stand now, the share of the Dominions in determining foreign policy cannot be a substantial one. Yet their status under the League of Nations and their liability to be involved in war arising out of foreign policy makes it imperative that their voice should be heard. Conferences between the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the various Dominions ought to be regular and frequent, but this is not now possible. Australia and New Zealand cannot send their Prime Ministers to Britain for six months every year, and no less time will suffice for a visit. Many suggestions have been put forward, but the Imperial Conference or Cabinet is the only practical machinery at present existing. It can hardly be said to be sufficient, if effective participation by the Dominions is to be assured. It has been suggested that an Imperial Cabinet or Council should be constituted, consisting of a Minister of each of the Dominions residing in England, armed with authority to speak for his country, but, apart from general objections, such a Minister could not speak with authority on matters concerning his country.

That could not be done by the Prime Minister of each of the Dominions, much less by any other Minister. I speak for myself and say that I am not in a position, except perhaps on one matter, to do other than assent to or dissent from any decision that may be arrived at here and submit the same to the Australian Parliament for ratification or rejection, as the case may be. Certainly no Minister, other than the Prime Minister, could come armed with the necessary authority, and that seems to me to dispose of this suggestion as a practical solution of the difficulty with which we are confronted. The Dominion Parliaments will not agree to surrender their rights of self-government; binding decisions can therefore only be made by the Cabinets, and in most cases by the Parliaments of the various parts of the Empire, and on definite questions of foreign or Imperial policy no such decision is possible unless the questions to be considered can be presented to the Dominions immediately they arise. **Imperial Communications.**

Clearly, then, it is essential, if our voice in the counsels of the Empire is to be a real one, and not a shadow, that the various parts of the Empire should have constant and speedy communication with each other. This is a compassable, as well as a necessary, ambition, and I venture to predict that the day is not far distant when the Prime Ministers of the various Dominions will be in wireless telephonic communication with each other, and I say that I know of none, nor can I conceive of any other means, by which the participation, a real participation by the Dominions, in Empire affairs, other than by those means, is possible. I do not suggest for a moment that this would do away with the necessity for personal consultation. But it would enable the principles agreed to on foreign policy or Imperial matters to be applied by the whole Empire and not merely by Britain, as at present. An up-to-date wireless installation which would enable the Prime Minister of Britain and the Prime Ministers of other portions of the Empire to be in consultation on every important Imperial question, would not impair those self-governing rights upon which the Dominions are so jealously insistent, and, at the same time, would enable the voice of the Empire, as distinguished from that of Britain, to be heard. The present position may be shortly stated—cases, I do not deny, may be cited to the contrary—but for all practical purposes the Dominions are told of things when they are done and when nothing remains for them but to accept. This is in most cases inevitable, because questions of foreign policy must be decided without delay. Yet it is unsatisfactory. I do not suggest for one moment that by any means at our disposal, it would be possible to have that close consultation between the representatives of the various parts of this Empire as exists between members of a Cabinet composed of members of the same Parliament in the same country, but I do say that it would be an immense stride forward if the present cable system, which is very far from adequate, were thus improved. The Imperial Conference can only formulate a general policy. Too frequently it does not even do that, and such a scheme as I have in my mind would enable the various parts of the Empire to be brought into such close, intimate and daily touch with each other as to enable them, by the common possession of facts upon which an opinion is to be formed, to exercise a real voice in determining the destiny of this Empire. I am sure that the Prime Minister and the Ministers representing His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom are not blind to the danger that exists under the present state of affairs. The problem of government of the Empire is a most difficult one. You have a number of independent or quasi-independent nations, who have been told—and who believe—that they have a right to make laws for the people themselves and who do make these laws. But foreign policy may affect the policy of every one of the Dominions and, of course, it may involve all in war. As things now stand Britain may involve us in war, and the Dominions feel that foreign policy, which has been so far made by Britain, ought not to be decided by Britain alone. The people of the Dominions ask themselves this question more and more insistently as time goes on, and will do so. How is this compatible with our rights of self-government? Where is this Imperial Government of which some speak? There is none. People speak of the Imperial Parliament, but it does not exist; and the Imperial Cabinet. Where is it? There is the British Parliament, a Canadian Parliament, the Australian Parliament and the Cabinets of these nations. We are not an Imperial Cabinet. We are not even allowed here to speak of ourselves as an Imperial Cabinet or Conference. We can call ourselves Imperial, but the moment we attempt to fix a substantive, there is trouble. Somebody says, it is not a Conference, it is not a Cabinet. *Empire's need of good Communications.*

Mr. Massey: It is our own fault.

Mr. Hughes: Probably it is, but I do not think that that helps us very much. Now, I want to emphasise, first of all, that if this Empire is to work together, if it

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

is to develop its great resources, if it is to take advantage of the tremendous possibilities of trade and of the profit that can come out of close co-operation between the various parts, if it is to be assured of that complete security which the strength of this Empire, rightly directed, can assure, if a citizen of the most remote part is to feel he has an equal voice in the government of this Empire with those at its heart, then we must have some means other than we have now of enabling the voice of the Dominions to be heard. I venture to say that one of the best assurances we can have, something that will help us very materially, anyhow, in this matter, is improved communications.

Special need of good Communications with Australia and New Zealand.

Now, consider the position from the point of view of those remoter Dominions which Mr. Massey and myself represent. I have said that these Imperial Conferences are the only machinery at present in existence for Empire Government, and for dealing with Empire affairs. If they are to be of any use they must be held frequently. Neither in those things that have been done, nor those things that are to be done, can Dominion Ministers have any real controlling influence, unless they meet very frequently and at least yearly. Mr. Massey can speak for himself, but it is certain that the representative of Australia cannot attend here yearly unless some means are found by which we can lessen the distance by shortening the time that attendance here now involves. At present it means six months. Clearly we cannot spend six months out of every year away from our own countries. The alternative, you may say, is to send another Minister—a Minister other than the Prime Minister. But what would he do? What could he do? He would be an onlooker. He would be, of course, invaluable in telling us what was being done, but he could not have any real voice in the Government of Empire. I do not know if you gentlemen quite realise that suspicion follows us like a cloud directly we leave our country. No sooner are we here than critics in our own country suggest that we propose to do some incredible and monstrous thing, that we propose to undermine the foundations of those free institutions which are our glory and our pride. I have never attended Conferences here but that it was suggested that I was in favour of an Imperial Parliament, and my denial of this, vehement, continued and regular, does not suffice to allay the fear that something will be done to impair our right of self-government. Mr. Meighen can speak for himself, but I should be surprised if my experience and his were not very much alike. Directly a man comes here it is said that he gets out of touch with "the opinion of the people." He cannot hear their voice. He does not know what the people want. It is suggested that he cannot interpret their wishes. To do so a Minister would have to return to his country very frequently. That alone would render him almost useless here. The High Commissioner, when he has been over here some time, is said to get out of touch with his country. I speak, of course, of the remote Dominions, for Canada enjoys a very great advantage over us. We are faced with this position, that while we cannot come here regularly, we must have a voice in the management of the affairs of the Empire. How are we going to get it? I ask you to consider this as a great Imperial question. It affects the very existence of the Empire; it concerns the business management—the government—of the Empire. Even our constitutional relations are—or will be—moulded by our decisions. And where do we stand to-day? What are we doing to bring the widely-scattered parts of this Empire closer together? The steamship service between Australia and England is slower to-day than it was twenty-five years ago.

We were told during the war and afterwards by postprandial orators that the war had changed everything. It may be said that if it has, it has changed the steamship services for the worse and not for the better.

Mr. Lloyd George: The expense is so much greater now.

Need for improved Steamship Services.

Mr. Hughes: No doubt, twenty-five years ago, Sir, if you and I had been asked "Is it possible to rush through the air at 150 miles an hour," we should have smiled. But it is not impossible. The expense is great—but expense does not govern progress. If you try all things by the test of expense, it must apply to the security of this Empire. Defence costs more now than it did twenty-five years ago, yet I think you will say that we must have security nevertheless. I say most emphatically that 12½ to 14 knots an hour for Inter-Imperial steamship communication will not do. It is a standing reflection upon our Imperial common sense. It is a menace to our Imperial interests. Of course I do not know whether it will pay the companies to increase their speed; but I am certain that it will not pay the Empire to be satisfied with the service as it stands. What do you know of Australia? What does the average Englishman know of Australia? He knows very much less of it than he

does of Canada, and he does so largely because of its distance. When people select a field for migration or emigration, why do so many go to the United States? Because it is near at hand. Our voice in the counsels of the Empire, our influence, the development of our mighty heritage, all are influenced by this fact, that we are remote from the centre of the Empire, and unnecessarily remote. There is no reason at all other than dividends; I admit that that is a reason and a substantial one. But there is no reason why Mr. Massey and I should not get home in four weeks by steamship. As things are we cannot get home under six weeks. I therefore propose to ask the Conference to consider the question of an improved steamship service. It is a matter which vitally affects all the countries which we represent. I recognise all the difficulties; we know them quite as well as, say, Lord Inchcape. But we are here as guardians and trustees of the Empire, and we have to ask ourselves not whether it is profitable for the great steamship companies to improve their services, but whether it is safe and profitable for the Empire to leave them where they are. This wide flung Empire—a world within a world—depends for its very existence on the unity of the whole. Not one part—not even this part called Britain, could stand alone now, whatever might have been true before the war. We depend upon each other. Does not common prudence as well as wisdom dictate the policy that we should endeavour to get as close to one another as is humanly possible?

Imperial Communications.

Air Communication.

Now turn from the sea to the air. Here is the last element which man has conquered. That which was before a mere dream or a plaything has become now a great factor in human progress and in moulding the affairs of nations, both in peace and in war. I do not propose in this general review, such as I am now making, to attempt to deal in detail with any one of these phases of wireless communication, of steamship communication, or air communication, but I do say that the Conference ought to consider the general question of communications in relation to the political, the commercial, and the national affairs of the Empire as a whole. It is said that airships are now capable, subject to adequate provision of mooring masts on suitable sites, of making the journey between here and Australia. It is a practical proposition. You know, Sir, that two of our citizens, Sir Ross Smith and Sir Keith Smith, flew in one machine from England to Australia. What might we not do with relays? I do not say it would be a commercial proposition at first, but the fact remains it is quite possible to arrange for an aeroplane service between here and Australia. It is not for me to speak on this matter when expert opinion is available, but I think I am safe in saying that airships can reduce the journey to something like ten days. Am I right?

Sir Frederick Sykes: Yes, that is right.

Mr. Hughes: I hope, Sir, you will not think that I am contending that an airship service is a complete and efficient substitute for a faster steamship service. It is not. We are confronted with a many-sided problem. All those things which I have mentioned—wireless communication, faster steamship communication, airships—all those things have relation to the same problem; they tend to bind the different parts of the Empire closer together. They make it a more profitable thing for every citizen in every part of the Empire to be a citizen of this Empire. We should not forget or cease to advocate that it is not only a very glorious thing to be a citizen of this Empire, but it is a very profitable thing as it is now, and it can be made still more profitable.

The demand by Public Opinion for good Communications.

I now come to another phase of the matter. I have not attempted to deal with the financial side of this question, although I am prepared to do so when the proper time comes for considering details. I come to another phase—the necessity for better means of communication in relation to what may be termed, for want of a better phrase, Imperial public opinion. The most potent factor in the world to-day is public opinion. The voice of the people cannot be ignored, and the opinion of the people upon any question is largely dependent upon the facts placed before them in the press and in other ways. I want to emphasise again that if that be true of the world at large, it is still more true of this lesser world, but still this great world in which we live, the British Empire. And if public opinion is a potent factor now, as time goes on it will become the dominant factor. Nothing strikes the visitor from the Dominions upon any of his visits to England more than the meagre information about his own country appearing in the columns of the British press. And the converse is not less true. If you look at the columns of the British press and endeavour from them to get some idea of what New Zealand is, what India is, what South Africa is, or even Canada—though to a lesser extent—or what Australia is,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

what a pitiable travesty of the truth do you get! Look at the press here and note the very restricted space that is available for such trivial affairs as Imperial matters or politics, and the pressure of space for sport and divorce and things of that sort. What do you see about Australia or India? It is the same throughout the Empire. If I had never been to England and if I were in Australia seeking from the press to know what England was, well, Sir, I should have a very poor opinion of England in the scheme of things. I should know nothing whatever of the real life of Britain, what it was thinking of, what were the great currents of British public life manifesting themselves in the economic, social and political spheres. I could know nothing at all about them. Before we left Australia, we got something about the coal strike, but very little. When I came here I found the people obsessed of this very thing. When I got to Suez and Toulon, I heard nothing whatever. We spent pounds trying to find out what was happening in England. Nobody told us. We heard of course that Carpentier was training for his fight with Dempsey and that Armstrong was doing very well. I have put the lighter side of it, but it is perhaps the most serious thing that we have to consider, because public opinion in the Dominions is the great factor that will determine the future of this Empire. We have got to foster an Empire spirit. But when you get before an Australian audience and ask it to have a concept of Empire and what Empire means, it is naturally thrown back on what it knows of Britain and the Empire, and so it is thrown back upon the press. How can you appeal to such an audience, informed in such a way, so that you can really make them understand in true perspective what New Zealand, Australia or the Empire is? You cannot do it. Every day that the case for Britain and for the Empire is put in this pitiable way, America is at work, doing that for which in her case there is far less need. Do you know, Sir, that every day there goes out from America to the East, radiating in every direction, American news, and not only American news, but American concepts of world news?

Sir, you know that the mind of the Chinese nation now is malleable. It seizes all the facts which it can and it forms its opinion of this Empire on the facts supplied. America has no interests in China greater than ours. Yet America does this and we do nothing. Here you have an Empire—widely scattered—that depends upon the unity of its parts, and yet those parts whose very existence depends upon united action are so ill-informed of what the other part is thinking and doing. They cannot form an independent opinion and the tendency must be to drift away. We do nothing; and the cause of this is very largely due to the high cable rates and our apathy towards wireless telegraphy. In Australia we ask the press, "Why don't you send us more news as to what you do in Britain?" They reply, "Every word costs from 7½*d.* to 9*s.*" I do not know what would be the average, but somewhere between those two figures. The press services that are concerned in supplying Australia with news spend tens of thousands of pounds in order to supply us with that meagre stream from which we slake our thirst. The British papers, on the other hand, get information from Australia about wild dogs and strikes, as if strikes did not occur elsewhere. I am sure English statesmen could correct that.

High cost of Press Cables.

Mr. Lloyd George: We have had one or two coal strikes.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, of course, but the answer to all this is that they cannot afford to do more than they are doing. I heard the other day that a column of news is sent from America to a Canadian paper at, I think, 19 or 20 dollars. They pour out the news, not at 7½*d.* or 9*s.* per word, but probably at one-twentieth of the price which is charged for every line or word that is sent from here to Australia.

Progress by other Nations in Wireless.

Now let me state shortly what other countries are doing in wireless; it is only necessary to retail them in order to see how backward we are. The mere recounting is a reflection upon us. Other countries are very active while we do nothing, or very little. Before the war Germany had completed chains of stations throughout Germany, in Africa, the Far East and the Pacific Ocean—practically surrounded the whole world with a chain of powerful wireless stations. These were destroyed, or captured, mostly by Dominion forces in Africa, Australia and elsewhere, but they had distributed the news about the war and they saved at least 8 million pounds' worth of German mercantile shipping. Germany would during the war have been isolated from the world but for her wireless stations. We could pick up in Australia, and we did pick up, wireless messages from Germany almost every day. To-day, Germany has two direct wireless services with the United States of America and a third is now being arranged. France has two great stations capable of communicating with all parts of the world. I myself have heard Lyons at Pennant Hills, Australia, and the message was so loud that it could be carried along 500 miles

of telephone wire and still be heard. America is so satisfied with this French service that she uses Bordeaux as the distributing centre for practically all her European news. The United States of America has long-distance internal wireless stations, and is at present conducting a wireless service in the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Japan and Germany, and arrangements are being made for duplicating the other existing services by a huge wireless station communicating simultaneously with five different countries. Italy has made considerable advances in this direction; Switzerland, too; and even Russia, according to statements which have been published in the press, is building the most powerful wireless station in the world. Now, the United Kingdom has two long wireless stations, one conducting commercial services with the United States of America and the other with Canada. It was from Carnarvon that a message was sent by my late colleague, Mr. Joseph Cook, and myself to Australia direct.

Imperial Communications.

The United States has two or three commercial services with European countries, including one Trans-Atlantic service, and she has a considerable number of short-range stations for communicating with American ships and other purposes. South Africa has only two stations of small range. Australia has a number of low-power stations capable of communicating with commercial ships a few hundred miles distant. New Zealand is no better off than Australia. Australia and New Zealand had a station erected some years ago and intended for inter-communication, but to-day it is almost obsolete. The range is supposed to be twelve hundred miles or more, and under certain circumstances we exceed that. India has a few internal coastal stations, but nothing modern. The Crown Colonies have very little, and Canada is the only Dominion having wireless communication with the United Kingdom. There is no system of direct wireless communication with the Dominions overseas. Now, it is obvious from this, if we do not give them the fullest encouragement in wireless telegraphy and wireless telephony in the immediate future, we shall be left far behind other countries. I understand also that other countries are gradually registering for their own use and so monopolising the best wave lengths necessary for economic communication. Wireless communication has been considered at several Conferences, I believe, and it was referred to or came before what is known as the Norman Committee.

Wireless situation in Empire.

I am not going to deal now with the recommendations of that Committee. I say, however, this, that nothing has followed upon either the decision of any of the Conferences or the recommendations of the Norman Committee. We still do nothing. Now, if I am asked what scheme I prefer, I say I prefer any scheme which will get itself done. When you refer these matters to the Post Office, your Post Office or our Post Office, we always get the same answer. It may be taken as symptomatic of Post Offices, but it is well known that they are obsessed with the idea that they, and they alone, are to be entrusted with the latest achievements of science. No doubt the Admiralty quite properly have to consider the effect of all this when at war, and they must take control when war breaks out. That goes without saying. I have had very spirited Conferences with my Postmaster-General, and with my officials, and I am bound to say they have not been altogether satisfactory. I come very reluctantly to the conclusion that our only hope for doing this thing is to get it done by somebody other than the Post Office, otherwise it will never be done at all.

I hope that nothing I have said will be taken as a reflection on the Post Office. I do not consider the Post Office is any worse than any other Government Department.

Mr. Lloyd George: All equally bad?

Mr. Hughes: I content myself with the way I have put it, but I say this, Mr. Prime Minister, that we ought not to be content to leave this thing where it is. If you say "that the Government will do this," then I say, "I shall be content that no one else than the Government shall do it." If you say, "We will get it done whether in this or that way," I am satisfied. All I ask is that it should be done. We cannot go on now as we are, imperilling our Imperial connections, imposing an intolerable handicap on commerce, and leaving our citizens in the various parts of the Empire generally uninformed of what the other parts are doing—left helplessly and hopelessly in the race for supremacy in a scheme of communication of which we were eleven years ago the originators. And so I say I am not going to pin myself down to any scheme so long as something is done.

Need for Wireless Progress in Empire.

I desire above all things that the thing shall be done, and I feel certain it will never be done unless we say it is to be done by the agency which will do it soonest

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

and give us the best service. We have been assured that efficient service can be provided which will give us messages at half cable rates, whatever they are. If you bring in wireless as a competitor the cable will drop its rates. That, too, will help materially. The press of this country and of Australia, if one is to find their opinion in their press associations, are strongly in favour of the wireless system. The Norman Committee suggested we should have it in relays of 2,000 miles each—a complicated scheme in which nothing can be done unless everybody is agreed. You, Sir, who have had much experience with conferences, know that if nothing is to be done unless everybody is of one opinion then nothing can be done at all, and if all are to wait until the most dilatory is ready then we shall still be found waiting in ten years' time. What I propose is very simple, and it has the merit of simplicity. It is this, that this conference shall approve of a scheme, that Great Britain shall say: "We will put up our plant, you put up your plant." In this event we will put up a plant in Australia which will communicate direct with you, and every other Dominion can do the same. Then every Dominion is in this position, it need not wait on any other, either to begin construction or to reap the advantages. It is true it will be cut off from the other Dominions, but it will have direct communication with the heart of the Empire, and you with that Dominion. That is what I propose, and there is no reason to suppose that it will involve a commercial loss. We are assured it will not involve a commercial loss. No doubt we will meet with opposition. The cable companies will oppose it. Perhaps that is the best argument that can be adduced why we should press on with it. However, I shall endeavour to deal with these matters when they come up for discussion in detail. I have endeavoured to set them out, more or less in broad outline, but I do strongly urge that from every point of view, from the point of view of what may be termed Government of Empire, in order to ensure that the Dominions' share in formulating foreign policy shall be real, in order that the defence of Empire shall be effective, in order that trade and commerce may be benefited, and in order that public opinion throughout the Empire may be well informed and that Empire and British propaganda throughout the world may be in a position at least to hold its own with anti-British propaganda, that this should be done. For all these reasons I urge very strongly that a wireless scheme should be adopted. For the rest, I have given reasons why we should have an Air Service and an improved Passenger Service. I will conclude by suggesting that a small Conference Committee might be asked to consider such of these points as you think fit and bring up recommendations of a definite character which we can then discuss. I shall not do more than make that suggestion, and I leave it to you, Sir, in your wisdom, to determine what is to be done.

Conference to consider Communications.

Canada's position as regards Communications.

Mr. Meighen: There is not very much that I wish to say. Our position is not so accentuated in this difficulty as that of Australia and New Zealand. We are much closer and our development in wireless telegraphy in connection with England is further advanced. We have had a contract for ten years running with the Marconi Company, the terms of which we had to remodel not very long ago. But we have a wireless service, and we do not find any very general complaint on that score. In the matter of a new service, I do not know that I can address any criticism to any Government.

We are interested with the Motherland in the exchange of news, and we know the present position is not satisfactory. We know that the news that comes to Canada filters through New York; indeed, it is censored by the American authorities. I do not mean the Government authorities, but from the American standpoint. It reaches us in that condition. And it has, as a result, an undesirable influence, and a very serious influence it is.

Little, if any, Canadian news reaches England. I have been struck as never before by the paucity of news that gets into the press here. But the difficulty is this. I have made enquiries. It is not that there are no facilities for getting news here. It is not that it does not come. It is because it is not printed when it does come. Your newspapers are simply selling goods, and they find our news does not sell. I do not know how to get over that. Perhaps someone has a solution. Anyway, I made enquiries at Reuter's, and that is the information they gave me. We have had proposals for a purely Reuter service here. I think it involved some contribution from the British Government as well as from ourselves. We did not go into it. We have not established it. It is under consideration still. But so far we have had to decline on account of the very great cost.

Consequently, the cure lies at our own door, as far as I understand the question, in regard to news of Britain reaching Canada in its real and true form.

Imperial Communications.

As regards the reverse picture, we cannot help it. I do not know anything that we can do in Canada to get Canadian news into the British press. It does not get in, and it is the choice of the press in Britain that it does not.

Nor do we suffer, as regards transportation by steamship, as do the farther parts of the Empire. We are seven days, in the worst period of the year, between Liverpool and Quebec, and we can do better in the later periods of the year when the danger from ice is past.

I cannot speak technically on what we are doing as regards the wireless service. Mr. Guthrie can perhaps say something which would be of interest, though. Airship Services will possibly have to start with Government subventions, but in the years to come they should be a commercial proposition, and I do not think it will take very long. Now, the important thing is this, and it is the first point that Mr. Hughes made, that we should concentrate our efforts on getting the closest means of communication between the Government of Britain and the Governments of the Dominions. If we are as near as he thinks we may be to telephonic communication then that is the best; that is the goal. If we were there, then there would be a lot of constitutional clouds removed in my mind at once. I do not know how far we are. It seems to me that the work of this conference might well be directed towards discovering what can be done to facilitate despatch between our countries, which will never be satisfactory even if it takes the form of wireless, but which, when it does reach the stage of telephonic communication, will solve many of our difficulties. Such communication as can be had by the written word is very different in kind, and different in value, from what can be had by the human voice to and fro, and I hope, with Mr. Hughes, that we shall see the result in our time.

Need for Progress in Communications.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I have not yet had much time to give consideration to this matter, nor to go into the papers since you stated the subject should come up this afternoon. I have for a long time taken an interest in the matter of Communications, and remember that in 1907 at the Imperial Conference, you were perhaps the most sympathetic United Kingdom Minister then present who realised the vital necessity of some arrangements being entered into between the Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions, with a view to perfecting and quickening the means of communication. I was interested in what Mr. Hughes and Mr. Meighen said with regard to the possibilities of telephonic communications. When we were coming over the other day, General Smuts and I were much struck with the clearness with which we got wireless telephonic messages 210 miles from the coast. They were absolutely as clear as you can hear people talking here, and one came to the conclusion that by scientific investigation improvements might result whereby you, sitting in London, could enter into telephonic communication with us sitting in Capetown, with Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey sitting in Australia and New Zealand. That seems possible, and if it is possible, it will solve one of the greatest difficulties in connection with our scattered Empire. As Mr. Meighen has said, no written communication can at all convey what the human voice conveys in any discussion of any sort whatsoever, but I do not think anything can be done by an ordinary discussion round this table in attempting to solve a question of that sort. I am in favour of a Committee being appointed, consisting of experts, to consider the matter and lay some conclusion before the Conference, but this, like all other matters, is one of expense, which is a serious matter under present conditions. When Mr. Hughes said that the war was hoped to change everything, he did not mention the one thing which the war has not changed, and that is the cost—except for the worse. When we discussed in 1907 the quickening of ocean communications, the price of coal was entirely different from what it is now, and I was surprised when we came over on the new Union Castle steamer, and she shortened her voyage to Southampton by one day, to find that to do this we burned 52 more tons of coal each day, which shows what an extremely costly problem the question of quickening our communications is. You remember, Mr. Prime Minister, that in 1907 the whole question of the advisability of quickening mail communications and passenger communications was very fully discussed, and it was then realised—and I think the same proposition faces us now—that it could only be done by common contribution on the part of the Mother country and the outlying Dominions. You spoke then of the desirability of a policy whereby each would bear a fair share of the cost. With regard to what Mr. Hughes says, I can go further back as far as South Africa is concerned. I can remember in 1890 and 1891 the "Scot" and the "Dunvelor Castle" made the voyage quicker than our commercial communication is carried out to-day. That is a very serious

Progress in Wireless Telephony.

Increased cost of Sea Communications.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

state of affairs when you realise the enormous developments that have taken place, in turbine engines and all sorts of improvements of that kind. We are largely in the hands of shipping companies and shipping combines, and in many cases they are sufficiently strong to dictate to the Governments of the various countries. That is our difficulty, and the question of cost in respect of diminishing the period of the voyage.

Mr. Meighen: We have Government steamers.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Yes, but whether the profits of that Government service are the same to-day as they were two or three years ago I should not like to say.

Mr. Hughes: Ask Lord Inchcape if his are. I am perfectly sure that where he could go we could follow.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Governments taking up commercial enterprises find that they are very expensive; that is our experience. What struck me to-day, when the Secretary of State for Air and the Air-Marshal were referring to the development of aerial transport, was whether it would be worth our while considering aerial communications from a business point of view; whether, before the Dominions entered into mail contracts extending over a period of years, we should not see whether there is any possibility within our means of developing the aerial service to carry our mails, even if it did not carry our passengers. It is a matter well worthy of our fullest discussion.

It is not alone that you want quickening of communication of thought, to which Mr. Hughes has referred with regard to wireless, whether it be wireless telegraphy or telephony, but you want a quickening of communication between individuals. If you cannot encourage the people of the Mother country to visit the Dominions, and the people of the Dominions to visit the Mother country, you cannot have that harmonious co-operation which we all desire. Mr. Hughes has referred to the Press. Well, Mr. Prime Minister, I must say that ever since I have been here I have viewed with the greatest concern the condition of the press of this country. It is not alone papers that you would expect to be catering for news of a sensational character, but leading dailies have during the last two or three weeks had their front columns filled with reports of prize fights, or divorce cases of nauseating character. That is all very detrimental. We are much better served in South Africa—though not well served—with events that are taking place here, than London is served with events that are taking place in the Dominions, and that is, to my mind, an extremely serious thing, because if you do not keep the people here—at the heart of the Empire—acquainted with what is taking place in the outlying portions of the Empire, they begin to lose interest, and I was wondering whether there would be any possibility of finding means whereby the newspapers could be got to adopt a policy of an educational character, or even only one newspaper, because there are sufficient among the reading public of this country to support it to a large extent, and give it a large circulation. Since we have been over here I have looked at the papers, and so far as the Union of South Africa is concerned I think I have hardly seen one single reference to what is taking place in that country. If somebody had run away with another man's wife—and he was a wealthy man—no doubt it would have been flashed over the wires, but so far as any news of real practical value is concerned, of information even with regard to our trade and our commerce, you hardly see anything whatsoever. The solution of all these problems is extremely important, but it is very difficult to suggest a remedy, and perhaps the best course would be, as already suggested, to refer the matter to a committee with expert advisers.

Unsatisfactory condition of Press.

Committee to consider Communications.

Lack of result from previous Committee on Communications.

Mr. Massey: There are one or two opinions which have been expressed by Mr. Hughes with which I do not agree, but I will come to them in a minute. Just with regard to this suggestion that a Committee should be set up to consider the whole question of Empire shipping. I happened to be here three years ago, and a Committee was set up then, and it went into the whole question exhaustively and submitted a resolution which still stands in the Public Records of this country. It was a good resolution, but I am very sorry to say that very little has been done to give effect to it. Then there is the question of time. I do not know how much longer this Conference is to continue sitting. Personally, I am not in a hurry to get away just yet. I want to get back to New Zealand by the 1st October, but that is a comparatively long way off. I hear of other members going fairly early, and it appears to me worth considering whether we ought not to sit in the evenings if it is possible to do so. I do not want to go back to the country from which I came and

have to tell them we have done practically nothing. I want to be able to tell them, and to show them, that we have done something that will be of benefit to the whole of the Empire.

Imperial Communications.

So far as the press news is concerned, I endorse what has been said. The same thing that has been described happened with regard to every one of our Dominions. I saw the other day a telegram stating that an earthquake shock had taken place in New Zealand and somebody's clock had stopped. Only that and nothing more. On another occasion, there was a telegram from New Zealand stating that a variety of native parrot that we have over there had attacked sheep. I am simply giving these as instances of the paucity and bad selection of news that comes to England.

Unsatisfactory condition of British Press.

I do not know whether anything can be done to rectify that, and I do not know whether it is any part of our business. We can only regret it. The fact remains.

Now, Mr. Prime Minister, I heard Mr. Hughes complain that we, of the Overseas Dominions, have not a share in the foreign policy of the Empire, and I think I interjected something at the time that it was our own fault. As to any interference with the autonomy of any one of the Dominions, I have never heard of it from any British Minister, I have never heard any suggestion that would in the slightest degree interfere with the right of self-government so far as the Overseas Dominions are concerned.

Lack of good Communications prevents Dominions having voice in Empire's Foreign Policy.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Surely, that is an entirely different subject to be discussed outside the Inter-Empire discussion.

Mr. Massey: The matter has already been introduced. However, about foreign policy, if we were a Cabinet, we could not only discuss foreign policy but we could take part in the foreign policy of the Empire. Being a Conference simply, all that we can do is to express an opinion and leave our opinions to be dealt with as they think proper by the Ministers of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Hughes: I do not accept that position.

Mr. Massey: That is the position.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, it is.

Mr. Massey: I would like to have it referred to some official constitutional authority and have it decided once for all, but that is the actual position. I know the difficulty, of course, and it is the distance which some of us have to travel in order to get here. That is the principal difficulty. There ought to be continuity and regularity so far as it is possible to attain it, but under existing circumstances neither continuity nor regularity is possible. That must be admitted. As time goes on, and distances become shorter—I mean, of course, as improvements are made in steam communications, rail communications, or whatever it may be—that difficulty will be got over to a certain extent; but I see no possibility of overcoming it by wireless, as suggested.

We have already had some experience of the business that was dealt with in this room finding its way into the newspapers. Why, when we send communications from one to another, or from the Prime Ministers overseas to the Imperial Prime Minister, as we call him, and I am glad to use that term . . . .

Mr. Churchill: You mean by wireless telephone?

Objections to Wireless Telephony.

Mr. Massey: By wireless telephone it would be simply publishing it to the world at large.

Mr. Hughes: Not necessarily.

Mr. Massey: There is no way out. I cannot see any other way at present. You could have an improved cable communication.

Mr. Churchill: Or wireless communication.

Mr. Massey: You could put it into code.

Mr. Churchill: But you cannot talk in code. You can have improved cables or improved wireless, but the wireless telephone would be open to the public.

Mr. Hughes: Why is it open?

Mr. Churchill: You can never tell who is listening to what you are saying.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

Mr. Hughes: Supposing you telephone it in code. There is nothing to prevent you.

Mr. Churchill: Then you cannot converse; you simply read out streams of figures.

Mr. Massey: You can always find a key to a code. There are many difficulties, but the difficulties can be made less. I quite agree with that.

Mr. Hughes: Might not they be able to get over that?

Mr. Massey: They have not done it yet. My point is that any improvements we may make for a considerable time to come, so far as it is possible for me to judge, must be made upon the basis of steamships and railway trains and cable communications. I hope there will be important improvements, and I have no doubt there will be in connection with wireless. I want to see them as well as other people, but they are not here yet.

Mr. Hughes: Wireless telegraphy is all right.

Climatic difficulties with regard to Aerial Communications.

Mr. Massey: So far as airships are concerned, I was listening to a particular friend of mine making a speech the other evening, and he detailed his experiences in an attempted flight from Paris to London. He told us that he had come down five times, and the fifth time he was only fifteen miles from where he started. Do you know him, Mr. Hughes?

Mr. Hughes: I know him, but that was one of the bad days.

Mr. Massey: I do not want to discourage anything in the way of improvement. So far as I am personally concerned, I should like to see improvements made, but do not forget this that we can do a lot with such experience as we have had here. We can do a very great deal, I believe, but when you talk about passing from this side of the world to the antipodes, do not forget that you cannot miss a winter both on this side of the world and on the other. If you start here in the summer you will get over there in the winter, and *vice versâ*. I know a little about mechanics, and that sort of thing, and I can imagine the effect of wind pressure on some of the big airships we see over London on a fine day. That may be got over but I do not see the possibility at present, and when you talk about travelling from here to Australia and New Zealand in ten days I want some of these gentlemen, who are so optimistic with regard to air services, just to attempt it and let me see if it can be done. If it can be done none will be better pleased than we who reside in the antipodes.

Sir Frederick Sykes: The Germans went to East Africa and back.

Steamship Communications.

Mr. Massey: Yes, and we can do anything that the Germans did. But on the journey from here to East Africa and back they did not go through a winter. The greater the distance of course the greater the disability. Mr. Hughes put his finger on a weak point when he made the statement that the steamships of to-day were no better than the steamships of 20 years ago so far as speed was concerned. I am afraid that is absolutely correct. I do not think we are as well off as we were. We in New Zealand are better off in one way—and everyone looks at his own country first—we are better off in one way because in getting to this country prior to four or five years ago the usual route—in fact, there was hardly any other route possible—was round Cape Horn, and ships were built for the Cape Horn trip. They were mostly slow vessels, cargo ships with a certain amount of passenger accommodation. We now go through the Panama Canal, and I hope the Americans will allow us to continue to go through it. We pass through the Panama Canal at present, although the distance is not a great deal shorter, nothing like one would imagine. Still, the weather encountered is better, and we are able to make trips with much more comfort for the passengers. I came over here once in a ship that averaged only 9½ knots, and we came across the North Atlantic with 175 passengers and not the slightest protection. If a submarine had come along it would have been the softest thing in the world for the submarine. A submarine did not come and we got here, but a submarine sunk the ship on her next trip. Those things are past, but instead of 10- or 12-knot ships—and we still have them—we ought to have vessels carrying mails and passengers and steaming not less than an average of 16 knots. That is not very much, and it can be done quite easily. But it means money. A 16-knot ship would take passengers from New Zealand to this country or *vice versâ* in a little less than thirty days, and thirty days would be a tremendous improvement upon what we have got now. It is too slow . . . .

Mr. Hughes: That is the least, really.

Imperial Communications.

Mr. Massey: I should like to say a higher figure, but that is quite feasible, and even if it required a subsidy I think it ought to be done. The mail services were very bad during the war, and they have not recovered yet. We never know when the mail will come, and when it does come we find it has taken between 38 and 42 days. That is the usual thing, and it is far too long. When this Committee was set up, which has been referred to, I expected big things from it. I thought we were going to do something definite and something for the benefit of every country in the Empire—because it is not limited to any country. I have read this document, and I have no doubt that other members have read it, and I think it is the most colourless document I have ever seen in all my life. If they had tried to avoid doing or saying anything important, or expressing an opinion upon any important point, they could not have done it better than they have done it here. It is no use, and if the next Board or Committee—this is only an *interim* Board which has reported recently—does not do better than this, it is not worth while going on. It needs to be taken in hand, and energetically. I believe that the Government which we are in the habit of speaking of as the "Imperial Government" should take the matter in hand, We can do a little for ourselves, and if it ever becomes a question of subsidy I have no doubt we shall do our share.

Contributions to Imperial Government for Communications.

I do not want to say much about the financial aspect, but I am looking forward to every country in the Empire, not being compelled, but volunteering to contribute more to the support of the Imperial Government than it has done up to the present, though I think we have done as much as we can do just now. So far as I am concerned, I do not want to make any rash promises with regard to this, but these things have to be paid for. There is no question about that. Shipowners are not philanthropists by a very long way, as most of us have experienced both as regards passenger fares and in freight rates. Speaking about freights, that is another of the difficulties the overseas people have at present. We got fairly good prices during the war period, New Zealand particularly perhaps, and I know that Australia joined in this. We had a contract with the Imperial Government by which the Imperial Government took over most of our products for the purpose of the soldiers, or for the navy, or for the civilians of this country. The Imperial Government took them over in our country, that is to say, f.o.b. They paid the freight and we did not feel it. But things have changed, prices have dropped, and we are now on our own, and are experiencing the very greatest difficulty in having anything left for the producers in the countries to which we belong after the expenses are paid. The least profitable of the products which we sent to this country, and of which we sent a very great deal, certainly during the war, was beef. I happen to know of this instance, because it came from the district which I represent. A pretty big shipment of beef of good quality came to Smithfield within the last few weeks from New Zealand. It was sold for 3½*d.* per lb., and it cost 4*d.* per lb. from the time the animals walked into the abattoirs in New Zealand until the meat was landed in London the other day. The unfortunate owner will have an additional payment of ½d. per lb. to make on account of the freight on the whole of the beef.

Freights to New Zealand.

Mr. Meighen: He will have to send more beef to pay the difference!

Mr. Massey: That is what the typical Irishman would be supposed to do. What is the difficulty? It is no use talking about keeping up the trade. We cannot do it unless freights are reduced. It is not so bad in the case of lamb. Lamb is selling at a fair price, but beef is very bad indeed, and second-class mutton is almost as bad as beef. Under these circumstances the trade must fall off, and there will be presently very little for the ships to carry. Altogether, the outlook is very far from good. We can produce any quantity, and there is no difficulty there. We can produce the goods that are required, but if we cannot get the price for them when landed here, owing to excessive charges in the way of freights and other expenses, and there is nothing left for the producer, then the country is going to suffer; and not only the people of my country, but the people of this country will suffer in proportion.

Cost of Oil Fuel.

There was a point mentioned about oil being cheaper than coal. I do not pretend to know a great deal about it except this, that just about the time the war came to an end several of the shipping companies trading to my part of the world changed their vessels from coal to oil. Some of them have now changed back; they say that the oil costs more than the coal, and I am afraid that there will be less oil in the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

Any improvement in Communications strengthens Empire.

future instead of more. One never knows. I only hope it will not be the case, but I am not at all certain that oil is going to be much cheaper than coal.

There is one point I wish to emphasise, and it is this. I have already expressed the hope that something will be done so far as this matter is concerned, because it is of extreme importance to the Overseas Dominions. There is this point which we must look at from an Empire point of view, viz., that anything in the way of improved communications, whether by post, by wireless, by cable, or by steamer, helps to strengthen the bonds of Empire and to bring us closer together than we are now, and on that account I think it is worthy of every possible encouragement. If the Committee is set up as suggested, I personally should raise no objection to it, but unless something more is going to be done than has been attempted up to the present, then I say it is not worth doing.

Exhaustion from the War.

Mr. Churchill: Prime Minister, I think everyone is agreed as to the objects which we have in view, and there cannot be any difference of opinion. Every one of these topics mentioned has shown us the need which we have got to meet, and the only question is how to meet that need and when it can be met; whether it is a cheaper news service or quicker correspondence in official matters, or faster steamships, or better aerial communication, or an Imperial wireless chain; every one of these things is not only desirable but an Imperial necessity. The question is, how can you get them and when can you get them? We must bear in mind that, at the present time, a great wave of exhaustion has passed over the world that has been fighting. The idea that we should have better methods of communication at our disposal for civilian purposes after five years of slaughter and destruction is not well founded. Obviously, all our civilian plant has been greatly impaired, worn out, deteriorating, and has only been imperfectly replenished, and there is a complete absence of new development which ought to have been planned two or three years ago, but which could not be planned because all our resources were engaged in the war. That is equally true whether you look at the comfort or speed of your steamships, or whether you look at the amount of money available, or whether you look at the amount of public interest in external affairs, the mind and resources of the nation are exhausted at the present time. There is a period of repose to gather the strength, which cannot be a long one—it may be only a few years. I agree it is deplorable at the present time to see the newspapers reporting the most trivial matters, yet, nevertheless, that is partly a sign of a temporary period of public fatigue, which will pass. While we see exactly what we want to do, it would be a mistake for us to propose very large or drastic action involving immense schemes and a huge expenditure of public money. We will do the best we can. We will drive ahead as far as we can. We will get plans made out on good lines, and we will get agreement between the different parties. Then, as our strength revives and recovers, we shall carry them into actual effect.

State of British Press.

Well, the first subject is the circulation of news within the British Empire. I lately received a deputation of all the press of this country, a most representative and powerful deputation, and they made a tremendous case exactly on the lines which Mr. Hughes has followed with so much emphasis to-day. They said the high rates of the cable service, the long delays in getting wireless communications into existence, hampered the whole transmission of news from the Mother Country to the Dominions and from the Dominions back here, and not alone does it hamper them, but it places us at an enormous disadvantage with regard to the news which is purveyed by the other great branch of the English-speaking world, which comes from America, under conditions at present far more favourable. There is no doubt that the American press, with their 100 million readers, is able to collect its news on a vast scale and, having paid for the collection by its internal circulation, it can afford to throw down the news—dump the news as it were—in other English-speaking countries.

Mr. Massey: And advertise itself.

Mr. Churchill: It is not merely a question of the news and of the demand for the news, but of the atmosphere created, and it is really a vital thing that the British Empire should develop a strong British Empire atmosphere, that we should know in each part of the Empire what the other parts are thinking. There should be a sympathetic understanding of each other's difficulties. It will come when we are telling our story to each other rather than having it told for us by other men.

Well, in this, as in other questions, you come up immediately against finance. Mr. Massey said he was looking forward to a greater effort being made to keep the British Navy upon a broad Imperial basis. I may say that stands absolutely first

and we must be very careful, however other things may press and be desirable, that we do not get in the way of that vital necessity. I promised the newspaper authorities that I would myself lay this matter before the Conference, and now it is clear that all the Dominion representatives hold the same view on the subject. I think that at the Committee, which I understand the Prime Minister proposes to set up, I might possibly arrange for a short Conference between the Dominion Prime Ministers and the representatives of the newspapers in this country, with a view of seeing what practical proposals can be made. There is one practical proposal which we hope already to do with the aid of the Postmaster-General—that is to allow the deferred rate in regard to press communications at the cheaper rate which was discontinued during the war. So far as the wireless chain is concerned, of course, it has been delayed by the war and there has been a hiatus in actual construction during which time the matter has been at a standstill. **Imperial Communications.**

Mr. Hughes: France has been in the war, too, but she has the largest high-power station in the world.

Importance of Egypt in Communications.

Mr. Churchill: We have now completed the Oxford Station. I think it is already able to talk. The next link in that chain is, of course, Cairo. It only shows you how vitally important from every point of view Egypt is; whether you look at aviation or naval movements, or the military position of our Empire, or at this wireless communication, Egypt plays her part as one of the most important countries in the world.

Mr. Massey: It is the heart of the Empire.

Mr. Churchill: Well, the Oxford–Cairo Station will be talking in November.

Mr. Hughes: What is the range of the Cairo Station?

Wireless Chain.

Mr. Churchill: It talks to India and talks to this country, and we can talk direct from this country to India for military purposes, but India cannot talk back. There is no doubt whatever that these wireless chains, when they get into operation, will afford a very great addition to the facilities of interchange of communication. They will not, in my opinion, displace the cables, but they will develop an additional class of traffic of very great importance.

If the Committee is set up, I understand that the Prime Minister proposes that the Postmaster-General should be a member, and I will take steps to bring Sir Henry Norman and other members into touch with the members of the Committee in order that you may hear shortly and briefly from them exactly what has been done, and will be done in the next six or eight months, in regard to the Imperial wireless chain.

Mr. Hughes: Is your policy definitely settled or do you mean what has been done? Are you fixed in your opinion?

Cost of present-day Steamship Services.

Mr. Churchill: Certainly. The construction is proceeding with these stations and with the two new ones Oxford and Cairo. It is finished in the one case and will shortly be finished in the other. So far as steamships are concerned, there I think you will find that at the present time financial difficulties will be very great indeed because the cost of everything is enormous, and to accelerate the South African and New Zealand services over these great distances of water will be a very costly matter; but, as Sir Thomas Smartt has reminded us, this is an old love of the Prime Minister's. He and I at the Conference of 1907, when I was Under-Secretary for the Colonies and he was President of the Board of Trade, always pressed this method of developing the unity of the British Empire, and it is one of the first objects to which we should devote our money and energies once the vital questions connected with the safety of the country and the naval power of the country have been provided for. There is no surer way, whether you take conveyance of freight, or conveyance of passengers, the cheaper freights and faster passenger services are the most vital need after security has been provided. With every knot an hour which is added to the steamships connecting the British Empire, that Empire gets smaller and less unwieldy, while retaining its old strength and richness and gaining in efficiency. It compresses the whole structure of the Empire.

Mr. Lloyd George: It gets both smaller and bigger.

Sub-Committee to consider improved Steamship Services.

Mr. Churchill: It gets smaller and bigger at the same moment. I think that a sub-committee of this Committee might be set up, of which the President of the Board of Trade and Sir Joseph Maclay would be members who could select

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

one or two practical schemes and put them forward for consideration. But I would say this. While looking at the general direction in which we wish to go in the next five or ten years, let us find some practical things which we can start now having regard to our limited resources, at the present time.

Development of Egypt-India Air Route.

So far as the air is concerned, I would like to say a word about that from the point of view with which I am specially concerned. Until a few months ago I was Secretary of State for Air, and, in the Middle East, I am concerned with what is a very large portion of the Royal Air Force. Perhaps you have had a look at this map, and the Prime Ministers will recollect what I said when I spoke to them about Palestine and Mesopotamia, as to our methods of aerial control in these wild countries. We have now in Mesopotamia seven air squadrons and there will shortly be eight. We have one here and five in Egypt. That is a very powerful force. We have to have the aerodromes and the pilots and the sheds and the planes and the mechanics and so on, at Baghdad, in Cairo and Ludd; having got them there for the purpose of maintaining order and maintaining order more cheaply, there is the possibility of utilising this plant, when conditions are peaceful, for purposes of accelerating communications. The expense in regard to carrying mails or passengers by aeroplane, or by airship if you like, is very considerable and if you charge the passenger with the whole cost of maintaining the pilot permanently, the training schools which create him, the aerodromes, the mechanics, the whole apparatus, you are putting a burden upon that means of communication which will make it uneconomical at the present time in many cases. But here, where you have already all the plant on the ground, it would not be necessary to charge a higher rate for the aeroplanes which would be passing to and fro with mails or passengers than would actually pay the cost of the trip of the aeroplane and the remuneration of the pilot. Therefore I believe it would be possible for this particular section, Karachi–Baghdad–Cairo, in the very near future, as a practical matter, without any large additional expenditure, to establish an economic and paying service for mails and for a limited number of passengers. Already we have got a line through the desert which the aeroplanes can fly over without the danger of coming down and being lost. The whole line has now been surveyed. We have made friends with the Arabs at the different places where you might want to come down. Little deposits of petrol have been entrusted to the Arabs. In fact yesterday this naked empty desert was crossed in eleven hours.

Captain Guest: They were into Cairo in eleven hours.

Mr. Churchill: The surface of the desert is white and you plough a line which shows black under the surface of the soil and therefore the aeroplane has no difficulty in following it, and yesterday a machine came through from Baghdad to Cairo in eleven hours, accomplishing a journey which would otherwise have taken 4½ to 5 weeks. That shows what the air can do for the British Empire.

In addition to that we have the great military advantage of being able to move all our aeroplanes from here into Egypt to reinforce her if trouble occurred, instead of having to take them to pieces and put them on board ship and then fit them up again. That is a very important aspect—this air route across the desert—and it would be well if we could apply this to the shortening up of the British Empire as a whole, especially to those parts in which Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey, and the representatives of India, are interested. It is almost a direct straight line, "as the crow flies" literally, and we must begin in a moderate way running these passenger aeroplanes. I took the responsibility of ordering these to be made, and they are being made, aeroplanes of a civilian character, which can be flown by a pilot when we are not doing military work.

Mr. Lloyd George: What tonnage can they carry?

Captain Guest: Eight people—1,600 lb.

Mr. Lloyd George: And anything in addition?

Captain Guest: I would not like to answer that off hand.

Sir Frederick Sykes: It is not an economic proposition yet, but it can become so, if the route is laid, and it is being laid down. I think it will be some time before it can be called an economic proposition, because of overhead charges.

Mr. Churchill: Exactly. That is perfectly true. But if we have to have 5, 6 or 7 of these squadrons lying there keeping order in the country, and the country was quite quiet in the interval, that is not a cost with which the ordinary mail should

be saddled. This plan would knock ten or twelve days or even more off the journey from New Zealand and Australia home to England, because you could get in the train at Colombo—or wherever you get on the mainland—and run up by train to Karachi and fly across to Cairo and take another ship—four days home. Imperial Communications.

It could very quickly be made to carry a large proportion of the mails, and I have no doubt that the mails could be lessened to a small weight. I am afraid I have trespassed upon ground which the Air Minister ought to have dealt with, but I thought we could go more at leisure into that if we have this Committee. The Prime Minister has fallen in with the suggestion of Mr. Hughes about a Committee, and I do not think we need have many meetings with the Prime Minister. If we have one or two meetings on the right lines, we could have some Sub-Committees to bring forward definite matters to come up before the Conference, and if it is agreeable I am quite ready to undertake the charge of that group of Committees and Sub-Committees. *Committee to consider Communications.*

Sir Thomas Smartt: Are any of the Departments carrying out any investigations with regard to development in wireless telephony?

Mr. Churchill: You will hear all about that.

Sir Thomas Smartt: If you can speak from one end of the Dominion to the other, it is going to have an enormous effect.

Mr. Churchill: The Postmaster-General is an expert on that.

Mr. Kellaway: The Committee already set up does not deal with that.

Mr. Churchill: The proposal is—

"A Committee composed as follows:—

"Mr. Churchill (*in the Chair*),
"A representative of Canada,
"A representative of Australia,
"A representative of New Zealand,
"A representative of South Africa,
"A representative of India,

"in consultation as required with the Ministers at the head of the Board of Trade, Air Ministry, and Post Office, and their officials, is appointed to consider the question of the practical means available at the present time for the development of Imperial communications by land, sea, air, cable, radio-telegraphy and telephony. The Committee should report as soon as possible."

Mr. Hughes: You say "practical means available at the present time." That is rather cryptic.

Mr. Churchill: I attach great importance to that. I think we might spend enormous time in considering what will be possible ten or fifteen years hence, and nothing would be done, but there may be practicable steps which we could take now.

Mr. Hughes: I see what you mean. Anything we can do now we might consider.

Mr. Lloyd George: Our programme is very much upset by the absence of General Smuts. I have been going through all these things on the agenda. It is very difficult to consider them in his absence. For instance, Constitutional Questions—you cannot discuss those in the absence of General Smuts. Then there is the League of Nations, Disarmament and Anglo-French Relations. *Future work of Conference.*

Mr. Meighen: I think we could discuss the latter.

Sir Maurice Hankey: General Smuts's last words to me were that we should not discuss Anglo-French Relations without his presence.

Mr. Lloyd George: He takes a very definite view on that matter. For to-morrow I think we could take Egypt. I do not know if General Smuts has any special opinion about that. It is very vital to the Empire. But I suggest that we take Egypt to-morrow afternoon. That is a very important question. We have been hanging it up until we could get the views of the Dominion Premiers and India. In the morning we go to the Treasury about Reparations, but in the afternoon we could take Egypt. Lord Curzon has seen the various Ambassadors, and proposes to give an account of his conversations with them to-morrow. He does not want further discussion until he gets their replies.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Communications.

Mr. Massey: I think that is very satisfactory.

Mr. Lloyd George: We had better sit at 11 to-morrow morning. I suggest that the Foreign Marriage Question should be referred to the Colonial Office Conference, that is about people of various nationalities born abroad; that is something to do with the Marriage Laws. The next question is the present control of the New Hebrides. The third is the Empire Patents. If those three questions could be referred to the Colonial Office Conference, it would relieve the pressure upon this Conference very considerably.

Mr. Hughes: I have no one to attend to these things for me. I cannot be in two places at the same time. If you are going to fix the Colonial Office Conference when we are not sitting anywhere else I can go to it.

Mr. Churchill: So far as the New Hebrides is concerned, it is only a matter between Australia and New Zealand. I could take that up.

Mr. Hughes: That will suit quite well.

Mr. Massey: It will also suit me.

Mr. Lloyd George: On the question of publicity for to-day, I do not think it matters what you publish for to-day, and I suggest that it be left very much as before.

Mr. Hughes: As far as Australia is concerned, I see no reason why I should not give the Australian press the substance of what I said about communications.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is a very vital matter to Australia, much more than it is to Canada.

Mr. Hughes: I did not raise any point that would hurt the feelings of any other country.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do not put in the attack on the Post Office.

Mr. Hughes: If you like, nothing shall be said about anybody.

Mr. Churchill: I was going to suggest that the Secretariat should work up a thoroughly good account, beginning with Mr. Hughes's speech and such parts of other people's statements as are suitable, and that they should let them out, not for to-morrow but for the day after.

Mr. Hughes: I do not mind that at all. What objection have you to my giving to the Australian press what I said?

Mr. Lloyd George: I should not think that there was any objection to that so long as it was agreed. These things are of special interest, and there is nothing controversial about them at all.

(The Conference then adjourned.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*1, *July* 5, 1921.

Mr Meighen

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SECRET.

E. 17th Meeting.

Revise No 3

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Lord Curzon: It was only yesterday afternoon that I was asked to be ready to take up the question of Egypt to-day, and, very busily occupied as I have been all yesterday afternoon and all this morning, I must be pardoned if I have not had the time to put the narrative and the exposition in as complete a form as I should otherwise have liked.

Difficulty of Egyptian Problem.

I think you will find, when I have stated the case, that the Egyptian tangle is about the worst of all those we have had before us, and I am doubtful if anything I may say will lead you to think that a practical solution is in sight. In order to understand the present position I must say a word or two, although my retrospect will be as brief as possible, about the circumstances which have led up to it.

Arabi Rebellion.

It is now over forty years ago since we went into Egypt to suppress the Arabi rebellion and found ourselves insensibly committed to something like an occupation of the country. In the years following the Arabi rebellion it was the deliberate and avowed policy of our Government to evacuate Egypt as soon as we could. That policy was frequently expressed by Lord Salisbury. It took the form of a Convention which Sir Henry Drummond Wolff went out to Egypt to negotiate, and it was only owing to the influence of France, most unwisely exercised in her own interests, that the Sultan of Turkey was induced to refuse his signature to that agreement. Had he given it at that time we should have been out of Egypt long before now. Whether we should have had to go back again is, of course, another question.

1888—1914.

Then ensued a period of a quarter of a century, from 1888 to 1914, the outbreak of the war, in which Egypt was a more or less autonomous nation existing under the suzerainty of Turkey, ruled by a Khedive and a Council of Ministers and with an Egyptian Legislative Assembly in the background. The British Government for that quarter of a century was represented by an official who had no higher rank than that of Agent and Consul-General. Indeed, his diplomatic status was not higher than that of the representatives of the other European Powers who were at Cairo. But little by little a gradual change in the situation took place, due to many causes. Firstly, to the presence of our army of occupation necessary for the preservation of order and the security of the country; secondly, the obligation that fell upon us to recover the Soudan; thirdly, the existence of very wide-spread and powerful British interests in the country; and, lastly, the personality of Lord Cromer himself—a man who with that remarkable administrative gift, with that genius for ruling an Oriental country, could not fail, apart from all the other conditions I have named, insensibly to draw all the strings into his own hands. Thus at the end of this period, or at any rate up to the time of Lord Cromer's death, Egypt came to be regarded almost as a British possession. Certainly it was a country in which the British point of view and British interest were very much in the ascendant. Meanwhile, and particularly after Lord Cromer had gone (because after his disappearance from the scene a number of other men unfit to wield the bow of Ulysses succeeded him), a number of influences began to be felt which were secretly eating away at the heart of our position. For instance, we began, hardly noticed at the time, to increase the figures, which afterwards became excessive, and in my opinion dangerous, of British officials in the country, and there can be no doubt about it that the immense and exaggerated number of these officials, the quality of whom appears to have deteriorated as time went on, was largely responsible for the rising that afterwards took place. Another tendency manifested itself, and that was, as you increase the numbers of your British-official population in an Asiatic country they tend not to draw closer to the people but to draw away from them. They become a colony by themselves, living apart, with their own sports, their own interests, their own life, and as we have seen in some parts of India (but less there than in Egypt, because they are more scattered), so did the British colony in Egypt tend to pursue a life of its own, divorced from Egyptian sentiment and habits. We had another failure in Egypt which is a little difficult to analyse but which I think is undoubted, and that was in our educational policy. It had in some respects the same sort of result as our education had in India; that is to say, taking a number of sharp, clever young men, all aspiring to fill Government posts which were not there to be filled, and, in so far as they failed in their aspirations, drifting into a backwater of sullen discontent. All these causes were at work, and meanwhile, the restraining hand of Lord Cromer having been removed, the then Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who at no time was a satisfactory or loyal person, was persistently intriguing against us.

Failure of Educational Policy.

Situation on Outbreak of War, 1914.

I now come to the conditions at the outbreak of war. When in the autumn of 1914 we found ourselves at war with Turkey, it became necessary, owing to the fact that Egypt was nominally subject to the Sultan, to regularise the position there.

Egypt.

Mr. Asquith's Government was then in power; the present Prime Minister was a Member of his Government, and he will recollect that the question was debated by that Government as to whether the better policy would be to annex Egypt straight away or to declare a British Protectorate. For reasons into which I need not enter, but with which I am entirely in accord, it was decided to take the latter of these courses and to declare a Protectorate. Thus in September 1914, the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who had openly associated himself with our enemies, was deposed, and one of his uncles, Prince Hussein Kamal, a gentleman of character and integrity and very loyal to us, was put upon the throne with the title of Sultan, and in the proclamation which was issued declaring the change of status, we laid down that Egypt was placed under the protection of His Majesty and would thenceforth constitute a British Protectorate.

Egypt as a British Protectorate.

We did that in perfect good faith, but with, I think, exaggerated innocence. For instance, we did not take the trouble to explain to the Egyptians exactly what a Protectorate meant. We are so used to Protectorates in a hundred different forms in different parts of the world that we did not bother to explain what was the kind of Protectorate we were setting up in Egypt. On the other hand, the word itself, as you well know, can have an invidious connotation. In one extreme it may mean a gentle and necessary supervision of the external and internal policy of a country. At the other extreme it may mean that under the guise of a Protectorate it is really ruled by British hands and controlled by British guns. We did not explain to the Egyptians exactly what we meant, and undoubtedly there existed in many of their minds the impression, not altogether unreasonable, that this Protectorate had been declared for the purposes of the war only, and that when the war was over we should revert to our older position, that we should remember our old promises as to evacuation, and that some change in the position in Egypt, favourable to the aspirations of the natives, might be expected to ensue. That was the position, I think, at the outbreak of the war. When it began, we said, quite rightly, that we did not expect Egypt to take her part on the fighting front, and that we would make ourselves responsible, as we did, for the defence and protection of her frontiers; but, although we did not ask her to contribute soldiers, we did ask her, and with very profitable results, to make an indirect contribution to the war. This was at once a source of strength to us, and of discord among the people. I need not enter into the actual position that Egypt occupied in the war.

The Dominion Ministers here will recall very well that it became a kind of Clapham Junction through which their soldiers passed to and fro, and where they spent many months. The Ministers will recall, too, our successful attempts to throw back a Turkish invasion of Egypt on the Suez Canal.

Egyptian Internal situation during the War.

I pass away from that to the internal symptoms that were largely responsible for what followed. Mr. Balfour rightly reminds me that it was a labour question. We recruited in Egypt what was called the Egyptian Labour Camel Transport Corps. These men were well paid, and, if the scheme had remained as originally conceived and carried out, it would have been all right, but the levying of this Corps fell into the hands of the local Egyptian officials, the village officials known as "Omdehs," and these men, freed from the control of their British superiors, who had all been drafted away to the war in one capacity or another, pursued methods of corruption, of oppression, even of cruelty, recalling the old days of the Press Gang in this country. At the same time, another source of trouble was the requisition of cereals and animals and the collection for the Red Cross Fund—all of them innocent themselves and right and proper in their inception, but gradually drifting in the hands of the native agents into engines of oppression upon the people. Simultaneously, Egypt found herself confronted, as almost all the other countries involved in the war, in a great rise in prices, which weighed heavily upon the population. Thus, all the while, almost unknown to us here and really either unobserved or insufficiently observed by our people who were working in the country, a state of affairs was growing up that presaged trouble. In 1917 the Sultan Hussein, of whom I have spoken, unfortunately died, and we then had to put up in his place the only available candidate, his brother, the present Sultan, whose name is Fuad, who had been educated abroad, was not in very close touch with Egyptian sentiment, and neither in character nor ability could be compared with his brother.

Situation at time of Armistice.

In 1918 the war came to an end. With the termination of the war a new cause of political discontent emerged. President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the ideals for which he fought at Paris had a wide repercussion in all Oriental countries, and not least, I think, and perhaps, in view of the history I have put before you, most of all in Egypt itself. In November 1918, just at the time of the armistice, a

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

declaration, for which Lord Robert Cecil was responsible, was drawn up and issued by the British and French Governments, mainly with reference to Syria and Mesopotamia, but laying down in language of great clearness that our policy was the enfranchisement of the various people who had been liberated by our arms from the yoke of the Turks and the institution in those areas of forms of National Government.

Well, when the Egyptians, who look upon themselves as in the very front files of civilisation and who trace their history back to thousands of years, found that the Arabs and other people who had been involved in the war were proposing to get some form of self-government of their own, they began to think very poorly of the situation in which they still found themselves under the Protectorate, and were to be denied conditions which were to be given to their much more backward brothers. This was the position at the end of 1918; then a man named Zaghloul Pasha, who had himself been Minister of one or other of the Egyptian Ministries—a somewhat discontented man and up to that time a man of no great political position or reputation—began to organise the Nationalist Party. He called upon our then High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, and presented to him claims that involved complete autonomy for Egypt, and he expressed his desire to come to London to put forward this programme before the British Government. Simultaneously, the then Prime Minister of Egypt, Rushdi Pasha, and one of his colleagues, Adli Pasha, of whom I will say more in a moment, expressed a desire also to come to London. Their suggestion reached London just before Mr. Balfour, who was then Foreign Minister, was going to Paris for the Conference, and, not unnaturally, he represented that the moment was an unfavourable one to receive them, but that he hoped to receive them a little later on. The Egyptian Party—the Nationalist Party—have always represented that as a great error of judgment on our part. It is easy, in the light of subsequent events, to indicate that a different answer might have been returned, but, in the circumstances, it was very difficult to give them another answer, and a little later, when the suggestion that they should be asked to come to England was renewed, Rushdi and Adli, having by this time got more into the hands of the extremists than before, laid down as a condition of their invitation that the other people—Zaghloul Pasha and his friends—should come with them and be received too. This invitation again, rightly or wrongly, we declined. We said we should be very glad to see the Ministers at any time, but we could not, in view of our position, contemplate receiving a man whose views were so utterly inconsistent with the whole principles of our position in Egypt. Thereupon, Zaghloul Pasha and his men raised the flag of revolt. They went with a delegation to the Sultan, Sultan Fuad, and used most menacing language to him, and our then representative in Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, being in England, Sir Milne Cheetham recommended, in the interests of order, that these men should be ordered to leave the country. His advice was accepted by us here—I was then acting at the Foreign Office—and they were removed to Malta. This was the final spark that kindled the flame.

Zaghloul Pasha.

Mr. Hughes : When was that?

Revolt in Spring of 1919.

Lord Curzon : In March 1919. Then ensued the rising in Egypt, of which you have all read, taking our people there and here almost entirely by surprise, on a scale almost unparalleled in ferocity and accompanied by looting, pillage, and the murder of British soldiers; in fact, an open revolt, and the serious part of it was not merely the incidents by which it was accompanied, but the fact that it permeated all classes, and that, for the first time in that quarter of a century of our connection with Egypt, which I just now referred to, the Fellahin for whom we had done so much to raise, whom Lord Cromer had by his successful policy brought into a condition of what we thought was permanent friendship with ourselves, were involved. It was not only a question of Moslem against Christian, but all classes of people, including for the first time, at any rate, in recent history, the Coptic community. Just at that time, Sir Reginald Wingate being in England, Lord Allenby, fresh from his triumphs in the East and at that time Commander-in-chief of the British Forces in Egypt and Palestine, went to Paris where the Conference was sitting. By common consent of all of us, it was thought desirable to invite him to return to Egypt as High Commissioner with full powers, military and civil, to deal with this perilous situation in the manner that he thought best. He arrived at Cairo in the concluding days of March 1919. His first step was to reverse the policy that had been pursued and to bring back Zaghloul Pasha and his friends from Malta. Whether that decision was right or wrong, I have often puzzled myself to think. On the one hand, it was a generous

Lord Allenby appointed High Commissioner.

concession, and it might have been held at that moment to be the sign of a desire to calm the spirits agitated by this terrible rising. On the other hand, it could be argued that this was a sign of weakness on our part, of which the Nationalist Party was certain to take advantage. However that may be, they certainly did take advantage of it—they certainly did. Zaghloul Pasha and his three friends, released from Malta, at once transferred themselves to Paris, where they had large funds at their disposal, and entertaining on a considerable scale, they tried unavailingly to get the sympathy of the Conference then sitting in Paris.

Egypt.

It was clearly necessary for us, and such was the advice of Lord Allenby, to take some special step, both to enquire into the cause of the outbreak and to place things for the future on a better footing. The man of all others marked out by his experience and reputation for dealing with difficulties, was one of our own colleagues—I mean Lord Milner. He, at that time, was Secretary of State for the Colonies, and his early fame had been made in Egypt more than a quarter of a century before. His book on Egypt is still a classical work on the administration of that country. Accordingly, we decided to send out a special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner for the purpose that I have described. Various conditions, into which I need not enter, rendered it difficult to send out the Mission in the summer of 1919, and it was not until the winter—in the latter part of the winter—that he and his colleagues (whom we selected as the men best suited), most of them of Egyptian experience, and all representing the liberal point of view, started from this country. It was not until December that they went out. When they arrived in Cairo they met with organised antagonism from Zaghloul and his friends, carried out with all their resources of boycotting, picketing and the like, by the Nationalist Party. Lord Milner and his colleagues conducted themselves with admirable composure. Although none of the prominent Egyptians were allowed officially to see them; although when any of them went about in the country to make enquiries, they were dogged and followed from place to place, and every effort was made to keep people away from them; nevertheless, in private conversations in private places with leading men, they collected an immense amount of valuable information, and arrived at a general *précis*. This they embodied in a kind of preliminary report which they sent home to us, but all the while they did not come into contact with Zaghloul himself, who remained in Paris. Accordingly, when Lord Milner came back to this country, and in his anxiety, before he framed his final Report, to get some idea of what the extremists desired, he invited Zaghloul and his friends—not in an official, but in a private capacity as representing an important section of Egyptian opinion—to come over and see him in London. Conversations took place between Lord Milner's Mission and these gentlemen in London in the summer of 1919, and by the month of August certain tentative conclusions had been arrived at between them.

Lord Milner's Mission.

Mr. Hughes : Before Lord Milner went out?

Lord Curzon : No, this was after Lord Milner came back in March—these gentlemen came here in June.

Mr. Hughes : You said 1919.

Lord Curzon : I beg pardon, 1920. I made a mistake, they came here in 1920. The conversations lasted until August 1920, and then this tentative agreement was arrived at. I ought to say in fairness to the Cabinet, that they knew nothing of what was going on. Lord Milner had undertaken these conversations on his own responsibility in private, and I, myself, as Foreign Secretary, had only the dimmest idea of what was going on, and I was a good deal surprised when I saw the conclusions in the form they ultimately assumed. However, in the month of August this tentative agreement having been arrived at, Zaghloul undertook to send back some of his friends to Cairo in order to receive a favourable reception. I need hardly say that they took advantage of the occasion to publish it in the papers without authority, and from that moment, the matter having been made public, we ourselves had to take cognisance of it, and I am bound to say that it began to be regarded, not as the pronouncement of Lord Milner and colleagues only, but that of His Majesty's Government. Probably you have had the Report.

Mr. Hughes : Did Zaghloul's arrival in Cairo precede the Report of Lord Milner to the British Government.

Lord Curzon : Zaghloul himself did not go back to Cairo, he remained in Paris. He sent back his principal friends to Cairo in order to secure—as they did secure—a favourable report for the tentative conclusions. Broadly speaking, what Lord Milner proposed in this arrangement was that, for the relationship of a Protectorate

Lord Milner's proposals.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

for Egypt, there should be substituted a Constitution, by means of a Treaty between Egypt and Great Britain, under which Britain would recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions; and Egypt would confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests, and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights. In the course of the same draft agreement, Lord Milner, advancing somewhat from the position he had taken while in Egypt, agreed, in order to meet the demands of Zaghloul Pasha and his friends, to hand over to Egypt the control of their foreign affairs, and the right of representation in foreign countries.

He also agreed, while providing for the maintenance of a British force in Egypt, that it should not be located in any of the capital cities where its presence was alleged to be a cause of offence, but that being kept there because of the central Imperial position of Egypt which necessitates the safeguarding of the Canal, the British forces should be maintained somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Canal itself. He further proposed that our British control of the administration should only survive in the form of the appointment of a number of rather shadowy officials whose relations with the native Government were left somewhat obscure, and he trusted to British interests being maintained in Egypt in the future by the paramount position of the High Commissioner who would continue to represent this country there, but who would apparently have to rely on the prestige of his personality and his position for the influence that he might exercise rather than, as hitherto, upon any definite show of force. That is a very brief and necessarily condensed and perhaps not altogether complete summary of the proposals made by Lord Milner. It was at this stage that the matter came before the Cabinet here, and papers were written upon the matter by myself and some of my colleagues in which we pointed out what we thought in some respects the weakness or the drawbacks of the position. I remember more particularly laying stress—and here I think I had the support of almost all if not all of my colleagues—upon the very doubtful provision about British troops, the proposal to concentrate them in some area removed from the great cities, and I remember pointing out that such a position seemed to me to be a source of great weakness and danger in the future. Also I was not quite reassured about the proposals on foreign affairs or the position of the judicial and financial advisers, who were to remain Europeans under the new régime, and I argued that it was necessary to lay down, if anything like this scheme was adopted, that no foreigner should be admitted into the military or civil service of the Egyptian Government except with our consent, in other words, that in the interests both of the very large staff of Englishmen serving there now, and in the interests of the future management of affairs, if we were to maintain any influence at all, we should not allow an opening for Frenchmen and Italians, and people of that sort, to overrun the Administration. Lord Allenby, who was over in England at the time, took substantially the same view as I did, but he held very strongly to the position, Lord Milner having reported, his report having been made public, the Egyptian people finding it impossible to believe that anything that came under Lord Milner's name could not be the view of the British Government, that it was impossible to go back from the broad principles of the policy recommended by Lord Milner, although he thought in those points I have mentioned, and some others, that we should be at liberty and we ought to insist upon conditions that guaranteed our position and rights in Egypt more effectively than some of Lord Milner's proposals had done. He then went back to Egypt, and at his instance, with a view to starting matters on the next stage, the Cabinet on the 22nd February sent a telegram to Lord Allenby for publication in Egypt. It was also published here. It communicated the broad lines on which we were prepared to proceed. I will read this declaration if I may: "His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a delegation, nominated by the Sultan, with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people."

The meeting will see that that was a tremendous concession to Egyptian sentiment because it did promise that for the conditions of the Protectorate existing since 1914 there should be substituted Treaty relations, creating some form of

View of the Government on Lord Milner's Proposals.

Lord Allenby's views.

Government's Declaration.

independence for the Egyptian people. On the other hand, in all other respects, we retained—and this was publicly stated—entire liberty when the delegation came over here to lay down and even to insist upon such conditions as we might think necessary, the Egyptian Delegation, of course, retaining equal liberty when it came over here to make any other proposals outside the strict lines of the report which it might find desirable to put forward. In other words, within the confines of the broad principles I have enunciated, both parties retained their liberty for the impending discussion. These communications having been made to the Egyptian Government and having been received with great gratitude and enthusiasm in Egypt, it then became necessary to take steps for the constitution of the official Egyptian delegation that had to come over here and conclude the new Treaty with us. The Sultan had always been promised that such a delegation should come. We exercised no sort of pressure in its constitution. We asked the Egyptian Government to send whom they pleased. The existing Ministry, which had been a mere stop-gap Ministry in Egypt, disappeared from the scene and was replaced by Adli Pasha, one of the gentlemen who had been engaged over here in the negotiations with Lord Milner. He is the present Prime Minister and he at once took steps to constitute the Delegation, to nominate its members and to give indications as to the programme. At this moment Zaghloul, the evil spirit in the whole discussion, returned to Egypt. He met with a great reception from the people; he was greeted with an ovation like that of some great military conqueror, and in the early stages after his return, he addressed himself, apparently, to an attempt at friendly co-ordination with Adli's Ministry. There was every hope for a week or two that the two would combine and that the Delegation would represent all parties. However, whether it was inspired by vanity, as is alleged by his critics, by a kind of megalomania from which it is well known that he suffers, or from jealously of Adli Pasha, whom he cordially dislikes, or from a feeling that by standing out altogether he could get the best terms and become the first ruler, he broke with the Prime Minister and started a campaign of his own. He went about the country making a series of speeches which would even excite the admiration of a Sinn Feiner, and finally owing to his harangues, a state of affairs was produced which culminated in serious disorders in Cairo and riots of the most terrible description in Alexandria, commencing with a squabble between Moslems and Greeks, which ended in an anti-European outburst in which many lives—forty I think—were lost and I think some hundreds were wounded.

Egypt.

Constitution of Egyptian Delegation to discuss situation.

Riots—May, 1921.

Mr. Hughes: When was this?

Lord Curzon: That was in May 1921, and the situation was only re-established by the appearance of British troops upon the scene. The native police and the Egyptian army who were first called upon, were quite inadequate to deal with the situation, and it was only restored by British troops. That is the position up till the last few weeks. Adli Pasha with his mission is now on the seas. They will be here at the end of this week. Zaghloul and his friends are carrying on this dangerous and, bitter campaign in Egypt, and I think there can be little doubt, from all we hear from them, that Zaghloul is out to destroy Adli, to defeat any arrangements that might be concluded between Adli and us here, and very likely in the long run to unseat the present Sultan of his position on the throne. Now we have arrived at this point that we have to consider what we are to do. Can we secure an agreement here, and if we do secure an agreement here, will it be accepted in Egypt, and by acceptance in Egypt, I mean acceptance by a legislative assembly or a national assembly convened for the purpose of discussing and ratifying the arrangement, because that is one of the promises that have been made. Can we hope to do that? It is difficult to answer these questions with any confidence. I am not confident that we can conclude an agreement, that is to say, I have no doubt that we can draw up an agreement which will broadly conform with Lord Milner's principles, and will safeguard all the points in which our interests are concerned and the interests of other parties. I can give you a draft of such an agreement. I do not know whether Adli Pasha would accept it. I am afraid that, however reasonable it might be, he is so terribly afraid—he is rather a timid man—of Zaghloul and the reception he would meet with on his return, that he would find it difficult to accept a peace. If he did accept, and I believe my colleagues agree, I am very doubtful of the reception it would meet with on his return. Now you may say to me, "If that is the position, whether you conclude your Treaty or not, supposing it ultimately to break down, what is the alternative?" There are some

Difficulty of present situation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

who would say: "We have done our best, we have been generous, we have abolished the Protectorate, we have declared our willingness to set up reasonable guarantees, and they will not have it. Upon their heads be it. We must revert to the *status quo ante*. Why should we not go back to the temporary Government and good administration and the many benefits of the Cromer régime?" I must tell you quite frankly that I believe that to be wholly impossible.

General Smuts: That is to abolish the Protectorate and go back to the *status quo ante?*

View of Lord Allenby.

Lord Curzon: Yes, to go back to the *status quo ante*. I believe that to be quite impossible and that is the view taken by Lord Allenby himself. I will just read a few lines from a despatch that came from him quite a short time ago. He said—

> "Western ideas of autonomy and self-government, not to speak of independence, to which the great war gave so considerable an impetus, have gained too strong a hold on all sections of the community in Egypt for it to be possible for us to return to old-time methods, or to look to the administrative devices created by Lord Cromer for precedence to guide us in our future action. The opinion of such leaders as Zaghloul has entered too deeply into the imagination of the people of Egypt to render any such solution of the problem possible."
>
> I have on many occasions emphasised to your Lordship that the memorandum published in Egypt in August last has come to be regarded, whatever the real intentions of His Majesty's Government, as a substantive offer; and that any wide departure from the main principles of the settlement which that memoranda advocates would be regarded as a breach of faith, not only in Egypt itself, but by world opinion at large."

Sir W. Hayter's suggestion.

I could elaborate it if required, but I think I have said sufficient to give you an idea of the position. During the last day or two, however, there has come to me a paper which I would like to circulate to the Conference. It was only seen by myself a day or two ago. It emanates from Sir William Hayter, who is the legal adviser in one of the Egyptian Administrations. It is a very able and prudent paper. It takes the line of accepting the principles of the Milner Report, while holding that many of the suggestions of Lord Milner are inapplicable or out of date; and it concludes with the suggestion, for which there is a good deal to be said, which is favoured by Lord Allenby in his covering despatch, and which we in the Foreign Office are rather favourably inclined towards, namely, that viewing the apparent impossibility of concluding a permanent definite agreement now which would be accepted by both parties, what we should do is to conclude a temporary *modus vivendi* to last for a period of ten years, and to be replaced, as I hope under happier conditions, at the end of that time by some more permanent arrangement. You must remember that although I talked about Egypt as being in the hands of the Zaghloul group, as it apparently is, although if you count heads, there are 90 per cent. of the population that would follow him into any polling booth which he asked them to enter, yet in the background there are many sensible men who are afraid of our going out altogether, and leaving them to the tender mercies of the Extreme Nationalist Party; and the views of these people have been greatly affected by what happened in Alexandria, just as foreign Powers have been. We have been talking about abolishing the Capitulations and setting up new Courts in their place, but you can understand that when the Greek, Frenchman and Italian is subject to being shot down in the streets of Alexandria without provocation, he will require better protection, and if a garrison is not there to protect him, he will put in his garrison himself. All these questions are having great weight upon the Egyptian opinion, and I only mention this because I think myself that, while adhering to the policy with regard to the Protectorate from which we cannot depart, and while considering the idea of constructing a Treaty with the Egyptian people and giving them independence, we should like an interval to elapse during which we had some provisional *modus vivendi* to tide us over to a better time. I should better be able to explain this if I could circulate these papers, and if the Prime Minister agrees, I should do that, and should include one or two despatches from Lord Allenby on the subject. The whole matter is very complicated, but I have tried in an unpretentious way to give an account of the situation.

Moderate Egyptian opinion.

The Prime Minister: Now for discussion. Are you ready to start? Egypt.

Mr. Meighen: No.

The Prime Minister: Mr. Hughes, are you prepared to go on?

Voice of Dominions in Empire's Foreign Policy.

Mr. Hughes: I feel myself ill-equipped to offer any useful contribution to the discussion. The subject is so complex. I come to it wholly unprepared either by previous study or knowledge of the facts that have led to what is a most extraordinary and lamentable position, but since you invite us to offer our opinions, there are just one or two observations I would like to make. First, let me say a word or two on a point that crops up continually here, and which we hope yet to decide. I refer to the adoption of a principle and the establishment of some machinery by which the foreign policy of the Empire might be guided by the representatives of Great Britain, the self-governing Dominions, and India. This case has demonstrated in convincing fashion the urgent need for action in this direction. For not only were we not informed beforehand, but we were not even informed after it had happened. The position, as revealed by Lord Curzon to-day, comes to me with something of a shock. I have had no communication from the Colonial Office or direct from you, Sir, with reference to the actual position in Egypt. I saw in a newspaper some time ago a statement to the effect that it was proposed to adopt Lord Milner's report. That is the first hint I had of anything being contemplated. I presume that the world at large learned of it at the same time.

Mr. Lloyd George: We have not decided yet.

Mr. Hughes: No, that is quite right, but I did not even know what the recommendation of the Milner Commission was. Shortly after the appearance of the paragraph to which I have referred a question was asked in the House of Lords. Lord Curzon, in reply, said that the report had been received, but it had not been considered by the Government.

Importance of Egypt with regard to the Empire.

A short statement appeared under this news item intimating that the report involved complete autonomy for Egypt. I at once sent you, Sir, a telegram saying that I was much concerned about the report; that I should be glad to be informed of the position; that I regarded the Egyptian question as one of such vital importance, not only to Britain, but to the whole of the Empire, and that, as Egypt was the gateway to the East, and so to Australia, that nothing should be done without full consultation with the Dominions. I may perhaps be accused of taking a narrow and biassed view, but it appeared to me that this question affected the national safety of Australia, and for that and other reasons I was frankly alarmed at the position set out in the brief press summary, and altogether opposed to the adoption of the Milner report.

We have now heard the matter sufficiently amplified by Lord Curzon. We know where we are. Lord Curzon has shown us clearly how the present position arose. I confess that it disturbs me greatly. It would be well if we could see our way to get out by the way we went in. But on the face of it this does not seem possible. The original cause of all this undoubtedly lies in President Wilson's Fourteen Points; that glittering phrase "self-determination" which he originated is responsible for this and much more. Reference has been made to the discussion which took place with the Egyptian delegates in 1918. General Smuts was here at the time, and he will correct me if I am wrong, but I have no recollection of this question being discussed or even mentioned at any meeting of the Imperial Cabinet. General Smuts might be considered at that time a member of the British Government, and so information denied to us might be accessible to him, but, so far as the Imperial Cabinet is concerned, I do not remember the matter being mentioned. Similarly in Paris there was nothing made known to us except the fact that the Egyptian delegates were in Paris while we were there. I know nothing of Lord Cecil's note to Lord Allenby, which, as it were, closed the door to any attempt to get out by the same way as we went in.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think it right to say about that that it was done without my knowledge. Mr. Balfour was then the Foreign Secretary. He and I were in Paris, and we knew nothing at all about it, and the French Foreign Office did exactly the same thing, and M. Clemenceau knew nothing about it until we came to a talk regarding it, and he said he was certain that nothing of the kind had been done; but it was done, and that is why Lord Robert Cecil said what he did without consulting anybody.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, that is so, but it is clear that a serious position has been created which affects us all. Anything that menaces the canal and British prestige in Egypt—or in any of those territories which are, as it were, the hinterland of the canal—affects the whole of the Empire vitally. Now we are asked to say what we are going to do. First, I want to say how much I regret that what has been done has been done, and to express the hope that we shall learn wisdom from what has happened, and devise means to prevent the recurrence of proceedings of this character, which might lead to equally or still more disastrous results. It has been stated in definite terms by Lord Curzon that, even if we granted all that Lord Milner recommended, it would still leave us in opposition to Zaghloul, and we should have opposed to us all those varied elements that make up, we are told, 90 per cent. of the population.

So, then, here is a remedy which, while disastrous to us, is going to be unacceptable to the greater bulk of the Egyptian people. Having made a concession which is the utmost that we can make, which we ought never to have dreamed of making, which, if made, will imperil Australia and the whole Empire; which, if we make, we make with the full knowledge, or at least with every prospect, of its being unacceptable to the great bulk of the people. Having made it, we can never recede from it; we shall always have to give a little more and a little more, in order that we may placate the implacable. How can we safeguard our interests? What guarantee is it proposed to exact in regard to our interests in Egypt that can be satisfactory? Speaking as a civilian, I think it impossible to hold the canal with troops confined solely to the canal zone with the hinterland peopled by a population bitterly hostile.

Lord Curzon: I think Mr. Hughes is pushing it rather too far when he says that the population are bitterly hostile. The population of the country are united in their demands for political independence, but they have no idea what it means.

Method of protecting Empire's interests.

Mr. Hughes: I do not say they have, but there is no smoke without fire. You have said that nothing we can do will placate Zaghloul. Is he, then, merely animated by this desire for political independence? May it not be that he has some other design, that perhaps behind him are some other influences? In any case, no one will contend for a moment that we shall be, if we concede what is demanded or even what the Milner report seconds, in as good a position to hold that canal, which must be held at all hazards, as at present. You say they propose to give us guarantees that our interests will be safeguarded, or that we will be permitted to safeguard them. First, they cannot give a guarantee that we dare accept. Secondly, supposing you do accept; suppose you give the Egyptians all they ask for, you give them autonomy. The matter does not end there. What you have done for Egypt you must do everywhere. I do not say you should not grant to all what you grant to the Egyptians; only it is well to realise what this means. Do not forget that, as the demand by the Egyptians was founded on President Wilson's Fourteen Points, any concession in this will be followed by demands from other quarters. We must consider, before we concede autonomy, if Egypt can stand alone? Do you believe for a moment that she can do this? But unless we are ready to believe that the world will turn from appeal to force to appeal to reason, we cannot entertain such an idea for a moment. What, then, will happen if we relinquish our position at this gateway to our estate? Will that be the end, or will not other nations seek to supplant us? We from the Dominions are asked to give advice in a case where the time is long past where advice could be usefully tendered. We are brought to a case in *articulo mortis*, and asked to perform a miracle. We can do nothing. Lord Curzon has taken what I may venture to say is a very optimistic view. He speaks of the 10 per cent. of the respectable interests upon which he builds such high hopes, but the *bourgeoisie* never were able to stand against revolutions, and never will be. We propose to withdraw the only force that can protect them.

Egypt unable to stand alone.

Need for a British Force.

Lord Curzon: No, we propose to keep it. Nobody has proposed for a moment to withdraw the force. My criticisms on Lord Milner's proposal were of precisely the opposite character, namely, that whereas Lord Milner proposed to confine the British force in the neighbourhood of the canal, treating it as an Imperial force, I argued, on the other hand, that the British force is required there for the maintenance of order, and for the protection of the country from enemies, and that it must, therefore, be maintained in the country.

Mr. Hughes: I am very pleased to hear you say that, but if you are going to grant them autonomy, if you are going to give them all they want, and at the same

time attempt to maintain our interests by armed forces, I have nothing further to say. If that is the kind of autonomous Government you propose to give them, you may look to me for support, but anything short of that I oppose. We have to consider the vital interests of this Empire, and this, in my opinion, is a matter of life and death. Egypt.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are assuming that we are committed to some of the things. We are not. We are here to discuss them, and before we commit ourselves we are going to confer with the Dominion Premiers and the Representatives of India, and that is what we are here for. We are committed only in so far as this declaration is concerned. Within those limits you can discuss anything, so therefore there is nothing like *articulo mortis*.

Mr. Churchill: We are committed to abolishing the Protectorate, but as to what we are to put in its place we are not committed.

Extent of present commitment.

Mr. Lloyd George: We say the Protectorate is not a satisfactory method. That is all we are committed to. We are therefore free. These gentlemen will be here in about a week and Lord Curzon will meet them, governed and instructed by the opinion which is formed here as a result of our discussions. So we are absolutely free, either to reject, or to accept, or modify. We have not committed you in the least beyond that declaration.

Mr. Hughes: I was certainly under the impression that Lord Curzon, on the whole, would have us understand something quite different. He said that when the Milner Report was made public all Egypt was overjoyed.

Mr. Lloyd George: They do not like the word "Protectorate," of course.

Mr. Churchill: They thought they were going to get a good deal more than we ever meant.

Mr. Hughes: That is sufficiently ambiguous of course to serve for an official pronouncement, but was it for that reason, I ask, that joy suffused the heart of the Egyptian? I do not think so.

Mr. Lloyd George: I remember Lord Milner telling us—I forget what the name was—he gave the Egyptian name for "Protectorate," which represented everything that was evil. They hated the word. We said we were not going for that word.

Mr. Hughes: I am sure your view is the same as mine on this matter. If we are only talking of words, any word will suit me so long as we get the thing we want.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are absolutely free to make any proposal with regard to the thing itself which is consistent with your not having something which called a "Protectorate"—absolutely free.

May I also point out we sent that very document to you on the 2nd March, so there is nothing that we have really kept away from the Dominions. We have sent you Lord Milner's Report—these are new—you would not have had them. On the 2nd March we sent you that identical document. That is all we have got.

Mr. Hughes: It is only fair to say you sent it to me after I had left.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is the difficulty which illustrated your speech yesterday—the difficulty of communications.

Mr. Hughes: I said nothing by way of criticism, let alone of censure, but I think I am entitled to point that out. I have only to add that I think we should be in a better position if Lord Curzon were to see the Egyptian Delegates and report to us what transpires. Let us have a concrete proposal, and then we shall have something to deal with. If you cannot satisfy them, of course you cannot satisfy the Extremists. If you have something tangible, put it before us. At present, we have nothing.

Suggests views of Egyptian Delegation be first Obtained.

Mr. Balfour: It is worth mentioning, isn't it, that if it came as a matter of surprise to Mr. Hughes, it came as a matter of surprise to the Cabinet. I shall never forget my feeling when in August last year, for the first time, I got an inkling of what was going on, and when Mr. Hughes says, with very great justice, that he is called upon to deal with the situation after it is too late to deal with it thoroughly and satisfactorily, that is the case with the whole Cabinet.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Mr. Hughes: Although, of course, I knew nothing of what Mr. Balfour says, I gathered from the reply Lord Curzon made in the House of Lords, that neither the Prime Minister, nor any other members of the Cabinet, including Mr. Churchill, had ever heard of it, or heard of it in time to do anything.

Mr. Balfour: That is true.

Mr. Churchill: I wrote my protest within five hours of reading it in the newspapers last autumn.

Mr. Hughes: We are all in the same boat.

Mr. Meighen: You are referring to the announcement of Lord Milner's? You are not referring to Lord Robert Cecil's?

Mr. Churchill: No.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is the reference to the Arabs; it had no reference.

Mr. Balfour: He was not thinking of Egypt.

General Smuts: Lord Robert Cecil's declaration had reference to the Sykes–Picot Agreement. That Agreement was a secret between us and the French, and at that stage it came to the notice of the Arabs to whom we had made quite different promises, and some statement had to be framed between the British and the French Governments which would conciliate Arab opinion, and so a new formula was devised. As I remember, that was the genesis of that Declaration.

Mr. Hughes: Look at this, that other paragraph which qualifies a little . . . .

General Smuts: I would only say I do not think that we are in a position usefully to discuss this subject now. The British Government is only bound by a general Declaration, and that we accept. The Egyptians have accepted that too, I understand; that is a general formula—this formula, that the Protectorate should go and that the special interests of Great Britain should be protected by a Treaty, and that, for the rest, Egyptian aspirations shall be satisfied. That general Declaration is the only document that binds us, and that we all agree to, and as far as the British Government knows, that satisfies Egyptian opinion. So that is all that we can found on.

Necessity only for protection of Empire's interests.

In regard to particulars, it is a matter for discussion between you and the deputation when it arrives. I would only say this, that I feel very strongly that we should not attempt to do more than protect Imperial interests; the attempt, I think, to govern these Oriental communities on our lines and by our methods is bound to fail. It will involve us in all sorts of entanglements. The whole political atmosphere of the world has changed. We do not want to govern Egypt, either directly or indirectly.

Mr. Massey: What about India?

General Smuts: Don't let us discuss India now. She is on a road which will take her far. We are discussing Egypt, and we have similar problems in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. I only think that as a principle we should simply conserve our Imperial interests and let these people govern themselves and find out how it can best be done. We do not want to be for ever entangled in Egypt, and send armies there to keep the Administration going. You only want to conserve Imperial interests, and we only want to do the same, and I think in that spirit we should work on this formula.

Mr. Hughes: May I say this to you. Look at that Canal and see how much it means to us and how little by comparison to you.

General Smuts: In Egypt you have two problems, the problem of internal government and the problem of autonomy; the problem of running an Administration, which I think is an Egyptian problem, and we should leave it to them.

Mr. Winston Churchill: Altogether, would you leave it.

General Smuts: As far as possible. There is an indefinable neutral ground, so to speak, between the two.

Lord Curzon: The element of all the foreign populations and the rights of foreign Governments place great responsibility on us.

Mr. Balfour: There is no country so international as Egypt at this moment. You have enormous foreign interests in proportion to the size of the country and the population.

Egypt.

General Smuts: Once we go further than protecting Imperial interests, with the new atmosphere growing up in these countries we are going to let ourselves into no end of entanglements, and the Empire cannot stand the burden.

Mr. Balfour: I not only see your point, but I have great sympathy with it, but do not let us conceive Egypt with a native population which happens to border on the Canal, and which can be left alone to carry out native ends with native methods. Unfortunately, Egypt is not; Egypt is quite different; Egypt is abnormal and like nothing else under heaven, and it is very difficult to deal with her on your plan. I quite understand you.

General Smuts: I know that the Dominions will do very little to help the Mother country in this matter; she will have to bear the burden. We talk of Imperial communication which we are going to protect, but it will in the end be the British navy and the British army that will go to Egypt, and the people of this country will refuse to carry this intolerable burden of keeping an army in Egypt; so long as we protect our interests there and see that things do not become hopeless from our Imperial point of view, that should suffice.

Mr. Hughes: Will you look at it in another way? You talk of the rights of the Egyptian people; is it not notorious that they are a corrupt people; that, in fact, it is not too much to say, their official hierarchy is hopelessly corrupt. Did not Lord Curzon point out that one of the causes of all this trouble has arisen from that very thing. Our armies were in Egypt for a long while during the war; they had an opportunity of seeing the Egyptian. I cannot speak from experience, and no one is here who has had any practical experience of Egypt, but I would like to say this, that I feel confident if you gave them everything they wanted they would still be unable to govern themselves. They are a corrupt people; there is an ignorant proletariat, there is a corrupt bureaucracy, there is a megalomaniac leading them. I say again most certainly, Egypt as a self-governing country in the sense we mean it, in the sense you mean it, General, is impossible.

General Smuts: You have the opinion of Lord Allenby. Lord Allenby says that a return to the old pre-war condition where the British Government, in a mild way and by subterfuges, so to say, ran the Government with Lord Cromer, has become an impossible situation. If that is so, what can you do? You don't want to annex the country; you don't want to run it directly. Where are you going to draw the line, except at this point, our Imperial interests as distinct from local Egyptian interests?

Unique position of Egypt.

Prime Minister: That is really the point. I think everyone would accept that formula, but you have to reduce that formula to practice. Your difficulties come in the practical application of that formula. For instance, I will give you two or three illustrations. Egypt is not a country merely; it is a high road. It puts it, as Mr. Balfour points out, in a different category from any other country. It is a high road between East and West. The first thing you come up against: Is Egypt to get foreign relations? That is the first point. Is Egypt to be represented separately in the Courts of France, here and elsewhere? That is the first question. Is that consistent with our Imperial interests? The second point is this: Is it consistent?—they really mean to run their show there without having outside advice, they are not sufficiently advanced for it. I quite agree with Lord Curzon they were overrun with minor officials and things which could be done very much better by Egyptians than by inferior Europeans, but there are certain things they cannot do, engineering for example, and finance. They want advice from outside. Well, now, are they to be at liberty to choose their advisers. Just see what that means. On the face of it, it looks as if they ought to have the right to have whom they like and pick the best man, but that is not the way to work. French interests will press them to take a French adviser; Italian interests and German interests, and other interests, perhaps American interests, will all be pressing to get their own particular man there. The moment you put the foreign outside advisers there our control over that country goes, and you get a hostile organisation which will make the difference between an Egypt working with you and an Egypt working in the interests of some other Power. Now, those are two vital considerations. You may say, if you don't allow them, you don't give them internal liberty; on the other hand, if you do, it will be fatal to Imperial interests; it might not be fatal in five, ten or twenty years, but ultimately it will be absolutely fatal. Then comes the third question. I am only

Three essential considerations in the question.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

giving these as three illustrations of the practical difficulties with which you are confronted. Take the question of a garrison; you have to protect your highway. It is a highway to Australia; it is a highway to the East. It is no use talking of Singapore if you cannot get to Singapore. You must get there, and it is no use having great fleets there if somebody here can do what the Turks did with the Dardanelles. It is really our trouble with the Dardanelles, but it is much more vital to us. The Dardanelles only locked the door to Russia and Roumania; that was very nearly fatal to us, but these are Dardanelles which lead to the whole of the East, and you were reckoning here the other day how long it would take the British fleet to get there, and the question of two or three weeks makes the whole difference to you. But if you have a Power here which might become hostile at any moment, which might be bought as the Turks were bought—they were bought with cash; the Turkish people did not want to quarrel with us. The Turks have said to me that they were amazed they were at war with us. Why did it happen? There were two or three leading Turks bought by Berlin with cash and promises of all sorts of positions. The same might happen here. You may have Egyptian Ministers bought, and the door is locked, and while we are arguing you are done in, and our interests in that part of the world are completely smashed, and you must begin again. Therefore comes the question, what about your garrison? This report says you may put it on the sands of the desert, on the brink of the Suez Canal. That is no use to you. Why should you plant your troops in a position of that impossible kind? Aden is bad enough, and it does not give you the necessary control. Those are three; there are others which will occur to other members of the Conference, but those are three very practical questions which go to the very root of the whole business, and upon those three things I do not think we should give way. That is my individual opinion. We are discussing this here; we are not putting the views of the British Cabinet, but we are each discussing our own individual view with a view to arriving at a Cabinet decision exactly as we did in the war. Some of us have advanced views, and some of us have not such advanced views.

Mr. Massey: I should like to say, Sir, that I agree thoroughly with the views you have put forward. New Zealand is not so much interested as Australia and India, but we are here not to look at the views of any particular part of the Empire, but to look at the positions of the Empire as a whole and to consider its interests. I am very glad that General Smuts and I are personal friends, for I am sorry to notice that we nearly always find ourselves of opposite opinions. I cannot help that. There must be a difference of opinion even in a comparatively small gathering like this. But in considering what has taken place I do not want to criticise adversely anything with which Lord Milner was connected, because I have a tremendously high opinion of Lord Milner. In listening to this discussion and reading the papers that have been supplied to us, I have been very forcibly reminded of a saying of a German writer in the early days of the war—I think it was Nietsche, but I am not positive, for one cannot remember these things or who is responsible for them, but whoever it was it attracted a good deal of attention. He said something like this, speaking from the German point of view, "To stab the British Empire to the heart we must get possession of Egypt and the Canal." That was as nearly as possible what was said, and a communication was sent to me a day or two ago in which there is another quotation from a German document to the effect that the Germans intended to establish themselves on both banks of the Suez Canal and so to cut the main artery through which circulates the life blood of the world, and particularly the British Empire. There is the whole position in a nutshell from an enemy point of view. It is the highway, the British, the Imperial, or, if you like to put it, the British Empire highway. It is the British Empire highway from the very heart of the Empire itself, where we are to-day, to India, to Australasia, to the whole of the Far East, and it is the way through which the ships of war would have to pass in the event of trouble in that part of the world, such as that we were considering a few days ago. To my mind it is exceedingly important. Whatever happens, there is no question about it that British interests must be protected with a people such as the people of Egypt. We cannot help remembering that under British control Egypt has made greater advancement and progress than it has done since the time of the Israelites. There is no question of that. I for one looked forward to a time when Egypt will be even far more prosperous than it is at the present moment. General Smuts says that we cannot pretend to govern these Eastern people and that we should not attempt it. That means that we have got to abandon the whole of

Egypt: the Highway of British Empire.

them. If we abandon them what is going to happen? The British Empire is at an end. That may not matter very much from certain points of view, but it would mean a great deal for the world if the British Empire came to an end. If we followed the doctrine expressed by General Smuts we should have chaos. It would put the clock of civilisation—I do not think there is any exaggeration about it—back for a thousand years. I hope it will never happen. I do not see the way out, but I do put it that in the interests of Britain and in the interests of humanity—I will put the interests of humanity first—that recommendation should not be given effect to in its entirety. To my mind it would be simply national and Imperial suicide, and so far as I am concerned—we are speaking confidentially now—I certainly will not be a party to it. We ought to be able to say, in the interests of the Empire, that we did what was right in connection with Egypt, and even more so, because I do not know of any country so important to the Empire as Egypt, with the exception of Britain itself. Even Australia and New Zealand might be parted with and the Empire would go on, but I do not think you could run the Empire without keeping control of the main artery, as stated by the German writer I have quoted. It is another of the legacies left to us by the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. I distrusted them at the time; my instincts were against them; I thought they would involve us in trouble and I was not disappointed. I am afraid we have not seen the last of them by a very long way. However, there may be a way out of it. Egypt.

Mr. Meighen: They know more than the Fourteen Points.

Mr. Massey: I believe they were the origin of a great deal of the trouble that has come to the British Empire and to the world since the signing of the Peace Treaty, and I do hope that some satisfactory way will be found out of what is taking place. I understand that Lord Curzon cannot make any recommendation until he meets those Egyptian representatives who are coming, or who are perhaps on their way now.

Lord Curzon: When you say I cannot make up my mind, I have a very clear idea of what I shall propose. I could circulate a draft to you conceding the main principle as we have already conceded it, but safeguarding all the points to which we attach importance. I have drawn it up and I have got it, but whether it will be accepted is a different thing.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think the Conference ought to see these proposals for discussion. I think it is really very important that when Lord Curzon meets these delegates he should go there armed with the general conclusions of the Empire upon that subject. I think it would be very desirable that Lord Curzon should circulate his proposals.

Lord Curzon: Would you like me to circulate them? That was my idea, and then I will put forward at the end the idea, suggested by Hayter, of a ten years' agreement on the assumption that we cannot get them to agree to anything on a permanent basis. I will circulate the two.

Mr. Massey: I did not mean that Lord Curzon could not make up his mind, because he is one of the men who can make up his mind. I am glad to be able to acknowledge it, but I think it is only right that before he says anything definite—confidential communication is a different thing—he must meet the men who are coming from Egypt.

Mr. Churchill: I really am responsible for the places next door to Egypt, namely, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and so my affairs are very much concerned with what goes on in Egypt. I was very shocked when I read about this in the papers last August, and the Prime Minister knows that I immediately sent off my protest and circulated it to my colleagues. At the same time I have always recognised that it was a fact that something had been done and that things could not be absolutely the same again after that publication had been made. Therefore I agreed to the Cabinet decision, and quite willingly, to tell the Egyptians that something would be substituted for the word "Protectorate," which was what they particularly disliked. Therefore I feel that the only thing that really lies before us now is the reserves which we must insist upon, and the Prime Minister stated with very great force several of those reserves. First of all, it would take more troops to protect the Canal if they were quartered along the Canal than it would take to keep order over the whole of Egypt and protect the Canal as well.

Necessary provisions to safeguard Empire's interests.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: And much more expense.

Location of Troops.

Mr. Churchill: If we put our troops in the desert along the Canal, leaving the country to stew in its own juice and to become a hotbed of internal and external intrigue, you would have to have other large forces, and you would be committed to heavy expenditure. Therefore the garrison we keep there, apart from the international aspect which Mr. Balfour dwelt upon, bearing in mind our responsibilities of protecting foreigners, will have to be kept in the great cities in Cairo, Alexandria and elsewhere. And the Egyptians ought to be told plainly that that is what we are going to do. Those garrisons are there not only for the purpose of protecting the Canal. If they were not there every other Power which has capitulation rights and felt its subjects were likely to be injured, would put their troops there. The withdrawal of British troops from the great cities in Egypt would not mean the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian soil; it would only mean that more foreign troops of various Powers would be put there in their place. We should probably be the only Power of importance that had not got a body of troops in Cairo for the purpose of protection. Therefore we must have our troops there.

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Curzon has to leave us now and the agenda concerns him. It is suggested that to-morrow morning at 11·30 we take the question of Anglo-French relations. That is a decision we shall have to take.

(Lord Curzon then left the Conference.)

Advisers to Egyptian Government.

Mr. Churchill: The Prime Minister spoke of a second point which I think you will see arises out of the prime military necessity and political necessity of keeping garrisons in Cairo and Alexandria. He spoke of the importance of not allowing the European advisers of the Egyptian Government to be picked freely by them from any nation they liked in the world, so that we might have hostile, intriguing people there who would be really working the machine against us. That is true from the point of view of their hostility, but also from the point of view of the efficiency of the Administration. I quite agree that the quality of the British administrative assistance given to Egypt has deteriorated in late years, and I think it is a subject which requires very careful investigation, why and how it can be improved, though it is absolutely certain that, unless you have a proportion—not such a large proportion as now—but a considerable proportion of authoritative advisers in the Egyptian Department of State under Egyptian Ministers (but still advisers whose advice is taken), unless you have a proportion of those, the country will relax and fall back from the point to which it has been raised—I do not say to the chaos and squalor of the days of Israel—but the cities will deteriorate, order will not be maintained and there will be discontent amongst the people, abuse and corruption will creep in on a large scale and then we will have real discontent amongst the people with violence, and troops will have to be brought in. You will have to keep your garrisons there until, at any rate, something like decent; orderly quasi-European administration has been set up. It would be a great mistake and a great danger; you would have all the responsibility for the country because you have to keep troops there. Otherwise, we shall see everything going to rack and ruin. It does seem to me wise to keep an element in the administration of advisers who will advise in the same way as they did in the days of Lord Cromer. Well, if you take these two very important points, you will see that we shall have to go rather on the lines we went on before the war, with such modifications as are possible in the growing advance of ideas. I do not say that we cannot do a great deal to meet Egyptian sentiment. I have been out there recently myself and I have thought a good deal about this, and certainly would not be afraid of reforms. It has only been a Protectorate and has always been a foreign country, and I do not myself see why we should not arrange our control of Egypt in the form which is most agreeable to them.

Mr. Meighen: What about representation in other capitals?

Representation in Foreign Capitals impossible.

Mr. Churchill: That we could not give. I am quite clear we could not give that. It would mean a centre of intrigue set up in every foreign capital. We could not possibly give that.

Mr. Massey: Has anything been done about the renewal of the lease of the Canal?

Mr. Churchill: It has only just been mooted in the most tentative way, but I have always considered myself that it is much better that the Canal should be more

or less vested ultimately in Egypt, than that Egypt should remain under British control. I always hope that that will be the ultimate thing. Egypt.

Mr. Massey: It would be a serious matter if the lease of the Canal came to an end and the British lost control.

Zaghloul's demand for evacuation of Soudan.

Mr. Churchill: It would be most fatal. Then another point that Zaghloul Pasha is insisting upon is that we should not only leave Egypt, holding on perhaps to the Canal, but that we should also give up the Sudan—that is the latest of his demands.

Mr. Balfour: That is sheer ignorance.

Mr. Churchill: Those tremendous regions which have been developed out of barbarism by British labour and money—that is another thing we have to make perfectly clear that we cannot put up with. Of course, I regret very much indeed that the handling of this matter at the outset was such as to set up a wrong ideal before the people of Egypt. The great ideal we wish to set up for the British Empire is the family of self-governing Dominions, all perfectly autonomous in everything that concerns themselves, but co-operating freely within the circle of the British Empire. That is the great conception, that is the conception which has animated Mr. Montagu and the British statesmen who have been concerned with the reforms in India—the idea of great self-governing Dominions.

Mr. Massey: A family of nations.

Mr. Churchill: Yes, and here in regard to Egypt we have diverged. We have put up a different kind of ideal altogether—that I regret most profoundly. Still, having gone so far on that road, I think we can now only really insist upon these vital securities, namely, garrisons, the foreign policy and such reasonable share in the administration as will secure efficiency and which will so far be a safeguard against inefficiency and the maintenance of the Sudan under British authority. This seems to me the very, very least that we can stand upon. I am pretty sure that Aldi Pasha and his Delegation will not be able to agree to this. If they did agree, I am perfectly certain that they would be repudiated violently by Zaghloul, who is certain to strike them down when they get back. I do beg and pray before this most important discussion begins, in which the Foreign Secretary will be concerned, that we should have a perfectly definite view of what are the vital points; it is not a matter of mere convenience or profits, it is a matter of the actual vital existence of the structure of the British Empire. It is only through this Canal that the British fleet can reach the stations where it can protect or come to the aid of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific in their hour of peril, and it is in Egypt naturally where there would be garrisons of British troops needed to reinforce any part of the Middle East. It is in Egypt that you naturally put your wireless station and aviation. It is the Clapham Junction—it has been described as the strategic Clapham Junction of the British Empire, and we really cannot afford at the end of a war, where we have struck down the most powerful Empire in the world, the Germans, the Austrians and the Turks, we really cannot afford to let ourselves be pushed out of our position in Egypt by the continuance of local agitations. With every desire to meet the wishes of the Egyptians, I do hope the Conference will stand very, very firmly on these essential points.

Egypt essential to Empire.

Mr. Meighen: I do not understand one statement you made, Mr. Churchill. You say it has been the development of self-governing nations and that you regret we diverged from that path in the case of Egypt. Your argument is one with which I fully agree; your regret is that we are unable to proceed in Egypt on that path at all.

Mr. Churchill: Now, I quite agree.

Mr. Meighen: We never should have undertaken to do so.

Mr. Churchill: I do not make myself clear. Of course, one had the idea that Egypt would be included in the British Empire, and, so included in the British Empire, would gradually attain the full Dominion status, but instead of that she has diverged on to a path which is inconsistent with her being in the British Empire, and they are being taught there that nothing matters as long as you can say: "We are outside the British Empire." That I very much regret, and I very much regret the report which was published should have, as it were, indicated that we should agree and approve of that, because after all, we had to declare a Protectorate. We had been round the Powers of Europe and received assent from all our Allies, from

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

France, the United States of America and from Belgium, we had received their agreement to the effect that it was incorporated in the British Empire; that is what I mean by getting on the wrong line, but I do not think you can avoid taking to some extent the position that it is an independent country, though we hope to bring it back in the course of time within the orbit.

Mr. Meighen: Your opinion in a word is that it is to our vital interest as an Empire that we do have a Protectorate there, but that we call it something else.

Mr. Churchill: Yes, exactly. That is much better put.

Lord Milner's opinion.

Mr. Balfour: I am afraid I ought to add, for what it is worth, Lord Milner's strong opinion—you see we have discussed this with him, and he knows quite well what dismay and anxiety his ex-colleagues have seen in his report, but he has maintained quite steadily both in the Cabinet and to me, and no doubt to everybody else in private conversations, that he does not believe that the Egyptians want to sever their relations with the British Empire, that they are all too perfectly conscious that they cannot stand alone, that they all are quite aware that they must have advisers, without which we think they cannot possibly get on, and that those advisers must be British advisers. Of course, if Lord Milner is right, the task we have with the deputation ought to be less serious than the tenor of the conversations to-day across this table would lead one to fear. I am afraid that I have always thought Lord Milner sanguine on the point. He knows a great deal about it, and he holds the opinion with very, very great vehemence, and that fact ought to be known to my colleagues.

Mr. Massey: He had that in his mind when he wrote the report.

Mr. Balfour: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: The moment they are permitted to take up advisers outside the British Empire they would get into the hands of those advisers, and their intentions would evaporate. Lord Curzon has promised to submit definite proposals to the Conference.

Mr. Hughes: Before he sees them?

Mr. Lloyd George: Before he sees them. I do not think it would do for him to go there without a clear idea of what his objective is, and when these are circulated we can fix the discussion upon that, and see whether we agree upon those lines. To-morrow we will take the Anglo-French relations at 11·30.

Mr. Massey: No report of this will go out.

Mr. Lloyd George: This is the report:—

"Lord Curzon in an introductory statement briefly reviewed the history of British relations with Egypt, dwelling upon the importance of Egypt in the war, and concluding with the circumstances attending the despatch of the Milner Mission to Egypt and the publication of the Milner Report. The discussion was then opened by Mr. Hughes, and continued by Mr. Meighen, General Smuts, Mr. Massey, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Balfour and the Prime Minister. It was decided that the proposals for meeting Egyptian national aspirations and safeguarding Imperial interests now under consideration by the British Government should be discussed in detail at a later date by the Dominion Ministers and Representatives of India with a view to the arrival of the Egyptian Delegation now on its way to England."

Mr. Hughes: I think that is sufficiently ambiguous.

(The Proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 6, 1921.

C 62049 Mr. Meighen

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SECRET.

PROOF.

E. 17th Meeting.

2nd Revise No 2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Lord Curzon: It was only yesterday afternoon that I was asked to be ready to take up the question of Egypt to-day, and, very busily occupied as I have been all yesterday afternoon and all this morning, I must be pardoned if I have not had the time to put the narrative and the exposition in as complete a form as I should otherwise have liked.

Difficulty of Egyptian Problem.

I think you will find, when I have stated the case, that the Egyptian tangle is about the worst of all those we have had before us, and I am doubtful if anything I may say will lead you to think that a practical solution is in sight. In order to understand the present position I must say a word or two, although my retrospect will be as brief as possible, about the circumstances which have led up to it.

Arabi Rebellion.

It is now over forty years ago since we went into Egypt to suppress the Arabi rebellion and found ourselves insensibly committed to something like an occupation of the country. In the years following the Arabi rebellion it was the deliberate and avowed policy of our Government to evacuate Egypt as soon as we could. That policy was frequently expressed by Lord Salisbury. It took the form of a Convention which Sir Henry Drummond Wolff went out to Egypt to negotiate, and it was only owing to the innuence of France, most unwisely exercised in her own interests, that the Sultan of Turkey was induced to refuse his signature to that agreement. Had he given it at that time we should have been out of Egypt long before now. Whether we should have had to go back again is, of course, another question.

1888—1914.

Then ensued a period of a quarter of a century, from 1888 to 1914, the outbreak of the war, in which Egypt was a more or less autonomous nation existing under the suzerainty of Turkey, ruled by a Khedive and a Council of Ministers and with an Egyptian Legislative Assembly in the background. The British Government for that quarter of a century was represented by an official who had no higher rank than that of Agent and Consul-General. Indeed, his diplomatic status was not higher than that of the representatives of the other European Powers who were at Cairo. But little by little a gradual change in the situation took place, due to many causes. Firstly, to the presence of our army of occupation necessary for the preservation of order and the security of the country; secondly, the obligation that fell upon us to recover the Soudan; thirdly, the existence of very wide-spread and powerful British interests in the country; and, lastly, the personality of Lord Cromer himself—a man who with that remarkable administrative gift, with that genius for ruling an Oriental country, could not fail, apart from all the other conditions I have named, insensibly to draw all the strings into his own hands. Thus at the end of this period, or at any rate up to the time of Lord Cromer's death, Egypt came to be regarded almost as a British possession. Certainly it was a country in which the British point of view and British interest were very much in the ascendant. Meanwhile, and particularly after Lord Cromer had gone (because after his disappearance from the scene a number of other men unfit to wield the bow of Ulysses succeeded him), a number of influences began to be felt which were secretly eating away at the heart of our position. For instance, we began, hardly noticed at the time, to increase the figures, which afterwards became excessive, and in my opinion dangerous, of British officials in the country, and there can be no doubt about it that the immense and exaggerated number of these officials, the quality of whom appears to have deteriorated as time went on, was largely responsible for the rising that afterwards took place. Another tendency manifested itself, and that was, as you increase the numbers of your British-official population in an Asiatic country they tend not to draw closer to the people but to draw away from them. They become a colony by themselves, living apart, with their own sports, their own interests, their own life, and as we have seen in some parts of India (but less there than in Egypt, because they are more scattered), so did the British colony in Egypt tend to pursue a life of its own, divorced from Egyptian sentiment and habits. We had another failure in Egypt which is a little difficult to analyse but which I think is undoubted, and that was in our educational policy. It had in some respects the same sort of result as our education had in India; that is to say, taking a number of sharp, clever young men, all aspiring to fill Government posts which were not there to be filled, and, in so far as they failed in their aspirations, drifting into a backwater of sullen discontent. All these causes were at work, and meanwhile, the restraining hand of Lord Cromer having been removed, the then Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who at no time was a satisfactory or loyal person, was persistently intriguing against us.

Failure of Educational Policy.

Situation on Outbreak of War, 1914.

I now come to the conditions at the outbreak of war. When in the autumn of 1914 we found ourselves at war with Turkey, it became necessary, owing to the fact that Egypt was nominally subject to the Sultan, to regularise the position there.

Egypt.

Mr. Asquith's Government was then in power; the present Prime Minister was a Member of his Government, and he will recollect that the question was debated by that Government as to whether the better policy would be to annex Egypt straight away or to declare a British Protectorate. For reasons into which I need not enter, but with which I am entirely in accord, it was decided to take the latter of these courses and to declare a Protectorate. Thus in September 1914, the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who had openly associated himself with our enemies, was deposed, and one of his uncles, Prince Hussein Kamal, a gentleman of character and integrity and very loyal to us, was put upon the throne with the title of Sultan, and in the proclamation which was issued declaring the change of status, we laid down that Egypt was placed under the protection of His Majesty and would thenceforth constitute a British Protectorate.

Egypt as a British Protectorate.

We did that in perfect good faith, but with, I think, exaggerated innocence. For instance, we did not take the trouble to explain to the Egyptians exactly what a Protectorate meant. We are so used to Protectorates in a hundred different forms in different parts of the world that we did not bother to explain what was the kind of Protectorate we were setting up in Egypt. On the other hand, the word itself, as you well know, can have an invidious connotation. In one extreme it may mean a gentle and necessary supervision of the external and internal policy of a country. At the other extreme it may mean that under the guise of a Protectorate it is really ruled by British hands and controlled by British guns. We did not explain to the Egyptians exactly what we meant, and undoubtedly there existed in many of their minds the impression, not altogether unreasonable, that this Protectorate had been declared for the purposes of the war only, and that when the war was over we should revert to our older position, that we should remember our old promises as to evacuation, and that some change in the position in Egypt, favourable to the aspirations of the natives, might be expected to ensue. That was the position, I think, at the outbreak of the war. When it began, we said, quite rightly, that we did not expect Egypt to take her part on the fighting front, and that we would make ourselves responsible, as we did, for the defence and protection of her frontiers; but, although we did not ask her to contribute soldiers, we did ask her, and with very profitable results, to make an indirect contribution to the war. This was at once a source of strength to us, and of discord among the people. I need not enter into the actual position that Egypt occupied in the war.

The Dominion Ministers here will recall very well that it became a kind of Clapham Junction through which their soldiers passed to and fro, and where they spent many months. The Ministers will recall, too, our successful attempts to throw back a Turkish invasion of Egypt on the Suez Canal.

Egyptian Internal situation during the War.

I pass away from that to the internal symptoms that were largely responsible for what followed. Mr. Balfour rightly reminds me that it was a labour question. We recruited in Egypt what was called the Egyptian Labour Camel Transport Corps. These men were well paid, and, if the scheme had remained as originally conceived and carried out, it would have been all right, but the levying of this Corps fell into the hands of the local Egyptian officials, the village officials known as "Omdehs," and these men, freed from the control of their British superiors, who had all been drafted away to the war in one capacity or another, pursued methods of corruption, of oppression, even of cruelty, recalling the old days of the Press Gang in this country. At the same time, another source of trouble was the requisition of cereals and animals and the collection for the Red Cross Fund—all of them innocent themselves and right and proper in their inception, but gradually drifting in the hands of the native agents into engines of oppression upon the people. Simultaneously, Egypt found herself confronted, as almost all the other countries involved in the war, in a great rise in prices, which weighed heavily upon the population. Thus, all the while, almost unknown to us here and really either unobserved or insufficiently observed by our people who were working in the country, a state of affairs was growing up that presaged trouble. In 1917 the Sultan Hussein, of whom I have spoken, unfortunately died, and we then had to put up in his place the only available candidate, his brother, the present Sultan, whose name is Fuad, who had been educated abroad, was not in very close touch with Egyptian sentiment, and neither in character nor ability could be compared with his brother.

Situation at time of Armistice.

In 1918 the war came to an end. With the termination of the war a new cause of political discontent emerged. President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the ideals for which he fought at Paris had a wide repercussion in all Oriental countries, and not least, I think, and perhaps, in view of the history I have put before you, most of all in Egypt itself. In November 1918, just at the time of the armistice, a

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

declaration, for which Lord Robert Cecil was responsible, was drawn up and issued by the British and French Governments, mainly with reference to Syria and Mesopotamia, but laying down in language of great clearness that our policy was the enfranchisement of the various people who had been liberated by our arms from the yoke of the Turks and the institution in those areas of forms of National Government.

Well, when the Egyptians, who look upon themselves as in the very front files of civilisation and who trace their history back to thousands of years, found that the Arabs and other people who had been involved in the war were proposing to get some form of self-government of their own, they began to think very poorly of the situation in which they still found themselves under the Protectorate, and were to be denied conditions which were to be given to their much more backward brothers. This was the position at the end of 1918; then a man named Zaghloul Pasha, who had himself been Minister of one or other of the Egyptian Ministries—a somewhat discontented man and up to that time a man of no great political position or reputation—began to organise the Nationalist Party. He called upon our then High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, and presented to him claims that involved complete autonomy for Egypt, and he expressed his desire to come to London to put forward this programme before the British Government. Simultaneously, the then Prime Minister of Egypt, Rushdi Pasha, and one of his colleagues, Adli Pasha, of whom I will say more in a moment, expressed a desire also to come to London. Their suggestion reached London just before Mr. Balfour, who was then Foreign Minister, was going to Paris for the Conference, and, not unnaturally, he represented that the moment was an unfavourable one to receive them, but that he hoped to receive them a little later on. The Egyptian Party—the Nationalist Party—have always represented that as a great error of judgment on our part. It is easy, in the light of subsequent events, to indicate that a different answer might have been returned, but, in the circumstances, it was very difficult to give them another answer, and a little later, when the suggestion that they should be asked to come to England was renewed, Rushdi and Adli, having by this time got more into the hands of the extremists than before, laid down as a condition of their invitation that the other people—Zaghloul Pasha and his friends—should come with them and be received too. This invitation again, rightly or wrongly, we declined. We said we should be very glad to see the Ministers at any time, but we could not, in view of our position, contemplate receiving a man whose views were so utterly inconsistent with the whole principles of our position in Egypt. Thereupon, Zaghloul Pasha and his men raised the flag of revolt. They went with a delegation to the Sultan, Sultan Fuad, and used most menacing language to him, and our then representative in Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, being in England, Sir Milne Cheetham recommended, in the interests of order, that these men should be ordered to leave the country. His advice was accepted by us here—I was then acting at the Foreign Office—and they were removed to Malta. This was the final spark that kindled the flame.

Zaghloul Pasha.

Mr. Hughes : When was that?

Revolt in Spring of 1919.

Lord Curzon : In March 1919. Then ensued the rising in Egypt, of which you have all read, taking our people there and here almost entirely by surprise, on a scale almost unparalleled in ferocity and accompanied by looting, pillage, and the murder of British soldiers; in fact, an open revolt, and the serious part of it was not merely the incidents by which it was accompanied, but the fact that it permeated all classes, and that, for the first time in that quarter of a century of our connection with Egypt, which I just now referred to, the Fellahin for whom we had done so much to raise, whom Lord Cromer had by his successful policy brought into a condition of what we thought was permanent friendship with ourselves, were involved. It was not only a question of Moslem against Christian, but all classes of people, including for the first time, at any rate, in recent history, the Coptic community. Just at that time, Sir Reginald Wingate being in England, Lord Allenby, fresh from his triumphs in the East and at that time Commander-in-chief of the British Forces in Egypt and Palestine, went to Paris where the Conference was sitting. By common consent of all of us, it was thought desirable to invite him to return to Egypt as High Commissioner with full powers, military and civil, to deal with this perilous situation in the manner that he thought best. He arrived at Cairo in the concluding days of March 1919. His first step was to reverse the policy that had been pursued and to bring back Zaghloul Pasha and his friends from Malta. Whether that decision was right or wrong, I have often puzzled myself to think. On the one hand, it was a generous

Lord Allenby appointed High Commissioner.

Egypt.

concession, and it might have been held at that moment to be the sign of a desire to calm the spirits agitated by this terrible rising. On the other hand, it could be argued that this was a sign of weakness on our part, of which the Nationalist Party was certain to take advantage. However that may be, they certainly did take advantage of it—they certainly did. Zaghloul Pasha and his three friends, released from Malta, at once transferred themselves to Paris, where they had large funds at their disposal, and entertaining on a considerable scale, they tried unavailingly to get the sympathy of the Conference then sitting in Paris.

It was clearly necessary for us, and such was the advice of Lord Allenby, to take some special step, both to enquire into the cause of the outbreak and to place things for the future on a better footing. The man of all others marked out by his experience and reputation for dealing with difficulties, was one of our own colleagues—I mean Lord Milner. He, at that time, was Secretary of State for the Colonies, and his early fame had been made in Egypt more than a quarter of a century before. His book on Egypt is still a classical work on the administration of that country. Accordingly, we decided to send out a special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner for the purpose that I have described. Various conditions, into which I need not enter, rendered it difficult to send out the Mission in the summer of 1919, and it was not until the winter—in the latter part of the winter—that he and his colleagues (whom we selected as the men best suited), most of them of Egyptian experience, and all representing the liberal point of view, started from this country. It was not until December that they went out. When they arrived in Cairo they met with organised antagonism from Zaghloul and his friends, carried out with all their resources of boycotting, picketing and the like, by the Nationalist Party. Lord Milner and his colleagues conducted themselves with admirable composure. Although none of the prominent Egyptians were allowed officially to see them; although when any of them went about in the country to make enquiries, they were dogged and followed from place to place, and every effort was made to keep people away from them; nevertheless, in private conversations in private places with leading men, they collected an immense amount of valuable information, and arrived at a general *précis*. This they embodied in a kind of preliminary report which they sent home to us, but all the while they did not come into contact with Zaghloul himself, who remained in Paris. Accordingly, when Lord Milner came back to this country, and in his anxiety, before he framed his final Report, to get some idea of what the extremists desired, he invited Zaghloul and his friends—not in an official, but in a private capacity as representing an important section of Egyptian opinion—to come over and see him in London. Conversations took place between Lord Milner's Mission and these gentlemen in London in the summer of 1919, and by the month of August certain tentative conclusions had been arrived at between them.

Lord Milner's Mission.

Mr. Hughes : Before Lord Milner went out?

Lord Curzon : No, this was after Lord Milner came back in March—these gentlemen came here in June.

Mr. Hughes : You said 1919.

Lord Curzon : I beg pardon, 1920. I made a mistake, they came here in 1920. The conversations lasted until August 1920, and then this tentative agreement was arrived at. I ought to say in fairness to the Cabinet, that they knew nothing of what was going on. Lord Milner had undertaken these conversations on his own responsibility in private, and I, myself, as Foreign Secretary, had only the dimmest idea of what was going on, and I was a good deal surprised when I saw the conclusions in the form they ultimately assumed. However, in the month of August this tentative agreement having been arrived at, Zaghloul undertook to send back some of his friends to Cairo in order to receive a favourable reception. I need hardly say that they took advantage of the occasion to publish it in the papers without authority, and from that moment, the matter having been made public, we ourselves had to take cognisance of it, and I am bound to say that it began to be regarded, not as the pronouncement of Lord Milner and colleagues only, but that of His Majesty's Government. Probably you have had the Report.

Mr. Hughes : Did Zaghloul's arrival in Cairo precede the Report of Lord Milner to the British Government.

Lord Curzon : Zaghloul himself did not go back to Cairo, he remained in Paris. He sent back his principal friends to Cairo in order to secure—as they did secure—a favourable report for the tentative conclusions. Broadly speaking, what Lord Milner proposed in this arrangement was that, for the relationship of a Protectorate

Lord Milner's proposals.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

for Egypt, there should be substituted a Constitution, by means of a Treaty between Egypt and Great Britain, under which Britain would recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions; and Egypt would confer upon Great Britain such rights as were necessary to safeguard her special interests, and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights. In the course of the same draft agreement, Lord Milner, advancing somewhat from the position he had taken while in Egypt, agreed, in order to meet the demands of Zaghloul Pasha and his friends, to hand over to Egypt the control of their foreign affairs, and the right of representation in foreign countries.

He also agreed, while providing for the maintenance of a British force in Egypt, that it should not be located in any of the capital cities where its presence was alleged to be a cause of offence, but that being kept there because of the central Imperial position of Egypt which necessitates the safeguarding of the Canal, the British forces should be maintained somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Canal itself. He further proposed that our British control of the administration should only survive in the form of the appointment of a number of rather shadowy officials whose relations with the native Government were left somewhat obscure, and he trusted to British interests being maintained in Egypt in the future by the paramount position of the High Commissioner who would continue to represent this country there, but who would apparently have to rely on the prestige of his personality and his position for the influence that he might exercise rather than, as hitherto, upon any definite show of force. That is a very brief and necessarily condensed and perhaps not altogether complete summary of the proposals made by Lord Milner. It was at this stage that the matter came before the Cabinet here, and papers were written upon the matter by myself and some of my colleagues in which we pointed out what we thought in some respects the weakness or the drawbacks of the position. I remember more particularly laying stress—and here I think I had the support of almost all if not all of my colleagues—upon the very doubtful provision about British troops, the proposal to concentrate them in some area removed from the great cities, and I remember pointing out that such a position seemed to me to be a source of great weakness and danger in the future. Also I was not quite reassured about the proposals on foreign affairs or the position of the judicial and financial advisers, who were to remain Europeans under the new régime, and I argued that it was necessary to lay down, if anything like this scheme was adopted, that no foreigner should be admitted into the military or civil service of the Egyptian Government except with our consent, in other words, that in the interests both of the very large staff of Englishmen serving there now, and in the interests of the future management of affairs, if we were to maintain any influence at all, we should not allow an opening for Frenchmen and Italians, and people of that sort, to overrun the Administration. Lord Allenby, who was over in England at the time, took substantially the same view as I did, but he held very strongly to the position, Lord Milner having reported, his report having been made public, and the Egyptian people finding it impossible to believe that anything that came under Lord Milner's name could not be the view of the British Government, that it was impossible to go back from the broad principles of the policy recommended by Lord Milner, although he thought in those points I have mentioned, and some others, that we should be at liberty and we ought to insist upon conditions that guaranteed our position and rights in Egypt more effectively than some of Lord Milner's proposals had done. He then went back to Egypt, and at his instance, with a view to starting matters on the next stage, the Cabinet on the 22nd February sent a telegram to Lord Allenby for publication in Egypt. It was also published here. It communicated the broad lines on which we were prepared to proceed. I will read this declaration if I may: "His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a delegation, nominated by the Sultan, with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people."

View of the Government on Lord Milner's Proposals.

Lord Allenby's views.

Government's Declaration.

The meeting will see that that was a tremendous concession to Egyptian sentiment because it did promise that for the conditions of the Protectorate existing since 1914 there should be substituted Treaty relations, creating some form of

Egypt.

independence for the Egyptian people. On the other hand, in all other respects, we retained—and this was publicly stated—entire liberty when the delegation came over here to lay down and even to insist upon such conditions as we might think necessary, the Egyptian Delegation, of course, retaining equal liberty when it came over here to make any other proposals outside the strict lines of the report which it might find desirable to put forward. In other words, within the confines of the broad principles I have enunciated, both parties retained their liberty for the impending discussion. These communications having been made to the Egyptian Government and having been received with great gratitude and enthusiasm in Egypt, it then became necessary to take steps for the constitution of the official Egyptian delegation that had to come over here and conclude the new Treaty with us. The Sultan had always been promised that such a delegation should come. We exercised no sort of pressure in its constitution. We asked the Egyptian Government to send whom they pleased. The existing Ministry, which had been a mere stop-gap Ministry in Egypt, disappeared from the scene and was replaced by Adli Pasha, one of the gentlemen who had been engaged over here in the negotiations with Lord Milner. He is the present Prime Minister and he at once took steps to constitute the Delegation, to nominate its members and to give indications as to the programme. At this moment Zaghloul, the evil spirit in the whole discussion, returned to Egypt. He met with a great reception from the people; he was greeted with an ovation like that of some great military conqueror, and in the early stages after his return, he addressed himself, apparently, to an attempt at friendly co-ordination with Adli's Ministry. There was every hope for a week or two that the two would combine and that the Delegation would represent all parties. However, whether it was inspired by vanity, as is alleged by his critics, by a kind of megalomania from which it is well known that he suffers, or from jealously of Adli Pasha, whom he cordially dislikes, or from a feeling that by standing out altogether he could get the best terms and become the first ruler, he broke with the Prime Minister and started a campaign of his own. He went about the country making a series of speeches which would even excite the admiration of a Sinn Feiner, and finally owing to his harangues, a state of affairs was produced which culminated in serious disorders in Cairo and riots of the most terrible description in Alexandria, commencing with a squabble between Moslems and Greeks, which ended in an anti-European outburst in which many lives—forty I think—were lost and I think some hundreds were wounded.

Constitution of Egyptian Delegation to discuss situation.

Riots—May, 1921.

Mr. Hughes: When was this?

Lord Curzon: That was in May 1921, and the situation was only re-established by the appearance of British troops upon the scene. The native police and the Egyptian army who were first called upon, were quite inadequate to deal with the situation, and it was only restored by British troops. That is the position up till the last few weeks. Adli Pasha with his mission is now on the seas. They will be here at the end of this week. Zaghloul and his friends are carrying on this dangerous and bitter campaign in Egypt, and I think there can be little doubt, from all we hear from them, that Zaghloul is out to destroy Adli, to defeat any arrangements that might be concluded between Adli and us here, and very likely in the long run to unseat the present Sultan from his position on the throne. Now we have arrived at this point that we have to consider what we are to do. Can we secure an agreement here, and if we do secure an agreement here, will it be accepted in Egypt, and by acceptance in Egypt, I mean acceptance by a legislative assembly or a national assembly convened for the purpose of discussing and ratifying the arrangement, because that is one of the promises that have been made. Can we hope to do that? It is difficult to answer these questions with any confidence. I am not confident that we can conclude an agreement, that is to say, I have no doubt that we can draw up an agreement which will broadly conform with Lord Milner's principles, and will safeguard all the points in which our interests are concerned and the interests of other parties. I can give you a draft of such an agreement. I do not know whether Adli Pasha would accept it. I am afraid that, however reasonable it might be, he is so terribly afraid—he is rather a timid man—of Zaghloul and the reception he would meet with on his return, that he would find it difficult to accept an agreement. If he did accept, and I believe my colleagues agree, I am very doubtful of the reception it would meet with on his return. Now you may say to me, "If that is the position, whether you conclude your Treaty or not, supposing it ultimately to break down, what is the alternative?" There are some

Difficulty of present situation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

who would say: "We have done our best, we have been generous, we have abolished the Protectorate, we have declared our willingness to set up reasonable guarantees, and they will not have it. Upon their heads be it. We must revert to the *status quo ante*. Why should we not go back to the temporary Government and good administration and the many benefits of the Cromer régime?" I must tell you quite frankly that I believe that to be wholly impossible.

General Smuts: That is to abolish the Protectorate and go back to the *status quo ante*?

View of Lord Allenby.

Lord Curzon: Yes, to go back to the *status quo ante*. I believe that to be quite impossible and that is the view taken by Lord Allenby himself. I will just read a few lines from a despatch that came from him quite a short time ago. He said—

> "Western ideas of autonomy and self-government, not to speak of independence, to which the great war gave so considerable an impetus, have gained too strong a hold on all sections of the community in Egypt for it to be possible for us to return to old-time methods, or to look to the administrative devices created by Lord Cromer for precedence to guide us in our future action. The opinion of such leaders as Zaghloul has entered too deeply into the imagination of the people of Egypt to render any such solution of the problem possible."
>
> I have on many occasions emphasised to your Lordship that the memorandum published in Egypt in August last has come to be regarded, whatever the real intentions of His Majesty's Government, as a substantive offer; and that any wide departure from the main principles of the settlement which that memoranda advocates would be regarded as a breach of faith, not only in Egypt itself, but by world opinion at large."

I could elaborate it if required, but I think I have said sufficient to give you an idea of the position. During the last day or two, however, there has come to me a paper which I would like to circulate to the Conference. It was only seen by myself a day or two ago. It emanates from Sir William Hayter, who is the legal adviser in one of the Egyptian Administrations. It is a very able and prudent paper. It takes the line of accepting the principles of the Milner Report, while holding that many of the suggestions of Lord Milner are inapplicable or out of date; and it concludes with the suggestion, for which there is a good deal to be said, which is favoured by Lord Allenby in his covering despatch, and which we in the Foreign Office are rather favourably inclined towards, namely, that viewing the apparent impossibility of concluding a permanent definite agreement now which would be accepted by both parties, what we should do is to conclude a temporary *modus vivendi* to last for a period of ten years, and to be replaced, as I hope under happier conditions, at the end of that time by some more permanent arrangement. You must remember that although I talked about Egypt as being in the hands of the Zaghloul group, as it apparently is, although if you count heads, there are 90 per cent. of the population that would follow him into any polling booth which he asked them to enter, yet in the background there are many sensible men who are afraid of our going out altogether, and leaving them to the tender mercies of the Extreme Nationalist Party; and the views of these people have been greatly affected by what happened in Alexandria, just as foreign Powers have been. We have been talking about abolishing the Capitulations and setting up new Courts in their place, but you can understand that when the Greek, Frenchman and Italian is subject to being shot down in the streets of Alexandria without provocation, he will require better protection, and if a garrison is not there to protect him, he will put in his garrison himself. All these questions are having great weight upon Egyptian opinion, and I only mention this because I think myself that, while adhering to the policy with regard to the Protectorate from which we cannot depart, and while considering the idea of constructing a Treaty with the Egyptian people and giving them independence, we should like an interval to elapse during which we had some provisional *modus vivendi* to tide us over to a better time. I should better be able to explain this if I could circulate these papers, and if the Prime Minister agrees, I would do that, and would include one or two despatches from Lord Allenby on the subject. The whole matter is very complicated, but I have tried in an unpretentious way to give an account of the situation.

Sir W. Hayter's suggestion.

Moderate Egyptian opinion.

Egypt.

Mr. Lloyd George: Now for discussion. Are you ready to start?

Mr. Meighen: No.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes, are you prepared to go on?

Voice of Dominions in Empire's Foreign Policy.

Mr. Hughes: I feel myself ill-equipped to offer any useful contribution to the discussion. The subject is so complex. I come to it wholly unprepared either by previous study or knowledge of the facts that have led to what is a most extraordinary and lamentable position, but since you invite us to offer our opinions, there are just one or two observations I would like to make. First, let me say a word or two on a point that crops up continually here, and which we hope yet to decide. I refer to the adoption of a principle and the establishment of some machinery by which the foreign policy of the Empire might be guided by the representatives of Great Britain, the self-governing Dominions, and India. This case has demonstrated in convincing fashion the urgent need for action in this direction. For not only were we not informed beforehand, but we were not even informed after it had happened. The position, as revealed by Lord Curzon to-day, comes to me with something of a shock. I have had no communication from the Colonial Office or direct from you, Sir, with reference to the actual position in Egypt. I saw in a newspaper some time ago a statement to the effect that it was proposed to adopt Lord Milner's report. That is the first hint I had of anything being contemplated. I presume that the world at large learned of it at the same time.

Mr. Lloyd George: We have not decided yet.

Mr. Hughes: No, that is quite right, but I did not even know what the recommendation of the Milner Commission was. Shortly after the appearance of the paragraph to which I have referred a question was asked in the House of Lords. Lord Curzon, in reply, said that the report had been received, but it had not been considered by the Government.

Importance of Egypt with regard to the Empire.

A short statement appeared under this news item intimating that the report involved complete autonomy for Egypt. I at once sent you, Sir, a telegram saying that I was much concerned about the report; that I should be glad to be informed of the position; that I regarded the Egyptian question as one of vital importance, not only to Britain, but to the whole of the Empire, and that, as Egypt was the gateway to the East, and so to Australia, that nothing should be done without full consultation with the Dominions. I may perhaps be accused of taking a narrow and biassed view, but it appeared to me that this question affected the national safety of Australia, and for that and other reasons I was frankly alarmed at the position set out in the brief press summary, and altogether opposed to the adoption of the Milner report.

We have now heard the matter sufficiently amplified by Lord Curzon. We know where we are. Lord Curzon has shown us clearly how the present position arose. I confess that it disturbs me greatly. It would be well if we could see our way to get out by the way we went in. But on the face of it this does not seem possible. The original cause of all this undoubtedly lies in President Wilson's Fourteen Points; that glittering phrase "self-determination," which he originated, is responsible for this and much more. Reference has been made to the discussion which took place with the Egyptian delegates in 1918. General Smuts was here at the time, and he will correct me if I am wrong, but I have no recollection of this question being discussed or even mentioned at any meeting of the Imperial Cabinet. General Smuts might be considered at that time a member of the British Government, and so information denied to us might be accessible to him, but, so far as the Imperial Cabinet is concerned, I do not remember the matter being mentioned. Similarly in Paris there was nothing made known to us except the fact that the Egyptian delegates were in Paris while we were there. I know nothing of Lord Cecil's note to Lord Allenby, which, as it were, closed the door to any attempt to get out by the same way as we went in.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think it right to say about that that it was done without my knowledge. Mr. Balfour was then the Foreign Secretary. He and I were in Paris, and we knew nothing at all about it, and the French Foreign Office did exactly the same thing, and M. Clemenceau knew nothing about it until we came to a talk regarding it, and he said he was certain that nothing of the kind had been done; but it was done, and that is why Lord Robert Cecil said what he did without consulting anybody.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, that is so, but it is clear that a serious position has been created which affects us all. Anything that menaces the canal and British prestige in Egypt—or in any of those territories which are, as it were, the hinterland of the canal—affects the whole of the Empire vitally. Now we are asked to say what we are going to do. First, I want to say how much I regret that what has been done has been done, and to express the hope that we shall learn wisdom from what has happened, and devise means to prevent the recurrence of proceedings of this character, which might lead to equally or still more disastrous results. It has been stated in definite terms by Lord Curzon that, even if we granted all that Lord Milner recommended, it would still leave us in opposition to Zaghloul, and we should have opposed to us all those varied elements that make up, we are told, 90 per cent. of the population.

So, then, here is a remedy which, while disastrous to us, is going to be unacceptable to the greater bulk of the Egyptian people. Having made a concession which is the utmost that we can make, which we ought never to have dreamed of making which, if made, will imperil Australia and the whole Empire; which, if we make, we make with the full knowledge, or at least with every prospect, of its being unacceptable to the great bulk of the people. Having made it, we can never recede from it; we shall always have to give a little more and a little more, in order that we may placate the implacable. How can we safeguard our interests? What guarantee is it proposed to exact in regard to our interests in Egypt that can be satisfactory? Speaking as a civilian, I think it impossible to hold the canal with troops confined solely to the canal zone, with the hinterland popled by a population bitterly hostile.

Lord Curzon: I think Mr. Hughes is pushing it rather too far when he says that the population are bitterly hostile. The population of the country are united in their demands for political independence, but they have no idea what it means.

Method of protecting Empire's interests.

Mr. Hughes: I do not say they have, but there is no smoke without fire. You have said that nothing we can do will placate Zaghloul. Is he, then, merely animated by this desire for political independence? May it not be that he has some other design, that perhaps behind him are some other influences? In any case, no one will contend for a moment that we shall be, if we concede what is demanded or even what the Milner report proposes, in as good a position to hold that canal, which must be held at all hazards, as at present. You say they propose to give us guarantees that our interests will be safeguarded, or that we will be permitted to safeguard them. First, they cannot give a guarantee that we dare accept. Secondly, supposing you do accept; suppose you give the Egyptians all they ask for, you give them autonomy. The matter does not end there. What you have done for Egypt you must do everywhere. I do not say you should not grant to all what you grant to the Egyptians; only it is well to realise what this means. Do not forget that, as the demand by the Egyptians was founded on President Wilson's Fourteen Points, any concession in this will be followed by demands from other quarters. We must consider, before we concede autonomy, if Egypt can stand alone? Do you believe for a moment that she can do this? But unless we are ready to believe that the world will turn from appeal to force to appeal to reason, we cannot entertain such an idea for a moment. What, then, will happen if we relinquish our position at this gateway to our estate? Will that be the end, or will not other nations seek to supplant us? We from the Dominions are asked to give advice in a case where the time is long past where advice could be usefully tendered. We are brought to a case in *articulo mortis*, and asked to perform a miracle. We can do nothing. Lord Curzon has taken what I may venture to say is a very optimistic view. He speaks of the 10 per cent. of the respectable interests upon which he builds such high hopes, but the *bourgeoisie* never were able to stand against revolutions, and never will be. We propose to withdraw the only force that can protect them.

Egypt unable to stand alone.

Need for a British Force.

Lord Curzon: No, we propose to keep it. Nobody has proposed for a moment to withdraw the force. My criticisms on Lord Milner's proposal were of precisely the opposite character, namely, that whereas Lord Milner proposed to confine the British force in the neighbourhood of the canal, treating it as an Imperial force, I argued, on the other hand, that the British force is required there for the maintenance of order, and for the protection of the country from enemies, and that it must, therefore, be maintained in the country.

Mr. Hughes: I am very pleased to hear you say that, but if you are going to grant them autonomy, if you are going to give them all they want, and at the same

time attempt to maintain our interests by armed forces, I have nothing further to say. If that is the kind of autonomous Government you propose to give them, you may look to me for support, but anything short of that I oppose. We have to consider the vital interests of this Empire, and this, in my opinion, is a matter of life and death.

Egypt.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are assuming that we are committed to some of the things. We are not. We are here to discuss them, and before we commit ourselves we are going to confer with the Dominion Premiers and the Representatives of India, and that is what we are here for. We are committed only in so far as this declaration is concerned. Within those limits you can discuss anything, so therefore there is nothing like *articulo mortis*.

Mr. Churchill: We are committed to abolishing the Protectorate, but as to what we are to put in its place we are not committed.

Extent of present commitment.

Mr. Lloyd George: We say the Protectorate is not a satisfactory method. That is all we are committed to. We are therefore free. These gentlemen will be here in about a week and Lord Curzon will meet them, governed and instructed by the opinion which is formed here as a result of our discussions. So we are absolutely free, either to reject, or to accept, or modify. We have not committed you in the least beyond that declaration.

Mr. Hughes: I was certainly under the impression that Lord Curzon, on the whole, would have us understand something quite different. He said that when the Milner Report was made public all Egypt was overjoyed.

Mr. Lloyd George: They do not like the word "Protectorate," of course.

Mr. Churchill: They thought they were going to get a good deal more than we ever meant.

Mr. Hughes: That is sufficiently ambiguous of course to serve for an official pronouncement, but was it for that reason, I ask, that joy suffused the heart of the Egyptian? I do not think so.

Mr. Lloyd George: I remember Lord Milner telling us—I forget what the name was—he gave the Egyptian name for "Protectorate," which represented everything that was evil. They hated the word. We said we were not going for that word.

Mr. Hughes: I am sure your view is the same as mine on this matter. If we are only talking of words, any word will suit me so long as we get the thing we want.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are absolutely free to make any proposal with regard to the thing itself which is consistent with your not having something called a "Protectorate"—absolutely free.

May I also point out we sent that very document to you on the 2nd March, so there is nothing that we have really kept away from the Dominions. We have sent you Lord Milner's Report. On the 2nd March we sent you that identical document. That is all we have got.

Mr. Hughes: It is only fair to say you sent it to me after I had left.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is the difficulty which illustrated your speech yesterday —the difficulty of communications.

Mr. Hughes: I said nothing by way of criticism, let alone of censure, but I think I am entitled to point that out. I have only to add that I think we should be in a better position if Lord Curzon were to see the Egyptian Delegates and report to us what transpires. Let us have a concrete proposal, and then we shall have something to deal with. If you cannot satisfy them, of course you cannot satisfy the Extremists. If you have something tangible, put it before us. At present, we have nothing.

Suggests views of Egyptian Delegation be first Obtained.

Mr. Balfour: It is worth mentioning, isn't it, that if it came as a matter of surprise to Mr. Hughes, it came as a matter of surprise to the Cabinet. I shall never forget my feeling when in August last year, for the first time, I got an inkling of what was going on, and when Mr. Hughes says, with very great justice, that he is called upon to deal with the situation after it is too late to deal with it thoroughly and satisfactorily, that is the case with the whole Cabinet.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Mr. Hughes: Although, of course, I knew nothing of what Mr. Balfour says, I gathered from the reply Lord Curzon made in the House of Lords, that neither the Prime Minister, nor any other members of the Cabinet, including Mr. Churchill, had ever heard of it, or heard of it in time to do anything.

Mr. Balfour: That is true.

Mr. Churchill: I wrote my protest within five hours of reading it in the newspapers last autumn.

Mr. Hughes: We are all in the same boat.

Mr. Meighen: You are referring to the announcement of Lord Milner's? You are not referring to Lord Robert Cecil's?

Mr. Churchill: No.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is the reference to the Arabs; it had no reference.

Mr. Balfour: He was not thinking of Egypt.

General Smuts: Lord Robert Cecil's declaration had reference to the Sykes–Picot Agreement. That Agreement was a secret between us and the French, and at that stage it came to the notice of the Arabs to whom we had made quite different promises, and some statement had to be framed between the British and the French Governments which would conciliate Arab opinion, and so a new formula was devised. As I remember, that was the genesis of that Declaration.

Mr. Hughes: Look at this, that other paragraph which qualifies a little . . . .

General Smuts: I would only say I do not think that we are in a position usefully to discuss this subject now. The British Government is only bound by a general Declaration, and that we accept. The Egyptians have accepted that too, I understand; that is a general formula—this formula, that the Protectorate should go and that the special interests of Great Britain should be protected by a Treaty, and that, for the rest, Egyptian aspirations shall be satisfied. That general Declaration is the only document that binds us, and that we all agree to, and as far as the British Government knows, that satisfies Egyptian opinion. So that is all that we can build on.

Necessity only for protection of Empire's interests.

In regard to particulars, it is a matter for discussion between you and the deputation when it arrives. I would only say this, that I feel very strongly that we should not attempt to do more than protect Imperial interests; the attempt, I think, to govern these Oriental communities on our lines and by our methods is bound to fail. It will involve us in all sorts of entanglements. The whole political atmosphere of the world has changed. We do not want to govern Egypt, either directly or indirectly.

Mr. Massey: What about India?

General Smuts: Don't let us discuss India now. She is on a road which will take her far. We are discussing Egypt, and we have similar problems in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. I only think that as a principle we should simply conserve our Imperial interests and let these people govern themselves and find out how it can best be done. We do not want to be for ever entangled in Egypt, and send armies there to keep the Administration going. You only want to conserve Imperial interests, and we only want to do the same, and I think in that spirit we should work on this formula.

Mr. Hughes: May I say this to you. Look at that Canal and see how much it means to us and how little by comparison to you.

General Smuts: In Egypt you have two problems, the problem of internal government and the problem of autonomy; the problem of running an Administration, which I think is an Egyptian problem, and we should leave it to them.

Mr. Churchill: Altogether, would you leave it?

General Smuts: As far as possible. There is an indefinable neutral ground, so to speak, between the two.

Lord Curzon: The element of all the foreign populations and the rights of foreign Governments place great responsibility on us.

Mr. Balfour: There is no country so international as Egypt at this moment. You have enormous foreign interests in proportion to the size of the country and the population.

General Smuts: Once we go further than protecting Imperial interests, with the new atmosphere growing up in these countries, we are going to let ourselves into no end of entanglements, and the Empire cannot stand the burden. Egypt.

Mr. Balfour: I not only see your point, but I have great sympathy with it, but do not let us conceive Egypt with a native population which happens to border on the Canal, and which can be left alone to carry out native ends with native methods. Unfortunately, Egypt is not; Egypt is quite different; Egypt is abnormal and like nothing else under heaven, and it is very difficult to deal with her on your plan. I quite understand you.

General Smuts: I know that the Dominions will do very little to help the Mother country in this matter; she will have to bear the burden. We talk of Imperial communications which we are going to protect, but it will in the end be the British navy and the British army that will go to Egypt, and the people of this country will refuse to carry this intolerable burden of keeping an army in Egypt; so long as we protect our interests there and see that things do not become hopeless from our Imperial point of view, that should suffice.

Mr. Hughes: Will you look at it in another way? You talk of the rights of the Egyptian people; is it not notorious that they are a corrupt people; that, in fact, it is not too much to say, their official hierarchy is hopelessly corrupt. Did not Lord Curzon point out that one of the causes of all this trouble has arisen from that very thing. Our armies were in Egypt for a long while during the war; they had an opportunity of seeing the Egyptian. I cannot speak from experience, and no one is here who has had any practical experience of Egypt, but I would like to say this, that I feel confident if you gave them everything they wanted they would still be unable to govern themselves. They are a corrupt people; there is an ignorant proletariat, there is a corrupt bureaucracy, there is a megalomaniac leading them. I say again most certainly, Egypt as a self-governing country in the sense we mean it, in the sense you mean it, General, is impossible.

General Smuts; You have the opinion of Lord Allenby. Lord Allenby says that a return to the old pre-war condition where the British Government, in a mild way and by subterfuges, so to say, ran the Government with Lord Cromer, has become an impossible situation. If that is so, what can you do? You don't want to annex the country; you don't want to run it directly. Where are you going to draw the line, except at this point, our Imperial interests as distinct from local Egyptian interests?

Unique position of Egypt.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is really the point. I think everyone would accept that formula, but you have to reduce that formula to practice. Your difficulties come in the practical application of that formula. For instance, I will give you two or three illustrations. Egypt is not a country merely; it is a high road. That puts it, as Mr. Balfour points out, in a different category from any other country. It is a high road between East and West. The first thing you come up against: Is Egypt to get foreign relations? That is the first point. Is Egypt to be represented separately in the Courts of France, here and elsewhere? That is the first question. Is that consistent with our Imperial interests? The second point is: Foreign advisers—they cannot really run their show there without having outside advice; they are not sufficiently advanced for it. I quite agree with Lord Curzon they were overrun with minor officials and things which could be done very much better by Egyptians than by inferior Europeans, but there are certain things they cannot do, engineering for example, and finance. They want advice from outside. Well, now, are they to be at liberty to choose their advisers? Just see what that means. On the face of it, it looks as if they ought to have the right to have whom they like and pick the best man, but that is not the way it would work. French interests will press them to take a French adviser; Italian interests and German interests, and other interests, perhaps American interests, will all be pressing to get their own particular man there. The moment you put the foreign outside advisers there our control over that country goes, and you get a hostile organisation which will make the difference between an Egypt working with you and an Egypt working in the interests of some other Power. Now, those are two vital considerations. You may say, if you don't allow them, you don't give them internal liberty; on the other hand, if you do, it will be fatal to Imperial interests; it might not be fatal in five, ten or twenty years, but ultimately it will be absolutely fatal. Then comes the third question. I am only

Three essential considerations in the question.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

giving these as three illustrations of the practical difficulties with which you are confronted. Take the question of a garrison. You have to protect your highway. It is a highway to Australia; it is a highway to the East. It is no use talking of Singapore if you cannot get to Singapore. You must get there, and it is no use having great fleets there if somebody here can do what the Turks did with the Dardanelles. It is really our trouble with the Dardanelles, but it is much more vital to us. The Dardanelles only locked the door to Russia and Roumania; that was very nearly fatal to us, but these are Dardanelles which lead to the whole of the East, and you were reckoning here the other day how long it would take the British fleet to get there, and the question of two or three weeks makes the whole difference to you. But if you have a Power here which might become hostile at any moment, which might be bought as the Turks were bought—they were bought with cash; the Turkish people did not want to quarrel with us. The Turks have said to me that they were amazed they were at war with us. Why did it happen? There were two or three leading Turks bought by Berlin with cash and promises of all sorts of positions. The same might happen here. You may have Egyptian Ministers bought, and the door is locked, and while we are arguing you are done in, and our interests in that part of the world are completely smashed, and you must begin again. Therefore comes the question, what about your garrison? This report says you may put it on the sands of the desert, on the brink of the Suez Canal. That is no use to you. Why should you plant your troops in a position of that impossible kind? Aden is bad enough, and it does not give you the necessary control. Those are three; there are others which will occur to other members of the Conference, but those are three very practical questions which go to the very root of the whole business, and upon those three things I do not think we should give way. That is my individual opinion. We are discussing this here; we are not putting the views of the British Cabinet, but we are each discussing our own individual view with a view to arriving at a Cabinet decision exactly as we did in the war. Some of us have advanced views, and some of us have not such advanced views.

Mr. Massey: I should like to say, Sir, that I agree thoroughly with the views you have put forward. New Zealand is not so much interested as Australia and India, but we are here not to look at the views of any particular part of the Empire, but to look at the positions of the Empire as a whole and to consider its interests. I am very glad that General Smuts and I are personal friends, for I am sorry to notice that we nearly always find ourselves of opposite opinions. I cannot help that. There must be a difference of opinion even in a comparatively small gathering like this. But in considering what has taken place I do not want to criticise adversely anything with which Lord Milner was connected, because I have a tremendously high opinion of Lord Milner. In listening to this discussion and reading the papers that have been supplied to us, I have been very forcibly reminded of a saying of a German writer in the early days of the war—I think it was Nietsche, but I am not positive, for one cannot remember these things or who is responsible for them, but whoever it was it attracted a good deal of attention. He said something like this, speaking from the German point of view, "To stab the British Empire to the heart we must get possession of Egypt and the Canal." That was as nearly as possible what was said, and a communication was sent to me a day or two ago in which there is another quotation from a German document to the effect that the Germans intended to establish themselves on both banks of the Suez Canal and so to cut the main artery through which circulates the life blood of the world, and particularly the British Empire. There is the whole position in a nutshell from an enemy point of view. It is the highway, the British, the Imperial, or, if you like to put it, the British Empire highway. It is the British Empire highway from the very heart of the Empire itself, where we are to-day, to India, to Australasia, to the whole of the Far East, and it is the way through which the ships of war would have to pass in the event of trouble in that part of the world, such as that we were considering a few days ago. To my mind it is exceedingly important. Whatever happens, there is no question about it that British interests must be protected with a people such as the people of Egypt. We cannot help remembering that under British control Egypt has made greater advancement and progress than it has done since the time of the Israelites. There is no question of that. I for one looked forward to a time when Egypt will be even far more prosperous than it is at the present moment. General Smuts says that we cannot pretend to govern these Eastern people and that we should not attempt it. That means that we have got to abandon the whole of

Egypt: the Highway of British Empire.

them. If we abandon them what is going to happen? The British Empire is at an end. That may not matter very much from certain points of view, but it would mean a great deal for the world if the British Empire came to an end. If we followed the doctrine expressed by General Smuts we should have chaos. It would put the clock of civilisation—I do not think there is any exaggeration about it—back for a thousand years. I hope it will never happen. I do not see the way out, but I do put it that in the interests of Britain and in the interests of humanity—I will put the interests of humanity first—that recommendation should not be given effect to in its entirety. To my mind it would be simply national and Imperial suicide, and so far as I am concerned—we are speaking confidentially now—I certainly will not be a party to it. We ought to be able to say, in the interests of the Empire, that we did what was right in connection with Egypt, and even more so, because I do not know of any country so important to the Empire as Egypt, with the exception of Britain itself. Even Australia and New Zealand might be parted with and the Empire would go on, but I do not think you could run the Empire without keeping control of the main artery, as stated by the German writer I have quoted. It is another of the legacies left to us by the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. I distrusted them at the time; my instincts were against them; I thought they would involve us in trouble and I was not disappointed. I am afraid we have not seen the last of them by a very long way. However, there may be a way out of it.

Egypt.

Mr. Meighen: They know more than the Fourteen Points.

Mr. Massey: I believe they were the origin of a great deal of the trouble that has come to the British Empire and to the world since the signing of the Peace Treaty, and I do hope that some satisfactory way will be found out of what is taking place. I understand that Lord Curzon cannot make any recommendation until he meets those Egyptian representatives who are coming, or who are perhaps on their way now.

Lord Curzon: When you say I cannot make up my mind, I have a very clear idea of what I shall propose. I could circulate a draft to you conceding the main principle as we have already conceded it, but safeguarding all the points to which we attach importance. I have drawn it up and I have got it, but whether it will be accepted is a different thing.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think the Conference ought to see these proposals for discussion. I think it is really very important that when Lord Curzon meets these delegates he should go there armed with the general conclusions of the Empire upon that subject. I think it would be very desirable that Lord Curzon should circulate his proposals.

Lord Curzon: Would you like me to circulate them? That was my idea, and then I will put forward at the end the idea, suggested by Hayter, of a ten years' agreement on the assumption that we cannot get them to agree to anything on a permanent basis. I will circulate the two.

Mr. Massey: I did not mean that Lord Curzon could not make up his mind, because he is one of the men who can make up his mind. I am glad to be able to acknowledge it, but I think it is only right that before he says anything definite—confidential communication is a different thing—he must meet the men who are coming from Egypt.

Mr. Churchill: I really am responsible for the places next door to Egypt, namely, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and so my affairs are very much concerned with what goes on in Egypt. I was very shocked when I read about this in the papers last August, and the Prime Minister knows that I immediately sent off my protest and circulated it to my colleagues. At the same time I have always recognised that it was a fact that something had been done and that things could not be absolutely the same again after that publication had been made. Therefore I agreed to the Cabinet decision, and quite willingly, to tell the Egyptians that something would be substituted for the word "Protectorate," which was what they particularly disliked. Therefore I feel that the only thing that really lies before us now is the reserves which we must insist upon, and the Prime Minister stated with very great force several of those reserves. First of all, it would take more troops to protect the Canal if they were quartered along the Canal than it would take to keep order over the whole of Egypt and protect the Canal as well.

Necessary provisions to safeguard Empire's interests.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: And much more expense.

Location of Troops.

Mr. Churchill: If we put our troops in the desert along the Canal, leaving the country to stew in its own juice and to become a hotbed of internal and external intrigue, you would have to have other large forces, and you would be committed to heavy expenditure. Therefore the garrison we keep there, apart from the international aspect which Mr. Balfour dwelt upon, bearing in mind our responsibilities of protecting foreigners, will have to be kept in the great cities in Cairo, Alexandria and elsewhere. And the Egyptians ought to be told plainly that that is what we are going to do. Those garrisons are there not only for the purpose of protecting the Canal. If they were not there every other Power which has capitulation rights and felt its subjects were likely to be injured, would put their troops there. The withdrawal of British troops from the great cities in Egypt would not mean the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian soil; it would only mean that more foreign troops of various Powers would be put there in their place. We should probably be the only Power of importance that had not got a body of troops in Cairo for the purpose of protection. Therefore we must have our troops there.

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Curzon has to leave us now and the agenda concerns him. It is suggested that to-morrow morning at 11·30 we take the question of Anglo-French relations. That is a decision we shall have to take.

(Lord Curzon then left the Conference.)

Advisers to Egyptian Government.

Mr. Churchill: The Prime Minister spoke of a second point which I think you will see arises out of the prime military necessity and political necessity of keeping garrisons in Cairo and Alexandria. He spoke of the importance of not allowing the European advisers of the Egyptian Government to be picked freely by them from any nation they liked in the world, so that we might have hostile, intriguing people there who would be really working the machine against us. That is true from the point of view of their hostility, but also from the point of view of the efficiency of the Administration. I quite agree that the quality of the British administrative assistance given to Egypt has deteriorated in late years, and I think it is a subject which requires very careful investigation, why and how it can be improved, though it is absolutely certain that, unless you have a proportion—not such a large proportion as now—but a considerable proportion of authoritative advisers in the Egyptian Department of State under Egyptian Ministers (but still advisers whose advice is taken), unless you have a proportion of those, the country will relax and fall back from the point to which it has been raised—I do not say to the chaos and squalor of the days of Israel—but the cities will deteriorate, order will not be maintained and there will be discontent amongst the people, abuse and corruption will creep in on a large scale and then we will have real discontent amongst the people with violence, and troops will have to be brought in. You will have to keep your garrisons there until, at any rate, something like decent, orderly quasi-European administration has been set up. It would be a great mistake and a great danger; you would have all the responsibility for the country because you have to keep troops there. Otherwise, we shall see everything going to rack and ruin. It does seem to me wise to keep an element in the administration of advisers who will advise in the same way as they did in the days of Lord Cromer. Well, if you take these two very important points, you will see that we shall have to go rather on the lines we went on before the war, with such modifications as are possible in the growing advance of ideas. I do not say that we cannot do a great deal to meet Egyptian sentiment. I have been out there recently myself and I have thought a good deal about this, and certainly would not be afraid of reforms. It has only been a Protectorate and has always been a foreign country, and I do not myself see why we should not arrange our control of Egypt in the form which is most agreeable to them.

Mr. Meighen: What about representation in other capitals?

Representation in Foreign Capitals impossible.

Mr. Churchill: That we could not give. I am quite clear we could not give that. It would mean a centre of intrigue set up in every foreign capital. We could not possibly give that.

Mr. Massey: Has anything been done about the renewal of the lease of the Canal?

Mr. Churchill: It has only just been mooted in the most tentative way, but I have always considered myself that it is much better that the Canal should be more

or less vested ultimately in Egypt, than that Egypt should remain under British control. I always hope that that will be the ultimate thing. Egypt.

Mr. Massey: It would be a serious matter if the lease of the Canal came to an end and the British lost control.

Zaghloul's demand for evacuation of Soudan.

Mr. Churchill: It would be most fatal. Then another point that Zaghloul Pasha is insisting upon is that we should not only leave Egypt, holding on perhaps to the Canal, but that we should also give up the Sudan—that is the latest of his demands.

Mr. Balfour: That is sheer ignorance.

Mr. Churchill: Those tremendous regions which have been developed out of barbarism by British labour and money—that is another thing we have to make perfectly clear that we cannot put up with. Of course, I regret very much indeed that the handling of this matter at the outset was such as to set up a wrong ideal before the people of Egypt. The great ideal we wish to set up for the British Empire is the family of self-governing Dominions, all perfectly autonomous in everything that concerns themselves, but co-operating freely within the circle of the British Empire. That is the great conception, that is the conception which has animated Mr. Montagu and the British statesmen who have been concerned with the reforms in India—the idea of great self-governing Dominions.

Mr. Massey: A family of nations.

Mr. Churchill: Yes, and here in regard to Egypt we have diverged. We have put up a different kind of ideal altogether—that I regret most profoundly. Still, having gone so far on that road, I think we can now only really insist upon these vital securities, namely, garrisons, the foreign policy and such reasonable share in the administration as will secure efficiency and which will so far be a safeguard against inefficiency and the maintenance of the Sudan under British authority. This seems to me the very, very least that we can stand upon. I am pretty sure that Aldi Pasha and his Delegation will not be able to agree to this. If they did agree, I am perfectly certain that they would be repudiated violently by Zaghloul, who is certain to strike them down when they get back. I do beg and pray before this most important discussion begins, in which the Foreign Secretary will be concerned, that we should have a perfectly definite view of what are the vital points; it is not a matter of mere convenience or profits, it is a matter of the actual vital existence of the structure of the British Empire. It is only through this Canal that the British fleet can reach the stations where it can protect or come to the aid of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific in their hour of peril, and it is in Egypt naturally where there would be garrisons of British troops needed to reinforce any part of the Middle East. It is in Egypt that you naturally put your wireless station and aviation. It is the Clapham Junction—it has been described as the strategic Clapham Junction of the British Empire, and we really cannot afford at the end of a war, where we have struck down the most powerful Empire in the world, the Germans, the Austrians and the Turks, we really cannot afford to let ourselves be pushed out of our position in Egypt by the continuance of local agitations. With every desire to meet the wishes of the Egyptians, I do hope the Conference will stand very, very firmly on these essential points.

Egypt essential to Empire.

Mr. Meighen: I do not understand one statement you made, Mr. Churchill. You say the history of the Empire has been the development of self-governing nations and that you regret we diverged from that path in the case of Egypt. Your argument is one with which I fully agree. You say that we cannot proceed along the line of self-government now in the case of Egypt, but you say your regret is that we were unable to proceed in Egypt on that path.

Mr. Churchill: Now, I quite agree.

Mr. Meighen: We never should have undertaken to do so.

Mr. Churchill: I do not make myself clear. Of course, one had the idea that Egypt would be included in the British Empire, and, so included in the British Empire, would gradually attain the full Dominion status, but instead of that she has diverged on to a path which is inconsistent with her being in the British Empire, and they are being taught there that nothing matters as long as you can say: "We are outside the British Empire." That I very much regret, and I very much regret the report which was published should have, as it were, indicated that we should

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

agree and approve of that, because after all, we had to declare a Protectorate. We had been round the Powers of Europe and received assent from all our Allies, from France, the United States of America and from Belgium, we had received their agreement to the effect that it should be incorporated in the British Empire; that is what I mean by getting on the wrong line, but I do not think you can avoid taking to some extent the position that it is an independent country, though we hope to bring it back in the course of time within the orbit.

Mr. Meighen: Your opinion in a word is that it is to our vital interest as an Empire that we do have a Protectorate there, even if it must be called something else.

Mr. Churchill: Yes, exactly. That is much better put.

Lord Milner's Opinion.

Mr. Balfour: I am afraid I ought to add, for what it is worth, Lord Milner's strong opinion—you see we have discussed this with him, and he knows quite well what dismay and anxiety his ex-colleagues have seen in his report, but he has maintained quite steadily both in the Cabinet and to me, and no doubt to everybody else in private conversations, that he does not believe that the Egyptians want to sever their relations with the British Empire, that they are all too perfectly conscious that they cannot stand alone, that they all are quite aware that they must have advisers, without which we think they cannot possibly get on, and that those advisers must be British advisers. Of course, if Lord Milner is right, the task we have with the deputation ought to be less serious than the tenor of the conversations to-day across this table would lead one to fear. I am afraid that I have always thought Lord Milner sanguine on the point. He knows a great deal about it, and he holds the opinion with very, very great vehemence, and that fact ought to be known to my colleagues.

Mr. Massey: He had that in his mind when he wrote the report.

Mr. Balfour: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: The moment they are permitted to take up advisers outside the British Empire they would get into the hands of those advisers, and their intentions would evaporate. Lord Curzon has promised to submit definite proposals to the Conference.

Mr. Hughes: Before he sees them?

Mr. Lloyd George: Before he sees them. I do not think it would do for him to go there without a clear idea of what his objective is, and when these are circulated we can fix the discussion upon that, and see whether we agree upon those lines. To-morrow we will take the Anglo-French relations at 11·30.

Mr. Massey: No report of this will go out.

Mr. Lloyd George: This is the report:—

"Lord Curzon in an introductory statement briefly reviewed the history of British relations with Egypt, dwelling upon the importance of Egypt in the war, and concluding with the circumstances attending the despatch of the Milner Mission to Egypt and the publication of the Milner Report. The discussion was then opened by Mr. Hughes, and continued by Mr. Meighen, General Smuts, Mr. Massey, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Balfour and the Prime Minister. It was decided that the proposals for meeting Egyptian national aspirations and safeguarding Imperial interests now under consideration by the British Government should be discussed in detail at a later date by the Dominion Ministers and Representatives of India with a view to the arrival of the Egyptian Delegation now on its way to England."

Mr. Hughes: I think that is sufficiently ambiguous.

(The Proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 6, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 18th Meeting.

2

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON JULY 7, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.M.G., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

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Mr. Meighen: Your opinion in a word is that it is to our vital interest as an Empire that we do have a Protectorate there, even if it must be called something else.

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Mr. Balfour: I am afraid I ought to add, for what it is worth, Lord Milner's strong opinion—you see we have discussed this with him, and he knows quite well what dismay and anxiety his ex-colleagues have seen in his report, but he has maintained quite steadily both in the Cabinet and to me, and no doubt to everybody else in private conversations, that he does not believe that the Egyptians want to sever their relations with the British Empire, that they are all too perfectly conscious that they cannot stand alone, that they all are quite aware that they must have advisers, without which we think they cannot possibly get on, and that those advisers must be British advisers. Of course, if Lord Milner is right, the task we have with the deputation ought to be less serious than the tenor of the conversations to-day across this table would lead one to fear. I am afraid that I have always thought Lord Milner sanguine on the point. He knows a great deal about it, and he holds the opinion with very, very great vehemence, and that fact ought to be known to my colleagues.

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Mr. Hughes: I think that is sufficiently ambiguous.

(The Proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 6, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 18th Meeting.

2

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON JULY 7, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain the Right Hon. F. E. GUEST, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Empire's Attitude towards European Affairs.

A discussion took place regarding the attitude of the British Empire towards European affairs, statements being made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, General Smuts, Mr. Massey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Only one copy of the Stenographic Notes taken at this Meeting has been made, and this is in the possession of Sir Maurice Hankey at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, July* 8, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 19th Meeting.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON FRIDAY, JULY 8, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. H. A. L. FISHER, M.P., President, Board of Education.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

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Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.
Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Status of Indians in the Empire.

Mr. Lloyd George : I am going to suggest to Mr. Sastri, General Smuts and the Colonial Secretary, who are more directly concerned in the Indian question, that after Mr. Sastri has made a statement to the Conference, the questions he raises should be referred to their Committee.

General Smuts : Mr. Sastri wishes to make a statement to the Conference?

Mr. Lloyd George : Yes.

General Smuts : I have no objection whatever.

Mr. Lloyd George : If that is agreed to I will call upon Mr. Sastri to make his statement.

Mr. Sastri : Prime Minister, I am very grateful indeed for the opportunity that has been afforded to me on behalf of India to make a statement of great importance to her. That statement relates to the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire to which she happily belongs. Let me begin my statement by clearing the ground of one or two misconceptions which have arisen in regard to it. In the first place, I will say at once that in India, among the intelligent population, the

Meaning of Empire to India.

meaning of "Empire" is fully understood, the great advantage and honour of belonging to this Empire are appreciated to the full, and I may even go further and claim that the significance of "Empire" is perhaps more fully understood and interpreted in a more exalted sense in certain sections of India than I have been able to find in some quarters even in the United Kingdom, where one would expect a full understanding of the question. There is such a thing as citizenship of the British Empire, which has found, I must say, an abiding residence in the Indian minds, but which, strange to say, I have found lamentably lacking in the minds of certain people here.

To us the Empire stands for equality, for absolute justice. It may be that this is not a legal or a juridical concept. I have no right, not being a lawyer, to lay down anything on that subject, but in the popular conception in India there is this element, that we conceive that when this Empire reaches to the fullest height of her moral greatness, it will be open to every subject to seek the fullest self-expression of which he is capable in any part of the Empire, unhampered and unhindered, that he will, to put it more particularly, be entitled to move about freely in any part of the Empire, to take up his residence in any part of the Empire and, provided only he conforms to all local laws, avail himself of all the facilities afforded, where he settles, for developing his faculties to the utmost. That is our conception. I find it very often stated, however, that this is not yet a fact and may never be a fact, and it is no use raising people's expectations on the footing that it is at the present moment an established fact. Now we know only too well that at present it is not an established fact, but we all look forward to the time when this full right of British citizenship will be a fact acknowledged and everywhere worked up to. That is why, Sir, in my opening speech, immediately after your pronouncement, I ventured to state the proposition that the compromise of 1918, which on behalf of India Lord Sinha accepted, was a deduction from the citizenship of the Empire. I ventured to say that there were two principles that came into conflict on that occasion; first, this principle of free and open citizenship which I have enunciated, and secondly, the other principle that every part of the British Empire, every self-governing Dominion, had the right to determine the composition of its population by suitable and appropriate immigration laws. When these two principles came into conflict the authorities of the Empire for the time were in favour of the latter principle, which I venture to think is the lower or inferior principle. Now there is no disposition, on the part of the class of people for whom I am entitled to speak, to go back on this understanding. We are quite prepared to abide by this compromise which we arrived at on that occasion. I venture, however, to draw your attention to the circumstance that it is regarded almost universally in India as a compromise entered into with our sister Dominions in order to meet their wishes fully, so that all ground of misunderstanding and mutual recrimination may be removed.

Reason why India has not passed Immigration Laws.

Now, there are some people who are naturally asking what has India gained by this compromise? When other Dominions have passed Immigration Laws in consequence of it, or in conformity with it, India has forborne to do so. If India has forborne to do so it is certainly with a particular object, and I am bound frankly to tell you that she has forborne to avail herself of this compromise, and has not passed any Immigration Laws, merely because she is not confronted with that danger

with which the Dominions are confronted. They have to safeguard their civilisation from the unlimited influx of Asiatics, and for that purpose have passed these Immigration Laws. India stands in no such danger. Her population is much too large to fear any risk of being swamped, and that is why she has hitherto not availed herself of this principle of reciprocity. If ever she should do so, it would not be in self-defence. It would be, rather, retaliatory in its effect. It would be that she wanted, after all hope had been abandoned of obtaining justice at the hands of the Dominions, to hit back. That being the significance of our action, I am bound to state at once that there are a great many people in India at the present moment inclined to think that if, after the compromise of 1918, we do not obtain fair treatment wherever we are lawfully settled in the Dominions, it would be time, when we had exhausted all means of conciliation, when we had exhausted all expostulation on the question, all mediation and arbitration, to think of this last act of retaliation.

Status of Indians in the Empire.

India's relationship with Dominions.

I think that I may now go to the next branch of the subject which is a consideration in some detail of our exact position in the Dominions. I am happy to dismiss at once Newfoundland and New Zealand as Dominions in which there is no Indian problem at all. New Zealand, of course, has Immigration Laws by which she excludes Indians, but they are framed in scrupulous conformity with the compromise of 1918, and the few Indians that happen to be there are likely to get the full franchise of citizenship of New Zealand. I will at once leave New Zealand with an expression of our gratitude that there is no trouble there by which we are confronted

India's position with regard to Australia and Canada.

Then to come to Australia and Canada, the position there is almost the same. In Australia and Canada I think the only thing that remains to be done is to confer the franchise on resident Indians, provided they are able to satisfy the authorities that they are lawfully resident in those places. That is the thing yet remaining, and I am full of hope that when we make suitable representations to those Dominions they will see the wisdom and the justice, having been reassured on this question of being swamped, of granting to such Indians as are settled the full rights of citizenship enjoyed by their own subjects.

South Africa.

There remains the question of South Africa. The Union of South Africa consists of four different provinces, but there is one province which may rank honourably with New Zealand and Newfoundland, that is the Province of the Cape, where there is no disability at all on an Indian, because he is an Indian. He enjoys the Municipal and the Parliamentary franchise as well, and there are no disabilities of any kind which he may not, in the ordinary exercise of his franchise, get rid of by his own efforts. The Cape Province is out of the range of my remarks, but elsewhere in the Union of South Africa there are serious disabilities to which Indians are subject to-day because they are Indians, and for no other reason. There are disabilities with regard to their residence; they are ordered to live in certain places marked out for them; that is what is called segregation. Then there are limitations to their right to acquire and own property. There are also limitations on their freedom of trade, they having to take out licences which are subject to renewal, with the risk on each occasion of renewal of not meeting with favourable treatment. There are other grievances which are detailed in our memorandum of 1918, to which, however, I will not refer lest I should load my subject to-day with too much subordinate matter. In these parts of South Africa, unfortunately, there is a feeling amongst the European population that the Indian, even though settled there for many years, is an alien, that he must be got rid of, and that the pressure of administration, if exerted with sufficient rigour, will bring about the desired result. There is a League of South Africans in the place, the members of which are actuated by the strongly expressed desire to get rid of the Indian element, for they cannot shake off the fear that if the Indian is allowed to live amongst them he may in the course of time prove a source of danger to their commonwealth. I believe that those fears are ungrounded, that the feeling of antipathy which these leaguers entertain towards the Indian are largely without justification, but we have got to recognise that there is that feeling for the moment, very strong, very powerful, and, in some seasons, absolutely irresistible.

Mr. Hughes: Do these disabilities to which you refer fall upon Indians born in South Africa?

Mr. Sastri: Also on them, unfortunately. There are many of these Indians—I am very thankful to Mr. Hughes for reminding me of it—who are true South

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Status of Indians in the Empire.

Africans, who were born there and do not know any of the languages of India, and some of whom, perhaps, have never seen India at all. They are, in every sense of the word, South Africans. Nevertheless, they are treated exactly on the same footing as though they went there yesterday against the wish of the local people.

Indentured Labour in Natal.

In point of fact, the Indian element in South Africa was introduced there at the request of the colonists of Natal, who sought cheap Indian labour, and, by a system of what is known as "indenture," introduced a number of our coolies into the Transvaal. It is to be remembered, on behalf of these coolies, that they have contributed to the present prosperity of Natal. Nevertheless, they are now regarded as undesirables, and the only thing is to attempt to remove them from the soil which they have enriched by their labour. From time to time when this anti-Indian feeling erupts, as it were, demands are made on the Government—I think, on the whole, an unwilling Government—that they should redouble the rigour of administration and aggravate the pressure on the Indians so that, in course of time, they may leave the colony out of disgust. The Indians, however, have not done so; they have resolved to live on the soil to the prosperity of which they have made some contribution, to which they were invited on a system of indenture, and on which they still hope, notwithstanding all discouragement, to be able to make good their position through the good offices of other parts of the Empire. Now, quite recently,

South African Commission on the Indian Question.

a Commission was appointed by the South African Government for the purpose of examining one or two questions connected with these disabilities. They have recorded one finding, which is of first-class consequence to this discussion. That finding is, that there is no ground whatever for the fear entertained in many parts of South Africa that there is a continual influx of Indians, and that that influx is at such an alarming rate as to necessitate drastic steps. That fear has been proved abundantly to be absolutely without justification. Now I remember in 1917 during the discussions at one of the Conferences, of which we are the successors, General Smuts making the statement that, when once this fear of being swamped is remedied by suitable immigration laws, all other questions of administrative disabilities and hardships could be solved freely and perfectly. Now, some time has elapsed since then, and all that we are able to say is, that instead of these hardships being lessened they have been in one or two respects greatly aggravated.

South African anti-Indian Legislation.

In the year 1919 a law was passed which removed one of the means by which Indian residents in the Transvaal were able to acquire and hold property. The law of 1919 made it impossible for them to do so and banned the only means which, up to that time, had been offered to them. This Commission to which I have just now referred made a recommendation that that law and the Gold Law of 1885—against which the Indian community have always persistently protested—should not be touched at all, and, further, they have recommended that a new disability be added to this long catalogue of Indian disabilities, to the effect that they should be prevented by law from holding property in the uplands of Natal. Against this particular recommendation one member of the Commission, I must acknowledge, protested. He has written a dissentient note. At the request of the Government of India, the Government of the Union of South Africa have hitherto delayed taking any action on the recommendations of this Commission, but there is pressure on them. The people of South Africa would insist on steps being taken to carry out these recommendations, and we are under a fear that perhaps early action may be taken, the effect of which will be to tighten the bonds under which Indians have lived in the three provinces in the Union of South Africa.

Now I have in my hands here two or three telegrams that I have received from Pietermaritzburg, from Durban and from other places in Natal, complaining against the laws already in force and against other laws which are contemplated, according to their information. I will not weary the Conference by reading them. Some of their grievances date back to the time of President Kruger, but it will only weary the Conference to hear all that sorry detail. Quite recently, in a debate in the Parliament of South Africa, several statements were made by members which have attracted the notice of newspapers in India. There is a certain class of newspapers in India, as elsewhere, which is on the watch for such sensational news, and these have worked them up into leading articles and all sorts of special contributions, the effect of which has been to make India believe that we are on the eve of a time when the fetters of Indian residents in that Dominion will be inevitably tightened.

Recommends conferment of full Franchise.

Now I wish to suggest to this Conference, what must be superfluous to those who have lived for centuries under representative institutions, that the only final and satisfactory way of solving all these problems is to confer the full franchise of the locality on such people as are qualified to receive the franchise by education, by property and by qualifications appertaining to general citizenship. The franchise

Status of Indians in the Empire.

has, I think, been discovered by humanity to be the only means by which people can, by their own efforts, remedy their grievances. Any other remedies that we may devise will only be remedies applied by others, and no such remedies have been found in the long run to be so efficacious as those which the franchise confers on those who receive it. If we made the franchise general and uniform as you have it in England for election to Parliament, the candidates would have to seek the suffrage of Indian voters, and, when that position is reached, when members of Parliament in the Union have to seek the suffrage of their Indian co-citizens, we can well see that we shall have arrived at a position when we may dismiss all concern for the welfare of that class of people. The solution will then be in their hands, and any further grievances which they may suffer from will be largely of their own creation or acquiescence. In the most interesting statement to which we listened yesterday on Egypt, a statement which, for my part, I heard with the most intense interest and admiration, Lord Curzon suggested more than once that the Egyptian situation was developing at a rapid rate, but that the authorities here in England did not know how fast it was developing. If, as the circumstances developed, they had been conveyed then and there to the authorities here, suitable remedies, it was implied, would have been applied at the right time.

Activity of Separatists.

Now we cannot say that, in this present case, at all events, timely information is not supplied to the authorities here. Both the people of India, and the Government of India, have very frequently addressed the authorities here and kept them fully informed of the situation as it develops from day to day. In the communication which has been circulated to the Conference by the Government of India, they have made it perfectly clear that, amongst the malcontents in that country at the present moment a movement of separation has begun to show itself—that people are asking this, whether it is to their lasting interest to remain in this Empire. This unfortunate feeling, newly emerged, is being stimulated by a set of people, amongst whom I will take the liberty of mentioning the name of Mr. Andrews. Mr. Andrews is a well known missionary. He has got the peculiar gift, I must say, of entering into the skins of other people. He understands Indians, their inmost feelings, their instinctive wishes; he has travelled into every part of this Empire where Indians are resident; he has counselled them, he has encouraged them, he has befriended them. Quite recently, probably under the influence of Mr. Gandhi, he has come to the conclusion that it is the belief in the topmost circles of statesmen and politicians throughout this Empire, with the real wish and desire, however it may be camouflaged, that it is desired to keep this Empire purely for the white man, that they will not find room in it for the coloured races of the world, except on a footing of complete political and economic subordination, that they have not yet assimilated the notions of equality, of brotherhood, and of humanity, and that there is no place, therefore, which India can honourably fill within the Empire, and that their utmost and immediate efforts should be directed to effect a separation from this Empire. I am somewhat concerned to think that this movement is gaining ground. I do not say that the situation is past hope, or past remedy, and I am making this clear and frank statement to you, supported by the Government of India in that Memorandum, of which copies have been circulated to you. I am making this frank statement in order that you may place in the hands of the friends of the Empire in India the means of countering this dangerous and disruptive movement. That is my mission. I have imposed upon myself as may have been seen, a vow of silence in other matters until this question, so vital to India, is disposed of satisfactorily. I would beg of you to give me leave to read what Lord Reading has stated quite recently. He has not stated it in this connection, but almost within a few days of his arrival in India; this state of feeling has been borne in upon him, and in one of his early utterances he has considered it necessary to state openly, and without reservation, this doctrine of the perfect equality of the Indian and the European. He was, however, of opinion—he assured Indians—that the British people did not indulge in any notions of racial superiority or predominance. He was, however, striving to put this principle of equality upon a firm basis, and in this connection he declared: "There could not and must never be humiliation under British rule of any Indian, because he was an Indian. The British people, both in India and in Great Britain, must realise that there was much suspicion and misunderstanding to banish, and must convince Indians by their own actions that they really meant what they said regarding India." Now, Lord Reading has found it absolutely necessary to assuage the feelings of considerable sections of Indians by making an unequivocal declaration of that character. If we are to avoid, betimes, the growth of this anti-Empire feeling in India, I would ask this Conference most earnestly to take into consideration the

Mr. Andrews' activities.

Lord Reading's Statement on Racial Equality.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Status of Indians in the Empire.

proposal which the Government of India in making through us. I have not the right—not possessing the necessary experience or the personal weight—I have not got the right to advise this Conference from a superior platform, but as a student and as a citizen, and as one admitted to a seat at this table, let me point out the great danger of allowing a situation of great risk to develop under our own eyes.

Example of Ireland.

You have Ireland, you have Egypt to warn you. Very many people, both in England and in India, believe that a big Ireland must be made and created in that vast continent, and at a great distance from the seat of Empire. These mischief-makers must be thwarted and foiled, and that can only be done by taking steps betimes to remove these grievances which they are able by their skill to manipulate for their own sinister purposes. And because I am convinced that this is a real genuine grievance felt not only by these mischief-makers, but by all true well-wishers of India, I urge the consideration of the resolution that I have got here. But I am not without realising the enormous difficulties by which this question is beset. I may say this at once, that I realise the difficulties of South African statesmen. They have got to deal with a population largely as dogged in the assertion of what they believe to be their rights, as the kind of people of whom I have been speaking with some warmth and disapprobation. Their electors do not understand still the full meaning of Empire. Empire to them is the right to live as they please and not to let others live as they please. They have not risen above this crude conception of British citizenship. That must be recognised. Time, therefore, must be allowed for the education of these electors, and we are quite willing to allow that necessary time. Our resolution, however, asks for the assertion and the acceptance by this Conference of a vital principle. It is surrounded by difficulties, but if there are difficulties, difficulties exist to be met and overcome, not to be run away from, not to be dreaded. I was present quite recently at a debate in the House when the question of Ministers without Portfolio was discussed. I heard one sentence from the Prime Minister's lips which I well recall—"This House whatever the risks must do right." If it is true of the House of Commons it is much more true of this Tribunal of the Empire, which exists to make difficulties less, not greater, which exists to remove grievances before they become incurable sores, which exists to improve matters everywhere, even to those communities whom fortune has not hitherto favoured. Do we ask for the impossible? I am convinced that the resolution which we are putting forward to-day, with the concurrence of the Government of India, is reasonable, is moderate, and allows full scope for the necessary delay and process of development. Let me read this resolution at once:—

Present feeling in South Africa.

Recommends Resolution establishing position of domiciled Indians.

> "This Conference, while reaffirming the Resolution of the Conference of 1918 that each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction of immigration from any of the other communities, recognises that there is an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some parts of the Empire. This Conference accordingly recommends, as a matter of the most urgent importance, in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth, the adoption of a policy of removing any disabilities under which such Indians are placed, and making them good citizens of their country of domicile by merging them in the general body of citizens in whatever part of the Empire they may be lawfully domiciled."

This Conference is asked merely to recommend the adoption of a policy. We cannot legislate. We can recommend to the Dominions the adoption of a policy. But it may be asked—"What is the use of this recommendation? Does not every Dominion, do not the Statesmen in every Dominion, already know this elementary and basic fact of the moral basis of Empire? Need we make a solemn recommendation on this subject?" I wish it were superfluous. It seems to me that in such complicated affairs it is often necessary to proclaim an ideal. A great writer on your constitution has said that the only value he could find of a declaration of rights is the moral stimulus it offers to the subjects, to the Government. Subjects are told what they may claim and legislators are admonished of their limitations. If we accept this principle and lay it down, although it may be a very elementary principle, we tell the Dominions which violate it to-day that they are in error, that they must set their house in order, that they must, at the earliest opportunity, begin the process of conforming to this principle. That is the value that India attaches to this declaration. We have been often told in the course of these discussions that India must exercise a little patience. I must say frankly, Prime Minister, and I say

this from the bottom of my heart, that it does not lie in the mouth of any portion of this British Empire to say to India that she must exercise patience.

Status of Indians in the Empire.

Patience has been her strong unmistakable characteristic from the beginning. She has borne, she has suffered, she has bled, but she has always only pleaded for justice, for redress. To-day when I came here, my rôle is not that of an impatient critic of the Administration, my rôle is still that of the patient man, who says, "I have borne so long, let me know that you are thinking of the remedy, that you are not making the situation worse for me, but that you have resolutely made up your minds that these grievances shall be no more. Establish your *bona fides*." I am sorry to say that even that elementary, that first fact in the situation, the *bona fides* of one Dominion, have still to be established. Face forward, that is all that I ask. Begin the process. It is late; I fear, it is very late; but I hope it is not too late.

Now, if the resolution that we propose has the good fortune to meet with your acceptance, we know that that is not the end of the matter. We realise fully that before that resolution can at all be carried out in South Africa, a good deal of popular education will have to be undertaken. India, for her part, will also do what she can to help this process of popular education. She realises, having night and day to dwell with this sore problem, she realises that it can only be done in course of time. She realises that the misunderstanding proceeds largely from mutual ignorance, that if more enlightened South Africans and more enlightened Indians could come together and understand one another, a great part of this rooted distrust would quickly disappear, and, in order to bring about that state of mutual knowledge, we are quite willing on our part—in fact, we have a proposal on foot on that behalf—to visit these Dominions in turn, three or four amongst us, and help Ministers who have undertaken this solemn duty of educating their electors. We will go, and provided they give us reasonable facilities, we will talk to the leading statesmen and politicians. We will talk, if it so pleases them, to public meetings and to the citizens at large. Similarly, I have authority from the Government of India and from the Secretary of State to convey to the Dominion statesmen an invitation that they should, in their turn, visit our large towns, and in as strong a force as they please, go and see how we live and what sort of people we are, how we have now come into the temple of representative institutions with a sure and steadfast footing. Let them see us, and we shall see them, and in that way we establish the beginning of an understanding which is sure to lead to sympathetic and honourable treatment of all these questions which, at present, lead to mutual recrimination.

Recommends Interchange of Visits between leading men of Dominions and India.

Only one word before I close. The existence of a subject of this nature, but so vital to the future of India, and, if I may venture to add, so vital to the Empire also, the existence on our programme of a subject of this kind is known to India. They watch my movements in that country with the most intense solicitude. What happens to this resolution, therefore, is a matter of profound consequence to our best interests. Let me be enabled, therefore, by your good offices, to go and tell my countrymen that there are still hopes for us within this British Empire, in this Empire where we wish to live in confraternity with other peoples, that there is room and honourable room for us. The mischievous propaganda of the Separatists must be conquered, and if this Conference breaks up without giving me that encouragement, without offering me something solid and substantial which I can hold out to the people as a message of hope from this Conference, then, to use a common phrase, the game is nearly up. We can do nothing thereafter. This is the critical time. Do not let, if I may venture to say it again, do not let the situation develop into sinister proportions before your very eyes. Be strong to do justice, do not let your strength be employed in the preservation of inequalities and injustices undermining the Empire. I put this resolution formally before the Conference.

The necessity of giving some definite pronouncement to India on Status of Indians as result of Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: Well, Mr. Sastri has put before us a very powerful and very eloquent speech in support of his resolution and he certainly has made a strong case for consideration. As he will recognise, this is a matter the Dominions must decide for themselves. We have no right of interference, we have no right of recommendation, we have only the right of communication in this matter. It is a question entirely for their decision. There is one self-governing Dominion which Mr. Sastri does not refer to where there are no disqualifications, and that is the United Kingdom. Here we have not disqualification of any sort or kind. Each country and each Dominion has its own problem; but I think it will be felt that this is a case which deserves consideration, affecting as it does India, representing so many millions of very loyal subjects of the Throne, who have given such guarantees of their loyalty in the greatest trial the Empire has been put to. I will therefore at

Status of Indians a question for Dominions individually.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Status of Indians in the Empire.

this stage simply suggest, unless somebody wants to make a statement, that if we begin discussion now, I think we should have to continue it; therefore, there is only one alternative, either to delegate it at this stage to a Committee to consider, or proceed with the discussion. I have suggested the former course, that Mr. Sastri and the Indian Delegation should meet the representatives of the Dominions concerned, and Mr. Churchill would be there to represent the Crown Colonies, which are also concerned in this matter.

Recommends question be delegated to a Committee.

Mr. Churchill: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is one course; the other is that we should discuss it here.

Mr. Hughes: What has this Committee to do, Sir?

Mr. Lloyd George: To consider the resolution put by Mr. Sastri, and discuss it with him, and report to the Conference.

Mr. Hughes: Has not Mr. Sastri laid down a broad general principle that has to be accepted or rejected, subject possibly to modifications after due consideration of all those difficulties which Mr. Sastri himself has admitted exist? But I can hardly think, Sir, that a Committee could help us. I understand, of course, that there are practical difficulties, and these must be dealt with by each Dominion, as Mr. Sastri has said, if this principle is accepted.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am just trying to save the time of the Conference. If we had unlimited time, it would be very useful to continue the discussion here, but we are working against time as it is.

General Smuts: Under those circumstances, I would suggest, Mr. Prime Minister, that your idea be followed, and that we do not take up the time of the Conference, which is occupied with much other work, but that we pass this matter on for discussion at a Committee such as is proposed by you.

Mr. Sastri: Which would report to the Conference?

Mr. Lloyd George: Very well. Then they had better meet under the chairmanship of Mr. Churchill at the Colonial Office.

Mr. Hughes: Will discussion come on afterwards?

Mr. Churchill: That may be so.

Supports Mr. Sastri.

The Maharao of Cutch: This is a question on which I feel quite as strongly as my friend Mr. Sastri. I should have liked to have made a statement on my own behalf as representing the interests of Indian States in support of Mr. Sastri's statement, but I think that as a Committee is to be appointed, and probably the question is to come up again before this Conference, with your permission I should like to reserve my statement for a future occasion. I may add that this is the one question in which—of all the questions before the Conference, momentous as they are—India is, I feel, most closely concerned. I feel that I should be wanting in my duty if I were not to place my views before the Conference, but it is better that I should not detain the Conference by another long statement; yet at the same time I should like to reserve my right to make a statement later on.

Mr. Lloyd George: Very well. The Colonial Secretary will convene a Conference on the subject, and the Indian Delegation will either in whole or in part be present, and such Dominions as are directly concerned in the matter.

Mr. Churchill: I think it is only General Smuts . . . .

Mr. Hughes: It is quite understood that we shall have an opportunity later of discussing it.

Mr. Lloyd George: That depends on the Committee.

Mr. Hughes: With all submission, I do not quite follow that. I cannot see how it depends on the Committee. We understand the position quite well.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am assuming that you will be there, Mr. Hughes. I think, Mr. Sastri, you wanted the Australian and New Zealand Premiers to be present?

The Maharao of Cutch: It is a question that affects them all.

Mr. Lloyd George: It affects Canada as well.

Mr. Churchill: If that is really going to happen, it means that the morning or afternoon that that takes place we should not have a meeting of this Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not see how you could. General Smuts would be absent in any case.

Mr. Montagu: I am only anxious to get forward with the Conference in the best way.

League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we can now go on with the League of Nations, if Mr. Balfour will make his statement.

Always supported a League of Nations.

Mr. Balfour: I have always been a League of Nations man, long before the League of Nations came into existence, and an experience now extending over one or two years has strengthened my conviction that the League of Nations is necessary, and it has also, I am sorry to say, strengthened my fears that it is an institution in many respects difficult to work. Perhaps I might begin by explaining where I think the special difficulties lie, before I explain where I think experience has shown that the need for it exists, is increasing, and is not likely to diminish.

Difficulties in way of League of Nations.

It is true that some of the difficulties are only temporary difficulties. The statesmen who at Paris framed the League of Nations had in their view undoubtedly that the Treaty of Versailles, and the subordinate Treaties that came into existence after the Armistice in consequence of the victory of the Allied Associated Powers, would rapidly and effectually settle the boundaries of the nations, redistribute territories in accordance with suggestions and in accordance with the various populations, and all that remained to the League of Nations, therefore, would be to see that rights clearly established were carried out, that war between those reconstituted areas should never be allowed to take place without, at all events, serious efforts being made to prevent it, that the catastrophe of 1914 should never be repeated in anything like the same form, and that in addition to that, there should be a machinery for protecting minorities in certain cases and for carrying out certain international arrangements of benefit to all the nations concerned.

Everybody knows that these hopes have not been indeed completely disappointed, but are in part not fulfilled. Even now the Treaty of Versailles is not an accomplished Treaty. Even that Treaty has not been carried out, and one of the most important points of that Treaty was settling the boundaries of Poland. The boundaries of Poland remain unsettled, and Poland is one of our great standing difficulties. Another of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles dealt with the question of Silesia, and everything that leaves the centre of Europe in a perturbed and unsettled condition really leaves the League of Nations with a problem before it which was not contemplated by those who framed the Covenant under which the League of Nations works. I hope, however, that that can be settled and got over. Another thing that was perhaps not fully contemplated by the framers of the Covenant was the state of disturbance which does not really so much depend upon the way frontiers are drawn as upon the populations in the areas. For instance, at the last Assembly one of the problems brought before the League was the problem of Armenia, a problem which is very near the heart of the statesmen who met in Paris in 1918—a question in which America has always professed to be deeply interested. It is a question in regard to which it is practically impossible for the League of Nations to do anything effectual except to ask the Great Powers, if they have it within their competence, to do what they can to bring it to a proper conclusion. Then there remains, as we all know, the tremendous lapse in the ideas of the Covenant, that three of the greatest nations of the world are still outside it, and of these three two are not, so far as we can see at the moment, very likely to come inside it in the near future. America unfortunately allowed the whole question to be caught up in the wheels and cogs of party conflict, and all common sense appears to be torn to pieces in the process. So much so, that America does not only not belong to the League, but they think it so accursed a thing that they will not answer the League's letters, which is carrying opposition to rather an extreme excess.

America.

Russia and Germany.

Then there is Russia. I assume that Germany will with no very great delay become one of us, unless she thinks it worth while to remain out because America is out, but Germany, if left to herself, will come in, I feel sure. But Russia will only come in if her present position is ameliorated. She wants to come in, but she is a helpless, dangerous derelict mass on the eastern flank of the whole series of small States, the politics of every one of which stand disturbed by the proximity of this

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

great unregulated Empire—every one of which feels that when Russia is restored, the result may be that their own future is compromised; a most disturbing state of things, one which we never anticipated at the time when the Pact was framed, and one the full consequences of which are still upon us, and to which, so far as I am aware, no solution is yet attained, or is in the way of being attained.

We must wait. I suppose, until the present régime of Russia comes to a natural and inglorious end, and then see whether some permanent and satisfactory system can arise by which the fragments of the late Russian Empire, which are in no sense Russia, which in no sense desire to be Russia, whose population belongs to a different race, who profess a different religion and speak a different language, but yet lie on the fringe of Russia and separate her, geographically seem to separate her, from the ocean, until their fate and their relations with the new Empire, with the new and restored Empire, can be satisfactorily arranged. That is a tremendous problem, and I do not see how the League of Nations can settle it alone, though perhaps they may do something to assist the Powers in carrying out the duty. Those are great difficulties, but there are some technical difficulties which I might perhaps mention, smaller difficulties which I might mention, and which I think should be present to those who want to see the kind of difficulty with which the League has got to contend.

Difficult for Responsible Ministers to attend League.

The first of these is distance, and the effect which distance has, great geographical spaces have, upon properly manning the Council of the Assembly. And it is not merely distances, it is the work which falls upon statesmen in these days, even if distance does not interfere. If you had an ideal League of Nations, the people who ought to attend it and carry on the business of it are the Prime Ministers and the Foreign Secretaries, but it is quite impossible that they should do it. It would be quite impossible for the far distant communities, such as Australia or Japan, to do it, from sheer distance. But it is quite impossible for Great Britain to do it. The Prime Minister, I hope, will be able, at some date, perhaps, to take part in the Assembly, but that he and the Foreign Secretary should do the work of the League is really, I believe—having watched the thing rather carefully—impossible. The French have found it impossible. One or two of the Central States sent an important Minister, the Central European States, but their work is less, and I doubt whether even they would be able to do it as a regular practice.

Mr. Massey: The Balkan States?

Mr. Balfour: Let me think—which of the Balkan States. No; they have not sent the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary. Venizelos came once, and Benes, who is Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and is a very valuable and important member of the League. That is a very great difficulty, because the thing can only be run by tact, by avoiding too clear distinctions. After all, the people who take a leading part in the League are the Representatives of France and the Representatives of Britain. It is so, has been so, and, I hope, it will long continue to be so. Whom do they send? Mr. Fisher and myself have hitherto been the Representatives of Great Britain in the main—I think Lord Curzon did it once when it was in London—but in the main the work has been done by Mr. Fisher and myself. We are members of the Cabinet. Being members of the Cabinet we know the general trend of opinion in our colleagues' minds on these questions, and while, of course, we should never think of taking a resolution or committing our country in any way upon a great new issue, we do allow ourselves, have to allow ourselves, a certain amount of initiative. If you want to deal effectively with the work of the Council, it must be done. You cannot always be referring by telegram, and people at home are hardly in a position to know exactly how the discussion around the table is going on, how harmony is to be arrived at, how the work is to be done. It has been done, so far, very successfully. We have always been unanimous—I think we may, broadly say that Great Britain has usually got her way—at all events we have had our full weight in the Assembly. But observe what a difficult system that is to work. The other members of the Council, other than France and Spain, usually depend upon an Ambassador. The Spaniard there has been the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, the Japanese has been the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, the Italian has varied, but has usually, I think, been a member of the Italian Government, but they have not made any such great and important decisions as have fallen to France and Great Britain. That is the difficulty, and it cannot completely be got over.

Financial Difficulties.

Another difficulty which I see is the money. We made an attempt—a heroic attempt—to get money voluntarily subscribed to relieve what was almost an international danger, the spread of typhus from the great Russian centre of infection over Poland, over the other nations coterminous with Russia, into the more western parts of Europe. We made it more than once. We failed We got a certain amount of money; Canada was most generous in her subscription, Great Britain did her duty, France more or less, but on the whole, the League did not produce any large amount of money, and all those who watched the response made to our appeals have, I think, come to the conclusion that that is a form of League activity which, in existing circumstances and in the existing temper of the world, perhaps in the existing financial condition of the world, it is quite useless to repeat, and I should never be responsible again for making any appeal of that kind.

League of Nations.

Another difficulty is that directly an effort is required of the League you inevitably make every Representative of the League, say: "Well, what will my Parliament say to the share of effort which it is called upon to make?" Then they go on to say: "Will my Parliament think it has a direct advantage in the effort which it is called upon to make?" And we all know Parliamentary duty well enough to be aware that even if the sum of money is not great, and even if the object is clearly beneficial, any Member of the Opposition may get up and say: "This is a worthy object; we have nothing to say against it, but it is wholly alien to the interests of this country, my constituents care nothing for it, they will in no sense benefit by it, and I do not think the effort should be made."

Of course, if that kind of argument is carried to excess, the League of Nations fails. Some effort—it need not be a very important one—some effort is required if common action is to be taken on any occasion which involves some slight sacrifice of the immediate interests of the communities making it. That is a danger. We cannot deny it. No danger, of course, arises from such incidents as the action of Argentina. As far as my information goes—I do not know whether the Foreign Office have had information—but the sort of information I collected when I was at Geneva with regard to the defection of Argentina, was that it was a purely internal affair, that for some reason the President of the Republic had views about the League of Nations and he thought it would help him or his party if he took the action which he did take. I do not know whether that is true or not.

Mr. Massey: Has Argentina formally withdrawn?

Mr. Balfour: It has not formally withdraw, and that, I think, really puts an emphasis on the particular kind of danger to which I refer. Unless the action of America produces a catastrophe I do not believe the League will perish from this or that Nation getting up and formally saying: "I do not approve of the League's proceedings. My Government wash their hands of it. We now hereby formally give the two years' notice required for leaving it." That is not what will happen. What will happen is that some representative of the League will get up and say: "This is very futile and my Government has told me I need not stay any longer or take any further part in it." He will then withdraw from the Assembly, the country will cease to pay its subscriptions and a sort of rot will set in. Without any formal declaration of abstention from the League, members of the League will practically cease to be members of it; it will fall into desuetude; they will take no part in the deliberations of the League and will not subscribe to its efforts. The full difficulties will only occur if the occasion should arise, for example, when some serious effort had to be made to stop a war, some effort, for example, involving blockade. I do not myself see how a blockade is to be carried out until we make an arrangement with America. A blockade in which America did not take a part, and to which America would probably say: "We do not recognise it"—it is clear that if the League of Nations is breaking off all commercial and financial communication with the criminal party, it is clear that even that will lose much of its efficacy if a country like America remains out. The American lender will gain instead of other lenders; the American exporter will gain instead of other exporters, and the Nations of the League undoubtedly are imperilled, and greatly imperilled, by the absence of America from our Councils. Russia does not matter to anything like the same extent—perhaps not at all from this point of view; America is particularly important.

Danger of League falling into desuetude.

Well, that is a very gloomy picture I have drawn. I have shown you there are great difficulties. I do not at all despair of getting over them, but I think it would be folly, as we are talking among ourselves, it would be folly to minimise the magnitude of the problems which lie before us. Then you will perhaps say, if the thing is so difficult, why not abandon the attempt. It was a well-meant attempt. It does

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

credit to all who were involved in it, but unfortunately the world is not ripe for this great work. I should regard that as one of the most calamitous disasters which has ever happened to the world. We had a chance after this war, and we still have a chance of establishing this arrangement, this international arrangement which will and ought to perform incalculable services to mankind which cannot be adequately performed merely by the old diplomatic methods. I know there has been a great deal of nonsensical attack made upon that method. The world, or some uninstructed fraction of the world, says diplomacy has made for war. I do not think at any time in its history has it made for war. It has been very ineffective in keeping the peace, but it is the nations that make for war. It is the diplomatic representatives of the nations who have done anything that has been done in the way of preserving peace. It is quite inadequate for many of the purposes for which the League exists, and I should regard really with horror the termination of our labours, and those labours, believe me, have not been unfruitful. I am really provoked when people say, well, what has the League done, and I am provoked for this reason, that the League has only been in existence since the 10th January, 1920. Since the 10th January, 1920, it has had to organise itself, to create its machinery, to carry out an infinite number of difficult tasks of internal policy, and it has had to work, as I have already explained to my colleagues, it has had to work in a world in no sense prepared for it, and in no sense corresponding to the ideal which existed in the minds of those who brought the League into existence. In spite of that, in spite of the disadvantages which might really have condemned the efforts of the Council of the League to barrenness, I think a careful observation of what it has done shows it has done a great deal already and is capable of doing a great deal more. Consider what it has done, for example, in the matter of quarrels between nations. Take a small case first, one that came under my own personal observation and which it so happened I had to deal with individually. It was a quarrel between the poor remains of the Austrian Empire, between Vienna and Austria on the one side and with Poland on the other, over a rather difficult question connected with the great immigration of Jews into Vienna during the war and their expulsion from Vienna after the peace. What happened was this. There were great areas of the Austrian Empire, of the then Austrian Empire, from which the Jews fled when those areas were over-run by the Russians or Germans in the course of the war. They went to Vienna for safety; they crowded in. They left the outlying parts of Austria and went to the centre. The outlying parts of Austria ceased to be Austrian after the peace and the Viennese began to say, well, these Jews must go back. They must go back to their old homes and areas. As long as they were Austrian subjects they had a certain right in the Austrian capital, but they have no right now, seeing that these outlying districts are no longer under Austria. There was a difficulty and a row. The Poles and the Austrians came before the Council. The matter was dealt with by the Council. It was dealt with in a friendly spirit, and I believe that no diplomatist could have done what the Council did, because the vanity of the two, the pride of the two, was not at all touched by the advice given by the representatives of the whole League of Nations, whereas dictation from England or France or dictation from anybody else would certainly have been resented. That, perhaps you will say, is a small point, but a much bigger point, unfortunately not yet settled, is the question of Poland and Lithuania. That is an immense problem on which I need not trouble my colleagues at the present moment at all beyond making these observations. We have prevented what otherwise would have occurred except for us, we have so far prevented recourse to arms between the two populations. We stopped a war that actually was going on, and we have prevented its renewal, and at this moment both parties have consented to meet under the presidency of M. Hymans to discuss a scheme of arrangement between the two which, if adopted, might be expected to produce harmony, where at present hopeless disorder appears to prevail. I ought to say that such has been the behaviour of the Poles and such is the temper of the Lithuanians, that it is impossible for anybody to be sanguine of the results of the negotiations now going on, but the fact that they are going on, and the fact that they are going on under the League of Nations, is, I think, evidence that we have already shown ourselves of value in stopping international conflicts, in diminishing international misunderstandings, and it may be in promoting permanent international arrangements. Another case, known to all of you by name, has without doubt prevented a war and, I think, without doubt has made a permanent settlement possible, and that is the Aaland Islands. That was taken in hand by the League; they sent up a Commission.

Progress of League.

Austria and Poland.

Lithuania and Poland.

Aaland Islands.

The Commission elaborately examined all the facts on the spot; they made an elaborate report to the Council. The result was the Council have come to a decision; that decision, though very unpalatable to one of the parties, has really been accepted by both; and, what I think is more important, the Council of the League have been able to give advice to the successful litigant, which was Finland, advising them to modify their laws in regard to the Swedish population which remains with them under the decision, the Swedish population of the Aland islands, which will greatly mitigate the objection which the Aland islands felt at still being kept within the limit of the Finnish territory; and we have it on clear evidence that it was really the persuasion of the League, because it was the League of Nations, and not one of the Great Powers, that induced the Finns to do what they would otherwise have refused to do, which is to modify their own internal laws at the suggestion of an external authority. Had that external authority been one of the Great Powers, had it been anything other than, in fact, the League of Nations, we have every reason to believe that the Finns would have said, this is our territory, we are really governing it well, mind your own business. I think that is a success in which we have justified ourselves, and which could not have been obtained by any other machinery, the machinery which is now in existence. Then there are all sorts of international questions, which I do not believe could properly have been dealt with conveniently except by the League of Nations. Whether the system of mandates is good or not, the system of mandates depends upon the League of Nations. If you abolish the League of Nations, I think you will have to abolish mandates. Some people think that an advantage. Perhaps from some points of view it might be an advantage, but given that mandates are part of the system that the world desires to see applied in regard to German conquered territory, there can be no doubt that the League of Nations or something like it is absolutely necessary. It is only they who can wisely appoint a Committee to watch how mandates are carried out; it is only they who, on the report of that Committee, can pronounce as to whether they have been carried out. You could not entrust that power to a Committee of Great Nations. The jealousy would be intolerable; the friction would be beyond the power of man to deal with. Therefore, for good or for evil, I consider that mandates are bound up inextricably with the fate of the League of Nations. I do not want to bore my colleagues by going into details, but I would like to add this. We had a great Conference at Barcelona on waterways. Canada was not able to send a representative there; Canadian interests were not touched. Broadly speaking, all Europe was represented, and, I think, South America, and I believe that all-important international question of waterways and transit, much more important, of course, in Europe, which is broken up into small States separated by ancient quarrels—it is more important there than in the new world, still it does perhaps touch the new world—has been considered as it could not have been in any other way.

League of Nations.

Mandates.

Conference on Waterways.

Take finance. The League of Nations appointed a Financial Committee at Brussels. The Financial Committee at Brussels made recommendations to the League of Nations which were pursued by the League and which are now being put into operation. They touch the very vital centre of our present discontents. Maybe it is slow in operation; I daresay it is not very effectual, but it is far more effectual than anything anybody could have contrived without the League of Nations, and the efforts now being made to put Austria upon her legs, to start the revival of credit in Central Europe, will, if they succeed, as I think they will to some extent be almost sure to succeed, be a contribution to the rehabilitation of the economic condition of Europe which really cannot be exaggerated; and I do not doubt that there will be other matters of general economic interest with which the League will be able to deal.

Financial Committee at Brussels.

Then with regard to the International Court of Justice, I do not know what my colleagues of the Conference think of the advantage of an International Court. I think it invaluable; but whether it is invaluable or whether it is not, it is the creation of the League and could never have come into existence without the League. Europe has tried over and over again to do it, and has always failed. We have now succeeded, and the International Court is in a fair way of being constituted and turned into a working machine.

International Court of Justice.

Now let me say one word upon a thing which everybody will admit can only be done by a League of Nations, so far as I can see, namely, the government of certain territories which it is contrary to the public interest should be confided to the undivided authority of any Great Power. I will mention two in particular. One is

Danzig.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

Danzig, the other is the Saar Valley. In the case of Danzig, I think the League has done absolutely invaluable work. Its business was to see that the Constitution framed by Danzig could be maintained. We came to the conclusion that we could not be asked to guarantee a Constitution which, in our opinion, had elements in it which rendered it hopelessly unjust and unworkable. The Danzigers sent us a Constitution in which practically the whole authority of the town was vested in a narrow oligarchy elected for eleven years, and from which all popular democratic authority was excluded. We told them that they really must reconsider that. They have reconsidered it, the whole matter is in process of reform, and I believe we shall get a Constitution in that city which will work, which we shall be able to guarantee, and which will preserve Danzig, which is ambiguously placed between Poland on the one side and Germany on the other, which economically depends upon Poland, upon which Poland economically depends, which is Polish from every point of view except population, but which in population is German. It was a most embarrassing problem which had to be dealt with, as the Prime Minister remembers. It was a problem which embarrassed us tremendously in 1919, which was solved by handing over Danzig to the League of Nations, and I think the League of Nations is showing that it is capable of carrying out the trust with which it has been invested. And who else could you find to carry it out if the League of Nations ceased to exist? I do not believe there is any possibility of finding an alternative. What I say of Danzig I could say, *mutatis mutandis*, with regard to the Saar Valley. The Saar Valley also presented a most difficult and ambiguous problem. It was found necessary, rightly or wrongly, in the course of the negotiations which we carried on, and which we carried on with our Allies the French, to satisfy them with regard to the Saar Valley. I do not say we have satisfied them. They would have liked to have taken the Saar Valley, which in point of population is purely German, and to have annexed it to France, with all its mineral resources. That seemed to the rest of the Conference in Paris to be a very high-handed proceeding, much too like Alsace and Lorraine to be justified, and the actual compromise ultimately adopted was to put the Saar Valley for fifteen years under the League of Nations, thereafter allowing it to determine its own fate by a plebiscite—evidently a compromise very difficult to carry out and involving the possibility of much unfairness, much hardship, much favouritism, and many of the evils inseparable from a form of government so anonymous. I believe, on the whole, that that is working well. It is largely working well, may I say, because Canada was good enough to send us a most admirable man to help us upon the Commission. I only know Mr. Waugh very little indeed; he was good enough to come and talk to me about the Saar Valley, but there can be no doubt whatever that he and the Frenchman, who also did very good work, are really working the Saar Valley as well as we could hope it should work. The French are going to withdraw all black troops, I believe: there are still some there, but they will be greatly diminished, I hope. If they carry out the advice of their own man they will diminish greatly their own garrison. There will be no labour troubles, the whole machinery of government seems to be working smoothly, and, on the whole, as far as I am able to judge from the reports, the government of the Saar Valley is really a triumph for the system which has been adopted, a system the success of which I think any prophet, looking at the matter in a strictly impartial spirit, would have greatly doubted. That the French have never done anything which the Germans have a right to complain of is perhaps saying too much, but, on the whole, that part of the country is orderly, is contented, is industrious, and has none of the troubles one might have expected to have arisen. On the whole, that is due to the labours of the Commission, and the two men on the Commission who have done it are the Frenchman and the Canadian, and indirectly, I suppose, the League of Nations, which is the ultimate responsible authority, may take some credit for the result.

Saar Valley.

Empire's interest in the League.

I have very little more to say. I think this Empire has a very special interest in retaining the League, and the reason I say so is this. I want to point out that the League is really a most important instrument of diplomacy from the British point of view. What is the British point of view with regard to Continental politics? The Empire, far removed as much of it is from Europe, is deeply interested in Continental affairs. It cannot help being interested. We, of course, are still more interested. The British policy on the Continent has for centuries been instinctively of one type; so far as the Continent is concerned, it is to keep the peace and to see that no nation gets a dominating influence within the European area. No doubt our many wars have had great results outside Europe in the way of acquisition of territory and all the things that we know about; but, so far as Europe

League of Nations.

is concerned, what we have always wanted is peace and what used to be called the "balance of power," but what, perhaps, we had better call the absence of any super-State, of any dominating Power. That is the policy of the League of Nations, and while the League of Nations is not strong enough by itself to carry it out, I hope it will be strong enough to carry it out without exciting the jealousies which any British action necessarily involves. Take the case of Poland. Now there have been troubles in Poland on the north and on the south. There are troubles in Poland in connection with the Lithuanian question, to which I have already adverted. There have been troubles in Poland in connection with the Silesian question. In connection with Silesia, it is inevitable that there should be a collision, as there has been a collision, between French diplomacy and British diplomacy. That is the great trouble which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have to deal with. When they go to these Conferences, England is up against France, France is up against England, with infinite evils to both communities. Those jealousies will be largely avoided if the matter is conducted through the machinery of the League of Nations. Then it is not England and France which are involved, not the British Empire, not the British Empire on the one hand and France on the other; it is the forty-eight States belonging to the League of Nations in the background and the eight States which are represented on the Council in the first line, and the result is, as you know, you get a harmony which it is almost impossible to get by the ordinary diplomatic machinery. Mr. Fisher will tell you—he was the President—Mr. Fisher actually got the French to admit that the Poles are hopelessly unreasonable in their whole treatment of this Lithuanian subject.

Mr. Fisher: I got the French to join me.

Mr. Balfour: Yes, he got the French actually to join in that declaration.

Mr. Lloyd George: This time?

Mr. Balfour: It is, indeed, one of the triumphs that he got. It is very difficult to do that when it is a Prime Minister versus a Prime Minister as between England and France. It has been a criticism against the League of Nations that it is not a measure of justice as it is working; the French, for example, could stop every beneficent action or every action that we wanted to carry out—what I call the British view of Continental policy. Well, they could; one Power could stop it, but observe at what cost they would stop it. They would have all the other members of the League against them; all the other members of the Council against them, and if it became knowledge to the world there would be a public debate. The French would give their case—I mention the French, because whatever Power it is they would give their case in public, and the other seven members of the Council, or a fraction of then, would give their case in public, and the whole world would judge between the two. Again, it would not be a sharp collision between nations; it would be a collision between policies considered from an international point of view and debated in public. I admit you very often camouflage it. I do not mean that this method is one that is going to deal with every situation, but they could not stand the public criticism to which a formal debate before the whole world would subject them and their Government. That really is all I have got to say. I am perfectly certain that the League will do what no other machinery can do. I am not certain that the difficulties with which the League are surrounded may not prove to be overwhelming, but I am confident if they do prove overwhelming and if the experiment fails, it will be one of the greatest disasters which can happen to civilisation. That is all I have to say.

Mr. Lloyd George: It has been a most interesting and illuminating statement. I think we had better discuss it this afternoon, and I should very much like to invite an expression of opinion from the representatives of the Dominions as to whether any practical steps could be taken to get the United States of America to associate itself, not with the League in its present form, but with an Association of Nations. At the present moment it is a sort of three-legged chair; you cannot sit on it with comfort or certainly with confidence, as you never know when it will drop you. You have, I think, to get America into it. I should like to consider whether anything could be done with a view to bringing America in. There is a great sentiment there, I am told, in favour of such an Association, and even Mr. Harding, who is a great opponent of the League, admitted there was a sentiment and that he thought America would come in under certain conditions, but not to this Covenant. I should

Possibility of America joining an Association of Nations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

like to invite an expression of opinion upon this subject. Will 3·30 P.M. suit everybody?

Mr. Balfour: I am sorry, but I have to speak at a meeting at 3 o'clock. I dare say I could get here a little after 4, if you do not mind.

Mr. Lloyd George: Very well, 4 o'clock here this afternoon this debate will take place.

(The Conference then adjourned until 4 P.M.)

Note.—A revised copy of Mr. Balfour's statement, as issued to the press, is attached (see Appendix).

2. *Whitehall Gardens, July* 8, 1921.

APPENDIX.

Revised Copy of Mr. Balfour's Statement on the League of Nations as issued to the Press.

Mr. Balfour: I have always been a League of Nations man, long before the League of Nations came into existence, and an experience now extending over one or two years has not only strengthened my conviction that the League of Nations is necessary, but also, I am sorry to say, my fears that it is an institution in many respects difficult to work.

Perhaps I might begin by explaining where I think the special difficulties lie, before I go on to show how much the League has already done, and how hard it would be to create any other authority to take its place. It is true that some of our difficulties are only temporary. The statesmen who at Paris framed the Covenant of the League undoubtedly assumed that the Treaty of Versailles would rapidly and effectually settle the new frontiers, redistribute territories in accordance with the wishes of the populations concerned, leaving to the League of Nations the relatively simple duty of maintaining rights clearly established, and prevent national differences developing into national wars.

Everybody knows that these hopes have not, as yet, been completely fulfilled. The Treaty of Sèvres is still in dispute, and even the Treaty of Versailles has not been fully carried out. One of the most important objects, for example, of the latter was the determination of the boundaries of Poland. But the boundaries of Poland remain still unsettled. Another problem was the status of Galicia. But the status of Galicia is still unsettled. Now everything that leaves Middle Europe in a perturbed condition really requires the League of Nations to deal with a situation never contemplated by those who framed the Covenant under which the League has to do its work.

Another thing that was perhaps not fully considered by the framers of the Covenant was the difficulty of dealing with semi-civilised populations in territories not under mandate. For instance, at the last Assembly one of the problems that excited most interest was the problem of Armenia. The Assembly was deeply moved but quite helpless. Nothing effectual *was* done, nothing effectual *could* be done. The League could only make appeals in favour of a population which it was quite powerless to protect.

Perhaps, however, the most serious difference between the League as it was planned and the League as it exists arises out of the absence from its ranks of three of the greatest nations of the world, two of which are not, so far as we can see at the moment, very likely to join it in the near future—I mean America and Russia.

I hope that Germany will at no very distant date become a member. But Russia will only come in when she had ceased to be what for the moment she is. And whether the Soviet Government endures or perishes, she is likely for some time to come to be a disturbing influence in the east of Europe, which it will be difficult for the League of Nations to guide and control.

Appendix.

These embarrassments are in their nature temporary; but there are others—due to the constitution of the League itself. There is the difficulty, for example, of manning the Council and the Assembly. This is partly the effect of the immense distances which separate many members of the League from our meeting place in Geneva, but partly also it is due to the fact that the statesmen best qualified by their position to deal with League problems, namely, the Prime Ministers and the Foreign Secretaries of the various nations, cannot possibly make a regular practice of attending its meetings. In the case of Great Britain, the work of the Council, and in part the work of the Assembly, has been hitherto done by Mr. Fisher and myself, although Lord Curzon was able to take the chair at one Council which happened to meet in London. We are Cabinet Ministers, and are acquainted with the general views of our colleagues: we can therefore, without inconvenience, exercise a certain measure of independent discretion without in every case referring to our Governments for instructions. This renders discussion more fruitful, and business more rapid than otherwise would be possible; but it is not every member of the League who is in a position to send Cabinet Ministers to Geneva as a matter of course.

Another difficulty which presents itself in our attempts to use the full machinery of the League is due to *money*. We made an attempt in 1920 to obtain funds by voluntary subscription from members of the League, in order to deal with typhus in Poland and the east of Europe. Typhus was at that time, and I fear still is, not merely a great misfortune to the countries bordering upon Russia, the great centre of the infection, but a menace also to nations lying further to the west. Poland was, according to our information, making every effort to deal with this danger; the Council came to the conclusion that she should be supported, and we therefore issued an appeal for funds to the members of the League. The appeal was on the whole a failure, a failure partly due no doubt to the financial difficulties which beset the whole world, partly to the fact that most members of the League were remote from the peril with which we were endeavouring to deal. In some cases very liberal subscriptions were offered, but on the whole it was clear that at least in existing circumstances such appeals were not likely to succeed.

It is indeed evident that under the Parliamentary system the expenditure of the League will always present an easy object of attack. The gain to the world of international co-operation is immense, but it cannot be allocated with any definiteness between the co-operating nations. It is always, therefore, easy for a Parliamentary critic to ask what advantage his particular nation derives from the expenditure which it is called upon to make, and in these days of universal poverty such questions fall upon sympathetic ears.

If this very natural frame of mind is permitted to dominate policy, manifestly, the League will perish. Some common sacrifice, however slight, is required if any common effort is to be successful. I believe this danger is not negligible, though I am sanguine enough to think that it will be successfully surmounted.

So far I have dwelt upon the obstacles which thwart and may even imperil the success of this great experiment. Let me now say a few words upon some of the reasons which require all men of goodwill to do their best to make it a success; and here I can appeal not merely to speculative theory, but to actual experience. The League has been in existence since the 10th January, 1920, say about a year and a half. In that time it has had to create its machinery, to organise its methods, and to devise means for pursuing what is without doubt a new adventure in the history of mankind. One would have thought that these facts alone would modify the sternest critic, and that no one would be so unreasonable as to expect in the first eighteen months, during which this infant institution has been in existence, the full authority and efficiency which only time can bring. But even these eighteen months are sufficient, in my opinion, to show to any impartial observer how valuable the League of Nations can be, and how impotent any other organisation would be to fill its place.

I am the last person to deride what is commonly called "The Old Diplomacy." The Old Diplomacy has for many generations done much in the cause of peace, and those who see in it merely a costly method of embittering international relations and snatching national advantages, completely misread the lessons of history. But there are assuredly many things which the League of Nations has even now shown that it can do, which diplomacy could scarcely attempt, and which it certainly could not attempt with success.

Let us consider them under three heads. The first of these is common international effort for objects which all admit to be good, but which are the special business of no nation in particular. For example, there are abuses which have to be

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Appendix.

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Again, the great Conference which met at Barcelona, under the auspices of the League, to consider the question of international transit by railways, rivers and other waterways, obviously dealt with an international problem of the first magnitude. It was the creation of the League, and without the League could hardly have come into being.

But consider another and yet more pressing subject—the economic condition of Europe and of the world. We have obtained peace, but we have not yet obtained the fruits of peace. The decay of credit, and the paralysis of production, imperil the whole industrial system of the civilised world. I do not suggest that for so great an evil the League of Nations could provide any sufficient remedy; but some contribution it has been able to make to the solution of these difficulties, a contribution which, however modest, could, so far as I can see, have been made by no other method. A Financial Conference was summoned by the League at Brussels in the course of last year. The Conference made some suggestions of great value. These we are endeavouring to apply, particularly in the case of Austria: and any measure of success which we can obtain will have beneficial effects, not only in Austria itself, but throughout the whole industrial world. Every part of that world is more or less organically connected with every other part; and what is required now is that this economic organism, paralysed and wellnigh destroyed by war, should resume once more its vigorous activities.

But there is another and wholly different set of functions thrown upon the League by the Treaty of Versailles, functions which cannot be carried out at all by any single Power, nor carried out effectually so far as I can see except by the League itself. I refer to the government of certain exceptional areas which are not the less important, from an international point of view, because they happen to be small. I refer to the town of Danzig and the Valley of the Saar.

The town of Danzig is economically inseparable from Poland, but in population is predominantly German. The war divided it politically from Germany, while the Treaty of Peace recognised its intimate relations with Poland. At the same time its independent existence as a separate and autonomous community under the protection of the League was fully secured. The League is responsible for maintaining its Constitution, though not for framing it. But the Council felt that it could not undertake to maintain it without satisfying itself that it was just and workable. In its view the Constitution, as originally designed, was neither just nor workable. But through the efforts of the Council fundamental changes are in process of accomplishment, which will, I trust, secure the good government of the city, and promote the most amicable relations with the Polish hinterland.

The other area in connection with which the League is specially responsible is the Saar Valley. The Saar Valley is an industrial area, mostly German in population, lying on the French frontier, and intimately connected with adjacent French territories. By the Treaty of Peace it is, for fifteen years, to be governed by a Council appointed by the League and reporting to it, after which, by means of a plebiscite, it is to determine its own destiny. As far as I am able to judge, the very difficult problem which such an area presents is being dealt with in a fashion at least as satisfactory as we have any right to expect. On the whole, the valley is orderly, industrious and contented. Much of this success is due, no doubt, to the self-devoted work of the Commission, of which Mr. Waugh, a Canadian Scot, is not the least distinguished member, but the Commission is responsible to the League, and without the League I fail to see how the system could be worked. Other duties touching questions of administration are thrown upon the League in connection with mandates. I will not argue whether the system of mandates is a good one or a bad one. On this point opinions differ, but the system is there. It is prescribed

by the Treaty of Versailles, and it represents the deliberate policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with what were once German territories outside Europe. An essential part of that system is that the procedure of the Mandatory Powers in connection with mandated territories should be subject to some kind of international survey. This work has been entrusted to the League of Nations, and I believe that only the League of Nations can perform it. But at present no forecast can be made as to the way in which this system will work. Appendix.

The last heading under which I will consider our activities is perhaps the most important of all. It deals more immediately than any of the others with those international differences which it is the main business of the League to heal. We are sometimes asked what the League has done to promote goodwill among the nations. I am anxious not to overstate the case, but it seems to me that during the eighteen months of its existence our record is far from being barren. I begin with a case which, if the League of Nations had not been in existence, could hardly have ended satisfactorily, though it involved no questions of territory. It seems that during the war large numbers of Jews from the northern portions of what was then the Empire of Austria took refuge in Vienna. After the peace the Austrian Government desired to compel their return to their original homes, now no longer in Austrian territory. The Poles objected. A bitter controversy ensued, and the subject came before the Council of the League of Nations. After a good deal of discussion an arrangement was come to acceptable to both parties, and not unfavourable to the Jewish population concerned.

There is a much larger question which the Council of the League are endeavouring to settle, and unfortunately final success has not yet crowned their efforts. I refer to the group of problems arising out of the relations between Poland and Lithuania. The subject is far too complicated to be dealt with here, but it may be proper to say that, in consequence of an appeal to the League, hostilities between these two countries were stopped, and a scheme determining their future relations is now being discussed in Brussels by the parties principally concerned under the able guidance of M. Hymans, the Belgian representative on the Council, who is acting on behalf of the League. Whether these efforts will end in an arrangement both amicable and permanent it would be premature to say, but I am confident that even the modest measure of success already attained would have been beyond the powers of any body possessing less authority than the League of Nations.

About the dispute between Sweden on the one side and Finland on the other concerning the Aaland Islands, I can speak with more confidence, and in this case a controversy involving the most complicated questions of international law and ethics has been finally settled. The Aaland Islands are Swedish by population; historically and juridically they form part of Finland. The whole subject was investigated on the spot by an International Commission appointed by the League, which, like some other of its Commissions, enjoyed the advantage of having on it an American representative. Their elaborate report was unanimous. They decided that the Aaland Islands belonged to Finland, but they used their good offices to secure the largest possible measure of autonomy for the Swedish population affected by their decision. We have evidence that this concession, voluntarily granted by the Government of Finland, would never have been obtained at the instance of any external Power other than a League of which Finland, in common with most civilised Powers, was itself a member. It would be difficult to find a clearer instance of the manner in which, under favourable circumstances, the League may contribute to the cause of International Peace.

Two further observations I will permit myself before concluding: the first is that, if the League were to dissolve, a new Peace Treaty would have to be framed, and new machinery would have to be devised for carrying out the duties with which the League has been entrusted.

The second observation is especially addressed to the British critics of the League. They must be well aware that for many generations the main anxiety of British statesmen in their Continental policy has been to preserve the peace, and to prevent the domination of any particular Power over its weaker neighbours. Those two aims have not always been compatible, and the first has had more than once to be abandoned in order to obtain the second. They were not compatible, for example, in 1914, but if the League of Nations reaches its full strength and stature, if it be supported by the great moral forces of the world, peace and national independence will be secured without resort to arms. If in the future there should again arise a Power greedy of domination, it will find itself confronted, not merely by defensive

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Appendix.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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SECRET.

PROOF.

E. 20th Meeting.

3rd Revise No 2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON FRIDAY, JULY 8, 1921, AT 4 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. H. A. L. FISHER, M.P., President, Board of Education.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Mr. C. LONGHURST, C.B.

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Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

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Mr. G. BREBNER.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Suggested Pacific Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: Well, Mr. Meighen.

Mr. Hughes: Before you begin to-day's discussion there is a matter I wish to bring under notice. This morning, Mr. Prime Minister, I received a Foreign Office despatch containing a report of the interviews and conversations held between Lord Curzon and the Japanese Ambassador, the Chinese Minister, and a copy of a cable from Earl Curzon to Sir Auckland Geddes. I only want to draw your attention, and the attention of the Conference, to some extracts which I think should be considered. On page 2 the paragraph begins:—

Interviews between Lord Curzon and Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors and Cable to Sir A. Geddes.

"In these circumstances, the plan had commended itself to the Imperial Conference now sitting in Downing Street that advantage should be taken of the interval which was now secured to us to hold a Conference on the Pacific question between all the Powers principally concerned with a view to arriving at an agreed solution. Our idea was to propose to the American Government the summoning at an early date of an International Conference, to be held possibly on American soil or somewhere in the neighbourhood, at which should be represented the Governments of America, Japan, Great Britain, China and the British Dominions who were directly concerned."

There are two other references I propose to attract your attention to, one of them being on page 7 of the second part of the cable from Lord Curzon to Sir Auckland Geddes; it is the first complete paragraph on the page, beginning:—

"Accordingly, with this hopeful information at my disposal, I made to the Ambassador the formal suggestion that his Government should invite the Conference to meet in the forthcoming autumn or winter, and I promised him our assistance in endeavouring to make it a success. Mr. Harvey, in reply, at once began to discuss the question of those who should be invited. He was reluctant to extend the number of these, and he hoped that it might not be necessary to include the South American States. He also raised a question as to the necessity of inviting France or Holland,"

Then the fourth paragraph, page 7:—

"As regards the place and time of meeting, the Ambassador, who throughout treated the assent of his Government as assured, recommended as the most suitable meeting-point the island of Cuba. There, at Havana, there were ample hotels, and the climate in October and the latter part of the year was delightful. The site was very central between the old and the new worlds, and the negotiations could take place in a favourable atmosphere."

Now, I want to protest against the manner in which these conversations have been carried out. Lord Curzon says, in the first paragraph of page 2:—

"In these circumstances, the plan had commended itself to the Imperial Conference now sitting in Downing Street that advantage should be taken of the interval which was now secured to us to hold a Conference on the Pacific question . . . ."

Mr. Massey: Who says that?

Mr. Hughes: Lord Curzon. In my opinion, that, as set out, is entirely inaccurate and not in accordance with facts. Lord Curzon was, without prejudice, to obtain the opinion of the Japanese Ambassador, the American Ambassador and the Chinese Minister in regard to the question, and to ascertain on what terms, if any, their Governments would favour the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. But Lord Curzon has stated in this Report that the very thing we were discussing—the point on which there was such a conflict of opinion—has been already decided and had commended itself to the Imperial Conference. I object to that. It makes it impossible for us to continue a discussion on this very point.

Mr. Lloyd George: Opposed to a Conference in the Pacific?

Mr. Hughes: I say, unless we have a policy in the event of the Conference failing to come to an agreement.

Mr. Lloyd George: I never heard you. It never occurred to me. I am amazed at my own lack of comprehension. I was certainly under the impression that we were all agreed that it was desirable to utilise this interval to effect some arrangement with Japan, the United States, China and ourselves, so that there could be complete views on the Pacific.

Suggested Pacific Conference.

Mr. Massey: That is all right.

(Lord Curzon joined the meeting at this stage.)

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes takes exception to something you have said; he says he never agreed . . . .

Mr. Hughes: What I said was that I did not take exception at all to the Conference provided one point was settled—that in the event of failure to reach agreement it was our intention to renew the Treaty.

Mr. Massey: I agree with that point myself.

Mr. Hughes: The whole point . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George: Here you are. This is the decision:—

Decision of previous Meeting on Consultation with other Governments.

1. "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will notify the Japanese Government that the position is changed and that the British Government are advised that no notification to denounce the Treaty has been given."

That has been done; consequently the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of the 13th July, 1911, remains in operation.

2. "The British Government will inform the League of Nations that we are dealing with the whole Eastern and Pacific question in a larger spirit; that any new arrangement will be in harmony with the Covenant (that is being done); and that in the meanwhile we are prepared to state that wherever the Covenant is in conflict with the Treaty the Covenant prevails."

That is about to be done.

Lord Curzon: It is being done.

Mr. Lloyd George:

3. "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will approach the representatives in London of the United States of America, China and Japan in order to find out whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as modified by paragraph 2, being still in existence, they will enter into a Conference on the matter.

4. "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will report to the present meeting later on.

5. "The British Government will not notify its intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new Conference or a new Treaty has been drawn up by common agreement to replace the present one."

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs seems to have carried out in the letter and in the spirit the instructions unanimously agreed to by the Conference. He has approached the Ambassadors of the United States, China and Japan in order to find out, the Treaty being still in existence, whether we will enter into a Conference on the whole question.

Mr. Hughes: I have no objection to the Conference so long as it is agreed to renew the Alliance.

Mr. Massey: There is just one point, however—the reference to the Conference being held on American soil. I do not remember anything about that.

Lord Curzon: That was the suggestion of Mr. Harvey. I said if the Conference is summoned by America, what are your ideas about it? And he said he thought that Havana would be a very good place. I expressed no preference for any locality.

Time and place of suggested Conference.

Mr. Hughes: I did not say you did. I thought Mr. Massey made it clear, and I certainly did, that we could not attend any Conference in the fall—which we call our summer—we could not possibly attend another Conference here this year. We could not go to Cuba or even to San Francisco. If the Conference were held in the Pacific, we might get over the difficulty by meeting next year.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Suggested Pacific Conference.

Lord Curzon: No definite suggestion has been made to that effect. I have reported, as I believe, with absolute fidelity, what the Ambassador said. There was nothing to prevent the Ambassador, when discussing the idea of a Conference, saying: "Well, I suppose we shall have to discuss where it shall meet, and Cuba would be a good place."

Mr. Hughes: In October this year, you said.

Lord Curzon: Pardon me, I did not say in October this year; that is what Mr. Harvey said to me.

Mr. Hughes: I am quoting from your words: "Accordingly, with this helpful information at my disposal, I made to the Ambassador the formal suggestion that his Government should invite the Conference to meet in the forthcoming autumn or winter."

Lord Curzon: Precisely, and the forthcoming autumn begins in the month of October, and the forthcoming winter ends in March, and that is what I had in view. The forthcoming winter ends in March; according to our computation it does.

Mr. Hughes: Not in Cuba, surely not?

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not think Lord Curzon has departed from the instructions that have been given by this Conference. I think he has most faithfully carried them out.

Mr. Hughes: I will not press the matter any more now, but I will look at what was said and if it was as you say, then there was no difference of opinion between any of us.

Mr. Lloyd George: There was no difference of opinion about the Conference, none, as to the holding of the Conference.

Mr. Hughes: Unless and until . . . .

Mr. Massey: We are agreed on that. Mr. Hughes is right, neither he nor I can attend this year, that is quite certain.

Mr. Lloyd George: When are you leaving?

Mr. Massey: Not before the middle of next month. That is, leaving here.

Mr. Lloyd George: It might be held in the Pacific. Of course, we will discuss later on as to the time and place. We must try to secure a place that is convenient to everybody. Now, Mr. Meighen.

Mr. Meighen: I think what has been done most faithfully carries out the instructions of the Conference. At the time, I protested and said I wanted somewhat different circumstances. I wanted a new and modified Treaty for a year and that was not accepted, the majority prevailed, and its instructions have been carried out faithfully.

Mr. Massey: That is to say that the Treaty stands?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, and on that basis Lord Curzon was to negotiate a Conference in the Pacific.

League of Nations.

Mr. Meighen: I refer now to Mr. Balfour's statement of this morning on the subject of the League of Nations. My first suggestion is this, that this most useful and, I think, very timely and necessary statement of the work of the League, as well as its difficulties and disappointments, should be made public to the fullest possible extent. There will have to be one or two excisions, but with these excisions it would be useful now to have the utmost publicity given to this statement. There is a disposition to criticise not only the work, but the prospects now of the League of Nations. It is an all too prevalent practice, and the review which we have listened to this morning from Mr. Balfour, if widely understood, will have a wholesome effect. Our concrete purpose, I think, is to see if some suggestion can be made and agreed upon, that will bring about a remedying of the one major

handicap under which the League labours to-day. It labours under more than one, it is true, but by far the greatest is the withdrawal, or rather the refusal to enter, by the United States of America. I am not hopeful that I can make any practical suggestion looking to definite action in this regard. I think Mr. Balfour appreciates as much as I do what forces have operated to keep out the United States. It is true, as he says, that the whole subject became involved in the turmoil of a political contest in that country. With that turmoil still proceeding, there is no hope of successful action for a while. But there are other considerations to keep in mind. Firstly this, the United States—there was this important body of sentiment there—were earnestly and conscientiously actuated to move only where they could usefully do so, that is with good results to themselves or to the world, and not to interfere in the settlement of European disputes. I think many of the best people of that country shared a doubt as to the usefulness of their taking part in European politics, and because they shared it, they did not throw themselves unanimously against the interposition of party politics into the question. If they had, they might possibly have resisted the course pursued by a large section of their press. They felt they were not in a position to render useful service in the settlement of these matters. They realised that it had been traditionally difficult for Great Britain and European countries generally to understand the New World, and they feared that they suffered under similar disabilities in trying to deal with the problems of the Old. There was what we all appreciate, the century-long reluctance on the part of the United States of America to leave the Western hemisphere, and that feeling proved to be just about as strong in the year 1920 as in the year 1800. It took hold of the popular mind, and the old instinct reasserted itself. They shrank from going away from the American Continent and meddling with affairs outside. It will take some time to alter those elements of policy. It is not going to be done as soon as perhaps many here expect. The President of the United States, in order to engage the goodwill of many who have firm belief in the ultimate usefulness of some League of Nations, but who object to the present League on one ground or another, has announced that he would like to see some association formed without the disabilities that they see in the present League of Nations, the principal disability in their minds being connected with article 10. In the Presidential contest that was a great bone of contention. It was preached on every platform, as leading them into vague and unlimited responsibilities, and those who took the adverse side against article 10 had much the better success in the contest. Their President has affirmed that he and his Government would like to associate themselves, at some unspecified time, with an Association of Nations which would have the same object, as far as I know, as the present League, but which would be constituted with a better Charter. If I were the head of this Government here, I think I would be disposed to wait until he came forward with a suggestion as to what he really meant.

League of Nations.

America's Refusal to enter League.

Preference of President for some other form of Association of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do you think he is likely to do that, Mr. Meighen? That is the point.

Mr. Meighen: I do not think he is for some little time. I think we shall have to wait for that. I feel sure that in any event another President will, but that is four years from now. It cannot be in less than that time, except in the event of the President's death. Those people of the United States upon whose influence in the Republic depend good relations between Great Britain and that country are very largely the people who are in favour of the League. That is, I venture to think, more true, perhaps, than the people of these islands realise. They are very stoutly in favour of the League of Nations, and their hearts are bent on securing the objects outlined by Mr. Balfour this morning. What I say applies to the ranks that support the President of to-day. They are the larger fraction of the class of people I have described. Of that there is no doubt. There is no room for argument on that score, and the sympathy of that section of American public opinion President Harding must have, or he cannot survive. He must have it. I do not say he cannot retain it, and do very little in the way of practical action towards going into the League of Nations. I do not pretend to give any opinion on that point. I think the progress of time will compel him to hold behind him just this body of American sentiment. In my opinion the more this country does further to solidify the confidence in the fair intentions of Great Britain that now exists among these people, the more helpful it will be; the more we do that the more we hasten the day that they will put themselves as a nation within the League.

Better Relations with America would influence her to join the League.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do you mind developing what you mean by that?

Mr. Meighen: I mean, for example, the step foreshadowed in the conversations the Foreign Secretary has had with the American Ambassador. If in the progress of these negotiations and the proceedings of the proposed Conference they are compelled to have the fullest confidence in the fair intentions of Great Britain, and the desire of Great Britain to keep them on an equality in connection with this Eastern question, that will add to the numbers of those who will press their Administration into the League or into some similar association. An opportunity may occur later when an advance may be made on the part of the British Government, but for the British Government to step out itself and walk towards the President now would probably have the result of his retiring, and the territory between would be just as great as before. I think it would be better to wait until an opportunity presents itself. That may occur, or it may not, but if it does not, then simply by so treating in other matters with the United States as to put it out of their power to criticise justly—by that course of conduct, in my judgment, the hands of the Administration will be forced. I believe that the patience under which this country has stood the utterly incomprehensible—to me certainly indefensible—attitude of the Hearst and kindred press in that country has had the effect of producing a reaction against those influences, and the coldness of America is not as marked now as it was six months ago.

Canadian position.

Now, before I cease I will say a word as to the position in Canada. I have no manner of doubt whatever that it would be with nothing less than a shock to the Dominion that news would be received of any disposition on the part of this Empire to abandon its part in the League of Nations. The Dominion of Canada still looks for the exhaustion of every resource to procure by concert with the United States the purposes of the League, the predominant one of which I take to be the minimising of the danger of war, and the reduction of armaments. The Dominion will scrutinise very carefully the *bona fides* of this and every country in the efforts it puts forth to reach that goal. If it feels that there has been any failure at all to make advances looking to a reduction of armaments all round, looking to the reducing to the minimum of the peril of war, then it will be impossible to bring a Canadian Parliament to the point of sharing in an adequate naval defence or general defence programme of the Empire. The people of Canada want to be thoroughly convinced—the conviction must sink into the people—that there has been nothing left undone in the way of establishing firmly and working efficiently the League of Nations. They must feel that everything has been done in that way, and in every other way, to bring about reduction of armaments. Until they are so convinced, then he has a difficult task indeed who seeks to gain the co-operation of Canada in any programme. That is an essential condition, whoever the Prime Minister or the Government may be, if there is to be a chance of succeeding. The people must be convinced that these efforts have been made. Consequently, there is no disposition there yet to feel that the League should be abandoned, and I speak within the bounds of correctness when I say that on our part we do not intend that the Dominion will be charged with leaving the League.

Mr. Hughes: I have nothing to say at this stage.

Public criticism of League due to ignorance.

General Smuts: I wish to join with Mr. Meighen in expressing my appreciation of the statement which was made by Mr. Balfour this morning. It certainly was most encouraging and heartening. I think there is a feeling of public disappointment with the League; the public generally feel that the League has not responded to the high anticipation of its performance, the high hopes that were entertained of its work, and there is no doubt that that disappointment is profound and widespread. But it is largely due to ignorance; it is not known what work in detail the League has done, that is, the Council and the Assembly, especially the Council, and I think it is one of the legitimate grounds of criticism against the Council that it has not seen sufficiently to the publicity side of its work. All this valuable work, for instance, that Mr. Balfour described this morning, as done in connection with the Saar Basin—I knew nothing about it; I always looked upon the arrangements about the Saar Basin as one of the most risky parts of the Peace Treaty, and I was much encouraged to hear this morning that under the auspices of the League and this Commission which is controlling the Saar Basin, the government of that territory is proceeding along these normal and favourable lines. And so in many other particulars, I am sure it is a genuine criticism against the League, and especially against the Council, that there is not sufficient publicity.

League of Nations.

A great deal of publicity has been given to the meetings of the Assembly; that is all to the good, but I do not think sufficient has been done in respect of the Council meetings. I also wish to say this, Prime Minister, that I appreciate very much the good work that Mr. Balfour has done as a representative of the Empire on the Council. There is no doubt that he has acted as a representative, not only of Great Britain, but of the Empire as a whole on the Council, in a way which I feel reflects honour and credit upon all of us. Now, I have this feeling about the League in regard to the larger question that has been raised. I have this feeling that the British Empire is pledged in honour to stand by the League. The League is our work, there is no doubt about it; the League was hammered out by British representatives in conjunction with America. If ever there is anything in the Peace Treaty which is a product of what I may call Anglo-Saxon ideas, it is the League of Nations, and I think we are pledged in honour to defend it, to defend our own work, and to give it every chance possible. It has fallen on evil days, it is a child which has been born in an evil time; the world is not fit for democracy nor is the world fit for the League, but it is only part of the great disillusion and disappointment that has come over the world. That is no reason why we should become disheartened. We should be all the stronger, all the more determined to pull whatever may be pulled out of the wreck and try to make a success of the League. It has not done so much; it is very young; the atmosphere is very unfavourable, but it is quite possible that the volume of public opinion may keep growing behind it in the years to come, and in the end it may acquire a very great moral authority in civilisation; I think it is the real hope of the world, that the League may acquire such moral authority, may have such a backing of public opinion behind it, that the Governments of the whole of the world, great and small, will listen to the judgment of its Council and its Assembly. I think it is our work very largely; we must back it up. America has fallen out temporarily, but there I am also encouraged by what Mr. Meighen says. It has unfortunately become a party question in America. Wilson mismanaged this question grievously, with the result that it became a party question where it never should have been a party question. The League of Nations idea was really the idea of the Republican Party; the associations that started the thing in America were largely composed of Republicans, but through the political mismanagement of this question it so happened that it was the Republican Party that kept the League out of America. But that may only be temporary, and I think that we should continue to give it all our support, all our strength, and help it on as much as possible.

Empire pledged to defend League.

Suggestion to help League.

The Prime Minister asks what we could do, what steps we could take, what active steps we could take to help the League. I would make these suggestions. In the first place, I think the time has come when we should make a real effort to get Germany in. I know the difficulty has been very largely French opinion, but I am very much afraid that if Germany stays out very much longer she may not desire to come in at all, that new channels may be worn for her ideas, and that she may not desire to join at all. Germany is going to be a great factor, a mighty factor, again in the future of Europe, and the sooner we can get her into the League I think the better.

Germany to join League.

A great change has now come through the settlement of the Reparation question, and I think that the time should be ripe, I hope that the time is ripe, and I hope that the British Empire will be able to use all its influence to get Germany in as soon as possible, because it may otherwise be too late. I know it will be difficult on all points to co-operate with Germany, but, of course, we have these difficulties all round. It is more the risks and dangers of the future that I am looking to, and from that point of view I would have Germany taken into the League as soon as possible. With regard to America, it is possible that we may have to take a different line. The League is not merely an organisation, it is also a great idea, a great system of ideas, on which we are working, and I think if we succeed in getting America into something like a Pacific Conference such as is contemplated, that we shall have gone a long distance in getting America into line with the ideas which underlie the League.

America.

Mr. Meighen: Hear, hear!

General Smuts: I would not bother so much about the formal aspect of the matter, but try and pull America into the League itself. If she says for the present she will not come in, let that rest; for the present she will not come in, but America is willing to join what she vaguely terms an Association of the Nations. She is not opposed to the conception itself; she is only opposed to what has been done in Paris,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

and under those circumstances, I think we should make further efforts to get America into other similar things which are of the character of the League and are intended to fulfil the functions of the League. To my mind there cannot be anything more important that the establishment of some Pacific concert, a system of conferences, to deal with the Pacific question in future, in which America takes her part. If she does that, she will be practically doing the work of the League on a smaller scale in a smaller circle, but doing it in a very essential sphere, and I think in that way we shall be preparing the way for her entry into the greater circle later on.

This is the second suggestion I would make, that we should not try to force America into the League, but should try to get her into other Associations of a similar character, and the Pacific Conference idea seems to me the most fruitful line that we could develop at present.

More Support by Governments of British Empire.

My third suggestion is this. I do not want to utter a word of criticism—I have no reason to do it—but I do feel that we, as Governments, should back the League more strongly. I am not sure that we are not also helping to leave the League, as it were, derelict as an organisation, which is left to go its haphazard way. If our Governments, and especially the British Government, were to back the League more actively, I think that would do a great deal.

Mr. Lloyd George : How?

General Smuts: It is difficult, Prime Minister. I do not want to criticise . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George : If you give suggestions . . . .

General Smuts : I am not sure that some of the questions which we take to the Supreme Council could not be left to the Council of the League.

Mr. Lloyd George: You are getting to the very heart of the thing. This is a real question. Would you mind giving us the sort of question to be settled by the League of Nations which is now disposed of by the Supreme Council? That is a practical question.

Merging of Supreme Council in League of Nations.

General Smuts: My original idea of the League at Paris was this: that insensibly the Supreme Council would go over into the Council of the League, that a time would come, not when you would have two parallel institutions working side by side—a sort of holy alliance on the one side and the League on the other—but insensibly, as we got away from Paris, the one Council would more and more merge into the other, and that the presence of the great leaders, Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers, which was essential in the one Council, would be felt in the other Council too. Unfortunately, there is very little of that so far. So far, the two institutions are continuing on absolutely parallel lines, the Supreme Council doing one set of work, trying to wind up the Peace Treaty, trying to settle all the various questions in the Peace Treaty, and next door you have the Council of the League dealing with another set of problems. It is a question well worthy of consideration, whether we are not approaching the time when these two bodies might not usefully be merged and the Council of the League therefore become a more important body, and acquire greater authority and influence than it has at present. It is a general criticism that I am making. I am not going into detail, because there may be practical difficulties in detail. I agree with what Mr. Balfour has said, that the League is in line with the fundamental ideas of the British Empire, and the methods of the League will also largely foster and further the things which the Empire is carrying out and has at heart. I feel profoundly, that the mission for which the Empire stands in the world is a mission which can be furthered on a larger scale by the League itself, and that from that ideal point of view, too, the League is an institution which is well worthy of our support.

The alternative system of ideas on which we have been working in the past has proved impossible and the Empire system, which is largely also the League system, is the only basis upon which we can continue into the future. I agree with Mr. Meighen, that our peoples want to be given a chance. If they are asked to vote money for armaments; if they are asked to vote money for fleets and armies, they will ask us, in the first instance, have you exhausted every means in your power to make use of the League? They will force that question on us; they will want an assurance, and they will want to be absolutely certain on this point, that every effort has been made to make use of the machinery of the League before they vote money for

armaments on a large scale. From all points of view, I think, even if the League were only an experiment—and I think it is much more than an experiment—but even if it were only an experiment—we are pledged to it in honour and we should support and assist it in every way we can. League of Nations.

Mr. Massey: To commence with I may say that I was exceedingly pleased with the address we had from Mr. Balfour, though I was not surprised to learn that difficulties were being experienced in the operations of the League. The difficulties are not greater than I, for one, expected, because I realised it would be some time, many years, perhaps, before the League of Nations would be able to influence the nations of the earth in the way its promoters and friends expected. I must say that to a certain extent I have been disappointed with the League; I say so candidly; I have been very disappointed with the League and very disappointed with the sayings and doings of its supporters. The one thing that prejudiced me against the League and one that will take some time to get over, was the attempt that was being made to show that the League of Nations had to a certain extent taken the place of the Empire Government; that the Dominions had become, by their representatives signing the Covenant of the League, independent, free to do exactly as they liked, either in peace or in war. That if the Empire got into difficulties, each one would choose for itself whether it was to join and assist the Empire or whether it should make an arrangement for itself with some other country. These ideas were scattered broadcast in every English-speaking country, and I expect everybody here at this Conference knows it as well as I do, and I said at the time and say it now, that if that sort of thing was to go on, I would recommend New Zealand to withdraw. If I had to choose between the League of Nations and the British Commonwealth of Nations, I would stick to the British Commonwealth of Nations every time. I started out a good friend of the League and I want to remain one, but I am bound to say my friendship has been chilled to a great degree by what has taken place. Now there was one point mentioned I think by all those who have spoken, that is that every possible attempt should be made to keep the League of Nations from being a party question. It became a party question in America, and it is killed as far as America is concerned. There is no possibility of the American people taking it up at present, although what the next Administration will do nobody can predict, but in the meantime it is dead in the United States of America, and if my information is correct, it has to a certain extent been used as a party question in the House of Commons. If the League of Nations is going to do any good, it must be kept above party in every country which is a member of the League, in Britain, in America, though it is almost useless to speak of America at present. The chief argument in America against the League was in regard to the Monroe doctrine. I am not at all certain that there was not a provision in the League which was intended specially to prevent it in any way interfering with the Monroe doctrine, and I think it would have that effect.

Effect of League on Status of Dominions.

League should not enter into Party Politics.

Mr. Balfour: There is that agreement and it is proposed to extend it by new amendments.

Mr. Massey: If I were an American I would be an ardent supporter of the Monroe doctrine. I am not at all certain that America is as well off to-day as it would have been if it had stuck more closely to the Monroe doctrine. If it had stuck to the Monroe doctrine it would not have annexed the Philippines and there would not have been this trouble with Japan. However, it is done, and although it may affect us seriously in the years to come, we cannot interfere at present. Then another weak point has been touched on to-day and that is the great cost of the League. I do not really know what it is costing us. It would be quite impossible to tell at the moment what it is costing my country, but I know it is costing a large sum and the representative of New Zealand at the last meeting of the League of Nations adversely criticised the enormous cost, and I think it is costing a great deal more than the nation should be called upon to pay at present. I know these things cannot be run without money, and a lot of money at that; but there is always a tendency to extravagance where men are allowed to fix their own salaries and their own travelling expenses and that sort of thing, and I do think something should be done to keep the expenditure within reasonable limits, at all events during this time of financial stringency through which we are passing. None of us care to ask Parliament to vote large sums of money unless we can really point to the fact that the country is getting some return for it, and I would be better able to submit a proposal for the money required for the League of Nations after having

Cost of League.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

heard the speech of Mr. Balfour to-day. I am bound to say that, and on that account I am glad to have the information he conveyed. There is one point and a very good point which must be admitted in connection with the League of Nations: that is the setting up of an International Court. I think something of the sort was urgently required. Personally I feel we ought to acknowledge that good work has been done in years past by The Hague Conference. I think it did perfectly good work, and if the League could take up the same work and improve on it, it will be worth its place in the world. Do not let us forget that the Empire to which we belong is to-day the strongest factor for peace in the world. I do not think there is any doubt about it, that the Empire will never go to war again for the purpose of increasing its territory or for aggrandisement or looking for indemnities and reparation, though indemnities and reparation are two different things. One would never go to war for those; but this is one of the dangers, and I am afraid of it, that we, the British people, sick and tired as we are of the very name of war after the awful experience we have had during the last six or seven years, may go to the other extreme and may rely on the League of Nations to prevent war when the League of Nations is not able to do it. It will become very useful, I go to the length of admitting it has been useful already, but I do not believe for one moment it will ever prevent war between certain of the Great Powers who are not members of the League of Nations to-day; they may be members, but I do not think the League will be able to prevent war in the case of trouble between any of these Great Powers. If the League of Nations is going to enforce the principles it lays down, it must have force, it must have armaments behind it. I do not suggest for a moment that it should be in a position to provide armies and navies. I know that is impossible, each country must do that for itself, but in case of trouble there must be sufficient force behind the League of Nations to take up a strong position, and I do not see any prospect of that for a very long time to come. We shall come back later on to consider what shall be done to defend the Pacific in the future, and I cannot forget that the very nations who are supposed to be exceedingly anxious for peace, are the nations who are forcing the pace in the way of building ships, and providing munitions of war. I am not going into that at present, but intelligent and sensible men must see what is going on and they must draw their own conclusions. I have said over and over again and I say it now, I am prepared to support at any time a combination between America and Britain with a view to dictating peace along with another powerful nation—France for instance, France is the one that occurs to me—to join in a combination which will make for the peace of the world, and I believe if we had had that at first instead of inviting all these small nations to come in, I believe the League of Nations would have been in a stronger position to-day. Imagine any of these nations being of serious use in the trouble we have just experienced, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras.

International Court of Justice.

Functions of the League.

Mr. Balfour: Hedjaz has not ratified yet.

Mr. Winston Churchill: Hedjaz is Mecca.

Mr. Massey: Neither Hedjaz nor Mecca is a nation yet. It is quite likely that Hedjaz will be. Liberia—the very idea of Liberia being of any use in connection with the League of Nations is, I will not say ludicrous, but it is something very near it—Nicaragua, Panamá, a little strip over the Canal, Peru, Uruguay, which is the place where nearly all the males were killed in a civil war not so very long ago.

Mr. Lloyd George: That was Paraguay, next door.

Mr. Balfour: Paraguay is a member, too.

Mr. Massey: That is where they attempted to establish the new Australia, the socialistic republic which was to lead the world in socialistic matters. Chile, which is not so bad. Chile occupies nearly the whole of the western coast-line of South America, and may be in years to come a powerful nation. I have no doubt the League of Nations will have an opportunity of making peace between them before long. Salvador, and so on. I do not know what you are going to get out of them in the way of contributions, but from any other point of view, I cannot help thinking the League of Nations would be better without them.

Mr. Balfour: Luxemburg is a member also; I do not know her population, but it is very small.

Mr. Massey: But to go back to the point, if we could get a combination, such as has been suggested, of the more powerful nations who would make it their business to police the other nations of the world and keep them within their boundaries and keep peace, not suggest it, but keep the peace. Say to them, you must keep it, or if you do not, we will see that you do. I think we should be in a much better and stronger position than we are in now.

League of Nations.

As to reduction of armaments, I am not at all certain that other nations have much to say regarding that question, but there are two of them, certainly, that are going on increasing all the time—America and Japan. There is nothing seriously wrong with that for the time being, but you cannot tell with this sort of thing what may happen. I have a very friendly feeling towards America, a number of my relatives are American citizens. I cannot forget that this is the sort of thing that is said. A personal friend of mine—and a good personal friend, an American citizen—speaking to me within the last month, said: "You British people are done; your time is past; you will never recover from the war, and you can make up your minds that we are going to be top dog." Coming from a friend of mine, I did not take any serious notice of it, but that is the sort of thing that has sunk into the minds of many American people, and it does not do any good. I have repeatedly heard something similar to that in the steamers going up and down the Pacific. Somebody sent me the other day a copy of a speech delivered at Toronto recently by an American citizen—I cannot put my hand on the speech for the moment—a journalist from New York. He was dealing with the international question, and his whole theme was this: "An American fleet for the Pacific; we are going to have our fleet there, and no other country's fleet is wanted." To me it was a revelation. Of course, he was received courteously. But I do not believe many Canadians agree with that view. That sort of thing does harm, and ought to be discouraged. In Toronto and in Vancouver they are extremely loyal. I do not say that there are many disloyal citizens in Canada. Those two places are enthusiastically loyal, if I am able to judge. All I have to say is this, Prime Minister, I believe some organisation is wanted. I am not enthusiastic about the League of Nations, but something of the sort is urgently required in the interests of peace and in the interests of the world, and if we can do anything to further that object, then, so far as I am concerned and the country I represent, we shall be very glad to assist.

American Expansion in Armaments.

Something in nature of League required.

Mr. Montagu: I do not want to say very much on this subject. I feel particularly grateful to Mr. Balfour for that very valuable collection of instances of what the League has done, and it will be very useful to all of us. I ought to have known them before, but it seems to me the most valuable information to put before the public when one is discussing the merits of the League.

From the point of view of India, there is one body subsidiary to the League which I should like to mention, and that is the Labour Conference, which is more valuable to a country of backward economic development like India than it would be to a European country. It has succeeded in bringing employees and employers and Government representatives together in the face of the world. Seeing the trend of development in the way of getting good factory legislation passed in India, a shortening of hours, a raising of the age of child labour, has brought Japan on in the same direction, which I think will be most valuable to the development of the country we represent here. I should like to ask Mr. Balfour about the expenditure of the League. As I understood it, there was rather a row about that at the last Assembly meeting at Geneva, and a Committee appointed which has resulted in making recommendations which will lead to economies in the future. It is a Budget Committee that has reported, is it not?

Labour Conference.

Mr. Fisher: There is to be stricter financial control and a proposed new allocation of expenses between the members.

Mr. Montagu: The last observation I shall make is this: You asked General Smuts a question which I thought of enormous importance, namely, what General Smuts had in mind when referring to the labours of the Supreme Council as connected with the labours of the League of Nations. You asked him if he could particularise on any special thing which was now being done by the Supreme Council that he would advocate ought to be done by the League of Nations. Did I understand him correctly when I say that he has no specific suggestion to make? As I understand it, the Supreme Council is mainly concerned with wiping up these horrible peace questions, like Greece, Turkey and Poland.

Relationship of Supreme Council to League.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George : And Reparations.

Mr. Montagu : Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George : You could not turn the League of Nations on to adjust a bill of costs between Germany and sombody else.

Mr. Balfour : The League of Nations would never touch anything connected with the war.

Mr. Montagu : Then if that is so, is it not a fact that the Supreme Council really only exists to wind up the war?

Mr. Lloyd George : Yes.

Mr. Montagu: And, therefore, if the League of Nations will never touch anything arising out of the war, there is no overlap between the functions of the two bodies?

Mr. Balfour : There are certain things.

Mr. Montagu : I did not understand the proposition of General Smuts.

General Smuts : What I said was not in a spirit of criticism at all. I was rather influenced by the public effect to-day of the Supreme Council, by its activities, as it were, dwarfing and putting completely into the shade the Council of the League of Nations. The Council in that respect suffers in public estimation.

Mr. Fisher: May I add a few words as a short footnote to Mr. Balfour's speech, with which I was in fullest agreement?

Value of League although America does not join.

You invited us, Mr. Prime Minister, to consider what steps we might take with a view to inducing America to join the League. The point I wish to make is, that valuable as the adhesion of America would be, the League has a most important function to perform apart from America. Its value seems to me to be largely independent of the question as to whether America does or does not enter the League. After all, Europe is the cockpit of war in the world. It is in Europe that you get the great historical antagonisms and the sharp racial tensions between Slav and Teuton, between Teuton and Celt, between Albanian and Serb, Greek and Bulgar, Pole and neighbours of the Pole. The question of the regulation of naval armaments, which I agree can only be effected by negotiation between the great naval Powers, England, Japan and the United States of America, is entirely separate from the question of land armies on the Continent of Europe. It appears to me, for instance, that there is a very great value in getting all the Balkan States, as we now have them, into the League. I speak under correction, but I think we should certainly have had fighting in Albania but for the fact that Albania is now a member of the League. I entirely agree with Mr. Meighen in holding the view that it would be a mistake now to attempt to modify the constitution of the League in the expectation of meeting American opinion. I think that our best course would be to go on with the League quietly and persistently and to let American opinion form itself. In my view, by far the most important question for the members of the League to consider now is the question

Admission of Germany.

raised by General Smuts, namely, the admission of Germany to the League—what steps, if any, should the British delegates or the British Government take with a view to securing the admission of Germany at the next Assembly. There is no doubt that there is a very considerable body of opinion among the States of the League that Germany ought to be admitted, and that if you allow much more water to flow under the bridges before the admission of Germany to the League, you have the risk of a combination between Germany and Russia which will be extremely dangerous. I understand that there is already a considerable change of feeling in France upon that point, and I myself should be very much averse from putting any very strong pressure upon France this year. France is still in a highly nervous condition, which may be realised when I inform the Conference that when a proposal was made to appoint a German as a member of the Opium Commission at the last meeting of the Council, the French did not see their way to accept it, and the proposal was, therefore, postponed. If that is now the feeling of France, it would, I think, be sanguine to expect that by next September France will be willing to assent to the admission of Germany. I am informed, however, on very good authority that

there is a very considerable change of opinion in France, and that after a year from September one might reasonably expect to find France actually consenting to the admission of Germany to the League. Although I am quite cognisant of the fact that many Americans take great objection to Article 10, and to some other provisions of the Covenant of the League, I should be disposed to think that it would be a mistake for us now to attempt to meet American opinion by altering the constitution of a body which is working tolerably well and to the satisfaction of many of its members.

League of Nations.

America.

I should like, in conclusion, to emphasise one point which Mr. Balfour made, and that is that the League, by virtue of its constitution, can perform services which the ordinary diplomatic agency is unable to perform or is less well able to perform. I think there was a very remarkable instance of that in the case of the recent dispute between Finland and Sweden. Finland made concessions in regard to the Aaland Islands at the request of the Council of the League, which the Finnish delegate told me they would never have consented to if they had been dealing with Sweden alone. Those concessions were undoubtedly made to Sweden as a result of services performed by the Council of the League of Nations.

Aaland Islands.

Relationship between Foreign Office and British Branch of League.

Lord Curzon: I would ask leave to say one or two words about the attitude of the Foreign Office towards the League of Nations and its work. The English branch of the League of Nations has nothing to do with the Foreign Office, that is to say, its Secretariat is not inside the Foreign Office, it is independent, and our connection with the work of the League only arises in two ways: Firstly, in the opportunities that occur of referring matters to the Council of the League, and, secondly, in the conversations that take place between the Foreign Office and Mr. Balfour or Mr. Fisher, whichever of the two is our representative at the meetings of the Council of the League. It is quite natural that before they go there they should wish to know what are the views of the Government (of which they are members) in relation to foreign affairs, and on no occasion do they go out without a preliminary conversation with the Foreign Office.

Value of League in Foreign Affairs.

As regards the other category, namely, the opportunities that occur to us of referring matters to the Council of the League, Mr. Balfour has given us a summary this morning of some of its activities, but he might have extended his list, and I can say emphatically, in reply to the question put by General Smuts, that we in the Foreign Office regard the League and the Council of the League as an invaluable instrument for discharging certain duties and solving certain problems with which our machinery is not adequate to deal. I hold that view most strongly, and I will give these illustrations. At one of the meetings of the Supreme Council here we all agreed to make the suggestion to the Council of the League that they should send a Commission of Investigation to Russia, holding that the League, by its wide representative character and by its prestige and impartiality, would carry an authority that no Foreign Office could. That failed, not from any action of ours, but simply because of the hostility of the Soviet Government. Take, again, the question of Armenia, one of the most troublesome we had to deal with. In the early days, when America had retired from the stage, we were looking anxiously in every direction for some nation who would assume the mandate for Armenia, or, if not, that would interest herself in the fate of Armenia. But we did not attempt to do that ourselves; we turned to the Council of the League, and we made representations to the Council of the League. I happen to remember them because I wrote them all myself. Take, again, the question which has been more than once mentioned to-day, and in which the League has really had a very notable success. I am speaking of the Aaland Islands, those islands in the Scandinavian waters which were a bone of conflict between Sweden and Finland. How did that come about? Sitting in the Foreign Office, I used to receive visits almost weekly from the representatives of these two parties; I was tired of the quarrel between them. I felt confident that no advice I gave would have the smallest effect with either party and that the Powers were incapable of solving it by themselves. I looked to the Covenant of the League, and I found there a clause which empowered any outside and detached representative of a country, in a case where the continuance of a disagreement was likely to disturb peace, on his own responsibility to write a letter to the Council of the League asking them to take it up. I did it on my own authority, without consulting anybody, and then I said to the Swedish representative and the Finnish representative, "This is what I have done in the exercise of my responsibility." The thing was done, and they at once deferred to it. In a little time they came to express their gratitude for it, and now they have accepted the result. I only mention that as an illustration of the kind of help that we can give in the Foreign Office.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

I could give you, but I do not want to trouble you with it, a list of other cases in which the Foreign Office here have gladly had reference to the Council of the League, and, in respect of one of them, the institution of the International Court, I have been taking very active steps, those steps being directed mainly to securing a ratification by the Dominions through the persons of their representatives who are now here and who have it in their power, if they can give their ratifications, to bring the International Court into existence at the time the Assembly meets in August or September next.

Relationship of Supreme Council to League.

General Smuts raised the point, which has been dealt with by the Prime Minister, as to how far the Supreme Council can be, or ought to be, replaced as time goes on by the Council of the League. I only mention one consideration which has not been alluded to so far. Look at the Powers who are on the Council of the League now. In addition to the four Great Powers, there are Brazil, Spain, China and Belgium. Well, is it really to be contemplated that, what Mr. Montagu described as a sweeping up of the débris of the war, can possibly be undertaken by any body in which an equal voice is possessed by the representatives of those Powers? Strictly, questions of the late war can only be solved by the Great Powers who fought and won the war. It must not be imagined that the Prime Minister and I derive the smallest pleasure from visiting such detestable places as San Remo and Spa, or that we would not gladly hand over our responsibility to others if we could. But for the present that is impossible. If, however, I am asked what is the attitude of the Foreign Office towards the League, it is this. I would say it is doing work on a necessarily modest scale in the early stages which is very valuable—I think I may say invaluable work. My inclination would be to give it all the chance that we can and to strengthen it for the particular work that it has undertaken. I would not myself be at all disposed to substitute for it at the present stage something else. I would rather keep it on the present basis with such amplifications as we can make.

America.

As regards America, I really think the line to pursue has been indicated by more than one speaker to-day. I would not scrap the League in order to replace it by some new American Association, but I would, by our attitude towards America in all these questions such as the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, accustom them to the idea to association with others, and particularly an association with ourselves growing gradually in a form that we cannot at the present moment determine, but which means that we endeavour to co-operate with the American Government, whether it brings them into the League or not. After all, in four years' time, the present Government will have gone out in America; there may be a change, and whether it ever induces them to come in and give their acquiescence to the present League or not, such a policy as I have described will, at any rate, bring them into co-operation with ourselves and with the other members. I have made these observations mainly in reply to something said by General Smuts, and because I was anxious to remove from his mind what struck me as a false impression as to the attitude of the Foreign Office.

General Smuts: I was glad to hear it.

Previous Doubts of League.

Mr. Hughes: May I say one word. You know very well what my views were of the League of Nations originally and what they are to-day. I can see no reason to change them, but I recognise how greatly the world is distracted and how much it needs peace, and although I am to be numbered amongst those who do not believe in the efficacy of the League to bring about all that its adherents claim, as I have no efficient substitute which I can put forward for acceptance, I am content that we shall remain a member of the League and do whatever we can to make it a success. We who are gathered round this table are members of the same Empire, the majority of us are of the same race; we all speak the same language. But even here it would be idle to deny that on great questions there is frequently a wide divergence of opinion. Any one who remembers the Peace Conference, and can visualise that gathering of all the nations of the earth, must surely realise that human nature being what it is, that it is utterly impossible for such a body to govern the world and determine its destiny. I have refrained from saying anything publicly to belittle the League, nor have I failed to do what I could to afford it opportunities to benefit mankind. But I confess that from its very inception I despaired of its being of use—indeed, that, in some circumstances, it might be a menace—to our Empire, but I had never been able to see that other side of the question presented by Lord Curzon this afternoon. Now I see the League in quite a different light. Lord Curzon has shown, that the Assembly—and to a lesser extent the Council of the League too—is a sort

Present Value.

of appanage of the Foreign Office, enabling us to do things for the glory of the Empire which would not be done so well, if at all, in any other way, and, as Lord Curzon has shown us, the League is to be brushed aside whenever it is necessary for the benefit of the Empire that we should act directly through the Foreign Office. I must confess that, as a zealous supporter of the Empire, such an interpretation appeals to me, but I am bound to say I do not think it would appeal to General Smuts. It is the most complete scathing exposure of the League's futility in deciding the destinies of the world that I have heard. League of Nations.

Lord Curzon: Let me say I do not for a moment recognise your description of my last remark. As it seems, however, to have given satisfaction to you and to General Smuts, I will not pursue the matter.

Mr. Hughes: I am sorry. It will be some consolation to you to know that what you have said gave me, for the first time, the hope that the League of Nations would be useful to the British Empire. I did hope it would serve the purpose of mankind as distinct from the Empire. However, my view, shortly, is this: I think it would be a great mistake for us to withdraw from the League. I think we must give it an opportunity whenever we can do so to be of use to us and to the world. As I have said, experience will prove it utterly incapable of preserving the peace of the world and banishing war from this earth. As for America, I think there is a great deal of truth in what Lord Curzon and Mr. Meighen say—that we should continue our relationship. If America will not come in—we cannot help it. I think it would be a very great mistake for the British Empire to pursue any other policy than it has done since its representatives consented to the Treaty and to the Covenant.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am not going to make any observations. Mr. Balfour, Mr. Fisher and Lord Curzon have represented the views of the British Cabinet on the subject, and the only point that I meant to deal with was the question of the Supreme Council, and that has already been disposed of by Lord Curzon much more effectively than I could, but I think we ought to arrive at some sort of conclusion to this discussion which we can register. The actual form we can discuss later on when we frame one, but I should like something of this sort recorded:—

> "(i.) That, even though the League has not fulfilled all the hopes of its originators, and cannot be expected to do so while some of the greatest nations in the world are outside the Covenant, nevertheless, it has already accomplished an invaluable work which would not have been effected by any international machinery previously existing."

Now, that is the first point. The next point is, I think, that you are generally agreed that Germany should be admitted as a member of the League.

Mr. Massey: Let us keep our hands upon her collar.

Mr. Lloyd George: Now about Germany.

> "(ii.) That Germany should be admitted to the League." *Germany.*

Mr. Balfour: Supposing I am at the next Council, am I to take it as instructions to ask France?

Mr. Lloyd George: No; that is a matter of discretion for you, and it is the view of the British that we ought to press. You can say you press the French privately. You must have some discretion.

Mr. Hughes: Is this for publication?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, this, for instance, you cannot.

Lord Curzon: Publish about Germany?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, I propose it should not be published. (Reading from paper)—"Although the League cannot hope to achieve its full purpose as long as the United States of America is not a member, it is not desirable to take any steps at this moment to approach the United States of America with an invitation to join the League." *America.*

Mr. Meighen: I would not put that in. Let us be silent upon it.

Mr. Churchill: There is not much advantage in putting it in.

Mr. Hughes: I think a "Bowdlerized" version of the first would be better. It would mean just the same.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

League of Nations.

Constitution of League.

Mr. Lloyd George: I wanted to come to the second point. I say at once, I am not satisfied with the constitution of the League. I did not think it would work. I agree absolutely with Lord Curzon. The idea of having China, Brazil, Spain and Belgium with equal authority with the Great Powers who have had the whole burden of carrying out the League, I think it is a perfectly impossible position but when the United States of America, Russia and Germany come in, well, then, you must find some means of getting the little nations represented in proportion to their weight. That is all.

Mr. Hughes: This is not a good time for us to withdraw from the League.

Mr. Lloyd George: No, I am not suggesting that. What I want to say is this, that I do not think it would be desirable to discuss all that until the United States of America comes in, but if the United States of America comes in, I think it is a suitable time to discuss the constitution questions. There are questions like the Xth Clause of the Covenant, those are questions to be discussed. I believe the Covenant to be much too rigid, to be much too binding in its verbal obligations. The Supreme Council is a much more effective body, because it has no clauses. We all go there without any binding Covenant to say that whatever is done there shall bind all, that we have to guarantee the particular frontiers which we lay down or enforce any particular decisions that we take, but all the same we do it. I do not think we can put it in the form of a Covenant, and if we do I think we would smash it.

Mr. Meighen: Why not in the recital also affirm that the Conference does not feel that the constitution of the League is beyond improvement?

Mr. Lloyd George: I should be very sorry to see, if there were any conclusions here, a conclusion which indicated that we were quite satisfied with the constitution of the League, and that we were bound in future. I think on the whole I can say it requires a little more consideration. These have now been roughly drafted, and I think you had better allow us to frame something to submit to you later on. I think we ought to have some conclusions not for publication, but to be recorded in the *procès-verbal.*

Question of Publication.

Mr. Hughes: Are you going to publish anything? I thought one was for our record and another of a different kind. I do not see what you gain by giving publicity to it.

Mr. Lloyd George: You must publish the fact that we have discussed it.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Is not Mr. Balfour's statement, with some editing, an extremely suitable thing for the public? It would be very useful to the public.

Mr. Balfour: What is that?

Sir Thomas Smartt: I think your statement with a little editing—there are one or two things you would not like to publish—would be a very extremely educative thing to publish.

Mr. Lloyd George: If I might suggest to Mr. Balfour that he should do it and let the press get it early to-morrow, very early, for the Sunday papers.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Yes.

Mr. Massey: You mean the "Observer" and the "Sunday Times"?

Mr. Lloyd George: The Sunday papers; they have twice, if not two and a half times, the circulation of the daily papers.

Mr. Meighen: I would not mention America, but I would associate the idea of the possible imperfections of the constitution with the fact that the other nations are not in it.

Mr. Lloyd George: There must be a paragraph about the functions of the Supreme Council in clearing up the débris of war. What have we got on Monday?

Panama Canal Tolls.

Lord Curzon: When are you going to take the question of the Panamá Canal tolls?

Mr. Lloyd George: Let us have it.

Panama Canal Tolls.

Lord Curzon: The question was raised in this way; the other day the American Ambassador came to see me and told me that the present administration in America, having put into their platform at the Convention a statement about their resolve to revoke the policy of their predecessors and to open the canal free from tolls to the coastwise traffic in America, had introduced a Bill into Congress with that object. The Bill has passed the House of Representatives, and is now before the Senate, and President Harding, having pledged himself in his electioneering campaign to support this policy, will have to put his signature to the bottom of the Bill. The Ministers will remember that when a Bill of this sort was passed at an earlier stage some years ago, in direct violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as interpreted by us, and, I believe, by the great majority of people, that Bill was, as soon as President Wilson came into office, revoked by him. The new proposal involves a complete reversal of policy on the part of the United States, and challenges the position which we have always hitherto assumed. The Ambassador came to me with the proposal to buy our consent to this change of attitude by a concession which his Government are prepared to make to Canadian coastwise traffic, that is to say, they are prepared to give the same immunity from dues and tolls to the Canadian coastwise traffic as they are proposing to give by this legislation to themselves. I pointed out that this raised a great issue of Imperial policy, and that I could not pledge the Government without consulting the Cabinet and Mr. Meighen, which I would have to do before giving an answer to him. The view taken by the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade and all the Departments concerned is that it would be highly undesirable to make this surrender. We then referred it to Mr. Meighen, and I believe Mr. Meighen holds the same view; and if we are unable to make what I think would be a really unholy bargain, the only course open to us is to protest to the American Government fiercely against the line of action which they are pursuing, which I think is in the highest degree immoral, and if we are unable to agree on the matter, to insist upon arbitration. I have, more than once, mentioned here Lord Grey's Treaty setting up a Commission for the investigation of any case in which the American Government and ourselves are disagreed, and I think we must insist upon referring this case to this Tribunal. For the moment, our decision is only on the point whether I am to return—which I hope you will authorise me to do—a formal negative rejoinder to the American Ambassador.

American Ambassador's Proposal.

Recommends rejection.

Mr. Meighen: I have not the least hesitation in dealing with the Foreign Secretary's statement. It is some years now since I have had an opportunity of reviewing the Treaty and the history of the discussions that led to it. I think it was in February 1914, when President Wilson vetoed legislation, that had passed both Houses—legislation that had the effect of giving preferential rates. I came immovably to the conclusion that any such legislation was a breach of the Treaty of the plainest kind; that for the United States to carry out such legislation would be simply taking a great world franchise, to the securing of which the concurrence of other Powers had been obtained on certain conditions, and, having done so, simply scrapping the conditions and seizing the franchise to itself. That is what this contemplated action means. Our Canadian traffic is affected seriously; I mean to say our coastwise traffic. More than that, we have the Dominion Government operating now a mercantile marine, and we are interested in that as a Government as well as a people—in the preservation of this coastwise traffic. That part of the traffic will increase very probably most rapidly of all. To let the Bill pass on condition that we secure this concession from them would, as far as the advantage to Canada is concerned, be very great. There is no doubt about that. But I for one will never be a party to the purchase of an unfair and unjust—should I say dishonourable—advantage. I do not think we have any right to it. Nor can I conceive the British Government acquiescing in the disturbance of the whole basis of a solemn Treaty, merely at the price of an advantage to Canada. These opinions of mine are firm. I think they are based on a careful study of the Treaty and its effect. I would say by all means protest in the most vigorous terms against the action, carry the protest to the utmost publicity at the present time. All I fear is whether it would be wise for us to suggest arbitration on a point clearly decided already. I think it would be better to wait for them to do so. The Treaty itself is the conclusion of an arbitration, and it looks like asking for re-trial of a case that is not now decided in our favour. However, as to that, I do not pretend to speak with authority, or to adduce further argument. I would say, at least, carry your protest to some considerable length before suggesting arbitration.

Preferential Rates.

Concession advantageous but unjustifiable.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Panama Canal Tolls.

Lord Curzon: The American Government is unhappily committed, and the Ambassador told me that the President's signature would be placed to the Bill, and we might protest to the uttermost, but nothing will happen. It is before the Senate, and it has been held up by this unholy offer made to us. The Bill will go through the Senate, and will be signed by the President, and we can protest, but nothing will happen. The American coastwise traffic will be exempted. In these circumstances, what is the good of having an Arbitration Treaty with America unless you use it? It was passed really to deal with cases of this sort, and our case is so strong that we should go into arbitration with every confidence. If Mr. Meighen could suggest any other alternative, I should be glad to consider it; but, to my mind, the only other alternative is inaction.

Question of Arbitration.

Mr. Meighen: I do not know of any other alternative, but it will be very valuable to let the world understand the strength of the protest. If you could get the suggestion for arbitration to come from them it would be so much the better.

Mr. Massey: I am glad to hear the opinions expressed by Mr. Meighen, and I congratulate him upon them. I am not surprised at this, though I had not heard of it before, but I have thought for some time that something of the sort would be attempted. I do not know whether the members of the Conference know that America has just raised its customs dues against the Dominions. We are to some extent affected. The customs dues have gone up; they were supposed to be on trial for six months, but I have not the slightest hope that they are going to be reduced. This is giving ships of the United States a tremendous advantage over the ships of other countries going through the Panamá Canal. If they are going to do this, there is no reason why they should not increase the canal dues. The canal dues might be increased so as to make it prohibitive for ships to pass through, except American ships. This may be a serious thing for New Zealand. Formerly, our shipping invariably went round Cape Horn, but nineteen out of every twenty ships now go through the canal, paying its dues. It pays them to do so, but I can just imagine the consternation in the country I represent when this gets out, and I hope that Lord Curzon will do what has been suggested—make the strongest protest possible. It is a most serious breach of faith. That was the one thing that led me to hope that America would not attempt to interfere after what took place some years ago, when President Wilson came into power. I do hope that they will reconsider the thing, and think better of what has been proposed. If not, the Pacific will be an American lake. That is what it amounts to.

Customs Dues Raised against Dominions.

Mr. Hughes: I can only support what has been said. You can see what it means to us. Panama is the most direct route to the East Coast of America, and at least as near as any other route to Europe; and we should have to regard any attempt by America in the direction suggested as a most unfriendly act, and not to be tolerated. It does not reveal that spirit of friendship which is so desirable in all branches of the English-speaking race. I have no doubt that Lord Curzon, when he has an opportunity to put the matter before the Ambassador, will be able to make him see in what light we view it, and he will then have an opportunity of hearing what the Ambassador's views are.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should like to express a word of gratification at the very notable declaration made by the Prime Minister of Canada, and to thank him on behalf of the United Kingdom, and, I think, on behalf of the Empire, for the very loyal and courageous stand which he has made. I think his stand will have a very far-reaching effect throughout the world.

Mr. Massey: It is a splendid thing to do.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is a very fine thing to do.

Future business.

Sir Maurice Hankey: As regards future business, is it impossible to have the Indian Conference to-morrow?

Mr. Lloyd George: The difficulty to-morrow is that we cannot get General Smuts, and he is very much concerned in the statement made by Mr. Sastri. What about Naval Defence on Monday? The suggestion is that the question of the Constitutional Conference should be discussed on Monday afternoon, and Imperial Policy in Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Hughes: That would work in, I should say.

Mr. Lloyd George: Let us have that on Monday afternoon if it suits everybody.

Mr. Hughes: What about this morning's publication for the press?

Mr. Lloyd George: We suggest that we have simply discussed the question of the League of Nations, but I think there would be a great . . . .

Mr. Hughes: I mean this morning's particularly.

Sir Maurice Hankey: We sent out a short notice, but Mr. Sastri did not want to publish.

Mr. Sastri: I think that in South Africa and in India there will be all sorts of comments made and it will create an unfavourable atmosphere.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is a very wise position. On Monday, I am not sure we had not better put the difficulties from this end, the difficulties we experience, and then invite the views and suggestions of the Dominions upon questions of foreign policy.

Mr. Massey: Is it possible to get the opinion of some constitutional authorities before then on some of the points that have been raised? I do not know who you have here in the way of constitutional authority unless it is the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, he would be available. It is rather a question of practical difficulty than otherwise, how we are practically to elicit your views upon questions which arise from day to day. That is the question, whether you are going to leave someone here with whom we can confer and whom we can send for, and who knows fairly well the views of his Government.

Mr. Hughes: We have to consider, of course—you will remember Mr. Meighen's memorandum, that goes to the very root. Clearly, that is linked up with the constitutional question.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is it.

(The Conference adjourned until 4·30 P.M. Monday, the 11th July, 1921.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, July* 8, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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Mr. Massey: I am glad to hear the opinions expressed by Mr. Meighen, and I congratulate him upon them. I am not surprised at this, though I had not heard of it before, but I have thought for some time that something of the sort would be attempted. I do not know whether the members of the Conference know that America has just raised its customs dues against the Dominions. We are to some extent affected. The customs dues have gone up; they were supposed to be on trial for six months, but I have not the slightest hope that they are going to be reduced. This is giving ships of the United States a tremendous advantage over the ships of other countries going through the Panamá Canal. If they are going to do this, there is no reason why they should not increase the canal dues. The canal dues might be increased so as to make it prohibitive for ships to pass through, except American ships. This may be a serious thing for New Zealand. Formerly, our shipping invariably went round Cape Horn, but nineteen out of every twenty ships now go through the canal, paying its dues. It pays them to do so, but I can just imagine the consternation in the country I represent when this gets out, and I hope that Lord Curzon will do what has been suggested—make the strongest protest possible. It is a most serious breach of faith. That was the one thing that led me to hope that America would not attempt to interfere after what took place some years ago, when President Wilson came into power. I do hope that they will reconsider the thing, and think better of what has been proposed. If not, the Pacific will be an American lake. That is what it amounts to.

Customs Dues Raised against Dominions.

Mr. Hughes: I can only support what has been said. You can see what it means to us. Panama is the most direct route to the East Coast of America, and at least as near as any other route to Europe; and we should have to regard any attempt by America in the direction suggested as a most unfriendly act, and not to be tolerated. It does not reveal that spirit of friendship which is so desirable in all branches of the English-speaking race. I have no doubt that Lord Curzon, when he has an opportunity to put the matter before the Ambassador, will be able to make him see in what light we view it, and he will then have an opportunity of hearing what the Ambassador's views are.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should like to express a word of gratification at the very notable declaration made by the Prime Minister of Canada, and to thank him on behalf of the United Kingdom, and, I think, on behalf of the Empire, for the very loyal and courageous stand which he has made. I think his stand will have a very far-reaching effect throughout the world.

Mr. Massey: It is a splendid thing to do.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is a very fine thing to do.

Future business.

Sir Maurice Hankey: As regards future business, is it impossible to have the Indian Conference to-morrow?

Mr. Lloyd George: The difficulty to-morrow is that we cannot get General Smuts, and he is very much concerned in the statement made by Mr. Sastri. What about Naval Defence on Monday? The suggestion is that the question of the Constitutional Conference should be discussed on Monday afternoon, and Imperial Policy in Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Hughes: That would work in, I should say.

Mr. Lloyd George: Let us have that on Monday afternoon if it suits everybody.

Mr. Hughes: What about this morning's publication for the press?

Mr. Lloyd George: We suggest that we have simply discussed the question of the League of Nations, but I think there would be a great . . . .

Mr. Hughes: I mean this morning's particularly.

Sir Maurice Hankey: We sent out a short notice, but Mr. Sastri did not want to publish.

Mr. Sastri: I think that in South Africa and in India there will be all sorts of comments made and it will create an unfavourable atmosphere.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is a very wise position. On Monday, I am not sure we had not better put the difficulties from this end, the difficulties we experience, and then invite the views and suggestions of the Dominions upon questions of foreign policy.

Mr. Massey: Is it possible to get the opinion of some constitutional authorities before then on some of the points that have been raised? I do not know who you have here in the way of constitutional authority unless it is the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, he would be available. It is rather a question of practical difficulty than otherwise, how we are practically to elicit your views upon questions which arise from day to day. That is the question, whether you are going to leave someone here with whom we can confer and whom we can send for, and who knows fairly well the views of his Government.

Mr. Hughes: We have to consider, of course—you will remember Mr. Meighen's memorandum, that goes to the very root. Clearly, that is linked up with the constitutional question.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is it.

(The Conference adjourned until 4·30 P.M. Monday, the 11th July, 1921.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, July* 8, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 21st Meeting.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, JULY 11, 1921, AT 12 NOON.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT BIRKENHEAD, Lord Chancellor.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

American invitation to Conference on Disarmament preceded by a Pacific Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have to give an answer in the House of Commons on the Anglo-Japanese position. There has been a very dramatic change in the whole situation, and although it has been nominally brought about by the President's invitation, it is really the result of our action here. You will recollect that it was decided here to approach the American, the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors with a view to suggesting a Conference on the Pacific question. That has produced one of the most remarkable documents of modern times in the form of a direct invitation from the President of the United States of America to a Conference on the question of disarmament, to be preceded by a Conference on the question of the Pacific.

Mr. Meighen: Is "preceded" the right word to use?

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Curzon will tell you about that. As you know, I saw Mr. Harvey, and I can only take his interpretation of it. I understand the Foreign Secretary has also seen him, and he has given him exactly the same interpretation. His interpretation is this, that a Conference should be held at Washington on disarmament, that those who are invited to take part should be the Allied and Associated Powers, to use the old phrase; that the Conference should be preceded—this is Mr. Harvey's interpretation of those words—by a Conference amongst those whom it concerns—that also has to be interpreted, but his views are more or less identical with ours on that subject—China, Japan, United States of America and the British Empire: that the two Conferences should be held at different times and at different places, but that the Pacific Conference should come first. That is obviously sensible, for you cannot settle disarmament until the various Powers know where they are in reference to this great Pacific issue. The immediate question is the answer I am to give in the House of Commons to-day. It is not quite ready, it is being drafted, but Lord Curzon will have it in about five minutes.

Lord Curzon: It will take a quarter of an hour to go through it and get it right.

Time and place of Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: Then comes the other question of time and place. As far as the Pacific Conference is concerned, there would be an obvious advantage to us, and certainly to those who have come here from a great distance, to have a Conference before we dispersed. London would also be the most convenient place. President Harding has invited us to Washington for the Disarmament Conference. Well, if we go to Washington for disarmament, then I think we are entitled to ask their representatives to come here for the preliminary Conference.

Mr. Massey: Yes, and soon.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, before this Conference disperses. Mr. Harvey, as you know, was very favourably impressed with that idea. He was very much impressed with the appeal which you both made to him as to the impossibility of your attending a Conference later on in the year after you had returned to your respective countries. He thinks that that will carry very great weight with the United States of America, who are anxious to meet our convenience in that respect. How Japan would view that I do not know. It is not that they would object to London; the only point that would weigh with them is whether they have anyone here who carries sufficient weight to represent them on a question of such moment to themselves. Ishii, of course, is a first-class man. Hayashi is obviously inadequate. If Chinda had been here I have no doubt at all they would agree, but it would take six weeks to come here from Japan by the quickest route, would it not?

Japanese Representative.

Lord Curzon: It takes three weeks from Japan to America and then a week across, that is four weeks, and then a week over here will make five, throw in a few days, and then you have the best part of six weeks.

Mr. Hughes: Where is Chinda?

Mr. Lloyd George: I think he has just returned to Japan.

Lord Curzon: Ishii was the man who was in America and signed the American Agreement with Lansing. He has been in Paris. Did you not meet him in Paris, Mr. Balfour?

Mr. Balfour: I do not know whether Ishii was the man in Paris.

Lord Curzon: I believe he was a delegate to Geneva.

Mr. Balfour: Yes, that is right. I know him quite well.

Mr. Lloyd George: I know him, too. He is a very interesting man, but whether he carries sufficient weight or whether the Japanese would feel that they were well and sufficiently represented at two Conferences that are very important to them, I do not know. They could not send anyone else in the time. Six weeks is almost prohibitive. **Pacific and Disarmament Conference.**

Mr. Balfour: The United States of America could hardly have contemplated a Conference at Washington at this time. The heat there is worse than it is here.

Mr. Lloyd George: No, they do not intend that. The Pacific Conference should come first, and Mr. Harvey thinks they would not mind meeting here.

Lord Curzon: I might say that the American Ambassador particularly asked me to take care that no mention of the first Conference being held here should be made at this date. You know how very susceptible they are, and as the Conference is being convened by the American President, he would not like the suggestion made from this end that we thought it should take place here. If the suggestion is made to him the Ambassador thinks he would readily conform to it, but he would not like us to publish it.

Mr. Massey: That is the Pacific Conference?

Lord Curzon: Yes.

Mr. Balfour: Could he not make the proposal?

Lord Curzon: I have no doubt that he would be prepared to do so. I told him I would see him after this Conference had taken place and communicate with him about the matter.

Mr. Hughes: I do not think the Americans could possibly take exception if you said, "We accept your invitation to go to Washington to discuss disarmament," and then adding, "We ask you to come here for the other Conference." I see your point with regard to the Japanese. They might say, "We are very much interested in this, and we must have our best men present, and they cannot get here under six weeks."

Lord Curzon: Ishii is in Europe. Was he at Geneva the other day, do you know?

Mr. Lloyd George: He came here to the Supreme Council, if you remember.

Lord Curzon: Was he at Geneva last week? We could easily find out.

Sir Maurice Hankey: I will find out.

Lord Curzon: If Viscount Chinda is still with the Japanese Crown Prince he will be in Europe. He left Paris only yesterday.

Mr. Lloyd George: Chinda is the man I think they would trust.

Mr. Hughes: Who is the present Ambassador?

Mr. Lloyd George: Baron Hayashi, but I do not think that he would do.

Lord Curzon: Hayashi knows the question almost better than the others, because he was their representative in China for many years. I think he knows the Far Eastern question as well as they do, but he has not got either the ability or the personality of the other man.

Mr. Hughes: What is the alternative? The matter will have to be decided, and decided quickly, if you are to have it here. It must be decided quickly in any case, for Mr. Massey's sake and my own. We must know where we are. What is the alternative if they will not agree? Cuba is out of the question. There is only one place other than London we can go to. I have discussed the matter with Mr. Massey, and Honolulu is the only place that we can go to, in the second week in January. *Date and site of Conference.*

Mr. Lloyd George: The two Conferences ought to be disposed of in the course of this year.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, I see that.

Mr. Lloyd George: You have here a very favourable atmosphere, and I think it is obviously in the interests of the whole problem that we should approach it immediately.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Lord Curzon: What is the latest date by which you and Mr. Massey must leave England?

Mr. Massey: The middle of next month.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Massey and I discussed this yesterday, and we must both be back in our own countries at the same time. I have made an arrangement with my Parliament, and I must be there in the first week in October. Of course, if you say to me: "There is a Conference to be held here, stay another week," and the Conference is of such vital importance as a condition precedent to the Conference on Disarmament, that will be my answer to my Parliament, and I am prepared to give it. But you see, Sir, there is a limit. I must be back some time.

Mr. Massey: I am in exactly the same position. I promised my Parliament that I would be back in October, and Parliament will be convened for the middle of September. They are looking forward to my being there because we propose to undertake a revision of the Customs tariff, which have not been touched for a dozen years and need revising very badly. The understanding was, when I left, that we should take that matter up and be ready to go on with it by the time I got back. As Mr. Hughes has pointed out, if it was only a matter of postponing my departure for a week, I could tell Parliament my reason for waiting, and I do not think there would be the slightest objection on their part. The only difficulty then would be that the ships might not fit in so well.

Mr. Lloyd George: If there is a preliminary Conference and then you go on to Washington, Honolulu or Victoria—which is another suggestion—might do for the preliminary Conference.

Mr. Massey: Victoria or Vancouver would be the place in Canada where it could be held.

Mr. Lloyd George: Then comes Washington.

Mr. Meighen: That is 3,000 miles away.

Mr. Hughes: We cannot have two Conferences on the American Continent. That would not do. We have certain interests here, and we must preserve them, and regard must be given to the "atmosphere," and our favourable atmosphere is here.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we ought to press for the Conference here. I understand from the Foreign Secretary that Viscount Chinda has left Paris.

Lord Curzon: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should have thought it would be better to have Chinda, Ishii and Hayashi together.

Lord Curzon: The difficulty is about their getting their instructions without consultation with their Government.

Mr. Lloyd George: But they know the problem very well.

Mr. Churchill: If they would come here, all the better. Is there not rather a danger that the Americans may feel—after all, it is a great Pacific question and a vital one for the Powers bordering on the Pacific—reluctant to come after what happened at Paris, when President Wilson got into such trouble with his own people? If they would come, nothing could be better. America and Canada would be a half-way house for everybody. If they would not come here, the next best thing would be Canada.

Mr. Lloyd George: But how can you suggest Canada on the Washington invitation? Why should we want a Conference in Canada and another in Washington? I could understand Canada being taken as a compromise for both Conferences. To have one Conference in Canada and one in Washington is a thing which they would not comprehend. They would say: "Obviously, you have an objection to Washington, not because of the distance, but purely because it is Washington."

Mr. Balfour: Also because it is August. There are people here who know more about it than I do, but I remember talking to some Washington people, and

they told me that Washington was an impossible place to do business in in the height of summer.

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Meighen: It is never hotter there than it is here now. I do not know the difference between the atmosphere of Victoria and Vancouver Island and the atmosphere of London.

Mr. Hughes: This means a great deal more to us than to you. You have 100,000,000 people right alongside of you. We cannot go to our Dominions and return. We cannot get back here; you can go to Canada and return here for the Conference; we can get, as I have told you, to Honolulu in the second week in January. That is the best we can do. I think *here* is the place.

Mr. Meighen: The suggestion was to hold the Conference there on your way home. You would save two weeks by having it in Victoria.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, but it seems rather absurd to have a Conference in Victoria and then to say: "We have settled that now, let us go on to Washington and settle the other." We could not do it. If we did not do it right away, we should all have to come back here and go to Washington then.

London best site for Pacific Conference.

Mr. Massey: London is the place for the first Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we ought to make a real effort to get it here.

Lord Curzon: I do not think there will be any difficulty. When I saw the Ambassador just now and discussed with him the proposition which you have laid down, that the two Conferences must be at different places and at different times, and that the Pacific Conference here should precede the other, he accepted both. Then I went on to discuss the place, and he himself made the suggestion to me that it should be London. He said: "I think if we have the big Conference on disarmament at Washington it will be only reasonable that our Government should conform to your wishes." He particularly mentioned the convenience to Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey of having the Conference here. He said: "I do not want you to say anything about that at the present stage. Could you come with proposals to me and talk them over with me, and I will make proposals to my Government?" I do not think from his point of view, or from the point of view of his Government, that any difficulties will arise. Therefore, I think this part of the discussion is really superfluous.

Mr. Massey: So far as the South Pacific is concerned the interests of Britain are very much greater than the interests of the United States of America. There is no question about it. They have not much concern there; they have few interests in the South Pacific. I am not speaking of the northern hemisphere, that is a different thing, the Canal itself gives an enormous interest to the Pacific.

Mr. Meighen: We are quite satisfied if we can be here.

Mr. Massey: Would you wait another week?

Mr. Meighen: I think I shall go home and, if essential, come back.

Mr. Massey: I would have to get a steamer at Vancouver—that seems to be my easiest way home. I have to leave here by about the 18th of next month.

Mr. Churchill: Would China come here?

Lord Curzon: China, of course, is delighted with the invitation.

Mr. Hughes: My arrangements at present are I am to leave by a boat—I think it sails from here on the 20th August.

Mr. Massey: The same time as myself.

Mr. Churchill: For a matter of such importance, Mr. Massey, would not your Opposition or your Parliament be content to have you spend a little more time?

Mr. Massey: I think Parliament will do what I request them to do.

Mr. Churchill: I think our position here would not be very good if the Prime Ministers were absent.

Mr. Massey: No doubt Parliament will do what I ask them to do. I have to show that I have done my best to keep my promise if there is not any other business of very urgent importance.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Churchill: I think this is the biggest thing we have had to do for a long time, and one cannot spoil the negotiations for a day or two.

Duration of Conference.

Mr. Hughes: Look here, Mr. Churchill, the point is this: when would this Conference start? We have a Constitutional Convention coming on. The matter does not interest you, but it is of great importance to Australia. We must pass the necessary legislation before the end of the year. The whole thing is highly controversial, and it has to be done as provided for by our Constitution. Any time later than, say, the middle of October will make it impossible for me to carry out the policy of the Government and the deliberate solemn pledges that we have made to Parliament, but if you say a fortnight, I may be able to manage it.

Mr. Churchill: This Pacific Conference is going to be a long business. It is not a thing that can be settled at a few meetings. The whole future of China and Japan, and the inter-play of Japan on Russia, all that will come in on the question of the United States of America, Japan and this country. I think there are formidable groups of problems and it might take two or three months before we arrive at any conclusion. Do not you think it will take a long time, Prime Minister?

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not say that it will take very long—not more than a fortnight.

Mr. Churchill: Nor more than a fortnight?

Mr. Massey: This is not open to the press?

Mr. Lloyd George: No.

Mr. Hughes: There is the possibility of a hitch in reference to the respective Governments, and so on; you must not overlook that fact.

Mr. Meighen: I think I would probably go home and come back, if it was essential.

Mr. Hughes: Would you?

Mr. Meighen: Yes, I think so.

Suggestion for Pacific Conference in Washington and Disarmament in Europe.

Mr. Balfour: Do you think the Americans would be content to keep to the order of the Conferences? They must take them in the order that I think you have suggested, but alter the places. Have the Conference about the Pacific in Washington and the Conference between the Allied and Associated Powers about disarmament in Europe. For the latter the presence of the Dominions is clearly not so necessary as for the former. It is the former which most emphatically requires the presence of the Dominions. Very well, they meet in Washington first, in spite of the hot weather, and then ask the Americans if they will not come to Europe for what is, after all, a European concern.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, except that you see their invitation is for the Disarmament Conference. It is their invitation.

Mr. Balfour: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: They simply suggested a conversation for the other. They clearly attach very great importance to the other because that is going to be a great international thing for Italy, France and all the Allied and Eastern Powers.

Mr. Hughes: If you are going to have disarmament first, you are suggesting that as an alternative, are you?

Mr. Balfour: No; I am suggesting leaving the Conferences in the order which, I understand, is the American order, and certainly the logical order—Pacific first and disarmament second. What I suggested was, you should invert the order of places of meeting and have the first meeting in Washington about the Pacific.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Mr. Balfour: That would suit the Dominions evidently much better than the other, because you go there on the way.

Mr. Lloyd George: At the second Conference on disarmament, you simply get the great Powers of the world—the Allied and Associated Powers.

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Hughes: I think the solution you put forward is the best one, that is to say, press for the Conference here, but I do certainly think that Mr. Balfour's is the best alternative that has been put forward.

Mr. Balfour: The best second string.

Mr. Hughes: Yes—that would be quite feasible for all, but it is not the best. I think the Prime Minister's is the best.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am a little afraid about approaching them on that—you sort of muddle the thing. It is now quite a clear invitation. They have invited us to Washington to discuss disarmament. Well, then, you see, the Japanese business does not concern America. I was talking to Murray Butler about it. The East does not care very much—does not care at all about it—the Japanese business—not so much, he says. He took rather a different view to the one Mr. Hughes takes.

Mr. Churchill: Mr. Harvey?

Mr. Lloyd George: No, Murray Butler. He says the West is anti-Japanese, and take a very keen interest in it, but the East does not. Disarmament is a thing which concerns the East even more than the West, and that is where you get the wealthy people who are taxed very heavily. That is a question which concerns the whole country, and they would probably think we were trying to filch the more important Conference.

Mr. Balfour: What do you say to this procedure, Prime Minister? Accept, without suggesting any alternative, and say you desire for the convenience of the Dominions that it must be soon. If that comes off, that is the best plan of all. Supposing it does not come off, we say to the Americans, "We accept this, and we would have been delighted with your plan, but the Japanese cannot do it or the Dominions," and then perhaps the second consideration might be come to without being offensive. If we accept, as far as we are concerned, in the order exactly what they propose, they cannot be offended if that breaks down on some really obvious legitimate ground.

Mr. Churchill: After all, this Pacific question is a vital one to them. The position is most important, and I am afraid that they might sheer off. I would be delighted to be convinced the other way, but they work up their national pride. There is no difficulty in what we want. I would like to see them here. I am only saying that I should be surprised . . . .

Mr. Chamberlain: Is it worth while to jump this fence before we come to it?

Mr. Churchill: No.

Mr. Chamberlain: Lord Curzon at his conversation with the American Ambassador thinks that there will be no trouble.

Mr. Lloyd George: As a matter of fact, Mr. Balfour and myself met the American Ambassador last Friday night dining here, and he suggested London. That is my recollection.

Mr. Balfour: I think he did.

Mr. Hughes: I think you would be in a strong position with Japan if you said America is willing to discuss the matter here in London on the Pacific question. I do not see how she can very well refuse. She can ask for delay, possibly, in which case you will be driven back to consider what you have to do, but I do not think she would refuse, Sir.

Mr. Lloyd George: She would meet anywhere in Europe, or, say, as far as Egypt. We can be back here in nine to ten days.

Mr. Chamberlain: He (Viscount Chinda) is probably in Switzerland at this moment, and, according to Lord Curzon, left Paris yesterday.

Mr. Massey: He would not travel by aeroplane to Japan?

Mr. Balfour: No. The thing to say to the United States of America, without consulting anybody, is, "We are in favour of your plan." Then, if that plan breaks down, find another.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is a very remarkable *rapprochement*.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Churchill: Very. We have made history sitting round this table—there is no doubt about it.

Sir Maurice Hankey: They did state definitely the first invitation is Washington, and the second does not suggest any place.

Mr. Churchill: At all events, I shall be very relieved to know they will come here.

Mr. Lloyd George: I hope they will for more reasons than one, as I do not want to go over there.

Mr. Churchill: No.

The Prime Minister's Statement to House of Commons, July 11, 1921.

Mr. Lloyd George: On the point of *amour-propre* they might say, "We will come over to you if you will come over to us." Now, this is the suggested statement which I am to make in the House of Commons:—

"When I told the House last Thursday that I hoped to be in a position to make a statement on Pacific and Far Eastern questions to-day, I was awaiting, as I explained at the time, replies to conversation which had taken place between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the representatives of the Governments of the United States, Japan and China, as the result of our discussions in the Imperial Cabinet. I am very glad to be able to inform the House to-day that the views of the Government of the United States reached me last night and are extremely satisfactory. The Chinese Government is also favourable. We have not yet had a formal reply from the Government of Japan, but we have good reason to hope that it will be in the same sense. Now that these views have been received, I am glad to be at liberty to inform the House of Commons fully regarding the course which our discussions in the Imperial Cabinet took. I do this with particular satisfaction, because it will show how very valuable a step forward we have been able to take by common consent in the sphere of foreign affairs.

"The broad lines of Imperial policy in the Pacific and the Far East were the very first subject to which we addressed ourselves at the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet, having a special regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, the future of China and the bearing of both those questions on the relations of the British Empire with the United States. We were guided in our deliberations by three main considerations. In Japan we have an old and proved ally; the agreement of twenty years' standing between us has been of very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the peace of the Far East. In China there is a very numerous people with great potentialities who esteem our friendship highly, and whose interests we, on our side, desire to assist and advance. In the United States we see to-day, as we have always seen, the people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is for us not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply-rooted instinct to consult and co-operate. Those were the main considerations in our meetings, and upon them we were unanimous. The object of our discussions was to find a method combining all these three factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy naval expenditure in the Pacific with all the evils which such an expenditure entails and to ensure the development of all legitimate national interests in the Far East.

"We had in the first place to ascertain our exact position with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. There has been much doubt as to whether the notification to the League of Nations made last July constituted a denunciation of the agreement in the sense of clause 6. If it did it would have been necessary to decide upon some interim measure regarding the agreement pending fuller discussions with the other Pacific Powers, and negotiations with this object in view were in point of fact already in progress. If, on the other hand, it did not, the agreement would remain in force until denounced either by Japan or ourselves and would not be actually determined until twelve months from the date when notice of denunciation was given. The Japanese Government took the view that no notice of denunciation had yet been given. This view was shared by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but as considerable doubt existed, we decided, after a preliminary discussion in the Imperial Cabinet, to refer the question to the Lord Chancellor, who considered it with the Law Officers of the Crown, and held that no notice of denunciation had yet been given.

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

"It follows that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement remains in force unless it is denounced, and will lapse only at the expiration of twelve months from the time when notice of denunciation is given. It is, however, the desire of both the British Empire and Japan that the Agreement should be brought into complete harmony with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that wherever the Covenant and the Agreement are inconsistent, the terms of the Covenant shall prevail. Notice to this effect has now been given to the League.

"The broader discussion of Far Eastern and Pacific policy to which we then turned showed general agreement on the main lines of the course which the Imperial Cabinet desired to pursue. I have already explained that the first principle of our policy was friendly co-operation with the United States. We are all convinced that upon this more than upon any other single factor depend the peace and well-being of the world. We also desire, as I have stated, to maintain our close friendship and co-operation with Japan. The greatest merit of that valuable friendship is that it harmonises the influence and activities of the two greatest Asiatic Powers, and this constitutes an essential safeguard to the well-being of the British Empire and the peace of the East. We also aim at preserving the open door in China and at giving the Chinese people every opportunity of peaceful progress and development. In addition to these considerations we desire to safeguard our own vital interests in the Pacific and to preclude any competition in naval armaments between the Pacific Powers. All the representatives of the Empire agreed that our standpoint on these questions should be communicated with complete frankness to the United States, Japan and China with the object of securing an exchange of views which might lead to more formal discussion and conference. Lord Curzon accordingly held conversations last week with the American Ambassador and Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Minister, at which he communicated to them the views of the Imperial Cabinet, and asked in turn for the views of their respective Governments. He expressed at these conversations a very strong hope that this exchange of views might, if their Governments shared our desire in that respect, pave the way for a Conference on the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. The reply of the President of the United States was made public by the American Government this morning. It is known to the House. Mr. Harding has taken the momentous step of inviting the Powers to a Conference on the limitation of armaments to be held in Washington in the near future, and he also suggests a preliminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern questions between the Powers most directly interested in the peace and welfare of that great region, which is assuming the first importance in international affairs. I need not say that we welcome with the utmost pleasure President Harding's wise and courteous initiative. In saying this, I know that I speak for the Empire as a whole. The world has been looking to the United States for such a lead. I am confident that the House will esteem it as an act of far-seeing statesmanship, and will whole-heartedly wish it success. I need hardly say that no effort will be lacking to make it so on the part of the British Empire, which shares to the full the liberal and progressive spirit inspiring it.

"Let me add only one word as to the part played in these events by the gathering of the Imperial Cabinet in Downing Street. I venture to say that the action we have taken could not have been taken in so prompt, effective and unanimous a fashion, but for the intimate personal consultation between the Prime Ministers of the Empire and the representatives of India, which this gathering has enabled us to enjoy. We have taken counsel together without reserve. With this result before us, I need not elaborate the inestimable value of that close consultation and co-operation in the conduct of the Empire's affairs."

Mr. Hughes: There is one phrase, I think towards the beginning, I want you to look at; you say something about not having heard from Japan.

Lord Curzon: It is in the first paragraph.

Mr. Hughes: I want you to consider this. You make this announcement and you say we have not heard from Japan—Japan knows nothing of this. We know nothing of her news. Do not you think we could put something in which would be a little smoother for her?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Lord Curzon: I saw the Japanese Ambassador this morning, and the Japanese Government is always a little punctilious about these things. I asked him what reply he had, and he said he had a reply on Saturday expressing no disapproval of the suggestion of a Conference, but asking him what were the exact suggestions which were going to be put before the Conference. I replied that that was a matter for subsequent discussion, and what we wanted was their assent to the Conference.

Views of Japanese.

I had a talk with him about the American Ambassador's proposal on the question, the idea of having two Conferences, the Pacific Conference before the other. With that idea he was warmly in agreement, and I asked if he thought there would be any objection on the part of his Government to it. He said he did not think he could conceive it would be possible there could be, and I sent him out of the room urging him to get his Government to wire at once consenting to both Conferences. I think we could put it in a more complimentary form if you like.

Mr. Hughes: If I had been a Japanese, I would say: "We were very much concerned in this. We are one of the two principal parties in this. China, who is our rival and one who is complaining and criticising, has said "Yes, but we have said nothing." I think you could get some other words which would just set that out in a little less troublesome manner. They are a very sensitive people.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes.

Lord Curzon: I think the phrase in that draft is: "I have no reason to doubt"; we could turn it round a little bit and say: "We have good reason to hope."

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes. We have good reason to hope; I think that is all right.

Mr. Hughes: I think if you were to say: "I have no reason to doubt" and so on . . . .

Mr. Lloyd George: It is rather taking it for granted.

Mr. Hughes: Japan has been very ready to appreciate our friendship and to renew this Alliance and so on, and if you follow that up it is all right, but the taste is there in their mouth.

Mr. Lloyd George: Take the general draft of the statement. Is it the line that the Conference would like taken?

Mr. Massey: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Mr. Meighen: Yes. It is very good.

Mr. Balfour: I think it is very good, I do not say that you could not alter a word in it, but what document could you not alter a word in?

Mr. Lloyd George: Lord Chancellor, your part of it is fairly stated and is without offence to the law officers?

Lord Birkenhead: Yes. I should think so, I think they would be quite pleased with that statement.

Mr. Lloyd George: Viscount Chinda has left Toulon for Naples, but can be reached by wireless through the Admiralty. I should have thought that with Viscount Chinda in Europe they would have been quite satisfied.

Lord Curzon: That is for them to say. I could see the Ambassador this morning, but I cannot say anything involving his supersession.

Mr. Hughes: Viscount Chinda cannot get beyond Egypt without our getting a reply.

Lord Curzon: I think it is quite open to ask the Ambassador as to the kind of plenipotentiary his Government is likely to appoint; they might send two.

Mr. Lloyd George: You could suggest that the meeting might take place here as it is very important that the Dominion Premiers should be here.

Lord Curzon: I could do so this morning. The Japanese want it to take place here. They think they would have a rather better chance here.

Mr. Hughes: Has Viscount Chinda a reputation for supporting us or not? You do not propose to suggest that we hint at what Viscount Chinda will do?

Pacific and Disarmament Conference.

Lord Curzon: I could say to the Ambassador that it was necessary for the convenience of the Dominion Premiers that it should take place, probably at the end of August or the beginning of September, and if it is not possible to send anyone over, they might use one of their famous men who are here in Europe.

Mr. Massey: Have you suggested that date?

Lord Curzon: I have suggested no date to anybody.

Mr. Massey: The end of August or the beginning of September is too late.

Dates suitable to Dominion Premiers.

Mr. Hughes: You were out when the Prime Minister put that question to us. Mr. Massey and I said we must get back home, and now the arrangement is that we get there the first week in October. That would mean we would have to have this not later than the last week in August.

Lord Curzon: Very well. You see the Conference would take the best part of a week or ten days undoubtedly, because there are a great many issues to discuss.

Mr. Hughes: When the principles are settled, when there seems to be an understanding, that would be quite satisfactory, we would not necessarily have to stay.

Lord Curzon: The form it will take will be the enunciation of a number of principles which will be subscribed to by all the parties. I do not think it will take the form of a Treaty. It will be a Conference which will have agreed principles to which we can all put our names.

Mr. Hughes: That is all we want, and I hope Lord Curzon will note that it must not be later than the last week in August.

Mr. Massey: It ought to be before then.

Lord Curzon: Could you give me approximately the date on which you must go?

Mr. Massey: My date is approximately fixed for the 18th.

Lord Curzon: Allowing for the week or ten days . . . .

Mr. Massey: Then it will depend upon a ship being available. Parliament will not mind a week or ten days, but I might not get a suitable ship if I miss the ship at Vancouver, which is a fast one. I should have to fall back on a ship going through the Panamá, which will be a slow one.

Lord Curzon: When does the ship that you contemplate catching leave?

Mr. Massey: Just at the moment I am not able to say. My calculation was to leave on the 18th to get the ship at Vancouver.

Mr. Hughes: My date is approximately the 20th.

Mr. Lloyd George: Is there anything further to say about this?

Mr. Hughes: You will, of course, Lord Curzon, try to get it as early as possible?

Lord Curzon: Obviously, in the interests of everybody, ourselves included.

Mr. Lloyd George: We certainly do not want to keep the thing open. I think that will do and we will have that sent to the House. That is all we decided to do this morning. I thought it was of sufficient importance. We had summoned the British Cabinet for this morning and we put it off, but I thought it was of sufficient importance to summon the Imperial Conference so as to get an agreement. You see it is an acceptance.

Mr. Meighen: It is, of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: We will go on this afternoon.

Sir Maurice Hankey: I was wondering whether we ought not to speed up a little during the next few days. It is Foreign Policy this afternoon.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, at 4·30 P.M.

Sir Maurice Hankey: I understand you will be busy at the end of this week, and was wondering whether we should not take the Naval Question, so as to be sure of that getting through by next Thursday.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, I shall be very tied up after Wednesday. My statement this afternoon will take about half-an-hour, but I shall be back here by 4·30.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Future Agenda.

Lord Curzon: I have circulated to Members of the Conference certain papers, which they will get in the next half-hour, containing the principal clauses of the draft Agreement as to Egypt. We had a discussion about it last week, and I have circulated a draft for a permanent Agreement, and, if that is found impossible, a Provisional Agreement. There will have to be a discussion with the Delegation immediately, and I am quite willing to have discussion here, if thought desirable.

Mr. Hughes: You say you have circulated the papers?

Lord Curzon: Yes, I have my own copy and you will get yours when you get back to your offices. I do not think we should put the draft of what we want on the table. It will be better to let them blow off steam; Orientals like that sort of thing; and I will then indicate to them the points on which we are going to stand.

Mr. Hughes: You are suggesting that we should discuss that this afternoon.

Mr. Lloyd George: You had better read the papers before coming this afternoon, and if you find anything in them you would like to discuss, you had better let us know this afternoon.

Mr. Chamberlain: It is important to get on this afternoon with Constitutional questions, because, although Mr. Meighen does not want to add anything, there will be observations, no doubt, which some of the members will like to make.

Mr. Massey: Yes, it is one of the biggest questions we have to deal with. There are other points of view, and I really think there is nothing of more importance coming before this Conference, not only of importance to Mr. Hughes, but to everybody in the Empire. I know it is of the greatest importance to us.

Lord Curzon: I should like to go into the discussion with the knowledge that I have you behind me. At this moment, of course, I do not know whether you approve of the draft I have circulated. You had better look at it and see.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes is anxious to know whether they can have the copies here. Is that possible?

Lord Curzon: They are already delivered at their offices, and they will find them all there.

(The Conference then adjourned until 4·30 P.M.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 11, 1921.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

SECRET.

E. 22nd Meeting.

PROOF. 2nd Revise No 2.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, JULY 11, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

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The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

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Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.
Mr. G. BREBNER.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Hughes has taken a very special interest in the Egyptian question. Have you read the Paper (E.31) that has been prepared, Mr. Hughes?

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: Have you anything you wish to say about it?

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: As Lord Curzon has to see the Egyptian delegates to-morrow I think he ought to know what are the views of the Conference.

Lord Curzon: I should like to have some indication of the lines I should go on. (Copies of E.31 were handed round.)

Suggested Clauses of Agreement.

I drew up yesterday a few clauses. Of course, an agreement, if an agreement is secured, will have to contain a good deal more, but what I thought you wanted me to do was to draw up in general phraseology, though I hope sufficiently precise, what I call the governing clauses of an agreement with Egypt. They proceed upon the hypothesis that the agreement we make, or try to make with them, is within the lines of the Cabinet decision which was read out here, and which was transmitted to Egypt in February of the present year. That decision, as you will remember, postulated the withdrawal of the protectorate as established in 1914, the substitution for it of Treaty arrangements with Egypt which would allow her to be constituted an independent State under a constitutional monarchy. Within those limits we are at liberty to lay down what lines I should insist upon, and the provisions we please. I must own again, as I stated the other day, that I think there will be a great difficulty in concluding any agreement with this deputation at all. My own impression is that they are in such deadly terror of Zaghlul and his extremists at the other end that they will decline anything; and it may be, therefore, that in the last resort we may have to contemplate a provisional rather than a permanent agreement.

British Forces in Egypt.

The points upon which I understood this meeting to lay great stress were these. Firstly, garrisons. The view was held here, which I certainly share most strongly, that no limitation ought to be placed, at any rate at the present stage, upon the continued presence of British troops in Egypt for the various purposes for which they are required: on the one hand, for the maintenance of Imperial communications; on the other hand, for the defence of Egypt against external aggression (an obligation which we assume); and in the third place, for the maintenance in the last resort, as occurred the other day at Alexandria, of internal order. I therefore propose to make no condition whatever either as to the number of troops that ought to be kept, or as to the places in which they should be kept, but to retain the right to keep a British force in the country. I should certainly not use the word "garrison," which is very invidious—but to keep a British force in the country at such places and for such time as may be considered desirable after discussion between the parties. Similarly, I put in a provision giving to the British Government the right to the use of the various harbours, aerodromes, barracks and so on, as may be required.

Foreign Relations.

The second point is that of foreign relations. In the old Cromer days the Egyptian Government did have, and has always had, a Foreign Office of its own under a Foreign Minister. That, of course, it would be unwise and, indeed, impossible to withdraw. The question you have to consider is what measure of control should be exercised over their administration of foreign affairs in the capital, Cairo, and what measure of similar control in foreign capitals. As regards the former, I do not think that you can do more than prescribe in general language that their foreign policy in Cairo should be conducted in close consultation with the British High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, for the moment. As regards representation of the Egyptian Foreign Office abroad, that is a point which Lord Milner conceded to Zaghlul Pasha after the meetings in London. Very grave doubt was expressed here as to whether we ought to concede that point. It was felt that Egyptian representatives in Paris and Rome might become the focus of a good deal of intrigue with foreign Powers, and therefore in these preliminary articles I have provided that while they should be allowed to have consuls in foreign towns or ports, for business purposes, the representation of Egypt in foreign capitals should be undertaken, at the request of the Egyptian Government, by the British representatives there. I tell you that I think there will be a very grave fight upon that, and that I very likely shall have to bring the matter again to the Conference at a later stage.

Status of Britain in the Administration.

Thirdly, I have put in a condition which did not appear in the Milner proposals, but which Lord Milner thought himself the Egyptian Government would accept, and

Egypt.

that is, that in view of the special position that Great Britain will occupy, and of the very large number of British officers and officials who are in her service, the Egyptian Government must enter into an engagement that they do not employ foreign officers or officials in any branch of their service without the consent of the High Commissioner. The position of the High Commissioner himself can only be determined in general language and will depend, as all these things do in the last resort, more upon the personality and prestige of the individual than they can do upon any formulas you lay down in advance. However, we do propose to indicate here that the British High Commissioner shall be in a position of commanding authority and influence, and in the last resort he will be not merely a symbol, but the pivot of British supervision over that country.

Financial Control.

There remain the two questions of financial control and judicial control. Here it is proposed in these draft formulas to give to the Financial Commissioner a rather less shadowy position than that which was contemplated by Lord Milner. I have defined with some precision the functions which he will have to discharge when the present Commission of the Debt ceases to exist and its duties devolve upon him, what I may describe, indeed, as the functions that he must discharge for the due protection of foreign interests in Egypt when those foreign interests arising out of the abolition of the Capitulations are taken over by us. I further provide, or attempt to provide, for a general supervision over the financial side of the Administration, which is really vital in order to prevent a complete collapse, by giving him the right of access to the Egyptian Prime Minister and to the Minister of Finance. Of course, what I mean by that in practice is this: I want him to know what is going on; I do not want him to be interfering at every stage in Egyptian Administration. We must let them walk in their own track now. They will no doubt make many grave mistakes. I have no doubt the Administration will deteriorate, but I want him to know what is going on, and then, in the last resort, he can do what all the British finance Ministers in Egypt have always done; they have gone and told the High Commissioner, so that if some great scandal is impending there is a chance of intervening and stopping it.

Judicial Control.

In the same way as regards the Judicial Commissioner, I have provided that he should be charged, as he must be, with the administration of the law in all matters affecting foreigners, assuming, as I have done, that those interests are to be handed over to us. I have given him similar powers of access to the Egyptian Ministers of Justice and of the Interior in order that he may have every opportunity of knowing what is going on.

Suez Canal.

I have added a paragraph at the end on another matter, which is really of almost greater importance than anything. Under the existing circumstances, the Suez Canal falls back into the hands of the Egyptian Government within a few years from now; I forget the exact number.

Mr. Churchill: Forty years.

Lord Curzon: It is something like that. It is very desirable indeed to contemplate at an early stage, and certainly at this stage when we are re-arranging the whole affairs, an arrangement by which the existing system, which places us in a position of practical control, should be continued for a long period of years. This, therefore, is the moment, I think, to endeavour to secure that the existing arrangement shall be prolonged for another period of 100 years.

Mr. Massey: By way of renewing the lease.

Lord Curzon: Yes; those I think are the main provisions, and I have put them down here really with a view, if you accept them, of giving me a sort of basis upon which I can stand in my conversations with these gentlemen, which are to begin to-morrow. I have always taken the view that at any stage when I come up to a bad fence which I cannot get over, and where I am liable to be unseated, I must come here in order to know whether you wish me to get up in the saddle again. I think such stages will occur very early in the day, but at any rate, these are the lines upon which I am prepared to act, if they are in general consonance with your views.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Prime Minister, I have had very little time to look at this paper, but I quite appreciate Lord Curzon's position, and if we are going to give him advice, now is the time to do it. Delay cannot improve and may still further prejudice our interests in this unfortunate matter. Looking hurriedly over a copy of the telegrams and despatches that Lord Curzon has sent, I feel that all I said the other day, and the anxiety I expressed in my original telegram to you, at what I felt to be the very serious position that had been created, was more than justified. Let

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

Effects of Lord Milner's proposals.

me quote a few sentences from these telegrams to show exactly where we are. Page 6 of this paper (E.31), which commences with General Allenby's despatch to Lord Curzon dated the 16th April, 1921, and Mr. Patterson's memorandum on the matter, contains the following: "The Milner proposals staggered the country as being far beyond anything they had ever dreamed of, and in the case of many, as I have already said, they were horrified at having been taken so literally. As a member of the Legislative Assembly said to me, with tears in his eyes, 'I could never have believed it of Lord Milner.'"

It is unfortunate, Sir, we have not the Milner report before us. I have not seen it, and so have not been able to familiarise myself with it in detail, but I want to direct the attention of the Conference to one or two matters which seem vital. On page 1 of Lord Allenby's despatch, at the bottom of the page, there are these words, which, I venture to say, are pregnant both with meaning and with menace for us:—

> "The conclusion to be drawn from the memoranda submitted by Mr. Amos and Mr. Patterson is that we stand committed to the general principles of the policy initiated by Lord Milner, and that His Majesty's Government must bring that policy to its logical conclusion. I am broadly in agreement with the views set forth in their memoranda. I have on many occasions emphasised to your Lordship that the memorandum published in Egypt in August last has come to be regarded, whatever the real intentions of His Majesty's Government, as a substantive offer; and that any wide departure from the main principles of the settlement which that memorandum advocated would be regarded as a breach of faith, not only in Egypt itself, but by world opinion at large."

One fact stands out—that we have not before us a clean slate. A position has been created by the Milner report, and its premature publication, which amply bears out all that I said the other day. So when we are asked whether we agree to the very vital modifications suggested by Lord Curzon, to which I have no objection whatever, we have to remember Lord Allenby's words, "A substantive offer has already been made." And we are told that, "We must have regard for the opinion of Egypt and the world at large." Sir William Hayter has contributed a very valuable paper on this question. He has set out clearly—and it has to be accepted as a fact—that independence is what the Egyptian people seek, and independence is what Lord Milner promised them. Probably when they asked for this they did not expect to get it, but the point is, that Lord Milner definitely promised independence on behalf of the British Government, and, Lord Allenby says, this "is a substantive offer and is so regarded by the world at large." But it is perfectly clear to me, and I think to every member here, that we cannot go any further than is compatible with our vital interests. Lord Curzon has set out the views of all of us on the matter. You must have an army there; and it must be a real army, with power to act as our interests demand. Not as Lord Milner would have us accept as a substitute, for as Sir William Hayter says, "Lord Milner's conception of an army, subject to such limitation of its scope of action, is radically unsound." There is to be a British force, to be used only for the defence of Egypt against external foes, and the protection of our Imperial lines of communication. However many foreigners are murdered by the Egyptians, the British army is to do nothing, to stand aside. And this army of Lord Milner's is to be confined within a narrow zone. Sir William Hayter further declares that Lord Milner's idea of the functions of the Financial Adviser and judicial officer "appear to be altogether misconceived," while his recommendations "for the plan of judicial re-organisation, generally known as the Hurst Scheme, has had the unhappy fate of meeting with universal opposition." It is clear, then, that we cannot accept Lord Milner's scheme, although, as Lord Allenby says, "Egypt regards it as a substantive offer." On the other hand, then, we are told that we cannot go back to the *status quo ante bellum*. Lord Allenby is very emphatic about that. He says we cannot go back, we made an offer. Egypt could hardly believe its eyes when it read it, but it is now accepted by Egypt and the world—it is "a substantive offer." Well, if we cannot go back, and we dare not accept Lord Milner's scheme, what are we to do? If we offer the Egyptians the shell but not the kernel of Lord Milner's recommendations, will the world consider that we are keeping our word? I am rather afraid that it will not, but I am bound to repeat once more that I think it is deplorable that the creation of such a position was permitted. I could never have believed that Lord Milner could have done this thing—never. I thought a man with his temperament, outlook and conception of the Imperial position, was incapable of such a thing, but he has done it, and we are

now asked to deal with the position which he, himself, has created, and which all these advisers of ours tell us—Lord Allenby, Mr. Amos, Mr. Patterson and Sir William Hayter—tell us we must accept, in appearance, if not in reality. But will appearance suffice? Lord Allenby says it must be regarded as "a substantive offer." I want to direct your attention, Mr. Prime Minister, and this is the last word I shall have to say on the matter, to the hope expressed by Mr. Patterson, in that: "If the Assembly refuse to ratify the agreement, His Majesty's Government can once more start again with a clean slate. Should, however, the agreement be ratified, we must see it through. It would be the most fatal error to go back on what is virtually an offer of the Government's to Egypt. Details may be modified and safeguards added, but in its general line the scheme should not be broken in Downing Street. If an agreement is come to it will still have to be ratified by an Egyptian Assembly, and I feel that there is a most excellent chance that it would never be ratified." Here, then, is the solid truth, as Mr. Patterson sees it. We are to offer something which must not be a mere shell of what Lord Milner offered them. It may be modified in detail but not in substance. And then we must hope that the Egyptian Assembly will fail to ratify this counsel of despair. I feel, in these circumstances, that nothing that I could say would help this Conference, but am more than ever convinced that I ought not to have omitted what I said the other day and have in part repeated to-day. That we should be confronted with such a situation created in such a way is deplorable. And although I find myself in excellent company, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Foreign Secretary at that time, and, of course, the present Foreign Secretary and Mr. Churchill—and I assume the whole of the Cabinet—it is deplorable that we in the outer Dominions should have been kept in ignorance of what had been done.

Egypt.

Mr. Lloyd George: We were just as staggered as Mr. Patterson.

Mr. Hughes: Lord Curzon, if you really ask my humble opinion as to the proposals set out by you, I say, stand fast by them—I am perfectly satisfied. But I say now emphatically that you ought not to go any further, that it is the last we can do in all the circumstances. We have to choose between these proposals and taking another and fatal step along a road on which we ought never to have set our feet for a moment unless we intend to destroy this Empire. Is it suggested for a moment that we should confine our troops to the Canal Zone? I pointed out to you in that cable of mine how this appeared to me the way to destruction. For that and other reasons I strongly urge that Lord Curzon's recommendations be strictly adhered to with only such minor modifications as will maintain in their integrity our vital interests. We must have control of foreign affairs, we must have an army of occupation, our High Commissioner must take precedence of others, our financial adviser must be the authority to whom they look for counsel, and where advised they must follow, for the rest of it is a *modus vivendi* for a period, and, as Sir William Hayter says in the postscript to his recommendations, at the expiry of this period of ten years Egypt's claim for complete independence will have to be very seriously considered. It must be clearly understood that we accept this position without prejudice to our own interests and are not committed to anything definite.

Supports Lord Curzon's proposals.

I have only to add this, Sir, if we fix this period ten years, if we say, "We will do this for ten years, without prejudice to your claim for independence," the position should be clearly understood. The Egyptians should be made to understand that while we do it without prejudice to their right to reserve their claim for independence, we at the end of ten years, on our part, will consider without prejudice the position on its merits as the facts then are. We cannot go further along this road and commit ourselves to another definite policy. Ten years in the life of a nation or of an Empire like this is nothing. In ten years the world, as Sir William Hayter says, may be a much safer place for defenceless nations. But to-day our circumstances are such that we must control the Canal; it is one of the vital communications of our Empire. We cannot control the Canal unless we have control of the country.

Reconsideration suggested after ten years.

Mr. Lloyd George: Does anybody else wish to say anything about this?

Mr. Montagu: I would ask Lord Curzon about this. There is a new provision in this that I do not quite understand. I understand how important it is if we are going to recede from Lord Milner's position with a desire to maintain British interests, but once again, there appears here what amounts really to the complete control of Egypt in finance. The Finance Commissioner is to be consulted on all matters of finance. What I have in my mind is merely this, that owing to the fact

Financial Control.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Egypt.

that Lord Milner was not repudiated when he came home, and has never been repudiated, I feel so anxious if I can to avoid a terrible letting-down of Adly Pasha. He has fought, as far as I understand, the battle; he has quarrelled with all his old friends, and has been trying his best to improve the present situation in Egypt. He has got to be presented with variations of the Milner proposal designed, as Mr. Hughes and the Prime Minister have said, to preserve the vital interests of the British Empire. Are the financial provisions essential to the position of the British Empire? Is it necessary to impose so stringent a control on the future of Egypt in its finances? This sort of provision appears so often in this kind of document. I never could understand how great Imperial purposes are served by it, and it is certainly a tremendous lowering of the independent Government of Egypt and its people which I thought was only to be done in the interests of the British Empire.

Lord Curzon: In answer to Mr. Montagu, I think I can reply easily on the various points he has made. If you will look at my article No. 5 you will find that powers are provided for this Finance Commissioner in three respects. The first are those functions which will devolve upon him in connection with the protection of the financial interests of foreign Powers. There is no dispute about that whatever. In any agreement that is concluded that must play a part.

The second category of powers are those provided for in No. 13, and here Mr. Montagu speaks of my having provided for the stringent control of every aspect of Egyptian finance by this officer. Surely that is not the case. What is it proposed that he shall do:—

> "For the proper discharge of his duties the Financial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed of all matters within the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance."

For my own part this seems to be very shadowy. What I have provided for is not interference, but knowledge of what is going on, and I do not think I have provided for more. As regards the third provision, No. 13, with regard to no external loan being raised for the revenue of any public service being assigned by the Egyptian Government without the concurrence of the Financial Commissioner, that is a proposal of Lord Allenby himself, and has been transferred by me bodily from one of his papers. That is how I wish to reply to Mr. Montagu. With regard to what Mr. Hughes has said, I would make one observation. While it is quite true that Lord Allenby has more than once drawn attention to the difficulty of getting away from the main lines of Lord Milner's proposal, every single proposal I have made here has the personal concurrence of Lord Allenby himself, and he thinks we can make a good stand and get them. Whether the situation has changed on the part of Zaghlul—that may be the case—or not, I am proposing nothing here that will not have the backing of the British High Commissioner.

Proposals approved by Lord Allenby.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think we might pass on now to the other question. We will pass on to the other subject. It is important that Lord Curzon should secure the views of the Conference before he meets the delegation.

Mr. Hughes: How was the reply to President Harding received in the House?

Mr. Lloyd George: Very well. They were very pleased.

Mr. Balfour: It was received very well.

Mr. Lloyd George: They were very pleased. Somebody told me who was sitting next to the American Ambassador that he looked pleased.

Mr. Meighen: I think he should be.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes. Now let us go on to the other problem. Mr. Meighen, did I understand that you left it where you put it before?

Mr. Meighen: Yes.

Mr. Lloyd George: For the moment. In that case I will pass on to Mr. Hughes.

Mr. Meighen: If what I say is attacked it may be necessary to reply to it.

General Smuts: What is the subject that we are discussing?

Mr. Lloyd George: The constitutional question—foreign policy.

The Constitutional Question.

Mr. Hughes: It is really the case that Mr. Meighen presented.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Meighen has made suggestions.

Mr. Hughes: I think I will direct my remarks to what Mr. Meighen said, for his speech really opens up the whole question.

I will devote myself to an examination of the position as set out by Mr. Meighen, because his view raised issues of such importance that they must be decided somehow or other, in order that we may know where we are. First of all, I desire to say that with much that Mr. Meighen has said I find myself entirely in accord. Many of the principles he lays down are not new. The basic principles upon which the Commonwealth of British nations rests are two: complete autonomy of the various parts, and unity of the whole. If I find myself unable to agree entirely with Mr. Meighen, it is not because he puts forward new principles, but because he seeks to extend existing principles much farther than has hitherto been done. It is not possible now to review the constitutional relations between Britain and the Dominions at length, and I do not propose to do so. I do not deny for a moment that the claim for wider application of existing powers which Mr. Meighen lays down as essential to Canada's welfare and progress is unassailable, if we consider Canada only as a self-governing Dominion, to whom by separate representation at the Peace Conference and as a signatory of the Versailles Treaty was accorded the status of a nation.

Mr. Meighen's suggestions.

But as Mr. Meighen has himself pointed out, although Canada is a nation, she is also a member of the Empire, that is to say, a nation within a federation of nations, and so, in a very different position to a nation like America, which not only does not seek alliances, but expressly declines them.

The point we have to consider is whether the application of the principles in the manner suggested by Mr. Meighen is compatible with our obligations to, or our membership of, the Empire. As I see it they are not. Let me show as shortly as possible why this is so. It is obvious that these two basic principles, upon which the Empire rests, autonomy and unity, are inconsistent, and that the relations actually existing between Britain and the Dominions would be impossible, but for the spirit in which the rights enjoyed by all are exercised. The explanation of how communities, enjoying the most complete autonomy and jealously insisting upon their right to exercise it as they deem fit, yet proudly declare themselves partners of a united Empire is to be found in their history, in the circumsances of their origin and development, and in the sea power of Britain. This last has been a dominating factor in Empire development and of itself sufficiently explains why the great self-governing Dominions, while being clothed with ever-widening powers of self-government, have never found any difficulty in reconciling their rights of autonomy with partnership of a united Empire. Quite apart from those other things which bind us together; race, language, ideals, free institution of government and trade, the sea power of Britain—the Motherland of the Dominions—is a sufficient reason why the Dominions, although in name and fact, nations, should exercise their rights of self-government in a way which makes the British Empire, what you said the other day, "a living force." Every Dominion owes all that it has of greatness and of liberty to one great fact. For over a hundred years the British navy has been the greatest sea power in the world. The territories of the Dominions are scattered all over the world; great stretches of ocean divide them from each other and from Britain. They have been able for over a hundred years to develop their great heritages without fear of foreign aggression. Or to put it in other words, but for the British navy, they would not now be self-governing Dominions—nor in all human probability be in existence as British or even free communities at all.

Dominions dependent on British Sea-power.

It will be convenient here to state Mr. Meighen's postulates and consider the effect of their application upon the various Dominions and upon the Empire as a whole. With Mr. Meighen's plea for "regular and if possible continuous Conferences, among other things for determining and clarifying the governing principles of our relations with foreign countries, and of seeking common counsel, and advancing contentment thereupon," we are, I feel sure, all heartily in accord. I am not quite sure what Mr. Meighen means by his reference to "Conferences determining and clarifying the governing principles with foreign countries." I should have thought the difficulty lay, not in "determining or clarifying principles," but rather in applying these principles to concrete cases. Personally, I see no reason why we cannot lay down the principles which ought to govern our relations with foreign

Regular Conferences.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62127

The Constitutional Question.

countries at this Conference. But I do see very great difficulties in applying these principles to the very many questions of foreign policy that may arise, say, within the next two years. The need for regular Conferences, however, is obvious. The practical difficulties not less so. I have already said something on this head and further opportunity will be afforded before the Conference adjourns.

Voice of Dominions in Foreign Policy.

I come now to postulate Nos. 2 and 3, to which I will refer: "That while in general, final responsibility rests with the Ministry advising the King, such Ministry should, in formulating the principles upon which such advice is founded and the application of these principles, have regard to the views of His Majesty's Privy Council in other Dominions and of the representatives of India.

"3. That as respects the determination of the Empire's foreign policy in spheres in which any Dominion is peculiarly concerned, the view of that Dominion must be given weight commensurate with the importance of the decision to that Dominion. Speaking for Canada, I make this observation with particular reference to our relations with the United States."

Now, here Mr. Meighen maintains in effect and indeed in so many words, that while final responsibility for advising the King upon matters relating to foreign policy rests with the British Ministry, the views of Ministers in other Dominions should be had regard to. With that view interpreted as I understand it, I entirely agree.

Effect of individual Dominions having special Rights in certain phases of Foreign Policy.

But postulate 3 lays down "that where any Dominion is peculiarly concerned in the Empire's foreign policy, the view of that Dominion should be given weight commensurate with the importance of the decision to that Dominion." And Mr. Meighen adds that he makes this observation in regard to Canada's relation to America. Now, if this postulate of Mr. Meighen's be applied to all questions and to every Dominion, as he states quite definitely it is intended, where is it going to lead us? With all respect to Mr. Meighen, I cannot see how we can continue as a united Empire if each one of the partners insists—as they logically may—on exercising their autonomous rights to the extent here implied. The effect will not be immediate, but as I see it, it is inevitable that we shall drift apart. We are like men parting at an old rendezvous, wandering along inviting but unfamiliar paths; for a little while we shall hear each other's voices regarding our relationship and our common interests unaffected, returning at irregular intervals for a few years to the old rendezvous, but each year will see us farther estranged.

Mr. Meighen's postulate is, in my opinion incompatible with a united Empire—with an Empire that will endure.

Canadian Relations with United States.

Mr. Meighen tells us that the relations between Canada and the United States on all matters of mutual concern are so vast and so vital to Canada, that the control of those relations has become and must remain a matter incident to Canada's autonomy.

Now these words, read along with Mr. Meighen's postulates and general argument and his firm intention to appoint an Ambassador at Washington, clearly indicate that in determining the foreign policy between Britain or the Empire and United States, Canada's advice is to be followed. Or to put it in other words, Canada is to determine the foreign policy of the Empire with the United States. I do not think this would be good for the world. I am quite certain it would not be good for the Empire. Let us look at the relative position of Canada and the United States. Canada has 9 millions, United States over 100 millions. We know very well to what extent American trade and financial interests must necessarily affect Canada. We all admire the United States. We want to be friends with her, to have such an understanding with her that would ensure the world's peace. But it can hardly be said that her response to our advances has been enthusiastic. She refuses to come into the League of Nations, although it was established for no other reason than our belief that she wanted it. She refuses to accept many of the responsibilities under the Treaty of Versailles. She is apparently hostile to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and this in the face of the fact that she has been told in most definite terms that we would most certainly not sign any Treaty that involved in the most general way the possibility of war between the Empire and the United States. And as we all know, the anti-British forces in the United States are—and are likely to remain—strong enough to prevent rapproachment between the two English-speaking peoples that we desire.

Undesirability of Empire Relations with United States being Governed by Canada.

Now what must necessarily be the result of applying Mr. Meighen's postulates to the determination of the foreign policy of the Empire towards the United States. That policy will be as we have been plainly told, moulded on the advice given by Canada. It is hardly possible that such advice will not tend towards a foreign

C 62128

The Constitutional Question.

policy suited to the circumstances and interests of the United States rather than to Britain. If we admit that the trade and national interests of the United States and Britain may at times clash, then is it not clear that since Canada's relations with the United States are so vast and vital, and her trade with the Republic so great and daily becoming greater, that Canada's advice can hardly be such as would prejudice her great neighbour? Canada's geographical position, as well as the overwhelming superiority of the population and of the naval and military strength of the United States, is such that any other attitude would be difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, the idea that the Foreign Policy of the United States would be moulded by considerations of Canada's interests can hardly be entertained. So then it comes to this. What we are asked to agree to is that the Foreign Policy of the Empire is to be determined by the United States of America! If Canada were not a partner in the British Empire this would be none of our business: but she is, and as Mr. Meighen has told us, she is resolved to remain so. That being so, how can we agree that the Foreign Policy of the Empire, upon which the security and the very existence of the other great Dominions depend, should be determined by postulates, the application of which must subordinate the interests of the Empire—and any part of it, except perhaps those of Canada—to those of any other Power? The argument could be elaborated at much greater length, but it will suffice for the present to touch upon one other point. Mr. Meighen has insisted that his postulates are to be applied generally, and that goes without saying. What is conceded to Canada must be conceded to all the Dominions, and ultimately at all events to India.

Australian Position and Interests in the East.

Now the circumstances of Australia are entirely different from those of Canada. We are a continent remote from the Western World. The oceans are our boundaries. Our development has proceeded along different lines from Canada. The bulk of our trade is with Britain. She buys the greater part of our produce. We are one of the best of her customers. Our trade with America is relatively small compared to that with the United Kingdom. That is one point. I have said we are remote from the Western World, but we are very near to the great population of the East. We are nearer to China and Japan than any other country. Eastern questions and development deeply concern us. We depend for our safety as a free community upon sea power. If any Power other than Britain controlled the sea, our position would be untenable. This being so, let us apply Mr. Meighen's postulate to the circumstances of Australia. Since we are vitally concerned in China and Japan—very much more so than Canada, or South Africa—then our advice must be taken on matters of Foreign Policy affecting the East, particularly those questions relating to China and Japan. Then again, since we depend absolutely on sea power for our existence, our advice must be followed—or as Mr. Meighen puts it—must be given weight commensurate with its importance to us in any discussion on Naval Power. Our interest in regard to the settlement of the Pacific problem is vital, and is immeasurably greater than that of some of the Dominions, if not all, except New Zealand. Is our voice only to be heard in the settlement of the Pacific policy? All these things are as much incident to our autonomy as are the relations with the United States incident to that of Canada. But our policy and our circumstances demand among other things, the maintenance of a navy greater than Britain herself can support, and so imposes on all the other Dominions the duty of adequately supplementing British naval expenditure by contributions in money or kind upon a uniform basis. Mr. Meighen has invited us to express our opinion on the postulates which he has put before us, which should determine Foreign Policy. I have endeavoured to show some of the reasons why I believe they cannot and ought not to be accepted, at all events without important reservations.

Unity of Empire compromised if Foreign Policy moulded on wishes of individual Dominions.

I do not wish to push this line of argument further. I can quite understand Mr. Meighen's position. It is quite distinct from that of our own, but if one Dominion is going to claim the right of insisting upon the Foreign Policies of the Empire being moulded upon her advice when her interests are peculiarly involved, conditions are created which are incompatible with the unity of the Empire. It is quite another thing that Mr. Meighen should come here and present his case, argue it, and convince us. I am trying to develop the point that Mr. Meighen in effect wishes to reduce to writing, a governing principle which in the future will determine the Foreign Policy of this Empire. I wish him to contrast that which he wishes us to do with that which is and has been the practice from the very first time that Conferences have been called together in this place, and particularly since the Imperial Cabinet was first assembled. We are gathered round this table to decide without prejudice upon the merits of every case that arises, and if Mr. Meighen

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question.

would leave it at that, all would be well. No plea will be made on behalf of the whole of this Empire, or of any part of it, to which the majority of the members of this Council would turn a deaf ear. Mr. Meighen has put the case with considerable force. But we know that when he seeks to reduce that to writing, he seeks to substitute a cast-iron principle governing our future action for those well-tried and salutary methods upon which we have relied. He does not seek the opportunity to convince us, but to lay down a principle that will take away from us the right to determine each case upon its merits. We cannot agree to that. I am sure that would involve Mr. Meighen in as many difficulties as ourselves.

Mr. Lloyd George: You mean you can use it as an argument, but it must not be a sort of action.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, you may use Mr. Meighen's postulate as an argument, but not apply it as a principle. Mr. Meighen asks you to consider his circumstances. We are very ready to consider them. He wants us to see what it means to him and give him a verdict which is compatible with justice to the whole Empire, and to the interests of Canada in particular. Where can he find men more ready to consider the difficulties which confront him and to aid him to overcome them than are seated round this table? But he wants something more. And to this I do not see that it is possible we can agree. I urge most strongly that we shall not lay down principles which must in effect cramp that perfect freedom which marks this Empire out from all other Empires, ancient or modern. Every man sitting round this table is a man sitting in authority amongst his own people. He is now able to say to his fellow citizens: " You have in future the right to mould not only your own destiny, but that of the Empire also. There are no limitations to your power; there is nothing you cannot do; providing only your cause be just, right and reason shall prevail. And this is the principle underlying all our free institutions, from the Parish Council in Australia, Canada or New Zealand, right up to this Grand Council of Empire. Just as there are no limitations to the power of the elector of Britain, so there is nothing we cannot do except that which is repugnant to our sense of justice, which we know is not right, which impairs our liberties, menaces our security, and strikes a blow at the unity of the Empire. I do ask Mr. Meighen not to insist upon doing that which will make it impossible for us to continue those relations under which we are able, as it were, to reconcile the irreconcilable autonomy of the parts and unity of the whole. The world has never before seen a Constitution such as ours; I ask him to remember when he takes this step that we cannot stop there; we must go on.

Advantages of Conferences over Written Constitution.

I do not ask him to refrain from appointing an Ambassador. We can argue that round this table. If Mr. Meighen insists upon it, he has a perfect right to do so, but he will not deny us a like right to speak freely as we think. There I leave it. I do hope we shall attempt to do nothing that will fetter our right to discuss things on their merits; nor to reduce to writing that which will only have the effect in the end of making relations that exist between the different parts of the Empire impossible. It is only by wise restraint, by refraining from exercising our undoubted rights as self-governing communities that an Empire such as ours which rests upon two conflicting principles of autonomy of the parts and unity of the whole can endure. If I were to say here and now on behalf of Australia, " there are things that we have the right to do," and then Britain should set down the things that she could do, and assume that both Australia and Britain proposed to exercise to the full these undoubted rights, then and there would be the end. It is because we have been cast in the same mould and bred in the same constitutional environment that we have exercised all our privileges with that restraint without which this Empire cannot continue to exist. I hope that we shall not hear so much about the rights of any particular part of the Empire, especially if these are to be urged to a point where it means the destruction of the Empire itself, or to the prejudice of any particular part of the Empire.

The other day we listened to an admirable statement of the case for India. I ask Mr. Meighen, " Is the voice of India to prevail, and if not, why not? ": and if it is to prevail, what has General Smuts got to say? Who is to decide between them? If any authority can, then it is this Council. But we cannot decide save by their consent. There is no written Constitution, no binding laws or code which limits their rights. The Empire is united only because every member of it is absolutely free. If we once lay down this or any principle in writing, it must prevail. But General Smuts and Mr. Sastri know perfectly well what this would

mean. General Smuts knows that the authority of this Council, if it has any, can now only be applied if the parties agree. But if we lay down principles, the position will be fundamentally changed. How can each part have complete autonomy when some authority superior to themselves can impose its will upon them? Here I leave the question. I hope that we shall be able to come to a realisation of the fact that we can only be free nations by exercising our freedom with due regard to the freedom of every other part of the Empire.

The Constitutional Question.

General Smuts: We are really discussing two different subjects, which, though related, are really different. One is the subject of the Dominions' share in foreign policy, which has been raised by Mr. Meighen, and that is really subsidiary to the other and larger question, the Constitutional Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, I think so.

The Question of a Constitutional Conference.

General Smuts: That is the matter for which we were called together. The subjects as announced to us for discussion included the settling of the agenda of the Constitutional Conference for next year or some future date. That is the really important matter, and it arises out of a resolution which was passed in 1917 at the Imperial War Conference, which was to the following effect:—

> " The Imperial War Cabinet are of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities."

This subject of constitutional relations was raised at the Conference of 1917, and after a good deal of discussion, and after private Conferences among the Dominion representatives themselves, we framed this resolution, that the subject was far too important and difficult to deal with during the war period, and that it should stand over and be dealt with at some future Conference. The resolution then went on to lay down certain guiding principles. It laid down that the autonomy of the Dominions should be recognised in full, and that their existing rights should not be infringed upon or abrogated in any respect. It also laid down that they should have a share and an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations, and that some machinery for more frequent and continuous consultation should be devised: but that the Conference itself which was to determine these things should be held at some future date. We have been called together in this present Imperial Cabinet to consider as one of our subjects the agenda of that future Conference which is to be held, and I take it that that is really the major subject which we are now discussing. The Dominions' share in Imperial policy is only an aspect of this larger question. I think we were very wise in not dealing finally with this subject in 1917, because in 1917 nobody could have foreseen what the course of events would be during the war and at the end of the war, and if we had had to lay down in 1917 the constitutional relations in the Empire, we might have been entirely out in our reading of the trend of things. These relations developed much after 1917, and the whole matter came to a head finally at Paris, at the Peace Conference, where the question of the constitutional relations of the Dominions was raised in a very decisive and conclusive form at the various meetings of the British Empire Delegation. The question was raised as to what share we should take in the Peace Conference. That is how it was first raised, and you know, Prime Minister, that in the Imperial War Cabinet the subject was given a great deal of consideration even before we went to Paris—what form of representation should be given to the Dominions at the Peace Conference. Owing to the insistence of the Dominions themselves, and to the very firm support they received from the British Government all through, it was finally decided that they should have the same representation as the minor Powers. We went to the Peace Conference on that basis, and on that basis alone, that we should have the same right of speaking and voting, that we should take part in the whole Conference exactly on the same basis as the minor Powers. When the form of the Peace Treaty came to be settled there were many meetings of the British Empire Delegation. We wanted the Peace Treaty to be moulded in a form which would recognise the new position of the Dominions. The earlier draft did not do so. Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Peace Treaty as a whole, in their original form, gave expression to this new status of the Dominions. But here again the point was raised. It was fought out, and again the Dominions were firmly supported by the

Change of Status of Dominions during the War.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question.

British Government, with the result that in the final form of the Peace Treaty, the Dominions signed as parties. The British Empire was constituted as a group, and in that group the Dominion Ministers signed on behalf of their own countries and their own Governments. They were specially authorised by the King and by formal resolutions of their respective Governments to act as plenipotentiaries. What emerged therefore from these very important events was that the Dominions, instead of being under the tutelage, so to say, of the British Government, as they had been in all their foreign relations in earlier times, emerged as States with an international status; they took part in this International Conference, they signed that great international document on behalf of themselves, no longer with a British Government signing for them, but signing for themselves.

Mr. Massey: For the King, on behalf of their own countries.

General Smuts: Yes; they signed as plenipotentiaries authorised by the King, the King having been moved thereto by the resolutions of the various Dominion executives. The position, therefore, in the middle of 1919 was entirely different and had altered completely from what it had been in the middle of 1917, when this resolution which I have read was passed. I say that we were wise in not pressing matters to a conclusion in 1917, but in awaiting the results of the war and holding our Conference thereafter. It is certain that when this Conference comes to be held next year or the year after, or on any future date, we shall have an entirely new situation in the British Empire to consider, a situation entirely different from that which existed in 1917.

The position as it has now emerged has been repeatedly declared as one of equality in status between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. Ministers of the Crown in a most formal way have declared that it is the general result emerging from what has happened at Paris. But although that is stated to be the general principle and the general result, there is no doubt that the position remains to a large extent obscure. I was involved in a great conflict over this question immediately after the Peace Conference. When I went back to South Africa in July 1919, after the Peace Conference, I found that a Republican movement had sprung up there, and that a very strong party had been formed whose main, in fact only, plank was the secession of South Africa as an independent Republic from the British Empire. I countered the movement by putting the other picture, by explaining to the people of South Africa what had really happened in regard to the status of the Dominions. I explained to them that they were no longer in a position as a subordinate British Colony as they had been before; that their position in the British Empire had changed fundamentally and that although there was a great deal of obscurity still, although all sorts of constitutional conundrums could still be proposed as to details, yet in principle, the new position had been laid down by the precedents established in Paris, and that we in South Africa and all the Dominions had acquired an international status, had been recognised by our signature of the Peace Treaty as having that international status, and that we were no longer in a position of subordination. On that general line I fought the General Election in 1920. I had to fight another on practically the same issue in the beginning of this year. The constitutional position in the Empire is therefore not a mere academic question, it is one of vital importance, and I think the time is coming, and has come, when we should do whatever we can to remove the obscurities which still cling to the situation. If we can do so by any constitutional declarations which could be made now or could be made hereafter at a Constitutional Conference, I think we should very materially assist the position in the Empire as a whole. As I say, in South Africa this separation movement has actually arisen; it has been beaten down at the recent elections, but it is by no means dead; we shall have to bear that in mind. It is also in agreement with the general trend of opinion all over the world. This movement in favour of greater national liberty and freedom is a world movement, and the British Empire will feel it too; and the more we can make it clear to the component parts of the Empire and to the world that ours is not a system of subordination, that this is not a system of one dominant Power or Government which keeps the others in a subordinate position, but that it is a system of equal States working together on principles of equality and freedom, the more we will, to my mind, stabilise the position in the British Empire and the greater power for good we shall be.

Situation of South Africa after the War.

Need for Declaration on the Constitution of the Empire.

The whole matter has been left by the Resolution of 1917 to the Constitutional Conference which is still to be held. The position, as I say, has already been

considerably developed by what happened at Paris; but what happened at Paris is, after all, only a precedent, and the constitutional position has to be clarified in the Empire. I am very much opposed to a written Constitution for the Empire. We have seen during the war how a written Constitution, like that of the United States of America, hampered its Government at every turn and made the prosecution of the war a matter of the utmost difficulty. We have seen also how a rigid Constitution like that worked at the making of peace when it really became impossible for the American Government to make peace; peace was made only long afterwards, only the other day, in fact, in a way which is still unintelligible to me. A resolution has been passed, but the effect of that resolution and what is to happen thereunder is still not clear to me. These anomalous results arise under written Constitutions. We have a different type of Constitution. It is not written; it is moulded by precedent, moulded by the internal development of the situation from time to time; and therefore the Constitution is like a garment that fits the body and the spirit of the whole group of nations as they develop in their national and their group relations. I am for maintaining that essential unwritten character of the Constitution, and I am against written formulas. But whilst that is so, I also think that it ought to be possible to clarify a number of points which to-day are obscure. They are obscure, even to constitutional lawyers; they are obscure to the Empire and they are obscure to the world outside.

The Constitutional Question.

Objections to a Written Constitution.

Take the case now of what happened in the United States when the ratification of the Peace Treaty came forward, and objection was taken to the voting power of the Dominions in the Assembly of the League of Nations. It is quite clear that the constitutional position in the Empire was entirely misunderstood in the United States. They still looked upon the four British Dominions as British Colonies, as constituents whose votes were commanded by the mother country. They did not understand what the new position in the British Empire was and that the votes were not commanded by the British Government at all, and that the Dominions were on a footing of equality in their new international status, and represented directly by their own spokesmen at the League of Nations. It is quite clear, from the debates that took place in the Senate, so far as I have been able to follow them, that the position was not understood. No difficulty was felt in the Senate against Cuba having a seat in the League of Nations, but difficulty was raised in the case of a British Dominion, which has a position of far greater real independence than Cuba. Not only from the point of view of internal public opinion in the Empire, but from the point of view of outside world opinion, I think we should clear up the situation. We can do so, I think, if half a dozen principles or declarations could be framed.

Status of Dominions not understood in United States.

Mr. Massey: Then you get the written Constitution.

General Smuts: I would not make it a written Constitution at all. I would certainly not favour very much the form of declaration which Mr. Meighen has submitted, because the subject is difficult and more complicated than he imagines.

Mr. Massey: I agree with you upon that point.

General Smuts: I know we agree, except in opinions; we are fundamentally in agreement. No; I think it would be unwise for us to lay down large vague general principles, the application of which in detail it would be difficult to foresee; I am therefore not in favour of the form of principles laid down in Mr. Meighen's memorandum. To 90 per cent. I think I could in practice agree, I think they are sound working principles, and in practice we shall act according to the spirit of them. A Dominion which has a special interest in the settlement of any question would no doubt carry special weight in the settlement of that question, and you could assume that as a fundamental axiom; but to lay it down as a fixed written principle might warrant further conclusions to which I would not agree, and which might be very dangerous. But there are other declarations clarifying our status of equality in the British Empire and the relations of the component parts, which could very well be formulated and be laid down, and which could receive some constitutional sanction and in that way clear up the position which is now to some extent obscure. I do not know in what way to proceed about this matter. We are asked to lay down an Agenda for this Constitutional Conference. Now there are two ways of settling an Agenda. One way is to tabulate a list of subjects that are going to be discussed. To my mind, if we were to do that we would not help this matter forward at all, and I doubt

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question.

Suggested publication of certain Propositions for consideration by Constitutional Conference.

whether there is any utility in simply stating a list of subjects which the Constitutional Conference of next year or the year after is going to discuss. I see no use in that. That Conference will itself determine the list of subjects that it will discuss, but I have been wondering whether we could not usefully go a step further and do something which would be of real utility, and that is, formulate a list of propositions about the constitution of the Empire, entirely of a provisional character, and for the consideration and settlement of that Conference work out a list of such propositions and publish them for the notice of the Empire and of the whole world. Then if half a dozen propositions like that could be formulated now, clearing up the real relations that exist in the Empire, they could be debated in the Empire, they would help to guide and form public opinion, and when the Conference of next year, or the following year does meet, it will have some concrete material to work on, and it can either accept or reject those propositions. But it would have provisional and tentative propositions before it which would have been discussed in the various parts of the Empire in the meantime. To-day, there is nothing to discuss. I do not know whether the subject of constitutional relations is discussed at all except in a country like South Africa where they arise in a very acute form, but if we could frame a series of propositions, and, without passing them finally, publish them as provisional propositions to be the material on which the Conference of the following year would work, then I think we would be giving a good lead to public opinion now, and we would settle the material for discussion, in the meantime, of those important subjects. I do not know what more one can say in a general statement. To my mind, this is a matter rather to be thrashed out in a sub-committee.

Practical machinery for obtaining opinion of Dominions in Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should have liked to have heard a little more, both from Mr. Hughes and yourself, on the very practical question of how, apart altogether from these general principles, you are to conduct the day-to-day work of the foreign relations of the Empire, and to gather the opinion of the Dominions upon the great questions.

Mr. Hughes: I did not attempt to do that.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is a very practical issue for us and for you.

General Smuts: That is so, Prime Minister. I am not prepared now to go into that question. It is a most difficult question, and the answer to it involves new machinery which does not exist to-day. To-day, the only form of consultation that there is is a weekly telegram from you to us on foreign affairs, notifying us of what is going on. Generally, those telegrams arrive after the events.

Mr. Lloyd George: I know; that is what I want to have from you. What do you suggest we should do in order to gather your opinions? We are inviting them.

Mr. Hughes: I think you should ask us to make some concrete suggestion, but I think it is only fair to say, at any rate as regards myself, that I understood you to refer to the general principle.

General Smuts: I am speaking generally now. So far, I have been speaking quite generally. I have not come to anything concrete.

Mr. Hughes: I should be ready, as I am sure General Smuts will be, to do what we can.

General Smuts: The answer to the Prime Minister's question involves new machinery in the Empire which will require very careful consideration, and which we could proceed to discuss to-morrow.

Mr. Massey: I am not raising any objection. If you desire to go on to-morrow I am quite willing.

Mr. Lloyd George: One of the resolutions adopted by the Imperial Cabinet was the right to nominate a Dominion Minister, a resident Minister here, to take part in our discussions. Well, I am not sure that any Dominion has acted upon . . . .

Sir Maurice Hankey: There have been some . . . .

General Smuts: That suggestion has never been practically carried out.

Mr. Massey: Because the Cabinet was dropped. I am speaking of the War Cabinet.

General Smuts: You understand that I have not discussed at all the very important question that you have raised. There are other similar important questions.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is our practical difficulty.

The Constitutional Question.

Mr. Massey: Prime Minister, I have referred to this question on other occasions, even during the present Conference, and I do not know that it is necessary that I should go over the same ground. Still, I want to discuss one or two of the points referred to this afternoon. Mention is continually being made of our autonomy. I have said before that so far as I can see there was not the slightest intention on the part of the British Government, or the Imperial Cabinet—just as you choose to express it—to interfere with our autonomy. We have the right of governing ourselves in our own way, and making our own laws, but, as I understand it, we have none of us the right to interfere with the welfare of any other Dominion, or any other part of the Empire, or the Empire itself.

Autonomy of Dominions refers to Dominions individually.

Those are the lines I am going on, and I believe them correct. A written Constitution has been suggested, or, at all events, reference has been made to the Constitution of the Empire which is not written. I am not asking for a written Constitution and have never asked for it. I do not know if it would be any improvement, but I do agree with General Smuts when he says there are certain points which require to be made very much clearer so that we may know exactly our relations to each other and to the Empire. We do not know them to-day. So far as the Constitution is concerned, it is not written, but I think it must be acknowledged that it is based on Statute Law, some of which goes back to the days of the Saxons; however, commencing with Magna Charta, then coming down the centuries to the Bill of Rights in 1688, then the Habeas Corpus Act, the Reform Act and the Act of two years ago which extended the franchise to the people of the United Kingdom. That has become part of the Constitution, but I do again say that something more is wanted. I mentioned one point. By the way, it is quite true that our status has been increased. We are a partnership of nations—a family of nations I would prefer to call it—but a partnership has its duties and responsibilities as well as its rights and privileges, and I think we ought not to forget that. I think we ought not to forget that we have a duty first to the Empire. I say my duty is first to the Empire and second to New Zealand, and I am quite prepared to stand by that anywhere. The greater includes the less, and certainly the greater is, to my mind, more important than the less. Take the point I raised the other day about the Cabinet and the Conference. It has never been settled yet. I have seen, with a certain amount of interest, that, in the draft which was submitted to us, this meeting was sometimes referred to as a Cabinet and sometimes as a Conference. I am not quite sure which stood. I do not think it matters much because we have not settled the point, and until we do, we do not know where we are.

Need for defining certain Relations between component parts of the Empire.

We have had a great deal to say, during the last few days, with regard to foreign affairs. They have been discussed at great length and very rightly and properly so, but I would ask anyone who understands the position to-day, in what position do the representatives of the Dominions stand with regard to the foreign affairs of the Empire, with regard to matters affecting the making of war or the making of peace? Where do we stand? Have we any say in connection with any one of them? I say we have not. The Crown Colonies have a say undoubtedly.

Voice of Dominions compared to Crown Colonies and India in regard to Foreign Policy.

Mr. Hughes: You do not say we ought not to have?

Mr. Massey: That is another matter. I say we ought. In matters connected with foreign affairs which come up at the Cabinet, Mr. Churchill represents them, and does it well, I do not doubt for one moment. His own opinion will coincide with the opinions of those he represents. Take India. India may have a grievance, and I do not say India has not a grievance, but India is in a better position so far as a voice in foreign affairs is concerned than the great Overseas Dominions. I do not envy India, I am only stating the position. I say it cannot be challenged and it should not be allowed to continue, so far as the Dominions are concerned. I express my own opinion, of course, but it has been my business occasionally to read up constitutional law and constitutional history, and I have come to that conclusion and I believe it to be right. That is one of the reasons why I think this matter should be submitted to constitutional authorities so that we may get to know exactly where we are, if we possibly can. So far as the remedy is concerned, it is quite easy according to my way of treating it. Let us get back to the position we occupied when the War Cabinet was sitting, when we joined with the Ministers of the United Kingdom in any representations which might be made to the head of the State. Surely that is a fair position to take up.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question.

Empire not so United as during the War.

I come back for a moment to the League of Nations. Most of us have been thinking of the League of Nations a good deal lately.

I heard Mr. Hughes say that, if Mr. Meighen's suggestion were given effect to, the countries of the Empire would drift apart. I do not know whether I am unduly pessimistic in regard to this—I am not of a pessimistic disposition as, I think, most members of the Conference know—but I am becoming pessimistic about the future of the Empire. It is not a question of drifting apart; the drift has commenced. We are not in the same position that we occupied two years ago. We are not united as we were then, and there are forces at work to-day that were not at work during the war, and members can see it in all directions. I see no other way of meeting the drift, which, I believe, has already commenced, except by arriving at an understanding as to where we are and making whatever provision may be possible, though I know the difficulties as well as any member of the Conference. We ought to make whatever provision is possible for the proper representation of the Overseas Dominions in what should be the Cabinet of the Empire. The distance is the difficulty that we are right up against. I know, of course, the principle of Cabinet representation. I am not quite sure about this point, but I think I am right in saying that every member of the British Cabinet must be a member of the Privy Council. I think that is so. Then, I think, that a member of the Cabinet must be invited to meet in Cabinet by the Prime Minister—that goes without saying. Well, that constitutes the membership of the Cabinet and on that I think there should be an understanding. I know perfectly well this is another of the difficulties, that even a member of the Cabinet other than the Prime Minister of a Dominion cannot represent his Dominion properly. Nobody but the Prime Minister can speak for the Parliament of which he is a member. The whole responsibility rests on this one man. He is supposed to know the mind of the Parliament and the mind of the Government, and, if he does not know the mind of the Parliament and goes wrong, well, he must take the consequences when he goes back. When questions are submitted to a body such as this, the Prime Minister who is not quite sure of his proper position could say: "Well, I shall be very glad to submit this to my Parliament when I get back," or, if his Parliament happens to be sitting, he could communicate with it; that is the way out. We need to be brought closer together and with the present means of communication it is very difficult to do it. A suggestion was made to me yesterday. In all probability, we are not likely to build many warships for many years to come, though, at the same time, I am one of those who stand for the proper defence of the Empire; yet I am anxious that something may come out of the understanding which has begun to be arrived at as between the Allied and Associated Powers. These are the people to take this thing up, and if they take it up, as I hope they will, and come to a proper understanding, a new organisation will take the place of the League of Nations, and I for one will not be sorry. That is the position I take up in regard to that. I believe what is proposed is worthy of all possible encouragement. As far as I am concerned, I do not intend to be half-hearted about it; if an arrangement can be arrived at, I shall receive it with a great deal of pleasure and I shall feel that we have done the right thing, and that we have done a very great work. At the same time, please understand, I want to see the Empire upheld. I do not want to see it humiliated in any way, and while Mr. Balfour was speaking across the table, I was interested in the interjection that the British Empire had no pride. We were not too proud to fight. It is one of the things we should bear in mind in our relationship with other nations, that we want to be perfectly courteous and perfectly respectful to them and do everything that is possible to meet their wishes, yet at the same time, we need to consider British rights, British interests and British pride—if you like to put it that way.

Difficulty of representing Dominions in the Cabinet.

Suggested special fast boats at disposal of Dominion Premiers.

By the way, speaking about the suggestion made to me, so as to get over the difficulty of distance. It is just possible we are not likely to build warships for many years, and I believe the world generally is sick of war and the world will be glad to see an easing up. Just as it happened after the Napoleonic wars there was a lull, and, for quite a number of years, there was no serious war, none of the Great Powers were at war. We cannot expect small nations like the Balkan States or the States of South America to refrain from war, but so long as the Great Powers are not at war the world will not be seriously affected. Now the suggestion was made that we should have what is called a yacht—I think that is the term. I am certainly not going to interfere with the privileges of the Royal Family, but I think a fast warship or a fast yacht would be a good thing for the use of Ministers with an economic speed—I think that is the term—of not less than 25 knots. I know

these vessels were scarce during war time and I know we had to get one in New Zealand for the Imperial Government; she was a vessel of some 25 knots and was called a despatch boat. She was returned to us in as good a condition as she was sent. That is the type of ship we want when an emergency arises, and at a time when it may become necessary to call together the Imperial Cabinet hurriedly. This ship should be placed at the disposal of Ministers for that purpose.

The Constitutional Question.

You could collect us at Vancouver, Victoria, Sydney, Melbourne, Auckland, Wellington, or the Cape when necessary. This wants thinking out; it rather appealed to me and I think there is something to be said for it. I do not say it will do all we need, but I believe if we do something of that sort, it will help us to solve the difficulty which we are up against at present.

Mr. Churchill: I hope you will collect a vessel of considerable burthen before I attempt to cross that ocean. A small yacht I am rather alarmed about.

Mr. Massey: The yachts at present cannot go beyond the Mediterranean. I do not suggest that such a ship as the "Renown" is necessary; I don't suggest that for a moment, but we saw what the "Renown" could do. It could go round the world at an average speed of over 20 knots—perhaps 25 to 30 knots if required; that means coal or oil as the case may be. The "Renown" has proved what can be done, and it would enable the British United Kingdom Ministers to see the country overseas and meet the people overseas in a way that they have never been able to do before.

Mr. Churchill: You want a few very fast liners.

Mr. Massey: Apparently we have not got them. We have not been able to build many ships during the war. There are few fast passenger ships as far as I know. I am speaking of the ordinary sea-going ships. I think we ought to see if something more can be done. At all events, there are many points where improvement is possible, and this is one of them.

Empire Unity and Sea Power.

One of the points to which we are looking forward continually is unity of Empire: only I put the word "Imperial" though I think "Empire" is better. I say I want to emphasise this point and repeat that I am certain we are not so well off as regards Empire unity as we were two or three years ago, in spite of the fact that nearly a million men from the whole of the Empire lost their lives to save the Empire from Prussian despotism. Then, there is sea-power which was referred to by Mr. Hughes; we have not yet finished the discussion on sea power. As a matter of fact I understand we are to have an opportunity of being given a separate day for it. I thoroughly agree with the arrangement that is in prospect; well and good, if a satisfactory arrangement can be made, but if not, then we must do what is right as far as sea power is concerned.

New Zealand's Loyalty to the Empire.

One point I might mention which is of interest to me, and it shows the mind of the people whom I represent—the people of New Zealand. Our soldiers when they returned had to their credit a sum of about 80,000*l.* profit from the canteens. The returned soldiers meet together twice a year in one of the centres in New Zealand; they meet generally in Wellington, and at the last meeting by a resolution of thirty-six to one they carried a motion to the effect that the interest on this 80,000*l.*, which belonged to them and no one else, from the canteen profits should be used for the purpose of maintaining the Imperial navy. I think it is a splendid thing to do. It may be a very small thing, but it shows the feeling there is of loyalty to the Empire and the feeling in overseas countries like Australia and New Zealand. The feeling has grown, and is growing, that proper protection is necessary and we have not got it now.

It is hardly worth while following this point up, except this, that I was reminded of something which happened during the war. After the battle of Jutland, when several first-class battle-cruisers were sunk (I cannot remember the names, I think they were the "Queen Mary" and one or two other smaller ships), what happened was this. When the news came to New Zealand, the Cabinet decided unanimously that if the Imperial Cabinet would accept a battle-cruiser they would purchase one as nearly as possible of the same power and armament as the ships that had been lost, from the Japanese, or from some one of the South American States which had good ships, and hand it over to the Imperial Government, free of cost. The Imperial Cabinet replied that under the circumstances it was not necessary, as they felt they had enough ships and of sufficient calibre to finish the war. I mention this point just to show the feeling in the country to which I belong as far

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question.

Question as to whether, when the Empire was at War, any portion of it could remain outside the War.

as the Imperial navy is concerned, and that we have now a Governor-General, one of the best sailors of the Empire, who at every opportunity calls the attention of the citizens of New Zealand to this great fact. Then there is a point raised especially by Mr. Meighen, and that is that any country of the Empire need not enter into a war in which the Empire is concerned. This is not a new point by any means, it has come up over and over again. I have turned up a report of the 1911 Conference* when Sir Wilfred Laurier raised the same point.

Mr. Meighen: Where is it in my statement.

Mr. Massey: It is more implied than stated definitely. I think you will find it there.

Mr. Meighen: I do not think you will find it.

Mr. Massey: Sir Wilfred Laurier brought it up at the 112th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence held on the 29th May, 1911, and there is a whole page with regard to it, and I am glad to say that, as far as it is possible to judge from the report, nobody agreed to it. Mr. McKenna, who was at that time in office, was particularly pronounced, and even the representatives of New Zealand. To my mind it would be an exceptionally anomalous thing that in the case of the Empire being involved in a war, one British nation, one British Dominion, should stand out and allow the others to bear the brunt of the war, and that at the same time that State should be getting the protection of the Empire.

Mr. Ballantyne: I think it is only fair to Sir Wilfred Laurier to say that I have heard him make the statement many times, in and out of the House, that when Great Britain was at war Canada was at war.

Mr. Massey: Let me quote :—

"*Dr. Findlay:* Do you mind saying what you mean by being at peace in these circumstances.

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* I say, not being engaged in war.

"*Dr. Findlay:* That is ~~their~~ from being left alone.

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* Being left alone.

"*Dr. Findlay:* And not being attacked.

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* Not being attacked and taking no part in the war.

"*Mr. McKenna:* Can you imagine the case of a Canadian grain ship coming across the Atlantic at a time when we are at war with Germany, and a German cruiser meeting that grain ship, is that grain ship a neutral, or may she become a prize?

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* No; it is a British ship.

"*Mr. McKenna:* I am ~~to~~ assuming that it is a Canadian ship?

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* It is a British ship.

"*Mr. McKenna:* Then she can become a prize?

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* Certainly.

"*Mr. McKenna:* The German cruiser can take her?

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* Certainly.

"*Mr. McKenna:* Then how can you be in a state of peace?

"*Sir Wilfred Laurier:* As I said a moment ago, there may be occasions when we may be in a state of peace and at others when we may not. It all depends on circumstances. But to say that when Great Britain is at war Canada must be at war seems to me a fallacy in view of the historical experience I have given."

Mr. Meighen: I think I can agree with both you and Mr. Ballantyne.

Mr. Ballantyne: Sir Wilfred Laurier was also on the eve of a general election at that time.

Mr. Massey: There is a great deal to be said for a Prime Minister, or the leader of a party, on the eve of a general election.

* Minutes of the 112th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The Constitutional Question.

Mr. Hughes: I think it only fair to say that if you take the whole of Sir Wilfred Laurier's attitude and position towards the Empire, you must remember where he stood. He was a French-Canadian, and on the whole he was all right.

Mr. Massey: I simply say that the point was raised and the Conference at that time did not agree with it. That is my point. I am not reflecting upon Sir Wilfred Laurier—far be it from me to do anything of the sort. Then take the other side of the question, that a Dominion may make a treaty with a foreign nation. I do not know that this expresses it. I do not think anything of the sort is possible. It all goes back to the point, that when the King is at war, his subjects are at war.

Question whether a Dominion can make an Independent Treaty.

Mr. Hughes: I think the position there is this. That it can do so. If I am asked, I say we have the right to do so. If we exercise this right, and I am asked if we can remain in this Empire, I say, "No." I say that is the position. I do not say that *ipso facto* we are out, but it is the end of the Empire.

Mr. Massey: Undoubtedly. I agree with Mr. Hughes in the opinion he has expressed. If that sort of thing is started, the Empire is gone. We might just as well face the position. I am very strongly of the opinion that we should do everything we can to strengthen the Empire, and if we do that, I believe posterity will bless us for doing it. If we allow the foundations to be taken away and allow the Empire to fall, I believe posterity will curse us and blame us for it. I would like to have these matters thrashed out and get a definite opinion from your constitutional authorities. I have neither spoken to the Solicitor-General nor the Attorney-General on the subject. I would be perfectly satisfied to have the opinion of these two gentlemen or any other qualified men, and have the thing, as General Smuts has suggested, clarified and cleared up once and for all.

Mr. Lloyd George: Do you want to say anything?

Position of India.

Mr. Sastri: I want to say a word if I may. I was much interested in an observation made by the Right Honourable Mr. Massey, that none but a Prime Minister is entitled to speak with any authority on behalf of a Dominion. I wonder where I come in?

Mr. Massey: You are not quite a Dominion.

Mr. Sastri: But I dare say that I will be.

Mr. Massey: Then you will be of the same opinion as myself.

Mr. Sastri: It was borne in upon me how approximate the position of General Smuts seems to have been quite recently to that we now hold in India. He described how we had to meet a Separatist faction in his Government, amongst his people. I wish I had it in my power to smite my opponents in India with the same weapon that he employed. I could then be sure I could disperse them. I only wish that this Cabinet would place such a weapon in my power, but General Smuts must agree that if I went back to India and told them that while I was debating their case in this very Cabinet, the people who had been enjoying this franchise were deprived of it quite recently, instead of having a weapon to smite my opponents with, my opponents would have a terrible weapon to smite me with. I am, therefore, much concerned with the proposition that General Smuts laid down, that we should put down a few general statements to be considered next year. That would not include the particular resolution that I have brought forward. It is most urgent, General Smuts must recognise, that our common enemies, your enemies and mine, must be accounted for immediately. The resolution that I have put forward, therefore, is not one which could come in the category referred to by General Smuts, as though it should be laid down provisionally or tentatively for consideration as a future Cabinet. In Turkey the position is getting worse. This particular matter is bad news, Prime Minister, and I am glad to have the opportunity of bringing it forward.

Mr. Lloyd George: Well, I do not know whether we will adjourn at this stage. Lord Curzon has gone down to meet the American Ambassador. We have had a pretty good discussion upon it.

Mr. Meighen: I have something to say.

Mr. Lloyd George: I also have something to say and thought I would say it to-morrow.

Mr. Meighen: I would rather get it off my mind, if we are not in too great a hurry.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question.

Mr. Hughes: You said when General Smuts had finished speaking that you wished some concrete suggestions to be made. I think you might allow us to put before you what we think might be done, and the constitutional position as we see it, and what we think should be done in regard to it.

Mr. Lloyd George: Right.

Mr. Hughes: That is, after Mr. Meighen has spoken.

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Meighen will make his statement now.

Mr. Meighen: I will not attempt to refer to some of the subjects which have been touched upon in the course of the Conference addresses to-day. I will make a short statement first as regards some observations on this constitutional deliverance of mine, or whatever you choose to call it.

Mr. Massey: A memorandum.

View as to the Voice of Dominions in Foreign Policy.

Mr. Meighen: And secondly, as to the proposed Constitutional Conference, and thirdly, as to how we should go about making progress on the question of the proper conduct of our mutual relations as regards Foreign Policy in the future.

Well, first, the circumstances in which this statement of mine was made should be kept in mind. The Foreign Secretary had reviewed the entire conduct of foreign affairs for, say, two or three years, since, at least, our last meeting. I thought it would not be out of place to put on record my general view as to the right of a Dominion to a voice in the determination of Foreign Policy, to consider the extent and the limitation of that right under the present recognised constitutional mechanism. I do not intend what I said to be in the nature of a resolution to which all must accede and to which a minority must submit; nor did I intend what I put forward to be regarded as of the rank of a Magna Charta or even of the Fourteen Points. I did not think there was a Minister of the British Government now who would deny to any Dominion anything affirmed on that Dominion's behalf in this statement. In answer to arguments put forward by Mr. Hughes, I only wish to call attention to two things. One is the word "distinctively" in the fifth line on the last page, and the second, the word "commensurate" in the second page. I have nothing else to say.

Constitutional Conferences.

Now as to the Constitutional Conference. We are confronted with several circumstances, but the main one I may be able to confine myself to. The fact is that in 1917 a resolution was passed calling for a special Constitutional Conference after the war. No doubt at the time the anomalies of our present position were getting home to the members of the Conference of 1917 with an accentuated force, due to the need of very direct co-operation during the war, and it was very generally felt that something had to be done to remove those anomalies. Consequently, this resolution was passed. I am not sure that if everything had been known that we know now the resolution would have been unanimous. I do not like the idea of advertising ahead that we contemplate constitutional changes. It has an unsettling effect in Canada, and it may also have in other countries. I must here refer to General Smuts's suggestion that there should be certain tentative resolutions now proposed, in order that we may revolve them in our minds between this time and when a Constitutional Conference is held. You put certain things in writing, and let your country know that two years or even a year hence you are going to discuss this or that. That would give rise to apprehensions. The thing that we have to decide is what we are going to do. We are called here, and one of the initial reasons for calling us here was to decide the items of the agenda. We have the alternative of preparing no specific agenda. My suggestion is this: We have to meet again. I do not see any reason for meeting arising from any necessity for constitutional changes at all. Such reasons alone are not sufficient. But I think for other reasons it will be necessary to meet again in a couple of years.

Mr. Massey: Less than that.

Mr. Meighen: Yes, perhaps less. Let us if we can, determine on the name, time and place of our next meeting. I suggest that "Imperial Conference" be continued as the name. Let us decide then from a review of all the circumstances whether a change of constitutional relationships is necessitated by the experiences we shall have had. Do not let us lay anything down as agenda. I do not see how we can; but if we could and did, it would have anything but good effects. I do not say that everything is right in our constitutional arrangements, and I do not say that we cannot do at least something very soon; I am inclined to think we can, but

the present is not the time to do it, and whether it be in two years or less, there should be a lapse of a reasonable time after the war conditions. It would never have done to have met immediately after the war, with the experience of the war in our minds, and then to have made adjustments to apply for a long period of peace. I consider that in another two years it will be time enough, and even then I do not think there will be any radical changes necessary; but we could review the conditions at that time, and we might then achieve something worth while.

The Constitutional Question.

Method of Co-ordinating Dominion's Opinions as regards Foreign Policy.

That is my suggestion on Topic No. 2. As to the third, what should be done in the meantime in order that we may be better advised, and better able to exercise the rights hitherto exercised and now sought to be expressed in this paper of mine. How we may the better do that is a question which is practical and immediate, and we ought to seek to make good progress upon it at once. My suggestion is this, that we should have a Committee at work for the next two or three days, which would report to this meeting on that matter and we should appoint the Committee to-day. We should see if we can do something in order to make the determination of questions common to us all a real determination of us all instead of one—in order that the Government of Great Britain could the more quickly, easily, more fully and effectually get in touch with and act in co-operation with the Dominions in the meantime. For that reason I suggest this Committee. That is how I express its work. It is the only suggestion I have to make now on that subject.

Mr. Lloyd George: I do not think we can decide that at this stage. The other members of the Conference have not expressed their views on the practical point, and therefore they would probably like to do so to-morrow. I suggest that we should adjourn at this stage, and that can be discussed to-morrow. That is the practical issue, I think, for us to consider.

Mr. Churchill: You will leave to-morrow afternoon blank, I suppose?

Sir Maurice Hankey: We had so arranged, but a change came over the scene, seeing that the Prime Minister would not be available this week.

Mr. Lloyd George: I should be very glad if you could take questions which it is very important I should be present at. De Valera is coming over.

Mr. Churchill: You will want a Cabinet Meeting one day this week.

Mr. Lloyd George: If we could take question of defence to-morrow I should be glad.

Mr. Churchill: All my notifications that I have been sending out are to the effect that we are going to meet on communications and migration, and one or two other things. I am quite agreeable if you would start and go through the whole afternoon, and come on here at 4·30.

Mr. Hughes: This question of the Constitutional Conferences which was raised really by Mr. Meighen is one which, if we attempted to deal with it other than after full consideration, will lead us into no end of difficulty, and I would suggest that we must have sufficient time, at whatever cost to any other subject, to go into it thoroughly as it is one of those things that agitates the minds of people in the Dominions.

General Smuts: I quite agree with Mr. Hughes, it is a very important subject.

Mr. Chamberlain: We could resume this to-morrow morning, and Mr. Churchill will then have his meeting in the afternoon.

Mr. Churchill: I am quite agreeable to that arrangement, but if you begin sitting at 3 and go on till 7 o'clock, you will find it rather exhausting.

Mr. Lloyd George: What you might do is to go on from 3 to 4·30, and then if you could go over, for even 10 minutes to the House of Commons, both the Speaker and the House of Commons would appreciate it; and we could then meet here at 5 o'clock.

Mr. Churchill: If we want more time on the Wednesday, in the event of our not finishing to-morrow, you will give us that.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, that is so.

(Adjourned until 11·30 to-morrow morning.)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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SECRET. PROOF.

E. 23rd Meeting.

2nd Revise No 2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: I am not sure that it would not be very useful if we continued the discussion on the lines initiated by Mr. Massey, and now go from general principles to ways and means. Mr. Hughes said that he had something to say upon that subject.

Position of United Kingdom in League of Nations.

Mr. Massey: Will you allow me to add something to what I said yesterday, although I do not attach much importance to it. It is an anomaly in connection with the League of Nations. I do not know whether it has been noticed by anyone but myself that the United Kingdom is the only part of the Empire that is not specially represented on the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George: Is that so?

Mr. Massey: Of course Ministers represent the British Empire, which includes the United Kingdom, but that leaves an overlapping between the Overseas Dominions and the other parts of the Empire. I do not say there is much in it.

Mr. Balfour: I am afraid there is a good deal in that point. I do not know that it concerns us here very much, but it is an anomalous position that is going to be very awkward. I do not think that we can avoid it. Do you want me to say anything about the League of Nations now?

Mr. Lloyd George: I think that could be taken afterwards.

Mr. Meighen's Propositions.

The only contribution at this stage which I should like to make on the question of general principles is to lay down one or two axioms which I think are accepted by everybody, and to lead up to a discussion on the best method of carrying out the principles which are accepted by all. Personally I do not take exception to the propositions laid down by Mr. Meighen in the sense in which he interpreted them. I take note of the fact that he emphasises those two words "distinctively Canadian" and the word "commensurate." Those words make a very considerable difference. I assume that those are questions which almost exclusively concern the relations of Canada with the United States of America; but there must be a good many questions. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is not a question which is distinctively Canadian. It is a question which affects other parts of the Empire. There must be a good many other questions of the same kind, but undoubtedly there are a good many questions (and necessarily there must be) which concern Canada primarily and almost exclusively. I take it that Mr. Meighen had in his mind questions of that kind. Therefore, there is nothing which is irreconcilable in the position taken by Mr. Meighen and the position taken by Mr. Hughes in his statement yesterday.

Mr. Hughes: Perhaps, if we knew exactly what Mr. Meighen has in his mind, we could say.

Mr. Massey: But he told us last night. I thought Mr. Meighen's explanation was satisfactory.

Necessity for maintaining Unity of Empire in Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Lloyd George: After the explanation Mr. Meighen gave us last night and the way in which he called attention to those words, I think he safeguarded the position of the Empire, and therefore, on that interpretation—speaking on behalf of my colleagues sitting on this side of the table—I certainly would not challenge Mr. Meighen's propositions.

I think it is of paramount importance that in foreign affairs we should maintain the unity of the Empire. I think it is of paramount importance not merely to the Empire as a whole or to its individual parts; but it is of paramount importance from the point of view of humanity as a whole. The late war demonstrated that. There is no doubt at all that the Empire saved humanity and civilisation from a very great catastrophe. I doubt whether any single part of the Empire could have done it if the Empire had not come in with the whole of its strength. It is very difficult for us to conjecture what would have happened, but it was so near a thing on one or two occasions that I think anyone who said that if the Empire as a whole had not come in, the issue would have been a different one, could make a very good case if not an irresistible one. So that the fact that the Empire spoke with one voice has really altered the history of the world and the direction in which civilisation has developed. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Empire should have one voice and that we should speak as a whole. The world has realised its power—I will not say for the first time—but it has realised the full extent of its power for the first time. The British Empire put very nearly ten million men into action on land and sea. I think we are rather too apt to dwell upon the service

the Empire achieved on land, forgetting the equally important and equally vital and essential part it played at sea. Whatever men we put on land would have been of no account if we had not had command of the sea. That is going to have a bearing upon our next discussion. It is that which decided the war. Anyone has only to make a picture in his mind of what would have happened if the positions had been reversed and Germany had had the command of the sea. The Empire would have been of no account, France would have been cut off from the world, America could not have come to her aid in time, and France would have been destroyed. Russia was destroyed as a matter of fact. It is not sufficiently realised that Germany succeeded in destroying her enemies on the east, and she only just escaped destroying her enemies on the west by the intervention of the British Empire.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

That was a contribution which the Empire made on land and sea. So that undoubtedly it is the fact that the Empire spoke as a whole with its united strength, with its concentrated strength, with a united purpose—that is what has made history as it is going to be for centuries to come. Therefore I think we ought to start there, that the first thing we ought to seek is some means by which the Empire can speak with one voice.

Great Power of the Empire when speaking as a Whole.

Now, I should like to take another phase. There is no part of the Empire that would be as potent speaking separately as it is now when speaking as part of the British Empire. I do not mean to say that the United Kingdom would not be powerful even if the whole Empire were not behind it. That is not what I mean. But the influence which it exerted, the share of the influence which it exerted, would not be as great, nor would that of Canada, Australia, New Zealand nor India. I will illustrate what I mean. The United Kingdom is very powerful. It has a population which exceeds that of France by about 7,000,000, and it would undoubtedly be a very potent influence in any war. But it goes without saying that its influence would not be as determining an influence as the one which it exercises when it has the whole Empire acting with it. Take any of the Dominions. The Dominion of Canada has the population of Roumania, Jugoslavia or Greece. It would always be a very powerful voice if it stood alone; but the influence which it would have actually exerted by itself in fashioning the world would not be comparable to that which it did actually exert as part of the British Empire Delegation. There the Dominions took part in determining the policy of the Empire, which very largely determined the peace. We consulted Roumania occasionally on Roumanian questions. We consulted Jugoslavia on Jugoslavian questions, and Greece on questions which affected Greece, but we never brought them into our Councils to determine what the world was going to be like for the next thousand years perhaps. But the British Empire Delegation—South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India—they were there in our Councils. We took no line of action with regard to world policy without having constant consultations with them, and I shall never forget the great meeting when the German reply arrived, when we sat for two days to consider what answer the British Empire was going to give. It was the answer of the British Empire that prevailed; it prevailed against America; President Wilson was not in favour of some of the things which we did in the way of concession over Poland, more particularly over reparation and one or two other things. But standing alone the Dominions would not have been in that particular part of the picture; they would not have been in the very centre of things. Therefore each Dominion exercised an influence which was infinitely greater as being part of the British Empire than it would have exerted if it had stood absolutely alone. What applies to the Dominions applies equally to India and the United Kingdom. Therefore, standing together, we are each of us more powerful, and each has a greater say in the world's affairs than if each of us stood alone and pursued a policy of isolation. Therefore, I would lay down a principle, which I am sure would be accepted, that it is vital, if we are going to influence the world, that we should speak with one voice. That does not mean the voice of the United Kingdom. I am coming to that. It does not mean the voice of Canada or of India, or of South Africa, Australia or New Zealand—it means the voice of the whole. That is what I am coming to, and it is a very vital consideration. If we speak with different voices, the influence of the parts would not equal that of the whole, and I consider that to be one of the greatest disasters that could befall humanity, for never in the history of the world have you had a combination of men of such different races, different ideals, different traditions, different histories, different outlook upon life, coming together and each contributing his own point of view, and the point of view of his nation, of his people, of his race, of the thousands of years which each has lived in his own way, and bringing the whole of that together

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Empire's Voice must be the co-ordinated Voice of all parts, not of one only.

into a common stock, to enrich the world and to add to its security and to its freedom.

Very well, I come now to my second proposition. It is essential we should speak with one voice, but that voice must not be the voice of Britain alone. If it is, it is not merely unfair to the rest of the Empire that we should determine policy, that we should write the cheque and expect the rest of the Empire to honour it with the blood of their sons. It is not only unfair, it is unreasonable. It is not liberty. It is not our conception of Empire, and, apart from that, it is a futile policy. Self-respecting people will not continue to operate upon that principle, and, if they did, they would not have half the value they have. It is because the Dominions are strong, vigorous, independent races that they are so formidable when they come into action, as the Germans well know, and, therefore, we must have some means of connecting and co-ordinating the voices of Empire, so that, having gathered these opinions, we can consolidate them, we can concentrate them, so that the voice as far as the outside world is concerned is one voice, but it is a voice made up of many chords, and what you want is to concentrate these, and how are you going to do it? Now, that is the problem to my mind, if you accept these principles which I have laid down, and I think it is the opinion of all those around this table. I have listened to all the discussions and I have never heard anything that indicated that it was not. The question is, "How is it to be done?" Mr. Massey made a contribution. It was a very bold one, and I hope it will be considered. It may not be the only means, but it may be a method of gathering the voices of Empire at crucial moments. Sometimes, it will be impossible, because situations arise so suddenly, so unexpectedly, that you have no time to summon a central conference at any point, not with the fastest cruisers you can invent. Therefore, there must be other means as well. We have tried it and we have had two or three methods by which we have attempted to improve upon the old position by which Great Britain practically spoke on behalf of the Empire without much consultation. Now, that is a past which we certainly have no desire to go back to. We have tried one or two, perhaps, crude methods. We have sent over to the Dominions all the essential and relevant material, which has given them the necessary information as to the trend of foreign affairs, the questions which were agitating this end of the world and which were affecting the affairs of Empire in every corner of the world, and yet we have sought not to overburden you with material which is of no importance. Every morning, as you can see, you have sheaves of all kinds of papers, coming from all parts of the world. They have no real bearing upon your judgment in foreign affairs, and most Cabinet Ministers who sit around this table confine their reading to the most vital papers that come along. Those papers are sent to the Dominions. When there is urgency, we send special cables informing the Dominions of the position of affairs. There was another suggestion which was made, I think it was at the 1917 Conference, that there should be a resident Minister who could be summoned in cases of emergency or who could be kept informed as to what was going on here. I know the difficulty of appointing a Minister of that kind. If he is a man of great influence in Dominion affairs, he probably prefers staying there to exert that influence at home, and when he goes from home that influence gradually weakens almost to vanishing point, because he is not keeping in touch with the public opinion of his own country. Then, there is the other difficulty. He does not quite know what is going on in his own Dominion. His mind, therefore, is not fresh upon the opinion which may fluctuate a good deal in your country as it fluctuates in ours. There may be not merely new issues, but new aspects, and it is very difficult for him to speak with the same certainty as to the opinion of his country as if he were there on the spot. Still, he does know his country and he knows the fundamental opinions of his country. He understands his people, and you would be in a position to communicate with him not merely officially, but more or less privately, as we do with Ambassadors in various parts of the world, and it has its value. We have had two or three very important meetings to which your agents and Commissioners here have been summoned. We had one before the great gathering of the League of Nations. We had another when we discussed the question of reparations before we went to Spa. That was one of the most important Conferences. It was the first occasion that we met the Germans face to face. We had a representative from Canada.

Methods of co-ordinating Empire's Opinions.

Question of Resident Ministers.

Sir Maurice Hankey: We had Sir George Perley, Sir James Allen and someone from Australia.

Mr. Lloyd George: And that distinguished Australian Senator Millen. Well, these gatherings were very useful, and I hope it will be possible not merely to

continue them but that it will be possible to summon them more frequently. But that is a question for you to decide. It is only you that can tell us whether you feel that meetings of that character are helpful from the point of view of the Dominions. They are certainly helpful from our point of view. What we want is to gather the voice of the Dominions and India upon all these questions, and that is one way of dealing with the situation. We have, first of all, communications by cable, not altogether satisfactory, because you cannot have an interchange of argument. You take what has happened here. We came here with apparently different views upon two or three different questions. We have thrashed them out among ourselves and have arrived at an agreement. You cannot do that by cable. All we do by cable is to express our views to you and you express yours to us, but you cannot argue about them. You do not come into contact and thrash out these questions. Therefore, there must be some other way, some other means by which we can interchange views and thrash out questions which affect the Empire as a whole, and I should very much like to have a discussion this morning upon the practical ways of arriving at conclusions on questions of Foreign Policy which will carry the whole Empire along with us in any decisions that we come to. The voice of the Empire must, of course, be communicated to the world through the British Foreign Office. I do not see any other way of doing it without breaking up the Empire, no other way of doing it, and I think it would be accepted. If we each of us indicate our separate views, the Empire as a whole will not carry the same weight. As a matter of fact, there will simply be a series of intrigues with foreign Powers. They naturally will not attach the same importance to the unity of the British Empire as we do.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Practical means of co-ordinating the opinions of Empire's component parts.

I am certain in their own interests they wish that the British Empire should be kept together rather than that it should fall to pieces, and I think the ablest and greatest statesmen among them realise it. If you talk to men like M. Clemenceau and M. Briand, they realise in their hearts that although we may not agree with them altogether upon many questions it is better in the real interests of France that the British Empire should be there. They are able to plead it against their own people. You can see M. Clemenceau constantly doing it and you can see M. Briand doing it. He likes to be able to say, "I should like to do that too, but you will not carry the British Empire with you if you do it." In his heart he is rather glad of it. If you look at his speeches when he fought the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on Reparation—they wanted something sterner. They really wanted to break up Germany. They wanted to occupy the Ruhr valley, and they would have put forward demands which would have been quite impossible; and if you had said to them, "That will destroy Germany," in their hearts they would have said that is what we want. There are a considerable number of Chauvinists in Paris with an influence which is far beyond their numbers, but the responsible statesmen of France, men of the Briand and Clemenceau type, do not want it, and they like to be able to say, "Well, you know if you do it the British Empire breaks with us—you will not get its support when you are in trouble," and they like the British Empire to be a fact. I believe it would fill the world with despair if it dissolved and broke up—with despair and rightly so. I cannot see anything between the world and a real catastrophe except this Empire, that has no purpose beyond what is the purpose of humanity to preserve the peace of the world, to develop along the lines of liberty and justice, and therefore I sincerely hope before we part this Conference will be able to devise some means by which the opinions of Empire can be gathered and concentrated, and be able to speak with that one voice which, spoken in 1914 without any discord, without any doubt, without any hesitation, rang through the world and saved it. I invite a discussion upon ways and means.

Mr. Meighen: I referred to the subject yesterday afternoon. As regards this, I suggested a committee. I had something in my mind at the time. I do not know whether I can do any good by advancing what I had in my mind now or not. My idea was that an Imperial Conference be held two years from now, that we do not denominate it specifically a "Constitutional Conference," that we inaugurate a series of annual Conferences, or semi-annual as we may agree, at least two years from now—I do not see how you could commence earlier at the present time—that we give them all the same name, and that at the first one to be held two years from now, we give special consideration to any necessary Constitutional readjustments. In a word, that we thus execute the charge imposed upon us by the Resolution of 1917.

Suggested series of Constitutional Conferences.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Resident Ministers.

Now, as to the improvement of our communications, that is to say, our communications regarding foreign affairs, as to meeting the desire of the Prime Minister to enable the Empire to speak, as it must meanwhile speak, through His Majesty's Privy Council here with one voice, I was only going to say this. The right of each Dominion to have a resident representative to sit with the British Government while it is engaged in the consideration of matters that are of vital concern, was affirmed by resolution and accepted in 1918, but only for the period and for the purpose of the war. It was exercised, but not very fully or generally. I think it would be well to have that right reaffirmed, even though it may be exercised no more fully and no more generally than before, until we meet again, say, in two years' time. It may be, or it may not be, that the exercise of such a right would have a good effect, but its existence, I believe, has had a good effect, and it might possibly be that it would be availed of more frequently than it has been. These things can be examined in detail in a committee better than here. I think that we are all anxious that some means should be found, with the least possible change and readjustment, that will enable all portions of the Empire to feel that grave steps taken and grave lines of policy followed have been taken and followed after the due deliberation and concurrence of all. Unless that is done, there is danger of the disintegration which the Prime Minister is so anxious to avoid. I do not think the danger is quite as great, for example, as Mr. Massey describes it to be; I do not think it is. The fact is that the British Empire is fundamentally a good thing; its people, on the whole, are of a more than ordinary measure of intelligence; they rise above the average of human intelligence. Those being the two great basic conditions, first that the institution is good, and second that its people have high intelligence and know it to be good, these show, to my mind, that it is pretty secure. The only thing I have said that is of any practical urgency is that the right to have resident representation here be reasserted and agreed to. Perhaps more could be accomplished through the instrumentality of a committee. I have no reason to complain myself of the fairness and care with which we have been kept informed; perhaps we get our cables more promptly than they get them in Australia or New Zealand. I would hope that something could be done to meet the objections that have been very strenuously urged by Mr. Hughes, on behalf of Australia, to the effect that the information reaches him when it is too late to act. That is all.

Mr. Lloyd George: Now, Mr. Hughes.

Interpretation of Mr. Meighen's Proposals.

Mr. Hughes: Sir, you have put before us this morning the position in which we stand. You have said that the unity of the Empire must be preserved in the interests of humanity. You have said that the Empire must speak with a united voice. I agree with all that you have said in this connection in the way in which you have put it. May I say, however, that I cannot quite accept your views with regard to Mr. Meighen's postulates, although put as you interpret them, I see no objection to them. As I said yesterday, it is not the principle to which I take exception, but to its application.

You will quite see, Sir, that if it were laid down as a fixed principle, that the voice of a Dominion in any matter of foreign policy must be commensurate with its interests, the question is, "Who is to decide the point?" If you are to accept the principle and apply it to all circumstances, subject only to that reservation that the Dominion voice must be commensurate with its interest, then we shall come here with our hands tied. We can discuss no question which particularly concerns any one Dominion with freedom. I do hope that you will see that the acceptance of Mr. Meighen's postulate leads us far beyond where we are now, and I am not going into that uncharted sea without uttering the most emphatic and earnest protest against a departure which may lead, we know not where. I am quite prepared to discuss every question on its merits, and to admit, nay, to insist, that in considering any question we must have regard to the peculiar interests of any Dominion on that question. But this is very different to the acceptance of the postulate. When Mr. Meighen referred me to those qualifying words in his postulate, I referred him to my own words, viz., that I took no objection to the principle, but only to the application of it, in the way and to the extent he urged. I go now still further and say that if you are able by way of illustration to cite a case in which the interest of any Dominion is so clearly vital to its welfare that its voice must have corresponding weight in deciding the policy; if you can show, for example, that Canada's vital interest in any question is not only so clear, but so overwhelming, as to make any decision that would prejudice her interests unjust, then apply your principle, but do

not lay it down as if it were one of the corner stones of a written constitution binding upon the Empire. The other day I stated that the proposal to hold a Constitutional Conference to amend the Constitution had caused alarm in Australia. Curiously enough, this has been displayed in two sections holding quite conflicting doctrines. One section regards any interference with the Constitution or any hint of such interference as an attempt to impair our sovereign or quasi-sovereign rights and powers; the other regards it as an attempt to weaken the bonds of Empire. Now, although appearing very illogical, it is nevertheless true that you can satisfy both those opposing sections by leaving things alone; and that is the only way you can satisfy them. This brings me to the proposal to hold a Constitutional Conference. I understand Mr. Meighen to say that we should hold a Constitutional Conference in two years.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: He challenges the date.

Deprecates a Constitutional Conference.

Mr. Hughes: I am coming to that. We are to hold it in two years, but we are to call it by another name. Well, Sir, if I believe in the necessity for a Constitutional Conference, I must favour Mr. Meighen's suggestion, but I intend to show there is no need for one, that there is, indeed, very great danger in a Constitutional Conference. And I do not believe for one moment that, having decided to hold a Constitutional Conference, you can by changing the name hide the truth under a bushel for two years, so that no one can discover it. I do not believe it. Do you mean to say that throughout the whole of this Empire it is possible that the truth, known as it must be to so many of, for we must necessarily inform, our colleagues—that the facts will not leak out, that we shall be suspected of an attempt to hold a secret Conference? It would be said: "Why are you doing this; what monstrous things do you intend to perpetrate?" Those who are fearful of an attack upon their rights of autonomy will be up in arms. On the other hand, those in the opposite camp will believe that this is an attempt to weaken the ties of Empire, and they will not be behindhand in saying so. I propose, therefore, to examine this question very closely. I am most strongly against a Constitutional Conference. There is no need for one. On the other hand, there is great danger. I do not think that a Conference to consider the Constitution should be held at all, but, if one is to be held, then I want the whole world to know what it is intended to do. I cannot agree to anything different. I said the other day that it was impossible for me to attend a Constitutional Conference next year. It is now suggested that it should be held the year after. I do not say that it is impossible for me to attend the year after. Mr. Massey, of course, will speak for himself. But, apart from the date of such a Conference, the more you examine this thing, the more hopelessly undesirable the suggestion appears. In theory I have nothing to say against the suggestion of Mr. Meighen that the Conference should be called by another name, or by no name at all, but in practice it would not work. In any case, there is no need for a Constitutional Conference. General Smuts, speaking yesterday, said that circumstances had altered since the 1917 resolution had been passed—the Treaty of Versailles had been signed, we had received the status of nations, we had been recognised as such, and given a seat in this League of Nations, our position had been defined, and that therefore, in his opinion, the same necessity for the Conference did not exist. I say that no necessity exists for the Conference to consider the Constitution, and I hope the matter will be dropped. Let me ask those who favour such a Conference to tell us why they demand it. Let me set out the constitutional position very shortly, and in order to do so I have reduced the position to a series of questions which deal directly with the matters which must be considered at any Constitutional Conference. Have the Dominions power to make treaties with foreign countries relating to (1) commercial matters, post office and telegraphs, and the like; (2) matters out of which wars arise, or treaties for submission of such disputes to arbitration? As to the first, there is no doubt whatever that we have the right to make commercial treaties with foreign countries; this right is incidental to autonomy under which we make tariffs, and so the right to make commercial treaties providing for reciprocal duties, &c., and of course we have a power to make treaties relating to post and telegraphs, and so on. As to (2), in my opinion, we have no right to make treaties with foreign countries in relation to matters which usually fall within the sphere of foreign policy. I must qualify this by explaining exactly what I mean. If I am asked, Is there anything in our constitutional relations with Britain which would preclude us from concluding a treaty, my answer is: "Yes, I think there is," but, quite apart from this, and even if this limitation did not exist, I say that, unless we accept as a basic principle that the Dominions cannot of

Power of Dominions with regard to Commercial Treaties, &c., with Foreign Powers.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

their own initiative make such treaties, unity is impossible. In my opinion, it must be accepted as a fundamental principle that the Dominions have no right to make treaties on those matters which fall within the sphere of foreign affairs. Now for another point. Is it possible for one part of the Empire to be at war and another at peace? I say, No, it is not; but, if I am asked: "Is each part of the Empire *ipso facto* involved in war by declaration of war by Britain?" I should not like to go so far as that. Probably it might be contended by Dominion Ministers that technically a Dominion is not necessarily involved by a declaration of war by Britain; but, viewed as a practical question, there is no doubt that a declaration of war by Britain must involve the whole Empire in war. I will show why I consider this is so later on. Sir Wilfred Laurier seems to have recognised this in answer to a question. Mr. McKenna asked him what would happen to a Canadian ship if it were overtaken by a German warship when war was raging between Great Britain and Germany; would it be regarded as a prize? Clearly it would, and I think any Prize Court would say so. But whether it would or not, there is no doubt as a practical question it would be decided against Canada or Australia or any other Dominion owning the ship. It may then be laid down that, whatever the theory may be, the fact is that when Britain is at war the whole Empire is at war. This brings me to the next question: "What would be the position if the King were advised by one set of Ministers to make war and by another set to make peace, what would he do?" Can His Majesty's Dominion Ministers advise him directly? The channels of communication at present do not permit of this being done, and it is difficult to see how the Prime Minister of any Dominion could tender advice directly to the King. No doubt the fact that his Ministers in any Dominion were desirous of tendering him advice would be known to the King, but that is all. But it may be asked, What would the King do if a Dominion Minister wanted to advise him, would he accept or reject such advice on his own responsibility? He would not. In this, as in all other things, the King acts on the advice of his responsible Ministers, and would therefore submit the matters for the consideration of his Ministers in London. "But why should the King take the advice of his Ministers in one part of the Empire without reference to any other authority and not take it from Ministers in another part?" The answer is that, while in theory and within certain limitations in practice, the same relations exist between the King and his responsible advisers throughout the Empire, there are certain most important practical differences between those existing between the King and his responsible advisers in the United Kingdom and those in other parts of the Empire. For example, it is from the British Parliament that the Crown draws its supplies. The support of the Monarchy rests wholly upon the shoulders of the people of the United Kingdom. The Dominions enjoy all the advantages of the Monarchical system, but contribute nothing towards its support. The King can only consider the advice of Ministers who are supported by a majority in the British Parliament. If the King acted upon the advice of any Oversea Dominion without consulting his Ministers in the United Kingdom and being advised by them to accept the advice of the Oversea Dominion, his Ministers in London would resign. It is not necessary to pursue this further, but it is obvious that an *impasse* has been reached. But there is another reason why the King could not act on the advice of the Oversea Ministers except with advice so to do by his advisers in the United Kingdom. To do so would destroy the principle of responsible Government and make the King in regard to matters within an indefinable, but a very considerable, sphere independent of his advisers, or some of them.

Possibility of Dominion Ministers advising the Crown.

The Empire's Constitutional Relations should be decided by the Imperial Conference, not by Legal Opinion.

Mr. Massey said yesterday he desired the opinion of the Solicitor-General and Attorney-General as to our constitutional position. But these authorities cannot advise us. This matter is not one in which they can do so. Are the relations between the Dominions and Britain then not to be determined by legal opinion? The answer is certainly not. If we ask, where are we to look for guidance as to our constitutional position, the answer is around this table. There is no other authority. What we around this table decide to do, that can be done, what we decide shall be the constitutional practice in future, that shall be the constitutional practice, provided only that our various Parliaments support our views. So that we are not to go to the Law Officers to know what is our constitutional position; we are not to turn to constitutional history or practice, because, as is very well known, these so-called constitutional authorities simply report what has been done, and do not and cannot tell us what will or can be done. The writers upon the Constitution look to precedents, but we establish the precedents to which they look, and are ourselves independent of those precedents. As you know, what has been done during the last five or six years is without precedent. For example, when we were here in 1918 it was decided that the

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

appointment of the King's representative, which had hitherto been a matter entirely in the hands of the Government of the United Kingdom, should be resolved by discussion, if necessary, between the parties, and the Dominions should have as much right as His Majesty's Ministers in the United Kingdom in submitting names for nomination. For myself, I can say that that practice has been followed.

Mr. Massey: That is to say we have been consulted.

Mr. Hughes: I want to make it perfectly clear what is the position. It is this, and it is recorded in the documents, that we were invited to nominate some gentleman for consideration for the appointment. As a matter of fact, we made no nominations, but the principle is not affected by that. We asked in turn that His Majesty's advisers here should submit some names to us, this was done, we made our selection and in due course the appointment was made. I only mention this as one of the things worthy of reference, but many things have been done since 1914 that have changed constitutional relations very materially. Examined closely, it would be idle to deny that these have effected a real change in these constitutional arrangements that existed, say, ten years ago. Let me cite another instance. I presented for consideration by His Majesty's Ministers a suggestion that the channel of communication should be changed in such a way as to ensure direct communication between Prime Ministers, that is, between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the various Prime Ministers of the Dominions. That was agreed to. It did not supersede entirely the ordinary practice, but the principle was established, and it was understood that, at the option of each Prime Minister, communications should go direct to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. I shall have a word to say as to how this has worked out in practice, but the principle has been established. That is a distinct advance. When the Government of the United Kingdom or of the Empire—if you like to call it so—is communicating to a foreign Government, it does it through the Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister or the Ambassador of the other country. Our status as a nation is thus as clearly recognised surely as that of foreign countries. We have a right to communicate direct with the Head of the State, and I think that is substantially a real recognition of our national status, as real as that established by our presence here to-day.

No need to extend the Constitutional Authority of the Dominions.

I come now to another question: "Is it necessary, for any reason, to extend the Constitutional authority of the Dominions?" Can any alteration in our relations with Great Britain and each other give us greater power than we have now? If, of course, the object of the Constitutional Conference is to take away something that we now have, these questions do not arise. But in that case, then, while we are allaying the fears of one set of critics we inflame the fury of the other. I assume that the idea in the mind of General Smuts when he, and other representatives of the Dominions, voted for this resolution in 1917 was to give us something we had not got. General Smuts says that is right. Very well. Let us then ask ourselves, what can any Conference give us that we have not got? I do not speak of the theory, but of the practice; and here let me show you how utterly illogical and inconsistent the theory and the practice are. In theory the power of the British Parliament to make laws is unlimited. You may, if you like, point to British statutes which limit its power. I do not deny that, but you must not forget that it has the power to amend or repeal such statutes. Well then, what is in theory our practice? We are here now, each one of us representing great self-governing Dominions, accredited, as we are proud of remembering, with the status of nationhood at the Paris Conference. We have affixed our signatures to the Versailles Treaty. But, if we look for the legal foundations of our power and our authority, where do we find them? In a British statute! And you, Sir, know very well that if you and the Parliament of the United Kingdom were so minded, and if you were so ill-advised, as to act as Pitt, and His Majesty's Ministers and Parliament did when there was trouble with the American Colonies, you could, by the exercise of legislative power, leave us without any legal foundation upon which to stand. I do not speak of the practical effects of your action, but of its legal effects. We should still insist upon rights of autonomy, but what would our legal and constitutional position be? You say that Britain will never exercise her undoubted legal rights, and, of course, that is true. But what does this mean—that it is not so much what we can constitutionally do, but what we ought to do in order to reconcile our autonomy with Imperial unity. Practically, no doubt, we should stand where we do now. You have great Dominions enjoying full rights of self-Government. I invite General Smuts to tell me what it is we cannot do. I have said we cannot make Treaties with foreign

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

countries, so that if he wants to make a Treaty with a foreign country—I am sure he does not, and am only taking that as an illustration—I say that he cannot do it as a nation within this Empire, because if he advises His Majesty to assent to a Treaty, His Majesty cannot act on that advice except it is first approved and then tendered by the Prime Minister of Britain. That is the constitutional position, but, apart from that, where are the limitations upon our authority? What is it we cannot do? When I am told that we want more power and there is something we have not got, I naturally say: "Tell us of something substantial that we have not got; or, if we lack nothing substantial, tell us, if you like, of some bauble with which we may deck out our *quasi*-sovereignty." I know of nothing that we have not got, but if there is anything that General Smut desires, let us see what it is, so that we may examine it, and, if necessary, grant it. I have mentioned two things, both substantial—not in the nature of gauds—with which we have really and substantially increased our status as nations. I could cite many more. I have a right to nominate or submit names for nomination of His Majesty's representatives. That is a real thing. We have a right to communicate direct with the Prime Minister, that is a very real and direct recognition of our autonomy. And there are other things. We are gathered around this table to consider this question, and I ask General Smuts what is there that the British Authorities have ever withheld from us? From what Councils have we been excluded? We have been asked to consider questions where the interests of Britain were so overwhelming that if interests were the determining factor in deciding policy they ought never to have been brought before us at all, for they were domestic questions. What more do we need in the way of power or recognition that a Constitutional Conference can give us? We ought not to agree to a Constitutional Conference unless it be shown that it will give us some advantage we do not enjoy, some real thing which we do not possess, which could be given to us by a Constitutional Conference, and which cannot be given here and now. I do not believe that there is any such thing, I cannot think of any.

When I stand up in the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, even though my feet rest upon a British statute as a legal foothold, I cannot see how I could be clothed with greater amplitude of authority if we were independent nations. I agree entirely with what you say, Sir—what should we be outside this Empire? Our voice would be lost across the waste of waters, the voice of a community of five and a half millions of people. But when we speak as part of the Empire, on behalf of the Empire, the voice of Australia is heard. But apart from that, what is it I lack, what do you lack, General Smuts, that you would have if your country was a Republic, or an indepedent nation like Belgium or Holland, or any of the nations of the world? I confess I do not know, I cannot believe that there is any man more jealous of, and more insistent upon, the rights of Australia, as a Dominion, to govern herself in her own way, than I. I have perhaps obtruded my opinions too much upon the British Government in this way, but, nevertheless, I see clearly that there are places where my feet must not tread, merely as an Australian, but when I come into these Councils, when I put on the toga of Empire citizenship, then my voice is and must be heard, and have equal weight with those of others. Here is the position. There is no constitutional nexus between the Dominions and the United Kingdom except the Crown. There is no way in which the Crown can be advised except it be advised by one set of responsible Ministers. It cannot be advised by half-a-dozen. There must be recognised channels through which advice tendered to His Majesty must go, and the King is the nexus that binds us together. Now, in regard to domestic matters, it is not suggested that we should all be of one accord, and I cannot recall any cases where our advice to His Majesty, tendered through his representative, in regard to domestic matters has not been taken. I know, of course, that under our Constitution certain matters, navigation for example, may be reserved for the assent of the Crown, but this, after consideration, has been given. If it be such things as these that you wish to push aside, let us discuss them, but, I do not believe that there is anything real and substantial that can be given to us by any Constitutional Conference. Now you, Sir, have laid down a great basic principle, you have said that the Empire must speak with one voice. Then you ask us how it is going to do it? If we cannot do it now, or by some means we can now devise, we certainly will not be in any better position to do so as a result of a Constitutional Conference. A Constitutional Conference could not help us in any of those difficulties that now stand in the road. They are embedded in our circumstances and have nothing whatever to do with our constitutional relations. The

Practical difficulty of co-ordinating Empire's Voice.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

reason why General Smuts's voice does not have the same weight when he is in Africa as when he is here, is, because he is in Africa. That will remain. We are not gods. Mr. Churchill the other morning said, "You make the Empire smaller," and the Prime Minister added, "And larger at the same time." No doubt that is so, but still there is Africa, there is Australia, there is Canada, New Zealand, and there is a waste of waters between us. How are our opinions to be gathered in such a form, and impressed upon the British Government in such a way, as will enable us to tell our people that our voice is heard in the Councils of the Empire, that in moulding foreign policy we have an equal right to share, or at any rate a share commensurate with our importance and our trade? That is the great question. How is that to be done? One thing is certain, a Constitutional Conference will not, cannot help us.

Let me state the position. At present we have no effective voice in foreign policy, except when we come here. That is certain, and in the very nature of things it seems that it must be so. This brings me to the point that I stressed the other day. The key to the whole position is communications. There is no other. That does not mean that I sweep aside the suggestion of having a Cabinet Minister here, for I can conceive that he would play a very useful part. But he would not be a substitute, complete and satisfactory in itself, for these Councils. General Smuts knows very well the difficulty and Mr. Massey emphasised it, yet Mr. Massey spoke as one who rather favoured the idea. He said: "Whom could we send that would have authority both here and in our own country?" We know very well that everything we do here we do subject to the reservation that our Parliament and our Government—our Government first and then our Parliament, must approve it. Upon our return they will ask, "What have you done?" and unless Parliament approves our actions we stand in a very parlous place. Our voice is in such a case the voice of a man and not the voice of a nation. But if Prime Ministers cannot speak with authority, how much less can other Ministers do so? One of the difficulties arises out of distance, though this does not apply to the whole Empire; Mr. Meighen, for instance, can go back to Canada and return here in time for the Pacific Conference. But what is possible to Mr. Meighen is not possible even to General Smuts; and is quite impossible for Mr. Massey and myself. It is impossible, I believe, for the representatives of India also. Yet it is clear that in the Councils of the Empire not the voice of one Dominion only, but the voice of all, must be heard, because it will be no satisfaction to Australia or New Zealand that Canada, or even Africa, is represented here, if we are not. We say that plainly. If we are to have Ministers here representing our Dominions, that would not be a solution sufficient in itself. I do not deny, however, that they might help very considerably; they could keep us informed, perhaps. I suggested the other day that we might have access to the Foreign Office, so that we might know things quickly, or quicker than we are told them now. This brings me to the point you wanted me to reach.

Certain advantages from Resident Ministers.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes, this is what I have been waiting for.

Mr. Hughes: I suppose I am on optimist, though chastened by long sojourning in the wilderness, but when you agreed, Sir, that we might communicate direct with you, I thought that we had made some substantial advance. The idea of direct channels of communication was not dissatisfaction with the Colonial Office, but first, that we had a right to communicate with you as Head of the Government, and secondly, that by so doing we might save time. Now, what is the actual position? I will set it out before you. The Foreign Office, as is natural and proper, gets the first intimation of matters which are likely to be of interest and are of importance. The Foreign Office naturally says nothing to us, because it has yet to bring the matter before the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Cabinet, and generally the matter is in a state of suspended animation for some little time. You said just now, however, that Ministers were in the habit of reading only a few of this most formidable pile of papers that comes every day. Do you read them all, Mr. Churchill?

Foreign Policy Questions should be dealt with by Prime Ministers direct, not through Colonial Office.

Mr. Churchill: I read the whole of the telegrams, and I have done so for the last fifteen years.

Mr. Lloyd George: You mean those that are circulated.

Mr. Churchill: Yes.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Lloyd George: But that is not the whole of the telegrams that come.

Mr. Churchill: Oh no!

Mr. Lloyd George: We all read the telegrams that are circulated.

Mr. Hughes: Then I admire your assiduity, Mr. Churchill. Anyhow, Mr. Chamberlain seems to give assent that he does not read them all.

Mr. Chamberlain: I should think it a great waste of time if I read all the telegrams that are circulated. I look them through and pick them out.

Mr. Hughes: What I am coming to is this. Matters are brought up to the Cabinet by the Foreign Secretary or by the Prime Minister, a decision is given perhaps, or the matter is in suspense. The Prime Minister thinks it desirable that a communication should be made to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions. A reply is drafted. It comes to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office sends it. I want to say this, that one of the reasons that we had in our mind when we altered the channels of communications was that we should have direct communication with the Prime Minister; another reason was that we should save time, because in this question time is the essence of the contract, and the real difficulty that we have, apart from that which must always exist, the lack of personal consultation round this table, is time. The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have to decide what is to be done. Something comes up to-day which must be decided in, say, forty-eight hours. What are they to do? If we do not get a message until it has run through all these tortuous channels we are not heard. So there is one thing you can do—very simple and not going very far, I admit—that is to send all important papers relating to Foreign Policy. Copies can be sent to the Colonial Office, but they must come direct to us. I think that is only fair.

Summary of Proposals for co-ordinating practically the Opinions of the Empire

The practical suggestions I make are these: that there should be, if you like, a Minister in London representing each of the Dominions. I do not attach anything like so much weight to that as some of you. No sooner does a Minister leave his country than he is accused of getting out of touch with the people. In any case, he could decide nothing; he could not speak as I can speak as the head of a Government; as Mr. Meighen can speak as head of the Canadian Government; as General Smuts or Mr. Massey can speak as heads of their Governments. He could speak only as a member of a Cabinet afar off, whose circumstances he does not know, and with whose ideas he is losing touch every day. Still, I am not against it. Regular Conferences are, of course, the one real solution, but regular and frequent Conferences are practically impossible, and so because time is the essence of the contract, we must improve our means of communications so that at least we are informed of what is intended to be done before you do it. I do not deny at all that there is no substitute for gathering round this Council table, but the remedy for that and the way to make these Conferences more frequent is to improve communications between the outlying parts of the Empire. Providing you can reduce, as you could by airship, the time occupied by the journey from Australia to England to, say, ten or twelve days for the single journey, the time occupied by us in coming and going, and in attending the Conferences, could be reduced to six weeks. The more frequent the Conferences, the less would be the accumulation of matters to be decided. There is nothing impracticable about such a scheme. I do not profess to speak as an expert, but we are told that it is possible, and I say that I hope that due regard will be had to possibilities in that direction.

With regard to the other side of communications, if we are to be in close and intimate touch with one another, which is essential, that is only possible if ampler and better means are provided for telegraphic and later telephonic communication. I dealt at length with this phase of the question the other day, and I hope that my arguments will not be entirely overlooked by you. If we have better means of communications, we shall be able to satisfy our Parliaments that we are in possession of information and that we know what is going on. I have stood in the Commonwealth Parliament many and many a time and have been asked questions relating to great international crises that I was assured were shaking the world to its foundations. Those who questioned me possessed, from some esoteric source no doubt, information which was entirely kept from me. I have been asked: "Did I know this" or "Did I know that," and my almost uniform reply has been I did not. My Cabinet is amazed when it is told that we have no information upon this or that important matter. Such disabilities can be removed in part, if not entirely. But there is no substitute for ascertaining the voice of the Empire except by

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Conferences round this table. More frequent Conferences round this table could be held if we improved the means of communication. But in the intervals, if you are going to satisfy the people of the Empire that they really have a voice in Foreign Policy and are not to be dragged into war and told when the tocsin rings that war was inevitable, you must improve the means of communication so that we are told daily of what transpires. I have suggested the means by which this can be done in whole or in part. I will only add this, that the principle for which I plead is that we shall exercise our great powers as autonomous States in such a way as will enable the unity of the Empire to be maintained. That can only be done if we are prepared not to push our powers beyond safe limits. That is the beginning and the end of the gospel of Empire. If Canada or Australia insists upon doing things which, being done, would make the Empire speak with two voices and make autonomy incompatible with unity, then that is the beginning of the end. So that, whatever we do, if we go away from here without doing anything else, we must resolve that, no matter whether we are informed or whether we are not informed, we must maintain a united front. But if we are to do that with due regard to the interests of our own States we ought to put things in very much better shape than they now are. We ought to create machinery by which every day there would come in complete information of where we are. There ought to be more frequent Conferences, and, if you like, Ministers in London, whose business it would be to supply direct the news to the Dominions, and who could tell us what was being done by you. As there is no need for a Constitutional Conference to enable us to do this, or to give us any right or power we do not now possess, I am opposed to any such Conference being held.

Better Progress probable from Informal Conversations.

General Smuts: May I make this suggestion, Prime Minister. I do not want to make a speech or go into the whole matter. I think that we are drifting into making speeches over this difficult subject and making no progress at all. We have been for the last two days making speeches to each other on a subject which is highly contentious and very difficult, on the subject of devising ways and means of arriving at a common policy in the affairs of the Empire. May I make this suggestion? It is very difficult to discuss this matter in a formal Conference like this, where we really tend to make speeches and state our position very formally, and where minutes are taken and shorthand notes are kept. Can we not adopt the procedure which we adopted on former occasions? That is, for the Prime Ministers to come together in quite informal conversation and go into the matter. There are things that can be said, points of view that can be raised, and suggestions that can be made which it is difficult to make in a formal Conference of this kind, so I would suggest, as we did on former occasions, that the Prime Ministers should talk quite informally and try and thresh out this matter and see if it is not possible to come to some decision. On special points, we simply held Prime Ministers' conversations. We went into it quite informally and without any record. This formal debate leads nowhere.

Mr. Lloyd George: I think there is an advantage in having preliminary discussions on broad lines like this. They are very useful for reference in future, and they are making the Constitution of the Empire in exactly the way the Empire has grown.

Mr. Massey: And we are much nearer agreement than we were a fortnight ago.

Mr. Lloyd George: I agree with General Smuts, that, each of us having laid down the broad principles, there is a great deal to be said for an informal talk, but the informal talk would not have had the same value if we had not had a preliminary discussion. We have had each Dominion laying down particular principles, and the United Kingdom doing the same thing. I think there should be an informal talk among the Prime Ministers. That occurred repeatedly before.

General Smuts: It proved to be a way out of several difficulties and we came to agreement on different points.

Mr. Massey: What time do you propose to adjourn?

Mr. Lloyd George: Could you stay for five or ten minutes, because Lord Curzon cannot be here at 5 this afternoon? He has a practical suggestion to put before the meeting, which, I think, is of importance. Do you mind putting it now, Lord Curzon?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Suggestions advanced by Dominion Premiers.

Lord Curzon: We have been considering this morning the various means by which the Dominion Premiers might have a closer hold upon the management of foreign affairs, and the suggestions have taken various forms. One, an extension of the system of Conferences that we now hold; two, the presence of a Cabinet Minister in London representing the Dominions; three, improvements in communications by telegraph, wireless, and telephone; and, four, the suggestion made by Mr. Hughes just now about telegrams being sent from home to keep the Dominion Premiers in touch with what happens. I think you will see there are certain difficulties about the latter. In all cases where a crisis is brewing, where things are drawing up to a situation which might involve the Empire in war or where treaties of first-class importance are likely to be concluded, the Dominion Premiers are, it seems to me, entitled to such information, and I am sure there will be no objection to sending it. Mr. Hughes will realise that, in the day-to-day conduct of the Foreign Office and of foreign affairs, it is impossible. Take, for instance, the Upper Silesian question, which is now before us. It is a very critical matter. It varies from day to day, and a telegram sent out to you from Upper Silesia would be out of date when it reached you. Nor would your views be of use to us in the matter. You would not understand it. And suppose we came to business, and instead of four battalions, we had to move eight battalions, the other four would not be Australian or New Zealand battalions, they would be British battalions. What you want is greater knowledge and greater influence in matters which concern you as parts of the Empire, and in which you yourselves, your Parliaments, your troops, may be involved. Now, how can we bring that about? The suggestion I made to the Prime Minister was this: You want, before you are involved in action, to know what has happened, to know what is happening from day to day. I think, as far as I can ascertain, your present knowledge is inadequate. What do you get now? Once a week, I believe, there is sent out to you from the secretariat a paper called "The British Empire Report," and another called "The Foreign Countries Report," which contains a condensed summary of the information, telegraphic and otherwise, of the preceding week.

Now look at the contrast between that and what happens when you come here. As long as you are in London you get the telegrams from day to day, you get a selection of despatches and papers sent to you by me on important matters, and you get, as, for instance, in the recent negotiations for the coming Conference on the Pacific, you get the papers recording the interviews of the Foreign Minister with various Ambassadors and Ministers, and the papers he supplies to the Cabinet. Cannot we bring your position when you are away from here into closer conformity with that which exists when you are here? That is the problem we want to solve. Let me describe the situation as it exists with the Cabinet here from day to day. There are circulated to the Cabinet in the first place the telegrams which you get now. I do not think there is any particular object in sending those out by post, because by the time they reach you they would be utterly out of date. The Cabinet also get now the Foreign Office papers, which contain all the principal despatches issued from the Foreign Office here or received by the Foreign Office here, and, what from one point of view is more important still, the accounts recorded from day to day by the Foreign Minister of his interviews with Ambassadors and Ministers. For instance, you have those papers that I circulated to you; my talks with the Americans, Japanese, and Chinamen a day or two ago, and anybody who wants to know the history of how we have arrived at the Conference now decided on will find it in those papers. The suggestion I made to the Prime Minister was this: That we might send out to you, to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, once a month, or, if necessary, once a week, a selection of these extremely confidential Foreign Office papers which are now seen only by the Cabinet and circulated to our representatives in our Embassies and Legations abroad. What I would propose amounts to this: to put you on the same footing as our Embassies abroad. I said to the Prime Minister just now that in making this suggestion, which I do at my own responsibility, and of which Mr. Balfour, to whom I communicated it, approves, I shall be shocking the traditions of the Foreign Office, who naturally cling to the idea that their papers belong to themselves, and they cannot be safely communicated to anybody else, but to which I make the rejoinder that I cannot see why a Prime Minister at Pretoria, or at Sydney, should not be just as capable of keeping his papers confidentially concealed as a British Minister at Bucharest or Prague.

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Mr. Hughes: You are speaking of sending it by post.

Lord Curzon: Yes; and a great crisis leading up to war does not develop in a week or two. A war or any great affair in which you are concerned is the result of a process that has been going on for several weeks or months. I would add that, if you favour the idea, firstly, I think it would be desirable that such papers should not be circulated in your Departments or in your Ministry. I think they should go to the Prime Minister and be in the hands of his private secretary, or be used by him, of course, in confidential communications with his Ministers, but not circulated in the Departments. Further, I would make the suggestion that when you leave office you should either destroy them or send them back. I make that suggestion for this reason: it would be a very unfortunate thing if these records, existing, we will say, in your Department at Pretoria, were afterwards got hold of by some historian—amateur or professional—who might in a corner of the Empire construct a partial history of the Empire for the period during which he had access to the documents. I think it would be desirable to accept an obligation either to destroy them or return them here.

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Future Business.

Mr. Lloyd George: Well, at 5 o'clock we meet.

Sir Maurice Hankey: We will go on with this?

Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Massey might speak, and then we will take up Naval Defence.

Mr. Hughes: I hope you will not do that, because the naval business concerns us very much, and I try and prepare everything, but I have not prepared for that. I am seeing Lord Lee this afternoon.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*1, *July* 12, 1921.

Mc Meighen

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SECRET.

E. 24th Meeting.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1921, AT 5 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

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Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

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Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62156

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Massey: I agree with the suggestion put forward by General Smuts that now that the general discussion is coming to an end we could probably arrive at a conclusion more quickly and more readily if the matter we have been discussing is referred either to a Committee consisting of the Prime Ministers or to a Special Committee appointed for the purpose. I am inclined to think that in either way we should come to some conclusion which would be satisfactory to each and every one of us. I want to express my appreciation of the speech delivered by the Prime Minister this forenoon. To my way of thinking, this speech displayed throughout a sincere love of Empire, and I hope it will not be lost. I am speaking now of the speech itself. I do not know whether it is possible to publish it. I cannot think of anything that would be objectionable to any other country or to any section of the community, but at all events I am quite clear about the main point—that it is a speech that will live. It ought to be preserved so that the people who come after us will get some idea of what has taken place in these eventful and strenuous times.

Circulation of Foreign Office Papers.

With regard to the suggestion by Lord Curzon that certain confidential documents should be forwarded to the Prime Ministers in the countries to which they belong, that is a concession which I have not the slightest doubt will be appreciated. I want to refer again to what I suggested by way of an interjection, that extreme care must be taken to see that these documents do not get into the hands of people who might make a very improper use of them. I had a personal experience upon one occasion of a thing like that, and it has made me very careful ever since. I hope that members, like myself, will be impressed with the importance of keeping these documents not only from the public, but from the hands of people who might take advantage of the information which has come to them.

We have had many problems to solve, but I think the problem before us now is probably one of the most important. I am inclined to think that it is as important as any of the others with which we have had to deal during the present Conference—that is the problem which will enable us, the representatives of the people of the Dominions, to speak with one voice and as a united Empire. That is the problem. It is a question of the unity of the Empire; but to get it we must have continuity and we must have regularity in connection with these gatherings. Whatever we may choose to call them, there must be continuity and there must be regularity, and it is difficult to arrange for either of them at the present time in existing circumstances. Several very useful suggestions have been made in connection with the present discussion, and reference was made to a suggestion put forward three years ago, before we separated and went to our homes, after we had had some experience of the working of the War Cabinet. That was with reference to a resident Minister. I agree with it as far as it goes. A resident Minister would maintain the connection, but it is not everything that we want, and I cannot think of anything which will quite fill the bill, at present at all events. I should like to see the experiment of a resident Minister tried. I should be very glad indeed to see the larger of the Dominions, Canada and Australia, select a resident Minister to live in London, and to represent them when foreign affairs were being dealt with by the Cabinet here. I think it would be a very good idea if he could be in practically the same position as an Ambassador is to-day, but it would be only until further development allowed a better arrangement to be made. Then there was another proposal which was referred to yesterday, briefly and incidentally, but which I had made on a previous occasion, I think at the commencement of the Conference, when I suggested that periodically, or at all events occasionally, these gatherings of representative men, Prime Ministers mostly, should take place overseas. I should like to impress the Prime Minister with the importance of something of the sort. I believe if it could be done it would be another of the bonds, and a very useful one, which would help to unite the Empire. Speaking for my colleagues, as well as for myself, coming here to these gatherings has been an education to us. There is no question about that. We understand the Empire problems very much better than we did some years ago. I can say that for myself unreservedly. But education is required in the other direction, and I am not casting any reflection when I say this, for nothing is further from my thoughts, that it would be an education to the Ministers of the United Kingdom to come to the overseas countries, and to see the development that is taking place, to see the possibilities of the different countries, and ascertain the sentiments and ideas of the prominent people connected with the overseas Dominions, especially their public men. I feel certain that if that was done once it would be an experiment which would be repeated, because it would be well worth doing.

Resident Ministers.

Imperial Conferences should meet in different parts of the Empire.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Nomination of His Majesty's Representatives in the Dominions.

I want to say a word with regard to some of the things expressed by my colleague, Mr. Hughes. I do not think that Mr. Hughes was quite correct in saying that we of the overseas Dominions have the right to nominate the representative of the King. That, as I understand it, is not the position. It is a right which should be reserved by the King himself in the last resort, on the recommendation of his Ministers, to say who shall represent him in the overseas Dominions.

Mr. Hughes: That is the position.

Mr. Massey: I am glad that Mr. Hughes agrees with me. That leads me up to the other part of the argument. I thoroughly agree with what Mr. Hughes mentioned, that a list of the gentlemen available, in case of a vacancy in the Governorship of any of the Dominions, shall be supplied to the Prime Minister of that Dominion, and that his opinion should be asked. I think that is only right and proper.

Mr. Hughes: What was agreed upon was this: That both parties, that is to say, the Ministers of the United Kingdom and of the Dominion affected, should have the right to submit names. We have as much right as they, but in the last resort, of course, the opinion of His Majesty's Ministers here should prevail.

Mr. Massey: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: I do not think in practice there would be any difficulty.

Mr. Massey: I do not think anything in the way of friction would be possible, because I cannot imagine any objectionable man being appointed or recommended.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is essential to the Empire that whoever is appointed should be acceptable to the Dominion.

Mr. Massey: I am bound to say that I am very proud of what took place on the last occasion when a vacancy occurred in New Zealand. It is no breach of confidence if I tell the Dominions what occurred. The last Governor had been there for quite a long time, and he was naturally anxious to get back to England to look after his property and business here. The "powers that be" consulted me, as Prime Minister, and gave me a list, as a matter of fact, of suitable men who might probably accept the position if it were offered. I do not say that everyone on the list was anxious for it, because I do not know. I had the opportunity of selecting the present Governor in that way, recommending and expressing the opinion that Lord Jellicoe was a particularly suitable man for the position in New Zealand. There is no question about it; without reflecting on any of the good men who have gone before, and we have had a long list of splendid men as Governors, we have not had an objectionable man that I can think of.

Mr. Hughes: There is only one thing I should like to add. If we liked we could present a list for consideration by His Majesty's Ministers here and they could proceed upon that. They have asked me if I had any names to submit, and I had not.

Mr. Churchill: It is a matter for friendly informal arrangement. The ground is thoroughly explored by that means in quite an unofficial way, and then a formal recommendation is made when something has been agreed upon.

Mr. Massey: There is no question about the experiment being successful in New Zealand. Lord Jellicoe is the most popular man we have had. The people in New Zealand think all the world of him, and I hope he will stay with us for a very long time. Mr. Hughes has expressed another opinion. He says that all we need now is in our possession. I go very nearly the whole way with Mr. Hughes. There is nothing in the way of self-government that we have not got. There is nothing in the way of autonomy—which is the technical expression—that we have not got. There was one point to which I referred a day or two ago, which was referred to this morning by the Prime Minister, and which has been incidentally mentioned on several occasions, that if it is at all possible to do it—and if it is not possible to do it in its entirety, we should get as near to it as we can—we of the Overseas Dominions should have a share in making any recommendation that becomes necessary to the Head of the State, His Majesty. That is where we fail at present. I have dealt with that before, and I am not going back to it now, but I hope something more will be done in that direction before we go away.

Dominion Representations to His Majesty.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Hughes: Do you mean direct to the King?

Mr. Massey: In conjunction with the United Kingdom Ministers we form a Cabinet which should be thoroughly representative of the whole of the Empire, that is to say, of the United Kingdom and of the Overseas Dominions. At present we have no say except in the way of expressing our opinions to the Ministers on the other side of this table. I do not say that our opinions are not considered—I know that they are, and that they are given effect to on every possible occasion. But that is not the point. Then, as to communicating direct with the Prime Minister, I agree with Mr. Hughes that that was a point gained. I seldom take advantage of it, because I know very well that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, or the Imperial Prime Minister, as you may chose to express it, is so overburdened with work that it is almost cruel to ask him to attend to anything that can be kept from his shoulders.

With regard to treaties, we have not the power, and we have not the right as Dominions, to make treaties with any other country. We can make a commercial arrangement, we can make a reciprocal trade arrangement, but that is as far as we can go, because we cannot ask His Majesty to sign a treaty. If we did, I am sure he would not do it; he would refer it to his Ministers, as Mr. Hughes himself suggested. There is no difference of opinion between us there.

No necessity for Constitutional Conference.

Mr. Hughes expressed an opinion with which I agree. He referred to the resolution which we dealt with in 1917 with regard to a Constitutional Conference. I think that at the time it was only dealt with tentatively, as it might not be proceeded with. I agree with Mr. Hughes in thinking that it was a mistake at the time and that we had better drop it. I do not think a Constitutional Conference is necessary. I am not afraid of it in the very slightest, but I do not think it is at all necessary. There is no question that it stirs up a lot of discussion which certainly does not do any good.

I have met in New Zealand gentlemen who considered they were authorities on constitutional matters, and who pointed out all the mistakes we have made. Probably having been over here and having discussed the question with other Prime Ministers and other Ministers, I knew as much as the critics themselves did, probably a little more. I am not afraid of criticism, not a bit, but there are times when criticism does a lot of harm, and I am bound to say that the discussions that took place on that subject caused a great deal of uneasiness to many loyal citizens in the Empire, so that my own opinion is that the proposed Constitutional Conference should be dropped, and that we should do a little each time we come back, and do what is necessary. The British Empire has grown, it has developed, and I think no doubt that changes and amendments will be necessary for centuries to come if the Empire lasts as long as I hope and believe it will. That reminds me of another possibility in connection with the League of Nations. Of course, that is really a part of the constitutional question. Each Dominion has the right to representation on the Assembly of the League of Nations. Now, this might possibly happen. I shall be very sorry to see it happen, but there are four or five Dominions, and it is just possible in time to come we might find the representatives of the Dominions on that Assembly—they do not get the length of the Council—we might get the representatives of the Dominions voting on opposite sides, expressing different opinions. That would be an unfortunate thing for the Empire, and I would sooner not see the Dominions represented at all on the Assembly of the League of Nations if they are going there divided and to express different opinions, and perhaps vote in different directions; the voting requiring unanimity in any proposal, that is to say, in any proposal of importance, would not matter so much. If anything is going to be done in the way of revising the Covenant of the League, that should not be forgotten. It seems to me to be an unfortunate position.

Dominion Representation on League of Nations.

Mr. Balfour: May I say something about that?

Mr. Hughes: That raises another point which is full of danger. America says, now, what we told you is right, Britain has six votes and we have only one.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is not so, they have many. They have Panamá, Cuba and a whole lot.

Mr. Hughes: Then, if we have only one vote, where are we, that is what Mr. Massey says?

Mr. Massey: I say it is better to have one vote than a divided vote—that is my point.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Hughes: I do not admit that.

Mr. Massey: That is only a side issue at present. I should like to say that, as far as it is possible to judge, and I think it is the opinion of thinking men all over the world, the British Empire so far as it has gone has been a tremendous success. Nobody looking back for forty or fifty years would have thought the Empire could have developed in the way that it has developed. Here we are all round the world, all races, all creeds, all colours and all united under one King, practically one Constitution, all working in the same direction as far as public affairs are concerned, and endeavouring to do our best for our fellow-citizens and for humanity. I am strongly of opinion that nothing we can do to keep the Empire together and keep our countries united should be left undone, and I hope at this Conference we shall be able to point back and say we appreciate the position taken up. Nothing has pleased me more than the attitude taken up by the representatives of India; they have shown themselves in their expressions of opinion, in the ideas they have put forward, they have shown themselves to be thinking men, able men, so far as that is concerned, and there are no more loyal and enthusiastic citizens in the United Kingdom itself or the Overseas Dominions than those who represent India here to-day. I notice a little trouble in the papers to-day in regard to India. Those things will happen and go on happening, but they hardly affect the question. It does not affect the loyalty of our friends in the slightest. At the last Conference, when we discussed constitutional matters, there was a suggestion put forward, and I thought it an important one at the time, in the case of a Constitutional Conference being held the leader of the Opposition should be invited along with the Prime Minister of the country concerned to attend the Conference and express the opinion of the people behind him. Since then, there have been developments. In my own country it would be almost impossible to say who was the leader of the Opposition at present. In the United Kingdom to-day, the Opposition is divided into a number of groups, as it is in my own country. In New Zealand there is one member who calls himself the leader of the Opposition, and, when the question was raised in the House, I must acknowledge that gentleman had the largest number of supporters behind him. He was able to show a dozen or thereabouts behind him as against five or six in the case of others, and, in consequence, he sits in the seat of the leader of the Opposition, but the Labour people say they are the legitimate Opposition, and, though they have not as many supporters as the other Opposition, they say their man should be referred to as the leader of the Opposition. That sort of thing is no use. The leader of the Opposition in a case like that would be of little value, and, in consequence, I do not think it is worth following up. There are cases where there are only two parties in the country and those cases could be considered, and, if the Prime Minister of that country is of opinion it would be of benefit to the Conference to have with him the leader of the Opposition, then I do not think any objection will be raised. A suggestion has been made by Mr. Meighen, who is not present, by the way, that constitutional matters should be postponed for a couple of years. I do not agree with it. These delays are dangerous. There have been many changes in the past two years and we do not know what changes we shall see in the next two years. I hope the British Empire will be in a strong position and will have got back to normal long before two years. However, for certain reasons, I do not think delay is advisable. There is nothing to be gained by delay and a great deal may be lost. I should like to see some real progress made in this connection.

Success of the Empire.

Suggestion regarding Constitutional matters at 1917 Conference.

I have often admired the ancient Romans whose favourite boast was to be able to say, "I am a citizen of Rome." I would like to see a very much larger number of the citizens of the Empire glad to acknowledge and proud of the fact that they happen to be citizens of the Empire to which they belong, and able to boast that they were citizens of the British Empire. Then, in considering the Constitutional Conference and what may possibly happen, we have always to remember that the Overseas Dominions are filling up. There is a good deal of immigration going on now and as far as I am able to judge very suitable people are going from this country to Overseas Dominions We are getting our share. Only the other day I saw a trainload going out and they seemed to me to be people who will make good citizens on the other side of the world. There is certain to be during the coming quarter of the century a considerable increase in the population of the Dominions. Waste places will gradually be filled

As Dominions progress some changes will be necessary.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

up and we have to face changed conditions and changing conditions—conditions which will render changes necessary not in the Constitution to which reference was made this morning, but in the arrangements under which we are working. I cannot suggest any changes at the present moment necessary in this respect, but I know they will be necessary as time goes on and as the population in the Dominions increases, and I hope and believe that the Overseas Dominions, and the other young Dominions that are coming on, the Crown Colonies, many of whom will claim the dignity of Dominions, I hope they will all be imbued with the same spirit of Empire and anxious to remain within its boundaries rather than to go out and carry on on their own. They have nothing to gain by such a course. Personally I am quite certain of this. If a poll were taken, if a vote were taken of the people of my own country or Australia or Canada (I cannot speak for South Africa as I have never been there), a large majority would decide to remain in the British Empire, and they would be right in doing so. I hope the day will come when there will be a large majority in South Africa, and I think that will be the case. If they come out, what do they gain? Absolutely nothing, and they lose the protection that is afforded to them by the fact of being within the Empire. They lose the dignity of being citizens of the Empire, and if any Dominion were foolish enough to go out on its own I do not think we should keep it within the Empire. It is not now as it was with Abraham Lincoln, when the best blood of the States was poured out to keep the States one nation. We have not come to that, nor are we likely to, but I hope the sentiments of unity which have been so well expressed by the Prime Minister will continue, and we shall hear less in the future of individuals—there is always a dissatisfied section who say it will be better to come out of the Empire. They will be sorry for themselves if they come out. I have no other opinions to express except just these, and these are only suggestions. I think we should

Status of Resident Ministers.

encourage the resident Minister idea. I do not think it likely that New Zealand would send a resident Minister for a long time to come. We have other things to think of, and many things to do which require to be done first, but the larger Dominions might at any time each of them send a Minister. I do think that this should be taken in hand by the Ministers of the United Kingdom. I do not know whether the other Prime Ministers of the Dominions will agree with me in this. I think there should be an understanding that any time a Prime Minister comes to England, and at that time there is any business of importance connected with foreign affairs, Peace Treaties, or any other Treaty for that matter, that he should be invited to take a seat along with the other Ministers, that is to say that he should really for the time being be a Cabinet Minister. It is only a beginning.

Mr. Hughes: A Cabinet Minister of the British Cabinet—surely not?

Mr. Massey: Of the Imperial Cabinet. I do not make the mistake of saying that you and I should interfere with the local affairs of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Hughes: I certainly understood that was settled.

Mr. Lloyd George: That is the rule. If there were any great question of Imperial policy we should certainly call him into our counsels.

Mr. Massey: I should like to see it done officially, with a record of it, so that we can point to this when we talk about being partners of the Ministers of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Hughes: I was under the impression that although we had only established it during the war, we were still entitled to call ourselves colleagues of Mr. Lloyd George.

Mr. Massey: That is exactly what I want.

Mr. Hughes: If we are here, *ipso facto* we, being colleagues, are entitled to be summoned.

Mr. Lloyd George: I have sent for the Minutes, and you will find the point recorded there.

Mr. Massey: I think this ought to be made clear, and I am glad Mr. Hughes agrees with me.

Mr. Hughes: The Australian climate always bring people to one opinion.

The Constitutional Question and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Massey: I am glad to hear that, and also to hear that Mr. Hughes is of the same opinion as New Zealand. I want to emphasise the suggestion made that we should do everything we can to shorten distances, and I should be very glad if an opportunity were taken to discuss the question I have put forward with the Admiralty. It might be a fast ship—not a warship, but one which would be useful for Imperial purposes, for carrying Ministers from one country to the other whenever required. I think it would work, but I should like to hear what the experts have to say before any decision is arrived at. That is practically all I have to say, Prime Minister, and I would strongly urge that we should go forward, but not too rapidly. It will not do to make false steps, and a false step might put us back for many years; but development should take place now, and let development go on as the British Constitution has grown up. That is all I wish to say.

Mr. Lloyd George: The Conference is now over, and we will now have that informal talk.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 12, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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SECRET.

E. 25th Meeting.

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, JULY 19, 1921, AT 11·30 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Pacific Conference.

A discussion took place on the proposed Conference in connection with Pacific questions.

By direction of the Prime Minister only one copy of the Notes has be made, and this is in the custody of Sir M. Hankey, at 2, Whitehall Gardens.

Lord Curzon hoped that he might receive a further communication from t American Ambassador in London that evening, and undertook to prepare, necessary, the draft of a despatch for consideration at a subsequent meeting.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 19, 1921.

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SECRET.

E. 26th Meeting. 2

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD IN MR. CHURCHILL'S ROOM, AT THE COLONIAL OFFICE, ON TUESDAY, JULY 19, 1921, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. LORD LEE OF FAREHAM, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. C. C. BALLANTYNE, Minister of the Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Prime Minister, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

Colonel the Hon. H. MENTZ, Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Admiral of the Fleet Earl BEATTY, O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Captain B. E. DOMVILE, C.M.G., R.N., Admiralty.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.

Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 62167

2

Naval Defence. A discussion took place on Naval Defence.
Only one copy of the Notes has been made, and this is in the custody of Sir M. P. A. Hankey, at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 19, 1921.

C 62168

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SECRET.

E. 27th Meeting. 2

MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON FRIDAY, JULY 22, 1921, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The following were also present:

Sir EDWARD GRIGG, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B.
Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Australia.
Mr. P. E. DEANE, C.M.G.

Canada.
Mr. C. H. A. ARMSTRONG.

India.
Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

The Pacific Conference. A discussion took place on the proposed Conference in connection with Pacific questions.
Only one copy of the notes has been made, and this is in the custody of Sir M. P. A. Hankey at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1, *July* 22, 1921.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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CABINET

NOTES OF MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS & INDIA, HELD IN LONDON IN JUNE AND JULY, 1921.

"E"(R) SERIES.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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CANADA

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SECRET.

E (R). 1st Meeting.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD IN THE BOARD ROOM, TREASURY, ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 1921, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. Sir ROBERT HORNE, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The Hon. SRINIVASA-SASTRI.

The following were also present:

Mr. L. C. CHRISTIE, Legal Adviser to The Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Mr. G. H. MITCHELL, Canadian High Commissioner's Office.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. A. L. SAUNDERS, C.S.I., Financial Department, India Office.

Mr. P. J. GRIGG, Treasury.

Sir B. P. BLACKETT, K.C.B., Controller of Finance, Treasury.

Mr. H. E. FASS, Treasury.

Sir ALFRED WATSON, K.C.B., Government Actuary.

Mr. R. W. STURGEON, Government Actuary's Department.

Sir VICTOR WARRENDER.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.
Mr. R. B. HOWORTH.

Australia.

Mr. M. O. SHEPHERD.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Sir Robert Horne: We will now begin and see what we can do until Mr. Hughes comes.

Empire Total Claims.

I will just explain that we claimed on behalf of the Empire something like 1,600,000,000*l.* In point of fact what has been awarded to us, if I may so put it, comes out at something like 1,400,000,000*l.* That is the figure in this document at any rate. Our claim was made up of a variety of items; pensions, separation allowances, shipping losses and non-maritime losses. Over and above those there is a matter which we shall have to deal with to-day, and that is the amount which is to be credited to us for the upkeep of the army of occupation, which raises a difficult question in connection with Australia, perhaps not a difficult question, but one which we shall have to settle.

(At this point Mr. Hughes entered.)

Claims in Respect of Pensions.

I propose that we should deal first of all with the question of the proportion in respect of pensions, afterwards we will take separation allowances, then shipping losses, and then the only remaining question will be that concerned with the amount to be credited respectively for the maintenance of the armies of occupation.

Mr. Massey: I think you had better tell us the total amount first.

Sir Robert Horne: The total amount of pensions which we asked for was something like 900,000,000*l.*

Sir Thomas Smartt: In order to be clear, I presume that all comes out of the 6,300,000,000*l.* which I believe was the amount agreed to at the last meeting in connection with reparations; that is the total indemnity that the Allies were to get?

Sir Robert Horne: 6,300,000,000*l.* is the total amount for the Allies. For the British Empire it works out roughly to about 1,452,000,000*l.*, which is 22 per cent. of the total. Our claims were made up upon a computation of what each part of the Empire would be entitled to in respect of these various items, pensions, separation allowances, and so on. I will come to that later and just say now that it does not very much matter, or may not very much matter, what was the basis of our computation in putting forward the original claim. What really matters now is how we should divide what is assumed to be about to be paid in the process of time.

Sir Thomas Smartt: That is the 22 per cent.?

Sir Robert Horne: Yes; that we should divide that amount according to the proportions which we agree upon. What was discovered was this. Let me take the case of pensions first. I think we can deal with that separately and then go to the others. At the time we put forward the claim it was practically known what was the British liability in respect of pensions. There was no actual account available of the amount of the liability of each of the other parts of the Empire.

Mr. Hughes: When was this?

Sir Robert Horne: February of this year. But there was put in as near an estimate as could be made, and as it turned out the total was very nearly right—I think it probably is right. When the final figures were got it was plain that certain adjustments had to be made. I will take an illustration. Canada's liability turned out upon her own figures to be less that that at which it had been originally assessed in arriving at the total. On the other hand, I think Australia's liability turned out to be slightly more than had been estimated at the time when the original computation was made.

Mr. Meighen: Is that in respect of pensions?

Methods of apportioning Pensions Claim in the Empire.

Sir Robert Horne: Yes. I am dealing now only with pensions, as it forms a good illustration of some of the other things, and I thought we could deal with it by itself to start off with. You can do one of two things, as I think: you can either correct the original computation by the facts that have since been discovered and bring the original figures into consistency with the accounts, as they have now been seen; or you may proceed in another way and take the actual capitalised liability of the various portions of the whole and divide up the amount of the reparation money which is paid to us in accordance with the proportion of the actual liability of each portion of the Empire.

Mr. Meighen: Do you mean the actual pensions liability?

Sir Robert Horne: Yes, the actual pensions liability capitalised. I will show you in figures in a moment what the difference is. Roughly, these are the two things in principle. On the first basis what was done was this. Under the Treaty we were entitled to be paid not upon the scale of pensions which any of us might happen to have arranged, but upon a scale which France had. That really was the basis. In point of fact none of us are paying actually upon the French scale. We are all paying more than the French scale, with the exception of India. The theory of the original computation was, taking the French scale and applying it to each part of the Empire separately. If you take that you accordingly reduce the amount which each person is to get to a common denominator; you assume they are all paying upon the French scale, although we shall have to make an adjustment in regard to India.

Sir Thomas Smartt: The Indian pensions are less, I understand?

Sir Robert Horne: I think so.

Mr. Massey: They are the pensions that are proposed to be paid to the soldiers, are they not?

Sir Thomas Smartt: No, I do not think so.

Mr. Massey: I think they ought to be.

Sir Robert Horne: I have no doubt the French scale did make a differentiation between different grades of soldiers, but we are not in that intricacy at the moment at all. We are taking the thing on a wide view, that you took the French scale as a whole, looked at the number of your armies, and assessed the amount which on the French scale you would probably be liable to pay. That is how the original computation was arrived at. You could proceed upon that basis if you liked and then correct the amounts that were put in for the separate parts of the Empire by the figures as now ascertained, making a further correction for India in the respect that she is not even paying up to that scale, and, therefore, that she should not take out more than she has actually paid. That is one way of doing it, and that is following the basis of the Treaty. On the other hand, it really does not matter amongst ourselves whether we follow the Treaty or not. The Treaty gives us a lump sum, and instead of dividing it upon that basis, we can if we choose apportion it amongst the various parts of the Empire on the footing of saying, "Well, now we have ascertained, each of us, our capital liability in respect of pensions, and we shall apportion it upon the basis of the ratio that the various liabilities have to each other." Those are the two main features. I can now show you from the tables how these two theories would work out.

Definition of Pensions.

Mr. Hughes: May I ask, first of all, if there is any definition of this category "Pensions"? Is a pension that which is ordinarily so-called, or does it include allowances and those other payments, which, I believe, are being made by all the Dominions and, I think, by Britain? For example, for Australia's 10*l.* paid in pensions last year she paid 20*l.* by way of allowances and under other heads.

Sir Robert Horne: You mean for land settlement and that sort of thing?

Mr. Hughes: For soldiers, yes.

Sir Robert Horne: I do not think it includes any of those things. I do not think any claim was made in respect of these adventitious aids, so to speak. It was purely upon a pension basis.

Mr. Hughes: I was a member of the Reparation Committee. Assuming that the Treaty did not adopt the whole of the recommendation of the Committee. When the Committee considered what might be paid under the category of "pensions," it was regarded as a generic term, under which might be grouped all the sub-headings to which I have referred. To the soldier or to his dependents it makes no difference whether the money received is called a pension or allowance or anything else. It is paid to him to enable him to rehabilitate or to maintain himself. I am bound to say that, although I did not agree with my colleagues entirely (Lord Sumner and Lord Cunliffe) as to the exclusion of certain categories, that I was always under this impression. And in making up our estimates, while we did not include land settlements because we could not then foresee what has since been done in this direction, we did contemplate those charges for which we have now undertaken responsibility and have statutory warrant for, such as allowances and other things.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

French Scale the Basis of Calculation.

Sir Robert Horne: I will tell you why I think that is ruled out of this discussion. The ultimate arrangement made under the Treaty was the French scale. That is the only basis we have, and the amount of our reparation is computed upon the basis of the French scale. We divide it amongst ourselves when we get it. Accordingly, nothing is in the computation as to what we are entitled to get except upon the basis of what the French were paying out or making themselves liable to pay out in respect of the remedies they were offering to their soldiers. That means, as I understand, practically pensions and pensions alone in the strict sense.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Otherwise you would get into a most serious complication, because some Dominions—we, for instance—are paying a high pension scale and some are not paying as much. If you divide on the basis of what each individual Dominion is paying you would hardly ever get a common denominator.

Sir Robert Horne: If you will look at the table* on the first page . . . .

Sir Thomas Smartt: Before you go to that, may I ask you whether you are now dealing with 22 per cent. of the computed amount of 6,300,000,000*l.* Besides that amount of 6,300,000,000*l.*, there is a further payment to be made over forty-two years on the basis of German trade estimated at 26 per cent.

Sir Robert Horne: The 6,300,000,000*l.* covers all the liabilities.

Sir Thomas Smartt: It covers the whole thing.

Sir Robert Horne: The upkeep of the armies of occupation are outside, but otherwise it covers everything.

Sir Thomas Smartt: So that really the annual payments, plus the alternative payments, are all included in the 6,300,000,000*l.*

Sir Robert Horne: Yes.

Mr. Massey: Everything except the cost of the armies of occupation.

Method of computation of Empire's total Claim.

Sir Robert Horne: If you look at the table* on the first page you will see what we applied for. That was the computation of our claim, 32,694 millions of marks, which works out at something over 1,600,000,000*l.* You see what the various items are: pensions, separation allowances, damage to property, non-maritime shipping losses, and damage to civil persons. We are not really concerned here at this moment with the proportion these things bear to each other. Again, if you look at what is described as Table 1, on page 4 of my copy . . . .

Mr. Montagu: Are you confining your attention this morning only to pensions?

Sir Robert Horne: No, I hope to do everything else afterwards, but I should like to take pensions first and get a principle upon that before we go on to separation allowances. If you look at Table 1 you will find, dealing with pensions alone, as this table does, that in column "A" you get the proportion that each part of the Empire bears to the other in respect of its claim on pensions. It is made up by the actuary upon the basis of what we computed at the time to be the liability on pensions of each of the various parts of the Empire.

Mr. Hughes: How do each of the columns differ from each other?

Sir Robert Horne: I will tell you what I think column "B" means now. Column "B" means column "A" corrected by the actual figures that we received from various parts of the Empire as the liability they were undertaking. Column "A," as you see, proceeds upon the French scale, which was the basis of the Treaty. Column "B," still operating upon the French scale, corrects the actual proportions as ascertained by the figures provided by each part of the Empire.

Sir Thomas Smartt: By the various pension Acts.

Basis suggested for computation of the share of portion of the Empire in Pension Claim.

Sir Robert Horne: So that you see on that basis while the United Kingdom's share remains the same, Canada, for example, is 6·22 instead of 3·13 and Australia comes out at 6·30 instead of . . . .

Mr. Meighen: I do not understand that at all.

* Paper No. E 26. Appendix.

Sir Robert Horne: We computed as best we could at the moment, as we could not get the actual figures from you at all.

Mr. Meighen: How do you figure Australia twice more than Canada?

Sir Robert Horne: Quite frankly, your Canadian Pensions Office has not been able to provide really accurate figures.

Mr. Meighen: It is not a matter of accuracy at all—it is a matter of profound error.

Sir Robert Horne: If you will let me explain the question. I am leaving column "A," because column "A" has turned out inaccurate in its proportions. I think I can show Mr. Meighen how the thing arises. I think I can make a complete explanation. Well now, I have told you what column "B" is. Now, column "C" corrects the position through an adjustment in respect of India. The 3·91 and 3·93 that you got in Columns "A" and "B" in regard to India turned out to be quite inaccurate, because India, in point of fact, as I have said, is not even paying on the French scale, and, therefore, we have reduced India to ·54, that being the exact proportion which she is paying according to her pensions scheme, and that has the effect of altering the figures in regard to all the others. For example, Canada goes up slightly to 3·24. We distribute the surplus that we get by putting India in its accurate position, and Australia gets a little more, and New Zealand slightly more, too. That is proceeding on the basis, as you see, of the French scale, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and correcting the figures originally put in, which actually shows in what proportions they are made up according to the pensions schemes of the various countries.

Mr. Meighen: It does not. There is no chance in the world of it being within 100 per cent. of being right.

Sir Robert Horne: I will show you how the thing works out. If you take Table 2, which is two pages further on, you will find the figures based upon a different principle. Instead of proceeding upon the French scale—what we paid on the basis of the French scale—it proceeds to a distribution of the amount to be received upon a different footing. It shows what is the capitalised liability of each of the various parts of the Empire as now discovered by actuarial estimate upon the pensions' schemes. That is what it does. It may possibly be the fairest way out—I do not know that we shall discuss that. I am only now explaining where we are. Now you see the figures change a little upon that basis. The United Kingdom percentage remains practically the same, 84·95 instead of 84·56; the minor Colonies remains the same. Canada goes up from 3·24 to 5·10. Look at Table 2. Australia goes down from 7·84 to 5·95; New Zealand remains about the same, 2·47 as against 2·78.

Mr. Massey: On the face of it, that column looks very much better in proportion to the number of soldiers from each country.

Sir Robert Horne: This is really a thoroughly scientific actuarial calculation upon the basis of the liability of each portion of the Empire under the pensions scheme operating—that is what it really is.

Mr. Hughes: I do not know where you get these figures, but you must have a record. I do not admit for one moment that you have the right to take what you call pensions in this country, but which we call in Australia pensions, and group them under, say, three headings. What have you done? You have taken one of ours and said, "That is all we are paying," but it is not. Might I ask this, the pensions scheme in Australia, for example, the rights of pensions alone—the term is ordinarily applied. I should like to ask your officials whether they had regard to that—what schedule they have taken apart from anything else?

Sir Robert Horne: I am told that they put in every kind of allowance on the same basis as here.

Mr. Hughes: What schedule did they take—the old schedule or the new one?

Sir Robert Horne: When was there a new one, Mr. Hughes?

Mr. Hughes: I should say the best part of a year ago—I do not know how long.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Sir Robert Horne : I am told it was about six months ago. The Australian one was obtained from Australia House, and it was on the basis of that one that these computations were made.

Mr. Hughes: I should say that it was not accurate.

Sir Robert Horne : Well, we will ascertain that.

Mr. Hughes: We paid 66,000,000*l.* to soldiers last year. On the face of it, therefore, that is . . . . (shaking his head in dissent).

Sir Robert Horne : You are probably including many other things which we have not included, like land settlement.

Mr. Hughes: Even when you have made every allowance for that it does not seem to be approximately correct.

Sir Robert Horne : Have you anybody, Mr. Hughes, that can tell us about this matter?

Mr. Hughes: Yes, I first want to know all you can tell us, because I do not know what figures you are working on. Perhaps your officials might be given an opportunity to consult with mine in order that we may see where we are and what we are doing. We must work on the same figures, otherwise we cannot arrive at any settlement.

Sir Robert Horne : They have been working together for the last six months. I cannot say that Australia House has left them in ignorance of any particular claim you are making.

Mr. Montagu : There is a strong question of principle raised by Mr. Hughes. Our figure is wrong. Have you included land settlement?

Sir Robert Horne : No land settlement is included in this.

Mr. Montagu : That is what Mr. Hughes was raising just now.

Case for inclusion of Land Settlement in Pensions' Claim.

Sir Thomas Smartt : You do not raise the question that, included in the apportionment of your pensions, should be the amount of money that you have spent upon land settlement. I understand from the Chancellor that these computations, no matter what the basis may be, had been estimated on the actual basis of the capitalised amounts of your pensions.

Sir Robert Horne : Pensions were including, of course, ordinary allowances for convalescent treatment and training—it includes all these, but does not include the kind of thing, for example, as able-bodied men that we send to Australia under the scheme of land settlement. We did not include any of that, although it is very costly to us.

Mr. Massey : If you are going to include an item like that, I should have to increase ours by 25 millions.

Sir Robert Horne : Obviously, it seems to be outside the purview of what we regard as the foundation of proper claims.

Mr. Meighen : They are loans.

Mr. Hughes: I am not talking about money, either out of revenue or of loans.

Mr. Meighen : I know. They are advances to soldiers by way of a loan.

Mr. Hughes: I am not talking about advances to soldiers, but what we have paid and are paying to them. We say to the soldier, "Very well, if you go on the land we will help you." If he says, "I prefer not to go on the land," we have got to support him until he is re-established. Whether the money is paid to the soldier to settle him on the land, or as payment by way of sustenance, it amounts to the same thing so far as our Treasury is concerned. Clearly, you cannot exclude the one in calculating the other.

Sir Robert Horne : With all submission, Mr. Hughes, I think it stands upon a different footing because, obviously, they are not in the ordinary way reparations in respect of war damage, because they are mixed up with a great many other considerations.

Mr. Hughes : No, they are not.

Sir Robert Horne : With us they are.

Sir Thomas Smartt : We believe, Mr. Chancellor, very large sums of money have been spent on land settlement and returned soldiers, but they are not returned in these claims.

Sir Robert Horne: No, they are not put in as part of your computation in connection with the Treaty.

Mr. Hughes: I hope you will hear this case argued. This is the first time we have had a chance to know upon what basis the Government of the United Kingdom proposes to dsitribute any monies received by way of reparation, and we ought to be allowed to hear all the facts before we are asked to come to any decision.

Sir Robert Horne : No. Well, Mr. Hughes, I think you are slightly in error about this, because the representatives of Australia, Canada, South Africa, and of the United Kingdom have been working hard on this thing for six months.

Mr. Hughes: While that may be very true, I, as head of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, have been kept wholly in the dark about it. I hear all this for the first time.

Sir Robert Horne : I am sorry for that. Your representatives have certainly been very busy.

Mr. Hughes : Probably they were under some obligation not to say anything.

Sir Robert Horne : The schedule upon which they proceeded came from Australia, and therefore I am sorry you did not know about it. It is not surprising with all the many duties you have to perform that you have not heard about it, but, believe me, the officials of Australia were very well apprised of the whole of the questions that are here under discussion.

Mr. Hughes : I know nothing whatever of it. I know of the 22 per cent. to the British Empire. Mr. Lloyd George reported that to us, but beyond that it has not gone.

Sir Robert Horne : There is this to be kept in mind. I do not say it is foreclosing things. What the Treaty provides in respect of reparation in connection with the liability for pensions is payment of pensions on the French scale, and that is in the Treaty. I am afraid you signed the Treaty.

Mr. Hughes: I did sign it, but I will ask any man who was there if he ever read it—all of it.

Sir Robert Horne : That is the basis upon which we are to be paid.

Mr. Hughes: I do not admit that, because the matter has been the subject of negotiation ever since.

Sir Robert Horne : But not getting away from the bases.

Mr. Hughes : I do not know.

Sir Robert Horne : What the clause says is—

> "(5.) As damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers, all pensions and compensation in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war (including members of the Air Force), whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims, the amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments being calculated for each of them as being the capitalised cost of such pensions and compensation at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, on the basis of the scales in force in France at such date." (Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Section I, Annex I, Clause 5).

That is the basis upon which reparation is to be paid, and that limits, as it would seem to me—but I say it with great deference to any view you may have—it seems to me to limit the scope of the matter we are considering. I think it really prevents us getting on to the big question as to what each country may have chosen to do as a part of general policy of that country in the way of providing for land settlement.

Mr. Hughes : I will leave land settlement out for the moment, but I understood you to say that quite apart from the basis upon which the monies received under the Reparation clause were to be divided between the different Allies, there was the question of the division *inter se*, which was not necessarily governed by the same principle. I think you said that.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Sir Robert Horne: What I said was, we could, amongst ourselves, if we chose, agree to a proportion in the way of distribution which would not necessarily be governed by the French scale, but what I have exhibited this other table for, upon capitalised value, is to show how the proportions would work out if you took such a basis as this.

Mr. Montagu: What you have done with regard to India is, you have claimed from Germany on the French scale, and then you have said to India you do not pay on the French scale. Therefore, it is a little nest egg for us. It is too high for you and we will distribute it to the other persons.

Sir Robert Horne: I could quite understand that objection if we were getting what we claimed, that really is the point.

Mr. Montagu: I am not questioning the propriety of some adjustment, but I am saying this adjustment requires a little consideration from that point of view and Australia's.

Mr. Meighen: That is the thing which has been in my mind.

Mr. Hughes: I do not see how you can ignore the circumstances of the Dominions.

Mr. Massey: You cannot receive more than you pay away.

Mr. Meighen: I do not know. You can increase the payments.

Sir Robert Horne: If the full amount of the claim was granted we could not deny India all that has been claimed on her behalf, but, when much less than the claim has been granted, if one takes more than she actually pays and the others less, because of the error in the original computation———

Sir Thomas Smartt: Seeing that other parts of the Empire have had to pay out on the basis of the higher scale of living.

Mr. Meighen: That is the point.

Sir Robert Horne: Having said so much and before we get on the discussion upon the principle which Mr. Hughes has raised, if it is to be raised, may I direct your attention to Table 3, which will show you the proportions? These are really illustrations which would be arrived at if you took the basis of casualties alone without regard to the scale on which pensions are paid in respect of those casualties. Table 3 shows that the casualties of the United Kingdom come out at 82·2 instead of 84. Canada comes out to 7·1, Australia to 7·2, New Zealand comes down to 1·9 and India remains at ·54.

Mr. Montagu: You do not make the calculations up for some reason or other.

Sir Robert Horne: It is kept at the same figure because that is the actual expenditure. The explanation of these figures is this. If you take casualties by themselves, they give some kind of indication of what your liability will be, but not a full and complete explanation, for this reason. If you take the case of the United Kingdom, we had, I think, almost twice as many married men in our army as any of the Dominions, as you would expect, and the result, of course, is that there is far more to be paid out in the way of pensions; there are far more widows and dependents to provide for, and, therefore, casualties by themselves do not give anything like the measure of the liability of the various countries, but I have put forward that table just to show you how it works out on casualties alone. Now, Mr. Meighen, I would like you to look at the table* which shows the general casualties and so on, and you will see in these figures an explanation as to why I think there is some error in the records of the Canada Pensions Office.

Sir Thomas Smartt: What page is that?

Sir Robert Horne: If you take the fourth column, first you see the total of the casualties of each of the various parts of the Empire. The United Kingdom is over 2,000,000, Australia 211,000, Canada 206,000, India 117,000, New Zealand 56,000 and South Africa 21,000. Look at the next column, representing the disabled men.

Mr. Meighen: Just a moment before you go on. Where do you reach the figure of 206,000 for Canada?

Sir Robert Horne: That was supplied to us, as I understand, by the War Office.

* Paper No. E 26, Appendix.

Mr. Meighen: Up to the 15th January, 1919, 218,433, according to our official figures here.

Sir Robert Horne: I do not know whether you can say whether these figures . . . . there is still the difficulty, whatever the correct figure is, Mr. Meighen, if you will kindly look at this table for a moment, because it is an important point—look at the next column on disabled men. We had one in three of our casualties disabled. No, it is one in two, because the disabled men are included in the casualties; that is, more than 20 per cent. disabled. If you take Australia, there are 95,000 disabled out of 211,000 casualties. It is just about the same proportion as ours.

Mr. Massey: It is more.

Sir Robert Horne: No, it is slightly less. Look at the Canadian figures: 52,000 disabled out of 206,000. That, as you see, is very much less than the proportion of either the United Kingdom or Australia, and, if you look at the New Zealand figures, 34,000 out of 56,000, that is a bigger proportion than either the United Kingdom or Australia, and South Africa, 15,000 out of 21,000, is a bigger proportion, but the Canadian figures look to me to bear some error on the face of them.

Mr. Meighen: It means it is likely that the different Departments have given a different meaning to the word "disabled."

Sir Robert Horne: I suppose it is upon disablement that you pay pensions.

Mr. Meighen: It may be. It may mean one thing in one country and not quite the same thing in another.

Sir Robert Horne: You may administer on a much higher basis.

Sir Thomas Smartt: That is the whole thing. If the Canadian Medical Boards are much more rigorous, they would have put their percentage of disabled on a much lower scale.

Mr. Meighen: That is so, but that would not make any difference in the distribution.

Sir Robert Horne: That explains why on your figures of your pensions scheme, when they are actually applied to the original computation, your figure comes down, because your figure of disablement, and therefore the figure of your pension liability, comes so much lower actually than is the average in other countries.

Mr. Meighen: In a word, care or whatever you may describe it as, in one country may result in a very considerable contraction of the number of any class, but that should not have any effect at all in the question of the distribution of Reparations.

Sir Robert Horne: That depends. You see, it depends on the point of view—I am not saying this is a conclusive answer—but it depends upon the basis you take to divide Reparations; whether on the basis of what you really incurred . . . .

Mr. Meighen: You would not argue that?

Sir Robert Horne: I do not know. It is for consideration.

Mr. Meighen: It is absurd.

Sir Robert Horne: Or whether it is on some basis higher than that.

Mr. Meighen: It is on the basis of the suffering of the country. The country suffers just the same whether the State pays a certain amount to the individual or whether the individual suffers it himself. There is not a bit of difference in that. One country by a very reckless policy might absorb the whole thing if it were reckless enough. All I want to draw attention to is this. We only want a reasonably broad basis of distribution, and it would be a shameful thing if we cannot agree on it. I do not think that this should be taken into account, not that I want any computation made of it of any kind, but in determining what the broad basis should be this should be taken into account, that Canada alone obtained no territorial acquisitions. They ought not to be wholly ignored in determining the basis of distribution.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Sir Robert Horne: What I said was, we could, amongst ourselves, if we chose, agree to a proportion in the way of distribution which would not necessarily be governed by the French scale, but what I have exhibited this other table for, upon capitalised value, is to show how the proportions would work out if you took such a basis as this.

Mr. Montagu: What you have done with regard to India is, you have claimed from Germany on the French scale, and then you have said to India you do not pay on the French scale. Therefore, it is a little nest egg for us. It is too high for you and we will distribute it to the other persons.

Sir Robert Horne: I could quite understand that objection if we were getting what we claimed, that really is the point.

Mr. Montagu: I am not questioning the propriety of some adjustment, but I am saying this adjustment requires a little consideration from that point of view and Australia's.

Mr. Meighen: That is the thing which has been in my mind.

Mr. Hughes: I do not see how you can ignore the circumstances of the Dominions.

Mr. Massey: You cannot receive more than you pay away.

Mr. Meighen: I do not know. You can increase the payments.

Sir Robert Horne: If the full amount of the claim was granted we could not deny India all that has been claimed on her behalf, but, when much less than the claim has been granted, if one takes more than she actually pays and the others less, because of the error in the original computation———

Sir Thomas Smartt: Seeing that other parts of the Empire have had to pay out on the basis of the higher scale of living.

Mr. Meighen: That is the point.

Sir Robert Horne: Having said so much and before we get on the discussion upon the principle which Mr. Hughes has raised, if it is to be raised, may I direct your attention to Table 3, which will show you the proportions? These are really illustrations which would be arrived at if you took the basis of casualties alone without regard to the scale on which pensions are paid in respect of those casualties. Table 3 shows that the casualties of the United Kingdom come out at 82·2 instead of 84. Canada comes out to 7·1, Australia to 7·2, New Zealand comes down to 1·9 and India remains at ·54.

Mr. Montagu: You do not make the calculations up for some reason or other.

Sir Robert Horne: It is kept at the same figure because that is the actual expenditure. The explanation of these figures is this. If you take casualties by themselves, they give some kind of indication of what your liability will be, but not a full and complete explanation, for this reason. If you take the case of the United Kingdom, we had, I think, almost twice as many married men in our army as any of the Dominions, as you would expect, and the result, of course, is that there is far more to be paid out in the way of pensions; there are far more widows and dependents to provide for, and, therefore, casualties by themselves do not give anything like the measure of the liability of the various countries, but I have put forward that table just to show you how it works out on casualties alone. Now, Mr. Meighen, I would like you to look at the table* which shows the general casualties and so on, and you will see in these figures an explanation as to why I think there is some error in the records of the Canada Pensions Office.

Sir Thomas Smartt: What page is that?

Sir Robert Horne: If you take the fourth column, first you see the total of the casualties of each of the various parts of the Empire. The United Kingdom is over 2,000,000, Australia 211,000, Canada 206,000, India 117,000, New Zealand 56,000 and South Africa 21,000. Look at the next column, representing the disabled men.

Mr. Meighen: Just a moment before you go on. Where do you reach the figure of 206,000 for Canada?

Sir Robert Horne: That was supplied to us, as I understand, by the War Office.

* Paper No. E 26. Appendix.

Mr. Meighen: Up to the 15th January, 1919, 218,433, according to our official figures here.

Sir Robert Horne: I do not know whether you can say whether these figures . . . . there is still the difficulty, whatever the correct figure is, Mr. Meighen, if you will kindly look at this table for a moment, because it is an important point—look at the next column on disabled men. We had one in three of our casualties disabled. No, it is one in two, because the disabled men are included in the casualties; that is, more than 20 per cent. disabled. If you take Australia, there are 95,000 disabled out of 211,000 casualties. It is just about the same proportion as ours.

Mr. Massey: It is more.

Sir Robert Horne: No, it is slightly less. Look at the Canadian figures: 52,000 disabled out of 206,000. That, as you see, is very much less than the proportion of either the United Kingdom or Australia, and, if you look at the New Zealand figures, 34,000 out of 56,000, that is a bigger proportion than either the United Kingdom or Australia, and South Africa, 15,000 out of 21,000, is a bigger proportion, but the Canadian figures look to me to bear some error on the face of them.

Mr. Meighen: It means it is likely that the different Departments have given a different meaning to the word "disabled."

Sir Robert Horne: I suppose it is upon disablement that you pay pensions.

Mr. Meighen: It may be. It may mean one thing in one country and not quite the same thing in another.

Sir Robert Horne: You may administer on a much higher basis.

Sir Thomas Smartt: That is the whole thing. If the Canadian Medical Boards are much more rigorous, they would have put their percentage of disabled on a much lower scale.

Mr. Meighen: That is so, but that would not make any difference in the distribution.

Sir Robert Horne: That explains why on your figures of your pensions scheme, when they are actually applied to the original computation, your figure comes down, because your figure of disablement, and therefore the figure of your pension liability, comes so much lower actually than is the average in other countries.

Mr. Meighen: In a word, care or whatever you may describe it as, in one country may result in a very considerable contraction of the number of any class, but that should not have any effect at all in the question of the distribution of Reparations.

Sir Robert Horne: That depends. You see, it depends on the point of view—I am not saying this is a conclusive answer—but it depends upon the basis you take to divide Reparations; whether on the basis of what you really incurred . . . .

Mr. Meighen: You would not argue that?

Sir Robert Horne: I do not know. It is for consideration.

Mr. Meighen: It is absurd.

Sir Robert Horne: Or whether it is on some basis higher than that.

Mr. Meighen: It is on the basis of the suffering of the country. The country suffers just the same whether the State pays a certain amount to the individual or whether the individual suffers it himself. There is not a bit of difference in that. One country by a very reckless policy might absorb the whole thing if it were reckless enough. All I want to draw attention to is this. We only want a reasonably broad basis of distribution, and it would be a shameful thing if we cannot agree on it. I do not think that this should be taken into account, not that I want any computation made of it of any kind, but in determining what the broad basis should be this should be taken into account, that Canada alone obtained no territorial acquisitions. They ought not to be wholly ignored in determining the basis of distribution.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Sir Robert Horne: I am afraid you would not like to take over Mesopotamia, Mr. Meighen.

Mr. Massey: That is my experience.

Mr. Meighen: As regards mandates, that may be true, but I should not like to hear that as regards territorial acquisitions after the trouble taken to get them.

Mr. Massey: What territorial acquisitions are you referring to, for instance?

Mr. Meighen: You have Samoa.

Mr. Massey: That is a mandate country, and it carried a good deal of responsibility. I know we are not going to get anything out of it, but it was taken to prevent any other country coming in.

Mr. Meighen: Australia wanted Nauru, and you also wanted something.

Mr. Massey: Only to keep other people out.

Mr. Hughes: What has that got to do with this question?

Mr. Meighen: Canada alone received none, and Canada alone from that standpoint is interested. We should be in a minority if interest alone was to dictate, but I suggest that it should not be left out of account in determining the principle that is to govern the distribution, not that any computation could be made, but if there was one principle defensible, that appeals to us as right and fair. If such a principle as that were defined, and if it gave a little advantage in that respect to the country that got no territorial acquisition, it might be adopted.

Mr. Massey: I see no financial advantage in it.

Mr. Meighen: Financial advantages are not everything.

Sir Robert Horne: I understood you to put forward a suggestion, Mr. Meighen, that we ought to try to find some way which does not rigidly follow the actual liability incurred, because you say there is something outside of that. That is your point.

Mr. Meighen: That is so. We would never get anywhere if we did not go on that basis

Sir Robert Horne: Something that does not rigidly follow the actual amount which the State happens to pay in the way of pensions.

Mr. Massey: You get into indemnity in that way. Once you depart from the principle of reparation, you get into trouble.

Mr. Meighen: I do not want to depart from it at all.

Mr. Hughes: What principle then are you going to adhere to? Liability should be the only principle. The question is to establish what is the liability, and we require some kind of principle to guide us, what we are to exclude, and what to include.

Mr. Meighen: Liability as between the State and the State's citizens is one thing, but the loss which the country itself suffered is another thing. You might, for example, have adopted a certain policy as to who is disabled or who is not, and whether a man is disabled 20 per cent. or 80 per cent.; we may have followed another course. You may have been reckless and we penurious, or *vice versâ*, but that should not determine the principle of reparation. We should seek the principle that has a bearing on the actual suffering of the country's people, and adhere to that. We would say, go on a casualty basis if we can. I realise Sir Robert Horne's point that the country which has exhausted its manhood the more, whose casualties are really greater casualties, man for man, than other countries is entitled to be considered as having incurred a greater liability. Perhaps some allowance could be made for that here.

Mr. Massey: That would suit me.

Mr. Hughes: I think there is a good deal in what Mr. Meighen says, and if we are to take into consideration all those things that he has touched upon, and consider all the circumstances of each Dominion during the war, we should have to include the effect of the war upon the trade of each country, and to examine whether one Dominion suffered more than another as a result of the war, and if we found as a fact that the trade of any Dominion had not suffered but increased or decreased by such an amount as to be negligible, we should have to take this fact into account.

And we should also have to consider the remoteness of any part of the Empire from its markets, the dangers to which its trade was exposed on that account, the price obtainable for its goods—all these and many other things would have to be taken into consideration. As I see it, you are launching into an uncharted sea. Once you fix the liability, you can express that liability in terms of money. We are invited to take pensions, as payable by each Dominion, as the bases, or as an alternative base the quotas upon the casualties suffered. I think that you have a much better basis for fixing the quota of reparation by taking the actual amount of its liability to its soldiers. This seems a more reliable and equitable basis than its casualties and disablements; but if you take this latter as a basis, namely, the amount that we are paying in compensation to our soldiers, then Mr. Meighen says it is inequitable, because he says some Dominions may have been reckless and others penurious. He says that, if you have the quota upon the actual casualties, you eliminate that.

Mr. Massey: The term "casualty" differs in the different countries. A casualty in New Zealand is not the same as in the other Dominions. A casualty in New Zealand was not counted unless a man was off duty for a certain number of weeks. We may differ in that respect.

Mr. Meighen: That is the same with us.

Mr. Massey: I do not think we would be wise in getting away from calculating in the actual liability the sum which each country has paid by way of pensions and compensations, without including land settlements.

Mr. Meighen: We are spending thirty-three millions in loans for the purpose of taking hold of the disabled fellows. That is not pensions you see.

Mr. Massey: Something might be done in that way, but I am very doubtful about it.

Mr. Meighen: You could not take pensions alone, at least I do not think you could. We have been spending more until just this year in other forms of assessments than in pensions.

Sir L. Worthington Evans: But those additions for civilian reinstatement do not alter the ratio.

Mr. Meighen: They would undoubtedly affect the ratio.

Sir Thomas Smartt: It would depend on what you can do. I understand Mr. Hughes is not only making provision for land settlement, but that he is setting the men up in business, giving them 500*l.* or 1,000*l.* to set them up in a shop.

Mr. Hughes: I hear you say that.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I am only asking if that is the case.

Mr. Hughes: As a matter of fact it is not.

Mr. Massey: We are doing it in New Zealand, and have spent a very large sum of money in that way. We have trained every man who was willing to be trained, paid him his pension during that training, and also paid him the minimum wage as provided in the Arbitration Act while he was learning his business.

Sir Thomas Smartt: If you go into all those questions you will never arrive at a good basis.

Mr. Massey: I quite agree.

Sir L. Worthington Evans: I very much doubt whether you would appreciably alter the ratio.

Mr. Massey: No, not much.

Sir Robert Horne: It is difficult to follow that in all its ramifications.

Mr. Meighen: It is difficult from the point of re-establishment of a disabled man.

Mr. Massey: We are only doing it in the case of a disabled man.

Mr. Meighen: We take another way of doing it. It is a loan that you make.

Mr. Massey: No, in the case of training a disabled man we pay him everything.

Mr. Meighen: If you paid him 1,000*l.*, that is a loan.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Massey: That is so.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I understood that New Zealand and Australia gave the men loans to set them up in business. Mr. Hughes does not do so, but you do it in New Zealand.

Mr. Hughes: For practical purposes these payments are negligible. We have confined our action to settlement on the land. If we were to be told now what payment Germany has made and is to make in the near future we should be better able to grip this as a practical proposition.

Sir Robert Horne: It is difficult to do that at this moment.

Mr. Hughes: If we are to divide nothing, it does not matter upon what principle we decide to divide it.

Sir Robert Horne: We must hope for something to divide.

Mr. Hughes: The Chancellor of the Exchequer does not entirely live on hope.

Sir Robert Horne: We shall have Bonds to deal with.

Sir L. Worthington Evans: Interest-bearing Bonds upon which interest will be paid.

Sir Robert Horne: Let us try to gather information upon this matter. Does the casualty basis recommend itself to Mr. Hughes, does it recommend itself to you, Mr. Massey?

Mr. Massey: No, I think it is too complicated. I suggested liability.

Offer to adopt Casualty Basis if Dominions prefer it.

Sir Robert Horne: I see Australia comes out all right on the casualty basis. It does better on that basis than on the liability basis. Great Britain suffers on that basis because it has so many more dependents to provide for, but if the representatives of the Dominions agree that the casualty basis would suffice, I will, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, undertake to suffer the loss that there is in it. There is an obvious loss in it.

Mr. Meighen: There is now. There is, however, this to be said, that as time goes on you are likely to get back to a lower cost of living than the Dominions. You were before the war substantially lower, though you are not now. I have seen no evidence of it since I came over, but when normal times return you very probably will. That would assist Great Britain.

Sir Robert Horne: I am not making any point about that now. I say that if the casualty basis is satisfactory to the representatives of the Dominions, I am perfectly willing to forego for the United Kingdom the proportion which obviously we give up. You will find it in Table 3, Mr. Hughes.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, I see.

Mr. Massey: Before we do anything in the way of casualties, or accept casualties, we need a common interpretation for "casualty."

Mr. Montagu: If you depart from liabilities and go to casualties you would have a higher liability for certain Dominions.

Sir Robert Horne: I put it to you that if the United Kingdom is taking the proportion it would be entitled to take, looking to its liability, India could scarcely complain if it gets the full amount that it pays out, gets it in that proportion. All the rest are getting less.

Mr. Montagu: If you are basing yourself on liabilities, I quite agree with your proposition, but if you depart from liabilities and go to casualties, which has no relation to liability at all, but is a measure of the suffering of humanity, then I say we are entitled to take that claim on casualties as well as any other part of the Empire.

Mr. Meighen: I think so too, except for this consideration that Sir Thomas Smartt advances, that casualties, as we adopt it, is merely a means of getting at the monetary suffering of the nation, and not of the Treasury. What he said, which rather altered my view, was this, that on account of the cost of living in India you

do not suffer per man as we do. If a man is injured 20 per cent. in each country, you do not suffer as much as Canada or Australia. If he is totally disabled you do not. I thought that argument was very strong.

Sir Robert Horne: I appreciate Mr. Montagu's point of view about this, but I am afraid that if India asks to be assessed on the basis of casualties, then the whole of this table will be put out.

Mr. Meighen: Casualties is only a means of getting at the suffering of each country reduced to pounds and shillings. That is all, and we think that is the fairest way of getting at it.

Sir Robert Horne: We are a little bit confused about this, because it is not really pounds and shillings, but the proportion in which you are going to claim pounds and shillings.

Mr. Meighen: I know that—the relative suffering reduced to the denomination of money. It is a means of getting at that, but as regards India a difference arises on account of the very great difference in the scale of the cost of living, and consequently an exception must be made there, because in the case of a man in India who is half disabled, the loss to that man in money is much less than if the same man was in Australia. Consequently, if you got the loss in money that seemed to me to be fair.

Sir Thomas Smartt: The only difficulty about casualties, as Mr. Massey suggested, is, what do you define as casualty? Get a common denominator. A man may get a scratch on his finger, he is off for the day, it is a casualty, but it does not interfere with his economic condition in his country when he goes back.

Mr. Massey: Really I do not think it is worth while. It all comes back to what incapacity means at the end of the war. If you are going to try to get the relative suffering of each country, the better way is to take the proportion of people, men and women, who went to the war, in proportion to the rest of the population. I do not suggest that, but it seems to me that is the better way of getting at the relative suffering. I do not think you will do better than stick to liability.

Sir Robert Horne: May I suggest we are really not endeavouring to find out the amount of suffering of one country as compared with another? What we are trying to discover is some rough measure in which we can estimate the proportion to each other in which we are going to take any money that becomes available. That is all. It is not going to compensate for suffering. That is not the object of this. This is an attempt to arrive at a proportion sum and nothing more. When you are looking at the question of pensions, the number of people who have been injured does give you a rough measure. I think that undoubtedly may be said, and you may say: "Well, upon what basis have you compared these things in the various countries?" As far as we are concerned, all the figures we have are War Office figures, the casualties suffered by the various armies I venture to think that is not a bad measure if we are looking at the means of making this proportion sum. For example, if you take the case of New Zealand, out of 56,000 casualties, 34,000 were disabled. I imagine that the proportion of casualties in the various armies came out not very differently.

Mr. Massey: It is not casualties. If you are going to do that, you have got to drop casualties and go for incapacity at the end of the war or at the time the soldier reached his country.

Mr. Meighen: What about the man who was treated for four years during the war? You cannot leave that out.

Mr. Massey: That would come under what I have said, the time he arrives in his own country.

Mr. Meighen: He might not arrive there at all.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: You might have the amount of casualties and capital liabilities and pensions. You will then get the actual casualties of the day during the actual service, and you will get another factor which represents the permanent loss.

Mr. Hughes: Look at New Zealand's total: 56,000, of which 16,000 were killed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Massey: 17,000

Mr. Hughes: Whereas you take Canada : 206,000, of whom 56,000 were killed. The proportion is different, and whatever you may estimate of the measure of a man's disablement, when he is dead there is an end of it.

Sir Robert Horne: There is his widow. If he is dead, there is still the question of the widow and family.

Mr. Hughes: You cannot say he is not disabled.

Sir Robert Horne: And they are part of the pensionable liability.

Mr. Meighen: We include deaths as disabled. A death is a disability.

Mr. Massey: The number of dependents has to be taken into account.

Mr. Hughes: Of course.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Does disease come under casualties, too?

Sir Robert Horne: Disease arising from war service is, I think, counted as a casualty with us.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I wonder if that is so?

Mr. Meighen: That is so with us; but it is claimed in this Memorandum, whether rightly or wrongly—I can hardly believe it myself—that we, in deciding whether a disease does arise out of the war, are more exact, they would get the advantage on that.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Take the troops in German East Africa. The worst cases of these troops were not the wounded, but the men who will carry to their dying day malarial fever, from which most of them will never be the same again. I do not know that they are treated as casualties.

Mr. Meighen: Surely.

Mr. Hughes: We had a larger force in Palestine, and may crack up now, over two years after the war.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Are they included as casualties?

Mr. Hughes: Many of them are not.

Mr. Massey: They are not officially included as casualties?

Mr. Hughes: No.

Sir Thomas Smartt: That makes a serious difference in our pensions.

Mr. Meighen: Those who, while in military service, took malarial fever are casualties. I think so.

Mr. Hughes: Wait a moment. I do not think so. Let me put this to you. There are plenty of people cracking up now in Australia who came out of the war apparently unaffected.

Mr. Meighen: So have we.

Mr. Hughes: They appear all right, then they go down, they crack up.

Mr. Meighen: Our Medical Boards decide that if break-up is traceable to the war he is a casualty; if not, he is not.

Mr. Hughes: These trickle through bit by bit. You are not able to measure yet.

Mr. Meighen: Neither are you.

Mr Hughes: No.

Mr. Meighen: So we are alike. It will even up. The question is whether or not, in determining whether his trouble is traceable to the war, each country has adopted equally rigorous standards. This paper says we have adopted more rigorous standards than you. If we have, you get the advantage in the distribution. Personally, I do not think we have. I am ready to take the chance.

Sir Robert Horne: The casualties that we have estimated are the War Office casualties. It has got nothing to do with the views we may take in the various countries as to the number of people with fever, or a diphtheria that he may get, or a pneumonia, nothing to do with any question of that kind. These casualties are casualties in the field at the end of the war.

Mr. Meighen: Are you sure of that?

Sir Robert Horne: These casualties are War Office casualties. It is true they do not cover what we each suffer in our different countries with regard to subsidiary diseases arising out of the war, but what one puts forward the figures for is that they afford a rough measure of what each country has suffered in respect of war injuries, and really, that is all you can hope to get. You cannot get perfection, otherwise you would have to get down to every single item of administration in respect of our various pension schemes. That is hopeless and impossible, and therefore I do not think we need require to argue the question whether we have different administrative methods with regard to pensions or not. We take the War Office casualties as affording a rough measure of what each has suffered.

Sir Thomas Smartt: If the War Office would only tell us what are included in the term "casualties."

Sir Robert Horne: It will be on the same basis for all.

Sir Thomas Smartt: The troops that served in East Africa and countries of that sort had casualties far more serious than many of the wounded people, because in the East African campaign, which I followed, a huge percentage of the troops that went down, went down owing to the malarial conditions of the country—they were not wounded. If they are not considered as casualties, the pension scheme on that basis is far higher than the scheme on casualties.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: It would not really be a fair measure of the amount of disablement. They would be reported as a casualty. That is really a life disablement.

Sir Thomas Smartt: These men are all under our pension scheme. They are really the worst cases.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: The worst cases we have here are the malarial cases that keep on recurring.

Mr. Massey: There are lots of casualties whose dependents themselves never claim or receive pensions.

Mr. Hughes: I think the principle fairest to all is one which rests upon what is the actual liability, the liability recognised by each State, in regard to the war, expressed in terms of money. That is set down really in Table 1.

Sir Robert Horne: Table 2, I think.

Mr. Hughes: I do not admit, however, that the percentages, as set down there, rest upon the monies actually paid in Australia. But that is a matter which can be determined by examination of the figures. It has been suggested that we should weight casualties with the figures of Table 2. Then you get this :—

Great Britain	83·6
Canada	6·1
Australia	6·6
New Zealand	2·21
South Africa	·77

and you get that as against under Table 1:—

United Kingdom	84·5
Canada	3·2
Australia	7·8
New Zealand	2·7
South Africa	·9

and under casualties the average disability, if it were wholly determined by that, would, according to the Appendix to E 26, be :—

United Kingdom	50
Australia	67

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Canada	...	...	...	36
New Zealand	...	...	...	71
South Africa	...	...	...	43

Now, I am afraid if we argue for a very long time we shall hardly ever be able to arrive at something which is entirely satisfactory, but if we can get some workable scheme which would be acceptable to us, that would be the best, if it could be hoped for, and I am willing to take either the casualties or Table 1, but not Table 2 as it is now or these.

Sir Robert Horne: I would venture to support you in the view that we should take the casualties' table taken along with the table of actual liability, bringing out the figures you spoke of on this sheet, in which Canada gets 6·1 per cent., Australia 6·6 per cent., New Zealand 2·2 per cent., South Africa ·77 per cent., Great Britain 83·6 per cent. This is all, of course, on the assumption that India is taking ·54 per cent. in the total as showing her actual liability.

Mr. Montagu: How do you mean the actual liability? I do not quite follow. It is a percentage.

Sir Alfred Watson: It is India's liability reduced to the proportion of 25/44ths of India's actual capital liability.

Mr. Montagu: On the scale suggested, if India gets 25/44ths of her capital expenditure, what will South Africa get?

Sir Robert Horne: Sir Alfred Watson was talking of the conversion of the franc into rupees, from which we are all suffering. He is trying to explain to you the result of the exchange, because the matter was originally computed in francs, but in saying you are to take ·54 per cent. you will be getting on that proportion the whole of your expenditure.

Mr. Montagu: Assuming Germany pays the whole debt.

Mr. Hughes: Is this on a franc basis?

Sir Alfred Watson: Table 1 is on the franc basis. Table 2 is on the pound basis and Table 3 is on the pound basis.

Mr. Massey: What are we discussing, because it seems to me we are not getting anywhere?

Sir Robert Horne: It does not matter whether you are talking of francs or pound sterling if you are only talking of a proportion, but I do not understand what Sir Alfred is trying to tell Mr. Montagu.

Mr. Montagu: Neither do I. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told me earlier that I ought to be content with ·54 per cent., because that would give me the total liability. Now you tell me you give me 25/44ths. If that be so, if I get that, what are South Africa, Australia and Canada getting? You want to compute my claim differently from them.

Sir Alfred Watson: In Table 2 you all get 25/44ths of your actual liability.

Mr. Montagu: Under Sir Robert Horne's alternative proposal he is keeping me to Table 2, but he is making a suggestion for combining Table 2 and Table 3 in regard to the Dominions. What proportion of their actual liabilities are they going to get?

Sir Alfred Watson: In total they will get the same as you. There will be a slight alteration as among themselves. Great Britain will suffer a loss of 3 per cent. and the other Dominions will get that 3 per cent. divided among them; India remaining the same.

Mr. Massey: What is the basis laid down in the Treaty? We seem to be talking all round the subject and are not getting any more forward.

Sir Robert Horne: The basis laid down in the Treaty is that the claim should be put forward on the basis of the French scale of pensions. That is to say, even although we are paying more, we cannot get more. That is on the French computation; that is what it provides. You get that lump sum. Some of us are paying, as you see, more than the French scale, India is paying less, the rest of us are paying

more. The suggestion has been made that we should arrive at a division as amongst ourselves, not merely upon what each of us happens to be paying out, because, as Mr. Meighen says, those who are more strictly administering their scheme are the losers.

Mr. Hughes: I do not admit that for one moment. If you are arguing on the merits of the case I withdraw my assent to the compromise.

Sir Robert Horne: I am not doing that. On the other hand, to measure on the casualty basis would be obviously wrong, as, for example, in the British case it very much exceeds Britain's liability in respect of pensions. Now, it is suggested that you should put these two things together and, by weighting them together, you should get at something which will approximate to the justice of the position.

Mr. Massey: I do not agree with it. Once you get away from the liability, you are going to get into trouble, and very serious trouble. I believe you should have a workable basis set down here in Table 1, column "C."

Sir Thomas Smartt: There is a manifest injustice to Canada there.

Mr. Massey: I believe there is an injustice to Canada there, but do not imagine I want to do any injustice to Canada.

Mr. Meighen: That is reflected again in the next table.

Mr. Massey: I think that ought to be altered.

Mr. Meighen: This feature comes in also, Sir Robert. As you know, the Royal Air Force was supplied in very exceptional degree from Canada, and that does not appear at all in our casualties; that appears in yours.

Sir Robert Horne: We are dealing with very big figures. I do not think it could touch that.

Mr. Meighen: I think it must be the difference between the 218,000 and the other. We had a great many men in that force, and also men who came from Canada who came over here and joined your forces, and who have now gone back to Canada.

Sir Robert Horne: Anybody who was in our force gets the pension from us.

Mr. Meighen: We suffered in those two respects. The Air Force enlistments and the enlistments in your army of men who were really Canadians. We suffer in both those respects; nevertheless, I would agree to the casualty basis, but I would not agree to its being weighted down by any other system of calculation as to pensions. There are those two respects in which it will be unfair. I do not like to agree for another reason. It has a certain complication about it which will make it a subject of perpetual controversy and will not be easily understood by the general public. It is not complicated to me; I understand it, but will it be generally understood? I do not think so. If we say it is divided on the basis of casualties, I think it will be accepted at that.

Mr. Massey: Irrespective of the pensions paid?

Mr. Meighen: Yes. When you took it to the peace table you took it on casualties, not on pensions.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: On the French pensions.

Mr. Hughes: Irrespective of the amount paid, then you cannot weight the pledge with anything, you must pay on the casualty basis.

Mr. Meighen: That is what I say.

Mr. Massey: The French system is not on the casualty basis, it is according to the amount paid. Supposing Canada paid twice as much in pensions as New Zealand does, do you think it would be fair for us to claim as much as you do?

Mr. Meighen: Certainly.

Mr. Massey: I don't.

Mr. Hughes: I see Mr. Massey's and Mr. Meighen's point, and I see they are both equally fatal to this compromise here.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: You keep talking of casualties as though they were synonomous with pensioners; they are not.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Canada	...	...	...	...	36
New Zealand	...	...	...	...	71
South Africa	...	...	...	...	43

Now, I am afraid if we argue for a very long time we shall hardly ever be able to arrive at something which is entirely satisfactory, but if we can get some workable scheme which would be acceptable to us, that would be the best, if it could be hoped for, and I am willing to take either the casualties or Table 1, but not Table 2 as it is now or these.

Sir Robert Horne: I would venture to support you in the view that we should take the casualties' table taken along with the table of actual liability, bringing out the figures you spoke of on this sheet, in which Canada gets 6·1 per cent., Australia 6·6 per cent., New Zealand 2·2 per cent., South Africa ·77 per cent., Great Britain 83·6 per cent. This is all, of course, on the assumption that India is taking ·54 per cent. in the total as showing her actual liability.

Mr. Montagu: How do you mean the actual liability? I do not quite follow. It is a percentage.

Sir Alfred Watson: It is India's liability reduced to the proportion of 25/44ths of India's actual capital liability.

Mr. Montagu: On the scale suggested, if India gets 25/44ths of her capital expenditure, what will South Africa get?

Sir Robert Horne: Sir Alfred Watson was talking of the conversion of the franc into rupees, from which we are all suffering. He is trying to explain to you the result of the exchange, because the matter was originally computed in francs, but in saying you are to take ·54 per cent. you will be getting on that proportion the whole of your expenditure.

Mr. Montagu: Assuming Germany pays the whole debt.

Mr. Hughes: Is this on a franc basis?

Sir Alfred Watson: Table 1 is on the franc basis. Table 2 is on the pound basis and Table 3 is on the pound basis.

Mr. Massey: What are we discussing, because it seems to me we are not getting anywhere?

Sir Robert Horne: It does not matter whether you are talking of francs or pound sterling if you are only talking of a proportion, but I do not understand what Sir Alfred is trying to tell Mr. Montagu.

Mr. Montagu: Neither do I. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told me earlier that I ought to be content with ·54 per cent., because that would give me the total liability. Now you tell me you give me 25/44ths. If that be so, if I get that, what are South Africa, Australia and Canada getting? You want to compute my claim differently from them.

Sir Alfred Watson: In Table 2 you all get 25/44ths of your actual liability.

Mr. Montagu: Under Sir Robert Horne's alternative proposal he is keeping me to Table 2, but he is making a suggestion for combining Table 2 and Table 3 in regard to the Dominions. What proportion of their actual liabilities are they going to get?

Sir Alfred Watson: In total they will get the same as you. There will be a slight alteration as among themselves. Great Britain will suffer a loss of 3 per cent. and the other Dominions will get that 3 per cent. divided among them; India remaining the same.

Mr. Massey: What is the basis laid down in the Treaty? We seem to be talking all round the subject and are not getting any more forward.

Sir Robert Horne: The basis laid down in the Treaty is that the claim should be put forward on the basis of the French scale of pensions. That is to say, even although we are paying more, we cannot get more. That is on the French computation; that is what it provides. You get that lump sum. Some of us are paying, as you see, more than the French scale, India is paying less, the rest of us are paying

more. The suggestion has been made that we should arrive at a division as amongst ourselves, not merely upon what each of us happens to be paying out, because, as Mr. Meighen says, those who are more strictly administering their scheme are the losers.

Mr. Hughes: I do not admit that for one moment. If you are arguing on the merits of the case I withdraw my assent to the compromise.

Sir Robert Horne: I am not doing that. On the other hand, to measure on the casualty basis would be obviously wrong, as, for example, in the British case it very much exceeds Britain's liability in respect of pensions. Now, it is suggested that you should put these two things together and, by weighting them together, you should get at something which will approximate to the justice of the position.

Mr. Massey: I do not agree with it. Once you get away from the liability, you are going to get into trouble, and very serious trouble. I believe you should have a workable basis set down here in Table 1, column "C."

Sir Thomas Smartt: There is a manifest injustice to Canada there.

Mr. Massey: I believe there is an injustice to Canada there, but do not imagine I want to do any injustice to Canada.

Mr. Meighen: That is reflected again in the next table.

Mr. Massey: I think that ought to be altered.

Mr. Meighen: This feature comes in also, Sir Robert. As you know, the Royal Air Force was supplied in very exceptional degree from Canada, and that does not appear at all in our casualties; that appears in yours.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62187

Mr. Montagu: There is a further political consideration I would raise from the point of view of people who are always trying to make trouble for us in India, namely, in Russia. If we proceed on our actual liability then we can face the world, but if we allow our enemies to say that we rate an Indian casualty lower than another casualty, we shall get into political difficulties which can be avoided on the liability system.

Indian Situation.

Mr. Hughes: I want to say this. I quite see the force of what has been urged in regard to India by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but I am not in favour myself —although I can see very plainly it may not be to the interests of the Dominions—I am not in favour of the amount allocated to India being on any different basis. I quite see, if it be a basis of amount paid, India may not do as well as if on the basis of casualty, I quite see that, and it might be, therefore, that we should be driven to fix upon a principle of actual amount of liability. That is a principle which, if applied to all, the Indian delegates can defend; it is the same for us as for all the others, but this compromise appears to me to disregard the effect of this upon Indian feeling. I am not in favour of having India singled out for worse treatment than any other part of the Empire. I do not come here as the champion of India, but she has signed the Treaty, she has parliamentary institutions, she has the same right to be treated on a footing of equality around this table as any other, and the same principle must apply without any exception to all of us. Although I did not see it at first, I see this compromise is open to very severe criticism by the outside world, will give ground to those people in India who are disaffected and who are all the time saying we differentiate between India and the others, it does give occasion for that censure and criticism, and I do not think it is fair, so while I prefer naturally and I think it is equitable that we should be paid according to what we actually paid, if we cannot have that we must have it on the basis of casualties. As we shall all be treated the same in either case, the same principle will apply to us, and that no doubt in Table 1 will have the effect of bringing us all down a little.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: Table 2 you are arguing for. Table 2 is casualties.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Table 2 would be fair.

Sir L. Worthington Evans: Take Table 2.

Sir Robert Horne: Table 2 is based upon the actual capital liability that each country is incurring. That is Mr. Montagu's suggestion.

Mr. Meighen: Mr. Hughes says "casualties, and put India the same as the rest." That is Table 3, with the ·54 altered, and the table altered accordingly.

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Massey wants Table 2, as I understand.

Mr. Massey: I am prepared to accept Table 2.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I will take Table 2 also. If you take the Indian casualties now, it will alter the figure very considerably, far more than people imagine.

Sir Robert Horne: I think you had far better stick to Table 2.

Mr. Meighen: I do not like to have to defend, and I do not think I can till I go into it further.

Sir Robert Horne: Table 2 is based upon the actual figures of what the pensioners are receiving, which have been forwarded to us by the Canadian officers.

Mr. Meighen: I do not think they are calculated the same. If it is revised, I think our scale is the highest, but there has been a different method adopted with regard to the capitalised liability.

Sir Robert Horne: We will decide upon the principle, and if there is a difference in the figures to be presented, that will have to be gone into.

Mr. Meighen: I will try to meet you, and I am anxious to do so, but I do not think that Table 2 is within a long way of being fair, and before I agree, even to the principle of Table 2, I should have to think it over. I am prepared to agree to Table 3, and to give India her casualties.

Sir Robert Horne: I think you had better see how the figures work out before you say that.

C 62188

Mr. Meighen: It is not a matter of figures so much as a matter of principle. I can defend figures, but I cannot defend a wrong principle.

Sir Robert Horne: I really do come back to this. After all, what we are trying to arrive at is a proportion. You are not now deciding something which you have got to go on the platform to defend as the amount you are going to hand out to your pensioners. It has got nothing to do with that. We are only trying to arrive at a rough and ready method of distributing what we assume, or hope, may come to us.

Mr. Hughes: Which do you prefer, Sir?

Division by Capital Liability incurred by each Country.

Sir Robert Horne: I must say it seems to me, so far as pure equity is concerned, the best way to do it would be by Table 2, by the capital liability which each country has incurred. I think that fits the situation myself.

Mr. Massey: I quite agree with the principle.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: It is the only one that fits in.

Sir Thomas Smartt: For everything they are paying out in pensions, they are receiving a proportionate share on the basis of the capitalisation.

Mr. Massey: I agree so far as the principle is concerned. I am losing a little by it, but I do not mind.

Mr. Meighen: I will not agree to that now.

Mr. Hughes: That is the same principle applied to us all, India, and everybody else?

Sir Robert Horne: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: All I have to say is this. I want to get a decision of some sort. It is understood, I assume, that in regard to the percentages set out in the third column, and the figures of capital value, &c., set out in the second column, we shall have an opportunity of going into those?

Sir Robert Horne: Certainly.

Mr. Hughes: In order to ascertain what in fact is the amount paid or claimed by each Dominion under each category, and correcting it if necessary.

Sir Robert Horne: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: I do not pretend that this is satisfactory to us, but I am prepared to accept anything that rests on a foundation of equity, and that has some relation to facts—actual expenditure. We can defend such a basis of agreement. The world can cast no stones at you if you do that. The Empire as a whole will be in an unassailable position. If the different parts of the Empire say: "We pay this out on the basis of what we have expended for this particular purpose, and on the understanding that India is to be treated as every other part of the Empire, and that we have a right to review these figures," I will agree.

Mr. Massey: I think we all agree. May I say that we have never been supplied with details, at least I have not. I mentioned the reason at the Conference the other day, that I was on board ship, and probably Mr. Hughes was on board ship, when these matters were arranged. I do not know now what the terms of payment were so far as Germany is concerned, that is to say, how many years it is spread over, or the shape the payment will take, whether bonds or gold.

Sir Thomas Smartt: You can get all that out of the papers you have received, the details of the 6,300,000,000*l.*, and the forty-two yearly payments.

Mr. Massey: That has not come to me.

Sir Robert Horne: I should be delighted, Mr. Massey, if you have not got such a document, to have it sent to you.

Mr. Massey: I think it probably went to New Zealand.

Mr. Hughes: I asked Mr. Lloyd George the other day, and he said there was a paper coming, but I have not seen it.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: It is a Foreign Office paper, and it has been circulated.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Massey: I think Mr. Hughes's copy went to Australia, and mine to New Zealand.

Mr. Hughes: I think this is a fair question, and surely it is capable of being answered—What are we going to get this year and next year?

Sir Thomas Smartt: Germany had paid 50,000,000*l* in gold already, or the equivalent.

Mr. Hughes: How much are we going to get out of that?

Sir Robert Horne: Of course it has not been paid in cash. A considerable amount has been paid in Bills, which will only mature on the 1st September. 12,000,000*l*. have been paid actually in gold.

Sir Thomas Smartt: The total is 50,000,000*l*.

Actual present payment by Germany.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: And that constitutes the first year's interest payment on the bonds. You do not touch it as cash except as dividends upon bonds.

Sir Robert Horne: There is a considerable number of priorities upon that. In the first place, the armies of occupation have to be paid for. That is one of the things we have to deal with.

Mr. Massey: And what "occupation" means.

Sir Robert Horne: That is a question we are going to discuss here. The Belgians have priority for certain claims of theirs. As you know, they were put before all the others, so that altogether I do not think there is going to be very much to divide this year, but we shall see.

Mr. Hughes: Then it is an academic question.

Mr. Meighen: We shall have to meet again upon this matter.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: Could we not take the question of the army of occupation now?

Mr. Montagu: What is the decision? Is it that the principle of Table 2 is accepted subject to an examination of figures?

Mr. Meighen: I have never said that I accept it, and I certainly will not. I look at Table 3 and even with those figures, which are not the same as ours, but assuming they are right, if I say to my Parliament: "Yes, our casualties are almost four times those of New Zealand, but they get practically twice the reparation." I cannot defend that. Furthermore, I cannot defend the principle that a country should have the right itself to decide what proportion of reparation it gets. The matter of calculation comes in. The methods of calculating these capitalised liabilities come in. The policy of the country comes in, and, as between ourselves, the individual policy of a country should have no weight whatever, not the least. I am ready to take casualties and have any correction made so that they will be, as nearly as we can get at it, calculated the same, but I will not agree to anything else at the present time.

Sir Thomas Smartt: The War Office will tell you that to compute casualties on the basis of men who went under with malarial disease, which is worse than some wounds, is impossible at the present moment without a total readjustment.

Sir L. Worthington-Evans: Casualties do not represent any fixed financial liability.

Mr. Hughes: Shall we have to meet again on this matter?

Sir Robert Horne: It is perfectly obvious that we must. If one member of the Conference says he cannot agree, then we must have another meeting.

Mr. Massey: I think there must be some inaccuracy so far as Canada is concerned, and that it ought to be adjusted and put right. What Mr. Meighen has said makes it perfectly impossible for me to agree to casualties. That is absolutely certain. I must stick to liabilities.

Sir Robert Horne: Let me say again, Mr. Meighen, that I do not think the point is quite appreciated. What we are doing here is not to say to any one of us or to the nation we belong to: "Now you have been looked at from this point of view with regard to the sufferings of your men." That is not the kind of point we are

trying to defend on platforms. There is a certain amount—let us assume it is 1,400,000,000*l*.—to be divided in reparations, not merely in respect of pensions, but in respect of other claims—separation allowances, shipping losses, armies of occupation. In the end, while we are trying at this moment to arrive at a proportion for pensions, the ultimate proportion will be made on separation allowances, shipping losses and all the other things, so that when you say to your people: "We are going to get a certain proportion out of the 22 per cent. that is awarded to the whole Empire," that is for all our losses. It is not only for pensions, because we have at the moment to discuss each of them separately in order to arrive at the final percentage. But we are not going out into the world saying: "We have got so much for pensions, so much for separation allowances, so much for shipping losses" and all the rest. It is not so. In the end we are getting a certain proportion for all the obligations with which we are concerned.

Mr. Hughes: That rests on the actual losses under the various categories.

Sir Robert Horne: Yes, quite.

Mr. Hughes: As established by the facts.

Sir Robert Horne: Yes, quite. You have got to make it up from these various things. I do not anticipate, as far as I am concerned, I shall be taking anything more. In the whole of these reparations we allocate our amounts so much to Canada, Australia, and so much to the United States of America, and they each get such proportion, but that is for everything.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Sir Robert Horne: That is how it will come out.

Mr. Hughes: May I ask you this? Are we going to have another meeting?

Sir Robert Horne: Yes, we must have another meeting, and I will have to arrange that with the Secretary.

Sir Thomas Smartt: We have other meetings, and to-day we have a meeting on communications.

Mr. Hughes: I cannot go back to Australia unless I know something quite definite. We have to know that.

Sir Robert Horne: I shall have to see Sir Maurice Hankey before arranging the next meeting, but we will take it on Friday.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*1, *July* 6, 1921.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62191

APPENDIX

SECRET.

E. 26.

Report by the Government Actuary on the apportionment amongst the Component Parts of the Empire of the Receipts from Germany under the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in respect of Pensions and Separation Allowances.

Preliminary Considerations.

The total claim of the British Empire for Reparation under the Treaty of Versailles, comprising: (1) Pensions; (2) Separation Allowances; (3) Damage to Property (non-maritime); (4) Shipping Losses; (5) Damage to Civil Persons; was presented under these five categories for the Empire as a unit. The several amounts were given in the British Delegate's Report of the 18th May, 1921, as:—

—	Gold Marks (Millions).	Percentage of Total Claim.
Pensions	19,007	58·14
Separation allowances	3,930	12·02
Damage to property (non-maritime)	445	1·36
Shipping losses	8,985	27·48
Damage to civil persons	327	1·00
Total	32,694	100·00

The proportions in which these five items enter into the claims of the several component parts of the Empire vary considerably It is accordingly recommended that the British Empire's share of the reparation receipts (22 per cent. under the Spa Agreement) should be divided in the above proportions into the sums due under each category before proceeding to sub-divide the payments separately amongst the United Kingdom, the Dominions, minor Colonies and India. The present report deals with this sub-division in respect of the items, Pensions and Separation Allowances.

I.—*Pensions.*

1. The claim submitted to the Reparation Commission in respect of military pensions totalled 42,670,000,000 fr. for the British Empire; and the sum included for this item in the total Allied claim as communicated to Germany was 19,007,000,000 gold marks.

2. This sum was arrived at by estimating the claim, in francs, on the French scale of pensions for the United Kingdom and for each other part of the British Empire, and the claim as presented represents the addition of the sums found by these separate estimates. If, therefore, the estimates were all based on data of the same kind and all were vested with the same authority it would be sufficient to propose that the sums recovered from Germany and allocated to pensions should be divided among the several parts of the Empire in the proportions in which their estimated claims enter respectively into the total of 19,007,000,000 gold marks. This, however, is not the position. While fairly full data were available in respect of the United Kingdom at the time when it was necessary to make the calculations in order to be ready with the claim on the final date (the 12th February, 1921) less complete information was to hand in respect of several of the Dominions and in the case of Canada the full particulars required were not received until the end of April. In these circumstances it was necessary to have resort to approximate methods of calculation in respect of the Dominions using such general materials as was available for the purpose. As the full data from the Dominions have come to hand a complete valuation has been made in each case based as far as possible upon the experience of the Dominion concerned. The result of this full valuation is to show that in total the estimates submitted to the Reparation Commission were very closely approximate to the true position. When, however, the total is separated into its component parts rather considerable differences reveal themselves, the claim for

C 62192

Canada being materially reduced, while those for Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are correspondingly increased. The reason for this seems to lie in the differences between the respective methods of pension administration. Although Canada has experienced as heavy losses as Australia by deaths and in the numbers of wounded, as shown in the official casualty returns, the number of pensions awarded in Canada is much smaller than in Australia; and, furthermore, in the case of disabled men, the average rating of the degree of disability in Canada is approximately only one-half that obtaining in Australia. (See Annex.)

3. This consideration suggests that the details of the original estimates would not supply a satisfactory basis for the apportionment of the sums to be recovered.

4. In the case of India, the figures need adjustment for another reason. As against Germany, the claim for the Indian native troops was rightly based on the French (European) scales, as was also the claim of France in respect of the strictly corresponding class. The provision actually made by the Indian Government for its native troops is, however, very small in comparison with the French (European) scales, and to use the proportion in which India was represented in the claim as the basis of apportionment to India as against the other parts of the Empire would have the effect of allocating to India not merely a wholly disproportionate share of the sum recovered, but, on the basis of the obligations now accepted by Germany, an amount considerably exceeding the total liability incurred by India in respect of pensions and corresponding allowances. It is submitted, therefore, that whatever general basis of apportionment be adopted the case of India must be specially dealt with, having regard to the great difference between her monetary obligations in respect of pensions, &c., and those of the other parts of the British Empire.

5. As a matter of information, though for the reasons given above this basis is not recommended for adoption, Column A of the following table is given as showing the proportionate extent to which the claim in respect of each part of the Empire entered into the total as presented to Germany. Column B shows the apportionment as it would have stood if the full facts now at hand had been available when the claim was prepared. As indicated in paragraph 2 above, the total amount of the claims is unaffected by the substitution of Column B for Column A; the question at issue is simply one of apportionment. Column C gives the same apportionment as Column B, save that the proportion allotted to India is reduced to the figure appropriate to the actual conditions of the Indian pension scales as lately revised, the rupee being taken at 1*s.* 4*d.* Subject to this adjustment, the allocation in Column C is strictly in accordance with the basis of the claim laid down by the Treaty.

TABLE 1.

—	Column A.	Column B.	Column C.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
United Kingdom	81·25	81·68	84·56
Minor colonies	·03	·03	·03
Canada	6·22	3·13	3·24
Australia	6·30	7·57	7·84
New Zealand	1·60	2·68	2·78
South Africa	·60	·87	·90
Newfoundland	·09	·11	·11
India	3·91	3·93	·54
Total	100·00	100·00	100·00

6. It may perhaps be considered that the Treaty basis of the aggregate claim of the British Empire does not supply a suitable basis for the apportionment of the amounts recovered, since it fails to give effect to the differences between the scales of pensions, &c., in force in the various parts of the Empire and allows nothing for differences of exchange. It has appeared desirable, therefore, to make a further investigation, bringing these factors into account, and the apportionment resulting from this calculation is shown in Table 2.

7. It should be mentioned that the adjustment for exchange is only important in the case of Canada, Newfoundland and India. In the case of Canada and Newfoundland the present rate of exchange is used as the conversion factor, and in the case of India the rupee is again taken at 1*s.* 4*d.* The whole question of exchange is one of great difficulty in view of the fact that the liabilities under consideration as well

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62193

as the amounts to be recovered represent payments extending over a long future period.

8. The apportionment shown in Table 2 is based upon the capitalised liability for pensions, &c., of each part of the British Empire as governed by its own scales and administrative methods. This liability has been actuarially ascertained for the present purpose and with the nearest possible approach to exactitude; it is adjusted where necessary to bring all the items on to the common basis of the British pound at the current rate of exchange, but otherwise exhibits directly the liability undertaken. It is thought that the actual figures brought out by the valuation will be of interest to the several Governments concerned, and these are accordingly included in the table.

TABLE 2.

—	Capital Value of Pensions, &c.*	Percentage of the Total.
	£	
United Kingdom	1,371,244,000	84·95
Minor colonies	537,000	·03
Canada	82,303,000	5·10
Australia	96,000,000	5·95
New Zealand..	39,933,000	2·47
South Africa..	13,319,000	·82
Newfoundland	2,184,000	·14
India	8,643,000	·54
Total	1,614,163,000	100·00

* These amounts do not include certain minor items, not appreciably affecting the totals, the values of which it was found impracticable to assess.

9. If it be determined that the apportionment should be governed by the relative money burden of pensions, &c., in the several communities concerned, the basis of apportionment provided by Table 2 is, it is believed, the most precise that is attainable, regard being had to the many and, to some extent, uncertain factors involved. Arguments in support of the adjusted Treaty basis (Table 1, Column C) as against this alternative basis may acquire strength from the fact that the assessed liability of each part of the Empire on which Table 2 is based is the result of the independent action of the Government responsible, exercised with reference solely to the circumstances of its own people and its own economic conditions. In view of the criticisms to which any strictly financial basis appears to be open it may be useful if a basis of a different kind be submitted. Such a basis might be found, it is suggested, in the relative military efforts of the several communities as expressed, for example, by their casualties (deaths and wounded). Such a basis as this would be wholly free of complication, and while ignoring such considerations as the higher rates of pensions and allowances in certain of the Dominions as compared with the United Kingdom would disregard such a considerable factor operating in the contrary direction as the difference between the proportions of widows to death in the several parts of the Empire. An apportionment by the numbers of casualties (as supplied by the War Office), modified, however, to secure to India and the minor colonies the capital amounts indicated by the previous apportionments, results as follows:—

TABLE 3.

—	Casualties.	Percentage of Total Sum Apportioned.
United Kingdom	2,391,167	82·25
Minor colonies	(Otherwise calculated)	·03
Canada	206,622	7·11
Australia	211,102	7·26
New Zealand..	56,903	1·96
South Africa..	21,068	·72
Newfoundland	3,715	·13
India	(Otherwise calculated)	·54
Total	..	100·00

C 62194

II.—*Separation Allowances.*

10. The sum included for the British Empire in respect of this item in the Allied claim, as submitted to Germany, was 3,930 millions of gold marks.

11. It is understood from the War Office that this sum was arrived at by applying the average daily French rate of allowances per man to the actual average number of troops (effective strength of the United Kingdom in each year, together with the estimated average number of Dominion effectives). Owing to the absence of Dominion statistics at the date when the claim was prepared the estimate of the number of Dominion troops was necessarily only approximate. Further, the claim made no allowance for the variations in the family condition of the troops of the several parts of the Empire, the proportion of married men amongst the United Kingdom forces being approximately twice as great as that obtaining for certain of the Dominions. As regards India, a claim was admitted based on the daily rate allowed to those French troops corresponding to Indian native troops, the fact that native troops do not receive separation allowances does not, of course, affect the claim under the Treaty. Although the sum of 128,997,023 francs was claimed on behalf of India in respect of separation allowances, the only sum charged to India revenues during the war on this account was £33,800, which was the sum disbursed up to the 10th January, 1920. As shown in paragraph 4, in discussing the apportionment of the pensions receipts, to use the proportion in which India is represented in the separation allowance claim as the basis of apportionment, would allocate to India a wholly disproportionate amount, and one far exceeding the liability incurred by India.

12. Although not recommending for adoption as a basis of apportionment, the following table shows the proportionate share of each part of the Empire in the total Empire claim for separation allowances as actually presented. No sum was actually included in the claim in respect of the minor Colonies, and the proportion allocated to the United Kingdom has been reduced to provide the share of the minor Colonies:—

TABLE 4.

United Kingdom	85·36
Minor Colonies	·04
Canada	6·64
Australia	4·72
New Zealand	1·19
South Africa	·27
Newfoundland	·08
India	1·70
	100·00

13. The proportions appearing in Table 4 would have a stronger claim to consideration as a suitable basis if the disproportionate sum adopted for India were adjusted to bring it into relation with the facts above indicated. Accordingly, Table 5 has been prepared showing the share of each part of the Empire on this basis.

TABLE 5.

United Kingdom	86·82
Minor Colonies	·04
Canada	6·75
Australia	4·80
New Zealand	1·21
South Africa	·28
Newfoundland	·09
India	01
	100·00

14. Tables 4 and 5, however, fail to take into account certain considerations which will probably be deemed both relevant and important in fixing the basis of allocation. They make no allowance for the different scales of allowances obtaining

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

in different parts of the Empire, nor for the differences of exchange which exist: and, as has been already indicated, they fail to give effect to the very significant differences in the proportion of married men in the forces of the several parts of the Empire. Table 6 has accordingly been prepared on the basis of the actual disbursements in separation allowances of the several parts of the Empire as supplied by the Governments concerned. In the case of Canada and Newfoundland, the actual disbursements have been converted into British pounds at current rates of exchange: as regards the other Dominions, this adjustment is regarded as unnecessary, as their currency stands practically at par with British currency.

Table 6 therefore indicates as nearly as may be the comparative weight of the separation allowance liabilities met by each part of the Empire, in its independent estimate of its own economic condition throughout the period of the war.

TABLE 6.

—	Amount.	Percentage of total claim for Separation Allowances.
	£	
United Kingdom	412,458,000	91·85
Minor colonies	175,000	·04
Canada	25,555,000	5·69
Australia	6,690,000	1·49
New Zealand	3,138,000	·70
South Africa	886,000	·20
Newfoundland	98,000	·02
India	34,000	·01
Total .. .	£449,034,000	100·00

Annex.

SHOWING for each part of the Empire—

(i.) The number of casualties up to December 31, 1919;
(ii.) The number of pensioners in principal classes (where available);
(iii.) The average degree of disability amongst disabled men at date of award of pension (where available).

—	Casualties (all Ranks) to Dec. 31, 1919.				Numbers of Pensioners (all Ranks).			Average degree of Disability as at Date of Award.
	Number killed.	Number Wounded.	Colonial Naval Casualties (killed and wounded).	Total.	Disabled Men.	Widows.	Dependants of Deceased Men.	
								Per cent.
United Kingdom (including Navy)	717,404	1,673,763	..	2,391,167	1,182,000	230,321	381,512	50·0
Australia	58,146	152,171	785	211,102	95,255	9,752	29,181	67·6
Canada	56,399	149,732	491	206,622	52,981	11,535	8,105	36·6
India	53,786	63,657	..	117,443	..	..	..	..
Minor Colonies ..	497	810	..	1,307	..	..	..	..
Newfoundland ..	1,204	2,314	197	3,715	1,662	86	230	56·8
New Zealand	16,136	40,749	18	56,903	34,323	1,896	5,911	71·0
South Africa	8,709	12,359	..	21,068	15,377	1,557	2,819	43·4

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SECRET.

E (R). 2nd Meeting.

2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA, HELD IN THE BOARD ROOM, TREASURY, ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1921, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. Sir ROBERT HORNE, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. A. MEIGHEN, K.C., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. M. HUGHES, K.C., Prime Minister of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Hon. Sir THOMAS SMARTT, K.C.M.G., Minister of Agriculture, Union of South Africa.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The following were also present:

Mr. G. H. MITCHELL, Canadian High Commissioner's Office.

Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. A. L. SAUNDERS, C.S.I., Financial Department, India Office.

Mr. P. J. GRIGG, Treasury.

Sir B. P. BLACKETT, K.C.B., Controller of Finance, Treasury.

Mr. H. E. FASS, Treasury.

Sir ALFRED WATSON, K.C.B., Government Actuary.

Mr. R. W. STURGEON, Government Actuary's Department.

Sir VICTOR WARRENDER, Treasury.

Mr. H. B. JENKINS, Reparations Department, Board of Trade.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Colonel S. H. WILSON, C.B., C.M.G.

Mr. R. B. HOWORTH.

South Africa.

Mr. G. BREBNER.

Australia.

Mr. M. O. SHEPHERD.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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SECRET.

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His Highness the MAHARAO OF CUTCH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

The following were also present:

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Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office.

Mr. A. L. SAUNDERS, C.S.I., Financial Department, India Office.

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Mr. G. BREBNER.

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Mr. M. O. SHEPHERD.

India.

Mr. G. S. BAJPAI.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62197

Reparations.

Sir Robert Horne: I think I might possibly make a suggestion which we could discuss, and then we might see what Mr. Meighen thinks about it when he arrives.

It is impossible to get at any scientific valuation of the proper method of distribution of reparations. I am perfectly certain of that. One has only to remember what it is we are attempting to divide. We are proposing to distribute the 22 per cent. of German indemnities that comes to Britain—when I say Britain I mean the British Empire, of course. That 22 per cent. is the roughest possible figure. It was not arrived at upon any really scientific basis or any meticulous calculations.

Mr. Massey: It is not supposed to be quite accurate.

Sir Robert Horne: It cannot be accurate; it is impossible that it should be. The division is, France gets 52 per cent. as against Britain's 22 per cent., and nobody suggests seriously that that is an accurate estimate of the extent to which each of the two countries should be indemnified. Accordingly I do not think that we ought to attempt here to arrive at anything which is accurate. All we can do is to take a rough axe and divide as nearly as we can, looking at the thing from a general point of view.

Suggested method of distribution of the Empire's Reparation Receipts.

I do not know whether this suggestion will meet with your acceptance, that, instead of going into each of these items separately, we should attempt to arrive at something that on the whole would give a more or less convenient distribution of the 22 per cent. of reparations which comes to the British Empire.

(At this point a document headed "Distribution of British Empire Reparation Receipts," was handed round. Appendix.)

I do not know whether you have also before you the larger table which shows the amount for each of these items taken separately, which is headed "Reparation Receipts under the Treaty of Versailles."* If you look at the larger document you will see that under each item there is a certain percentage given to each of the portions of the British Empire, and in the final column there is a table which gives the following totals: United Kingdom 88·16 per cent., the minor Colonies ·77 per cent., Canada 3·88 per cent., Australia 4·04 per cent., New Zealand 1·57 per cent., South Africa ·55 per cent., Newfoundland ·10 per cent. and India ·93 per cent. making in all 100.

The smaller document which I have now circulated makes a readjustment of that not upon any basis at all, but making a readjustment of the figures so as perhaps to make the distribution more plausible and to arrive at some kind of rough method of treating the matter. By this method the percentage of the United Kingdom is slightly reduced, with the effect of bringing up Canada and the minor Colonies, and New Zealand and South Africa, Australia losing a very small percentage. You can see that the result is to bring Canada and Australia to the same share of the reparation money, New Zealand getting rather less than half of either of them, and South Africa between one-sixth and one-seventh. What I venture to suggest is, that we might look on this matter in the rough and might discuss whether, on the whole, we cannot say, taking it in the rough, that Canada and Australia should get about the same share, and New Zealand a little less than half of either of them. If we can agree upon that in a general way, it seems to me that we should be getting much nearer to an end of this discussion. If we discuss the matter as we did the last time we were here, we shall be sitting here for ever, and never get through it. I do not know first of all whether this method of dealing with the matter will commend itself to this Committee or not; and in the second place, whether the figures more or less will be accepted. What do you think of this plan of dealing with it, Mr. Hughes?

View of Australia.

Mr. Hughes: The more I go into the matter, the more am I bewildered by the manner in which the totals have been arrived at. I am referring now not to the rough estimates which you spoke of as having been arrived at by considering what would be, on the face of it, a plausible division—to use your own phrase. I am speaking of these other schedules which are set out under the various tables.

Sir Robert Horne: You mean the tables we dealt with on the last day?

Mr. Hughes: Yes. There are five of them, I think. I stated, when we were discussing this matter last, that I should like to have an opportunity to look into

* Paper No. E 27.

C 62198

Reparations.

Difficulty of obtaining accurate basis of calculation.

the figures upon which these calculations were based. I am bound to say that I have not been able to get everything that I could desire, but I have received some information both in respect of pensions, separation allowances and casualties, which were the two bases upon which we were to settle the matter, or which were presented for consideration. In both of those I see that inaccuracies have crept in, so that any calculation based upon the figures supplied will afford us no opportunity for comparing the proper and just claims of each Dominion. I do not propose now to address myself to any one of these suggested bases of settlement—pensions and separation allowances on the one hand and casualties on the other. I merely wish to say that the figures that I have received show that the calculations if dependent upon those figures would not give the percentages set out opposite Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Therefore I have to consider what has to be done. You will readily understand, Sir, as the function of your office is concerned with money, that notwithstanding what may be said about the importance of other things, that it is upon the wings of finance that nations move, and if they are to avoid the bumps and the débris of this solid earth they must have money to rise into the upper air. We cannot agree to any division that does not take into proper and strict account the circumstances of the various Dominions, and of Australia in particular, of course.

Referring to Table 1, and to the three lines in the memorandum which immediately precede it, I desire to call your attention to the fact that we are told in this official memorandum (E 26), presented to us for consideration, that, subject to this adjustment—meaning thereby the adjustment of the rupee to the rate of exchange—the allocation in Column C on Table 1 is strictly in accordance with the basis of the claim laid down by the Treaty. Under that Australia is allotted 7·84 per cent., Canada 3·24 per cent., New Zealand 2·78 per cent. and India ·54 per cent. In Column B, Australia is offered 7·57 per cent., Canada 3·13 per cent. and India 3·93 per cent. Strictly speaking, and if we are to stand by the letter of the bond, we are told that it is Column C of Table 1 to which we must have regard. I express my willingness, and indeed my desire, to see India treated on the same basis as other parts of the Empire, and, although I say this without prejudice, I am prepared to accept Column B, but I am not prepared to do so without a further examination of the figures, which I believe will show that Australia is entitled to a still higher percentage than that. Certainly, if we look at the casualties it is obvious that no fair basis of calculation is offered because Canada has included in her calculations of casualties those involving under a disability of 20 per cent. 72 per cent. of her total casualties are under 22 per cent., while only 1·66 per cent. of Australian casualties are under 20 per cent. It is obvious that with such a wide disparity it is impossible to have any basis upon which you can make a comparison.

Divergence in method of calculating Casualties.

Sir Robert Horne: That is obviously because the Canadian Medical Boards and the Australian Medical Boards must have operated upon entirely different estimates of disability.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, but if you are going to take casualties you must have a uniform method, and I submit the method should be disability resting upon a common basis. If you are going to say that Canada's disability includes 46 per cent. who are under 10 per cent. of disability, and a further 26 per cent. under 20 per cent., then 70 per cent. of casualties included by Canada are excluded from the Australian figures. Very well, if you do include these, and we have as much right to do so as any other part of the Empire, if you are to base it upon justice and estimate the loss to a country like Australia upon the disability of its fighting men, we must include those, and there must be added to Australia's casualties an additional 70 per cent. to adjust our figures to the Canadian denomination.

It is an impossible thing to suppose there can be this difference, unless one Dominion's battle casualties were received at a safe distance in the rear, while the other did the fighting at the front. This could not have happened, and the whole thing, as you say, arises from the different methods adopted by the Pensions Boards. I submit that ours is the more equitable; when a man is not injured beyond 20 per cent. regard must not be had to it. And in the circumstances therefore I stand on column "C," or at any rate on column "B" of Table 1. I shall be prepared to go into figures as far as I have them, but I might point out that the money Canada spent on pensions, &c., last year was £13,000,000, while we spent £22,000,000. The separation allowances and pensions for the year amount to £8,299,000 for Australia

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

and £1,113,000 for New Zealand, but looking into the percentage for the two Dominions we see that these give Australia as 7 per cent. to 2 per cent. for New Zealand, but the actual figures show at least 5 to 1 is as 6 is to 1. I have no option but to stand by column "B." I want to do justice to India with a right to examine the figures and to adjust them in such a way as to enable the actuaries to arrive at a basis calculated on the monies actually paid. In addition to the figures I have quoted, we paid nearly £7,000,000 for repatriation, monies which are not recoverable. But I have left this large item out entirely. I do not press them.

View of New Zealand.

Mr. Massey: I am afraid, Sir Robert Horne, that we are not getting much closer to an understanding or settlement of the difficulty that appears to have arisen. So far as I am concerned I am pressing no claim on behalf of New Zealand for land settlement, for homes for soldiers or anything else except the actual payments by way of pensions and separation allowances. I do not know that I have had sufficient time to go into all the figures submitted to us, but the other day, when we met, the column that appealed to me was the column mentioned just now by Mr. Hughes—column "C" on Table 1. If we are not agreed upon the basis upon which the calculation ought to be made I do not think we shall be very far out because then it would be a matter for the actuaries. It appears to me that there are three methods of calculation (1) on the Treaty basis. I am prepared to stand upon that; I am prepared to accept that and leave it to the actuaries to say what will be the amount coming to New Zealand. If there is any objection to that I fall back on the liability. Personally, I do not know of any fairer; I believe the Treaty basis will give New Zealand a little more than we should receive if paid on the actual liability, and I cannot think of any fairer way. The other suggestion that has been put forward is that the payment shall be made in proportion to the casualties. I think that would be absolutely unfair. I think it would probably work out very unfairly, and consequently would not give satisfaction in our country or in Australia, whatever the case may be for Canada, and of that I cannot speak. I come back to where I started, and I do not think I shall be able to get away from this; I prefer payment on the Treaty basis, the basis laid down in the Peace Treaty and which was intended should be a guide to us in arriving at the amount which should be forthcoming, and the proper allocation of it.

The Treaty Basis preferred.

View of South Africa.

Sir Thomas Smartt: We discussed that the other day, and I think we arrived at one main conclusion, that whatever the distribution of amount might be no State should certainly get more than the absolute amount they paid. In that case, column "B" of Mr. Hughes would come out entirely wrong because I understand, no matter what column you take, on the basis of the Indian pensions, and realising the difference in the value of money to the recipients of those pensions, India would work out on either of those calculations at about ·54. As far as we in South Africa are concerned I do not wish to press the point; I think we should have had a statement from the War Office as to what is included in casualties. I think perhaps malarial fever is perhaps one of the heaviest causes of casualty within the Union, and this is not included in casualties. A large number of our men were for a long time in the East African campaign, and we are paying the largest amount of pensions to these men, a larger amount than is being paid to those who fought in France with the Brigade. I think there was a suggestion the other day that we might have taken the capitalised value of the pensions and the casualties adding them together and dividing them. Why that appealed to me was, without knowing the circumstances of the manner in which these figures were arrived at, it seemed manifestly unfair to Canada in that first Table that she should get such a small amount when she put such a large number of men into the field, and had such a large capitalised pension account and a large casualty account. There must be something wrong in Table 1. If you look at columns A, B and C you will see that Canada has 3·13 and 3·24, Australia 7·57 and 7·34, and New Zealand 2·58 and 2·78, and South Africa ·90. Whether it is worth while raising the question of how a casualty is arrived at now I do not know. I think we should certainly arrive at a common agreement; we shall be working on this for ages and never reach a conclusion. I am willing to do any adjustment which is fair.

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Massey, would you be willing to accept what Sir Thomas Smartt suggests—capitalised pensions?

Mr. Massey: No, I will not accept that. I will accept the Treaty basis or the Liability basis; either would suit me.

Reparations.

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Hughes, would you be content to accept the capitalised liability basis in each country?

Mr. Hughes: Capitalised value of the pension?

Sir Thomas Smartt: I take it that we are dealing with pension alone in this table.

Sir Robert Horne: At this moment we are.

Mr. Hughes: I do not know that I can say what that means.

Sir Robert Horne: It means this, accumulating the whole of your liability for pensions; it would be capitalised at £96,000,000.

Mr. Hughes: But why on our old scale of pensions?

Sir Robert Horne: It is on the latest scale that the Australian Commonwealth furnished to the Government.

Mr. Hughes: I happen to know it was based on the old scale.

Sir Robert Horne: Supposing we adopted the principle suggested, subject to correction of the figures.

Mr. Hughes: I shall be willing to consider that, but I must have a little time to consider the matter. I do not know where it leads me; if I were only speaking for myself it would not matter, but I am speaking for a country.

View of Canada.

Mr. Meighen: I have thought it out. I do not see how you can, for this reason. I explained the difficult case that Canada is in if they give their pension scheme and that is capitalised out, but the fact is we are paying practically double that scale, but we do not say we are going to do it permanently; we have allowed one bonus on the pension, then another, then another; in fact, we have three of them. The gross pension is practically double what our scale is. We had a Committee this session, a joint Committee from all sides of the House, to see if we should take off one of these bonuses this year. We decided not to; next year we may take it off, or the year after, or we may take none of them off. How can you capitalise pensions? If we have a system of commutation, one country will have one system of commutation and another country another system. We give a man the option of taking so much money if he is within a certain percentage of casualty, which saves the country a great deal and the man gets the benefit.

Mr. Massey: It is the capitalised value of the pension?

Mr. Meighen: No, it is less, and it would depend on how the money had been applied as to how it would total up in the capitalisation. Then, coming to the sphere of re-establishment. I do not think you can capitalise this in Canada. Although I gave two reasons which seemed to be conclusive, but getting on to re-establishment we have all manner of systems there. We have a system of bonuses while they are at work.

Mr. Massey: I am making no claim as to re-establishment.

Sir Robert Horne: Nobody is including these things.

Mr. Meighen: I know that, but you cannot help it if you are going to try and compare these things, because it depends on what you do in this respect how your liability totals up.

Sir Robert Horne: I would like to say this again: we are not trying to get scientific division, and this is only one item in a series of items involving a percentage at the end as to how we should divide out over the different parts of the Empire.

Mr. Meighen: We shall be a 100 per cent. out in pensions. Yes, because our capitalised value will be just 100 per cent. of what we may claim. I do not see anything to do except that it may be this. You can take the casualties. That is satisfactory. I know there is an objection, but you could never be 100 per cent. out; you might be up to 15 per cent. out, because of the fact that the casualties in a certain class of one country might be greater in a like class with another country, and that class might be the heaviest in point of liability.

Mr. Massey: Taking casualties, a country might receive a great deal more than it pays.

Mr. Meighen: You might have to make a correction on that. Anyway, you could cut it out; or you could get Australia and Canada alike, and if the other people

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

agree it would be satisfactory. That would appeal to our country as right, or you might take casualties, and you might take a certain scale of pensions and apply that same scale to the casualties in each class of all countries.

Sir Robert Horne: Well, I suggested before you came in, Mr. Meighen, that we might start upon a general principle, that practically Canada and Australia should be put on the same footing, that is to say, 4 per cent. each, and that New Zealand should take rather less than half.

Mr. Massey: To put Australia and Canada on the same footing and give New Zealand a half, but that is a rough and ready way.

A rough and ready method of division more easy to defend.

Mr. Montagu: May I say this conversation carries me back to the spring of 1919 in Paris, where we had exactly the same problem and exactly the same conversations, that is to say, to try and divide the German indemnity between the Allies. I was in this, and I had meeting after meeting with the French and the Americans for months when we were trying to arrive at a scientific basis just as we have been trying round this table; we failed, and eventually we had to get in a rough and ready method, such as Sir Robert has suggested this afternoon, as the best that we could do. Each country knew the sort of thing that its constituents would expect to get, and they gave and took, to get some colourable, but wholly rough and quite unscientific basis, and that was the origin of the final 22 per cent. I do submit, with that experience in my mind, that the suggestion of the Chancellor is worthy of a little more consideration, and I think so particularly because of the difficulty which I wholly admit on account of the country which I represent. I do not want to ask for a sum which is largely in excess of the money which we have actually spent, although, let me say in passing, that I regard our scale of pensions as shockingly low—it is so low because we could not afford more—and if we get any money in this scheme I shall do my best to see that it is used not in relief of the taxpayer, but to increase the scale of pensions, so that it comes more nearly to the Dominions scale. Therefore, we are going to be penalised for our poverty under the system of pensions. I could consent quite easily to a lump sum which I could justify as being the best that I could do in the circumstances, to come into a common scheme, but if I have got to agree to a calculation on a scientific basis then it is my duty to those whom I represent to go into all sorts of details. For instance, I understand these figures are calculated on the basis of a 1*s.* 4*d.* rupee exchange; I think that if we are not entitled to a 2*s.* rupee gold exchange, at any rate we are entitled to a 2*s.* rupee sterling exchange, which would alter the figures to our advantage. Secondly, as I suggested at the last meeting, I cannot take—if it is a scientific calculation it is so difficult for me to take a different basis calculation to the Dominions, even though it gives me more money than I am entitled to, but if it is a lump sum I can take into account those things. Your suggestion, to my mind, seems to be simpler from the point of view of India and it seems to me to give, in the light of the experience we had with the Allies, a greater chance of coming to a decision soon.

Sir Robert Horne: How does that commend itself? That we should really try to arrive at a single percentage over the whole region of pensions, separation allowances, damage to property, shipping claims, partly as to hulls and partly as to cargoes. Then outside of these things, there is another element, which is the amount to be paid for the armies of occupation.

Cost of Armies of Occupation.

Mr. Meighen: That is outside the 6,600 millions.

Sir Robert Horne: That is so. It is an extra item.

Mr. Hughes: They have to pay it?

Sir Robert Horne: They have to pay it, but it is not included in the 6,600 millions.

Mr. Hughes: That money the Belgians had, was that in addition to reparations?

Sir Robert Horne: Yes. It is part of the 6,600 millions, but it is a prior claim.

Sir Basil Blackett: The repayment of the Belgian debt, incurred during the war, is separate.

Mr. Massey: Does not that raise the question as to the armies of occupation being separate?

Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: You have raised another claim now, Sir Robert. This army of occupation calculation here gives £624,000 to New Zealand and £1,388,000 to Canada—and a thousand to us.*

Mr. Meighen: A thousand pounds?

Mr. Hughes: Yes, a thousand pounds. Of course, we are a very poor and humble people, and I a very impoverished individual, but I think I could manage that myself. It is an impossible amount. Our men, like yours, were soldiers; they obeyed orders; they went where they were sent, by the mere accident of circumstances ours were retained in France, and yours were sent to Germany. However, there it is. A soldier must go where he is told, and we had to maintain them. While you are to be recouped.

Mr. Meighen: Why were they maintained in France if they were not needed for the army of occupation?

Mr. Hughes: It was based on the number in Germany.

Mr. Meighen: Why were they not taken home?

Mr. Hughes: You cannot send 400,000 men home in a few weeks. We sent them home as quickly as possible, but of course we had to maintain them until they could be sent home. Ours were in Europe as long as yours—in fact, longer, probably—because we had to send them further. That is a charge upon us which you will escape, because you happen to be a few miles near than us, and they were sent there.

Mr. Meighen: Your suggestion is that it would apply to Britain, too?

Mr. Hughes: If it were based on the number of troops in Europe—Germany, France and Belgium—Britain would get, about I suppose, 1½ to 2 per cent. less than she gets now. That is all. You would lose, and New Zealand would lose.

Mr. Massey: I cannot afford to lose. I believe New Zealand has spent more money on returned soldiers than any other country in the Empire, not excepting the United Kingdom.

Mr. Hughes: It may be so, we have spent very much more per head than the United Kingdom. I do not admit that you spent more than Australia, but I will not enter into an argument on the matter. I say your soldiers, like ours, were under the orders of their commanders; they were sent because they were told, and it appears that the maintenance of yours is to be borne by Germany, and the maintenance of ours by Australia.

Mr. Meighen: This was communicated to the Canadian Government many months ago, *i.e.*, the position Australia takes, and a reply was sent, and from recollection, I rather think, we acceded.

Sir Robert Horne: Well, I think, if I may express a *primâ facie* view, that it does seem to me rather inequitable that the troops which were compelled to be kept on the continent, but simply did not happen to be used for the armies of occupation, that that circumstance should rob the country that sent them of using part of the reparations for the up-keep of the occupation troops. It looks to me so.

Mr. Hughes: It is not suggested for the moment that the troops in Germany were occupying a dangerous position, and I, myself, told Sir Henry Wilson that our troops were available. I told him so in a letter to which I had an answer.

Mr. Montagu: Does this include the army of occupation in Turkey?

Sir Robert Horne: No, it is only what Germany has to pay. (Passing a paper to Mr. Massey.) That is how the figures were arrived at. I do not know whether you have seen this or not.

Mr. Massey: This is the army of occupation only. I think if we could clear this question up, we could get on further.

Mr. Hughes: I think I ought to say, Sir Robert, that I am given to understand—I do not know myself—that the British Authorities are quite willing that we should be paid on this second basis, the number of troops quartered in France, Germany and Belgium.

Mr. Meighen: Because it does not affect them much.

Sir Robert Horne: It affects us only to the extent of £300,000.

* See Appendix to Paper No. E 45.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: Oh, yes, it affects them a good deal. They lose £319,000.

Sir Robert Horne: Yes. It is rather a matter for you others; we are perfectly favourable to it.

Proposal to settle on a Capitalised Basis.

Sir Thomas Smartt: As you do not seem to have any real basis upon which everybody agrees, if you were to settle the pensions first on the basis of the capitalised amounts of each State, which really you have in column 2—it is true there is a note to say there must be some little differences—I take it that is roughly the amount of the capitalised value of the pensions of the various States?

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Meighen says it is not.

Mr. Meighen: You would be 100 per cent. out.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I see with regard to Canada that the capital value of pensions is £12,300,000.

Mr. Meighen: That is fixed pensions. We pay double that in the form of bonuses.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I think all the other States do. We pay a lot of money for other things, but they are not capitalised. We capitalise the actual pensions paid under the Pensions Act, as the United Kingdom has done.

Mr. Meighen: Supposing your bonus turns out to be permanent?

Sir Thomas Smartt: If you like to do extra liberal things, each State should bear it. To most of the men who have been at the front we give two years' agricultural training, and give them 3*s.* a day during training. All soldiers have been placed on the same basis.

Mr. Meighen: But if you take pensions alone you will be 100 per cent. out. What is the use of taking the pension of one country which includes all pays, and another that only includes half that it pays.

Mr. Massey: Just look at this: here is this latest proposal by which New Zealand loses £460,000, and Mr. Hughes gains £499,000. I congratulate Mr. Hughes, but I am sorry for my country.

Mr. Hughes: You can please yourself what you do, Mr. Massey, but it is not fair to Australia that we should have £1,000 against £400,000 for New Zealand.

Cost of Armies of Occupation: Suggested Arbitration.

Mr. Massey: No, I do not think it is. I am prepared to let it go to arbitration, if we can agree upon arbitrators. We shall never settle it here. It is the most undignified squabble anyhow. I do not think the Prime Ministers should be expected to do a thing like this.

Sir Thomas Smartt: I agree that arbitration will be the best solution.

Sir Robert Horne: I tell you what I am willing to do, Mr. Massey, in order to get a settlement of this. If we can get a settlement of the army of occupation question, we can settle other matters more readily. The Imperial Government loses £318,000, which is a small proportion of the total, the total being £14,684,000. I am willing to take half of your loss, Mr. Massey.

Mr. Massey: Let us see how that will work out. It means our losing £230,000.

Sir Robert Horne: It means that you lose £230,000, yes.

Mr. Massey: I cannot justify it; that is the trouble. If it was only myself, there would not be so much difficulty, but I have to justify this to the public.

Mr. Meighen: You mean you could not justify the United Kingdom taking half your loss?

Mr. Massey: If they will take three-quarters of the loss, I will say yes.

Mr. Hughes: Your suggestion was made on the basis that Canada and Australia got the same.

Sir Robert Horne: I was coming to that afterwards. I thought we had better get this out of the way about half the cost of the army of occupation. Shall we take the army of occupation first, and then get on to that?

Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: What are we to fall back on? We must know where we are. I think we should consider the whole position. I say I am willing to consider the proposal. Mr. Meighen says he will take the basis of casualties; Mr. Massey says he will not do that. Sir Robert Horne puts forward a proposal on a different basis which gives you (Canada) 4 per cent., and I think Australia 4 per cent. What I want to ask Sir Robert now is, if we can come to an understanding amongst ourselves in regard to the Army of Occupation, where do we fall back on to casualties or Sir Robert's proposal?

Sir Robert Horne: I understand Mr. Meighen would be willing to accept an arrangement by which Canada and Australia got the same, whatever that might be.

Mr. Hughes: I will agree to that if we can get an understanding on the Army of Occupation.

Sir Robert Horne: The Army of Occupation was composed partly of British troops from the United Kingdom, partly of Australians, partly of New Zealanders, and partly of Canadians.

Mr. Massey: This is the point I want to get at; do you include troops that could not get back because of the want of shipping, and things of that sort?

Sir Robert Horne: They are not included in the armies of occupation in the strict sense, but then, on the other hand, here is Australia with a considerable body of troops in France and Belgium, and it is only a matter of accident that they do not form part of the Army of Occupation.

Mr. Massey: That is not answering my question. Were these troops left there because there was no shipping to take them away? Our men wanted to get home, but could not do so.

Mr. Hughes: If they had not stopped you would not have got this.

Sir Thomas Smartt: There were other troops as well as these that could not get back. The South African troops were delayed a considerable time. Those who had interests in shipping got their men back quickest.

Sir Robert Horne: The table I have shown you is worked on the basis of taking each portion of the Empire which had troops actually in the Army of Occupation, and taking this, they included the Imperial Government, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. South Africa had no such troops.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Our troops were in France waiting to return, but they could get no shipping.

Mr. Meighen: Then they come under the second head.

Sir Robert Horne: There are no South African troops here.

Sir P. B. Blackett: I imagine they took just those parts of the Empire which had claims on the Army of Occupation, but instead of basing their claims on the troops, they based them on their troops in Belgium, France and the Army of Occupation; and no claim was sent in from South Africa.

Mr. Massey: It is a very great pity that Ministers from overseas should be expected to do this sort of thing. It is humiliating.

Sir Robert Horne: Well, Mr. Massey, I will take three-quarters of your loss.

Mr. Massey: All right, I accept.

Mr. Hughes: I do not want to be hanging about over this; if you take three-quarters we will take one-quarter.

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Massey is content to take the one-quarter himself. We will fix up that upon that basis.

Mr. Hughes: That is £953,000, minus one-quarter of Mr. Massey's loss—that is £115,000.

Sir Robert Horne: Are you taking this quarter from me, Mr. Hughes, or from Mr. Massey?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: No; I am assuming that, readjustment having been made, you are willing to take this sum. I do not know where Canada is now.

Sir Robert Horne: Canada comes down naturally to £1,212,000.

Mr. Meighen: I do not like it. I thought the Government had agreed to that. I do not like the responsibility of taking this figure.

Sir P. B. Blackett: I understood that the Canadians were willing to agree to what is done round this table.

Sir Robert Horne: Let New Zealand bear her quarter, I will take the other three-quarters, and you the Canadian.

Mr. Meighen: No, that would not do. If you took half the Canadian, I do not know whether I should ask for that. If it is right, it is right; but I would not like to say take one-half. If, however, it is right, let it be so.

Mr. Massey: I think it would be a fair suggestion.

Mr. Meighen: Was there any extra hardship entailed in the march into Germany? Of course there might have been ructions too.

Mr. Massey: They took the risk, certainly.

Mr. Meighen: I will make it one-half; I think that will do.

Sir Robert Horne: Then take half Canada, and the United Kingdom takes three-quarters of New Zealand.

Mr. Massey: That seems fair.

Sir Robert Horne: This lets you off cheaper. You were taking £115,000. If you are taking one-half of the Canadian, you are only taking £85,000.

Mr. Hughes: That suggestion was not made to me, I did not hear that.

Mr. Meighen: I have some hesitation in accepting it. You can put it the other way; the United Kingdom give us one-half, and you take one-quarter. I shall have a little difficulty in explaining to the Canadian Parliament why New Zealand is compensated for three-quarters and Canada for none. What is the ground for the compensation? There must be some ground, or it would not have been done. I suppose there was more hardship entailed for the troops; they were on duty instead of on leave. I suppose there is some ground in that, but if there is, it applies to the others. I do not feel too secure in my ground one way or the other. I do not know whether there should be something allowed because they were on duty, or were not. That is the way it was put to us in Canada.

Mr. Hughes: Now, do you mind figuring it out at what that actually leaves us?

Sir Robert Horne: You get £950,000, less £85,000, which gives you £865,000. Perhaps it is better that the United Kingdom should take half of Canada's loss. I think it would be better that it should be done like that, than that Australia and Canada should get mixed up.

Mr. Meighen: I prefer that.

Sir Robert Horne: Half of Canada and half of New Zealand. Take half of Canada and half of New Zealand, and Australia a quarter of New Zealand.

Mr. Massey: It is the other way; the British Government take three-quarters of New Zealand's loss.

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Hughes is going to take a quarter. That is the best way, I think. You take a quarter of New Zealand, and we take a half of New Zealand and a half of Canada.

Mr. Hughes: That is the figure I said, £830,000 something.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Then you come to the question whether we come in at all in this, because I do not know. I see you dividing the bear's skin in this extraordinary manner. I do not know whether we have a claim which, I have no doubt, the Chancellor would be glad to meet.

Reparations.

Suggested basis for all remaining items.

Sir Robert Horne: Mr. Meighen asked how we arrived at these figures of distribution which are in this conglomerate table, the one which gives the 4 and the 4. New Zealand 1·6. Now, if you look at this large sheet you will get in the last column the figures upon which we have made adjustments. I tell you how we do this. Separation allowances are measured according to the amounts actually paid in separation. It is a known figure, practically speaking, as distinct from pensions. We know what we have done in separation allowances, and the United Kingdom, having more of the married people, their percentage is enormously greater than the others.

Damage to property, non-maritime, including damage to civil persons. We get the bulk of that, and I do not think there is any real question of controversy there.

Losses on Shipping. Hulls.

On shipping hulls there was a question arose practically with Canada, as between Australia and the United Kingdom, and New Zealand and South Africa and the United Kingdom there was no difficulty. The calculation is based upon the port of registry of the vessels. Canada, I think, rather questioned that principle, and maintained that it ought to be according to the domicile of the company. That gave rise to horrible difficulties, because if you take your company it is composed of people of varied races and varied climates and varied nationalities. You get, as the list of the owners of a ship, people who are all over various countries, and therefore you could not really arrive at any way——

Mr. Meighen: The shareholders, but not the company.

Sir Robert Horne: I agree, but the only ground for taking the domicile of the company is because the shareholders are the people who have got the beneficial interest but in point of fact, in a company you have the people getting the beneficial interest spread all over. If you take some of these companies that one knows of—the White Star, for instance—a great many of the people would be American.

Mr. Meighen: What are you taking?

Sir Robert Horne: The port of registry of the vessel.

Mr. Meighen: The Canadian Pacific register the vessel here. That would be your loss, not ours.

Sir Robert Horne: Certainly, if they register the vessel here, and the reason why a vessel is registered here is that then all the obligations owed by that vessel are owed by the country with which she is registered—all the obligations to the crew, &c. Suppose the crew are entitled to workmen's compensation; it is at the port of registry, for the most part, that the crew is obtained, they are collected there, and it is there that the obligation is owed to them. It means that the country that is supposed to get the compensation is the country that is under obligation to the ship and her crew. That is where the obligations lie, and that is the basis upon which we have gone, so far as shipping hulls are concerned. I ought to say this, also, that the Reparations Commission has adopted, after consideration and deliberation, the basis of the port registry. They have done that on their own, without any consultation with us.

Shipping cargoes—I think there is no difficulty about that at all. All cargoes, of course, are the property of the people with whom they arrive. That is the basis upon which the total of distribution has been arrived at.

Damage to property.

Mr. Meighen: Did you include damage to property? I see Canada is 1 per cent. Does this include the 30 million dollars loss at Halifax.

Mr. Fass: It depends upon whether it is a loss accepted by the Reparations Commission. These are the figures of the Board of Trade.

Mr. Meighen: Who set up the Reparations Commission?

Mr. Fass: They are under the Treaty of Versailles. The British representative is Sir John Bradbury.

Mr. Meighen: Who was the Canadian representative?

Sir Robert Horne: There is only one for the whole Empire.

Mr. Meighen: Does he decide between us and you?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

Mr. Fass: He did not decide. The Reparations Commission decided. They are an Allied body.

Mr. Meighen: He treated it as a war loss?

Mr. Fass: All your claims were sent to the Board of Trade, the Reparations Claims Department, and this table is merely an addition of the various claims which we sent in as falling within this Treaty and distributed again in proportion. It is mainly, of course, air raid losses and that sort of thing.

Mr. Meighen: I do not see why air raid losses——

Mr. Fass: It is only 1 per cent. of the whole total.

Mr. Meighen: Ours is nothing.

Mr. Fass: Look at the front page of the first document. It only represents 1 per cent. of the total claims. Pensions, 58 per cent.; Separation Allowances, 12 per cent. There is very little in it in any case.

Mr. Meighen: What was coming to my mind, chiefly, was this. You are only getting a part of your loss, a very small fraction in any event, but in the way you have calculated that, are not you getting the whole of that class of loss which you have suffered: Damage to Property, Shipping Hulls and so forth? You are virtually getting the whole thing.

Sir Robert Horne: What was that, again, about Halifax?

Mr. Meighen: A ship carrying T.N.T. collided with another ship. We spent about 30,000,000 dollars. Who would have argued it for us?

Mr. Fass: Sir John Bradbury.

Mr. Meighen: It would not make any difference to him.

Mr. Fass: Oh, but it was part of the British Empire.

Sir Robert Horne: For example, the "Bulwark" blew up, when lying in the Thames. We could not get anything for that.

Mr. Fass: It depends entirely whether it is within the Treaty or not.

Mr. Meighen: In adding those percentages, do not you see the effect? You are getting nearly the whole claim, whereas here we only get a fraction of it. Would it not be fairer to add the total losses in everything, the total capitalised losses in everything, and then take your percentage?

Sir Robert Horne: From an actuarial point of view, is there any difference?

Sir Alfred Watson: It comes to precisely the same thing.

Australian Shipping Losses.

Mr. Hughes: May I say a word about shipping losses? I do not want to labour the question, but you are aware of the circumstances of Australia during the war. We detached the greater part of our coastal tonnage, and I think some 250,000 to 300,000 tons of our overseas shipping, and these were handed over to the British Government for Imperial purposes. We lost nine vessels—I mean the Government—and if you take the distribution of reparation in respect of shipping on the basis of the port of registry, that would be prejudicial to our right to claim the special consideration which our circumstances demand. I want to know exactly where we stand in regard to all tonnage that we have, ex-enemy and otherwise, whether, in agreeing to this 4 per cent. which you have suggested, we can claim in addition for our shipping losses, or whether the latter are covered by the 4 per cent.

You will understand, we have claims for 300,000 tons of shipping. I do not want to labour the question, but it is of great importance to us. As you are aware, we had to sell our freights for very much less than the world's rates, and we were very severely penalised by reason of our remoteness.

If we agree to this 4 per cent. and we find there are claims unsatisfied and made by anybody—it does not matter who they are—then, I say, I shall be in a most unfortunate position. I cannot say: "This figure has been agreed upon." Supposing I am confronted with this table of 7·84—I think it is—and they say: "Why did you agree to 4 per cent. of 22 per cent. of 16,000,000,000 gold marks?"—that is what I think it is. I should reply: "Because it is the basis on which payment for the Army of Occupation was made." That is one

Reparations.

answer; but if, on the other hand, I have an unsatisfied claim, I cannot stand up in Parliament and defend it because I have agreed really to cut in half, or nearly cut in half, the Australian share of the reparation claims under Table 1, Column C, so I would like to know where we stand in regard to that.

Sir Robert Horne: So far as this matter is concerned, Mr. Hughes, it would relate solely to general compensations and entirely exclude the ships which Germany gave up.

Mr. Jenkins: They are, of course, being distributed and being allocated between the various parts of the Empire in respect to tonnage. This is the distribution of money and not of ships.

Mr. Hughes: I know.

Sir Robert Horne: This is a distribution not in regard to any particular losses, you see, because it does not meet particular losses. It is only a division of a rough figure that we have arrived at as between France, Belgium, Italy and ourselves. It is not really an assessment of compensation—not really. When we put down ship hulls, we only put that down as a kind of guide of what we have actually lost, so that I do not think this fund can be looked upon as something you are going to use for the purpose of compensating particular individuals at all. On the other hand, there are German ships to which you are entitled undoubtedly, and I imagine you would use these in making such compensations as might be thought necessary to make to individuals.

Mr. Hughes: Well, I want to make the position quite clear. When the war broke out, the United Kingdom and every other part of the Empire and other Allied Powers seized a certain number of enemy ships. During the war, a number of these stayed in the ports of the United States of America. While we were discussing peace terms, the United States of America took these ships. I think it is fair to say they took them without regard to the Treaty—at any rate, it was independent of any allocation under the Treaty. All that I am anxious to make clear is this, we suffered very heavy losses, much heavier losses than the Dominions nearer at hand, by reason of our remoteness and of our failure to sell our goods at market rates. Does this (1) prejudice our claim for ex-enemy ships—the further allocation of ex-enemy ships; and (2) does it constitute a quittance by the United Kingdom by any authority, judicial or otherwise, of that tonnage that we took from the enemy? These are the two points on which I want some information.

Sir Robert Horne: Can you answer that question, Mr. Jenkins?

Mr. Jenkins: The ships were divided amongst the Allies in proportion to the losses, that is to say, when the prizes within their ports had been subtracted from their losses. Australia, I think, detained about 90,000 tons of shipping, and her losses were, I think, 27,000, or something very small, at any rate.

Mr. Hughes: I do not admit that.

Mr. Jenkins: I will give you the exact figures—it may be 40,000, but I think it was a great deal less, and so Australia was written to and it was suggested that she had only a claim on the other ships. If she had any claim for her losses, it would be adjusted out of the 90,000 tons that she had detained in her ports, and so that was how the matter was left.

Mr. Hughes: Well, it was settled, of course, without reference to us.

Mr. Jenkins: No, no. You were written to—at least, I mean to the Government.

Mr. Hughes: I assure you I never heard of it, and, as I am the Minister in special charge of this, it could not have been decided without my knowledge.

Sir Robert Horne: I think, Mr. Hughes, it is irrelevant to this particular thing. Because I mean, whatever be the claims otherwise for compensations or for a portion of ex-enemy ships, this is outside of that. This really is not compensation on any particular item at all. It only happens that, in order to arrive at some sort of basis for distribution amongst ourselves, we took what in general we may be assumed to have lost—at least, the ratio may be assumed amongst ourselves. This is not compensation for any particular thing; this is only what Germany says in general reparations that we are to get.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: Yes.

Mr. Jenkins: I would explain one point. The ships you were speaking of were given under what was called reparation in kind. Now, this reparation under that clause is really only in the nature of a food ticket.

Mr. Hughes: What?

Mr. Jenkins: Really like a food ticket that was given during the war for rations. That is to say, if you get ships, you have to pay for them out of your reparation claim, so that any part of the British Dominions who have got ships in that way have the value of those ships deducted from the money payments that are made them by Germany, you see. It is settled against their share of money payments.

Mr. Meighen: This German reparation in kind, that comes off the total indemnity?

Mr. Hughes: After being credited with the actual shipping losses, is that it?

Mr. Jenkins: Supposing that Great Britain—we will say—is given a particular ship as a part of the reparation for its shipping losses.

Mr. Hughes: Well.

Mr. Jenkins: That is settled against Great Britain, who has to pay, in effect, money for the ship.

Sir Thomas Smartt: It is credited with the value.

Sir Robert Horne: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: On what basis is it debited—on the pre-war value, or the present value?

Mr. Jenkins: It is the present value.

Mr. Hughes: Debited on the present value?

Mr. Jenkins: Quite so.

Mr. Hughes: Are losses credited to us on the pre-war value or on the present value?

Mr. Jenkins: The losses were claimed for originally on the Norwegian market values.

Mr. Hughes: The market value at the time of the loss?

Mr. Jenkins: Yes, but as you know, no details of the claims of losses were given by the Reparation Commission, and it is not possible now to say by how much the shipping claim was reduced.

Mr. Hughes: Let me see if I have got it right. This is without prejudice to any claims that we may have in regard to ex-German ships?

Mr. Jenkins: That is it.

Mr. Hughes: Those German ships that were seized by us at the outbreak of war will be debited against our reparation claim, and the 4 per cent. Is that it?

Mr. Jenkins: No; the ships you took (I think they have not gone into the Prize Court yet), but the corresponding British ships that came into the Prize Court have been deducted as prizes so that there is no debit in the reparation account.

Sir Robert Horne: You have this in your pocket without any disadvantage to any of your claims.

Mr. Jenkins: What I was speaking of were ships that Germany has handed over.

Mr. Hughes: Handed over now?

Mr. Jenkins: Yes.

Mr. Hughes: If we get any of those it comes out of our reparation claim on present value?

Mr. Jenkins: That is right.

Reparations.

Mr. Hughes: I understand.

Mr. Meighen: We have none at all.

Mr. Jenkins: You decided not to have any.

Mr. Meighen: Those we got we keep. We did not keep any.

Mr. Jenkins: I think you have one in Canada yet.

Mr. Massey: Have you got any for me?

Mr. Meighen: Was it not principally good fortune where the ships happened to be?

Sir Robert Horne: It happened there were none in Australia, I think.

Mr. Hughes: I do not know how many.

Mr. Meighen: I say on the principle you apply to the Army of Occupation account, you should average the ships that happen to be in your ports, that you should average them for the benefit of the rest of the Dominions.

Mr. Hughes: Germany was not able to say: "Go here or go there."

Mr. Massey: I think that is quite fair.

Mr Meighen: It was only a matter of accident.

Mr. Hughes: No, it was a matter of Providence.

Mr. Meighen: You should not have mentioned that on the same day as the Army of Occupation.

Mr. Massey: I think we had better revive this and see what can be done even now.

A general basis for settlement desirable.

Sir Robert Horne: Can we come to a conclusion upon this general basis? I will tell you the suggestion I will make. Britain's figure at the present time is 87·9. I propose to distribute that point nine (·9) amongst the other claims.

Mr. Massey: What document is that?

Sir Robert Horne: 87·9, and I think it would bring out a fairer proportion in regard to other portions of the Empire if Canada was to get 4·35 and Australia 4·35—that is increasing their proportions slightly—and India 1·2. I think it is a fair distribution, Mr. Massey, between New Zealand, Australia and Canada.

Mr. Massey: Honestly, I do not see much wrong with this.

India and the Army of Occupation.

Mr. Montagu: I want to put to you one consideration that we are entitled to bring into account, relating to the Army of Occupation. We have no claim under the Army of Occupation. How does that arise? It arises from the fact that the "Powers that be" decided that our armies, instead of going to Germany, should go to Palestine; they are still there, and are fighting there. We are still incurring liabilities for their pensions. If we had been lucky and you had wanted some Indian troops in Berlin, there would have been no fighting, and yet we should have got something under the Army of Occupation basis.

Sir Thomas Smartt: Some of our troops also went to Palestine. We are in the same position.

Mr. Montagu: But you have got them home, and we have not.

Sir Robert Horne: You have a paper provision in the Turkish Treaty.

Mr. Montagu: Yes, but you know what that is worth. I will give you that over. If you will put me on the same basis as New Zealand I will give you my claim on the Turkish Army of Occupation.

Sir Robert Horne: I propose giving India 1·2 per cent.

Indian Pensions should, if possible, be increased.

Mr. Montagu: I think that is low. I make two claims and I will leave it at that. The first is a claim in regard to the Army of Occupation, for their army is still in Turkey. The second claim is a point I put to you before, that I had hoped to be able to afford out of this to increase their pensions. We are really being penalised in this matter because of the poverty of the people. Our taxable people have got an

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Reparations.

actual average income of 60 rupees, so that there is not much margin for taxation. Therefore, our pensions are very low, and we are suffering for it. If we could get a little more we could put the pensions up. I hope you will realise that point. This will not all go to the Indian Government. I have to take something off it to pay the native States for their Imperial service expenditure. That has to come out of it as well.

Mr. Meighen: What is the value of the ships that were impounded in Australian waters?

Mr. Massey: Half a million.

Suggestion that Great Britain and India should make a separate settlement.

Sir Robert Horne: I do not know whether it is a feasible proposition, but I think we know rather less about the Indian scheme than we know about any others, for the reason that Mr. Montagu has given, that things are going on still so far as India is concerned, which although the United Kingdom is in them, the other Dominions are out of. Perhaps Mr. Montagu will be satisfied if I said that, as between him and the United Kingdom, I would be willing to reconsider with him any facts which he can bring forward. The Secretary of State for India is always here, but you other gentlemen have to go away in the course of time. We can adjust those things as between ourselves without altering the proportions of anybody else. If India was to get anything extra it would come off the United Kingdom share alone. How does that strike you?

Mr. Montagu: Your suggestion is that I should take your 1·2 per cent. for the present and take my chance?

Sir Robert Horne: You will not get less, obviously. Then in those circumstances the Table will be as follows:—

United Kingdom	...	87·00% (eighty-seven per cent.).
Minor colonies...	...	·80% (point eighty per cent.).
Canada ...	...	4·35% (four point thirty-five per cent.).
Australia ...	...	4·35% („ „ „).
New Zealand ...	...	1·60% (one point sixty per cent.).
South Africa ...	...	·60% (point sixty per cent.).
Newfoundland	...	·10% (point ten per cent.).
India ...	...	1·2 % (one point two per cent.).

Mr. Meighen: I guess I can give up all hope of those ships.

Mr. Massey: There are three very fine ships. I think Canada should have one, New Zealand one and Australia one.

Sir Robert Horne: The Table as it now stands settles everything. It would have been a great misfortune if we had had to say that we had been incapable of settling it.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W., July* 13, 1921.

APPENDIX.

Distribution of British Empire Reparation Receipts.

The following Table for apportionment of total receipts is suggested as an alternative to the Table proposed:—

——	As Proposed.	Now Suggested.	Difference.
United Kingdom	88·16	87·90	— ·26
Minor colonies	·77	·80	+ ·03
Canada	3·88	4·00	+ ·12
Australia	4·04	4·00	— ·04
New Zealand	1·57	1·60	+ ·03
South Africa	·55	·60	+ ·05
Newfoundland	·10	·10	
India	·93	1·00	+ ·07
	100·00	100·00	

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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C 62212 E-1302-3

OFFICE OF
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANADA.
E.T.

Memorandum for Mr.Beaudry.

With reference to the Prime Minister's wishes respecting the Order of the House of Commons for papers relating to the Conference of Prime Ministers in 1921, I desire to say that as regards the confidential despatches (though of course not their enclosures, which are very voluminous), they can be ready in a day or two after the necessary authority is received for their production.

As regards the non-confidential portion of this correspondence, I have given instructions to have it placed in the hands of the copyists at once. As in the case of the secret papers, the enclosures are very voluminous, and would take a long time to copy, but copies of the despatches themselves can be ready by tomorrow noon.

O.K

Ottawa,20th June,1922

J. Pope

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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C 62213

E-1302-3

Secret portion of

Return

to

ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

dated 24th April,1922,

asking for copy of all correspondence,letters,

telegrams and other documents exchanged between

the British and Canadian Governments, leading up

to and concerning the Conference of Prime Ministers

in 1921.

(not laid on Table.)

Ottawa,21st June,1922

J.B.S.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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CANADA

C 62214

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

July 24. 1923

MR. KING:

The Acting Auditor General, Mr. Kearns, reports that there is no record of any official press correspondent's expenses being defrayed by the Government on the Imperial Conference trip with Mr. Meighen. Mr. Kearns said such expenses might have been paid out of either Mr. Meighen's or Mr. Ballantyne's total expenses; but there is no way that he wouldknow of this because the Ministers do not give details of their travelling expenses. Mr. Keamns stated that there was no vote for a press correspondent on Mr. Meighen's trip; and that the various amounts of travelling expenses were charged to the Contingencies of Mr.Meighen's & Mr.Ballantyne's Departments.

WHM

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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PRELIMINARY LIST OF BOOKS GOING TO ENGLAND

Superceded for Imperial Conference of 1923

The Secret of Heroism	3
Industry and Humanity	6
Four Parties to Industry	12
The Making of a Premier	6
Life of William Lyon Mackenzie	2
The Battle with Tuberculosis	2
Nerves and Personal Power	4
Canada and the Navy	6
Canada as a Field for British Branch Industries	2
Map of Canada - British Empire Forestry Conference	1
Bentley's Complete Phrase Code with Appendix	1
The Treaty of Peace between The Allied and Associated Powers and Germany	1
Ottawa Telephone Directory	1
The Development of the British Empire	1
Conference on the Limitation of Armament held at Washington. Report of the Canadian Delegate - Sir Robert Borden	1
Copies of Halibut Treaty Correspondence	20
Copies of Genoa Conference	12
Copies of the Message of Liberalism	15
Parliamentary Guide	1
Canadian Almanac	1
Copies of Ewart's Canada and Foreign Wars	4
Corrected list of Members of Senate and House of Commons	1

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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Books Cont'd

Copies of Sir Robert Borden's "The British Commonwealth of Nations".	2
Copies of the handbook on the "League of Nations"	3
Copies of Mr. Meighen's "Overseas Addresses"	2
Houses of Parliament, Ottawa, Canada	1
Dodd's Parliamentary Companion	1
Discours de Sir Wilfrid Laurier - 1871-1909	1
Copies of the "Contemporary Review" containing an article by W.P.M. Kennedy on "Canada and the Imperial Conference"	4
Who's Who	1
Who's Who in Canada	1
Copies of Grand Trunk Railway replies	50
Who's Who Year Book - 1917	1
Liberal Year Book for 1916	1
Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. 2	1
Laurier, A Study in Canadian Politics	1
Oversea Addresses	2
House of Commons Debates, Ottawa, Friday May 20,1921	1
House of Commons Debates, 1922 Edition	1
5,000 Facts about Canada	1
International Conciliation Canada	1
Commerce and Natural Resources -Canada	1
The Canada Year Book 1918	1
Canada's War Effort 1914-1918	1
Canada and the Peace	1

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Memoranda & Notes

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CANADA

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Canada at War	1
Canada and the Navy	1
The Future of Canada	1
Canadian Club Addresses 1917-18	1
Au Canada	1
Report of the Department of Immigration & Colonization for the Fiscal year ended March 31,1922	1
Publications of the Natural Resources Intelligence Servi ce	1
Dominion of Canada	1
Canada Descriptive Atlas	1
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, June 12,1923	1
Budget Speech, by Hon.W.S. Fielding, House of Commons, May 11, 1923	1
Canada Estimates for the Fiscal year ending March 31, 1924	1
Public Accounts for Fiscal year ending March 31,1922	1
Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the year ending March 31, 1922,1921,1920	1
Report of the Department of Naval Service for fiscal year ended March 31, 1922, 1921, 1920	1
Conference on the Limitation of Armament held at Washington November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922.	1
The Canadian Historical Review, Vol.3 No. 1,March 1922	1
The Immigration Problem in the United States	1
After the War, 1920-1922	1
Canada - The Customs Tariff 1907 and Amendments with Index to - July 1, 1922	1

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Memoranda & Notes

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Canada as a Field for British Branch Industries	1
Sixth Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission, 1922	1
Introductory Survey of Colonial Tariff Policies	1
Imperial War Conference, 1917. Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Conference, 1918.	1
Imperial War Cabinet, 1917, 1918	1
Conference of Prime Ministers & Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions, and India, held in June, July and August 1921	2
Imperial Meetings 1921, Vol. 1 and 2	1
The Spirit of the Saar Statute & the Execution of the same by the Governing Commission	1
Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the Instruments signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923	1
The Monetary Times 1923	1
Germany's Capacity to pay	1
The Million Dollar Diamond	1
Sea Power in the Pacific	1
Imperial Copyright Conference 1910	1
Further Correspondence relating to the Imperial Conference	1
Correspondence relating to the Imperial Conference 1911	1
Minutes of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference,1911	1
Papers laid before the Conference	1
Papers laid before the Imperial Conference, Naval and Military Defence	1
Precis of the Proceedings	1

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Memoranda & Notes

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Books Cont'd

Papers laid before the Colonial Conference 1907	1
Minutes of proceedings of the Colonial Conference,1907	1
Correspondence and Papers relating to A Conference with Representatives of the Self-Governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire 1909	1
Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 15, 1922	1
The Pomp of Power	1
Relations between France and Germany. A Report by Henri Lichtenberger	1
Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa1910-21	1
Foreign Affairs, March 15, 1923	1
Foreign Affairs, December 15, 1922	1
Tariff Information Surveys on the Articles in Para.322 of the Tariff Act of 1913	1
List of Principal Subjects investigated and reported upon by the United States Tariff Commission	1
Reciprocity with Canada. A Study of the Arrangement of 1911	1
The Relation of the Tariff on Sugar to the Rise in Price of February-April 1923	1
Agricultural Staples and the Tariff	1
Parliamentary Debates, August 2, 1923	1
The Stateman's Year Book 1923	1
Parliamentary Debates, August 4, 1923	1
Labour Legialtion in Canada 1920-1921-1922	1
Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911	1
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1923	1

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Memoranda & Notes

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Independence Papers, Ottawa 1921	1
The Round Table, June 1923	1
Report on Foreign Affairs for months of May & June 1923	1
Colonial Conference, 1902, June to August	1
Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, Vol. 4,No. 1 January 1923, April 1923.	1
Report on the Commercial, Industrial and Financial Situation in Japan, 1922 and up to June 30, 1923	1
The Canadian Bank of Commerce Year Book, Vol.3, 1922	1
The British Dominions Year Book 1923	1
New Zealand Official Year Book 1921-22	1

From Mr. King's Library:

Catalogue of Library.
Industrial Representation Plans (152)
Industrialism vs. Militarism - Mackenzie King (513)
The Naval Question (327)
Canada and the United States (84)
Liberal Pamphlets 1912-15 (303)
Laurier (297)
The Liberal Party and the Tariff (210)
Notes of Speeches - Mackenzie King (504)

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Memoranda & Notes

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List of Books taken by A.G. Doughty.

for Imperial Conference 1923.

1.A permanent League of Nationa. Sir Geo. Paish.
2. A Short History of the Great War. A.F. Pollard.
3. League or War. Irving Fisher.
4. Canadian Almanac. 1923.
5. Whittaker Almanac.1923.
6 History of Canada. Wrong.
7. Canadian Constitutional Studies. Borden
8 British Empire and World's Peace. Rowell
9 Industrial and Commercial History of England. Rogers.
10 Canada's Future. Victor.

---

11. Canada Year Book.1921.
12. Sixth Census of Canada.
13. Constitution of Canada. Kennedy
14. How Canada is governed. Bourinot.
15 The Friends of England.Peel
16. Self Government in Canada. Bradshaw.
17. Canadian Constitutional Development. Egerton & Grant
18 Federation and Union within the British Empire. Egerton.
19 Documents of the Canadian Constitution 1759-1915. Kennedy
20 Political Annals of Canada. Cockburn.
21 History of North America. Munro.
22. Progress od Canada in the 19th Century
23. British Supremacy and Canadian Self Government. Morrison.
24 Annual Review.
25 Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.(To be obtained in London).
26 A complete set of the Publications of the Natural Resources Intelligence Service. (Sent to England.)
27 5 vols of Public Speeches.
28 The Real Canadian.
29.Where there is no Peace.
30 Canadian Cities of Romance.
31 The Prime Ministers of Britain.
32 A history of European Nations.
33. A Revision of the Treaty
34 Labrador.
35 The Safety of the Nation.
36 Things New and Old. 6
" " 5
" " 4
37. Modern Studies
38. Douglas Present Discontents.
39. The League of Nations. Grey
40 League of Nations and Labour.

Leg. of Canada & Lib. Provincial.
asked for in both.
also Fulford Comms.
Families & Debates

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Memoranda & Notes

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Imperial Conference 1923

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Material r Stationery.

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CANADA

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CONTENTS OF CASES

Box	Contents	Disposition
No. 1.	Stationery	Hold
No. 2.	Stationery	Hold
No. 3.	Stationery	Hold
No. 4.	Reference Books	Cabin 288
No. 5.	Mr. King's Books Stationery	Hold
No. 6.	Mr. Coat's Books	Hold
No. 7.	Correspondence	Cabin 101
No. 8.	Correspondence	Cabin 332
Black Box Square.	Mr. Kings material, books obtained at the last minute, and sundry items.	Cabin 61U

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Memoranda & Notes

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LIST OF STATIONERY IN

BOX No. 1.

ENVELOPES : Prime Minister's Office:

250	10½ x 4⅛	-	Red Crest.
1,000	9 x 4	-	" "
250	9 x 4	-	Blind Embossed.
50	9 x 4	-	Red Crest - - - French.
50	8¼ x 5¼	-	" "
50	5⅝ x 4⅛	-	" "
50	" x "	-	Blind Embossed.
500	5½ x 4½	-	Red Crest.
250	" x "	-	Blind Embossed.
500	" x "	-	" " - Crest Only.
250	" x "	-	Plain.

Privy Council:

25	9 x 4	-	English.
25	" x "	-	French .
25	5½ x 4½	-	English.
25	5⅝ x 4⅛	-	French .

PAPER:

1,500 - Lettersize Onion Skin - Glazed.
750 - " Red Crest

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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LIST OF STATIONERY IN

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PAPER:

Foolscap size:
- 2,000 - Onion Skin - Glazed
- 500 - Chaldean Vellum - Plain
- 250 - " " - Blind Embossed
- 250 - " " - Red Crest
- 250 - " " - " " - French.
- 500 - Azure - Plain

Letter size:
- 500 - Chaldean Vellum - Blind Embossed
- 500 - " " - " " - Crest Only.
- 500 - " " - Plain
- 250 - Azure - "
- 750 - Chaldean Vellum - " - Punched 3 holes.
- 500 - Onion Skin - Glazed - " " "

- 50 - Privy Council - English.
- 50 - " " - French
- 50 - " " - Second sheets.

- 50 - Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- 50 - do. - Second sheets.

- 1,000 - Clipping sheets.

Note:
- 125 - Chaldean Vellum - Red Crest.
- 375 - " " - Blind Embossed.
- 500 - " " - " " - Crest Only.
- 500 - " " - Plain.

- 25 - Envelopes, 8½ x 6½ - Red Crest.
- 50 - " - Strong linen.

- 50 - Blotters.
- 36 - Small Memorandum Pads.
- 10 - Large " "

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Memoranda & Notes

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LIST OF STATIONERY IN

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1,000	-	Azure Note (With Mr. Mackenzie King's Compliments).
1,000	-	Cards - W. L. Mackenzie King, Laurier House, Ottawa.
300	-	" - W. L. Mackenzie King - (only)
300	-	" - Prime Minister of Canada-----English
100	-	" - " " " " -----French.
40	-	Correspondence Guides.
12	-	Dockets. not there
24	-	Foolscap Folders.
12	-	Filing Pockets - 1¾" Expansion.
12	-	" " - 3 " "
12	-	Pairs Foolscap size Covers.
24	-	Pairs Blue Clipping Covers.
20	-	Large Memorandum Pads.
4	-	Foolscap Pads - ruled.
6	-	Lettersize Pads-, plain.
1	-	6 x 4 Filing Cabinet, with alphabetical index.
500	-	6 x 4 Cards.
24	-	Pencils - Venus H.B.
2	-	Sticks Sealing Wax.
6	-	Typewriters erasers.
6	-	Pencil erasers.
6	-	Typewriter Ribbons - light inked.
1	-	Shannon Punch.
1	-	Hand Punch.
2	-	Scissors.
2	-	Cico Paste.
2	-	Balls of Twine.
20	-	Boxes Paper Clips - Large.
10	-	" " " - Small.
9	-	" Star Paper Fasteners.
1	-	Box Paper Clamps.
2	-	Boxes Rubber Bands - long thin; strong.
3	-	Boxes Pen nibs.
1	-	Box Refills for Eversharp Pencils.
2 Doz.	-	Laces - long.
2 "	-	" - short.
1 Pkge	-	Blank Gummed Index Tabs.
		Adhesive Strips - Blue, Buff, and yellow.
200	-	Memo Cards.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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In

BOX No. 4.

	No. of Copies.
Au Canada	1
Agricultural Staples and the Tariff	1
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1923.	1
British Commonwealth of Nations by Sir R. Borden	2
Bentley's Complete Phrase Code with Appendix	1
British Dominions Year Book 1923.	1
Canada and the Navy	6
Canada and Foreign Wars - Ewart's	4
Canada as a Field for British Branch Industries	2
Canada Year Books : 1914; 1916-17; 1918; 1921.	4
Canada's War Effort 1914-1918	1
Canada and the Peace	1
Canada at War	1
Canada, The Future of	1
Canada - The Customs Tariff 1907 and Amendments with Index - July 1, 1922.	1
Canada Estimates for the Fiscal year ending Mar. 31/24.	1
Canada Descriptive Atlas	1
Canada, Dominion of	1
Canada	1
Canada, 5,000 Facts about	1
Canada, Commerce and Natural Resources	1
Canada, Map of : British Empire Forestry Conference	1
Canadian Almanac, 1923.	1
Canadian Club Addresses, 1917-18.	1
Canadian Historical Review, Vol.3, No.1, March 1922	1
Canadian Bank of Commerce Year Book, Vol. 3, 1922	1
Colonial Conference, 1902, June to August	1
Colonial Conference, Papers laid before the - 1907	1
Colonial Conference, Minutes of Proceedings - 1907	1
Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911	1
Conference, Papers laid before the	1
Conference on the Limitation of Armament held at Washington November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922.	1
Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, held in June, July and August, 1921	1
Colonial Tariff Policies, Introductory Survey of	1

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Memoranda & Notes

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	No. of Copies
Contemporary Review, June 1923	1
Conference with Representatives of the Self-Governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire 1909	1
Commercial, Industrial and Financial Situation in Japan, 1922 and up to June 30, 1923	1
Dodd's Parliamentary Companion	1
Foreign Affairs, March 15, 1923	1
Foreign Affairs, December 15, 1922	1
Genoa Conference	12
Halibut Treaty Correspondence	3
Houses of Parliament, Ottawa, Canada	1
House of Commons Debates, Ottawa, May 20, 1921	1
House of Commons Debates, 1922 Edition	1
Immigration Problem in the United States	1
Imperial War Conference, 1917. Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Conference 1918.	1
Imperial War Cabinet - 1917; 1918.	2
Imperial Meetings - 1921, Vol. 1 and 2	2
Imperial Copyright Conference - 1910	1
Imperial Conference, Further Correspondence relating to the	1
Imperial Conference, Minutes of Proceedings - 1911	1
Imperial Conference, Correspondence relating to - 1911	1
Imperial Conference, Papers laid before the; Naval and Military Defence	1
Imperial Conference, Precis of the Proceedings	1
Independence Papers, Ottawa 1921	1
Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1923, April 1923.	2
Liberal Year Books for 1916 and 1917.	2
Liberal Party and the Tariff	1
Liberals and the Tariff	1
Liberal Party, The Tariff Record of	1
Message of Liberalism	15
Members of the Senate and House of Commons	2
Monetary Times, 1923	1
Ottawa Telephone Directory	1
Parliamentary Guide, 1923	1
Publications of the Natural Resources Intelligence Service	1
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, June 12, 1923	1
Public Accounts for Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1922	1
Pomp of Power	1
Parliamentary Debates, August 2 , 1923	1
" " " 4, 1923	1
Report of the Department of Immigration and Colonization for Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1922	1
Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the Year ending March 31, 1922, 1921, 1920	1

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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Box No. 4 Cont'd.	No. of Copies
Report of the Department of Naval Service for Fiscal Year ended March 31, 1922, 1921, 1920	3
Report of the United States Tariff Commission, 1922	1
Report on Foreign Affairs for months of May & June, 1923	2
Round Table, June 1923	1
Relation of the Tariff on Sugar to the Rise in Price of February and April, 1923	2
Reciprocity with Canada, A Study of the Arrangement of 1911	1
Relations between France and Germany. A Report by Henri Lichtenberger	1
Speech, Budget - by Hon. W. S. Fielding, House of Commons, June 12, 1923	1
Spirit of the Saar Statute and the Execution of the same by the Governing Commission	1
Statesman's Year Book, 1923	1
Scientific and Industrial Research, Set of Pamphlets	2
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany	1
Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the Instruments signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923	1
Tariff Information Surveys on the Articles in Para. 322 of the Tariff Act of 1913	1
The Principal Subjects investigated and reported upon by the United States Tariff Commission	1
Who's Who - English, 1923	1
Who's Who in Canada, 1922	1
Who's Who Year Book, 1917	1
Kingdom Papers	1
British Empire and World Peace - by Hon. N. W. Rowell	1

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C. 62230

LIST OF MATERIAL

in

BOX No. 5

Stationery:

150 - Manilla Folders
50 - Large Brown Envelopes
2 - 4 Ring Binders for Minutes of Conference
3 - Concertina Folders
2 - Monthly Sets of Correspondence Guides.

Books:	No. of Copies
Australia, Commonwealth of - Offical Year Book 1922	1
Development of the British Empire	1
Dominions Royal Commission Final Report	1
Four Parties to Industry	12
Germany's Capacity to Pay	1
Industry and Humanity	6
Life of William Lyon Mackenzie	2
League of Nations	3
Nerves and Personal Power	4
New Zealand Official Year Book, 1921-22	1
Pomp of Power	1
Sea Power in the Pacific	1
The Battle with Tuberculosis	2
The Making of a Premier	6
The Secret of Heroism	3
Union of South Africa, Official Year Book 1910-21	1

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62231

BOX NO. 6.

Filled with Material for

Mr. R. H. COATS.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62232

LIST OF ITEMS IN BOX NO. 7

E-1106 Naturalization
Naturalization of Married Women
National Council of Women (Dept. of External Affairs)

E-1106 Naturalization
Naturalization in the Dominions
I-1001-O - Naturalization of Orientals
Exhibit "A" - Statement of Winston Churchill (Book from Dept. of Sec.of State Library)
Exhibit "B" - Copies of Imperial & Canadian Naturalization Acts
Exhibit "C" - Resolution at Imperial War Conference 1917
Exhibit "D" - Resolution Mr. Massey - Imperial War Conference 1918
Exhibit "E" - Nationality of children of British subjects born abroad
Exhibit "F" - Copy of amendments Canadian Naturalization Act of Session of 1922-23
Exhibit "G" - Notes of Conference, Home Office 3rd August, 1922
Exhibit "H" - Letters re revocation of Certificates of Naturalization
Exhibit "I" - Edvind Haugerud - naturalization of
Exhibit "J" - Registration of the child of Peter Dimitry
Exhibit "K" - Status of Greeks naturalized in Canada
Exhibit "L" - Revocation of Certificates of Naturalization
Exhibit "M" - List of Revocations of Naturalization Certificates
Exhibit "N" - Naturalization Acts and Regulations thereunder
Naturalization Regulations U.S.(No.346)

E-1300 External Affairs
Parliamentary control of Foreign Policy

E-1301-1 Wireless Telegraph Commission
Radio Telegraph Convention 1912

E-1301-1 Wireless Telegraph Commission
Wireless Telegraphy Commission in London

E-1301-1 Wireless Telegraph Commission
Memorandum - Radio Branch, Department of Marine & Fisheries

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E-1302-1-A	Washington Appointment of Sir Robert Borden
E-1302-1-C	Washington Under Conservative Regime
E-1302-1-L	Washington Last communications and despatches
E-1302-1-L	Washington Washington Conference under Liberal Regime
E-1302-1	Washington "C" Mandates - Australia U.S."C" Mandates
E-1302-1	Washington Right to publish secret correspondence
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Conference Prime Ministers 1921
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Memo. Lucien Pacaud International Postal Union Seniority of Privy Councillors Cost of former Prime Ministers' Conferences Official Despatches re Transportation
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Common basis Income Tax Assessments Miscellaneous - Imperial Conference Fred Cook Imperial & Economic Conferences - Hansard References Marriage between British subjects and Foreigners Miscellaneous - No. 11,1911 - Laws of Marriage Foreign Countries
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Main Pyle
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Agenda - Committee of Imperial Defence (2) Imperial Conference Agenda
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Canadian Representation
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Press Representative Confidential Pyle - Press Correspondent
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Good wishes - eve of departure
E-1302-3	Imperial Conference Naval Base - Singapore

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E-1302-4 International Labour Organization
International Labour Conference 1923

E-1302-14 International Postal Conference

E-1302-15 Imperial Economic Conference
Main Fyle

E-1302-15 Imperial Economic Conference
Press Representative
Request for appointments
Confidential fyle - Seniority Privy Councillors
Suggested Committee of expert advisers
Enquiry attitude on questions

E-1302-16 Imperial Economic Conference
Canadian Representation

E-1302-16 Imperial Economic Conference - Agenda
Reciprocal enforcements of judgements
Imperial Statistics
Commercial Intelligence
Workmen's Compensation Laws - extension to Seamen
Mineral Resources
Stabilization of Inter-Empire Exchange Con
Confidential Memo. on Agenda
Preferential Tariff
Copyright
Import duty on Catalogues
Report Colwyn Committees - Taxation
Memorandum from Bureau of Statistics
Agenda

E-1303-2 British Empire Exhibition
Main Fyle

E-1304 League of Nations
Limitation of expenditure on Armaments
Canadian Delegation to
Paul Mantoux re activity of League of Nations
Lord Robert Cecil's report 25th Session
Requesting information re appointment of Delegates to

E-1305-1 Near East War Situation
Statement to Press, Sept.3, 1922
Exchange of Important Despatches
Private Fyle
Near East Crisis Vol. I
" " " " II

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

B-1305-2	Opinions re Canada's Participation Canada's Participation
B-1305-4	Treaty of Sevres Treaty Series No. 15, 1923 (Booklet)
B-1306	Wrangel Island Noel J. Ogilvie - enclosing complete set of 6 maps Arctic Flight Route Relief to Wrangel Island Party Wrangel Island - ownership of Copies - Departmental Correspondence Hon. Chas. Stewart - Private Fyle
B-1309	Reparations Ruhr Occupation Despatches re - Ruhr Occupation Clippings re
B-1309	Reparations Saar Valley Commission
B-1310	Treaties Loring Christie re Treaties References to Peace Treaty in House of Commons - 1919
B-1400	British Empire Shipping Memo. re Shipping Industry Marine Insurance (4 memos. re.) Resolutions - Council of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom Memo. of the Imperial Shipping Committee Memo. for the Prime Minister "Carriage of goods by Sea" Relations to the several parts of the British Empire
B-1450	Great Britain Removal of Passports John Lewis enclosing quotation Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy
B-1452-1	Applications for Appointments Application for appointments to High Commissioner's Office
B-1452-5	Secretary and Staff Appointment of Colonel Reid Hyde
B-1454	The Press Situation of Reuters Office in London

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E-1455 Finance
Dollar Bond transaction
Foreign Debt Refunding Bill

E-1456 Emigration
Empire Settlement Policy

E-1457 Tariff
Trade relations within the Empire
British Preference on Musical Instruments
Preferential Tariffs within the Empire
Federation of British Industries

E-1458 Imperial Defence
Summary of record of National & Imperial Defence Committee
Hansard - House of Lords - Vol. 54 (57 & 42)
Hansard - House of Commons - Vol. 163 (49 Vol.166 No.100)

E-1601 Deputation to Canada
Visit of Sivisawmy Aiyer to Canada
Dinner to Mr. Sastri
E-1601 Visit of Mr. Sastri to Canada
E-1800, South Africa
Indians in Kenya

E-1650 Ireland
Representative of Irish Free State
Cattle Embargo - effect on
Irish Free State of the removal of
Irish Free State Constitution, Despatches re
" " " " Bill

E-1651 Trade negotiations with Ireland

E-1800 South Africa
Indians in Kenya (charged to envelope E-1601)

E-1825 British West Africa
Trade with west of Africa
West Africa and its opportunities for Canadian trade (Booklet)

E-1850 West Indies
Increase in Cable rates
Merchant Marine route between Canada and West Indies

E-4000 France
Presentation of Porcelain Vase

E-9000 United States
Visit to Vancouver by Pres.Harding (Manitoba Free Press)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E-9000 United States (Cont'd.)
W-1006 - International Joint Commission
Migratory birds Conventions Oct. (2 copies)
E-1302-14 - International Postal Convention

E-9001 Canadian Representation at Washington
Can. Representation at Washington - American Views

E-9002 Alcoholic Liquors
Smuggling of spirits between Sweden and Norway
Liquor in Territorial Waters

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62238

LIST OF FYLES IN BOX NO. 8.

E-9007 Rush Bagot Agreement
Naval Vessels Great Lakes
Rush Bagot Official
Rush Bagot Confidential Fyle re

E-9008 Fishing Relations with United States
Fishing relations between Canada and the United States

H-1101 Archives
Moncton Papers
Sir William Schooling - Hudson Bay Co.'s Records

I-1001 Oriental Immigration
Naturalization of Orientals charged to Envelope E-1106

M-1000 Marine and Fisheries
Halibut Treaty
" " Press Comments
" " Copy tabled March 16, 1923

N-1100 National Defence
Asking Canada to suggest immediate disarmament at Imp. Conference

N-1101 Forests
Forests of Canada (Booklet on, issued by Dept. of Interior)

N-1103 Mines
J. Murray Clark

N-1300 National Status
Canada's relation within the Empire
Canada's right to sign Treaties
Clipping on National Status
E-1310 - L.C.Christie's Memo. re conclusion of Treaties
9 Fyles or Memos. on Canada's Status as a Nation

N-1300 Docket labelled "Canadian Status, participation in War" (a) Near East (b) General - 28 Enclosures, clippings, etc.

N-1301 B.N.A. Act and Amendments to
Extra Territorial Rights of Canada
Confidential Series No. 38
General Register No. 231
Dept. of External Affairs
Name - Colonial Secretary, London
Extraterritorial Legislation

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62239

R-1100 Parliamentary Work
R-1305-1 - Near East War situation - Official communications and Private
Secret Documents re Imperial Conference - Not laid on table
Publication of messages - Confidential file

R-1100 Parliamentary Work
Correspondence re official Correspondence & publication thereof

R-1101 Speech from the Throne
References - Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Speech in reply to Speech from the Throne 1907-8-9-10-11

R-1300 The Press
Having Mr. Brothers remain in London

R-1602 Parliament Buildings
Houseman - invitation to visit foundry

R-1103 G.T.R.Acquisition
G.T.R. Conf. Sir J. Flavelle
G.W.Yates printing of document "Reply to Overseas Criticism"
Claims of G.T.P. 4% Debenture Shareholders
Claims of G.T.R. Company of Canada Shareholders
G.T.R. Replies - 5 copies of each

R-1111 Railway Management
Financial arrangements for C.N.R. - Conf. File

S-1103 Pensions
Mrs. L.C.S.Amery - reduction of Pension of Mary A.Dow

T-1000 Tariff
Hon.Chas. Murphy enclosing "The Tariff Record of the Liberal Party"
Removal duty on New Zealand Honey
Preferential Trade within the Empire
British Preferential - Acetic Acid
British Preferential Tariff - Canadian Manufacturers' Association
Liberal Platform on Tariff - 1919

T-1200 Trade and Commerce

T-1205 Foreign Trade
Status of Canadian Trade Commissioners

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

W-1008 Georgian Bay Canal
Sir Robert Perks

W-1006 International Joint Commission
" " " See Folder K-9000

W-1102 Canadian Battlefields' Memorial Commission
Memorial Arch on the Menin Road
Unveiling of Monument - St.Julien

K-1600 Interviews
Leighton McCarthy - requesting interview

K-2100 Photographs

YK-1700 Alberta
Lawrence E. Jones

K-1200 Congratulations received
Major Frederick Lascelles

K-1700 Private
Mrs. Bidwell
Mr. Norman W. Tronholme
Aneurin Williams re Armenian Immigration
Robert Millie - requesting position

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62241

LIST OF MATERIAL IN BOX NO. 8

Personal Files -(Mr. Measures' Drawer)

Laurier House
Conferring of Degrees -- Mr. King
Travelling Expenses
Form Letters
Personal Letters
Petty Cash

Two dozen Charge-out Cards

Subject and Personal Index Cards to correspondence

7 Packages of Photographs

Material collected by Mr. Giddens

Departmental Files

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62242

SQUARE BLACK BOX

Annual Report of the Ottawa and Ottawa Valley Branch of the Canadian Red Cross Society - Speech by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, page 37.
Canada and British Countries - by John S. Ewart, K.C.
Canada and the United States - by W. R. Riddell
Catalogue of Pamphlets, Reports and Journals.
Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of United Kingdom, Dominions and India - June, July and August, 1921.
Edinburgh Review - July 1923.
Engagement Book Refills - Book 104
Cash refills.
Fortnightly Review - July, 1923.
Empire Review - June, 1923.
Empire Review - March 1923.
Imperial Meetings - 1921. Notes of meetings Nos. E 1 - E 4. June 29 - August 25, 1921. With Subject Index.
Imperial Meetings - 1921. Minutes of meetings of sub-committees Nos. E(R) 1 and 2, E(D) 1 and 2 and E(Sc) 1 to 7.
Imperial Meetings - 1921, with subject index.
Industrialism Vs. Militarism - by W. L. Mackenzie King.
Industrial Representation Plans.
An International Experiment - by Lawrence J. Burpee.
International Joint Commission - Waterways Problems.
Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire. Vol 4 - No. 3, July, 1923
Mr. McGregor's Address Books.
Liberal Pamphlets 1912 - 15, Publications 1 - 31.
Naval Question.
Notes of Speeches - Mackenzie King.
Memoranda E series. Papers E 1 - E 56, with subject index.
Round Table - 1923.
Round Table, Vol. 1. November, 1910 to August, 1911.
Treaties and Agreements affecting Canada, in force between His Majesty and the United States of America, with subsiduary documents - 1814 - 1913.
Labour Legislation in Canada, - 1920 - 1921 - 1922.
Mr. King's two Concertinas.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62242

SQUARE BLACK BOX

Annual Report of the Ottawa and Ottawa Valley Branch of the Canadian Red Cross Society - Speech by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, page 37.
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Fortnightly Review - July, 1923.
Empire Review - June, 1923.
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Imperial Meetings - 1921. Notes of meetings Nos. E 1 - E 4. June 29 - August 25, 1921. With Subject Index.
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Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire. Vol 4 - No. 3, July, 1923
Mr. McGregor's Address Books.
Liberal Pamphlets 1912 - 15, Publications 1 - 31.
Naval Question.
Notes of Speeches - Mackenzie King.
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Round Table - 1923.
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Mr. King's two Concertinas.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62243

LIST OF BOOKS TAKEN BY A.G. DOUGHTY.

1. A permanent League of Nations - Sir Geo. Paish
2. A Short History of the Great War, - A.F. Pollard
3. League of War - Irving Fisher
4. Canadian Almanac - 1923
5. Whittaker Almanac - 1923
6. History of Canada - Wrong
7. Canadian Constitutional Studies - Borden
8. British Empire and World's Peace - Rowell
9. Industrial and Commercial History of England - Rogers
10. Canada's Future - Victor

---

11. Canada Year Book 1921
12. Sixth Census of Canada
13. Constitution of Canada - Kennedy
14. How Canada is governed - Bourinot
15. The Friends of England - Peel
16. Self Government in Canada - Bradshaw
17. Canadian Constitutional Development - Egerton & Grant
18. Federation and Union within the British Empire - Egerton
19. Documents of the Canadian Constitution 1759-1915 - Kennedy
20. Political annals of Canada - Cockburn
21. History of North America - Munro
22. Progress of Canada in the 19th Century
23. British Supremacy and Canadian Self Government - Morrison
24. Annual Review
25. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy (To be obtained in London)
26. A complete set of the Publications of the Natural Resources Intelligence Service (Sent to England)
27. 5 Vols. of Public Speeches
28. The Real Canadian
29. Where there is no Peace
30. Canadian Cities of Romance
31. The Prime Ministers of Britain
32. A History of European Nations
33. A Revision of the Treaty
34. Labrador
35. The Safety of the Nation
36. Things New and Old 6
    " " 5
    " " 4
37. Modern Studies
38. Douglas Present Discontents
39. The League of Nations - Gray
40. League of Nations and Labour

Set of Canada and its Provinces arranged for in England, also Fulford's County Families and Debrett.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Coll - Imp. Conferences 1923

C 62244

Collateral

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

.....

The draft caveat attached was shown to Hankey who agreed it was reasonable, but he had an hour's conversation with Lord Curzon, who wholly declined to accept it (as being stated too broadly and not applicable to Ireland or India). Lord Curzon also demurred to accepting the proposed amendation as to Egypt. Lord Curzon will consider it further this afternoon. Hankey suggests that Foreign Affairs be postponed and not taken up in the full Conference at 5, but be taken up privately in a Prime Minister's Committee immediately after the Conference.

(By the way, Hankey does not want his letter of last night mentioned)

After discussion with Mr. Graham and Mr. Dafoe, three alternatives seem possible: -

1. Acceptance by the Conference of the caveat you drew up.

2. Withdrawal of both the Curzon memo and your caveat and just a brief statement to the effect that there was a full discussion of Foreign Affairs.

3. Or that Canada should file a reservation or interpretation along the lines of the caveat.

.....

(Refers to report on Foreign Affairs at the Imperial Conference 1923 etc).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

O. D SKELTON

O. D. Skelton E-1302-3.
(1923) C 62245 Vol. 2
(1923)

1. CANADA and the CONTROL of FOREIGN POLICY

The fundamental question before the Imperial Conference of 1923 will be the control of foreign policy. The general question and the application of the implied or explicit general principles to specific issues will both come up for discussion. It is doubtless undesirable to discuss general questions at such a Conference except in so far as may be necessary to solve actual and practical problems. On this occasion, the discussion is inevitable. Other Dominions, particularly Australia, have announced their intention to thresh out to the full the question of Dominion share in imperial policy and of imperial control over Dominion policy. The Near East episode and other events of the two years since the last Conference have presented practical tests of the understanding declared to have been reached in 1921. Canada's attitude in the Rush-Bagot and Halibut Treaty negotiations has been vigorously challenged by Australia and New Zealand. Statements of the present position as to control of foreign policy have been made by a British Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) and a British Foreign Secretary (Lord Curzon) which imply a direct reversal of the whole trend of Dominion development in the past half-century, and cannot be allowed to stand as an accepted and unquestioned change in imperial relations.

It seems clear, then, that it will be necessary to present to the Conference Canada's view of the fundamental issues involved. It will not only be a necessity, but a distinct opportunity. There has been so much haziness and confusion on the whole subject that it will be a memorable service to reaffirm the Canadian view of the problem.

Of late years a theory of control of foreign policy of a revolutionary character has been put forward by high authorities,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

namely: That the British Empire can have only one foreign policy; that in the past this policy has been determined by the United Kingdom alone and that the Dominions had no share in shaping it; that now it is determined by Great Britain and the Dominions acting jointly; that the instrument of this joint policy is and must remain, the British Foreign Office; and that, with control, the Dominions have accepted a corresponding share of responsibility for the outcome of that policy; further that, conversely, in no other way can or should or has control in foreign affairs been exercised by a Dominion

These positions may be illustrated by a few quotations:

(a) Mr. Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in British House of Commons, November 1921: (probably framed by Secretariat):-

> "They (the discussions of the Imperial Conference of 1921) revealed an absolutely unanimous opinion as to the main lines to be followed and a very deep conviction that the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs. Very careful consideration was given to the means of circulating information to the Dominion Governments and keeping them in continuous touch with the conduct of foreign relations by the British Government. It was unanimously felt that the policy of the British Empire could not be adequately representative of democratic opinion throughout the peoples unless representatives of the Dominions and of the Empire were frequently associated with those of the United Kingdom in considering and determining the course to be pursued. All members expressed a vivid sense of this year's meetings in that respect, and a desire that similar meetings should be held as frequently as possible. A resolution embodying the views of the Conference declares that the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and the Representatives of India should aim at meeting annually or at such longer periods as may prove feasible. The existing practice of direct communication between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, as well as the right of the latter to (nominate resident ministers ?) represent them in consultation with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom are retained.

(b) Mr. Lloyd George, in British House of Commons, December 21: (Mr. Lloyd George's own more informal and more illuminating statement):

> "The position of the Dominions in reference to external affairs has been revolutionized in the course of the last four years. The Dominions since the war have been given

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

equal rights with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire. The machinery is the machinery of the British Government, the Foreign Office, the ambassadors. The machine must remain here. It is impossible that it could be otherwise, unless you had a Council of Empire where you had representatives elected for the purpose.....The instrument of the foreign policy of the Empire is the British Foreign Office. That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable, but they claim a voice in determining the lines of our policy. .....The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility, and when the burden of Empire has become so vast it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along. ....Our troubles were Upper Silesia, the Ruhr valley, Angora and Egypt, and they came there (to the Imperial Conference of 1921) with other questions, with the problems of the Pacific, Honolulu, the Philippines, Nagasaki and Peking. All these problems were brought into the common stock, and a wide survey was taken by all the representatives of the Empire, who would honour that policy and support that policy when it was challenged. They felt that there was not one of them who was not speaking for hundreds and thousands and millions of men who were prepared to risk their fortunes and their lives for a great Empire."

(c) Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in public address, London, November 8, 192Z, -

"In former days the policy of Great Britain was the foreign policy of Great Britain alone. Now it is the foreign policy of the British Empire. The initiative, and to a large extent, the executive action must necessarily remain in the Foreign Office, but in the various Imperial Conferences assembled in London full statements were made to the Ministers assembled from all the Dominions on foreign affairs. Every aspect of them was discussed, a foreign policy for the whole Empire was framed, and in the intervals, when the Dominion Ministers were not here, full papers were sent to them, and on no matter of first class importance was a decision taken without their being informed .... This is a great change, and it will readily be seen what enormous strength it adds to the position of the Foreign Secretary. He feels now that he is not only speaking for Downing Street or for the British Isles, but for the State which constitutes the British Empire."

(d) Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, in 1921 Conference, Confidential report II, pp.7, -

"We, the representatives of the Dominions, are met together to formulate the foreign policy of the Empire."

Mr. Hughes, Ex-Prime Minister, in London Morning Post, May 9, 1923, -

"From 1916 therefore not only has the right of the Dominions to have a voice in the moulding of foreign and imperial policy been recognized, but an entirely new instrumentality, imperial in its character, has existed, functioning, it is true, only at intervals, by means of which foreign and imperial questions are dealt with by representatives of the whole Empire."

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(e) Round Table, June 1923: The New Imperial Problem

So far as foreign policy was concerned, the new view was embodied in the decisions of the meeting of Prime Ministers in 1921. Though it has never been officially set forth in precise language, the present constitutional theory, largely set forth in a speech by Mr. Lloyd George to Parliamanent in the autumn of 1921, (#) seems to be as follows. The formulation of the general policy of the Commonwealth is now in the hands of all the peoples of the Commonwealth represented in the Imperial Conference, acting through their Prime Ministers, meeting as often as possible, and keeping in touch, as far as practicable in the interval by cable and dispatch. Inasmuch, however, as the conduct of foreign affairs calls for constant action and prompt decision, it was recognized that, in the intervals between the gatherings of Prime Ministers, the policy agreed to had to be carried out mainly by the British Foreign Office with such consultation with the Dominions as is possible by cable and dispatch. Because of this, it was also recognized, however, that no Dominion could be committed to approval or support of any new action undertaken between Imperial Conferences, except by its own government and parliament, and that Great Britain, as heretofore must continue to carry the lion's share of the burden. In all dealings with foreign powers, whether they were conducted by the British or a Dominion Government, prior consultation is now the essence of the case, for without it there can be no assurance of agreement or support from the rest of the Commonwealth.

Statement (a) above. It will be noted that the Round Table endeavours to reconcile the L.G., statement of 1921, with the actual developments of 1922.

That is, roughly speaking, the present constitutional theory of the Commonwealth. The theory has received illustration in two recent events - the enquiry by the British Government as to whether the Dominions would support it in the action it had decided to take in offering, if need be, forcible resistance to the crossing of the Dardanelles by the Turks, and the action of the Canadian Government in arranging that the Halibut Treaty should be signed by a Canadian minister alone. These events showed that Great Britain, while carrying out a generally agreed foreign policy. carries also the primary responsibility, the Dominions being free to co-operate or not as they please. They also showed that any of the Governments of the Commonwealth may conduct the negotiations of a treaty with a foreign Power, but that inasmuch as, to quote the Senate of the United States, it applies "to all British nationals", it can do so only after consultation with the Commonwealth as a whole."

Other utterances express the opinion that the Dominions do not now actually control the Empire's foreign policy, but that they should adopt measures to enable them to do so:

(a) W. M. Hughes, continuing in "Morning Post" article:

"Let us see now how it has worked out. Has it given the Dominions an effective voice in directing foreign policy? There is only one answer to this question - as things are, the Dominions have not an effective voice on questions of foreign policy.....In theory, we have a voice in shaping

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

foreign policy. In practice, our voice is generally a mere echo. It can hardly be said therefore that there has been any change of control over foreign policy or that the Dominions have any more effective share in shaping it than before the war. And of course, they have no share in carrying out foreign policy. Now it can hardly be said that this practice is satisfactory or that its continuance is not a danger to the unity of the Empire.

(b) S. M. Bruce, Prime Minister of Australia, House of Representatives, March 1, 1923, -

> "There are some in Australia who think that we can be a law unto ourselves, that since we are 12,000 miles away from Europe we need not worry about what happens in other parts of the world; I remind those who take that view that the distance of 12,000 miles did not save us from being involved in the late War nor will it save us in the future. We have to try to ensure that there shall be an Empire foreign policy which, if we are to be in any way responsible for it, must be one to which we agree and have assented. With full appreciation of the responsibility for what I am saying, I suggest that this question today is not in a satisfactory position, and that unless some better arrangements can be made, the position of an outlying Dominion like Australia will become intolerable. If we are to take any responsibility for the Empire's foreign policy, there must be a better system, so that we can be consulted, and have a better opportunity to express the views of the people of the country. That is a matter that will have to be considered at the Imperial Conference.

(c) In a speech in August, Mr. Bruce stated that he was going to press for an Empire foreign policy, and hoped that if this was worked out satisfactorily certain Dominions would abandon their attempts to work out an independent policy.

As to the effect of this policy, and its complete reversal of Canadian traditions, it is sufficient to quote Sir Clifford Sifton, Ottawa, Canadian Club, April 8, 1922,-

> "This statement is rather startling after Sir John Macdonald and Sir Charles Tupper, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Robert Borden for fifty years have asserted the right of Canada to have no military or financial responsibility for a war unless her parliament voluntarily takes on that responsibility. We now find the Prime Minister of Great Britain making the statement that we have entered into an arrangement by which we assume responsibility for the wars of Great Britain all over the world in return for being consulted.....Premiers drift into London....discuss a lot of matters casually....drift out again....no one very sure what is decided....and Dominions become jointly responsible for everything the British Foreign Office does in every part of the world.
>
> I consider it an entirely impossible arrangement. I think it a complete abandonment of the theory of Dominion autonomy as it has developed for fifty years. The people of Canada have never agreed to any such arrangement, and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

in my judgment they never will, I think the people of Canada will demand that responsibility for engaging in any war or contributing to it shall rest exclusively with the Parliament of Canada."

The assertion that the Dominions have now assumed or should assume a share in the control of the foreign policy of the British Empire makes it desirable to consider what is meant by "foreign policy" and what is the nature and position of the "British Empire."

Foreign Policy is simply the course which a country follows in its dealings with other countries. An analysis of the foreign policy of different countries shows that (1) foreign affairs have to do chiefly with economic questions - trade, tariff, coal or oil or railway concessions, international debts, immigration, fishery or power or navigation rights in boundary waters, etc., (2) foreign affairs are largely neighbours' disputes, naturally arising most frequently with the countries which have most intercourse with it; (3) the question whether a certain matter in dispute will lead to war is not so much a question of the character of the specific issue as of the spirit and traditions and supposed general interests of the countries concerned. European states have come to blows over a tariff on pigs.

The British Empire is not a single community, homogeneous, concentrated, with uniform neighbours, problems, needs. It is a league of peoples plus an empire; it covers all the Seven Seas; it includes communities of every conceivable stage in civilization, every variety of resources, every range of neighbours, every combination of problems and interests. The more advanced of these communities have developed rapidly in numbers and trade and international intercourse; they have developed relations with other countries varying with their situation; they have developed distinct problems in external as well as in home affairs, a distinct national consciousness, distinct parliaments and governments to control their affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Some problems are distinct and primarily concern only one or a group of these Empire states; some are of common interest or common menace, and concern the whole Empire and it alone; some are of still wider implications and concern all or a great region of the world, whether organized in permanent Leagues of Nations or in temporary conferences, or not organized at all.

Given, then, these conditions, -- given wide scattered communites within the British Empire growing steadily in numbers, in intercourse with the world, and in the habit of self-government; Given the growth of problems and difficulties especially with neighbouring countries; given the diversity of conditions and of interest and of knowledge which makes these problems in many cases distinct in each country, - it is inevitable that each of these communities should seek to control those foreign affairs which concern it primarily.

This is obviously true, and has long been true of the United Kingdom. Its foreign affairs have been of such overshadowing importance, - it is on the verge of a crowded and troublesome and uneasy continent, it is the greatest trading nation in history, it has dependencies, protectorates, coaling-stations, in every quarter of the globe, - that they have in the past been practically identical with the foreign affairs of the whole British Empire, and are still immensely more important and complicated than the foreign affairs of any other part of the Empire.

It is increasingly true also of the Dominions. In this field Canada has naturally been most active, as the oldest federation and as the community which next to the United Kingdom, is in most intimate and constant intercourse with powerful neighbours, pre-eminently, with one great neighbour. It is unnecessary to review the process by which Canada has steadily widened the range of foreign affairs with which she deals through her own

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

parliament and Government; trade, tariffs, immigration, boundary disputes as to power, navigation or fisheries and other questions which half a century ago were considered beyond her jurisdiction, are now unquestionably matters for her own decision. It will suffice to note one illustration of this wide measure of control - the establishment in 1909 of the International Joint Commission. This permanent body, consisting of three citizens of the United States and three Canadians, is entrusted with the settlement of all the wide range of questions concerning boundary waters, as to navigation, power, irrigation, and the other complicated issues that arise on a three thousand mile border. But further, it is provided (Article X) that "any questions or matters of difference arising between the High Contracting Parties involving the rights obligations or interests of the United States or of the Dominion of Canada, either in relation to each other or to their respective inhabitants, may be referred for decision to the International Joint Commission by the consent of the two parties, it being understood that on the part of the United States any such action will be by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and on the part of His Majesty's Government with the consent of the Governor General in Council.....a majority of the said Commission shall have power to render a decision or finding upon any of the questions or matters so referred." Secretary of State Hughes has recently suggested the still wider extension of this principle to the relations between the two countries. Incidentally, it is significant that every decision of the Commission but one - and that on a minor question as to jurisdiction - has been unanimous.

Clearly then, as regards this wide and growing range of foreign affairs, the Dominions now possess control, and determine the policy to be followed. It is not true to-day

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62253

that all the foreign affairs of the British Empire are controlled from London. It is not possible that this evolution which has proceeded steadily and with increasing acceptance for more than two generations should now be reversed, that Great Britain or Canada should decide Australia's trade policy or that South Africa should determine whether Canada shall join with the United States in the development of the proposed St. Lawrence waterway. Self-government means the right of each part of the Empire to control its own affairs, whether those affairs are domestic or foreign or both. That is the principle on which this Empire has been maintained, that is its unique and distinctive contribution to the world, that is the principle which has been tested in fire of late years and not found wanting. It cannot now be abandoned.

Equally impossible and undesirable is it for the Dominions to control those foreign affairs which primarily affect the United Kingdom. Her geographical situation, her foreign trade, the enterprises of her investors, create many relations, interests, problems which are primarily her concern and which have intimate connection with her domestic problems. As to these affairs the Dominions have not the knowledge, the direct interest, the responsibility, which would warrant their seeking control. Great Britian is also entitled to claim self-government.

Each part of the Empire then, has its own sphere. But at certain points the arcs cut, the interests become common. There are issues which are of fundamental concern to all parts of the Empire: and with these all parts of the Empire must deal; the Governments of the Empire must confer; the Parliaments of the Empire, if need be, must decide.

It is true that there is no clear cut and enduring line of demarcation between these fields, between those foreign affairs which are of primary concern to one part of the Empire and those which are of joint concern. No foreign question affecting one part

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

of the Empire is without its influence on other parts, however small and indirect that influence may be, but it is equally true that no domestic affair of one part of the Empire, no foreign problem of any foreign country, is without some bearing on the fortunes of the rest of the Empire and the world. It is a question of degree. Again, issues which were primarily of concern to one part may grow to vast proportions and afford a menace or an opportunity that has substantial concern for all parts; if so, it can then be dealt with by all concerned. In drawing the lines there will inevitably be differences of opinion, as there are in the dealings of province with province, business firm with business firm, but goodwill and common sense will settle these as they have in the past.

The assumption that there must be one foreign policy for the Empire in all relations is, then, not consistent with the facts and trend of past development and present practice. It is not consistent with the needs and interest of the several communities of the Empire. It does not make for the joint welfare of the whole Empire.

It is claimed that this course of action, this endeavour to change the trend of past development and to set up a common foreign policy for the whole Empire means an extension of influence and power for the Dominions. Exactly the contrary is the case. It offers a maximum of responsibility and a minimum of control. It commits a Dominion in advance to an endorsement of courses of action of which it knows little and of which it may not approve, or in which it may have little direct concern.

The real way in which the Dominions may extend their power is the way in which such extension has come in the past - by reserving for their own peoples and their own parliaments the ultimate decision as to their course of action Only in this way

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

can responsibility become real, can enduring friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the Empire develop. The centre of political gravity must remain in each self-governing state of the Empire. If the Dominions are committed to action by blank cheques given the Foreign Secretary by their Prime Ministers they have sham control and real responsibility. If they are committed to action only by their own parliaments and peoples, they will have real influence and responsible control.

Not only is the new programme undesirable, it is not practicable. No scheme has been worked out, no scheme can be worked out, by which each part of the Empire can be not only informed but consulted as to all the relations of every other part of the Empire with foreign countries, and a really joint policy worked out. The range is too vast, the situation too kaleidoscopic, the interests too diverse, the preoccupation of each government with its own affairs or its own existence too absorbing, to make this possible. We must face facts. It is possible to consult on matters of overwhelming and enduring common interest; it is not possible to consult on the great range of matters of individual and shifting concern.

How has it been proposed to work out this joint foreign policy?

(1) <u>By Imperial Conferences</u>. These conferences are eminently helpful; they are necessities, but they cannot do what is proposed. They cannot be in constant session; they cannot, with the constant pressure of home business, the long voyages, the difficulty of finding a relatively free season common to all the parts of the Empire, meet every year. When they are held they are Conferences between Governments, conferences for discussion, and their discussions are subject to ratification by the several parliaments before any action can be taken. British Ministers may and will give freely and lucidly the information

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

at their disposal; they may listen courteously to advice the visiting Prime Ministers may offer, but if the matter is one in which the British Government is primarily concerned, in which that Government will have to take the action and the responsibility, they will have to keep in mind their own parliament, their own electorate.

Such a conference can discuss with advantage one or more concrete and outstanding questions, such as the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1921 or the question of reparations in 1923. But no survey of the world by however able a Foreign Minister before passive visiting Prime Ministers, no casual discussion of intricate issues, can give the Dominions a real voice in the decision. The Dominions cannot afford to drop in intermittently to these ~~international polcar games~~ Conferences, sign blank cheques, and depart.

(2) By resident Ministers in London. If what is proposed is a link, a means of confidential communication and negotiation, between the Government of Great Britain and the Governments of the Dominions, this exists now in the High Commissionship. If what is proposed is not a link between governments, but a new or super-government, if the resident minister is to be a member of an imperial cabinet determining policy and binding all the participants, that is the old policy of centralization which has been definitely and permanently rejected. No Minister or High Commissioner of a Dominion resident in London can speak for and bind his country; he may secure information, he may convey proposals, he may suggest a basis of agreement, he may carry out administrative duties, but he cannot take the place of the Dominion ministry, cannot speak for it.

This proposal was at one time favoured by Sir Robert Borden, and it was agreed in 1918 that any Dominion Prime Minister might nominate a Resident Minister who would be given access to the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

British Cabinet. It is now strongly urged by Mr. Bruce, but equally strongly opposed by Mr. Hughes. The objections to it were well summed up recently by Sir Francis Bell, Attorney General in the Massey Cabinet, speaking in the New Zealand Legislative Council, February 9, 1923:

> "He would ask the Hon. Gentlemen whether they could seriously contemplate having in London a man entitled to speak for the Government of New Zealand? A minister who would consent to leave New Zealand as a member of the Cabinet and reside in London would, in the nature of things, not be a very prominent man in political life. He would not have been away from the country a year before he would be distrusted, in the sense that he would have lost touch with matters that would be alive around them in the Dominion. It was certain that the Minister would never venture to speak on behalf of his Dominion without reference to the Cabinet of his own country; or if he did, he would speak without authority.

(3) Information from British Foreign Office, cable and letter.

This is helpful as one means of information, but it is not consultation; it is not decision. The receipt of such information is of value, but it cannot of itself enable a Dominion to control policy. Nor can the mere receipt of such messages bind a Dominion to acceptance or support of the policy outlined, unless after explicit discussion. This has been definitely and lucidly laid down in recent correspondence between the Canadian and the British Governments.

(4) A Dominion Secretariat in London, or Dominion officials in the Foreign Office in London charged with procuring and forwarding such information. This suggestion has been made by Richard Jebb (Morning Post, May 14, 1923):

> As to a better system of official information, might not a remedy be found by the Dominion Governments having their own officials in whatever Secretariat is charged with obtaining and transmitting information from the Foreign Office? At the Imperial Conference of 1921, and also in connection with British Empire Delegations, Dominion officials have been included in the Secretariat. Could not a similar arrangement be made on a permanent basis? It would then be possible for each Dominion to control the supply of information to itself.

Mr. Jebb's proposal has been taken up by Mr.Bruce.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

This proposal does not meet the situation. It is the business of the British Government or any other government of the Empire to decide as to what information of its plans and activities it shall send to other governments. As for the Dominions, they undoubtedly do require to secure further information about world affairs, but the place to build up Secretariats for the purpose is in the External Affairs Department of each Dominion, where the information from various sources, official and unofficial, will be collected and analysed, and the officials be available for consultation by Ministers.

It is of interest to note a revealing statement by Lord Curzon in the course of the 1921 Conference, which contrasts significantly with his public remarks quoted in (c) above. Speaking of the possibilities of sending F.O. information to the Dominions, Lord Curzon practically makes the distinction between Empire affairs and United Kingdom affairs which has been emphasized above:-

> Mr. Hughes will realize that in the day-to-day conduct of the Foreign Office and of foreign affairs it will be impossible. Take for instance the Upper Silesian question which is now before us. It is a very critical matter. It varies from day to day and a telegram sent out to you from Upper Silesia would be out of date before it reached you. Nor would your views be of any use to us in the matter. You would not understand it. And suppose that we came to business and instead of four battalions we had to move eight battalions, the other four would not be Australian or New Zealand battalions, they would be British battalions. What you want is greater knowledge and greater influence in matters which concern you as parts of the Empire and in which you yourselves, your parliaments and your troops may be involved....A great crisis leading up to war does not develop in a week or two. A war or any great affair in which you are concerned is a result of a process that has been going on for several weeks or months.

The futility of these or similar expedients in securing any real control over the whole range of U. K. policy is coming to be

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

recognized. Mr. Hughes admits that the Dominions have no voice, only an echo; Mr. Bruce admits they do not control. The Near East episode provided the touchstone for the grandiloquent assumptions of 1921. Yet some supporters of those assumptions still contend that in one way or other they may be made good. It is surprising that they do not see that it is not the faulty means but the undesirable end that prevents success. So long as the distinction between foreign affairs of primary concern to one part of the Empire and affairs of joint concern to all or several parts of the Empire is not recognized, the discussion will be futile and endeavours to work out machinery for giving the Dominions control of what is really United Kingdom matters will be beside the mark.

A further unacceptable feature of the Empire one-foreign-policy theory is that it ignores the necessity for associating the parliaments and peoples in the decision of foreign policy. Granted that a measure of secrecy is essential in the course of negotiations, granted that the conduct of affairs must rest largely with an experienced and specialized executive department, still it is true that is not desirable for any Dominion or for the Empire that vital issues of foreign policy should be determined decisively in a small Executive or Conference group. The problem of foreign policy is not settled when provision is made for bringing Prime Ministers together. Each Prime Minister must on important issues, secure the backing of his Parliament and his people.

What is the application of these tried and established principles to the procedure and conduct of foreign affairs?

(1) <u>As regards the great bulk of foreign relations</u>, it follows that negotiations will be carried on by the Kingdom or Dominion concerned with the foreign country concerned. Where these relations are important and continuous, it may

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

be advisable to appoint a representative of the Dominion in the foreign capital; this is notably true in the case of Canada's relations with Washington. It is however, not in harmony with Canadian traditions that this Canadian representative should be merely a clerk of the British Embassy nor that he should be a Chargé d'affaires for the Ambassador during the absence of the latter. Other issues may be dealt with by permanent boards such as the U.S.-Canadian International Joint Commission. In other cases ministers or officials of the Dominion confer with the foreign Government.

(2) Treaty-making. These negotiations usually result in informal agreement or administrative action. Sometimes more formal executive or legislative confirmation is necessary. This may be arranged by concurrent legislation, or by the signing of a convention or treaty to be ratified afterwards. It is now admitted that the Dominions may make conventions or informal agreements without any authorization or consultation with the British Government, as in Mr. Fielding's agreement with Italy as to tariff in 1910. As to treaties, the process has gone through several stages; (a) first, all the Empire bound by U. K. treaties; (b) Dominions not bound unless they expressly agreed, i.e. negative freedom, (as to commercial treaties, as long ago as 1881; as to political treaties, in the Anglo-American-French draft treaty of 1919). (c) next, Dominions empowered to make treaties themselves, at first with the British Ambassador or other plenipotentiary associated with the Canadian plenipotentiary,- in the Halibut case, with the Canadian plenipotentiary alone representing His Majesty. The question still remains whether in the latter case the grant of full powers by His Majesty, is on the motion and advice of His Canadian Ministers, or on the advice of His British Ministers through whom the advice of the Canadian

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Government is transmitted. A consistent autonomous practice might develop in either of two ways: the Dominion Ministers might be entitled to approach and advise the King without intermediary (as e.g. the Manitoba Free Press says is essential) or, the action of the British Ministers in transmitting the Dominion advice should in time by constitutional usage come to be considered automatic and a matter of course. A very able and interesting discussion of this point by Mr. Hughes is found in the 1921 Conference Report, 23rd meeting, p.8.

(3) War-Making. Foreign disputes may lead to war. Not, even in these days, so often as to make consideration of war making and peace-making procedure the outstanding question, but still the possibility remains.

(a) Declaration of War by United Kingdom. The understanding up to the Great War undoubtedly was that (1) technically the Dominions were at war when Britian was at war, (2) the extent to which they actively engaged in war was for them, or conceivably for the enemy, to decide. As to (1) this position has probably been changed by the measure of distinct international recognition afforded the Dominions in the Paris negotiations and the League of Nations, and particularly by the Anglo-French-American draft treaty of 1919. Cf.Ottawa Journal, June 5, 1919: (referring to this treaty)

> "No longer is it true to say what only this week was true, in words famous in our Parliament, 'When England is at war, Canada is at war.' An agreement framed by British statesmen lays down the principle that although England should go to war in a just cause, neither Canada nor Australia nor South Africa has any obligations in the matter except as the representative parliaments of the Overseas Dominions shall decide, each for itself."

This
~~It~~ cannot however, be said to be clear beyond dispute yet.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

As to (2) this principle has been clearly affirmed by the present Government, e.g., in the Fielding resolution of 1919,

> "That in giving such approval (to the Treaty of Versailles) this House in no way assents to any impairment of the existing autonomous authority in the Dominions, but declares that the question of what part, if any, the forces of Canada shall take in any war, actual or threatened, is one to be determined at all times as occasion may require by the people of Canada through their representatives in Canada."

and in the discussion of the Near East episode, notably in the Prime Minister's statement:

> "We have felt and felt very strongly that if the relations between the different parts of the British Empire are to be made of an enduring character, this will only be through a full recognition of the supremacy of Parliament and this particularly with regard to matters which may involve participation in war. It is for Parliament to decide whether or not we should participate in wars in different parts of the world, and it is neither right nor proper for any individual or for any group of individuals to take any step which might limit the rights of Parliament in a matter which is of such great concern to all the people of our country" (Hansard, Feb. 1, 1923)

It has also received recognition in the constitution of the Irish Free State, based on the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, Article 48:

> "Save in the case of actual invasion, the Irish Free State (Saarsatt Eireann) shall not be committed to active participation in any war without the assent of the Parliament (Oireachtas)."

Note may be made of General Smuts' statements:

> "The Dominions have, in principle, authority and power not only in respect to their domestic questions but also of their international or foreign relations and the questions of peace and war which affect them. If a war is to affect them, they will have to declare it. If a peace is to be made in respect of them they will have to sign it. Their independence has been achieved... [Again] the self-governing Dominions in future must exercise the right to say whether after full deliberation they will join in a war in which any portion of the Empire may be engaged."

Mr. W. M. Hughes, takes a different position. He declared in a recent article (London Morning Post, May 9,)

> In theory, each of the parts of the Empire may

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

may decide for itself whether it stands aloof or joins hands with the other parts of the Empire in time of war. But although this choice is open to them, they cannot escape their responsibilities as members of the Empire. When Britain is at war they are belligerants, their ships are liable to capture, their territories to invasion. I know, of course, that in certain quarters this does not seem to be realized, but the position is as I have stated."

Mr. Massey and Mr. Bruce would go still further, declaring that when one part of the Empire is at war, all are so technically and should be actively. This position is of course linked up with their views as to a common Empire foreign policy; if automatically the Dominions are to be involved in war by Britain's action, then they must beforehand secure a share in the control of every phase of her policy or accept a position as a helot nation. Contrariwise, if the participation of the Dominions is to be determined by their Parliaments, the occasion for seeking such control is greatly lessened.

(b) Declaration of War by a Dominion. If a Dominion were to declare war or have war declared upon it, it cannot rightly demand that the United Kingdom or other Dominions should automatically take part in the war. That is for their Parliaments to decide.

(4) Peace Making

In the negotiation of treaties ending a war in which all parts of the Empire have been engaged, each Kingdom and Dominion will be represented in the negotiations by its own plenipotentiaries who will sign severally, and the parliament of each country will have to ratify. In practice, the extent to which any Dominion will count in such negotiations will depend on the number of other Allies involved and the location of the interests that are being settled; as to ratification again, if it is primarily a British interest that is involved, the action of a Dominion may be only formal, a technical and legal

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

sign of the end of the war; but the situation would vary according to circumstances and the relative magnitude of United Kingdom-Dominion interests involved.

Certain objections may be raised against the "Canadian" view of foreign policy summarized above:-

(a) "Dominion control of purely trade matters is perfectly legitimate and desirable, but the right of independent action in political matters (e.g. Halibut treaty) is not desirable and has not been conceded" (Substance of Premier Massey's criticism, cable, 1923)

(1) "Merely trade affairs" are the warp and woof of the foreign affairs of most countries to-day.

(2) A generation ago many Colonial statesmen from south of the line deprecated Canadian action in the field in which it is now agreed it is perfectly legitimate. ##

(4) What exactly is meant by political treaties?

Why is a treaty as to Halibut any more political than a treaty as to postal or radio arrangements? ###

(4) Is not the more important distinction to be borne in mind the one referred to above - e.g., between arrangements which concern only one part of the Empire and those which affect several or all parts, a distinction of range rather than subject matter?

Colonial Conference, 1887, James Service of Victoria: "When the principle was first conceded to Canada that she should negotiate her own treaties, I remember well feeling that so far as the retention of Canada within the bounds of the Empire was concerned, that was a step entirely in the wrong direction, and I am quite satisfied that it is not a step to be imitated."

Sir Thomas Upington, Cape of Good Hope, "This proposal will lead to the disruption of the Empire."

Letter of Sir William Mulock,- "Canada is an independent member of the International Postal Union and in accordance with the Union's constitution, is entitled to enter any convention it chooses with any other country. I am satisfied that for years the various conventions between Canada and the United States were entered into by these two countries alone without any intervention by Great Britain by signature or any other participation...If it is "loyal" for

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(b) "How can you distinguish between Empire affairs and Kingdom or Dominion affairs? One part of the Empire may insist that an affair is common which another may say is its primary concern:"

True, there is inevitably a twilight zone, a marginal region as to which there may be some difference of opinion as to jurisdiction. But this is true of every co-operating group; it is true of the relations even between the Allies. If claims such as are referred to are made, they will doubtless be discussed and light reached. Experience and goodwill gradually will solve the problem of marginal cases.

(c) "We cannot have six foreign policies and one Empire: it means the break-up of the Empire, of the united front it formerly presented to the world" -

Why cannot we? That depends on your definition of foreign policy and your conception of the Empire. It was asserted with even greater assurance and in more official quarters two generations ago that there could not be more than one domestic policy for the Empire, that the ultimate decision must rest in Downing Street or the Empire would shatter into fragments. It seems to be surviving these prophecies very well. Responsible government in foreign policy will no more weaken the real springs of union than responsible government in domestic policy.

(Contd)

Canada to make an agreement with the U.S. about letters and newspapers. I do not understand why it is disloyal to make such an agreement about fish."

Radiotelegraph Union in same position (Memo. from G.J. Desbarats) Plenipotentiary powers conferred on Canadian representative in 1912.

To be remembered however, that these Unions consist of Administrations not of States; quite minor Portuguese and French Colonies are also included. Our action here is hardly an argument for recognition of our full and distinct international status but it does at least show that as regards the subject matter of the discussion, action in other fields as important has long been [illegible].

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(d) "If it is so difficult to build up means of common Empire action as indicated, will not this prevent effective co-operation in any field, even in what is admitted to be of common interest?"

True, there are difficulties: but the really big and enduring interests are much more easily discussed, it is more possible to secure public and parliamentary interest in them; they do not arise over night (though party and personal crises may).

(e) "Canada is prepared to accept far-reaching responsibilities at the behest of the Council of the League of Nations, to safeguard Chile or Jugo-Slavia or Siam and is not prepared to accept less sweeping engagements in regard to Britain or Australia."

Not so: Canada is prepared to do what her knowledge and powers permit in the restoration and maintenance of peace, but she has consistently declined to give any blank cheques or promise to commit herself to any programme of intervention without parliamentary sanction.

(f) #Canada is claiming to dictate the Empire's policy as to the United States, simply because nearest that country."

Not so: Mr. Meighen may be interpreted as laying down that proposal in 1921, but it was not in accord with Canadian tradition, and was an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the theory of one policy for the Empire with the fact that Canada was controlling and must control her own primary relations with the United States, which form 80 per cent of the Empire's dealings with that power. ##

-- No, when a question arises with the United States in

Mr. Meighen's "Conclusions on Foreign Policy, 1921. (6th meeting, June 24, pp.3.):-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

which all or several parts of the Empire are concerned, Canada does not claim to have a controlling voice, though she may be able to contribute to the solution through her knowledge of the United States situation and temperament; it is only when a question arises which affects Canada primarily, that Canada, in the future as in the past, will consider it desirable to carry it on herself.

(Contd)

1. There should be regular and as far as possible continuous conferences between the responsible representatives of Britain and the self-governing Dominions and India with a view, among other things, of determining and clarifying the governing principles of our relations with foreign countries, and of seeking common counsel and advancing common interests therein.

2. That while in general final responsibility rests with the Ministry advising the King, such Ministry should, in formulating the principles upon which such advise is founded and in the application of those principles, have regard to the views of His Majesty's Privy Council in other Dominions and of the Representatives of India.

3. That as respects the determination of the Empire's foreign policy in spheres in which any Empire is peculiarly concerned, the view of that Dominion must be given a weight commensurate with the importance of the decision to that Dominion. Speaking for Canada, I make this observation with particular reference to our relations with the United States.

(Also discussion in meeting 22, pages 7, 10, 20).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(g) "It is all very well for Canada to assert her right to make treaties herself, but when she gets into trouble over them it will be the whole Empire that will be involved." (Canada Morning Post,

Imaginable, but highly improbable. Canada's policy in foreign relations has been discreet and friendly (with some reservations as to Oriental Immigration) and has been a distinct asset not a liability to the Empire. Canada may rightly claim a considerable share of credit for the improved relations among English-speaking peoples.

Canada has never yet involved any other part of the Empire in trouble; no British soldier has ever fired a shot, no Australian parliament ever voted a shilling, in any war entered upon by Canada or on Canada's behalf, whereas there are a few important entries on the other side of the Empire war ledger. There is no indication that it will be different in the future.

(h) "The theory is a fine theory, but in practice it will not safeguard Canada's interests: if Britain goes to war, whatever the cause or initial justice, Canada will be swept into it by imperialist agitation, by newspaper campaigns, by offers of enlistment, etc., so why not recognise this and try, by taking a moderating part in Empire policy, to avert war, rather than let it develop and then, after going through the paper form of deciding for ~~themselves~~ ourselves, be swept in as before?"

Some force: no question that a real difficulty will arise in Canada if Britain goes to war in a cause that does not commend itself to the Canadian Government of the day. But it will have to be faced, and the Government's action in the Near East crisis will make it more difficult on any

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

future occasion to stampede the country. In any case, the British Government is more likely to moderate its action if it knows it must convince the Dominions than if they are pledged in advance to aid in no matter what cause.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

1493

Empire Boards
as
Responsible Governments

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The assemblage of representatives of mother and daughter states united around this hospitable board tonight may be fitly described as a family gathering. We have come together from all parts of the earth, from both hemispheres, and from both sides of the Equator. In England, I presume, this fact in itself presents nothing that is unusual. It is the habit of young men and women born and brought up in this country to scatter themselves over the face of the earth in pursuit of fortune, and a gathering of the whole family under the parental roof, after the first separation, would entail long journeys on the part of some of its members.

But this family gathering of ours is distinguished from all other family gatherings by this unique feature. The British Empire is composed of many peoples and of many different races. Some of its parts have been peopled from the loins of British settlers and colonizers. Others have been brought in by one or other method of adoption. But the blood gives no privileges. All are equally dear to the mother. All sit down together at the family board as of equal right, and each has his own assured place at the family hearth. And, most wonderful of all, every one comes with equal readiness to take his place at the board, and participate in the family councils.

What is the magic by which this island of Great Britain has succeeded in holding together so large a proportion of the dwellers on this globe? One quarter of the population of the earth acknowledge the sovereignty of our King. It is not to be found in the display of power.

Great Britain is wealthy and powerful, but it is not the habit of Britons, either at home or abroad, to be unduly impressed with these attributes. The strong arm, unless associated with the virtue of kindliness, or employed in the defence or furtherance of right commands little abiding

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

respect among men anywhere. The bond is not to be found in written documents, for of these there are none.

Whence then proceeds the virtue that binds mother state and daughter states, and, through her, daughter state to daughter state? There is no tie whatever that is visible to the uninformed eye. To foreigners it is all pure mystery, and to many of our own people it is far from clear. The Empire has been called, sometimes affectionately, sometimes contemptuously a ramshackle affair, which, said some, was bound to disrupt at the first shock. The War has changed opinion on this last point, however far the solution of the mystery may remain out of reach.

But the explanation of the tie holding together the many and diverse parts of this widely scattered Empire is one of those open secrets, whose very patency defies the seeker for truth. Oddly enough, the British people themselves do not seem to have grasped it. But we, who dwell in the outer parts of the Empire, and who recognise the bond, understand the matter better.

Great Britain is beloved at home and revered abroad, because it exhibits on a national scale those qualities, which make the individual Englishman, a distinctive character among the human races- love of truth and fair play, and a tenderness for the under dog, with, at the roots of his being, a serene courage and steadfast patience, before which all obstacles must finally give way. He scorns the imputation of sentimentality, but he responds to the cry of his sentiments, beyand any other human being.

In her wars, she has been impelled by her sentiments, carefully disguised in the garb of self interest. For three centuries- to go no further back- her great European conflicts have been at the head of those powers, which were engaged

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

in repelling the ambitions of some would- be conqueror, who was intent on establishing an overlordship on the continent. The words of Pitt's last public utterance, delivered at the moment when the fortunes of Britain's continental allies were at their lowest ebb, contain the very spirit, with which she has waged all her wars: "England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example."

Capable, then, as Great Britain has shown herself to be in assuring her safety from foreign aggression, she is even more distinguished for the steady development of those institutions, which secure to its people those things most valued by mankind- the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Our Parliament, which is the model accepted by all nations, as they advance towards the establishment of representative institutions, is but the natural ourgrowth of the Parliament summoned by Simon de Montfort to Westminster in 1265. That sovereign security for justice before the courts of law- trial by jury- sprang into being, full orbed, 600 years ago, and its efficacy for the purpose in view has never been seriously challenged, during its many centuries of working.

Thus much, then, of Great Britain, as one of the great nations of the world. These things, together with her contributions to art, literature and those various things comprehended under the term civilisation, stand out for the admiration of all mankind. But I shall now touch a more personal note, one befitting us as members of the family.

Here a Canadian may, if I shall be pardoned for saying so, speak with peculiar authority. Canada was the laboratory, in which the Colonial Office tried out its theories, and evolved the principles, which in their further development, govern the relations subsisting between all the members of the Empire today.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

When the fortunes of war decreed that Canada should come under the wing of Great Britain, the Mother Country was confronted with a situation, which tried her statesmanship to the utmost. There fell into her care a considerable population of highly civilized race, but whose political outlook was radically different from her own. There was the further complication, that this population were ardent devotees of a religion, which at that time was proscribed in England,

If this were all, there would probably have been no unusual difficulty. The French Canadians had been under a system of absolutism, in which the monarch of France had been both the law giver, and administrator. If when the change of regime took place, an English sovereign replacing the King of France, the British had been able to stop short at that point, and simply take over the government as a bequest from the King of France, there is no reason to think that the outcome would not have been satisfactory to every body. The last years of the French rule had been marked by so much corruption and oppression, that it would have been an easy matter to have contented the inhabitants with a much improved administration of the country.

But the English Government destroyed its chances of a quiet life by opening up the country to English immigrants from the Mother Country and the older American colonies. These were not in the least likely to be contented with the absolute rule of a governor, and, indeed, they had scarcely had time to settle down in the new country and look about them before they demanded a representative assembly. Now, it would have clearly been impossible to elect an assembly at this time, without violating every principle of prudence on the one hand or of justice on the other.

There were something like 80,000 French Canadians in the Province, and the merest handful of people of British race.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

If, on the one hand, the assembly had been really representative, it would have been composed almost entirely of members, who were in arms against Great Britain five short years before, not one of whom, moreover, had had the smallest experience with Parliamentary institutions. On the other hand, to have made people of British stock alone eligible would have placed the lives and fortunes of the vast majority in the hands of a few of an alien and until recently a hostile race.

The handful of English saw no impropriety in the latter alternative, and indeed clamored for it, but such a proposal outraged the sense of justice in the British Government, and a government was established as nearly as possible in accordance with that to which French Canadians were accustomed.

Then, the religious differences seemed to threaten formidable trouble. In Great Britain, they were living under statutes, which practically outlawed Roman Catholics, and presdribed ferocious penalties for all, who conducted services in that religion. Furthermore, so far as the plain letter of the law stood, those laws ran into the colonies from the Mother Country.

But the Government had no desire to apply their Anti-Catholic laws in Canada, and so they referred it to the Attorney General to know whether these laws did govern in this country. By some miracle of reasoning, of which he did not disclose the processes, the Attorney General, in the face of the plain words of the Statute, declared that these laws had no application in Canada. A further difficulty arose about the ordination of a bishop. Here the difficulty appeared insuperable, but where there's a will there's a way, and the difficulty was surmounted, by a bit of kindly advice to the bishop-to-be to go over to France to see his mother, and while there obtain his ordination, without, however, any flourish of trumpets. By the additional device of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

appointment of a coadjutor cum successione at the time a new bishop was appointed, the perpetual succession was assured. By these innocent stratagems the deepest wishes in the hearts of the new subjects were respected, and the way paved for future harmony. Soon after, the old French land system and laws were reestablished, much to the satisfaction of French Canadians, but to a chorus of complaints on the part of the British minority, who insisted that the rights inherent in them as natural born British subjects were being violated.

The American Revolution and the foundation of the United States put an entirely new face on the situation. From that momentous event, is to be dated the British Empire as it exists today. It brought the British Government face to face with the problem, which is still in process of solution. The problem may be stated thus; "Is it possible for a British Empire to exist, every part of which will be so free, that it will have no occasion to envy the United States its liberty? Britons, they were convinced, would be satisfied with no smaller measure of liberty. The problem was attacked tentatively, and generally with profound misgivings, until light began to appear in the early forties, which, under the wise hand of Lord Elgin, widened, until by 1849 it seemed to give promise of the perfect day.

In Canada itself the Revolution wrought a change scarcely less important to it. There had been ejected from the newly established States all those persons, who remained loyal to Great Britain. Most of these came to Canada, and were styled United Empire Loyalists. These settled for the most part in what was then known as the Upper Country, far to the west of the French Canadian settlements, on the shores of Lake Ontario. In their old homes, these new settlers had been habituated for generations to government by representative assemblies, and it was unthinkable that they should be subjected to the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

existing system of government by a governor and an appointed council.

On all hands it was conceded that for the colony as augmented by the recent arrivals, there must be representative institutions. The question then arose, should the whole colony be formed into one political unit, or should the new settlers in the Upper Country be given a government of their own. The question was settled in the latter sense, one of Pitt's reasons being, that the French Canadians who were without political experience might see the advantages of representative institutions as worked by a body composed of men familiar with the operation of this system.

The province was divided into Lower Canada, and Upper Canada, and assemblies elected by popular vote for each. These assemblies functioned each after its own genius. That in Upper Canada lost no time in beginning its work of legislation. In the Lower Canadian assembly, there was much more of the school for debate. But there were one or two racial questions that called for settlement before the Lower Canadian Assembly could get down to business. In spite of rather arrogant protests on the part of the English section, a French Canadian was elected speaker, and the French language was placed on a parity with the English in the drawing up of legislative records and papers. A notable fact is that, although the Assembly nearly always contained a disproportionate number of English members, the House had become so far Gallicized that in 1812 a speech in English in the Chamber was something of a rarety.

For a number of years the proceedings in the Assemblies of both provinces exhibited little that was untoward. There was no more contention in either than was to be expected in bodies that breathe the air of contention. But gradually a change became observable. Clashes between the Assemblies

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

and the Legislative Councils became more frequent and more acrimonious. Bills that were adopted in the Assemblies to meet pressing needs in the country were mangled beyond recognition, when not rejected altogether, in the Legislative Councils. Deadlocks occurred, money was withheld by the Assemblies, charges of disloyalty, either to the Mother Country on the one hand, or to the land in which they lived, on the other, were flung about. Matters reached a point when the Assembly in Lower Canada was suspended altogether, and in Upper Canada where the Governor by the exercise of undue influences of every sort, had secured an Assembly to his liking, the Province itself was up in arms.

The fault lay in the system of government which was imposed on the Provinces. It was radically vicious. The Home Government, in spite of the experience it should have gained from the revolt of the older colonies, transferred the same system to the new Canadian provinces.

The legislative scheme consisted of a Governor appointed by the Sovereign, a Legislative Council, appointed on the nomination of the Governor, the members of which held their positions for life, and a popularly elected Assembly. The Legislative Council conceiving their chief function to be a buffer between the Assembly and the Governor, removing from him the odium of rejecting Assembly measures, which he disliked, contracted the habit of opposition to the Assembly, and, in this way, became obnoxious to the Assembly; so that the harmonious cooperation between them on which the success of any bi-cameral system depends, became impossible. In Lower Canada, the antagonism between the two bodies was accentuated by racial divisions, the Council being predominantly English in origin, while the great majority of the Assembly were French Canadians.

The Assemblies, who represented the whole body of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

people in their respective Provinces, saw themselves to be little more than petitioners to the Governor, for measures which they believed were demanded by the interests of the people, but whose petitions might be rejected or amended by persons, who represented nobody but the Governor.

Such a state of things could not continue. Apart from the interests involved, it lacerated the self respect of the people and their representatives. The popular discontents culminated in revolts in both provinces, which awakened the Home Government to the perils of the situation.

The outbreak was soon quelled, but something more had to be done. It was not the wish of the Home Government to set up a permanent rule of force, even had that been practicable. In casting about for some person to go to Canada, and devise a system of Government, which would restore contentment in the country, their eyes were providentially directed to the man, who had had a principal hand in the measure, by which the peaceful revolution had been wrought in Great Britain in 1832.

On his arrival in Canada, Lord Durham was deeply impressed, not to say depressed, by the evidences of the prevailing disorder. He had expected to see a war of parties, but found, as he thought, a war of races. The hands of English Canadians and of French Canadians were raised against one another, whenever they came together in contact. Maladministration was rampant in all the departments of government. It is probable, and in the light of later events it seems certain, that he exaggerated the degree of racial animosity which prevailed. His highly sensitive mind laid perhaps too much stress on the symptoms, that came under his observation.

But, with all abatements made, the situation was grave enough to excite alarm, and to arouse him to the necessity for heroic measures. Although it appeared to him that sedition

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

was as rife among the English portion of the community as among the French, he pinned his hopes of saving the country on the English. He would pacify the country generally by giving it responsible government on the model of the system, by which the Mother Country was governed, and in order to secure a preponderant English proportion in the population, proposed to unite all the provinces of British North America under one government. In coming to his decision to recommend a system of Government, in which the administration should be in the hands of only such a body as could command the support of the Assembly, he had before him a masterly exposition of the principles of responsible government as applicable to a colony, by an eminent Canadian statesman, Robert Baldwin. In this paper Baldwin expressed his doubts as to the success of a measure designed to swamp so large a section of the population as the French Canadians, and urged the value of complete self government as the sovereign remedy for the political evils from which Canada was suffering.

Durham's report excited great interest and feeling both in England and Canada. To Liberals in both countries it was an evangel, while Tories, on the other hand, denounced it as pointing the road to Imperial disaster. To them it was but the prelude to a new declaration of independence. Its acceptance demanded a faith in the efficacy of British institutions robuster than was to be found in any but a few British statesmen.

But something had to be done. Further inaction was impossible. A second rebellion broke out immediately after Lord Durham's departure from Canada. To suppress it was not difficult, but permanent military government was not to be thought of.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Government took the plunge. Fortunately, a well-tried Liberal, Lord John Russell, had control of Colonial Affairs. A bill was introduced into Parliament, uniting Upper and Lower Canada, and on its adoption, a ministerial colleague of Russell's was sent out as governor to Canada, to set the new ship of state afloat.

Much foreboding prevailed, and indeed conditions in Canada were not propitious. Upper Canada welcomed the scheme as furnishing the much desired responsible government. Lower Canada, on the contrary, was thoroughly discontented. The union with Upper Canada was avowedly intended to put the French Canadians in a position of subordination to their fellow citizens of British origin, and, to emphasize this fact, French was suppressed by the Act of Union, as an official language in the new legislature. French Canadian temper was raised to boiling point by the methods employed by the first Governor, Lord Sydenham, to secure a majority in Lower Canada favorable to the Union.

The first two governors accepted the principle of responsible governments with reservations, which in the case of the second governor led to a breach with his advisers. He dismissed his ministers, and, on an appeal to the country, secured a majority in the Assembly by methods, which would not could not always be defended, and this heightened the general exasperation.

Things had now reached a pass, when the separation of Canada from the Empire seemed inevitable. It was openly discussed in Parliament, in political clubs and in the press. Some publicists deplored it, others took it philosophically, while others again expressed relief at the prospect of being rid of so troublesome a dependent. When matters appeared to be in extremes, a man was sent out who by his loyal adherence to the principle of responsible government, his

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

faith, in the virtue of British institutions, coupled with political wisdom and tact, in an incredibly short time restored peace and contentment, and inspired hopes of a brilliant future for the country under the aegis of the British Crown.

On his arrival at the beginning of 1847, Lord Elgin found a ministry supported by the Assembly elected under the auspices of his predecessor. It was Tory, and predominantly English. Elgin treated the premier with a perfectly friendly frankness. He told him that he would give him his best advice at all times, and all legitimate support, but would do nothing that would make it difficult to cooperate with the leaders of the Opposition, should they at any time secure a majority of the Assembly. To this policy he consistently adhered. When the Opposite party came into power at the succeeding election, nothing had taken place on his part to prevent immediate cooperation between him and his new ministers.

The first ministry was a weak one, always dwelling within the shadow of impending defeat. As a consequence all its energies were occupied in the unfruitful business of clinging to office. Elgin observed on one occasion to his friendly correspondent the Colonial Secretary that, while the Assembly was fully taken up with the question as to who should be its ruler, the Governor spent his time devising measures for the good of the country.

A little more than a year after Elgin came to Canada, the occasion arrived for putting his principles to the test. His government had been decisively defeated at the polls, and it became his duty to summon as his new premier the leader for the Lower Canadian section of the dominant party, a man who had taken part in the recent outbreak, and whose arrest for treason had been ordered by the Government.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Although he had no idea of faltering, his letter at the time to the Colonial Secretary showed signs of the perturbation with which he looked forward to his first interview with Lafontaine. But there proved to be no cause for alarm. Lafontaine was a statesman with a full sense of the responsibility of the position he held, and he and Elgin met on friendly terms, and thus commenced a union which was satisfactory to both and of great benefit to the country. The new ministry, of which Lafontaine in association with Robert Baldwin, was the head, was strongly supported in the House, and was able to carry through many useful measures. Elgin, later, spoke of it as "the first really efficient and working Government that Canada has had since the Union."

The course events had taken, and the use he had made of the opportunity they afforded him, were matters on which Elgin honestly congratulated himself, 1848 was the year of the Revolution in France with its reverberations throughout Europe. It was also, the year in which the Chartists were creating a panic in England. But while thrones were toppling on the Continent, and England, herself, looked about her with foreboding, Elgin was able to report that "at no period, during the recent history of Canada, had the people of the Province been better contented, or less disposed to quarrel with the mother-country".

Elgin's loyal adherence to the principle of government by a ministry enjoying the confidence of the Assembly was put to the severest trial in the second year of the incumbency of the Lafontaine-Baldwin ministry. And the antagonism he hadto encounter came not from his ministers or from the Crown, the only two powers towards whom he bore responsibility, but from a mob in the capital, an English speaking mob, who arrogated to themselves the guardianship of the British interests and the honor of the Crown.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62283

Elgin, in the course of his duty had given his assent to a measure, which had been passed in the Assembly by a large majority, but which these soi-disant patriots conceived to be a bill indemnifying rebels for losses they had suffered in the course of the rebellion. Despite the fact that this measure had been initiated a few years before by their own leaders, they carried their resentment against Lord Elgin to the point of assault upon himself, and the destruction of the Parliament Buildings by fire. Elgin remained firm; the Ministry in England gave him their steady support, and the net local result was that the capital was removed from the city, which could not protect the government against its own mobs.

But the larger- the constitutional- issue was settled. Thereafter there was no serious challenge to the principle that measures presented by a ministry, supported by an Assembly representing the majority of the people, should become part of the law of the land. There were, indeed, proposals made from time to time which were for one reason or another objectionable to the authorities at Home. But as the result of the friendly remonstrances of the Governor, many of these were suppressed before they saw the light. Others, which were regarded as important to the interests of the country, were pressed forward, notwithstanding the Governor's objections. In these cases, the British Government, after stating their objections, withdrew them and allowed such measures to become law. With tact and goodwill on the part of governor and ministry, the difficulties which loomed so large in anticipation, to hamper the carrying through of responsible government in a dependency, were overcome one by one as they came to be encountered.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

One of the most serious difficulties which confronted Elgin, in his efforts to inspire in Canada a faith in its future as part of the British Empire, was the tone of the public utterances in Great Britain, to which I have adverted.

Ministers themselves did not conceal their opinion that it was only a matter of time, before Canada would separate its fortunes from those of the Empire. Elgin combatted these utterances vigorously. He did not hesitate to condemn certain words of the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell on this point, quoting with approval a statement made to him by Baldwin that if Russell's anticipations as to eventual separation should prove to be well founded his interest in public affairs was gone for ever.

Elgin held his fáth in the British Empire, in the superiority of its institutions, and its capacity to embrace the colonies when they came to maturity with religious fervour, and his was a potent influence to check the separatist tendencies, which were manifesting themselves in many forms, in Great Britain.

Before Lord Elgin left Canada in 1854, the Mother country was satisfied that it had found the solution of the problem set before her by the American Revolution, and that it was possible to have an Empire, every part of which enjoyed a liberty, which feared no comparison with that afforded to its citizens by the United States.

Thereafter, responsible Government was established in all the Colonies, which had reached a status, enabling them to take advantage of it. In the year following the return of Lord Elgin from Canada to his home in Scotland, the system was extended to the several colonies of Australia and to New Zealand. The British American colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were granted the same boon during the period when the experiment was on trial in Canada, and the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62285

evidence of its success in those colonies added weight to the evidence from Canada.

A supremely important consequence of the demonstration of the feasibility and success of responsible government as applied to the colonies, was the disclosure it afforded of the unseen foundations on which the British Empire rests. The basis on which it stands is purely spiritual to be found only in the deep places of the heart. There is a class of worthy individuals who cannot be got to see this. They have before their eyes a great political system made up of mother state and daughter states firmly established, each on its own feet, and in its relations with one another. They see the several states cooperating with one another with a harmony that must surprise even themselves. They have witnessed the great spectacle of the daughter states all rushing to the side of the mother when her honor and safety are in the balance, and staying with her through all the vicissitudes of a great war, and yet, with all these things in full view, they cry 'It cannot last, it will go down unless you allow us to prop it up with a mass of documental underpinning.' Away with such notions. Why can these people not see that parchments, so far from strengthening the bonds, will not only hamper interimperial development, but may well prove fatal to the permanence of the Empire.

The future of the British Commonwealth depends on the success with which each part labors for the prosperity and welfare of the people within its bounds. On this point, and in closing, I cannot do better than to repeat the message sent out by the King last Empire Day, to the young people throughout the Empire:-

"On this day my people in all parts of the world join to celebrate their unity, and to draw closer the common ties which hold them to gether. Each of our many peoples has its

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

own life to lead; each has its own work to do; yet all are members of one family, sharing their sorrows and joys. You have learned how the Empire was built up by brave and wise men and women in the past. It is only by courage, wisdom and unselfishness that it will endure. It is a great inheritance. Your fathers and forefathers made it. Its future welfare and good name are, under the Providence of God, in your hands. Do not think of it as a thing far away from you. Every one of you counts, and what you do and learn now will decide how far you will be able to play your parts worthily when you grow up. Get knowledge; be brave, honorable and kind, thinking of others before yourselves; and always play the game. So will you fit yourselves to hand down this community of free nations to your children and grandchildren as a great instrument of justice, peace and goodwill, which will deserve the respect and esteem of mankind."

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62287

NEAR EAST SITUATION.

1. Colonial Office Despatch of Friday, September 15; received Saturday, September 16.

   Facts concerning transmission, delivery, and receipt of.

   Agreement between officials of Governor General's Office and my Office as to time of delivery at office of the Prime Minister - between 2 and 3 o'clock.

2. Semi-official communiqué or manifesto of Colonial Office to Press.

   Facts concerning given out in London, 3 p.m. should reach Canada 11 a.m. (Saturday); appearance in Press of Montreal and Toronto; also replies of Australia and New Zealand.

3. My absence from Ottawa at time.

   Made no difference as to the semi-official communiqué being public in Canada, before receipt by the Prime Minister of the Colonial Office despatch.

4. Circumstances concerning first intimation of any communication from Great Britain respecting a crisis in the Near East.
   Shewen despatch by representatives of Toronto Press about to address patriotic gathering in company with hon. member for West Toronto.

5. Embarrassing situation - whilst semi-official communiqué public - despatch from Colonial Office marked Secret and Confidential and in cypher; impossible therefore to give contents to public;
   doubly embarrassing in that impression conveyed by semi-official communiqué as to nature of invitation sent out was quite different from that which a reading of the despatch itself conveyed.
   General Smuts, the Premier of South Africa, told the Parliament of South Africa that despatch was not to be construed as an invitation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

6. Necessitated immediate cable to Prime Minister for explanation and permission to make public.
Contents of communication cabled to colleagues in Geneva.
Council called for Monday morning.
Statement given to Press.

7. Reply sent to Prime Minister of Great Britain.
Answer of British Govt. to request to make despatch public.
Subsequent communications.

8. Re Prior Information

A. Sources:

(1) British Empire Report

(2) Foreign Countries Report

(3) Foreign Office Despatches

Nature of.
Method of distribution and receipt of.
Personal and confidential.
Delivered at irregular intervals - 2 to 3 weeks.
No despatches of any kind between September 6 and 16

B. Contents:

Latest reports and despatches reassuring.
Calculated to convey impression Near East situation adjusting itself - an impression quite contrary to that of despatch of September 15.
Was it on strength of these reports that Canadian Govt. was to reply "Ready, aye, ready"
To act on secret despatches . . . would be secret diplomacy with a vengeance, and autocratic as well.
State vs. servant of state.
Secretary of State apologizing for manner in which notification given; says it was due to "suddenness of emergency".

C. Round Table in similar error - p. 19, December number.

D. View of the Government with respect to obligation incurred in virtue of receipt of information.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62289

9. Importance of clear understanding that receipt of despatches conveying information should not be regarded as placing an obligation upon the Government as respects the determination of and acquiescence in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom is borne out by attitude of British Government towards publicity to be given despatches.

In present instance -

Government has expressed desire for fullest publicity:

(1) at the time of receipt;

(b) by Parliament.

British Government's attitude that contents be not disclosed.

Inform House that Government has expressly informed the British Government that it will not regard the receipt of information as necessarily carrying with it an obligation to raise questions, suggest alternatives, etc., or be regarded as acquiescing; nor as in any way placing restrictions upon Parliament with respect to its action in dealing with these matters.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

10. Exact purport of despatch and nature of request of British Government, and attitude of Government of Canada towards:

an inquiry not an invitation

(1) as to approval of policy.

Did Government desire to associate itself with policy of resistance of Turks as decided upon by British Cabinet.

(2) as to desire to be represented by a Contingent in the Near East

We replied ~~to~~

to (1) We should be glad to receive all the information possible.

to (2) It was for Parliament to decide whether Canada should send a contingent or not.
That we would be glad to be advised as to the necessity of summoning Parliament, which we were ready to do at a moment's notice.
That we did not think it necessary to reassert the loyalty of the Canadian people to the British Empire.
That Parliament might be relied upon to see that Canada would do her full duty.

Our action based on the view

(1) Executive a committee of Parliamentto do the will of Parliament - not an autocracy to impose the will on Parliament.

(2) The supremacy of Parliament in deciding upon Canada's participation in Foreign wars.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

11. As to whether we were right in course adopted -

It is only necessary to appeal to facts and subsequent events.

All information that has come to light has shown:

(1) That the Government of the day in Britain (~~=~~) were wrong in their policy - which was to dessociate the British Empire from the Allied Powers, and go it alone in settling matters with the Turks, or .....? the policy during and since the war of joint action on the part of Allied Powers.

(2) That there was no necessity of declaring that we would be represented by a contingent.

We now see it was not assistance to an Empire in distress but to a government in extremis, which was desired

That the Government was wrong in its policy ~~which was~~ desired and mistaken in its action is borne out by:

(1) The Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of that day.

(2) By public opinion in Great Britain, and the views of leading British Statesmen, and Journals.

(3) By the verdict of the British electorate at the polls.

(4) By the contrary policy of the present Prime Minister and Government of Great Britain.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(5) By the attitude of South Africa.

That our Government was right is borne out:

(1) By the above.

(2) By public opinion expressed in the press of Canada -Journals as McLean's.

(3) By views publicly expressed by majority of members of this Parliament -Grezzr -Forke .

(4) By the founder of the Conservative party himself insofar as we are able to gather his views.

12. As to any obligation under Treaty of Sevres:

No such treaty in existence.

A document intended to be a treaty; never a treaty in fact; materially changed since signed.

13. As to the wisdom of the course pursued.

A good deal of time has been given by Canada to the affairs of Europe during recent years. The time has surely come when we are justified in giving attention to our own problems, and meddling just as little as may be possible in the affairs of other countries or other parts of the British Empire where our interest is

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

not immediate and direct.

Canada may well follow the advice:

"To thine own self be true".

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62294

Imperial Conference. 1923

Strictly Confidential and Private

Data required for following

1. **Short speech at Quebec before leaving** - Sept. 21

   In nature of reply to Meighen's speeches-
   Significance of Conferences.
   Departure from Quebec.

2. **Interview to be given press on landing at Liverpool** - Sept. 29

   Refer to Conferences,
   To Conditions in Canada,
   Economic revival since war,
   Position of Government respecting
   Immigration, Railways, Trade etc.

3. **Opening meeting of Conference** - October 1

   General Review of Canadian Conditions since last Conference - 1921
   Political considerations of importance
   Relations with United States and other countries.

4. **Review of Foreign Policy** - meeting of Conference October 2

   Canada's attitude,
   towards Foreign Policy of Great Britain
   " Common foreign policy for Empire
   " European affairs
   " League of Nations

   in re Near East
   The Ruhr
   Graeco-Italian dispute
   Reparations

5. **Colonial Institute Dinner** - October 2

   Reply to Toast to "United Empire"
   proposed by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught
   Governor General -
   Development of basis of Empire etc., Form of Government next etc.
   Significance of Conferences,
   Refer to Forestry Conference in Canada
   Imperial Exhibition
   Visit of Prince of Wales to Canada

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

6. London Chamber of Commerce Dinner - October 3

Canadian Trade and Commerce - via Pacific etc.
Economic development of Canada
Investment of Labour and Capital
Building of Empire
Preference?
Removal of Embargo.

7. British Government Dinner - October 8

(Speeches by Prime Ministers of Empire)
Hospitality of British Government
Evolution of Government under British system
Relations - Canada and United States - Treaties, Arbitration etc.
Canada as an interpreter.

8. Dinner Buckingham Palace - October 11

Possible reference to Royal Family -
Victoria, Edward, George, Wales -

9. Freedom of City of London - October 12

Two speeches
1. Guildhall - (IMPORTANT)
. along with Baldwin and Bruce - on significance of British Empire acknowledgment to be on behalf of Canada.
2. At Banquet later.
Significance of Conferences. Place of Canada in Empire etc.

10. Canada Club Dinner - October 18

Canadians in London.
Review of Canadian affairs - Canada's need.
An answer to "Whisper of Death."
" " re G.T.R. shareholders.

11. Canadian Club Dinner - date to be fixed

Similar to Canada Club
(different themes) Britain's opportunity.

12. Association of British Chamber of Commerce Dinner - October 24

Trade, Commerce etc.- (Opportunities for in Canada)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

13. Visit to Fleet at Portsmouth - Speech at Dinner - November 3

14. Overseas League Dinner - November 6

Prince of Wales presiding.

15. Inter-Parliamentary Association Dinner - date to be fixed

Significance of meetings of in Canada.

16. Compatriots Dinner - November 8

Empire, etc.

17. English Speaking Union (Date to be fixed)

On Anglo-American Relations

To be Prepared For:

University Degree - Oxford or Cambridge
Oxford, British-American Club.

Meetings of Women's Organizations.

Dinners to Smuts. Bruce. Massey. Baldwin. Irish Free State Representative

Particulars re careers of each of these.

Possible Church gatherings.

e.g. Methodists, etc.

Visits to Edinburgh or Bristol

Knights of Round Table Dinner

Press Dinner

Meeting of Historical Association. French-English

re Canadian Records and Archives

Visit to Paris - Acknowledgment of gifts by French Government - Vase
France Triumphant - Bronze.
Honateaux - Volume on Canada
On Canadian Exhibition Train partoculars..

Laying of Corner Stone - Canadian Exhibition Building - Imperial Exhib'tn

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62297

Please jot down topics to be marked into speeches and any sources of information or data relative thereto -

Facts and figures of interest etc.,

Stories or Anecdotes etc.,

Incidents etc.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E-1312-3

C 62298

Agenda

(1923). 2

(O.D. Skelton)
JC.

Imperial Conference

Data in Preparation.

Memoranda are being prepared on the following points:

1. Organization of the Conferences: relation of the two Conferences: basis and organization of future "Imperial" Conferences.

2. Foreign Policy.

Organization and status

Dominion participation in U.K. negotiations, policies and treaties.
British relation to Canadian negotiations, policies and treaties.
Direct access of Dominion Ministers to the King.
Direct communication of Dominion P.M. with British P.M.

Specific Issues

Ruhr situation.
Reparations and Canada's position.
Near East and Lausanne.
C Mandates

(Also memos in preparation by Capt. Hose and Mr. Pound on territorial waters).

3. Naval and Air Defence.

Present policies and trend of opinion in other Dominions.

(Also memos by Capt. Hose).

4. Naturalization.

1. Working of present act:
   (a) Cancellation of certificates of British naturalization after 7 years absence;
   (b) Re-Admission to Canada of naturalized citizens who have lost Canadian domicile by year's absence.

(Comprehensive memo by Mr. Malvey).

2. Personal Naturalization of women.

3. General review of working of uniformity of Empire naturalization laws effected in 1914.

5. Extra-Territoriality.

Canadian Parliament's request for amendment of B.N.A. Act hanging fire; bearing on Halibut closed season regulations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62299
O.D. SKELTON, 1923.

The Organization of the Conference

In the Preliminary Notes it was stated that there was an evident desire to differentiate the present Imperial Conference from the gathering formerly so known, and to make it a continuation of the War Cabinet. Some basis for this development is perhaps afforded by Resolution XIV of the 1921 Conference, section (b):

> The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and the Representatives of India should aim at meeting annually, or at such longer intervals as may prove feasible.

It still remains a question whether it is desirable to continue this innovation, which is quite a piece with the conception of a common Empire foreign policy promulgated in the same Conference: the Prime Ministers' Conference would be the main instrument for determining the Empire policy. Unless the Conference is put back on the 1907-1911 basis the tendency will be to develop more and more into a quasi-cabinet or Council of the Empire. It would seem that the question should be raised: what reason can be given for not considering in one Conference, with, of course, sub-committees when necessary, all the matters on which consultation is desirable -- other than the desire to mark out foreign policy and defence as matters to be settled in executive fashion by an imperial cabinet rather than a Conference of Governments?

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

FILE O.D. SKELTON E-1302-3 1923.
2 of 2 - B

C 62309

The Imperial Conference. (O.D. SKELTON)

Preliminary Notes. (1923)

Summary. ✓ Imperial Conference of 1923
✓ Imp. Conf. 1923 - Foreign Affairs
✓ Imp. Conference - Defence
✓ Singapore

1. Relation and Organization of the Imperial and the Imperial Economic Conferences: possible reasons for keeping distinct; 1907 - 1911 precedent not followed.

2. Importance of the Issues before the Conference.

3. Naval Defence: general.

   (a) The proposals for joint Empire action, especially in the Pacific.

   (b) Reasons advanced for such action now.

   (c) " " against such action now.

   (d) Australia's insistent attitude.

4. Naval Defence: the Singapore base.

   (a) The scheme.

   (b) Its History.

   (c) Arguments for the scheme.

   (d) Arguments against it.

   (e) Proposals for Dominion and Colonial assistance: Australia and New Zealand in favour, South Africa opposed.

5. Committee of Imperial Defence: probable suggestion to include permament Dominion members.

6. Foreign Policy: the Question of Control.

   (a) The issue raised by other Dominions.
   (b) The new theory of a single Empire Foreign policy.
   (c) "C" mandates, affecting other Dominions.
   (d) Cecil Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (primarily a League of Nations matter, linked up with Article X).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62301

The Imperial Conference, October, 1923

Preliminary Notes.

1. Relation and Organization of the two Conferences.

The holding of two Conferences concurrently, and the distinction between an "Imperial Conference" and an "Imperial Economic Conference" are new developments.

The last formal decision as to the organization of a Conference was taken in 1907, when a resolution of the Colonial Conference declared "that it will be to the advantage of the Empire if a Conference, to be called the Imperial Conference, is held every four years, at which questions of common interest may be discussed and considered as between His Majesty's Government and His Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond the seas." The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was to be ex-officio president, and the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, were to be ex-officio members, with such other ministers as the respective governments should appoint. Provision was also made for subsidiary conferences from time to time.

This basis of organization was followed in the Imperial Conference of 1911, and in the main in the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918, with the addition of a representative of India. The Imperial War Cabinets which met at the same time and which were practically meetings of the British War Cabinet plus one or two representatives from each Dominion and India, were executive rather than deliberative bodies. The proposal to perpetuate the Imperial War Cabinet did not find general favour, but the precedent afforded by its meetings has clearly had its effect on later developments.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The meeting in London in 1921 attended by Mr. Meighen was officially termed a "Conference of the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, Dominions and India." It is probable that a desire to shelve the question of constitutional re-organization of the Empire which General Smuts and Sir Robert Borden had arranged in 1917 should be dealt with in a special "Imperial Conference" to be held as soon as possible after the end of the war, contributed to the decision to give this 1921 meeting a different name. But other factors, and particularly the precedent of the Imperial War Cabinet, were involved. It was stated in the published report of this meeting that "the greater part of the proceedings, particularly that relating to Foreign Affairs and Defence, was of a highly confidential character, comparable rather to the work of the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917 and 1918, rather than of the Imperial War Conferences of those years." It is further stated that "a precedent created by the Imperial War Cabinet was also revived with valuable results ... the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Representative of India present in London this year were invited to meetings of the British Cabinet called to deal with Imperial and Foreign questions of immediate urgency which arose in the course of the sittings." The main meetings in 1921 were held in the office of the Prime Minister, not in the office of the Colonial Secretary as was customary in the former Imperial Conference.

When Mr. Bonar Law proposed in November, 1922, to summon an Imperial Economic Conference, it was intended to hold it well in advance of any general Conference, on account of the urgency of the trade and employment situation in Great

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Britain. The parliamentary situation in several Dominions made it necessary to postpone the Economic Conference, and at the same time the interest of the United Kingdom and of Australia in the Defence question made it seem desirable to consider other than economic matters. Had the precedent of 1907 and 1911 been followed, a single Conference, attended by the Prime Minister and two or three other Ministers from each Dominion, would have been held, and would have dealt with defence and foreign affairs as well as with tariff, shipping, immigration and other economic questions. The decision of the United Kingdom authorities to hold two distinct Conferences, meeting concurrently, and the fact that in the official correspondence the terms "Imperial Conference" and "Conference of Prime Ministers" are used interchangeably, seem to indicate a desire to differentiate and to follow in some measure the precedent of the Imperial War Cabinet. The "Imperial Conference" or "Conference of Prime Ministers" would thus be a small body, exercising at times a quasi-executive capacity, and dealing with the "arcana imperii" as Mr. Asquith termed them, those questions of foreign affairs and defence on which it is considered by the British authorities that there must be a single unified Empire policy. The Economic Conference would be a larger body, deliberative in character, and dealing with questions such as trade and tariff and migration on which it is admitted separate and independent action may be taken.

Whether this development is accidental or is intentional, it seems desirable that the question of the future basis of these Conferences should be considered and discussed at the proper time.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

2. Importance of the issues before the Imperial Conference.

The Imperial Conference of 1923 faces a number of questions which are both important and thorny. Perhaps most insistent will be the question of a common Imperial policy of naval defence, particularly in the Pacific. The demand on the part of Australia that a common Pacific policy should be agreed upon and that Canada should contribute in ships or otherwise as much as Australia to this common cause, and the decision of the British Government to begin at once the establishment of a powerful naval base at Singapore, bring the question to a head. New urgency and point will be given the question of Dominion control and responsibility in foreign affairs by the review of the Near East crisis, the present reparations difficulty, and other issues; General Smuts and Mr. Bruce, speaking from quite different standpoints, have both announced their intention to secure a full discussion of the Dominions' share in imperial policy and a definite understanding or organization for the future. Specific foreign affairs, the Ruhr and reparations, Lord Robert Cecil's Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, (if referred from the League of Nations) the United States proposal to extend territorial waters to twelve miles in case of rum-smuggling, and many other matters, will be brought before the Conference. The status of India and of Indians in the Empire will come up from more than one angle.

3. Naval Defence:

General.

(a) General Proposals It is urged that a common naval policy for the Empire should be agreed upon; that each Dominion should undertake definite and substantial reponsibilities, whether in the maintenance of seagoing squadrons of light cruisers and submarines, in the construction of naval bases, or in the provision of oil-fuel reserves; and that the burden of constructing the new naval base of Singapore, the key to the Western Pacific, should be shared by Australia and New Zealand and possibly by other Dominions and Colonies.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

It is not necessary to do more than refer to the statements to this effect by the late First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, and his successor, Mr. Amery; or to the statement of Premier Bruce in March that" the Government believe that to-day for the discussion of the question of an Empire naval defence and scheme, consultation between the Dominions and the Motherland is essential, and, if an Imperial Conference is not summoned, Australia will press for one at the earliest possible moment, believing, as we do, that it is vital to our safety and our whole future welfare;" or to his more recent demand for a common Pacific policy and equal contributions by all Dominions. Note may be made of the confidential memorandum issued by the British Admiralty in August, 1922, "The Admiralty must frankly confess to their great disappointment at Canada's decision to abolish her seagoing squadron and to confine her naval endeavours to such secondary forms of cooperation as can be left to a force maintained on a reserve basis; for reasons already pointed out, these can be of no real assistance in the naval defence of the Empire." The Admiralty urged the maintenance of at least a nucleus of a seagoing squadron and the provision of oil-fuel reserves in Halifax and Esquimalt, to the extent of 150,000 tons.

(b) <u>Reasons which may be Advanced for Immediate Joint action</u>.

i. The Empire is one and the sea is one; defence must be mobile, united and adequate.

ii. This common interest and common obligation have repeatedly been recognized, in resolutions of Imperial Conferences, in resolutions of the Canadian Parliament in 1909, and of other Dominion parliaments, and in the common action taken in the Great War.

<u>Resolution of 1917 Imperial War Conference</u>: "That the Admiralty be requested to work out immediately after the conclusion of the War what they consider the most effective scheme of Naval Defence for the Empire for the consideration of the several Governments summoned to this Conference, with such recommendations as the Admiralty

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

consider necessary in that respect for the Empire's future security.

Resolution of Conference of 1921.

"That while recognizing the necessity of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire to provide such naval defence as may prove to be essential for security, and while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned, and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on Disarmament."

iii. The fact that the Washington Conference set standards for the British Empire as a whole makes it necessary hereafter to consider the activities and strength of all the different parts of the Empire conjointly.

iv. The defeat of Germany and the agreement reached at the Washington Conference have not removed, though they have lessened, the danger of war; the direction of the danger has been changed. The centre of naval rivalry and naval danger has now shifted from the North Sea to the Pacific. It is now the Dominions rather than the United Kingdom that are in most immediate danger, owing to the ambitions and the rising power of Japan. The necessity for a substantial share in the Empire's naval defence is therefore greater rather than less, so far at least as the Dominions are concerned.

v. It was the insistence of Canada, as interpreted by Mr. Meighen, which led to the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which Lord Curzon and Mr. Hughes insisted was the best safeguard against possible Japanese hostile aggression; therefore Canada should now face the situation created by the repeal of that treaty and the removal of the check upon Japan.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(c) Reasons which may be advanced against immediate substantial joint naval action.

i. The overthrow of Germany, the efforts of the League of Nations and the Washington Conference to remove the causes of friction, and the general weariness of war, make the danger of a world conflict less imminent. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, stated in his speech on the Naval Estimates, March 12, 1923: "If we are content with an easy equality it is just because there are no underlying rivalries or conflicts of purpose which could bring a war within the zone of reasonable probability in the near future, and because there is a widespread desire for peace and for relief from the burden of armaments which we on our part have done everything by our example to encourage." He added, however, "There is a limit to the risk we can afford to run by weakening ourselves in order to promote peace, - if indeed we do promote peace by going beyond that limit - and we have reached it."

ii. At the present moment, the best assurance of peace lies in the continuance of constructive efforts toward international understanding along League of Nations, Washington Conference, and Rush-Bagot lines. Any new step in armament may break the slowly-forming bonds of amity. If the experience of a few years fails to justify these hopes, we can then, with a good conscience, try the old road of competitive armament. The question might be considered in Canada whether on Governmental or private initiative, something could not be done by interchange of visits, tours of representative Japanese business men, educationalists, pressmen, etc., toward creating a friendly feeling.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

iii. There seems no imminent danger of war between Japan and the British Empire. The militarist party in Japan is discredited for the moment, and even if it revives, what permanent advantage would realistic Japan expect to gain from such a tremendous contest? If war came, would not the United States almost certainly, in its own interest, be found on the British side, and with a naval and military effectiveness which, all in all, has been greatly strengthened since 1914?

iv. While Canada has not at present any very substantial naval force, it does not follow, as is frequently charged, that she is "sponging" on Great Britain or Australia for her defence. It should be remembered (1) that Canada, by her situation, is less exposed to serious hostile attack than almost any other part of theEmpire; if Japan cherishes any aggressive designs, they are not directed against Canada; it is not for our defence but for Australia and New Zealand's that the new Pacific forces are demanded; true, our Pacific commerce would be hit in war-time, but it cannot be wholly protected even with the naval preparations proposed; (2) that while comparisons are invidious, it may be recalled if need be that Canada has never involved and is most unlikely to involve a single British or Australian soldier in a war begun by her or on her behalf, while, on the other hand, she sacrificed 60,000 men and nearly two billion dollars in a war entered primarily to aid the Mother Country in a serious crisis; (3) and that Canada may be trusted to assist other parts of the Empire again in a proven crisis, but it must be left to her own Government, parliament and people,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

after careful consultation, to decide as to the reality and extent of the danger, her power to deal with it, and the means to adopt.

v. It was not Canada but the United States that brought the Anglo-Japanese treaty to an end; in any case, a country which can only be prevented from attacking you by making an alliance with it, is a dubious ally.

vi. With the heavy burden of taxation resting upon the people, the depression of trade, the drift of population to the United States, the war-weariness and the hope of advance by other paths, the Canadian people could not be persuaded to sanction a new and ambitious plan of naval armament except by a lurid and sensational appeal, a cry of immediate danger; such a campaign might well do more to bring on the danger it sought to avert, and incidentally lessen the country's unity and effectiveness in other directions.

(d) Australia's attitude. In the light of such general considerations as the above, and of the technical advice of the Canadian naval authorities, the question of what new action, if any, or what extension of existing agencies, naval, military, air, Canada should adopt, will require to be determined by the Government of Canada. There is no doubt that a demand for further action will be put up to Canada, not merely by the Admiralty, but by Australia, and less vigorously perhaps, but equally directly, by New Zealand. A distinct change has come over Australian attitude on the naval question. A dozen years ago Australia was emphasizing the need for a distinct Australian navy, for at that time the primary danger

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

was in the North Sea and the Admiralty was urging concentration of forces and command; incidentally, the "Emden", the "Karlsruhe" and Coronel proved that there was no little strategic as well as political soundness in Australia's position. Now, the primary danger is supposed to be in the Western Pacific; it is greater than Australia can face alone, she believes, and consequently she is now emphasizing the need for common action. Australian pressure on the question may be less subtle and skilful than Admiralty pressure, but it will be outspoken and may be more difficult to meet if echoed, as it may be, by a section of Canadian opinion.

4. Naval Defence: Singapore.

(a) The Scheme. The most pressing single naval question, though one that may not affect Canada so directly as other parts of the Empire, is the Singapore Naval base. This involves the construction, at Singapore, the "gateway of the Pacific", of a strong naval base, adequate for the handling of a fleet of Capital ships, and comprising a graving dock, repair station, oil-fuel reserves, fortifications and garrison; construction costs officially estimated at £11,000,000; time for completion, 10 years; small vote, £300,000, in 1923-24 British estimates and slightly larger vote proposed for 1924-25; further grants from certain Dominions and Colonies expected.

(b) Its History. In its present form, the proposal is a post-war development. It was drawn up by the Naval staff in 1920-1921, approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and brought before the Conference of 1921 as one part of a lengthy memorandum on "Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation." It has been stated that the Conference approved the plan: Commander Eyres-Monsell, Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, House of Commons, May 1, 1923:

> "This work was approved by the Dominion Conference in 1921; it was strongly recommended by the Committee

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

> of Imperial Defence; it was approved by the late Cabinet; it has been approved by this Cabinet, and it is most strongly urged by the Dominions." (Hansard, Vol.163, No.49, pp.1233).

L. S. Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty: same debate, Hansard, pp.1273:

> "These proposals were before the Imperial Conference of 1921 and met with the approval of the Imperial Conference. It is no use telling us to wait for another Imperial Conference. The question of principle has been already agreed to by ourselves and by the Dominions concerned. After all, what we are engaged on now are the veriest preliminaries. There is ample time to discuss, and we mean to discuss, the fuller development of the dockyard and of the contribution these parts of the Empire may make. There is every time for that at the next Conference .... I have no doubt the Conference this autumn will endorse the conclusions to which the Conference of 1921 came."

These statements are not wholly confirmed by the evidence available. There is no reference to the plan in the brief summary of the 1921 Conference which was published for public use, and while the confidential report of the proceedings notes a discussion of the question, there is no record of any formal endorsement. (Report not yet fully read). It is possible that the Australian and New Zealand representatives expressed support of the plan, in private interviews, but in any case, as General Smuts points out, definite decision on Pacific naval matters was deferred until after the Washington Conference. Certainly, even had an agreement been reached, Canada could not be considered bound by a decision never confirmed by, nor even reported to Parliament.

The plan was brought before the British Parliament this spring, and after a division, a preliminary vote was passed. It was, and is, vigorously attacked by the Independent Liberals and by the Labour Party in Britain.

(c) <u>Arguments for the Singapore scheme</u>:

i. In the public official statements, it is not

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

directly asserted that there is any definite and immediate danger of war in the Pacific, or that Japan in particular is the likely enemy. In fact, the official advocates of the scheme were careful to say it was directed against nobody in particular: "My answer is that it is not against Japan or any other great Power any more than Malta and Gibralter can be considered as a menace against France or Germany." (Amery) But unofficial supporters in the House of Commons debate, e.g., Commander Bellairs, definitely put forward the rise of Japan and the possibility of war with Japan, as the reason, and in confidential documents the Naval Staff have declared that if Japan should declare war on the British Empire, the position of Australia, New Zealand, India and the Eastern Colonies, would be one of grave danger until the main fleet arrived; for a rapid concentration of the fleet in the East, a secure base at Singapore is essential; the matter is of great urgency.

ii. In the event of war with Japan, United States bases would be of little avail for Western Pacific work, as the Washington Conference forbids the United States to develop bases west of Honolulu. There is not now in the East a British base capable of dealing with Capital ships. Without such a base, the naval authorities emphatically declare, the fleet would be helplessly handicapped. Hong Kong cannot be expanded, as it falls within the boundaries (110° west) within which further fortification is forbidden for ten years. Singapore is the gateway to the Pacific, and on the flank of commercial and strategic lines of communication with Australia and is five degrees outside the forbidden zone. The base should therefore be established

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

at Singapore, and at once.

iii. The construction of a base at Singapore, just outside the forbidden zone, is not a violation of the Washington agreement. It was understood at Washington that Britain reserved the right to develop Singapore. The United States and Japan will not go further than the letter of the agreement; they will build up to the margin of that zone.

iv. "There is no use telling us to wait for another Imperial Conference. The question of principle has already been agreed to by ourselves and by the Dominions concerned. After all what we are engaged on now are the veriest preliminaries. There is ample time to discuss, and we mean to discuss, the fuller development of the dockyard and of the contribution the parts of the Empire may make. There is every time for that at the next Conference." (Mr. Amery, H. of C. May 1, 1923.)

(Repetition)

(d) Arguments against the Singapore scheme.

i. Policy. Such a plan renews the race in armaments. It has already evoked vigorous press criticism in Japan; it is being used in the United States to justify expansion of its bases; it has been put forward in Holland as a proof of imminent danger of war in the Far East, and a reason therefore, for the big naval expenditure the Dutch government is proposing (with much dissension and the resignation of the Minister of Finance in protest).

ii. Honour. The proposal is a violation of the spirit if not of the letter of the Washington Conference (It is not exactly a breach of the terms, Mr. Asquith declares, but, in view of the Washington agreement, new fortified bases

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

should not be erected in that part of the world at all unless in "an obvious and urgent and indisputable case of necessity."

iii. Strategic. The plan assumes that the Capital ship is now the dominating factor in naval war, which some doubt, notably the Scott school, and that it will be the dominant factor in ten or twenty years from now, which, in view of submarine and aerial development, many more doubt.

iv. Cost. Put now at £9,500,000 - £11,000,000, but according to some well informed judges, more likely to cost £20,000,000.

v. Dominion Assent. In view of the resolution of the 1921 Conference and the Washington discussions, the matter should have been left until after the 1923 Imperial Conference. The fact that small appropriations are proposed for the first two years indicates that there was no real need of haste, unless to present critics with a fait accompli.

(e) Proposals for Dominion and Colonial assistance.

It is suggested by the Admiralty that Australia, New Zealand, and India should assist in the development of Singapore, whether by a cash contribution or by the provision of material manufactured locally if that is preferred. The New Zealand Government is apparently prepared to make a grant of possibly £100,000 a year; and the Australian government is undoubtedly prepared to give support, though perhaps on terms. In view of the dissatisfaction in India over the Kenya decision and the Salt-tar, and other factors, no action on the part of India is probable.

The Admiralty is not likely to propose that either

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Canada or South Africa should contribute to this particular scheme. While the sea is one, it may be observed that from Vancouver to Singapore the distance is greater than from Vancouver to London or from Halifax to Madagascar. What will be sought by the Admiralty, so far as Canada and South Africa are concerned, will be an endorsation of the scheme, or at least, on Canada's part, an abstention from opposing it. Australia may not be backward, however, in suggesting a Canadian contribution.

The South African government, in confidential despatches to the United Kingdom and to the other Dominions, vigorously criticises the adoption of the plan before consideration by the Imperial Conference, and in view of the Washington Conference decisions.

5. Committee of Imperial Defence.

It is quite probable, though the proposal is not on the Agenda, that suggestions will be made for reorganizing the Committee of Imperial Defence so as to include permanent Dominion representatives. The Committee now consists of certain members of the British Cabinet and a number of military, naval and air experts. The proposal is the old Central Council idea in a somewhat different form; no conclusive reason appears why Canada should abandon her historic attitude of action by consultation rather than through representation on a London Council.

6. Foreign Policy. The question of Control.

(a) The Issue raised by other Dominions. The general question of the control of foreign policy will be raised from several quarters. The Near East crisis last September has made that certain. Mr. Bruce has declared that "we have to try to ensure that there shall be an Empire foreign policy, which, if we are to be in any way responsible for it must be one to which we agree and have assented; this question is not in a satisfactory position

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

to-day and unless some better arrangement can be made the position of an outlying Dominion like Australia will become intolerable." General Smuts, who is more interested in European than South African affairs, is keen to use the Conference as a pedestal for advising Europe, à la Wilson. Lord Curzon will repeat his bland assurance that the Empire's foreign policy is and must be one and he must be that one.

It may be assumed that Canada will follow its traditional attitude of not propounding elaborate schemes of reconstruction to the Conference. Others, however, are raising broad issues and a statement of Canada's position will be called for.

(b) The New Theory of a Single Empire Foreign Policy.

It has frequently been stated, and by men in high imperial places:

(1) That the Empire has and can have only one foreign policy.

(2) That until 1917 or so control of this policy rested solely with the United Kingdom.

(3) That the Dominions can secure a share in the Empire's foreign policy only by action centred in London, whether through representation in a new imperial parliament or council or cabinet, or by advising the British Foreign Office.

(4) That as a matter of fact within recent years the Dominions have been granted a share in the Empire's foreign policy by Conferences, Cabinets, and daily cabling of Foreign Office views.

(5) And that correspondingly they have undertaken the responsibility of enforcing this common policy.

This position was taken explicitly by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George; e.g. Lloyd George in House of Commons, December 1921:

"The Dominions since the war have been given equal rights with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire ... The machinery is the machine of the British Government, the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors. The machine must remain here. The instrument of the foreign policy of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Empire is the British Foreign Office. That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable, but they claim a voice in determining the lines of our policy. The advantage to Britain is that joint control means joint responsibility, and when the burden of Empire has become so vast, it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along."

Then came the September crisis exposing the hollowness of the claim that the Dominions had any real voice in shaping policy in the Near East. But the doctrine persists. Mr. Bruce, for example, while asserting that Australia does not now exercise that control, thinks she can and must somehow secure it.

(c) The Historic Canadian position: It would not be difficult to show that this theory is a revolutionary reversal of the position which Canada at least has long taken, and that instead of leading to increased control it will lessen control and increase responsibility.

i. "Foreign policy" : an analysis of the term is necessary; it simply means the sum and trend of the dealings of the Government of one country with the Government of another; it is not something found only in London or Paris or Geneva; it means, in the great majority of cases, dealings with neighbouring states, dealings on commercial matters; foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy.

ii. The British Empire is a league of states with the widest diversity of climate, resources, races, economic organization, and neighbours; as each part of the Empire grows in population, unity, consciousness and extent of dealings with neighbouring peoples, it comes to have distinct foreign as well as distinct domestic interests of its own (a point admirably expressed in a state paper of Sir John Macdonald in 1880, and in a speech by Mr. Meighen in London in 1921). In some matters, then, its foreign interests are distinct and it alone can adequately direct a policy to secure these interests.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

iii. As a matter of historic fact, Canada, for example not only has developed and recognized these distinct local interests, but has steadily taken over the negotiations and developed the policy required to settle them, - in trade, tariff, fisheries, post-office, immigration, etc., So must Great Britain deal with those phases of her much more complex foreign relations which concern her primarily; and so may, say, South Africa, deal with those many fewer local issues which face it. It is undesirable and impossible to have a common Empire foreign policy in these matters. What can Australia or New Zealand or Great Britain know of our St. Lawrence waterways question? What can we know of British interest in a railway concession in Turkey? Canada's handling of her own foreign problems has been discreet. She has not merely avoided involving the rest of the Empire in friction or danger by any bumptious or aggressive policy, but has in positive fashion contributed to the strengthening of the Empire by building up a fund of good will in the United States.

iv. Canada will exercise a real control and shoulder an appropriate responsibility if she continues the historic tradition, the tradition of Macdonald, Tupper and Galt, of Blake and Laurier, and Fielding, of deciding as to her action in each case through her own Government and her own Parliament. Any attempt to secure a real control over the Foreign Office and the intricate details of every British foreign problem is futile. In may tickle our vanity to try to guide Europe and Asia day by day, but that will be all. The control would be illusory; the responsibility would be real.

v. In matters which primarily concern one self-governing part of the Empire, it should determine its own policy. In matters which are of common concern to all the parts of the Empire (e.g. in division of reparations or settlement of territorial

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

water limits) their various governments should confer and seek to work out a common policy. In matters which are of general and world-wide concern, the League of Nations offers the machinery for discussion. The assumption that all the foreign policy of the Empire must be handled through Lord Curzon will not bear examination.

Space will not permit at present detailed reference to the various proposals by which it is assumed such control of imperial policy could be secured. A bi-annual lecture to visiting Premiers on foreign affairs, from Lord Curzon, or daily F.O. cables which according to Mr. Hughes usually repeat yesterday's newspaper despatches, may be of value, but they cannot ensure control, and the proposal of a resident Cabinet Minister in London, now revived by Mr. Bruce, has been rejected by the various Dominion Governments on full consideration.

(d) Signature of Dominion Treaties:

A matter of collateral interest is the procedure to be followed in the negotiation and ratification of treaties. It seemed likely at one time that a good deal of attention would be given to Canada's Halibut Treaty action, but as the "Montreal Gazette's" London correspondent cables, the question has now receded into the background. New Zealand, however, may raise a mild query. Mr. Massey declared recently that while it was perfectly right for Canada to negotiate agreements on commercial matters she should not deal herself with "political" affairs. It is interesting to observe that in the very first Colonial Conference, held in 1887, the New Zealand representative took exception to Canada's frisky and dangerous action in negotiating trade treaties for herself, (referring to Galt's and Tupper's activities in Europe), and predicted the fall of the British Empire in consequence. Now after 36 years the British Empire is still going strong and New

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Zealand accepts as a matter of course independent negotiation in "commercial" matters.

In an article in the July "Edinburgh Review", Dr. A. B. Keith, formerly of the Colonial Office, the recognized constitutional authority in Great Britain on imperial relations, and a consistent imperialist, takes the position that the question who signs the treaty is only secondary, and that the real point is, who advises the issue of the power to sign:

> "Pacts recognized by international law ... can be brought about in one way only; the British Crown must issue full powers authorizing signature and the British Crown must ratify. The personality of the negotiators is indifferent to the United States, as are the arrangements within the Empire, but the Crown alone can conclude a treaty. Now, the issue of full powers and the signature of an act of ratification are matters which require under the British constitution, the personal action of the King: His Majesty, however, is a constitutional ruler, and he must act in all political matters on advice,and that advice, unless and until the constitution of the Empire is formally revised, must be that of the Home Ministry ..... The Home Government still controls the treaty powers of the Crown; without its assent no treaty can be signed, or ratified, though it is equally true that, as matters stand, there is a constitutional understanding that it will permit the signature and ratification of such treaties specially affecting the Dominions, unless in its opinion, any proposed convention vitally affects the interests of Great Britain herself or of some other part of the Empire."

In the light of this statement, it is rather surprising to note that Mr. Massey himself, who has always been the white-haired boy of the Round Table, announces that he intends to press for allowing the Dominion Ministers the same direct access to the King, the same power of advising him, as the British Ministers enjoy. Canada should warn Mr. Massey not to break up the British Empire.

7. Foreign Policy: Specific Issues.

During the Conference, certain matters which are considered of common interest will come up for discussion:
(a) The Ruhr and Reparations. Events are moving fast and it is probable that decisive action will be taken before the Conference meets. Whether at the Conference or by communication

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

beforehand, it is probable that the British Government will seek endorsement and support of its policy. South Africa will give emphatic support, Australia more moderate approval. As to Canada, there is undoubtedly a growing feeling that the British Government's criticism of French action is justified; that the occupation of the Ruhr is not making for immediate peace, nor for ultimate peace, nor for substantial reparations; that there is some question whether France wants reparations or a divided Germany; and that Britain's policy, though inspired by her own interests, coincides with the interests of the rest of the world. On the other hand, there is more suspicion of Germany than has survived in Britain; we are not able to take such sharp curves, and there is strong sympathy with France, as evidenced notably by Senator Beaubien's speeches and by Premier Taschereau's East Angus message, "Hold fast, France, we are behind you." These considerations make for caution; incidentally, the situation illustrates the danger of supporting a British policy simply out of racial sympathy with Britain or supporting a French policy simply out of racial sympathy with France; the difference in racial origins is a factor in our attitude to foreign policy which is not present in Britain or Australia or New Zealand, and points the danger of excessive intervention in European quarrels and of putting English-Canadian or French-Canadian sympathies ahead of all-Canadian interests.

As for the proposals which will be made to postpone and cut down Germany's reparations obligations, it is true that the chance of eventual receipt of any substantial sums is remote; Germany is not likely to pay much for some years; on what she does pay, France and Belgium are likely to claim priority; on whatever falls to the British Empire, the expenses of the British army of occupation are a first charge, and hitherto a 100% charge. But it will probably be considered advisable to allow Great Britain

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62322

to take the initiative in proposing any reductions.

(b) Territorial Waters Limits. The British Government is anxious to secure united action on the question of a change in the traditional three-mile limit, proposed by the United States. Probably Canada will be prepared to agree, though as regards the right of search for rum-smugglers any decision reached in the forthcoming conference between the United States and Canadian Governments will have a bearing.

(c) "C" Mandates. The Colonies and other non-European territories taken from the enemy powers, it will be recalled, were divided among the Allies, in accordance with secret agreements effected during the war, but on a new basis of mandates or trusteeship, under the supervision of the League of Nations. These territories were divided into three classes: "A" mandates, such as Palestine, where the country was fairly advanced and the control should be temporary. "B" mandates, such as German East Africa or the Cameroons, not fitted as yet for much self-government; and "C" mandates, such as German South West Africa or Figi or German New Guinea, which were so closely connected with certain states as to warrant being incorporated in their legislative and administrative system.

The United States has insisted that no discrimination should be shown against her nationals in any of these mandates. She takes the ground that such discrimination has taken place in certain "C" mandates; in New Guinea, where Australia limits oil concessions to her own people; in German South West Africa, where British imports have been given the usual South African tariff preference over U.S. goods, etc., These questions primarily concern South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and should eventually be determined by the League of Nations mandates Commission; one possible point of interest to Canada is whether admission of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

U. S. claim re German South West Africa would involve admission that preferences granted to Britain by the Dominions constitute discriminations against the U. S., and therefore ground for tariff reprisals - probably not, but worth further consideration.

INDIA is raising the question of the admission of Indians into "C" mandates administered by New Zealand. This is only one phase of the very thorny question of Indian immigration and status, which will be much discussed at the Conference. Kenya and South Africa will be the main issue but doubtless the Canadian Government's policy in British Columbia will be noted.

(d) Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. While this item is placed on the Imperial Conference agenda, it will reach it only if favourable action is taken by the League of Nations Assembly in the preceding month. It is closely bound up with the question which Canada has brought before the League, of the abolition or revision of Article X. of the Covenant.

Lord Robert Cecil has proposed a plan for mutual guarantee, to be signed by such nations as desire, obligating the participating powers, on condition of certain reciprocal reduction of armaments, to come to the rescue of any other signatory when attacked, if a two-thirds majority of the Council considers the other power the aggressor. Each state is to earmark at least one-third of its naval and air forces for such joint action, and to furnish each other military forces as may be required. To meet U.S. and other objections, it is provided that non-European states are not required to come to the aid of European states, etc., except as regards naval and air force. This proposal was rejected as unworkable by the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League, in May. It is now (August 6) before the League of Nations Disarmament Commission, probably in revised

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

form, along with an alternative proposal submitted by Colonel Requin, of France, providing for mutual guarantee, but with sanction for alliances of groups of nations within the larger ring. The report of the Commission will be submitted to the Council of the League the end of August and to the fourth Assembly in September.

Canada's position on Article X. seems to cover this collateral question.

(O, D. SKELTON)
J.C.

(This memorandum is by O.D. SKELTON.
See MEMO. OF F.A. McGREGOR TO
L.C. MOYER attached)
J.C.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

C 62325

MEMORANDUM

MR. MOYER:

This is a copy of Dr. Skelton's memorandum prepared before the Imperial Conference, 1923. From page 10 on, it deals with the subject of the Singapore Base.

When you are finished with it, will you please return it for the Imperial Conference fyle.

McG.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62326

Memo for the
Prime Minister
re Defence
Resolutions.

O.D.

O. D. SKELTON

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62326

Memo for the
Prime Minister
re Defence
Resolutions.

O.D.S.

O. D. SKELTON

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62327

O.D. SKELTON to W.L.M.K. (1923) (1)

Imperial Conference of 1923 - Defence c

As to Resolutions re Imperial Defence

1. No resolution is likely to cover and reconcile all the phases of the discussion during the Conference.
2. While concrete and specific problems may suitably be the subject of resolutions expressing an agreed ~~policy~~ solution, the primary purpose of the Conference in reference to broad questions of policy is to provide for exchange of views and information rather than to prescribe ~~policies~~ action in general resolutions.
3. Canada is much more likely to ~~decide~~ take effective and enduring action in the matter of defence if the initiative comes from within; we

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

must continue to develop a sense of responsibility in this as in all other fields of national endeavour; ~~we~~ we must develop a public opinion & technical advisers at home. If defence proposals are brought forward in Canada in accordance with ~~the~~ resolutions adopted at an Imperial Conference in London, they will meet with ~~instant suspicion~~ opposition from many quarters which would not exist, or exist in only a small degree, if they were brought forward as a natural outgrowth of our own conditions and on the full and undivided responsibility of our government.

[I may add a personal note: I am convinced that while striving for international reconciliation, we must meanwhile maintain defence forces;

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

I should like to see a decent Canadian navy, perhaps beginning with shore defences, & air development & Dafoe takes the same position: and he adds that he thinks public opinion in Canada will sanction advance along these lines, provided it does not come as the result of imperial urging and pressure].

4. If it is felt that some public record of the fact that defence was discussed should be made, is not what is wanted, what corresponds to the facts of the situation, a statement to that effect and not a resolution?: e.g. (as rough draft).

"The subject of ~~imperial~~ defence, ~~was all it was~~ naval, military and air, was discussed fully at ~~full~~ general sessions of the Conference and in committees in

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

which the members of the Conference had the opportunity of learning the views of the members of the technical staffs upon the existing defence situation, the principles of strategy involved in meeting it, and methods of organization and coordination".

If beyond this statement any resolution is felt to be required, it may might, after reciting the above or some similar statement, as preamble, continue:

"It is considered that it is for the each part of government and parliament of the Empire, in the light of ~~the discussion this information and other~~ all the information at their disposal, to make such preparations for defence as ~~will~~ after careful and responsible consideration they believe called for."

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62331

If the other members of the Conference are not prepared to accept such a resolution, then let us drop the all resolutions or stick to a statement, or make no reference to the question at all.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Conference of 1923

C 62332

Memorandum for Mr. Christie:

The Prime Minister has directed me to ask you to be good enough to draft a cable reply to the attached message from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, bearing date the 28th ultimo, such reply to take the following general lines:-

1. The Canadian Government would be agreeable to be represented at both the Economic Conference and at the Conference of Prime Ministers.

2. The Canadian Government would approve of the holding of the two conferences concurrently, but consider that neither of these conferences should commence later than October 1st, 1923.

Mr. King would welcome your opinion as to whether the terms "Conference of Prime Ministers" and "Imperial Conference", employed in the attached message, are intended to have the same significance, and whether it would be advisable to mention in his reply the use of these terms.

March 13, 1923.

(Enclosure filed separately)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62333

Memorandum for Mr. Christie:

The Prime Minister has directed me to ask you to be good enough to draft a cable reply to the attached message from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, bearing date the 28th ultimo, such reply to take the following general lines:-

1. The Canadian Government would be agreeable to be represented at both the Economic Conference and at the Conference of Prime Ministers.

2. The Canadian Government would approve of the holding of the two conferences concurrently, but consider that neither of these conferences should commence later than October 1st, 1923.

Mr. King would welcome your opinion as to whether the terms "Conference of Prime Ministers" and "Imperial Conference", employed in the attached message, are intended to have the same significance, and whether it would be advisable to mention in his reply the use of these terms.

(Sgd) L.C.Moyer.

March 13, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62334

3

COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

CODE.

LONDON,

February 28th, 1923

Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister begins:-

Answers to my message of November 29th as to suggested Imperial Economic Conference now complete, and I find that it is generally agreed that it would be of advantage to hold such a Conference. I gather, however, that there is a feeling that the best results would not be achieved if an Economic Conference were held independently of a Conference of Prime Ministers, and therefore that it would be best to hold the Imperial Economic Conference and a meeting of the Imperial Conference concurrently.

Prime Ministers present at the latter would thus be enabled to be in constant consultation with their colleagues who were taking part in the former, and if necessary could themselves attend the most important meetings of the Economic Conference.

This procedure would be quite in accordance with the views of the Cabinet here, and for myself, I should greatly welcome the opportunity of discussing this year with my fellow Prime Ministers, the many urgent problems of foreign

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

policy and defence which confront us.

As to dates - it would be impossible to make the necessary preparations before June at the earliest, and the answers to my message of November 29th indicate that a meeting in the autumn would be preferred.

We accordingly suggest that both Conferences should open about November 1st 1923 in London.

Please let me know, as soon as you can, whether you agree to holding both Conferences concurrently and whether the time suggested will suit you.

As to the Agenda for the Economic Conference --------(?) send you as soon as possible detailed list of the subjects suggested for discussion.

As to Agenda for the Imperial Conference, our idea would be that the arrangements should follow generally those for the 1921 Conference.

Similar telegram sent to other Prime Ministers.

Ends.

(SGD) DEVONSHIRE.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

L.C. CHRISTIE TO WLMK

C 62336

O

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Imperial Conference of 1923

SECRET

In response to Mr. Moyer's memorandum I submit herewith a draft telegram to Mr. Bonar Law.

With regard to the date, I should think it would be helpful to give a reason for requesting an earlier date than November 1, and I have accordingly suggested a sentence in the second paragraph for that purpose.

I feel quite sure that the terms "Conference of Prime Ministers" and "Imperial Conference" as used by Mr. Bonar Law are intended to have precisely the same significance. Strictly speaking the term "Imperial Conference" applied to the former series of conferences held at the Colonial Office; but people have fallen into the habit of using the term for the more recent conferences held at 10 Downing Street - simply I suppose because it is a shorter term. I myself do not see that there is any substantial point in the matter; but it is perhaps better in official correspondence to use the term "Conference of Prime Ministers". I venture to suggest however that when the next conference opens it would be well to raise at the outset this question of nomenclature and to have the thing regularized, since there is at present some unnecessary confusion.

L.C. Christie

L.C. CHRISTIE

Ottawa,

March 13, 1923.

5.10PM.
MAR 13 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62337

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

OTTAWA, March 16, 1923.

Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

I have discussed your telegram of February 28th with my Colleagues ~~and~~ we concur in proposal that the Imperial Economic Conference and ~~a~~ the Conference of Prime Ministers should be held concurrently ~~in London~~. ~~The Canadian Government will be glad to be represented at both Conferences~~.

As for the time we are most anxious that both of these Conferences should begin not later than October 1st. A later date than this would greatly inconvenience preparations for next winter's Session of Parliament.

We should be glad to receive the proposed Agenda for the Economic Conference and if possible some more definite indication of the subjects for discussion at the Conference of Prime Ministers.

End.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

P. C. Department.

C 62338

(1924)

13

Imperial Conference - Imperial Economic Conference

At Geneva

Imperial Conference

Liberal point of view triumphed

1. Naval policy
2. Near East (ready aye ready)
3. Treaty-making power
   Citizenship with Empire
4. Copperation in defence
   (see Liberal resolution)
5. Conference not Cabinet

   Supremacy of Governments

   " of Parliament.

428/23

Re Preferences -

Borden to Strathcona.

Liberal features of Budget -economy - consolidation
Tariff.
Constructive policy -re transportation
Taxation Reform -
Senate Reform
Electoral Reform - re transferrable vote

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62339

CONFERENCE a vindication of Liberal principles and polides

1. Laurier - British Empire a galaxy of nations

2. Preference - A policy for the Empire
   Inter-imperial trade
   No bargaining, etc.,

3. Naval services for the Dominions less centralized.
   True of army, navy and air.

4. Attitude on Near East crisis a year ago
   Meighen "ready aye ready"
   Each Government to determine for itself in light of conditions as they arise.

5. Treaty making rights -

6. The approval of Parliaments

7. Publicity

(MACKENZIE KING)
dc.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62340

Schedule of Papers relating to the Imperial Economic Conference and the Conference of Prime Ministers laid before the House of Commons.

(1) Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, November 29th 1922.

(2) Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, December 8th 1922.

(3) Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, February 28th 1923.

(4) Telegram from Governor General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 14th 1923.

(5) Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, March 23rd 1923.

(6) Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, April 7th 1923.

(7) Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, April 7th 1923.

D.O.S.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62341

"THE COMING IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN"

By Chrystal MacMillan in "Time and Tide," London, England, May 4, 1923.

It was so long ago as 1918 that at the request of the Imperial Conference of that year the then Home Secretary, now the Lord Chancellor, received the deputation of Women's organizations arranged by the National Council of women. That deputation presented a Memorial signed by fifty women's nationally organized societies of the United Kingdom and Dominions asking that the right to retain her nationality on marriage with an alien, a right lost by British women in 1870, should be restored to her and that a woman should be given the same right to retain or to change her nationality as a man. The Home Secretary was to have brought the matter again before the Imperial Conference but no further information of proposals made, or decisions taken, has been made public.

An effort to bring the question before the Imperial meeting held in 1921 was shelved. The Government stated the meeting was not an Imperial Conference but was to be on the lines of the Imperial Cabinets of 1917 and 1918. Five years is a long time to wait to know what reception the views of the deputation have had from the Imperial Conference, but its forthcoming meeting gives an opportunity again to bring the question of the nationality of married women before a body representing the whole Empire. Since the time when a Colonial Conference first passed a resolution urging the adoption of uniform nationality laws throughout the Empire, and then proceeded to draft a Bill in which the nationality rights of married women were uniformly denied, special vigilance has been required. It has been necessary to urge upon both the Imperial and the Dominion Governments that in future the uniformity ought to be that of recognizing the claim of a married woman herself to the same nationality rights as other people.

But, if there is no definite legislative improvement to record, things really have begun to move. Last year the Bill promoted by the National Council of Women with the support of many other organizations was introduced by Sir John Butcher. It passed its second reading without a division and was being considered by a Select Committee when the dissolution prevented its further progress. The new Parliament has now appointed a Select Committee of the Lords and the Commons to consider the whole question of the nationality of married women, to take evidence and to make recommendations as to the amendment of the law. When the Imperial Conference meets, therefore, the British Government will have a considered report on which to base its policy.

The treatment of this question through the Imperial Conference illustrates the danger to the parliamentary control of legislation if the present method of procedure is allowed to crystallise. The matter is serious. I wish there was space for a digestion on this point. The Empire policy on any important legislation of this kind should not be produced in a so-called agreed shape before the different Empire parliaments have themselves had an opportunity of expressing their opinion on the matter. Without such a discussion the individual representatives at the Imperial Conference are not in a position to express the views of their respective countries. What has happened in Canada reads like comic opera. During the absence of the Canadian Minister of Justice in 1919 the Parliament there passed an Act which gave to married women the right to their own nationality. On his return this law had to be repealed because, forsooth, it was contrary to an Imperial Act which it had been arranged was to be a model for the Dominions.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Could the Canadian member of the conference which framed the Model Act really be considered as representative of his country? Were the other members any more representative of their countries? And yet the Bill was called an agreed measure. And the Governments of Canada, South Africa, Australia and this country when asked to amend the law have sheltered themselves under this so-called agreement. Who is it who have agreed? Certainly not the Parliaments of these countries. The danger of this method of procedure which is creeping into the working of our constitution is by no means grasped by the general public.

Fortunately Canada and Australia are the only two Dominions which have adopted the whole of the model uniform laws of this question. Well, Canada as represented by its Parliament and not by the individual who attended the conference has shown that it is only this supposed agreement which is preventing it doing justice to its married women. The British Parliament, too, when given the opportunity passed without a division the second reading of the Bill to give women equal nationality rights. The Imperial Conference does not need to abandon its idea of uniformity. But this time it should recommend uniformity on the lines of equality between men and women.

Outside the British Empire definite legislation on the right lines has recently been adopted. The United States in September last passed an Act giving to a married woman the independent right to her own nationality and to naturalisation. Soviet Russia has adopted a similar law. And last year a new Belgian nationality law gave to the Belgian woman the right to remain Belgian after marriage with a foreigner.

To improve the law in individual countries, however, is not enough. There are many conflicts between the laws of one country and of those of another. No country can do more than decide who shall or shall not be one of its nationals. To declare that one of its women nationals who marries a foreigner belongs to the same nationality as her husband does not of necessity produce that effect under the laws of his country. Some persons have two nationalities, others have none. To prevent overlapping and the hardships which arise from being without nationality some international agreement is necessary. It is important that any such agreement should be on the lines of ensuing the due consideration of the rights of married women. It is for this reason that the International Woman Suffrage Alliance at its conference in Rome is going to discuss on May 12 the Draft of an International Convention with a view to recommending the promotion of legislation in all countries on a co-ordinated plan.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62343

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

Agenda. Imperial Conference

1. "Statement on a general review of the main issues of Imperial policy"

2. Review of foreign affairs since 1921 conference
present problems. - foreign policy

Discussion on Naval, military and defence

3, " re Treaty of mutual guarantee
(a) Treaty of mutual guarantee
attitude of U.S. to the 'B' mandate
including admission of India into 'B'
Mandate territories
(b) Common conference policy re territorial matters
(c) Position of Dominions in India in
relation to signatures of treaties

4 Issue of naval defence resulting from naval conference - consultation in all branches of defence

5. Imperial air services committee

6. Marriage with foreigners
Naturalization measures to ensure

WLMK
(1923)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62344

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

Imperial Conference
Expert advisers
Secretarial arrangements

Note May 10th
despatch.

Naval Air Experts

Hankey = Secretary of Imperial Conference

Committee of Economic ministers of Secretariat

Cabinet Office accountable to London & part from Nov 1st

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62345

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

Economic Conference

MEMORANDUM

3 delegates
Secretary, Experts, advisers } Sir Thomas Comi
Hon Geo. P. Graham
Hon Chas. Stewart

Secretary, Experts, advisers

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Self governing dominion — Assembly of League of Nations

C 62346

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

AGENDA

(Contained in cable from Secretary of State for the Colonies dated May 10., 1923).

1. "Statements as to the general position on the main issues of Imperial Policy".

2. (a) Review of foreign affairs since 1921 Conference;

Consideration of present problems and future policy.

(b) Discussion on Naval, Military and Air Defences.

Not to be Published →3. (a) Questions connected with League of Nations, including:

Treaty of Mutual Guarantee;

Attitude of U.S.A. to "C" Mandate, suggested by N.Z. (India desires to bring up question raised at last Assembly of League of Nations, viz. admission of the Indian into "C Mandate" territories).

(b) Question of common Imperial policy regarding Territorial Waters.

(c) Position of Dominions and India in relation to Signature of Treaties.

4. Review of Naval situation resulting from the Washington Conference, and arrangements for future co-operation in all branches of defence.

5. Imperial Air and Wireless communications
(As one of questions of principle to be referred from Imperial Economic Conference).

6. Marriage with Foreigners ; Nationalities married to women.
(Suggested by Australia).

NOTE - (extract from above cable):

"Similar telegram sent to other Prime Ministers and to India, and question of publication of any part of the Agenda for the Conference must, I think, stand over until replies complete. I assume, however, that there will be a general desire to announce outline of the programme and this telegram has been framed accordingly, though I should not contemplate publication of paragraphs 3 and 8." (8 refers to publicity of proceedings).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62347

COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

CODE. LONDON

May 10th 1923.

CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram of April 7th. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister begins:-

Paragraph 1.

We have now further considered the question of the Agenda for the Imperial Conference. We suggest that, as in 1921, opening meeting should include statements as to the general position on the main issues of the Imperial Policy.

Paragraph 2.

These preliminary statements might be followed by (i) Review of foreign affairs since the 1921 Conference and consideration of the present problems and future policy; (ii) Discussion on the Naval, Military, and Air Defences.

Paragraph 3.

Former headings would also cover (a) Any questions connected with the League of Nations, including Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, and the attitude of the United States to the "C Mandate", which has been suggested by New Zealand; We understand India desires to bring up in this connection, the subject which has been raised by the Indian representative at the previous meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, viz, admission of the Indian into "C Mandate" territories, (b) Question of common Imperial policy regarding territorial waters, which we are anxious to have discussed, (c) Position

11:30 am
MAY 11 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(c) Position of the Dominions and India in relation to signature of Treaties.

Paragraph 4.

Heading (ii) would comprise review of the Naval situation resulting from the Washington Conference, and arrangements for future co-operation in all branches of defence.

Paragraph 5.

Among the subjects which will also require attention on the part of the Imperial Conference at some stage of the proceedings on questions of principle referred from the Imperial Economic Conference, will be Imperial Air and Wireless communications, and probably certain economic questions of special importance.

Paragraph 6.

Lastly, Australia recently suggested the discussion at an Imperial Conference of the question of marriage with foreigners and we may wish to bring up the question of nationalities married to women.

Paragraph 7.

Should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you are in agreement with the Agenda outlined above and whether you have any further subjects to add?

Paragraph 8.

We should also like to make it clear that the Cabinet here, while recognizing the importance of fullest publicity consistent with the entire freedom of discussion, are strongly of opinion that the precedent of the 1921 Conference should be followed; that is to say, that in cases of questions such as Foreign Policy or details of Imperial Defences, where secrecy is essential to complete freedom of discussion, the result only of the deliberations should be published, discussions themselves being kept secret.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Similarly we trust that any documents forwarded to you in advance of the Conference will be regarded as strictly confidential.

Paragraph 9.

Similar telegram sent to other Prime Ministers and to India, and question of publication of any part of the Agenda for the Conference must, I think, stand over until replies complete. I assume, however, that there will be a general desire to announce outline of the programme and this telegram has been framed accordingly, though I should not contemplate publication of paragraphs 3 and 8.

Paragraph 10.

I am telegraphing separately as to the attendance of expert advisers and secretarial arrangements.

Ends.

(sgd) DEVONSHIRE.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62350

Imperial Economic Conference 1923
Imperial conference of 1923.
(ANONYMOUS)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

1923

November 29, 1922:

Code message from Colonial Secretary indicating intention to hold Imperial Conference in 1923.

February 28, 1923:

Cable message from Colonial Secretary suggests Imperial Conference open concurrently with Imperial Economic Conference November 1, 1923.

Agenda:

"Arrangements should follow generally those for the 1921 Conference".

March 14, 1923:

Governor General cables Canada favours October 1st for opening date. (Fixing of this date decided April 7)

The following despatches from the Colonial Secretary have not yet been acknowledged:-

May 10, 1923:

Code message from Colonial Secretary containing suggested Agenda of Imperial Conference.

May 10, 1923:

Confidential message from Colonial Secretary containing detailed references to certain subjects contained in Agenda (files covering these subjects enclosed in docket herewith).

May 10, 1923:

Code message from Colonial Secretary suggesting naval and air experts accompany representatives at

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62351

-2-

Imperial Conference.

Canada asked to nominate member of Secretariat and to indicate office requirements in London.

May 17, 1923:

Confidential message from Colonial Secretary, suggesting that Conference itself should decide question of publicity of its proceedings.

Canada again asked to nominate member of Secretariat.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62352

OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANADA.

15

Memorandum for the Prime Minister on
Mr. Larkin's cable of the 19th June, 1923.

In regard to Mr.Larkin's suggestion that the Canadian representatives to the Imperial and Economic Conferences should decline the offered hospitality of His Majesty's Government, I would observe that I am afraid such an act might be misinterpreted and regarded as ungracious, particularly as we have accepted this hospitality for some years past without question. Moreover, it is to be further considered that the hosts are upon their own ground, and that it is not altogether infrequent for prominent English public men visiting Canada to do so as the guests of the Canadian Government, whose hospitality they accept in the spirit in which it is offered. I would therefore respectfully suggest that Mr.Larkin might be replied to in the terms of the accompanying draft cable.

(Sgd) J. Pope.

Ottawa, 25th June, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

copy kept for c. C 62353
August 22/1923.

Imperial Conference

Possible question for consideration of P.M. and Council.

Reparations.

The recent reparations controversy raises the question of the Dominions' share in German payments. Lord Curzon's note published on August 12, stated:

> "The principle of the British plan is that Great Britain is ready, subject to the just claims of the other parts of the Empire, to limit her demands for payments by her Allies and by Germany together to a net sum approximating 14,200,000,000 gold marks ($3,550,000,000), representing the present value of Great Britain's funded debt to the United States. The concessions the government may be able to offer in respect of inter-allied debts must accordingly depend largely on the percentage of this sum which it can recover from Germany."

The share falling to Canada from the German reparations payments depends on several contingencies:

1. The total payment made by Germany. The total amount demanded by the Allies has been reduced steadily in the course of the negotiations of the past three years, in which Canada has not been directly represented. It is clear there must be a still further reduction; with what moratorium and what guarantees and supervision, is the question now at issue. The total demanded in 1921 was $30,000,000,000 plus certain sums depending on the surplus of German exports over imports. Recent discussion tends to the sum of $12,000,000,000 as basis of discussion.
2. The proportion of this total falling to the British Empire. It was agreed at Spa that the British Empire

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

should receive 22 per cent of the total German payments. The recent Baldwin-Curzon note practically abandons this basis and suggests as Germany's payment to Britain an uncertain proportion of a lump sum equal to Britain's debt to the United States, that is, Germany will pay Britain X per cent of $3,500,000,000 and France will pay her Y per cent. At the Conference of 1921 it was assumed that Germany's payments to the British Empire would total $7,070,000,000. France's debt to Great Britain is (from memory) another $3,000,000,000. Now the British Government declares its willingness to accept as its share (or the British Empire's share) $3,550,000,000 in satisfaction of both payments, or one-third of the total assumed in 1921.

3. The proportion of the British Empire's share to be assigned to Canada. It was agreed at the Conference in 1921 that the United Kingdom should receive 86.85 of the British Empire share, Canada 4.35 per cent, Australia 4.35 per cent, and so on. Does this proportion stand? If so, on what sum is it to be calculated? It is not clear from Lord Curzon's statement whether he assumes that the Dominions' share is to be included in what Britain now demands from Germany plus France, or whether, as is more probable, it is to be additional; if so, how computed?

4. The possible deduction of the costs of the British army of occupation in Cologne, from any payments made by Germany, before the Dominions receive a share. Thus

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

far the costs of the British army of occupation have equalled or exceeded the amount received by the British Empire from Germany as reparations payments. I have not found in the Conference reports any agreement by the Dominions that these costs should be deducted from reparations: has any such understanding been reached?

It is not possible with the situation changing so rapidly from day to day to decide definitely what aims Canada should ask. Doubtless the Finance Minister has not been counting very definitely on receiving anything from this source, and public opinion would agree that peace is more important than shadowy reparations payments. At the same time, if Britain and other countries are exacting payments, though on a reduced basis, the Canadian people and government will doubtless expect a share. As a basis for discussion it may be noted that Canada's share as set by the Spa Conference and the Imperial Conference of 1921 is approximately 1 per cent of Germany's total payment (4.35 per cent of 22 per cent or .957 of 1 per cent). If the Allies continue to act jointly, this percentage of any reduced total might stand if, as is possible, though certainly not desirable, they take separate action, France and Belgium looking to the Ruhr for her returns and Britain, and Italy making a separate agreement with Germany, a different basis of calculation will have to be adopted to meet the circumstances.

(O. D. Skelton)
J.C.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

C 62356

MEMORANDUM

Friday,
September 7,
1923

MR. KING: Liberal Party & the Imperial Conf. 1923

I had a talk this morning with Tom Fraser about the Overseas proposition and find that he is in very much the same position as Bishop. He represents a great many Tory papers throughout the Dominion, and could not very well, therefore, undertake a mission of the kind without prejudicing himself in the eyes of the papers he represents.

Fraser was very appreciative of your thought of him and hoped you would not misunderstand his inability to accept. If it were not for the circumstances mentioned he would be only too eager to arrange for the trip.

McG.

WLK

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E.1302-3:

O - C 62357 225

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

Saturday,
September 8,
1923

MR. KING:

In talking further with Tom Fraser last night he suggested that you could not do better than arrange to have Mr. Grange make the trip with you Overseas. Fraser thought he could make connections with a number of good papers.

McG.
F.A. McGREGOR

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62358

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

SECRET.

E. 67.

65

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

GRANT OF NATURALISATION TO PERSONS RESIDENT IN MANDATED TERRITORIES.

Joint Memorandum by the Home Office and Colonial Office.

THE Commonwealth Government have asked that the question of amending "The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914," so as to permit of the grant of naturalisation to persons resident in mandated territories may be brought before the Imperial Conference. It is understood that the Commonwealth Government have in mind Imperial naturalisation, and the amendment which they suggest is one to the effect that residence in "B" or "C" mandated territories should count as residence in His Majesty's dominions for the purpose of qualifying by residence for naturalisation.

2. In this connection, the Commonwealth Government have referred to the proposal submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Permanent Mandates Commission in August 1922, which was in the following terms:—

> "It is open to mandatory Powers to whom 'B' and 'C' mandated "territories have been entrusted to make arrangement in conformity with "their own laws for the individual and purely voluntary acquisition of their "nationality by inhabitants of these territories."

3. The matter was considered by the Council of the League in April 1923, and the following resolutions were adopted:—

(1.) The status of the native inhabitants of a mandated territory is distinct from that of the nationals of the mandatory Power, and cannot be identified therewith by any process having general application.

(2.) The native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not invested with the nationality of the mandatory Power by reason of the protection extended to them.

(3.) It is not inconsistent with (1) and (2) above that individual inhabitants of the territory should voluntarily obtain naturalisation from the mandatory Power in accordance with arrangements which it is open to such Power to make with this object under its own law.

4. Hitherto naturalisation, except on the ground of service under the Crown in foreign countries, has depended on residence in British territory, and it has been considered undesirable to allow naturalisation on account of residence in protectorates on the ground that it is contrary to sound principle to exercise such a high right of sovereignty as that involved in changing the nationality of an inhabitant in a territory which does not form part of His Majesty's dominions. Only two exceptions to this principle have been admitted, namely, in South and Northern Rhodesia, where *local* naturalisation has been provided for by Orders in Council.

5. If provision is to be made for Imperial naturalisation in mandated territories, and it would appear from the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations quoted above that the League entertains no objection to this as regards "B" and "C" mandated territories, it will be necessary to make similar provision in protectorates to which these territories are analogous.

6. The position is different as regards protected States where there are local rulers and the native inhabitants are subjects of those rulers. It would hardly be

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

possible for His Majesty to take power to enable such subjects of the local rulers to transfer their allegiance to himself, and even if naturalisation in such territories were confined to persons who were not subjects of the local rulers it is probable that the local rulers would object to such action as an infringement of their own sovereign rights and powers. Somewhat similar objections would apply to a proposition to provide for Imperial naturalisation in "A" mandated territories, the position of which is analogous to that of protected States.

7. If a general desire is expressed for such a change in the law as is proposed by the Commonwealth Government, the most convenient method of procedure would appear to be that, when next legislation amending the Act of 1914 is introduced, provision should at the same time be made enabling the Act to be applied by Order of His Majesty in Council (or, in the case of territories mandated to dominions, Order of the Governor-General in Council), to the territories in question, subject to such modifications and adaptations as may be necessary. Having regard to the difficulty which arises in connection with protected States and "A" mandated territories, it would be desirable not to provide generally for the application of the Act to "any territory under His Majesty's protection or in "respect of which a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations has been "accepted by His Majesty," but to provide for its application to certain individual territories specified in a schedule to the Act. This schedule would include "B" and "C" mandated territories and most of the protectorates, as to which no difficulty in regard to sovereignty occurs, but would not include "A" mandated territories or protected States.

8. *Nationality of Children Born to British Subjects in Mandated Territories.*—Somewhat similar considerations underlie another question which arises out of the scheme for the continuance of British nationality amongst successive generations born abroad contained in "The British Nationality and Status of "Aliens Act, 1922." It would appear that, as regards the children of British subjects born in "B" and "C" mandated territories, there is no necessity to go through the procedure contemplated in the Act of 1922 in order that they may obtain British nationality at birth and retain it at majority. It would seem that they are to be deemed to be "born in a place where by treaty, capitulation, grant, "usage, sufferance or other lawful means His Majesty exercises jurisdiction over "British subjects," and they therefore acquire British nationality at birth in their own right under the proviso to section 1 (1) of the Act of 1914, as amended in 1922. Children born in protectorates appear to be in the same position. On the other hand, children born in protected States and in "A" mandated territories would appear not to acquire or retain British nationality except in pursuance of the procedure laid down in the Act of 1922 in regard to registration at birth and assertion of British nationality at majority.

September 10, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62360 227

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

Imperial Conference 1923
The Press

Tuesday,
September 11,
1923

MR. KING:

I just had a talk with Mr. H.E.M. Chisholm. He was greatly pleased that you had thought of him, but explained that on account of Mr. Dafoe's going to England, it would be practically impossible for him to consider it. He thought that Mr. Dafoe would rather resent his raising the question, which, of course, he would have to do. He explained that Mr. Dafoe would probably be sending reports to the Toronto "Globe" - and just possibly the Vancouver Province - as well as to the Manitoba "Free Press".

Another consideration which presents difficulties is that there are no papers, other than those which have already been provided for, which are big enough to take such a special service.

McG.
F.A. McGREGOR

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

S.C.

Prof. Cudmore:

C 62361 E-1302-3
2-1900

Attached is a typed copy of Mr. King's memorandum of the various occasions on which he will be expected to speak in the course of his pending Overseas trip. Mr. King requests that you suggest topics to be touched on, and assemble helpful material for his assistance in the preparation of each of these addresses. He is counting on having your copy not later than the end of the present week.

Sept. 11, 1923

Private Secretary.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Please return C 62362
this mems. when
finished.

Strictly Confidential
and
Private

Data required for following

1. Short speech at Quebec before leaving - Sept. 21

In nature of reply to Meighen's speeches-
Significance of Conferences.
Departure from Quebec.

2. Interview to be given press on landing at Liverpool - Sept. 29

Refer to Conferences,
To Conditions in Canada,
Economic revival since war,
Position of Government respecting
Immigration, Railways, Trade etc.

3. Opening meeting of Conference - October 1

General Review of Canadian Conditions since last
Conference - 1921
Political considerations of importance
Relations with United States and other countries.

4. Review of Foreign Policy - meeting of Conference October 2

Canada's attitude,
towards Foreign Policy of Great Britain
" Common foreign policy for Empire
" European affairs
" League of Nations

in re Near East
The Ruhr
Graeco-Italian dispute
Reparations

5. Colonial Institute Dinner - October 2

Reply to Toast to "United Empire"
proposed by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught
Governor General -
Development of basis of Empire etc., Form of Government next etc.
Significance of Conferences,
Refer to Forestry Conference in Canada
Imperial Exhibition
Visit of Prince of Wales to Canada

9/3

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

6. London Chamber of Commerce Dinner - October 3

X Canadian Trade and Commerce - via Pacific etc.
Economic development of Canada
Investment of Labour and Capital
Building of Empire
Preference?
Removal of Embargo.

7. British Government Dinner - October 8

(Speeches by Prime Ministers of Empire)
Hospitality of British Government
Evolution of Government under British system
Relations - Canada and United States - Treaties, Arbitration etc.
Canada as an interpreter.

8. Dinner Buckingham Palace - October 11

Possible reference to Royal Family -
Victoria, Edward, George, Wales -

9. Freedom of City of London - October 12

Two speeches
1. Guildhall - (IMPORTANT)
2. along with Baldwin and Bruce - on significance of British Empire acknowledgment to be on behalf of Canada.
2. At Banquet later.
Significance of Conferences. Place of Canada in Empire etc.

10. Canada Club Dinner - October 18

Canadians in London.
Review of Canadian affairs - Canada's need.
An answer to "Whisper of Death."
" " re G.T.R. shareholders.

11. Canadian Club Dinner - date to be fixed

Similar to Canada Club
(different themes) Britain's opportunity.

12. Association of British Chamber of Commerce Dinner - October 24

Trade, Commerce etc.- (Opportunities for in Canada)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

13. Visit to Fleet at Portsmouth - Speech at Dinner - November 3

14. Overseas League Dinner - November 6

Prince of Wales presiding.

15. Inter-Parliamentary Association Dinner - date to be fixed

Significance of meetings of in Canada.

16. Compatriots Dinner - November 8

Empire, etc.

17. English Speaking Union (Date to be fixed)

On Anglo-American Relations

To be Prepared For:

University Degree - Oxford or Cambridge
Oxford, British-American Club.

Meetings of Women's Organizations.

Dinners to Smuts, Bruce, Massey, Baldwin, Irish Free State Representative

Particulars re careers of each of these.

Possible Church gatherings.

e.g. Methodists, etc.

Visits to Edinburgh or Bristol

Knights of Round Table Dinner

Press Dinner

Meeting of Historical Association. French-English

re Canadian Records and Archives

Visit to Paris - Acknowledgment of gifts by French Government - Vase
France Triumphant - Bronze.
Honoteaux - Volume on Canada
On Canadian Exhibition Train particulars..

Laying of Corner Stone - Canadian Exhibition Building - Imperial Exhib'tn

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62365

Please jot down topics to be marked into speeches and any sources of information or data relative thereto -

Facts and figures of interest etc.,

Stories or Anecdotes etc.,

Incidents etc.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62366

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E 68.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

57

Imperial Airship Scheme.

Statement made in the House of Commons, by the Secretary of State for Air, on July 26, 1923.

(Extract from Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 167. No. 105, Thursday, July 26, 1923.)

THE question of the development of airships has recently been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Imperial Shipping Committee. The Committee of Imperial Defence attaches considerable strategic value to airships, whilst the Imperial Shipping Committee considers that it is by means of an airship service that the carriage of mails can most cheaply be expedited to the Far East and Australia.

The Government have, therefore, decided to resume the development of airships and to proceed, if possible, by means of a commercial service rather than by State operation.

Proposals have been placed before them by the hon. and gallant Member for Uxbridge (Lieut.-Commander Burney), under which a bi-weekly service of six large airships to India will eventually be set up. The Government have accepted the scheme in principle, subject to the details of the contract being satisfactorily settled by the Treasury. The House of Commons will have an opportunity of considering the scheme when the details have been provisionally agreed.

The Dominions are being informed of this decision, and it is hoped to discuss the question at the Imperial Conference with a view to their co-operation in the scheme.

The administration of the scheme in so far as it is a matter of commercial aviation will come under the Air Ministry.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
September 20, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 62367

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SECRET.

E/64. REVISED.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on the Limits of Territorial Waters.

AS the result of correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, an Inter-Departmental Committee was convened for the purpose of preparing, for reference to the Dominions and India, a draft memorandum regarding the adoption of a common policy for the Empire in respect of the limits of territorial waters. It is anticipated that this question will receive consideration at the Imperial Conference to be held in October 1923.

2. The Committee met at the Admiralty on the 4th, 11th and 22nd January, 6th and 22nd February, and 16th April. Representatives attended from the following Departments :—

Home Office.
Foreign Office.
Colonial Office.
India Office.
Admiralty.
Board of Trade.
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
Board of Customs and Excise.
Scottish Office.
Fishery Board for Scotland.

3. The accompanying memorandum has been drawn up as the result of the deliberations of the Committee.

4. In view of recent war experience, the Admiralty representatives emphasised the paramount importance of opposing any recognition of territorial waters beyond the 3-mile limit. So far as the open coast is concerned, the Committee were unanimously in agreement with this view, which is in accordance with the traditional policy of the British Empire.

5. With regard, however, to the question of bays and other inlets, it is unanimously recognised that exceptions to the strict application of this rule must be made in the case of certain areas described in paragraph 16 of the memorandum as territorial inlets. It is also agreed that in the case of bays whose width at the entrance does not exceed 6 miles, universal practice is in favour of placing the limit of territorial waters 3 miles to the seaward of a straight line drawn across the entrance.

6. It has also been proposed by the representatives of the Scottish Departments concerned in fishery administration that a further exception, applicable to fishery purposes only, should be made in the case of bays. They consider that British policy should be directed to obtaining universal recognition for the 10-mile bay rule, as embodied in the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882, as a general rule for all countries, but applying to fisheries only ; in other words, that the 3-mile limit in bays should have as its starting point a line drawn across the bay at the first point where the width does not exceed 10 miles.

7. The arguments adduced by them in support of this proposal are briefly :—

(1.) The special practical significance of the 10-mile bay rule in the case of fisheries, which is referred to in paragraph 9 of the memorandum ;

(2.) The recognition by British practice and certain utterances of British statesmen and by international jurists of the view that the 3-mile limit is subject to some qualification in its application to bays of a certain width ;

(3.) The desirability of substituting a general rule in place of the limited measure of uniformity already attained by separate international conventions, which they regard rather as giving formal recognition and definition to an existing principle than as introducing a new one ; and

(4.) The special importance of the proposed rule to Scotland, whose coast is much indented by bays and inlets and is inhabited by a large fishing population.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

8. The other members of the Committee feel that if the British Delegates at an International Conference took the initiative in proposing this rule for fishery purposes it would render it more difficult for them to oppose wider claims not necessarily limited to fisheries. These difficulties would not arise in the same degree if the policy adopted were not to put forward this rule, but to accept it, for fishery purposes only, on its being proposed by other Powers with substantial support; and on these lines the Committee have found it possible to reach an agreed conclusion, which is expressed in paragraph 20 of the memorandum.

(Signed)	F. C. LEARMONTH, Rear-Admiral and Hydrographer (*Chairman*)	Admiralty.
	J. V. CREAGH ...	
	W. H. HANCOCK ...	
	R. T. GOULD	
	M. SHEARMAN	Foreign Office.
	JOHN RISLEY	Colonial Office.
	J. C. WALTON	India Office.
	P. J. ROSE	Scottish Office.
	G. A. STEEL	
	DAVID T. JONES ...	Fishery Board for Scotland.
	HENRY G. MAURICE	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
	H. S. MOSS-BLUNDELL	
	G. E. BAKER	Board of Trade.
	A. E. LEE	
	B. HAWKINS	Board of Customs and Excise.
	WILLIAM CHRISTIAN	
	L. S. BRASS	Home Office.

June 1923.

(Confidential.)

Memorandum regarding a Common Policy for the British Empire on the Question of the Limits of Territorial Waters.

The question of the extent of territorial waters is of the greatest importance to the British Empire, particularly in time of war, when any considerable extension of territorial waters would gravely hamper the exercise of naval power. As is well known, the views of this country and of a number of other Powers are by no means in agreement, and it is probable that it will be impossible to avoid an international conference on the subject in the near future. It is therefore essential that a common policy for the Empire with regard to all aspects of the question should be arrived at by mutual agreement, thus enabling a united front to be presented to any proposed alteration of the present conditions which would operate to the disadvantage of the Empire.

2. While fully recognising the importance which must be attached to the other aspects of the questions (fisheries, customs, &c.), it is considered that the naval aspect is, from the Empire point of view, of pre-eminent importance, and that consequently the object to be aimed at is, generally speaking, to reduce as far as possible the restrictions placed by territorial waters upon the exercise of naval power.

3. His Majesty's Government have always opposed the recognition by this country of the claim of any other Power to exercise jurisdiction outside a 3-mile limit, which has generally come to be understood as the envelope of all circles of a radius of 3 nautical miles whose centres are on the low-water mark of the coastline.

4. This limit has also been adopted by most other Powers, but some exemptions from its rigid application are generally claimed, particularly as regards bays, while several Powers refuse *in toto* to accept this limit and put forward varied claims to wider limits.

5. The following are the principal Powers that recognise the 3-mile limit :—

Great Britain, United States of America, Japan, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Portugal and Austria.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62369

. Wider limits as shown below are understood to be claimed by certain Powers :—

Power.	Extent of Territorial Waters Claimed.	For what Purposes.	Remarks.
Spain	6 miles	All	Old-standing claim.
Norway	4 miles	All	Old-standing claim; mutually recognised by the three countries named, but not by other Powers.
Sweden			
Denmark*			
Norway	10 miles	Customs...	Recent claim; intended to aid enforcement of prohibition.
Russia	12 miles	Mainly fisheries ...	Recent revival of unsuccessful claim made in 1911.
France	6 miles	Fisheries (in Morocco) and Neutrality	Accepts 3 miles for exclusive fishery limits in the North Sea and in the English Channel under Fishery Conventions.
Italy ...	10 miles	Control of merchant vessels	Law of 1912.
	6 miles	Neutrality	Decree of 1914.
Greece	10 miles	Neutrality	Put forward in 1913
Uruguay	5 miles	All	Put forward in 1914.
Ecuador	12 miles	Neutrality	Put forward in 1914.
Colombia	12 miles	Fisheries. Deposits of hydrocarbons	Put forward in 1923.

* Denmark has accepted the 3-mile limit for purpose of exclusive fishery limits in the North Sea.

7. In addition to these claims to a greater limit of territorial waters than 3 miles, special territorial rights over certain bays, &c., are claimed by various Powers, including both those who do, and those who do not, accept the principle of the 3-mile limit.

8. There also appears to be a growing tendency to claim for all purposes the application of a rule laid down in various Fishery Conventions that for purposes of fishery protection the 3-mile limit in bays should have as its starting-point a line drawn across the bay at the first point where the width does not exceed 10 miles.

9. In the case of fisheries, as distinguished from other purposes, a practical basis can be adduced in support of the 10-mile rule for bays. In a bay of 10 miles or less in width, fishing in the narrow limits of the free waters between the 3-mile lines drawn on each side of the bay would be impracticable. If foreign fishing craft were allowed to fish in such a small space, there would be a constant risk of their violating territorial waters. They are, therefore, in certain cases excluded altogether from such bays by International Convention.

Policy proposed for Adoption.

10. After careful examination of the question, four draft resolutions are put forward as embodying the policy proposed.

Resolution 1.

It is essential that the general limit of territorial waters should be fixed at a distance of 3 miles from low-water mark.

11. This resolution is in accordance with the policy of this country for upwards of a century past. So long as the Empire depends upon Naval supremacy it is essential that any extension should be vigorously opposed, as it would gravely interfere with the successful conduct of naval operations, both those of a military nature and those connected with the extremely important and difficult operations for cutting off an enemy's sea-borne commerce.

12. One of the principal reasons, apart from the consequent restriction of the "high-seas," against widening the present 3-mile maritime belt is that the difficulty of determining with accuracy, either by observations taken on board or from shore, whether a ship is within the maritime belt or not is found in practice to be considerable even before the 3-mile limit is reached while it increases very rapidly beyond this limit.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

13. From the point of view of a neutral Power such extension is also objectionable, as increasing the responsibilities imposed upon that Power by the necessity of preserving its territorial waters from violation by belligerents.

14. The starting-point of the maritime belt (*i.e.*, whether the latter should be measured from low-water mark, high-water mark, or any other definition) is to some extent a moot point, but the general consensus of opinion amongst the various Powers is that the low-water mark should be adopted.

Resolution 2.

The limit of territorial waters should be the same for the purposes of belligerency, neutrality, customs, fisheries, control of vessels, and all other purposes.

15. It is considered than when rights outside the 3-mile limit are once conceded for any purpose, it becomes more difficult to refuse to recognise similar rights for other purposes. Any jurisdiction beyond the normal 3-mile limit must be based on special international agreement.

Special areas may, however, be defined by International Convention, in which, with a view to the preservation of fish, trawling or other particular methods of fishing are prohibited to vessels of all countries that are parties to the Convention. The closing of such special areas would not involve any assertion of territorial rights over the waters in question.

Resolution 3.

The limit of territorial waters should, in the case of bays whose width at the entrance does not exceed 6 miles, be 3 miles to seaward of a straight line drawn across the entrance.

Similar territorial rights may, in addition, be admitted in respect of a certain number of larger bays or inlets, to be known as territorial inlets, which should be specifically enumerated and geographically defined.

16. Where the width of the entrance of an inlet (or, if there is more than one entrance, the widest) does not exceed 6 miles, it is generally recognised that the whole of the inner waters, however great their lateral extension, are territorial.

Territorial rights are, however, also claimed over certain inlets the width of whose entrances in many cases much exceeds twice the ordinary territorial limit

Those inlets include openings of all kinds, *i.e.*, bays, gulfs, estuaries and straits, and it is proposed to describe them by the special term " territorial inlets."

Such claims have in the past been based on :—

Configuration (that is, the shape and degree of enclosure of the area of water in question, with special reference to the extent to which it penetrates into the land),

either by itself or combined with one or more of the following reasons :—

(*a.*) That territorial rights are essential for reasons of national defence, safety or neutrality.
(*b.*) That sovereign jurisdiction has been exercised for a long period.
(*c.*) That territorial rights have been claimed for a long period.
(*d.*) That exclusive rights are necessary for the maintenance of the country's food supply, or for some other adequate economic reason.
(*e.*) That the waters in question are remote from general sea traffic routes.

17. It is recognised that it would probably be impossible and undesirable to obtain a general renunciation of these " historical " claims, or of similar future claims based on reasons mentioned in paragraph 16, and it is accordingly proposed that a schedule of such inlets within the Empire should be drawn up, stating the grounds on which exclusive jurisdiction is necessary or desirable, for consideration at an Imperial Conference. The policy of the Empire should, however, it is thought, be to restrict such claims as much as possible in order to prevent excessive claims by foreign Powers, which, if upheld, would seriously limit the exercise of naval power.

18. In the accompanying Appendix particulars are given of claims which have actually been made by foreign Powers. It is to be observed that in most cases they have not been substantiated.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62371

19. It has been proposed that the "10-mile bay rule" should be put forward as a general international rule *applicable to fisheries only*. In other words, that the "exclusive fishery limits" in bays should be generally recognised as including in all cases the waters within a distance of 3 miles measured from a straight line drawn across the bay in the part nearest the entrance at the first point where the width does not exceed 10 miles. This rule would be strictly limited to fishery purposes, and would not affect general territorial rights in bays.

20. It is however considered that while no strong objection can be taken to the 10-mile rule for bays being generally adopted, for fishery purposes only, if agreement to this effect can be negotiated with the other countries concerned, it is undesirable that the British Empire should take the initiative in any such negotiations.

Resolution 4.

The coast-line from the low-water mark of which the 3-mile limit of territorial waters should be measured is that of the mainland and also that of all islands. The word "island" covers all portions of territory permanently above high water in normal circumstances and capable of use or habitation.

21. The definition of the word "island" in the foregoing resolution is advanced as the best solution of an almost insuperable difficulty. On the one hand, it is essential that the area of territorial waters should not be unduly extended, firstly, on account of the consequent restriction of the action of His Majesty's ships in war, and, secondly, on account of the serious increase in the practical difficulty of determining a vessel's position if objects are low or indefinite; on the other hand, there are certain legal decisions bearing on this question which cannot be ignored.

22. The phrase "capable of use or habitation" has been adopted as a compromise. It is intended that the words "capable of use" should mean capable, without artificial addition, of being used throughout all seasons for some definite commercial or defence purpose, and that "capable of habitation" should mean capable, without artificial addition, of permanent human habitation.

23. It is recognised that these criteria will in many cases admit of argument, but nothing more definite could be arrived at in view of the many divergent considerations involved. It is thought that no criteria could be selected that would not be open to some form of criticism.

September 27, 1923.

APPENDIX.

Extension of Foreign Maritime Jurisdiction over (1) *large Bays and* (2) *Straits.*

(Prepared by Foreign Office, January 1923.)

1. Bays.

Ecuador.

Gulf of Jambeli.—In 1915 the Ecuadorean Government claimed territorial jurisdiction over the waters of Jambeli channel from inside a line drawn 1 marine league west of Punta Salinas Point to 1 marine league west of the mouth of the Payana. The Gulf of Jambeli is an inlet of the sea between the mainland of Ecuador and the Island of Puna; at its extremity it would appear to be upwards of 20 miles in width. The Government of Ecuador was informed that His Majesty's Government were unable to recognise territorial jurisdiction as extending beyond the usually recognised limit of 3 miles, whether along the open coast or in bays.

It may be observed that the waters at the mouth of the Payana are also claimed to be territorial waters of the Republic of Peru.

France.

Granville Bay.—By the Anglo-French Convention of 1839 a considerable stretch of water, containing oyster beds, in the Bay of Granville on the French coast, between

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62372

Cape Carteret and Point Meinga, south-east of Jersey, and extending far beyond the 3-mile limit, was reserved exclusively for French fishermen, the boundaries being defined and laid down on a chart annexed to the Convention; British fishermen were prohibited from carrying on any kind of fishing, even for floating fish, within this area. The bay thus appropriated is over 17 miles in breadth, and the closing line passes in some places about 14 miles from the shore. This concession to France was a recognition of the principle that fisheries of this nature—that is, for objects which are attached to or stationary on the bottom—require special treatment.

Greece.

By a law of the 8th April, 1913, the Greek Government sanctioned the exclusion, in war time, of shipping from a zone of 10 nautical miles from the coast, and, in the case of gulfs and roadsteads, the zone was to be measured along a straight line drawn across the indentation and at the outermost part thereof where the width of the opening did not exceed 20 miles. The usual protest was made by this country.

On the 15th August, 1914, the Greek Minister intimated that his Government had fixed the limits of Greek territorial waters, for neutrality purposes, at 6 nautical miles. The Admiralty, who were not prepared to make the same concession to the Greek Government as they had done in the case of a similar claim by Italy (see under that country), concurred in the proposal that no reply should be returned to the Greek announcement, the Foreign Office view being that it would be impolitic to differentiate more than was absolutely necessary between the two cases.

Subsequent events proved that Greek steamers were arrested by His Majesty's ships in waters within the 6-mile limit.

Italy.

An Italian Royal Decree of the 10th August, 1914, stipulated that, for purposes of neutrality, territorial waters in bays, creeks and gulfs extended as far as a straight line drawn at a tangent of the circumferences of two circles of 6 marine miles radius, having as their centres the extreme points of the opening of the bay, creek or gulf, provided the distance between these points does not exceed 20 marine miles. If this distance is exceeded the territorial waters were stated to be comprised within a straight line drawn between the two farthest points, which are 20 marine miles apart.

His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome was instructed to intimate to the Italian Government that the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean had been instructed to respect rigidly the neutrality of Italy, even to the extent of not approaching within 6 miles of the Italian coast. It was pointed out, however, that this act of courtesy did not entail any abandonment of the principle of the 3-mile limit for territorial waters. Any further action was, for political reasons, deprecated at the time by His Majesty's Government.

It may be added that in 1911 when a Bill providing for the extension, when considerations of national defence rendered it necessary, of territorial waters to the limits just referred to, was presented to the Italian Parliament, the Italian Government were informed that His Majesty's Government could not recognise any claim to jurisdiction over, or to interference with, British vessels beyond the 3-mile limit. A further protest was made on the passage into law of the Bill.

Norway.

The question of the limits of Norwegian territorial waters, which are claimed to be "an ordinary sea-mile" (4 English geographical miles) seawards from the outermost island or rock which is not washed over by the sea, together with the Varanger Fjord, Vest Fjord, and certain other "internal waters," was raised in a somewhat acute form by the arrest of the British trawler "Lord Roberts" on the 11th March, 1911, and by the refusal of His Majesty's Government to admit the right of Norway, in the absence of any specific agreement to the contrary, to exercise jurisdiction in waters outside the 3-mile limit. His Majesty's Government proposed at the time to call an international conference for the settlement of maritime limits, but chiefly owing to the opposition of Germany it was impossible to arrange for its meeting.

The question still remains unsettled; but mainly out of regard to the services of Norwegian seamen during the war, the British Government has not wished to raise the matter in recent years.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62373

Russia.

Gulf of Bothnia.—In 1915 the Russian Government called the attention of the Swedish Government to the legal status of the waters of the Gulf of Bothnia. By the Russo-Swedish Treaty of 1810 the frontier between Finland and Sweden was defined as following a certain line somewhat to the west of the middle of the gulf, so that all the waters to the east of that line must be considered, in any case as between Russia and Sweden, as Finnish, and all the waters west of that line as Swedish.

The Admiralty considered that Russia and Sweden jointly could make out a strong case for the waters of the gulf being territorial, unless there was an international custom of long standing to the contrary. During the war the matter was one of almost exclusively Russian interest, and if at some later date it should be to our interest to claim that the waters of the gulf are the high sea, it would be enough that we should have expressed no opinion on the matter.

Gulf of Finland.—The Russian Ministry of Marine having issued a notification in 1913 respecting the area over the mouth of the Gulf of Finland which was prohibited for flying craft, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to call attention to the fact that the area in question, measuring 120 miles by 60 miles, completely closed the whole entrance to the gulf over a considerable distance, and that the gulf being at its neck 30 miles wide on the average, the order of the Ministry of Marine claimed jurisdiction in the air over waters outside the territorial limits—a claim which His Majesty's Government were unable to admit. The treaty of Dorpat between Soviet Russia and Finland makes special provision in regard to the territorial waters of Finland within this gulf

White Sea.—In July 1910 the British trawler "Onward Ho!" was seized for fishing in the White Sea, but on representation being made by His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh the vessel was released.

In 1911 the Russian Government having introduced into the Duma a Bill forbidding foreigners to fish in the White Sea south of a line from Cape Kanin to Cape Svyatoi (a distance of 102 miles), and also anywhere within 12 miles of the coast of the Archangel Government, mainland or island, His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to point out that it was not generally admitted that foreign fishing vessels could be prevented from exercising their avocation beyond the ordinary 3-mile limit, and that His Majesty's Government certainly would not accept a limit extending as far as 12 miles.

A voluminous correspondence took place, and the Bill was withdrawn in 1912.

In 1919 the provisional Government of Northern Russia passed a decree prohibiting trawling for fish and sealing within the coastal waters of the Northern Territories. The limits of those waters were laid down as 12 sea miles from the outstanding points of the Murman coast, the Ainof Islands and Kildin Island being reckoned as extensions of the coast. As regards the White Sea the limits extended to a line running 12 sea miles north of Capes Kanin and Svyatoi.

M. Nabokof, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, was told that His Majesty's Government saw no reason to depart from their consistent policy of opposing any extension of territorial waters beyond the 3-mile limit. They recognised, nevertheless, that the circumstances affecting seal hunting were somewhat different from those affecting ordinary fishing, and would consequently be prepared to consider a convention specifically dealing with that question, provided that the wider question of the extension of the existing territorial limits for normal kinds of fishing was not affected thereby.

In May 1921 the Russian Trade delegation communicated to the Board of Trade a telegram from M. Chicherin pointing out that fishing and hunting in Russian territorial waters, especially south of a line from Kanin Nos to Svyatoi Nos, had been prohibited to foreigners since the 1st May, 1920, and adding that compulsory action against British vessels for infraction of the order would be regretted.

M. Krassin communicated, in June 1921, a Soviet Decree of the 24th May of that year, imposing the same restrictions as regards the White Sea. A reply, in similar terms to that given to M. Nabokof in 1919, was sent to M. Berzin, the Soviet representative, on the 27th August, 1921. It was arranged on the 13th October following that the negotiations for a convention dealing with seal fisheries should be carried on in Moscow.

Nothing more appears to have transpired in regard to the White Sea, although a lengthy correspondence has taken place respecting the arrest of British trawlers off Murmansk.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

It may be of interest to recall that the Norwegian Government has intimated to the Russian Government its willingness to agree to an area for fishing and whaling of 1 geographical mile (7,420 metres), reckoned from low-water mark on the mainland and islands, and to negotiate in regard to the recognition of the White Sea as a closed area for Russian fishing and whaling within a boundary drawn closer in than the line from Svyatoi to Kanin Nos, at a point where the distance between the coasts is appreciably less and where it would be easier for Norwegian whalers to take the necessary precautions against entering Russian territorial waters

The area of the White Sea is approximately 38,000 miles.

United States.

Delaware Bay.—In 1793 the French frigate "L'Embuscade" captured the British ship "Grange" in Delaware Bay at a distance from the shore of more than 3 miles. Declaring that the whole of the bay was within its jurisdiction, the United States required the restoration of the British vessel. France complied. The bay has a headland width of 10½ miles.

Chesapeake Bay.—In 1885 it was held by the United States Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims that Chesapeake Bay was American territory and that seizures made by the Confederate cruisers within any part of Chesapeake Bay were not made on the high seas. The headlands of Chesapeake Bay are 12 miles apart, and its length is over 114 miles before its waters narrow to 6 miles. The fishing in this bay is controlled by State legislation.

2. STRAITS.

Chile.

A Chilean Decree of the 15th December, 1914, laid down that, for purposes of neutrality, the interior waters of the Strait of Magellan, and of the southern channels even in those places where the distance from shore to shore was more than 3 miles, were to be considered as a jurisdictional sea.

After some correspondence the Admiralty accepted the Foreign Office view that the question of jurisdiction should not then be raised with the Chilean Government. They placed it on record, however, that they were not disposed to go as far as the Foreign Office in admitting the validity of the Chilean claim. They considered it to be arguable that, in a natural international highway, the internal waters of which open out so as to include a tract of water more than 3 miles from the nearest land, such an area should be regarded as outside territorial limits. The Admiralty pointed out that His Majesty's ships had, on occasion, performed acts which disregarded the Chilean claim, and which, if called in question, His Majesty's Government could and should justify.

Denmark. (See *Norway.*)

France.

The French Government having, in October 1912, passed a Decree relating to neutrality in maritime war, which Decree fixed the limits of French territorial waters at 6 marine miles from low-water mark, the Admiralty, after some correspondence, pointed out that the case of France being neutral in a war between this country and a North Sea State was the very one in which British interests as a belligerent would be most affected by an extension of the French territorial limits. If France established the right to force belligerent warships to keep outside a 6-mile limit, it would be almost futile to station a British patrol force in the Straits of Dover in such a war. As matters stood, the off-lying shoals between Calais and Dunkirk compelled large vessels to keep more than 3 miles from the French coast, or at least render it very risky for them to keep closer in. With a 3-mile limit, therefore, a British patrol could act effectively, but a 6-mile limit would clear many of the dangers to navigation and enable an enemy's ship, or a contraband-carrying neutral, to pass with comparative impunity.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris was instructed on the 19th May, 1914, to intimate to the French Government that His Majesty's Government did not recognise the claim to extended territorial waters, and that any such extension beyond the customary 3-mile limit must be a matter for special agreement.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62375

Norway.

Skaggerack.—At the North Sea Fisheries Conference of 1881 it was agreed, in deliberating on the boundaries of the North Sea for the purposes of the Convention, to exclude the Skaggerack (whose waters are nowhere less than 60 geographical miles in width) the fisheries of which it was stated by the President were not international, but were " essentially within the jurisdiction of the States to which the shores belong."

It should be stated, however, that neither Denmark nor Norway appears to have asserted since the conclusion of the Convention exclusive jurisdiction in its moiety of those waters, where in fact both British and German vessels are believed to carry on an extensive fishing.

Spain.

Straits of Gibraltar.—The Admiralty have pointed out that the effective control of the Straits of Gibraltar has been greatly weakened through the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in the extension of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco to the westward, which carried the right of territorial waters with it, and gave an enemy a 3-mile gap through the straits in which to pass in safety from attack.

United States

Fuca Straits.—A case in which the principle of the sovereignty of the riverain Powers over straits seems to have been recognised by Great Britain and the United States in 1873, when, in carrying out the award of the German Emperor, the international boundary was carried along the middle of the Fuca Straits, which are about 70 miles long and from 15 to 20 miles wide. The treaty of the 15th June, 1846, lays down that the boundary is to continue through the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver Island and of Fuca Straits. The commissioners appointed by the two Powers were unable to agree upon this portion of the boundary, *i.e.*, as to whether it should run through the Canal of Haro. This definition of the boundary is finally established by Article 8 of the treaty between Great Britain and the United States respecting the demarcation of the boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada, signed at Washington on the 11th April, 1908. This agreement is naturally binding only on the parties to the treaty; and in that respect it corresponds to the Russo-Swedish Agreement of 1810, whereby the frontier of the two countries was defined as following a certain line somewhat to the west of the middle of the Gulf of Bothnia.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62376

(Mr. King's note. 1923)

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Opening of Imperial Conference

Reference to Mr. Baldwin's opening address.

Welcome in name of the Dominions the Irish Free State into the Community of Nations.

This Conference a Conference of His Majesty's governments, not a super government or cabinet or Council for executive action; value in exchange of information, in consultation on matters of common concern.

Further, along line of consideration of Canada's general position on Empire foreign policy, or reference to European situation and Canada's attitude to European situation and Canada's attitude to that problem (probably the latter, as Mr. Baldwin is likely to deal largely with the Ruhr and reparations).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62377 Imp. Conf. Evolution of affairs
Private notes.
Imperial Conference

PRELIMINARY REVIEW.

Appreciation of review by Prime Minister of United Kingdom.

Thanks for invitation to be present at Conference of Prime Ministers of British Empire.

Privilege and advantage of personal acquaintance and direct conference.

Precise Status of Conference - terminology loose and inexact.
In 1921 Conference expression frequently used "we don't know what we are, or what weshould call ourselves - a Conference, a Cabinet, a Council (successor to Imperial War Cabinet), a Meeting".
"A meeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India" - designation fiven the Conference of 1921.

To the word Conference no expeption can be taken from any quarter.

Conference expresses exact nature of gathering
it is in accord with spirit of times
it recognizes the equality of status for purposes of discussion of those present.

Cabinet is not a correct designation
not known to the constitution, but has a definite significance - it implies in British Parliamentary practice a body that acts as a unit with a single policy on all matters of State, selected by a Prime Minister whose spokesman he is, assuming and resigning office with him.
It is chosen from the representatives of the people in relation to the policies with which it is concerned.
It retains office in virtue of its retaining the confidence of the people to whom it is responsible - responsability to the people - the electorate - is of the essence of its being. In this capacity alone is it competent to advise the Sovereign.
It is related to a Parliament, which derives its authority from the people; it sits as a part of that Parliament.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

If Imperial Cabinet ever formed it will grow out of Imperial federation.

Imperial Federation, ~~whether~~ necessary, desirable or possible to-day may in the course of years become all three. The agencies of transportation and communication are multiplying in a variety of directions. They may yet eliminate both time and space to such a degree that the members of an assembly sitting at Westminster may be sufficiently in touch with their constituencies, as to be able to intelligently to ascertain their views upon the problems that arise for consideration, and from their member select such outstanding figures as may command the confidence of the whole in a Cabinet concerned with policies which govern the whole - but that day at best is remote. If there are it is brought about, Imperial federation will be a natural growth, not forced and artificial. Till (?) it is present, it would be usurping the rights of the people, for any group of men, not elected by, nor responsible to the whole to assume to constitute themselves a Cabinet. The analogy from war-time is not applicable. The war was fought and carried on by the executive usurping the rights of the people in many directions with no sanction save that of necessity. It was a reversion back to autocracy. To attempt to press this movement in peace times would be to disrupt rather than unite the Empire.

Council. This word is even more objectionable than Cabinet in that it does not suggest the delegated authority from or responsibility to the representatives of the people. It is suggestive of power from above, not from below. It is associated with the beginnings not the consummation of Governments by free peoples. An Imperial Council to have powers at all would have to be in a position to enforce its decrees or findings or resolutions, whence is this power to come? Only from the people by whom payment of bills must be made. "No taxation without representation" is a sufficient answer to any attempt at formation of an Imperial Council. The self constituted authority of a few men, temporarily in office in their respective countries, men with the sanction of their colleagues, would not be sufficient to bring such a body into being; representation to be effective must be relative to the particular policy or project concerned. Council begins at the wrong end - it is autocracy not democracy, government bya few not the people - in reference to the people's affairs.
It has never been discussed before the people - there is no

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

mandate to any one attending the conference to ask for anything of the kind, no parliament of the Empire has pronounced in favour of it. This conference might recommend its consideration, to do so would be to ensure its quietus.

To substitute a Council for a Cabinet is to revert to the days prior to responsible government, and create on an empire scale, the difficulties that gave rise to revolution in United States and rebellion in Canada.

Terminology.

British Empire

British Commonwealth
neither term exact nor adequate.
Both suggest single administration, a legislative and administrative unity.

Empire - is associated with autocracy - hence use of Commonwealth

Imperial - has some significance - Prussianism.

The reason we find it difficult to get a term to describe what we wish is thatour condition is a new one - never existed before- not a federation
"q" union
" " Commonwealth
" an Empire
a community of States under British Flag.

Community of British Nations, Colonies and Protectorates.

As a Community we have interests in common.
Whatever affects the honor, integrity or common interest of the whole is of concern to all the parts.

As nations we claim equality of rights and privileges in matters of immediate and direct concern.

British, a better term than Imperial, to descrive our community of interests, i.e. British flag, British Sovereigns, British justice, British fair play, British traditions.
English, Scotch, Irish, Canadian, Australian, South African, etc. all British the only term to descrive what we hold in common.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Note differences - Self-Governing Dominions
Dominion of Canada
Commonwealth of Australia
Dominion of New Zealand
Union of South Africa
Irish Free State
Dominion of New Foundland

Comment upon presence of representative of Irish Free State

" " " " " of India
underlying significant factor in British Empire is self-government

Entire evolution of Government within Empire is towards self-government.

Herein lies solution of Irish problem
Hope of solution of problem in India.

Comment upon illness of Mr. Bonar Law

Comment upon personel of Conference - absence of familiar figures, e.g. Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Sir Robert Borden, Mr. Hughes. -Mr. Massey a link with the past - General Smuts - The advantages of having new men not filled with war methods, etc.

<u>Canada's position at the Conference.</u>

Were pleased to accept invitation of Prime Minister of United Kingdom to meet himself and Premiers of other self-governing Dominions in Conference.

Ready to consider and express our views upon any subject that have been placed on the agenda or may be brought forward.

Are in happy position of being satisfied with existing conditions and relationships as between ourselves and other parts of the British Empire.

This is not to be taken as implying that there may not be room for improvement in any direction, or that great good may not

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

come from more perfect understanding.

We can think of no finer spectacle to offer the world than that the Conference should disclose we were all in hearty accord.

It does imply, however, that we seek neither constitutional change, nor alteration in the methods by which in the course of a natural evolution, influenced by events, we have "here a little, there a little, line upon line, precept upon precept", worked out a development within the Empire which has led to even fuller recognition of their national status as regards the self-governing Dominions, and of unity and community of interest as regards the whole.

It implies further that we have no grievances for which we seek redress.

It has always been so. - Note Mackenzie's grievances Report - Could there be a better guarantee of unity than this. I regard it as of significance to the whole future of the Empire that it should be possible for the grandson of one who presented to the Colonial Office the grievances of the Canadian people, number some in all, to be able to say that to-day as respects his relations to the British Crown and British Government, Canada has no grievances to present; none for which she seeks redress. That she has found in the British connections, in British institutions, the guarantee of the liberties and rights she has claimed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62382

It has also this further significance. It questions the wisdom of raising at this time or creating issues where none at present exist.

It is not as though all parts of the Empire had not been left by the war with problems of their own sufficient to tax their resourcefulness, ingenuity and powers.

The public are in a very unsettled frame of mind, they are chary and fearful of new ventures, they do not wish to be drawn into situations which are likely to involve new dangers or new expenditures.

Their loyalty requires no assertion. Anything by way of resolution or otherwise which would appear to demand such would be resented.

It may be well to remember that an ill in one part of the Empire will not be remedied by creating in the effort to cure it, a condition of unrest or discontent in another.

It recognizes that that the ties which bind and unite the Empire are ties of sentiment; of common tradition, aim and aspiration; of common conceptions of government of law and of right and honour, of a common allegiance - not a matter of bargaining. It means we have nothing to demand as the price of our loyalty, allegiance or efforts - bargaining is an impossible basis of union.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Canada's Present Position

or

(Secure recent speeches from Throne at beginning and close of Parliament).

Situation in Canada at present.

Economic:

An emergence from the depression which followed the war, and which found expression in unemployment, cessation of immigration, continued increase of public debt, heavy railway obligations, greatly increased taxation, trade dormant, depressed agricultural conditions.

A distinct economic revival occasioned by conditions relatively more settled, bountiful harvests 1922-1923, revival of industry and trade, diminution in unemployment, promise of reduction in annual deficit of Government railways.

People as heavily taxed as circumstances will permit.

Local, Provincial and Federal taxation.

Demand for reduction of taxation.

Margin within which reduction can be made exceedingly narrow

Interest on public debt
Payment of pensions
Expenses incident to Soldiers' Civil Re-Establishment
" Land Settlement
Payment to Provinces of subsidies:
1. General
2. Technical Education
3. Aid to agriculture
4. On roads
5. Loans for housing

(All a first charge - and equal 1/2 of total budget.

Little or nothing thus far done by way of meeting national requirements public buildings, lighthouses, etc.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Branch lines of railways - especially on prairies.

Proximity to United States

A factor to be taken into consideration re increase taxation.

Policy of United States in maintaining an aloofness from European situation, attratice to many people.

Prosperity of United States an important consideration - has advantages of geographical position, climatic conditions, variety of resources, etc., cheaper country to live in.

Tendency ever present for Canada's population to drift U.S.-ward - quite noticeable at beginning of present year.

3,500 to 4,000 miles of frontier - invisible boundary.

Prices of Agricultural machinery etc., lower on U. S. side.

Canada's problem to retain her population - to build up the Dominion, with this power of attraction ever present at her side. This is not a factor which is present in case of United Kingdom, - Australia, Africa, New Zealand, S. Q., or India.

To impose upon Dominions burdens incidental to British connection, not felt or known by the peoples of the United States is to lose Canadian population to our neighbour, and to alter sentiment.

Canada's strength to Empire lies first and foremost in her own unity, prosperity and solidarity. Numbers, etc, etc...

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62385

An important factor in reviving Canadian industry and trade - the removal of the embargo on Canadian cattle going into the United Kingdom - Action of the British Government greatly appreciated all over Canada.

(Get particulars of - dates, scope of agreement, effect on shipments, prices, etc.)

The increase in preference on British goods coming to Canada via Canadian Ports - 10% reduction on Customs dues = 2½ per cent increase in preference which ranges 33 1/3 to over 50% on numerous articles - In part, a return for improved facilities in trade with United Kingdom in cattle import, a development of our preference on British goods. No bargaining in this matter. No demand on British Government or public. To our own advantage, as well as to British trade. Encourage shipments by Canadian ports and on Canadian Railways.

Trade via the Pacific - is a new and important consideration. The opening of the Panama Canal has created a new trade route to Europe. Our Pacific Coast cities Vancouver, Victoria and Prince Rupert have acquired a new significance in their relations not only to the Orient, Australia and New Zealand, but also to the British Isles and Europe.

(Get particulars of grain shipments via Vancouver - recent years -)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

This likely to have a far reaching effect upon settlement and development of the Middle West - Alberta,and Saskatchewan will also give new significance to trade on the Pacific, and help to bring home to Prairie provinces their interest and concern therein.

We have witnessed new development in transportation of goods from Eastern and Western Canada by all water route instead of by rail - (Get particulars vessel leaving Montreal for Vancouver with Eastern shipments to Western Canada returning with cargoes lumber, etc. -)

Immigration is beginning to revive (Get particulars of)

During war naturally ceased, after war with unemployment no effort made to stimulate. Change in administration, time required to recommence efforts. Special efforts made to bring back settlers from U. S. to Canada - to set tide of immigration from British Isles to Canada. Europe no longer the recruiting ground ~~for~~ it was for immigrants. We have sought to avoid the errors which have been apparent in settlement of United States. We have been careful as to the non-admission of undesirables, of dependents, defectives and delinquents - but we have extended a welcome and do welcome men and women who are able and ready to work and who desire to improve their lot by coming to the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62387

new world to help in building up, not in adding to our problems.

(Get particulars of immigration policy)

Trade and Commerce:

Particulars re growth of at present and since war.

Revenues:

Particulars as to

by sources, etc. showing trend.

Railways - particulars of.

Bank clearings, deposits, etc.- P. O. deposits.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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Vol. 2 - (a)C 62388

Pub list of previous conferences.

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
CANADA

Chronological sheets.

Canada & Navy handbook.

Developments during the war.

Procedure of Royal Colonial Institute - Election of previous decisions
Delhi of Parliamentary Union etc.

References - Canada Year Book

Work on obtaining -

Previous visits to England.

Search articles in English
Editorials & other papers.

Search writings

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62389

Notes for Prime Minister

re

Opening address, Imperial Conference.

O.D.S.

O.D. SKELTON, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Conference. C 62390

Opening Meeting

Mr King's position.

Speaking first as representing the oldest Dominion;

A new comer personally in Conference affairs, as are most of our colleagues — Mr Warren of Newfoundland, Britain's oldest colony and Canada's nearest British neighbor; the representatives of ~~the East~~ India, now passing through a most promising evolution, and the Prime Minister of Australia; fortunate that we have with us a veteran of the Conference in Mr Massey, and a statesman of wide experience of world affairs in General Smuts.

~~For if a new comer, Mr King feels that he is among friendly and discriminded~~

As new comer personally, Mr King represents a long established Canadian tradition, happy to be privileged to carry on attitude and policy developed through two generations of ~~a~~ pioneer experiment in the reconciliation of empire and liberty, self Government and cooperation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Conference.

Opening meeting. C 62391

Goodwill to Irish Free State.

Pleased to associate Canada with Mr Baldwin's welcome to Irish Free State, as newest member of the Community of Nations; ~~the recognizing a community; and youngest state~~ the youngest member in this ~~for~~ present organization, but also the oldest in the ~~creation and~~ development and spreading of Christian civilization; confidence that ability and initiative of the Irish people will be displayed in the successful attainment of peace and prosperity - and in distinctive contributions to the world's store of political and social achievement.

Canada's special interest because of the ~~definite~~ honour of being specially and definitely linked with the Irish Free State in the Treaty.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Conference.
Opening ~~Address~~ Meeting.

C 62392

Mr Baldwin's address: (re Europe):

Congratulate Mr Baldwin the Conference on the clarity & forcefulness of the statement, the sincerity and feeling ~~he~~ shining through it

No question as to the seriousness of the situation. - Civilization ~~trembling~~ of a Continent trembling in the balance. - Complexity increased by fact that the strife is not merely of nation against nation but ~~between~~ of class against class and social creed against social creed. - Yet must recognize also that much energy much regenerative force released by developments on the Continent: permanent and effective rebuilding must come from within, though it may be possible to aid in creating the machinery and the atmosphere.

Obvious that we cannot in the few minutes available in this opening session consider in detail any of the complex and momentous issues surveyed by Mr Baldwin. They will be discussed at length in future meetings, after the further survey by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. What solution is ~~most~~ practicable, what should be the attitude of the several Dominions to ~~on~~ this question and on the ~~more~~ general question of participation and control in foreign affairs, can then be considered. At

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

this stage we can only : —

express our appreciation of the help afforded in framing an opinion by Mr B.'s impressive statement ;

cherish the hope that ~~it will~~ Europe will find it possible to reconcile peace and justice, the lessons from the past and the calls of the future

and express the belief that some measure of the good will and mutual understanding which ~~has~~ prevailed during the war not only among the ~~several~~ members of this ~~British~~ Empire but among the Allied and Associated powers will continue and will aid in opening the ~~same~~ path desired.

[Perhaps add reference to League as instrumentality in regional understanding.)

As to monetary phase of reparations, ~~some~~ believe dominions would be quite prepared to consider, along with Great Britain reduction of total expected, as part of general satisfactory settlement ~~and of reached by agreement~~.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Conference. C 62394

Opening Address.

France:

Pleasure in learning of the reknitting of good friendly relations between the British and the French governments; in no part of the Empire are these good relations more desired than in Canada, where men of British blood and of French blood are working side by side in the endeavor to build up a common national life. Clear, that enduring good will must rest on frank acceptance of facts, on mutual recognition of the others needs, not merely on phrases.

United States.

Policy of Canada, irrespective of sections or parties, in the constant and dealings private and public which our three thousand mile common border make inevitable, is, while conserving our own just and vital interests, to maintain and develop friendliest possible relations with the United States. No part of Canada's activities in the field of foreign affairs so important as the possible service she may do, and how we may say she has done, in building up a fund of goodwill, a measure depth of understanding, which will be of vital moment for those good relations of all parts of the English speaking world upon which the world's peace so greatly turns. [Will have occasion later to discuss/refer to ~~our~~ her service in these specific transactions relations

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Imperial Conference.
Opening meeting. C 62395

British Empire unity. [If Mr Baldwin brings it up]

Desirable to explore fully and ~~thoroughly~~ all practical possibilities of strengthening ~~and linking this~~ the nations of the Empire and increasing their mutual service; should not be bound by old ~~doctrines~~ catchwords, but neither should be carried away by new catchwords; ~~investigate~~ should consider, with open mind ~~the various proposals made~~ in this ~~the~~ final Conference, what substantial and ~~real~~ advantage may be secured from any or all of the varied proposals which are to be brought forward.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Canada's position re status. C 62396

(Briefly - non-provocatively:)

Canada desires no special privilege. The decision of Great Britain on any important public issue, domestic or foreign, will be made by the people of Britain, their representatives in Parliament, and the government responsible to that Parliament. So, the decision of Canada on any important public issue, domestic or foreign, will be made by the people of Canada, their representatives in Parliament, and the government responsible to that parliament. Where a question arises which is of direct and immediate concern to more than one part of the Empire, it will be necessary, as a preliminary step, to provide for consultation, ~~whether through~~ ~~conferences, agencies through special visits of representatives~~ followed ~~if need arises~~, by consideration by the several parliaments and governments, and such action as they may deem necessary.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Peoples of parliaments : good will or pledges.

C 62397

Essential as are those Conferences
between members of ~~the~~ His Majesty's ^ several governments,
it is still more essential to ensure
communication and discussion and
understanding on the parts of the parliaments
and ^ the peoples ~~of the~~.

Without this understanding and good will
no enduring cooperation can be effected.

With that understanding, all desirable
things are possible.

~~Confirm~~ The desire to multiply contracts
and pledges, to have ~~the~~ detailed promises
as to action in all possible contingencies,
rests on a misconception of the human
character and ~~t~~ the Empire's history.
Irksome pledges do not bind ; a people's
enthusiasm cannot be requisitioned.
Imperialists should learn to have faith
in the Empire.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 62398

SECRET

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IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA IN RELATION TO THE SIGNATURE OF TREATIES AND THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS.

At the Meeting of the Imperial Conference held on Wednesday, 3rd October, 1923, at 11 a.m. the Conference agreed (E. 2nd Meeting, 1923) that a Committee should be formed as follows:-

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies
A Representative of Canada.
" " The Commonwealth of Australia
" " New Zealand.
" " The Union of South Africa.
" " Irish Free State
" " Newfoundland
" " India

to consider and report to the Imperial Conference (a) on the position of the Dominions and India in relation to the signature of Treaties, (b) on the question of Territorial Waters.

The Committee has now been constituted as follows:-

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Prime Minister of Canada.
The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Prime Minister of New Zealand.
The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa
A Representative of the Irish Free State
The Prime Minister of Newfoundland
The Secretary of State for India

The

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Prime Minister of Canada (for Dr Skelton)

C 62399

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E-9002

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IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

[A 5909/116/45]

PROHIBITION AND LIQUOR-SMUGGLING IN THE UNITED STATES.

Memorandum by the Foreign Office.

THE stages of the prohibition question in the United States as affecting Anglo-American relations are briefly as follows:—

1. The enforcement of prohibition (January 1920) was followed by liquor-smuggling, at first sporadic and then continuous, particularly from the West Indies.

2. From the end of 1922, cases of the seizure of British vessels outside the 3-mile limit grew more and more frequent, the United States Government basing their action on a section in their customs laws (akin to the old British "hovering" laws), which gave them jurisdiction (including the right of search, but not explicitly of seizure) within a 12-mile limit.

3. His Majesty's Government lost no time in formally reserving their right to protest against seizures of British vessels outside the 3-mile limit, and a series of protests in individual cases followed. In the summer of 1922, seizures became increasingly frequent (owing to the strengthening of the prohibition flotilla), and a clause was surreptitiously introduced into the United States Tariff Act of 1922 expressly affirming the right of seizure for customs purposes within a 12-mile limit. His Majesty's Government therefore intensified their diplomatic pressure; the United States Government gave way, and the United States Cabinet in September 1922 promulgated a ruling that no seizures were to be made outside the 3-mile limit unless the small boats of the vessel concerned could be shown to have entered that limit for an illegal purpose. His Majesty's Government have refused to accept the principle of international law implied in this reservation.

4. Prior to their abandonment of the claim to a right of seizure within a 12-mile limit, the United States Government addressed to His Majesty's Government a request (in June 1922) substantially identical with that which they have now put forward. This request Sir A. Geddes was instructed to reject in a despatch, dated the 30th September, 1922, on the grounds that His Majesty's Government had in the past consistently opposed any suggestion for the extension of territorial waters, and that they felt unable to reverse their attitude on an important question of principle in order to meet an emergency which they were confident would prove a temporary one.

At the same time Sir A. Geddes was instructed to affirm that "His Majesty's "Government are desirous of assisting the United States Government to the best of "their ability in the suppression of the traffic and in the prevention of the abuse of "the British flag by those engaged in it."

5. The United States Government have made various proposals as to the steps which could be taken to assist them to check smuggling. They suggested that His Majesty's Government should give information of shipments of liquor from British ports, that transfer to British registry of United States vessels should be refused unless permits from the United States Shipping Board had been obtained, that exporters under bond should be required to land cargoes at places specified in the clearance papers, and that the export of liquor from the United Kingdom should be prohibited except under licence. After careful consideration of these proposals by the departments of His Majesty's Government concerned it was found impossible to give effect to any of them. On the other hand, the United States Government were informed that His Majesty's Government were prepared to stop fraudulent transfers to British registry when the ownership in fact remains American, to stop the issue of double clearance papers and to delay the survey of vessels in suspicious cases until enquiries had been made in London. Moreover, the attention of the Governor of the Bahamas was drawn to a number of irregularities which had occurred.

6. It must be admitted that the cumulative effect of these measures has been to interfere little, if at all, with the use of British facilities by the liquor-smugglers and their financial "backers." The revenue statistics of the British West Indies (particularly the Bahamas) since the introduction of prohibition in the United States show (*a*) an enormous increase in the quantity of imported wines and spirits, (*b*) the inauguration and development of an entirely new export trade in these commodities. There is no secret about this and the statistics are readily available to the United States Government.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

At the same time the more highly organised of the smuggling "rings" have discovered, especially since our championship of the 3-mile limit in the controversy with the United States referred to in section 3, that the easiest and cheapest way of disposing of liquor is to fit out vessels of some size and despatch them directly to lie outside the 3-mile limit opposite New York, &c. There the liquor is sold to small vessels coming out from points on the coast. The place where these vessels (nearly all under the British flag) lie has come to be known as "Rum Row," and they are stated to constitute danger to navigation lying as they do, often without lights, in the path of incoming ocean liners. One of these vessels, the "Istar," has returned some months ago to Glasgow boasting of a net profit of over £100,000 on her five-months' trip.

7. The present phase of the controversy started at the end of April, when the United States Government suddenly obtained a decision from the Supreme Court (where the question had previously been dormant for a good many months) interpreting the Volstead (Prohibition) Act as prohibiting the transportation of liquor by foreign vessels within United States territorial waters, even when such liquor was placed under seal on the vessel entering these waters. In spite of representations on the part of His Majesty's Government and of the other maritime Powers, on the grounds of international comity, regulations enforcing this decision came into effect on the 10th June, a few minor concessions alone being made to permit the carriage of liquor for medicinal purposes and for the use of the crew when such use was enjoined by the law of the vessel's country.

8. The following day Mr. Hughes communicated to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Washington a draft treaty* consisting of two articles, of which the substance is as follows :—

Article 1. The two parties, without attempting to extend the limits of their respective territorial waters, agree that the authorities of the other party may, within the distance of 12 geographical miles from its coast, board the vessels of the other and make enquiry whether such vessels or the persons controlling them are attempting to violate the laws of the party making the enquiry, and prohibit or regulate the unlading near, or the importation into, its territories of any articles. An officer of one party may examine a vessel of the other party and make enquiry of the master with respect to the cargo and destination. If such officer has reason to believe that the vessel or the person controlling it is engaged in the wilful commission of acts which constitute the violation of the laws of the State of which such boarding officer is an official, he may institute a search of the vessel and an examination of any articles on board. If there is reasonable cause to believe that the vessel is engaged in the commission of acts which constitute a violation of the laws of the State whose officer is conducting the search, the vessel may be seized and brought in for an adjudication and subjected to imposition of penalties established by law by the party whose laws and regulations are found to have been violated.

Article 2. Any article, the importation of which into the territories of either party is prohibited, but which is listed as sea stores or as cargo destined for a port foreign to either party, on board a vessel of either party destined for a port of the other party, may be brought within the territorial waters of the other party on condition that upon the arrival of the vessel within 12 geographical miles of the coast of the other party such article shall be placed under seal.

9. On the 14th July, Mr. Chilton informed Mr. Hughes that although theoretically the international validity of the 3-mile limit might be strengthened by a treaty making an exception for a special purpose, in practice such a treaty would weaken the principle, because it would form a precedent for the conclusion of similar treaties. For this reason the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs felt bound to state in Parliament that His Majesty's Government could not accept Mr. Hughes's proposal. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government Mr. Hughes's proposed treaty would not provide for any immediate remedy, seeing that it could not be ratified until Congress meets, when an amendment of the Volstead Act could equally well be introduced if the United States Government so desire. Moreover, even if the 12-mile limit were accepted, cases would inevitably occur liable to cause serious friction between the two countries, owing to the difficulty of deciding the position of a limit usually out of sight of land, at any rate on the Atlantic coast. Mr. Chilton added that the Hovering

* See Annex.

Acts in the United Kingdom were entirely superseded by "The Customs Consolidation Act, 1876," by which British municipal legislation is made to conform to international law.

On the 19th July Mr. Hughes replied that it was not his intention to propose an extension of the limits of territorial waters. He was unable to agree that the conclusion of a treaty making an exception for a special purpose would weaken the principle, and there could be inserted in the treaty any qualification deemed desirable to show that it was definitely limited to the particular situation in view. No assurance could be given as to the action of the Senate or with regard to the prospect of securing from Congress an amendment of the Volstead Act in relation to ship liquor and cargo liquor destined for foreign ports, but it was believed that the solution of the present difficulty through the making of a fair and reasonable agreement would be the most promising method of securing early action. With regard to the difficulty of determining the position of the 12-mile limit and the friction which His Majesty's Government contended would therefore arise, Mr. Hughes felt that the treaty would do much to eliminate the present cause of friction. He emphasised that the treaty would not interfere with vessels bound to United States ports when engaged in legitimate commerce, as they would in any case come within 3 miles of the coast. He confidently asserted that there would be no disposition on the part of the United States authorities to interfere with a British vessel, save within the limits proposed and when it was clear that a vessel was engaged in smuggling.

10 On the 22nd August an interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which had already examined the possibility of introducing legislation to stop smuggling, reported that in their opinion, His Majesty's Government have strong ground for complaint that British vessels are no longer allowed to carry liquor in United States territorial waters even under seal. They considered that His Majesty's Government could hardly be expected to adopt measures to assist the United States in suppressing smuggling unless the latter is prepared to remedy the British grievance. With regard to the possibility of retaliation, it was felt that this, to be effective, would have to take the form of the exclusion of United States vessels from the ports not only of the United Kingdom, but of the whole Empire, and that no steps in this direction could be taken without the concurrence of the Dominions and India. In any case, the Empire has much more to lose than the United States by such a contest, as it possesses a far greater amount of tonnage.

11. The committee next examined Mr. Hughes's proposed treaty. The Board of Trade representative said that the Liverpool Shipowners' Association and the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom were in favour of the proposal. A fear was expressed that opposition to the proposal might result in His Majesty's Government losing the support of the United States to the principle of the 3-mile limit for general purposes, and it was suggested that the proposed treaty might strengthen the doctrine if it were reaffirmed in the text. The precise distance from the shore at which the search should take place was not regarded as of great importance, provided that the right were exercised *bonâ fide* and not abused. The committee thought that there was much force in the suggestion made by Sir C. Hurst that no limit should be fixed, and the term "in the vicinity of the coast" substituted, subject to an interpretative clause. They also thought that the omission of mention of the 12-mile limit would have the advantage of emphasising the exception to the recognised limit of territorial waters and of avoiding the adoption even for this exceptional case of a limit which certain nations claim for all purposes. They believed that a treaty on the lines suggested by Mr. Hughes offers the only satisfactory solution, but as any such agreement would be applicable to all British vessels, it was agreed that it would be necessary to consult the Dominions and India. Hence the placing of this subject on the agenda of the Imperial Conference.

12. Inasmuch as it was desirable, pending the meeting of the Imperial Conference, that a reasoned reply should be returned to the United States Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Washington was accordingly instructed to address a note to the United States Government containing the following points: The amount of smuggling of liquor into the United States by sea is admitted by the United States Prohibition Commissioner to be exaggerated by anti-prohibitionists in the United States in order to discredit prohibition. This makes it the less justifiable to weaken the authority of the general rule of international law. The 12-mile limit would be almost impossible to observe, at all events on the Atlantic coast of the United States, which lies low. The British Hovering Acts were modified in 1876 to bring them into harmony with the principle of international law. It is no violation of any law to sell

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

liquor on the high seas. The export of liquor from the United Kingdom could only be regulated by measures similar to those in force during the war. His Majesty's Government could not be expected to revive such measures, more especially as the United States had refused to ratify the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919 for this very reason. All other countries must adopt similar measures if they are to be effective. It would in any case be impossible to recommend such measures to Parliament so long as British ships are prevented from carrying liquor under seal in United States territorial waters. His Majesty's Government claim the right to exercise jurisdiction over all vessels in British territorial waters, but it is only exercised in the interests of the safety and welfare of the ship, crew and passengers. As a matter of international comity, the maritime Powers refrain from imposing their jurisdiction except for these purposes. The United States Government had themselves in the past made representations to the Spanish Government on this basis and had recognised it recently in exempting vessels trading between the United States and Italy from the strict application of the Volstead Act, on the ground that Italian law requires the provision of liquor on such ships. In view of the difficulties of the case, His Majesty's Government could not agree to an extension of the 3-mile limit even for a limited purpose until the matter had been submitted to the Imperial Conference.

13. The conclusions to be derived from the above narrative would appear to be as follows: On the one hand the case for concluding such a treaty as has been recommended by Mr. Hughes may be thus stated :—

(*a.*) Although no breach of international law is created by vessels under the British flag hovering on the verge of United States territorial waters with liquor on board notwithstanding the fact that it is admittedly the intention of the owners to sell the liquor to United States citizens: yet inasmuch as the failure of His Majesty's Government to stop the practice has necessarily given rise to strong criticism in the United States, it is in the interests of the continuance of cordial relations between the two Governments that a settlement of this troublesome matter should be reached. It has been found impossible, for various reasons, for His Majesty's Government to take any effective action by legislation or otherwise to assist the United States authorities. Hence the acceptance of Mr. Hughes's treaty in some form may lead to the avoidance of an open quarrel, in which His Majesty's Government would be represented as the champions of an odious traffic, while British vessels would remain exposed to the confiscation of any ship or cargo liquor which they might bring into United States ports and waters. On the other hand, if Mr. Hughes's proposals were accepted, British vessels would in future be able to carry liquor under seal in United States territorial waters.

(*b.*) The fear that the extension of the 3-mile limit for a limited purpose would weaken the principle of the 3-mile limit for general purposes, might be met by the actual terms of the treaty itself.

(*c.*) The further objection that United States prohibition officers might abuse the powers accorded to them under the proposed treaty and interfere with innocent vessels, could also be met by limiting the duration of the treaty to a short period, *e.g.*, one year in the first instance.

14. If the idea of a treaty be favoured, it will be necessary to settle whether a limit of 12 miles shall be fixed, or whether Sir Cecil Hurst's proposal be accepted, that the right of search should be conceded "in the vicinity of the coast," with an interpretation clause limiting the "vicinity of the coast" to so many hours' steaming. An "hour's steaming," which has been suggested, seems too vague a definition even for this purpose, and a fixed limit of distance would, in spite of the objections which will be mentioned presently, in all probability be preferable.

15. It will also be necessary to decide whether the treaty if concluded should be reciprocal, as proposed by Mr. Hughes, or non-reciprocal. Of these alternatives the latter seems preferable, since it would be undesirable to give the United States Government the opportunity to claim that they have made us a concession which would, in fact, be valueless.

16. Such is the case of those who advocate a settlement by treaty on the lines proposed by Mr. Hughes On the other hand there are arguments in the opposite sense :—

(i.) The object of the United States Government in making these proposals is to secure the right to search and arrest ships from which spirituous liquors

are sold just outside the present limit of territorial jurisdiction. The extent of this traffic seems, however, to have been exaggerated, judging from the following statement published by Mr. Haynes, the United States Prohibition Commissioner, in the "New York Times" of the 18th July last :—

> "The moonshine-still is the bootlegger's chief source of supply. "From what other place can he get his liquor in quantity? Surely "not from the rigidly controlled bonded warehouses—they are "eliminated at once. As to smuggled liquor, some, it is true, is "brought into the country, but not one-tenth as much as the illegal "traffic would have us believe.
>
> "When reports of huge smuggling operations are circulated it "should be remembered that the illicit liquor interests are conducting "a great and elaborate propaganda campaign to discredit law enforce-"ment and that the spreading of such reports is part and parcel of "that campaign. No bootlegger, of course, is willing to admit that "he can obtain only adulterated moonshine. Hence, fanciful tales of "the wet wave sweeping in on our coasts and other related falsehoods "pass from mouth to mouth to hide the real and dangerous origin of "what the bootlegger has to sell."

(ii.) It may further be argued that it is for the United States to enforce their own laws, and that His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to hamper a lucrative export trade carried on, so far as British subjects are concerned, without any violation of municipal or international law, and that there is no reason why the British Empire should alter its laws because another country has altered its social system.

(iii.) Further, there is the less reason for purely disinterested action on our part, seeing that the United States Government have seized a considerable number of vessels under the British flag outside the 3-mile limit in entire violation of the accepted principles of international law.

(iv.) The view which has hitherto been uniformly held by the British Government is that jurisdiction over foreign vessels in territorial waters should not be exercised except to restrain acts calculated to disturb public order and safety. Upon this point the comity and practice of nations were clearly defined in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the "Wildenhus" case. In that case the jurisdiction of the United States was extended to cover an act committed on a foreign ship. Yet, even so, the Supreme Court recognised the existing international doctrine on the subject to be as follows :—

> "And so by comity it came to be generally understood among "civilised nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on "board which affected only the vessel or those belonging to her, and "did not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquillity "of the port, should be left by the Local Government to be dealt with "by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged as the "laws of that nation or the interests of its commerce should require."

The regulations issued as a result of the judgment of the Supreme Court afford an example of the kind of issue that might be raised all over the world if the existing comity and practice were abandoned. Ships of all nations frequently pass through the jurisdiction of other nations, even when not entering their ports. For example, to reach Antwerp a vessel must pass through Dutch territorial waters, to reach the Baltic through Danish or Swedish waters, to reach the Black Sea through Turkish waters. The principle was well stated in the despatch of the 28th October, 1852, from Mr. Conrad, when Acting Secretary of State, to the United States Minister at Madrid, which contained the following passage :—

> "You will state that this Government does not question the "right of every nation to prescribe the conditions on which the "vessels of other nations may be admitted into her ports. That "nevertheless those conditions ought not to conflict with the received "usages which regulate the commercial intercourse between civilised "nations. That those usages are well known and long established

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

" and no nation can disregard them without giving just cause of " complaint to all other nations whose interests would be affected by " their violation."

The British Hovering Acts were modified in 1876 precisely in order to bring them into harmony with international practice, and His Majesty's Government can therefore hardly be expected to admit that the municipal legislation of any country can override this practice.

The action of the United States in not allowing vessels to carry liquor in United States territorial waters affects not only passenger vessels, more particularly in regard to their homeward-bound voyages from the United States, but also cargo vessels, especially those plying in the Pacific between the ports of Australia, Canada and Hong Kong, which, if they have cargoes of liquor on board, as is probable, are unable to use United States ports.

(v.) The United States Government maintain that they have no choice but to enforce the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court, and that they can exercise no dispensary power. Nevertheless, they have exercised such power in the case of French and Italian vessels which are allowed to carry wine on the ground that this is necessary under French and Italian law, although there is no proviso in the judgment of the Supreme Court to meet this necessity. They have also allowed British ships in the Italian trade to carry liquor for third class passengers in order that Italian law in this respect may be complied with.

(vi.) Friction would not be avoided by the acceptance of a 12-mile limit, owing to the difficulty of deciding the position of the limit, usually out of sight of land, at any rate on the Atlantic coast. Indeed, the present difficulty would be revived, though in a different geographical area, for larger vessels could easily be employed which would lie further out from the land. It has already been proposed that vessels with liquor on board should lie 20 or 25 miles from the United States coast.

(vii.) That the general validity of the 12-mile limit could be strengthened by making an exception to it for a special purpose, appears to be very doubtful reasoning. It is much more likely that the exception thus conceded would be made the precedent for similar treaties and that a serious inroad would thus be made in the principle itself.

(viii.) Further, the fixing of a 12-mile limit is particularly open to objection, because France and Italy are in favour of this limit being fixed for all purposes.

It is, in any case, essential that all countries should accept the 12-mile limit, if this were agreed to by His Majesty's Government. The result would otherwise merely be to penalise British vessels for the benefit of their trade rivals.

(ix.) It has been suggested, for whatever the point may be worth, that the loss to the Bahamas would be so serious were the traffic effectively stopped, that, however illogical it may be, impetus would be given to the movement to transfer the islands to the United States.

(x.) Finally, the view has been put forward that, if Sir C. Hurst's proposal to accord to the United States the right of search " in the vicinity of the coast " were adopted, prohibition agents would seize vessels all over the Western Atlantic in the confident expectation that no protest would be made. Congress might then defer their approval of the treaty, and His Majesty's Government would not obtain the proposed concession with regard to the carrying of liquor under seal in United States territorial waters.

17. The above statement of the arguments pro and con will perhaps assist the Imperial Conference in arriving at a decision on this exceedingly complex subject.

Foreign Office,
October 1, 1923.

Among the above objections could be met by making the treaty from year to year until reference is granted. See par. 13.(c).

[A 3778/116/45] ANNEX.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 751.)

My Lord, *Washington, June* 14, 1923.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 260 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of the draft treaty in regard to the extension of the limit of territorial waters to 12 miles, which was handed to Mr. Chilton by Mr. Hughes on the 11th June.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
H. G. CHILTON.

Enclosure in Annex.

Draft Treaty in regard to the Extension of the Limit of Territorial Waters to 12 Miles.

ARTICLE 1.

THE high contracting parties, without attempting to extend as between themselves the limits of their respective territorial waters adjacent to the high seas, agree that the authorities of either high contracting party may, within the distance of 12 geographical miles from its coasts, board the private vessels of the other and make enquiry of the masters thereof as to whether such vessels or the person or persons controlling them are engaged in any attempt, either with or without the co-operation of other vessels, or persons on board the same, to violate the laws of the high contracting party making the enquiry, and prohibiting or regulating the unlading near, or importation into, its territories of any articles.

An officer of one high contracting party boarding a private vessel of the other may examine the manifest of the vessel and make enquiry of the master with respect to the cargo and destination thereof. If such officer has reason to believe from the statements of the master or from documents exhibited by him or otherwise, that the vessel or the person or persons controlling it, either with or without the co-operation of other vessels, or persons on board the same, is or are engaged in the wilful commission of acts which constitute a violation of the laws of the State of which such boarding officer is an official, with respect to the unlading or importation of any article or articles, he shall impart his belief to the master of the vessel, and thereupon may, with the aid of the master, institute a search of the vessel and an examination of any articles on board. The search shall be conducted with the courtesy and consideration which ought to be observed between friendly nations. If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel or the person or persons coutrolling it is or are wilfully engaged, with or without the co-operation of other vessels or persons on board the same, in the commission of acts which constitute a violation of the laws of the State whose officer has conducted the search, forbidding or regulating the unlading near, or importation into, its territories of any article or articles, the vessel, cargo and the person or persons controlling it or them may be seized and brought in for an adjudication, and subjected to the imposition of the penalties established by law by the party whose laws and regulations are found to have been violated.

ARTICLE 2.

Any article or articles the importation of which into the territories of either high contracting party is or are for any purposes prohibited by its laws, but which is or are listed as sea stores, or as cargo destined for a port foreign to either high contracting party, on board a private vessel of either high contracting party destined for a port of the other high contracting party, may be brought within the territorial waters of such other high contracting party on condition that upon arrival of the vessel so destined within 12 geographical miles of the coasts of such high contracting party whose territorial waters are about to be entered, such article or articles may be placed under seal by the appropriate officer of that party, and shall be kept sealed continuously thereafter until the vessel enters and during the entire stay of the vessel within those waters, and no part of such article or articles shall, during that period, be removed from under seal for any purposes whatsoever. Upon the departure of the vessel from such territorial waters destined for a foreign port, such article or articles under seal may be released therefrom either by an officer of the vessel or by an officer of the party affixing the seal.

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IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

The Position of the United States in Relation to "C" Mandates.

Note by the Colonial Office.

AT a meeting held in June 1921 the Council of the League of Nations decided that a letter should be addressed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers requesting them to negotiate direct with the United States Government on various points at issue in connection with Mandates. As a result the United States Government were asked to formulate their views, and this they did in a Memorandum dated the 24th August, 1921, a copy of which was communicated to the Governments of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa in a despatch dated the 1st September, 1921. Some of the points raised affected all Mandates; others were confined to Mandates of particular types.

So far as "C" Mandates were concerned, the points raised by the United States Government were as follows:—

1. Article 5 of the Mandates (which deals with the entry and residence of missionaries) should be changed so as to embrace nationals of the United States (and not merely nationals of States Members of the League of Nations), and so as to avoid ambiguity as to the right of missionaries to exercise charitable and educational activities in the Mandated Territories.
2. The terms of the "C" Mandates, if not qualified, would permit discrimination in commercial matters. The United States Government desired a guarantee of most-favoured-nation treatment in all "C" Mandated Territories, and, in addition, special rights in Samoa based on Article 3 of the Treaty of the 2nd December, 1899.
3. There should be provision prohibiting monopolistic concessions by the Mandatory, or the monopolising of natural resources by the Mandatory itself.
4. Modification of the Mandates should be subject to the assent of the United States.

His Majesty's Government replied to the points raised by the United States Government in connection with "B" Mandates and the Mandate for Palestine, but no reply was returned to the representations as regards "C" Mandates.

At the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–22 some discussion of the question took place, and the Four Power Treaty of the 13th December, 1921, relating to the Pacific, was accompanied by a Declaration (pp. 40 and 41 of Cmd. 1627) that the making of the Treaty should not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States to the Mandates for the Pacific Islands, and should not preclude agreements between the United States and the Mandatory Powers in relation to those islands.

A further Memorandum on the subject of "C" Mandates was submitted by the United States Ambassador on the 26th July, 1922. This Memorandum repeated the four suggestions contained in the Memorandum of the 24th August, 1921, and quoted certain instances of alleged discriminatory treatment in "C" Mandated Territories, as to which enquiry was desired. These were as follows:—

1. The introduction of a tariff in Western Samoa giving preference to imports from the British Empire.
2. The inclusion of South-West Africa in the Union of South Africa for Customs and Excise purposes, the effect of which would be to give preference to certain British goods imported into South-West Africa over similar United States goods.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

3. Regulations promulgated by the Commonwealth Government as to the sale of ex-enemy properties in New Guinea, under which sale to persons other than British subjects or British companies was prohibited.
4. A statement made in the Commonwealth Parliament that it was proposed to reserve the oil deposits of New Guinea for the exclusive use of the Mandatory authorities.

The United States Government also asked that, pending the conclusion of a definite agreement as to "C" Mandates, they might receive duplicates of the reports submitted to the League of Nations on the administration of "C" Mandated Territories.

This Memorandum was communicated to the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa for consideration in a despatch dated the 18th August, 1922. The New Zealand Government suggested in reply that, as the Memorandum raised questions affecting all three Governments, the points raised should be left in abeyance until they had been considered by the Imperial Conference. A similar view has been expressed by the Commonwealth Government. No comments have been received from the Union Government.

As regards the points of principle raised in the United States Memorandum of the 24th August, 1921, it may be noted that similar points were also raised, though in a slightly different form, as regards "B" Mandates, and have been substantially met :—

1. As regards missionaries, His Majesty's Government have undertaken to grant to United States missionaries equal treatment with that guaranteed by the Mandates to missionaries who are nationals of States Members of the League of Nations. This ensures that United States missionaries will in "B" Mandated Territories enjoy the right to erect religious buildings and to open schools, subject to such measures of control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government.
2. The "B" Mandates expressly provide (unlike the "C" Mandates) that nationals of States Members of the League of Nations shall enjoy, on the same footing as British nationals, complete economic, commercial and industrial equality, and further, that concessions for the development of the natural resources of the territories shall be granted without distinction on grounds of nationality between the nationals of such States, but on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the local Government. Here again His Majesty's Government have undertaken to grant to United States nationals the same rights and privileges as are granted to nationals of States Members of the League of Nations.
3. The "B" Mandates (unlike the "C" Mandates) prohibit the granting of concessions having the character of a general monopoly (subject to the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territories, and in certain cases to carry out the development of natural resources either directly by the State or by a controlled agency).
4. His Majesty's Government have stated their readiness to give an undertaking that they will not propose or accept any modifications in the terms of the "B" Mandates without previous consultation with the United States Government, and to make provision that the rights of the United States and its nationals in "B" Mandated Territories shall not be affected by any modifications in the terms of the Mandates unless such modifications have been assented to by the United States.

His Majesty's Government have also undertaken to supply to the United States a duplicate of each of the Annual Reports on "B" Mandated Territories made to the League of Nations.

It may be observed that the third of the points of principle raised (the monopolising of natural resources by the Mandatory) has a bearing upon the arrangements made by His Majesty's Government and the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments for exploiting the phosphate resources of Nauru. Neither of the two United States Memoranda refers expressly to Nauru, but it seems evident from conversations between Lord Balfour and Mr. Hughes, the United States Secretary of State, at the Washington Conference on the subject of "C" Mandates, that the United States Government have the case of Nauru in mind. The Permanent Mandates Commission, at its meeting of

August 1922, devoted some attention to this topic, and its observations on the Nauru Report expressly raised the question "whether the establishment by the three "Governments concerned of a State organisation enjoying the sole rights of develop- "ment of the only natural resources of the area is fully in keeping, although no formal "provision under the Regulations for 'C' Mandates forbids it, with the disinterested "spirit which should characterise the mission of the Mandatory State." It was pointed out in the report of the Sixth Committee of the 1922 Assembly that the position in this connection was merely that the three Governments had acquired, by direct purchase through voluntary sale on the part of the owners and not through the Mandates, exclusive rights granted before the war by the German Government to a private company.

October 1, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62409 W. Mackenzie King

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E-1302-3
Vol. 1-(a)

SECRET.

E. 78.

41

CANADIAN RESIDENT SECRETARY
25 OCT 1923
IMPERIAL CONFERENCES (1923)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

PUBLICITY ARRANGEMENTS.

Memorandum as the Basis for Discussion.

In the course of the preliminary correspondence as to the Conference the view has been expressed by the representatives of some of the Governments that as much publicity should be given to its proceedings as is compatible with the necessity for secrecy on questions such as foreign policy or the details of naval, military and air co-operation.

In previous years, the practice has been to issue daily communiqués, sometimes stating only that a meeting has been held, sometimes giving a brief outline of the subjects discussed. These were supplemented in 1921 by—

(*a.*) Verbatim reports of certain discussions given to the Press, in the course of the proceedings, at the wish of the Conference.

(*b.*) A summarised report of the discussions as a whole, drawn up for, and approved by, the Conference before it separated, and subsequently published.

It is suggested for consideration that this procedure might be somewhat expanded. There would seem to be great advantages in arranging that Press correspondents should be able to go to some specified person or persons to get what may be called the "atmosphere" of the Conference and any particulars which could safely be communicated and are likely to prove of interest to the newspapers overseas and here.

It is thought that it might be convenient to the Members of the Conference if a British Minister were made generally responsible for the publicity arrangements (subject to the special arrangements as regards the discussions on foreign policy and defence which are suggested below). He could attend the meetings of the Conference with a "watching brief," and at the end of each meeting, subject to any special ruling from the Conference itself and any necessary consultation with the individual speakers, he might have discretion to arrange for communication to the Press, in the most convenient manner, of such information as could properly be given regarding the work of the Conference. As regards the discussions on foreign relations and defence questions, special considerations arise. As to the former, it is thought that the most satisfactory arrangement might be that any information as to such discussions which the Conference might decide to make public should only be given to the Press under the express authority of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and through the Foreign Office machinery. Stafements relating to Imperial defence should, it is thought, before publication, be referred to the office of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 1, 1923.

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SECRET.

E. 78.

61

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

PUBLICITY ARRANGEMENTS.

Memorandum as the Basis for Discussion.

In the course of the preliminary correspondence as to the Conference the view has been expressed by the representatives of some of the Governments that as much publicity should be given to its proceedings as is compatible with the necessity for secrecy on questions such as foreign policy or the details of naval, military and air co-operation.

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2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 1, 1923.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62411

S E C R E T.

E. 78.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

PUBLICITY ARRANGEMENTS.

61

(Memorandum as the basis for discussion).

In the course of the preliminary correspondence as to the Conference the view has been expressed by the representatives of some of the Governments that as much publicity should be given to its proceedings as is compatible with the necessity for secrecy on questions such as foreign policy or the details of naval, military and air co-operation.

In previous years, the practice has been to issue daily communiqués, sometimes stating only that a meeting has been held, sometimes giving a brief outline of the subjects discussed. These were supplemented in 1921 by

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(b) a summarized report of the discussions as a whole, drawn up for, and approved by, the Conference before it separated, and subsequently published.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

1st October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62413

The following will be added to the Committee when the question of Territorial Waters is under consideration:-

The First Lord of the Admiralty (or a representative)
The President of the Board of Trade (or a representative)
The President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries (or a representative)
The Secretary for Scotland (or a representative)

Mr.C.W.Dixon, M.B.E., Colonial Office.
Mr.F.E.F.Adam, Foreign Office and
Professor O.D.Skelton, Dominion of Canada Delegation

will act as joint secretaries to the Committee.

The place, date and time of the first meeting of the Committee will be notified in due course. It is requested that all communications on the subject of the Committee should be addressed in the first instance to Mr.C.W.Dixon, Colonial Office, Whitehall,S.W.

(Signed) M.P.A.HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

9th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62414 335

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1923.

SECRET

E.71.

NATIONALITY COMMITTEE.

At the Meeting of the Imperial Conference held on Wednesday the 3rd October, 1923, at 11 a.m. the Conference agreed (E.2nd Meeting 1923, Appendix B. Resolution I.) that a Committee should be formed as follows:-

The Secretary of State for Home Affairs (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or representative)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (or representative)
The Secretary for Scotland
The Attorney-General
The Registrar General
A Representative of Canada
" " the Commonwealth of Australia
" " New Zealand
" " the Union of South Africa
" " the Irish Free State
" " Newfoundland
" " India

to consider and report to the Imperial Conference on the following questions:-

(1) The Grant of Naturalisation to Persons resident in Mandated Territories.

(2) The appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the revocation of Certificates.

(3) The re-admission to British nationality of British-born women married to aliens.

(4) Marriages with foreigners.

The Committee has now been constituted as follows:-

The Secretary of State for Home Affairs (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or representative)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (or representative)
The Secretary for Scotland
The Attorney General
The Registrar General
The Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Dominion of Canada
The Hon. R.V.Wilson, Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Commonwealth of Australia
The Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand
The Hon.N.J.de Wet,K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa
A Representative of the Irish Free State
The Prime Minister of Newfoundland
His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, India.

OCT 29 Rec'd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62415

Mr.R.L.Bickn ll of the Home Office and
Sir Robert R.Garran, Australian Secretary to the
Imperial Conference

will act as Joint Secretaries to the Committee.

A Notice of the place, date and time of the first Meeting of the Committee will be circulated later.

It is requested that in the first instance any communications respecting the Committee should be sent to Mr. R.L. Bicknell at the Home Office, Whitehall, S.W.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
9th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62416

55

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SECRET.

E.73.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE ANGLO-FRENCH CONDOMINIUM IN THE NEW HEBRIDES.

At the Meeting of the Imperial Conference held on Wednesday, 3rd October, 1923, at 11 a.m. the Conference agreed (E. 2nd Meeting, 1923, Appendix A, Resolution III) that a Committee should be formed as follows :-

Secretary of State for the Colonies (in the Chair).
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Prime Minister of New Zealand.

to consider the question of the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides.

Mr. N.E. Archer, Colonial Office, and
Mr. F.D. Thomson of the New Zealand Delegation,

will act as joint secretaries to the Committee.

The place, date and time of the first meeting of the Committee will be notified in due course. It is requested that all communications for the Committee should be addressed in the first instance to Mr. N.E. Archer, Colonial Office, Whitehall, S.W.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY .

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

9th October, 1923.

OCT 29 Rec'd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(2) COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA IN RELATION TO THE SIGNATURE OF TREATIES AND THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS.

(Reference E. 2nd Meeting, 1923, Appendix A, Resolution II)

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To consider and report to the Imperial Conference (a) on the position of the Dominions and India in relation to the Signature of Treaties and (b) on the question of Territorial Waters.

PERSONNEL.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Prime Minister of Canada.
The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Prime Minister of New Zealand.
The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.
The Minister for External Affairs, Irish Free State.
The Prime Minister of Newfoundland.
The Secretary of State for India.

The following will be added to the Committee when the question of Territorial Waters is under consideration.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (or a representative)
The President of the Board of Trade (or a representative)
The President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries (or a representative)
The Secretary for Scotland (or a representative)

Secretaries -
Mr. C.W. Dixon, . Colonial Office
Mr. F.E.F. Adam, Foreign Office, and
Dr. O.D. Skelton, Dominion of Canada Delegation)

(3) COMMITTEE ON THE ANGLO-FRENCH CONDOMINIUM IN THE NEW HEBRIDES

(Reference E. 2nd Meeting, 1923, Appendix A, Resolution III).

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To consider the question of the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides.

PERSONNEL.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The First Lord of the Admiralty
The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia
The Prime Minister of New Zealand

Secretaries -
Mr. N.E. Archer, Colonial Office, and
Mr. F.D. Thomson, New Zealand Delegation.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
13th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62418

E-1302-3
Vol. 5-(a)
76

London, October 14, 1923.

A copy of "The Times" of Saturday, October 13, 1923, has been sent to each of the following:

J. E. Atkinson, Esq.,
273, Warren Road,
Toronto.

Mrs. George E. Barchett,
Route "A", Box 130,
Belfield Farm,
Anapolis, Maryland.

W.H.S.Cane, Esq.,
Newmarket, Ont.
Canada.

Rt. Hon. Sir Robert L. Borden, K.C.M.G.,
Wurtemburg St.,
Ottawa.

Rev. George Duncan, D.D.,
161, Stanley St.,
Montreal, P.Q.

Rev. Thomas Eakin, Ph.D.,
116, Madison Avenue,
Toronto.

Col. John G. Foster,
The Roxborough,
Ottawa.

Hon. Peter G. Gerry,
408, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Edward R. Hewitt,
127 East 21st St.,
New York.

Mrs. William Hendrie,
Gateside House, Aberdeen St.
Hamilton, Ont.

Mrs. W. T. Herridge,
Rideau Apartments,
Ottawa.

L. G. Jackson, Esq.,
Newmarket, Ont.

Mrs. D. Macdougall King,
966, Washington St.,
Denver, Col.

Mrs. H.M.Lay,
Barrie, Ont.

Gerald R. Larkin, Esq.,
11, Elm Avenue, Toronto.

John Lewis, Esq.,
237, Silver Birch Av. Toronto.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62419

✓ Ivy L. Lee,
Room 3127,
61, Broadway, New York.

✓ Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux, K.C.,
265, O'Connor St.,
Ottawa.

✓ Mrs. Robert McGregor,
435, MacLaren St. Ottawa.

✓ Mrs. Godfrey B. Patteson,
The Roxborough,
Ottawa.

✓ John D. Rockefeller, Esq. Junr.,
10, West 54th St.,
New York.

✓ J. M. Walton, Esq.,
Aurora,
Ont.

✓ J. F. Welborn,
1065, Logan Street,
Denver, Col.



Posted at Dover Street. p.o.
9.0.A.M. 15/10/23.
A. Neville

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62420 E-1302-3
Imperial Preference Vol. 2-(a)
Imperial Conference of 1923

MEMORANDUM of Conference, or General Discussion, of Issues under consideration at the Imperial Conference, 1923, held today at the Ritz Hotel.

At the invitation of the Prime Minister, who took the chair, supported by the Hon George P. Graham and the Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin, the following attended:- Hon. Peter C. Larkin, Lucien T. Pacaud, John Howard, Agent-General for Nova Scotia, F. E. Percival, representing the Agent-General for Ontario, Lieut-Col. J. P. Pelletier, Agent-General for Quebec, F. C. Wade, Agent-General for British Columbia, Harrison Watson, Chief Trade Commissioner for United Kingdom, Obed Smith, Supt. of Emigration, London, Dr. O. D. Skelton, Mr. F. C. Blair, Dr. Camsell, Mr. R. H. Coats, Major-Gen. J. H. McBrien, Commodore W. Hose, Dr. Grisdale, Lieut-Col. O.F.Brothers, Lieut-Col. J. Reid Hyde.

Mr. Duncan Marshall, Commissioner for Agriculture, was unable to attend.

The Prime Minister invited general observations by all present on matters germane to the Imperial Conference, and indicated that he would welcome as of general assistance any suggestions on such matters as trade and commerce or immigration interests.

The Hon. Mr. Graham stated he would be glad to hear comment upon such subjects as immigration, postal service, wireless communication, cables, tariff preference, etc.

The Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin referred to the statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at a meeting of the Imperial Economic Conference on the 9th October, to the effect that certain proposals had been put forward from the British Government point of view, he said, "we have come here, as I understand it, to take counsel together and give one another information as to the manner in which Imperial Trade can be helped by adjustment of arrangements between us, and therefore we have avowedly framed our proposals as our contribution to the task of increasing inter-Imperial Trade, and if these proposals in any way fail to carry out the object which we have in view, then we want to know it".

Oct. 16/23 (J. REID HYDE)

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The High Commissioner submitted that in his opinion the Prime Minister and his colleagues had adopted a safe and proper course; if Great Britain will give a preference on foodstuffs or any other article, raw or manufactured, Canada would do well to accept it, but Canada should have due regard to what might possibly follow or be expected from her in regard to such concession.

Sir Lomer Gouin indicated that Canada's policy would be to name certain articles which, if preference were accorded, would benefit Canada, but at the same time to impress upon the British Government that these were not bargaining proposals, but offered in the spirit of the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer quoted above.

Mr. Percival, representing the Agent-General for Ontario, referred to the tariff preference already announced on dried fruits, vegetables, fish, etc., and emphasized the benefit which would accrue to Ontario if fresh fruits, apples, peaches, etc. could be all included in the list of preference.

Mr. F. C. Wade, Agent-General for British Columbia, hoped that the Conference would deal with the all-important question to export of Canada, namely, the/grain (using an inclusive term) to the United Kingdom, and stated that he had formed the opinion that the open door within the Empire as against the closed door for foreign grain would find a large sympathetic following in the United Kingdom. He also referred to the benefit which would accrue to British Columbia if fresh fruits were included in the Preference scheme, and informed the meetingthat the fruit growers in British Columbia must face complete ruin if some relief was not afforded. He gave certain

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

reasons, e.g. the U.S.A. crop was earlier, and filled up the market in Canada for preserving jams, etc., and when the time came to market Canadian fruits sales were extremely difficult and prices consequently bad. Furthermore, he pointed out that U.S.A. firms exporting to Canada citrous fruits invariably included a clause in their contract with the dealers in Canada stipulating that they must also furnish, and Canadians must buy, fresh fruits through the same channels. He submitted that the Dominion Federal Government in co-operation with the Provinces might profitably study a scheme to provide cold storage or cooling sheds in the United Kingdom, wherein consignments would be deposited and held pending favourable market conditions, or for seasonable trade, on this side. Further, he made reference to the necessity of supporting the Act to be introduced into the British House of Commons, namely, the Merchandise Marks Act, the provisions of which would compel all imports from the Empire or foreign goods to carry a Trade Mark such as "Empire Product, Canada" as against "Foreign Product".

Mr. Pacaud promised to send to Mr. Graham a copy of correspondence with the Colonial Office on this subject.

Mr. Blair made a general statement on the proposals under consideration at the Conference for Overseas Settlement, and indicated certain new measures, also extension of provisions under certain of the present regulations.

Col. Obed Smith submitted certain points which might be summarized as follows:

(a) Children of families should get a grant of a like sum to that now made to the individual children emigrating to Canada through the offices of Institutions, Homes, etc.

(b) That some scheme should be adopted to recruit the farm labourer in connection with the assisted passage scheme, and that steps should be taken to secure this type of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

emigrant, having regard to his seasonable occupation in this country, and in reference also to the season he would be required to start work in Canada.

(c) He thought improvement was possible in the present arrangements for reception, care and placing of emigrants, and recommended that a regulation adopted many years ago, but not now in force, should be reintroduced, i.e. to "book" the emigrant to his destination in Canada.

(d) He referred to the length to which the Dominion Governments were carrying out emigration propaganda, how every field was exploited, and in this connection indicated that an enquiry might be addressed to the British Government as to what it was doing of a like character to stimulate emigration to the Dominions.

Mr. Percival made further observations on behalf of Ontario in connection with immigration, as follows:-

The experience of the Ontario Government had been that farm workers' wages in United Kingdom were so low as to prohibit any possibility of saving toward the cost of emigrating to a Dominion, yet such a type of emigrant was desirable for Canada, and he submitted that consideration should be shown wherever possible on the question of the amount of advance paid to assist such men to go out to Canada. The amount of the advance should be proportioned on the probable time of repayment, based on a reasonable expected wage in Canada and the savings therefrom. He thought an emigrant should be allowed only so much as he could repay comfortably in from 12 to 18 months.

He informed the meeting that New Zealand was contemplating a new

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

measure which would permit (a) free passage of children in a family up to 17 years; (b) 17 to 19 years £50 each, and of this advance 50% must be repaid; (c) parents standard passage of £11, which had to be repaid.

Col. Pelletier, Agent-General for Quebec, made further reference to the suggestion by British Columbia that Federal and Provincial Governments might appropriately consider co-operation to build storage warehouses in this country. It was pointed out by the Hon. Mr. Graham that such a measure would almost commit the Government to a commercial trading scheme, for the goods shipped to this country would have to be sold, and the only method of doing this would be through a Government organization. He thought that private enterprise would be justified in considering the situation, and if necessary could discuss with the Governments the question of an appropriate grant towards construction. Mr. Pacaud stated in this connection that some correspondence had passed through the High Commissioner's Office, and he would refer to same with a view to further discussion if desirable.

J. REID HYDE.

October 16, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62425 E-1302-3

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SECRET

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

Schedule of documents transmitted to the

Acting Prime Minister, Canada.

E.57. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Copy No. 56

E.58. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Australia. Copy No. 56

E.59. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. New Zealand. Copy No. 56

E.60. Establishment of Naval Base at Singapore. Copy No. 56

E.61. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Canada. Copy No. 56

E.62. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. South Africa. Copy No. 56

E.63. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Newfoundland. Copy No. 56

E.64. (Revised). Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on the Limits of Territorial Waters. Copy No. 67

E.65. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. India. Copy No. 56

E.66. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Irish Free State. Copy No. 56

E.67. Grant of Naturalization to Persons Resident in Mandated Territories. Copy No. 65

E.68. Imperial Airship Scheme. Copy No. 57

E.69. Recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence Committee. Copy No. 57

E.76. The Position of the United States in Relation to "C" Mandates. Copy No. 55

E.78. Publicity Arrangements. Copy No. 61

OCT 17 Recd Mr Fielding has seen.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E-1302-3

C 62426

59

E. 80.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

BEFORE the Conference comes to consider this thorny subject, I wish my colleagues to consider the following suggestion of a way out of the difficulties in which we find ourselves. In India the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire seems to be adding to the political agitation and unrest, while in those other parts the atmosphere for the solution of the difficulty is not improving but on the contrary getting worse. This latter change is in some measure due to the Sastri mission. Mr. Sastri by his mission and his speeches has undoubtedly made matters worse. He has, for instance, never failed, whenever opportunity presented itself, to attack the Indian policy of South Africa, and has thereby greatly exasperated public opinion in that Dominion, already very sensitive on this issue. In other Dominions he has made people alive to the issue—indeed he has largely created it. The claim he has everywhere vigorously pressed for equal franchise rights for Indians over the whole Empire has not only gone further than the local claims of the Indians themselves, but has tended to raise opposition in quarters where it did not exist before. It is because I foresaw this development that I did not invite Mr. Sastri to include South Africa in his mission. It is not alleged that the economic position of Indians in other parts of the Empire is bad. It is admitted that they are successful and thriving under the laws of the Dominions, and are in most respects economically better off than they would be in India. But the claim is put forward for equal political rights throughout the Empire, and its denial is looked upon as a stigma, as an affront to our Indian fellow-subjects. And no questions are more difficult and dangerous than those involving national dignity and honour.

The Indian claim for equal franchise rights in the Empire outside of India arise, in my opinion, from a misconception of the nature of British citizenship. This misconception is not confined to India, but is fairly general, and the Conference would do not only India but the whole Empire an important service by its removal. The misconception arises, not from the fact, but from the assumption that all subjects of the King are equal, that in an Empire where there is a common King there should be a common and equal citizenship, and that all differences and distinctions in citizen rights are wrong in principle. Hence it is claimed that whether a British subject has or has not political rights in his country of origin, he should, on migration to another part of the Empire where British subjects enjoy full political rights, be entitled automatically to the enjoyment of these rights. It is on this basis that equal political rights are claimed for Indians who live in the Dominions or Colonies outs id of India.

It is, of course, clear that the assumption on which the claim is based is wrong. There is no equality of British citizenship throughout the Empire. On the contrary, there is every imaginable difference. In some parts British subjects have no political rights whatever; in others they have modified rights of one kind or another; in others, again, they have the fullest political rights. In the same part you may find British subjects with little or no political rights, and others with full rights. There is no common equal British citizenship in the Empire, and it is quite wrong for a British subject to claim equality of rights in any part of the Empire to which he has migrated or where he happens to be living. There is no indignity or affront at all in the denial of such equality. Once this is clearly recognised, the stigma above referred to falls away. Indians in those parts of the Empire where they do not enjoy equal franchise rights cannot justly or fairly claim that their national dignity or status is involved.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62427

I go even further. The newer conception of the British Empire as a smaller League of Nations, as a partnership of free and equal nations under a common hereditary Sovereign, involves an even further departure from the simple conception of a unitary citizenship. British citizenship has been variable in the past; it is bound to be even more so in the future. Each constituent part of the Empire will settle for itself the nature and incidents of its citizenship. The composition and character and rights of its people will be the concern of each free and equal State in the Empire. It will not only regulate immigration from other parts of the Empire as well as from the outside world, but it will also settle the rights of its citizens as a matter of domestic concern. The common Kingship is the binding link between the parts of the Empire; it is not a source from which private citizens will derive their rights. They will derive their rights simply and solely from the authority of the State in which they live. Hence Indians going to Canada will not be entitled to claim equal political rights with the other citizens of Canada, no more than Canadians going to India or Australia could claim equal political rights there. The conception of the Empire as a League of Nations ought to do away with these claims, which are so disturbing and unsettling in the Empire.

From this point of view the Indian resolution passed at the last Imperial Conference was a profound mistake. It was not only impracticable, but it ran counter to the new conception of the Empire, as not a unitary State, but a partnership of equal States. It has both theoretically and practically landed us in a false position, and the sooner we get out of it the better for the future good relations of the different States of the Empire. The political claims of Indians arising under that resolution should not be allowed to create difficulties for the Governments of the Dominions, which would not have arisen if the constitutional position had been properly appreciated.

The Indian Government should not claim from the other Empire Governments what (say) the friendly Governments of Japan and China would not claim. And the fact is that with neither of these Governments have we any difficulties in the Dominions, while the difficulties with India are notorious and growing.

We must get to the right constitutional conception, which I take to be the absolute and unquestioned power and authority of each part of the Empire to settle such questions for itself. India has threatened retaliation as a method of reprisal against Dominions which do not concede equal rights to her nationals. This is, again, a false position arising out of the misconception which I have explained. There should be no question either of retaliation or reprisal. India should be free to deal with nationals of the Dominions on a basis of reciprocal treatment, and neither on her part nor on the part of the Dominions concerned should there be any resentment or ill-feeling in the matter. Our relations in this regard should be practically those of friendly sovereign States towards each other Unless this readjustment of viewpoint is brought about it is feared that the question of the position of Indians in the Empire may continue to grow in gravity.

I would therefore suggest that for the resolution of the last conference on the subject there be substituted a resolution affirming the right of each portion of the Empire to regulate citizenship as well as immigration as domestic questions for its own handling and not affecting the status or dignity of other portions of the Empire, and expressing the opinion that provisions for reciprocal treatment of the nationals of the States of the Empire should not be looked upon as unfriendly or otherwise affecting the good relations of these States *inter se*. It would thus be left to the good sense of each State of the Empire to say what citizen rights shall be enjoyed, and by whom, within their territorial jurisdiction, and no State of the Empire should have claim to force its citizens on any other State or resent their exclusion or special treatment by the latter.

(Signed) J. C. SMUTS.

South African Delegation, Savoy Hotel, W.C. 2,
October 18, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Mackenzie King 40C 62428

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

S E C R E T.

E. 80.

THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

(Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Before the Conference comes to consider this thorny subject, I wish my colleagues to consider the following suggestion of a way out of the difficulties in which we find ourselves. In India the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire seems to be adding to the political agitation and unrest, while in those other parts the atmosphere for the solution of the difficulty is not improving but on the contrary getting worse. This latter change is in some measure due to the Sastri mission. Mr. Sastri by his mission and his speeches has undoubtedly made matters worse. He has, for instance, never failed, whenever opportunity presented itself, to attack the Indian policy of South Africa, and has thereby greatly exasperated public opinion in that Dominion, already very sensitive on this issue. In other Dominions he has made people alive to the issue, indeed he has largely created it. The claims he has everywhere vigorously pressed for equal franchise rights for Indians over the whole Empire has not only gone further than the local claims of the Indians themselves, but has tended to raise opposition in quarters where it did not exist before. It is because I foresaw this development that I did not invite Mr. Sastri to include South Africa in his mission. It is not alleged that the economic position of Indians in other parts of the Empire is bad. It is admitted that they are successful and thriving under the laws of the Dominions, and are in most respects economically better off than they would be in India. But the claim is put forward for equal political rights throughout the Empire, and its denial is looked upon as stigma, as an affront to our Indian fellow subjects. And no questions are more difficult and dangerous than those involving national dignity and honour.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

what citizen rights shall be enjoyed, and by whom, within their territorial jurisdiction, and no State of the Empire should have claim to force its citizens on any other State, or resent their exclusion or special treatment by the latter.

(Sgd.) J.C. SMUTS.

South African Delegation,
Savoy Hotel, W.C.2.

18th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62433

60

SECRET.

E.81.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LEACUE OF NATIONS.

At the Meeting of the Imperial Conference held on Friday, 19th October, 1923, the Conference agreed (E.10th Conclusions (3)) that a Committee should be formed as follows:-

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (in the Chair)
The Lord Privy Seal (if able to attend)
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (or a representative)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or a representative)
The Prime Minister of Canada (or a representative)
The Prime Minister of Australia (or a representative)
The Prime Minister of New Zealand (or a representative)
The Prime Minister of South Africa (or a representative)
A Representative of the Irish Free State
A Representative of India

to consider and report to the Imperial Conference on the question of India's Contribution to the League of Nations.

The Committee has now been constituted as follows:-

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, (in the Chair)
The Lord Privy Seal,
Mr. O.E. Niemeyer, C.B., Treasury,
The Rt. Hon. Sir Rennell Rodd, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
The Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin, G.C.M.G.,
Canada,
Sir Robert Garran, K.C.M.G.,
Commonwealth of Australia,
The Rt. Hon. W.F. Massey,
New Zealand,
Captain E.F.C. Lane, C.M.G.,
Union of South Africa,
A Representative of the Irish Free State,
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, K.C.S.I.,
India.

Mr. Rowe-Dutton, Treasury, and
Professor Rushbrook Williams

will act as Joint Secretaries to the Committee.

The place, date and time of the first meeting of the Committee will be indicated later. It is requested that any communications on the subject of the Committee may be addressed in the first instance to Mr. Rowe-Dutton, Treasury Chambers, Whitehall.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY,
Secretary.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
25th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62434 E-1302-3 Agenda

30

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA IN RELATION TO THE SIGNATURE OF TREATIES AND THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS.

CONCLUSIONS of Meeting October 25th, 1923.

(1) POSITION OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA IN RELATION TO THE SIGNATURE OF TREATIES

The Committee decide to recommend for adoption by the Imperial Conference the Draft Resolution relative to the Negotiation, Signature and Ratification of International Agreements (See E (T.C.) 2) subject to the amendment of the last sentence of Part II (c) to read as follows:-

"In the case of treaties negotiated at International Conferences, where there is a British Empire Delegation, on which, in accordance with the new established practice, the Dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should also be utilised to obtain this object."

The Complete Resolution in its amended form appears in Appendix A.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to circulate to the Committee a short historical memorandum on the position of the Dominions in relation to the signature of treaties (See Appendix B.).

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(2) PROHIBITION AND LIQUOR SMUGGLING IN THE UNITED STATES.

The Committee recognised the importance of no action being taken which might tend to impair the principle that the three-mile limit should be the general limit of territorial jurisdiction. At the same time the sense of the Committee was that it was desirable, first on moral grounds, secondly with a view to maintaining good relations with the United States of America, and thirdly in the interests of British commerce, that action should be taken, if practicable, to assist the United States Government in suppressing the smuggling of liquor by British vessels.

It was noted that the Interdepartmental Committee, which had examined the question in Great Britain, had been unable to recommend any satisfactory method of assistance apart from an agreement with the United States Government on the general lines of Mr. Hughes's proposal. It was felt, however, that the form of Treaty suggested by Mr. Hughes was not wholly suitable and that it would be better to frame a counter proposal on similar lines designed to obtain from the United States Government a formal affirmation of the general principles of the three-mile limit and to ensure their support of that principle at any International Conference on Territorial Waters.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accordingly proposed that the British Government should take the initiative in suggesting to the United States Government an exchange of notes by which the principle of the three-mile limit of territorial waters would be affirmed on both sides; at the same time it would be arranged on the one hand that no objection would be raised, as a special concession for a limited period, to the search of British vessels engaged in liquor smuggling outside the territorial waters of the United States, and on the other hand that British vessels should be permitted to carry liquor under seal in the territorial waters of the United States.

It was agreed that a draft note to the United States Government should be prepared on these lines and circulated to the Members of the Committee for consideration.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

CANADIAN RESIDENT SECRETARY
SECRET
IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

W. Mackenzie King

C 62437

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923

NOTICE OF THIRTEENTH MEETING.

8

E.(23).

The Thirteenth Meeting of the Imperial Conference will be held at 10, Downing Street, on Monday the 29th October at 11 a.m.

AGENDUM.

Status of Indians in the Empire; continuation of discussion.

Papers
(E.77. Political Status of British Indians in the
(Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.
(E.80. The position of Indians in the British
(Empire. Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the
(Union of South Africa.

Copies of this Notice have been sent to the following representatives:-

GREAT BRITAIN.

The Prime Minister.
The Lord President of the Council.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

CANADA.

The Prime Minister.
The Minister of Railways and Canals.
The Minister of Justice.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

The Prime Minister.
Honorary Minister (Senator Wilson).

NEW ZEALAND.

The Prime Minister.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

The Prime Minister.
The Minister of Finance.

IRISH FREE STATE.

Vice President of the Executive Council.
Minister of External Affairs.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

The Prime Minister.

INDIA.

The Secretary of State for India.
H.H.The Maharajah of Alwar.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1. (Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.
26th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62438

Mr Mackenzie King

SECRET.

E. (Ind.) 1st Meeting.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

The Meeting of the above Committee arranged to be held in the room of the Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, S.W., on Tuesday, the 30th October, 1923, at 12 noon has been postponed to 12.30 p.m.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

29th October, 1923.

Re publicity re Indian ~~debate~~ discussion.

OCT 29 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62439

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. October 1923.

E-1458

SECRET.

E 70.
(*Also C.I.D. No. 206–C.*)

This Memorandum was approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 177th Meeting, held on the 12th October, 1923.

58

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1923.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMINION AIR FORCES.

Introduction.

Note by the Secretary of State for Air.

THE following memorandum prepared by the Air Staff is circulated in continuation of the corresponding paper (C.I.D. No. 132–C),* prepared for the Conference in February 1921.

It will be noticed that this memorandum deals at some length with the present position of the Royal Air Force, and the scheme of expansion that has been authorised by the Imperial Government. It was thought that the representatives of the Dominion Governments might desire to be put in possession of the latest developments in the Royal Air Force, with a view to seeing how far and in what way it is possible to devise a scheme of co-operation between the various Governments of the Empire. I hope, therefore, that the paper will form a basis of discussion, and will lead to an interchange of views between representatives of the Dominions and the Air Staff.

The Air Staff paper deals almost exclusively with the problems of military aviation. It may, however, be noted that I have already circulated to the Economic Conference a paper (I.E.C. (23) 1) upon the Imperial aspects of civil aviation, certain of which, as for instance the carrying of mails and geographical survey, are already being developed to some extent by the air forces of the Empire.

S. H.

Memorandum by the Air Staff.

Preparation in Peace.

It is an essential to success in air operations that the forces employed against the enemy should be based on a secure foundation of peace organisation. Air forces cannot be extemporised. A practical illustration of this is furnished by the experience of the Americans on their entry into the war in 1917. Referring to the matter, the Chief of the United States Air Staff wrote :—

> "Owing to the many technical problems which had to be solved, to the many "difficulties connected with the procurement of equipment which had to be "overcome and to the considerable time that it takes for training, it has been "shown that it takes longer to place an efficient air service in the field than is "the case with any other arm of the Service. In all planning for the future this "fact must be given full consideration."†

2. Adequate preparation in peace is therefore essential to the success of air operations in modern war, the conditions of which make it probable that great events will immediately follow, if they do not actually precede, a formal declaration of hostilities. If organisations have to be improvised, staffs created, aircraft and equipment provided and plans matured after the outbreak of war, the value of air co-operation, however willingly and enthusiastically given, will be greatly lessened.

Policy. Royal Air Force.

3. Since the war the Air Force has been reduced to the absolute minimum compatible with the immediate needs of the Navy and the maintenance of units for overseas garrisons.

* Also Paper No. E. 7.

† Final Report of the Chief of the Air Staff, American Expeditionary Force, February 15, 1921.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The actual distribution of the Royal Air Force throughout the Empire (exclusive of Home Defence), together with the duties of individual units, is given in Appendix (A) to this paper.

In addition to the above, however, the Government decided in 1922 to institute a small force for the purpose of Home Defence against Air attack. This force was to consist of eighteen squadrons.

Mr. Bonar Law on assuming office appointed a representative Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to investigate certain aspects of National Defence as affected by the last war and by modern development of mechanical weapons. This Committee recommended the increase of the Home Defence Air Forces to a total of fifty-two squadrons, and this recommendation has been accepted by His Majesty's Government.

In announcing this decision to the House of Commons on the 26th June, 1923, the Prime Minister outlined the policy which would govern the strength of British air forces as follows :—

"The Government have come to the following conclusions with reference to "British Air Power :—

"In addition to meeting the essential Air Power requirements of the Navy, "Army, Indian and Overseas commitments, British Air Power must include a "Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against "air attack by the strongest Air Force within striking distance of this country.

"It should be organised in part on a regular and permanent military basis, "and in part on a territorial or reserve basis, but so arranged as to ensure that "sufficient strength will be available immediately for purposes of defence. The "fullest possible use to be made of civilian labour and facilities.

"In the first instance the Home Defence Force should consist of fifty-two "squadrons, to be created with as little delay as possible, and the Secretary of "State for Air has been instructed forthwith to take the preliminary steps for "carrying this decision into effect. The result of this proposal will be to add "thirty-four squadrons to the authorised strength of the Royal Air Force. The "details of the organisation will be arranged with a view to the possibility of "subsequent expansion, but before any further development is put in hand the "question should be re-examined in the light of the then air strength of foreign "Powers.

"In conformity with our obligation under the Covenant of the League of "Nations, His Majesty's Government would gladly co-operate with other "Governments in limiting the strength of air armaments on lines similar to the "Treaty of Washington in the case of the Navy, and any such arrangements, it "is needless to say, would govern the policy of air expansion set out in this "statement."*

Necessity for a Common Doctrine.

4. Meanwhile, however, there appears to be no immediate probability of any general limitation of air armaments. It is, therefore, necessary, not only for this country, but also for the Dominions, to consider the strength of Air Forces which the circumstances of the Empire require and the form of organisation which would best promote their mutual assistance and support if the necessity arose.

THE SITUATION OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE WITH REGARD TO PERSONNEL.

5. It is desirable first to describe briefly the present position as regards the supply of personnel in the Royal Air Force.

(i.) *The Situation of the Royal Air Force with regard to Officer entry and Reserve.*

It has been an accepted principle that the great majority of pilots of the Royal Air Force shall be officers. From this principle and the nature of the work it follows that there must always be in the General Duties Branch of the Royal Air Force a very large number of junior officers for whom it is impossible to provide permanent careers.

* "Hansard," Vol. 165, No. 83.

Again, owing to the limit in age above which an officer cannot be expected regularly to fly, officers leaving the Air Force in middle life will not be available for the active flying reserve in the event of war.

To counter these two problems two systems of commissioning officers have been adopted in the Royal Air Force, namely :—

(*a.*) A system of permanent commissions granted mainly to boys between 17 and 19 who pass through Cranwell, the Royal Air Force Cadet College, and who look to the Force as a permanent career.

(*b.*) A Short Service system by which commissions are granted for five years, at the end of which period officers are transferred to the Reserve with gratuity.

In addition it is contemplated that a considerable number of Naval and Military officers will be seconded to the Air Force for periods normally of three or four years, returning thereafter to the duties of their parent Service.

The principle in view has been that 50 per cent. of the Flying Officers and Flight Lieutenants in the General Duties Branch should be officers holding short-service commissions. To achieve this at the present strength of the Royal Air Force there is required an annual intake of from 250 to 300 officers. When the expansion foreshadowed in paragraph 4 above has been fully achieved, the required annual intake will be about 400 to 450 short-service officers.

(ii.) *The Situation of the Royal Air Force with regard to Airmen.**

There is a disinclination on the part of the mechanic class of tradesman to offer himself for service under peace conditions in a disciplined force at service rates of pay and with the liability for overseas service. In this respect a country which relies on voluntary enlistment is at a disadvantage compared with one which has compulsory service.

It has, therefore, been found necessary to enlist boys and train them as airmen, in addition to the ordinary enlistment of skilled and semi-skilled mechanics.

The terms of service of these boys are ten years on the active list and two years on the Reserve. The boys are trained on lines similar to those for apprentices in civilian trades, and their training is regarded favourably by the various Trade Unions. They should not, therefore, meet with opposition when they seek employment in skilled trades on discharge from the Service.

Personnel Problems of the Dominions.

6 It is presumed that, in the supply of skilled personnel for their reserve, the Dominions would be confronted with a similar problem. In addition they would have to contend with the maintenance expense of training establishments for their permanent air forces. This expenditure on training may prove to be out of all proportion to the size of the force to be maintained, and it is in this connection that the Royal Air Force and the Dominion Air Forces may be of mutual assistance.

Proposals for Dominion Co-operation.

7. As a basis for discussion it is therefore suggested that a scheme of mutual co-operation might be worked out on the following lines :—

Short Service Officers—

(*a.*) The Dominion authorities to recruit candidates for Short Service Commissions in the Royal Air Force.

(*b.*) The Royal Air Force to grant short service commissions to these selected candidates and to employ them on the active list of the Royal Air Force for five years

(*c.*) On conclusion of their short service engagements these officers to pass into the Reserve of the Dominion concerned to complete their four years' reserve engagement.

* The term "airmen," as used in the Royal Air Force, excludes officers of commissioned rank, who are always termed officers, but includes all warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men, irrespective of the duties on which they are employed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(*d.*) The Dominions to be responsible for the organisation of a system of Reserve training on lines similar to the present Royal Air Force system. This arrangement might also provide training for officers of the Royal Air Force Reserve who have emigrated to the Dominions.
(*e.*) The financial arrangements to be discussed between the representatives of the British and Dominion Governments.

Permanent Commissions—

(*a.*) The Dominions to nominate suitable entrants to Cranwell.
(*b.*) The Royal Air Force to train these entrants at Cranwell and employ them for some four years. They would then be given permanent commissions in the Air Force of the Dominion concerned. The British Government would bear the cost of their pension rights for the period of their service with the Royal Air Force.
(*c.*) Any officer trained under this scheme who, at the end of his four years' service with the Royal Air Force, was found to be surplus to the requirements of the permanent Air Force of the Dominion concerned could be retained in the Royal Air Force.
(*d.*) The financial arrangements to be discussed between the representatives of the British and Dominion Governments.

It will be remembered that the Governors-General of the Dominions have already the privilege of nominating Dominion candidates for entry to the Royal Air Force Cadet College with a view to their making a permanent career in the Royal Air Force. No candidates have, so far, been forthcoming from this source, and it is thought that it may become more attractive to Dominion candidates if it is made to include, as suggested in paragraph (*b*), an ultimate return to service with the Air Force of the parent Dominion.

8. To allow for specialist training it would probably be necessary for some officers to extend the period of their time of service with the Royal Air Force beyond the four years suggested, but the advantage would lie in the fact that these regular long-service officers, when they had reached an age at which they would no longer be of great practical value as pilots, would be in a position to do useful work as Commanders or Instructors in the more specialised branches of air force work.

If a scheme on these lines could be mutually agreed upon, the career of an officer cadet selected by a Dominion for training at Cranwell and subsequent attachment to the Royal Air Force prior to returning to the Dominion Regular Air Force would be somewhat as follows:—

Age.	Employment.
17½–19½ .. Cranwell..	.. Disciplinary, educational, general technical and service-type flying training.
19½–21½ .. Service squadron	.. Continued flying training in service types, general training in bombing, fighting and formation flying, &c., Army or Fleet co-operation course, and/or seaplane training and/or flying instructors' course.
21½–22½	.. If selected as suitable, any of the twelve months' courses detailed in paragraph 16.
22½–23½	.. Service squadron overseas—probably employed on duties in connection with the technical training just completed.
23½	.. Returns to Dominion Regular Air Force.

A scheme on the above lines would confer many advantages; for example:—

(*a.*) It would bring about a constant interchange of personnel and ideas between the Dominions and Great Britain, and would ensure a community of doctrine and method between the various air forces of the Empire which would greatly facilitate their mutual co-operation.
(*b.*) It would provide the Dominions with a reserve of highly-trained pilots at a smaller cost than if each Dominion provided on its own behalf full facilities which would necessarily be elaborate and costly.
(*c.*) It would assist the Royal Air Force in maintaining a flow of temporary junior officers.

The foregoing suggestions would involve charges and liabilities both on the Imperial and the Dominion Exchequers. Should they be accepted in principle the incidence of such charges would require careful consideration by the financial authorities on both sides.

TRAINING.

9. In order to fit air forces for war, training in peace must be organised to produce the following main categories:—

(i.) Commanders and Staff Officers.
(ii.) Personnel to fly aeroplanes and operate their armament.
(iii.) Personnel to supervise the provision and accounting of stores and pay.
(iv.) Higher technical experts in aircraft, armament and allied technical matters.
(v.) Personnel for the maintenance of aircraft.
(vi.) Reserve for (ii) above.
(vii.) Reserve for (v) above.

All officers of the above categories, with the exception of those in (iii), who belong to a "Stores List," are on a "General List," and are trained pilots, thus ensuring that all concerned with the more technical aspects of equipment have had air experience.

10. *Commanders and Staff Officers* will eventually be drawn from officers who have passed through the Royal Air Force Staff College at Andover.

The subjects taught at this college are as follows:—
Air Strategy and Tactics.
Organisation and Training of the Royal Air Force.
Imperial Strategy.
Elements of Naval and Military Strategy and Tactics.
Organisation of the Army, Navy and Dominion Forces.
Writing Appreciations.
Operation Orders.
Drafting of Letters.
Staff Organisation and Staff Work in General.

There are at present twenty Royal Air Force officers, two military, two naval and one officer from each of the Canadian and Australian Air Forces, undergoing the twelve months' course at Andover. The next course begins on the 1st May, 1924. The attachment of an officer of the Australian Air Force has already been arranged and the attendance of an officer from other Dominion Air Forces as a student will be welcomed.

11. The sources from which are drawn the personnel to fly aeroplanes and operate their armament have been explained under the heading of "Personnel."

The system of training is as follows:—

(a.) *Permanent Commissioned Officers.*—Before receiving their commissions these officers undergo a course of two years as Cadets at the Royal Air Force Cadet College, Cranwell. The course comprises instruction in all the duties of a pilot officer, including the flying of a service aeroplane.
(b.) *Short Service Commissioned Officers.*—These officers are obtained by a system of direct entry from civil life for a period of five years' service in the Regular Air Force followed by four years' service in the Reserve. On appointment to Short Service Commissions they are sent to one of the four Flying Training Schools for a course of one year and are trained in the duties of a pilot officer including the flying of a service aeroplane.
(c.) *Airmen Pilots.*—These are trained on a course of one year at a Flying Training School on lines similar to the Short Service Commissioned Officers above. They are drawn from the "skilled" ranks of the Royal Air Force, and, while under instruction at Flying Training Schools, and subsequently when with a Service Squadron, they keep in touch with their original "trade."
(d.) *Aerial Gunners.*—These are drawn from the non-commissioned and other ranks of the Royal Air Force and are trained both at home and abroad in a course of ground gunnery, and in camera gun practice in the air. Conditions abroad permit of aerial firing being carried out in the unit, but at home this part of the training has to be done at the Armament and Gunnery School at Eastchurch. This school also carries out the elementary training of a certain proportion of the aerial gunners required for home units.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Service Training.

12 At Cranwell and the Flying Training Schools pilots are taught to fly a service aeroplane, but are not taught to fight in it, still less to fight in flight and squadron formations; this and all the service knowledge necessary for a pilot is obtained in the Service Squadron and is the responsibility of the Service Squadron Commander.

13. The Air Ministry endeavours to keep all pilots for a term of four years with the same squadron in order to enable both pilots and squadrons to become efficient in their own particular duty, and in order to foster "esprit de corps" in Squadrons.

14. There are a number of specialist schools in the Royal Air Force at which pilots during the course of their employment with the service squadrons can attend short courses in the various more technical aspects of flying. These schools are as follows:—

Training School.	Nature of Course.	Duration of Course.
School of Army Co-operation, Old Sarum ..	Army co-operation	3 months.
Seaplane Training School, Lee-on-Solent ..	Fleet spotting and reconnaissance ..	5–6 „
Armament and Gunnery School, Eastchurch ..	Aerial gunnery and bombing ..	2 „
Central Flying School, Upavon	Training of flying instructors ..	3 „
R.A.F. Base, Calshot	Air pilotage	3 „
„ „	Seaplane training	3 „

These courses not only serve to train individual pilots, but also enable certain selected officers to be employed as instructors in service units.

The Air Staff would welcome the attachment of a certain number of Dominion officers to service squadrons, and also to undergo some of the short courses outlined above.

Training of Technical Experts.

15. A number of officers on the General List are selected for training in the higher technical subjects concerning Aircraft, Armament and Equipment. For this purpose there are a number of long courses at Service Specialist Establishments and at the Universities. Details of these courses are as follows:—

Training School.	Nature of Course.	Duration of Course.
School of Photography, Farnborough ..	Aerial photography	40 weeks.
Electrical and Wireless School, Flowerdown ..	Wireless telegraphy	12 months.
Armament and Gunnery School, Eastchurch ..	Armament	11 „
Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough ..	Engineering, A	12 „
Cambridge University	Engineering, B	2 years
Imperial College	Advanced, C	1 year
Cambridge University	Signal officers	2 years
Imperial College	Research course	1 year
„ „	Meteorology	1 „

NOTE.—The three engineering courses follow one upon the other. Officers from Course A provide the engineer officers for squadrons and training units, &c., with the exception of a few of those who pass out highest, who go on to Course B, which provides even more highly qualified officers for the various technical establishments. Again, a few of the best from Course B continue into the advanced Course C, and are available for the higher technical staffs and for research work.

The Air Staff consider that the Dominions would derive considerable advantage from these courses and they recommend that selected officers of the Dominion Air Forces should go through some of them.

Training of Maintenance Personnel.

16. The training of airmen is undertaken at Flowerdown for electrical trades and at Manston and Halton for the remaining skilled trades. Men enlisted as aircraft hands (unskilled) undergo a disciplinary course at Uxbridge, the Royal Air Force Depot, and then are posted direct to units.

Training in skilled trades at Flowerdown and Manston is completed within a period varying from four to twenty-four months, according to the trades and the initial skill of the individual.

Aircraft Apprentices (Boys) are trained at Cranwell, Halton and Flowerdown, the length of the course being three years.

While in a squadron, unskilled men are encouraged to learn a trade, and if considered likely to progress they are recommended for a course in one of the skilled trades.

With a view to the provision of skilled technical instructors the Dominions would no doubt derive benefit from the attachment of certain non-commissioned officers to these Technical Training Schools.

Training of Reserve Pilots.

17. It is essential that pilots of the Reserve should carry out a certain amount of flying annually. For this purpose four Civilian Training Centres have been formed as follows:—

Location.	Firm	Machines.
Stag Lane, Hendon ..	The De Havilland Aircraft Company	Avros and D.H.9 a's.
Filton, Bristol	The Bristol Aeroplane Company	Bristol Lucifer and Bristol Tourer.
Coventry	Armstrong, Siddeley Company	Avros and Wolf machines.
Renfrew, Glasgow ..	W. Beardmore and Co. ..	Avros and D.H.9 a's.

This system, in addition to relieving the Regular Force of a duty which at present it is too much occupied to carry out, is of direct benefit to the aircraft industry.

Each school can handle seventy pupils per annum. Pilots who have not flown for some time are first instructed on a school type of machine, and subsequently on a service type. In order to qualify as reserve pilots they must each carry out five hours solo flying on a service type machine and also pass certain tests of efficiency.

Pilots with more recent experience of flying are given quarterly training and must carry out three hours solo flying per quarter on a service aeroplane. It should be understood that the direct entry of ex-officers of the war period into the Reserve is a temporary measure to provide an immediate increase in the number of trained reserve pilots. The main source of supply for the Reserve will be the short service officers who have completed the active list portion of their engagements. Officers so entered need only the ordinary quarterly training to keep in practice in flying.

Reserve officers of Class B (technical and observer officers) are liable to be called upon to carry out fourteen days' training per annum with an Air Force unit.

It is suggested that training of Reserve pilots on the lines indicated would prove satisfactory in the Dominions.

Training of Reservists (Airmen).

18. Airmen on the Reserve of the Royal Air Force are liable to be called upon for twelve days' training per annum with an Air Force unit.

EQUIPMENT AND STORES.

19. Aeronautical equipment is one of the most important factors in the efficiency of a flying force, and it will undoubtedly play a large part in assuring the security of the British Empire. It is manifest, therefore, that no opportunity should be lost of improving aeronautical equipment in every way, and of developing the resources of the Empire in this respect.

Aircraft Production.

20. At the present time practically all aircraft production for the equipment of the various air services of the Empire is carried out in the United Kingdom. In time of peace this may not be disadvantageous, but in the event of a serious threat to

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

the security of one of the distant dominions this state of affairs might have grave results. From the military point of view it is important that there should be no undue delay or exceptional risks involved in transporting aircraft equipment to any threatened part of the Empire. But so long as practically the whole of aircraft manufacture is carried on in the United Kingdom it is beyond doubt that considerable delay would take place in transporting stores for the defence of a Dominion, even if the maritime risk involved could be satisfactorily overcome. The constant flow of equipment from an assured source would be essential to meet the heavy wastage which would inevitably take place in extended operations. It is a matter of importance therefore that the development of a healthy aircraft industry should be encouraged in the Dominions, or at least that a nucleus industry, capable of expansion in an emergency, should be established and maintained.

Standardisation of Aircraft.

21. In considering the question of the efficient utilisation of the resources of the Empire for the defence of any threatened Dominion, the question immediately arises as to the best method by which the maximum co-operation in the supply of aeronautical equipment could be achieved. If the types of aircraft and aircraft parts could be completely standardised throughout the Empire it would be undoubtedly true to say that a very great stride would be made in this direction. Production would be facilitated and cheapened; the confusion resulting from non-interchangeability of equipment, which so frequently attends combined operations, would be very largely, if not completely, eliminated; pilots from all parts of the Empire would be familiar with all types of machines in use, and one country would be enabled to come to the assistance of another in the supply of equipment without the great preliminary delay which would otherwise almost certainly take place. Standardisation would thus be attended by great military advantages.

There are, however, obvious difficulties in the way of complete standardisation. Local conditions in the Dominions would probably dictate considerable alteration to the design of machines constructed for operation in, for example, the United Kingdom. Moreover, there is always the risk that standardisation may restrict originality in design, and thereby hamper the progress of aviation.

It would seem, therefore, that the realisation of the ideal of complete standardisation might prove to be impracticable; but the advantages of standardisation are so great that the failure to attain this ideal completely should not be allowed to obscure the possibility of achieving some step in its direction. It is for consideration, therefore, whether partial standardisation could not be brought into force with advantageous results, and without acting as a drag on aircraft design. Careful consideration of this matter leads to the conclusion that partial standardisation could undoubtedly be effected.

Partial Standardisation.

22. It is important that only such aeronautical equipment and stores should be standardised as have reached some degree of finality in design. It is most undesirable to standardise equipment which might require to be scrapped owing to obsolescence during its useful life. It is considered that there would be little risk on this account in the standardisation of aircraft spares, such as A.G.S.* parts (bolts, nuts, screws, &c., which are common to all types of machines), wheels and tyres, propeller hubs, bomb racks, &c. Standardisation, it is thought, could also be effected in the matter of photographic equipment, plates, &c., and in the case of machine guns, ammunition, bombs, &c., and perhaps wireless equipment.

It is also desirable that common specifications for materials should be adopted throughout the Empire, *e.g.*, for fabric, dope, metals, petrol and oil.

It is unlikely that any very material advantage would be derived from the standardisation of instruments, such as speedometers, &c.

Nomenclature.

23. Wherever standardisation of equipment is possible it is suggested that standard nomenclature should be adopted in order to obviate confusion.

* Aircraft General Stores—Stores common to all aircraft.

Supplies of Raw Materials.

24. It is obvious that one of the most important factors in the problem of aeronautical supply at any time of emergency where increased production would be required at short notice is the existence of stocks of the raw materials necessary for aircraft construction. In particular, the supply of spruce would be a difficulty in the event of any great expansion of aircraft manufacture. The development of the all-metal machine may, in the near future, alter the situation, but at present, spruce, which must be of the best grade and well seasoned, is essential to the manufacture of aircraft. There is a shortage of stocks of wood of the right quality, not only in Great Britain, but also in the world markets generally. Measures are being taken by the Air Ministry to build up a small reserve stock, but this far from providing a complete solution to the problem. Further measures are greatly to be desired for the development of stocks of spruce from the potentially abundant supplies which exist in Canada.

RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL WORK.

25. The Air Member for Supply and Research at the Air Ministry is responsible, through the Director of Research, both for the direction and co-ordination of pure research in aeronautics and for the conduct of experimental work and the construction and development of experimental equipment, both for the Royal Air Force and Civil Aviation.

26. The Aeronautical Research Committee was set up in 1920 to take the place of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Its principal functions are to advise the Air Ministry on scientific and technical problems relating to the construction and navigation of aircraft; to initiate any research work which it considers advisable; to assist the aeronautical industry by scientific advice and research; to prepare for the approval of the Air Council a scheme of work and estimate of expenditure for the year, and to make reports from time to time to the Air Council.

The research work initiated by the Committee is principally carried out at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, and the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington, but in addition there is some research carried out at the universities and at commercial research establishments.

Aerodynamical Research.

27. Pure research in aerodynamics is carried out in the Aerodynamics Department of the National Physical Laboratory (wind channel and theoretical investigations) and at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough (wind channel and full scale investigations). The problems investigated include the plotting of pressure areas on the wings and other parts of the aeroplane, the measurement of the forces exercised by the various controls, questions of stability, the aerodynamic properties of various forms of construction, and the problem of control flight above the stalling angle. For full scale research on many of these problems the development of special instruments is necessary to secure accurate results, and the development of these instruments is carried out entirely at the Royal Aircraft Establishment.

28. There are Sub-Committees of the Aeronautical Research Committee for the more detailed investigation of special problems which may be referred to them, such as the Engine Sub-Committee and the Accidents Sub-Committee.*

Engine Research.

29. Engine Research is carried out under the supervision of the Air Ministry at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, at Messrs. Ricardos, and in some cases at the works of engine constructors. The Air Ministry Laboratory is responsible for research on thermodynamics.

Armament Research.

30. Research on Armament is to a great extent carried out jointly on behalf of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry by the Ordnance Committee. The

* This must be distinguished from the Accidents Investigation Branch of the Air Ministry whi investigates all accidents however caused. The Accidents Sub-Committee only investigates such accidents as are referred in order that the aerodynamic aspects of the question may be considered.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Air Ministry is, however, directly concerned in research upon the aerodynamic properties of bombs, the composition of bombs and pyrotechnics, and the development of special guns suited for use in aircraft. Efforts are being made to develop guns of a larger size than have hitherto been used. The question of special ammunition is also continually under investigation.

Wireless Research.

31. Research on wireless telegraphy and radio telephony is carried out by the three services jointly under the supervision of co-ordinating bodies, each service concentrating on the development of apparatus specially designed to meet its peculiar requirements. The Air Ministry has for some years carried out special research on oxygen and oxygen apparatus for use in aircraft, while a great deal of work has been done in the development of special navigating and course-setting instruments, more particularly for use in Naval gunnery work.

32. Considerable work has also been done in connection with the design of other accessories, such as radiators, petrol pipes, tyres and shock-absorbing components, with a view to evolving a type of equipment capable of resisting extremes of temperature ranging from the heat of Iraq, India and Egypt to the intense cold of great heights in northern latitudes.

33. In order that the Dominions may secure the full benefit of the work which is being done by the Air Ministry, the first essential is that there should be some machinery by which the results of this work may be communicated to the technical officers of Dominion Air Forces or to Dominion aviation companies.* To a great extent the results of pure research can be communicated by the transmission of reports and papers such as are produced by the Aeronautical Research Committee; but if the Dominions are to be kept in touch with the experimental work and also with such research work as does not always become the subject of formal reports, it is desirable that Dominion liaison officers should have sufficient technical experience to enable them to select on behalf of the Dominions such points as are likely to be of interest to them. The present difficulty experienced in arranging for the common investigation of certain problems of interest to all concerned or the investigation of special problems by the Dominion whose climatic conditions make such investigation particularly desirable or easy would thus be overcome. Co-ordination of this kind is essential if the best results are to be obtained without unnecessary duplication of effort.

34. If, however, some indication is required as to the type of problem which might be investigated more particularly by the Dominions, the following suggestions are made :—

Canada—

The effect of extreme cold on material of all kinds.
The effect of extreme cold on air-cooled engines.
Air Survey.

Australia—

The effect of extreme heat on materials.
The effect of extreme heat on engines. (This might overlap to some extent with the knowledge already acquired by the Royal Air Force in Iraq and Egypt.)
Effect of heat on dopes, fabrics and glue.
Air Survey.

35. A certain degree of co-operation has already been obtained in the past with regard to Canada and Australia through the medium of the Aeronautical Research Committee. The Secretary of the Committee has been for some time in direct correspondence with both these Dominions, and has until recently sent copies of aeronautical papers direct to the Director of Research on Air Matters in Australia. He has also received copies of the programme of research in hand in Canada and has answered questions referred to the Aeronautical Research Committee by Canada. While this degree of co-ordination has undoubtedly been useful, it clearly cannot be so effective as the maintenance of close touch by the appointment of technical liaison officers.

* In the latter case, subject to such reservations as may be necessary on military grounds.

Use of Naval and Military Aircraft in Peace.

36. Air forces developed on the lines indicated are not only an insurance against external aggression in time of war, but can also be economically used for other purposes in time of peace. Thus, in the intervals of war training aircraft may be employed with advantage on coastal survey, land survey, forest fires and postal work.

In the United States of America military aircraft are extensively employed on survey duties with most beneficial results.

In Canada, air patrols have been found to be the most efficient and most economical method of locating forest fires. The Canadian Government is now almost entirely dependent on aircraft for this work.

The employment of aircraft in peace on duties of the above nature is not only an excellent method of developing the art of airmanship in the flying personnel of an air force, but may be in many cases an economical method of carrying out certain services of a civil character, especially in undeveloped or unsettled areas. Owing to such causes as the greater distances between centres of population, superior climatic conditions for flying, &c., the Dominions may be expected to have considerable advantage over Great Britain as regards opportunity for useful auxiliary employment of aircraft primarily provided for national defence. It may be observed in this connection that the employment of military aircraft for carrying mails between Cairo and Bagdad has effected an average saving of seventeen days on the time taken for mails between London and Bagdad.

Air Staff, October 4, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62450

APPENDIX (A).

Distribution of the Royal Air Force.

(*Service Units.*)

United Kingdom—
2 squadrons, army co-operation.
2 squadrons, reserve (probably to become army squadrons).
1 squadron, communications.

Navy—
3 flights, reconnaissance.
3 flights, fleet spotters.
3 flights, ships' fighters (for embarkation in three aircraft carriers).
2 flights, torpedo aircraft.
1 flight, flying boats.
(All naval flights comprised of six aircraft each, except the boat flight which is comprised of five.)

Malta, navy—
1 flight, reconnaissance.
1 flight, fleet spotters.
1 flight, ships' fighters (for embarkation in Mediterranean Fleet aircraft carrier).
1 flight, seaplanes.

Egypt—
3 squadrons, under General Officer Commanding, Egypt, for operations.

Palestine—
1 squadron, internal security under Air Ministry.

Transjordania—
1 flight, internal security under Air Ministry

Aden—
1 flight, under General Officer Commanding, Aden, for operations.
(Also available for operations in Somaliland.)

India—
6 squadrons, under Commander-in-chief, India, for operations.
(The expense of these squadrons is borne by the Indian Government.)

Iraq—
8 squadrons, internal security under Air Ministry.

Note.—In addition to the above, there are now authorised a total of 52 squadrons for Home Defence, to be stationed in the United Kingdom. Of these—

3 are already formed.
15 are in process of formation.
34 are recently sanctioned.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62451 E-1302-3

SECRET

Ref: No: C.A./A./15.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

58

LIST OF COMMITTEES.

The following statement gives the Terms of Reference and Personnel of the Committees formed in pursuance of Decisions of the Imperial Conference up to Saturday, 13th October, 1923, inclusive. It is proposed to issue revisions of the statement from time to time during the sitting of the Conference as may be necessary.

(1) NATIONALITY COMMITTEE. (Reference E. 2nd Meeting, Appendix B, Resolution I).

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

To consider and report to the Imperial Conference on the following questions:-

(1) The Grant of Naturalisation to Persons resident in Mandated Territories.

(2) The appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the revocation of Certificates.

(3) The re-admission to British nationality of British-born women married to aliens.

(4) Marriages with foreigners.

PERSONNEL.

The Secretary of State for Home Affairs (in the Chair)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or a representative)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (or a representative)
The Secretary for Scotland.
The Attorney-General
The Registrar-General
The Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Dominion of Canada
The Hon. R.V. Wilson, Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Commonwealth of Australia
The Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand
The Hon. N.J. de Wot, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, Minister for External Affairs, Irish Free State.
The Prime Minister of Newfoundland.
His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar and
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, India

Secretaries -
Mr. R.L. Bicknell of the Home Office, and
Sir Robert R. Garran, Australian Secretary to the Imperial Conference.

OCT 29 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

CANADIAN RESIDENT SECRETARY
29 OCT 1923
IMPERIAL CONFERENCES (1923)

Prime Minister, Canada
C 62452

SECRET.

E. (Ind.) 1st Meeting.

2

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

A Meeting of the above Committee will be held in the room of the Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, S.W., on Tuesday, the 30th October, 1923 at 12 noon. changed to 12.30

A G E N D A.

CONSIDERATION OF PUBLICATION OF SPEECHES.

Copies of this notice have been sent to the following representatives:-

GREAT BRITAIN. - Secretary of State for the Colonies.

CANADA - Prime Minister.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA - Prime Minister.

NEW ZEALAND - Prime Minister.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA - Prime Minister.

IRISH FREE STATE- Minister of External Affairs.

NEWFOUNDLAND - Prime Minister.

INDIA - Secretary of State for India.
- H.H. the Maharajah of Alwar.
- Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens,

29th October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62453

59

CONFIDENTIAL.

E. 84.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

Committee on Spahlinger Treatment of Tuberculosis.

At the Meeting of the Conference on October 31st. it was decided to form a Committee as follows:-

The Minister of Health (Chairman).
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (or Representative).
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (or Representative).
A representative of Canada.
" " " The Commonwealth of Australia.
" " " New Zealand.
" " " The Union of South Africa.
" " " The Irish Free State.
" " " Newfoundland.
" " " India.

Joint Secretaries) Mr. J.N. Dark,) (Ministry of Health)) Mr. F.D. Thomson.) (New Zealand Delegation).

The first Meeting of the Committee will be held in the room of the Minister of Health at the Ministry of Health on Thursday, 1st November, at 11 a.m.

A copy of this notice has been sent to:-

GREAT BRITAIN — The Minister of Health. The Chancellor of the Exchequer. The S/S for the Colonies. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

CANADA. — The Prime Minister.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. — The Prime Minister.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62454

New Zealand	The Prime Minister.
Union of South Africa.	The Prime Minister.
Irish Free State	The Minister of External Affairs.
Newfoundland	The Prime Minister.
India	The S/S for India.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
31st October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr Mackenzie King

C 62455

CONFIDENTIAL.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Meeting of Committee held on Tuesday, October 30th, 1923, at 12 - 30 p.m.

(E. (Ind.) 1st Conclusions)

The Draft Conclusions of the above Meeting are enclosed herewith for favour of approval or amendment.

It is requested that the attached copy may be returned to me by noon on Saturday, the 3rd proximo. After this time, unless a communication is received to the contrary, it will be assumed that no corrections are desired.

The attached copy should, in any case, be returned immediately on receipt of the FINAL COPY to the Secretary of the Conference, at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

(Signed) G.H. CREASY.
Joint Secretary to the Committee.

2 Whitehall Gardens
~~Colonial Office~~, S.W.

31st October, 1923.

NOV 1 Rec'd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62456

2

S E C R E T.

E. (Ind.) 1st Meeting.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of Meeting of the above Committee held in the Room of the Secretary of State, Colonial Office, S.W., on Tuesday, October 30th, 1923, at 12 - 30 p.m.

P R E S E N T:-

His Grace The Duke of Devonshire, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies. (In the Chair).

Sir James Masterton Smith, K.C.B., Permanent Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. E.J. Harding, C.M.G., Deputy Secretary, Imperial Conference.

The Right Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. S.M. Bruce, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Captain E.F.C. Lane, C.M.G., Secretary, South African Delegation.

Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Right Hon. Viscount Peel, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel H.H. The Maharajah of Alwar, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, K.C.S.I.

Lieut.Col. Sir Wolseley Haig, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.E., Political Secretary to H.H. The Maharajah of Alwar.

Prof. L.F. Rushbrook Williams C.B.E., Secretary, Indian Delegation.

Lt.Col. C.W.G. Walker, D.S.O., Asst.Secretary,.....) Joint
Committee of Imperial Defence,)
Mr. G.H. Creasy, Colonial Office.....) Secretaries.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Committee considered the question of the publication of the speeches regarding the status of Indians in the British Empire, which were made at the 12th and 13th meetings of the Imperial Conference.

It was decided that :-

> it would be advisable that these speeches, together with those with which the discussion should terminate at the 14th meeting to be held on the 31st October, should, subject to the omission of:
> (i) the reference to Mr. Lloyd George's speech delivered at the 1921 Imperial Conference;
> (ii) the last two sentences of the quotation from the Viceroy's speech on the Kenya decision, and;
> (iii) such parts of the concluding speeches as may be considered unsuitable for publication,
> be issued to the Press, in extenso, on the 1st November, for publication on the 2nd November.

The Committee also decided that it would be advisable that :-

> the two memoranda circulated to the Conference on the subject, viz: E.77, Memorandum by the Colonial Office on the political status of British Indians in the Colonies, Protectorates, and Mandated Territories, and E.80, Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa on the position of Indians in the British Empire, should be issued to the Press at the same time.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies promised that he would ask the Editor of the "Times" to see that these speeches were published in full in that newspaper.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

31st October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62458

SECRET

E. 85.

59

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

Publication of Correspondence.

Status of High Commissioners.

At the meeting of the Conference on October 31st it was decided to form a Committee to deal with the above questions constituted as follows :-

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Chairman)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or representative)
The Lord President of the Council.
A representative of Canada,
" " " The Commonwealth of Australia.
" " " New Zealand.
" " " The Union of South Africa,
" " " The Irish Free State,
" " " Newfoundland.

The first meeting of the Committee will be held in the Secretary of State's room, Colonial Office, on Friday November 2nd at 12 noon.

A copy of this notice has been sent to -

Great Britain :	The Secretary of State for the Colonies, The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Lord President of the Council, The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Canada :	Prime Minister.
Commonwealth of Australia :	Prime Minister.
New Zealand :	Prime Minister.
Union of South Africa :	Prime Minister.
Irish Free State :	Minister of External Affairs.
Newfoundland :	Prime Minister.

(Signed) M.P.A.HANKEY

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
31st October, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62459

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

(Paper "E. 80").

It is requested that the attached print may be substituted for the typewritten version of the above paper issued on the 22nd inst. and the latter returned to this Office.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
31st October, 1923.

NOV 2 Rec'd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62460

W. Mackenzie King

E. 80.

39

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

BEFORE the Conference comes to consider this thorny subject, I wish my colleagues to consider the following suggestion of a way out of the difficulties in which we find ourselves. In India the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire seems to be adding to the political agitation and unrest, while in those other parts the atmosphere for the solution of the difficulty is not improving but on the contrary getting worse. This latter change is in some measure due to the Sastri mission. Mr. Sastri by his mission and his speeches has undoubtedly made matters worse. He has, for instance, never failed, whenever opportunity presented itself, to attack the Indian policy of South Africa, and has thereby greatly exasperated public opinion in that Dominion, already very sensitive on this issue. In other Dominions he has made people alive to the issue—indeed he has largely created it. The claim he has everywhere vigorously pressed for equal franchise rights for Indians over the whole Empire has not only gone further than the local claims of the Indians themselves, but has tended to raise opposition in quarters where it did not exist before. It is because I foresaw this development that I did not invite Mr. Sastri to include South Africa in his mission. It is not alleged that the economic position of Indians in other parts of the Empire is bad. It is admitted that they are successful and thriving under the laws of the Dominions, and are in most respects economically better off than they would be in India. But the claim is put forward for equal political rights throughout the Empire, and its denial is looked upon as a stigma, as an affront to our Indian fellow-subjects. And no questions are more difficult and dangerous than those involving national dignity and honour.

The Indian claim for equal franchise rights in the Empire outside of India arise, in my opinion, from a misconception of the nature of British citizenship. This misconception is not confined to India, but is fairly general, and the Conference would do not only India but the whole Empire an important service by its removal. The misconception arises, not from the fact, but from the assumption that all subjects of the King are equal, that in an Empire where there is a common King there should be a common and equal citizenship, and that all differences and distinctions in citizen rights are wrong in principle. Hence it is claimed that whether a British subject has or has not political rights in his country of origin, he should, on migration to another part of the Empire where British subjects enjoy full political rights, be entitled automatically to the enjoyment of these rights. It is on this basis that equal political rights are claimed for Indians who live in the Dominions or Colonies outsid of India.

It is, of course, clear that the assumption on which the claim is based is wrong. There is no equality of British citizenship throughout the Empire. On the contrary, there is every imaginable difference. In some parts British subjects have no political rights whatever; in others they have modified rights of one kind or another; in others, again, they have the fullest political rights. In the same part you may find British subjects with little or no political rights, and others with full rights. There is no common equal British citizenship in the Empire, and it is quite wrong for a British subject to claim equality of rights in any part of the Empire to which he has migrated or where he happens to be living. There is no indignity or affront at all in the denial of such equality. Once this is clearly recognised, the stigma above referred to falls away. Indians in those parts of the Empire where they do not enjoy equal franchise rights cannot justly or fairly claim that their national dignity or status is involved.

[10768]

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62461

I go even further. The newer conception of the British Empire as a smaller League of Nations, as a partnership of free and equal nations under a common hereditary Sovereign, involves an even further departure from the simple conception of a unitary citizenship. British citizenship has been variable in the past; it is bound to be even more so in the future. Each constituent part of the Empire will settle for itself the nature and incidents of its citizenship. The composition and character and rights of its people will be the concern of each free and equal State in the Empire. It will not only regulate immigration from other parts of the Empire as well as from the outside world, but it will also settle the rights of its citizens as a matter of domestic concern. The common Kingship is the binding link between the parts of the Empire; it is not a source from which private citizens will derive their rights. They will derive their rights simply and solely from the authority of the State in which they live. Hence Indians going to Canada will not be entitled to claim equal political rights with the other citizens of Canada, no more than Canadians going to India or Australia could claim equal political rights there. The conception of the Empire as a League of Nations ought to do away with these claims, which are so disturbing and unsettling in the Empire.

From this point of view the Indian resolution passed at the last Imperial Conference was a profound mistake. It was not only impracticable, but it ran counter to the new conception of the Empire, as not a unitary State, but a partnership of equal States. It has both theoretically and practically landed us in a false position, and the sooner we get out of it the better for the future good relations of the different States of the Empire. The political claims of Indians arising under that resolution should not be allowed to create difficulties for the Governments of the Dominions, which would not have arisen if the constitutional position had been properly appreciated.

The Indian Government should not claim from the other Empire Governments what (say) the friendly Governments of Japan and China would not claim. And the fact is that with neither of these Governments have we any difficulties in the Dominions, while the difficulties with India are notorious and growing.

We must get to the right constitutional conception, which I take to be the absolute and unquestioned power and authority of each part of the Empire to settle such questions for itself. India has threatened retaliation as a method of reprisal against Dominions which do not concede equal rights to her nationals. This is, again, a false position arising out of the misconception which I have explained. There should be no question either of retaliation or reprisal. India should be free to deal with nationals of the Dominions on a basis of reciprocal treatment, and neither on her part nor on the part of the Dominions concerned should there be any resentment or ill-feeling in the matter. Our relations in this regard should be practically those of friendly sovereign States towards each other Unless this readjustment of viewpoint is brought about it is feared that the question of the position of Indians in the Empire may continue to grow in gravity.

I would therefore suggest that for the resolution of the last conference on the subject there be substituted a resolution affirming the right of each portion of the Empire to regulate citizenship as well as immigration as domestic questions for its own handling and not affecting the status or dignity of other portions of the Empire, and expressing the opinion that provisions for reciprocal treatment of the nationals of the States of the Empire should not be looked upon as unfriendly or otherwise affecting the good relations of these States *inter se*. It would thus be left to the good sense of each State of the Empire to say what citizen rights shall be enjoyed, and by whom, within their territorial jurisdiction, and no State of the Empire should have claim to force its citizens on any other State or resent their exclusion or special treatment by the latter.

(Signed) J. C. SMUTS.

South African Delegation, Savoy Hotel, W.C. 2,
October 18, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

(Nov. 1923)
2c.

Mr King's first draft of proposed addition to Draft 2.

C 82462

In the conduct of foreign affairs care must be taken to differentiate between matters especially affecting the interests and responsibilities of the individual countries of the British Commonwealth or Great Britain, and those which may be regarded as of common concern, as respects a. The former it was recognized that each part of the Empire, which ought to be entitled to act on its own responsibility and initiative, must decide for itself; such decisions as regard matters of common concern it was recognized should be taken only after the fullest consultation with the other governments (or endorsation) of the parliaments concerned to which they are responsible. Such understandings as to policy were arrived at in the course of conferences between governments concerned

While conclusions of this character were understood to be arrived at

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

~~matters of importance~~

as regards matters of common concern it was
recognized that ~~powers exercised~~ by which
action based upon policies arrived at
in conference or by other forms of consultation
~~should~~ being necessary ~~be subject to~~ the result
of conferences or other forms of consultation
concerned action therein was necessarily
subject to the approval of the Parliaments
concerned

to give binding effect to policies
arrived at as a result of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62464

~~Document as to~~

In the discussion of foreign affairs care must be taken to maintain the distinction between ~~conference~~

of views expressed by the representatives of the respective governments

that neither the opinion of the governments of the Dominions represented nor the opinion of the conference as a whole is expressed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

In the discussions of foreign affairs, care was taken to differentiate between matters especially affecting the interests and responsibilities of the individual Dominions or Great Britain and those which may be regarded as of common concern.

With respect to the former, it was recognized that the Governments and Parliaments of each part of the Empire might, with due regard to the possible contingent interests of other parts, be expected to act on their own initiative and responsibility.

As regards matters of common concern, it was felt that policies with respect thereto should, as far as possible, be an expression of the general consensus of view likely to be arrived at after consultation or conference with the several Governments concerned.

It was recognized, however, that to the extent that conference or consultation did not permit of a considered and explicit judgment being given by the Governments of the countries concerned, the ~~common~~ understanding arrived at in conference with their representatives ~~or otherwise~~ could not be held to ~~bind~~ their respective Governments or Parliaments ~~and that any action arising out of the same must necessarily be subject to their express assent and~~ approval.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

POOR
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Mr. Mackenzie King - rough draft - 6.XI.23

C 62466

3 copies

In the discussions of foreign affairs, care was taken to differentiate between matters especially affecting the interests and responsibilities of the individual Dominions or Great Britain and those which may be regarded as of common concern.

With respect to the former, it was recognized that the Governments and Parliaments of each part of the Empire might, with due regard to the possible contingent interests of other parts, be expected to act on their own initiative and responsibility.

As regards matters of common concern, it was felt that policies with respect thereto should, as far as possible, be an expression of the general consensus of view of the countries affected likely to be arrived at after consultation or conference with the several Governments concerned.

It was recognized, however, that ~~to the extent~~ as explicitly stated that conference or consultation did not permit of a considered and explicit judgment being given by the Governments of the countries concerned, the ~~common~~ understanding arrived at in conference with their representatives ~~or otherwise~~ could not be held to bind or commit their respective Governments or Parliaments. ~~and that any action arising out of the same must necessarily be subject~~ without the ~~in their~~ express sanction or ~~assent and~~ approval of the latter.

in regard to the action of the delegates

19

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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C 62467

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As revised by Mr. Skelton - Nov. 6

In the discussions of foreign affairs, care was taken to differentiate between matters especially affecting the interests and responsibilities of the individual Dominions or Great Britain and those which may be regarded as of common concern.

With respect to the former, it was recognized that the Governments and Parliaments of each part of the Empire might, with due regard to the possible contingent interests of other parts, be expected to act on their own initiative and responsibility.

With respect to matters considered of common concern, it was recognized that consultation was required, by conference or otherwise. The present Conference was a meeting of representatives of Governments primarily for the purpose of exchanging information and opinions, and proposals made thereat did not commit the Governments so represented or the Parliaments to which they were responsible, without ~~full~~ their consideration and express consent.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

A.

In the discussions of foreign affairs, care was taken to differentiate between matters especially affecting the interests and responsibilities of the individual Dominions or Great Britain and those which may be regarded as of common concern.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62469 5-5-

N-1102

S E C R E T.

E.83.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

PROPOSED EXTENSION OF THE POWERS OF THE IMPERIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION.

Note by the Secretary.

With reference to the application of the Imperial War Graves Commission for an extension of their powers, I am directed by Mr. Baldwin to circulate herewith the draft of certain paragraphs which he suggests should be incorporated in the Report of the Imperial Conference.

The question will be placed on the Agenda at an early meeting.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

2nd November, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62470

8

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

PROPOSED EXTENSION OF THE POWERS OF THE IMPERIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION.

SUGGESTED DRAFT PARAGRAPHS FOR REPORT.

During the course of the Conference a proposal was received from the Imperial War Graves Commission that the powers conferred upon the Commission by the Charter of 10th May, 1917 and the Supplementary Charter of the 10th August, 1921 should be extended so as to enable the Commission to comply with a request based on public expediency and economy that they should undertake the public duty of the future maintenance of such Cemeteries and Graves as the Old Military Cemetery at Tel el Kebir, the Crimean Cemetery at Scutari, which is in the same plot of ground as the Commissions's War Cemetery, and the older Cemeteries in Turkey which could more conveniently be maintained in conjunction with the War Graves.

This proposal was submitted to the Representatives of the Dominions and India and the Colonies and Protectorates, all of whom have indicated their acceptance of the proposal as outlined in the following Memorandum:-

> The Commission, if in their absolute discretion they deem it desirable, may, at the request of any Government of any part of our Empire responsible for or desirous of maintaining any place of burial or memorial whether or not of or relating to such officers or men as may fall within the descriptions contained in Our Original Charter of May 10, 1917 or Our Supplemental Charter of August 10, 1921 or of or relating to any other officers men or civilians whatever, exercise with regard to such place of burial or memorial as aforesaid and the graves in such

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

8

place of burial all or any of their powers as if the said Original and Supplemental Charters were applicable to the said burial place or memorial and graves, provided that the cost of or incidental to any exercise of the additional powers given of this Our Charter be provided by the Government making the aforesaid request.

The necessary steps will be taken forthwith to incorporate the above Memorandum in a further Supplementary Charter for submission to His Majesty the King.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62472

Friday,
November 2, 1923.
10 a.m.

MR. KING.

Sir Maurice Hankey telephoned me this morning to say that the Prime Minister is anxious to have a confidential and informal talk with some of the other Prime Ministers on Monday afternoon next at 3 o'clock on the subject of Reparations and one or two other things. At one of the early meetings of the Conference, Lord Curzon undertook to prepare some resolutions. He wishes to talk about them at the meeting on Monday, and it may be that there are some other matters which the Prime Ministers would like to have discussed. What will be said in the Report on Foreign Affairs will depend very much on what takes place at this meeting on Monday afternoon.

You have an appointment to visit Cliveden on Monday afternoon. I presume you will wish to arrange another time for this engagement.

McG.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Nov 5/1923 Berlin conclusions of Foreign policy of Labour Govt

C 62473

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Upon adjournment to meet Lord Curzon

Papers to attend Conference

Have to confer
with Sir Maurice Hankey

Decision to confer
if

Any important
communication or question

Lord Curzon

Foreign Policy of Labour Govt

Should there be two Conclusions
or perhaps two decisions merely
of this policy

File
(Lord Curzon)

3.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62474

Secret
November 5, 1923

Lord Curzon's
Written draft.
Nov. 5, 1923. (a.m.)

Foreign Relations

The discussions on foreign relations were commenced by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on October 5th, who gave the Conference a review of the general situation in every part of the world, and the most frank exposition, first, of the main problems which have confronted the Empire during the last two years, and secondly, those which seem most likely to arise in the near future.

The greater part of what Lord Curzon said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving orally to the representatives of the Dominions and India the inner history of the period, but it was thought advisable that certain parts of his speech which related to subjects of immediate interest and importance, namely, the situation in connection with the reparations problem and the Turkish Treaty, should be published forthwith.

This was a departure from the practice at previous Imperial Conferences, when statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been regarded as confidential throughout.

Lord Curzon's review was followed by a general discussion on foreign relations, in which Lord Robert Cecil as British Representative on the Council of the League of Nations, all the Dominion Prime Ministers present, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, and the three members of the Indian Delegation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Conference met at a time when foreign problems of the greatest importance to all parts of the Empire were engaging attention. The British Government warmly welcomed the participation of the representatives of the Dominions and India both in the discussion of these subjects and in the settlement of the action to be taken upon them, being not merely anxipus to proceed upon the principles of mutual co-operation and responsibility laid down at the last meeting in 1921, but also conscious that in all international affairs where Great Britain was conducting negotiations affecting the British Empire, she would speak with a more powerful effect if it were known that her voice was that not of herself alone but of the entire body of States composing the Empire.

That principle does not contravene, but is, on the contrary, in strict harmony with the practice by which individual Dominions of the Empire negotiate directly with foreign Governments in matters especially affecting their responsibilities.

Frequent and detailed examination took place not only of the main features of the international situation, but of the different aspects of the situation as they developed from day to day, nor did the Imperial Conference terminate its sittings until each subject had been fully explored and an agreement arrived at upon all the main heads of foreign policy.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

It was while the Conference was sitting that the President of the United States renewed the offer of the United States Government to take part in an international Conference or enquiry to investigate the European Reparations problem, and to report upon the capacity of Germany to make the payments to which she is pledged. The Conference cordially welcomed, and decided to take immediate advantage of, this overture; and communications were at once entered into with the Allied powers to obtain their co-operation.

The Conference, while approving the Policy that has hitherto been pursued was convinced that the European situation could no longer be allowed to drift, that it could only be lifted on to the plane of a possible settlement by the united action of the Powers and by the co-operation of the United States of America, and that if the scheme of common enquiry to be followed by common action were to break down, the results would be disastrous both to the peace and to the economic recovery of the world.

(It felt that in such an event it would be desirable for the British Government to consider very carefully the alternative of summoning a Conference itself in order to examine the financial and the economic problem in its widest aspect).

The Conference registered its profound disagreement with the attempts being made in different parts to break up the unity of the German state. It regarded such a policy if persevered in, as being inconsistent with the Treaty obligations entered into both by Germany and the Powers and as incompatible with the future discharge by Germany of her necessary obligations. It agreed that the strongest representations on this subject should be made to the Allied Governments, and these were accordingly made.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Conference considered the situation in the Near and Middle East and recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey. An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension of military anxiety and financial strain in the eastern parts of Europe, and more particularly had great relief been given to the sentiments of the Moslem subjects of the British throne in all parts of the world.

It remained to pursue a policy that would stimulate the peaceful development of the Middle East and encourage the Turkish state in the policy of reconstruction upon which it has embarked.

The Conference, so mush of whose time had been occupied two years ago with the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with the future regulation of the Pacific, noted with satisfaction the results of the Washington Conference which had added immensely to the security of the world without disturbing the intimate relations which have for so long existed between the Empire and its former Ally.

It recognised the loyalty with which Japan had carried out her obligations under the Washington Treaties; it registered the confident belief that the future relations between the Governments and peoples of the British Empire and Japan will be not less sincere and cordial than when the British and Japanese Governments were bound by written conventions; and it recorded its profound sympathy with the Japanese Government and people in the terrible catastrophe which has recently befallen them.

Another of the subjects that engaged the attention of the Conference was that of Egypt. The Conference was glad to recognise the great advance that has been made during the last two years towards a pacific settlement of this complex problem. It noted with approval the agreement that was arrived at in February, 1922, and of the reservations by which it was accompanied. And it held that, when the four reserved subjects which were safeguarded by

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

that agreement came up for examination and settlement, the utmost importance should be attached to the freedom of the passage through, and the security of, the Suez Canal, which constitutes the central and vital link in the chain of Imperial communications, and that adequate guarantees must be taken to secure and safeguard these objects.

During the session of the Conference, the question of the regulation of the liquor traffic off the American coasts and of the measures to be taken to avoid a serious conflict either of public opinion or of official action was seriously debated. The Conference arrived at the conclusion that, while affirming and safeguarding as a cardinal feature of British policy the principle of the three mile limit, it was yet both desirable and practicable to meet the Americal demand for an extension of the right of search beyond this limit for the above purpose, and negotiations were at once opened with the United States Government for the conclusion of an experimental agreement with this object in view.

Finally the Conference after listening to a detailed exposition of the work of the League of Nations during the past two years, and more particularly of the recent sitting of the Council and the Assembly at Geneva, placed on record its emphatic approval of the action that had been taken by, and the support that had been given to, the representatives of the British Empire on the latter occasion. There was full accord that the League should be given the unabated support of all the British members of the League as a valuable instrument of international peace and as the sole available organ for the harmonious regulations of many international affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

41

C 62479

SECRET.

E.86.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

1923

The paragraphs enclosed are circulated for consideration at to-morrow's Meeting of the Imperial Conference, as a basis for the Section of the Report of the Conference dealing with Foreign Affairs.

(Signed) M.P.A.HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
5th November, 1923.

9.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62480

2nd draft

Foreign Relations.

The discussions on foreign relations were commenced on October 5th by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who gave to the Conference a review of the general situation in every part of the world, and the most frank exposition, first, of the main problems which have confronted the Empire during the last two years, and secondly, of those which seem most likely to arise in the near future.

The greater part of what Lord Curzon said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving orally to the representatives of the Dominions and India the inner history of the period, but it was thought advisable that extracts from those parts of his speech which related to subjects of immediate interest and importance, viz., the situation in connection with the Reparations problem and the Turkish Treaty, should be published forthwith.

This was a departure from the practice at previous Imperial Conferences, when statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been regarded as confidential throughout.

Lord Curzon's review was followed by a general discussion on foreign relations, in which Lord Robert Cecil as British representative on the Council of the League of Nations, all the Dominion Prime Ministers present, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State and the three members of the Indian delegation, took part.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Frequent and detailed examination took place not only of the main features of the international situation, but of the different aspects of that situation as they developed from day to day. Nor did the Imperial Conference terminate its sittings until each subject had been carefully explored and a common understanding reached upon the main heads of foreign policy.

It was while the Conference was sitting that the President of the United States renewed the offer of the United States Government to take part in an international Conference or enquiry to investigate the European Reparation problem, and to report upon the capacity of Germany to make the payments to which she is pledged. The Conference cordially welcomed, and decided to take immediate advantage of, this overture; and communications were at once entered into with the Allied Powers to obtain their co-operation.

The Conference, after careful consideration of the policy which has been pursued, was of the opinion that the European situation could only be lifted on to the plane of a possible settlement by the co-operation of the United States of America, and that if the scheme of common enquiry to be followed by common action were to break down, the results would be inimical both to the peace and to the economic recovery of the world.

It felt that in such an event it would be desirable for the British Government to consider very carefully the alternative of summoning a Conference itself in order to examine the financial and the economic problem in its widest aspect.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Conference regarded any policy, if persevered in, of breaking up the unity of the German State, as inconsistent with the Treaty obligations entered into both by Germany and the Powers, and as incompatible with the future discharge by Germany of her necessary obligations. ~~It agreed that~~ the strongest representations on this subject must ~~should be made~~ to the Allied Governments, ~~and these were~~ accordingly made.

The Conference considered the situation in the Near and Middle East and ~~recorded its~~ learned with satisfaction ~~at~~ the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey. An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension of military anxiety and financial strain in the eastern parts of Europe; and more particularly had great relief been given to the sentiments of the Moslem subjects of the British throne in all parts of the world.

It remained to pursue a policy that would stimulate the peaceful development of the Middle East and encourage the Turkish state in the policy of reconstruction upon which it has embarked.

The Conference, so much of whose time had been occupied two years ago with the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with the future regulation of the Pacific, noted with satisfaction the results of the Washington Conference, which had added immensely to the security of the world without disturbing the intimate relations which have for so long existed between the Empire and its former Ally.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

It recognised the loyalty with which Japan had carried out her obligations under the Washington Treaties; it registered the confident belief that the future relations between the Governments and peoples of the British Empire and Japan will be not less sincere and cordial than when the British and Japanese Governments were bound by written conventions; and it recorded its profound sympathy with the Japanese Government and people in the terrible catastrophe which has recently befallen them.

Another of the subjects that engaged the attention of the Conference was that of Egypt. The Conference was glad to recognise the great advance that has been made during the last two years towards a pacific settlement of this complex problem. It noted ~~with approval~~ the agreement that was arrived at in February 1922, and the reservations by which it was accompanied. And ~~it~~ held that, when the four reserved subjects which were safeguarded by that agreement come up for examination and settlement, the utmost importance should be attached to the freedom of the passage through, and the security of, the Suez Canal, which constitutes the central and vital link in the chain of Imperial communications, and that adequate guarantees must be taken to secure and safeguard these objects.

During the session of the Conference, the question of the regulation of the liquor traffic off the American coasts and of the measures to be taken to avoid a serious conflict either of public opinion or of official action was seriously debated. The Conference arrived at the conclusion that, while affirming and safeguarding as a cardinal feature of British policy the principle of the three mile limit, it was yet both desirable and practicable to meet the American request

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

for an extension of the right of search beyond this limit for the above purpose, and negotiations were at once opened with the United States Government for the conclusion of an experimental agreement with this object in view.

Finally the Conference after listening to a detailed exposition of the work of the League of Nations during the past two years, and more particularly of the recent sitting of the Council and the Assembly at Geneva, placed on record its emphatic approval of the action that had been taken by, and the support that had been given to, the representatives of the British Empire on the latter occasion. There was full accord that the League should be given the unabated support of all the British members of the League as a valuable instrument of International peace and as the sole available organ for the harmonious regulations of many International affairs.

5th November, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

WALTER HOSE TO WLMK C62484-A.

London, November 6, 1923.

WLMK

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

Imperial Conference of 1923 Defence

The attached memorandum from the Admiralty was handed to me this afternoon.

This memorandum deals with co-operation between the Imperial and Dominion Naval Services as regard War Staff Training and War Staff Duties with a view to obtaining similar administrative methods in peace time and thereby ensuring more effective co-operation of the Navies themselves in the event of combined strategy and operations in time of war.

The proposals are in entire accordance with the principles agreed to between the Imperial and Canadian Governments in 1910, and are, as regards details of procedure of exchange of officers, command, etc., the same as now carried out in practice.

The principle that the training system should be uniform and that there should be exchange of officers has been accepted always for all three services.

The only item which I consider open to question is the wording of paragraph 13(a). It would perhaps be better if it were to read as follows:-

(a) In order to obtain continuity of Naval policy and to ensure that the best advice on questions concerning the Naval defence of the Empire is always available for the British and Dominion Governments, British and Dominion Naval Staffs should be built up by uniform staff training and a free interchange of officers between the British and Dominion staffs.

The new proposal contained in paragraph 14 is recommended for concurrence.

The remainder of the proposals are in accordance with existing procedure as far as Canada is concerned, and are recommended for concurrence.

Walter Hose

Commodore, R.C.N.,
Director of the Naval Service of Canada.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Memoranda and Notes 1922-1932 (M.G. 26, J 4).

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62484-A-1

October 6, 1923. 3

NOTES ON NAVAL DEFENCE POLICY.

The following is the extent and the organization of the Canadian Naval Forces with a view to meeting the requirements of the first phase of Naval Defence functions, i.e. the defence of local waters.

Ships.

Two torpedo boat destroyers, the Patriot and Patrician are maintained in sea-going commission, one on each coast.

Four trawler minesweepers are maintained in commission, two on each coast.

All the above vessels are utilized mainly in training young personnel of the R.C.N. and in the annual training of ranks and ratings of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve and of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve.

H.M.C. Submarines C.H.14. and C.H.15. are laid up in Halifax.

H.M.C.S. Aurora, Light Cruiser, is laid up at Halifax, her guns and fire control gear are being utilized in shore gun drill sheds for training purposes.

Establishments (other than Headquarters, Ottawa)

HALIFAX, N.S. A naval barracks with very efficient gun drill shed lately equipped with modern control apparatus, drill shed, parade ground, workshops, etc.

Repair base capable of very considerable repair work. This is not kept in full operation but a nucleus personnel is maintained and portions of the plant operated when necessary. Organized and maintained in condition to expand to full capacity on short notice.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Memoranda and Notes 1922-1932 (M.G. 26, J 4).

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Store base in operation and capable of stocking and operating sufficient naval and victualling stores for a light cruiser squadron. At present stocked with considerable surplus of stores beyond immediate requirements.

Naval Ordnance Store Base: In operation capable of moderate expansion in quantities of ammunition beyond present Canadian Naval needs.

Oil Fuel stocks: quantity 3,735. tons in rented tanks.

ESQUIMALT B.C. Naval Barracks similar to that maintained at Halifax.

Repair Base in same condition of readiness for expanded operations as at Halifax. Not capable of carrying out quite so extensive repairs.

Store Base: in operation and capable of stocking sufficient naval and victualling stores for a light cruiser squadron. Few surplus stocks on hand.

Naval Ordnance Store base: in operation, capable of moderate expansion in quantities of ammunition beyond present Canadian Naval requirements.

Oil Fuel Stocks: quantity 4,105 tons in rented tanks.

ESQUIMALT, VANCOUVER, CALGARY, EDMONTON, REGINA, WINNIPEG, HAMILTON, TORONTO& OTTAWA, MONTREAL, QUEBEC, CHARLOTTETOWN, ST. JOHN and HALIFAX.

Company Headquarters of R.C.N.V.R. companies or half companies, with accommodation and equipment provided for carrying out their proper drills and instruction.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Memoranda and Notes 1922-1932 (M.G. 26, J 4).

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62484-A-3

P E R S O N E L.

ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY: Total ranks and ratings 400, of these a certain proportion of officers and men of all branches are always under training in ships and establishments of the Royal Navy.

The remainder form the complements of H.M.C. ships and establishments.

ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL RESERVE: Authorized complement 500. Recruiting for this force is just commencing, but full complement is anticipated by the close of financial year.

ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE: Authorized complement 1,000.

Recruiting commenced in April, 1913, and 750 have been enrolled. Over 500 have carried out annual training this year at Halifax or Esquimalt.

N A V A L INTELLIGENCE.

Naval Headquarters at Ottawa is also the Headquarters of what is known as the Ottawa area of the Admiralty world-wide system of Naval Intelligence.

Working under the supervising Intelligence Officer there are District Intelligence Officers at Ottawa, Halifax and Esquimalt.

The Ottawa area includes, in addition to all Canadian territory, Newfoundland and the United States coasts as far south as Charleston on the Atlantic and Panama (including Central American Republics) on the Pacific and also the Great Lakes.

Walter Stone

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Memoranda and Notes 1922-1932 (M.G. 26, J 4).

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

E - 145-5

C 62484-A-4

The Ritz Hotel,
London, November 7, 1923

Commodore Walter Hose, R.C.N.,
Director of the Naval Service of Canada,
Ritz Hotel.
L o n d o n .

Dear Commodore Hose:

I received this morning your memorandum enclosing the attached statement from the Admiralty, handed you yesterday afternoon. I share with the Director of Training and Staff Duties Division the regret expressed in his communication to you that as the Conference will practically come to a close tomorrow, the enclosed paper on Empire Naval Co-operation can only be dealt with by correspondence by the Dominion Naval representatives putting the subject before their political chiefs with as little delay as possible.

Unfortunately, the Minister of Defence is not one of our delegation to either of the Imperial Conferences, and the time at my disposal will not permit of my communicating with him by cable with respect to any of the matters referred

W. Mackenzie King Papers, Memoranda and Notes 1922-1932
(P.A.C., M.G. 26, J 4).

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62484-A-5

to in the memorandum. If they are unimportant, such delay as may be involved by correspondence should not prejudice any aspect of the situation. If, on the other hand, the considerations to which the memorandum gives rise are important, there should, I think, be afforded to the Minister of Defence an opportunity of considering them before approval or disapproval of any feature is given on behalf of the Canadian Government.

Under the circumstances, I would ask you to explain to the Director of Training and Staff Duties Division that in my opinion the limited time available for a consideration of the memorandum will not permit of immediate concurrence being given the proposals, but that it will be necessary to have such further action with respect to them as may be desired taken up by correspondence with the Minister of Defence.

I would ask you kindly to see that the memorandum and communications in reference thereto are brought immediately to the attention of Mr. Macdonald, on your return to Ottawa.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

Prime Minister.

W. L. Mackenzie King Fonds, Memoranda and Notes 1922-1932
(M.G. 26, J 4).

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

O.D. SKELTON C 62485 Nov. 6. (1923) P.C.

4b.

F O R E I G N R E L A T I O N S.

.....

The draft caveat attached was shown to Hankey who agreed it was reasonable, but he had an hour's conversation with Lord Curzon, who wholly declined to accept it (as being stated too broadly and not applicable to Ireland or India). Lord Curzon also demurred to accepting the proposed emendation as to Egypt. Lord Curzon will consider it further this afternoon. Hankey suggests that Foreign Affairs be postponed and not taken up in the full Conference at 5, but be taken up privately in a Prime Minister's Committee immediately after the Conference.

(By the way, Hankey does not want his letter of last night mentioned)

After discussion with Mr. Graham and Mr. Dafoe, three alternatives seem possible: -

1. Acceptance by the Conference of the caveat you drew up.

2. Withdrawal of both the Curzon memo and your caveat and just a brief statement to the effect that there was a full discussion of Foreign Affairs.

3. Or that Canada should file a reservation or interpretation along the lines of the caveat.

.....

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

POOR
COPY

In the discussions of foreign affairs, care was taken to differentiate between matters especially affecting the interests and responsibilities of the individual Dominions or Great Britain and those which may be regarded as of common concern.

With respect to the former, it was recognized that the Governments and Parliaments of each part of the Empire might, with due regard to the possible contingent interests of other parts, (be expected to) act on their own initiative and responsibility.

With respect to matters considered of common concern, it was recognized that consultation was required, by conference or otherwise. The present Conference was a meeting of representatives of Governments primarily for the purpose of exchanging information and opinions, and proposals made thereat did not commit the Governments so represented or the Parliaments to which they were responsible, without their full consideration and express consent.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62487

6. (Nov. 1923)
J.C.

Final Revision of last A. Foreign Affairs report
by Mr King. General Smuts Lord Curzon

This conference is a conference of representatives of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy as recorded above are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the results of its deliberations will meet with their approval.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62488

W. Mackenzie King

CONFIDENTIAL.

E. (Ind.) 1st Meeting.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON THE POSITION OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

No amendments having been received to the Draft Conclusions of the Meeting of the above Committee held on Tuesday 30th October, 1923, at 12.30 p.m., it is requested that the copy issued on the 31st ultimo may be regarded as the FINAL version.

(Signed) G.H. CREASY.

Joint Secretary to the Committee.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
6th November, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62489

SECRET.

E.86 (Revise)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The attached revised paragraphs on Foreign Relations for the Report of the Imperial Conference are circulated in substitution for the earlier draft, and will be brought up for consideration at the Meeting of the Imperial Conference on Thursday afternoon.

(Sgd.) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
November 7th, 1923.

NOV 8 Recd 31

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Mackenzie King

C 62490

CANADIAN RESIDENT SECRETARY
8 NOV 1923
IMPERIAL CONFERENCES (1923)

Revise.

Foreign Relations.

The discussions on foreign relations were commenced on October 5th by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who gave to the Conference a review of the general situation in every part of the world, and the most frank exposition, first, of the main problems which have confronted the Empire during the last two years, and secondly, of those which seem most likely to arise in the near future.

The greater part of what Lord Curzon said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving orally to the representatives of the Dominions and India the inner history of the period, but it was thought advisable that extracts from those parts of his speech which related to subjects of immediate interest and importance, viz., the situation in connection with the Reparations problem and the Turkish Treaty, should be published forthwith.

This was a departure from the practice at previous Imperial Conferences, when statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been regarded as confidential throughout.

Lord Curzon's review was followed by a general discussion on foreign relations, in which Lord Robert Cecil as British representative on the Council of the League of Nations, all the Dominion Prime Ministers present, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State and the three members of the Indian delegation, took part.

Frequent

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr. Mackenzie King

C 62499

CANADIAN RESIDENT SECRETARY
8 NOV 1923
IMPERIAL CONFERENCES (1923)

Revise.

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Frequent

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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The Conference, after careful consideration of the policy which has been pursued, was of the opinion that the European situation could only be lifted on to the plane of a possible settlement by the co-operation of the United States of America, and that if the scheme of common enquiry to be followed by common action were to break down, the results would be inimical both to the peace and to the economic recovery of the world.

It felt that in such an event it would be desirable for the British Government to consider very carefully the alternative of summoning a Conference itself in order to examine the financial and the economic problem in its widest aspect.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The Conference regarded any policy, which would result in breaking up the unity of the German State, as inconsistent with the Treaty obligations entered into both by Germany and the Powers, and as incompatible with the future discharge by Germany of her necessary obligations. The strongest representations on this subject were accordingly made to the Allied Governments.

The Conference considered the situation in the Near and Middle East and recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey. An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension of military anxiety and financial strain in the eastern parts of Europe; and more particularly had great relief been given to the sentiments of the Moslem subjects of the British throne in all parts of the world.

Another of the subjects that engaged the attention of the Conference was that of Egypt. The Conference was glad to recognise the great advance that has been made during the last two years towards a pacific settlement of this complex problem, which will safeguard important communications between several parts of the Empire.

The Conference, so much of whose time had been occupied two years ago with the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with the future regulation of the Pacific, noted with satisfacti on/

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

satisfaction the results of the Washington Conference, which had added immensely to the security of the world without disturbing the intimate relations which have for so long existed between the Empire and its former Ally.

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During the session of the Conference, the question of the regulation of the liquor traffic off the American coasts and of the measures to be taken to avoid a serious conflict either of public opinion or of official action was seriously debated. The Conference arrived at the conclusion that, while affirming and safeguarding as a cardinal feature of British policy the principle of the three mile limit, it was yet both desirable and practicable to meet the American

request

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

for an extension of the right of search beyond this limit for the above purpose, and negotiations were at once opened with the United States Government for the conclusion of an experimental agreement with this object in view.

Finally the Conference after listening to a detailed exposition of the work of the League of Nations during the past two years, and more particularly of the recent sitting of the Council and the Assembly at Geneva, placed on record its emphatic approval of the action that had been taken by, and the support that had been given to, the representatives of the British Empire on the latter occasion. There was full accord that the League should be given the unabated support of all the British members of the League as a valuable instrument of International peace and as the sole available organ for the harmonious regulation of many International affairs.

This Conference is a conference of representatives of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy as recorded above are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the results of its deliberations will meet with their approval.

7th November, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr King's proposal for reservation by Canada C62495 5

November 7, 1925

As far as Canada was concerned, it was explicitly stated that, as the procedure of the Conference did not permit of the consideration by the Canadian Government of the questions of foreign policy discussed at the Conference, the views and opinions expressed by the Conference on matters of foreign policy could not be held to bind or commit the Canadian Government or parliament without the express sanction or approval of the latter.

In the discussion of foreign affairs the Conference proceeded throughout upon the principle that any policy to be adopted on behalf of the Empire in matters of common concern should be formulated by an expression of the general concurrence of the countries chiefly to be affected, arrived at by the method of consultation or conference between the several governments of the Empire.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62496

In the discussion of foreign affairs, the Conference proceeded throughout upon the principle that any policy (to be adopted) on behalf of the Empire in matters of common concern should, as far as possible, be an expression of the general consensus of view of the countries likely to be affected, arrived at as the result of consultation or conference between the several Governments of the Empire.

As far as Canada was concerned, it was explicitly stated that, as the procedure of the Conference did not permit of the consideration by the Canadian Government of the questions of foreign policy discussed at the Conference, the views and opinions expressed by the Conference on matters of foreign policy, and in particular matters respecting the Near East and Egypt, could not be held to bind or commit the Canadian Government or Parliament without the express sanction or approval of the latter.

November 7, 1923

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62497

W. Mackenzie King 5

E-1452

SECRET.

E.(P.S.) 2.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

CANADIAN RESIDENT SECRETARY
8 NOV 1923
IMPERIAL CONFERENCES (1923)

COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE AND STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS.

STATEMENT AS TO PRIVILEGES AT PRESENT GRANTED TO

(a) Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers

and

(b) Dominion High Commissioners

in the matter of British Taxation.

I. INCOME TAX.

(1) The privileges in regard to Income Tax enjoyed by an Ambassador or Minister of a foreign State are secured to him by International Law, and depend on the fact that he represents a foreign Sovereign. Thus a foreign Government, and equally the permanent individual Head of a foreign State, are regarded as wholly exempt from British Income Tax.

The representative character of an Ambassador or Minister so far invests him with the personality of his Sovereign as to entitle him, not indeed to complete exemption from Income Tax, but to very wide immunities. These immunities are only one aspect - and an inseparable aspect - of the general diplomatic status accorded to him under International Law: another aspect is his immunity from legal proceedings.

(2) In the case of High Commissioners for the self-governing Dominions prior to 1916/17 no special relief was granted. From that year onwards relief from Income Tax on official emoluments has been given and this relief has now been made statutory by Sec.19 of the Finance Act, 1923. The concession made in 1916-17 was analogous to that

made

NOV 8 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

made to the Consular and certain other representatives of foreign States. (From 1922/23 onwards Consular representatives are the only class of foreign non-diplomatic representative to enjoy such relief).

(3) The comparative position may be tabulated as follows :-

Nature of Income.	Ambassadors & Ministers.	High Commissioners.
(a) Income from earnings.	Diplomatic emoluments exempt.	Official emoluments exempt.
(b) Income from investments etc.	Remittances from abroad exempt.	Remittances from abroad liable.
	Income from investments in the U.K.(except from British Govt.securities) liable.	Income from investments in the U.K. liable.
(c) Income from house or land property in U.K.	Exempt, if occupied for diplomatic purpcses. Liable, if either (1) occupied for purely private purposes, or (2) let to a tenant. (Similar reliefs apply in the relatively trifling matters of I.H.D. and Land Tax).	Liable (but property relieved from tax, if owned by the Dominion Govt., and occupied for Governmental purposes).

II. CUSTOMS & EXCISE DUTIES.

(4) As a matter of international practice foreign Ambassadors or Ministers are granted exemption from customs duties in respect of articles required for their personal use.

The

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The main articles now coming under the exemptions are motor-cars, tobacco, spirits and wine.

(5) Dominion High Commissioners are accorded relaxation in the examination of their baggage, and are also exempted from payment of all Customs Duties on first arrival.

No further exemption from Customs Duties is granted, except as regards motor cars for official use.

(6) Remission of Excise Duties has never been granted, either to foreign or Dominion representatives.

In the case of foreign representatives, however, there is an old-standing exemption in respect of the relatively small matter of Establishment Excise Licence Duties. e.g., the gun licence and the licence to employ a male servant.

III. RATES

and MOTOR CAR LICENCE DUTY.

(charges assessed and levied by the Local Authorities).

(7) Under reciprocal agreement with nearly all foreign countries, foreign Ambassadors or Ministers are relieved of the part of the Rates referable to services not of direct benefit to them (poor relief, police rate, etc.)

(8) There is no corresponding relief applicable to Dominion representatives.

(No exemption is given in respect of property owned by the Crown: the Crown in this country voluntarily foregoes any claim, in order to avoid adversely affecting other ratepayers in the neighbourhood).

(9) Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers are exempted from Motor Car Licence Duty whether their cars are owned by themselves or by their Governments.

Dominion/

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2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
7th November, 1923.

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IMPERIAL CONFERENCE,

1923.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

(Appendices published separately in Cmd. 1988.)

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

November, 1923.

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CANADA

CONTENTS

	PAGE.
I.—Preliminary Note	4
II.—Opening Statements	7
III.—Message to their Majesties the King and Queen ...	7
IV.—Message to Japan	8
V.—Death of Mr. Bonar Law	9
VI.—Publicity	9
VII.—Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories ...	10
VIII.—Foreign Relations	10
IX.—Negotiation, Signature and Ratification of Treaties ...	13
X.—United States and "C" Mandates	15
XI.—Condominium in the New Hebrides	15
XII.—Defence	15
XIII.—Status of High Commissioners	17
XIV.—Position of Indians in other parts of the Empire ...	17
XV.—Contribution of India to the Expenses of the League of Nations	20
XVI.—Nationality Questions	21
XVII.—Validity of Marriages between British Subjects and Foreigners	22
XVIII.—Proposed Extension of the Powers of the Imperial War Graves Commission	23
XIX.—Address to His Majesty the King, Emperor of India ...	23
XX.—Concluding Resolution	24

LIST OF APPENDICES.*

I.—Opening Speeches.

II.—Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies as to the Colonies Protectorates, and Mandated Territories.

III.—Statements by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as regards the Turkish Treaty and the Reparations Problem.

IV.—Speeches regarding the work of the League of Nations.

V.—Speeches regarding the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire.

VI.—Papers regarding Nationality questions.

VII.—Address by His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar on the Dussehra Festival, 19th October.

VIII.—Reply from His Majesty the King, Emperor of India, to the Address from the Conference.

* Published separately in Cmd. 1988.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62504

I.—PRELIMINARY NOTE.

THE proceedings of the Conference opened at 10, Downing Street, on October 1st, 1923, and were continued until November 8th. During that period 16 plenary meetings took place, which were normally attended by the following:—

GREAT BRITAIN.

The Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin, M.P., Prime Minister, (Chairman).
The Most Hon. the Marquess of Salisbury, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.
The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

CANADA.

The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, C.M.G., Prime Minister.
The Hon. G. P. Graham, Minister of Railways and Canals.
The Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

The Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce, M.C., Prime Minister.
Senator The Hon. R. V. Wilson, Honorary Minister in Charge of Departments of Health and Migration.

NEW ZEALAND.

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

General The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister.
The Hon. H. Burton, K.C., Minister of Finance.
The Hon. N. J. de Wet, K.C., Minister of Justice.

IRISH FREE STATE.

Professor John MacNeill, T.D., Minister of Education.
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, T.D., Minister of External Affairs.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

The Hon. W. R. Warren, K.C., Prime Minister.

INDIA.

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Peel, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India and Head of the Indian Delegation.
Colonel His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, K.C.S.I.

C 62505

SECRETARIAT.

Great Britain.

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B.
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. Skelton.

Commonwealth of Australia.

Sir R. R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. Thomson, C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.

Mr. P. McGilligan.

Newfoundland.

Mr. W. J. Carew.

India.

Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

Other Ministers took part in the proceedings at one or more meetings.

These were:—

GREAT BRITAIN.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K.C., M.P., Lord Privy Seal.
The Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Rt. Hon. W. C. Bridgeman, M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Derby, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame, K.B.E., M.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Hon. W. G. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

IRISH FREE STATE.

Mr. W. T. Cosgrave, T.D., President of the Executive Council.
Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, T.D., Vice-President of the Executive Council.
General R. Mulcahy, Minister of Defence.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62506

Mr. J. C. C. Davidson, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Minister in Charge of Publicity, and Sir J. Masterton Smith, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, were present at nearly all the Sessions of the Conference.

The following also attended for the discussion of subjects which particularly concerned their respective departments :—

GREAT BRITAIN.

Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Admiralty.
General The Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh M. Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry.
The Rt. Hon. Sir John Anderson, G.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office.
Mr. R. G. Vansittart, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, C.B.E., Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. T. Jones, Principal Assistant Secretary, Cabinet Office.
Lieut-Colonel C. W. G. Walker, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
Commander H. R. Moore, D.S.O., R.N., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
Major L. A. Clemens, O.B.E., M.C., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
Major-General Sir Fabian Ware, K.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G. Vice-Chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission.
Major C. K. Phillips, O.B.E., Land and Legal Adviser, Imperia, War Graves Commission.

CANADA.

Major-General J. H. MacBrien, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of General Staff, Canada.
Commodore Walter Hose, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Vice-Admiral Sir Allan F. Everett, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of the Royal Australian Naval Board.
Rear-Admiral P. H. Hall-Thompson, C.M.G., First Naval Member Designate of the Royal Australian Naval Board.
Brigadier-General T. A. Blaney, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Representative on the Imperial General Staff, War Office.

NEW ZEALAND.

Commodore A. G. Hotham, C.M.G., R.N., Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Delegation.

C 62507

IRISH FREE STATE.

General Sean MacMahon, Chief of Staff, Irish Free State.
Major-General J. J. O'Connell, Assistant Chief of Staff, Irish Free State.
Mr. O. Esmonde. (acting for Mr. McGilligan).

INDIA.

Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Cobbe, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., Secretary, Military Department, India Office.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir Wolseley Haig, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.E., Political Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

In addition to the meetings of the full Conference, there were eleven meetings of Committees, and technical discussions on Defence Questions at the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

II.—OPENING STATEMENTS.

In opening the Proceedings on October 1st, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, as Chairman, extended a welcome to the Representatives of the Dominions and India, and referred especially to the enlargement which had taken place in the circle of the Imperial Conference by the constitution in 1922 of the Irish Free State.

Mr. Baldwin then made a general statement on the Imperial and International situation, in which he reviewed the chief events which had taken place since the Conference of 1921, and outlined briefly the agenda of the Conference and the main problems which would come before it.

Speeches were made in reply by the Prime Ministers of Canada New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and Newfoundland, by the President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, and by the Maharajah of Alwar for India. The cordial greeting extended by Mr. Baldwin to the Representatives of the Irish Free State was warmly endorsed by other speakers, and Mr. Cosgrave expressed his deep appreciation of the welcome which he and his colleagues had received.

These opening speeches were published in full immediately afterwards.*

The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia was not present at the opening meeting: he was unable to reach London until October 5th.

III.—MESSAGE TO THEIR MAJESTIES THE KING AND QUEEN.

The first official act of the Conference, in accordance with the

* See Appendix I in Cmd. 1988.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

practice on previous occasions, was to send a message of greeting to Their Majesties the King and Queen.

The words of this message were :—

"The Prime Ministers and other Representatives of the British Empire assembled in Conference, at their first meeting and as their first official act, desire to express their respectful greetings and fidelity to the King, and fervently hope that His Majesty and Her Majesty the Queen may be long spared to strengthen those ties of love and devotion which unite the peoples of the British Commonwealth."

His Majesty's gracious reply was read aloud by the Prime Minister of Great Britain at the meeting on October 5th and was in the following terms :—

"I sincerely thank the Prime Ministers and other Representatives of the British Empire for the generous terms of the message which they have addressed to the Queen and myself on the occasion of the opening of the Imperial Conference. I sincerely trust that their deliberations will lead to a solution of those many and grave problems the settlement of which is so essential to the future welfare and prosperity of the Commonwealth of the British Nations.

GEORGE R.I."

IV. MESSAGE TO JAPAN.

It was also resolved at the first meeting of the Conference to send the following message of sympathy to Japan :—

"The Prime Ministers and Representatives of Great Britain, the British Dominions and India, assembled at the Imperial Conference, desire at their opening session to send to their old and faithful ally, Japan, an expression of their profound sympathy in the terrible calamity by which she has been assailed; their admiration of the patriotic energy and unconquerable spirit with which the Japanese nation have met the blow; and their confident expectation that Japan will rapidly recover from a shock that might have overwhelmed any less courageous people and will pursue, undismayed, the great part that she is destined to fill in the social and economic progress of the world."

In reply to this message a note was received from the Japanese Ambassador in London. This note, which was read aloud by the Prime Minister of Great Britain at the meeting on the 11th October, was as follows :—

"Under instructions from the Japanese Premier, I have the honour to request Your Lordship to convey to the Right Honourable Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister, and his eminent colleagues on the Imperial Conference, the Japanese Premier's sincere thanks for the touching message of sympathy in the calamity which has befallen Japan. Count Yamamoto desires to assure Mr. Baldwin that the manifestation of cordial sentiment coming as it did so promptly from the representative statesmen of the British Empire, the old and never failing ally of Japan, has deeply moved the Japanese nation in their great distress and will give them encouragement and reassurance in taking up the tremendous task of reconstruction.

I have, etc.,

HAYASHI."

V.—DEATH OF MR. BONAR LAW.

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, Prime Minister of Great Britain from October 24th, 1922, to May 21st, 1923, died on October 31st. One of his first acts on assuming office had been to have a message of invitation sent to the Dominions and India, which resulted in the calling of the Imperial Conference and of the Imperial Economic Conference this year.

The following resolution was passed by the Conference at its meeting on the afternoon of October 31st :—

"The Members of the Imperial Conference have learnt with the most profound regret of the death of the Rt. Hon. Andrew Bonar Law, at whose invitation, issued on his assuming office last year, the present Conference is now meeting.

"They desire to express to the members of the late Prime Minister's family their deep sympathy in the irreparable loss which they and the Empire have sustained by his death."

VI.—PUBLICITY.

The Conference gave special attention to the question of publicity for its proceedings. There was general agreement that at meetings of this nature, where questions of high policy and of the greatest consequence to all parts of the British Commonwealth are surveyed and dealt with, it was of the first importance that the representatives present should feel able to speak among themselves with the utmost freedom and in a spirit of complete confidence. Hence, it was considered essential that nothing should be published without the approval of the Conference as a whole and under its directions.

At the same time it was felt that the proceedings of the Conference would cause wide interest among the peoples of the countries represented, and consequently that, as opportunity offered, information regarding its deliberations should be made public.

It was decided to place the general arrangements as to publicity in charge of a British Minister, and, at the unanimous wish of the Conference, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr. J. C. C. Davidson, C.H., C.B., M.P., was asked to be present at the meetings and to undertake the necessary work.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

This procedure, though of an experimental character, turned out to be of much value and at the conclusion of the meetings the Conference expressed to Mr. Davidson its great indebtedness for his valuable help.

A discussion also took place, at the instance of the Prime Minister of Canada, as to the desire of the Parliaments of the various parts of the Empire to be afforded the fullest information possible on all matters concerning which negotiations were going on, or discussions taking place, between the various Governments. It was felt that as many as possible of the communications passing ought to be made available for the use of the Parliaments, and a general understanding was reached as to the principles which should govern the publication of correspondence between the Governments.

VII.—COLONIES, PROTECTORATES AND MANDATED TERRITORIES.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies gave to the Conference, on October 3rd, a comprehensive review, subsequently published*, of the situation in the Colonies, Protectorates, and Mandated Territories.

A general discussion followed on various aspects of policy in regard to the development of the Colonial Empire and the Mandated Territories, and great stress was laid by the representatives of the Dominions and India on the economic importance of these parts of the world and, in particular, on the value to the Empire as a whole of the great tropical territories in East and West Africa and in Eastern Asia.

One question touched on was the recent arrangement concluded with the Belgian Government for the rectification of the Ruanda Boundary, and it was made clear that this rectification still left available a strip of the British mandated territory of Tanganyika west of Lake Victoria, which could be utilised for the construction of a line north and south.

The Prime Minister of Newfoundland expressed his interest in the researches about to be undertaken in the Antarctic by the late Captain Scott's ship "Discovery." It had already been arranged that any information obtained from these researches should be made available to the Government of the Union of South Africa, and the Duke of Devonshire undertook that the information should be supplied also to the Newfoundland Government.

It should be added that the further developments in the Middle East, and particularly in Palestine, which occurred during the sittings of the Conference, were placed before it.

The Conference took note of these developments.

VIII.—FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The discussions on foreign relations were commenced on October 5th by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who gave to the Conference a review of the general situation in every part of the world, and the most frank exposition, first, of the main problems which have confronted the Empire during the last two years, and, secondly, of those which seem most likely to arise in the near future.

* See Appendix II in Cmd. 1988.

The greater part of what Lord Curzon said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving orally to the Representatives of the Dominions and India the inner history of the period, but it was thought advisable that extracts from those parts of his speech which related to subjects of immediate interest and importance, viz., the situation in connection with the Reparations problem and the Turkish Treaty, should be published forthwith.*

This was a departure from the practice at previous Imperial Conferences, when statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been regarded as confidential throughout.

Lord Curzon's review was followed by a general discussion on foreign relations, in which Lord Robert Cecil as British representative on the Council of the League of Nations, all the Dominion Prime Ministers present, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State and the three members of the Indian delegation, took part.†

Frequent and detailed examination was given, not only to the main features of the international situation, but to the different aspects of that situation as they developed from day to day. Nor did the Imperial Conference terminate its sittings until each subject had been carefully explored and a common understanding reached upon the main heads of foreign policy.

It was while the Conference was sitting that the President of the United States renewed the offer of the United States Government to take part in an international conference or enquiry to investigate the European Reparations problem, and to report upon the capacity of Germany to make the payments to which she is pledged. The Conference cordially welcomed, and decided to take immediate advantage of, this overture; and communications were at once entered into with the Allied Powers to obtain their co-operation.

The Conference, after careful consideration of the policy which has been pursued, was of the opinion that the European situation could only be lifted on to the plane of a possible settlement by the co-operation of the United States of America, and that, if the scheme of common enquiry to be followed by common action were to break down, the results would be inimical both to the peace and to the economic recovery of the world.

It felt that in such an event it would be desirable for the British Government to consider very carefully the alternative of summoning a Conference itself in order to examine the financial and the economic problem in its widest aspect.

* See Appendix III in Cmd. 1988.

† For speeches on the work of the League of Nations see Appendix IV in Cmd. 1988.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62512

The Conference regarded any policy which would result in breaking up the unity of the German State as inconsistent with the Treaty obligations entered into both by Germany and the Powers, and as incompatible with the future discharge by Germany of her necessary obligations. The strongest representations on this subject were accordingly made to the Allied Governments.

The Conference considered the situation in the Near and Middle East and recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey. An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension, of military anxiety and financial strain in the eastern parts of Europe; and more particularly had great relief been given to the sentiments of the Moslem subjects of the British throne in all parts of the world.

Another of the subjects that engaged the attention of the Conference was that of Egypt. The Conference was glad to recognise the great advance that has been made during the last two years towards a pacific settlement of this complex problem, which will safeguard important communications between several parts of the Empire.

The Conference, so much of whose time had been occupied two years ago with the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with the future regulation of the Pacific, noted with satisfaction the results of the Washington Conference, which had added immensely to the security of the world without disturbing the intimate relations that have for so long existed between the Empire and its former Ally.

It recognised with satisfaction the progressive fulfilment of the obligations incurred under the Washington Treaties; it registered the confident belief that the future relations between the Governments and peoples of the British Empire and Japan will be not less sincere and cordial than when the British and Japanese Governments were bound by written conventions; and it recorded its profound sympathy with the Japanese Government and people in the terrible catastrophe which has recently befallen them.

During the session of the Conference, the question of the regulation of the liquor traffic off the American coasts and of the measures to be taken to avoid a serious conflict either of public opinion or of official action was seriously debated. The Conference arrived at the conclusion that, while affirming and safeguarding as a cardinal feature of British policy the principle of the three mile limit, it was yet both desirable and practicable to meet the American request for an extension of the right of search beyond this limit for the above purpose, and negotiations were at once opened with the United States Government for the conclusion of an experimental agreement with this object in view.

Finally the Conference, after listening to a detailed exposition of the work of the League of Nations during the past two years, and more particularly of the recent sitting of the Council and the Assembly at Geneva, placed on record its emphatic approval of the action that had been taken by, and the support that had been given to, the representatives of the British Empire on the latter occasion. There was full accord that the League should be given the unabated support of

C 62513

all the British members of the League as a valuable instrument of international peace, and as the sole available organ for the harmonious regulation of many international affairs.

This Conference is a conference of representatives of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy, as recorded above, are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the results of its deliberations will meet with their approval.

IX.—NEGOTIATION, SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF TREATIES.

The principles governing the relations of the various parts of the Empire in connection with the negotiation, signature and ratification of Treaties seemed to the Conference to be of the greatest importance. Accordingly it was arranged that the subject should be fully examined by a Committee, of which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was Chairman. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Prime Ministers of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and Newfoundland, the Minister of External Affairs of the Irish Free State, and the Secretary of State for India as Head of the Indian Delegation, served on this Committee. With the assistance of the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, Sir C. J. B. Hurst, K.C.B., K.C., the following Resolution was drawn up and agreed to:—

> "The Conference recommends for the acceptance of the governments of the Empire represented that the following procedure should be observed in the negotiation, signature and ratification of international agreements.
>
> "The word 'treaty' is used in the sense of an agreement which, in accordance with the normal practice of diplomacy, would take the form of a treaty between Heads of States, signed by plenipotentiaries provided with Full Powers issued by the Heads of the States, and authorising the holders to conclude a treaty."

I.

"1. *Negotiation.*

"(*a*) It is desirable that no treaty should be negotiated by any of the governments of the Empire without due consideration of its possible effect on other parts of the Empire, or, if circumstances so demand, on the Empire as a whole.

"(*b*) Before negotiations are opened with the intention of concluding a treaty, steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other governments of the Empire likely to be interested are informed, so that, if any such government considers that its interests would be affected, it may have an opportunity of expressing its views, or, when its interests are intimately involved, of participating in the negotiations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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C 62513

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"(*c*) In all cases where more than one of the governments of the Empire participates in the negotiations, there should be the fullest possible exchange of views between those governments before and during the negotiations. In the case of treaties negotiated at International Conferences, where there is a British Empire Delegation, on which, in accordance with the now established practice, the Dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should also be utilised to attain this object.

"(*d*) Steps should be taken to ensure that those governments of the Empire whose representatives are not participating in the negotiations should, during their progress, be kept informed in regard to any points arising in which they may be interested.

"2. *Signature.*

"(*a*) Bilateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire only should be signed by a representative of the government of that part. The Full Power issued to such representative should indicate the part of the Empire in respect of which the obligations are to be undertaken, and the preamble and text of the treaty should be so worded as to make its scope clear.

"(*b*) Where a bilateral treaty imposes obligations on more than one part of the Empire, the treaty should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the governments concerned.

"(*c*) As regards treaties negotiated at International Conferences, the existing practice of signature by plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the governments of the Empire represented at the Conference should be continued, and the Full Powers should be in the form employed at Paris and Washington.

"3. *Ratification.*

"The existing practice in connection with the ratification of treaties should be maintained.

II.

"Apart from treaties made between Heads of States, it is not unusual for agreements to be made between governments. Such agreements, which are usually of a technical or administrative character, are made in the names of the signatory governments, and signed by representatives of those governments, who do not act under Full Powers issued by the Heads of the States: they are not ratified by the Heads of the States, though in some cases some form of acceptance or confirmation by the governments concerned is employed. As regards agreements of this nature the existing practice should be continued, but before entering on negotiations the governments of the Empire should consider whether the interests of any other part of the Empire may be affected, and, if so, steps should be taken to ensure that the government of such part is informed of the proposed negotiations, in order that it may have an opportunity of expressing its views."

The Resolution was submitted to the full Conference and unanimously approved. It was thought, however, that it would be of assistance to add a short explanatory statement in connection with part I (3), setting out the existing procedure in relation to the ratification of Treaties. This procedure is as follows:—

(*a*) The ratification of treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire is effected at the instance of the government of that part:

(*b*) The ratification of treaties imposing obligations on more than one part of the Empire is effected after consultation between the governments of those parts of the Empire concerned. It is for each government to decide whether Parliamentary approval or legislation is required before desire for, or concurrence in, ratification is intimated by that government.

X.—THE UNITED STATES AND "C" MANDATES.

Certain general questions concerning the territories in South West Africa and the Southern Pacific administered under "C" Mandates had been raised by the Government of the United States of America, and the opportunity of the Conference was taken to examine these questions.

XI.—CONDOMINIUM IN THE NEW HEBRIDES.

The developments in the New Hebrides since the Conference of 1921 were examined and the present situation and possibilities of action further discussed by representatives of the British Government in consultation with the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand.

XII.—DEFENCE.

The Conference gave special consideration to the question of Defence, and the manner in which co-operation and mutual assistance could best be effected after taking into account the political and geographical conditions of the various parts of the Empire.

The Lord President of the Council, as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, opened this part of the work of the Conference by a statement outlining the main problems of Defence as they exist to-day. He was followed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air, each of whom explained to the Conference the aspects of defence which concerned his special responsibilities.

In addition to these statements there was a full and frank interchange of views in which the standpoints of the various representatives and the circumstances of their countries were made clear. There were

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

also discussions at the Admiralty and Air Ministry at which Naval and Air Defence were dealt with in greater detail. The points involved were explained by the Chiefs of the Naval and Air Staffs respectively and were further examined.

In connection with Naval Defence one matter of immediate interest came before the Conference, namely, the projected Empire Cruise of a squadron of modern warships. The First Lord of the Admiralty explained that the project was that two capital ships, the "Hood" and the "Repulse," together with a small squadron of modern light cruisers, should visit South Africa, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, and return by way of British Columbia, the Panama Canal and Eastern Canada. The light cruisers would accompany the battle cruisers as far as British Columbia, but would return to England by way of the west coast of South America and Cape Horn. The Dominion Prime Ministers expressed their appreciation of this proposal, and assured the Conference that the ships would be most heartily welcomed in their countries.

After the whole field of Defence had been surveyed, the Conference decided that it would be advisable to record in the following resolutions its conclusions on the chief matters which had been discussed :—

"(1) The Conference affirms that it is necessary to provide for the adequate defence of the territories and trade of the several countries comprising the British Empire.

(2) In this connection the Conference expressly recognises that it is for the Parliaments of the several parts of the Empire, upon the recommendations of their respective Governments, to decide the nature and extent of any action which should be taken by them.

(3) Subject to this provision, the Conference suggests the following as guiding principles :—

(*a*) The primary responsibility of each portion of the Empire represented at the Conference for its own local defence.

(*b*) Adequate provision for safeguarding the maritime communications of the several parts of the Empire and the routes and waterways along and through which their armed forces and trade pass.

(*c*) The provision of Naval bases and facilities for repair and fuel so as to ensure the mobility of the fleets.

(*d*) The desirability of the maintenance of a minimum standard of Naval Strength, namely, equality with the Naval Strength of any foreign power, in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Treaty on Limitation of Armament as approved by Great Britain, all the self-governing Dominions and India.

(*e*) The desirability of the development of the Air Forces in the several countries of the Empire upon such lines as will make it possible, by means of the adoption, as far as practicable, of a common system of organisation and training and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment, and stores (with the exception of the type of aircraft), for each part of the Empire as it may determine to co-operate with other parts with the least possible delay and the greatest efficiency.

(4) In the application of these principles to the several parts of the Empire concerned the Conference takes note of :—

(*a*) The deep interest of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and India, in the provision of a Naval Base at Singapore, as essential for ensuring the mobility necessary to provide for the security of the territories and trade of the Empire in Eastern Waters.

(*b*) The necessity for the maintenance of safe passage along the great route to the East through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

(*c*) The necessity for the maintenance by Great Britain of a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength to give adequate protection against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of her shores.

(5) The Conference, while deeply concerned for the paramount importance of providing for the safety and integrity of all parts of the Empire, earnestly desires, so far as is consistent with this consideration, the further limitation of armaments, and trusts that no opportunity may be lost to promote this object."

XIII.—STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS.

Certain questions were discussed relating to the status of the High Commissioners in Great Britain, particularly in connection with precedence and with exemption from taxation, Customs duties, etc.

The representatives of the British Government undertook to examine the points raised, while explaining that any alteration of the existing rules of precedence would require the approval of His Majesty the King.

XIV.—POSITION OF INDIANS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE EMPIRE.

The position of Indians in other parts of the Empire was reviewed by the Conference in the light of the developments which have taken place since the Resolution which formed part of the Pro-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62518

ceedings at the 1921 Conference.* The subject was opened by a general statement from the Secretary of State for India as Head of the Indian Delegation. He explained that the intensity of feeling aroused in India by this question was due to the opinion widely held there (which, however, he did not himself share) that the disabilities of Indians were based on distinction of colour and were badges of racial inferiority. This statement was followed by a full presentation of the case on behalf of India by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

It was found possible to publish these speeches, and those made in the course of the discussions by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Dominion Prime Ministers and the Minister of External Affairs of the Irish Free State, shortly after the speeches had been delivered.† In this respect the procedure differed from that at the Conference of 1921 when only the Resolution adopted was made public. It is unnecessary in the present Report to do more than refer to the main proposal made on behalf of the Indian Delegation and the views expressed and conclusions reached with regard to it. The Indian proposal was to the effect that the Dominion Governments concerned, and the British Government for the Colonies and Protectorates, should agree to the appointment of Committees to confer with a Committee appointed by the Indian Government as to the best and quickest means of giving effect to the Resolution of the 1921 Conference.

In the case of the Union of South Africa, which was not a party to the 1921 Resolution, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru expressed the hope that the Union Government would agree to the Government of India sending an agent to South Africa who would protect Indian nationals there, who would serve as an intermediary between them and the Union Government, and who would place the Indian Government in full possession of the facts regarding Indian nationals in South Africa.

The Conference expressed its high appreciation of the able and moderate manner in which Lord Peel and his colleagues had presented the Indian case. The opinions expressed and the conclusions reached with regard to the above suggestions were, in brief, as follows :—

The Prime Minister of Canada observed that, so far as he knew, Indians now domiciled in Canada did not suffer any legal or political disability in eight out of the nine provinces of Canada ; as regards the ninth province—British Columbia—he was not aware of any legal disability, and even the political disability that existed in the matter of the exercise of the franchise does not apply to all Indians because the federal law relating to the franchise lays it down that any Indian who served with His Majesty's military, naval or air forces is entitled to the franchise. He explained the present difficulties in conceding the franchise to Indians generally in British Columbia which are due not to distinction of colour but to economic and complex political considerations, and he reiterated what he had already said to Mr. Sastri on the occasion of the latter's visit to Canada in 1922, namely, that the

* Cmd. 1474, P. 8. † See Appendix V in Cmd. 1988.

C 62519

question whether natives of India resident in Canada should be granted a Dominion Parliamentary Franchise on terms and conditions identical with those which govern the exercise of that right by Canadian citizens generally was necessarily one which Parliament alone could determine, and that the matter would be submitted to Parliament for consideration when the Franchise Law comes up for revision.

Mr. Mackenzie King added that he was somewhat doubtful whether the visit of a Committee appointed by the Government of India would make it easier to deal with this problem in Canada, but that, should it be desired to send a Committee, the Canadian Government would readily appoint a Committee to confer with the Committee from India.

The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia explained the principles underlying the present attitude of Australia on this question. He stated that the representatives of every shade of political thought in Australia had shown sympathy with the claim that lawfully domiciled Indians should enjoy full citizen rights, and that he believed that public opinion was ready to welcome, so far as concerned the position of such Indians, any measure conceived in the interests of the Empire as a whole.

The Commonwealth had the right to control the admission to its territories of new citizens, and its immigration policy was founded on economic considerations. He felt that, in view of the position which existed in Australia, there was no necessity for a Committee, but assured the Indian representatives that he would consult his colleagues on his return to Australia as to what action should be taken in connection with the Resolution of the 1921 Conference.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said that the New Zealand Government would welcome the visit of a Committee from India such as had been suggested should this be desired ; New Zealand practically gave the natives of India now resident in the Dominion the same privileges as were enjoyed by people of the Anglo-Saxon race who were settled there.

The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa intimated that, so far as South Africa was concerned, it was not a question of colour, but that a different principle was involved. He stated that the attitude of thinking men in South Africa was not that the Indian was inferior because of his colour or on any other ground—he might be their superior—but the question had to be considered from the point of view of economic competition. In other words, the white community in South Africa felt that the whole question of the continuance of western civilisation in South Africa was involved. General Smuts could hold out no hope of any further extension of the political rights of Indians in South Africa and, so far as the Union was concerned, he could not accept Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's proposal.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, on behalf of the British Government, cordially accepted the proposal of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru that there should be full consultation and discussion between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and a Committee appointed by the Government of India upon all questions affecting British Indians

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

domiciled in British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories. At the same time the Duke of Devonshire was careful to explain that, before decisions were taken as a result of discussions with the Committee, consultations with the local Colonial Governments concerned, and in some cases local enquiry, would be necessary.

Further, while welcoming the proposal, the Duke reminded the Conference that the British Government had recently come to certain decisions as to Kenya, which represented in their considered view the very best that could be done in all the circumstances. While he saw no prospect of these decisions being modified, he would give careful attention to such representations as the Committee appointed by the Government of India might desire to make to him.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, while taking note of the above statement of the Duke of Devonshire, desired to make plain that the recent Kenya decision could not be accepted as final by the people of India.

The Secretary of State for India, summarising as Head of the Indian Delegation the results attained, pointed out that the discussion had demonstrated that it was a mistake to suppose that Indians throughout the Empire were given an inferior status or that such disabilities as might be felt to exist were based on race or colour.

XV.—CONTRIBUTION OF INDIA TO THE EXPENSES OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The question of the contribution of India to the expenses of the League of Nations was raised by the representatives of India at the Conference and was referred to a Committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It was there explained by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru that India was assessed far higher than any other part of the Empire, except Great Britain. In 1922, Lord Balfour had stated publicly at a meeting of the Assembly that the various parts of the Empire represented on the League would settle among themselves the exact amount which each would find. India desired to ascertain whether, in view of this statement, some relief could be afforded by the other parts of the Empire.

The members of the Committee representing Great Britain and the Dominions, while expressing sympathy with the difficulties of India, explained that their Governments were not able to agree to any variation from the standard of contributions already laid down by the Assembly for 1923 and 1924.

In the circumstances it was, of course, impossible for the Committee as a whole to make any recommendation. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru intimated that India must necessarily reserve the right to raise the question of its contribution at the League Assembly of 1924, and the Secretary of State for India, as Head of the Indian Delegation, affirmed this attitude when the matter came up before the Conference.

The Conference took note of the position.

XVI.—NATIONALITY QUESTIONS.

Certain questions connected with the law of British nationality were brought before the Conference at the instance of the Commonwealth Government and were referred to a Committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs.* These questions were shortly as follows :—

(1) *The grant of naturalisation to persons resident in Mandated Territories.*

Apart from certain special cases, there is under the existing law no power to grant an Imperial Certificate of Naturalisation to a person who is not qualified by residence in His Majesty's Dominions. The Commonwealth Government proposed an amendment of the law, so as to provide for the grant of certificates on the basis of residence in " B " or " C " Mandated Territories, *i.e.*, the territories administered under Mandates in Africa and the Southern Pacific. To this proposal (which accorded with certain recent decisions of the Council of the League of Nations) the British Government added the suggestion that similar provision should be made, generally speaking, in the case of persons resident in British Protectorates.†

The Committee decided to recommend that the power of granting Certificates of Imperial Naturalisation be extended so as to cover persons resident in " B " and " C " Mandated Territories and also in Protectorates.

(2) *The appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the Revocation of Certificates.*

A self-governing Dominion which has adopted Part II of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, as amended, has power in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of that Act to revoke certificates of naturalisation. Provision is made in the Act for investigation of the circumstances, in given instances, by a Committee of Enquiry, presided over by a person who holds or has held high judicial office. The Commonwealth statute adopting Part II of the Imperial Act laid down a definition of high judicial office which it is now anticipated may cause difficulty in some cases, as persons of the prescribed standing may not be available. The Commonwealth Government accordingly contemplated the adoption of a somewhat wider definition.

The Committee came to the following conclusion :—

> " Having heard the reasons for which the Commonwealth Government is disposed to provide that the presidency over such Committees of Enquiry may, where convenient, be taken by persons holding judicial office of lower standing than that prescribed at present by the Commonwealth statute, the Committee see no objection to a question of machinery of this nature being settled according to local circumstances and needs, if after examination of the experience of the Committee of Enquiry, and of the practice which has grown up in the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth Government desires to make an alteration."

* For the memorandum prepared by the Commonwealth Government see Appendix VI, Part I, in Cmd. 1988.

† For a joint memorandum on this subject by the Home Office and the Colonial Office see Appendix VI, Part II, in Cmd. 1988.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62522

(3) *The Nationality of Married Women.*

The Commonwealth Government proposed an amendment of the Imperial nationality law as to the nationality of British-born women married to aliens. Under the present law the national status of the wife follows that of her husband; a British woman becomes an alien on her marriage to an alien, and there is no power to naturalise her during the continuance of the marriage. The Commonwealth Government have found that the wife's loss of British nationality tends to give rise to hardship in cases where the wife is separated from, or has been deserted by, her husband, and they accordingly suggested an alteration of the law to cover such cases.

This proposal raises wider questions of principle and policy in regard to the national status of married women, which have attracted considerable attention in recent years both within the British Empire and in certain foreign countries.* A number of arguments for and against maintaining the existing rule that "The wife of a British subject shall be deemed to be a British subject and the wife of an alien shall be deemed to be an alien" will be found in the two draft Reports† prepared by Members of a Select Committee of both Houses of the British Parliament who examined this question earlier in the year in connection with proposals which had been made for a fundamental alteration in the law.

The discussion of this question by the Committee of the Conference did not disclose any opinion in favour of altering the existing law as to the nationality of husband and wife; and the following resolution was passed:—

> "The Committee are of opinion that the principle of the existing law that the nationality of a married woman depends on that of her husband should be maintained. They nevertheless recommend that power should be taken to re-admit a woman to British nationality in cases where the married state, though subsisting in law, has to all practical purposes come to an end."

The conclusions of the Committee were reported to the Conference and received approval.

XVII.—VALIDITY OF MARRIAGES BETWEEN BRITISH SUBJECTS AND FOREIGNERS.

Another matter suggested by the Commonwealth Government for consideration by the Conference concerned the law relating to the validity of marriages between British subjects and foreigners. The main difficulty appears to be that such a marriage, although validly contracted in British law, may nevertheless in certain circumstances be invalid in the law of the foreign country concerned.‡

The Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Home Secretary, to whom this question was referred, came to the conclusion that, having examined the action which is being taken by the Foreign Office and

* The subject in its various aspects is dealt with briefly in a Memorandum prepared by the Home Office, for which see Appendix VI, Part III, in Cmd. 1988.

† Published in House of Commons paper 115 of 1923.

‡ For the correspondence see Appendix VI, Part IV, in Cmd. 1988.

C 62522

the Home Office to carry into effect the Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906, they had no recommendation to make. The Committee's resolution to this effect was laid before the Conference and accepted.

XVIII.—PROPOSED EXTENSION OF THE POWERS OF THE IMPERIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION.

During the course of the Conference a proposal was received from the Imperial War Graves Commission that the powers conferred upon the Commission by the Charter of 10th May, 1917, and the Supplementary Charter of 10th August, 1921, should be extended so as to enable the Commission to comply with a request, based on public expediency and economy, that they should undertake the public duty of the future maintenance of such Cemeteries and Graves as the Old Military Cemetery at Tel el Kebir, the Crimean Cemetery at Scutari, which is in the same plot of ground as the Commission's War Cemetery, and the older Cemeteries in Turkey which could more conveniently be maintained in conjunction with the graves of those who fell in the Great War.

This proposal was submitted to the Representatives of the Governments concerned, all of whom have indicated their acceptance of the proposed amendment of the Charters by the addition of a clause to the following effect:—

> "The Commission, if in their absolute discretion they deem it desirable, may, at the request of any Government of any part of Our Empire responsible for or desirous of maintaining any place of burial or memorial whether or not of or relating to such Officers or men as may fall within the descriptions contained in Our Original Charter of May 10, 1917, or Our Supplemental Charter of August 10, 1921, or of or relating to any other Officers, men or civilians whatever, exercise with regard to such place of burial or memorial aforesaid and the graves in such place of burial all or any of their powers as in the said Original and Supplemental Charters were applicable to the said burial place or memorial and graves, provided that the cost of or incidental to any exercise of the additional powers given by this Our Charter be provided by the Government making the aforesaid request.

Accordingly the necessary steps will be taken forthwith to incorporate a clause on the above lines in a further Supplementary Charter for submission to His Majesty the King.

XIX.—ADDRESS TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING, EMPEROR OF INDIA.

The following Address to His Majesty was moved by the Prime Minister of Great Britain at the concluding meeting of the Conference and was unanimously adopted.* Mr. Baldwin, as Chairman of the Conference, was asked to submit the Address to His Majesty.

* For the reply from His Majesty see Appendix VIII in Cmd. 1988.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62524

To His Majesty the King, Emperor of India.

"We, the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the British Empire, who have been assembled to take counsel together during the past six weeks, desire, before our meetings come to an end, to give expression once again to our affection and respect for Your Majesty and Her Majesty the Queen, and to reaffirm our fidelity to the Crown.

"We have had to face, in the course of the deliberations at both our Conferences, many and serious problems which confront the sister nations and the peoples of the British Commonwealth. We shall count ourselves fortunate if we have been able to contribute towards the solution of these problems, even to a small degree.

"Yet as we look back on the years which have passed since the Great War, we are proud to feel that, amid the economic and political convulsions which have shaken the world, the British Empire stands firm and that its widely scattered peoples remain one in their belief in its ideals and their faith in its destiny.

"To the task of promoting that unity, of which the Crown is the emblem, Your Majesties have long devoted your strength and labours. We pray that the consciousness of the devotion of the peoples and the members of your Empire may encourage and uphold you in that task for many years to come."

XX.—CONCLUDING RESOLUTION.

The Conference at its concluding meeting placed on record the following Resolution:—

"Before the meetings of the Imperial Conference terminate, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues desire to express their great pleasure at having been able to welcome in London the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the other Representatives from overseas, and their appreciation of the readiness of other members of the Conference to travel so far in order to take part in its sittings.

On their part the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the Dominions and India wish to place on record their thanks, first to the Prime Minister of Great Britain for his conduct of the business of the Conference, and secondly, both to him and to the other members of the British Government for their constant attention to its work, in spite of the pressure of other duties.

The members of the Conference are unanimous that the hours spent in consultation have been of the greatest value, and will do much to facilitate the work of achieving unity of thought and action on matters of common concern to all parts of the Empire."

London.
8th November, 1923.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr Mackenzie King.

C 62525

39

SECRET.

E. 91.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STATUS OF INDIANS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

(Ref:- E. 12th, 13th and 14th Meetings.)

The accompanying telegram from the Viceroy of India to the Secretary of State for India is circulated to Members of the Conference at the wish of Lord Peel.

(Sgd) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
16th November, 1923.

From Viceroy, Department of Education, Health and Lands to Secretary of State for India.

Dated Delhi, 7th November, 1923.

Received 7th November, 1923, 8 a.m.

Priority A.

We have now the completed text of the speeches delivered at the Imperial Conference on the position of Indians overseas, and hasten to express to you and your colleagues on the Indian Delegation our grateful appreciation of all you have achieved by the strength and cogency of your advocacy of the Indian case. It is a cause of deep gratification to us that on this momentous occasion, the Government, Princes and Peoples of India have spoken with one voice. We desire also to express our appreciation of the spirit in which India's representation was received by the Conference as a whole, and the sympathy shown generally towards our claims and aspirations. To you personally we tender warm thanks for your efforts on India's behalf, and for your powerful presentation of her case. Please convey our warm thanks to Alwar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. We owe to you and to them a deep debt of gratitude. We are publishing the above portion of this telegram, and also our telegrams to Maharajah Alwar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62526

S E C R E T.

E. 91.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

40

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62527

S E C R E T.

E. 91.

59

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

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DEC 5 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62528

Mr. Mackenzie King

S E C R E T.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

E.(P.S.) 2.Revise.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE AND STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS.

The enclosed Statement as to privileges at present granted to

(a) Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers

and

(b) Dominion High Commissioners

in the matter of British Taxation

is circulated in substitution for the paper on the same subject already circulated (E.(P.S.) 2).

Corrections have been found necessary in the first and second paragraphs.

It is requested that the original document may be returned in the accompanying envelopes.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

29th November, 1923.

DEC 12 Recd

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62529

6

SECRET.
E.(P.S.) 2.
Revise.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE AND STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS.

STATEMENT AS TO PRIVILEGES AT PRESENT GRANTED TO

(a) Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers

and

(b) Dominion High Commissioners

in the matter of British Taxation.

I. INCOME TAX.

(1) The privileges in regard to Income Tax enjoyed by an Ambassador or Minister of a foreign State are secured to him by International Law, and depend on the fact that he represents a foreign State. Thus a foreign Government, and equally the permanent individual Head of a foreign State, are regarded as wholly exempt from British Income Tax.

The representative character of an Ambassador or Minister entitles him, not indeed to complete exemption from Income Tax, but to very wide immunities. These immunities are only one aspect - and an inseparable aspect - of the general diplomatic status accorded to him under International Law; another aspect is his immunity from legal proceedings.

(2) In the case of High Commissioners for the self-governing Dominions prior to 1916/17 no special relief was granted. From that year onwards relief from Income Tax on official emoluments has been given and this relief has now been made statutory by Sec.19 of the Finance Act, 1923. The concession made in 1916-17 was analogous to that

made

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

made to the Consular and certain other representatives of foreign States. (From 1922/23 onwards Consular representatives are the only class of foreign non-diplomatic representative to enjoy such relief).

(3) The comparative position may be tabulated as follows:-

Nature of Income.	Ambassadors & Ministers.	High Commissioners.
(a) Income from earnings.	Diplomatic emoluments exempt.	Official emoluments exempt.
(b) Income from Investments etc.	Remittances from abroad exempt.	Remittances from abroad liable.
	Income from investments in the U.K.(except from British Govt.securities) liable.	Income from investments in the U.K. liable.
(c) Income from house or land property in U.K.	Exempt, if occupied for diplomatic purposes. Liable, if either (1) occupied for purely private purposes, or (2) let to a tenant. (Similar reliefs apply in the relatively trifling matters of I.H.D. and Land Tax).	Liable (but property relieved from tax, if owned by the Dominion Govt., and occupied for Governmental purposes).

II. CUSTOMS & EXCISE DUTIES.

(4) As a matter of international practice foreign Ambassadors or Ministers are granted exemption from customs duties in respect of articles required for their personal use.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The main articles now coming under the exemptions are motor-cars, tobacco, spirits and wine.

(5) Dominion High Commissioners are accorded relaxation in the examination of their baggage, and are also exempted from payment of all Customs Duties on first arrival.

No further exemption from Customs Duties is granted, except as regards motor cars for official use.

(6) Remission of Excise Duties has never been granted, either to foreign or Dominion representatives.

In the case of foreign representatives, however, there is an old standing exemption in respect of the relatively small matter of Establishment Excise Licence Duties, e.g. the gun licence and the licence to employ a male servant.

III. RATES.

and MOTOR CAR LICENCE DUTY.

(charges assessed and levied by the Local Authorities).

(7) Under reciprocal agreement with nearly all foreign countries foreign Ambassadors or Ministers are relieved of the part of the Rates referable to services not of direct benefit to them (poor relief, police rate &c.)

(8) There is no corresponding relief applicable to Dominion representatives.

(No exemption is given in respect of property owned by the Crown: the Crown in this country voluntarily foregoes any claim, in order to avoid adversely affecting other rate-payers in the neighbourhood).

(9) Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers are exempted from Motor Car Licence Duty whether their cars are owned by themselves or by their Governments.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Dominion High Commissioners are exempted from Motor Car Licence Duty in respect of Government-owned cars used by them for official purposes.

(10) It may be added that no privileges at all are given in regard to Stamp Duties or in regard to Death Duties except that any movable property which may be actually situate in an Embassy or Legation is exempt from Death Duties.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

November 29th, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Mr Lakeside
Q. Mr Geddes
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C 62533

LIST OF PAPERS SENT TO:- THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

E. 15th Meeting (1923). Stenographic Notes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Imperial Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Tuesday, November 6, 1923, at 5 p.m. **(2 copies).**

E. 16th Meeting (1923). Stenographic Notes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Imperial Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, November 8, 1923, at 4.30 p.m. **(2 copies).**

E. 61. - Corrigendum. Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Canada. Revise of paragraphs 7 and 8 on page 5. **(2 copies).**

E.11478/199/44. Despatch from Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received December 3).

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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C 62534

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MEMORANDUM OF EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES BY CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT THE IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN RESPECT OF CANADA'S ATTITUDE TO -

IMPERIAL TARIFF PREFERENCE

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62535

MEMORANDUM OF EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES BY CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT THE IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN RESPECT OF CANADA'S ATTITUDE TO:

IMPERIAL TARIFF PREFERENCE

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.
Mr. Mackenzie King said:-

"Perhaps I had better leave the question of Preference for more mature and careful consideration at some sitting of the conference when that subject will be specially discussed. I should like to say this, however, with regard to trade by Preference, that Canada feels not a little pride in the circumstance that she was the Pioneer in granting a Preference to British goods. At the present time we are giving a Preference averaging 33-1/3 per cent. or more, on all goods coming from Britain and also from different parts of the Empire. In the last session of Our Parliament, we made a slight additional increase in the Preference by undertaking to give a discount of ten per cent. of existing duties on any British goods that came through Canadian Ports. We had in mind there development of trade by the "All Red" route, but we had also very much in mind the action of the British Government in undertaking to remove obstacles to the importation of our cattle into the British markets here. Throughout the Canadian attitude in the matter of Preference has been one of goodwill; it has been based on goodwill; bargaining has not been the basis of it. We have done what we have done believing it would be to our advantage, but believing also that it would be helpful to the countries to which the Preference was extended and especially to the Mother Country, and I would like to repeat the action we took at our last session in increasing the Preference was due primarily - and I can speak with a knowledge of the circumstances which governed it - to the action of the British Government in meeting us as they did meet us, with respect to an important commodity of trade and commerce. Now that spirit of seeking each other's mutual advantage will, I believe, go further than anything else to help to build up the trade and further the industrial development of the Empire"

.....

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

5th Meeting, October 9th 1923.
Hon Mr. Graham in his statement in reply to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said:-

"Mr. Chairman, as you rightly remarked some time ago, we have never approached the question of Preference in any kind of bargain spirit. To my mind the proposals you have made must have been decided by your Government as the ones you should make in the interests of all concerned. So far as Canada's representation is concerned, they are not to criticise your propositions. They are your propositions made by the British Government on behalf of the British People. We placed our Preference on the Statute Book in 1897, increasing it gradually until in some cases it reaches over fifty per cent., and I am bound to say that, that was not altogether the result of an altruistic motive to help the British Empire; it was to help the Canadian people. We believe that it is your function to do things to help your people, and if it helps the British Empire at large, so much the better for the British Empire. I think it would be out of place altogether for me, as a representative of Canada, or my colleagues, to attempt for a moment to dictate what the British Empire should do in the way of its tariff. It is dangerous ground; it is your business. We are willing to accept what you give us and, so far as you wish to go, we will not stop you. But to attempt to drive you along faster than you feel it is in the interests of your own people to go, I think would be altogether out of place so far as we are concerned.

Further in the same speech Mr. Graham said: -

"We should like to develop wider trade in every respect with our relatives within the Empire, in all parts of it, but, for practical purposes, as it is your duty to look after the interests of your people, we are compelled at every step to keep in view as the paramount question the interests of the people of the Dominion of Canada.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

20th Meeting, November 7th 1923.
The Hon. Mr. Graham, in commenting upon the re-introduction of the question of Preference by the Chairman, and, in reply to the offer of Tariff Preference on specific articles (see I.E.C. paper (23)-22 said:

> "The preferential proposals which have been mentioned today and which , it has been observed, are within the framework of the existing fiscal system of Great Britain, will, we are certain, be received in Canada with due appreciation as of distinct value to Dominion producers."

At this same meeting Mr. Graham referred to a statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the 5th meeting, October 9th, 1923. The statement was as follows:-

> 'We want you to tell us whether what we have proposed is going to heop you; whether our proposals can,,in any way, be improved, and, if so, in what direction. That does not bind us to accept any suggestions that you make to us, any more than you are bound to accept any suggestions we may put to you as to what we might desire as to increasing our trade with you; but, it does give us the opportunity at any rate, or realizing what the position is, and then it will be for us to say whether, consistently with the interests of our own people here, we can carry out what you have suggested to us. '

In response to this overture, The Hon Mr. Graham said:

> "Canada has given preference in her own interest, as well as what she conceived to be the interest of the rest of the Empire. It has never hitherto, in the case of the United Kingdom, been made conditional on the grant of an equal preference in return. We have at all times recognized the importance of conceding to each Government concerned the right to legislate as its own interests might demand, on tariff matters, or, in other words, complete control over its own fiscal policy. Should the British peoples decide at any time that it will be in their own interestd, as well as what they conceive to be the interests of the Empire to make far-reaching changes in their p resent

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62538

fiscal policy, Canada will naturally expect that, in the establishment of a tariff, full and adequate consideration would be given, through preferential duties, to the interests of Canada's producers and th the substantial preference which Canada accords to British goods."

He continued:-

"The Prime Minister of Great Britain has recently announced that the new fiscal policy of the British Government will include a substantial Preference to the Dominions, not as a matter of bargaining, but as a free-will offering. This has been the spirit in which Canada has approached the question, and it was, we believe, the only position possible to take under the circumstances. If, however, a general tariff is established in Great Britain, as well as in the Dominions, and reciprocal trade relations are negotiated with foreign countries, as the Prime Minister has forecast, it is plain that, in some measure a new situation will be created, and bargaining on a business basis, with weighing of reciprocal advantages, will tend to become the rule inside as well as outside the British Empire, though we hope that this will not involve any less ning of the forces of sentiment and imperial policy which have operated in the past and which animate the proposals of the British Government today.
Coming specifically to the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that we state what preferential duties would be of the most advantage to our producers, and noting that the Chancellor quite properly observes it will be for the British Government to consider whether such duties would be in the interest of the British people, I now outline some of the chief Canadian exports to Great Britain in which an effective preference would be of most value."

This List included Wheat; Barley, Flour: General Agricultural products, e.g., fresh fruit, apples, peaches, pears and plums; Dairy Produce, e.g. cheese, butter and eggs, bacon and hams; canned vegetables, flax, linseed, Sea Foods; In Mineral Resources and manufactured articles, reference was made to about fifty items which included the principal Canadian manufactured articles.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62539

At this same meeting (20th) Resolutions were submitted, in support of Tariff Preference, by jointly The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand as follows:

(1) That the greatest economic development of each of the several countries and territories composing the British Empire, is to be found in the promotion of their mutual trade and in the development of the resources of the British Empire as a whole.

(2) That the further extension of the policy of Imperial Preference, which was inaugurated by Canada in 1897 and which was accepted in 1917 by all the Governments represented at the Imperial Conference, offers the most effective means of acheiving this end.

The discussion on these Resolutions was continued to the 21st. Meeting held the same day (November 7th 1923.) and, in speaking on these Resolutions, the Hon Mr. Graham said:-

"I hesitate to take a position that might be construed to mean that I was not in favor of Preference, because Canada has been always in favour of Preference, in the Empire and has extended it as rapidly as she could. I think the first resolution is hardly accurate and must be a question of opinion. It is a sweeping statement to make - "That the greatest economical development of each of the several countries, territories, etc:"
The second portion of the resolution,is, I think, unnecessary, because, I am of the opinion that anything that we are doing does not need a Resolution to say that it is right. In our country we have adopted Preference; all the parts of the British Empire have adlpted it, and why pass a Resolution to say that what we did was right? The suggestion that there should be an extension of Preference is dangerous, to my mind, in the form of a Resolution, because, you must leave every portion of the Empire to work out its own policy as to Preference.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62540

We are gathered here as a Conference, not as an executive. I know that what we are all after is, the best interests of the various parts of the Empire, and are all anxious to develop trade within our own borders. I would much prefer in the interests, I believe, of all parts of the Empire, that we should not, at the present moment particularly, pass a resolution of this kind."

The following resolution was at this meeting subsequently adopted.

"This Imperial Economic Conference, holding that, especially in present circumstances, all possible means should be taken to develop the resources of the Empire and trade between the Empire countries, desires to reaffirm the Resolution on the subject of Impreial Preference passed by the Imperial War Conference of 1917."

.....

IMPERIAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

At the 19th meeting, held on November 6th, 1923, a Resolution was offered, it s purpose being the establishment of an Imperial Economic Committee on the lines of the Imperial Shipping Committee. The Canadian attitued, as expressed by the Hon. Mr. Graham was:-

(1) He thought it would be a mistake to go on organizing permanent Bodies as the outcome of a friendly Conference, as to the conditions existing in different parts of the Empire. Such Committee, to his mind, would take away much of the freshness and originality of the Conference and would be an impediment to its work, rather than a help.

(2) Fiscal policy was not a matter about which the advice of any Body of that kind would be sought; nor would Canada, at any rate, submit to advice being tendered to her on that subject by such a Body. The suggestion, so far as that portion of the work of the Committee was concerned, seemed

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62541

largely to resolve itself into a proposal for a Tariff Commission for the Empire, but tariffs and dumping were matters for the Governments themselves and their constituents to consider.

At this meeting the following Resolution was adopted.-

That in the opinion of the Imperial Economic Conference (Canada dissenting) -

(1) It is desirable to establish an Imperial Economic Committee, comprising representatives of the Governments represented in the Imperial Conference, and responsible to those Governments.

(2) The function of the Committee should be to consider and advise upon any matters of an economic or commercial character, not being matters appropriate to be dealt with by the Imperial Shipping Committee, which are referred to it by any of the constituent Governments, provided that no question which has any reference to another part of the Empire may be referred to the Committee without the consent of that other part of the Empire".

J.R.H.
14.XII.23

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62542

CORRESPONDENCE,

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RT. HON. W.L. MACKENZIE KING

VOL. II. - Part II.

E - 1302-3 - Imperial Conference - 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62543

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

E (1923) Series: Stenographic Notes of Meetings.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

Number of Meeting.	Date.	Principal Subjects Discussed.
1st	Oct 1, 1923, at 11 A.M. ...	Opening Speeches.
2nd	„ 3 „ 11 „ ...	Statement by Secretary of State for the Colonies. Publicity. Programme of Arrangements. Appointment of Committees. Joint Secretariat.
3rd	„ 5 „ 10·45 A.M. ...	Foreign Affairs: Statement by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
4th	„ 8 „ 11 A.M. ...	Foreign Affairs: Statements by Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
5th	„ 8 „ 3·30 P.M. ...	Foreign Affairs: Statements by Prime Minister of South Africa. Vice-President of Executive Council of Irish Free State, Prime Minister of Newfoundland, Secretary of State for India, Maharajah of Alwar, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.
6th	„ 11 „ 11 A.M. ...	Italian-Greek Crisis, 1923. League of Nations.
7th	„ 11 „ 2·30 P.M. ...	League of Nations.
8th	„ 15 „ 3 P.M. ...	Imperial Defence.
9th	„ 17 „ 11 A.M. ...	Naval Defence. Armistice Day Arrangements.
10th	„ 19 „ 11 „ ...	Foreign Affairs. Military Defence. Air Defence.
11th	„ 22 „ 3 P.M. ...	Defence.
12th	„ 24 „ 11 A.M. ...	Position of Indians in other parts of the Empire.
13th	„ 29 „ 11 „ ...	Foreign Affairs: Reparation. Position of Indians in other parts of the Empire.
14th	„ 31 „ 3·30 P.M. ...	Foreign Affairs: Rhineland. Position of Indians in other parts of the Empire. Reports of Committees.
15th	Nov. 6 „ 5 P.M. ...	Imperial Defence Resolutions. United States and Liquor Traffic. Extension of Charter of Imperial War Graves Commission. Reports of Committees. Appointment of Drafting Committee.
16th	„ 8 „ 4·30 P.M. ...	Palestine. Address to His Majesty the King. Draft Report of Conference. Publication of Report. Concluding Resolution. Appreciation of Work of Secretariat.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62544

SECRET.

E. 1st Meeting (1923).

57

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE FIRST MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1923, AT 11 A.M

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir PHILIP LLOYD-GREAME, K.B.E., M.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. W. T. COSGRAVE, T.D., President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

R. K. SARDAR SINGH, Private Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.

Mr. P. McGILLIGAN.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.

Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62545

OPENING SPEECH BY Mr. STANLEY BALDWIN.

Question of Reporting Proceedings.

Mr. Baldwin: Before we begin our business I think I should just announce that, subject to no objection being offered, we shall follow the precedents of previous years in the matter of reporting and publication of what passes here. The usual practice has been that there should be a verbatim note taken of the general discussions, circulated amongst the members; but in matters of a highly confidential kind only one note is made and is preserved by the Secretary. What should or should not be given out for publication after our discussions is a matter which we shall discuss on Wednesday and come to a conclusion upon. The proceedings to-day being more formal, I think the general practice has been that they should be fully reported, and the observations which I shall have the pleasure of making to you now will be printed just as they are delivered, and I imagine that that will be the case with any replies which any members of the Conference may think fit to make.

Welcome to Oversea Representatives.

I have great pleasure in extending to you all a very hearty welcome to Great Britain. General Smuts and Mr. Massey are no strangers to this historic Council Chamber. They took an important part in the deliberations of the last Conference, and indeed in those of all similar meetings held here since 1917. The same is true of Lord Curzon. The rest of us, with the exception of Mr. Burton, are, I believe, here for the first time at an Imperial gathering of representatives of Great Britain, the Dominions and India.

I have at the outset to draw your attention to the enlargement which has taken place in the circle of the Imperial Conference by the constitution last year of the Irish Free State. I am sure you will wish that I should, on behalf of all His Majesty's Governments who have in the past been entitled to attend these meetings, extend to Mr. Cosgrave, as President of the Free State Executive, and to his colleagues, a cordial welcome on joining our counsels.

We welcome Mr. Mackenzie King, and we shall rely on him to continue the high traditions of his predecessors. Especially shall we be glad to benefit by his knowledge of industrial problems. Mr. Warren is almost as new to his high office as I am to mine, but he is no stranger to this country. Nor is Mr. de Wet, to whom also I extend a cordial greeting. Mr. Bruce is unable to be with us at the opening of our deliberations, but we shall welcome him a few days hence.

It is a great pleasure to have with us distinguished representatives of the Indian Empire in the persons of His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. His Highness is widely known as an enlightened ruler deeply interested in the educational and material progress of his State—a State which rendered valuable help in men and money during the war. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has long been a conspicuous figure in Indian public life, and we recognise in him a brilliant lawyer and wise statesman.

German Reparation and Ruhr Occupation.

In his review of the state of the world at the opening of the last Conference in the summer of 1921, the British Prime Minister struck on the whole a moderately hopeful note. At home he observed a sense of strain and exhaustion after the prolonged struggle of the war; there was labour unrest and unemployment, though no actual privation amongst our people. Abroad there was turmoil and tension, but some of the most troublesome and menacing problems of the peace had either been settled or were in a fair way of settlement. One of these was the disarmament of Germany, the other was reparation. The former was in process of being accomplished. The schedule of reparation liabilities drawn up in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles by the Reparation Commission had been forwarded to the German Government on the 5th May, 1921. When Mr. Lloyd George spoke six weeks later it had been accepted by Germany, so that, as he told his colleagues at this table, the two most troublesome problems were either settled or in a

C 62546
62546

very fair way of being adjusted. Nowhere is prophesy more difficult than in politics, and especially in the field of foreign affairs.

As is well known, it proved impossible to hold Germany to the fulfilment of her reparation obligations under the scheme evolved in May 1921. The Allies at various times granted alleviations and postponements, but the German payments grew ever less, until at the end of last year we were faced with the possibility of total default. Definite proposals for a complete and final settlement were made in January last by Mr. Bonar Law. These proposals involved heavy sacrifice by the British taxpayer in the direction of writing off debts for which we hold the unconditional obligations of our Allies. Our proposals would involve the writing off of the greater part of the Allied obligations amounting to over £1,200 million sterling and leaving the British taxpayer to face the resulting burden without himself receiving payment. We deeply regret that so generous an offer to effect a final settlement did not receive more favourable consideration.

This difficult problem of reparation was complicated by a difference of opinion amongst the Allies as to the measures to be taken to secure the payment of what was due to them. It need scarcely be emphasised that there was no difference of opinion whatever on the principle that Germany should be made to pay to the utmost limit of her ability. The French and Belgian Governments decided to seize and exploit the Ruhr Valley, and they claimed that, Germany having been reported in voluntary default by the Reparation Commission, they were entitled to do this under the Treaty of Versailles. His Majesty's Government could not share this view, and were, moreover, convinced that such action could not but prejudice the prospects of the Allies ultimately securing the bulk of reparation. The French and Belgian Governments, however, with the acquiescence, though not very active support, of the Italian Government, proceeded to put their plan into execution. His Majesty's Government decided that, being convinced of the inexpediency of such action, they could take no part in the execution of the Franco-Belgian measures. The German Government, refusing to recognise the legality of the occupation, ordered and organised passive resistance, which has been practised up till now, and has, in its turn, called forth ever stronger measures on the part of the occupying authorities. His Majesty's Government have had no easy task, while remaining in occupation of part of the Rhineland, in carrying out their policy of neither helping nor hindering the action of their Allies, but they dare to hope that they have succeeded in the main in maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality. The Notes which have been exchanged between us and the French Government since the January Conference have more and more revealed an honest divergence of opinion as to the best method of obtaining reparation and of advancing the cause of permanent peace in Europe. That divergence reflects differences of temperament and outlook between the two nations which it would be foolish to ignore, but the last twenty years have shown that they are not incompatible with whole-hearted co-operation in the face of grave danger.

We have strained every nerve to preserve the solidarity of the Allies and especially the Entente with France. We have done this believing that any rupture between us might still further postpone the peace which Europe so sorely needs. I am aware that the patience we have shown in trying to preserve good relations with France has laid us open in many quarters to the charges of indecision and weakness. But at least it has borne witness not only to our wish to act, in the words of Disraeli, as "a moderating and mediatorial Power" in the Councils of Europe, but to our ardent desire to preserve our friendship with France.

At this moment it seems that we are entering on a new phase with the collapse of German passive resistance, which appeared to be imminent when I met the French Prime Minister in Paris not many days ago. How the new situation will develop I shall not venture to predict, but one thing was clear to us in Paris, and becomes daily clearer; it is only by the closest co-operation and complete confidence of the Allies in each other that we can hope for a settlement of Europe's difficulties.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62547

A fuller and more detailed statement of the situation will be made to you by the Foreign Secretary when we come later on in the week to the discussion of foreign affairs.

The Janina Murders and Occupation of Corfu.

Within the last few weeks, we have been faced by a sudden crisis in the relations between Greece and Italy which threatened at one moment to assume serious proportions, but which, I am glad to say, has now been settled. I do not desire to anticipate what will be said later upon this subject, but I wish in my present speech to call your particular attention to the very useful and, in my opinion, effective part played in this crisis by the League of Nations. I am aware that there are many people who consider that the League has missed a very obvious opportunity of establishing its prestige in quarters where it has hitherto been either derided or ignored. The temptation to react dramatically and violently to the present crisis is one to which a less statesman-like body than the League Council might pardonably have succumbed. I consider that the members of the Council deserve the greatest credit for having placed the permanent interests of peace above what might have seemed the immediate interests of the League itself. And in this moderation they have been amply justified: there is no single person possessing real knowledge of the recent crisis or any settled experience of similar crises in the past, who does not realise to-day that, had the League not existed and acted as it did, a resort to arms would almost inevitably have taken place, and that, had the Council not shown the wise discretion for which in some quarters they have been assailed, the outcome of the crisis might have been very different. The League by its moderation and common sense may temporarily have disappointed the expectations of its more ardent and impetuous supporters; but the exhibition of these qualities in very trying circumstances has strengthened its hold upon the confidence of reasoning men in all countries.

I think we have every reason to be satisfied with the part played by our Delegations at Geneva in contributing to this happy result.

Treaty of Lausanne.

Peace with Turkey was signed at Lausanne on the 24th July last, after a Conference lasting seven months, with a suspension of sittings from the 2nd February to the 20th April. Various reasons—the delays of the Paris Peace Conference, political changes in Greece, the difficulty of maintaining a united Allied policy, the development of a strong military and nationalist movement in Turkey—compelled us to negotiate a treaty with Turkey on a different basis and of a different nature from those concluded with our other enemies of 1914. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will shortly explain to you in greater detail the genesis of the treaty and its main lines, but I think that after hearing his statement you will agree with me that, broadly speaking, this treaty not only safeguards the essential interests of the British Empire, without damage to British prestige, but has done something to reconcile those different national and religious interests which have so often troubled this quarter of the world, and may have laid the foundation of a period of comparative tranquillity and economic reconstruction.

Debt to U.S.A.

Thanks largely to a mutual determination to arrive at an agreement, arrangements have been concluded with the Government of the United States of America for the gradual repayment over a long period of the sums we borrowed from that Government to ensure the successful prosecution of the war. It must be remembered that on our debt we were liable, apart from any question of repayment, to pay 5 per cent.—amounting to over 200 million dollars—for interest alone. The funding arrangement has reduced the burden for interest and repayment combined to 161 million dollars per annum. The burden, despite the various provisions intended to assist us in shouldering it, is very heavy; it amounts to 7*d.* in the £ on income tax; it equals three-quarters of our total receipts from that tax

C 62548

before the war. The repayment of this debt is going to call for all our energies. But we considered that funding the debt was the only possible course consistent with the supreme standard of British credit; and that it was an essential preliminary to the restoration of the normal economic life of the world. The debts of Great Nations must be recognised if the foundations of commercial progress are to stand.

Imperial Defence.

It will be remembered that when the last Imperial Conference was held in 1921 the chief question with regard to Imperial defence under consideration was the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its bearing on the relations of the British Empire with the United States.

Washington Conference.

It was during these discussions, which extended over several days, that the invitation from the President of the United States for a Conference on Disarmament was received.

The Conference on Limitation of Armaments assembled in Washington in November 1921. I do not think I exaggerate if I say that the results achieved exceeded our most sanguine anticipations. If these were due in great part to the dramatic proposals with which the United States Government confronted the Conference at its opening meeting, by general admission they were also in no small degree attributable to the skill, tact and diplomacy of Lord Balfour, ably assisted by the delegates from the Dominions and India.

It may not be out of place to remind you that these results included:—

1. The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments.
2. The Quadruple Pacific Treaty.
3. The Nine-Power Treaty regarding China.
4. The Nine-Power Treaty regarding the Chinese Customs Tariff.
5. The Treaty for the protection of the lives of Neutrals and Non-combatants at sea in time of war and to prevent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals.
6. Many supplementary Resolutions and Declarations.

I think we may justifiably claim that these results, which are not only a real benefit but also contain a promise in the future for the whole Empire, are in no small measure due, first, to the last Imperial Conference, which was so largely concerned in initiating the Washington Conference, and, second, to the British Empire Delegation, which co-operated so successfully with the United States and other Governments in bringing it to fruition.

The ratification of the Quadruple Pacific Treaty has now been completed, and thereupon the agreement concluded between Great Britain and Japan in 1911 automatically terminates.

We have all been deeply moved by the news of the recent earthquake in the East, and I am sure you will wish me to express our profound sympathy with our faithful Ally in the terrible calamity which has befallen her and our recognition of the brave spirit in which she has met it.

Air Defence.

The other chief questions of Imperial Defence which have been dealt with in the interval since the last Conference will be reviewed later by the Lord President of the Council. Problems of Empire Defence will necessarily occupy a considerable share of our deliberations. It will be within your knowledge that we decided with great reluctance to add to our defensive Air Forces. When announcing this increase in our programme to Parliament, I said, and I should like to repeat here, that, in conformity with our obligation under the Covenant of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government would gladly co-operate with other Governments in limiting the strength of air armaments on lines similar to the Treaty of Washington in the case of the Navy, and any such arrangement, it is needless to say, would govern our policy of air expansion.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62549

Unemployment.

The impoverishment of the world consequent on the ravages of the war has been immensely aggravated and prolonged by the unsettlement of Europe which I have described. Contraction of trade in Europe is felt throughout the world, in India, in Canada, in Australia, in South Africa, on all of whom the European market reacts. All countries of the world are burdened by debt, by taxation, by budget difficulties, by exchange fluctuations. We here at home as a great trading and exporting country feel the result with especial severity.

Since the summer of 1921 there has on the whole been some improvement in the state of employment in this country; but unfortunately the numbers unemployed remain still very large, and the depression in trade which revealed itself in the autumn of 1920 has not passed away.

In the spring and early summer of the present year there were signs of an early revival of trade. Unhappily the improvement then promised and partly realised has suffered a check. Recently the figures of unemployed have taken an upward turn, and it is to be feared that this increase will continue during the coming winter months. We have roughly a million and a quarter out of work as compared with a little over a million and a half when the last conference met.

Inter-Imperial Trade.

The efforts of the Government to cope with this situation have been and will continue to be directed on three main lines. In the first place, relief works of a useful and practical kind and costing many millions are set in operation with Treasury assistance through Local Authorities and otherwise. Secondly, provision on an unprecedented scale is made through the National Unemployment Insurance Scheme for those in the insured trades who are unavoidably unemployed; and, thirdly, every practicable step is taken to stimulate and encourage the revival of trade at home, with the Dominions, India and the Colonies and with foreign countries.

An Agenda for the Conference has been prepared and it embraces a number of topics in addition to foreign affairs and defence which it is desirable we should examine together, but I think you will agree that one of the most important items on it is this question of inter-imperial trade. The whole subject will be gone into by the Economic Conference under the Chairmanship of my friend, the President of the Board of Trade, and we shall have before us here some of the major questions which are involved. I am confident that we shall be able to devise measures which will be to our mutual advantage by way of redistributing the population, improving transport and means of communication, and, generally, increasing the facilities for the growth of trade within the Empire.

The economic condition of Europe makes it essential that we should turn our eyes elsewhere. The resources of our Empire are boundless and the need for rapid development is clamant. I trust that we shall not separate before we have agreed upon the first steps to be taken to create in a not too distant future an ample supply of those raw materials on which the trade of the world depends. Population necessarily follows such extension, and that in its turn leads to a general expansion of business from which alone can come an improvement in the material condition of the people.

India.

Upon the peculiar problems presented by India I do not now propose to dwell, however briefly. Doubtless they will be authoritatively interpreted to us, as occasion arises, by the Members of the Indian Delegation. But it does seem to me important to remember that this great country stands at the moment in special need of all the sympathetic understanding we can give her. She is engaged, under British guidance, in the stupendous task of educating one-fifth of the human race to the burdens and privileges of responsible government; and the period of transition between the old traditional régime and the emergence of self-governing institutions must necessarily be both delicate and difficult. Moreover, her relationship with other component elements in the British

C 62550

Commonwealth presents a problem at once complex and critical, for in it are involved the contact of civilisations, so varied in history and tradition, and the future harmony of East and West. I am convinced that we may look with confidence for the co-operation, not merely of the peoples of India themselves, but also, in so far as may lie in their power, of the Dominion Governments.

Closing Survey.

Contemplating Europe as we do to-day and comparing what we see with what we hoped for three or four years ago, we can find little to encourage us in our labours. The size of armies and the money spent on munitions are greater than in 1914. Economic solidarity is rent asunder. Is it not amazing that after an exhausting world-wide war all efforts should not be directed to reconstruction, to the building up of the wealth spent in war and waste, and to the re-creation of the economic machinery which war has put out of joint? The only consolations I can draw in a situation so charged with unrest are to recall the history of the past and to reflect on the unity of our own Empire and the deep and universal desire of our people for peace.

All the great European wars have been followed by a recrudescence of militarism and the nations have taken far more years to recover from the shock of war than the years which separate us from the Treaty of Versailles. It took France a couple of centuries to recover from the Hundred Years' War; a long and dreary period followed the Thirty Years' War, in Germany. The years which followed Waterloo were among the darkest in our national history. After the Congress of Vienna there was no organised demand for schemes of disarmament.

Compared with a century ago, we have, at least within limits, a League of Nations, and no one can have studied the transactions of its Assembly at Geneva without becoming aware of a growing international moral sense, and a determination to confront the problems of the reduction of armaments, difficult as they must be. What can be achieved by international co-operation and reconstruction on sound economic lines is shown in the case of Austria, where nine Governments have joined to guarantee a loan. No one who knew Austria eighteen months ago would recognise the new spirit which now prevails there. Compared with a century ago, there is a powerful friend of peace in the United States. In this room on this occasion it is natural that we should be most conscious of that League of Nations in whose name we are assembled—the British Commonwealth—that system of States spread all over the world, far greater, as General Smuts once truly said, than any Empire which has ever existed, "a dynamic system growing, evolving all the time towards new destinies."

The British Empire.

The British Empire, whose representatives are assembled here to-day, has often been described as the product of accidents. It is, in fact, the natural and spontaneous product not of its own necessities only, but of those of mankind. Scarcely four centuries have passed since the continents of the world swung like new planets into each other's ken. When Columbus discovered America and Vasco da Gama opened the routes to the East, all nations and kindreds of the earth were presently brought into intimate contact. A few years later a political writer of the sixteenth century remarked: "Henceforth the world is one Commonwealth." In a sense his words were prophetic. Our ever increasing control of natural forces has so knit the nations together that whatever affects one for good or ill affects them all. They are as organs of one body. But the mastery achieved over physical forces has completely outdistanced the control acquired over human forces. The fact is that our minds learn far more quickly than our characters change; so the social and political structure of the world has not kept pace with the growth of its knowledge. I am not saying that no progress has been made in applying moral ideas to political facts. Before me I see men who together can speak for a world commonwealth containing one-quarter of mankind. The peoples you represent are drawn from all the continents, from all their races, from every kind

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62551

of human society. Like a network of steel embedded in concrete this Commonwealth holds more than itself together. It held through the greatest cataclysm that has ever shaken the foundations of the world. Dissolve those ties and civilisation itself would collapse.

We are often told that self-interest binds the Empire together. A half truth presented as the whole is a dangerous falsehood. I have likened the ties which unite us to steel, but steel of the wrong temper may be brittle as glass. The only element which can give a tensile quality to human ties is a sense of duty in men to each other. We, gathered in this chamber, will strengthen the bonds which unite us so far as we are able to keep in mind the needs of others than those for whom we speak. We stand here on an equal footing and no Government present in this chamber can bind the rest. We can act with effect so far as we agree, and no further: but I weigh my words when I say that we shall achieve agreement and so strengthen the bonds which unite us only in so far as each and all of us is seeking how to relieve not only our own difficulties and troubles, but those also of a distracted world. The British Empire cannot live for itself alone. Its strength as a Commonwealth of Nations will grow so far as they unite to bear on their shoulders the burdens of those weaker and less fortunate than themselves.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Prime Minister and Gentlemen: The Prime Minister in his opening remarks made reference to precedents which have been established at former gatherings. I understand that the representative of the senior Dominion has been the first to speak after the Prime Minister of Great Britain. In these circumstances, I venture to say just a word or two. Personally I could not but wish that one of the more experienced and older members of the gathering had been the first to address his remarks to this Conference, my friend Mr. Massey, or General Smuts, who have been at similar gatherings in the past; but it may be well that precedents should be observed, and the procedure at former Conferences followed.

Welcome to Representatives of Irish Free State.

May I thank the Prime Minister very cordially for the heartiness of the welcome which he has extended to us? I am sure we all join with him in experiencing pleasure at the presence at this gathering of the representatives of the Irish Free State. Coming from the Dominion of Canada, the close association of the name of our Dominion with that of the new Irish Free State in the Treaty and Constitution makes it a special pleasure to me to have the privilege of meeting at this table the representatives of that State.

Comments on Mr. Baldwin's Speech.

Having regard to the short time we expect to occupy this morning, it would scarcely, I think, be advisable for me in any way to attempt to comment upon the clear, comprehensive review which has been made by the Prime Minister of the situation in Europe, and of the mention made of other parts of the world, except to say that the information which has been given to us to-day, and particularly the elevated note which has been struck, will, I believe, be welcome not only to members of this gathering, but to the countries that are represented here, and, indeed, should be helpful in the wider field of international relations. The subjects that have been touched on are, of course, among the most important with which the British Empire is concerned, the issues with which they deal and to which they give rise are far-reaching, and it would not be advisable therefore to attempt to comment in any particular upon any phase of the questions at this stage. During the sittings of the Conference I assume ample opportunity will be afforded to all of us to make such references and comment as we may think would be necessary and helpful.

Value of Imperial Conferences and of Personal Consultation.

I feel it is a very great privilege to have the opportunity of meeting in this personal way members of the British Government,

C62552

the heads of the Governments of the Self-Governing Dominions, and the representatives of India, to discuss matters, many of which are of common concern. In matters of government the value of personal contact and association cannot I think be over-estimated. Some of the gentlemen present, most in fact, I am having the opportunity of meeting for the first time to-day; some little acquaintance has been formed by correspondence and cables, but I think a personal meeting is worth more than all the cables and correspondence combined. In so far as I have the privilege of speaking for the people of Canada, I would say that at this Conference we have only one aim and purpose, that, namely, which actuates all of us, of meeting together with a view to being mutually helpful, in doing what we can towards solving as far as may be possible many of the great problems which are of concern to us all. I think as we each speak our minds clearly with reference to matters in which some of us have perhaps a special interest and to other matters of general interest, we will find that no problem is incapable of being at least in some way appreciably solved if the spirit of goodwill is present, as it is certain to be in this gathering.

Value of Publicity.

May I just say this one word—it is a thought which has come to me more forcibly as I have listened to the Prime Minister's review—important as it is that those of us who represent Governments and are members of Governments should have the information which has been given to us to-day, and should have a common understanding among ourselves, more important I believe it to be that the Parliaments of the Empire should have equal advantage, as far as may be possible, of the fullest information with respect to such matters as are of concern to us all, and not only the Parliaments, but still more important, I would say, as far as this can be attained, the peoples of the various Dominions from which we come. For that reason I am glad of the publicity which is to be given to to-day's proceedings.

As a common sentiment, a common feeling, is developed among the peoples of the component parts of the British Empire, the solution of the questions that arise will be found appreciably easier. I can think of no greater service any of us could find it possible to render, than that perhaps of taking back to our Parliaments, and through our Parliaments transmitting to our people, much of the information which we will gather here, information which will be helpful in interpreting to those whom we represent the difficulties and problems with which other parts are concerned. Similarly, I feel positive that no contribution can be rendered to this gathering of greater value or of greater permanent worth than that as representatives we should seek not merely to express our own individual views, but, so far as we can do it, set forth the views of our Parliaments and the views of the people represented in our Parliaments, with reference to the affairs of the Empire, and of the different countries that compose it.

Empire stands for Peace.

I think, Prime Minister, that throughout the British Dominions there will be very great satisfaction at the emphasis which you have placed upon the desire which actuates us all here, not only to further goodwill and harmonious relations between the different parts of the Empire, in working out our own problems, but also to make what contribution we can towards peace and justice in the world. That, I think, is the pride we all feel in the British Empire, that it has stood for peace, justice and goodwill among men, and, in so far as we can make a contribution that will be of benefit to mankind, it seems to me that it will come in largest measure through the circumstance that, representing different countries, scattered in different parts of the globe, we nevertheless are all one in our aims and in our purpose, and that the purpose which you have just set forth in such eloquent terms.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Mr. Massey: Prime Minister, I do not intend at present to comment upon matters to which you have referred in the very clear

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62553

and very exhaustive statement which you have just given to the Conference. I say that because I think better and more suitable opportunities will offer later on, and I would just like to express a hope that before this Conference comes to an end we shall be able to do something definite and satisfactory in the way of solving as many as possible of the problems that have arisen during the last few years. I just wish to join with you, Prime Minister, and with the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Mackenzie King, in the welcome which you have extended to each and every one of the new members who have appeared at the Conference table to-day for the first time. I have no doubt they will be able to do good work, and as one of the older members I can say for myself, and I know General Smuts will join with me, we shall be very pleased to have their assistance in the many matters that are certain to be brought before us during the next six weeks or two months.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Welcome to Representatives of Irish Free State.

General Smuts: Prime Minister, I join with my colleagues here in expressing with what great interest we have listened to you. I also join with them in welcoming our friends from Ireland to this Conference. You have painted a very dark picture of the present state of affairs in Europe, and yet the presence of the Free State here goes to show what the spirit of goodwill can effect. Two years ago, when we had our last Imperial Conference, the state of affairs in Ireland was about as black as anything which exists in Europe to-day; but the difficulties were resolutely grappled with and as a result we have the Irish Free State represented here at this great Conference, sitting at this Board of our Commonwealth and collaborating with us on the problems which face us all. A case like this is to me a proof that nothing is really as bad as it looks, nor perhaps is Europe as bad as it looks. I join most heartily and most sincerely in welcoming our friend President Cosgrave here to-day. He will find in this Conference, I am sure, sympathy and support from all of us. The difficulties which Ireland has passed through and will continue to pass through are difficulties which are not peculiar to her. He will find that many of those questions which confront Ireland are common to the whole Empire. Here he will find help and assistance and sympathy in the consideration of his own problems, and he will find that this Conference, this High Court of our great Commonwealth, is the best forum for the discussion of his problems.

I am also glad that Mr. Massey has been able to come. I know he has had to face great difficulties in coming. However, he has triumphed, as he always does, and I hope that, now we shall have a full Conference, we shall be able to do really good work and that a real advance will be registered on this occasion.

Situation in Europe.

This is a most important and solemn occasion in the history of our great Commonwealth. The picture which the Prime Minister has painted to us to-day in his able and interesting speech is a very black one. The world is undoubtedly in a bad way. Instead of the peoples drawing together as we hoped they would after the War the tendencies are the other way, the passions which the War has let loose are still rampant everywhere, and if ever there was a time when a helping hand was needed by the world, and Europe especially, it is now. Our Commonwealth is still there; it has stood many a storm; it has laid down many a great precedent in the history of the world; and the present situation in Europe more than any previous one calls for a great united effort on its part. I trust it will really pull its weight and make a great contribution to the solution of the questions which are confronting the world.

Washington Conference.

You were right, Prime Minister, in pointing out what was achieved with regard to the Washington Conference. There is no doubt that the inception of the Washington Conference was brought

C 62554

about in this Chamber. It originated here in our deliberations, and owing to the subsequent great initiative of the Government of the United States.

That Conference marked greater advance for peace than any other Conference which has been held after the war. In that way the last Imperial Conference became very fruitful. I hope that this Conference will be as fruitful, and even more fruitful, in the contributions which it will make towards a settlement of the questions which are now distracting the world.

With regard to the Empire questions to which you have referred, I am sure that in one way and another they are all capable of solutions. At least, we can, as Mr. King has said, make an advance towards their solution. The spirit of goodwill and friendship in which we meet here makes every question soluble. We can register an advance even if we cannot arrive at definite solutions. In saying this, I do not wish to enter into a discussion of details; we will do that as the Conference progresses.

Prime Minister: Yes, on Friday.

Power of the Empire.

General Smuts: Yes, Friday. I await the statements of the Foreign Secretary and other gentlemen who are going to address us. But let me say this here and now; I have the feeling that our Commonwealth is a very great and powerful one. The British Empire can exert a force such as possibly no other agency on earth to-day to pull the world together, and I am anxious, so far as it can be done with goodwill and firmness, that whatever influence there is in this Empire, this greatest machine on earth, should be used to the full in order to assist the settlement of Europe. We have no reason to speak with bated breath. For centuries this country has, on every critical occasion in the history of Europe, spoken with the voice of authority, and the other Nations have always in the end had to listen to that voice.

My feeling and my desire is that on a unique occasion like this, without using threats or violent language, and in a spirit of complete goodwill, we should once more do what has been done before and speak with a voice that will be listened to in the affairs of the world. I am not going into details now because we shall come to them later in the course of the week.

Janina Murders and Occupation of Corfu. Position of League of Nations.

You have made reference to the League, and I agree with what you have said. At the same time, I think there is much misunderstanding as to what happened quite recently at Geneva. I have the feeling that the League has strengthened its position. The League has in the face of what threatened to be a very grave crisis in Europe acted with moderation and wisdom.

But the general view is that the crisis in Southern Europe has constituted a check for the League. The impression is that the League in a first-class crisis has not pulled its weight and has been inefficient, and whatever good work there was was done by other agencies. It is most important to clear up the position and remove this erroneous impression. I hope Lord Robert Cecil, when he comes back, will be able to explain to this Conference what has really happened. It would be lamentable that the impression should gather that the League has been pushed aside. Our object should be to strengthen the League and support it in every way; there is nothing else to do. If there were some other agency holding the nations together and working for peace, I would back that up. It is not a question of any particular form. So far we have devised one form and one form only for holding the nations together in a brotherhood of peace. As the real nature and interest of the British Empire is peace, I think we should support the League to the full and strengthen her hands as far as possible and add whatever weight we can to her counsels. I hope the misunderstanding which exists at present will be cleared up and that people will recognise that the League has really come with credit out of the Italian business.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62555

Debt to United States.

As regards the American debt, I have expressed my cordial agreement with what you have done in funding that debt. The British Empire carries out its contracts. At the same time, I fear that, unless there is a real recovery of the world, unless you can succeed in re-establishing the trade and commerce of the world, you may find that you have undertaken an intolerable burden for this country. What you have done should therefore be followed up with equal decision in a great attempt to restore the trade conditions of Europe. Otherwise you may find that what you have undertaken is perhaps more than this nation can bear. Some people seem to regard their debts very lightly nowadays. I am glad that the British Government has been consistent. At the beginning of the war in 1914, it insisted on the fulfilment of International obligations. It staked the existence of the whole Empire on that. Similarly after the war, you said, we shall honour our bond and pay. That is right and proper as a policy, but, at the same time, I think it would be almost an intolerable burden to this people unless you can really have peace in the world.

Need for Peace in Europe.

Our duty, therefore, not only to the world, but to this people who are going to carry this obligation, is to move heaven and earth in having peace re-established in Europe. Some people think that Europe does not concern us, that it is mere philanthropy or meddlesomeness to concern ourselves with her affairs, that we should leave Europe alone in her present stress. That attitude seems to me quite hopeless. You cannot have even the possibility of paying your American debt unless you can restore peaceful conditions in Europe. We can go far to extend Empire trade, and I hope that everything will be done to do so. Without any revolutionary departure from the settled fiscal policy of this country, I think a great deal can be done to foster inter-Empire trade, and I hope that this Conference will register a very great advance in that direction. But it will naturally take many years before the British Empire could take the place of Europe in your trade. In the meantime, you will have to carry all your burdens; you have to carry the present internal burdens and also to carry the weight of this intolerable external debt. It is clear to me you will not be able to do it unless peaceful conditions are restored in Europe. I do not want to say any more, Mr. Prime Minister. I only wish that this Conference will be successful—that it will achieve not only the objects it has in view with regard to the Empire, but also with regard to that larger and more difficult situation which confronts us in Europe. It is not only you who wish to re-establish trade—we in the outer Empire want to do the same. We also had our markets in Europe, and they are largely gone. Therefore, even if there were no higher motive than mere self-interest, we should still try our very best to establish conditions of peace and quiet in Europe. But there is much more. Deeper human motives appeal to us. The same motives that carried us into the war continue to guide us in the peace. It is quite impossible for us to disinterest ourselves in the awful conditions which exist all around us as a result of the war. We shall require much patience, and it may be that it will take much longer than we thought possible to have the world restored to normal conditions. Let us exercise patience, but at the same time let us really pull our weight. There is a rapid worsening of conditions all over Europe. It may be that this will still continue for years and become an irremediable set-back to Western civilisation. Even at this moment fundamental changes are taking place in Europe which will largely affect the future status and relations of the nations. I only hope that it may be possible to stay the rot before things have gone too far.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, IRISH FREE STATE.

Acknowledges Welcome extended to Representatives of Irish Free State.

Mr. Cosgrave: Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to express my very real appreciation of the welcome you have extended to us and of the

C 62556

pleasing references you have made to our inclusion in this Conference. I also appreciate very highly the cordial welcome extended to us by Mr. King, Mr. Massey and General Smuts, and the great interest in Ireland shown by General Smuts in his speech. He is perhaps the best able to appreciate the difficulties through which we have passed, as he also gave ready and most valuable assistance to bring about the position which leads to our presence here to-day.

Position of Free State.

In your statement, Sir, you have referred to problems which, both in size and number, overshadow our own immediate difficulties, and it gives us hope that, besides settling our own affairs, we may give some assistance in the solution of problems affecting the whole world. We come to this Conference in good faith, with an earnest desire to render what assistance we can in the solution of the problems to be faced, and to carry out with good faith and goodwill our part of that undertaking which you on your side have faithfully honoured in the past, realising that it is only in the exercise of these great attributes that it is possible for us to reach the desired end. This business is new to us and it is not possible for us to express opinions upon the many great and important matters which have been mentioned in your speech. The troubles and difficulties of our present situation and the circumstances surrounding it make my immediate association with the Conference less than I would wish. You, Mr. Prime Minister, will appreciate that, and I am sure His Grace the Duke of Devonshire will do so also. I would say it is a very real pleasure for me to be here and to have witnessed such a cordial and wholehearted reception. We realise our responsibilities and we are prepared to take over and shoulder the burdens, which are common burdens. I was very much gratified with the concluding paragraphs of the Prime Minister's speech and with the statement made by General Smuts that the real objective of this Conference is to further the cause of peace.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Welcome to Representatives of Irish Free State.

Mr. Warren: Mr. Prime Minister and Gentlemen, I just desire to thank you, Sir, for the very cordial welcome that I have received. Perhaps as representing Britain's first-born, it might come well from me to congratulate the newest Dominion, the Free State, and to assure Mr. Cosgrave, on behalf of Newfoundland, that he has many of his countrymen there who have the greatest sympathy for him, and they all sincerely hope that he may be successful in the task he has undertaken.

Position of Newfoundland.

I should like to say, Sir, that the fact that I am here at all is a sign of what Great Britain has always stood for. I represent a small community, but we have never been impelled, coerced, not even, as far as I know, asked to merge our political independence into that of a larger Dominion. We have been allowed to plough our own furrow and we have every confidence that we shall be allowed to do so in the future. Perhaps after I have attended as many Conferences as my friend on my right, Mr. Massey, I may be able to speak with more confidence than I do this morning. I have to thank him for his reference to us. We all know that among Dominion Prime Ministers he is the father of us all and, sitting as I do so close to him, I hope that I may learn from him how to acquire a title to Prime Ministership by prescription. There are a vast number of people looking to this Conference and looking to us to show some results. I feel sure that we are all imbued with one idea, and that is to do everything we can to achieve the results which are expected of us, and I am sure that we are all ready to make any sacrifice that may lead to those results.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, ON BEHALF OF THE INDIAN DELEGATION.

Lord Peel: Mr. Prime Minister, I will ask my colleague, His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar. to reply for the Indian Delegation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62557

The Maharajah of Alwar: Prime Minister of Great Britain, your Lordships and Gentlemen, I come to-day as the nominated representative of the Princes of India. You know that they rule over one-third of the Indian Empire and most of them are connected by treaties and engagements with the British Crown; but they are perhaps best known for their united loyalty and attachment to the Throne.

To-day, however, I am privileged to speak in the name of the 300 millions of peoples of my country. I speak on behalf of one of the oldest civilisations within the Empire, but who in the race of self-government have still much leeway to make. In the name of India, I thank you, Prime Minister, for the very felicitous terms in which you have extended your welcome to us on behalf of the British Cabinet. I thank you, and through you those on whose behalf you speak, for the expressions of goodwill for my country. I thank you all, friends, for the hopes that have been expressed that the Conference may achieve harmonious results. I can only say that I sincerely share that hope myself and, in conclusion, I trust that it will be permissible for me to thank the Prime Minister for the kind remarks he has made about myself and my State. I appreciate them particularly as I take them to be compliments paid to my Order, through me as their representative.

I will only speak about one word more. On such an occasion as this, I ask myself what is to be our attitude? Surely it is on this factor that the ultimate results of our Conference will mainly depend. The answer I receive to my question is in unhesitating terms. Surely is not this Conference composed of brother delegates from the sister Dominions? We assemble round the hub of the Empire as members of the family of nations, all united in one cause—namely, the uplift of the British Empire—all cemented together by one force, namely, the British Crown.

Gentlemen, the recent great war has left behind its aftermath of which the Prime Minister has given very lucid expression. Wounds and sores are still festering in many parts of the world.

With a little sacrifice, with a little toleration, with a little understanding, all this world can, I believe—and firmly so—still be made a playground for God's children. With a little willingness to give—and it does not require much willingness to take—mountains can certainly be converted into mole-hills.

On the completion of this Conference, I ask myself—would we rather say that we were able to achieve and gain this or that for our individual country or that we were in the privileged position of being able to subscribe, however little or great it was, for the unity of the British Empire. It will be a proud moment indeed if we can subscribe to the latter sentiments eventually. I do not mean to say that there will not be questions during our discussion and deliberations on which there may be differences of opinion, or on which it will be our responsibility to seek gain for our individual territories and nationalities. But in carrying out that responsibility, all we have to remember is that we have something greater to look to than our own country, namely, the British Empire, and that there is something even greater than the British Empire, namely, Humanity. Why is it then that we wish to subscribe our little quota to make that British Empire, which is already great, if possible even greater? It is because we like to believe that it will be, with every individual component part working out its own destiny in mutual harmony with others, and even with all our different nationalities, creeds, castes and religions existing—that the British Empire is going to fulfil its great object of leading humanity, not only towards peace, not only towards right understanding, but ultimately towards the great Divinity of which after all each one of us are but active sparks. That at least is my idea for the attitude at our Conference; to fulfil it shall be my endeavour.

MESSAGE TO THEIR MAJESTIES.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I think I will stand, for I am to propose the following resolution, which I feel it is a great honour to have the opportunity of doing:—

"The Prime Ministers and other representatives of the British Empire assembled in Conference, at their first Meeting and as their first official act, desire to express their respectful greetings and fidelity to the King and fervently hope that His Majesty and Her Majesty the Queen may be long spared to strengthen those ties of love and devotion which unite the peoples of the British Commonwealth."

C62558

Mr. Massey: I am going to follow the good example set by the Prime Minister of Canada and I want to say I have the honour to second the motion which he has moved. Needless to say I endorse every word of it, but I would go the length of saying that had it been worded in stronger and even more definite terms it would not have exaggerated the sentiments, respect, affection and esteem which the people of the different Dominions and countries of the Empire feel for Their Majesties, King George and Queen Mary. I second the motion.

(Carried unanimously.)

MESSAGE TO JAPAN.

Prime Minister: I thought it would probably fall in with the wishes of all the members present if, on the occasion of this first meeting of this conference, we were to send a message to Japan from the conference, and Lord Curzon has very kindly drafted this, which I think will meet with everyone's approval:—

"The Prime Ministers and representatives of Great Britain, the British Dominions and India, assembled at the Imperial Conference, desire at their opening session to send to their old and faithful ally, Japan, an expression of their profound sympathy in the terrible calamity by which she has been assailed; their admiration of the patriotic energy and unconquerable spirit with which the Japanese nation have met the blow; and their confident expectation that Japan will rapidly recover from a shock that might have overwhelmed any less courageous people and will pursue, undismayed, the great part that she is destined to fill in the social and economic progress of the world."

(Agreed unanimously.)

FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS.

I made allusion to the meeting on Wednesday—that will be at 11 o'clock—before I made my speech. We have to discuss arrangements as regards publicity and business and reference to committees and so forth, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies will fill a gap that we rather left to-day by making a statement in connection with the Colonies and Protectorates. It will be such a short day's business that it seems it would be very useful to occupy the time by a statement of that kind, which will be of very great interest to all of us. Friday will be the Foreign Secretary's statement on foreign affairs, which necessarily must be somewhat lengthy, and undoubtedly the discussions that follow that will last for some time, probably a matter of two or three days, possibly more.

PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

There is one thing before we go. It has been suggested to me by Sir Maurice Hankey, and I think it is a good idea, that we should circulate a communiqué this afternoon in the evening papers just mentioning that we have held this meeting, stating who was present, and giving the two resolutions, the one about the King and the one about Japan, merely saying that I welcomed the representatives and that speeches were made by different members, the speeches to be published in full in the Press to-morrow—they cannot get into the Press to-night. I think a communiqué of that kind which Sir Maurice Hankey has drawn up would be the right thing.

That concludes the business of this meeting.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Wednesday, October 3, at 11 A.M.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 1, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

SECRET.

C 62559

57

58

E. 2nd Meeting (1923).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE SECOND MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir PHILIP LLOYD-GREAME, K.B.E., M.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Sir JAMES MASTERTON-SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

The Hon. W. G. ORMSBY-GORE, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

KHAWAS RAM TAL, Private Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

Irish Free State.

Mr. P. McGILLIGAN.

India.

Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62560

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES AS TO THE COLONIES, PROTECTORATES AND MANDATED TERRITORIES.

The Duke of Devonshire: I understand that it is the general wish of the Conference that, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, I should give a brief account of the manner in which the responsibilities entrusted to the Colonial Office for the Colonies and Protectorates have been discharged during the two years which have passed since the Conference last met. Although the destinies of these great dependencies of the Crown are the immediate responsibility and trust of the British Government, it would be wrong if it were to be supposed that the moral and material progress and development of these large areas were not of increasing importance to all the partners in the British Empire, and it is the constant aim and endeavour of the Colonial Office to foster the interest of the Oversea Dominions in these great territories and so to stimulate inter-Imperial trade.

I do not propose to attempt to deal in any detail with the economic aspects of the Colonial Empire. These aspects, important as they are, come more properly within the purview of the Economic Conference, on which the special interests of the Colonies and Protectorates will be represented and advocated by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, who will have associated with him Sir James Stevenson and Sir Gilbert Grindle, aided by an Advisory Committee composed of persons possessed of special and practical experience of the industrial life of the several Colonies and groups of Colonies concerned.

Economic Depression Slowly Lifting.

In the statement which my predecessor, Mr. Churchill, made to the Conference of 1921 about the Colonies and Protectorates, he referred to the creeping paralysis which had overtaken almost all their industries after the artificial prosperity of the war period. They still suffer under the general depression of trade, but I think I may say that, taken as a whole, the Colonies are "pulling through." The financial position of some of the smaller Colonies is a constant source of anxiety to their Governments and to us, but there are indications that the larger tropical areas for which we are responsible are recovering. Much, however, remains to be done before the trade of the Colonies can be said to be in a satisfactory position, and it is to trade within the Empire that we must look to regain at least part of the ground that has been lost during recent years. Proposals will be placed before the Economic Conference with the object of increasing inter-Imperial trade with our tropical possessions and of fostering their development. But action by Governments alone, however beneficial if rightly directed, is not in itself sufficient and needs to be aided and reinforced by private capital and private enterprise; and this all-important aspect of the question is being explored by an expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Ronaldshay, the late Governor of Bengal.

British Empire Exhibition.

It may not be thought inappropriate if I refer in passing to the British Empire Exhibition, with which I am associated in an unofficial capacity as Chairman of its Council. In common with the Dominion Governments the Colonial Governments are taking a considerable share in promoting the success of the Exhibition, and my anticipations will be disappointed if the Exhibition does not achieve the results expected of it and if it does not open the eyes of the world to the tremendous material resources contained within the ambit of the British Empire. I am looking forward to meeting members of the Conference at Wembley next Saturday, when they will be enabled to see for themselves the scale and scope of this great enterprise.

With this brief preface I now propose to touch upon certain aspects of the progress which has taken place in the political and industrial life of the Colonies since last their affairs were under review at a Meeting of the Governments of the Empire. The British Colonial Empire, with its two million square miles and a population

C62561

of fifty millions, distributed in every quarter of the globe, presents a panorama of ever-varying interest and romance; and I must emphasise what was said by my predecessor two years ago that it is impossible in the time at our disposal to attempt to do justice to this theme.

West Indies.

I will turn first to the oldest group of British Colonies—the West Indies.

The visit to the West Indies and British Guiana in 1922 of the former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Mr. Edward Wood), who was accompanied by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, gave an impetus to the movement in progress there, as in other parts of the Empire, for constitutional development. At the same time it enabled the Secretary of State to deal with West Indian problems with the aid of the sure knowledge which comes from personal touch with the representatives of every shade of opinion on the spot. I feel confident that I carry the members of this Conference with me when I say that the written and cabled word is no substitute for direct personal contact. It is the fixed policy of the Colonial Office to follow the precedent so successfully established and to take every opportunity of repeating in other parts of the Colonial Empire similar official visits. I have already invited Mr. Ormsby-Gore to pay a visit to the British West African Colonies this forthcoming winter, and I hope that he will be leaving in the middle of December.

As a result of Mr. Wood's visit constitutional reforms are in the course of being carried out in Jamaica, Trinidad, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica.

The economic position of the West Indian Colonies is far from satisfactory. It has been necessary for several Colonial Governments to come to the assistance of their staple industries in order to enable them to tide over a period of grave depression. Both the sugar and the cocoa industries have experienced great difficulties, and the oil industry of Trinidad, from which so much was hoped, has not hitherto come up to the expectations that were formed in regard to it.

Telegraphic Communication with West Indies.

Telegraphic communication between and with the West Indies has given rise to dissatisfaction for some time past, both in those Colonies and, I believe, in Canada. The question was discussed at the Conference held at Ottawa in 1920, but at that time the existing contract with the West India and Panama Telegraph Company had still some years to run and no immediate solution of the problem was possible. We have recently put before the Canadian Government and the West Indian Governments concerned a scheme for an all-British cable from Turks Islands to Barbados, with subsidiary connections by cable and Wireless Telegraphy to the other Colonies. This scheme, which is based on the continued co-operation of the Government of the Dominion and of the Colonial Governments with His Majesty's Government, has now been accepted in principle by all the contributory Governments, and I hope that it will be carried out during the coming year.

This scheme will afford an opportunity for an even wider measure of inter-Imperial co-operation than the existing arrangement for joint contributions to the West India and Panama Cable Company's subsidy. The proposed cable is to be laid and maintained by, or on behalf of, all the Governments concerned, and as it is impossible for them to undertake directly an enterprise of this nature we propose, if the Dominion Governments represented on the Board see no objection, to ask the Pacific Cable Board to undertake the management of the cables and wireless stations which will be maintained under the scheme. We do not, of course, suggest that the Board should undertake any financial responsibility in the matter. All we ask is that they will extend to this new all-British route the skilled management and control which has been so successful in maintaining the all-British route across the Pacific. If our proposals are accepted, as I sincerely trust they will be, this new development of the activities of the Pacific Cable Board will form an interesting example of a Board, constituted for one inter-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62562

Imperial purpose, being subsequently employed for another kindred inter-Imperial purpose and will show in practice how co-operation between British administrations once started in any sphere tends inevitably to grow. We could ask for no happier augury of the outcome of the first Economic Conference.

Agricultural College.

Another Imperial development which emanates from the West Indies is the recent change in the scope and title of what was formerly known as the West Indian Agricultural College. At a meeting held at the Colonial Office this summer under my Chairmanship it was unanimously agreed that the scope of the College should be Empire-wide, but it was felt that the prospect of obtaining the necessary funds would be gravely impaired if the College retained a title suggesting that it was merely a local institution. It was, therefore, recommended that the title should be changed to the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, and our aim is that it should provide for the needs of all tropical dependencies by becoming the chief centre of agricultural research and staff training.

British Guiana in particular presents a special problem. Our only Colony on the Mainland of South America is rich in mineral and forest resources. In area it is as large as Great Britain, but it has a population of only 300,000. It is to be hoped that immigration, without which the Colony cannot be developed, may be resumed.

Africa.

I now turn to Africa. The British West and East African colonies both in area and population provide our greatest opportunity and the widest scope for sustained development. In those large tropical territories the improvement of communications and the advancement of education are the foundation of moral and material progress. New railway construction is now steadily proceeding in Nigeria, Gold Coast and Kenya, while important harbour works are being carried out at Takoradi in West Africa (Gold Coast) and at Kilindini in East Africa (Kenya). It is also hoped that the last link in the connection by railway of Lake Nyasa with the coast at Beira will soon be undertaken.

Kenya.

In Kenya political questions have recently overshadowed all others. It has been no easy task to provide an equitable adjustment of the several interests concerned in the political future of the Colony, but, after very careful consideration, the British Government has taken certain decisions which have been made public and which I need not here repeat. I sincerely trust that the settlement which we have made will enable all its inhabitants to devote their utmost energy to the development of the great resources of the territory in which they live.

In the administration of Kenya, as in other African Colonies and Protectorates, we regard ourselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population. Whatever measures we take must be considered in their relation to that paramount duty. We propose to continue the general policy of moral, economic and intellectual development of the African. Within the limits of their finances the East African Governments will continue, side by side with the great work of the Missions, to do all that is possible for the advancement of the natives. Considerable progress has already been made, and the Uganda Railway Administration is now paying special attention to the training of natives for mechanical work on the railways. It is confidently anticipated that in time mechanical work of this kind and the ordinary clerical work of Government will be carried out by Africans.

Tanganyika Territory.

In East Africa we administer, under a mandate issued by the League of Nations last year, a territory larger than any Colony, that of Tanganyika. The country's prosperity depends mainly upon agriculture and it has suffered from the general trade depression, besides having much lee-way to make up owing to the wreckage

C 62563

caused by the War. Progress is, however, being made, though revival is necessarily slow. Revenue is steadily increasing, and the relations between the native population and the Government are excellent. It has been found possible to make a considerable reduction in the military garrison. The system of administration which has been adopted is to support and supervise, with the least possible interference, the established native authority. It is recognised that, except to a very limited extent, the country is not suitable for European settlement, and this has been recently affirmed by the adoption of a Land Law modelled closely on one which has stood the test of time in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. "Compulsory servitude," which is the same thing as slavery, has been abolished without any of the social disturbance that was dreaded in some quarters, and, I may add, without expense. This was a step which our German predecessors had never ventured to take. We are now able to spend more money on native education—though not so much as I would wish—and also on Agriculture, thanks to the liberal assistance afforded by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, who regard the Territory as a promising field for development.

Rhodesia.

In Rhodesia important constitutional changes are now taking place.

As explained by Mr. Churchill, the position when the last Conference was held in 1921 was that a delegation from Southern Rhodesia was due to arrive shortly in this country to discuss the terms of the future constitution. As the result of this visit, draft Letters Patent providing for the constitution of responsible Government were prepared with a view to submission to the electors in Southern Rhodesia. Subsequently discussions were also held in South Africa between the Union Government and representatives from Southern Rhodesia regarding the alternative policy of entry into the Union.

Following on these discussions, a referendum was held in October of last year on the question whether the territory favoured entry into the Union or the grant of responsible government. The referendum having resulted in a vote in favour of the latter alternative, the new Constitution has accordingly now been completed and came into force this week on the 1st October. Difficult questions which had arisen with regard to the unalienated lands and the rights of the British South Africa Company on the termination of their administration have now been satisfactorily settled by means of agreements which have been arrived at with the Company and the Elected Members of the present Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia. The settlement with the Company involves a substantial contribution from Imperial funds in addition to the amount for which the new Administration will make itself responsible. The settlement should be of material assistance to the new Government in the discharge of its responsible task. Under the new Constitution certain powers with regard to native administration are reserved to the High Commissioner for South Africa, but in other respects the people of Southern Rhodesia will have a full control of their Government and administration. In Northern Rhodesia, under the agreement made with the British South Africa Company, the British Government will relieve the Company of the administration on the 31st March, 1924, so that on that date the whole of the administrative side of the Company's great work in Rhodesia will come to an end.

I turn now to the East.

Ceylon.

In Ceylon the new Constitution granted in 1920, under which the unofficial element in the legislature is given a majority, has justified the hopes of its advocates and has worked successfully for three years, although some further modifications of the Constitution are now under consideration. Ceylon's tea and copra trade is flourishing, and there has recently been a substantial improvement in the position of the rubber industry as the result of the measures for the restriction of output undertaken jointly by the rubber-growing Colonies.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

962564

Malaya.

I am glad to report that the economic depression in Malaya, especially in the two main exports of tin and rubber, would seem to be passing.

The revenue has improved, and the financial stringency, which was especially severe in the case of the Federated Malay States, is to some extent relieved. A large loan of £10,000,000, of which £9,000,000 have already been issued on the London market, has enabled the administration to be carried on and important public works to be proceeded with. The loan has been entirely applied to Federated Malay States purposes, but in order that it might be a trustee security it was found necessary that it should be issued by the Colony of the Straits Settlements, which has re-lent it to the Federated Malay States.

The Colony itself has come through a severe period of adversity without having to borrow for its own purposes.

Hong Kong.

The disturbed condition of the neighbouring Chinese province of Kwang Tung and of China generally has naturally had a bad effect on the trade of Hong Kong as a distributing centre for South China, but in spite of this the trade returns for last year would have shown a considerable increase on those of the previous year had it not been for a very serious strike of Chinese labourers which paralysed the port for several weeks in the spring of 1922. A large scheme is under contemplation at present for an extensive reclamation undertaking, designed to increase the facilities of what is already, from the point of view of tonnage entered and cleared, the biggest port in the world.

Of all parts of the Empire, Hong Kong has probably come through the recent acute period of trade depression with the least loss and suffering. This is due to the fact that, as the entrepôt of South China, she profits from every branch of the huge and varied export trade of China, as well as from its European imports. It is also true that political unrest in China has diverted much wealth and capital to the neighbouring British Colony, in which the merchants and well-to-do classes of Chinese have implicit confidence.

Fiji.

Fiji has suffered from the loss of the Australian market for its principal export products, namely, sugar and fruit. But thanks to New Zealand, which now takes the bulk of the sugar crop, these islands, which are of great importance to our Imperial position in the Pacific, have passed the worst. I have recently learned with interest that there is an expectation of important new developments in trade and shipping communications between Canada and Fiji which cannot but be of mutual benefit to both. The demand for labour in Fiji exceeds the present supply, but the impetus of the new Canadian trade may attract both capital and labour to the South Pacific group.

Falkland Islands and Antarctic.

It may interest the Conference to know that the late Captain Scott's Antarctic ship, the "Discovery," has been purchased on behalf of the Government of the Falkland Islands for employment mainly in research into whaling in the Dependencies of the Colony, which include South Georgia, the South Shetlands and Graham Land, the South Orkneys, and the South Sandwich Islands.

In these Dependencies the Empire possesses a whaling field which in recent years has been more productive than all the rest of the world combined.

Existing scientific knowledge of the numbers and habits of the whale is inadequate; and we are anxious to devise a system of control of the industry which will prevent the practical extermination which has taken place in other whaling areas. The expedition will also afford opportunities for adding to scientific knowledge in many other directions.

Evidence that the investigations are also of interest to the Dominions is afforded by the opinion expressed by the Government of the Union of South Africa that the efforts which are contemplated

962565

in regard to the study of whaling off South Africa will gain immensely from the operations of the "Discovery."

Middle East.

This concludes what I have to say to-day about the Colonies and Protectorates, but my survey would be incomplete without some special reference to developments in the Middle East. The supervision of this area, which includes Iraq and Palestine, was assumed by the Colonial Office in the spring of 1921.

In the statement made to the Conference by Mr. Churchill in 1921, a general outline was given of the Middle Eastern policy of the late Government, which was directed towards reducing expenditure both in Iraq and Palestine. This policy has been steadily pursued both by the late Government and the present Government, and the result is that the total expenditure this year on these two countries is estimated at £8,548,000 as against the actual expenditure of £26,695,364 for the year 1921-22.

Iraq.

To take Iraq first: On the 23rd June, 1921, the day after Mr. Churchill made his statement, the Emir Feisal, third son of the King of the Hejaz, arrived at Basrah as a candidate for the throne of Iraq. He was well received by the people, and on the 11th July the Council of State passed a unanimous resolution declaring him King of the country, provided that his Government should be a constitutional, representative and democratic Government, limited by law. Sir Percy Cox, who was then High Commissioner, took steps to obtain a confirmation of this resolution by means of a referendum, of which the results were known on the 19th August. In an electorate of about 1,000,000 the votes for King Feisal represented a proportion of 96 per cent., and he was accordingly recognised as King of Iraq by His Majesty's Government. The next step was to place our relations with him on a proper footing. Our position as mandatory was regulated by the terms of the draft mandate (though that document had not then, and has not yet, been formally approved by the League of Nations); but it was felt that a stage had been reached, with the establishment of constitutional monarchy in Iraq, when some more appropriate instrument was required as between ourselves and the mandated State. Accordingly a communication was made in November 1921 to the Council of the League of Nations, informing them that the British Government had been led by political developments in Iraq to the conclusion that their obligations *vis-à-vis* the League could be most effectively discharged if the principles on which they rested were embodied in a Treaty to be concluded between His Britannic Majesty and the King of Iraq. This Treaty would serve merely to regulate the relations between the mandatory and the Iraq Government, and was not intended as a substitute for the Mandate, which would remain the operative document defining the obligations incurred by His Majesty's Government towards the League of Nations. Negotiations with King Feisal were opened at the same time. After somewhat lengthy discussions a Treaty of Alliance was eventually signed on the 10th October, 1922. You will note the date, which was just before Mr. Lloyd George's Government went out of office. The Treaty provided for the conclusion of a number of subsidiary Agreements in which the precise degree of obligation undertaken by His Majesty's Government was to be defined. It was originally to remain in force for twenty years, but the present Government, after a most careful review of the whole question of policy in Iraq, arrived at the conclusion that this period was too long. On the 30th April, 1923, a Protocol was signed at Baghdad, providing that the Treaty should terminate upon Iraq becoming a member of the League of Nations, and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace between Great Pritain and Turkey. It was further stipulated that nothing should prevent a fresh agreement being concluded with a view to regulate the subsequent relations between the High Contracting Parties, and that negotiations for that object should be entered into between them before the expiration of the above period.

The present position is that the elections for the Constituent Assembly in Iraq, whose approval is necessary before the Treaty and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62566

Protocol are ratified, commenced on the 12th July. The electoral procedure is a cumbrous one, with an elaborate machinery of primary and secondary elections based upon the Turkish system. It is not expected that the Assembly will be in session much before the end of the year. It is hoped that before its first meeting the various subsidiary Agreements now under negotiation with the Iraq Government will have been provisionally concluded.

Future of Mosul Vilayet.

There is one important point with regard to which the future of Iraq is still unsettled. You may remember that, during the first Lausanne Conference, an acute controversy arose over the future of the Mosul Vilayet. The Vilayet has been administered as part of Iraq since the end of the war. On economic and racial grounds the case for its inclusion in the Iraq State is exceedingly strong.

Nevertheless, the Turks, though their arguments were entirely refuted by Lord Curzon, held tenaciously to their claim that the Vilayet should be restored to Turkey. It was finally agreed that a decision on the boundary question should be held over for the moment; that a period of nine months should be fixed (as from the date of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey) during which the frontier between Turkey and Iraq was to be laid down by "friendly arrangement" between the British and Turkish Governments; and that, failing such agreement within the period specified, the matter should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. This arrangement was embodied in Article 3 of the Treaty as eventually signed at Lausanne on the 24th July last. We hope to start negotiations with the Turks at a very early date.

Although this question is still outstanding, it may, I think, be claimed that the policy initiated by the late Government and adopted with the modifications explained above by the present Government, has on the whole succeeded beyond expectation. Relations between the British representative at Baghdad and the Arab Government are good. Our hope is that, within the maximum period of four years, we shall have discharged in full our obligations to the Iraq State. We also hope that we shall have established such strong ties of friendship with the Government and people of the country that they will be glad to make fresh arrangements with us, at the termination of the mandatory period, in which our special position, as the Power mainly instrumental in achieving Arab liberation, will be freely recognised. That is our confident hope. If it is realised, Iraq may yet constitute a stable factor in the East. I do not wish, however, to take too sanguine a view of the present situation. There are many difficulties still before us. The Iraq Constituent Assembly has still to be elected. It is impossible to predict with any certainty what will be its general attitude and complexion. Its first task will be to ratify the Treaty concluded by King Feisal and the subsidiary Agreements which I have already mentioned. Also to enact the Organic Law which the Mandatory is required under the terms of the draft Mandate to frame for submission to the Council of the League of Nations. Until these stages have passed it is difficult to speak with full confidence.

Tribute to Sir Percy Cox.

I should not like to close this part of my statement without paying a tribute to Sir Percy Cox, who recently retired from the High Commissionership for Iraq. He possessed a knowledge and experience of Middle Eastern affairs that can only be described as unique. They were built up on a quarter of a century's arduous and successful work in the Persian Gulf region, where he acquired an influence that can never have been surpassed. We have been very fortunate in having been able to count on the assistance of this distinguished public servant in dealing with our Middle Eastern difficulties. He was succeeded last month by Sir Henry Dobbs, an Indian civil servant with a distinguished record, who had served previously in Iraq.

Palestine.

With regard to Palestine there is one direction in which the situation has greatly improved since Mr. Churchill spoke in June

C62567

1921. The garrison has been largely reduced and the cost correspondingly diminished. The actual charge to the British Exchequer in respect of Palestine was £2,024,000 in 1922–23. The estimate for 1923–24 is £1,500,000, while we have undertaken to reduce the figure to £1,000,000 in 1924–25. The figure of £1,500,000 is, of course, included in the amount which I mentioned above as the total estimated expenditure in Iraq and Palestine for this year. Beyond 1924–25 we have not given any explicit undertaking, but we hope that the progressive reduction of expenditure will go steadily on until the figure has been reduced to very small dimensions indeed. But our success in this direction must depend on the economic development of the country, which in its turn depends upon political stability. I wish I could report to you that there has been a substantial improvement in the local political situation during the last two years. In one sense it would be true. Since the Jaffa outbreak in the early part of 1921, which Mr. Churchill mentioned in his speech, there has been no serious disturbance of the public peace. We have now got a very efficient gendarmerie in Palestine which could be trusted to deal promptly with any emergency that might arise. But political unrest is by no means a thing of the past. A solution of the Jew-Arab controversy has still to be found. Perhaps I may be allowed very briefly to sketch the events of the last two years.

Zionist Policy.

You are aware that our policy in Palestine is based upon the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, by which we undertook to promote the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, subject to the conditions that the civil and religious rights of the rest of the population were not to be prejudiced. We have been doing our best to honour both parts of that declaration. Our High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, has displayed not only administrative abilities of the highest order, but also the strictest impartiality in dealing with the conflicting interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. A Jew himself, he has never been accused of showing undue favour to the Jews. On the contrary, his high sense of justice is recognised and applauded in every quarter.

Nevertheless, opposition to the so-called Zionist policy has continued. It came to a head in May 1921, when the Jaffa outbreak took place. In the following June the late Government published a definition of what was meant by the "National Home," with a view to allaying Arab apprehensions. The Arab spokesmen were not satisfied and decided to send a Delegation to London to place their case before the Government. The Delegation stayed in London for nearly a year, but in spite of much discussion it was not found possible to come to terms with them. What did happen was that a fresh statement of policy was issued in June 1922 which made important advances towards meeting the Arab views. The statement was officially accepted by the Zionists, but not by the Arab Delegation, who returned to Palestine after its publication. The new policy included the establishment of a Legislative Council on a partially elected basis. The elections for this Council were fixed for the early part of this year. Owing to Arab abstentions, an insufficient number of secondary electors were returned and the project of setting up a Legislative Council had to be suspended. The Arab politicians have, in fact, adopted an attitude of non-co-operation with the Government. They have received a good deal of encouragement from various quarters, both in England and elsewhere. We shall, of course, continue to carry out our obligations. There can be no doubt whatever on that point. But the present unrest is undoubtedly doing harm, and we should be glad to see it brought to an end without delay. The matter is engaging our active attention.

I should like to tell you, for your confidential information, what we are doing. For reasons which you will appreciate this part of my statement will not be published, and I would ask you to treat what I say as quite confidential. A Committee of the Cabinet was appointed last summer to go into the whole Palestine question. Their recommendations, which have been approved by the Cabinet, aim at modifying certain features of the present system that have

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62568

the appearance, not I think the reality, of unduly favouring the Jews as compared with the rest of the people of the country. No public announcement has yet been made on this point, but a despatch on the subject is on its way to Sir H. Samuel, who has been authorised by telegram to approach the local Arab leaders with a view to securing their acceptance of the settlement proposed. Any premature disclosure at this end might very adversely affect his prospects of success. If we should succeed in obtaining the concurrence both of Jews and Arabs in the new proposals, we shall have overcome the political difficulty that has hitherto so greatly retarded all our progress in Palestine. That is what we hope; but I cannot at the moment put it higher than a hope.

Transjordania.

Perhaps I ought to add a word about Trans-Jordan. To this region, though it is covered by our Mandate for Palestine, the Zionist policy does not apply. We have there an administration under an Arab ruler, assisted by a British adviser. The ruler is the Emir Abdullah, a brother of King Feisal of Iraq and a son of the King of the Hejaz. On the whole the experiment has worked well, though the position is not altogether free from anxiety.

That is all that I wish to lay before the Conference this morning. I shall be very glad to supply further information on any point connected with the Colonies and Protectorates or with the Middle East in which any member of the Conference may be interested, and I need not say that we shall welcome any advice or counsel which may be forthcoming from any of the Delegates in the handling of the large and complex responsibilities which devolve upon the Colonial Office.

Wireless Communication between Canada and West Indies.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Prime Minister, if I am expected to lead in a few remarks, beyond expressing very sincere appreciation for the most interesting and comprehensive review which the Secretary of State for the Colonies has presented, I would just say that I have not any particular comment to make at the moment. The only matter among those referred to of immediate and direct interest, so far as Canada is concerned, is the question of wireless and cable communication between Canada and the West Indies. The proposal that the management of this should be placed under the Pacific Cable Board is, I think, both practicable and desirable and, so far as Canada is concerned, would be entirely acceptable to us. Of the other subjects, while they are most interesting, I would say that the affairs to which they relate, speaking candidly, seem so remote to the matters to which we have been giving attention in our Government and country, that it would be presumptous for me to give an expression of opinion by the way of either suggestion or counsel with respect to them.

Pacific Islands.

Mr. Massey: Just a few words, Prime Minister. I would like to say that I listened with a great deal of attention to the very interesting statement made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. New Zealand is interested to a certain extent in some of these Islands within the Tropical Zone in the Pacific, and, so far as our Islands are concerned, I am glad to be able to say they are fairly prosperous, much more prosperous than they were some little time ago. In coming to this country on the present occasion, the steamer on which I travelled called at Raratonga. It is not the most important of the Islands, but it is representative of the others, and I am glad to be able to say that good feeling prevails in Raratonga, and I gathered from what the people told us there that the same feeling prevails throughout all the Islands under the control of New Zealand. I do not suggest that it is because New Zealand controls them. Most of these Islands produce fruit, of very fine quality, and, in the last revision of the tariff some eighteen months ago, we gave a preference to fruit imported into New Zealand from other Islands. This has hit Fiji to a certain extent, but it has done good to our own people. The islands are in quite a good financial position. There is another interesting point arising out of this.

C 62569

While I was at Raratonga, I was met by practically the whole population—at all events some hundreds of people, including the whole of the British residents—and they asked me to convey a message of stedfast loyalty and affection to King George. I have not done that yet, but the matter is in progress and I intend to put it through the Colonial Office in the ordinary way. I wish to say that these people are not savages. There is an impression which ought to be got rid of that they are still savage or only half civilised. That is not the case. The people of Raratonga are civilised. It is one of the countries where the missionaries arrived a little over a hundred years ago, and did splendid work, and the effect of the work done by the missionaries is visible to-day. I have been informed that a larger proportion of the population of Raratonga are churchgoers than the population of any other part of the British Empire. It is an extraordinary thing, but I believe it to be the case from what I heard. Taking our Islands, I mean the Cook Group, we have connected some of them with wireless and it is a very great advantage to them in the way of getting their produce away. The steamers call; the people know when they are coming and they have the opportunity of getting their produce ready, whatever it may happen to be. I think it is chiefly fruit and copra—copra hardly comes under the heading of fruit—but copra is really the most important article of export. There is a difficulty about copra. There is no market for it, so far as I know, within the boundaries of the British Empire. There is a market for cocoanuts, but not the prepared article. I do not know why that is. I have not looked into the possibility of establishing a manufacturing concern in New Zealand, but I will have an opportunity of looking into that later. The copra produced in these Islands has to go to the United States. I would sooner see the business done within the boundaries of the Empire, and, if it is possible to do it, it will be attended to a little later.

British Empire Exhibition.

So far as the Exhibition is concerned I am very strongly in favour of the Exhibition. I think at a time like this it is a splendid idea and by bringing the resources of the Empire before the public showing what the Empire is capable of I think a very great deal of good can be done. Now is the time to extend our industries if it is possible to do so, and I do not need to remind you, Sir, and the other gentlemen who are present, that anything that can be done to help the heart of the Empire at the present juncture, helps the whole of the Empire. I do not like the outlook here. If the depression continues it is going to affect every part of the Dominions. Britain is our principal market and as the purchasing capacity of Britain goes down it most certainly will affect the other countries. I do not want to take a pessimistic view of this, and nobody will be better pleased than myself if I am wrong, but the present position makes it all the more necessary to push and extend our industries, trade and commerce wherever it is possible to do so.

Fiji.

Reference was made in the statement with regard to the sugar industry in Fiji. I mentioned that, I think, yesterday. There is a field for the extension of the manufacture of sugar in Fiji. When you speak of Fiji the impression is that you are speaking of one Island and that there are no others; there are many islands in the Fijian Group—I really do not know how many, but I should think at least a couple of dozen or perhaps many more than that. Some are quite large islands and are suitable for the production of sugar. That has been proved by what the Colonial Sugar Company has done there. At the present time the sugar industry is somewhat under a cloud, but the outlook is improving and I think it is going to come out all right. The company have a contract with us to supply sugar, which has recently been renewed for twelve months, but it has become necessary for them to get sugar from Java. Java is outside the Empire—it is Dutch. Sugar is one of the things in which New Zealand was very fortunate right through the war period. When people in England were practically unable to get sugar, it was being sold over the counter in New Zealand at 3½*d.*

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

062570

a pound. It is not quite so good as that now. Owing to their having to go to Java for it, sugar is dearer, but I think that it is probably being sold in New Zealand even now over the counter at 4½*d.* a pound or something like that, so the people there have no reason to complain of getting sugar at anything like that price.

Ross Sea Territory.

I am interested in what was said about the Ross Territory. Again New Zealand comes in. We have taken over the control of the Ross Territory on behalf of the Imperial Government—I am afraid later on it will be necessary for us to patrol the territory. I believe everything that has been said about the great quantity of oil which has been produced in the Ross Territory. We have all heard, although much was not said about it, that during the war huge quantities were sent from that territory to Norway, and thence to Germany. Even in peace time we do not like that sort of thing, and it is very important that the territory should be controlled. The whale fishing industry there should be conserved. There is also the seal fishing industry in those seas, which is of very considerable importance, and we know that seal fishing poaching, or whatever you like to call it, has been going on very largely for a number of years. We know that vessels have been down there and have come back loaded—they do not come to us—with oil and seal skins. We cannot hope to put things right at once, but we will endeavour to do our best so far as control of the industry is concerned, and make it, if possible, of more importance than it is at present.

Iraq.

With regard to Iraq, I have read the despatches that have come to hand, and I have also read the statements in newspapers, and I am glad to see that matters are fairly satisfactory there. I have a high opinion of the ability of King Feisal. I do not know whether Colonel Lawrence is still in that part of the world, or that he is assisting as he did previously. I consider that the work done by Colonel Lawrence was exceptionally valuable.

Palestine.

So far as looking upon the position from the point of view of the Middle East is concerned—Palestine—I never understood what was being done there, and I am bound to say that I do not understand what is being done there now. I only know this, that the Arab population of Palestine exceeds all the others put together. I have no doubt it is in capable hands, and I am not going to interfere—please understand that—but we have to remember that Palestine is practically under British control. I know about the Turkish Government and its relations, and, much as I sympathise with what is being done with the Jews, I think we have to be very careful not to do any injustice to the Arab people. The Arabs are extraordinary people to deal with. I know that, and if they are pushed too hard it will make for serious trouble. I am only interested from the Empire's point of view, and I should like to see things go smoothly in the Middle East as much as anybody else; but from what has been said by the Secretary of State for the Colonies we are not out of the wood so far as Palestine is concerned, but I hope with our usual good luck things will settle down and come out all right.

Economic Importance of West and East African Colonies.

General Smuts: I have listened, as I think we have all listened, with the very greatest possible interest to the informative survey which the Secretary of State has made of the Colonial Empire. Many of the points affect South Africa, and I will not refer to them, but I should like to raise a couple of points and ask a few questions. I said yesterday at the Economic Conference that I thought there was a great field for British development on the African Continent, and I will not say anything about that just now. It is a subject which I think requires careful consideration; it is one of our estates which has been least developed, and is the most promising, not from the population point of view, but from the economic and industrial point of view.

062571

Tanganyika Territory.

The Secretary of State said, in reference to Tanganyika, that it was not, except in small parts, an area suitable for white settlement. That is largely true, but at the same time we have to bear in mind that if Europeans are not to be induced to enter it there will be no development at all. It is not a home for white people such as many of the other British Colonies are, and our primary object there should be the development of the natives. But I see this danger, that if we are too much dominated by that point of view—that it is not a white man's country, and that it should be the natives' country—nothing will be done at all. As it is, the territory is largely stagnating; it is a considerable charge to the British taxpayer; it has gone back very much from what it was in pre-war days. The Germans spent a large sum of money upon it. The war meant the expulsion of the Germans, and in a rich tropical country like that everything reverted to the old position of stagnation, and that is very much the state of affairs we have to contend with now. If we want development there, we should have to give the whites some inducement to go there, and we should not look upon it as purely a native country. The best thing you can do for the natives is to get white capital for development there. Without that it is beyond the natives. They have stagnated during thousands of years, and they will continue to stagnate for another 1,000 years unless you can lift them up by the development—the white European development—of their country.

Duke of Devonshire: Can you suggest any means by which we can get white development? We are anxious to have any advice you can give us in that direction.

General Smuts: Yes, Secretary of State, I am prepared to make a suggestion, but I do not think we can do it now. We can discuss it among ourselves. A good deal can be done there, but I wanted to enter that caveat. I think we must not be dominated by the feeling that Tanganyika is a black man's country; and we want to do the best for the natives, and therefore white capital should be given the best inducement to go there. It is the best thing you can do for the natives—in fact, it is the only thing we can do for the natives. Education will be no good to them unless it is industrial education.

Ruanda Boundary.

The second point that I wanted to raise was with regard to Ruanda. Coming over I saw in the press that we have made another agreement with Belgium by which Ruanda has been given to Belgium under mandate. The position at the peace was this, that we had German East Africa and occupied it; the Belgians occupied another bit of country which they had covered in the war, and as a settlement we gave them a substantial part of Ruanda, which was the most important part of German East Africa; but we were very careful, with a view to the future, to reserve the eastern part of Ruanda, because we wanted to have our future communications intact between north and south. The British Empire at present occupies ——

Communication between North and South in Africa.

Prime Minister: The whole of the west side of the Lake.

General Smuts: Britain occupies to-day a part of the whole length of the African Continent. They have throughout the whole African Continent a most valuable part, the back-bone, and if we are to have through communications from the extreme north to the extreme south we must have an all-British route, and that involves a considerable part of Ruanda for future communication between north and south. I do not know what has been done, but I saw in the papers that a new agreement has been come to, and I do not know whether it will be carried out.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: There will still be a contact between Tanganyika and Uganda. Both Governors made representations as to their difficulties in maintaining the artificial frontier proposed in Paris, and an additional strip is going to be given to Belgium which is about 25 miles wide. It will not interfere with the possibility of communication between north and south. Belgium will not come up to Lake Victoria as we retain the Bukoba district.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62572

General Smuts: I am glad to hear that. I knew how anxious the Belgians were to get it. The position in the future may be acute in regard to the communications between north and south, but what you say is very satisfactory. The Union of South Africa has been giving a good deal of attention recently to this question of the development in Central Africa. Uganda and Kenya and Tanganyika are somewhat isolated; they lie far away, and we thought we could lend a helping hand from the south in their development and trade arrangements, developing trade with South Africa as much as possible.

Trade Agreement with Kenya.

We sent up a very able gentleman—whom I have in London with me now—to negotiate with the Kenya Government to see what sort of trade arrangements we could make with them that might be beneficial both to them and to us. It is clear that we can take lots of stuff from them that might be useful to us. Take railway sleepers, which we import on a very large scale into South Africa from other parts of the world.

Well, there you have in Tanganyika and in Kenya big forests of splendid timber and we thought we might lend a helping hand to the development of those countries. We fixed up provisionally a draft agreement with the Government of Kenya, which would be extended to Uganda and Tanganyika also. The convention for equal treatment of all nations within the Congo basin includes our African Colonies and the Protectorates too, and we have now been brought to a standstill by this Treaty, which was reaffirmed after the peace and which now bars the way. I shall be glad if we can overcome this difficulty, because I am convinced, so are the people in Kenya, that it is to their interests if a trade agreement can be made. If trade between South Africa and Kenya can be increased very largely it would give a great fillip to the development of those potentially very rich parts of the British Empire, and I should be very glad to consult Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office to see how we can overcome this difficulty. Any agreement we make with Kenya would be somewhat of a preferential character. That seems to go straight against the clause of equal treatment which has been put into the Congo Agreement. I wish we could overcome that.

The Duke of Devonshire: I think you will find it is probably a great inconvenience in many other directions as well. It is certainly a question we ought most carefully to explore.

General Smuts: It is important to us to some extent, but much more to those countries.

Sir P. Lloyd-Greame: There is another side to it also which one has to take into account. The French and Belgian Congo territories are in the same area, and they equally are precluded from making a trade arrangement which would be to their advantage but would cut us out. The Treaty is not all against our interests.

General Smuts: At the same time, that will not help forward the trade development of a country like Kenya—there are very limited markets there. It is a colony that will grow very fast once it is taken in hand.

British Guiana.

I was interested in what the Secretary of State said about British Guiana, that huge territory with a handful of people in it, opening a very wide prospect for emigration. Some years ago, during the periodical occurrence of our Indian troubles, we had Sir Benjamin Robertson there and we discussed with him at the time the question if it was not possible to find an outlet for many of our Indians who are disposed to become agriculturists in another place. He mentioned British Guiana at the time, and we agreed that a deputation should go to investigate British Guiana and go into the prospects and see whether it was a suitable place either for emigration from India or from South Africa or for both. I have heard nothing further about this interesting question. If it is a potentially very rich country, it is just the sort of country our Indians might be induced to go to. South Africa will welcome any such development.

C 62573

Palestine.

I just want to say a word or two about Palestine, and I register my very emphatic protest against the remarks made by my colleague from New Zealand. I was surprised to hear his remarks. I always looked upon him for the opposite view. I do not know why he has changed his mind. I think the British Empire is definitely committed to a definite policy, and any change of front about the National Home there would require very careful consideration. That formula was verified and it was approved by America, it was approved by the Government of the United States, it was approved by France and the other Powers, and it has become embodied in declarations by this Government. I think we ought to be very careful about changing one of the very important war objects which we achieved and achieved successfully. We have got up against some other difficulty. The Arabs are very tiresome people and the difficulties are very great. The western Government of Oriental peoples is almost insuperable. It is going to be a difficult matter in Palestine, but we are committed to this policy, and I hope that no departure will be made from this policy of a National Home without the most careful consideration. We have other reasons, too, besides, for being very careful in this matter. Our communications do not seem to be very safe now through Egypt. I do not know what is happening in Egypt. I agree with Mr. Massey; we do not know much about it, but certainly there seems to be a weakening on that front and we all know that the position there is most important for the future communications of the Empire. We now hold another frontage further in advance in Palestine. I should be very sorry if we had to abandon this front and fall back on the Suez Canal.

The Jewish influence in the world has been minimised by us. I consider Jewish influence is one of the great influences existing in the world to-day. There is no subtler influence working in the world, I hope for good, than the influence of that international people, full of brains and character, and dominating much bigger nations in many parts of the world through the filtration of their ideas and policies. So far, the British Empire has succeeded in keeping the Jewish influence on its side. We have had no anti-semitic feeling. It has been helpful to us and I hope it will continue in that way, but a departure from the principles has come as such a shock to the world that there is a danger of Jews being set against us. I am sorry, Mr. Massey; I thought we were all agreed that in the British Empire the Jewish influence should be kept on our side. It is not only in finance, but in much greater affairs than finance. I simply wanted to make these few desultory remarks. The dependent Colonial Empire is so vast that it is really beyond the scope of the Dominions. We have enough to do in the struggle with our own little problems of mandatory territories. I am very glad to hear that, on the whole, all is going well in the Colonies, and I hope they will add an enormous weight to the influence of this Empire. It might not be felt here at this table, but their economic importance is far-reaching. In the sum total this Great Empire is dependent upon them for a great deal.

Fiji.

Mr. Massey: My secretary has just informed me that I spoke of Fiji as French; that is altogether wrong. Fiji is British and has been for a great many years past; I should say for at least half a century, and perhaps more. Fiji, I am glad to say, is one of the native countries that sent a contingent for the Great War, and a particularly good one as it happened. The Fijians are not the same race as the other races in the Pacific. They are not Polynesians, but Melanesians. Physically, it is very hard to beat them. So much for that point.

Samoa.

I wanted to refer to Samoa. During my voyage across the Pacific I received a wireless from Samoa asking me to convey to His Majesty the King their loyalty and affection. It was couched in the usual flowery language which the Polynesian can use to advantage. Samoa was taken over by New Zealand from the Germans. Some

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62574

trouble was experienced during the first years of occupation. The difficulties have come to an end. We have a new administrator at Samoa at present, General Richardson, who was in London representing New Zealand Military Headquarters during almost the whole of the years of the war, and he is a particularly efficient officer. He was selected because I thought his character would appeal to the native people. He has been a tremendous success and has gained the confidence of the native people, who are now convinced that the change in control from Germany to Britain, or rather to New Zealand, has been for the benefit of the people themselves. They are settled down already so far as I can judge.

Palestine.

I think that General Smuts misunderstood me to a certain extent with regard to Palestine. Nothing is further from my thoughts than going back upon any arrangement that has been made with regard to Palestine. I think it would be one of the greatest mistakes possible to lose possession of Palestine, and I hope the Turks will never again get a footing there. I have had correspondence from people who have visited Palestine, some of them residents, who have represented that we ought to be careful in handling the Arab population, or there may be serious trouble in the future. I am glad that General Smuts gave me the opportunity to put the matter right. I am certainly not in favour of tearing up scraps of paper. The honour of the Empire must be the first consideration.

Investigation of Whaling Industry in South Atlantic.

Mr. Warren: I would like to express my satisfaction at the action of the Government of the Falkland Islands in sending the "Discovery," with the view to investigating the whaling industry —an industry of recent growth in the Western Hemisphere. It was a profitable one in Newfoundland about twenty years ago, but for lack of information it failed and the whales were depleted. Recently it has come back, enterprised by Norwegian capital. I only mention this because I should be very glad if any information which the Colonial Office gets as the result of the work of the "Discovery" might be made available for us.

Position of Indians in Empire.

Lord Peel: Prime Minister, there is one subject which was alluded to in the statement by the Colonial Secretary which is of profound interest to the members of the Indian Delegation and also to India, that is, the treatment and position of Indians in the Colonies. Of course, it is connected with the wider subject of the treatment of Indians in the great Dominions. Now my colleagues on the Delegation are very anxious that this subject should have a very full, free and friendly discussion at this Conference. I do not know whether this is the opportunity when we should discuss the matter because we are dealing now with the Colonies and Dependencies. I only wish at this stage to say it might possibly be taken when we are on the question of mandates, but whenever it is taken I hope the whole subject will be open for discussion. I should like, if I may, to ask my colleague, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, to support the view I have expressed in view of the strength of feeling in India on the subject.

Prime Minister: I think we should discuss it on some other occasion than this.

Lord Peel: It would be a matter of great satisfaction if this matter could be discussed.

Prime Minister: It is a new point to me, but I do not think we shall have any difficulty in arranging for it to be taken.

Duke of Devonshire: It is such a big subject; we could perhaps put it down for discussion at one of our future meetings.

Prime Minister: I think you might consult with Lord Peel about it.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: It was not my intention to go into the merits of any particular question or to discuss any issue in its details, but, as reference has been made to certain matters in which India is vitally interested, I think opinion in India will be awaiting

C62575

an expression of the general feeling of the Conference. My intention to-day, with your permission, was, without going into the details or raising any issue of a specific character, just to give expression to the Indian point of view. I am entirely in your hands, and I would like an opportunity, whether now or in the future, generally to express my country's opinion on this question. Whether it will be now or at a later stage, I will leave it to the Conference to decide, but, if you will give me an opportunity generally to express the Indian point of view, I hope it will facilitate our work here, and it may possibly lead to a better understanding among the members of this Conference.

Prime Minister: I think the Conference would certainly welcome such a statement, and, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies has said, the matter is of great importance and one to which a whole sitting might well be devoted. We shall have to arrange what will be a convenient time for that. This morning we are only touching very generally on the points that have been raised in the Secretary of State's speech, and I feel that the matter to which you have just alluded is one of such importance throughout the whole Empire that it had better be dealt with as a whole in a separate discussion.

The Maharajah of Alwar: That is my opinion, and I think we are agreed that a friendly discussion on the general question at a date to be decided would be of considerable profit both to the British Empire and to my countrymen, and, starting as we have done in an atmosphere of goodwill and friendly feeling, I think it may not prove such a bogey as it may be in the minds of some. I believe that to look at the question from a friendly standpoint, with our difficulties explained, with a willingness to ask whether there are solutions, and, if so, what and how, will go a long way towards easing any anxieties that may exist among my countrymen and may help to arrive at some kind of settlement or agreement which would strengthen the confidence of the people and strengthen their loyalty towards the British throne.

Duke of Devonshire: Perhaps it might be convenient to circulate to the Conference a paper which we can have prepared as to the position in British Guiana, Fiji, and so forth.

Prime Minister: I think that would be a very good thing. I think the Foreign Secretary would now like to say a few words on one or two points that have been raised.

Zionist Policy in Palestine.

Lord Curzon: There is only one point on which I should like to say a word, because it involves the question of national honour and Treaty obligations, the conservation of which, of course, is more particularly in the hands of the Foreign Office. I allude to the question raised between Mr. Massey and General Smuts with regard to Palestine. General Smuts referred to the occasion, now several years ago, in the war, when the question of formulating a policy for Palestine, which resulted in the declaration about the national home, was discussed at length in this room. I forget if he was a member of the War Cabinet at the time the decision was arrived at, but, if so, he will remember that I was one of the few members of the Cabinet who opposed it. The feeling was very strong with the majority of the Cabinet that it was worth while to make this declaration quite apart from the merits of the case as affecting Palestine, because of the influence it would be likely to have on the Jewish population throughout the world and the desirability of winning their sympathy, and not only that, but their active support, during the war. There were one or two members of the Cabinet, Mr. Montagu was one, who opposed it on the ground that it was against their conception of the part to be played by the Jews in the world; and when General Smuts spoke of the great importance of having Jewish sentiment and Jewish support on our side, I think perhaps he to some extent ignored the fact that Jewish opinion is very widely divided on this subject. However that may be, I opposed it at the time for these reasons. Firstly, I was certain, knowing the country, that Palestine did not admit of the extreme economic development which was predicated by some of the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62576

supporters of the idea; secondly, I knew that we should have great difficulty with the Arabs who, as Mr. Massey said, constitute an overwhelming majority of the population; and, thirdly, I was very nervous about the interpretation which might be attached by the Jews themselves to the very ambiguous phrase "national home"; perfectly innocent if you regard it from one point of view, capable, however, of being interpreted as going even up to the point of national autonomy at the other extreme. Well, the policy was decided upon, and has since been acted upon; and here comes in my point, the point in which, as Foreign Secretary, I am involved. I agree with General Smuts that it is wholly impossible to depart from that engagement. It is an engagement involving the national honour, an engagement entered into and carried out to its logical consequences before the whole world. The phrase about the national home, much as I mistrusted it, was incorporated in the agreement arrived at between the Powers in which I took part at San Remo. The declaration was itself repeated verbatim in the original Treaty of Sèvres. It has since been embodied in the Draft Mandate. That Mandate has been submitted to and approved by the League of Nations. We have been constituted the mandatories upon that basis, and only two days ago we heard from Geneva that the last obstacle to the definite sanction to the Mandate had been removed by an agreement that has been arrived at between the Italians and the French with reference to the cognate Mandate for Syria. Therefore the Mandate will henceforward be in active operation, and it is wholly impossible for us, without an abnegation of national duty and national honour which it is impossible to conceive, to recede from that position. There are other reasons which render it impossible to recede. Supposing we give up the Mandate for Palestine, do you suppose that the Arabs will be able to manage the country themselves? It is quite true, as Mr. Massey said, that they represent 80 per cent., or perhaps more than 80 per cent., of the population, but they are incapable of constructing a Government and administering the country. They must rely for some time on foreign assistance, and our surrender of the Mandate would not merely mean local anarchy, it would mean that some other Power will come in, and what Power will that be? There is no doubt whatever but that the French would step in. They are already in possession of the Mandate for Syria on the north. They are having considerable difficulty there, and our disappearance from Palestine would inevitably mean that they would join Palestine to their Mandate for Syria, and they would then be on the threshold of Egypt and on the outskirts of the Canal. We should then be confronted with a new political danger and a new strategical problem. That aspect of the case should be remembered. There is another aspect. Palestine, as I have pointed out, is a poor country capable of a certain but not of a very wide development, standing in need at every point of foreign money, foreign resources. The Arabs are quite incapable of providing it themselves, and the only people from outside who have hitherto made any particular contribution to the development of Palestine have been the Jews with their colonies, largely subsidised by wealthy Jews and in a flourishing condition. Let us hope that support will continue. Large sums have been raised in America during recent years for the purpose. You want to build ports, you want to introduce electricity. There are a hundred things you want to do in Palestine, and with the tremendous calls made upon us here you cannot expect large sums to be contributed by the British. It is only from the Jews that it can come. Therefore those are strong practical reasons for continuing the task we have undertaken. What then should be our policy towards the Arabs? Of course, it should be to remove every possible mark of invidious preference for the Jews as against the Arabs which may have crept into the administration. Now undoubtedly in the earlier days of the administration in Palestine the Jewish leaders, the Zionist leaders, said very foolish things. They interpreted the national home in its most extreme sense, and indeed they sometimes talked as if the administration was their own and conducted by them. That was a mistake. They have now been brought to reason, and one of the last acts of Mr. Churchill before he left office was to issue a statement, published as a white paper, accepted by the Zionist leaders, putting things on a proper

C62577

basis. When the Duke of Devonshire alluded just now confidentially to the proposals that have been made he was alluding to what will transpire presently but must not be disclosed now, namely, the effort being made by us to give the Arabs precisely that measure of official share in the administration, through the creation of an Arab Council, which the Jews now enjoy, which has been looked on as a mark of preference to the Zionists, but if shared by the others should remove a large portion of their discontent. The first thing to do is to be absolutely fair to the Arabs, and the second thing is to be absolutely firm. They have been allowed too much to think that by conducting an agitation here and running round and sending delegations and deputations we can be driven out of the country. We are not going to be driven out of the country, and our policy should be on the lines that General Smuts has so well indicated, to be absolutely true to our Treaty obligations, removing every sign of invidious preference for the Zionists as against the Arabs, and maintaining a firm resolve to pursue what is the only salvation for Palestine, the economic and industrial development of the country. I wanted to make these observations because I have been on the other side.

General Smuts: I am satisfied with that statement of policy. If that is the policy I am satisfied.

Prime Minister: We have no alternative. Whether we agreed with the policy originally or not we are bound now by questions of honour.

PUBLICITY.

The next question is publicity, and I need not weary the conference on that because a memorandum has been circulated on the subject,* and I will ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies to say a few words in amplification of the concluding paragraph.

Duke of Devonshire: In endeavouring to make what arrangements we could for the conference we quite appreciated that not only in this country but also in the Dominions there was a great anxiety that there should be as much publicity given as possible, and we have made these suggestions for submission to the conference as a means of providing first-hand information and not merely a brief summary of what takes place.

Appointment of Minister in Charge of Publicity.

We suggest having a Minister who, although taking no part in the actual discussions himself, shall make himself *au fait* with the atmosphere of the conference and be able to give further information to the Press. I think a similar procedure will probably be adopted at the Economic Conference, and if the same Minister could undertake both duties I think it would be a material advantage. He would be in touch with all the members of the different delegations and he could give a great deal more real information than can be gathered from the official summary.

Prime Minister: It is a delicate work, and I think you had someone in your mind when you spoke to me about it.

Duke of Devonshire: Mr. J. C. C. Davidson.

Prime Minister: The Foreign Office would arrange for their own publicity—that is essential.

Duke of Devonshire: Obviously so.

Prime Minister: When the Secretary of State brought the matter up to me he suggested a name, that of Mr. Davidson, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who was with Mr. Bonar Law for so long. I think he is well known, and I am quite sure if it met with the general assent of the Conference this very delicate work could be in no more capable hands. I know Mr. Davidson feels that it is a very responsible task, and although he would do it he would be reluctant to undertake it unless he felt that his appointment to this duty met with the full assent of every member here. If so, he would do it to the best of his ability, and I am sure he would do it well. But he feels that it is a task which could only be undertaken successfully if at the outset he had the confidence of every member here.

* E. 78.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62578

Mr. Massey: It is a very important matter and one which has to be dealt with very carefully. So far as Mr. Davidson is concerned, I have not seen him lately, but I knew him years ago and I know what a thoroughly good man he is. I think, if it is a matter which should be placed in any official's hands, it could not be in better hands than those of Mr. Davidson. I look upon publication or non-publication, as the case may be, of our proceedings as of the greatest importance. We have had a great deal of talk about open diplomacy and secret diplomacy and all that sort of thing. My opinion is that open diplomacy is absolutely impossible, and if it is adopted it is going to land us into serious trouble. What I mean by open diplomacy is the publication of the whole of our proceedings. Take this morning for instance. There were very awkward suggestions, or the possibility of inferences being drawn from one or two statements made here this morning, which might land us in difficulties very easily.

Lord Curzon: We know, the politicians know, how things like that are distorted for party purposes, and how careful we ought to be in regard to them. And it is not only what has taken place this morning. What Mr. Massey referred to were merely instances that might occur any day, and there is a possibility of statements being made which would be distorted and altered to the disadvantage of those concerned. Personally I do not think these things ought to be reported at all.

Prime Minister: All that you say shows the need for the greatest discretion in any communications that are made, and communications have to be made, and the question is, how can we do it best?

Mr. Mackenzie King: Might I ask if procedure somewhat similar to this was not adopted at Versailles and Washington in respect of the Conferences there? I was not present at either of these Conferences.

Sir Maurice Hankey: At Washington, most certainly it was a precisely similar arrangement. Lord Riddell there was the medium of communication, but also some of the Delegates used to address the press occasionally. That has been followed in other cases.

Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame: At Genoa and at The Hague.

Prime Minister: It was from past experience that this suggestion was put forward to-day. I think the Foreign Secretary wants to say a word on that.

Need for Secrecy as regards Discussions on Foreign Relations.

Lord Curzon: As regards the Foreign Office, I think we must make different arrangements. It is true that there are a great many things said at this table, some this morning, which it would be disastrous to circulate to the world; and so strongly do I feel about that, that I would not consent to make the statement which I am going to make on Friday and which will cover the whole ground of foreign affairs except in a spirit of absolute confidence with all those here present. It would be quite impossible for me to make that statement if there was any chance of disclosure, either of the text or the substance of it, to the world at large. What could I say with the necessary candour about France, Germany and other Powers, if the whole of it were to go forth? Our conception of this body is that it is a Cabinet, and has in it many of the powers and all the privileges of a Cabinet, and that involves complete confidence among ourselves. I exercised that confidence, I took advantage of it two years ago, as General Smuts will remember, and I propose to do it on Friday as regards foreign affairs. We had a talk last week with Mr. Davidson, who is thoroughly competent for the task, and he agreed that, as regards foreign affairs, no statement should be made that had not received my sanction as Foreign Minister, since the responsibility is mine. I shall have my Private Secretary at the Foreign Office here with me in the room, and any statements communicated to the press about foreign affairs will be communicated by him after consultation with me; and therefore all I would do at this stage would be to appeal to my colleagues in regard to foreign affairs to respect the confidence upon which I have built, and to ask that none of them, through their delegations or through their secretaries, will make any

C 62579

independent statement. Take, for instance, the question which we shall shortly bring before you, the question of liquor prohibition in the United States and the desirability of making an arrangement with America upon the subject, either by agreeing to the Treaty which has been proposed by Mr. Hughes, or otherwise. Can you conceive anything more unfortunate, if we had had such a discussion, than that there should appear in the papers the next morning that there had been a discussion, that I had said one thing, that someone else had said another, and that certain proposals were on the tapis. It would be absolutely ruinous; and what I say as regards America in that case, applies equally to Egypt—the situation there is delicate—and to many other cases. Therefore, not from any love of secrecy, but with due regard to the vital interests which are in our hands here, I appeal to the Conference, as I am sure they will allow me to do, to publish nothing as regards foreign affairs except by communication from agencies which are under my control.

Need for Secrecy as regards Discussions on Defence.

Lord Salisbury: If I may say one word, I do not wish to trouble the Conference at great length, about questions of Imperial Defence. Though they are not on quite as large a footing in point of bulk as my noble friend, Lord Curzon's, particular jurisdiction, they do involve, on occasions, matters quite as delicate and, though I do not know that it is necessary to have the exact procedure which he has described in the case of the Foreign Office, it would be absolutely fatal if some of the things which it will be my duty to say and which it will be the duty of others to comment upon no doubt, found their way into the public press, and I am encouraged by what Mr. Massey said to make an equal appeal on my own behalf when we reach those topics.

Prime Minister: I think it is obvious that what you have to say would be very much on the same footing as what the Foreign Secretary has to say.

Mr. Massey: If my recollection is right when we discussed Empire defence two years ago what was said was not even reported by the ordinary official stenographers. It ceased to exist, except in very short minutes which were got out, I understand, by Sir Maurice Hankey.

Prime Minister: You will remember I said at the opening of that session that what took place on such occasions would not be reported, but there would be just a record kept by the Secretary of the Conference.

Lord Peel: I suppose it is understood that other Secretaries of State will be consulted before communications are issued. To take a particular case, India. I am not questioning the full competence of Mr. Davidson, but it is very difficult unless you are in touch with things in that country, constantly and closely in touch, to know what may be the effect of any particular statement on public opinion, so I take it we shall all have the opportunity of seeing communications before they are issued.

Prime Minister: The last thing he would do would be to circulate anything without consulting you.

Secrecy Essential to Frank Discussion.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Might I say a word on this subject. There are two particular considerations which have to be kept primarily in view. There is the third party, so to speak, the world outside the British Empire and ourselves. It is desirable that here among ourselves things should be said with the utmost freedom, and for that reason I should feel it deplorable if everything that was said here was to be made a matter of immediate publicity. We shall all of us probably say some things to each other here which we would hesitate to say in public anywhere. I believe, if we are to work for the common end we have in view, we must have complete freedom to express our minds and not lay ourselves open in any way to being misunderstood or misinterpreted. Certainly as regards countries outside the British Empire, it is most necessary that a consideration of their vast political significance should weigh, and that they should not be made capable of misinterpretation to or

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62580

by those other countries, and to that extent I am quite in accord with the view that on all these matters, having regard to the nature of the discussion and such like, we should preserve the secrecy that is essential to full and complete discussion.

Status of Conference.

Before referring to the other consideration I have in mind, there is one other point of which I should like to make mention. Lord Curzon used the expression, and I touch on it immediately because I think this is desirable, that his conception of this gathering was that it was in the nature of a Cabinet. So far as respects the procedure to be observed and the attitude to be taken in the matters we are discussing I heartily agree, but there is a definite distinction which, I think, we should have continually in mind between a gathering which has the powers and significance of a Cabinet and one which has the powers and significance of a Conference. I look upon this gathering as a Conference of Governments. We are here as representatives of Governments, I cannot feel that I come with any right or power to be a member of an Imperial Cabinet, using the word Cabinet in the sense in which we understand it as a body necessarily responsible to Parliament and through Parliament to the people.

Lord Curzon: I only meant what you mean, Mr. Mackenzie King. I am the strongest possible advocate of your conception of the nature of the work of this body. When I spoke of a Cabinet I only meant that we should treat each other with the confidence that Cabinet Ministers do; in no other sense did I use it.

Mr. Mackenzie King: That was my reason for bringing up the point; in order to make it quite clear.

Value of Publicity to Peoples of Empire.

May I say this of the other consideration I had in mind. I feel, if the Conference is to serve the end which we hope it will serve, the end for which it is intended, it is most important that the peoples of the countries which are represented here should be interested intelligently in what is going on, in so far as that may be possible. I fear that, if the proceedings are to be wholly secret, and if wise discretion is not used with respect to due publicity, the impression might soon prevail in the Dominions that we were a group meeting round a table and deciding a number of matters which were of vital concern to the people of the Dominions, of which they will have no knowledge, and with regard to which their views in no way could be expressed publicly. For that reason, I hope it may be possible to devise some means whereby as much publicity as is consistent with security will be given, not so much to the expressions used or to the particular arguments presented, but to the procedure and attitudes in a general way, and this one point in particular I would submit for consideration: that, with respect to matters which each of us representing different Dominions may have reason to believe will be of particular interest to our own Dominions, we should feel free to indicate to our press the subject that has come up for discussion and the attitude which we are taking towards it. I say that, having in mind the great care and caution which must be exercised, particularly with regard to questions of Defence and Foreign Policy; but some fundamental issues will be raised here, and the Dominions will wish to know in a general way what they are, what questions are being discussed, and what attitude we are taking towards them. I would like to feel that so far as each of our Dominions is concerned we are to have the right and privilege to see that through our press, in a very careful way, the people are kept intelligently informed of the broad lines of the discussions and the attitudes we are taking. At any stage of the proceedings some matter may come up, and any member of the gathering might well say: "This is something that we do not wish to have publicly mentioned." In such a case, I should feel that it would be the duty of everyone present to respect that wish, but what I have very much in mind is that the people of the Dominions and our Parliaments would expect us to give them some account of what has transpired at the Conference, the questions

c 62581

that have come up, the attitude we have taken, and that we should now feel the same freedom with reference to keeping the people generally and currently informed, as we should feel in our responsible positions in Parliament.

Mr. Baldwin: I find myself in general agreement with all you have said, Mr. Mackenzie King, and it all shows that the Secretary of State, and I think the President of the Board of Trade, had these things in mind when they suggested the appointment of a man holding the position of a Minister who would accept the responsibility for this work and who is admirably qualified both by his tact and experience, and, if it seems good to you to agree with the suggestion that has been made, I think you will find that in the working the object you have in view will be attained most securely and most satisfactorily. That is my own view.

Mr. Massey: I do not think there is any difference of opinion with regard to what Mr. Mackenzie King has said. What has been suggested is exactly what has been done by most of the members who have attended these conferences. Speaking for myself, I would like my Parliament to know what has been done. In the first place, we do not commit our Parliaments to anything. Anything done here has to be ratified by the respective Parliaments before it comes into effect, and, so far as giving information is concerned, I have always made a two hours' speech to them, and Sir Robert Borden has done the same for Canada. But the point I want to make is that information does leak out here; there is no question about it. At our meetings two years ago, when very important business was being considered round the table at which we are sitting to-day, certain information appeared in the morning papers in London, and there was very serious trouble arising from it. I got come confidential information about it, which I cannot of course divulge, but certain information did get out, and we cannot be too careful about it. The question of the Liquor Traffic in the United States has been referred to by Lord Curzon. I have never seen it referred to in the newspapers, but passing through the United States I was actually asked to give my support in connection with certain proposals for dealing with that question, and I was told for the first time that it was coming before this Conference. I thought it a very improper thing on the part of those people to come to me and ask for my support in connection with matters of that kind.

Sir Tej Sapru: May I ask, Sir, whether it is open to me to say that you have been good enough, in response to our request, to set apart a special day for the discussion of questions affecting India?

Mr. Baldwin: I was going to mention that at the end, but as you have asked the question now, I may tell you that in the draft communiqué which Sir Maurice Hankey has drawn up, which he has just submitted to me, and which I was going to put to the Conference, it was suggested that we should say: "In the course of this discussion the Conference decided, on the suggestion of the Secretary of State for India, who was supported by his colleagues on the Indian Delegation, to devote a session at a later date to the discussion of the position of Indians in the British Empire."

Sir Tej Sapru: I am most anxious that that statement should be published and that India should know of it.

Mr. Baldwin: That is how it stands. May I take it that there is general approval to the suggestion of the Secretary of State that Mr. Davidson should do this work?

Mr. Mackenzie King: I would suggest, if I may be permitted to do so, that emphasis should be put on the fact that this procedure has been adopted by way of giving wider publicity. I fully approve of the suggestion.

Mr. Baldwin: The paper circulated to the Conference is headed "Publicity Arrangements." That is the whole point of it—what can be given shall be given; but the idea is that the general control of what should be given should be in the hands of some responsible Minister. That is the whole point.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62582

Mr. Mackenzie King: My point is rather to let the Press appreciate that we have made provision for wider publicity.

Mr. Baldwin: I think everybody will recognise that we are anxious to find a conduit of communication from this room to the public so far as it can be done. I do not think any of us have a different mind about that.

Lord Curzon: What Mr. Mackenzie King means is that in the announcement to the Press it should be stated that Mr. Davidson's appointment has been made and accepted by this Conference with a view to giving as much publicity to the proceedings as possible.

Mr. Baldwin: May I take that as agreed?

Sir Maurice Hankey: There is just this point. When I first drafted the communiqué before this meeting I did put in the point that Mr. Mackenzie King has made, but some of my colleagues came to me and said that Mr. Davidson would be so overwhelmed by attentions from the Press that his life would become intolerable.

Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame: I should propose, if it is agreed to, that the Economic Conference which meets to-morrow should invite him to attend and at the close of the Conference we should agree among ourselves what should be revealed and what not, and he would have his regular times for seeing the representatives of the Press. That worked admirably at Genoa and other places, and it would save everybody from being bombarded. (*Agreed.*)

PROGRAMME OF ARRANGEMENTS.

Mr. Baldwin: The next business is to submit the proposed sketch programme for the next ten days (see Appendix A*). While the members of the Conference are waiting for the paper to be distributed I might put this question to them. The Foreign Secretary on Friday will be making his most important statement, which will probably take up the greater part of the whole of the morning Session. Now, would the members of the Conference prefer that we should proceed to the general discussion of his statement on Friday afternoon, or would they rather take further time to consider it and open the general discussion on Monday morning? I am entirely in their hands on that, and perhaps they will just consider it for a moment.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I think it would be an advantage to have until Monday morning to reflect on a statement that will be as important as that.

Mr. Baldwin: I thought very probably that would be the decision, because the statement will cover a great deal of ground and it will be of the first importance.

General Smuts: I notice that on this draft programme an Economic Conference meeting is set down for Friday afternoon.

Mr. Baldwin: That is quite true. It is only if the Conference expresses a preference to devote the whole day to Foreign affairs, it would mean putting off the Economic Conference. I thought it was better like this, but I felt it only right to consult the members of the Conference.

Mr. Massey: That is, you should have a meeting of the Economic Conference on Friday afternoon?

General Smuts: Yes.

Mr. Massey: I am not going to raise any objection to this. I am anxious to get as much work done as soon as possible, but I thought we might commence the afternoons' sittings next week. Personally I have some engagements, but, of course, I should be quite prepared to give them up if the other members wish to sit.

Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame: We really can do very little to-morrow in the absence of the Australian Delegation, and it would be of great value if we took some subject like "Settlement" before the week closes and get the preliminary discussion on that and get into some of the Committee work. I am entirely in your hands.

Mr. Massey: I am not going to raise any objection.

* For revised Sketch Programme, see Appendix (C).

C62583

Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame: Is Saturday possible? I understood that there was to be a visit to Wembley.

General Smuts: Saturday will have to go out.

Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame: We could only meet for an hour. I understood that all the Prime Ministers were going to Wembley in the morning and to luncheon there. Is not that so? That would only give us at the most an hour. It is hardly worth it, I think.

Mr. Baldwin: This is only for the information of the members. You see, the work that will come later in the week is subject to further discussion and revision. We seem to have plain sailing for the next few days.

Lord Salisbury: I do not know whether you have noticed that Friday, the 12th October, is the great day in the City.

Mr. Baldwin: We are going to discuss that later on. Sir Maurice Hankey has just put down these notes for our guidance.

Sir Maurice Hankey: I meant to suggest that Friday's meeting should be in the afternoon.

APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEES.

Mr. Baldwin: The question has arisen as to whether a number of important but, after all, small questions which may arise might be dealt with by committees. Such questions, for instance, as the Grant of Naturalisation to Persons resident in Mandated Territories, the appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the revocation of Certificates, the readmission to British nationality of British-born women married to aliens, and marriages with foreigners.

General Smuts: Those are not questions for the Imperial Conference, surely?

Mr. Baldwin: Then there is the question of the position of the Dominions and India in relation to the signature of Treaties and also the question of Territorial waters. Those are subjects which Sir Maurice Hankey has brought before me, and they are just put down on the note that I am circulating (Appendix B). I am entirely in the hands of the members of the Conference with regard to these questions if they will be good enough just to glance at the papers.

General Smuts: Committees could deal with all these questions.

Mr. Baldwin: That is the suggestion, and the composition of the three committees is set forth on the paper. I think you have got three sheets there, and you will find two groups of subjects.

Duke of Devonshire: Would it be possible to discuss the question raised by General Smuts as to the Congo Basin at the Committee on Treaties?

General Smuts: I think that we need not raise the point here.

Mr. Baldwin: It is a departmental matter.

General Smuts: It is for the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and myself to discuss that question between us.

Lord Curzon: I do not think we should have a second reading discussion on the points raised in the reference to Committee No. 1; they are small points.

Mr. Baldwin: No. 2, of course, is very important.

Lord Curzon: Referring to No. 2, the position of the Dominions and India in relation to the signature of treaties, that is very important, but whether it is desirable to have a second reading discussion here before there is a committee depends really upon the view of the Dominion representatives.

General Smuts: If a committee like that is constituted I should like to go upon it myself.

Lord Curzon: The Prime Ministers must obviously be on it.

Mr. Mackenzie King: That is one of the very important questions.

Mr. Massey: Is it necessary to bring that subject before the Conference? It is one of the thorniest you will have to deal with. I am quite certain of that.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62584

Mr. Baldwin: We might ventilate it, at any rate.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I am inclined to think we will find it an easy matter to deal with.

General Smuts: This is a thing we might discuss in a committee, and no doubt the Dominion Prime Ministers will be members of that committee.

Lord Curzon: I think we might refer it to the committee and constitute the committee of the heads of the various delegations. The Prime Ministers must be upon it.

Mr. Baldwin: The wording here is "or representative," but the secretary will see to that.

Lord Curzon: I shall be there. I do not see any advantage in having a general discussion here. The same people will speak here as upon the committee. In that way we should get to business quicker.

General Smuts: The Foreign Secretary might convene the committee. No doubt he will be there himself. He could convene it at any time that is convenient.

Mr. Baldwin: The next committee is on the question of the Anglo-French condominium in the New Hebrides.

Mr. Massey: We cannot do any good on that; I know that perfectly well. The French people have made up their minds, but there are so many people interested that I promised to bring it before the Conference—not for the first time, I may say.

Mr. Baldwin: Will the Conference agree to the setting up of these three committees?

General Smuts: Yes, we agree. Who will call together the first committee?

Sir Maurice Hankey: The Home Secretary.

Mr. Baldwin: The only other business is a point that was raised to me this morning by Sir Maurice Hankey, on which I think it would be well if he were to say a word in explanation; it is the question of a Joint Secretariat such as was established at the British Empire Delegations both at Paris and Washington.

JOINT SECRETARIAT.

Sir Maurice Hankey: At the last Conference we had a Joint Secretariat, and it would be very useful to me if I could have a colleague from each Dominion, and if this Conference would just agree in principle to set up a Joint Secretariat and would allow us to work out the details, subject, of course, to the approval in each case of the Prime Minister concerned. I would not like to dogmatise at this moment until I have discussed it with my colleagues, but, broadly speaking, the sort of suggestion I would make would be that, following the previous precedent, there should be a day "on duty" for each Dominion Secretary. On that day a secretarial representative would sit in my office and would help me in the discharge of all the mass of detail there really is in carrying out the work—in distributing, reproducing and correcting the documents and minutes, and so on, of this Conference. That would be the first point.

The second point would be that a Dominion or Indian secretary should be nominated—one only—to every committee of the Conference. The way we work Cabinet committees is that we get an expert in the department—if it concerns the Home Office, in the Home Office—who acts as a joint secretary. Then we associate someone with him from the Cabinet Office, who carries out the distribution, co-ordination, and the rest of the work of the Cabinet Office. I thought the same principle might apply to this Conference, that a Dominion or Indian secretary might be associated with, say, Resolution 1, the committee there—with a man from the Home Office. They would share the duties in that way. Subject to Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame's concurrence, I thought we might make corresponding arrangements, *mutatis mutandis*, for the Economic Conference. I think it would help us by giving us some assistance, and it might also assist the Dominions by giving them an insight into the interior working of the methods of the Conference.

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Mr. Massey: You suggest arrangements similar to those which were in operation last time?

Sir Maurice Hankey: Exactly the same.

Mr. Massey: I can endorse what has been said by Sir Maurice Hankey. They worked very well then and gave great satisfaction, and I think it is a good opportunity for the secretaries who come with the Prime Ministers to become properly acquainted with the business of the Conference.

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PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

Sir Maurice Hankey: There is the Press communiqué.

Mr. Baldwin: The Press communiqué. The Secretary proposes to send out, first of all, the names of those present. The communiqué then proceeds:—

"The Secretary of State for the Colonies made a statement to the Conference in regard to recent developments in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories. This statement will be published. A discussion followed in which the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Representatives of India took part. In the course of this discussion the Conference decided, on the suggestion of the Secretary of State for India, who was supported by his colleagues on the Indian Delegation, to devote a session at a later date to the discussion of the position of Indians in the British Empire.

"The Conference then proceeded to discuss its programme and order of business, and agreed to give its proceedings as much publicity, in the course of the meetings, as the nature of the subjects discussed, and the circumstances of the moment, permitted.

"With a view to making provision for carrying out this decision, the Conference agreed that Mr. J. C. C. Davidson, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, should be placed in general charge of the arrangements for publicity and should be present at the meetings of the Conference for this purpose.

"It was also arranged that a summarised report of the general results of the deliberations of the Conference should be published as soon as possible after its termination.

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Then come the questions on the papers which have been circulated.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Not quite all of them. We left out the New Hebrides and the Signature of Treaties.

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, I think those might be left out at the moment.

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"The Grant of Naturalisation to Persons resident in Mandated Territories.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

062584

Mr. Baldwin: We might ventilate it, at any rate.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I am inclined to think we will find it an easy matter to deal with.

General Smuts: This is a thing we might discuss in a committee, and no doubt the Dominion Prime Ministers will be members of that committee.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62586

"The appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the revocation of Certificates.

"Readmission to British nationality of British-born Women married to Aliens.

"Marriages with Foreigners."

The communiqué concludes with the following:—

"The Conference decided to establish a joint secretariat on which all the Delegations will be represented.

"The next meeting will be held on Friday, the 5th October, when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will make a statement on foreign policy."

PROPOSED PUBLICATION OF CERTAIN PARTS OF LORD CURZON'S STATEMENT.

Lord Curzon: I have been talking with the Prime Minister about the difficulties of the statement that I propose to make on Friday. I said just now that it would be entirely of a confidential nature. It is quite clear that the public will not be entirely satisfied to know that I made a statement covering one and a half hours, or whatever the length of time may be, of which they know nothing; and it is quite certain, also, that as regards certain questions which are exciting the greatest public interest—for instance, the question of Germany and France—they will expect a little more; and therefore, what I have been thinking about, and have been discussing with the Prime Minister, is that, while I shall make my statement in a general and conversational way, and while it will be taken down for circulation here, yet on one or two aspects of foreign affairs, in which the public is particularly concerned, I had better draw up something to read which will be communicated verbatim to the Press. That will only apply to two or three cases. It might perhaps only apply to one, namely, the French and German case. Of course, I shall tell the Conference here the real inner history of the matter during the past two years, which it is right that they should know, but when I come to our present position and our present policy, then I think I had better do it in a form which can be communicated to the public, so that on Saturday what would appear in the Press would be this, that the Foreign Secretary made a statement on every aspect of foreign affairs in every part of the world, from which it has been decided to publish the following extracts: and then give those verbatim. That is not what happened two years ago, but there have been so many charges brought against us of secrecy, the public not knowing where we stand in respect of M. Poincaré, and so on, that I think in those cases, at any rate, it would be desirable to indulge in rather greater publicity.

Mr. Baldwin: And this gives a very good opportunity of getting before the public just as much as can in safety be given to them—which has not been done yet.

Mr. Massey: Of what you want to tell them?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes.

General Smuts: I think this departure from our previous procedure is really necessary. The statements which you made at this Conference previously were not published, but there is so much tension and expectation, and I can see so much feeling on this matter, that I think the Government would be fighting public opinion if some statement were not made.

Lord Curzon: Of course, if the whole thing were published I should have to alter the entire character of what I say.

General Smuts: I think we should have here the fullest and frankest statement of what has happened in foreign policy in the last two years, but the public will want some guidance on certain matters, and, if you prepare in advance those points you are going to give them, it makes the matter easier. You will be forced to publish something.

Lord Curzon: A statement about France and Germany is, I think, very important, and I think also it may be desirable to draw up something for publication about the Turkish Treaty. We have been very much attacked about the Turkish Treaty, and the public

C 62587

really do not know what the position is or what is the defence. I think I can draw up something about that.

Mr. Baldwin: That concludes the business.

(The Proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 3, 1923.

APPENDIX (A).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE.

Proposed Sketch Programme for Next Ten Days.

Thursday, Oct. 4 ...	Morning and afternoon	Economic Conference.
Friday, Oct. 5 ...	11 A.M. ...	Imperial Conference. Lord Curzon's statement.
Friday, Oct. 5 ...	Afternoon ...	Economic Conference.
Saturday, Oct. 6 ...	...	Economic Conference.
Monday, Oct. 8 ...	11 A.M.	Imperial Conference. (Discussion in regard to Lord Curzon's statement on foreign policy.)
Monday, Oct. 8 ...	Afternoon ...	Reserved for continuation of morning discussion, if required.
Tuesday, Oct. 9 ... Wednesday, Oct. 10	Prime Minister away in Scotland	Economic Conference and Committees of Imperial Conference.
Thursday, Oct. 11... Friday Oct. 12 ...	Morning ...	Imperial Conference. Subjects for discussion to be decided on the previous Monday, but probably either some question arising from discussion on Foreign Affairs or Defence.
Saturday, Oct. 13 ...	...	Imperial Economic Conference.

APPENDIX (B).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

Appointment of Committees.

Resolution I.

That a Committee be formed as follows:—.

The Secretary of State for Home Affairs (in the Chair);
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or representative);
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (or representative);
The Secretary for Scotland;
The Attorney-General;
The Registrar-General;
A Representative of Canada;
A Representative of the Commonwealth of Australia;
A Representative of New Zealand;
A Representative of the Union of South Africa;
A Representative of the Irish Free State;
A Representative of Newfoundland;
A Representative of India;

to consider and report to the Imperial Conference on the following questions:—

(1.) The Grant of Naturalisation to Persons resident in Mandated Territories.

(2.) The appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the Revocation of Certificates.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

062588

(3.) The readmission to British nationality of British-born women married to aliens.
(4.) Marriages with foreigners.

Resolution II.

That a Committee be formed as follows:—

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (in the Chair);
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (or a representative);
A Representative of Canada;
A Representative of the Commonwealth of Australia;
A Representative of New Zealand;
A Representative of the Union of South Africa;
A Representative of the Irish Free State;
A Representative of Newfoundland;
A Representative of India;

to consider and report to the Imperial Conference on the position of the Dominions and India in relation to the signature of Treaties; and
(if the Conference desires) the question of Territorial Waters.

Note.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (or a representative);
The President of the Board of Trade (or a representative);
The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (or a representative);
The Secretary for Scotland (or a representative);

will be added to the Committee for the latter part of its Terms of Reference.

Resolution III.

That a Committee be formed as follows:—

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (in the Chair);
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
The First Lord of the Admiralty;
The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia;
The Prime Minister of New Zealand;

to consider the question of the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides.

APPENDIX (C).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE.

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Friday, Oct. 12 ...	Afternoon ...	
Saturday, Oct. 13 ...	...	Imperial Economic Conference.

062589

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

VERY SECRET.

E. 3rd Meeting (1923).

LOCK AND KEY 45

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE THIRD MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W. ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1923, AT 10·45 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS, T.D., Vice-President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, CABINET OFFICE.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B. (*Secretary*).

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Newfoundland.

Mr. W. G. CAREW.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

India.

Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62590

Mr. Baldwin: We are all very sorry that Mr. Bruce is weather-bound. We should have been glad to have welcomed him to-day, but as it seemed uncertain when he would arrive it was thought that, having regard to the limited time at our disposal, we had better not alter our programme, and doubtless the Foreign Secretary will have an opportunity of discussing part of the subject of his speech with Mr. Bruce when he comes, and we shall hope to see Mr. Bruce here on Monday.

Welcome to Mr. Graham and Mr. O'Higgins.

In the meantime—and I am glad to do so—we have to welcome two more colleagues to our Conference. Mr. Graham, the Minister of Railways in Canada, is here to-day, and Mr. O'Higgins, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of Ireland. We are very glad to see both these gentlemen, and we look forward to their contributions to our deliberations.

His Majesty's Reply to Message from Conference.

Before I call upon the Foreign Secretary, I have to read a message which I have received from His Majesty the King: "I sincerely thank the Prime Minister and other Representatives of the British Empire for the generous terms of the message which they have addressed to the Queen and myself on the occasion of the opening of the Imperial Conference. I sincerely trust that their deliberations will lead to a solution of those many and grave problems the settlement of which is so essential to the future welfare and prosperity of the Commonwealth of the British Nations."

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Lord Curzon: The first appeal I have to make to my colleagues is for absolute secrecy with regard to what I am about to say. Two portions of my address will, according to the arrangement which we made two days ago, be circulated to the Press and published to-morrow morning. They will be the parts relating to the Turkish Treaty and the situation with France and Germany on the Ruhr. The remainder will be of so confidential a character that to publish it would be highly detrimental in the public interest. But I take the view now, as I did two years ago, that here at this table you want to know the truth, that it is no good concealing anything, and that if you are to come here to assist us in carrying on the foreign policy, which is not that of these islands alone, but of the Empire, you should know the whole of the difficulties with which we are confronted, and should be in full possession, not only of the facts which are familiar to the world, but of things which are scarcely known outside the walls of the Foreign Office. Therefore I hope that when my speech is put into print you will be very careful that it does not pass into other hands.

Introductory Observations.

I have to deal with a period of two years since the time at which we last met at this table. They have been two years packed with incidents, crises, alarms and excursions, even with tragedies. Although it is now nearly five years since the Armistice was signed in a railway carriage in France, the tramp of armed men is still heard upon the Continent, and you have only to pick up your daily paper to hear the rumble of almost chronic revolution in your ears. I will endeavour to give you a general summary of what has passed in those two years, to explain to you what has been the policy of the British Government with regard to all the problems that have arisen, and to present you, in so far as prediction is safe, with some forecast of the future. I shall have to take you over pretty well the whole surface of the globe. My remarks will relate to countries that are spread over four Continents. In Asia I shall have to say something about Japan and China and some other smaller countries. I shall have to take you across the Pacific, to America, and to say something about the United States. In Africa there are two problems touching vital Imperial interests—at any rate in one case more particularly—namely, those of Egypt and Morocco. Finally, we shall come to Europe, where, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, there is scarcely a single State which is not in a position of some unrest, and where British interests are not actively and sometimes

C 62591

perilously involved. And when you realise the enormous ambit of geographical space which I have to cover this morning you could not have a better demonstration of the world position which is occupied by our Empire. I am not going to give you a picture of something which is merely happening to other people and which interests them rather than us; I am going to show you that at each stage we are involved, that we must have a policy, and that in many of these cases we exercise a decisive voice. The fact is, as General Smuts truly said the other day, we cannot, even if we would, extricate ourselves from the entanglements of our duty and our destiny. We are in the centre of a great world whirlpool and we are affected by every movement of its waters.

Communications between Governments since 1921.

There is one advantage which both you and I enjoy to-day in excess of anything that existed two years ago, and it is this. Under the system which was started then and has, I think, been successfully followed since, telegrams, papers and despatches have been sent out to you during the past two years in a manner and in a volume which has, I believe—you will tell me if I am wrong—given general satisfaction; and therefore I feel to-day that in approaching these problems there is a good deal of preliminary information which I need not give, because you are familiar with the earlier stages, and indeed with the stages up to the present moment in a good many of the cases with which I shall have to deal. The picture which I am about to draw is, I am afraid you will think, a rather sombre one. The world, particularly in this continent of Europe, is still convulsed with old passions, still on the verge of perpetual explosion, still the scene of lawless violence and crime. Revolutions are frequent. Dictatorships are becoming quite popular. It is almost impossible to take up a newspaper without seeing that some new gentleman has installed himself as Dictator in what was supposed to be a free country. I am afraid that this affords a great and pathetic contrast to the reign of peace and liberty and justice about which so many admirable perorations were made four or five years ago. The dark shadows of my picture will develop as I proceed. Let me not anticipate them now.

Hopeful Factors in Present Situation.

But there are certain points of light to which I should like to call attention at this stage, because they throw a feeble flicker of illumination upon the prevailing gloom. Peace with Turkey has been concluded in circumstances which I shall presently describe, and that festering sore in our relations with Eastern countries, and notably with Moslem populations, has been successfully removed. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in discussing which we spent so many hours two years ago, has terminated, but it has been replaced by wider conceptions of international relationship. Another matter which occupied us for long in 1921 was the case of Egypt, about which I shall also have something to say, and although the future is far from being devoid of anxiety, there is a temporary lull there; we have arrived at a solution of the Egyptian question, which, even if it be not free from anxiety for the future, has at least given us peace for the present.

The Polish question, which took up a good deal of my time in 1921, has ceased to be acute. The Little Entente, that is to say, the three States of Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, have consolidated both their own security and their mutual friendship, and are undoubtedly an element of stability in Central Europe. The condition of Russia, is, on the whole, less bad than it was. The League of Nations has exercised a wholesome and conciliatory influence in world politics. The British Empire has in this period escaped without any actual recrudescence of war. I venture to think that British prestige and British honour have been maintained. Our policy has been one not of sensation, but of sobriety. It is not one, I think, of which we have any cause to be ashamed. We have endeavoured to exercise a steadying and moderating influence in the politics of the world, and I think and hope that we have conveyed not merely the impression, but the conviction that, whatever other countries or Governments may do, the British Government is never untrue to its word, is never disloyal to its colleagues

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62592

or its allies, never does anything underhand or mean; and if this conviction be widespread—as I believe it to be—that is the real basis of the moral authority which the British Empire has long exerted and I believe will long continue to exert in the affairs of mankind. Our sole object throughout this period has been not the gratification of any territorial ambitions of our own—after all, we have no further conquest that we desire to make—it has been to bring about stabilisation, peace and security among those nations and peoples who are still disturbed.

Difficulties of Present Situation.

I must allude, in a sentence or two, to certain difficulties with which we have had to contend. The first of these is the weakening of our material and to some extent our moral resources. The world knows only too well that when the war was over we disbanded our forces with almost undue alacrity. We have now an Army, in relation to the vast extent of our Empire, of almost insignificant dimensions. There is not only war weariness, but profound moral repugnance to the very idea of war among our people. I am not sure, also, that there is not a certain weakening of moral fibre in this country which you see in the reign of sensation, of excitement and holiday making, that prevails almost everywhere and finds expression in the daily newspapers. Our material weakness has undoubtedly been a source of weakness in our foreign policy. For instance, when I was dealing with the Turks at Lausanne, their knowledge that, apart from the Dardanelles and Constantinople, where we had forces, we were really not in a position to go to war, and that in no circumstances would this country have tolerated war, tied my hands and enabled them to claim much that they would not otherwise have done. Again, it puts us in a position of chronic inequality with France, who, with the great resources to which I shall presently allude, possesses at every stage pieces on the board that I cannot move, and with which, if she chooses to do so, she can check me at almost every turn. Another, but I hope a transient, source of weakness has been a certain disunion in our own ranks. While public opinion in general has, I believe, warmly supported the line of action which the Government has thought it necessary to take in foreign affairs, there are certain elements in the Press, as you know, powerful, wealthy, wholly unscrupulous, which have done their best to weaken our position, to present an impression of disunion, and often to take the side of those who are opposed to us rather than our own. This, although, as I say, I hope only a transient phenomenon, has certainly added to the difficulties of the Government.

Difficulties with France.

But—and here I am about to say something of the most confidential character—our main difficulty during the past two years has been the difficulty of working in absolute sincerity and friendship with our great neighbour across the Channel, the frequent desertions and the almost chronic lack of loyalty in great emergencies of the Government of France.

I will give you concrete illustrations. She has broken away from us over and over again. In M. Millerand's day you will remember her unauthorised excursion into Frankfort and the neighbouring towns. In M. Briand's day she concluded without our knowledge and behind our backs a secret Treaty with the Turks at Angora—the real source of my difficulties at Lausanne. In the war between Greece and Turkey, although we bound ourselves to furnish arms to neither party and faithfully adhered to our pledge, she steadily provided the arms for Mustapha Kemal with which he succeeded in defeating the Greeks. At Lausanne I found her a faithless ally, deserting me at the pinch everywhere, and carrying this attitude and these proceedings to a point at which the leading French Delegate, M. Barrère, left the Conference and threw up his post, sooner than carry out the instructions for surrender over the whole field and the abandonment of our cause which he had received from M. Poincaré in Paris. In January of the present year, as you know, in the face of our opposition, she persisted in rushing into the Ruhr. These are facts; nobody can dispute them, and we

C 62593

have to realise that there is no altruism in the policy of our great neighbour.

Desirability of maintaining Entente.

She is out for definite objects. The war gave her the opportunity, and with a defeated enemy and a distracted Europe, she aspires to attain, and she has already attained to some extent, the domination of the European Continent. Her Government is presided over by a Minister of great ability and untiring zeal, but of a stiff and rigid nature. She has a Parliament which is absolutely subservient to his decrees. She has a public opinion that would support him in any measures taken against a defeated enemy. She has the most powerful army in Europe, an air force of overwhelming superiority, a menacing array of submarines, and a large black army in the background. She is pursuing a policy that, in our view, at any rate, is far from being favourable to the recovery of the world.

Now, do not imagine that when I use those words I use them lightly, or that I am inspired by the smallest animus against our great neighbour and ally. No one is a more profound believer than myself in the policy of the *Entente;* and I do not rest that belief merely on the memories of the war, or on principles of self-interest; my conviction is based on the widest considerations of world peace and world progress. If France and ourselves permanently fall out, I see no prospect of the recovery of Europe or the pacification of the world. To maintain that unity we have made innumerable sacrifices. During the last two years I have preached no other doctrine, and I have pursued no other practice. During the last year alone I spent nearly as much time on the Continent as I did in this country, endeavouring at every stage with laborious hands to build up that unity. I cannot say truthfully that this loyalty has received any encouragement, still less any imitation. These are things which I cannot possibly say in public, but of which I shall give proofs as I go along. Some I have given you already. They make the task of conducting British foreign policy extremely difficult; and the qualities which a British Foreign Minister should now cultivate seem to be those not of cleverness or astuteness, still less of enterprise or daring, but those of endless patience and an equanimity that never falters. When I was in India I used to sit weekly in the Viceroy's chair under the picture of Warren Hastings, and beneath that picture was written the motto—his motto—"Mens aequa in arduis." I have often thought since that a better motto could not possibly be taken for the work that the Foreign Minister of this country has now to discharge.

General Survey.

With this little prelude of a general character I must press on to my survey, and I will take you through the Continents to which I have referred. I will begin first with Asia. I had not much to say about Asia two years ago, but since then, much more than before, she has been swept into the maelstrom, and Asiatic politics touch the Empire at many points now just as closely and require just as great a vigilance as do the politics of Africa or of Europe.

Japan.

Take, for instance, Japan, with which I will begin. Since the last meeting of our Conference there has been a great change in the outlook of the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to an end on the 17th August last, when there were deposited at Washington the ratifications of the four-Power Pacific Treaty between the British Empire, America, France, and Japan, which henceforth takes the place of the old alliance, and also the ratifications of the Naval Treaty. The tension between Japan and the United States of America, which preceded the Washington Conference, is now definitely ended, and Japan has given proof of her desire for peace by returning to China the Shantung Railway and Kiaochau, and by withdrawing her Expeditionary Force from Siberia and her garrisons from Harbin and Hankow. The strategic position of Japan has been greatly strengthened as a result of the Naval Treaty. Now that no Naval fortifications may be extended within effective striking distance of the Japanese shores,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62594

the Japanese can feel that the seas between Japan and the Asiatic mainland are in their sole keeping. The Philippine Islands lie more than ever at their mercy. The Japanese Government could well afford to sacrifice their ambitious Naval programme, since the Treaties secure for them the very object for which the Fleet has to be maintained. Meanwhile, the Army, although reduced slightly in numbers, has been greatly improved in equipment and organisation, and is a more powerful factor than ever. So far as the strategic situation alone is regarded, Japan is at full liberty to take whatever action she wishes in China and Siberia, and there is probably no Power in Europe or America who could effectively interfere against her.

But Japan, though potentially more powerful in the Far Eastern Area, is becoming increasingly averse from complications abroad. Her aggressive action in China in 1915 and her intervention in Siberia have brought her nothing but trouble. The lesson of Germany has not been without effect, and the numerous Japanese, who during and since the war have been travelling in Europe and America, have returned home with an impression that, however powerful Japan may be in her own geographical sphere, she is a long way behind the British Empire and the United States in resources, organisation and development. Meanwhile, agrarian and labour problems are asserting themselves in Japan, and she seems increasingly desirous of remaining on good terms with her neighbours.

There have been several abortive Conferences with the Soviet Government. The Japanese are anxious to come to some working agreement with Russia; but so far they have been prevented by difficulties about the status of Northern Saghalien and reparation for the massacre of Japanese at Nikolaevsk.

The relations between ourselves and Japan remain entirely friendly. I cannot say that I feel they are positively intimate. There is an element of secrecy and mystery about the policy and character of that inscrutable people; but so far as all external appearances go, we may rely entirely upon their friendship and support; and at the various Conferences I have attended, I attach a high value to the Japanese representative, because he always votes on my side. Therefore I do not think that, although the Japanese Alliance has terminated, there is any weakening in the ties that unite us. Further, as regards the case of Singapore, which I dare say will be discussed here, you must understand that the criticism in Japan of the project for extending the Naval Base in Singapore has been aroused much more by comments in the British Press and Parliament than by the scheme itself. There is no reason to think that the Japanese, either as a nation or as a Government, regard the project as an unfriendly act. In my judgment, it would be absurd if they did so.

You must not think that the disastrous earthquake in Japan has in the least injured her position as a Great Power. Her Army is unaffected, her Navy has lost the valuable base at Yokosuka, but no important ships. The social structure of the country is stable, and her credit is very high. The catastrophe, however, is likely to accentuate the present tendency to avoid adventures abroad. The material damage of the catastrophe is estimated to run into 200 to 300 million pounds; and for two or three years at least all her available funds will have to be utilised for reconstruction purposes rather than for strengthening the Army and Navy or for national expansion overseas. During this period, Japan will be very dependent upon the goodwill of the United States and the British Empire for various materials, and probably also for financial aid.

China.

I pass to China. The situation in China is steadily and continuously deteriorating. The two Washington Treaties dealing respectively with the general policy of the Powers in China and with the Chinese Customs tariff, have not been ratified, owing to delay on the part of the French Government. The British Empire has notified its readiness to ratify. Further, we have announced our desire to devote our share of the Boxer indemnity to purposes mutually beneficial to Chinese and British interests. We declared at Washington that we should restore the leased territory of Wei-Hai-

C 62595

Wei. An agreement governing the terms of the rendition has been drawn up by an Anglo-Chinese Mission, and would have been carried out by now were it not for the obstructive attitude of the Chinese Government and Parliament in regard to a few minor points. Apart from the Japanese, who have restored Kiaochau, we alone have taken any action to meet the Chinese demand for the restoration of the leased territories, as the French have shown no inclination or desire to surrender their territory of Kwangchouwan. They maintain that they are under no obligation to do so, since they undertook to return it only in the event of all leased territories being restored to China, including presumably the Kowloon extension and the Kwangtung Peninsula. The foreign postal agencies have also been withdrawn from China. If the Chinese have failed to advance further towards the aspirations expressed by their Delegates at the Washington Conference, they are themselves entirely to blame. The country seems further than ever from unification. There is no President. There were seven Prime Ministers in 1922.

General Smuts: Is there any now?

Lord Curzon: None; and for my own consolation I may add that there were four Foreign Ministers during that period. A shadowy Cabinet still exists in Peking and a shadowy Opposition, whose tactics are to absent themselves from the capital and so make it impossible to form a parliamentary quorum. The power is in the hands of the military chieftains or "tuchuns," and it is difficult at times to distinguish them from the brigands with whom their troops seem to be interchangeable. These "tuchuns" are continually intriguing and disputing among themselves and fighting of a desultory character frequently takes place. But no single man is strong enough to enforce his will upon the others. Meanwhile, during the last two years, China has defaulted upon nearly every one of her foreign loans, other than those secured on revenues controlled by officials of foreign nationalities. She owes large sums of money to foreign firms for materials supplied on credit, and has failed to meet legitimate claims for compensation for damage suffered by foreign firms by brigandage and civil war. Even her contribution to the League of Nations, although she has been a member of the Council, has been in arrears since 1921. Every form of taxation, including many levies on foreign trade in violation of treaty obligations, and scandalous opium exploitation, is resorted to by the provincial and local authorities, but little of the proceeds reaches Peking, and practically the whole is swallowed up in the maintenance of the "tuchuns" and their armies.

The feature of internal chaos which most affects the foreigner is the increasing menace of brigandage and the danger to foreign lives and property. This came to a head last May, when an express train was looted, one foreigner, a British subject, was killed, and twenty to thirty persons, mostly Americans, were carried off into the mountains. Under strong pressure from the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, the last of these foreigners was finally released after five weeks' captivity, but the incident has damaged foreign prestige in China, since it has been impossible for the impotent Government to punish the offenders. Consequently, a strong note was presented by the Treaty Powers to the Government on the 20th August. It calls for damages for losses suffered, demands that vigorous military action be taken, and insists on guarantees for the suppression of brigandage; also on the dismissal of three high officials. The reply of the Chinese Government has just been received. It is conciliatory in tone but entirely unsatisfactory in substance. The future, therefore, in China, is the reverse of encouraging. We must be prepared at any time for news of fresh outrages, and an increasing sense of insecurity is inevitable. We must be ready for an ever-growing volume of reproaches from British interests in China, which find that they cannot secure payment of their just debts; and we may have to make up our minds whether, if the present state of affairs follows its lamentable course, we can afford, in the last resort, to exert ourselves by taking military action, or whether we must retire for shelter to the comparative safety of the Treaty Ports. China has reached a state of collapse and she is a great potential danger to the world.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62596

No one wants to take her in hand, and she seems quite incapable of regenerating herself. Her numbers, the extent of her Empire, her resources, the latent strength of her people, invest her with the illusory appearance of a Great Power. Her representative was admitted to the Council of the League of Nations. The fact is that in no effective sense, except numerically, is China a Great Power. She will steadily go from bad to worse until some strong man arises and cleanses the Augean stable; but in face of a problem so large, a population so vast and disorganised, no single man can cope with the task, and, if he did, his next step would be to picket himself in the principal stall of the stable which he had just cleansed.

Afghanistan.

I must say a word or two—they will only be a few words—about one or two other Asiatic countries. The first of these has great interest for our colleagues from India. I speak of Afghanistan, and I mention it here because it is since we last met at this table that Afghanistan, instead of being a country under the control and within the purview of the Indian Government, has, under a Treaty which we concluded two years ago, acquired diplomatic representation, and is now a part of the area for which I am responsible. Up to and before the war Afghanistan was a semi-independent country with a ruler to whom we had conceded the title of Sovereign, but who, in return for the handsome subsidy that we gave him, was pledged to conduct his foreign policy in accordance with the views of the British Government. Upon the death of the late Amir, who on the whole was a loyal and friendly ally, a younger son of his seized the throne, and, under the bad advice of his Council, indulged in the luxury of a war with us. It was a somewhat indecisive war, as conflicts of that nature in those mountainous countries usually are; but it was concluded at length in 1919 by a Treaty of Peace which recognised the independence of Afghanistan and was to be followed later by a Treaty of Friendship. One and a half years were then spent in tortuous negotiations; and at the very time that the Afghan representatives were in India, a Soviet Mission was in Kabul, plentifully endowed with funds, offering a subsidy, and endeavouring to present itself as the real claimant to Afghan friendliness. In November 1921 we at length concluded a Treaty which we described as one of neighbourly relations, that was to last for three years. No subsidy is now given to the Amir. A British representative is placed at Kabul, and there are British Consuls in the towns of Jellalabad and Kandahar, and there is an Afghan Minister in London. The Afghans enjoy the privilege of importing material, including munitions, through India, subject to the right of the British Government to stop this traffic if they are guilty of unfriendly acts. In return no Russian Consuls are to be employed in Afghanistan in places contiguous to the Indian frontier. Simultaneously, Afghanistan has opened up diplomatic relations with France, Germany and Italy, and has Ministers at their capitals. She has therefore now entered the comity of Nations. But I tell you, knowing them well, and having been there, that the Afghans are a backward, suspicious and intriguing people, and that we are seldom free, as my friend Lord Peel will know well, from anxieties because of the question of the frontier tribes. I can tell you in a sentence what that trouble is. In the mountain country between India and Afghanistan exist these fanatical people, many hundred thousands strong, who are within the political but not the administrative border of India. They are connected by ties of blood and religion with Afghanistan. It is the business of the Amir to keep in touch with them, and not infrequently he foments their raids. Just at present there is a good deal of trouble with him, because of his apparent lack of interest in handing over certain criminals in those frontier tribes—the murderers of British officers and even of a lady within our border. Therefore, difficulties there are chronic and intense; and I merely mention Afghanistan to you now because you can never be quite certain that the storm cloud may not collect again on those hills, as has more than once happened with disastrous consequences to our prestige in the past. I think we shall have further difficulties when the Treaty comes to an end, which it does this year. It will probably be denounced by the Afghans, and then long and interminable negotiations will begin again for some Treaty which will be more favourable to themselves.

C 62597

Persia.

I will now turn to another small Asiatic Power, Persia, a country always hovering on the brink of a dissolution that never comes. She has a feeble and useless monarch, who is constantly endeavouring to exchange the asperities of Persian life for the fleshpots of Paris and Nice. She has a Government which changes every few months, and whose officials regard office as a legitimate and pleasant means of extortion. She has a people who are destitute of any nobility of character or strength. She has a political system that is permeated with every vice. She lived for a century on the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, and has recently endeavoured to revive the experiment. The Bolshevists have large sums of money at their disposal; they practise an intense propaganda; but, so far as political matters are concerned, and Persia herself is involved, they are not over successful. A local Mussolini, the Minister of War, has been in office since 1921. He shows great vigour and patriotism; he is the first man to have raised a real Persian army. Whether he will turn out to be a King maker, or King breaker, or King himself, I cannot forecast. As regards financial reform in Persia, as the Persians were unable to accept the assistance we offered them, we have encouraged Dr. Millspaugh, the American Financial Adviser, who has been in the country for some time. We have an able and active Minister there, Sir Percy Loraine, who upholds our interests while giving good advice to the Persian Government. Our interest in Persia lies in its geographical position between Iraq, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. We cannot ignore it, but it is a source of small consolation and constant trouble.

Hejaz.

In the western parts of Asia there is one other potentate with whom we have to deal, and who causes us a good deal of annoyance. This is King Hussein of the Hejaź. The Conference will remember that in the earlier stages of the War, in our anxiety to bring in the Arabs on our side, we gave a number of assurances to King Hussein, then the Sherif of Mecca, couched sometimes in rather ambiguous terms. A little later, when we concluded the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France about Syria, Palestine, and other countries, and later on when we accepted the Declaration about a Jewish National Home in Palestine, we took steps which were regarded by the King as inconsistent with the pledges we had given to him. The Sykes-Picot Agreement he regarded as barring his claims on Syria—as, indeed, it did. The Balfour Declaration prevented him from satisfying his ambitions in Palestine. Mr. Massey spoke the other day about Colonel Lawrence, and asked if he was still being employed. We sent out Colonel Lawrence two years ago to negotiate a Treaty with this difficult potentate, but even the tact and influence of Colonel Lawrence were of no avail. Since then we have spent two years in trying to come to terms with him, the object of the arrangement being to protect British subjects in the Hejaz, to regulate the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, to settle his boundaries, and to prevent conflict with his Arab neighbours. We were to recognise under this Treaty Arabian independence, and he was to recognise our special position in Iraq and Palestine. So far we have not come to terms, and I am afraid that this erratic and intractable old man will defeat us in the end.

United States of America.

I now cross the Pacific and go to America. One of my colleagues here the other day asked me to indulge in flattering words about the United States. I do not propose to do so. Not that I am unwilling to perform that task—I have performed it on many public occasions, and no doubt shall have to do it again—but I am here not to indulge in empty flattery, but to tell you what is the exact position of affairs. The Prime Minister mentioned the other day the six Treaties of the Washington Conference, particularly those which dealt with the limitation of naval armaments, with the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific, with China, and with the use of submarines and poison gas in War. No doubt the pro-

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62598

ceedings at Washington, and the tact of Lord Balfour in particular, had a great and admirable effect upon our relations with the United States, which have since been of a very friendly and agreeable description. I should also like to say in the presence of our colleagues from Ireland that the settlement of the Irish question and the constitution of the Irish Free State have brought about a very perceptible diminution in the Irish and anti-British agitation in America.

One of the reasons which, in our frequent Government discussions on the matter, had an influence in the solution which we afterwards adopted, was the consciousness that the position of Ireland was a great source of weakness in conducting our foreign policy, by alienating from us the sympathy of our great sister nation across the seas at the very moment when we most wanted it; and the removal of this source of friction has had an even wider effect than I have indicated, because the very people who were at the bottom of the anti-British agitation in the United States on the score of Ireland are the same people who are also running the cause of the Indian seditionists, of which my colleague, the Secretary of State for India, could tell you so much. A further effect of no mean character has been produced by the successful result of the Prime Minister's mission in funding the American Debt, although, as he pointed out, the burden which we have to shoulder in consequence, and which will not be exhausted until the year 1984, is one of the most severe and almost overwhelming character. I will not refer to the question of liquor prohibition and the 3-mile limit, because I propose to circulate a paper on that subject to the Conference, and no doubt we shall devote to it a separate morning. The United States had on the stocks a Ship Subsidy Bill which, if passed, would have dealt a severe blow to British shipping, but which was happily talked out. The existence of State-owned shipping in the United States of America is, I am sorry to say, a frequent and fruitful source of incidents with ourselves. We had an illustration of this the other day in connection with the action of the American Vice-Consul at Newcastle, whom we found exercising a quite improper pressure upon passengers, whom he advised or compelled to go by United States ships. We consequently had no alternative but to withdraw the exequatur of the Consul at Newcastle. This has been a source of inconvenience both to the United States and ourselves. I have had a good deal of discussion with the United States Government upon the matter, and I hope that it is in course of solution, although I need not go into further detail now.

Our relations with the United States are therefore of a very satisfactory description; but I must warn the Conference, as no doubt many of them know, that we make a mistake in this country if we judge of American opinion solely by the American opinion of the East. The seaboard of America, originally colonised from this country and inhabited by people in close contact with Europe, is not America. It may contain the governing cities; it does not contain the weight of opinion; and you will notice that in the United States, if a President goes on tour and wants to be certain of winning an election, it is to the centre and the west that he goes. Therefore, never delude yourselves by thinking, because Boston or Washington or New York takes this or that particular line, that necessarily means the United States. Mr. Mackenzie King will know that just as well as I do, and there is in the centre and in the west of that country an enormous mass of powerful opinion which we can scarcely touch. It is really the regulating force in the United States politics. They are the people we want to get on our side. These are the people who make friendship or enmity with the United States a certainty.

The Conference may perhaps expect me to say one word in passing upon the attitude of the United States towards European problems. Their attitude towards the League of Nations remains unchanged. It is wholly hostile. It is true that the late President was interested in the International Court; but his support of it excited a good deal of opposition even in his own country. They had a member upon the Reparations Commission; they withdrew him. The United States representative with whom I sat at Lausanne was not very helpful at critical stages. The Secretary

C 62599

of State, Mr. Hughes, proposed last year a Committee of Experts for enquiring into the financial position in Germany, but he has never followed it up. You must therefore count upon this, that the attitude of the United States Government towards European politics has in it no element of altruism at all. They are governed exclusively by what they regard as their own interest, and by an overpowering fear of being involved in the entanglements, perils and dangers of Europe. That is the policy of the last Administration. During the short time for which Mr. Coolidge is in the Presidential Chair, it will be his. It will be the platform upon which any candidate for the Presidential Chair will have to stand. Even the war debt policy of the United States, to which I have referred, is unfavourable to the general settlement of affairs on this side of the ocean, while their tariff increase is equally unfavourable, in so far as it restricts exports from abroad to the United States. Take as an instance of what I call their non-altruistic policy, their attitude about the cost of their army of occupation on the Rhine. Although they never ratified the Treaty of Versailles, they insisted upon demanding from Germany the cost of their army of occupation and some other charges as well, thus claiming all the profits while unwilling to bear any of the burdens entailed by the Treaty that concluded the war. That is, so far as I see, the exact position in the United States at the present time.

Mexico.

I need only allude in a couple of sentences to one other country on the American Continent with which we have close trading relations, and that is Mexico. Mexico, under the rule of General Obregon, is, I think, one of the worst governed countries in the world. We have refrained from recognising his Government because of the corrupt and violent nature of the Administration, and because of his total refusal to settle our claims. The United States Government, more amenable, have just, I believe, resumed diplomatic relations with him. We must get something for our people, some satisfaction for our claims, before we can extend a similar favour. Only yesterday evening I received a despatch from Mexico dealing with a scandalous case of expropriation by the Government of the property of a British subject. Therefore, matters are there in *statu quo*.

Egypt.

We will now cross the ocean and come back to Africa. The Conference will remember that many hours were devoted two years ago to the discussion of affairs in Egypt. At that time we were drawing up a draft Treaty with the Egyptian Government. Our position had been somewhat compromised by the action taken by Lord Milner's Mission in the previous year, and that Mission and its report had excited expectations which we found it difficult altogether to fulfil. Those of my colleagues who were here will recollect that our discussion rested solely upon our conception of the importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal in the chain of Imperial connections; and I think quite as much stress was laid upon that point by the Dominion Prime Ministers as by the members of our own Government. A draft Treaty was drawn up in the Foreign Office and was brought by me here and was discussed line by line at this table, and those were the general instructions upon which I was authorised to proceed in my impending negotiations with the Egyptian Government. It was while the Conference was sitting that Adly Pasha, who had been on many occasions Egyptian Premier, came over to conduct the negotiations with a representative delegation, and we spent some months in debating the matter over the way. The negotiations broke down because Adly Pasha dared not concede anything from fear of the extremist or Zaghlul party in Egypt, whereas my instructions rendered it impossible for me to meet him on many of the points upon which he was disposed to insist. Accordingly, in the autumn of that year he resigned office on returning to his country.

There then ensued a period of agitation and commotion in Egypt in the course of which Lord Allenby, our representative, had to deport Zaghlul Pasha and some of his agitating friends to

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62600

the Seychelles. This, of course, was a temporary necessity, not a permanent solution. The alternative lay between a policy of armed coercion on our part and one of considerable concession. Lord Allenby and the whole of his advisers in Egypt advocated the latter course. Lord Allenby came home, exerted great pressure upon the Government, and finally we arrived at the Declaration of February 1922. This Declaration terminated the Protectorate, declared Egypt an independent sovereign State, promised the abolition of martial law upon the promulgation of an indemnity law, and reserved for future discussion between the two Governments the following four subjects:—

(*a.*) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
(*b.*) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression and interference, direct or indirect.
(*c.*) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
(*d.*) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of agreements the *status quo* in these four matters was to be preserved. In March 1922 the text of this Declaration was debated in the House of Commons and was approved on a division by 202 votes to 77. The following day the Sultan assumed the title of King Fuad and proclaimed Egypt a Monarchy. Simultaneously His Majesty's Government, in notifying all the Powers with whom they were in diplomatic relations that the British Protectorate over Egypt was terminated, informed them they would regard any interference in the internal affairs of Egypt or any aggression against her territories as an unfriendly act, thus establishing virtually a Monroe Doctrine in regard to that country. During the ensuing weeks almost all the Powers who had hitherto maintained in Egypt only agents and consuls-general raised their representatives to the rank of Minister, and accorded a varying degree of recognition to the new Egyptian Monarchy.

The next year, that is the past year, has been spent in preparing for the new régime in Egypt. The Egyptian Government have been engaged in drawing up a new democratic constitution, while King Fuad, who has strong autocratic leanings, has done his best to whittle down those provisions, even going so far as to discredit his own Ministers by paying court to Zaghlul. We, on the other hand, have been engaged in securing an Indemnity Act to provide immunity for those persons who had taken action under the régime of martial law, which of course, we desired to abolish, and which has since been abolished, and further in protecting the interests of our own officials and securing adequate compensation for those who in the change of circumstances might wish or be obliged to retire from the Egyptian service. During this period Ministries have risen and fallen, three in the past year. Finally, the present Prime Minister, Yehia Pasha Ibrahim, took office and all the above measures were carried.

In the meantime Zaghlul Pasha, whom I left just now at the Seychelles, developed an illness that followed the ordinary course of the maladies of political invalids, for the startling vicissitudes of which medical certificates are apparently always forthcoming. In the Seychelles he was so bad that he had to be removed to Gibraltar. In Gibraltar we learned on medical authority that his life was in peril, unless he went to France for a cure. In France he recovered so rapidly that, martial law having been abandoned, he returned to Egypt, and he is now conducting there a vigorous electoral campaign with all the physical activity and the complete lack of moral restraint that mark the worst tub orator in Hyde Park.

The situation at the moment therefore is that Egypt has acquired the status and rights of a sovereign and independent monarchy in addition to a democratic constitution, but subject to the limitations imposed by the British Declaration of February 1922. Those limitations ensure the maintenance of the *status quo* where vital British interests are concerned, *i.e.*, in the defence of Egypt, the protection of foreign interests and minorities, the security of imperial communications and the Sudan—until, as I have said, agreements on these subjects can be negotiated between ourselves

C 62601

and Egypt. His Majesty's Government are prepared to fulfil their promise of negotiation with Egypt on these four subjects, but it is for the Egyptian Government to make the first move.

I must admit to the Conference that I look forward with no small anxiety, although the sky is now relatively clear, to the future in Egypt. You will presently have a native Parliament, probably very much under the domination of Zaghlul Pasha, who will decline to accept the bases upon which we agreed a year ago, who will proclaim that the independence which we have given them is a sham, who will declare that the continued presence of British troops, of the British garrison, in the country is an outrage, and who will revive and put forward their claims to its expulsion. You will have there a King who must be carefully watched, and who, while protesting loyalty to us, will always be courting popularity with the extreme party. His own character and convictions will in all probability produce a conflict between him and the Parliament, and he will therefore try to divert the struggle into one between the Parliament and ourselves. Our policy in Egypt I have always felt, with due loyalty to the concessions we have made and the constitution we have set up, must, broadly speaking, be guided by large imperial considerations; and it is from that point of view that the Foreign Office regard the problem which will be placed in a few days before you by Lord Salisbury, namely, the question of the defence of Egypt viewed from the Imperial standpoint. At the same time I warn you here that we shall have trouble in Egypt, and that we shall in all probability have to stand very firm. If I am in office for any length of time, I think that this will be one of the chief anxieties with which I shall be confronted.

Morocco and Tangier.

At the other end of Africa, I must mention in passing the question of Morocco and of Tangier. You all know from history the enormous strategical importance of Tangier, which was at one time a British possession, and you will already have realised, our naval advisers will at any time tell you, of what supreme strategical importance Tangier, facing as it does and almost opposite to Gibraltar, is to the British Empire. In virtue of that position and of its past history, Tangier has acquired an importance which nothing else would justify. A few years ago, when we agreed to recognise the French Protectorate over Morocco, we only did so on condition that the town and zone of Tangier should be placed under some general international administration; and this was definitely provided for in agreements which were on the verge of being concluded between France, Spain and ourselves, the Powers principally concerned, when the war broke out. Ever since then the French have been doing their best to repudiate those agreements, and to secure the complete incorporation of Tangier in the dominions of the Sultan. This is a policy which we have strongly resisted, for I need hardly say that the final acquisition of North Morocco and of Tangier by France would imperil the whole of our position in the Mediterranean, and place our imperial communications practically at her mercy. For the past three years, since I have been at the Foreign Office, I have been endeavouring to settle this question, about which I have had much correspondence and conversation with the French and the Spaniards. Things have been very unfavourable until last week. We have had sitting here a Committee of experts to see if we could find a basis for a larger Conference to deal with the question in the broadest possible manner; and, greatly to my surprise and much to my satisfaction, the French representative, only three days ago, came back with instructions from Paris of a quite different character from any which he had hitherto received, providing the basis of a possible arrangement in the future. Great pressure has been brought to bear upon the French Government by their colonials and their traders at Tangier, which has suffered severely from this long period of indecision. Therefore I am more hopeful now of coming to an agreement than I have been at any previous date.

But with the question of Tangier is bound up the question of the Spanish zone. If you will look at your maps you will see a long belt of territory which is under the Protectorate of Spain and which

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Q 62602

fringes the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Spain, of course, is bound to that country by every tradition of long connection, and national pride; but she is wholly unable to deal with the problem. She is incapable either of handling, of defeating, or of ruling the tribes. She suffered a terrible disaster a year or two ago, and her position there is a source of constant anxiety. What the Military party who have just seized power in Spain will do in Morocco I do not know. I think it is quite likely that after re-establishing, if they can, the military prestige of their country, they may propose to withdraw, because Morocco is a sink into which so much of the treasure and life of Spain has been poured fruitlessly for years. But their retirement would at once open up another and more serious danger because, undesirable as it is to have there a weak country like Spain, Spain could only be succeeded by France, and the extension of French power along the whole southern shore of the Mediterranean, from Tunis and Algiers, to Morocco, would be a very grave matter. You can understand therefore how anxious I am to settle the Tangier question, and what great importance I attach to the success of the negotiations which are taking place on this subject.

Spain.

Here I cross the Straits and take you into Europe; and perhaps you may ask for a word about what has been passing recently in Spain and what is its meaning. Our own relations with Spain are good, and only last year we concluded a Commercial Treaty with her of a very favourable character, to which the Dominions and India can accede if they desire to do so. The weakness of Spain lies in the appalling corruption and depravity of her Government and her parliamentary institutions, and it was the public recognition in Spain of the vices of this system, which has gone on unchecked for years, and in which every interest in the country has been deeply involved, that brought about the successful military revolt the other day. Although carefully organised it had been successfully concealed. It took most people, including the King of Spain, by surprise; but it was so completely successful that the whole parliamentary and public and governmental system of Spain collapsed in an hour before the attack. This was not because the people of Spain loved the soldiers, but because they detested the politicians; and they would have grasped at any alternative in order to get rid of the parliamentary system by which they have been afflicted during all these years. You must not believe that this was a revolt of what they call the juntas in Spain. It was not a military revolt. It was a revolt headed by Generals, because they thought and knew that they were the only people to deal effectively with the special circumstances of the case; and then it became a revolt in which everybody acquiesced from sheer disgust at the system which it was designed to destroy.

The King himself had no alternative but to accept the victorious General as his Counsellor, just as King Victor Emmanuel had to take Mussolini in Italy; but the real bearing of the revolt in Spain may be the impetus that it will ultimately be found to have given to the Republican movement in that country. The Generals declare that they are only there to purify the system, and that they will then retire. First they said in four weeks. Then the four weeks became four months. It is much easier to take up power than to lay it down in cases like this. I think that at the end of the four months they will find it not easy to go. The change back again from a military or dictatorial régime to a constitutional one is exceedingly difficult to carry out in practice.

Portugal.

I now turn to the little country next door to Spain, to which we have in a sense just contributed a President, by the election to that Office of the recent Portuguese Minister here. Portugal remains on very friendly relations with ourselves, and—an almost unique instance in its history—it has a Portuguese Prime Minister who has been in office since February 1922. There is a genuine desire on the part of the Portuguese Government to settle our claims. They are now negotiating with General Smuts on the question of Lorenzo Marques. The Minister, before leaving here to take up the Presidency of the Republic, said that he thought there was no reason

Q 62603

why those negotiations should not lead to a satisfactory conclusion, provided only that Portuguese sovereignty was generally safeguarded.

Russia.

I now come to the remaining and more important European countries. You will expect me to say something about Russia. In June 1921 I ended my remarks on Russia with these words: "As to the future of Russia, I will refrain from speculating. It is still the great mystery of Europe, the great dark cloud of the world, and what new forces are germinating behind it, I do not know."

That cloud has not yet been either dissipated or pierced. I can only say that the storm which it seemed to portend has not actually burst, and that Russia remains under a form of Government which, though detestable in its principles and in much of its practice, is quite unlikely to be displaced, and is strong because every body or agency that could dispute its strength has been eviscerated or destroyed.

There are certain chapters in the recent history of Russia which are already known to the Conference, such as the International Conferences of Genoa and The Hague. The Dominions and India were represented at those Conferences, and they will be familiar with the reasons which rendered them abortive. It is sufficient to recall that the Soviet Government refused to give any explicit recognition of the claims made against it, refused to restore any of the property confiscated from foreigners and refused to table any practicable scheme by which further credits to Russia could be adequately secured. It has since then shown no disposition to revise its attitude, and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government have been unable to agree to any fuller measure of recognition than was entailed by the signature of the Trade Agreement. As to the Trade Agreement, we have proved ourselves absolutely loyal to its provisions. I do not think that it has done very much good to our trade, but it has been of enormous benefit to Russia. It has given them a position and a prestige which were vital to their interests, and it has been the real corner stone of their policy. This was visible in the controversy with Russia in which we were involved this year, over the question of their propaganda and their violations of the Trade Agreement. You must realise that, whatever pledge or promise they may give, the Soviet Government are quite incapable of refraining from propaganda. It is the strength and secret of their existence. They have been practising it relentlessly for years, and have directed it particularly against India and the British position in the Near East. Ever since the conclusion of the Trade Agreement we have collected the evidence of these activities, and their cumulative effect was such that a few months ago our patience was exhausted and we decided to strike. It was then that with the approval of the Government, and after informing the Dominions, I issued what was practically an ultimatum to Russia, and said that, unless this insidious system of anti-British propaganda ceased, we should recall our trade representative in Russia and the agreement would come to an end. We further called upon them to desist from certain most violent and illegal proceedings in which they had indulged against our fishing vessels, and to give compensation, which they had long refused, to certain British subjects who had been imprisoned in Russia. In one case there has been an execution of a most disgraceful character. This brought about an exchange of correspondence with the Soviet Government, and resulted in one of the most abject capitulations on their part that I think has even been recorded in diplomatic history. We received from them the full execution of the demands which we made, and we called upon them to sign an even more explicit pledge about desistence from propaganda in the future. I do not pretend for a moment that they will keep it, because, as I said just now, they are incapable of doing so; but we now know from experience that we have the whip hand, and that the threat of denunciation of the agreement will always bring them to heel.

Perhaps the Conference may like me to add a few words about the present condition and trade of Russia, and the degree to which it is likely to affect our policy in the future.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62604

The internal condition of the country has improved. Life is getting easier, more shops are open, there are more things to buy, more food is being produced, and there are fewer provincial disturbances. Foreign trade is slowly increasing. The total imports and exports for 1923 will probably amount to about the same figure as those of 1922, viz., about 25 millions sterling, but the proportion of exports to imports has increased. The Soviet Government has succeeded in putting into limited circulation a new currency which can be sold in London at par. On the other hand, it must be remembered that this improvement is in relation to a condition of extreme misery and poverty, that it is least perceptible or not perceptible at all in regard to certain fundamental industries such as the production of iron and steel goods or of raw cotton and wool, that the capital resources of the Russian Government in specie and precious stones and metals have been almost exhausted, and that the agricultural industry is not in a position to produce the large surplus of cereals which was formerly exported. As to the future, it seems probable that the improvement shown in Russian internal conditions may continue, but at a retarded rate of progress, but that without a change in the character of the Government Russia cannot resume her place as a great trading nation.

As to the Government, there has been a gradual movement away from the practice of Communism. But the Government has not abandoned its complete control of foreign trade—a fatal obstacle to commercial intercourse—nor has it freed the judiciary from the executive. The gradual retreat from the economic theories of 1920 has not, however, been accompanied by any moderation of the political views of the leading Bolshevists. Indeed, they seem to find the frequent and violent expression of these views to be necessary for the maintenance of their position in the country. That position is at present unassailable. They represent but a fraction of the population, but they have no rivals, and it is not easy to see how they can be displaced except by death itself. On the other hand, death, illness and overwork are gradually thinning the ranks of the thorough-paced Communists, and no fresh blood is being infused into the party. They have themselves expressed apprehension that their ascendancy will thus gradually disappear from natural causes.

As to *de jure* recognition, for which the Soviet Government would sell their souls, I see no reason for departing from our present attitude. So long as the Bolshevists repudiate every foreign liability, a Government like ours, which represents hundreds of expropriated claimants, and is itself a creditor to the amount of £650,000,000, could hardly with any show of decency shake hands with the expropriator, or recognise him as a suitable recipient either of further credits or of diplomatic recognition.

Poland.

Next door to Russia, and for a long period a part of the Russian system, is a country about which I spoke in 1921 in rather despondent, and almost in despairing, tones. I am referring to Poland. The Conference will remember that the re-creation of Poland was one both of the objects of the war and the achievements of the peace. For some time things went very badly in Poland; the country itself and its Government were animated by foolish territorial ambitions; they were totally without administrative experience; they became involved in conflict with the Bolshevists; Warsaw itself was within an ace of falling, and at one moment the State seemed on the brink of disappearance. During the last two years there has been a marked change for the good. Poland has acquired a greatly increasing measure of stability, and this has been due partly to the increasing experience and the greater wisdom of her Government, partly to the fact that, by accident rather than by design, she has succeeded in realising the greater part of her territorial ambitions. Her frontiers have now been determined. She obtained more of Silesia under the decision of the League of Nations than she had any right to expect; she practically acquired Eastern Galicia, subject only to a nominal form of autonomy that she has had to give to the people. She seized Vilna by a bandit stroke two years ago, and it has been impossible to turn her out.

C 62605

No doubt she would like to have Lithuania, and Memel as well, and to get a firm hold upon Dantzig. But she has bitten off quite as much as she can chew, and for the moment we must hope that she will be satisfied with her good fortune, and that, profiting by experience, her statesmen will conduct the affairs of their country —as I trust they are doing now—with circumspection and prudence. Poland is very much in the hands of France, for reasons that you know. She is now seeking the assistance of an English financial expert in order to put her finances on a satisfactory footing, and we hope that the effort will be attended with success.

Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The little conglomeration of Baltic States, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania I need not allude to here. Some of them may one day be swallowed up again by the greater country from which they split off; but as time passes they gain strength, and possibly in some form of federal union they may find salvation.

Italy.

I turn to Italy. I am not going to say anything to-day about the recent Corfu incident, because I think that what I have to say on that matter I had better reserve for the occasion when Lord Robert Cecil will be amongst us, and when I can give you the political history of the case.

I am sure, however, that you will want to know something about Italy, and the strong personality who has laid hold of the helm there, and with whom I had a good deal to do at Lausanne last year. I am afraid I have been very long, but you must remember the area I have to cover.

Mr. Massey: I hope you will not think of stopping.

Lord Curzon: The history of Italy during the last two years can be divided into two distinct periods, divided by the Fascista revolution of the autumn of 1922. The triumphant success of that revolution is attributable to the widespread exasperation caused by the futility of every Government in Italy since the armistice. One and all had proved incapable of keeping order at home or upholding the national prestige abroad. Far from improving during 1922, things had grown steadily worse, so that the coming of Mussolini was hailed throughout the country as the coming of a saviour.

Since then the lack of energy that had characterised previous Administrations has given place at home to a feverish reforming activity, and abroad to a policy of grandiloquent chauvinism. Among M. Mussolini's administrative reforms may be mentioned civil service reform, housing, army and railway reorganisation. But much of his action has been of a more purely political character. He has challenged the whole system of government associated with the last century. Liberty, democracy, and parliamentary government are for him outworn catchwords, which must give place to the living creed of Fascism. His more immediate interest has been to see that the Fascisti party remain all-powerful in Italy. Accordingly, he has organised a National Militia of 500,000 Fascists, which is declared openly to be a political police, to keep the peace and to suppress every attempt at sedition against the Fascista Government. It is for the service of God and the Fatherland, under the orders of the Prime Minister. Meanwhile all other militias of a similar character have been abolished. He has thus secured his position as against all other parties, though at the moment there is no other party fit to challenge him. The Socialists have not recovered from their break-up last year. The Nationalists are now fused with the Fascisti. The Popular party have more or less disintegrated, and M. Mussolini is trying with some success to win the favour of the Vatican for himself. There only remain the old democratic parties, which in their heyday were never more than small agglomerations of politicians serving particular leaders. In fact, M. Mussolini's difficulties are far greater inside his party than outside, and in the summer there were signs of a coming disruption. This has been healed for the moment by the Greek crisis, but whether Mussolini will be able to hold either his country or his party together without external *coups* is another matter.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62606

He has also introduced and passed an astonishing electoral reform bill, based on the novel idea of making the whole country into a single electoral district, and giving two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber to the party which polls the largest number of votes. Elections have not yet taken place to show how the system will work in practice.

As to the foreign policy of Italy, the régime of M. Schanzer, Italy's Foreign Minister during most of 1922, was a period of ineffective intrigue. M. Schanzer claimed that friendship with England was the keynote of his policy, but he never hesitated to perpetrate any petty intrigue behind our backs, *e.g.*, the sending of a special envoy to Angora at an inopportune moment; the attempt to establish Italian predominance in Austria; the breach of the Dodecanese engagement. Consequently, when he came to London last year, to try and score a concrete success, he returned home after a few weeks a sadder, though perhaps not a wiser, man.

M. Mussolini claims that realism is the keystone of his policy—nothing for nothing. His main preoccupation is that Italy shall play her part as a Great Power. He is careful not to identify himself either with French or British policy. He bolted with the French from Chanak, but only sent three engineers to follow them into the Ruhr. Since then he has been inclined to side with us on that question. His realist principles leave no room for treaties or other obligations. Soon after coming into power he signed an agreement with Jugoslavia to amplify the Treaty of Rapallo, but has never paid any regard to either document since. He has shown every sign of annexing the Dodecanese in spite of the agreements of his predecessors to the contrary. His recent seizure of Corfu and defiance of the Covenant of the League are fresh in our memory. I propose to deal with them when we devote a day to the discussion of the recent history of the League.

I may add that I heard yesterday, on what appears to be good authority, that when he took this action with reference to Corfu and Geneva, he had never read the Covenant of the League, and was not even aware that such a document existed.

Mussolini is, in fact, a law unto himself and may be diversely regarded as a national hero or as a public danger to Europe and the world. In reality, for all his strength, he is hardly master of his movements. He has created an enthusiasm that he can no longer direct, and he has not the force, or even perhaps the vision, to turn Italy's thoughts to peace and retrenchment, which are her one hope for the future. Quite recently the British were the object of Italian enthusiasm, and the visit of our King and Queen to Rome was the occasion of an extraordinary demonstration. The French were, at that time, equally disliked, and even abhored. With the line that was taken by the Press and public opinion in England over the Corfu incident, and which was greatly exaggerated in the Italian Press, there was a sharp revulsion of feeling, and for the moment we are the villains of the piece.

I attach no importance to this. Italian opinion is as mercurial as the aneroid when exposed to the British climate, and one day we shall be the favourites again. But I impress upon the Conference that Italian policy is conducted exclusively on the bargaining principle—that they do nothing except for a return, and that, while they are willing to take anything as a gift, they are also willing to extort anything by blackmail. We have no desire to be other than friends with Italy, but we object to being called upon to pay through the nose on each occasion that we are reminded of that privileged position.

Bulgaria.

Bulgaria's post-war place in Balkan politics was suddenly and violently changed last summer by the revolution which overthrew M. Stambolisky's agrarian Government and set up in its stead a thinly disguised military régime, made up mostly of the elements who had brought Bulgaria into the war.

M. Stambolisky was a barbarous dictator, but quite an attractive man. I used to have long conversations with him at Lausanne, and he told me, *inter alia*, that his two tests of the good government of a country were the state of its hospitals and the state of its prisons, and when I asked him why he selected the latter, he said because he had spent so much of his life in them, that he was a good judge. When he came to London he came and saw me at the Foreign Office, and the one thing he asked for was a pass to our prisons, which he asked to be allowed to visit without any previous warning being given to the prison authorities. I handed him the document, and he at once went out to Wandsworth or Wormwood Scrubbs, and when he found everything in spick and span order there, he came back, and said to me: "This is a great country. This is the greatest country in Europe." On the other hand, when he went to Italy, he received an order, but was not given admission. He told me at Lausanne that he thought Italy was quite the worst governed country in the world.

C 62607

This curious phenomenon was a peasant who governed for the peasants. During the past year he was being led more and more into the extremists' camp, so that before the end he had not only put the leaders of every opposition party in gaol, but he had expelled from the Government every member of his own party who held views less extreme than his own. But, whatever, his shortcomings, he was at any rate wise enough to see that Bulgaria's most formidable neighbour was Serbia, and that as long as Bulgaria's army was restricted to the numbers imposed by the Treaty of Neuilly she must cultivate Serbian friendship. To that extent he did have a definite foreign policy, and in spite of the bitterness sown by the war he had, before he died, succeeded in bringing the two countries closer together. His efforts were crowned by an agreement signed at Nish last spring, which provided for joint action against the Macedonians. It was a brave act, for the Macedonians had threatened him with death for months past, and he did not long survive it. The Macedonians were a strong element in the revolution.

Apart from his pro-Serbian policy M. Stambolisky's foreign policy was not marked by anything of note, except obstinacy and persistent propaganda. While evading every obligation under the Treaty that he possibly could, he did succeed in persuading the unknowing that Bulgaria alone of the ex-enemy Powers was observing the Treaty of Peace. His continual quibbling over the military clauses of the Treaty exasperated the Powers, and his obstruction over the reparation clauses very nearly led to a definite breach. This was, however, avoided at the last moment, and his last act of foreign policy was to secure a resettlement of the reparation terms by which Bulgaria escaped paying three-quarters of the sum laid down in the Treaty, the rest being reserved for discussion thirty years hence.

While M. Stambolisky was evading all his obligations under the Treaty, he never ceased to complain of the bad treatment accorded to Bulgaria in regard to the outlet to the Ægean. But over this he finally over-reached himself at Lausanne. M. Venizelos, acting upon the advice which I gave him, offered the Bulgarians very generous terms, but the latter refused them, with the result that they are now worse off than before, because the railway connecting Bulgaria with Dedeagatch now goes through the territory of two foreign countries instead of one (that is Turkey as well as Greece).

The new Government under M. Tsankoff do not appear to be very firm in the saddle. They have put all their opponents out of the way, it is true, and are now arresting Communists by the hundred, but they are divided among themselves and not very happy over the task they have set themselves. I do not think they will last, and I expect another revolution to take place before long. Bulgaria has in fact become again a danger spot in the Balkans. Hitherto the new Government have made no difficulties in their relations with the Great Powers.

Greece.

Greece during the past two years has been the victim of the mistaken policy that at the Paris Conference in 1919 tempted her with the Nessus' shirt of Smyrna and continued at later stages to egg her on to futile hostilities with the more powerful Turks. Her position in 1922 was unenviable. Her troops were unable to advance and destroy the Turkish army, retreat was out of the question, seeing that it meant leaving the whole Greek population of Asia Minor to the mercies of a Turkish army; while the State's

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62608

finances made it more doubtful every month whether it would be possible even to retain the territory already won. The Great Allies had proclaimed a policy of neutrality in the struggle, but whereas Great Britain abode by that undertaking, the French and Italian Governments never ceased to give Turkey material aid in the way of arms and munitions. The Greeks tried in vain to induce His Majesty's Government to assist them financially, and, when their efforts failed, were reduced to the most drastic forms of taxation, such as the forced loan.

The Greek Government further attempted to overcome their difficulties by putting their case in the hands of the Allies; and twice I went to Paris with the special object of bringing about a cessation of hostilities. But we were never able to offer terms acceptable to both parties, and the French at that time were deep in the pocket of the Turks. No compromise could bridge the dispute. The end was hastened by Mr. Lloyd George's famous speech in August (encouraging the Greeks), parts of which were issued as an army order among the Hellenic troops. The Turks derived the impression that they must strike at once. They launched attacks all along the front, and within a few days the Greek army had ceased to exist, and only the intervention of the Allies, by securing an armistice, saved Greece from still further humiliation.

In Greece proper the war did not avail to heal the old feud between Constantinists and Venizelists, nor even to hold the various Constantinist cliques together. No less than four separate Ministries held office between January and September. The most prominent politician among them was M. Gounaris, and it was he whom the revolution singled out for their principal victim.

The Asia Minor disaster was quickly followed by revolution. The ground was prepared in the army, and the movement spread to the navy. The objects were at first purely national, to save the country from the Gounaris influence, heal the great internal feud, and save Thrace. The movement was, however, soon captured by the extremists, who forced King Constantine to abdicate and initiated a policy of revenge. Five ex-Ministers and the Commander-in-chief of the Asia Minor army were tried and shot. The crime might have been prevented if the Corps Diplomatique had been unanimous; but the French Minister received orders not to interfere, while the French military mission did their best to spur on the revolutionaries to extreme measures.

After the judicial murders, which were in the majority of cases a travesty of justice, had taken place, the British Minister, in accordance with the previous warning given to the Revolutionary Government, was recalled and we have been represented at Athens ever since by a Chargé d'Affaires. We have announced that we can recognise no Government so long as those responsible for the murders are in power, and until a new Government has been installed by popular vote.

One of the first acts of the revolutionaries was to appoint M. Venizelos as the Greek representative in Europe. He was thus Greek delegate at the Lausanne Conference, where he behaved on the whole with dignity and restraint. Greece, by the Lausanne Treaty, gave up all Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, but after her military disasters she could hardly have expected more.

Since then Greece has been overwhelmed with the problem of the Greek refugees, turned out, often in the most cruel circumstances and by hundreds of thousands, from Asia Minor. A scheme is on foot to float a refugee loan, under the auspices of the League of Nations, and it is hoped that something may come of it. While she was still reeling under this accumulation of blows, Greece was suddenly confronted with the Corfu crisis. In spite of the failure of the policy pursued by the late Prime Minister and the unfortunate consequences of his advice, Greece still regards Great Britain as her chief, indeed almost her only, friend in the world. Perhaps the greatest mistake that she has made has been in losing the services of M. Venizelos, who, although in some respects a rather impetuous character, has many of the qualities of a statesman, and is certainly the most considerable figure, although he is a Cretan, that she has produced for half a century, and who might have been trusted far more effectively than any of her present rulers to guide her fortunes in the future.

C 62609

Austria.

Two years ago, I drew a pathetic picture of Austria, in a complete state of exhaustion, with a shattered currency and an impoverished people. The only friend who at that time had given any substantial assistance to her in her trouble was Great Britain; but even that had been of little avail, and union with Germany, which had been vetoed by the Allies, was freely discussed. Since then a great change for the better has taken place, and Austria is one of the encouraging features to which I just now alluded. She appealed to the League of Nations; the Council of the League took up her case; a loan was made which was guaranteed by Great Britain among other Powers; the fluctuations of the currency have been arrested; the Austrian finances have been placed under drastic foreign control; the Austrian Government has co-operated with loyalty and efficiency; they have also wisely cultivated good relations with their neighbours. Austria is, in fact, incredible as it would have seemed two years ago, becoming a stable element in the fortunes of Central Europe, and this change for the better is one of the most hopeful signs that have occurred since the termination of the war.

Hungary.

Hungary, terribly mutilated and pulled about by the Peace Treaties, is a country which excites in equal measure the enthusiasm of its friends and the wrath of its opponents. Rightly or wrongly, she has profoundly disgusted all her neighbours, who are convinced that she is attempting to recover her lost provinces at their expense. Accordingly, scares on the frontier are always taking place or being invented, and I am afraid Hungary will for a long time be a source of unrest in Central Europe. The Conference will remember the second abortive attempt of the ex-Emperor Karl to recover his throne in 1921. He was, however, not of the stuff of which heroes are made, and the attempt was foredoomed to failure. But the Little Entente took advantage of the occasion to wring from the Hungarian Government the pledge that no Hapsburg should ever be elected to the throne. The Regent of Hungary is Admiral Horthy, who seems to possess many of the sterling qualities of loyalty, sincerity and commonsense which one associates with that admirable profession. The main problem of Hungary is now the financial problem, and here we have proposed to apply to Hungary the same treatment that has been so successful with Austria, that is, a loan conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations. For the moment the matter is at a standstill, since France is hostile and the Hungarians themselves are not showing good faith.

Little "Entente."

Among the points of light I mentioned at an earlier stage the existence of the Little Entente and their influence in Central Europe, that is to say, the States of Jugo-Slavia, or Serbia as it sometimes continues to be called, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. I have not time to go into their respective histories and politics; but perhaps the most remarkable feature about this little block of States is the personality of the statesman who is the Foreign Minister of the Czecho-Slovakian State. The President of that State is a wise and learned man, Professor Masaryk, who will be in this country in three weeks' time. He is coming to pay us a visit here. But the individual to whom I am alluding is Dr. Benes, who has a very comprehensive grasp of the European situation, constantly moves about among the European capitals—I see him here every three or four months—and has been able, by his activity and his general sagacity, to weld the Little Entente into a formidable engine of stability and prosperity, making for peace in Central Europe. He is the real creator of the Little Entente, the object of which is to defeat any Hungarian aggression, to carry out the peace settlement to which these States owe their present form and existence, and to ensure their own continued stability in the future. They are, as is well known, greatly encouraged by France, who likes the idea of a ring of satellite States round Germany, which will effectually close Germany in. Therefore they are very much under the influence of France, who provides them with armaments, munitions, officers and money. But they sometimes show signs of breaking away from

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

French control. Their relations with us are entirely friendly, and we give them every encouragement in our power.

Statements for Publication.

I think I have now covered the whole field with the exception of those two parts of my statement which are going to be published in the Press, and which I would therefore ask your permission to read from the paper that lies before me. They relate chiefly to the Turkish Treaty, which has been a good deal (and, as I think, very unfairly) criticised and attacked in this country; and, secondly, the present very critical position in relation to the Ruhr.

I will first deal with the Turkish situation.

Turkish Treaty.

Two years ago, when I spoke here about the position in Anatolia, where the Turkish and Greek armies were ranged opposite to each other, hostilities between them had just recommenced. The fighting began with a preliminary success, but ended in an early check, to the Greeks.

My object throughout, for I acted as representative of His Majesty's Government in the many Allied conversations and Conferences that took place, was to bring these ill-judged and ill-fated hostilities to a close. They could do no good to either party. They were desolating one of the fairest regions in Asia. The Greeks were unlikely to win, and, even if they did win, had neither the men nor the resources to maintain an advanced position in Asia Minor. The Turks would probably triumph in the long run, but only at a heavy cost.

Throughout 1921 and 1922 therefore my time was largely consumed at Conferences in London and in Paris in the attempt to bring about Allied intervention, and to persuade both parties to place their case in our hands. I was a firm believer in united action, *i.e.*, in Allied action. His Majesty's Government at no stage had a policy as distinct from the Allies, and to this policy we loyally and unswervingly adhered. But my task was not rendered easier by the notorious Agreement concluded in October 1921 between a French agent and the Angora Turks, known as the Franklin–Bouillon Agreement, which undoubtedly led the Turks to think that the French Government was unreservedly on their side, and which greatly encouraged their pretensions. All our efforts to bring about negotiations, or mediation, or an armistice failed. Finally, the Turkish Army, imbued with a revived national ardour, well led, and taking advantage of the increasing weakness and demoralisation of the Greeks, made a sustained advance and practically drove the Hellenic forces out of Asia Minor.

This was followed by dramatic events. There was a revolution in Greece which resulted in the enforced abdication of King Constantine. The victorious Turkish army, elated by its successes, conscious of Allied disunion, and resolved to push forward even at the cost of a war with Great Britain, practically destroyed Smyrna and advanced towards the Straits, then held by Allied forces. The French withdrew their troops to the European shore, being resolved in no circumstances to become involved in hostilities with the Turks. Great Britain alone saved the situation and prevented the invasion of Europe by rushing a powerful force, military, naval and air, to the Dardanelles and to Constantinople. But it was by a hair's breadth only that the renewal of war was avoided. Presently I found myself again in Paris, engaged once more in the attempt to build up Allied unity and to obtain even at the eleventh hour a pacific solution. The Mudania Armistice followed in October 1922, and the stage for the peace negotiations was set

Just, however, as the Greek defeat had cost Constantine his throne, so the victory of Angora cost the Sultan his Kaliphate. He was deposed by Angora and fled to Malta, and his successor, appointed by the Grand National Assembly, was permitted only to enjoy a purely religious authority.

On the 20th November the first Lausanne Conference began, and there I met the representatives of France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Greece. Thither came the Turks, with whom we were to negotiate the Treaty, and the Bulgarians and others when their interests were involved. Thither the Americans sent

observers. There, for the purpose of discussing the future status of the Straits, in which they were vitally interested, Russian representatives also were admitted. There we sat for eleven weary weeks, engaged in daily, and often in nightly, negotiations. At the end of that time we were on the brink of concluding a Treaty—indeed, the pen and ink were ready and the draft was lying on the table ready for signature, when at the last moment difficulties about the financial, economic and capitulatory clauses of the draft Treaty arose—features in which the French and Italian, but particularly the former, were more actively concerned than ourselves, but in respect of which I stood unflinchingly by my colleagues—and the Turks, calculating, in view of the many concessions that had been made to meet them, that they had only to hold out to obtain even more, declined to sign. I had no doubt myself that in the long run, after some more palavering and after extracting some further concessions from the fatigue and war-weariness of the Allies, they would come to terms, and this view I expressed confidently on my return to England in February of the present year.

The discussions were resumed at Lausanne in April, and lasted for another three months, our chief representative on this occasion being Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople. There were many anxious moments then as before, and the process of haggling was continued with pertinacity and at a length that recalled the palmiest days of Oriental diplomacy in the past. Finally, a Treaty was signed on the 24th July last, which has since been ratified both by Turkey and Greece, and only awaits ratification at the hands of the remaining Great Powers as soon as their Parliaments have reassembled. Since then, it having been decided by the terms of the Agreement that the Allied forces, which have remained in occupation of Constantinople ever since the war, should evacuate within a period of six weeks—which period terminated two days ago—the British troops, ably commanded by Sir Charles Harington, who has shown the most conspicuous tact and self-restraint in very trying circumstances, have withdrawn. Our Turkish entanglement is now at an end, and it rests with the Turkish Government, having re-entered into possession of their capital, to demonstrate what use they can make of their recovered position.

I have seen the Treaty thus concluded severely criticised, as a rule by those whose motives in making the attack are not free from suspicion. Undoubtedly, the Treaty is not such a Treaty as could have been concluded in 1919, had the Allied Powers at Paris devoted to the Turkish problem one-fiftieth part of the attention that they bestowed—I might almost say squandered—upon problems and peoples of vastly inferior importance. It is not such a Treaty as was concluded and signed, though not subsequently ratified, at Sèvres in August 1920. It is not such a Treaty as might have been signed at Lausanne had the Powers at all points maintained the united front which they displayed on some. But I should like to explain how and why it was that it was the best Treaty that could be obtained in the circumstances.

In the first place, I would remind the Conference that when I went out to Lausanne in November last it was not generally believed that a Treaty could be concluded at all. Such was the temper of the Turks, elated by their overwhelming defeat of the Greeks, profoundly suspicious of Allied and notably of British intentions, and convinced that their arms were unconquerable, that the majority of my colleagues here condoled with my mission and expected very soon to see me back again. Secondly, the principal problems, whether of the Straits or the Islands, or the frontiers, or the capitulations or finance, seemed almost insoluble, unless the Allies were prepared to dictate their terms at the point of the bayonet.

Such had been the case with all the previous post-war Treaties. These had in each case been drawn up by the victorious Powers, sitting, so to speak, on the seat of judgment, in the absence of the culprit, and imposing what penalty or what settlement they chose. Only when the terms had been drawn up was the beaten enemy admitted to be told his sentence and to make the conventional protest of the doomed man.

Such indeed was the environment in which the original Treaty of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62612

Sèvres was drawn up and signed, though never ratified, by the Turkish representatives. Far otherwise was it at Lausanne. There the Turks sat at the table on a footing of equality with all the other Powers. Every article of the Treaty had to be debated with and explained to them. Agreement had to be achieved, not by brandishing the big stick, but by discussion, persuasion and compromise. The Turks knew very well that the Allies had no stomach for further fighting. The Allies were never certain how far the genuine desire of the leading Turks for peace would control the unruly Nationalist and Extremist elements, who had a quite exaggerated estimate of their strength.

What then did the Treaty achieve? Territorially it lopped off from the Turkish State the whole of Syria, of Palestine, and of what is now called Iraq. Turkey ceased to have any hold or power over Arabia. Her possessions were confined to the Anatolian plains and highlands from which the Ottoman Turks originally came, and to the narrow European territories of her former Empire up to the confines of Bulgaria on the one hand and Greece on the other. She recovered Eastern Thrace and two or three of the Islands, but beyond the River Maritza, except for the tiny enclave of Karagach, she was not permitted to go.

But I draw special attention to the arrangement about the Freedom of the Straits, that great international safeguard, for which thousands of brave British and Dominion soldiers fought and died. When I went out to Lausanne, I doubt if anyone thought that we could secure more than the freedom of commercial passage. I came away with an arrangement by which free access from the Ægean to the Black Sea, for foreign warships and aircraft, as well as merchant ships, subject to a reasonable limitation of numbers, was guaranteed to the States of the world. The Black Sea ceased *ipso facto* to be a Russian preserve. Demilitarised and unfortified zones were created on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Turkey was given an international guarantee for the safety of her capital and the territories round the Straits, and was allowed to maintain a garrison at Constantinople. Who can doubt that this was a solution eminently favourable to those British Imperial interests which I was sent to Lausanne to guard?

In the course of the discussion about the Straits, to which Russia had been admitted, but which at that time she indignantly refused to sign, I was fiercely criticised by advanced organs at home for alienating the Power whose acquiescence in any future *règlement* of the Straits was essential, and was charged with sowing the seeds of future war. My concluding remarks at Lausanne, when the Powers, with the single exception of Russia, had signified their adhesion to the Straits Convention, were as follows :—

> "M. Chicherin has announced to us that Russia will have no voice and take no part in this Convention. The responsibility for that rests on the Russian Government, and even if it be their present decision I hope the time may come, perhaps not in the distant future, when, on reconsidering the matter, they may find it in their own, as well as in the public interest, to give the signature which they refuse to-day."

Those words were prophetic. Five months later the Russians, quietly and without saying much about it, affixed their name to the very Straits Convention which they had repudiated and denounced, and which is now therefore a part of the accepted law of Europe. But I have never received a word of apology or vindication from the critics who were so certain six months ago of my sanguinary and sinister intentions.

In the course of the discussions at Lausanne, remembering all that my countrymen and fellow-subjects throughout the Empire had suffered at Gallipoli, I insisted upon the handing over, the proper maintenance and the safeguarding of the sacred soil on the Gallipoli Peninsula, which had been stained with their blood, and where their bodies lay. When the Turks realised that I would break up the Conference sooner than cede this point they gave way.

We laboured hard at Lausanne to secure for the minorities, particularly the Greek and Armenian minorities in the future Turkish State, a protection even in excess of that guaranteed to them by the minority clauses of the European Treaties which we

C 62613

adopted and confirmed in ours. I cannot say that in this I was successful. The records will show the nature of the fight that I put up for these unhappy peoples. But the Turks, in their passion for a self-sufficing and self-centred national existence, were resolved upon purging their State of all alien elements—a policy which, in my view, was grossly mistaken, which has been attended by incidents of great cruelty and hardship, and which, as time passes, they will often have occasion to repent. I did, however, obtain this much, that Turkey undertook to apply for membership of the League of Nations after the ratification of Peace; and at the hands of that tribunal the afflicted minorities will receive such protection as it may be in the power of Europe to afford.

A troublesome question arose about the future possession of the Mosul Vilayet on the northern border of the Iraq State. To that province the Turks put forward what I conceived to be quite untenable claims, which I was called upon vigorously to contest. The dispute ended in an agreement to refer the matter to amicable discussion between Turkey and ourselves during the period of nine months after the evacuation of Turkish territory by the Allied forces. If we cannot come to an agreement, the matter will then go to the League of Nations.

The financial and economic clauses of the Treaty, which concerned France much more than ourselves, ended in considerable concessions to Turkish pertinacity, as did those parts of the Treaty which related to the conditions under which foreigners will in future reside and trade in Turkey. I do not pretend to be satisfied with those conditions. But in my view the chief sufferers will not be the foreign communities so much as the Turks themselves, who will soon learn from experience the extent to which even an emancipated Turkish State is dependent upon the resources and assistance of the foreigner. At Lausanne Turkey was consumed with jealousy for her own sovereignty, which none of us had any desire to impugn; and when the alternative was presented, as it frequently was, of ceding a point which though important was not vital, or of breaking up the Conference, and reverting to a state of war, diplomacy was, I think, rightly reluctant to adopt the latter alternative.

Perhaps from the British point of view the most satisfactory result of the protracted discussion and the final agreement was the resumption of friendly relations between ourselves and a people with whom we had many connections in the past, and who went to war with us, not we with them. A second result which I do not think will be disputed by a single foreign Delegation at Lausanne has been that the Power which emerged from the proceedings with the largest access of prestige in Turkey was our own. This prestige, coupled with the strong financial position of Great Britain, should enable this country to play such part in the financial and economic reconstruction of Turkey as the stability of the future Turkish Government may justify and our own interests demand.

If then we survey the whole field, I think that the final restoration of peace in the Near East, where our troops have now been engaged for exactly nine weary and costly years, the Freedom of the Straits, the liberation of the entire block of Arab countries, the enhanced prestige of Great Britain in Turkey, together with the appeasement in all Moslem countries which is already following the reconciliation between Turkey and ourselves, are results sufficient to justify our labours at Lausanne, and to silence the not always disinterested and frequently ungenerous critics who have derided our handling of a problem which they were powerless to compose themselves. But I repeat that the destiny of Turkey lies with Turkey herself far more than with anyone else. The future which she has planned for herself, whether she become a Republic or not, whether she rules from Angora or Constantinople, will be mainly of her own creation. A very heavy task in the disbandment of her forces, the reorganisation of her civil service, the husbanding of her economic resources, the resuscitation of her industrial and commercial life, lies before her. I think that she will experience great disillusionment and many disappointments, and that some of the fruits which she claims to have garnered will turn out to be Dead Sea apples in her mouth. But in making what will be a great experiment she starts with a complete absence of resentment on our part and with the sincere expression of our goodwill.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62614

European Situation. General Observations.

Now I come to the concluding part of my address, which relates to the position in Europe, and before I read the passages which will be circulated and printed, I want, in the utmost confidence, in a few words, to enable you to grasp the relative positions and personalities of the factors in this case, because in order to understand, you want to know what the nations involved are driving at and by what forces and motives they are being impelled. I say this to you, which I dare not put in print. The countries and Governments involved in this European problem are France, Belgium, Germany and ourselves. I omit Italy for the moment from consideration, because her part in the business was very reluctant and has turned out to be infinitesimal. Let us try and understand the position of France. She is a country whose blood is still boiling with the memories of the War, who can never obliterate from her mind the terrible sufferings of her people, the evidence of which is every day before her eyes. She is conscious of the enormous strength which she has acquired as a result of the War, and which I described in an earlier portion of my remarks. She is profoundly suspicious of Germany, and she is determined to crush and effectively destroy all chances of recovery or resuscitation on the part of Germany within the time of the youngest child at the period when the War came to an end. Accordingly, you see her inspired by those views, pressing for payments which can never be recovered, imposing conditions which cannot possibly be satisfied, sacrificing future advantages for the sake of a momentary triumph, claiming on the one hand to rest her whole case on the Treaty of Versailles, and yet on the other, openly saying that she intends to evade one of the principal obligations of that Treaty, namely, by remaining in the Rhineland after the fifteen years have expired, sowing as we think by the above policy, the seeds of certain retribution in the future. We must, however, understand and allow for the depth and naturalness of the feelings which I have described and which guide her action.

Then we pass to Belgium, a Government, nervous, irresolute, and vacillating—I am speaking of their political attitude, not of their natural characteristics—dragged into the operation of the Ruhr with France because they could not afford to stand out, very much disliking the company which they have to keep, disapproving heartily of the methods which are being employed, longing to break away, but powerless to do so; terrified at the thought of being encircled by France, making almost every week little hesitating overtures to me, and yet, the moment the stern voice of M. Poincaré is heard, coming back to heel with their tail between their legs.

Next we pass to Germany, defeated, hopelessly defeated, in the war, impotent, conscious of her impotence, but burning with an unslaked wrath and thinking of future revenge. However, just as Germany in the war always did things in the wrong way, so she is doing them in the wrong way now. Her mentality strikes me as being at once the most formidable and the stupidest in Europe. They are absolute children in diplomacy. They make every conceivable blunder in dealing with France, and, for the matter of that, with ourselves; and, in dealing with them and with their methods and system, one never knows whether they are really perfidious or merely perverse, whether they are actually dishonest or merely dull, whether they are friendly or whether they are hostile. You cannot like them, but you do not quite know whether your feelings are those of distrust or positive dislike. Our policy towards them since the war has been perfectly straightforward and simple. We have no sympathy with an enemy at whose hands we suffered so terribly, and whose characteristics we know so well. But the moment peace was signed we felt it a part of our duty to recognise Germany as a member of the comity of Nations, who had been readmitted, and to give her a chance, not so much in her own interest, or even in our interest, as in the interest of the recovery of the world.

When I see in the papers of this country the Government accused of being pro-German I am shocked. But if I am accused of being pro-German in the sense of being fair and holding the

C 62615

scales even and of giving Germany, in common with every one of our recent enemies, a chance to recover, then I should not resent the charge.

The fourth of the Great Powers entangled in this mesh is ourselves. I do not know if I can successfully diagnose our own symptoms, but it appears to me that we are a people very war-weary, longing for peace on almost any terms consistent with honour, most anxious to set things straight, almost tremblingly desirous of getting on with our neighbours, willing to make the greatest sacrifices financially or otherwise in order to secure that end, but baffled at every turn by the shortsightedness, sometimes by the treachery, of some of our neighbours, and by what appears to us to be the obstinacy or the stupidity of others.

These seem to me to be the characteristics of the parties that are standing in the ring of action which I am about to describe.

Franco-German Relations.

I proceed to deal with the Franco-German, or as I should prefer to call it the European, problem; for it is one that concerns not two or three States alone, but the whole of those Powers that were engaged in the war, and to whom reparations were allotted, and not least among them the British Empire. His Majesty's Government have consistently held the view that the final settlement could only be achieved by common action and common consent, and that the dispute is not merely a military or political conflict between contiguous States.

I cannot in the small space of time available to me narrate in detail all that has happened since we last met at this table in June 1921. At that date the German Government had just yielded to an Allied ultimatum which covered a schedule of payments for the discharge of the reparation debt, as well as undertakings by the German Government for the early execution of the military disarmament and other clauses of the Treaty. The Reparation Commission, who had under the Treaty been charged with the task of fixing the reparation debt, had estimated it at £6,600 millions—a total which has since in some quarters assumed an almost sacrosanct character, but which in reality bore no relation to what Germany could pay, but was arrived at by lumping together the demands of the various claimant Powers. This total, which is well known to be a quite impossible sum, and which no sane person has ever expected that Germany would be able to pay in full, can only be altered by the consent of all the Powers. For a time in 1921, the ultimatum having been accepted by Germany, and the policy of Dr. Wirth's Government being the fulfilment of the Treaty, payments were regularly made. But the situation in Germany was unstable; the mark began the first downward movement of its finally catastrophic descent; German industry and high finance were stubborn and hostile; assassination found its first victim in Erzberger—to be followed at a later date by Rathenau. Before the end of the year Germany made her first application for a reduction of the payments due in 1922. This request was discussed at Cannes in January 1922, and certain concessions were made; more were then asked for, involving the grant to Germany of a more complete Moratorium for the rest of 1922 and for the whole of 1923, 1924.

This was the situation when the Allied Premiers met in London in August 1922 to consider the request. M. Poincaré declared that if there was to be a further Moratorium he must have productive pledges, *i.e.*, the yield of certain taxes and industrial undertakings, as well as the forests and mines in the Rhineland and the Ruhr. These proposals were declared to be financially and economically unsound by the majority of the expert Committee who advised Mr. Lloyd George in the matter; and no decision was arrived at.

In the course of the autumn Dr. Wirth's difficulties increased; in November he resigned; and with his disappearance the policy of fulfilment, which had been his watchword, receded into the background. He was followed by Dr. Cuno.

At the end of the year, when a decision by the Powers was necessary, since the next payments were due, a further Conference

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62616

of Allied Prime Ministers was held in London, followed a little later by a renewal of the meeting in Paris. By this time Mr. Lloyd George had ceased to be Prime Minister, and Mr. Bonar Law had taken his place. Now it was that the Ruhr, which had been in the background of all the French plans and proposals for two years, emerged into prominence as the sole French specific—the Ruhr to be occupied, preferably by the Allies, if not, then by France and such of her Allies as would go in with her, France's object in the move being to obtain immediate payment of the £1,300 millions which she claimed, plus whatever sum might be required to pay off her debts to Great Britain and the United States. Put in another way, France would agree to no reduction of the total of the German reparation debt save as a set-off against the cancellation of her war debts to Great Britain and America.

The British view on the other hand was that Germany was incapable of making large immediate payments; that the occupation of the Ruhr was not the right way in which to secure such payment; that by reducing the capacity of Germany to pay, owing to the loss of her most important industrial and economic centre, payment would be indefinitely postponed, and further exasperation and probably at a later date internal disruption in Germany would be produced; and that grave economic loss would thus be entailed, not merely on the occupying Powers, but on Europe, viewed as an economic unit, in general. Mr. Bonar Law therefore declined to join in the occupation, and proposed an alternative plan for the reduction of the total debt to £2,500 millions with an accompanying issue of bonds, a moratorium for a short period of years and the institution of a drastic control over German finance. Further, if this proposal were accepted, he made the offer, startling though unrecognised in its generosity, to cancel the French and Italian war debts to us *in toto*.

The French refused, and on the 11th January the Franco-Belgo-Italian occupation of the Ruhr began. It cannot, I think, be denied that the sanguine expectations with which it was entered upon have been largely falsified by the results. An extensive and prolonged military occupation was far from being contemplated, and, indeed, as soon as it appeared inevitable, the Italians retired from the scene. The sustained obstinacy and fury of passive resistance were not foreseen. The anticipated payments, whether in deliveries of coal and coke or in reparation payments, were presently shown to be not forthcoming. Meanwhile, as the net yield of the Franco-Belgian occupation became increasingly disappointing, so the treatment of the inhabitants by the Franco-Belgian authorities became increasingly severe. Thus there grew up a sort of deadlock, or, if the metaphor be varied, a condition of embittered stalemate between the rival forces. The Germans took the view that the occupation was in direct violation of the Treaty. They refused all voluntary reparation payments to France and Belgium, and they threw every possible obstacle in the way of the industrial exploitation of the region. The work of the military disarmament of Germany, provided for by the Peace Treaty, also came to a standstill.

In the meantime Mr. Bonar Law, in a generous anxiety not to frustrate by British action the success of a policy in the practical application of which he disbelieved, but the principle underlying which, viz., the desire and necessity to obtain reparations, was equally accepted by ourselves, while wishing the French good fortune in their undertaking, took up an attitude of strict neutrality. That attitude we have maintained throughout the summer, retaining our army of occupation in the area the custody of which had been assigned to us by the Treaty, endeavouring to hold the scales between the rival parties, and hoping to bring them to an ultimate arrangement. The fact that we learned from our Law Officers, after Mr. Bonar Law's return from Paris, that the occupation was not, in their opinion, justified by the terms of the Treaty, thus confirming the wisdom of the British attitude, was never concealed by us from our Allies. On the other hand, public use was not made of it until M. Poincaré himself raised the legal issue by basing his case on the alleged illegality of the German action in resisting the occupation.

I am not here to apportion praise or blame between the various parties in the conflict. Our sentimental sympathy would always have been and was with our old and trusted ally. We had not the

C62617

smallest desire to take the side of Germany, or to let the Germans down easily, or to deprive France of her just due. On the other hand, we also had to consider our due, and, viewing the matter not through the glasses of sentiment, but from a severely practical angle, we regarded with increasing anxiety the prosecution of a policy that seemed to us to be productive of no good results, and to be leading on to disaster and ruin.

In the course of the spring the German Government under Dr. Cuno made a number of rather ill-advised suggestions for compromise, which I need not summarise because they were in each case inadequate and stillborn. I did not think that their diplomacy in this respect was wise; and in my various interviews with the German Ambassador I never failed to impress upon him this point of view and to urge that the duty of his Government was threefold: (1) to pay their just debts, (2) to agree to the fixation of the payments by competent authority, (3) to offer specific and adequate guarantees. Simultaneously His Majesty's Government never wavered in the assertion of their broad and general loyalty to the Entente, and more than once indicated to the French Government that if security rather than, or in addition to, reparations was in their mind, we should at any time be willing to discuss it. The first definite move, again halting and ill-conceived, was made by Germany in the opening days of May last. It was promptly turned down with scorn by France and Belgium and met with no approval from us. Then in response to a suggestion made by His Majesty's Government their second offer of the 7th June came. This was more substantial; for the German Government now offered to accept the decision of an impartial international body as to the amount and methods of payment, they proposed certain specific guarantees, and they asked for a Conference to work out a definite scheme. Here at least seemed to His Majesty's Government to be both the chance of progress and the material for a reply. Prolonged conversations with our French and Belgian Allies left their views and intentions veiled in some obscurity; and accordingly we decided, with their knowledge, to draw up the draft of a joint reply, with a view to securing the inestimable advantage of concerted action.

By this time the question of passive resistance, which had been continued with unabated intensity and had baffled all the French expectations, had assumed the first place in the outlook of our Allies, and M. Poincaré more than once laid down with uncompromising clearness that not until it was abandoned would he enter into discussions as to the future. For our part we continued to give advice in a similar sense to the German Government; and in the draft reply which we submitted, its abandonment, entailing the gradual resumption of civil administration and the progressive evacuation of the Ruhr, was put in the forefront of our scheme. In our explanatory letter to the Allies we further made concrete proposals, viz., for the examination by a body of impartial experts, acting in conjunction with, and if necessary under the orders of, the Reparations Commission, of the question of German capacity and modes of payment, a similar examination into the question of the proposed guarantees, and the summoning of an Inter-Allied Conference to bring about a general financial settlement. I do not think, therefore, that it can be said of His Majesty's Government that they were either backward in initiative or barren of suggestion; and certainly our proposals appeared to us to be characterised both by impartiality and goodwill. They were unfortunate, however, in receiving an unfavourable reply from France, and a not much more favourable reply from Belgium. These replies have been published to the world, and I need not recapitulate their nature. It is enough to say that not until passive resistance was definitely abandoned by Germany would our Allies agree to make any move; our proposal for an expert enquiry was rejected; the French and Belgian claims for repayment were restated in unqualified form. I confess that my colleagues and I were greatly disappointed at the result of our sincere but thankless intervention. Once more we stated our case in the British Note of the 11th August, a note revised with meticulous care, first by the Cabinet and then by the Prime Minister and myself, and once again we offered as the price of a settlement to cancel the whole of our claims except for the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

sum of £710 millions sterling to meet our debt to the United States Government. Moreover, if we could get a portion of the sum from German reparations, our demands upon our Allies would be proportionately reduced. The replies of the French and Belgian Governments have been published. They indicated not the faintest advance from the position already taken up. Our capacity for useful intervention was manifestly exhausted.

Meanwhile, as time passed, it became apparent that the German Government could not, even if they desired, persist in the policy of passive resistance; and at length, only a week ago, Herr Stresemann, who had succeeded Dr. Cuno a few weeks earlier, decided to surrender. I think myself that this surrender should have been made three months ago and was unwisely and foolishly postponed. But I have always been told, and I suspect that it is the truth, that no German Government could at that time have survived which made the surrender. Whether Herr Stresemann, who had the courage and the wisdom to take this step, will survive is uncertain as I speak these words.

And now what is the point to which we have come? We do not grudge our Allies the victory—if victory it be. On the contrary we welcome, just as we have for long ourselves advised, it. But are we any nearer to settlement? Will the reparation payments begin to flow in? What is the new form of civil administration or organisation that is to be applied to the Ruhr? These are questions which it is vital to put, and vital also to answer.

One of the results at any rate that we anticipated has already been brought about. For we see the beginnings of that internal disruption which we have all along feared, but which we have been consistently told to regard as a bogey. And let it be remembered that disruption is not merely an ominous political sympton. It has a portentous economic significance, for it may mean the ultimate disappearance of the debtor himself.

What therefore should be the next step? I have made no concealment of our view in my conversations with the French Ambassador, and it has the approval of the Prime Minister, who recently did so much by his visit to Paris to recreate a friendly atmosphere after the rather heated discharge of the rival guns. We have repeatedly been assured by the French Government that as soon as passive resistance definitely ceased, the time for discussion between the Allies would have come. So far as I can gather, the German Government are sincere in their intentions, and have taken the steps required of them. What may be the attitude of the local population in the Ruhr I cannot say. But if the French contention be valid that it is only in obedience to orders from Berlin that they have hitherto resisted, there should be no difficulty about their conduct now. I would merely remark that while passive resistance has, as we hoped and desired, been replaced by passive assistance, it may be too much to expect it to be followed all in a flash by enthusiastic co-operation.

The French Government know therefore that we await and expect the next proposals from them. The contingency of the cessation of passive resistance must have long been anticipated at the Quai d'Orsay, and the consequent measures doubtless exist in outline if not in detail. We shall be quite ready to receive and to discuss them in a friendly spirit. Our position at Cologne in the occupied area gives us a right to be consulted in any local arrangements that may be proposed, and that position we have no intention to abandon. Our reparation claim, willing as we have been to pare it down in the interests of settlement, renders it impossible that any such settlement could be reached without our co-operation. Our stake in the economic recovery of Europe, which affects us as closely, and in some respects more so, than the immediate neighbour of Germany, makes us long for an issue. We have already shown our willingness, by unexampled concessions, to contribute to it.

I have now finished, and in concluding I must express my apologies for the inordinate length of time for which I have detained the Conference, and thank them more than I can say for the very patient hearing that they have been kind enough to give to my words.

Appreciation of Lord Curzon's Statement.

Mr. Mackenzie King: It was understood at the last session that any consideration and discussion of this statement of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be postponed until Monday. I think, however, that we should not permit this session to rise without expressing to Lord Curzon our thanks for the profoundly impressive review which he has just given us of foreign affairs, and which, if I may be permitted to say so, has been expressed throughout in language the strength and dignity and adequacy of which is comparable only to the supreme importance of the subjects covered.

Mr. Massey: I should like to endorse that, and I am very glad the suggestion has been made by the Prime Minister of Canada.

Press Communiqué.

Prime Minister: Gentlemen, before we separate it is just necessary I should read to you the communiqué.

(*See* Appendix I.)

May I take it that that is approved, and we will just add a little note to say that Mr. Bruce was unavoidably prevented from being here.

(*Agreed.*)

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 5, 1923.

APPENDIX I.

THE Imperial Conference met at 10, Downing Street at 10·45 A.M., when the following representatives were present:—

[See heading of E., 3rd Meeting.]

The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, who had been delayed at Calais by bad weather, was unable to be present.

The Prime Minister communicated to the Conference the gracious reply which the King had been pleased to make to the address to His Majesty which the Conference adopted at its first meeting. The King's reply was as follows:—

[See above.]

The Prime Minister then welcomed to the Conference the Hon. G. P. Graham, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada, and Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, Vice-President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State.

The Foreign Secretary occupied the entire morning in giving a review of the foreign situation in all parts of the world. The greater part of what he said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving to the Representatives of the Dominions and India orally the inner history of the period and explaining to them the springs of British policy since 1921. But it was decided that certain parts of his speech which related to subjects of urgent interest and importance should be given verbatim to the Press, and passages dealing with the situation in the Ruhr and with the Turkish Treaty will accordingly be published later in the day as they were delivered.

This is a departure from the practice of all previous Imperial Conferences, when the statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been treated as confidential.

The Conference adjourned until 11 A.M. on Monday next, when the discussion on Foreign relations will be continued.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

C62620

SECRET.

E. 4th Meeting (1923).

45

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada (for Mr. Mackenzie King's statement only).

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Senator the Hon. R. V. WILSON, Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS, T.D., Vice-President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON-SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. A. W. A. LEEPER, C.B.E., Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62621

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)
Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir R. R. GARRAN, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Newfoundland.
Mr. W. G. CAREW.

India.
Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

WELCOME TO MR. BRUCE, SENATOR WILSON, AND SIR LOMER GOUIN.

Mr. Baldwin: Since we last met I am glad to say that our numbers are now complete in spite of some of our friends having been weather-bound at the end of a long journey. We have to welcome our delegates from Australia, Mr. Bruce and Senator Wilson. We are also glad to see Sir Lomer Gouin from Canada, whose name is well known to all of us.

I think our Conference is complete now and I will call upon Mr. Mackenzie King to open the discussion following the statement made at our last meeting by the Foreign Secretary.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Appreciation of Lord Curzon's Statement.

Mr. Mackenzie King: The survey of activities and problems which have engaged the attention of the Foreign Office during the past two years, as given by the Foreign Secretary on Friday, was deeply impressive, in the range, the intricacy, the delicacy of the issues, and the ceaseless shifting of the panorama, in the strong evidence afforded of the desire of the British Government to act as a moderating force, and in the skill and knowledge and imperturbable temper displayed in the conduct of these affairs.

Review of Canadian External Affairs.

Before proceeding to make any observations on the great issues raised by the Foreign Secretary's statement, I may be expected to give a brief review of some of the external affairs of primary concern to Canada which have developed since the last meeting of this Conference. Our direct international relations are preponderatingly, though not wholly, with a single country. The issues in this connection are not unlike those which arise among European States, and which often prove very difficult to solve. If ours have not proved insoluble, it is due mainly to the fact that in the settlement of differences between the United States and Canada we have the inestimable advantage of speaking (for the most part) the same language, and that not merely in the linguistic sense, for we have, in larger measure than is the case of Continental Europe, the same values, the same standards, in part the same traditions. And we are fortunate again as compared with the peoples of Continental Europe in having less history and more geography, fewer traditions of ancient wrongs to redress, larger space and elbow room for our expansion.

Relations with United States.

The United States is not, as the Foreign Secretary has very rightly implied, always easy to deal with. The great diversity of occupation and cultural background in that vast area, the frequent lack of co-ordination among the branches of its Government, the power of unscrupulous politicians and newspapers to create a sudden stampede, must all be taken into account. But as far, at least, as Canada is concerned we have found the United States of late years an increasingly friendly and dependable neighbour. It has been our aim, the aim of all Governments, irrespective of party, in the

C 62622

last quarter-century, to maintain and develop this good feeling. That does not mean that we are prepared to sacrifice vital interests on the altar of American friendship, that is not the way to deal with our United States friends. But neither do we believe in a policy of pinpricks such as perhaps characterised relations during the previous quarter-century. We have our differences, we thresh them out, and usually a solution develops. It is our firm belief that there is no contribution that Canada can make to the fair and peaceful settlement of international affairs, no way in which she can so strengthen the Empire of which she is a part, as by so handling our relations with the United States as to build up an enduring fund of goodwill, and work for that common understanding among the English-speaking peoples which is the chief hope of the world. That is our primary task; the task assigned to us in the division of Imperial labour, by our proximity, our constant intercourse, our knowledge of their idiosyncrasies. I think it will long remain our primary task.

International Joint Commission.

Perhaps of first inportance in the field of Canada's external affairs is the International Joint Commission. This body is unique, I believe, in its range and composition, and not without significance for wider fields. It was devised to meet a very difficult situation. In the three thousand miles and more of common boundary between the United States and Canada, constant disputes were arising, particularly as to boundary waters, navigation rights, water power rights, irrigation rights, and so on. Many of these problems contained possibilities of serious trouble; with thousands of farmers in irrigated areas on each side of the boundary dependent for their prosperity on the development or diversion of a given river basin, or with corporations with capital running into tens of millions jockeying for water power development rights, international incidents might at any moment occur. Accordingly, some fourteen years ago, provision was made for the establishment of an International Joint Commission, consisting of three members appointed by the President of the United States, and three appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation of the Governor-General-in-Council, or Cabinet, of the Dominion of Canada. Upon this Commission is conferred authority to enquire into and decide upon any operations as to use, obstruction or diversion of boundary waters which would affect interests on both sides: a majority of the Commission has power to render a decision binding on the Governments and private interests affected: if it is evenly divided, a report is made to the two Governments, which will then endeavour to reach a solution. It is interesting to note that in the many cases which have come before the Commission there has been absolute unanimity of finding in every instance but one—that is out of about twenty cases, I think—and in that instance the difference of opinion was as to jurisdiction rather than as to the merits of the case. This remarkable result is in large part due to the permanent character of the Commission; its members come to know one another well, and realise that a principle which may tell against their country to-day may tell for it in another case next year. The Commission is not narrowly legal in its procedure. Any private citizen of either country may bring his case directly before it, without the intervention of the Government, a procedure which lessens political tension and permits the emergence of several different points of view on the same side of the boundary.

A reference to the map will show the wide range of cases covered. I thought it would be possibly of interest to the members of the Conference present to glance at leisure at the number of cases that have come before that Joint Commission, as illustrated by a map that I should like to have placed on the record.* It shows how considerable is the number and variety of the subjects with which this Commission has to deal. Time will not permit detailed reference to the many intricate questions of navigation and power and irrigation rights, each of which might otherwise have provided a distinct diplomatic incident.

I may illustrate by reference to a difficult case now under consideration. The City of Chicago, some years ago, began the con-

* Annexed.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62623

struction of a canal from Lake Michigan across the ancient portage to a river flowing into the Mississippi. It was originally devised for sanitary purposes, but other possibilities soon developed; far-reaching plans for power installation and the building of a Chicago to the Gulf of Mexico waterway took form. In brief, Chicago was calmly proposing to drain the Great Lakes into the Gulf of Mexico instead of through the St. Lawrence. It was given permission to divert a certain amount of water, but it has without authority exceeded this diversion. It now asks to be allowed this excess and to erect compensating works on the Great Lakes. The Canadian authorities have opposed this diversion, and so, it is interesting to note, have the States of Michigan and Wisconsin, which are equally concerned with Canada in maintaining the level of the Lakes. The matter will be considered further during the coming year.

But the powers of the International Joint Commission are not limited to boundary water questions. It is provided further that any questions or matters of difference whatever "involving the rights, obligations or interests of the United States or Canada, either in relation to each other, or to their respective inhabitants," may be referred for decision to the Commission by the consent of the two parties, any such action being taken on the advice and consent of the United States Senate, on the one hand, and of the Canadian Governor-General-in-Council, on the other; a majority of the Commission shall have power to render a decision upon any matter so referred. Thus far the necessity has not arisen for referring any such general issue to the Commission, but the existence of this machinery to meet any sudden emergency is a very valuable safeguard.

Disposition of United States to Enlarged Scope of Commission.

At the Bar Association dinner in Montreal last month, Secretary of State Hughes strongly endorsed the Commission idea and said that personally he would be in favour of even a fuller extension to cover all possible grounds of friction or dispute.

I think perhaps it would be worth while to insert here the words used by Mr. Secretary Hughes in the address before the Bar Association delivered on the 4th September of this year. They indicate very clearly the attitude of the United States towards us in the matter of the settlement of differences between us, an attitude which I may say is heartily reciprocated by us; if, indeed, we did not initiate this point of view in the first instance. I will now quote Mr. Hughes: "While I do not undertake to speak officially upon this subject, I may take the liberty of stating as my personal view that we should do much to foster our friendly relations and to remove sources of misunderstanding and possible irritation, if we were to have a permanent body of our most distinguished citizens acting as a commission, with equal representation of both the United States and Canada, to which automatically there would be referred, for examination and report as to the facts, questions arising as to the bearing of action by either Government upon the interests of the other, to the end that each reasonably protecting its own interests would be so advised that it would avoid action inflicting unnecessary injury upon its neighbour."

In this connection, a personal incident of much interest was the visit to British Columbia of the late President, Mr. Harding, in the course of his Western tour. His extremely cordial and sympathetic addresses produced an impression which was deepened by the sudden illness and death which followed a few days later. I should like to quote the concluding paragraphs of a speech made by the then President in Vancouver: "It is the public will, not force, that makes for enduring peace, and is it not a gratifying circumstance that it has fallen to the lot of us of North America, in living amicably for more than a century under different flags, to present this most striking example produced, of the basic fact that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of controversy, between peoples who wish to keep it.

"What an object-lesson of peace is shown to-day by our countries to all the world. Only a scrap of paper, recording hardly more than a simple understanding, safeguards lives and properties on the Great Lakes, and only humble mile-posts mark the inviolable boundary line for thousands of miles through farm and forest.

C 62624

"Our protection is in our fraternity; our armour is our faith, and the tie that binds more firmly year by year is an ever-increasing acquaintance and comradeship through interchange of citizens. The compact is not of perishable parchment, but of fair and honourable dealings, which God grant shall continue for all time."

Goodwill between Canada and United States.

I place these on record largely because I think they help to illustrate the new-world point of view that is in very striking contrast to the old-world attitude of the past, if not of the present, that force is always essential in the preservation of peace. The emphasis the President has placed upon the will to peace, that peace can always be kept, whatever the grounds of controversy may be, between peoples who wish to keep it, is a fact to which we on the North American continent are inclined to give a great deal of attention. We believe that by frequent intercourse between the public men of both countries, by the constant interchange there is between the populations of the two countries, we are developing a common attitude towards each other in the matter of solving our differences by machinery arranged for purposes of conciliation and arbitration, and that in that way we are perhaps rendering the greatest service that it is possible for us to render as a part of the British Empire in maintaining the friendly relations so essential between the United States and the British Empire. A fund of goodwill is being built up, and to appreciate its real value one has to consider what is gained by the elimination of the enormous cost and waste involved in competitive arming, which would be the other alternative. If we started on a policy in America which meant that we were looking to force for the solution of our difficulties with the United States, and began to fortify our boundaries from the Atlantic to the Pacific, I am afraid we should not have public funds left for any other purpose. Neither America nor ourselves is put to any material expense in the matter of international frontier cost for armed purposes.

Improvement of St. Lawrence Waterway.

A somewhat broader boundary question, involving the possibility of joint Governmental action, has been raised by the advocates of an elaborate improvement scheme on the St. Lawrence which would permit large ocean-going vessels to pass to the head of the Lakes, and incidentally would develop great quantities of electric power. The heavy freight rates on farm products have aroused a strong feeling in support of any feasible means of lowering transportation costs. A joint commission was appointed some time ago to enquire into the feasibility and cost of the plan, and the advisability of joint contribution by the two countries. We were recently asked by the United States Government if we were prepared to enter into an agreement to carry out the recommendations of the Commission. We have thus far declined to take up the proposal, but the desirability of appointing a joint Board to report to the respective Governments upon the practical application of the recommendations of the Commission is under consideration.

Postal Convention with United States.

A comprehensive revision of the postal convention between the United States and Canada was effected this past year by the efforts of the Postmasters-General of the two countries, Mr. Hubert Work and Mr. Charles Murphy. It has put the postal relations of the two countries on a very efficient and satisfactory basis.

Canadian Representation at Washington.

During Sir Robert Borden's term of office, an agreement was reached between the British, Canadian and United States Governments for the appointment of a Canadian representative at Washington. No appointment was made during Sir Robert's term of office or that of his successor, Mr. Meighen, and no appointment has thus far been made by the present Government. We shall probably suggest some revision of the original agreement, particularly in the way of omitting the provision that in the absence of the British Ambassador the Canadian Minister should take charge of the Embassy. I might add that I recently spoke with General Sir Arthur Currie about the possibility of the Government securing him for the post of Canadian

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62625

Minister at Washington. He has informed me that personal and financial factors would prevent his acceptance should the position be formally offered to him. The matter stands in that way at the present time.

Settlement of Fishery Questions.

The regulation of our fishery resources has, as usual, raised some difficult points.

Negotiations have been under way for some years looking to a closer regulation of the salmon fisheries of the Pacific Coast. It has not yet been found possible to secure agreement, largely owing to the attitude of the salmon canners in the State of Washington. We are in hopes, however, that an agreement will be effected before long.

Halibut Treaty.

The threatened depletion of the halibut fisheries on the same coast has been met, on the initiative of the United States, by an agreement between the two Governments concerned. The agreement provides for the establishment of a close season during the winter spawning season—November to February—and the establishment of a joint scientific Board to study the life history of the halibut and make further recommendations as may be required for its preservation. The treaty was signed on the 2nd March, by Plenipotentiaries representing the parties. Mr. Hughes for the United States, and Mr. Lapointe, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, to whom at our request, conveyed through the British Government, Full Powers had been issued by His Majesty. The treaty was then laid before the United States Senate, which was to come to the end of its statutory term on the 4th March, and approved by that body. At the last moment, on the suggestion of a Senator from Washington, and in pursuance of the custom which is oddly termed "senatorial courtesy," a reservation was added providing that "none of the nationals and inhabitants and vessels of any other part of Great Britain shall engage in halibut fishing contrary to any of the provisions of this treaty." While, as a matter of fact, no other British nationals have taken part in these fisheries, or are likely to do so, Canada did not desire to undertake on their behalf that they should so act. The Canadian Government was, therefore, unwilling to accept this reservation. The Parliament of Canada has given its approval to the treaty apart from the reservation and has passed an Act, to come into effect by Proclamation, forbidding all persons to fish for halibut in our territorial waters during the closed season, forbidding Canadian nationals to fish in prohibited waters beyond the territorial limit, and barring the use of our ports by any persons as a fishing base during the closed season, which under the conditions existing there will effectively bar any operations. Since we arrived in London, information has been received through the British Embassy that the Under-Secretary of State of the United States has stated confidentially that the President had agreed, as we anticipated, to reintroduce the Halibut Treaty as originally signed, without Senator Jones' reservation, and that the presumption was that it would pass. In the meantime, the beginning of the close season will be postponed until next year.

We are setting apart, I think, a special time for the discussion of treaties, and perhaps I should not go further into the Halibut Treaty matter at this moment; perhaps, however, it might clear up a misconception in the minds of some of the members present as to the significance of our action in negotiating an agreement with the United States over the conservation of halibut, were I to point out at once the real character of the subject-matter of the treaty. It relates entirely to the conservation of the halibut in the Pacific Coast waters of the United States and Canada. It is as much to our interest as to the interest of the United States, as much to their interest as ours, that we should try to conserve the halibut, and the most effective way is to bring about an agreement between the two of us that neither of us will permit fishing from our ports in those waters during a certain close season. I have seen the question asked, what will be done if the United States does not carry this out; whom will Canada look to to see that the treaty is enforced? A question of this kind reveals a lack of appreciation of the subject-matter and the purpose. Of course, if the United States do not carry out their part

C 62626

we will not carry out ours, and *vice versâ*; both of us will be losers; we shall lose some of our fish, a valuable resource; the whole Empire will lose to that extent, inasmuch as some of its resources will be depleted in part, but the factor that would compel enforcement of that treaty is the one referred to by the President—the obvious mutual interest of the two countries to see that it is carried out. Let me make this also clear, that by no conceivable construction could it be shown that any other part of the British Empire would be affected in any adverse way by our action. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland—no part of the British Dominions could be other than helped by the agreement we have made. Their rights are in no way affected; the rights of the British Isles, the citizens of the British Isles, are in no way affected. I might further point out this, that, had we wished so to do, we could have referred—and I speak of this more particularly in connection with the signing of the treaty—we could have referred the whole subject-matter of this treaty to the Joint Commission to which I have just made reference, and asked its members to deal with it. Had they dealt with it under the powers which have been given to them, three of the citizens of the United States and three of the citizens of Canada—or rather the chairman on each side—could have signed that agreement and it would have had the same force as the signatures of the Ministers which are on it at the present time. In other words, two gentlemen, neither of whom has any powers other than those they derive from the Governments themselves, could have done all that has been done by a Canadian Minister and an American Minister in signing the treaty. It is perhaps as well to mention those points at once, as apparently, judging from what I have seen in the press of comments from different parts, there appears to be a fear that we in Canada have sought in some way to invade the rights of other parts of the British Empire.

Revision of Rush–Bagot Agreement.

One of the most far-sighted international actions to which either Great Britain or the United States has been a party was the conclusion of the Rush–Bagot Agreement in 1817, to restrict naval armament on the Great Lakes. The agreement provided that the armament by either country on the border lakes should not exceed four 100-ton vessels, armed with 18-pounders, I think one 18-pounder each. This understanding has unquestionably contributed greatly to the prevention of a competition in armament, and to the maintenance of a 3,000-mile frontier practically without a fort. The agreement has become obsolete, however, so far as the details of construction are concerned. The United States Government, usually after request, but occasionally without notification, has stationed there vessels, which, though small and lightly armed at first, have gradually been increased in size and efficiency until they now number from fifteen to twenty. They are used as training ships for the naval militia of the States bordering on the Great Lakes. The Canadian Government has had no doubt that this was their sole purpose, but felt the danger of misunderstandings and recriminations. The pressure of shipbuilding firms on the Great Lakes to secure naval contracts had also to be taken into account.

After considering these and other points laid before us by our naval advisers, the Government reached the conclusion that the matter should not be allowed to drift. Accordingly, in July 1922, my colleague, Mr. Graham, at the time Minister of National Defence, and I visited Washington and discussed the question with Secretary Hughes and President Harding. Our reception was very satisfactory, and it was agreed that the best solution would be to prepare a draft treaty which would preserve the full spirit and effect of the agreement of over a hundred years ago, but would adapt its principles to present-day conditions. I may add that the British Embassy cordially co-operated with us and greatly assisted in facilitating our interviews. On our return our technical officers prepared a draft treaty. We then, in August, sent a copy of this treaty to the British Government, asking for any comment and suggestion, particularly of a technical character, concerning the safeguards that should be incorporated. The Prime Minister responded on the 19th October, expressing entire sympathy with our proposals for revision, and offering valuable technical considerations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62627

A draft was then sent to Washington. In May of this year the United States replied, accepting some articles and proposing substitutes for others. We desire to take advantage of being in London on this occasion to discuss the matter further before taking final action. The prospects are excellent for a limitation which will be reasonable and effective.

I might say, in regard to what is proposed, that we have new problems of police on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River which arise out of the prohibition laws of the United States and some of our own Provinces, that will necessitate possibly putting police vessels on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. There are additional difficulties in enforcing the revenue laws of the respective countries, and we have to come to some definite understanding as to how far we will permit any kind of armament for these two purposes, revenue and policing. We will have no difficulty with the United States in reaching an understanding, as whatever is done will be with our knowledge and with our approval. I think we can work out an agreement wholly satisfactory in that line. Then, in regard to shipbuilding, during the period of the war a number of shipbuilding concerns at the head of the Great Lakes found that they might develop a profitable industry in the matter of building small warships; the Americans have sometimes a real difficulty in controlling their people, particularly where these large industries are concerned, and it may be that we will have to work out with a little more care what should be permitted to those shipbuilding companies in the way of the building of the ship itself, apart from any armament to be placed on it in other waters. There again, I believe we can work out with them an arrangement which will be satisfactory to both of us. As matters now stand, however, while the Rush–Bagot Agreement in name is being quoted and held up to the world as a great example, and to a large extent the spirit of the agreement is kept, the letter is being violated to a considerable degree, and it seems to us that we should revise that agreement in a form which will preserve its spirit and its effectiveness, but which will meet the necessities of the new situations that have arisen.

United States Tariff.

The United States tariff changes of the past two years have been distinctly protectionist, and have hampered Canadian trade, particularly in agricultural commodities. There is no prospect of immediate improvement. It is possible, however, that the Democrats will seek to make a downward revision of the tariff the main issue in the election of 1924, and there are signs that the Western farmer, in whose supposed interest the tariff was raised, is realising it has availed him little; the organiser of the farm *bloc*—Gray Silver—has recently pointed out that the United States farmer gained rather than lost by the import of Canadian Western cattle, which were really stockers and feeders well adapted for finishing on the corn lands of the States.

Coal and Pulpwood.

The possibility of an embargo on shipments of coal to Canada during the recurrent coal strikes has been imminent, but fortunately has been averted. We are trying to develop imports of Welsh coal to lessen our dependence on Pennsylvania anthracite. On the other hand, the Canadian Government has been strongly urged to place an embargo on the export of pulpwood to the United States, and the question is now being investigated by a Royal Commission.

The two points I have just mentioned help to illustrate the kind of difficulties that might very quickly develop a serious situation, unless they were handled by those on the spot who appreciate their significance. We depend during our winters, in large part, upon the coal we receive from the United States. They have been hard put to it, on account of strikes, to get sufficient coal for their own people. They have been generous in their treatment towards us. I really think the Government of the United States have gone out of their way to try and help us, in every particular, in the supply of coal for the winter.

Now we come to this matter, to the depletion of our forests through the export of pulpwood, and there we are up against this, that the United States newspapers are practically dependent upon our forests. Mr. Hughes told me in conversation

C 62628

the other day that from representations which had been made to him it would appear that if we stop the supply of pulpwood summarily within a year the Dailies of the United States would have to cease publication (laughter) and we can imagine the kind of stir there might be expected through action of that kind.

Position of Canada.

I mention these facts simply to illustrate what I am going to speak of, perhaps more particularly near the end of this review, why in Canada we feel very strongly that in these matters of international relations we must to some extent have a foreign policy of our own, if I may use that expression in this connexion—not a policy necessarily distinct from the policy of the British Empire—rather, I should perhaps say, we feel that we cannot confine our rights of self-government to matters of a purely domestic character, but that any questions which we have with our neighbours, or with others, which are matters of immediate and direct concern to each of us, we must have freedom in negotiating and settling. May I say at once that I do not wish to imply that we have thus far experienced any handicap or restriction from the British Government in any particular in this matter?

Liquor Traffic.

The existence of legal prohibition of liquor traffic in the United States has put a premium on the smuggling of liquor from Canada. Recently the United States has requested a Conference with our Customs Authorities to discuss means of checking clearances. The situation is complicated by the variation in the laws of our various provinces, six having prohibition themselves and three permitting sale under Government control or through Government agencies, and also by variations in the attitude of the provincial Attorneys-General, who are responsible for the enforcement of the local regulations. A conference between officials of the United States Government and our own has been arranged for November.

There again an illustration is afforded of what I tried to indicate a moment ago. This matter of clearing from our ports shipments of liquor has reference more particularly to Customs Regulations. That is something which is of immediate concern to our Government and to the Government of the United States. I do not think it is a matter of any particular concern to any other part of the British Empire. There we would feel, and I should be inclined to think all parts of the Empire would feel, that we should deal with that purely local situation ourselves. It is a matter that relates to the North American Continent.

Three-Mile Limit.

On the other hand, when it comes to the question of the 3-mile limit and proposals for extension to a 12-mile limit, we would recognise in a moment that here is something which affects the entire British Empire, here is a matter which is of concern to all of us. It involves a new principle and so we would not think in any way of expressing a final opinion or, so far as we are concerned, attempting to deal in any final way with that situation, without the closest co-operation with the other parts. Indeed, I should think, on a question as large as that, we should feel that the decision should be made here, and made in the light of views expressed by representatives of all parts of the Empire.

Inter-relations of Canada and United States.

In completing this hasty review of our relations with the United States, I might refer to the very true observation which Lord Curzon made on Friday as to the power of the West in United States politics. The same thing is observable and increasingly true in Canada; the prairie provinces are coming to hold the balance of power. They are largely influenced by the same factors which influence the Western States. In fact our neighbourhood to the United States is a factor which comes into nearly every equation of ours. It has a direct bearing on the question of our policy towards Europe. There is no question that, if the United States persists in its policy of isolation, and if we were to go to the other extreme of assuming daily responsibility for settling the affairs of Europe, the result

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62639

would be a distinct growth of Continental sentiment which would have grave danger for the Empire and afford a renewed stimulus to emigration to the United States. That is a consideration which may be overruled. If a great and clear call of duty comes, Canada will respond, whether or no the United States responds, as she did in 1914, but it is a most important consideration against intervention in lesser issues.

True Basis for Foreign Relations of Empire.

May I say, Prime Minister, that, in what I am now going to take up, I feel the great wisdom of what Lord Curzon said at the outset, as to the importance of the truth in all matters which we are here to discuss. It would be very pleasant and easy for me to say that Canada would do this or would do that as occasion arises, but ill-considered statements will not help in what we here are all most concerned about, namely, laying the basis of the British Empire in an enduring fashion and furthering the development of its strength. Whatever I have to say will have that end primarily in view. I think we should differ, some of us who have discussed these questions in our own countries, as to how our objects can best be effected, but I will give to this gathering what my colleagues and myself believe to be the basis on which foreign relations can be most satisfactorily worked out.

Relations with Far East.

Just before I touch that, however, I have a note which deals with the Orient. I am following Lord Curzon's example in travelling about the world. So far as the Orient is concerned our relations are mainly on the question of immigration. There our policy has been in every way in our power to relieve the possibility of friction between the peoples of the Orient and ourselves, to let them understand that we appreciate their difficulties, and on the other hand to prevent difficulties arising in our own country which might create a very serious situation abroad. We can take it, I think, for granted that it will not help to solve any difficulty in any part of the Empire by creating a new difficulty in another part. The more we can circumscribe the difficulties that exist the better.

Japanese Immigration.

To come to Japan. The one problem there is that of immigration. Some years ago we adopted the plan of trying to work out an agreement which would allow the Japanese themselves, in accordance with their expressed wish, to restrict the numbers of their coolie labourers coming to our country. In the consideration of this question throughout it was the economic phase we had in mind; it was not the question of race, but a matter of maintaining a certain economic standard for our industrial population. Once the Japanese fully appreciated what our difficulty was, they expressed a willingness themselves to limit their numbers. They did not wish, however, to tell their own people how far they were limiting their numbers. An agreement was reached through the co-operation of the British Foreign Minister in Japan to the effect that immigration from Japan would be limited for certain classes, and a very definite number was fixed. The numbers were brought down to a few hundreds. These Orientals have the capacity for increasing their numbers once they get into the country. The children of Japanese and Chinese families on the whole are much more numerous in British Columbia than are the children of white families. The people of British Columbia—I speak of that province particularly—are very much alarmed over this situation, and have demanded that we should absolutely prohibit Japanese immigration, notwithstanding the numbers admitted each year are small. I have had something to do with this question and I think I appreciate its difficulties. I ventured to take the position very strongly that if we could avoid legislation altogether we should be helping in maintaining good relations with Japan. The thing the Japanese Government fears most is invidious legislation. The only way to avoid it was to get the Japanese to make further restrictions. We happen to have in Ottawa as the representative of the Japanese Consular Service—there is no diplomatic service represented there—a very good man with whom personally I have friendly relations,

c 62630

and I explained to him very thoroughly the position we were in, that unless we could get a guarantee that the Japanese Government would further restrict their numbers we would have to pass restrictive legislation. After personal conferences and an exchange of communications with his Government, he said that he thought I could be sure the Japanese Government would limit the number of labourers to 150 a year. With this assurance, I felt justified in mentioning in Parliament that I saw no necessity for any legislation. We shall let the facts speak for themselves; if in another year the numbers are what we expect they will be, probably the necessity for legislation will disappear altogether; so at the present time we have left the matter of immigration from Japan to Canada in that position.

Chinese Immigration.

In regard to the Chinese we have had what seems to many of us an undesirable system of restricting their numbers by imposing a head tax of 500 dollars a head. It meant that many were sold into virtual slavery. They came into Canada to work under contract. At any rate, the tax has not had the effect of restricting their numbers. They have come in in very large numbers. This year we passed legislation doing away with the obnoxious head tax altogether but made arrangements between China and Canada virtually similar to those between Japan and Canada. We prohibit altogether certain classes coming into the country and allow others, subject to restriction of classes and numbers, to come in on a passport basis. We are attempting more and more so to arrange matters as to ensure that before men leave their own country they are fit and entitled to come into ours; thereby endeavouring to prevent a number of them coming across and having to be sent back through one disappointing reason or another.

Status of Indians.

With regard to India, I understand we are going to discuss a little later the question of franchise of Indians in Canada, so I will leave that for the moment. I would just mention that we had the pleasure of a visit from Mr. Sastri last year. The Government did what it could to further Mr. Sastri's mission, and we welcomed his speaking publicly in all parts of the Dominion, to make clear to our people the concern of the people of India in our dealing with this question. We invited him into a meeting of our Cabinet and talked to him intimately and freely of the different considerations of which we had to take account, and we sought to have him feel that we were quite as anxious as he was, in so far as it was possible for us at all to do so, to solve this difficult problem. I will have more to say about that later.

Commercial Treaties with France and Italy.

Now in regard to Europe. The two factors of immediate interest in the last two years have been the commercial treaties we have made with France and Italy. Agreements have been concluded securing minimum terms on the most important Canadian products in return for our intermediate tariff rates on certain French and Italian goods.

Relations of Various Parts of Empire in Foreign Policy.

From this brief survey of some of the external affairs which have occupied the attention of the Canadian Government during the past two years, I may now pass to some general considerations as to the relations of the different parts of the Empire on questions of foreign policy. I have thought it well to bring this matter up at once, because it arises out of the remarks of the Foreign Secretary on Friday, and, if we are going to discuss any further phases of it, it will perhaps present our point of view. The question is involved in the Foreign Secretary's opening remark as to our coming here to assist in carrying on "the foreign policy which is not that of these islands alone, but that of the Empire," but it has been raised many times and in more specific fashion.

Public opinion in Canada was surprised some time ago by a statement of the late Prime Minister, Mr. D. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons in December 1921 to the effect that the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Q 62631

position of the Dominions in reference to foreign affairs had been revolutionised since 1917, that the Dominions had been given equal rights with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire, that the instrument of this policy was, and must remain, the British Foreign Office, and that the advantage to Britain was that such joint control involved joint responsibility.

If any such sweeping and general agreement as Mr. Lloyd George assumes has been made, implying, if it means anything, that all the foreign affairs of the whole Empire are to be carried on through a single channel, the people of Canada have no knowledge of it. This arrangement has never been sanctioned by our Parliament. It may be sufficient to quote a comment made by Sir Clifford Sifton, who, it may be recalled, organised the campaign against the Laurier Government on Reciprocity in 1911, and the campaign for conscription in 1917:—

> "This statement is rather startling after Sir John Macdonald and Sir Charles Tupper, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Robert Borden for fifty years have asserted the right of Canada to have no military or financial responsibility for a war, unless her Parliament voluntarily takes on that responsibility. We now find the Prime Minister of Great Britain making the statement that we have entered into an arrangement by which we assume responsibility for the wars of Great Britain all over the world in return for being consulted . . . . Premiers drift into London . . . . no one very sure what is decided . . . . and the Dominions become jointly responsible for everything the British Foreign Office does in every part of the world.
>
> "I consider it an entirely impossible arrangement. I think it a complete abandonment of the theory of Dominion autonomy as it has developed for fifty years. The people of Canada have never agreed to any such arrangement, and in my judgment they never will. I think the people of Canada will demand that responsibility for engaging in any war or contributing to it shall rest exclusively with the Parliament of Canada."

General Smuts: Who are you quoting from?

Mr. Mackenzie King: From Sir Clifford Sifton, formerly a member of the Government of Canada. Sir Clifford has been giving a number of public addresses in Canada, and these statements seem more precisely than any other I have yet read to present the point of view of our country, as I understand Canadian opinion, on the question of foreign policy.

Lord Curzon: I suppose he spoke without official authority, did he, though he is an influential and powerful person?

Mr. Mackenzie King: That is quite right, Lord Curzon. I am merely quoting his speech as an illustration of a view widely held. Speaking after conference with my colleagues in the Cabinet, we would feel that those statements substantially express the Canadian Government's view.

Implications of Phrase "Foreign Policy of the British Empire."

May I take a few minutes to examine briefly into the implications of both halves of a phrase frequently used, "the foreign policy of the British Empire"? As to foreign policy (the sum of those dealings or relationships or policies which the Government of one country carries on in connection with other countries), a few observations may be hazarded. May I say that I speak with very great deference? My reason for presenting these views is that there may be no mistake in appreciating our particular position. If we are wrong in that position, I hope, as the result of the Conference here, we will see our mistake. On the other hand, it may be that in using phrases such as "foreign policy" there are different things in the minds of each of us. As I have tried to make clear, we have the moment we go beyond our own boundary to deal with a neighbour next door to us, and so we must have a foreign policy. We must meet him either with a smile or with a frown in the relations we are going to have. Take the whole question of International Agreements between the two Governments, such as the work of the Joint International Commission—that is an expression

Q 62632

of our foreign policy. It is true it is a part of the foreign policy of the British Empire, as it is acquiesced in by the others. In one sense we are prepared to agree that the policy of Great Britain is the policy of the British Empire, but what we want to know is how far the obligations arising out of that policy are material and how far they extend in reference to ourselves.

Foreign policy, I take it, is in a large measure an extension of domestic policy. It depends upon the balance of social and political forces, upon the industrial organisation, upon the racial aspirations, upon the whole background of the people's life. As an illustration I may refer to a matter briefly touched upon by the Foreign Secretary on Friday—the attitude of the United States as to the seizure of liquor on ships in territorial waters or hovering outside the presently recognised territorial limit. This attitude arose out of the policy of prohibition adopted as a domestic policy without any thought of the international complications which it might involve later. So, in the same matters, with ourselves; some provinces in Canada have adopted prohibition, some have rejected it. It makes a great deal of difference in our relations with the United States what the precise policy of each province is upon this matter. Again, foreign affairs nowadays have to do very largely with economic questions—trade, tariff, coal or oil or railway concessions, international debts, immigration, fishery or power or navigation rights in boundary waters, &c.

They are largely neighbours' disputes, naturally arising most frequently with the countries which have most intercourse with it.

The question whether a certain matter in dispute will lead to war is frequently not so much a question of the character of the specific issue as of the spirit and traditions and supposed general interests of the countries concerned.

The British Empire, again, is not a single community, homogeneous, concentrated, with uniform neighbours, problems, needs. It is a league of peoples plus an Empire; it covers all the Seven Seas; it includes communities of every conceivable stage of civilisation, every variety of resources, every range of neighbours, every combination of problems and interests. The more advanced of these communities have developed rapidly in numbers and trade and international intercourse; they have developed relations with other countries varying with their situation; they have developed distinct problems in external as well as in home affairs, a distinct national consciousness, distinct Parliaments and Governments to control their affairs. Some problems are distinct and primarily concern only one or a group of these Empire States; some are of common interest or common menace, and concern the whole Empire and it alone, some are of still wider implications and concern all or a great region of the world, whether organised in permanent Leagues of Nations or in temporary conferences, or not organised at all.

Given then these conditions—given wide scattered communities within the British Empire growing steadily in numbers, in intercourse with the world, and in the habit of self-government; given the growth of problems and difficulties especially with neighbouring countries; given the diversity of conditions and of interest and of knowledge which makes these problems in many cases distinct in each country—it is inevitable that each of these communities should seek to control those foreign affairs which concern it primarily.

This is obviously true, and has long been true of the United Kingdom. Its foreign affairs have been of such overshadowing importance—it is on the verge of a crowded and troublesome and uneasy continent, it is the greatest trading nation in history, it has dependencies, protectorates, coaling-stations, in every quarter of the globe—that they have in the past been practically identical with the foreign affairs of the whole British Empire, and are still, and must long remain, immensely more important and complicated than the distinctive foreign affairs of any other part of the Empire.

It is increasingly true also of the Dominions. In this field Canada has naturally been most active, as the oldest federation and as the community which, next to the United Kingdom, is in most intimate and constant intercourse with powerful neighbours, preeminently with one great neighbour. It is unnecessary to review

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62633

the process by which Canada has steadily widened the range of foreign affairs with which she deals through her own Parliament and Government; trade, tariffs, immigration, boundary disputes as to power, navigation or fisheries and other questions which half a century ago were considered beyond her jurisdiction, are now unquestionably matters for her own decision, as my opening observations concretely indicated.

Clearly, then, as regards this wide and growing range of foreign affairs, the Dominions, or some of them, now possess control, and determine the policy to be followed.

Right of each Part of Empire to Control its own Affairs.

It is not possible that this evolution which has proceeded steadily and with increasing acceptance for more than two generations should now be reversed, that Great Britain or Canada should decide Australia's trade policy or that South Africa should determine whether Canada shall join with the United States in the development of the proposed St. Lawrence waterway. Self-government means the right of each part of the Empire to control its own affairs, whether those affairs are domestic or foreign, or both. That is the principle on which this Empire has been maintained, that is its unique and distinctive contribution to the world, that is the principle which has been tested in fire of late years and not found wanting. I can hardly think that anyone would now propose that it be abandoned. I repeat, Canada has perhaps been more active than other of the newer parts of the Empire in assuming direction of such foreign affairs as distinctly affect her own interests. This is an outcome partly of our longer history, but much more of geography; the outcome of the fact that for 3,000 miles we lie side by side with a great foreign country which is yet of English speech, and with which our people have constant and unending business and social intercourse. Possibly, if we were in the position of some of the other Dominions, we would regard the question somewhat differently; possibly, if they were in our position, they would take the stand that we do. We are not asking that these differences be overlooked, or that the same policy be adopted by Dominions which differ in their circumstances.

I may say that, listening to the discussion of the questions that come up here, I have been more and more impressed with the part that geographical situation plays in determining the point of view in many of these matters. When I heard General Smuts the other day refer to matters that concern him in Africa and Egypt, and when I thought of the route that he and his colleagues have had to take in coming from Africa to Britain, I could see that many questions might arise in the area between London and South Africa which for him could not be satisfactorily solved without considering many aspects of British foreign relations with countries between here and there; and, similarly, perhaps in a more far-reaching manner in the case of Mr. Massey and Mr. Bruce in coming from Australasia. This aspect of means of personal and trade communication between Britain and Australia or New Zealand, and the consequences arising out of it, brings to the fore the whole question of their possible desire to express views about British foreign policy as it relates to any of those countries which they must pass in a way which does not come up at all so far as Canada is concerned. That has to be considered, because, after all, the people themselves are the ones who are doing the thinking on these questions, and it is not sufficient that those of us who have the privilege of attending this Conference should have views as individuals. We should, in all we express, indicate the views of the people we represent; they are the most concerned about the matters of which we are speaking. It would be simply ludicrous for me to say, for example, that the people of Canada have, as a whole, given any thought to some of the matters which are perhaps of vital concern to General Smuts—they have not. It is in the nature of things that they could not, neither could General Smuts, nor Mr. Massey, nor Mr. Bruce, in such a matter as the development of the Chicago Canal or the level of our Great Lakes express opinions representative of the views of their people who would be likely to be interested in such matters.

If it is not possible or desirable that Great Britain or other Dominions should control these foreign affairs which are distinctly

C62634

of primary concern to one Dominion, so it is equally impossible and undesirable for the Dominions to seek to control those foreign affairs which primarily affect Great Britain. Her geographical situation, her foreign trade, the enterprise of her investors, create many relations, interests, problems which are primarily her concern and which have intimate connection with her domestic problems. As to those affairs, the Dominions have not the knowledge, the direct interest, the responsibility, which would warrant their seeking control. Great Britain also is entitled to claim self-government.

Need for Consultation on Fundamental Issues.

Each part of the Empire, then, has its own sphere. But at certain points the arcs cut, the interests become common. There are issues which are of fundamental concern to all parts of the Empire; and with these all parts of the Empire must deal; the Governments of the Empire must confer; the Parliaments of the Empire, if need be, must decide.

It is true that there is no clear cut and enduring line of demarcation between these fields, between those foreign affairs which are of primary concern to one part of the Empire and those which are of joint concern. No foreign question affecting one part of the Empire is without its influence on other parts, however small and indirect that influence may be, but it is equally true that no domestic affair of one part of the Empire, no foreign problem of any foreign country, is without some bearing on the fortunes of the rest of the Empire and the world. It is a question of degree. Again, issues which were primarily of concern to one part may grow to vast proportions and afford a menace or an opportunity that has substantial concern for all parts; if so, it can then be dealt with by all concerned. In drawing the lines there will inevitably be difficulties, but goodwill and commonsense and experience will settle these as they have in the past.

Again, were it considered desirable to establish a unified foreign policy on all issues, it would not be practicable.

No scheme has been worked out, no scheme, I venture to say, can be worked out, by which each part of the Empire can be not only informed but consulted as to all the relations of every other part of the Empire with foreign countries, and a really joint policy worked out. The range is too vast, the situation too kaleidoscopic, the interests too diverse, the preoccupation of each Government with its own affairs or its own existence too absorbing, to make this possible. We must face facts. It is possible to consult on matters of overwhelming and enduring common interest; it is not possible to consult on the great range of matters of individual and shifting concern.

Concern of Parliaments and Peoples in Foreign Policy.

A further questionable feature of the Empire one-foreign-policy theory is that it ignores the necessity for associating the Parliaments and peoples in the decision of foreign policy. Granted that a measure of secrecy is essential in the course of negotiations, granted that the conduct of affairs must rest largely with an experienced and specialised executive department, still it is true that it is not desirable for any Dominion or for the Empire that vital issues of foreign policy should be determined decisively in a small executive or Conference group. The problem of foreign policy is not settled when provision is made for bringing Prime Ministers together. Each Prime Minister must on important issues secure the backing of his Parliament and his people.

May I say, Prime Minister, the reason I have spoken as I have here to-day is primarily the one I have already referred to, the desire to face the truth regardless of how it may affect the feelings of any of us, and also in part because I feel that if we are to render any service to each other we must let each other know very frankly what we can do and what we cannot do; what we may expect and what we have no right or reason to expect. There are many things right in principle which are not possible in practice. I was struck in looking over the 1921 Conference report by a remark made by Lord Curzon in regard to what had been the view taken in England as to what should be done with the Kaiser and certain of the German war criminals. It was right in principle that they should be tried,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62636

and I think Lord Curzon mentioned that, but he also stated that where a short-sighted attitude had been taken, and where the Government was in the wrong, was in assuming that it could be done. If there is one thing above another which must have impressed all of us it is the deplorable condition in which ex-President Wilson has brought himself and his country in view of the part he took at the Versailles Conference. President Wilson went there with high ideals, believing in certain principles which he thought were right; he did his utmost to have certain views accepted, and he had them accepted, but he left out of account one factor of vital concern, namely, the extent to which the people of the United States were behind him. I do not wish to come to the Conference and say to the gentlemen gathered round this table, "Yes, Canada will do this and Canada believes that," unless I am sure that I can say the same thing in Canada on my return and get the same amount of applause there as I do here. That is the sole reason I have for dwelling at such length on this question of foreign policy. We must speak here in regard to the extent to which we are going to be able, through our Parliaments and by our appeal to the people, to make good every single undertaking we give and every implication for which we are responsible.

Recent International Conferences.

I must say just a word about International Conferences. When we came into office the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments was being held at Washington. Sir Robert Borden was representing Canada. His report was made to the Government, and later I would like to draw the attention of the members of this Conference to two or three of its pages, more particularly where Sir Robert Borden sets forth his views on the matter of treaties. It is a point of view I think we all hold in common.

At Genoa and at The Hague we were represented. We had been invited to be present at these Conferences and, considering their nature, we felt it would perhaps be not only of interest and benefit to ourselves, but also to others if we were represented there. At Lausanne we were not represented; we were not invited. We took and we take no exception to not being invited. We felt that the matters that were being discussed there were not of the same immediate and direct interest to ourselves as they were to those who were represented at the Conference and we have no exception to take to the course that was adopted.

Near Eastern Crisis, September 1922.

In referring to the Lausanne Conference, perhaps I should say just a word or two about the circumstances surrounding the manner in which we were asked if we would like to associate ourselves with the British Government in its policy towards the Near East, and, in particular, if we would participate by sending a contingent. I mention this because I think it shows the great necessity for our working out, with a little more care and caution than has thus far been exercised, the means by which communications are to pass between the different Governments concerned. The first intimation I had that Canada was being asked to participate in a situation as serious as that in the Near East was when a press reporter came and showed me a despatch which he alleged had been given out by the British Government and asked what Canada was going to do in this matter. I did not wish to embarrass the situation by saying I had not received any communication from the British Government whatever on the situation in the Near East, and I fell back on a phrase I had frequently used in a previous political campaign, that it was not a one-man Government, that when I had had a chance of conferring with my colleagues we would decide what action we would take. I then communicated with Ottawa—I was away at the time in my own constituency—to find out if any communication had been received from the British Government, and none had been received at the time I communicated. This was on Saturday. On Sunday morning I came down immediately to Ottawa; I went to my office and ascertained that a communication had been received at noon on the previous day by the Governor-General's Secretary, the communications coming, of course, in that way. It had to be decyphered, and it came to my office during the latter part of

c 62636

Saturday afternoon. But in the meantime the entire press of the country, the Saturday afternoon press, had the alarmist appeal that there was likely to be war in the Near East and that New Zealand had already undertaken to send a contingent. When I called my colleagues together on the following Monday we all felt that until we had more in the way of information it would not be wise to say to what extent we were prepared to associate ourselves with the policy of the British Government. As to participation in any war by the sending of troops, as a Government we felt that Parliament must decide on that point, and I communicated accordingly. Lord Curzon spoke on Friday of the despatches and telegrams which we had been receiving from the Foreign Office. I am inclined to think that there is a doubtful value to be attached to them. They have been helpful in some particulars, but, if I may cite this case, a reference to the despatches will indicate that a couple of weeks prior to the telegram being sent, to which I have just referred, one despatch indicated that the crisis in the Near East seemed to have passed, that there was not much danger of any trouble arising of a serious character. That was the last despatch I had to place before the Cabinet before the telegram referring to possible participation in a war. These despatches come in in a bundle a week or two after the events to which they refer, and actually the information we had at that time on the Near East situation would seem to indicate that there was no crisis.

Lord Curzon: You get telegrams.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Since then, Lord Curzon, we have been receiving telegrams in regard to the Lausanne Conference and some other questions. At that time we did not; at that time we were not receiving daily telegrams. We were receiving the printed despatches which came by mail and which reached us a couple of weeks afterwards, sometimes even later.

Lord Curzon: You know, of course, Mr. Mackenzie King, that the particular manifesto to which you are referring was not a normal occurrence, and that it was issued without the knowledge or approval of the Cabinet.

Mr. Mackenzie King: So I understand. I have no desire to do other than just present to the Conference some of the embarrassments we had at the moment, and I raise the point more with a view of indicating what we may wish to consider later on very carefully, namely, the best means to be adopted as between the Governments concerned of being informed on questions which are likely to be of real concern to us all.

I want, however, at this moment to say a word about the great care that should be exercised in respect to issuing any statements from the British Government or departments of Government to the peoples of the Dominions over the heads, so to speak, of the Governments concerned. I think whatever is to be done with regard to our affairs must be done through our own Government. It will certainly create all kinds of difficulties were a practice to be adopted of having memoranda or appeals sent out from any department of the British Government to the Dominions which had not received in the first instance the authorisation of the Government of the Dominion concerned.

European Situation.

Now just a word in conclusion about the general attitude towards Europe.

The Dominions are undoubtedly concerned in the present situation. Their material interests, their humanitarian interests, their interest in the preservation of peace and of fair and honest dealing among nations, make it impossible to say we are not concerned. In fact, no part of the world, whether within or without the Empire, can be without concern, though there may be, and are, wide differences in degree.

The practical question, however, is whether any effective remedy for the situation is within our reach, and whether our peoples are agreed upon the value and the necessity of this remedy. Because our interests are prejudiced by the situation it does not follow that it can be set right at once, or that the setting right is to come from outside. This is particularly true in view of the fact that

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c62637

much of the disturbance is internal rather than international, civil war, class war. the war of social creeds. The question for consideration is the practicability of any specific proposal, the balance of losses and gains, interpreting both, of course, in no narrowly materialistic sense.

As to the diagnosis of Europe's trouble, the British Government, supported by the dominant public opinion of the country, appears, while blaming Germany for much stupidity and lack of good faith, to place the main responsibility for the present unsettlement upon the chauvinistic ambitions and unscrupulous intrigues of France. I cannot say that there is any clear Canadian opinion on that point. A large portion of what may be called, in the general sense, liberal opinion is inclined to agree, and believes that the policy France has pursued is calculated to ensure neither her own security nor Europe's welfare. But there is also, so far as the question has been considered at all, a strong sympathy for France. I want to say that this remark has reference to the feeling we have in the light of the knowledge that we have of the European situation. I confess that since coming to England it has been a surprise to me to have heard the strong expressions about France's indifference to her obligations. The extent of that feeling has come as a shock to me. Little of that is known to the people of Canada. We are so remote from Europe; we have not the knowledge of the situation, and the view that our people take must continually be in the light of the knowledge that they have. I think there is a large body of Canadian opinion which feels that France has taken a mistaken course from the economic point of view in occupying the Ruhr as she has; that she has stood in her own light as well as in the light of what is best for Europe and the world. On the other hand, I believe that the preponderating sympathy of the people in Canada is still with France. They feel that, having been treated in the way that she was by Germany, no one can wonder at her attitude being extreme. It would be exceedingly difficult to get the people of Canada to feel that France was deserving of blame, and that it should be part of their duty to try and pass judgment upon her. Suspicion of Germany is still strong. We were led during the war to paint France 100 per cent. white, and Germany 100 per cent. black, and it is not easy to depropagandise a people. The curve is rather sharp. That, I think, broadly is the way in which the country generally would view the situation. Also, I may here mention this. Lord Curzon spoke of the American point of view, and mentioned that the Americans were filled with terror at being drawn into a European situation. I think that is perfectly true of the United States. I believe that is almost equally true of Canada. I am sure the people in the Dominion would view with great alarm the possibility of their being involved in any European situation at the present time. As to remedy, I gather from the statement of the Foreign Secretary that the British Government does not propose at this stage to suggest any definite plan of action, but rather to let France make the next move.

Our attitude is not one of unconditional isolation, nor is it one of unconditional intervention. It depends upon the specific situation in Europe and also in our own country. It would be worse than useless for the representatives of Canada here to pledge themselves to policies which may have no effective backing in the country.

Reparations.

As to reparations, in the narrower sense, Canada, I am sure, will not make her small share in the sums promised by Germany a stumbling-block to a solution. We are prepared to agree to a proportionate scaling-down of our allotted amount, if that will materially smooth the return of peace to a distracted continent.

Canadian Conception of Imperial Relations.

It is sometimes asserted that Canada or the Canadian Government has latterly put forward new principles of imperial relationship, and claimed special privileges in status. That is not the case. Canada is not putting forward any new principles, though, naturally, every new year and every new problem may make it necessary to apply the old principles in somewhat new fashion or in a wider range. Canada stands on the old principle of

c62638

responsible democracy. She still believes in democracy, in representative democracy, in the rule of the people through, in large part, their representatives in Parliament. She still believes in responsible government, self-government, the right of each part of the Empire, as it attains a fitting degree of strength and capacity and experience, to undertake the control of its own affairs. For seventy years our most honoured leaders have done what they could to develop the basic principle of responsible government, and to apply it in steadily increasing measure to the whole range of domestic and foreign affairs. That principle, which Canadians are proud to remember was, in notable measure, pioneered and developed by their leaders in the past, has proved itself beyond dispute in the testing times of these later years.

Canada desires no special privilege. We believe that the decision of Great Britain on any important public issue, domestic or foreign, should be made by the people of Britain, their representatives in Parliament, and the Government responsible to that Parliament. So the decision of Canada on any important issue, domestic or foreign, we believe should be made by the people of Canada, their representatives in Parliament, and the Government responsible to that Parliament. Some of these questions will be of direct concern to more than one part of the Empire, and in that case consultation, in formal conferences, like that of to-day, or in more informal discussion, is necessary to give the Government and Parliament and people of each country an understanding of the needs and point of view of the others, so that their decision can be made in the light of this knowledge and the sympathy that is born of knowledge.

I hope I have made it clear that in speaking for Canada as to what we feel should be the extent and scope of our rights in matters of government, whether they pertain to domestic or foreign affairs, I have had wholly in mind only the point of view of how to help to make the relations between all parts of the Empire of a character that will tend towards permanency of relations and the successful working out of a wise development in matters pertaining to foreign policy. Also, I hope I have made it clear that, while we do feel strongly that there are some matters which more immediately affect us than they do other parts of the Empire and over which we desire an immediate and direct control, nevertheless, we are equally appreciative of the fact that there are great common interests in which all of us have an equal concern and are equally ready to share.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Reply to Mr. Baldwin's Welcome.

Mr. Bruce: Prime Minister, I have, in the first place, to thank you very much for the welcome you have been good enough to offer to me and my colleague and to express our gratification that we are able to be here and to discuss these questions of very great moment to the Empire as a whole with the leaders of Great Britain and of the other Dominions. I regret very much that we were delayed and were not here at the beginning, and we appreciate the courtesy that was shown in holding back the final consideration of matters, as far as could be done, without delaying the Conference, and so enabling us to be present before any definite decisions were arrived at.

Interest of Australia in Foreign Policy.

To this matter that we have to discuss to-day, foreign policy, Australia attaches the very greatest possible importance, because the voice of the Parliament and of practically the whole of the people of Australia is in favour of world peace, and of Australia's efforts and the efforts of the whole Empire being directed towards trying to achieve that end. I agree very cordially with what Mr. Mackenzie King has said with regard to the great example that has been set to the world by Canada and America, whose common border extends for some 3,000 miles without any fortifications or any defensive measures at all; but I cannot say that I agree with some other things that Mr. Mackenzie King has said, and particularly I do not agree

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62639

with the view that he apparently takes, that there is nothing at all to be done, that in no questions of foreign policy should there be any real concerted Empire policy directed towards the attainment of a common end.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Excuse me; I hope my remarks were not capable of that interpretation.

Mr. Bruce: They left that impression on my mind, because there was certainly no suggestion as to reaching agreement here upon a policy of any sort which was to be the governing policy for the whole Empire; and the chief stress seemed to be placed on questions of local importance which the Dominions would naturally desire to handle for themselves.

Determination of Local Questions.

There are a number of questions with which every Dominion is faced, on which they are quite capable of coming to an unaided decision, and I do not know that there has ever been any sort of action by Britain which interfered with that in any way. We have to remember that the Empire has gradually evolved, and constitutional practice has been determined without laying down any hard and fast lines; and I am certain that, with regard to those matters of primary importance to a particular Dominion, we shall find in course of time that a solution will be found. But I rather gathered from what Mr. Mackenzie King said that his view was that the attitude we ought all to take up was more or less that of separate nations.

Need for Common Empire Policy.

I do not think, remembering the facts of the Empire and the relations in which we stand to the rest of the world, that we can maintain that position at all. The rest of the world regards us as one and indivisible, in our international aspect, and I think that we must all appreciate that point and—although we all claim a very full measure indeed of autonomy, and I think that Australia is just as determined to claim it as any other part of the Empire—we must recognise that we may be involved in obligations of the most serious character by reason of the action of some other part of the Empire, and particularly of Great Britain herself; and I would like to indicate to the Conference how the present feeling with regard to this matter has grown up in Australia. Prior to the war I do not think Australia took a very great interest in foreign policy. She regarded it as a matter that concerned Great Britain and for which Great Britain had to be responsible. We did, indeed, occasionally voice very definite opinions with regard to some major matters, and we also pointed out on some occasions that Great Britain did not appear to recognise the importance of questions which, in our view, were of great interest to the Dominion, but, generally speaking, we took no real part, and I do not think any of the Dominions took any real part, in the foreign policy of the Empire. I think we generally desired to place the whole responsibility for foreign policy upon Great Britain. And here I may interpose that it appears that is somewhat the position which Canada takes up to-day. The major partner in the foreign policy of the Empire is the United Kingdom; and the suggestion seems to be that we should revert to the position which existed before the war, that we are not going to be in the very least responsible for what that policy is. Well, that would be a position that might have commended itself to us if we had not had the experience of the war, which has changed all our points of view and has made us all recognise that we are equally involved in any trouble that may come upon Great Britain as the result of her foreign policy. I do not think that before the war we had really considered that point at all; but the war came and suddenly we were involved in it as a result of a treaty that had been entered into by Great Britain as part of her foreign policy guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium. I think there were very few Dominion statesmen who appreciated what that treaty meant or the obligations under it; and the bulk of the Australian people certainly had no knowledge even of the existence of the treaty.

The truth is that as soon as war broke out we all woke up to the fact that, owing to a policy which we had had no part in framing, we had got to make the maximum effort that was possible for our own safety and the preservation of our own integrity. I do not

C 62640

put that forward in any way as a complaint. I think the part played by the Dominions during the war frees them from such a suspicion. I am merely pointing out that it is a fact that we were involved, and there were no limits to the effort we would have to make. That having been brought home to them, in all the Dominions, and certainly in Australia, a very strong public opinion has grown up that no country ought to be involved in war without the consent of its own Parliament and people. I think that every Dominion would subscribe to that. In actual fact these things can happen to us. If Britain does become involved in war we are all involved; and that is one reason why there should be some common Empire policy framed to which all the Dominions would be willing to subscribe. I say with all respect that that will to some extent safeguard Great Britain as well as the Dominions from a foreign policy which may lead to war; I think the remarks of Mr. Mackenzie King emphasise that point very much. He pointed out that in the North American Continent, where they are further removed from the old-standing disputes of Europe, they perhaps take a different view of these things to the views held by the old country. Similarly, in Australia we have a different point of view also. With all respect I say that we in Australia feel that our peace loving instincts may possibly help towards the foreign policy that may keep the Empire out of war.

Results of Declaration of War.

I know that the view is taken in some Dominions that the fact of Britain being at war does not necessarily involve the whole of the Empire. Australia does not take that view at all—I am certainly expressing the opinion of the people as a whole. They do not, after the experiences of the war, believe that position can be maintained. They think that, though we might indicate that we were not at war, the facts of the case would prevent us being able to maintain the position. Suppose that Britain is at war with a Power or Powers that are in a position to take definite action against one of the Dominions. We suggest that an expression by that Dominion that it does not approve of the Empire's policy on that particular occasion, and does not want to participate in the war, would not in any way save the Dominion if those Powers could, by attacking it, strike a vital blow at Britain. They would not fail for one moment to take the action which would bring about that result and which would, of course, strike a paralysing blow at Britain's prestige amongst the nations of the world. Another case might be that there was a Power that was not able to take offensive Military or Naval action against the Dominions. It would certainly take measures against the commerce and against the nationals of the whole Empire and would not discriminate between the different parts. Australia really sees the position only in one way, and thinks that if at any time, under very regrettable circumstances, she found herself in the position where she could not agree to the action of the rest of the British Empire, there would be only one way of safeguarding her position, that would be by seceding from the Empire. That is a situation which fills us with nothing but horror and alarm. So Australia sees very clearly that it is necessary to have a definite foreign policy which is acceptable to the Empire.

Meaning of Phrase "Foreign Policy."

I wish to make what I meant by foreign policy perfectly clear. I am not suggesting that everyone of the things which Mr. Mackenzie King has referred to are questions which you should incorporate in an Empire foreign policy. Time will evolve the manner and way in which those questions of primary importance to a particular Dominion can be handled by that Dominion. But we must have a foreign policy on important questions, and on the broadest lines, which is the foreign policy of the whole Empire, to which we all would be prepared to subscribe. Unless we can get something of that sort, I personally, and the people of Australia generally, see the very gravest dangers to the future of the Empire. Then, too, it is said that the distances between the different parts of the Empire make it almost impossible that we should have a policy of that kind.

Suggested Basis of Policy.

While I certainly agree that the distances make it extraordinarily difficult for a policy, once it is determined upon, to be altered, and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62641

difficult to carry out the necessary consultations with regard to its being carried out, I do not see that there are difficulties in the way of laying down the outlines of foreign policy now, when the representatives of the Dominions are here. It should be possible to lay down, on the very broadest principles, a policy for the Empire to which we would be all able to subscribe, and to obtain for it the support of the whole of the peoples of the different Dominions. It seems to me that that is the task we are faced with. It is possible that at a later stage we shall have to consider some improvement in the method of machinery of consultation which will be carried on after these Conferences are broken up, but, with regard to the policy itself, I see no reason why it should not be laid down. It has to be on extraordinarily simple lines, so that it is perfectly easy of understanding, and gives effect to the wishes and sentiments of the whole of the people of the Empire. It must be a policy that can be announced, for, if we cannot announce the outlines of our policy, it is quite hopeless for any of us to go back to the Dominions and say we are prepared to take a share of the responsibilities for the Empire's foreign policy—when we cannot say what the character of the policy is. I am not suggesting that we can go into the most delicate diplomatic questions and announce them in public, but I do believe we can lay down some basis which it would be quite possible to announce. It would be to the benefit of the whole of the Empire, and I am certain to that of the whole world at the present time, if a United British Empire after a meeting of representatives of all of her parts could announce the foreign policy that she will be prepared to follow during the coming year. The points which would certainly have to be considered or the principles which would have to govern such a policy, as far as Australia is concerned, are really, I think, four in number. The policy would have to have, as its underlying principles—

That the British Empire is determined upon maintaining the peace of the world and in ensuring the freedom of all;

That we are determined upon maintaining the integrity and security of the British Empire;

That we believe in the League of Nations, and are resolved, in so far as lies in our power, to support it and give it the fullest possible help towards attaining the ideals for which it was established;

That we take as a basis the closest possible co-operation between the great English speaking countries of the world.

I quite appreciate that these things appear perfectly obvious, and that they follow the lines of diplomacy to which we have been accustomed in recent years. With these four principles as the corner stones I think it would be possible for us to frame a policy here which could be accepted by the whole of the Empire. At the same time there are a great many questions of outstanding importance on which we would have to get some sort of common understanding. If it were possible to announce that we had arrived at this it would be very desirable. If we could not, it could not be helped.

Ruhr and Reparations.

One question that stands out above all others at the present moment is the question of reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr by France. That question, it seems to me, has to be considered by this Conference, and we have to endeavour to try and come to some clear understanding as to what are our views about it. Lord Curzon the other day intimated that the next move rests with France, and, if I may say so with every respect, I entirely agree. I think it does; but we have to consider where we stand if France fails, or takes steps of such a character that we cannot agree to them. In this matter, we have come to recognise that the Dominions have a strong responsibility in the matter of foreign policy. I do not think any Dominion wishes to avoid its responsibility. We were all in the war, we were all signatories to the Peace Treaty and we have all got a direct obligation to see that Germany is made to carry out the responsibilities and obligations which she incurred as a result of the war.

As to what action can be taken, provided that nothing further is done by France or that she makes proposals which are as unsatisfactory as those which she has made in the past, that of course is very difficult to see. It does, however, appear to me that it might be possible to consider the question in one way. The present British proposals are that an independent tribunal should be established, or probably the Reparations Commission strengthened in some way, to assess Germany's capacity to pay at the present time. The French object very strongly to that, and I must confess that I have very great sympathy with them in the objection they take, for the reason that if that were done and Germany's capacity to pay were assessed to-day it would really mean a triumph for Germany's policy of artificial depreciation which she has carried out for some time now. But I do suggest—I do not know whether this will be the line, although we have to find some line—that it might be possible to agree to some arbitrary figure as to what Germany should pay. It is generally recognised now that the figure which has been taken is too high; and also one has to remember that Belgium and Italy have shown some disposition to agree to an arbitrary figure. It is perfectly true that France would probably object to any arbitrary figure which was any lower than the figure as it exists to-day. But if it were possible to get an arbitrary figure generally agreed to by the countries concerned, other than France, there might be the possibility of putting pressure upon France to agree to the figure that was determined upon. If a figure could be determined upon, it could then, I think, be a matter for consideration whether an independent tribunal, or the Reparations Commission strengthened, as has been suggested, could consider the question of how Germany was to pay. But the primary essential is to make it perfectly clear to Germany that, however she pays and whatever she pays, there is a fixed and definite amount that she will have to pay. From the point of view of German mentality, about which we learned a good deal during the war, that is apparently the only thing that would make her try and live up to her obligations, if she once definitely knew, without question, that the Allies were determined to make her pay a definite amount and that there would be no weakening or changing from that. I only throw out that suggestion because I do feel that this particular question is certain to arise, either during the sitting of this Conference or soon after the Conference is over. If it arises during the sitting of the Conference, there is really no need to have dealt with it at this moment; if it arises after the Conference is over, I think it would be a very disastrous thing that this Conference should have sat to discuss the questions of vital importance to the Empire at the present moment, and should have dissolved without having come to any sort of decision as to what our action should be with regard to this question of Reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr by France. If the question of Reparations could be determined upon on the basis of a fixed amount or an arbitrary amount, then I should imagine that the question of the occupation by France of the Ruhr would assume a very much more simple aspect than it has at the present moment. There would no doubt be involved questions of guarantee for any payments, but the situation would be clearer and better.

C 62642

Dangers from Intervention in European Affairs.

Then there are one or two things which I wish to say with regard to the speech Lord Curzon made; but before I do so I think there is one aspect of foreign policy which has to be recognised, and it is that the overwhelming sentiment of the Dominions at the present time is that they are opposed to constant intervention by Britain in the affairs of Europe and the disputes that almost daily arise between different small countries in Europe. We do recognise that for centuries Britain has taken up the attitude of trying to adjust the affairs of the world, but the Dominions know that there is now a League of Nations—whether it is successful or whether it is not is beside the point—and they consider that Britain should try to avoid as part of her policy constant intervention in Europe in the affairs of the smaller nations. The general view of the Dominions certainly is that Britain's policy should be as far as possible one of non-intervention in Europe, and that we should concentrate now as our primary objective upon trying to build up our

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62643

commercial strength and our wealth by the development of our own Dominions. If we do so we are doing a great deal towards ensuring the peace of the world, because it is recognised that the strength and power of a nation in the Councils of the world do not depend entirely upon its naval and military strength, but to a great extent depend upon the position of commercial pre-eminence which it may have established.

Comments on Lord Curzon's Speech.

Now with regard to the speech that Lord Curzon made, I certainly think we should all be very grateful to him for the very great amount of information he has given us as regards practically all the countries with whose policy Britain is in any way concerned. It was a most masterful review of the position of the countries of the world to-day in so far as they are concerned with the foreign policy of Great Britain. But I must also express a certain feeling of disappointment, because I say, quite frankly, it was not exactly the type of speech I expected to read when I heard that he had made his pronouncement. I rather expected to find in that speech more indication as to what Britain's foreign policy is, but the information that we have got deals almost entirely with what the facts of the position are, and gives very little information as to what Britain's policy with regard to these matters is and how far that policy is affected by the circumstances which he set out.

I think it is really quite impossible for the Dominions usefully to discuss the statement that was made by Lord Curzon in the form in which it is at present, and I would suggest, for the consideration of the Conference, whether it would not be possible for the Foreign Secretary to amplify the statement that he has made, in the direction of indicating what the policy of Great Britain with regard to the various countries whose affairs have been discussed is, and I would stress this point very much because I am certain that, if the discussion continues on the present basis, we are going to achieve nothing at all with regard to consultation as to foreign affairs.

Need for Enunciation of Broad Principles.

For my own part I say quite frankly that if we cannot here agree on a policy, as I have suggested, as that of the Empire, on very broad lines and of such a character that it is possible to announce it to the world and say: "This is the policy of the Empire with regard to the present position of the world," it is quite useless for me to go back to Australia and say: "Well, we discussed foreign policy, we considered the responsibility of the Dominions with regard to it, but there is nothing else I can tell you; I was told an extraordinary amount about our present relations with different countries, but that is all of a confidential character; I cannot tell it to you, but everything is perfectly right with regard to consultation between Britain and Australia upon that foreign policy." As the position is at present, I cannot go back and say there is a policy, and give it in broad outlines, and indicate what it is; and really one is forced to the position that, unless we can change the character of this discussion and can look for some broad principles of our policy which can be discussed, and on which the Dominions, if they wish, can express their opinion, I am afraid we shall not get anywhere. If that is the result, that there is no policy laid down, one has to go back in that situation. One is almost brought to the point of having to say: "There is no necessity for us to go further to see if we can improve the methods of consultation between Great Britain and the Dominions, because there is no policy that such a consultation can be based upon; it is apparently impossible to evolve anything of that character, and consequently, as far as we are concerned, we really think it would be better that we did not get this information which at present we are receiving with regard to foreign affairs. We must leave the whole thing to time, and hope for the best, and, as far as each Dominion is concerned, we must leave ourselves in the position of determining what action we must take if at any time any serious difficulty should arise." I am sorry to put the position in that way, but, as Mr. Mackenzie King said, it is necessary, when we come here to discuss matters, that we should put them exactly as we see them; and, from Australia's point of view, I have to say that, unless as a result of the discussions which take place we can evolve some

C 62644

policy on broad lines which we can say is the policy of the Empire, the attempt to build up consultation and the supply of information to the Dominions are of very little use, and probably it would be better that the whole system should be discontinued.

Mr. Baldwin: I think it might be to our advantage if Mr. Massey would make his observations before lunch; that would make a fairly even division between the various speakers.

Mr. Massey: I am afraid if I occupied an hour and a half in telling the Conference the view-point of New Zealand with regard to foreign affairs, it would not be for the convenience of the representatives here to-day. I am quite willing to go on, but I do not quite know how long I may speak. I will endeavour not to go into details to any extent, but I know how easy it is to occupy half an hour or more in connection with the many important subjects which have been mentioned in Lord Curzon's speech.

Mr. Baldwin: We adjourned at a quarter to two the other day, and if you come to a convenient place in your remarks to break off, we could continue afterwards. If we do not utilise this half-hour, it may throw us behind with all our programme.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Mr. Massey: I am quite willing to meet the convenience of the members of the Conference.

Appreciation of Previous Speeches.

I would like to say, by way of preliminary, that I listened with a very great deal of interest—and I think every other member of the Conference may say the same thing—to the speech delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a few days ago. In my opinion, it was the most important statement ever made by a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the representatives of British citizens either in Britain or in the oversea countries of the Empire. So far as the two speeches we have heard this morning are concerned, I may say that I listened with much interest to both of them. I may not agree with every opinion that has been expressed, and I will take the opportunity of referring to one or two of the points where I hold a slightly different opinion from either the Prime Minister of Canada or of Australia. So far as the Prime Minister of Australia is concerned, just let me say this. There may be a little difference of opinion between us, but I am quite satisfied, from what Mr. Bruce has said, that at any rate the present representatives of Australia and New Zealand will be able to work together heartily, for the benefit of the young British nations in the South Pacific, and, I hope and believe, for the benefit of the Empire.

I want to say this in case there may be a little misunderstanding; one cannot be too careful at times. With regard to the gentleman who represented Australia at the previous Conferences when I have been present, we may have had some small local differences occasionally, if I may so express myself, but, so far as Empire matters are concerned, I am glad to be able to say that Mr. Hughes and I nearly always found ourselves in agreement, and I am looking forward to finding myself also in agreement with the present Prime Minister of Australia.

Personal Position.

Just let me say a word with regard to my position here as representing New Zealand. I think I mentioned, if not at this Conference, then at the Economic Conference, that I was here not exactly in the position of a delegate, but in the position of a representative, subject to one qualification. I have a free hand, I am glad to say, so far as the people of New Zealand are concerned, up to a certain point. That one point is this, and I agree with my fellow citizens whom I represent, that anything that is done here requires to be ratified by the Parliaments of the different countries of the Empire, and that principle applies in the case of the Parliament of New Zealand. I think in this respect the other representatives here to-day are similarly situated; but there is one point which was impressed upon me by the Parliament of New Zealand

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62645

and by the people of New Zealand, whom I had the opportunity of meeting just before I left.

I do not need to say that, when Parliament is sitting and doing its best to wind up its business as quickly as possible, it is necessary that the Prime Minister should be there. I was with my Parliament until almost the last hour of the session. The one point which was impressed upon me, as might be expected from the people of New Zealand, because their characteristics in this respect are well known, was that whatever happened I was to stand for a united Empire, for the unity of the Empire in every possible way, and for strengthening its influence not only for the benefit of its own citizens but for the benefit of the whole Empire, and also for the benefit of humanity. Subject to the conditions I have mentioned, I use my own judgment.

Comments on Lord Curzon's Speech.

Now, Sir, I said that I was not going to deal with the whole of the points that have been raised, but in following the statement made by Lord Curzon I could not help thinking what a tremendously anxious time Lord Curzon and his colleagues must have had during the years since the war came to an end. I am sorry to say that many of those difficulties are still in existence and many problems are still waiting to be solved. Just one word here with regard to a remark made by the Prime Minister of Australia. He expressed alarm and anxiety lest this Conference should come to an end and we had not been able to achieve anything. Well, I hope that will not be the case, and I do not think it will be the case. I hope when this Conference comes to an end and we go back to the people whom we represent here, we shall be able to tell them that we have achieved much. Even in connection with the present European difficulty—and I shall speak about that later—I do hope that the counsel and opinions expressed and the advice given by the representatives of what may be called the overseas countries of the Empire—for that is a more expressive term than "Dominions"—will be of great value in settling the very serious difficulty that has arisen in Europe, a difficulty which I hardly think many of us contemplated during the time when the peace negotiations were going on. As to that, I speak with some authority, because I happened to be present during the very serious months during which the Peace Conference sat in Paris.

Need for Maintaining Entente.

Before I leave that point I want to say this. I know there has been a certain amount of friction between Britain and France, not serious friction, but there has been a certain amount of friction between those two great nations during the last few years, and especially during the last few months—especially since the trouble with regard to the Ruhr commenced or assumed serious shape. I do hope that whatever happens we and everyone concerned will do our best to maintain the Entente. We are not exactly a similar people, so far as race is concerned, to the people of France—I am speaking now more particularly of the people of the United Kingdom and not of the overseas Dominions. We are not exactly the same race, but geographically there is no question about it that the interests of Britain and France are almost identical. There is no question about that. We have been Allies now for a long time past. Now and again some little trouble flares up, but I am glad to say that wiser counsels prevail and it dies out. We are none the worse friends for a little plain speaking.

We have had some candid speaking during the last year or two and during the last month or two, and it is likely that there will be more plain speaking before this difficulty is settled. I think, from what I know of my colleagues here to-day, and everyone present is a colleague of mine, that we shall be able to present some opinions, if not to-day on another occasion, which will assist towards a solution of the present European difficulty.

Need for Empire Development.

I have one other word to say with regard to an opinion expressed by the Prime Minister of Australia. I do think it would be better for Britain and, with the exception that I have made, for France, if we interfered less with European politics and Britain took a more important part with the other countries of the Empire in looking

C62646

after its own affairs. There is plenty of scope there for all the abilities that we possess, and if we go on building up a great nation —I will not use the term "Empire" at present—if we go on assisting to build up a great nation, we shall have done a great work not only for this generation but for many generations to come. Prime Minister, I leave the Entente for the present, and I want to say a word or two in the order in which the Foreign Minister referred to some of our difficulties in other countries of the world.

Japan.

I think I am right in saying that the Foreign Minister made a statement that Japan was seeking for a working arrangement with Russia. Japan has been a very loyal ally of Britain for the last twenty years. We have little or no fault to find with the actions of Japan. I am not going into detail now, but as the representative of New Zealand I am under an obligation to Japan, and I do not mind saying so. But I do say this, and it is as well that we are able to speak our minds plainly, bearing in mind that what we say in this room is confidential; I do say that a combination between Japan and Russia, or anything in the way of an alliance for offensive and defensive purposes, would be a very serious matter and might lead to similar difficulties to those which we have experienced during the last seven or eight years. I do not think we can do anything to prevent it. I am glad to say that Japan is still our ally—not as it was before the Washington Conference, but Japan is still in alliance with Britain, along with America and France—four great nations, wielding, if they choose to exercise it, and I hope they will, enormous power, and I hope their influence will be used in keeping the peace of the world so long as it is possible to maintain it, and I trust that will be for many a long year to come.

Singapore.

While talking about Japan, I am reminded of what is proposed with regard to Singapore. I know perfectly well that we are going to have the opportunity of discussing the defences of the Empire, and especially the naval defence of the Empire, and I am not going to deal with it at any length; but I take the opportunity of saying that I do think it is in the interests of the British nations on the other side of the world, and, therefore, in the interests of the whole Empire, that we should have some better protection in the Pacific. I am not sufficiently expert to say whether there is anything better than Singapore. I do hope that the proposal to go on with a British naval station at Singapore will be proceeded with, because in the event of war breaking out—and one never knows where war may come from, war has come very suddenly in past years—a naval station, an impregnable naval station, such as our American friends have at Pearl Harbour in the vicinity of Honolulu, would be invaluable—there is no question about it, it would be invaluable so far as the defence of the Empire is concerned—and I cannot imagine that any objection would be taken to our doing something of the kind by the other countries with which we may be associated. Certainly there is nothing in the Washington Agreement to prevent this being done. That is quite clear.

China.

Now, another possibility of trouble was pointed out by the Foreign Minister. We are apt to overlook these things, and I am bound to say, after what I heard from the Foreign Minister, that I do not attach a very great deal of importance to the conditions in China. But when we think of a great nation like China with a huge population, an intelligent people—I do not mean to say that they are a martial people, I do not think they are, but an intelligent people and an industrious people—when we think of a country like that being practically left—without a Government, without sufficient control, without a President, it leads one to think that some of the great Powers of the world will find it necessary to interfere there before long. If so, I venture to predict that Japan will take a foremost place in anything that may happen, I do not know whether Britain will be called upon to interfere, I sincerely

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62647

hope not—but, if any interference is necessary, one never knows where it is going to end, because it is quite certain that jealousy and friction will come in between the different countries. I do not know whether it is possible, so far as diplomacy is concerned, to avoid anything of the sort; I doubt it very much, and I do not think we can do anything at this Conference with regard to it.

Afghanistan.

Then the danger of the position of Afghanistan was referred to. It is not the first time we have heard of Afghanistan in connection with the frontier troubles. It is not one of the great Powers of the world—nor is it ever likely to become one—but the danger is that Afghanistan is practically one of the gates of India, and, after all the Bolshevistic propaganda that has been circulated in many of those Eastern countries, and, I think, especially in Afghanistan and Persia from communications that have reached me, we do not know what may come from that. It points—and I repeat this—it points to the necessity of not being altogether unprepared so far as coming trouble is concerned. None of us wants war. Whatever we thought before the last war broke out, I think most of us are praying now for peace, and that anything that may be proposed will be to maintain the peace of the world rather than to cause trouble or promote war. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the position in India and the position in Afghanistan to say anything further. As a British citizen I have read a great deal of what has taken place in those countries and the possibilities there, and perhaps our friends who are representative of India will have something to say later on with regard to that particular point, if not now, then when they are discussing the defence of the Empire, although I think I am right in saying that one is intended to discuss, not the military, but the naval defence, which, I believe, under existing circumstances, to be the much more important point of the two.

United States.

The position of America was referred to by both the previous speakers, particularly, and I think not unreasonably so, by the Prime Minister of Canada. The United States, of course, is just over the boundary from Canada, and, naturally, what interests the one, and what is of importance to the one, interests and is of importance to the other. I just want to say a word about the Washington Conference that was held about a year ago. I think it has done a great deal of good. I honestly believe that it has promoted a very much better feeling as between the British Empire and America than existed prior to that Conference being held. I believe it has removed the suspicion—everybody must have known it who came into contact with American citizens, that, if they were friendly—and I am glad to say most of them were friendly—to our countries and ourselves, there was always the feeling that they were suspicious—I will not say jealous because I do not think that was the feeling; they were always suspicious of what was going to be the next move of Britain, or what Britain was going to do. I have had the opportunity of meeting a good many American citizens during the last few weeks. I am not one of those who believe that a man can go to a country and write a book about it that is of any value after he has been there a week; I do not think that at all, but on this occasion I took the opportunity, which came to me for the first time, of landing in United States territory and travelling across the American continent to New York. One cannot do that, and stay a few days on the way, without meeting a great many people who take a great interest in public affairs, and I am glad to say that the impression conveyed to me by those American citizens whom I met was a very very good one indeed. I do not pretend to be an important representative of the Empire, coming from almost the other side of the world, and representing perhaps a small country of the Empire, but, on landing at San Francisco, I was amazed at the interest which was being taken by the people there in the mere fact that a representative British citizen had arrived, and would be likely to be in their country for a day or two.

It is only an indication, but in several sections of the community that I met with from San Francisco to New York, including Washington itself, nothing but pleasure was expressed at the fact

C 62648

that a man, who, to a certain extent, is a representative British citizen, was passing through United States territory, and everything that they could possibly do to show that I was welcome there was done. I am glad to be able to say that left a very pleasant impression with me, not only in San Francisco, where the Chamber of Commerce laid itself out to give me a very hearty welcome, and where the members of its leading Club did practically the same thing in a different way, and a similar experience awaited me at Washington. I hoped to have the opportunity of an audience with the new President of the United States. I got the opportunity without the very slightest difficulty and I would like to say this, I am speaking to the representatives of the Empire, that I believe in the present President—and the same remark applies to the late President, they have got a man who will "fill the bill," as far as the United States is concerned, and who will prove to be a good friend to the British Empire. That is my impression of President Coolidge. I had the opportunity of meeting some of those associated with him in the Government. Unfortunately Mr. Hughes was away from Washington, but I came away feeling that, so far as the opinion of the United States is concerned, I believe we have made headway. When I say we, I am not speaking of my own country particularly, but of the British Empire as a whole. I am sorry to say the American tariff is against us, but we cannot interfere with the right of the American people to arrange their own tariff. We arrange our tariffs and arrange our taxation. Their tariff is against us for the moment, but what will happen at the next election is not for me to say and I will not express any hopes. I would like to see a more satisfactory tariff between the different countries of the Empire and the United States than that which they have arranged at present.

Influence of Western States.

There is one point which has been mentioned this morning by the Prime Minister of Canada, and that is with regard to the influence of the West. Now one cannot speak positively after only a two or three days' visit, but, so far as San Francisco is concerned, I do not think there is any doubt of the feeling there. I have had communications from some of the other States and I had a cordial invitation from the Governor of Oregon to come along as a British citizen and accept an official reception and the hospitality of the people of Oregon. I could not accept it but again the indication was good. I am not at all certain that the whole of the people on the eastern side are friendly to us. I think I had better not mention names of places, but there are two cities which I did not visit this time—I had the opportunity of passing through them—where the feeling is not quite so good as in many other places in the United States. I will not elaborate that point here, and will leave it so far as this gathering is concerned.

Egypt.

As to Egypt, naturally I am quite certain that the Prime Minister of Australia and I take a good deal of interest in the affairs of Egypt, not only on account of its ancient history, but because one of the main arteries of the British Empire passes through Egypt. I am speaking of the Suez Canal and I cannot forget that our tenure of the Canal is leasehold. I am glad that the lease is not coming to an end in the near future, but I personally do not like the position in Egypt, and I think it will take all the diplomacy of Lord Curzon, and those associated with him, to keep the peace in that country, so far as the British Empire is concerned.

The wish is not father to the thought—far from it. I hope our relations with the authorities in Egypt will continue to be good, but we cannot help recalling that the British interests are very important in Egypt and will have to be looked after very carefully and I think very firmly. The same thing can be said in connection with the Sudan. It is not nearly so important as the Canal, but any giving away of British territory in the Sudan might encourage the authorities in Egypt to ask for a great deal more than they have asked for up to the present and I think that would be doing a very great deal. I think it would be a request which would hardly be agreed to by British people overseas.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62649

Russia.

I come next to Russia. I look upon the position in Russia as one of the most serious influences from our point of view of all the nations of the earth. I have kept hoping for a long time past, ever since the change in the system of Government took place in Russia, that a strong man or a strong party would come to the front and that Russia would again come under what might be called a constitutional government. That time seems to be as far distant as ever and in the meantime Russia seems to be going, as far as we are able to judge from outside, from bad to worse. One thing puzzles me with regard to Russia. Everyone at this table knows perfectly well that huge sums have been expended by the present Government of Russia in Bolshevic propaganda which has found its way into every country of the Empire. I know it has, I have seen it in New Zealand, and, if we get it there in the outposts of the Empire, we may be sure it has been expended elsewhere. We have proof of the money being expended and that it was Russian money. Honestly I would like to see the present Government in Russia break down. I think it would be a very good thing for everybody, but there it is and it seems likely to continue to exist. I am glad to think that the Foreign Minister speaks more hopefully of the present position in Russia, I hope he is correct in his way of thinking, and, while we do not look with any sympathy on the present form of government in Russia, I should be glad to think that we are not going to have serious trouble with Russia, but instinct rather than anything else has caused me always to be afraid that the next European war will come from the north of Europe. I do not want to be a prophet of evil—far from it—but all the same I think the position in Russia requires, perhaps, more watching and more careful attention than the position of all the other countries, except the immediate difficulty as between France and Germany. That I shall deal with presently. The Russian indebtedness to Britain was mentioned I think by Lord Curzon, and I should be glad to think there was some possibility of that indemnity being paid off by Russia. I do not think it would affect us very much in the overseas Dominions because Great Britain itself takes all these responsibilities and liabilities upon its own shoulders, and so far it has been a most generous thing to do. I hope it has been a wise thing to do—I sometimes doubt it—but there it is. Russia is supposed to owe Britain 650 millions, and I do not hear a word of any part of that enormous sum of money being repaid to the country from which it was borrowed.

Poland.

Then as to Poland. I was very glad to hear what the Foreign Minister said about Poland. We naturally take a great deal of interest in Poland, which has been an oppressed country for centuries. It has recovered to a certain extent now and it is holding its own. When the Peace Conference was sitting a great deal was heard about Poland which was intended to become a sort of buffer State, especially as between Germany and Russia, and I hope Poland will be strong enough to ensure that. If it keeps Germany and Russia apart in years to come it will have done a great service to Europe and to mankind.

Austria.

I was glad to hear that Austria was endeavouring to get back to normal. If the people of a country do not attempt to help themselves, it is not of very much use for other countries to endeavour to help them. I hope that position will arise before long with regard to Germany and with regard to France.

Near Eastern Crisis, September 1922.

I will come to France presently; before doing so I want to say a word or two with regard to Turkey. I think the thanks of the whole of the Empire are due to Lord Curzon with regard to the present position in Turkey. I know what a difficult position it was. I heard this morning, and I think not for the first time, that the British Cabinet was not made acquainted with the telegram sent to the overseas Dominions asking the overseas Dominions what position they would take up in the event of war with Turkey. Of course, I accept unreservedly the statement made by Lord Curzon, but I can-

C 62650

not help thinking that there may have been serious reasons for sending that telegram to Australia and New Zealand.

It came to New Zealand first; that was probably more an accident than otherwise; I do not go back on it in the very slightest degree. There was a gathering that evening at Government House in Wellington. I and my colleagues were there, along with many prominent members of the public. Of course they were not made acquainted with its contents. As soon as the Governor-General saw what the telegram contained, he sent for me. It then became my duty to convey the contents of the telegram to my colleagues who were present. There was no occasion to summon the Cabinet, because there was no difference of opinion between the members of the Government with regard to Empire matters. We were all of one opinion. At that gathering, before we left Government House, we decided that our answer would be in the affirmative; and it went out accordingly. I do not go back upon it. Australia would not go back upon it. Australia and New Zealand will never forget what took place at Gallipoli; we cannot forget that within the boundaries of that territory there are the graves of many thousands of the very best of Australia and New Zealand, and the first thought that occurred to us in New Zealand—I am not referring to Australia—was this: what is going to happen to the cemeteries where our boys are buried there. Parliament was sitting at the time; I would not like to say that there was no note of disapproval, because there was, but what I do wish to say is that when I submitted the matter to the New Zealand Parliament on the following Tuesday it was agreed to unanimously. There was no vote against it. Opposition members may think it their duty to criticise whatever comes along—when I was in Opposition myself, I did it; but there was no dissentient vote; and if the question was raised to-day in New Zealand, I feel certain that, so far as my fellow citizens are concerned, the opinion expressed would be exactly the same as it was in those days. Of course, we were all very glad when the danger was past—do not make any mistake about that—but if the Government of New Zealand had wanted 50,000 men, we could have got them within a week; fortunately, they were not required. I thank heaven for it. But, to put it in the vernacular, it was a close shave. If war had broken out, it might not have been confined to Britain and Turkey. If it had, it might not have lasted very long, but it might not have stopped at that; it might have been a war of races; it might have been a religious war—a war between the Moslems and the Christians, a war between the Cross and the Crescent, and, if so—well, it might have been far more serious than most people contemplated. I honestly believe that but for the offer of assistance which came promptly to the British Government at that time things might have been different, but that fact helped to open the eyes of Turkey and those associated with it to the danger of going to war. I leave it at that. I consider that, looking at it from the Empire point of view or in any other way, that it is just as much of importance to the commerce of the world as to a very great extent the prosperity of the Empire that the freedom of the Straits should be maintained, and that mercantile vessels—or warships, if you like—of all countries should be allowed to pass through unchallenged.

I hope there will be no attempt to reinstate these forts at the Dardanelles, about which we had such a discussion before, and which not only did a great deal of damage locally, so to speak, but affected distant countries as well, but I would like to say this, and I do not think I can leave these subjects without a word of appreciation of the valuable services—I am leaving Lord Curzon out for the present—rendered by General Harington. I had an opportunity, like other representatives, of meeting General Harington when the war was going on, and I formed a very high opinion of that gentleman's services, both his services as soldier and his ability as a diplomat, and I could not let this opportunity go by without referring to General Harington.

Ruhr and Reparations.

Now about the Ruhr and reparations. This is the most immediately urgent question that we have to deal with, there is no doubt about that. I have already indicated that I was present, along with General Smuts, at the Peace Conference, but I was not on that side

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62651

the negotiations that were going on: other duties were assigned to me, and I had not the opportunity of taking part in the negotiations with regard to a possible settlement of the difficulty so far as Germany was concerned, and the fixing of the amount of the reparations. As a member of the British Delegation, I was familiar with what took place. I take my share of the responsibility, but I am justified in saying that I felt at the time when the amount of reparations was being fixed that we were going too far, that we were asking Germany for more than she would be able to pay. It is not a case of being wise after the event, but I say it now as I said it before. At the same time, I want to say this, that my sympathies were then and are even now with France. We have to remember that the French people are a proud people, highly-strung, and very sensitive, that their country has been invaded twice during the last fifty years and practically by the same nation. In 1870 it was spoken of as the Franco-Prussian War; this time it might be called the Franco-German War. It was not a war between France and Germany together, because other countries were brought into it, but I had experience of what had taken place in France. I was there in 1919 for nearly six months; we were there on previous occasions; we saw the devastated territories, which I shall never forget if I lived for one hundred years. We knew the misery that had been brought to millions of French people by the action of the Germans, and I do not wonder at their feelings now and their intense anxiety. If we can do something to get rid of the present difficulty in Europe as between France and Germany—I feel in my soul that they will never be friends; it is almost too much to expect—but if we can do something to relieve the tension and get over the present difficulty, then I think this Conference will have been justified. I am sorry to have to call your attention, Mr. President, to the clock; I am quite willing to go on for another ten minutes, if you wish. I am in the hands of the Conference.

Prime Minister: I think we had better finish and have our afternoon session at 3·30, rather than trouble you to pick up the threads again.

Mr. Massey: I am quite willing; I am in the hands of the Conference.

Prime Minister: I think that will meet our wishes, Mr. Massey.

Mr. Massey: Very well. I have not many more remarks to make.

Freedom of Action of Self-Governing Dominions.

I do want to say a word on the opinions that have been expressed both by the Prime Ministers of Canada and of Australia, and again I say, if we cannot agree, well, we shall just have to agree to differ, and I hope any differences of opinion that may be expressed here or that we may feel will not make the slightest difference or be of any importance to the people we represent or to the Empire as a whole. We are here to draw the Empire more closely together if we can possibly do so and we are here to avoid anything in the way of friction and I hope anything I may say will not leave any uneasy feeling on the part of the members with whom I do not quite agree.

The Prime Minister of Canada, I have not quite got his words, referred to the possibility of any of the different countries of the Empire being compelled to engage in a European war, whether they liked it or not, or to be involved in war in which Britain was engaged. My feeling is just this. We of the overseas Dominions value our freedom and our liberty. We have never been compelled to take part in any way against our wishes. There are representatives of countries here to-day, several of them, whose soldiers took part in the South African war. I think on one occasion Australia sent a contingent to the Soudan many years ago, I believe that is correct. We know what took place when the recent war broke out. There was no compulsion brought to bear; there was no coercion brought to bear; we were asked what we were going to do.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I hope I did not convey the idea that we were compelled, certainly we never have been. Whatever Canada has done she has done entirely from voluntary motives and with pride in our relationship with Britain. Britain has not coerced us.

C 62652

Mr. Massey: I accept that unreservedly and I did not think anything else, but the point I was going to make was this. As no attempt has ever been made to compel the overseas countries of the Empire to send soldiers or sailors, to send fighting men, to any war in which Britain has become involved, as nothing of the sort has taken place in the past it is a million to one chances that anything of the sort will never be attempted in the future. It would be the most stupid mistake that could happen. Supposing at the commencement of this last great European war we had had a Government in office in Britain—we must not forget that the sovereignty of the different countries of the Empire rests with the head of the State, it rests with The King—but supposing an attempt had been made to compel New Zealand, and I say New Zealand because it is the country with which I am specially concerned and a country the enthusiastic loyalty of whose citizens is well known, supposing any attempt had been made to compel us to send 100,000 men to the war, as we did, supposing we had been told we were to send them and provide their equipment and their pay and all expenses connected therewith, it would have caused a very ugly feeling in my country and in every other country of the Empire. I think there is too much statesmanship on the part of the people who look after the affairs of Britain to attempt that sort of thing. They will never do it. If in the future they get into difficulties—I hope it will not be in this generation, I hope not at any time, but if similar difficulties occur again they will be met in the same spirit. We owe a great deal to Britain and the British people and we do not forget it. We are of British stock ourselves and we cannot forget the British strain that runs in the blood of every one of us.

I shall never forget the way the native races rose to the occasion in every part of the Empire on the outbreak of the Great War without being asked, and the difficulty of the Government of New Zealand was to hold back the people under their control—I am speaking of the native races—and insist on their being trained. A good many of them went to the war and did their duty there and if people who are only half civilised are willing to do their duty in that way I am certain those of us who belong to older nations, I include my friends on the left, will have no hesitation in doing again what we did in the late war. There has been a change in status. We have accepted that. There is no written document with reference to the change of status; there is nothing to show it except conversations around this table in this historic room, but it was understood at the time when the Imperial War Cabinet, as it was called, was convened and it did useful work, it was understood that instead of being dependencies we were taking up the position of partners in the Empire and we meet round this table as partners in the Empire. If we were not partners in the Empire we should not be here now.

Results of Declaration of War.

That being the case, let us suppose that some sudden emergency arises, and some foreign country lands its troops on British territory or sends its warships to attack our mercantile marine. There is no time to get the different Parliaments of the Empire together. It cannot be done. The men at the head of affairs here must take the lead in this country; they say to the attacking nation that they are committing an act of war; they are responsible for it and must be punished accordingly. There is no time to communicate with each other, though I hope our Empire communications will be much better in the future than they are now. War, however, must be declared and the Governments of the different countries of the Empire must take the responsibility to their Parliaments. I could not imagine any Parliament being convened and discussing a thing like this for any length of time. It is the easiest thing in the world to discuss matters connected with foreign policy and keep on discussing them—I am not speaking of what happens round this table—but from the point of view of overseas countries it cannot wait; action must be taken, and the overseas Governments must take the responsibility of acting for their people. The constitutional law—I am not a lawyer, I leave law to General Smuts—but constitutional law is to this effect, as I understand it, that when the sovereign goes to war the whole of his subjects are

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62653

at war. It cannot be avoided, and do you think the enemy, I am not going to mention a supposititious enemy, do you think the enemy with whom the Empire went to war would allow any overseas Dominion to withdraw its allegiance to the British Crown or if they were victorious would they say to any of the overseas Dominions, we do not want any indemnity or reparation? That is not human nature as I understand it; far from it.

Need for Improved Methods of Consultation.

I sympathise with the idea put forward by the Prime Minister of Australia, that we want a council or conference—I do not care what you call it—an Empire council or Empire conference that can act quickly in an emergency, and I do think before this Conference comes to an end we should decide whether it is in the interests of the Empire and of our respective countries to meet at intervals of not less than two years. I know the difficulties in the way of meeting every two years because of triennial Parliaments, and triennial Parliaments do not fit in with two-yearly conferences, but I hope some more businesslike arrangement than the present one will be brought into operation. I am not looking out for more power for my own country and I do not want to interfere with the sovereignty of the other nations of the Empire; far from it, but I do think we are not making the progress we ought to make in regard to constitutional matters and I can see very clearly we shall not make much progress in constitutional matters this session. If, however, we make some progress on the other matters to which I have referred, the difficulty in European affairs, in regard to trade and commerce, and with naval defence of the Empire, we shall be able to tell our people when we go back that we have made progress in regard to these matters and I think we shall have done very well indeed.

Relations with United States.

One other point. I want to say this, and it is only an amplification of what I have said already. I think we should not lose any opportunity of cultivating friendly relations with our kindred on the other side of the Atlantic, with the Americans; the same race again, English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh, speaking the same language. We do not want to interfere with their Government and they do not want to interfere with ours, but if we were able to stand together and say to the rest of the world, we are combined for the peace of the world and we are not going to allow war to take place if we can avoid it and if a weak country is attacked by a stronger country we will see the former does not suffer injustice, I think we should do better in keeping peace in the world. So far as I am concerned, I want to make it perfectly clear that I stand for the old saying—Peace on Earth and Goodwill as between the Nations of the Earth. I have nothing more to say.

PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

Prime Minister: I propose to communicate to the press the fact that three Ministers have addressed the meeting, giving a list of the members present, nothing more.

(Adjourned until 3·30 P.M.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,*
October 8, 1923.

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
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C 62654

MISSION




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Memoranda & Notes

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ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62654

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Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

C 62655

SECRET.

E. 5th Meeting (1923).

44

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE FIFTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1923, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Senator the Hon. R. V. WILSON, Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS, T.D., Vice-President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62656

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir R. R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Non-publication of Speeches.

Mr. Baldwin: There is one question on which I should perhaps say a word before we proceed this afternoon. Of course, the discussions to-day, as those of Friday, are and must be secret. With the freedom with which we speak here, and the divergence of the views expressed, it would be particularly undesirable that accounts should go forth to the public, but if there is a feeling on the part of any of the Prime Ministers that it is desirable that any portions of their speeches should be made public, I hope that they will be good enough to confer with the Foreign Secretary on the subject, and doubtless a common agreement can be reached as it was reached on Friday, when the Foreign Secretary advised the Conference of those portions of his speech which he thought might safely be made public, and they were made public, and it was after he had made that statement, and assent was given by the Conference to it, that two particular portions of his speech were published. I think probably everyone will agree with what I have said about that.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Wasn't it understood that Mr. Davidson would give out what was to be given to the Press? I rather gathered the impression that that was the understanding we had, that Mr. Davidson would indicate to us what should be published.

Mr. Baldwin: That did not apply to foreign affairs.

Lord Curzon: I made a special reservation. You see how careful we have to be. Take for instance what happened on Friday. I addressed the Conference then, and I took it to be my duty, as I am sure you will all acknowledge, to make you acquainted with the condition of affairs that has grown up since we last met in 1921, and therefore I gave you a narrative leading up to the present moment. Then we decided, in view of the great public demand for a knowledge of our proceedings, to publish those parts of my speech which related to two subjects. You know what followed. In France they altogether ignored the circumstances under which the speech was delivered. They do not realise that I have to keep you in touch with everything that has passed and lead you to the present moment, and they look upon it as a pronouncement directed exclusively to them, and in some ways directed against them. That shows the sort of misapprehension to which we are liable, and therefore I support what the Prime Minister has said, and I suggest that, if you desire any portion of your speeches to be published, they should be very carefully looked through before any circulation is authorised to the Press.

Mr. Massey: Are we to understand that that means, Lord Curzon—supposing I make a speech by way of illustration, and supposing I think afterwards it ought to be made public, and supposing something I have said reflects upon or puts someone else in a false position, where is the other man going to be?

Lord Curzon: Who is the other man in this case, me or somebody else? It is more likely to be me.

Mr. Massey: The man whom I mean is not here. Supposing I put him in a false position and then say I want this part of my

C 62657

speech published? It all goes to show how extraordinarily careful we ought to be. I think we cannot be too careful when discussing subjects such as those discussed on Friday, and which have been referred to this morning.

Lord Curzon: Are your remarks directed to publishing nothing at all?

Mr. Massey: Personally I should prefer that nothing should be published from a debate such as this. That is my own opinion.

Lord Curzon: I thought a desire had been expressed in the other direction.

Mr. Massey: I know. We have had experience of too much publicity in past years, and I want to avoid it, if possible, this time.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I am all in favour of publishing at present as little as possible. I think we ought to speak very freely here and have it distinctly understood that what we say will not go out.

Lord Curzon: I am only too willing.

Mr. Bruce: As far as I am concerned I agree also. A great deal of what I said this morning I would be only too pleased to allow to go out, particularly as it expressed where Australia stands in the matter, and no doubt Australia would be very interested to have that stated, but I see there is a great deal of difficulty associated with it, because incidentally one refers to other members' views, and it is quite possible that some of the statements one hears are misunderstood. If it is the general feeling that it is undesirable to publish, I quite agree with that.

Lord Curzon: The general conclusion is that we publish nothing. Is that so, Prime Minister?

Mr. Baldwin: I think that seems to be the general view.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Relations of Various Parts of Empire in Foreign Policy.

General Smuts: Before I come to the main discussion of our foreign policy I should like to say a few words on a preliminary point which has been raised here by the Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia. I did not come here prepared to discuss constitutional questions to-day, which I did not consider really part of the specific question of our foreign policy, but they have raised the matter, and I should like just in a word to say this. I think that there is some misunderstanding in Canada about the purport of the statement that was made by the British Prime Minister in 1921. I never took it to refer to every possible question of foreign policy affecting, not only the British Empire, but every part of it. I think that the Prime Minister in 1921, when he made that statement, was referring to questions of our general foreign policy, questions which do not affect any locality, any part of the British Empire in particular, but affect all together in the same way. There is no doubt that we have our local questions in every part of the Empire. The Prime Minister of Canada has said to us that he has a great deal of Canadian foreign policy to conduct with the United States, and I am sure that he will continue to conduct it in the future, as he has in the past, and the British Prime Minister never wanted to detract from his rights in that respect. Similarly, in regard to South Africa, we have been for years now dealing with our neighbours, the Portuguese, the Belgians, and others who are our neighbours and with whom we have continually points of foreign policy arising. The British Government has never concerned itself in those questions unless invited by us, and we have very often invited their assistance in order to see us through. But besides those local questions, we have general questions of foreign policy which concern us all equally. Take the very questions which we have been discussing, the question of reparations, and the Ruhr and similar questions. They arise out of the Treaty, which we all signed. It is not merely a British question. It is a question for the whole Empire, for every Dominion who is signatory to that Treaty, and therefore it is quite right that questions of that character, affecting all of us equally, should be considered by us,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

and we should try to see whether it is possible to hammer out some common policy to which all can agree. I think on that we are all agreed. I suppose the Canadian Prime Minister is quite in agreement with the position which I am stating, and there is really no difficulty if the matter is properly understood. In dealing with general questions of foreign policy we want to state our special points of view, so far as the Dominions are concerned; we can all, in that way, make a great contribution, just as the Canadian Prime Minister made a great contribution, to this question of foreign policy, by telling us what the attitude in Canada is, not only in the East, but also in the West, a difference which was not known to me. We can be helpful in other ways. We represent equal States in the British Empire, and we can make a contribution to many of the questions which have to be decided in relation to our foreign policy. Take this very question which we are dealing with. I am sure that we can be helpful. We can be helpful to the British Government in easing the intolerable burden which they are bearing. We can be helpful to them by the attitude we take. We can strengthen their hands in a crisis which is of first-class importance to the whole of the Empire. As far as I am concerned, Prime Minister, I am here as far as possible to help you, to strengthen your hands, and in whatever I am going to say this afternoon, even when I am going to be critical, my whole object is simply to strengthen your hands, to help you, and to see that our Empire pulls its full weight in the situation which is of cardinal importance for the whole world.

Comments on Lord Curzon's Speech.

I do not quite agree with the Prime Minister of Australia when he said that the Foreign Secretary had made no statement of our foreign policy. Naturally, the real discussion is still to follow. I understand that what has happened here is a very full and unreserved and candid statement of the facts and developments in regard to our foreign policy of the last two years. The discussion on that will still take place. I took it, not only that a general discussion was likely to follow, but also that every point mentioned by the Foreign Secretary was really foreign policy. His statement showed what particular line we had taken in regard to every one of those countries and those questions during the last two years, and, therefore, I think he has, with ability which is beyond praise, stated to us the foreign policy of the Empire, such as it has been during the last two years. The policy for the immediate future remains now for discussion, to which I now proceed.

General Observations on Foreign Policy.

Prime Minister, I have listened with the deepest interest to the Foreign Secretary's masterly survey of the whole world-wide field of the Foreign Policy of our Commonwealth. In offering some remarks on that statement and on our Foreign Policy as a whole I wish to emphasise in advance that I do so with much diffidence. The subject is so difficult, my knowledge of the facts is so imperfect, the problems appear baffling and almost insoluble that one really hesitates to offer any opinion at all. Besides, one feels the enormous responsibility of offering any advice in such matters. The present conditions of the world are so difficult to understand, the future appears so dark and unpredictable, any course of action now embarked on may have such far-reaching and unexpected consequences, that the temptation is very strong to leave the whole matter in the able and experienced hands of yourself and Lord Curzon. However, I shall not shirk the duty which is imposed on me of putting my views with all frankness and sincerity before the Conference. And if I sometimes appear somewhat critical I beg you to believe that my object is not to criticise but to be helpful and make constructive suggestions in the task which lies before us all, the task of discovering a wise general direction which our Foreign Policy might pursue in the great crisis of history through which the world is passing.

Question of Withdrawal from European Affairs.

There are several possible courses before us. One is to cut ourselves out from European affairs altogether. The Foreign Secretary has quoted with approval the remark which I made on the first day

of our meeting to the effect that we could not disinterest ourselves in the affairs and the fate of Europe. The difficulties and embarrassments of our European policy are, however, so great that there are many thinking people who believe that the only wise course for us is to clear out of Europe and all its entanglements and possible dangers. It is therefore worth while to explore this suggestion for a moment. It is put in two ways. In the first place it is said that our European policy does more harm than good, it irritates France without helping Germany. It simply prolongs the agony and prevents the two parties mainly concerned from coming together and settling their affairs between them. So far from being helpful it is said we are really a disturbing factor, and the wisest thing would be that neither party should rely on us or look to us. It is also said that there is grave risk of our getting further entangled and becoming in the end hopelessly involved, with perhaps the most embarrassing consequences to ourselves. The other and more attractive way of putting the policy is as follows. It is said that European commitments are fatal to our world-wide Commonwealth. None of the great Dominions will accept them or stand for them, and therefore Great Britain as the senior partner should not stand for them either. She has quite enough to do with India, Egypt, and the innumerable problems raised by her Colonies, Protectorates and mandated territories. Our foreign policy should, therefore, become a Commonwealth policy and not a British or European policy, and it is up to the Imperial Conference to see that this matter is put right. This is, of course, the form in which the policy will appeal most widely to Dominion sentiment, and I am sure that in the days to come, days of ever increasing difficulty and embarrassment, this doctrine of a purely Commonwealth policy will become more and more popular not only in the Dominions, but also in this country.

Speaking for myself and on behalf of South Africa I would say that we would most strongly deprecate a European policy likely to involve this country or our Commonwealth in a European war. Our people want peace and will insist on peaceful policies, and it would, indeed, require an overwhelming case to be made out before the South African Parliament is ever likely to sanction active participation in a continental war. The clear and direct interest of South Africa in the matter would have to be shown. Any entangling alliances or commitments likely to lead to war would, therefore, be a most serious matter and require the gravest consideration from the Dominion point of view.

Policy of Isolation Impossible.

But to say this is not to say that there should be a retirement from the continent and that we should abandon Europe to its fate and leave it to work out its own salvation, or what is more likely its own damnation, without any reference to our Commonwealth. Not only our deepest interests but our membership of the Society of Nations make such an attitude impossible. As long as our policy is peace we should bear our weight in that great body of civilisation of which we form members. Our active support and moral backing might make all the difference between a ruined or a restored Europe, and a policy of selfish isolation on our part may in the end recoil on us and our interests with the most disastrous effects. If one lesson more than any other has been stamped indelibly on the conscience of mankind by the Great War, it is the unity, the moral and material unity of our European civilisation, and the lesson was, perhaps, great enough to have been learned at such a cost. Do not let us now go back to wild talk of isolation. As I said in this room two years ago, let our gaze not be too exclusively fixed on Central Europe, let our foreign policy have due and close regard to the interests and view-points of the Dominions also, and of the Empire as a whole. But, subject to that governing consideration, let us by all means avoid a policy of selfish isolation in Europe.

Need for Maintaining Prestige of Empire.

But I would add this. If we cannot stand aside, if we must bear our part, let it be an honourable, a decisive part, a part worthy of this Commonwealth and the position it occupies in the world. Our Commonwealth is much too great to be made subservient to the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62660

policies of other more ambitious States. We can lead, we can march abreast with others, we have not learnt to follow.

This great Commonwealth rests not merely on a basis of common interest and on common ties of blood or language; it is based just as much on profound sentiments of self-respect, and pride, and honour. Its peoples are proud of its prestige and jealous of its honour. It cannot afford to see its policies waived aside or ignored or treated with contempt by others. It cannot afford to speak with an ineffective voice among the nations. Whatever injures its prestige in the world not only lessens our influence abroad, but also helps to that extent to loosen the ties which bind us all together. And I would say this: If we cannot make our voice heard, if our counsels are to be ignored or flouted, if we are to have no real effective voice in the reshaping and reconstruction of post-war Europe, then let us rather retire and not expose ourselves to rebuffs which no community of nations such as ours should or could stand.

I ask on what ground should France have a greater voice in the post-war settlement than this Commonwealth? We raised far more men and produced far larger resources than any of the other Allies, and in the final result our contribution proved the most decisive in winning the war. To-day this country is groaning under far heavier burdens than any of the other Allied countries. Yet its advice in the European settlement is treated with ill-concealed impatience. Or let us compare Belgium with a British Dominion like, say, Australia. Australia came to the rescue of Belgium in the war and raised larger armies and suffered heavier casualties than Belgium; with Canada it broke the Hindenburg line in the end. It incurred a war debt of over £300 million, which it is proudly paying. Belgium's war debt of £300 million to the Allies has been cancelled and she has, in addition, been accorded a priority of £100 million from reparation payments, most of which has already been paid. I speak in full friendship and goodwill for Belgium when I ask on what ground of justice or equity of sacrifice has Belgium an effective share in the settlement or rather unsettlement of the post-war Europe while Australia's voice is not to be heard at all?

In spite of all their disappointment and disillusions and intolerable burdens, the people of this country have remained loyal to their old Allies, and I fear advantage has been taken of that loyalty. Perhaps they have been too complacent, and advantage has been taken of their complacency. I think the time has come for complete frankness and plain speaking and for removal of all possible misunderstanding and ambiguity about our real attitude.

Need for Strong Policy.

I do not put the blame merely on others, and I trust you will forgive me if I point out where I think we have gone wrong. We are by no means free from blame for the present state of affairs. At innumerable conferences since the peace we have virtually played with France. We have seldom been really frank with her and dealt honestly and faithfully with her as a friend. We were always heading her off, appearing to agree but really thwarting her at every turn. France really never knew where she was with us. Hence her growing distrust of us. Hence her finally ignoring us, and going her own way since last January. And we have committed an even more serious mistake. Where we differed from France we have not seriously and resolutely stood up to her. We have thus seriously misled France as to the length she might safely go in enforcing her will and having her own way. France never knew when we were really serious, because we never declared to her in unmistakeable terms how far we were prepared to go, and no farther. We kept talking of the sacredness of the Entente, of the Entente as the pivot of our foreign policy, and she took us at our word and went ahead, knowing that we would follow. To some extent we have followed, where we should have held her back with all the influence and prestige which we have in the world. And there is a risk that our prestige with the other States of Europe may be affected. They see a resolute, determined France, working on a definite plan and having her way from point to point, and a benevolent, well-intentioned, but complacent Great Britain pursuing a colourless policy. They naturally look at the externals of the situation and may come to think it safer to go with France.

C 62661

There is no decline in our power to justify this. In my opinion, we have never, during the last two centuries, been more powerful relatively to other European Powers than we are to-day. And yet our prestige may be affected, and that would be a most serious business in a world where our prestige means the principal guarantee of world peace. We get credit for goodwill and good intentions. But that is not enough if we have to play our proper part in the world. The fact is, we have been undecided and uncertain in our minds, and therefore weak in our policy. We have been halting between two loyalties—loyalty to France and the Entente on the one hand, and loyalty to something far greater and deeper on the other. That has been a mistake, an honourable and pardonable mistake, but a profound mistake nevertheless.

Occupation of Ruhr.

The result has been that our position has remained obscure and even ambiguous. I shall mention two instances of what I mean. In January last, when France announced her intention of occupying the Ruhr, we disapproved of her policy in the strongest terms and dissociated ourselves from it, and yet we managed to convey to her the clear impression that she had our blessing in that terrible enterprise. Could any attitude be weaker or more calculated to be ineffective? But that was not all. We were advised that France's action was a breach of the Peace Treaty. Here was a matter which went to the very root of things. In 1914 we had gone into the war because of the breach of a treaty. The Great War had been fought and untold suffering and loss inflicted on the human race to vindicate the sacredness of public law and the maintenance of international obligations. The peace itself was based on the root idea that in future any breach of the public law or peace of the world should be prevented or avenged by a combination of the nations. Here in January of this year France violates this fundamental principle of the peace and breaks the Peace Treaty in an act which, unless God forbid, may within a generation prove even more devastating to the world than the invasion of Belgium in 1914. Yet out of regard for France we have kept quiet until all the evil has been done and the Ruhr business has sown the dragon's teeth of the future. This may be loyalty to France, but it is not loyalty to Europe or the great ideals for which we fought the Great War.

Question of Reparations.

Let me mention another instance of the obscurity of our position. After the Ruhr business had run its course for some months we were appealed to by the German Government to come forward and assist in a settlement. We publicly advised the Germans to make an offer to France. An offer was ultimately made which we considered a basis for further discussion and negotiation. We said so publicly. We even hinted separate action to enforce our view. France and Belgium flatly refused our proposals, and we have been sitting passive ever since while, as Lord Curzon says, the break-up of Germany has begun and Europe is once more thrown into the melting-pot. All through, with the best intentions and out of loyalty to our friends in the Entente, we have declined to come to grips with the solution, and the situation has developed until it is now almost beyond remedy. We have blamed France, and I believe rightly blamed France, for going too far, but at the same time we are also to blame for letting her go so far in a matter where we had exactly the same say as herself and the power to make our will good. This Conference affords a unique opportunity for a review and reconsideration of our position, and I trust as a result of our deliberations we shall once more be able to resume our proper note and proceed to make a contribution worthy of this great Empire to the cause of European peace and restoration

Possible Line of Action.

The moment appears favourable for many reasons. In the first place you, Prime Minister, have smoothed the way for happier personal relations with the French Government. I think you have done a very great service there. Then again an appreciation appears to be dawning in French responsible quarters of the extreme difficulties in future of the Ruhr policy. The moment appears favourable for another and more important reason. The Ruhr occupation and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62662

the extreme lengths to which the French are evidently prepared to go have at last brought the Germans to a frame of mind which renders a large settlement possible. They have been made to see at last the spectre of Germany's political and economic dissolution, the undoing of all the work of her great statesmen half a century ago, and the complete defeat of all her great national aspirations. Complete national disaster stares her in the face. A Government is at last in power in Germany prepared and anxious to come to an agreement with France. This is a very great advance, and if French policy will now be wise and moderate it can score a success such as has hitherto been impossible after the war. Undoubtedly, up to now, Germany has been pursuing a policy of evasion and irresponsibility. Convinced that the reparation sum was beyond her capacity to pay, she has made no real honest attempt to put her house in order, and as a result her whole financial position is now rapidly crumbling. The Mark has gone and much else threatens to go. This is fully realised, and she is now prepared to come to terms with her creditors. The moment has therefore arrived for action, and, unless it is at once made use of, a great and perhaps final chance of European settlement will disappear. For events are marching at a great pace, the process of break-up and decay is proceeding very fast, and soon there may not be a Germany to negotiate with at all.

Possible Results of Break-up of Germany.

I am afraid that in the dense fog of European relations through which we are passing the public do not realise what the break-up of Germany will mean. Mr. Bonar Law, in his conference with M. Poincaré in Paris last January, said something which, coming from such a high quarter, may seriously have misguided public opinion here. He said that it was arguable that the break-up of Germany was to the advantage of this country, because Germany was our greatest industrial competitor and our greatest industrial danger, or words to that effect. And many will no doubt rush to the conclusion that, if that is so, then France is doing this country a great and signal service by smashing up Germany.

Nothing could be further from the truth, nor, I am sure, did Mr. Bonar Law express his own opinion by the point he raised. The industrial decay of Germany will not mean industrial prosperity or security for Great Britain. Just the reverse is true. That is already being realised in all responsible quarters, such as, for instance, the great Federation of British Industries.

There are two other grave dangers likely to follow from a break-up of Germany which I wish to mention. In the first place, it will upset the political equilibrium of Europe to an extent which may be fatal to its future peace. The relations of the European nations have their roots deep in the past, and the Great War has not torn up those roots, much as it has destroyed the trees or rather the branches. There remains the secular problem of Slav and Teuton. There remains the historic rivalry between this country and France. Do not let us water the roots of ancient hates and ambitions. By destroying Germany we are going to give a new meaning to the Russian menace in future in Eastern Europe. The revival of Russia is a certainty which nothing can prevent. Before a revived Russia grave dangers must arise for the Little Entente and Poland and Finland and all the little Baltic States. Nothing could effectively help them except the counterpoise of an existing Germany, the backing and support of a united Teutonic Power! The break-up of Germany will not only mean political and economic chaos for the present for a large part of the continent, but also the opening of the flood gates of destruction in the not distant future. If we sincerely desire the peace of Europe, let us now stabilise whatever is still left of a European equilibrium. Let us uphold Germany in the day of her weakness and fainting, for the sake of Europe (if you will) even more than for her own sake.

Attitude of France.

I have mentioned the old rivalry between this country and France. Let me put my point quite frankly.

I very much fear that the impotence and dissolution of Germany will tend to revive that rivalry. France has already an unrivalled political and military position on the continent. She may be

c 62663

tempted to attempt too much. Military power is in the last resort nothing unless backed by still greater financial and economic power. That at any rate the Great War taught us, though the lesson does not seem to be generally realised yet. France admittedly has not the financial power to support the great military and political system which she is founding. Her very procedure is destroying the chance of reparation payments by Germany and thus still further emphasising her financial weakness. It is therefore to her own interest as well as to the interest of our future good relations that she should be dissuaded or prevented from proceeding too far with her German policy.

Relative Financial Positions of Great Britain and Germany.

So much for the political danger of a break-up of Germany. There is another danger to which we should be very much alive, in this country especially. I refer to the financial danger. This country, by an heroic and colossal effort, and at a cost which it is almost impossible for people outside to realise, has saved her great position as the financial centre of the world. She has worked up the pound sterling until it is now within a few per cents of the dollar or gold. By taxation and deflation, which has been a crushing burden to her industrial system, she has succeeded in saving her financial system which means so much to her. In the execution of this great policy she is paying her huge internal war debt and substantially reducing it. She has in addition honoured her bond and is paying her debt to America, which must in some ways be as difficult a matter as paying her vast internal debt. The keeping up of sterling, the payment of the American loan in addition to the internal debt, constitutes a burden on British industry which forms and must continue to form a fearful handicap to it in its competition with others.

Now compare this position with that of Germany. Through the printing press she has cancelled her internal debt. Her industrial equipment, great as it was before the war, has been vastly improved since. If she were now to escape just reparation payments she would in future be free of all the tax burdens which weigh down industry in this country, and will ultimately be in a position to deliver a knock-out blow. If Germany is not destroyed, she can pay a very large amount of reparations. But what is to happen if she is destroyed, if there is no Government to speak for her as a whole, and we have to start badgering a number of weak and insolvent States into which she has been dissolved? We could no doubt have got substantial sums of reparation out of an intact Austria-Hungary; what have we got or are we ever likely to get out of the fragments into which she has been dissolved? It must be clear that if we want reparations from Germany, if we do not wish to place our industries under an intolerable handicap with future German competition, we must now uphold Germany and prevent her collapse. If she collapses now she will assuredly arise again in future, but it will be at a time when the reparation issue will be dead and gone in the politics of Europe.

Immediate Steps to be Taken.

I have stated the general viewpoints by which I think we should be guided in our foreign policy. I wish now to say a few words on the practical steps which I think should be taken in order to promote a general settlement. The matter is immensely difficult, and it might almost seem an impertinence on my part to venture into so dangerous a field. And yet I am going to make certain suggestions for what they are worth. I know the position is very fluid and shifting and any actual steps to be taken must depend largely on the situation at any given moment. But even so we ought to have a general plan of settlement towards which to work, just as the French have been more or less consistently following a general plan in their German policy. It is on that general plan of settlement that I wish to say a few words.

Let me first refer to what Lord Curzon has called "the next step." The French Government have been informed that, without prejudice to the position taken up in our recent correspondence, we await and expect the next proposals from them, now that passive

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62664

resistance in the Ruhr has ceased. On this I venture to utter a word of warning. The French Government have every possible inducement to involve us in this Ruhr business, and I fear they will now invite us to participate with them in the fruits of their so-called victory in the Ruhr. They will say that after all the event has proved us in the wrong, they have successfully beaten the German resistance in the Ruhr, and they will magnanimously invite us to share in the spoils and to collaborate with them in the exploitation of the resources of the Ruhr. I trust that the offer will not tempt us to depart from the policy which we have followed since the beginning of this year. Whatever profit there may be in the business, the humiliation would be more than we could bear before the world. It will be said that when there was a grave risk to be run we adopted the high ground of principle and abstention, but, when there is a profit to be made, we are not above taking it. Our moral prestige, which stands high in the world to-day, would suffer a grave eclipse.

Besides, I do not think there is any profit to be made in the Ruhr. The restoration of industry there will, under all the circumstances, be very slow. The burden of feeding that great population will be very heavy. I fear wholesale unemployment and starvation in the coming winter. Our hands are clean, let them remain clean in this matter. If we are to have anything to do with the Ruhr at all, it must be as part and parcel of a general settlement in which the Ruhr will form merely an incident.

But indeed it would be impossible for the British Government to participate in the Ruhr business after their declaration that the Ruhr occupation is a breach of the Peace Treaty. I have already pointed out that this raises an issue of fundamental importance, on which no compromise is possible. The scrap of paper brought us into the war, the scrap of paper is the symbol under which the future of Europe is going to be hammered out. Let us not compromise ourselves there.

Proposed Tripartite Agreement.

With regard to a general settlement, I wish to express my opinion that the only satisfactory form of settlement will be a Tripartite arrangement between Great Britain, France and Germany.

Lord Curzon: There is Belgium, of course.

General Smuts: Yes, I am leaving out some other Powers, but an arrangement which includes those three—Great Britain, France and Germany—should be come to, and any separate action or arrangement on our part with Germany should only be resorted to in the very last instance and then only as a means of forcing the hands of France. I dislike a separate agreement between us and Germany, and I fear a separate agreement between France and Germany. I anticipate a repetition of the Angora incident. Our whole object should be to bring about a Tripartite arrangement, and we should exhaust all the resources of our diplomacy and influence to bring it about.

Italy should also be invited to join it, and in due time Russia, as the only other Great Power in Europe, should be made to join it too. In the meantime we should in our relations with Russia, quietly but actively, pave the way towards such a conclusion and make Russia realise that it is our wish to be friends.

Unless Great Britain, France and Germany can be made to work together the future of Europe is hopelessly compromised; its economic recovery will be impossible, and its suffering populations will in the end once more seek a way out of their miseries in a life-and-death struggle.

Support of United States Essential.

In order to bring about such a settlement we should do everything in our power to enlist the sympathy and support of the United States. In fact I fear that without strong backing from the United States it would be most difficult to carry any arrangement with the present French Government. The attempt is worth making and if it succeeds it may carry us far to success in the great cause of European appeasement.

c62665

Reparations: Suggested Solution.

With regard to Reparations, I believe the recent correspondence has brought us within sight of a solution. In fact, there seems to be a fair consensus of opinion that the Reparation scheme should be £2,500 millions, that is, confined to the "A" and "B" bonds under the Peace Treaty, and that a moratorium should be given Germany for its payment. The chief difficulty arises from the claim of M. Poincaré that the balance, consisting of "C" bonds, should only be cancelled if Inter-Allied debts are also cancelled. Italy also makes a strong point of the cancellation of these debts, while the creditor Governments, the United States and Great Britain, have not agreed to cancellation. We are now so near a solution, and the Reparation question is so urgent and so fatal in its effects on European restoration that I would suggest some such compromise as the following, based on the treatment which has been accorded Bulgaria in her Reparation troubles.

The Reparation sum should be provisionally fixed at £2,500 millions and a moratorium should be given Germany before payments should begin. Ten years after such payments have begun, the Great Powers concerned should at a conference decide the question of any additional payment over and above this amount. They may decide either for additional payment or against it or for further postponement of the question. At the same conference in the future, where the United States of America will also attend, the question of Inter-Allied debts will also be considered and decided. The effect of this proposal will be that Inter-Allied debts will not be cancelled but only a long moratorium will be given, which will in any case have to be given as no European Government other than Great Britain will be able to repay their indebtedness for many years to come, if at all.

I feel convinced that the concession suggested will be a fair and wise one for this and the American Governments to make, and I have little doubt that with it we shall be able to settle the Reparation amount provisionally with the German Government, and thereby obviate the necessity of a further enquiry into German capacity to pay which the French Government have already vetoed. If my suggestion is ruled out, we shall have to fall back on the enquiry proposed in our correspondence.

My suggestion has also the advantage of not ousting the Reparation Commission and it leaves a settlement in the hands of the Governments concerned in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

Steps to be taken by Germany.

As part of the settlement Germany should undertake to reform and stabilise her currency, to balance her budget, and to close her printing press, and should submit to Allied and American supervision of her financial administration for the purpose. In order to assist Germany to re-establish her currency and credit, the Allies and America will support her generally on the lines on which Austria has been helped, although I am informed that a guarantee of her bonds may not be actually necessary.

Inter-Allied Conference and Appeal to United States.

The scheme here proposed would involve the calling forthwith of a conference of the Powers represented on the Reparation Commission. To this conference the United States Government should also be invited. If necessary, a solemn appeal should be made to her, not only by the British Government, but by this conference representing the whole Empire. The desperate position of Europe should be laid bare to her, and her moral responsibility should be emphasised on the grounds of the glorious and decisive part she took, not only in the Great War but also in the shaping of the Peace settlement. Her collaboration in such a conference and her active participation in the Reparation Commission may have a decisive effect.

Position if France will not attend Conference.

Should the French Government decline to come to such a conference or refuse to accept any reasonable settlement on the above or similar lines, a very serious situation for Europe and for

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62666

this country will undoubtedly arise. In that case the whole character of our foreign policy may be affected, the new situation may have to be laid very frankly before the people of this country; and the battered Entente will finally go and this Government may have to resort in real earnest to that separate action which has been hinted. My conviction is that our position morally and materially will be a very strong one. In Cologne we hold the key to the Ruhr position, and, if we are determined to assert ourselves and resolutely use our position there for the purpose of saving Europe from chaos, France will be prepared to talk to us once more.

I do not think we should raise the question of the Ruhr or of security with France at this suggested conference. One problem at a time. If we could settle the Reparation question now, we should be thankful and content to leave the thornier question of security to be raised thereafter.

Settlement of Ruhr Question.

But after the Reparation question has been disposed of the Ruhr problem will have to be dealt with in real earnest. You will not get Reparations as long as the French are in the Ruhr. But the occupation of the Ruhr is far more than a Reparation question. Unless that illegal act is undone, Europe will be undone. There is not only the penknife in the works of the watch but the poison in the soul of Europe. The Ruhr has been rapidly followed by Corfu. And so it will go on unless the reign of law and international justice is once more re-established among the nations.

I confess that personally I go much further. When the Peace Treaty was being drafted at Paris I looked upon the occupation clauses as the one really fatal blot on the document. They put a temptation before France which was sure to prove too much for her. And so they have proved. First it was the illegal seizure of Frankfort and other places; then came the seizure of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort, in which most unfortunately we compromised ourselves; finally, came the invasion of the Ruhr. French occupation of German territory is more likely to prove the cause of the next great world war than any other matter I can think of. And the greatest service we could render to the cause of European peace in our day would be the substitution of some other system for these fatal occupations.

Security for France.

France must have her security in some other, more innocent, more effective form.

It is somewhat difficult to raise the matter with France because she is extremely sensitive and secretive on it.

Lord Curzon: That raises the question of the Treaty, and that is a serious thing.

General Smuts: It is difficult to raise it because whenever during the last two or three years the matter has been mentioned the French representatives have always waived it aside. In the recent correspondence M. Poincaré has politely bowed us out. M. Poincaré does not want to discuss French security for the present. The master of many legions is not afraid. I am afraid. I am horribly afraid, not only for France, but also for Europe. And the sooner this matter can be dealt with, the better for the future peace of Europe.

Suggested Neutralisation of part of Western Germany.

The suggestion which appeals most to me is that, in exchange for the occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr, a substantial part of Western Germany shall be neutralised under effective international supervision. If France has a population of 40,000,000 and Germany of 60,000,000, the position between them should be equalised by the perpetual neutralisation of an area containing 20,000,000 of Germans. The neutralised area to be an integral part of Germany under German administration, but to have neither military training nor fortification nor munition factories of any kind whatsoever. This will probably be agreed to by the German Government and will give France much more effective security than the present dangerous occupations, which are simply hate factories for the two neighbouring peoples. I think the matter is well worth careful exploration, and, even if it does not appeal to France at once, it may do so as soon as circumstances have somewhat changed.

C 62667

Peace must be based on Law and Justice.

Let me in conclusion add this one word more. In the Reparation and the Ruhr problem is involved the question which goes to the root of the whole thing; shall we have peace based upon law and justice? Shall we have a peace which will give the world an opportunity to look forward to the future with hope and the determination to repair damage done to its present civilisation; or shall we have peace based on fear and force and the rule of the strong? Infinite sacrifices have been made to establish the ideal of a peace between the nations based on justice and the faithful observance of international law and treaty obligations. For that ideal the young men fought and died in their millions. And the root question for us, on whom the responsibility rests to-day, is whether that sacrifice shall be a total loss, or whether with our earnest backing it shall yet be saved for the future. Great is the responsibility especially upon this Empire, which made the keeping of their word by the Nations the fundamental issue of the Great War. I feel sure we shall do our best to be faithful to that great responsibility.

STATEMENT BY THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, IRISH FREE STATE.

Mr. O'Higgins: Prime Minister, I feel some difficulty in speaking on this matter of Lord Curzon's statement, and I intend to speak very briefly indeed.

Position of Irish Free State as regards Foreign Policy.

It scarcely needs to be stressed that the position of Ireland is not exactly the position of other countries represented here. The relations between Ireland and England have not been the same and have not been as happy. A Treaty of Peace has been concluded between the two countries, and it is hoped here, as in Ireland, and in Ireland as here, that there has been opened up a chapter of goodwill and peace and growing friendship between the two countries. But, dealing with conditions as they stand, it is to be remembered, for one thing, that the European situation to-day arises very much from the Versailles Treaty, and we were not at Versailles.

Neither have we any mandated territory arising out of the settlement arrived at at Versailles.

On the question of this Conference generally, and on the constitutional points raised by the Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia, I have only this to say, that we have not hitherto regarded ourselves as particularly concerned with the matter of British foreign policy. It is true that despatches and occasionally telegrams have been sent, but I would be ashamed to say how little of the time of the Executive Council of the Free State has been given to the consideration of these. They were forwarded to a particular Minister of the Government and I think that in reading them that Minister considered merely the extent to which we were concerned or affected by the matters dealt with in the despatch. We have not regarded ourselves, and we do not regard ourselves, as having any special mandate from our people in the matter of the foreign policy of Britain. We do not consider that we have responsibility to them for that. I think that that point needs to be stressed, and also the point that no British Minister can be supposed to have any particular responsibility to our people for the conduct of their foreign policy. Sometimes, when those despatches were sent along, I wondered what exactly would be the effect if, for instance, we found ourselves in emphatic disagreement with a particular line of British foreign policy. We at all times appreciated the courtesy of the sending of those despatches, and I listened with great interest to Lord Curzon's statement on foreign policy here the other day. It was most interesting and most illuminating, but I could not agree that either the sending of the despatches or the making of the statement imposes upon our country a kind of "post factum" responsibility. This would be pretty much the position as outlined by Mr. Mackenzie King, that we believe in democracy, we believe in representative government, and we recognise that we have not a mandate from our people to concern ourselves with the foreign

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

policy of Britain. Unlike England, we have a written constitution. It may be an advantage or it may be a disadvantage. Occasionally we find it a disadvantage, but the effect of that constitution is that all authority in Ireland, legislative, executive, and judicial, is derived from the people, and we who for the time being form an Executive Council—President Cosgrave and myself and the others—have not taken the view that our people wish us to concern ourselves particularly with the foreign policy as carried out by the British Foreign Office.

Preoccupation of Irish Free State with other Problems.

Now, there were many matters dealt with in the statement the other day. The position in Afghanistan was one of these. I can scarcely conceive it possible that the position in Afghanistan was a matter of intense interest, let us say, to the Government of Newfoundland, and I can scarcely conceive it as possible that the Government of Newfoundland have given less consideration to that matter than we have. We have been preoccupied with our domestic problems and we think that we are doing the best thing for the world and for the Commonwealth in concentrating on those, in directing our efforts to restoring order and decency of life there, in developing the resouces of the country, and, for the present at any rate, in taking up that attitude which General Smuts has described as one of selfish isolation. If I were asked, frankly, what is the view in Ireland, what is the public opinion of Ireland on this matter of the Ruhr, I could not say. I have heard both views outlined and explained eloquently and emphatically by people in Dublin, but I do not know that one particular view predominates or has crystallised and, certainly, we of the Executive Council have not felt ourselves compelled to discuss the matter seriously or to arrive at any very definite or any very emphatic view. That, quite frankly, is the position of Ireland at the moment on the question of foreign policy. In so far as we have foreign relations at the moment, they arise largely from the fact that our race, to a very large extent, is a mother race, that our people are far-flung, and our external relations would, for the most part, be with the countries whose representatives sit here, and would arise from the fact that so many of our people reside in those countries—with the countries whose representatives sit here and with one other, with America..

Effect of Irish Settlement on United States.

We noted the statement in Lord Curzon's address that anti-British feeling in America was less intense by reason of the Irish settlement. We noted that with satisfaction. In greater or less degree according as circumstances varied in Ireland, there has always been in America amongst the Irish and the Irish-Americans a feeling of distrust and suspicion of Britain, and, much as you and I might deplore that, we have to advert to the relations that have existed back through the ages between the two countries, and we have to advert to the circumstances in which so many of these people or their parents or, mayhap, their grandparents, left their native land, carrying with them these seeds of inflammation and distrust to the new country in which they found their home. Now, we are glad that that is lessened, we are glad that that is to a great extent neutralised and cancelled by this new relationship so recently brought about. It is a feeling that, by the nature of the case, we can do more to lessen than even the British themselves, and we who are standing over this treaty that has been signed between the two countries, standing over it because we believe that it contains the seeds of future good for both countries, will do all in our power to lessen any inflammation, any distrust, any suspicion, that there has been of Britain wherever we have influence. We have stood over that treaty and stood over it in the face of very great difficulty among our own people and in the face of very painful tasks at home, because we believe that the five Englishmen who set their hand to that treaty set their hand to as big a thing as it was politically possible for them to carry. What we can do to allay ill-feeling against England in America we have done and we will continue to do, but people must not fall into the mistake of simply regarding the whole position as if the relation between our country and England had been the same or had been as happy as the relation

between England and other countries that are represented here. They have been totally different. We can only hope that the settlement that has been arrived at will lead to very much better relations than have existed in the past.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Appreciation of Lord Curzon's Speech.

Mr. Warren: Prime Minister, it would almost be presumption on my part, in the position I occupy, and with the limited experience I have had, to criticise in any way what has taken place here during the last two Sessions, but perhaps the views of an onlooker, more or less, may not perhaps be altogether out of place. I want, first of all, to associate myself with what has already been said by my colleagues from overseas in regard to the very lucid and enlightening statement as to our position in world politics given by Lord Curzon.

Position of Newfoundland.

Newfoundland has no entanglements. Years ago, we figured in, I think, nearly every treaty that was made between Great Britain and France, and it always seemed to me that if they really wanted to arrive at a settlement, and something was required to make up the balance, Newfoundland was handed in, either from the one side or the other. All that is over. We have settled down to peace and harmony, with the exception of some treaty rights which the United States have on our shores. We no longer consider ourselves as being very much involved in world politics. I was going to say, also, that we have no frontier, but I would be wrong if I said that; we have an unexpected frontier in Labrador, about which my friend Sir Lomer Gouin and I propose to have some words later on. The territory there is about the size of Germany and Austria-Hungary put together, and if we cannot settle the matter between ourselves we are going to refer it, not to the League of Nations, but to the Privy Council, to say where the frontier should be.

Proposed Treaty with United States.

Of what Lord Curzon said, I am only interested in two things. One of them will come up for discussion later on; that is the question of the three-mile or twelve-mile limit in the territorial waters of the United States. Anything that I have to say about that I will reserve until the matter comes up.

Ruhr.

We are also interested in the Ruhr. We export a large amount of iron ore to the Ruhr, and the recent occupation there has cut our export down from where it ought to be—1½ million tons a year—to about 150 thousand tons, the last figures I saw. I am personally quite satisfied to leave our interests in the hands of the present Foreign Minister.

Relations of Various Parts of Empire in Foreign Policy.

Before I finish, I would like to mention one thing, because it seems to me to be rather important. I listened with a great deal of interest to what Mr. Bruce had to say this morning with regard to this matter. Mr. Bruce said that he thought we ought to formulate a policy. That more or less brings up the functions of this Conference, and, while I personally would hesitate very very much even to take part in formulating a policy, I am rather concerned as to what that means. I take it that this is purely a Conference of overseas Prime Ministers, and is not in any way a War Cabinet or an Empire Cabinet, or that we have any authority really from those who sent us here to take upon ourselves the responsibilities of formulating a policy. I took it that when Lord Curzon addressed us on Friday he was merely—to use an expression that we have on our side of the world—"putting us wise" as to the present condition of affairs all over the world; and I, for one, would like to say that I never expected him to formulate a policy in that speech—in fact, I was very much struck with something he said as to the formulation of a policy, which has really been borne out by General Smuts here this afternoon. It is no good formulating a policy unless you can enforce it, and I think, from my experience in the last three or four years, that the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62670

whole Empire is so war-weary that it is hardly worth while formulating a policy you will not be really able to carry out. General Smuts, this afternoon, asked on what grounds the French were taking such a prominent position in post-war policy. Well, I think General Smuts answered that question in an earlier portion of his speech, in which he said, as far as South Africa was concerned, "they wanted peace," and from his words I gathered they want, not only peace, but peace with a capital "P." My friend, Mr. O'Higgins, asks me, or suggests, or wants to know, what interest Newfoundland should have in Afghanistan. To be perfectly frank, I am not giving away any secret when I say we have not any direct interest, but indirectly we have as much interest in Afghanistan as we have in Ireland or in Canada. If our policy in Afghanistan were to be interfered with, it might not affect me as a Newfoundlander, but as a Britisher it would, and I would feel it my duty to go to the help of Afghanistan, if it required my help, just in the same way as I should expect the citizens of the Indian Empire to help Newfoundland, if anyone came to interfere with us. I have nothing more to say, Mr. Prime Minister.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Lord Peel: Prime Minister, I do not wish, speaking for the Indian Delegation, to comment generally on the very broad questions which have been raised by the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, but I wish to comment on one or two of the observations in Lord Curzon's statement, and to deal with them from the purely Indian point of view. The two points on which I wish to say a word are what I may call the Bolshevik menace as regards India, and a word upon the Turkish Treaty.

Bolshevist Menace in India and Afghanistan.

Now, as I think Lord Curzon said, the Bolshevists must "bolshevise," that is the essence of their existence and their life, and we know that the Third International is only another aspect of the Soviet Government itself. I realise very thoroughly, from the Indian point of view, that the diplomatic success to which Lord Curzon has alluded, our diplomatic success over the Soviet Government, had an exceedingly wholesome effect upon Soviet propaganda connected with India. It had, I might say, also a very useful effect upon that country in which Mr. Warren and Mr. O'Higgins take no interest whatever, *i.e.*, Afghanistan. They regarded us in a far more important light when they felt that Russia, who had been attempting such active propaganda in Afghanistan, humbled itself so completely and thoroughly before the power of Great Britain. Now the attack, or the Bolshevist menace of propaganda in India, takes two forms and runs through two channels. It is first of all a propaganda carried on in India itself, through Indian revolutionaries, and by the methods of Indian revolutionaries, or by persons who are not Indians, coming from different parts of Europe subsidised by the authorities of the Third International. The second way in which it acts is by creating difficulties in those countries which adjoin India. I wish to say a very brief word on both those points. Of course, in 1919, during the time we were engaged in the War with Afghanistan, the Soviet Government had a splendid opportunity of posing as the great friend of Afghanistan, and it made an arrangement and treaties with Afghanistan of that ostentatiously self-denying type, which are generally made by the Soviet Government in their first relations with countries which they would like to influence or possibly to absorb. Well then, unfortunately for Russia, its actions in Bokhara and the countries so closely adjoining Afghanistan threw rather a different colour upon the altruistic aspirations of the Soviet Government in Afghanistan, and then the pendulum swung very much our way. Now I am not going in detail into this question, but I will mention two points. One is this. Whatever propaganda, whether in money or influence, is carried on is dealt with through the hands of the Afghans themselves. In fact, you may say the Emir regulates the ebb and flow of Soviet propaganda, whether it goes by way of influence or of money. He has a pretty good control over it, and not only in order to assist his relations with the Government of India, because he himself has learned by experience the dangerous effect

C 62671

that propaganda of this kind may have upon his own citizens. But I certainly could add this, I think, that of course we are anxious to be, and desire to be, on the very best terms with the Government of Afghanistan. We are trying to settle our difficulties there. We are trying to place our arrangements on a solid basis of good faith and sincerity, but our work would be immensely assisted, very much assisted, if all this Soviet intrigue in Afghanistan were entirely cut away.

Then as regards the propaganda in India itself, it is carried on, of course, through agents subsidised by the Soviet Government, who by various ways, by the traditional ways in which India has been invaded in the past, seek to get a footing, and also by a great deal of literature, some of which is printed in Hamburg. Newspapers and so on containing these various Soviet propositions are carried into India. I presume that the Soviet Government itself or the Third International thought that during the years 1921 and the beginning of 1922 some success had been obtained, because in 1922 they voted a large sum of money for the further carrying on of the Indian propaganda. Fortunately, there are two sets of people, both rivals, who are anxious to do the work in India. They vied with each other, and by their rivalry each often neutralised much of the work which the other has done. I understand the Third International is very impartial and throws its weight to the side of the one who will do the work the better. The Government of India has taken measures, partly by preventing the literature coming into India and partly by arresting the emissaries, but some small cells have been formed in the big towns, in Bombay and in Lahore. Latterly the Soviet Government have attempted to introduce their propaganda and their newspapers into India by influencing Indian sailors on vessels which touch at Indian ports.

Like other disturbers of the peace, the Soviet Government is always ready to cast its line on to waters that are already troubled. Much unrest has been caused in the Punjab through the activities of the Akalis, a Puritan reforming sect of the Sikhs. There again Soviet influence has been active in trying to turn what was originally no doubt a religious movement into more worldly political paths, and one of the notorious Sikh revolutionaries was largely subsidised by the Soviet Government. I should add, of course, that this propaganda, and more especially among the Moslems both in the East and in India, has taken a nationalist and revolutionary, rather than an economic, colour. The propagandists do not so much preach the pure Communistic doctrines which they were taught in Russia, and this is of some relief to many of the preachers who probably have ceased entirely to believe in the doctrines of Communism. So much for what I may call the Bolshevist menace. I do not think it has gone very far at present in India, but it is a thing which always has to be watched, and the Government of India was anxious that I should give some indication of the methods and the extent to which it has already proceeded.

Turkish Treaty.

The only other point I wish to mention is the effect of the Turkish Treaty in India. Of course, the settlement with Turkey has had an admirable soothing and calming effect upon the large Moslem population in India. There has been some criticism here, and in other places, no doubt, of the details of that Treaty, but the details of that Treaty are not closely scanned by the Moslems in India. They are satisfied that the Treaty has been made and that good relations have been restored between this country and an important Moslem Power, and that Turkey, free from what they would call the Treaty of Sèvres, has once more taken its place as an independent sovereign Power. This settlement has done very much to relieve one of the many anxieties of the Government of India.

STATEMENT BY THE MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR.

Maharajah of Alwar: Prime Minister, no doubt my colleagues must be somewhat surprised at my attempting to speak on this gigantic subject of foreign policy and foreign relations of the British Empire, but I am not surprised at their being surprised as I feel somewhat surprised myself at finding myself speaking on this proposition. I will only say a very few words.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62672

Appreciation of Lord Curzon's Speech.

In the first place, I should like to add my tribute to the numerous compliments already paid to Lord Curzon for the very lucid and interesting statement given to us, explaining the policy of the European events and the part that the British Empire is playing in them. I am speaking here to-day as the representative of one-third of India, where we may perhaps not hold exactly the same ideas on such problems as are held here, but which on that account are no less important. Being in touch with people of my own State as well as of my countrymen, I think I may claim to speak on certain aspects. The part that the British Empire has played in not only European politics but world politics has been discussed to-day by the various Dominion Prime Ministers and representatives, and the part that the British Empire has to play has, after all our meetings, I am sure, left no doubt in any one's mind how united it is likely to be. The British Empire as a whole, I feel sure, expects that the British Government may take such action as will achieve peace as the fruitful result of that gigantic enterprise—war. When we boil all the problems down that face us to-day, I try to see what is the outstanding question that really prevents us from achieving as rapidly as we should like to do those fruits.

European Situation.

Without making any further ado, it seems to me that the whole question, looked at from the material political point of view, rests primarily on the Ruhr. When war did take place and when the British Empire did put its whole might into it, I must say I should like to have seen that the British and the Allied forces had marched into Berlin, in the words of Lord Curzon, we should like to have seen that the Gurkhas had camped in Potsdam and the Bengal Lancers had marched into Berlin. Of course, that was a compliment to India, but I take it really to mean that Lord Curzon wanted to see the Allied forces march right into the enemy capital. It would no doubt have been a great achievement for the British Empire as well as for the Allies, but the Armistice was signed in the meantime and it became somewhat prolonged. In the case of Turkey, it lasted even for some years. If by providential dispensation and by our effort we should have succeeded in what I have said, we should then have been able to make the enemy acknowledge their defeat without any doubt in their own minds; we should then have been able to dictate terms to them, and in dictating these we could then have afforded to be generous. Those terms would then have to-day been fulfilled. I am speaking, I admit, in ignorance of the events in this and other countries that might have prevented this event taking place, but I only speak from the knowledge available from the newspapers. When the armistice lasted so long, it no doubt gave the enemy countries an opportunity to devise means and seek means to find out how they could evade at least some of their responsibilities, with the result that in some cases the final settlement was prolonged for several months; and in one case even for a number of years. I believe that France to some extent realised this position, and therefore penetrated into the Ruhr in order that they might get Germany to acknowledge defeat unconditionally. From this point of view I must admit—and I am talking quite frankly and candidly—I should like to have seen the British Government take part in the same enterprise, because then they could have controlled France, and they could have prevented Germany from being shattered and from being screwed down for the benefit of France alone. As General Smuts has very ably said in his speech, Germany, who were our enemies, are nevertheless important from the point of view of trade, and in order to keep Europe in a prosperous condition. Purely from that point of view, I think that if the British Government had taken the same action as France, they could have controlled France in what she was doing, and they might have been able to control Germany from heading to its downfall, which is bound to affect the whole of Europe.

Future Policy.

But now all that is past history. The question remains: What is to be done in the future? It would indeed be presumptuous on my part to dictate any particular policy or any particular action, but I

C62673

must admit I agree with the able speech delivered by Mr. Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia, wherein he said that it was imperative that the Empire should know, and the Dominions and India should know, what is to be the definite policy of the Imperial Government, so that we may all be certain of what line of action is likely to be followed, and so that we can prepare for it with every goodwill and with wholeheartedness. I quite realise—having had some experience in my own sphere in ruling my State—how difficult it is to prejudge events and to form policies in advance. Nevertheless, in the present case, as Mr. Bruce said, a definite firm policy is very necessary to be formulated.

I must express my regret at having occupied your time in expressing my views, but as I have come here in a Conference, the principal object of which, I understand, is to confer and interchange ideas and views. whatever mine are, I have given with the best intentions, because I am as anxious as anyone else is to see the British Empire achieve peace, progress and prosperity as quickly as possible, and thus to help the star of human progress to shine with even greater vigour and greater radiance than it has done in the past.

STATEMENT BY SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

Sir Tej Sapru: I do not propose to make a long speech, because I hesitate to rush in where more experienced, more trained and wiser statesmen of the Empire are afraid to discuss this important question.

Position of India.

Unfortunately, or fortunately, the position now in India is that she cannot occupy the position of isolation which she might have done before the war. She has now been drawn into the vortex or world politics, she is an integral part of the British Empire, and has taken a share in the war—a very humble share, I admit. Indirectly, if not directly, she feels interested in the settlement of these questions. India is not in a position to give you any advice or to formulate for you any foreign policy, for the very simple reason that India cannot formulate her own policy. I will only tell you one thing, and that is that there is not a single movement in Europe or England or any part of the British Empire which is not watched by my countrymen, which is not studied from day to day carefully, and you would be greatly mistaken if you were to think that that had not somehow or other its effect on the masses, though they might not be able fully to understand those matters.

Appreciation of Lord Curzon's Speech.

I do not propose to express any opinion upon your foreign policy. I will only say that I have listened with unbounded admiration to the great speech of Lord Curzon, and I feel that I have realised something by coming over to the Conference which I never realised in India when Lord Curzon was Viceroy. I never had the privilege of hearing him before, but I have had the privilege of hearing him now.

India's Interest in European Settlement.

I think, however, that it is my duty to interpret to you the political mind of India in regard to your own policy, and I think you ought to know it. It is very often said that Indians cannot settle their own quarrels. Indians reply to you by saying: "You set your house in order." That is their criticism. It is affecting your prestige in India. It is affecting the prestige of Europe and its civilisation; I may tell you that I received a letter which I read only during the recess in which a very intelligent Indian politician writes to me—I can give you almost the words—"This material civilisation of Europe is going to lead the world to absolute ruin." All that may be hyperbolic language, but that is the state of the Indian feeling. We say that you have not been able to settle your differences, and you have no right to blame us for not settling our differences. India is, however, very much interested in the settlement of your differences. Therefore, I think, that, although we have no right to advise you, we are very much interested in the settlement which will really restore peace to the world. There is only one more remark that I will make so far as this Ruhr question is

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62674

concerned. It is being followed with the greatest possible interest in India, and the one comment that is being made is that the whole action of France in its relation to Germany has been extremely high-handed, and that it is time that England did assert herself to set Germany on her legs. It is not that India has any particular weakness for Germany now, but she views these questions not merely from a political point of view, but also from an ethical point of view. That may be the bane of my countrymen, but there it is, and they feel that it is time England did something really to settle the question because India is vitally interested in the settlement of this question for more reasons than one, for commercial reasons and for other reasons. I do not wish, therefore, to say anything more in regard to your foreign policy; only I wish you to bear in mind that your prestige in Eastern countries is at stake.

Bolshevist Propaganda.

I will only add a few more remarks in regard to the question of Bolshevism to which Lord Peel has referred. I have had, if I may say so with all modesty, exceptional opportunities of following the political situation *vis-à-vis* Bolshevism in India as a member of the Government of India—a position I held until ten months ago. I had access to confidential documents and I used to study them carefully. As a private politician, directly in touch with my countrymen, I know the trend of political thought and the direction in which the political mind is running. I do not for a moment deny that there are agencies of the character to which reference has been made by Lord Peel, but there is one thing I would ask you to bear in mind. You hear a good deal about political unrest in India. I will be frank with you. You hear a great deal of disloyalty and political agitation in India, but you must make a distinction between that kind of unrest and Bolshevism. Do not mix up the two. They are absolutely different. So far as political unrest and political agitation relate to domestic matters they are of an entirely different character from Bolshevism. I will only ask you to bear in mind one important fact in regard to India and that is as to what chance Bolshevism has of success in India. Assuming that the Soviet Government succeeded in pushing its propaganda about Bolshevism either through Afghanistan or some other source, what chance has Bolshevism in India? You may have trouble in India but I do not think that Bolshevism has the slighest possible chance of success in India and I will tell you the reason why. The reason is to be found in our mentality, in our history, in our traditions and in our law. We may have our grievances against the British Government. We have grievances and I wish to tell you frankly that our ambitions are neither few nor small, and that we are keenly looking forward to the day when India will occupy the same position as those other countries whose Prime Ministers are on this side of the table. The institution of property is a very sacred institution and we are a country of big landlords and small landlords, and if the Soviet Government, if the Communists, or the Bolshevists, expect that we are going to allow our institution of property which has come down to us through thousands of years, and which is a living institution and part and parcel of our law, to be destroyed, they are deluding themselves. They may create riots or troubles of similar kind, but, so far as Communism as understood in Russia is concerned, I do not think that there is any chance of success. At the same time I do not wish you to entertain a false sense of security. There is every need for being alive to the danger and for taking active steps to prevent the poison spreading, and we must be forearmed. The only thing I would now say is that there is no country which required more or greater development of publicity or propaganda on sounder lines than India does. When I was a member of the Government I was a strong supporter of publicity and propaganda. I do not think that I succeeded entirely. I think, if I may say so in the presence of Lord Peel, that the value of it has to be recognised here in Whitehall, and you can undo a great deal of mischief and prevent a great deal of Bolshevism spreading in India if you develop propaganda and your publicity on the right lines and let the people know really what the dangers of Bolshevism are. That is the only way in which you can proceed in regard to that matter.

C 62675

Afghanistan.

I do not think that I should be justified in taking more of your time. I will only venture to make one observation in regard to Afghanistan, in which our colleagues from Ireland and Newfoundland said they were not very much interested directly. We are more interested in Afghanistan possibly than Australia and New Zealand are interested in Japan. Afghanistan is very much nearer to us than Japan is to Australia. It is only about five hours by motor car from us. We have signed a Treaty. I know a great deal about that Treaty because I was a member of the Government at the time it was settled, the Treaty passed through my hands and I had to advise the Government of India on its legal aspects. For the time being we are I hope safe, but the Treaty of friendship has to be revised in three years and in Afghanistan things change far more rapidly and friendship has not that element of stability which you and I would like to have. There has not been much stability on our side either in regard to our Afghanistan policy. It means a great deal to us. It has a great effect on our internal progress and development and on our Budget, and although the conference itself may not be prepared to give any advice or to formulate any policy in regard to Afghanistan I do make an earnest appeal to His Majesty's Government that a stable and careful policy in regard to Afghanistan should be adopted, because unless you do so we shall never have real peace on our border and, what is more to my mind, we cannot realise the ambitions we have in regard to our domestic development.

Main Questions before Conference.

Lord Curzon: I only want to say one word before we adjourn at this stage the Foreign Office discussion. Broadly speaking to-day two aspects of the case have been touched upon. The first is the general question of the control of the Dominions over the foreign policy of the Empire, and the means, if any, and machinery to be adopted for improving it. That is, as General Smuts pointed out, not the question we came here to discuss this morning, and I hope we shall resume the discussion upon it at a future date.

The second question was a *résumé* of the general position throughout the world and the foreign policy adopted by this country in regard to it. That is the question which I think was really the topic set down for discussion. Mr. Bruce seemed to think that I had not given sufficient indications of the policy of the British Government in all these respects. Now, if he will allow me to say so, Mr. Bruce enjoyed the extraordinary advantage, owing to the special interposition of Providence, of not hearing my remarks, and perhaps if he reads what I said when it goes into print he will find I am not really open to that charge. Anyhow I had two defenders who sprang to my rescue to-day. One was General Smuts, who found that on the whole I had given or attempted to give some indication of policy; the other, Mr. Warren, who said it was not my business to give it at all. The truth lies midway between the two extremes. My duty was twofold. Firstly, to give a general account of the situation and, secondly, to give some indications of policy. I did not pursue the latter aspect of my duty to the final stage, because I thought it only respectful to this Conference to wait and hear what you had to say, and because the discussion will be resumed at a later date when I have had the opportunity in the Foreign Office of considering very carefully the extremely useful and valuable suggestions which have been made by many speakers, notably by General Smuts to-day. Definite propositions have been put before us. They will require most careful examination at the hands of the Foreign Office, and in a few days time, Prime Minister, when the discussion is resumed I hope to be in a position to give my opinion upon them. We can then have a resumed discussion upon foreign affairs, and can arrive at the results which everyone really desires.

FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS.

Mr. Baldwin: The Economic Conference will meet to-morrow and Wednesday. We propose a meeting of this Conference on Thursday morning to hear a statement from Lord Robert Cecil on the work of the League of Nations.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

062676

PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

That concludes the business. I would only say in the communiqué for the Press, after the names of those who addressed the conference, the conference came to the unanimous decision that the whole of the proceedings should be treated as absolutely confidential. The words "for the time being" had been inserted, but I think it wise to cut them out because people may expect immediate publication.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
October 8, 1923.

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TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

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SECRET.

E. 6th Meeting (1923). 45

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE SIXTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. LORD ROBERT CECIL, K.C., M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Professor JOHN MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)
Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir Robert R. GARRAN, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

Newfoundland.
Mr. W. G. CAREW.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. P. McGILLIGAN.

India.
Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

WELCOME TO PROFESSOR MacNEILL.

Mr. Baldwin: Before we begin I should like to say a word of welcome on behalf of the Conference to Professor MacNeill, one of the Irish Delegates, who has not been able to be with us before. We are very glad to see him here.

JAPANESE REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM CONFERENCE.

I should now like to read a Note which we have received from the Japanese Embassy in answer to the message of sympathy we sent from the Conference on our first day. It is as follows:—

"Under instructions from the Japanese Premier, I have the honour to request your Lordship to convey to the Right Honourable Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister, and his eminent colleagues on the Imperial Conference, the Japanese Premier's sincere thanks for the touching message of sympathy in the calamity which has befallen Japan. Count Yamamoto desires to assure Mr. Baldwin that the manifestation of cordial sentiment, coming as it did so promptly from the representative statesmen of the British Empire, the old and never failing ally of Japan, has deeply moved the Japanese nation in their great distress and will give them encouragement and reassurance in taking up the tremendous task of reconstruction.

"I have, &c.
(Signed) "HAYASHI."

Baron Hayashi is the Japanese Ambassador.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS REGARDING ITALIAN-GREEK CRISIS, AUGUST–SEPTEMBER, 1923.

Lord Curzon: Last week, when I spoke upon foreign affairs, the Conference will remember that I postponed dealing with the question of the recent incidents at Corfu because I thought it would be better to deal with them *en masse* with Lord Robert Cecil here, who would explain that part of the situation which arose in connection with the sittings of the League of Nations at Geneva. It seems to me that it is important that the Ministers here assembled should have some knowledge of what passed, because of the interesting light that it throws, firstly, upon the post-war mentality and moral standards of Europe; secondly, upon the character and personality of the Italian Dictator, Signor Mussolini, about whom I said a good deal last week; and thirdly, upon the procedure and authority of the League of Nations. I will confine what I have to say to the political history and aspect of the case, leaving Lord Robert Cecil to deal with what passed at Geneva when the matter came into the hands of the League of Nations.

Janina Murders.

The boundary between the small new State of Albania and Greece was being determined by an International Commission appointed under the auspices of the Ambassadors' Conference of

Paris, whose duty it is to see to the fulfilment of the terms of the Peace Treaties. There were British, French, Italian and Greek members of this Frontier Commission. They were engaged in tracing the line in difficult and mountainous country. The Head of the Italian branch of the Commission was General Tellini, a man, I believe, of considerable military standing and attainments, but who had, by his attitude, incurred the suspicion, if not the hostility, of both the Greek and Albanian peoples. At nine o'clock in the morning of the 27th August, the Italian Section of the Commission—the different sections were working apart from each other—consisting of this General and some of his Staff, was ambushed while travelling in motors, and shot down in the most cold-blooded and heartless manner.

Action of Greek and Italian Governments.

As soon as the Greek Government heard of the crime, they sent the head of their Gendarmerie, with a number of judicial authorities, to make an enquiry upon the spot. On the other hand, the Italian Government on the 29th August, as soon as they heard of it, jumped at once to the conclusion that the guilt for the crime was exclusively Greek; they drew up and issued an ultimatum in which they demanded what seemed to the world at large to be extravagant compensation for the lives of the persons who had been slain, and they attached to it very humiliating conditions to be fulfilled by the Greek Government itself. They demanded a reply within twenty-four hours. The Greek Government accepted the greater part of these conditions without a murmur, but deprecated, at any rate until the matter had been enquired into, the payment of this exorbitant indemnity and the fulfilment of the humiliating conditions as regards the Fleet, to which I have referred, and then said that if their protest was not listened to they must appeal—as they had a right to do under the Covenant of the League—to the League of Nations.

Bombardment of Corfu.

The Italian Government rejected this appeal and sent their Fleet to Corfu, where the Italian Admiral who was in command, after calling upon the Greek General who was in command of the defenceless and unoccupied fort to surrender the place in half an hour, and without giving him time (because he knew nothing about it) to get his instructions from the Government in Athens, proceeded to bombard this defenceless place, the bombardment resulting in the slaughter of something like twenty men, women and children, mostly of the refugee class, who were collected in some of the old buildings on the hill behind the harbour. The Greek Government had, in the meantime, before the bombardment had taken place, made the appeal to the Council of the League of Nations to which I just now referred.

League of Nations and Ambassadors' Conference.

Thus, you will see that at this stage two controlling international bodies were involved. The Greek Government had made their appeal to the Council of the League. The Ambassadors' Conference, which had originally appointed this Commission, and under whose instructions, therefore, it was serving, were involved at Paris. Directly the outrage occurred they had met and addressed a letter to the Greek Government protesting against the crime and demanding an enquiry. This duplication, involving, of course, some overlapping of functions, was a source of anxiety and inconvenience from the start, but you will see that it was quite inevitable in the circumstances of the case. When the matter came before the Council of the League, Signor Mussolini instructed his representative absolutely to deny the competence of the League, because it was a matter in which Italy's honour was involved. He declared that it was an affair that concerned Italy and Greece alone, and that the action of his Admiral at Corfu was not an act of war.

Effect on Public Opinion in Great Britain and France.

Meanwhile, public opinion in the various countries concerned had been a good deal stirred. In this country the Press, which is very sensitive on matters of this sort, took an almost unanimously

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62680

unfavourable view of what was regarded as the high-handed and inexcusable conduct of the Italian Government. I happened to be in France at the time, and the same attitude was taken up by the French Press for twenty-four hours, until it was closed down by orders from the Quai d'Orsay, M. Poincaré realising that this was a favourable opportunity, if he showed some friendliness towards Italy, of enlisting the favourable attitude of Italy in his difficulties in regard to the Ruhr. Therefore, after twenty-four hours, there was rather a sharp change of attitude in the French Press. In Italy, of course, there was an outburst of flaming indignation at this outrage committed upon their officers, and this insult, as they regarded it, to the nation as a whole.

Attitude of His Majesty's Government.

Our attitude here was, as it seemed to me, quite clear. So far as the crime was concerned, the murders on the frontier at Janina, it was a matter for the Ambassadors' Conference. So far as an appeal to the League was involved, we had no doubt whatever as to the competence and right of the League to deal with the matter, and it seemed to us to be our duty to give to Lord Robert Cecil the support for which he asked. If it were necessary he could read to you the telegram that I sent to him on the 1st September. It was sent by me in France after consultation with the Prime Minister. Without taking sides in the matter, it said to Lord Robert Cecil that we would uphold him in his defence of the Covenant of the League and of the rights which it entailed.

Action taken by Council of League and by Ambassadors' Conference.

Meanwhile, the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris began to lay down the conditions of the enquiry which they thought ought to take place, and, in the course of this, they also laid down the rather doubtful proposition in International Law that it is a principle of International Law that States are responsible for political crimes and outrages committed on their territory without any reference to the question whether they had any measure of culpability or not. At Geneva, as Lord Robert Cecil will tell you, feeling ran very high, and the little States who constitute the majority of the League stood together, feeling that their chances of protection at the hands of the League were gravely imperilled if a great Power like Italy were allowed, as it appeared to them, to trample upon and to ignore the elementary principles upon which the League itself rested. I will not follow with what passed at Geneva, because that belongs to Lord Robert Cecil rather than to me; but the outcome at this stage was this, that Lord Robert Cecil finding it impossible, owing to the attitude of his Italian colleague, to send definite proposals from the Council at Geneva to the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris, which was dealing with the matter, very cleverly, as I think, secured that in a communication that was sent to Paris the Minutes of the proceedings at Geneva should be forwarded for the information of the Ambassadors.

With equal tact and wisdom, in my judgment, the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris accepted almost without exception these suggestions, thereby paying a very proper compliment to the authority of the Council of the League. They agreed to appoint an International Commission of Enquiry under a Japanese president; they required Greece to deposit the indemnity demanded—50,000,000 lire—with a view to payment of such portion of it as they might afterwards be adjudged to have to find, and they referred the adjudication of the final sum to the Permanent International Court. At the same moment, the Italian Ambassador agreed to evacuate Corfu if these conditions were fulfilled. Then ensued a somewhat troubled period at Paris, from which it emerged that Signor Mussolini was bent in any circumstances upon extracting his big fine in order that he might have something to show to his people for the action that he had taken, should he be compelled eventually to retire from Corfu. Accordingly, he began by declining to evacuate until he was satisfied that the Greeks had finally executed the whole of the terms, a condition which, of course, admitted of a good deal of controversy; and when his Ambassador in Paris, Baron Avezzana, agreed to evacuate in any case on the 27th September, he practically threw

C62681

him over, and declared, shifting his attention for the moment to Geneva, that, if the League chose to regard the controversy as within its competence, he would be absolved from the promise given by his Ambassador at Paris to evacuate.

What then passed at Geneva I leave Lord Robert Cecil to say. But in the meantime the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris had really given away their case by somewhat incautiously accepting a formula which was suggested by the Italian Ambassador and which enabled the Italians to escape from the obligation with regard to evacuation, not if it were established by the enquiry that Greece were culpable, but if it were not established that Greece had not been negligent. Those were very dangerous words, as I will presently show.

Report of Commission of Enquiry.

The enquiry took place. I read only last night—it only came last night—the report of the British officer who was a member of the Commission of Enquiry. The Italian representative on this Commission conducted his case with shameless partiality. He announced that he was not only a member of the Commission, but that he had come with a special mission from Signor Mussolini—which was only too true—with special instructions from Mussolini—which was only too true; he assumed throughout the guilt of the Greeks; he acted upon the hypothesis that a Greek colonel, Colonel Butsaris, was the person responsible; he threw every possible obstacle in the way of his colleagues who were united on the other side. The Commission sent a preliminary report that they could not fix the responsibility for the murder, that there had been some negligence on the part of the Greek local authorities in conducting the enquiry and making the necessary search for the criminals, but whether the Greek Government had any responsibility for this they were not agreed. It now transpires that the three of them were agreed that no responsibility attached to the Greek Government at all, but that in order to get the unanimous consent of all parties on the Commission they put the thing in that negative and ambiguous way, not knowing what had happened at Paris and not realising for a moment that this ambiguity would be taken advantage of there, in view of the words that had been accepted at Paris, to afford the excuse to the Italian Government to escape from their obligation with regard to the evacuation.

Decision of Ambassadors' Conference.

Thereupon, this preliminary report having been received, Italy declared that she was relieved of her obligation to evacuate, and that she intended to remain. This was the situation in Paris. The Ambassadors had ignorantly, I think, and certainly unwisely, given away their case by the formula they had accepted. Meanwhile, M. Poincaré, the French Premier, had swung over to the side of Italy, and was voting for her. Lord Crewe, our Ambassador, stood absolutely alone, and there would have been placed upon his shoulders the responsibility of being overruled by the majority of his colleagues, or, if he persisted, of being responsible before all Europe, solely responsible, for the continued presence of the Italians in Corfu and for the disastrous consequences that might have ensued—and how disastrous they might have been arises from our knowledge of the fact that the Fiume question at the north of the Adriatic was unsolved, that Signor Mussolini was believed to be on the verge of a *coup* there, and that the possession of Corfu, if indefinitely persisted in, would not only enable him to carry out that *coup* with greater success, but would, if persevered in, have meant a very crucial and dangerous disturbance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

Instructions sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

Accordingly, the Ambassadors having given away their case by the language they had accepted, we had no alternative but to instruct Lord Crewe to defer to the attitude of the remainder of the members of the Conference. We felt very greatly the responsibility that might devolve upon us if any action on our part, however justifiable, were responsible for a great European conflagration, a

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

062682

conflagration which really was on the verge of bursting out. Once again, as I said to you so often the other day, we decided upon this attitude—or we made, if you like to call it so, this sacrifice—in order to maintain what I have always held to be the cardinal principle of European policy at this moment, namely, the entente between ourselves and our allies. The result was that the Greek Government was ordered to pay the whole fine of 50,000,000 lire, and the reference to the Permanent Court at The Hague, to fix the actual sum, was dropped.

Comments on decision of Ambassadors' Conference.

I am bound to say to you, in confidence here, that I think the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference was unjustified by the evidence, that it was a political and not a judicial decision, and that its justification, and indeed I think its sole justification—and many will think an adequate justification—was that it saved, as I think it did save, Europe from the chances of very grave complications. The general feeling was that it was worth paying this sum, or asking Greece to pay this sum, in order to escape more serious consequences, and I really believe that Greece, badly as she has been treated, rather thinks so herself, because she was terribly nervous at what might have happened had the Italians found some excuse for remaining in Corfu. On the other hand, as regards Geneva, I think Lord Robert Cecil will be able to tell you, in what he is going to say, that our support of the Covenant there had a great effect, because it prevented the French at a critical moment from swinging round to the side of the Italians at Geneva, and M. Poincaré was thus prevented from repudiating in any way or even weakening the authority of the League, all the more so because had he done so he would have been impugning the Treaty of Versailles out of which the League arises and upon his case with regard to which his whole position in relation to the Ruhr depends. I think, therefore, that Lord Robert Cecil will be able to make out a very good defence, not only of what passed at Geneva, but of our policy in relation thereto.

It only remains for me to add this. As I said, I read last night the report of our representative on the Commission of Enquiry. I should have added just now that when the Conference of Ambassadors came to their regrettable decision they straightaway dissolved the Commission thinking it had nothing more to do, although no final report had been received. The Commission were very angry at their work being suspended in this way, and when the news came to them that Paris had taken advantage of those rather ambiguous words in their report to which I referred, in the words of our representative there, the French representative on the Commission of Enquiry said that they had been duped; the Japanese representative said: "Our enquiries have been futile throughout, since a decision was evidently taken in advance"; and the only person to express gratification at the issue was the Italian, who had succeeded in engineering it.

Net Result of Dispute.

The net result is that Greece has suffered what I cannot help thinking is a grave injustice, because from the report of the Commission there is no reason to suppose that the Greeks committed the crime any more than the Albanians. They have been unable to find out who committed it; it may have been Greece, or it may have been Albania, but certainly there is no evidence to show culpability in either case: Italy has set an example to the world of what a Great Power is capable of doing in an emergency of this description; the League of Nations has suffered, but I think has successfully survived, the considerable shock that was attempted to be dealt to its authority; and Europe has escaped by these means—which I cannot myself applaud—the chances of a renewed conflagration.

I need only add that yesterday the Italian Ambassador came to see me. The attitude of the Press in England, because no public pronouncement was made at any stage by the Government, had excited great fury in Italy, and articles of the most passionate nature have been directed against us during the past two months.

062683

The Ambassador came to say that now that the whole thing was over he hoped that it might be forgotten, that his people were a very mercurial people and said things in the heat of the moment which do not count for very much and are soon repented of, that Italy had not swerved in the smallest degree from the position of complete accord with us which she had held for many months with regard to the question of the Ruhr, that she was anxious to resume that accord and that friendly spirit, and he hoped that this incident would be forgotten and that we might walk side by side as we had done until lately in the solution of the larger European problem. Of course, I responded at once to this advance on his part. I said that, like him, we were anxious to let bygones be bygones and wipe the matter off the slate, that I fully accepted the loyalty of his Government with regard to the bigger issues to which he referred, and that I hoped we might henceforward, as we had done before, march side by side in the more difficult and critical issues that arise out of Reparations and the Ruhr.

That is, briefly, my case on the political side. I hand over the statement of the Geneva aspect to my colleague, Lord Robert Cecil.

STATEMENT BY LORD ROBERT CECIL REGARDING THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Lord Robert Cecil: Prime Minister, I am in a little physical difficulty and I hope the Conference will pardon me if my statement appears to be inadequate to the importance of the cause.

I propose, with your permission, to deal a little generally with the topic of the League and not merely to confine myself to this particular issue of the Italo-Greek crisis, unless the Conference desires me to do so.

I do not propose to give you, or attempt to give you, a review of the history of the League proceedings during the last few years, or during any other period, because, in the first place, I have so recently joined the Government that I should not be qualified to do it from the inside point of view, and from every other point of view everybody is equally qualified with myself, because the whole of the proceedings, as you know, are always published either immediately or at a very short interval after they have taken place.

Aims and Position of League.

What I would like to try to do, if I may, is to make some kind of estimate of the present position of the League and what place it ought to occupy, and does occupy, in the foreign policy of the Empire. I do not pretend to hope that I can deal with that adequately, but I will try and say what I can on the subject. And it is necessary, though I should have hoped it would not have been, to begin by one or two elementary observations, owing to certain criticisms from highly-placed quarters, which have been passed on the recent proceedings of the League. It seems necessary to emphasise once again that the League is not a super-State and it is not there to give laws to the world; it is not an organisation which either legislates for or administers other countries, nor is it a mere debating society, a collection of more or less eminent persons who go there to indulge in futile oratory. I think it may be defined as an international organisation, to consider and discuss and agree upon international action and the settlement of international difficulties and disputes. Its method is not, therefore, the method of coercive government; it is a method of consent and its executive instrument is not force, but public opinion. Now, I am sorry to insist upon what to many of my hearers must be very elementary observations, and I only do so, because, in connection with this crisis, there was published a very strong criticism of the League and the action of the British representatives, on the authority of an ex-Prime Minister, which seemed to me to show that there was a considerable misapprehension, even in the highest quarters, of what the League really strives to do. It was asked whether I had the authority of the British Government to commit the British Fleet to action, and it described the proceedings of the League as an experiment in adjudication.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62684

Object of League is to promote Agreement among Nations.

Well, of course, that seems to me an entire misconception of what the League was to do. The League's business is not to impose a settlement, even when a controversy is brought before it; it is to promote agreement. The controversy was brought before the League under Article 15, as I shall show in a minute, and its business was to get a settlement of the controversy and an agreement of the parties, and, if they did not agree, there was no power under the Covenant, nor would it have been at all in accordance with the general principles of the League, for the League to attempt to enforce what the Council of the League might think was the proper settlement. As everybody, I imagine, in this room knows quite well, there is only one occasion in which, under the Covenant, force is to be used, *i.e.*, under Article 16, and the object of that is not to enforce any particular settlement or a particular action, but to prevent nations from fighting, especially until an opportunity has been given for discussion, and consideration, and agreement. It is rather important, I think, that that should be realised in considering the actions of the League, and not least its action in connection with this Italian-Greek crisis. There ought to be no doubt about it, because the very words of the Preamble describe its objects—"To promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security." Those are the two objects of the League and they are to be accomplished, as I say, by inducing the nations to agree and act together, and not by any attempt by a group of nations, or by the majority of the League or, indeed, by the whole League itself, to enforce on any particular nation any particular line of conduct which is approved.

Results Already Achieved.

Now I would like—I will be as brief as I can—just to ask whether this conception, because it is necessary to ask it in view of what has recently been said in some quarters, whether this conception has, in fact, worked out successfully. Let me just take the first object of the Preamble—international co-operation. I do not think the severest criticism of the League will deny it has achieved an immense amount of co-operation of the most valuable kind and of the most multifarious description. I only propose to mention—I do not propose to discuss or describe—what it has done, but, when we come to consider the enormous number of different ways in which it has acted in order to promote international co-operation, I think there will be no doubt in the minds of anybody in this room that it has carried out this part of its duty with very remarkable success. Take its humanitarian exertions: the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, the relief of hundreds of thousands of refugees, the organisation of a defence against the epidemics from the east of Europe, achieved with very little expense and with absolutely complete success. Or you may take its social activities: the great efforts and the successful efforts it has made to strengthen the fight against opium, to extirpate the horrible traffic in women and children, which is one of the disgraces of our civilisation, the assisting and protection of native races, and a very large part of its work which is subsidiary to the League, but in a sense a part of it, its work in the International Labour Organisation.

Or you may take its economic work: the great amount of work it has already done to facilitate the increase of transit between nations, or the smaller matters that it has had something to do with, to relieve the hindrance caused by passport regulations, or the work which it has done quite lately, the other day, to induce the nations to agree on a convention for the enforcement of commercial arbitration, a thing of immense importance to the commercial interest all over the world. Or you may take its financial work: I need not go back on the old Brussels Conference of 1920, although I still think that was a very considerable effort towards the financial re-establishment of the world, and that it deserved better practical success than it actually achieved. Or you may take the better known and more striking success, the very, very considerable steps that have been taken towards the financial rehabilitation of Austria, very remarkable work—I have not time to deal with it in any detail, but the Conference is well aware of

C 62685

the very remarkable success that has been achieved in that direction. So remarkable is it that Hungary is asking us to help her in the same kind of way, though, I hope, with less contingent financial liability than in the case of Austria; and unhappy Greece, which has been saddled with a terrible financial problem of providing for a million refugees, *i.e.*, a quarter of her whole population, in addition to the existing population, is asking us to facilitate the raising of a loan for that purpose, and the establishment of a scheme for the settlement of these refugees on a sound economic basis. Or you may take its administrative work: the administration of Danzig, the administration of the Saar, the various administrative duties which have been thrust upon it, or have been offered to it, by the Lausanne Treaty; or you may take the number of other cases—I will not weary the Conference by enumerating any more—from what is called the intellectual co-operative work, which I think perhaps has more the sympathy of our continental neighbours than ourselves, down to a conference for fixing the movable feasts of the Church so as to have a fixed holiday instead of a movable one. All this work has been done, and, I think, with very great and remarkable success, and, considering the immense amount of advantage that has accrued to the populations of the world, with wonderfully little expense. I do not believe it could have been done in any other way than by the existence of the League.

Improvement on Previous Procedure.

If anybody who is familiar with these things considers what, under the old system of a diplomatic correspondence and special conferences perhaps called of a partial kind, which have no machinery to carry them out between their summoning, if you consider that, I think you will agree that the work could not have been done except by the League. And I venture to recount a curious bit of evidence as to the value of the League, which I have come across personally. When I was in the United States and Canada, a few months ago, I found myself in controversy with Mr. Stephen Porter, who is the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the House of Representatives, over the opium question, in the course of which he denied that the efforts of the League in the matter had been of any value. He was a very open-minded man, and he accepted the suggestion of the United States Administration that he should lead a delegation from the United States to Geneva, to discuss, with the Advisory Committee of the League on Opium, the opium question, and he went there. He is a Republican and, of course, a strong opponent of the League. He was very much altered, let me put it mildly, in his attitude towards the League, or at any rate towards their opium activities, and left Geneva last summer—at least we think so—certainly very much less hostile than he was, at any rate as regards opium. So much so was this the case that, at his own suggestion, he came back officially from the United States to attend the meeting of the Assembly as a kind of special delegation to deal with the opium question. This is the thing I am leading up to. Some conference was to be summoned, and the question arose as to whether it should be summoned by the League or not, and Mr. Porter then made this observation: "He recognised that it was desirable that the League of Nations should convene the conference, which could not fail thereby to be invested with a much more considerable importance." I think that is rather an interesting example of the effect of the League's organisations in these matters on a perfectly unprejudiced mind from outside. The truth is that the League really has done splendid work in all these respects, and, as Lord Curzon said the other day, the League has exercised a wholesome and conciliatory influence in world politics. I do not think it is right to underestimate the immense importance of all these kinds of activities in that conciliatory influence on the larger political questions which have to be transacted between nations. But, of course, all that is comparatively a minor matter.

Status of League in International Disputes.

The second object of the League is the object of achieving international peace and security, and anyone may well say how

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62686

can you make any claim for the League if you consider the condition of Europe now, after the League has been in existence for three or four years.

I feel the force of the observation. But, in the first place, I must point out that the League is only what the Governments composing it choose to make it. It is for them to say. As I have already explained, it is not a super-State, it has no coercive jurisdiction—it is for the Governments to say how much or how little work they entrust to the League. The League was not asked to deal with the Russo-Polish war, and it was not asked to deal with the Turco-Greek war; it was not asked to deal with the question of Reparations; and it is those three big questions more than anything else that have been responsible for the unrest which still prevails in Europe. No doubt, of course, it may be said that if it had been asked to deal with those three big questions it would have failed. All one can say is that that may be so, but the organisations which have attempted to deal with them have not been pre-eminently successful. On the other hand, as everyone knows, in the number of smaller questions which have been entrusted to the League, the League has succeeded in allaying the difficulties and disputes which have come before it. I need not recount the circumstances of those disputes, the question of the Aaland Islands, the question of Upper Silesia, the question of Albania and Serbia, which was a very dangerous question, and even the question of Vilna, which many people regard as one of the least successful matters; but war between Lithuania and Poland was prevented. I think no-one can deny that the work of the League did not meet with complete success, yet it did do this, it prevented any fighting on the subject, and stopped the fighting which was already in progress.

Italian-Greek Crisis.

But all these are smaller questions, and that is why the recent Italian-Greek question is of such enormous importance in the history of the League. It was the first occasion on which an International Dispute of the first order—one which might easily have led to serious wars in Europe—it was the first big question that had come before the League, and it is for that reason that I hope the Conference will allow me just to go through the dates and events, and point out exactly what the League did do and what the League did not do.

As we have been told, the murder of General Tellini took place on the 27th August, and the Italian ultimatum was issued on the 29th August. The Greek reply was the next day—the 30th August—and after acceding to the first three or four demands and explaining that the Greek Government was not able to accede to the other three, without abdicating its sovereignty—that is, undertaking to hang somebody, to allow another Power to take its place in trying the criminals, and, above all, to undertake to pay 50,000,000 lire whatever happened—those three demands the Greeks refused and concluded by saying that, if their reply was not deemed to be satisfactory, they were quite willing to submit the whole matter to the League; and they bound themselves beforehand to accept whatever the League should suggest. On the same day, the 30th, came the Ambassadors' note making their demands, for the Ambassadors were parties to the dispute; they made their demands on the same day, and also on the same day the Italian Government intimated that they would not accept the League. It is rather important that that should be emphasised, because it has been suggested that it was something which the League did which induced the Italian Government to reject it, but, as a matter of fact, they rejected it before the League had done anything. On the 31st the Ambassadors' note was delivered and the bombardment and occupation of Corfu took place, and articles appeared in the Italian press hostile to the League.

Appeal to League by Government of Greece and Action taken by Council.

On the 1st September the Greek request for a hearing before the Council of the League was received in Geneva. The Council of the

C 62687

League happened to be in session already. It immediately met on the morning of the 1st in private; it is an illusion of some of our critics to suppose that the first meetings of the Council to deal with this matter were in public. It met in private, and the Greek representative, M. Politis, presented his request for the consideration and decision of the League. He read Articles 12 and 15, or at any rate the material parts of them, and under those articles anyone can see who refers to them that there is an absolute right given to any member of the League to submit to the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture with any other member of the League, and it becomes the absolute duty of the Council to take that matter into consideration and endeavour to effect a settlement of it, and, if a settlement is impossible, then to hear and report upon the issue submitted to it, the parties agreeing that they will not resort to war until the dispute has been heard and reported upon.

In making his speech M. Politis disclaimed any desire that Article 16 should be applied. Article 16, as everyone knows, is an article which provides for economic pressure and blockade, and ultimately stronger measures, in case a country resorts to war without having submitted its dispute to the League. In other words, M. Politis did not claim that there had been a resort to war. I think he was right in the attitude he took. There had been an act which might have been treated as an act of war, but in fact was not treated as an act of war by the party against whom it was directed; and, therefore, there was technically no resort to war, and M. Politis very explicitly said that he had no desire that Article 16 should be applied.

Question of Competence of League.

I do not know whether the Conference may have noticed a letter by Sir Frederick Pollock in yesterday's "Times" in which that distinguished jurist explains his view that there was no resort to war in this case. The Italian representative, Signor Salandra, said that he had no instructions, and asked for an adjournment, but incidentally called attention to the fact that, since the matter was also an offence against the Conference of Ambassadors, they were involved, and it was a question—he did not actually say that the League had no competence at that stage, but suggested that it was a matter that the Conference of Ambassadors ought to deal with. That was not accepted at that stage by the Greek representatives, and on behalf of the British Government I said we had no doubt at all as to the competence of the League, and I, while deploring deeply the murder—which I, of course, did—said on behalf of the British Government that we felt there was no question as to the duty of the League to entertain the request of the Greek Government under the clear terms of Article 15. I think the Conference would agree that the position was clear. There was a dispute, if ever a dispute existed which could be described as likely to lead to a rupture; it was a dispute of that nature; it was a dispute which at any moment might have caused war between the two countries. Any hasty action on the part of the Greek Commander might have precipitated the two countries into a war, and it may be with other countries as well; that was clearly a dispute likely to lead to a rupture. It was submitted to the Council of the League by one of its members expressly asking them to act under Article 15, and, as anyone who will read that article will agree, there was no option or discretion in the matter; the Council were bound to act, and they did act. The line which I took on behalf of the British Government was very warmly supported by the Swedish representative, M. Branting, and there was no question on the part of any member of the Council as to what the duty of the Council was, apart from the Italian representative. However, we adjourned till the 4th in order to allow the Italian representative to receive his instructions, merely passing a resolution to the effect that we hoped nothing would be done on either side to aggravate the situation.

Feeling in Assembly.

The Assembly met on the 3rd, and it had become quite evident that there was a very strong and a unanimous feeling in the Assembly on the point. It is perhaps worth while to remind the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62688

Conference of the position of the Assembly, I mean of the delegates. The larger Powers are usually represented by persons of more or less importance, commonly ex-Ministers or persons of note of that kind; the smaller Powers are not infrequently—I think I might say almost usually—represented by their Foreign Minister or somebody of equal authority in their country: Dr. Benes on behalf of Czechoslovakia, M. Nincic on behalf of Serbia, M. Kalfoff on behalf of Bulgaria and Dr. Nansen on behalf of Norway, and so on; consequently a very large proportion of them speak directly for their Governments, and those who are not actually Ministers are usually people of such importance that anything they say carries the opinions of their countries with them. It was, therefore, of great importance that there was a really strong vehement feeling that the League must act and must do its duty, and a strong feeling also, of course, that the occupation and bombardment of Corfu was, in the circumstances, not a defensible proceeding.

Further Proceedings of Council.

There had been delivered on the 2nd, and this is an important fact in the situation, the reply of the Greeks to the note from the Ambassadors' Conference and in that reply they expressed their willingness to accept whatever the Ambassadors put upon them. On the same day I received, and was intensely grateful to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary for them, the instructions from the British Government authorising me to take whatever action I thought right to support the Covenant. The next day the Greek Note to the Ambassadors was received of course, and we received—I need not go into the detail of it—we received information of the rather vehement and formal rejection of all competence of the League on behalf of the Italian Government. That was the 2nd September. When we met on the 4th September, in the first public meeting of the Council, the Italian instructions had not arrived. They had sent somebody, one of their members, to Rome to get personal instructions and all that we did on that occasion was to hear a further proposal from the Greek Government offering the deposit of 50 million lire in a Swiss bank to await whatever damages might be awarded against them. Then came the meeting of the 5th September and then we had a communication for the first time from the Ambassadors' Conference telling us what was going on in Paris. We had a speech from the Italian representative denying the competence of the League in a very much more moderate form, it must be said, than the language which had been used outside the Council of the League, and it was on that occasion that we had read to us the relevant articles of the Covenant in French and English pointing out what the duties of the Council were and that we could not infringe those duties without breaking the Covenant and incidentally breaking the Treaties of Peace of which the Covenant was part. It became clear at this stage, both from what Signor Salandra said to us in the Council and from information conveyed to us from outside, that the Italians were now prepared—they had not said so up till then—to accept the Conference of Ambassadors, not only as the proper authority for dealing with the offence to the Ambassadors, but as determining what ought to be done between Greece and Italy, and therefore on that date we were for the first time in the presence of an agreement by the two parties of the dispute to accept the decision of a Tribunal, of a body, outside the League. We had a meeting, a certain number of members of the Council met and considered what reply we ought to send to the Ambassadors and we felt that our business under the Covenant was to do everything we could to promote a settlement, and since the two parties had agreed to accept the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors our object henceforward was to do everything we could to facilitate the task of the Ambassadors, and to make their decision as nearly in accordance with public opinion of the world as expressed at Geneva as we could. We therefore drew up the proposed terms of settlement apart from the question of the evacuation of Corfu, and these were proposed by the Spanish member of the Council at the meeting of the Council on the 6th. As Lord Curzon has explained to you, owing to the opposition of the Italian representative which perhaps might have been got over, but also owing to the

C 62689

reluctance of the French representative to agree to these proposals until he had received instructions from Paris, we were unable to send those proposals as agreed recommendations to the Council of Ambassadors, and it was in order to get over that difficulty that at my suggestion we decided to send the whole of the minutes of our proceedings to the Ambassadors who, as we knew, were going to meet the next day to deal with the matter, and the minutes included not only the actual proposals which were, in fact, the proposals as Lord Curzon has said, which were afterwards adopted practically without alteration or very small alterations by the Conference of Ambassadors, but also included certain very important declarations by other members besides the British member of the Council as to the competence of the League. The Belgian member, for instance, M. Hymans, made a very strong declaration as to the clear competence of the League. That was assented to by the Swedish member and by the Uruguayan member, and also by the Spanish representative. It was, of course, quite well known that that represented the strong feeling, as I have already said, of all these nations there assembled at Geneva, and I happen to know, as a matter of fact, that that feeling was conveyed by a great number of different nations both at Paris and at Rome to the Governments of France and Italy. I have not myself the least doubt that that strong feeling had a considerable effect upon the readiness with which the Conference of Ambassadors on the 7th September adopted the suggestions which the Council of the League had put forward as to the settlement of the question apart from the evacuation of Corfu. The Conference of Ambassadors did adopt them. They were accepted by Greece and Italy and then took place, as Lord Curzon has said, a rather awkward pause. We were informed that the Conference of Ambassadors were going to deal with the question of Corfu also. As I have said only too often, the business of the League was to promote an agreement and a settlement, and as long as there was any prospect of a settlement being reached it was not the right, it was not the duty, it was not within the power of the Council of the League to intervene. They therefore held their hand altogether during the next few days waiting the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors as to what was going to happen in Corfu. They, of course, reserved to themselves the right to take the matter up again if no settlement was reached or if a settlement was reached so plainly in defiance of all public law that they could not allow it to pass. As a matter of fact on the 13th the settlement was reached, and the note which was sent by the Conference of Ambassadors to Greece was not unsatisfactory. It said, as Lord Curzon has reminded you—it said that it adhered to the terms, of course, of the 7th September, the first note, and that having received from the Italian Ambassador a statement that Italy would in any case evacuate Corfu on the 27th September, which, I may parenthetically observe, was two days before the end of the Assembly, having received that assurance it went on to say that, if the Ambassadors were satisfied that Greece had not carried out with due care its obligations to search for and punish the criminals, then they reserved to themselves the right to impose further penalties on Greece including the payment of the whole 50 million lire without any reference to the International Court. That was the note of the 13th September. Lord Curzon has told you there was, in addition to that, a declaration, made by the Italian Ambassador before the note was agreed to, which was held to modify the note to the extent of saying that it was for Greece to prove that she had done everything she could, not for the Conference of Ambassadors to decide that she had not done everything she could. On that we were not called upon to make any observations, because both Greece and the Italians accepted the note and so far as the League was concerned the matter was at an end.

Part played by League in Settlement.

A settlement had been effected; we had done the best we could to effect that settlement and I am convinced that the concentration of public opinion at Geneva was one of the great factors in promoting what was, after all, a very rapid pacific solution of an exceedingly difficult question. On the 17th September there was a meeting of the Council at which we took note of this settlement and I took the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62690

opportunity of explaining very much what I have explained to the Conference here, what seemed to us the duty of the League in cases of this kind. On the 18th the Italian representative made a further statement as to his objection to the competence of the League. It was, I think one may say without impertinence, more moderate than the previous declarations had been and thereupon it was agreed that we should take means to clear up definitely and for ever, as far as one could, all these legal questions that had been raised, the question of competence and the question of the right to seize territory in order to enforce demands—I will deal with that in a moment—and also the question to which Lord Curzon has alluded, the responsibility for political crimes committed on the territory of a State. I need not trouble the Conference with the details of the negotiations that then took place. They are rather tedious. A number of meetings of the Council took place and we called in our legal advisers. They drew up five questions which raised these matters and they were accepted, together with a declaration to which I shall refer in a moment, by the Italian Government.

Discussion in Assembly.

On the 28th, and this is the last date I shall have to trouble the Conference with, there was a meeting of the whole Assembly when, for the first time, the Assembly thought it was right for them to discuss and express an opinion upon these events. It was begun by the President of the Council, Viscount Ishii, reading the resolutions to which the Council had come. He was followed by M. Branting, who expressed certain criticisms, particularly that the matter had not been referred directly to the International Court of Justice. I made some observations.

Then occurred a really rather remarkable demonstration. Eight or ten representatives from all parts of the world, from all four quarters of the globe, one after the other, expressed in the strongest way their conviction that the League was competent to deal with the matter and their regret at some of the incidents that had occurred.

Summary of Position.

May I just try and summarise what seems to me to have been the result? Greece submitted the questions under Articles 12 and 15, and, as I have explained, the Council was bound to entertain them and did entertain them. There was no resort to war and hence, as the Greeks very truly said, Article 16 did not apply. On the other hand a very serious question was raised as to the action of the Italian Government in occupying territory in order to enforce a demand, which they believed they had, and, indeed, which they undoubtedly had to some extent justly, against Greece.

Precedents for Italian Action.

That is not as clear a matter as perhaps some of us would wish. Undoubtedly before the Covenant it had been quite common for countries of all kinds to exercise coercion of that kind. Sir Frederick Pollock called attention to the proceedings in Crete, but there are stronger cases still. There is a case in the early sixties where the British Government did almost exactly the same as the Italian Government. A British subject was murdered in Japan by one of the feudal clans. This was before the marvellous changes in Japan. The British Government demanded £25,000 as compensation to the relatives of the murdered man and £100,000 as compensation to the British Government and apologies and the arrest of the criminals. When the criminals were not arrested as quickly as they thought they ought to be arrested the British Fleet bombarded a place called Kagoshima and burned it to the ground. I mention this because it is right that we should realise that, apart from the Covenant, there was nothing unusual, whatever we may think of it as a proper international proceeding, there was nothing unusual in what the Italians did at Corfu. On the other hand it has raised the question of whether that Covenant permits any such action to be taken by one member of the League against another without at any rate resorting to every means of discussion and debate in order to settle the dispute before such measures are taken.

C 62691

Defence of Council's Action.

Shortly, I venture to say that the Council did exactly what it ought to have done under the Covenant. Its business was to promote a settlement. If that settlement could not be promoted by diplomacy or by arbitration, which are mentioned under Article 13, its business was to hear and report upon the dispute itself. It carried out that duty of promoting a settlement absolutely, and its suggestions, as I venture to think, for the settlement were of great value and were in themselves quite sound. But once the parties had agreed on settling it in another way than by the report of the Council, it was not only the right, but it was the duty of the Council to do everything they could to facilitate the settlement by those means.

Appointment of Commission of Jurists.

There remain then these two questions which I have referred to, the question of the legality of the occupation of Corfu, which I have already dealt with, and the question of the competence of the League. They have been dealt with in this way. We, most of us, or I and several of the other members of the Council, desired that they should be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The Italians were vehemently opposed to that, in the case of one of the questions. They proposed that they should be referred to a Commission of Jurists. Ultimately we agreed to the Commission of Jurists and they agreed to a very strong declaration: That any dispute between members of the League likely to lead to a rupture is within the sphere of action of the League and that, if the dispute cannot be settled by diplomacy, arbitration or judicial settlement, it is the duty of the Council to deal with it under Article 15 of the Covenant. In view of that very strong declaration which seemed to me to go far to dispose of the question of competence, I did not myself think it was necessary to fight any longer for the immediate reference to the International Court of Justice. The matter will go to this Committee of Jurists and they will report to the next meeting of the Council on the 10th December. If the Council still feel that the matter is in any doubt they will be able to put any further questions they like to the International Court. It seems to me, therefore, that, as far as the formal position of the League is concerned, it is unhurt. An attack was made on its competence that has been either actually withdrawn or will be dealt with finally in the near future. The question of the occupation of Corfu is also to be submitted to legal determination, and so is the question of the responsibility for a political crime committed on the territory of a State. I confess I think those provisions for dealing with these questions which have been raised in this dispute in a strictly legal way form a very valuable precedent. I do not recall any instance of an international dispute of this nature raising very difficult questions which has been followed by an attempt to settle those questions by strictly legal and constitutional means, and if that precedent is established and is followed it really will lay the foundation, as it seems to me, for a gradual elaboration of international law which may be of enormous value for the future peace of the world. Therefore formally the League is unhurt.

Effect of Italian Action on Position of League.

Substantially, however, I do not think one can go as far as that. There has been the challenge by a great Power of the competence of the League. It is quite true that that has been met immediately by a very remarkable rally of all the smaller Powers to the support of the League. It showed a very strong, vigorous, vital feeling on the part of all those Powers not only in Europe, but all over the world that the League must be supported, that it was the only guarantee of justice between the States and that the small States particularly were vitally interested in the maintenance of the authority of the League. I think that was a very valuable counterweight to the repudiation—I think we must admit it was repudiation—by a great Power of the competence of the League, at any rate for a time. I do not think that repudiation has done the League's authority as much harm as some people believe.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62692

Fiume Dispute.

Certainly one incident seemed to show it had not done it much harm. Lord Curzon has referred to the dispute over Fiume. That is a dispute that brought in question the construction of the Treaty of Rapallo, I think it is the Treaty of Rapallo.

Lord Curzon: Yes.

Lord Robert Cecil: The Treaty of Rapallo had never been registered with the League, and by the provisions of the Covenant it could not therefore be relied on in any proceedings before the League because it was not registered. Immediately after this dispute had taken place, I think about the 10th or 12th September, some date of that kind, the Serbian Government decided that it would be desirable to register this Treaty, and, though it was thought not to be particularly approved of by Italy, it was, in fact, registered, indicating thereby that the Serbian Government thought the proceedings before the League were of such importance that it was as well to get their tackle clear in case they had to make such an appeal.

Attitude of France.

There is a matter which, whatever else of what I have said is reported, ought not to be reported, namely, as to the attitude of France. There is no doubt that the attitude of France was ambiguous. The French press, the first French reaction as they say on the other side of the Atlantic, was vehemently against the bombardment of Corfu, but there is no doubt that the official communications by the French Government to the Italian Government were of a far less unfavourable character. There is no doubt that the Italian Government had some reason to think that the French Government would support them in their resistance to the competence of the League. That was the attitude of the French Government at first, but when they found, as they did find, that all the countries of Europe, even the countries which were most in the habit of working closely with them, Poland, for instance, Roumania, for instance, Belgium, for instance, were all unanimous against this view and in favour of the League, the French attitude modified very considerably, and the Italian Government were given to understand that if it came to a straight fight over the competence of the League the French Government would be unable to support the Italian Government. Now that, of course, cannot be said outside this room, but it is very valuable evidence of the great help and strength that public opinion of the League really is in matters of this kind.

General Attitude towards Council of Governments represented on it.

Apart from the actual repudiation by a great Power, the other unfavourable symptom that struck me at Geneva was a certain want of confidence in the Council of the League by the members of the Council. They did not feel as sure of themselves as I could have wished. They did not quite know what it would be safe for them to do. That is perhaps not a matter of surprise considering the short time which the League has been in existence, but I do think, if I may say so, that it points to the necessity for those countries that believe in the League, as I hope we do, giving to the League on all possible occasions every support that they can and making it a most essential part of our foreign policy.

Comparison of Machinery of League with that of Ambassadors' Conference.

On the other hand, I think we may say, those of us who believe in the League, that there were very many encouraging things about this crisis, not only the matters to which I have already alluded. I think we may say with great truth that the machinery of the League worked well, that it all worked as we used to be told, according to plan, that the dispute when it was presented came naturally to the Council, the Council naturally considered it, there was no hitch or difficulty. I myself believe that the publicity in which the later stages of the controversy took place was all to the good. I believe it enabled public opinion to support the League, to support what I think was justice. I think that the effect of public opinion was exactly what we who believed in it thought it would be; it was overwhelming, that no country, not even in the state of vehement and nationalistic excitement that undoubtedly Italy was in, could stand against it, and that, when it became clear that the public opinion of the world was on one side, that country had to modify its policy in accordance with the opinion expressed. I perhaps may be permitted to say without importunity that I think the machinery of the League and its method of working compare favourably with that of the Ambassadors' Conference. I am not making any attack on the individual Ambassadors, for whom I have a high respect, but the actual machinery, the actual method of working have been unfortunate. When we considered this question, Greece came as a matter of course and as a matter of right to the Conference table. She had just as great a right to be there as her opponent. She was not heard, of course, at the Conference of Ambassadors. That was not the conception on which they worked when they came to the decision which Lord Curzon has said was not one which he could himself approve. They did not even publish the report from the Commission on the spot on which they affected to act. The result was that nobody to this day, outside official circles, knows exactly what happened. I venture to say that the actual decision imposing the penalty on Greece which may possibly be defended on political grounds would have been simply impossible at Geneva. It could not have been done. It could not have been proposed, and if it had been proposed it would never have been adopted. I must say I think that as a matter of procedure there are great advantages which the League is shown to possess, and I venture to add a very few words of a general kind. It is not a mere accident that the Ambassadors and the Council of the League adopt different methods. It is an essential difference between two conceptions of foreign policy. The Conference of Ambassadors rests on the theory—it is a product of the war, of course—it rests on the theory that three or four great Powers who are by far the most powerful Powers in the world shall meet together and shall decide what ought to be done in Europe and rely for the acceptance of their decisions on their overwhelmingly military and naval strength. The conception of the League is different. There is no idea of enforcing their decisions. The object is to bring the countries together; to produce agreement and to utilise public opinion, that is, what Austin used to call positive morality, the general sense of right of the world, in order to induce that agreement. I cannot help thinking that the League conception is the sounder and more likely to produce results. If I may venture to illustrate my meaning, I would take this very question of reparations about which you have been debating. Germany was not consulted as to the terms to be imposed upon her; she was not allowed in effect to take any part in the determination that was come to at Paris. The Allies met together; they decided what ought to be done, and they tried, and continued to try, to enforce their decision upon Germany by their great preponderance of strength. The result has been—and this is a fact which you will hear as often stated in France as anywhere else—that you have no will to pay on the part of the Germans; they have never had a wish to pay; they think it is no use their paying because the more they pay the more they will have to pay; but you have not attempted to produce a will to pay; you have tried to force them to pay without persuading them. I believe that will fail; I believe it has failed; I believe it always will fail, and until that conception of foreign policy is abandoned I do not think you will get any permanent peace in Europe.

C 62693

Support of British Empire for League.

After all, what I am advocating at this moment is no new thing. Somebody said to me the other day that the British Empire never had any foreign policy except to keep the peace. I believe that is roughly true; at any rate, true for very many decades, if not centuries, past. We have tried to keep the peace; that has been the great object of British foreign policy, working not by force, not by power, but by trying to promote friendliness amongst the nations. That has been, I believe, the broad object, sometimes

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62694

more and sometimes less successfully pursued by successive British Ministries. I believe it is still the essential thing we should aim at. We now have in our hands an instrument for that purpose in the League of Nations, incomparably more effective than anything we have had before. We ought to do our utmost to strengthen the League and make it more and more the corner stone of our policy, for unless we can get rid of the war machinery, the idea of force and compulsion, I do not myself think there is any hope that we shall see, at any rate in the near future, a pacified and restored Europe.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Appreciation of Previous Statements.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I do not know that I have much to add by way of comment to what has been said by the Foreign Secretary and Lord Robert Cecil, except to express appreciation for the information we have received, particularly in relation to the Italian-Greek crisis, and the fact that Lord Robert Cecil went so carefully and fully into the different aspects of the work of the League in which we are all so interested.

Effect of Italian Action on Public Opinion in Canada.

In speaking of the Italian-Greek crisis and the relations of the League thereto, we cannot from a distance but feel that the extent to which public opinion was focussed on the dispute was increased a thousandfold by virtue of the fact that the League's authority to a certain extent had apparently been ignored. It gave to every country, certainly to Canada in her interest in the dispute, a feeling of immediate concern, which I think she otherwise would never have had. I believe that much the same feeling was aroused in America, though she is not a member of the League. I think there was a feeling that, after all, nations had endeavoured to set up some machinery to take the place of force, which machinery should be respected, and Italy had to a certain extent, in attempting to ignore it, defied the whole world. I believe that the fact that the League was meeting at the time certainly went far in arousing world opinion and would have led to a much more vigorous action from the outside world if necessity had occasioned it. Certainly nothing could better express the views that were held in Canada generally with reference to the support which should be given to the League than the concluding remarks of Lord Robert Cecil. In every particular they would be endorsed with enthusiasm from one end of our country to the other.

Good Effects of Lord Robert Cecil's Visit to Canada and the United States.

May I take advantage of this occasion to express the pride and pleasure which we all felt in the visit of Lord Robert Cecil to America and the addresses given there. I believe they were distinctly helpful in interpreting the work of the League in a sympathetic manner to the people of the North American continent. I believe the speeches did much good. I cannot say that of some other speeches that have been made; but I do think that Lord Robert Cecil's visit was in every particular helpful to the League and to the British Empire.

I should like to mention that my colleague, Sir Lomer Gouin, was one of our representatives at the League and possibly the Conference would like him to say a word or two if he so desires.

STATEMENT BY SIR LOMER GOUIN.

Sir Lomer Gouin: I was at Geneva representing my country at the last meeting of the League of Nations. I followed the deliberations of the Assembly and the deliberations of the Council. I must say that I felt proud of the rôle played by Lord Robert Cecil both before the Assembly and before the Council.

Canadian Amendment to Article 10 of the Covenant.

I must take this opportunity to thank Lord Robert Cecil for the great help he gave Canada in connection with the proposition that we laid before the Assembly with regard to Article 10 of the Covenant.

C 62695

As you remember, in 1919, at the time that the Peace Conference was preparing the Covenant, the representative of Canada, my predecessor, the Right Hon. Mr. Doherty, opposed Article 10, and, after the Covenant was signed and brought to our Canadian Parliament for ratification, he maintained his opposition to that Article. But, believing in the Covenant and wishing to be a party to the League of Nations, he asked our Parliament to ratify the Covenant, which was done. In 1920, at the very first meeting of the Assembly of the League, he came before the delegates and asked for the repeal of Article 10. This was referred to a Commission appointed by the Council, and the report of that Commission was to the effect that, instead of repealing Article 10, an interpretative clause should be adopted by the Assembly. That report was discussed at two Assemblies, and in 1922 our representative, the Hon. Mr. Lapointe, finding that he could not obtain the repeal of Article 10, brought up another amendment in advance of the proposition of the interpretative clause. This year I brought up the same amendment and, with the help of Lord Robert Cecil and the representatives of the other Great Powers, we succeeded in having the Commission, which had been entrusted with the examination of our proposal, submit an interpretative declaration to the Assembly, which voted for it by a large majority, one State only voting against it. It is true that the Clause was not adopted, as unanimity was necessary under the rules, but . . . .

Lord Robert Cecil: It was only Persia who was against it.

Sir Lomer Gouin: Yes, and that is why I say that in effect we have obtained the interpretative declaration which we were seeking. And for this I wish to renew my thanks to Lord Robert Cecil for the assistance that he has given us. That is all I have to say

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Interest of Australia in League.

Mr. Bruce: Prime Minister, on behalf of the people of Australia, I feel I must say something in regard to this question, because I do not think there is anything at this time they are more interested in than the League of Nations. The idea of the aims and objects of the League is gradually percolating through Australia, and there is a very strong feeling growing up there that the League of Nations has at least got the germ of a hope to maintain peace in the world. I am confident that Australia would take any action it could to promote the authority of the League of Nations, and to give it every opportunity to go forward and grow in strength and become the great instrument that those who brought it into being had in mind. I think that Australia's demand for some voice in the foreign policy of the Empire is, to a very great extent, directly traceable to the League of Nations and Australia's interest in its objects.

Australia stands for Peace and Support of League.

It has been very well put by Lord Robert Cecil, to whom we are very grateful for the information he has given, that Britain's foreign policy is Peace. Australia's foreign policy would certainly be Peace; and, quite apart from any apprehensions, which I may have appeared to suggest that we had, of being involved in war without our consent, we also feel that, after the late tragic war, we have a responsibility to try to do our share in promoting peace in the world, and Australia believes that the foundation of Britain's foreign policy should certainly be to support the League of Nations and make its authority as great as is possible in the world. In the debate which took place in Australia with regard to these Conferences, the view was expressed that one of the greatest tasks that lay to our hand was to see whether this Conference, representative of the whole Empire, could not really do something towards ensuring the peace of the world and solving some of the very serious problems we are faced with to-day. The people of Australia take a very strong view of this matter; and I am sure they would say, almost with a united voice, that they do believe in the League of Nations, and that all our actions ought to be directed

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62696

towards trying to promote its power, its force and its authority in the world.

Italian-Greek Crisis.

With regard to the recent happenings, of course, they are disastrous. I do not want to go over them. It was a most unfortunate episode, and it was especially unfortunate that one great nation, a member of the League, should have taken the attitude of denying the competence of the Council of the League to deal with the matter which had arisen.

Instructions sent to Australian Representative at Assembly.

Our view in Australia was perfectly clear that the League had competence; and as the head of the Government I cabled to our representative at Geneva to make that perfectly clear. The League has, however, got through a very critical time, and, while I recognise that all its opponents will say that its prestige has been irretrievably damaged, I do not think that that is the position at all. I think that it will survive this shock, and that no irreparable harm has been done.

Comments on Action of Council and Position of League.

With regard to the action of the Council I agree that it has taken the proper attitude under very difficult circumstances. The desire of the League is to try to promote peace, and bring about peace, and it is certainly no part of the duties of the Council, as I interpret them, to insist that it is their function to perform this feat, if they can see some other way by which the purpose for which they were brought into being can be achieved. As to the last episode I personally am very hopeful that it has not done any lasting damage, and it is now our task to try to restore the League to the position it was in before this happened. There are a number of questions with regard to the League that I should like to deal with, but I do not wish to delay the Conference.

Need for Discretion.

There are one or two things, however, that I think I ought to say. We are enthusiastically in favour of the League, but we think that the League ought to show great discretion, and very great discretion, in the next few years, certainly in the period of its infancy. If the League tries to go too far and too fast and to achieve all the objects it has in view in too short a time, I think it will defeat its own ends.

Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

I say that because I have read the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance; and, though that is not being discussed at this moment, I say at this stage, without hesitation, that Australia would be very much afraid of it. It seems to me to be trying to do too much too quickly, and to be based too much upon the idea of armed intervention by the League of Nations. If the League of Nations is not going to be able to maintain the peace of the world except by armed intervention, then we had better make up our minds that it is never going to achieve any of the things for the solution of which it was established. The force of the League to a great extent has got to be moral, and that moral force will come about by creating as time goes on the spirit to achieve the things that it stands for.

Progress already made and Prospects for the Future.

Personally I think very great progress, considering the time the League has been in existence, has already been made, and I am quite certain that that progress will be accelerated and that we may be a little surprised at what the League can accomplish. I recognise, of course, that the League of Nations is never going to do what we hope while there are great nations outside it; but there is no reason because certain nations to-day do not see that they can join the League why we should think that the League should not go on and that the position is hopeless. The position will probably improve in the future, and the one thing we have got to bear in mind is to keep the League in existence, keep it functioning; and whether it is this League, or a greater League that will spring up in a few years, we have to keep its idea alive. We saw very

C 62697

clearly that it was imperative when the tragic sufferings of the war were very close to us, which many of us rather seem to have forgotten. The League should be kept alive because, if this League goes, we have no hope of establishing anything of the sort until we have been through another world tragedy of the same character as that which our generation has seen. The next world tragedy of that character is going to be a tragedy one-hundredfold worse than the one we have experienced. So that, although Australia is enthusiastically behind the idea of the League of Nations, it does not think that the League at this stage, in its infancy, can ensure the peace of the world, but it believes that, if the League is given opportunity to grow, there is the germ here of the one thing that may ensure the great object we all have, to maintain the peace of the world.

Feeling in Australia against War.

Might I also say one other thing which, as Lord Robert put it, whatever else may be published, should certainly not be published. There is a question which I think has got to be considered very much from the point of view of the British Empire, and more particularly from the point of view of our future position. We have been dealing with the League of Nations upon rather high ground. I now want to deal with the League of Nations upon the very lowest ground from our own point of view. In Australia we are advancing very fast. I think most people will admit that with regard to industrial legislation we are considerably ahead of the rest of the world. Our people think a very great deal. They are imbibing doctrines which are certainly not going to encourage them to take part enthusiastically in wars in the future. The doctrines I am referring to now are not doctrines of Bolshevism, the doctrine of paralysing Socialism or anything of that sort. I mean doctrines that nobody can really complain about. They are sincere. They are perfectly honest and possibly they may be right; they are doctrines that many people hold to-day, that wars are wrong and that the masses of the people have the right not to be thrust into war. Those doctrines are growing increasingly strong in Australia and, I suppose, in other parts of the Empire; and from what I know I should imagine they are growing very strongly here. We are told very often by people who say they know human nature that nations will ever fight and that you will never eliminate that natural instinct. I quite agree that you never will, out of the individual, but to get the whole of the masses of individuals to exercise this instinct of human nature when it is going to be rather unpleasant to do it, and they have no very direct connection with the struggle, is a very different question, at least as far as Australia is concerned.

Coming Development of this Feeling.

I am prepared to say that if a war takes place in ten years' time there will have been such a progression of these ideas amongst the people that, while we shall be just as loyal a people, while we shall be just as strongly a part of the Empire, for perfectly honest reasons in many cases, men are going to refuse to go and fight in these wars. I do not believe that we could get anything like the response in Australia, after another ten or twenty years of education has passed by, that we got in the late war. I think it is necessary to put this point forward because I believe in all British countries we are advancing rather faster down these lines than other countries, and we might find ourselves in another ten years with a great country like France, that was able to whip the whole of her people into line, in a struggle that might arise, while we in the British Empire might find ourselves completely paralysed by a handicap of that character. I admit that that is a very low ground for trying to ensure that there shall be some instrument to promote the peace of the world in the future, but I think we should really find ourselves in a very much more comfortable position if in another ten or fifteen years' time some great agency like the League had grown up, so that when we were involved in a serious dispute, that possibly did concern our national honour, we should be able to take up the attitude that this was a matter for the League to deal with and handle and not one upon which we had to go to war. I apologise for putting that side of the question, which I readily admit is not quite a proper one to

57 58 59 60 61 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62698

stress, but which is a very serious one from the point of view of all our interests.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Appreciation of Statements of Lord Curzon and Lord Robert Cecil.

Mr. Massey: I would just like to say by way of introduction, Prime Minister, how much I appreciate the very plain and straightforward statements that we have had this morning from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord Robert Cecil. I think if even part of Lord Robert Cecil's statement is published it will go a long way to clear the atmosphere which has undoubtedly been created by recent events. I wish also to say, in case I forget it later on, how much I sympathise with Lord Robert Cecil in what has recently taken place.

For years past he has given practically the whole of his efforts, and the whole of his energy, and the whole of his ability, to the business of the League of Nations, from the commencement right up to now. I know that he must have been disappointed with some of the criticisms, at which I am surprised myself, and with some of the misrepresentations—which are worse than criticisms—that have been given utterance to by men who ought to have known better.

Personal Opinion of Value of League.

In saying that, I am bound to admit that I have never been quite an enthusiastic supporter of the League, and I will say why presently. But, with regard to what has taken place, my own opinion is that too much was expected from the League, and I think that some of the more ardent supporters of the League are themselves to blame for the feeling that has been created. The idea that was created was this, that the operations of the League would prevent war. I never thought so. I do not think for a moment that the prevention of war by the League was possible. The League was initiated to promote peace—peace by arbitration, peace by conciliation, or peace by bringing to bear public opinion. I say now that I believe a very great deal of good has been done by the League and it ought to get credit therefor.

Italian-Greek Crisis.

Just coming to recent events which have brought the League into prominence, in a way I think very undesirable, I refer to the very serious trouble that has arisen, and which I hope is settled or in a fair way of being settled, between Italy and Greece. I have no hesitation in saying that I think the action of Italy with regard to Corfu particularly was very high-minded, and, while I do not pretend to be an authority on international law, I am strongly of opinion that it was not justified, and I believe it has been condemned by right-thinking people all over the world. The worst thing about it is this, according to my mind, that Greece apparently has been punished for an action of which she was not proved to be guilty. Surely the first thing in international law is to prove the guilt of the nation which is being charged with an offence. I cannot think that it is right to punish any nation in the way that Greece has been punished in regard to the recent trouble. Referring to the appeal to the League of Nations, I think that Greece was quite justified in appealing under Articles 12 and 15. I think it was the right thing to do. If the League of Nations is going to do any good, surely it should have a right to express an opinion upon a matter such as that, or have it referred to an International Court of Justice. Something of the sort is right and justified, and I think we cannot find fault with Greece for going as far as that.

Article 16 of Covenant.

Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is quite a different matter. I happen to know personally the representative of Greece—we had a good deal in common during the Peace Conference and we happened to be engaged on the same Commission for a number of weeks. I can quite understand M. Politis making the statement on behalf of his country that he had no intention of taking advantage of Article 16. Article 16 is a dangerous Article, and I think it ought to be safeguarded. It may at any time, out of a very small matter, be the cause of a serious war, and this is

C 62699

exactly what we are anxious to avoid. I do not know what can be done in the circumstances. I know it must be very difficult to attempt anything in the way of amending the Covenant of the League of Nations, because we have got to get unanimity on the part of the Council of the League. I do not think that is so in the case of the Assembly, if my memory is right, but certainly in the case of the Council it is so, and I can just imagine how difficult it is to obtain it.

Position of British Empire in relation to League.

Italy repudiated the League—I think very improperly—but I cannot agree with those people who say that Britain has been humiliated by what has taken place, and especially by the action of Italy. I do not think so for one moment. Personally, my opinion is this, that the British Empire, or the British Government, in whose hands the matter is for the time being, has received sufficient provocation during the last three or four years to cause half a dozen wars. They have been avoided, and we are glad to know it. Sometimes I think that these things are being done for political reasons, but I cannot imagine for one moment that any humiliation has come to Britain in connection with the recent troubles. I have quoted from memory what Lord Robert Cecil has said with regard to the intentions with which the League was formed. Unfortunately, I did not take it down at the moment, but I think I did quote it sufficiently accurately for my purpose. Here is the danger that I foresee in connection with the League, and I want to be perfectly candid about it. I have always been afraid that the existence of the League, or rather the want of discretion on the part of some of its best friends, would lead some day or other to a false sense of security and tend to leave the Empire undefended, or not sufficiently defended. That is what I have been afraid of. There is no reason at all why the League should not proceed with the good work which it has been doing. I think that every organisation formed with the object of promoting and maintaining the peace of the world should receive all the support that the countries of the Empire and the civilised nations of the world are able to give. There is no reason at all why the League should not go on with its good work, but, on the other hand, there is a very great responsibility on the shoulders of those who are entrusted with the management of the public affairs of the Empire to see that it will not be altogether undefended some day when trouble may come along suddenly. I do not mean to say that there is at present any trouble in sight; at the moment, I am bound to say I do not. I am afraid, however, that it may come in the future.

Washington Conference.

Many people expected a great deal from the Washington Conference. I did for one, and I would not like to say I am disappointed, because good work has been done and work with which I thoroughly agree. The competition in capital ships has been stopped. But we know perfectly well that the results of the Washington Conference would not prevent war. We have only got to look around and see what has taken place on the part of some of the countries who have assented to the Treaty, I am speaking of the most important of the Treaties that were agreed to at the Washington Conference. We can see what has taken place on the part of some of those nations. One of them is engaged in building a number of powerful cruisers of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns. Well, they are not being built without an object. Another country has been building a very large number of submarines; I think the work is still going on. We hear of yet another nation, which is not connected with any of the Treaties and which took no part in the Washington Conference, which is engaged in building aeroplanes and experimenting in poison gases. These are all indications of the troubles that may be in store for us, though we can only hope that they will not be allowed to interfere with the peace of the world. While those things are going on I believe it to be our duty to provide a certain amount of defence. That is what I was thinking of when the Prime Minister of Australia was speaking. We have got to defend the Empire of which we are citizens. I do not want to go to extremes at all, and I am not suggesting that we want a great

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62700

standing army, but we are going to have another very important subject before the Conference comes to an end; that subject is the subject of naval defence, and there I think we ought to express our opinions as to what should be done. The desire for peace on the part of the whole British Empire has been proved by what took place after the Washington Conference. Britain agreed to scrap a very large number of useful ships. Not a single objection was taken to that course by any British citizen, so far as I know—certainly there was no objection on the part of any British nation, no nation within the boundaries of the Empire—and the ships have been scrapped. But I do think that we should take precious good care to be able to maintain communications between the different nations of the Empire, and that is my point—to maintain the communications between the different nations of the Empire in case of trouble coming upon us suddenly.

Feeling in New Zealand against War.

The Prime Minister of Australia referred to the feeling that is growing up—and, unfortunately, I am prepared to agree with him to a certain extent—that in the event of our being compelled to go to war we should not find the masses of the people as ready to enlist as they were on the occasion of the Great War. I think there is something in the statement—I have noticed it in my own country—and I have heard people who ought to know better and who are amongst those I referred to as ardent supporters of the League say openly on the public platform that young men of the Empire would not be justified in offering to fight for the Empire in case of another war. That I do not agree with at all, because the alternative is the breaking up of the Empire. There is no way of stopping it, unfortunately, and I do not suggest that there should be any legislation to prevent it, because I think the citizens of the Empire should have the opportunity of expressing their opinions freely and candidly so long as they do not break the law by giving expression to seditious utterances. That is another story altogether. Prior to the last war, we heard a lot to the effect that none of the nations of the Empire would take part, that Britain would be left to defend herself and her allies, but the people of the Empire, both men and women, young men and old men, rose to the occasion, and, while there may not be quite the same feeling on another occasion, I think they would be ready to do the duty which is required of citizens on such occasions. When people realise they have got either to defend the Empire or let it become disintegrated, personally I do not think that there would be any doubt as to the result.

ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. Baldwin: General Smuts, I do not know whether we can finish this morning, or whether it would be to the convenience of the Conference and desirable to resume this afternoon.

General Smuts: I do not think we can finish this morning. It is a very important subject.

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, it is a very important subject.

General Smuts: Perhaps we might meet again at 2·30?

Mr. Baldwin: My only difficulty is that I have to see the King, but you could start without me, and as soon as I got away from the Palace I would come straight here. If I should be detained that would be my loss and I would read the notes. It is rather important that we should not scamp the subject, and should if possible get it finished this week. As this is a subject in which you are particularly interested, it might be well to take the adjournment now and meet again at 2·30 and try to finish this afternoon.

(The proceedings were accordingly adjourned until 2·30 P.M. on the same day.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens,*
October 11, 1923.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

C 62701

SECRET.

45

E. 7th Meeting (1923).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE SEVENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1923, AT 2·30 P.M.

Present:

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. LORD ROBERT CECIL, K.C., M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Professor JOHN MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.

Mr. P. McGILLIGAN.

India.

Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62702

CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Appreciation of Lord Robert Cecil's Work for League.

General Smuts: Foreign Secretary, I wish to join those of my colleagues who have already spoken in expressing very strong appreciation of the work that Lord Robert Cecil has done at Geneva. As the Representative of one of the Dominions for a number of years, and now the Representative of the British Government, I think he has rendered invaluable service, not only to the world at large, but also to the British Empire, in the stand he has made for League principles and for the position of the League. I nominated him as the South African Representative, not because he was necessary from the South African point of view or to defend South African interests, but in order to give him, as the great protagonist in this country for the League, a platform from which he might continue effectively to support that movement. He has done so in a way which I think is above praise. The moral stock of the British Empire, so far as I am informed, is very high in Geneva. I was very much struck by what one of the South African representatives told me on his return from Geneva the other day. He said the most remarkable thing at Geneva is the confidence, the faith, the reliance, which all the small peoples of the world represented there have in the British Empire and in the stand that we are making for justice, fair play, and international honesty. That is a matter of very great importance to us and I think it is very largely due to the ethical tone which Lord Robert Cecil has been able to give to the discussions there, and to the message of goodwill that he has been able to bring from this country and from the other young nations of the British Empire to the nations of the world.

Restoration of Austria.

Lord Robert has told us this morning in his very full statement what the League has done and the successes the League has achieved, and he has in particular referred to the successful restoration of Austria. The success of the Austrian experiment is valuable and significant not only in itself, but because it points a way to a similar treatment to any other country that may require our help in the future. I was discussing with some financial men in the City what might be done in case Germany were to break down completely financially, and there was a consensus of opinion that the Austrian experiment had been so successful and formed so good a precedent that, if we had to take action, our treatment of Austria might serve as a very valuable precedent. And let me say this; that in the case of Austria also South Africa has been able to be helpful. We happen to have as one of our South African representatives a gentleman of Austrian origin, Sir Henry Strakosch, a man of very great financial ability who has been able, not only for personal and patriotic reasons, but by his financial stability, to make a very notable, if not the main, contribution towards the rehabilitation of Austria.

Saar Administration.

Lord Robert has referred to some other successes that I am more doubtful about. I remember, at the last discussion two years ago, the Saar administration was referred to as one of the outstanding successes of the League. I remember that Lord Balfour was more eloquent on that point than on any other in the statement he made to us on the League. To my great surprise I saw a whole storm burst quite recently over this question of the Saar administration. I saw that the Canadian representative had gone out and that public attacks were made on the Saar administration which reflected very gravely on the administration of the League itself, and, in fact, Lord Robert had to take a very prominent stand on behalf of better administration. I hope things have improved very much as a result of what has been done, but I am very much afraid that in some of these cases the League is compromising itself, and runs the risk of being looked upon as an instrument of French

C 62703

policy; and nothing would be more disastrous from the point of view of the League than that impression that the League, through its administrations, these parts that are committed to its agency, is serving the ends of any particular Power. The more impartial and dispassionate the spirit the better.

Danzig.

As to Danzig, I do not know what has happened. Lord Robert has mentioned that as a success, but I do not know what has happened. I always feared Danzig would become a running sore. It is a German town, it is the port of Poland, and intrinsically it is in a very difficult position. We are very much put on our mettle there. I believe we have a High Commissioner there, and we are very much put on our mettle in regard to Danzig. I hope Danzig will not develop into another Saar scandal.

Italian-Greek Crisis.

Now let me say a few words about this Italian business. I look upon it as very bad indeed. The only good I see in this Italian business is this, that it has mobilised public opinion, and the opinion in the League, in a way which must have surprised some of the great Powers. There is no doubt that to that extent the Italian crisis and the Italian defiance of the League has done good. It appears, both from the statement made by Lord Curzon and from that made by Lord Robert, that at any rate one of the great Powers was very much surprised by the strong feelings aroused among the smaller Powers, and the more that happens the more I think the public, and also the great Powers, will understand that the League really counts, and that if they defy the League they do so at the risk of mobilising the public opinion of the world and the opposition of the small States against them. That is about the only good thing that I see as a result of what has happened. I think in other respects, although I would not say the damage is irretrievable, grave damage has been done to the position of the League. Quite apart from all technicalities, let us look at the main facts which appeal to the public. We see a case where one of the great Powers, in defiance of League principles, was making an attack on one of the smaller Powers, and we find that the great Power, in spite of everything, has been able to enforce its will, to enforce its standpoint, and that the appeal by Greece to the League of Nations has been in vain. Greece has been condemned to pay the sum of 50 million lire without the intervention of any tribunal and without any judicial condemnation. The impression made on all the smaller countries must inevitably be that the League is no support to them in a contest with a great Power. They joined the League because they thought it would be a guarantee of peace and a real protection to them against violence. Confidence in the League among all these small Powers must have been profoundly shaken by the ultimate result of this affair—the condemnation of Greece practically unheard, and the triumph of Italy in her attitude of violence.

Position of Ambassadors' Conference.

There is no doubt that the chief blame rests on the Ambassadors' Conference. There, too, the only bright spot is the statement that Lord Robert has made, that such a thing would have been impossible at Geneva. The Ambassadors' Conference has let the League down very badly. I understand the position to be this: that the Conference laid down a certain formula under which Greece had to pay such damages as might be laid down by the International Tribunal. Greece accepted that as the ruling of the Ambassadors' Conference. The Council of the League accepted it too. Subsequently by one manœuvre or another the Ambassadors' Conference departed from that position and laid down that Greece was to pay a sum of money without the case being heard by the International Tribunal at all.

Lord Curzon: They gave themselves away by a formula they accepted on the 13th September. On the 7th September they took a strong and intelligible line; on the 13th September they gave way altogether and accepted a very evasive formula which was rendered still more dangerous by a declaration that the Italian Ambassador

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62704

was allowed to make, and from that time power went out of their hands.

General Smuts: It was owing to the manœuvring of Italy, both in the Ambassadors' Conference and on the enquiry which was being held in Albania, that was brought about. I am talking of the broad effect on the public mind. People do not understand the intricacies of the matter; they do not know the facts that we have learnt here. They simply see the result that has been brought about. It puts the League in a very invidious position, there is no doubt about that. We can only throw the real blame on to the Ambassadors' Conference. I think they really behaved shockingly in a matter which involved very important interests. That is really the only defence one can put up. It was the Ambassadors' Conference which is one of the rival agencies we supported. We had the Supreme Council, that has gone; now we have the Ambassadors' Conference, and they have made themselves so ridiculous before Europe that I hope we shall not hear too much of the Ambassadors' Conference in the future.

Support of British Empire needed for League.

The matter seems for the time to be ended, but I am not so sure of it. I think we shall have to be very careful in the future. I noticed a statement made by Signor Mussolini a few days ago in an interview, in which he said that it was impossible for Italy, as a great Power, to subject herself to the criticism of these smaller Powers. He spoke of a hierarchy of nations, and the whole spirit of his speech was a denial of the primary principles on which the League rests, and I am very much afraid that, although we may be at an end, and a very bad end, of this Greek business, with this spirit of brigandage abroad in Europe, we never know when there may not be another outburst in the future, and I would press very strongly that the British Empire, the British Government and the Governments represented here at this Conference, should use all their power in order to keep their hands clean and support the League and support the smaller Powers where their interests clash against the larger Powers. I agree thoroughly with Lord Robert when he said that the position of the League is not one of force; it does not rest on the sanction of force, but on public opinion, the moral enlightened opinion of mankind. The more we can marshal that opinion, and we can play a large part in doing so, the more we can marshal the support of public opinion and the feeling of the world on the side of the League, the better for the future of the League. The League is inevitable. The League ideal seems to be the only hope of the world, and, if in practice the League has not realised the great anticipations of those who originally supported it, it is because of its youth and inexperience, and because of the difficulties of the time through which we are passing, times of reaction, times of disillusion, times when it is almost impossible to keep any good cause afloat. We recognise that we are passing through an era of grave difficulty; all we can do is to keep the flag of the League flying, and not to put burdens on it which it cannot carry. In the end it must triumph; that is inevitable. There is nothing else if there is to be a reign of law and justice in this world. In the meantime, we can do our best to marshal public opinion behind it and to see that it stands for the high principles for which it was originally founded. I was very glad, Foreign Secretary, to hear the speech of Mr. Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia. It shows how all the young countries of the British Empire are now falling into line in real wholehearted support of the League. To my mind there is no doubt that the League is not only a great world interest; it is a British interest too. I thoroughly endorse what Mr. Bruce has said. The more we can make the League a real living force, the less armaments we as an Empire shall require. We cannot rest merely on a military or a naval basis. Something far greater than armaments will be wanted in an Empire as great as ours, and the League seems to me to be a real, substantial, moral reinforcement of our whole position. The more we can strengthen it, the more we can make it a reality, the more secure our position will be, which is not one of military or naval ambitions, but one of peace and social

C 62705

progress in the world. I therefore hope that whatever we can do to strengthen the position of the League we shall do.

General Attitude towards Council of Governments represented on it.

I was very much struck by those remarks of Lord Robert in which he said that there was an uncertainty about the action of the Council in those difficult days through which they have just passed. The members of the Council did not seem to be certain of themselves. Evidently they reflected the uncertainty in the minds of their Governments and they did not know whether they had the support of their Governments behind them.

Value of League to Empire.

Let the world know that behind the League and behind the action it has occasion to take is the whole force and weight of the British Empire. I am sure the League is adding a new bond of cohesion to the Empire. I am sure that the time is coming when the young nations of the British Empire will be prepared to support any particular line of action, not merely to support Great Britain, but because the League is being flouted, because the League is being attacked, and they stand by the League. These young nations will have an added motive and an added reason for coming forward and supporting the international action of Great Britain. I hope this will be borne in mind and that we shall more actively than ever before come forward to support the League and make it a reality.

Need for Discretion.

I have sometimes the feeling that we may easily overburden the League and put a burden on that young body too heavy to bear. It is the first time now that one of the great Powers has attacked the League and has questioned its competence and tried to oust its jurisdiction. A thing like that has not occurred before. We have come with a certain amount of discredit out of it, but I think it is entirely due to the Ambassadors' Conference, not because of the Council of the League or the body at Geneva. We can just save our faces, but I am sure this is not the last occasion on which the League will be attacked by great Powers. We have heard threats that this will happen or that will happen if the British Empire takes a certain line, and I think we must be prepared to look forward to a time when other attacks will be made upon the position and jurisdiction of the League by other great Powers. I hope that we shall continue to take so strong a line and be able to marshal all the smaller countries to such an extent on our side and on the side of the League that, when a renewed attack is made to withstand the jurisdiction of the League or to flout the League, it will be possible—we have not scored a victory now by any means—but I hope it will be possible to score a victory then. It will be in these tussles which are taking place and which will take place in the future even more than in the past that the League will be able to develop real power and take real root.

World's Need for League.

But it is to our interest, not only from the point of view of the British Empire, but far more still from a broad human point of view, to support the League as strongly as we can. What do we see to-day? We see a whole world lapsing into decay. Europe has been so smashed by the war that nothing seems possible to make her rally again. The break-up which began at the end of the war is continuing. We do not know what Europe will be like in ten or twenty years' time. We only see that forces are at work, far deeper and of a more fundamental character than we ever thought possible. We thought it would be possible to stabilise the position at the peace and to have a settlement of Europe which might be abiding. We have seen now that hope has been in vain. Nothing now is abiding. The unsettlement of Europe continues, the break-up continues. And in those circumstances, if there is any practical force that will work in keeping the nations together in peace and protect us against an era of complete reaction and brigandage such

57 58 59 60 61 62 8 91 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62706

as seems now to be setting in, if there is any such practical institution, let us exploit it to the full. We are no doubt in for a very bad time. I think this present generation will probably see human institutions put to as severe a test as they have ever been. And when we have an institution like this which, whatever the attitude of the great Powers, is undoubtedly appealing strongly to the smaller Powers, practically to all of them, I think we should marshal our forces behind it, knowing that this will be a stabilising agency and that it will help to keep us together and keep humanity afloat through the dark seas through which we are voyaging now. Perhaps I speak too strongly, but that is my feeling. So far from the League being a sort of revolutionary agency as many have thought, something that will destroy the British Empire, something that will work unknown mischiefs in the world, I look on it as a great conservative stabilising force working on the side of the British Empire and the ideals for which we stand. Not only from the large human motives which have impelled us, but also from the point of view of the British Empire, we have every reason to support this movement to the fullest of our power and ability, and I hope we shall continue to do that, and I trust that the next crisis, which may not be far off, will see the League emerge with greater credit and more strongly than it has come out of this last crisis.

STATEMENT BY PROFESSOR MacNEILL.

General Concurrence in Views expressed by other Speakers.

Professor John MacNeill: I can, I think, echo the greatest part of the criticisms and hopes which have been expressed by General Smuts, and the sundry expressions which have been heard in the statements made by the representatives of other nations. It is known that the Italo-Greek crisis was already in full operation at the time of our admission into the League of Nations. From our experience there, so far as we can form an estimate, I should like to correct a word that has been used, that there was a loss of confidence on behalf of the majority of the nations, and especially the smaller nations, who were represented at the League. It was not so much a loss of confidence to my mind as a far more healthy feeling, a feeling of deep dissatisfaction. I trust, I am sure we all trust, that that dissatisfaction will lead to positive results in the future. The facts of the crisis are, I presume, known to most of the participants in the Assembly of the League of Nations. I trust that the knowledge of those facts will have borne fruit, and perhaps very valuable fruit, before the next Assembly of the League of Nations.

Acceptance by Irish Free State of Principles of League.

At this point I may say that the Irish Free State has arrived at nothing nearer to a definition of foreign policy than is expressed in its adhesion to the League of Nations, and I was very much gratified to hear on all sides to-day, from Lord Robert Cecil and from the representatives of other States who have spoken, the view expressed that the foreign policy in which we, as a group of nations, ought to be interested—I shall not say to which we ought to be committed, but in which we ought to be interested—should be in harmony with the principles underlying the League of Nations. I sincerely trust that will always be so. If it is so there will never be any difficulty in our following a common course together and following it effectively. Speaking as the junior among you and representing a junior State among you, I have no hesitation in saying that, if a test of those principles arose and if the League of Nations through its properly accredited organs required a certain duty to be done, a certain amount of pressure, in whatever form desired, to be applied, I am perfectly certain that the nation for which I sit here would not be behindhand in doing that duty. I should like to emphaise the point of view that I have expressed, because, as an observer in Geneva, I did my best to estimate the feeling that was abroad, especially among the smaller nations, and I should say undoubtedly it was a feeling of dissatisfaction rather than a feeling of want of

c 62707

confidence, a feeling of desire that the objects of the League should be made effective, which is I think the next thing to the operative will that they should be made effective. On this question in general I did my best to express the view of the Irish Delegation in a statement that I made at the meeting of the Assembly on the 28th September and I shall not take up the time of this Conference in repeating that view now.

Appreciation of Lord Robert Cecil's Work for League.

I should like to join with those who have spoken already in offering a testimony, a stronger testimony than my own personal testimony, when I say that, so far as I know, and I have heard of nothing to the contrary, it was the unanimous feeling of the representatives of the nations at Geneva that Lord Robert Cecil had done as much as could be done to maintain the prestige and the effectiveness of the League of Nations.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Appreciation of League.

Mr. Warren: My Lord, I will not trespass upon the Conference except to express what I feel as a result of this discussion. Youth as a rule does not command respect and is sometimes subjected to correction, either moral or physical, which, as I know from personal experience, is sometimes quite unjustifiable. The League is a young one and I think it has borne the strain very successfully. The fact that it has borne that strain shows that although it is young still it is a hardy and strong growth, and I feel confident that when it goes forward and becomes the power, which undoubtedly it will become, it will not be subjected to such strains as have been put on it recently. By that I mean that the nations will see what the League can really do and will rather apply to it for aid than attempt to thwart it.

Newfoundland's Confidence in Lord Robert Cecil.

So far as Newfoundland is concerned we are not represented in the League of Nations, but we leave our interests, with perfect confidence, in the hands of Lord Robert Cecil.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Support of League.

Lord Peel: Lord Curzon, I desire to associate myself generally, on behalf of India, with the views that have been expressed here by the representatives of the Dominions in support of the League of Nations.

Opium Question.

Lord Robert Cecil in his most interesting statement explained to us that the Council of the League had invited the Government of the United States to send a delegation to Geneva, chiefly I think in connection with the opium question. We were very much interested in that point, because hitherto we had not quite understood how it was that the United States, which is not a member of the League, had been able to take so close an interest in the opium question and consequently, to the same extent, in the affairs of India, and had taken, I understand, some part in the discussions on that subject on the Committees. Some resolutions were passed with reference to the traffic in opium and we have been criticised, I understand, in certain quarters because our representatives could not fully accept those resolutions and were compelled to make a reservation on behalf of India. The reservation that was made on behalf of India was to the following effect: "That the use of raw opium according to the established practice in India and its production for such use are not illegitimate under the Convention." Those who are familiar with Indian habits and customs will realise how essential it was that the representatives of India should support such a reservation.

57 58 59 60 61 62 8 91 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62708

India's Position as regards Opium Traffic.

As there has been some criticism of Indian action on this point I should like to say, and I will say it very briefly, how very strong the position of India is upon this subject. First of all, let me remind the Conference that the Indian Government have made very great sacrifices in the cause of the restriction of this opium traffic. They have sacrificed no less than four million sterling per year by their restriction of this traffic, a very great sacrifice indeed in the case of a country with such a large poor population and such comparatively limited resources as India possesses, but not only that, they have most loyally and faithfully and fully carried out—I was going to say to the letter—all the provisions of the Hague Conventions in connection with the subject of opium. I do not want to criticise other countries, but I could not say the same thing of many of those countries adjoining India who have a financial interest in the opium traffic. And not only that, but the Indian Government have been very careful to restrict all their exports of opium to the amount actually approved of by the Governments of the countries to whom their opium was exported. They have, in fact, only exported on indents, as you might call them, from those particular countries and I would like to add this point, that, as regards the consumption of opium, during the last three years this has become a subject which is domestic to the provinces rather than an all-India subject, because this question of the consumption of opium is now under the control of Ministers, Indian Ministers in the provinces; in fact, it is altogether under the control of Indian Ministers except in one particular province, and that is Assam. Those Indian Ministers are responsible to Councils and those Councils consist of a substantial majority of popularly elected persons; therefore we may assume that those Ministers responsible to those Councils are fully cognisant of the interests of their own people and are fully competent, if they wish, in the interests of those people to restrict the consumption of opium. I point this out because the situation, of course, has very largely changed in this respect during the last three years and I am not sure whether the American delegation, or even some of the other representatives at the League of Nations, were fully cognisant of the change that had thus taken place.

Lord Curzon: Does any other member of the Conference wish to address us? If not, I will ask Lord Robert Cecil if he has anything he would like to say in reply.

REPLY BY LORD ROBERT CECIL.

Lord Robert Cecil: I have very little to say, except to thank the Conference very warmly for their kindness to me personally and for the very strong support which the League of Nations as a policy has received from every member of the Conference, I think, who has spoken: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland and Newfoundland are all united on that point.

Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

Perhaps I might be allowed to say just one word in reply to what fell from the Prime Minister of Australia about the Treaty of Guarantee. I carefully did not deal with that on this occasion; I do not know whether the Conference will have time to deal with it at all; but, if so, I should hope to be allowed to say what I have to say about that. I want, however, just to say this. It is not proposed that the Treaty of Guarantee should be a League Treaty; it is merely a Treaty into which members of the League, and, indeed, any other countries besides members of the League, may or may not enter, as they like. Undoubtedly it is to be worked by the League, but it is not, strictly speaking, a League duty or a League function.

Saar.

With regard to what General Smuts said about the Saar and Danzig, there was no doubt a very serious mistake committed in the Saar by the governing commission, to which he has referred, and, as he knows, there was an enquiry into it at Geneva at which we had the opportunity of examining the President of the governing

C 62709

commission at some length. I think on the whole, from the undertaking he gave and from the assurances we had from him the resolutions of the Council were satisfactory; at any rate, a representative of the Saar population who has acted unofficially as a representative of Saar interests came to me the next morning and volunteered the statement that he was more than satisfied with what had occurred. I enquired this time also and was told that things were going much more satisfactorily and that they did regard the League as quite separate from the governing members of the League and had great faith in the wisdom and justice of the League.

Danzig.

As to Danzig, the reason why I referred to it as satisfactory is that its recent developments have been extraordinarily satisfactory. They came to the previous meeting of the Council with twenty or thirty different compromises between the Danzig Corporation and the Poles. They were heard by the Council and made speeches of a very violent kind. We asked them one or two questions and listened to them. They went away and the influence at Geneva was such that they settled every one of their thirty questions without coming to us for a decision at all, so that we were not troubled.

General Smuts: And the Poles?

Lord Robert Cecil: Yes, I had some conversation with the Polish representative and there is no doubt that they are anxious if they can to change their policy and work as far as they can with the League. They were candidates for membership of the League which, perhaps fortunately, they did not succeed in getting.

General Effect of Italian-Greek Crisis on Position of League.

One of the encouraging symptoms is that the smaller nations are growing in confidence in the League, and may I just say also with reference to what fell from General Smuts that it is quite true that we received a considerable shock, but it is striking that, in spite of that, the confidence of the smaller nations was not shaken. I agree that there was an element of dissatisfaction. I quite agree with what Professor MacNeill said. I asked Dr. Benes, the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, what he thought was the result, and he said "Well, I think we have gained a victory—a small victory—but with very heavy losses." I thought that that was not a bad summary of what was the result. There is no doubt that the Foreign Minister of the Serbians, M. Nincic, told me the reason they had registered their Treaty and prepared to appeal to the League was that they did recognise that there was a considerable desire in the Council to protect the smaller nations; and they were not prepared merely to say ditto to anything that a big Nation said; they thought we had more courage than they suspected. So that, on the whole, I do not think the result was bad. Of course the difficulty no doubt was—and I do not disagree with what General Smuts said—that Greece had formally said that whatever the Conference of Ambassadors put upon them they would take, before they knew what they were going to say. No doubt they did make it impossible for Greece to object, and Greece, in fact, accepted everything and paid up like men the next day or two days afterwards.

General Smuts: It was not Greece that suffered; it was the Ambassadors' Conference that suffered.

Lord Robert Cecil: That made it impossible for the League to do anything, because it was outside their jurisdiction altogether.

United States Attitude to Opium Question.

May I say that I hope Lord Peel understands that the American representative was there in a purely advisory capacity; he did not vote.

Lord Peel: I said he did not vote, but my representative tells me that he took a considerable part in a discussion at a Committee to which he did not belong.

Lord Robert Cecil: Yes, he was there. It was evidently a very desirable thing to get a representative of the United States to come

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62710

officially to a Committee of the League of Nations and take part in its deliberations.

Lord Peel: Excellent, provided that it is not at the expense of India.

Lord Robert Cecil: I do not think India suffered. I am led to believe that the decision was arrived at unanimously ultimately and with the full approval of the representative of India.

Lord Peel: With the reservation, of course.

Lord Robert Cecil: Yes, with the reservation; but the reservation was not attacked at all as far as I understand. May I add that I think everybody recognised the complete loyalty with which India has carried out her obligations, as she did, indeed, in connection with industrial matters in a very striking way and set a very good example to some other countries.

REPLY BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Lord Curzon: There are only three observations I should like to make before we close the discussion on the main subject before us to-day.

Position of Ambassadors' Conference in connexion with Italian-Greek Crisis.

The first is this. It is quite true that the Ambassadors' Conference came to what we regard as a wrong decision, and that by so doing it stamped its own impotence; but, of course, the real difficulty, which we cannot state in public, but which we know at this table, is that the result would have been different had the French and ourselves been in agreement. Had these two great Powers taken the same view, they would have gone to the Conference and would have obtained a decision which would have been in accord with justice and right; but it was the fact that France was nervously anxious to compose the situation and that she swung over completely to the side of Italy in the final stages, which incapacitated our Ambassador from carrying the weight which he otherwise would have done and securing the issue which we all desired.

Welcome to Irish Free State as Member of League.

The second remark, if I may be allowed to make it, is this. Only a day or two ago the Irish representatives appeared at this table for the first time as members of the Imperial Conference. To-day we have had Professor MacNeill here, who represented the Irish Free State at Geneva. May we not take this opportunity of expressing our satisfaction, not merely that Ireland has entered the narrower Conference of the British Empire, but by her appearance at Geneva has for the first time signalised her appearance at a world board? I remember reading in the papers of the demonstration that took place when President Cosgrave appeared in the Hall of the Assembly. It was a welcome recognition accorded to the Irish Free State of this notable appearance on her part, and I am sure there is no one at this table who does not rejoice, not only at the steps she took, but at the acclaim with which they were received.

Support of British Government for League.

My third observation will be this. We have heard to-day not merely an absolute consensus of approval of the principles and actions of the League, but a warm appeal from the representatives of every part of the Empire to the British Government to accord to the League on all possible occasions a full measure of support. Speaking for the present Government and the Foreign Office, I have no hesitation in saying that that support will be given; and, indeed, I think that Lord Robert Cecil will acknowledge that it was the receipt of the telegram of authority and instructions, to which I referred earlier in the morning, that placed him in the position of advantage which he occupied at Geneva and which he utilised to such good effect. Nobody is more conscious than myself, as representing the Foreign Office, both of the work that the League has done, some illustrations of which Lord Robert Cecil mentioned this

C 62711

morning, and also of the larger work it is capable of doing, and whether the work that lies before it covers the narrower ground upon which, to some extent, it has hitherto moved, or whether it embraces those larger problems which General Smuts seems to think it may very likely be confronted with—and, indeed, it is more than likely—I think he and our colleagues may rest assured of this, that the strong, consistent and loyal support of the British Government will be behind it and that we shall do everything in our power to strengthen its hands and to increase its utility. I am sure if the Prime Minister were here he would have spoken to the same effect, but perhaps as representing the Foreign Office you will allow me to make those remarks on his behalf.

There now remain one or two business matters which perhaps we may deal with before we separate.

General Smuts: Are you going to leave that point now?

Lord Curzon: Yes.

Need for Formal Expression of Support of British Empire for League.

General Smuts: I should like to say something further with regard to that point before we leave it, and it is this. There is no doubt that the League of Nations is suffering a severe check, and if at this stage the British Empire formally places itself behind the League, so to speak, it will have a very great moral effect. It will strengthen public opinion in this country and throughout the world, and I was wondering whether we could not pass a fairly strongly worded resolution from this Conference to support the League and to back it up. We have had this discussion here in secret, and it has no effect on public opinion really. If we could declare some strong policy in support just at this juncture when the League needs it most, I think it might serve a very good purpose.

Lord Curzon: I had had that in mind. I think it is very desirable that we should do it. The question is whether we should do it to-day at this moment or as part of the larger discussion on foreign affairs and the resolutions which I hope we shall come to later.

General Smuts: I agree with that. I simply wanted it to be a part of to-day's meeting that a resolution should be drafted and passed later on.

Lord Curzon: I will tell you what I had had in mind about these Foreign Office discussions. The other day we had a number of very valuable suggestions and speeches containing a number of concrete proposals. Some of these require very minute and careful examination, and they have to be correlated with the other matters we have been dealing with so far. My desire was to ask the Conference, after we have had full time to examine them in the Foreign Office, to resume the discussion on foreign affairs within a week or ten days from now, or whenever a suitable opportunity occurs, and then I shall have something to say in reply to the various suggestions that have been made. I am rather hopeful myself, if the Premiers take the same view, that the discussion should not terminate, so to speak, in the void, but that we should find it in our power to pass a number of resolutions, embodying what I hope may be the unanimous views of the Conference upon certain broad aspects of foreign affairs; and I have had in my mind that one of the first, if not the first, of those resolutions should be one stating our emphatic support of the principles of the League and our intention to stand by it to the end. It occurs to me that perhaps on the whole it would be better not to detach it from the *corpus* of all our resolutions, because it would occupy a very fine place in the forefront, and, with this assurance that the matter will come up again, perhaps you will allow me to defer passing this particular resolution until we are able to consider the other ones that should accompany it.

General Smuts: I quite agree.

Publication of Proceedings.

Lord Curzon: As regards the publicity to be given to what we have said to-day, we shall publish as much as we can; but certain

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62712

of the things that are said round this table it is dangerous to publish Some of us have suffered too much from it already. It has occurred to me that perhaps the best way to treat the matter would be that I should this evening very carefully go through the report of what has been said to-day in regard to Foreign Office matters, with a view to releasing to the press to-morrow, for publication on Saturday, so much of it as it is really desirable to publish. As far as the speeches of the Dominion Prime Ministers are concerned, of course, I could not assume the responsibility of deciding myself how much or how little it would be desirable to publish. The proposal I should like to make would be this, that through Sir Maurice Hankey's Secretariat I should communicate to the Dominion Prime Ministers in the course of to-morrow, when I have gone carefully through the text of their speeches, so much of it as seems from the Foreign Office point of view to be desirable to publish. Then it would be for them to curtail that as they desire or to make such other suggestions as they think fit.

Mr. Massey: In the meantime, there would be no publication?

Lord Curzon: Yes; we are clearly not in a position to do so; we have to think over it very carefully and see how it will look in print.

General Smuts: I have said a number of things that I should not like to see published.

Lord Curzon: If any speaker desires that nothing should be published, he should be entirely at liberty to control us in that respect.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Perhaps I might draw attention to this circumstance. I have received a wire from a Toronto paper mentioning that the "New York Times" correspondent had made a reference to some remark I made at this table, referring more particularly to what Mr. Secretary Hughes had said on the Joint International Waterways Commission, as to the desirability of extending the powers of the Commission. I have enquired from the correspondents in this country of Canadian papers and they say that they have no knowledge or information as to what I have said. The members of my staff have no knowledge, but apparently the "New York Times" correspondent, whoever he is, is getting some information somewhere. I think I should mention this in case there may be something else more serious later. The fact that I received a cable from Toronto about it would indicate that there is a leak somewhere.

Lord Curzon: I am sorry, Mr. Mackenzie King, that you have been the victim.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I do not mind so far as I am concerned, but I thought it well to bring the matter up, because it might be possible to trace the leak. There is evidently a leak somewhere. It is a curious thing that that particular item referring to the United States should have found its way across the Ocean.

Lord Curzon: The practice as I understand is, that only one copy of what we say here is sent to each Delegation. The number is limited, and the indiscretion could only have occurred by somebody who had seen or read a copy of the report, or somebody in this room. I am afraid we never find out the guilty parties in these cases. All we can do is to renew a pious expression of our appeal to observe the secrecy that is incumbent upon everyone of us.

FUTURE BUSINESS.

Lord Curzon: Then as to future business; to-morrow morning is a *dies non*, I understand.

Sir Maurice Hankey: I think the Nationality Committee has been asked to meet at 10·30 to-morrow morning.

Lord Curzon: In the afternoon again there is a meeting of Committees; on Saturday there is no meeting, and on Monday

C 62713

morning there is no meeting as we have a meeting of our Cabinet that day. In the afternoon at 3 P.M. we begin the discussion on Imperial Defence, which will be opened by Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council. The Economic Conference meets on Tuesday morning and afternoon. On Wednesday the subject of Naval Defence comes before the Imperial Conference. In the afternoon the Imperial Economic Conference will meet. On Thursday, the Imperial Economic Conference and Committees meet. On Friday, the subject is not yet fixed, but the Imperial Conference or Committees will meet.

Sir Maurice Hankey: It will probably be Naval Defence again, which is likely to take the rest of the week.

General Smuts: Are we making an effort to bring our meetings to an end by the end of the month? I do not know whether the business is being arranged on that basis, but we ought to work to some date. I must go back by the 9th November.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Of course, it is much more difficult to wind up the Economic Conference than this Conference; that is why we are giving such a lot of time to the Economic Conference.

Mr. Massey: There is a great deal of work to be done on the Economic side yet, and though I may be wrong I believe it is quite impossible to finish satisfactorily by the 9th November, or even a week later than that.

General Smuts: It would be difficult for us to continue this Conference if Parliament is sitting at the same time.

Lord Curzon: We have your date in view, General Smuts, and we will try and get through by then.

Mr. Massey: I was going to ask whether the meeting that was intended to be held on Monday afternoon—it is not mentioned in this paper—will include a discussion on Naval Defence.

Lord Curzon: Naval Defence is on another day.

Lord Salisbury: If I may say so, the general subject of Defence will have to be dealt with—I should try to be as short as I could; to cover the whole ground would mean touching upon the Navy, but it would not go into Naval detail, which will be left to the First Lord of the Admiralty. That is the conception.

Sir Maurice Hankey: That is down for Wednesday, although it might be a bit earlier or later.

Mr. Bruce: Then the meeting on Monday afternoon is a general discussion on the whole question of Defence.

Lord Salisbury: If you please.

Lord Curzon: That finishes our present sitting.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 11, 1923.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

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SECRET

E. 8th Meeting (1923).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE EIGHTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1923, AT 3 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. the EARL OF DERBY, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir SAMUEL HOARE, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Admiral of the Fleet EARL BEATTY, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Admiralty.

General the EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.

Air Chief Marshal Sir HUGH M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. G. WALKER, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Major-General J. H. MACBRIEN, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of General Staff, Canada.

Commodore WALTER HOSE, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.

Vice-Admiral Sir ALLAN F. EVERETT, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of the Royal Australian Naval Board.

Brigadier-General T. A. BLANEY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Representative on the Imperial General Staff at War Office.

Commodore A. G. HOTHAM, C.M.G., R.N., Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Delegation.

Lieutenant-General Sir ALEXANDER COBBE, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., Secretary, Military Department, India Office.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62715

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B. (*Secretary*).
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. Thomson, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. P. McGilligan.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

STATEMENT ON DEFENCE BY THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

Mr. Baldwin: I will ask Lord Salisbury to make his statement.

Origin of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Lord Salisbury: I appear before the Conference this afternoon in conformity with the precedent set by a most distinguished predecessor of mine, Lord Balfour. He, on the last occasion, addressed the then Conference as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I ought perhaps to say that he was largely responsible, as the members of the Conference may know, for the institution of the Committee of Imperial Defence in its present form. The Committee originally arose out of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which was started in the third Administration of my father; it was developed, and finally reached practically its present form, with certain exceptions and developments introduced recently, in 1904, when it had its permanent Secretariat.

Acting for the Prime Minister as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence under him, I am directed to give a general survey of Imperial Defence, not dealing of course with the details of the fighting services, for those are in the hands of my colleagues, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air, but with its general aspect.

Committee of Imperial Defence is an Organisation for Defence.

The first thing I should like to say is that it is emphatically an organisation for defence, because you have already heard from colleagues of mine, the Foreign Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal, who addressed you on the last occasion, that the policy of this country is peace. Therefore, the organisation in whose name I speak is an organisation for defence. We have to speak of armaments and preparations of all sorts, but the settled policy of this country is to further the cause of limitation of armaments, not their increase; and if I have occasionally to refer to foreign countries and conceivable possibilities of difficulties leading up to hostilities, it must not be supposed that I think it is probable, but that, in the interests of defence, all these things have to be contemplated. I repeat, however, that the reduction of armaments is the primary policy of this country. I do not mean to say that we can reduce our Army or Navy any further than we have done, but, as the Prime Minister has already told you, if we could come to some agreement in respect of Air we should be prepared to allow that to modify our policy very directly. But we cannot ignore possibilities, and the responsibilities of this country are so extended and so multifarious—no one who listened to Lord Curzon's speech the other day will doubt it—that we must be prepared. It is defence, not defiance—to use an old phrase of a great leader of mine in the past, that is the policy of this country. And it is a policy of insurance, just as a man, when he insures his house, does not expect it will be burnt to the ground, yet thinks it necessary to make preparations in case of fire. That is vitally important if a catastrophe should take place. And this policy of insurance is certainly vitally important if a catastrophe should take place. I think I may say that it is also of vital importance in this respect,

C 62716

that nobody in the position of Lord Curzon, carrying on the foreign affairs of this country, can carry them on effectively unless he does it from the standpoint of a sufficiently armed and defended Empire. It is not that what he says would lead to war, but he is deprived of very much of his authority in negotiation unless there is a background of power behind him. That is the every-day experience, with which I am sure he would agree, of the Foreign Office.

Now, it therefore being a policy of insurance against these risks, the direction of policy may be divided into two parts. We may say, in the first instance, that the most peaceful thing we can do is to limit the forces against which we might possibly have to contend; and, in the second place, we may, within that limit of risk, make our defensive preparations as perfect as they can be.

Reduction of Armaments.

Taking those two heads one after the other, the policy of reduction of armaments, of which I have spoken, belongs to the first head. In so far as we can induce other countries to reduce their armaments we limit the forces that we have to contend with; and, of course, the great policy which was carried out at Washington is a typical example of that method of reducing forces with which we have to contend. The Washington Conference, with its limitation of naval armaments and its Pacific agreement, its provisions against the unlimited use of submarines, the prohibition of poison gas—all these things are not only directly in the direction of Peace, but they are in the highest sense of the word defensive. They have not all, of course, been ratified. The limitation of armaments has been ratified, and the Pacific agreement; but the provisions against poison gas and the unlimited use of submarines. I think, still await the ratification of France, but have been ratified by the other Powers. Upon the other side, the second head, the perfecting of our defensive system, that is connected with the protection of our communications, our fuel stations, and our repairing bases.

Effect of Washington Agreements.

Let me say, if the Conference will allow me, a word or two upon the Washington Agreement. I shall attempt not to traverse in any shape the ground which has already been covered by my colleagues, who had the honour of addressing you. Take the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments. What is its strategic importance? Now, as the Conference knows, defensive preparations within certain geographical limits are stereotyped; they cannot be increased any further. The effect of that is that Hong Kong is stereotyped. Nothing more can be done on our side to increase the power of Hong Kong or its defences. It may be kept up, of course, to its present standard, but that standard cannot be increased. On the other side, the United States can do nothing practically West of Hawaii. The effect, therefore, is that, so far as the Western Pacific is concerned, the British Empire is left face to face with Japan; no one else, practically, will be there to intervene. Now, I hope the Conference will be good enough to remember the words with which I ventured to open what I had to say to-day. The fact that I mention Japan does not mean any note of hostility to Japan; on the contrary, there is not a cloud, so far as I know, between us and Japan, not a cloud in sight. But if you are going to pursue a policy of insurance such as I have spoken of, you must not leave anything to chance; you must take care that you are fully protected, and that in the interests, not only of these Islands, but in the interests of the great Dominions, whose representatives I see before me now. These agreements are interesting in a degree to Canada, as a great maritime territory and as a nation on the Pacific; they are also, and much more directly, of importance to the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Those Dominions have a great trade, they have vulnerable shores, and we should have been singularly lacking in our duty, as the primary guardian of the Empire's interests and of those of our friends in the Dominions, if we had neglected to protect their trade and their shores in any international instrument to which we had set our signature. Consequently, when our representatives were sent to Washington to negotiate these Treaties, they were expressly instructed on these heads, so that nothing should be forgotten. Our principal represen-

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62717

tative at Washington was the distinguished statesman to whom I have already referred—Lord Balfour. With him the situation of Singapore was an old friend; he had often considered it and dealt with it before in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and at the very last Conference, the one at which many of my audience were present, he used these words: "One of the most pressing needs of Imperial defence is that Singapore should be made into a place where the British Fleet can concentrate for the defence of the Empire." So that it was well known what the policy of the British Government was, as announced at the Conference two years ago; the context and the circumstances show that that statement was made independently of the fate of what was called the Japanese Alliance. It was already being contemplated that that Japanese Alliance might be superseded by something other and better, and the statement made by Lord Balfour was made quite independently of any question of the Japanese Alliance.

Development of Singapore not contrary to spirit of Washington Treaty.

I dwell upon this point because, as the Conference knows, our conduct in respect of Singapore has been challenged, and notably challenged in Parliament in this country. A very great English statesman, speaking, I am quite certain, without really full information, criticised the action of the Government and described it as being too clever, meaning thereby that we had taken advantage of the letter of the Treaty, in order to avoid its spirit. I need not say that no such policy would be tolerated and never would have been contemplated by the Government. As I have said, Lord Balfour was definitely instructed when he went to Washington that no Agreement with the Conference should be made which would interfere with the development of Singapore; and, consequently, when they came to draw the actual details they fixed the 110th degree of longitude as the limit beyond which we should be free to fortify and develop, and that was done expressly in order to protect Singapore. No secret was made about it at the Conference at Washington; it was quite understood; and, in order to confirm this, I venture to quote a confidential telegram, which, of course, has never been published, but which I may state in this room was sent by Lord Balfour on the 24th January of last year: "I introduced certain amendments to place beyond doubt the exclusion of Singapore (in which Baron Kato (that was the Japanese Delegate) acquiesced) as well as territories of Australia according to a formula designed by Senator Pearce (that was the Australian delegate), also to limit the *status quo* in fortifications and defences. I have since discussed the draft with Mr. Hughes, who tells me that American Delegation has accepted all my amendments. During this conversation, Mr. Hughes volunteered the observation that, of course, Singapore was excluded as it was neither an island nor in the Pacific." I believe it is an island as a matter of fact, but it is not an island within the meaning of the Treaty. So that I think I have established the point which I am very anxious to do because I cannot bear, speaking for the Government here, to have it said that we were too cunning and took advantage of a technicality in order to do what we had no right to do, under the spirit of the Treaty. It was quite understood by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, and it was quite understood by the Plenipotentiaries of the United States, that we agreed to draw this line, the 110° longitude, for the express purpose of preserving our liberty of action in respect of Singapore; and I think, if I may say so in their presence, our Australian and New Zealand Representatives would never have forgiven us if we had not saved the Port of Singapore. That was the principle upon which we acted; that is to say, the principle of the defence of the Empire, more particularly in the interests of the great Dominions of Australia and New Zealand.

Length of Time needed for Development of Singapore.

As to the application of that principle—I mean how quickly we should push on with the works for the defence of Singapore—that is a matter of detail. It is clearly evident that that could be done rather more quickly or rather less quickly, and upon that I believe

C 62718

I speak for my colleagues when I say that we shall be very glad to hear anything which the Dominions most principally concerned have to say about it. As I have said, there is not a cloud in the sky as far as our relations with Japan are concerned; and I believe it to be absolutely true, as Lord Curzon said the other day, that Japan has no adventurous policy in front of her, and, indeed, if she had one, the earthquake would act as a very distinct deterrent from any such forward policy, but sooner or later, but in good time—please understand that that is what I mean—that Singapore should be made into a fully-equipped base I do not doubt. Without it the British Fleet would be powerless in Far Eastern waters. What is the good of a Fleet if you cannot use it? Why have a Fleet if you cannot use it where it is required? It is upon that principle we have acted.

Need for Fuelling Bases on Lines of Communication.

Now I began naturally with the Pacific and the Washington Agreement, and, if I may venture to carry the Conference with me, I would like to trace backwards as it were the path between Great Britain and this far-flung outskirt of our responsibility, the line of communication between Great Britain and the Far East. Coming backwards we may note that it is not sufficient to have a great base at Singapore. You must indeed have a repairing base there; you must have a great fuelling depot there. I need not repeat to the Conference what has already been said, that we have to think in terms of oil now, not in terms of coal, and you must have such preparations made. It is not sufficient to have one at Singapore; you must have Stations from place to place at proper intervals so that your Fleet may be properly nourished with fuel as it goes, and these Stations we have in mind to establish. There is no immense hurry to develop Trincomali, which is probably the base we shall take in Ceylon, but that has got to be done some day, and then as we go nearer there is Aden; Aden is the next place; and that also will have to be properly provided with oil provision. Then we come to the most critical place, the narrow neck which joins the Mediterranean to the Red Sea—the Suez Canal—through which all our communications to the Far East must pass. That is for the protection of India and the Great Dominions and the Far East; all must pass through that narrow neck, because round the other way, round the Cape, the time lost is so great as would amount to a most formidable handicap. I shall have a word to say about that in a moment. I do not mean to say it must be neglected, but it is certainly a very poor substitute for the communication through the Canal.

Suez Canal.

And so that brings us to the defence of the Suez Canal. Now recently, as the Conference knows, independence was restored or granted to Egypt, but in the very instrument in which this country accepted or proclaimed the independence of Egypt it was laid down that one of the conditions of that independence was that security of the communications with the British Empire should be preserved in Egypt, and therefore we have an absolute right to protect our communications, and that right I can assure this Conference we are very alive to the importance of, and have been deeply considering the necessary steps to be taken, though I do not propose to go into all the details which affect that subject. We have to protect the Canal itself; that is the main, principal thing, involving a force of some kind to protect it—for it is very vulnerable, I hope the Conference will realise—and that force requires all the proper equipment—it need not be a large force; I hope it will not be a large force—but it requires a large equipment of many things—food and fresh water and so on. All that has to be seen to, and, besides that main thing, there is a wireless system in Egypt belonging to the Imperial Government, and there are two important Air Establishments, one not very far from Cairo, and one not very far from Alexandria. These must be protected. A large sum of British money has been invested in them, and provision for whatever may be necessary will be carried out. I will not go into the details, partly because it would be superfluous and partly because they are not fixed yet, and therefore they may be left out; but the broad fact

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 15 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

remains that it is an essential element in the defence of Imperial communication that we should have military control of the Suez Canal.

Palestine.

Well, then, going a little further, I have just a word to say about Palestine, not of a very definite kind, but merely that it has a certain strategic bearing, apart from the political side of it, which we discussed the other day. I do not mean to say that the strategic considerations are by themselves conclusive, they are not, but they are just worth bearing in mind as an element, because Palestine might easily be made, if in hostile hands, a base from which the Suez Canal could be threatened, an air and a naval base. Anybody will realise that it is very well placed for a hostile purpose of that kind, and therefore it is to be regarded from that point of view, and also we shall use it, as I believe and hope, as one of the air stations in the great developments we are looking to of the Air Communications of the Empire. One station happens to provide a locality which is exceedingly well fitted for that. I do not mean to say that it would not be possible perhaps to find another, but as matters stand that is a consideration.

Mediterranean and Straits of Gibraltar.

Well then, there comes the Mediterranean itself that requires unceasing vigilance on our part, but I need not dwell upon it. And then we come back to the Straits of Gibraltar. There again there is another narrow neck through which the communications of the British Empire have to pass to the Far East. I need not say that these all require to be most carefully safeguarded. Here again I must mention a foreign Power, but with the same sort of preface, which I need not repeat, as I did on the last occasion. The French are very powerful in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Gibraltar. They have already got 180 aeroplanes in stations within very easy reach of Gibraltar and, as Lord Curzon told you, there is a question pending as to the future control of Tangier. Tangier has great strategic importance. There was a Departmental Committee of the British Government which sat in 1920—of course all that I am telling the Conference is intensely confidential—and that Committee found, among other things, that French authority in Tangier would constitute a very serious menace to the British position in the Mediterranean, assuming that Power is hostile—an assumption which we have no reason to think at all, but that is an assumption upon which that statement was made. It provides a very possible submarine base, and also a very useful air base for an enemy, and therefore I am sure the Conference will feel glad that under Lord Curzon's diplomacy we have every hope that Tangier will not be allowed to come under the control of any foreign Power; and so we shall be protected. And if anything were to happen to Morocco, as suggested—I need not go into that any more—but still it further strengthens the position of a possible enemy. All these are matters which require the unceasing vigilance of the Foreign Office and the unceasing representations of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Route round the Cape.

I said just now that I might say one word about the possibility of the alternative route round the Cape. I think we must not ignore that, because, notwithstanding all our precautions, if the worst happened, we might have some difficulty in maintaining our communications through the Mediterranean. I think it would be a most tremendous blow to our strategic position if it happened, but it is right that we should know that we have an alternative route round the Cape; and may I take this opportunity of expressing to General Smuts our grateful thanks for all he has done for promoting an oil station under his jurisdiction. That is a very important matter, and it shows what strength it does give us, a united Empire working on a common plan.

Food Supply of Great Britain.

I venture to bring the Conference back along the lines of communications. I have now arrived home at Great Britain herself,

and I might perhaps just be allowed to say one word upon the question of supplies of food in times of war to this country. I mention it specially because there was an important debate—or at least a debate of some importance—in Parliament last session, in which the Government were urged, and promised, to have this matter considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and we were also urged to bring it before the Imperial Conference, and I do so now. I ought to say that I have no proposal to make to the representatives of the Dominions in reference to it. Generally speaking, we approach this subject from a better standpoint than we did during the late war, because we have all the experiences behind us. We know exactly what to expect, what the methods are of attack, and what methods we must provide to counter the attack, and I am not, from a Naval point of view, at all inclined to adopt a pessimistic attitude. It is quite true the submarine menace, as it was developed by Germany, was exceedingly formidable, but we have learnt a great deal since, and I see no reason for pessimism. But when I say that, I hope the Conference will not think that any of us—my Right Honourable Friend here will know a great deal more about it than I do—but none of us despise the submarine menace—it is not that; but we are not prepared to take anything like a pessimistic attitude in reference to it. Still, everything depends upon whether the stock of food in this country affords us sufficient margin upon which to work. As everybody knows—it is public property—the stock of food in this country is not enough to feed the population, and at certain times of the year, owing to the dates of the harvest, it is very small comparatively; and, looking at it, as one must do, as a matter of business, from that point of view and taking the worst and calculating what that leads us to, the question is whether, taking the stock of food at the worst, we have sufficient margin upon which to work during the time when the Navy is doing its work,—of course, when the Navy has done its work, the menace no longer is formidable,—but during that period whether we have sufficient I will not go into details, but I will say this, that the margin is very barely sufficient and—here perhaps speaking more for myself only than I have done hitherto—I should be happier if the margin were larger, if the stock of food were a little larger, during the minimum period. Upon that matter nothing has been settled at the Committee of Imperial Defence; we are still discussing it. But this conclusion we have arrived at, that we do not see any proposal that we can make to the Dominions directly to help us in the matter. We know we have their goodwill; we know that they would do everything they could to help to feed these Islands if the occasion arose, but large stocks in the Dominions are not the vital thing; the vital thing is large stocks in this country—for this purpose, I mean—and it is on this side of the water that it is important, and the best assistance the Dominions can give us in that matter is to render our Fleet more effective by relieving us of a certain strain in their own parts. That may help us to concentrate a little more force—not to leave them in the lurch, but to give us a little more force in this country and so to protect our food supply. That is the direct way of helping. If we do see an opportunity of asking their assistance, we shall not, of course, be the least shy in putting it forward, but at present nothing more can be said.

Defence of Great Britain.

Well then, I come to the question of the national defence in its narrower aspect, that is to say, the defence of these islands themselves; and the present Government, while Mr. Bonar Law was Prime Minister, were so deeply impressed with the necessity of taking stock again of our situation that he appointed a special Committee to go into it, a Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, but specially fortified for the occasion by additional members, amongst whom I would merely mention Lord Balfour, who had made the subject his own, and Lord Weir, who is a great authority on Air and departmental difficulties, and this Committee sat for a large part of this summer. It had to consider the questions which depended upon the advent of the Air Force as an integral element in armaments, and they had to deal with the question of whether the several arms of the service were—to use

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 9a 94 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62721

a horrible word which I alway try to avoid if I can—sufficiently co-ordinated to meet present needs. Those were the two main heads under which their discussion took place, and the report is in draft, but it has not yet been finally agreed upon, although its main outlines are already agreed upon, and, indeed, a good deal of it has already been published, in chapters as it were, in *interim* reports which have been laid before Parliament.

Report of National and Imperial Defence Committee. Strength of Air Force.

That Report deals with the relation of the Air Service to the other arms, to the Navy and to the Army, and with the strength of the Air Force which is now required; and I am not going to say anything about those details, which belong to my noble friend, Lord Derby, and my Right Honourable friends, but merely to say in general terms that we are under the deplorable necessity of largely increasing our Air Force, indeed, recreating it, because it had been allowed almost to disappear, and in order to equalise it with the strongest Air Force within striking distance of this country. There again it is impossible to disguise which Power it is, because that is notorious. The French have got a fleet in being of 1,200 first-grade aeroplanes, and if their programme is carried out they will have more than 2,000, and we have a ridiculously small number up to now. Therefore, even without the least kind of element of hostility to France, it was absolutely necessary that we should have an Air Force in some way comparable to the Air Force of a foreign country within 20 miles of our shores, and that had to be done.

Co-ordination of Defence Ministries.

That was one of the main elements of the enquiry, viz., the relation of the Air Force to the other arms, and its own strength, and the other was the question of co-ordination. It had been moved very often in this country by various persons of distinction that there ought to be a definite and separate Minister of Defence, and I believe that that is a plan which has been adopted in some of the Dominions—I believe in Canada you have that, but with us it was more difficult because of the very large extent of the forces and their distribution which we have to deal with. This matter was very carefully considered. Our Committee came to the definite conclusion that a Ministry of Defence would be quite unwieldy in this country and unworkable, and we resolved against it, and the old departments are maintained.

Development of Committee of Imperial Defence.

The only thing that was done, and that was of some importance, was that we recommended to the Cabinet, and that has been accepted, that the position and circumstances of the Committee of Imperial Defence itself should be developed. That Committee, as the Conference probably knows, consists of the Prime Minister himself and such other persons as he may summon to assist him. As a matter of actual practice he summons the Secretaries of State of the Fighting Services, and he summons the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I ought to say he also summons myself to act for him as Chairman; and then in addition to these Parliamentary Ministers he summons the professional technical heads of the Great Services, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Air Staff—all are integral members in practice of the Committee of Imperial Defence; and he also summons anybody else whom he thinks would help.

Dominion Representatives invited to attend Meetings.

He has always extended a most cordial invitation to those Dominion representatives who are available. That is only carrying out a long succession of precedents which have been set. Whenever we have an opportunity of asking representatives of the Dominions who are authorised and qualified to come, they are abundantly welcome to help us in our deliberations. Then, besides that, there are the reports circulated to the Dominions, which I know the gentlemen here have received.

C 62722

Range of Work of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

I have said how the work of this Committee is a very widely extended work dealing with an enormous variety of subjects; to give you some example of the topics that have been discussed in the last two or three years, there are the value of capital ships, Imperial Naval Policy, Limitation of Armaments, the stragetic situation in the Far East, Singapore, Reserves of Oil Fuel, the Persian Oilfields, Washington, Laws of War, Airships, the Defence of Ports, the Defence of Railways, the Defence of Wireless—all those subjects and a host more, and they are only a few of the kind of topics that we deal with every week. But I may say, if the Conference expressed the least desire for it, it would be very easy to circulate a paper describing in detail the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and its history, and if it was asked for I should be only too delighted to put the necessary machinery into action, and it would be very little trouble because most of the material is in existence if it is desired. All this work I hope the Conference will not think is over-elaborate, it is essential if you are to have a really first-rate machine, a machinery for defence, not for aggression of any kind or sort, but for defence.

Compilation of War Books.

In many respects it has been necessary for us—this was begun long before my time and is being carried on—to put together in a tabulated form all the experiences of the late war, so that we may know exactly what to do if it ever should happen that another war should take place. They are contained in books, which we call the War Books; each Department concerned has contributed its own experiences, and it is all put down in tabulated form. I do not mean to say that we should be absolutely wise if a catastrophe came, but all the experience we have got would be instantly available in a single instant if a war broke out, everything that we have done. We also hope that could be done in the Dominions, if they would be good enough to consider the very respectful suggestion, that each should have in a tabulated form their experiences. I think they have done a good deal in that direction, but we hope that could be carried out, if we may make the suggestion.

Censorship.

There is work to be done in the direction of censorship, which should be brought to their notice. There must be an elaborate system of censorship the moment war breaks out, and we are anxious that they should collaborate with us in bringing it to full form. We have been in communication with them upon it, and we are anxious that it should be carried out to its proper fulfilment. Those are the respectful suggestions which I wish to make to them.

I have now reached the end of my address. I hope I have said enough to make the Conference feel that we are doing everything we can to make preparation. May it never be required, but we are bound to do our duty. Anyone who has passed through the great war and the awful exigencies which it exhibited cannot bear the responsibility of not being ready in case there were another, and we hope in the organisation we have established—it is a living organisation, full of work, full of vigour and full of knowledge—we can ask for your co-operation and assistance in defence of the British Empire.

Mr. Baldwin: Mr. Mackenzie King.

Mr. Massey: Would not it be convenient to hear the First Sea Lord?

Mr. Baldwin: I think there is going to be a definite discussion on the Sea on Wednesday.

Mr. Amery: We are going to have a general Naval discussion on Wednesday, and, if it meets with the approval of the Conference, a general discussion at the Admiralty, when Lord Beatty could answer questions and lay the things before you in their details as may be desirable from your point of view.

Mr. Baldwin: It is very general to-day.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62723

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Co-operation in Defence desired by Canada.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Prime Minister, I have not anything to say at the moment beyond mentioning that the suggestions just made by Lord Salisbury will be fully met by Canada. They have already, I understand, been met in large measure. So far as Canada is concerned, her attitude will continue to be in the future what it has been in the past, one, namely, of hearty co-operation in matters of defence, having regard always to the fact that actual participation in war, the extent of participation and such like, must necessarily be matters which will have to be carefully considered and be decided by Parliament itself. I think that is understood.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Mr. Bruce: Prime Minister, I am not very clear what we have to discuss at this stage. I think it would be a good thing to have a general discussion on defence, but we do not at the moment quite appear to be shaping in that direction. As I understand it, we are subsequently going to deal with the question of Naval Defence and with the action the Dominions are going to take with regard to it; but there seems to me to be a broader aspect, covering Empire defence generally. We have to consider the Imperial Council of Defence, and to come to a conclusion whether we think it wise to continue this central authority which is charged with laying down the whole of the plans for united action by the Empire in a period of national danger. I suppose that that is quite generally accepted, but assuming that we are all agreed that there is to be this Council, and that this Council is going to deal generally with the question of Empire Defence as a whole, we immediately come to the other side of the position—how far the Dominions are to co-operate in that defence by means of the efforts they are prepared to make in their own respective spheres. I am not at all clear whether this is the time to discuss that, or at what stage we are going to discuss it, but it appears to me to be quite the most important subject we have before us.

Imperial Defence is a matter for the Whole of the Empire.

From Australia's point of view we are rather in this position. We see clearly that our future lies inside the Empire, and that our defence must be a part of the general defence of the whole Empire, and we are prepared as far as we can to bear our share of it. I think it is generally recognised that in the past the Dominions have not quite done all that is possible to help. They have rather left their defence in the hands of Great Britain. Australia's attitude is that we are ready and willing to consider whether there is anything more that we should do, but it would make a tremendous help to us in determining how much we can do if we could get general recognition of the principle that the question of Empire Defence, irrespective of which part of the Empire is concerned, is a question for the whole of the Empire, and not only a question for Great Britain and the Dominion that is primarily concerned in any particular problem.

Of course we take the view that the Empire's defence is a matter for the whole of the Empire. We believe that if a disaster occurred to Great Britain, a tremendous reverse which to a great extent destroyed her prestige and position in the world, and we had not a naval force sufficient to secure Great Britain's supplies—we believe in Australia that that would be almost a greater disaster to Australia than it would be to Britain. Therefore we take the view that this question of Empire Defence is a matter in which the whole of the Empire is concerned, and in regard to which every part of the Empire ought to be prepared to bear its fair proportion. I am only saying those few words now because at this stage I do not quite see what questions we ought to discuss. I wanted to talk about Singapore and to ask for a great deal of information. There are a number of points that I wish to raise. But as this was a general discussion, I first wanted to clear my mind as to what we are discussing, and whether we are dealing with the general question of the broad co-operation by the whole Empire in Empire Defence.

C 62724

Mr. Amery: Personally, I should like it if Mr. Bruce raised any general points that he has to raise in connection with Singapore to-day, because I could answer them straight away.

Mr. Bruce: I think it would be helpful if I did, and I will indicate the type of information which we want. Before doing that, I would like to finish the point I have raised, as I want to make Australia's position perfectly clear. We take the view that the Empire is one and indivisible, and that every part of the Empire ought to be prepared to bear its share of responsibility for Empire Defence; and that view is founded on the reasons I have given, and also on the fact that the great basis of the Empire is the Empire's trade. We are all equally concerned and interested in the protection of the trade routes of the world, and we think that question ought to be fully discussed. I do not think I shall be misunderstood if I say that Australia has looked at the position very carefully. We recognise that Great Britain herself has borne a greater burden of the Empire's defence than any of the Dominions, on a *per capita* basis or any basis that you choose to take, but we venture to suggest that that is quite right and proper, apart from the position of the Dominions, their small population and their present limited financial resources. The Empire is primarily the responsibility of Britain; and, while each of the Dominions is very concerned about its own particular safety, the major responsibility for the Empire is Britain's, and naturally at the present time—at some date in the future we may be able to do more—it is proper that Britain bears a greater share. We emphatically think that Australia, in the past, has borne rather more than her share in comparison with the other Dominions. I am sure that the Dominion representatives will understand why I have to raise this point here, because it is a matter which has been raised in Australia in the past and will be raised in the future; and if there is a great difference between the effort that we are making in comparison with the other Dominions, it may lead to a political situation which will very seriously hamper what we are able to do. I am afraid there is no way of avoiding the consideration of that question, and seeing if we cannot lay down some principle. The principle that Australia stands for is that the whole Empire is vitally interested in the Empire's safety, and we should all bear as great a proportion of the burden as we can according to our present circumstances and situation, but I do not want to labour that point at this moment. On the general question of Empire defence one has, of course, to consider it particularly from the point of view of one's own Dominion.

Provision for Land Defences of Australia.

As far as Australia is concerned, we appreciate that the land defences of Australia are entirely a matter for Australia, and we are endeavouring to bring about a position where, if it should unfortunately happen that a hostile force were able to land on our shores, we could deal with it under our own organisation. I do not propose to delay the Conference by explaining exactly what we have done; but the underlying principles of the scheme we have now established are that the first necessity in any war is to have a staff capable of handling the forces we put into the field, and the second is to have the necessary munitions of war. The soldier himself can be recruited if you have a strong and virile population, and you can meet your difficulty in regard to man-power when the crisis arises; but you can never meet your difficulties in regard to a staff or in regard to munitions, and the first object we have in view is to create that staff. We train a sufficient number of men at present to give the staff the necessary opportunity of carrying out their side of the task and training themselves. At the moment we are, to some extent, relying upon the fact that we have a great body of returned soldiers in Australia. I think we are relying perhaps a little too much upon that, because the number will be reduced as time goes on; but as it becomes necessary we shall of course have to train a greater number of our manhood. We have, in our home defence in Australia, the provision for universal training. In regard to munitions, at the moment, we can produce all our requirements in regard to small arms and small-arms ammunition, but there are many other things we have not got;

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62725

and the basis we are working on at the present moment is, to try to establish factories in Australia which will only be on a nucleus basis, to provide all the things we require in regard to munitions which are not manufactured commercially in the country. Everything we require, if it is manufactured commercially, we have, since the war, handed back to private enterprise, and we rely upon our powers to take action and acquire these factories when trouble arises. But to put through the present scheme, the establishment of nucleus factories for the other things we require, will probably take something like six years. We have also got a present trouble. Apart from anything we can manufacture in the future, we have to try to safeguard our position at the present moment; and in order to make a start towards the necessary provision, we have this year taken an additional sum of £250,000. That is supplementary, of course, to the ordinary expenditure in regard to munitions, which is continuing at about £500,000; and during the next few years we hope to place ourselves in the position of having the necessary supplies of munitions in the country, and of having laid down the basis for all these factories, so that we may produce the necessary munitions in Australia. I am saying this to indicate that we do appreciate the responsibility which rests on us for our land forces, and, as far as we are able, we are trying to take the necessary steps to carry out the task which we realise lies on our shoulders.

Need for Sea Defence.

The actual task, however, of protecting a great country like Australia against any first-class Power is quite an impossible one. With a population of five and a half millions, and a 12,000-mile coast line, we cannot deceive ourselves for a moment that we can do it. There is only one way in which we can protect ourselves, and that is on the sea. We say quite frankly that, with our population, and at our present stage of development, we certainly could not create the big fleet which would be necessary to protect ourselves from aggression by a great Naval Power, but there we have enjoyed protection in the past from the British fleet. To some extent, in later years, the protection has been one of co-operation between the Australian units of the Navy and the British Navy, and in the future that is, of course, the thing we have to look to. Naval defence is going to be discussed later, and, as the First Lord has suggested, I think it would be helpful if I indicated some of the things which are in our minds in regard to it. In Australia we are perfectly clear that, if battleships are essential for modern naval defence, then there has got to be a base of some sort in the Pacific, and I do not think I need delay the Conference very long to put the points on which we want a little enlightenment.

Development of Base at Singapore not a Breach of Washington Treaty.

Before doing so I may say, as far as Australia is concerned, that, if there is any suggestion that a base at Singapore is in any sense a breach of the Washington Treaty or that it amounts to sharp practice, we repudiate that immediately; because Senator Pearce was Australia's representative there, and Australia never would have given her free and willing consent to the action taken at Washington if there had been the slightest doubt but that Singapore could be proceeded with if necessary, and I think I should make that very clear indeed.

Strategic Position of Singapore.

Now in regard to Singapore, the first thing that I should like to have put, and put as fully as possible by, I presume, the First Sea Lord, is whether Singapore is the right place. I have seen many arguments and I have read a good deal of literature, but it never has been clearly and convincingly put. We have in Australia a Council of Defence consisting of three Ministers, the Naval, Military and Air Advisers, and before I left Australia I put the point to them and asked them to demonstrate to me the effect of Singapore, and what the exact position would be in the case of, say, trouble with Japan—of course, I do not anticipate anything of the sort—and how that base on the flank would render an attack on Australia, if not absolutely impossible, at least a naval venture that

C 62726

nobody would be very likely to take on. I had many arguments and explanations given to me; but—it may be my own stupidity—I have not yet got clearly into my mind, from the strategical point of view, the effect of having a base at Singapore in relation to the defence of the Pacific generally.

Value of Capital Ships.

The other thing that I think would be very helpful to the Conference is information in regard to this question of battleships being necessary to-day. It would be useful to have the opinion of the First Lord or other expert opinion that would help to show us that battleships to-day are absolutely essential, because, of course, if battleships are not essential, if there is anything in the theory of those who say "No, the day of the battleship is past," then, of course, Singapore is a matter of comparative indifference, because it is the battleship, and the battleship primarily, that Singapore is designed for.

Prospects of Developing Singapore without Interruption.

Another question which I think is of very great interest—not so much for the Navy as for the British Government—is this: Is there any guarantee, beyond the prospect of peace in the Pacific consequent on the Washington Treaty, that we are going to be able to build Singapore? What I have in mind is, was there any arrangement or any discussion at all in regard to this at the Washington Conference? I gather there was not.

Lord Salisbury: I read out that telegram from Lord Balfour to the Home Government explaining how he was negotiating in regard to it.

Mr. Bruce: I was on another point altogether. Possibly it is a point that need not be pursued, because I do not think any such thing took place. What I had in mind was that possibly, when this Treaty was entered into, there might have been some understanding that this base was to be proceeded with.

Lord Salisbury: It was understood between the British Plenipotentiary and the Dominion representatives.

Mr. Bruce: Certainly, but was there an understanding with America, which safeguarded its being built without interruption?

Lord Salisbury: There was nothing official, but I think it was quite well understood. It was general talk at Washington, and it was mentioned in the press, and it was well known, as far as the British Empire was concerned, because it was discussed at the Conference in 1921.

Mr. Bruce: That really is no additional safeguard to us that there will be no interference in building.

Lord Salisbury: The Japanese Government publicly announced the other day that they acquitted us of any kind of sharp practice in regard to it; it was practically understood.

Mr. Massey: It was practically approved.

Mr. Bruce: That is not quite the point I am on; I will put it more clearly. What I should really like to hear, and I think the Conference would like to hear, is this: Was there any understanding with America that, while this base was being built, it should be safeguarded by joint action, at the stage that it had reached, and defended, in case of anything untoward happening prior to its completion? And what possibility there would be of action being taken against it in the event of hostilities breaking out during the period it was under construction?

Garrisoning of Singapore.

The other point which is of very great interest to Australia is, assuming Singapore is the place and Singapore is built: What are the proposals in regard to the garrisoning of Singapore? Exactly how is it proposed to garrison it during the period of complete peace? How is it proposed to reinforce it during the period of tension, and how will it be garrisoned during a period of actual hostilities? I am

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62727

particularly stressing that point, because Australia, if one excludes India, is the nearest British country to Singapore, and there may be some idea that Australia could find the men to garrison it in a period of tension or during hostilities. In Australia we have no permanent force that we could use for that purpose, and, as we can only send men overseas if they volunteer, it would probably be extraordinarily difficult for Australia to do anything at all to help in regard to the garrisoning of Singapore until hostilities had proceeded for some period.

Money Contribution by Australia.

Lord Salisbury: You can help, of course, with money very well.

Mr. Bruce: You mean at this stage?

Lord Salisbury: Yes.

Mr. Bruce: I shall be prepared to discuss the question of contribution when the question of the base itself is taken up. I was trying to raise a few points which might be helpful to the First Lord in putting the matter of the Singapore base to us when we come to discuss it.

Mr. Amery: That will be a Committee stage between us later.

Mr. Bruce: I am trying to indicate the things which will be helpful when Singapore is under discussion.

Possibility of avoiding Development at Singapore.

There is also another point on behalf of Australia I must bring out in regard to Singapore. This point really has two aspects; on the one side it concerns foreign affairs, and on the other it concerns the Admiralty. It is the question whether there is any possibility of avoiding building Singapore altogether. The point that concerns the Admiralty is this. Suppose—in this world it is certainly difficult to come to arrangements—but suppose you could come to an arrangement with the Powers that are concerned. The only class of arrangement, as I understand it, that would be satisfactory from a naval point of view would be one which would actually involve the doing away with battleships altogether. As long as battleships are in the programme of the Navies of the world, we want a base in the Pacific so that we can take a battleship into the Pacific, so that the only possible arrangement would be that battleships shall disappear altogether. I should like to be quite sure whether there is any idea of so drastic an action as that, and I certainly should like some assurance—and possibly the representatives of the different countries will see why I want it—as to the possibility of a Conference which might follow the Washington Conference and even go a step further. It is a question that Australia is very interested in. We have, as I indicated the other day, very strong views with regard to the question of armaments and the peace of the world generally, and I felt that I had to raise that point so that we could at least consider it. With regard to Singapore, provided that at this time there is no possibility of arriving at arrangements with the other Pacific nations which would completely ensure the safety of the Pacific—and it would have to be the safety of the Pacific indefinitely, not for a period of years—and provided that it can be demonstrated that Singapore is the right base, Australia is very anxious to see this work proceeded with, because we are convinced that if battleships form the programme of the Navy it is imperative that there should be some base in the Pacific.

Need for Pacific Base Imperative.

The other point—and this, of course, is very confidential indeed—the other point that Australia feels very strongly is this. I have suggested the possibility of some arrangement in the Pacific which might do away with the necessity for building Singapore, but if no arrangement can be made we consider it is imperative that Britain should get a base of some sort in the Pacific. The Washington Conference was made possible by the fact that there were three Powers who were all in such a strong position that it was really useless to go on with the competition; and the Washington

C 62728

Treaty certainly did one very good thing; it got rid of the competition which was just starting between Great Britain and America, a competition which probably would have had the most serious results in both countries, certainly from the financial point of view. On the other hand the Washington Treaty has to a great extent left Japan in a very much better position in the Pacific than she was before; and, in Australia, those who have thought this question out feel very strongly that after the period of the Washington Treaty has run out, if Japan has proceeded through all this time to build up to her 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-in. guns, and is very strong as a Navy, and Britain has no base in the Pacific upon which modern battleships could be based, it would certainly be much more difficult to come to a further arrangement at the expiration of this Washington Treaty period than if Britain had a base, America was still strong, and Japan was strong. The three would then be in a position where nobody could think it a simple task to become the mistress of the China Seas. Broadly speaking, subject to various points that I raised, Australia is certainly very much in favour of a base in the Pacific, and is prepared to consider whether there is anything that we can do to help in the establishing of it.

Mr. Baldwin: Are there any other points you would like to raise before you discuss them at a more technical meeting?

Mr. Bruce: I do not think so. Of course, at that meeting there will be prepared programmes and you will indicate what you suggest we should do, but I think that will be much more a Committee question that we shall have to thrash out. I do not think we can do anything in the full Conference.

Mr. Amery: In addition to what I call a second reading of the Naval discussion there will still be technical points to be illustrated, probably on maps, which might more conveniently be done at the Admiralty some afternoon.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Mr. Massey: Like the other overseas Ministers I have listened with an intense amount of interest to the statement made by Lord Salisbury. Prior to the statement being made I was rather afraid that the subject of defence was, to a certain extent, being neglected and that we were beginning already to forget the lessons of the war and the experience that we gained during those awful years. I am glad to acknowledge that I was wrong and that defence is not being neglected. Lord Salisbury reminded us that there were no war clouds on the horizon at the present time. I am glad to be able to agree with him. There are no clouds on the horizon to-night, but there may be plenty here to-morrow morning. I was very glad to have an expression of opinion from Lord Salisbury that what was contemplated—and we have only got to that stage—was for the purposes of defence and certainly not for purposes of offence, and what was in his mind and also that of the Imperial Government—and I think in the minds of all those who have made this subject a study—was that we were only preparing for possibilities, that what was intended was in the way of insurance. That is quite right, but a prudent man insures his house against fire and does not wait for the fire to break out. I know the financial difficulties in every country of the Empire. I think I can appreciate the financial difficulties of the heart of the Empire itself, but the subject of being prepared for any possibility is so serious that I do not think that we should wait too long. Now that brings me up to the other question, what are the overseas countries of the Empire going to do in the way of contributing their share for defensive purposes, and I am thinking now more of Naval defence. That is one of the difficulties of the moment. I do not want to say very much about Naval defence, but I think all those who have looked into the subject will agree that Naval defence is at present at all events far more important than military defence. The war taught us that it is possible not only to get together an army, but to train them within a comparatively few months. I know of men who went from the different overseas countries and in less than six months training they were in the fighting line and gave a very good account of themselves; and I am sure the same may be said of the

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62729

soldiers who went from the United Kingdom. But you cannot do that with Naval defence. It takes much more than six months to build a capital ship or even a light cruiser.

Progress with New Capital Ships.

I should be glad to learn, when the proper time comes, whether anything is being done with regard to those two capital ships for which tenders I think were accepted quite a number of months ago, and which were intended to be proceeded with, and which, by the way, were agreed to at the Washington Conference. It was understood then that Britain was entitled to build two of the most powerful ships in existence for the purpose of defence.

Mr. Amery: Perhaps I may interrupt at once. They have been under construction since the end of last year, though they have been somewhat delayed by boilermakers' strikes and other troubles. They are well under way.

Mr. Massey: A few months is not serious so long as the ships are being gone on with, and that brings me back to this.

Dominions have not hitherto taken their full share in Naval Defence.

I am strongly of opinion—I am going to quote a word that I have heard very often used in this connection; to my mind it may be an objectionable word, I do not like it, but it has been used already and I am going to use it because it expresses what I intend to say—that we in the overseas countries of the Empire have been "sponging" upon Britain for Naval defence. There is no question about it, but the time has come when we should face our responsibilities, as far as it is possible for us to do so. If certain countries are suffering from financial depression it may not be possible, but even in those cases an advance may be made. I do not want to refer to what my own country is doing, but I would like to say this. I asked Parliament last Session, speaking as Finance Minister, for a Vote of £500,000 for Naval defence and there was no objection raised; a few words of criticism, but nothing serious, and, as a matter of fact, it was agreed to unanimously. Well, I suppose the other countries of the Empire are prepared to do the same thing, perhaps proportionate to their population. I have no doubt that they are. Every country must speak for itself. Certainly I am not going to interfere with the citizens of any other country, but I cannot help thinking that every country of the Empire has an almost equal interest in the subject of Naval defence.

Need for Light Cruisers.

Speaking of the lessons of the last war, and again I come back to my own point of view, I saw it in one of the English papers that during the war New Zealand had lost two big ships loaded to the hatches with food supplies for Britain. *Two*—we lost twenty-one. They were not all loaded with food supplies and raw materials and that sort of thing. All those which were going to Britain were loaded in this way, but some of these vessels were coming the other way, and, of course, were not carrying food supplies. In case I may be misunderstood I want the Conference to understand that those ships were not all owned in New Zealand. Most of the ships of the New Zealand Shipping Company and of the Union Shipping Company are owned in New Zealand, but there were other Lines whose ships were sunk, but which were not New Zealand owned ships, though they were carrying New Zealand produce. Very well, it seemed to me that what we wanted during the last war in this respect was light cruisers that would keep the trade routes open, and while I am very glad to hear about big capital ships—we have something more to say about them later on, though not this afternoon—I should be glad to know whether anything is being done to provide a sufficient number of light cruisers. When I say light cruisers I am not thinking of good-sized cruisers, I am thinking of the cruiser that will carry 6-in. guns and be able to steam up to 25 knots if required. That is about the type that appeared to me to be wanted during the last war and of which we had not a sufficient number.

If we had had a sufficient number of those I do not think the different countries of the Empire would have suffered to the extent

C 62730

they undoubtedly did, and we should not have had that narrow escape which we had of having our connections cut, because undoubtedly there was a very narrow escape at the time. I do not pretend to speak as an expert, far from it, but if the enemy had been able to cut the connections I do not think we could have held out for very long, as the centres of population, such as this and other countries, were running short of supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. In making preparations we have got to think of these things, and I have no doubt that they are being thought of not only by Members of Parliament and Ministers of the Crown, but by those whose special business it is to think of such things. I do not want to make myself misunderstood here. I think it was extraordinarily fortunate that the British Navy was able to keep the sea during the last war. It was ready for war and I hope that if ever war comes again we shall be at least as well prepared as we were on the last occasion.

Value of Capital Ships.

Just a word with regard to the controversy that has been going on with regard to Battleships. Again, we have got to look back to experience. I am trenching on a subject which the First Lord of the Admiralty will have to talk about; perhaps I am dealing with some material which he may be able to make use of. I have read of what took place in the British Parliament on the question of naval defence; I read what the newspapers had to say so far as it was possible for me to do so; I have read the reviews on the subject, and I have had the opinion of men who do know, men who have had experience, men who took part in the last war. Notwithstanding different debates which I have heard and the different opinions that have been published, I have never seen—nor is it the opinion of one who took a prominent part in the last war and who was able to say—that capital ships would be of no use in the future. On that point, I have been able to form an opinion, but whether it is worth anything remains to be seen. But I cannot help recalling, and I watched it with great interest at the time, that the Navy never lost a capital ship—I am speaking of modern ships—through being torpedoed. We lost the "Audacious," which was mined off the northern coast of Ireland, but that was the only one that I can think of. I am one of those old-fashioned enough to think that we ought to take care of the bridge that carried us over. It was certainly the capital ships—whether battleships or battle-cruisers—that was the class of ship that saw us through the last war. I have read of experiments with old battleships, say, of 20 years of age or more, which have been towed out to sea, and where aeroplanes have tried to sink them and have had great difficulty in doing so. I do not think that is much of an experiment. I want to say that so far as New Zealand is concerned, and so far as I am concerned, I do not think that we should neglect anything in the way of proper precaution. I will leave it at that.

Singapore.

As regards Singapore, I may say the same as I have said with regard to capital ships, it is impossible for a man who is a layman to make up his mind and express an opinion that is of any value unless he has had an opportunity of consulting men who knew the position very much better than he does himself. That was exactly my position. I have come across men who knew Singapore quite well, actually before the war broke out. I heard a great authority express the opinion then that the British countries in the Pacific would never be safe until either Singapore or Hong Kong were properly fortified. I believe I mentioned on a previous occasion that I had had an opportunity of looking at the fortifications of Pearl Harbour which belongs to America. America is within her rights in fortifying Pearl Harbour. The American authorities gave me an invitation to look over it, and the people with me expressed the opinion that Pearl Harbour was positively impregnable. I think it is. I am not thinking of the possibility of going to war with America. I know everything is possible, but this is one of the most improbable things that could happen. That is no reason at all why we should not go on with the fortification of Singapore, and I believe, from expressions of opinion to me, that the American authorities—

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62731

not the American people, because I do not think many of them know what is taking place in the Pacific or the position in the Pacific—but the American authorities would, I believe, be pleased rather than otherwise if Britain were to say that she is to go on with the proper fortification of Singapore.

That, of course, will come up again. I do not know that I need follow this further. As I have said, I take a great deal more interest in naval defence at present than military defence, and I think naturally.

Provision for Land Defences of New Zealand.

As for military defence, New Zealand is like Australia. We have a very large number of trained men who, if occasion required, would undoubtedly volunteer for active service. I was surprised on the occasion when there was trouble with Turkey. When our soldiers came back they talked to me and said to me repeatedly: "No more war. If ever you allow the country to be involved in war again, you can go and do the fighting yourself." I do not mean to say those were the exact words used, but that was their meaning. When that trouble came along with Turkey, there was, of course, the sentimental question with regard to Gallipoli, which will never be forgotten either in Australia or New Zealand. When that trouble came, the Government never asked for a volunteer; we had not got to that stage, and we kept it back to the last possible moment. That moment never arrived, and I hope it never will, but in three days 14,000 men, speaking approximately, and 300 or 400 nurses volunteered to give their services if required. They were nearly all men who had seen service, and many of them, I noticed, were among those who had positively said over and over again that they had done with fighting, no more war for them; they were the most anxious of the population to get away when the moment came. I think that in the event of any trouble we need not be afraid of the men of the Empire not doing their duty, and I, myself, am not a bit afraid. The men brought up under the Southern Cross, whether Australia or New Zealand or Fiji or any of the islands, will, I believe, do exactly what they did before. All the same, I do not want to see it. I will leave the rest of what I have to say until the next opportunity, when we shall be able to go more fully into the question of naval defence.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

General Smuts: I should like to ask a few questions. I will not detain you.

Value of Work of Committee of Imperial Defence.

Lord Salisbury referred to the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the impracticability, at this stage, of instituting a joint Ministry of Defence such as we have in several of the Dominions. That I quite understand; I also understand the great importance of the work which is being done by the Committee of Imperial Defence, work of the most important kind possible.

Standing Committee of Chiefs of Staff.

In days gone by, when I made a closer study of this question than now, what seemed to me to be very badly wanted was an additional standing Committee of the three heads of the great defence services.

Lord Salisbury: The professional heads?

General Smuts: Yes—the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff, the First Sea Lord, and the Air. It seemed to me that it was quite necessary in peace time to get these heads of the three great defence services to work in a standing Committee, so that they learned in peace time the sort of joint work which becomes essential as soon as war occurs.

Lord Salisbury: It is so. I do not want to overburden what I wanted to say, but I had intended to mention that. We have got exactly the arrangement which General Smuts indicates. Very

C 62732

likely it is the opinion which he expressed on a previous occasion which suggested it. At any rate, so it is, and there is a Committee consisting of the three great professional heads of the three fighting services to act as a sort of joint General Staff in commission, and who advise the Committee of Imperial Defence upon all technical questions.

Singapore.

General Smuts: A question about Singapore. I raised the question of Singapore in correspondence with the Imperial Government under a misapprehension. When we discussed this question two years ago I was not under the impression, from our discussions, that the point had already been decided by the British Government, and that the information given here was merely for purposes of informing us; I was under the impression that it was an open question.

Therefore some months ago, before the controversy had been raised here politically, I asked that this question of Singapore, the final decision about Singapore, should stand over until we had discussed it here. It appears now that Singapore is an old decision of the British Government taken previous to our last Conference; it is stated in the paper that has been circulated that Singapore had been decided as a question of high policy previous to the last Conference, and that our Delegation that went to Washington went with definite instruction upon this point; and therefore I was belated in raising this question and asking for the decision to be postponed. I understand that, and I am not going to raise that question now. I assume that Singapore, from the naval point of view, is the proper thing; that from the point of the Navy in any future contingency Singapore is necessary and Singapore is the best place as a great Naval Base; and I also assume that Singapore does not involve any question of good faith on our part as regards our old Allies, Japan.

Implications of Construction of Singapore Base.

What troubles me is this. What more is involved in the Singapore matter? The building of a base merely at Singapore is no protection really to Australia and New Zealand and the other parts of the British Empire there. The mere establishment of a base in itself is no protection at all, and we should not by any such step lull them into a false sense of security. They must not think that, once Singapore has been built, on a proper occasion the British Navy can move there and defend them. I am just afraid that Singapore involves much more than that, if it is to be a real insurance to those distant parts of the Empire. Take the case of Port Arthur. Port Arthur was a great naval base which Russia started in the Far East, but it was no protection. Port Arthur was taken by the Japanese, and the efforts which the Russians made afterwards to relieve it simply led to their undoing. The point which troubles me in regard to Singapore is this. Supposing we carry out this idea of creating a great naval base there; what more have we to do in the meantime before a great incident in the future arises and it is going to be used? What more is going to be done in the meantime to protect it? You cannot simply build a base for an enemy to capture. It is close to Japan; it is a few days' steaming from Japan. Therefore, if you build a great base there, supposing trouble were to arise between us and Japan in future, this base may be captured long before the British Navy can move to it and keep it as a base. So that the question which arises is, what more would be required really to defend it, not merely from the land point of view but from the navy point of view? It may even do great harm by lulling Australia and those parts into a false sense of security; and when the danger really comes the first thing that would happen would be the capture of Singapore by a potential enemy which is close by, a few days off.

Is Base Defensible against Japan.

That raises the question: Is the idea we contemplate feasible? Can you have a British Navy in these waters on the Washington basis and move it in time of danger to a base in the Pacific? The

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 94 10 11 12 13 14 15

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62733

Washington basis is 5, 5 and 3, 1·7 and 1·7. Compared with Japan our Navy is as 5 to 3, and it is almost inconceivable to me that when the danger ultimately arises in the East, in the Pacific, there will not be danger here too. It is almost inconceivable that Japan or China or any such potential enemy—let us mention Japan confidentially here—it seems to me almost inconceivable that Japan would be raising trouble when she has no European support. If there is the least danger in Europe, is it a feasible proposition to divide our 5 between East and West and to send part of the Navy over to Singapore and keep part here? That is the point that troubles me. If we can build a Navy of the decided superiority which we had formerly, there is no doubt that we could divide it and could send it against both. We could keep sufficient here in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to serve our purpose here, and the balance we could send to the Pacific; but, having limited ourselves as regards capital ships to those proportions, I am very doubtful whether Australia and New Zealand could safely rely on a division of the Fleet in a future contingency for their protection by a movement of that Fleet from here to those waters. I feel very doubtful about the whole thing.

Lord Salisbury: I do not propose to answer the General now. The First Lord of the Admiralty will answer your points. I may tell you at once that we are quite conscious of all these points.

General Smuts: Yes. I think it is very necessary that in the statement the First Lord is going to make these points should be elucidated, because I do not think it would be fair to Australia and New Zealand to make them think that Singapore is going to make them really safe in future. It may be just the opposite. My own feeling is this: That it will be a very long time before any danger arises in that quarter—a very long time.

Effect of Quadruple Pacific Pact.

The Quadruple Pact for the Pacific will probably be the beginning of a number of similar arrangements, and I do not anticipate that for a long time there will be any danger, and it was from that point of view that I tried in vain at a previous conference to cry a halt to the carrying out of the scheme. It seems to me that the danger just now is so very slight, and so distant in the future, that it would be far better to concentrate our energies in other quarters where the danger, to my mind, is much nearer. I am very sorry that a political controversy has arisen in this country over the matter and that so much attention has been given to the Singapore question, because it must reflect somewhat on our relations with Japan which have been for a long number of years so happy. I am afraid that unfortunately the discussions which have taken place upon the Singapore question itself will not help to improve those relations.

Lord Salisbury: I hope it will not make any difference.

General Smuts: I hope it will not.

Lord Curzon: I ought to say that I had a few words with the Japanese Ambassador, and he altogether ridiculed the idea that the statements which have appeared in the press about Japanese suspicions or Japanese hostility were shared by the Japanese Government. He told me he understood quite well, and that his Government understood, that the matter was well within our rights, and was in accordance with previous decisions and discussions which have taken place, and that he, for his part, did not in the least share the views which had been expressed in the public press.

General Smuts: No. It is a question of public opinion. There is no doubt that this seems as if it is directed against Japan. We cannot cover the impression that in a couple of years, or a year, after we had ceased to be Allies we were building armaments against Japan. It is unfortunate. I do not think there is any serious danger, and therefore I am sorry that we should be reduced to the necessity of weakening or strengthening that impression. To my mind the danger is much greater in other quarters, and I would turn my attention much more in other directions. If one looks at the condition of the World to-day, can you make up your mind we

c 62734

are moving into an era of peace? It may be that we are probably moving into an era of disturbance and unsettlement in the World, and we have to be prepared in a certain sense from a naval, military and air point of view.

Dangers nearer Great Britain.

I should not dream of any danger in those distant waters, but much nearer home. The question that arises and has not been discussed, and which it is very difficult to discuss in a full meeting like this, is: What is the position much nearer home? Are we in the position, in case things were to develop in a bad direction very suddenly here, of having undisputed mastery in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, and is the impression of our strength at present so convincing that other people would hesitate before they challenged us?

That is a point that has not been raised here at all. Lord Salisbury has discussed Egypt, and he has mentioned the Mediterranean, he has mentioned the Spanish Zone, Tangier, and it is all very vague as to what would happen supposing that there is a breakdown in Spain and that part which wholly upset us, would not that completely destroy the position in the Mediterranean, and interfere with our communications? Then in regard to the Air Service, which I understand is now improving again in this country, what we have to concentrate our attention on is to see that in the Air, on the Sea and on Land, and so on, we are so strong that there is no doubt whatever about what may happen if we were challenged. I think we have devoted so much attention to a question which is quite a minor question; it is only important so far as policy is concerned; but the other question is a very important one, and it has been so for a number of years. I hope the First Lord will be able to give us some reassuring statement on the position of this country from a defensive and offensive point of view in Europe. If any great catastrophe were to take place, we only know the balance of power in Europe has been upset. The German menace has completely disappeared, but we do not know what other menace may be appearing on the scene. We only know that one Power adopted a tone towards us which has not been done for many years, and it is a question whether people are thinking in a more sinister sense than that at which we are taking them, and whether they would take more risks than we expect them to take. All this we might be enlightened upon. These matters are very important, and they may become of very urgent importance in the near future.

Co-operation in Defence.

The Prime Minister of Australia has raised the question of contributions for the defence of the Empire. We agree that that is for the Empire. It is one of the outstanding features, that in case of attack the part attacked may look for assistance from the others. That is a much more powerful thing than the Covenant of the League of Nations; this is the real thing. It is the very nature of the Empire. But, of course, it is difficult for us to say what is going to happen. We can only work out peace schemes, and we have such schemes before us. The Admiralty has been careful to work out what the contribution should be from each Dominion. We can only do our little bit in accordance with the scheme for war time.

Mr. Amery: You say, work out what it should be. We have done what, from our point of view, would be a convenient help. It is a matter for your own decision what it should be.

General Smuts: Yes. We cannot do better now on an occasion like this than follow the suggestions which the Admiralty has placed before us, but it is very difficult for us to go further. It must depend very much upon the spirit which exists in the Empire—a spirit of mutual help and assistance in case real danger were to arise. I have no further observations to make, Prime Minister; it is only some of these fundamental questions which trouble me, and I hope we shall turn our attention to them before we part with this question of defence.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62735

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Mr. Warren: I would just say this, that, from the speech of the Marquess of Salisbury, Canada, as regards the East Coast, and Newfoundland are more or less reassured. I say this because his cruise took us into the Mediterranean and the Pacific and not the North Atlantic—I therefore reserve anything I have to say until we go into details later on.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

India's Responsibility for Internal Defence.

Lord Peel: I have only one word to say on this subject as it affects India. The Government of India, as is fairly well known, is responsible for its internal defence, but as regards external defence—that is to say, war with foreign Powers, such as Afghanistan—India relies on reinforcements from this country. Hence, India is of course interested in the question of movements in the Red Sea, Aden and Singapore, but I have to guard myself by saying that internal defence does not imply contributions towards these communications. In the present year India's estimate for its military budget, including the Air, is no less than 40 million pounds sterling, its total budget being, less the Commercial Services, 61 Crore—nearly half its whole budget. These payments, of course, cover the Indian Army proper, and the British Army in India, and the Air Force. The Air Force now is six squadrons, and India would like to increase it to eight squadrons if it had the money. As regards the Royal Indian Marine, that is a subject which will be discussed on Wednesday, I understand. I have some observations to make about that, and I should like to reserve those for that discussion.

FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS.

Mr. Baldwin: That, I think, will bring to an end the preliminary discussion which was inaugurated by Lord Salisbury, and we resume on Wednesday morning, when the First Lord of the Admiralty will make his statement and we will get to closer grips with the whole subject. If there is time on Wednesday morning we will take the War Minister's observations, but without any desire to curtail what the members of the Conference may desire to say in reply to the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Mr. Massey: Supposing we do not finish on Wednesday morning.

Mr. Baldwin: At the moment we have Wednesday afternoon for the Economic Conference, but the discussion as at present arranged will be continued on Friday. That is settled anyway. As to whether it will be morning or afternoon, it is rather early yet to say.

Mr. Amery: Could we perhaps fix a date on which we could go to the more detailed discussion of Naval matters, so that the members of the Conference could take them up with Lord Beatty and the Staff, while the general discussion is fairly fresh in their minds?

Mr. Baldwin: You had better apply to Sir Maurice Hankey about that, because he has all the Meetings of the Committees in his head.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Thursday afternoon might be possible.

Mr. Baldwin: I agree it would be convenient to have it as soon after the general discussion as possible.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Could you fix Thursday afternoon provisionally?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes.

(Adjourned.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 15, 1923.

C 62736

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

SECRET.

E. 9th Meeting.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE NINTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.
The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Right Hon. the EARL OF DERBY, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir SAMUEL HOARE, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.
The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.
The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.
The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.
General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.
The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.
The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.
General R. MULCAHY, Minister of Defence, Irish Free State.
The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.
Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.
Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Admiral of the Fleet Earl BEATTY, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Admiralty.
General the EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.
Air Chief-Marshal Sir HUGH M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry.
Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.
Commander H. R. MOORE, D.S.O., R.N., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
Major-General J. H. MACBRIEN, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of General Staff, Canada.
Commodore WALTER HOSE, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.
Vice-Admiral Sir ALLAN F. EVERETT, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of the Royal Australian Naval Board.
Brigadier-General T. A. BLANEY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Representative on the Imperial General Staff at War Office.
Commodore A. G. HOTHAM, C.M.G., R.N., Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Delegation.
General SEAN MACMAHON, Chief of Staff, Irish Free State.
Major-General J. J. O'CONNELL, Assistant Chief of Staff, Irish Free State.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62737

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir Robert R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. Thomson, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. P. McGilligan.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

FOREIGN POLICY.

Mr. Bruce: Before we start, there is one point I should like to raise on a matter connected with foreign policy. I recognise that at this moment the Conference is not particularly well constituted to take a question of that sort, which is a fairly delicate one. I would like to raise it at the earliest possible moment, and may I suggest that perhaps when we adjourn to-day, when we have dealt with the defence side, I might take up a few minutes.

Mr. Baldwin: Is it connected with the naval side?

Mr. Bruce: No, not at all; but I should like the opportunity of raising it at once.

Lord Curzon: Is it something you would like me to give information about?

Mr. Bruce: I will explain. It is something which really deals with the Conference and the actions of the Conference, and which concerns the Dominions as well as Great Britain.

Mr. Baldwin: Perhaps you will put your point afterwards.

Mr. Bruce: Yes. I thought that would be more suitable.

Mr. Baldwin: I will now call upon the First Lord of the Admiralty.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

STATEMENT BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Mr. Amery: What I thought would be most useful for me to do would be to give a general conspectus of the naval position, as it has been affected by the Washington Conference, and to initiate a general discussion, which would then be followed to-morrow afternoon by a more detailed and confidential—of course it is all confidential—but a more detailed strategic discussion at the Admiralty, where we could also follow up the more technical points, and members of the Staff could answer questions that any member of the Conference wished to address to them. This morning I thought of stating the naval position generally as I see it, and I only hope that I will not be too long and weary the Conference in doing so.

Superiority at Sea vital to Empire.

If I may go back for a moment to the foundation of things, we have to remember that our Empire is an oceanic commonwealth. "Oceana," as a writer nearly 300 years ago described it, "is a commonwealth for increase, and upon the mightiest foundation that any has been laid from the beginning of the world to this day"—the sea. All the nations and communities here represented live and move and have their being by keeping open the highways of the sea. Our dependence on the sea is not something accidental, but is intimately of the structure of each and every part of the Empire. The economic system, the provision for defence, the external policy of every part of the Empire has grown up right through its history,

C 62738

and is based to-day, on the pre-supposition that the seas are free to us for mutual co-operation in peaceful development and for mutual assistance against external aggression. Any interruption of our sea communications is the severing of the arteries of the life of the Empire, would involve each and all of us in immediate economic disaster and would leave us helpless in the face of attack or invasion.

Necessity of keeping Communications open.

Now the object of the naval forces of the Empire is to keep open these vital communications, and their capacity to carry out this duty in the actual event of war enables them to fulfil what is really their primary and their continuous function, viz., to preserve our peace and to secure the safeguarding of our common interests by peaceful diplomacy. There is only one way in which that task can be fulfilled and that is by the capacity of the Navy to destroy or neutralise the naval forces of any Power that attempts to disturb our peace. Wherever that task can be most effectively fulfilled, there and there alone can the Empire as a whole and each part of it, however remote from the actual centre of operations, be effectively defended.

Task of the Navy.

If we have a Fleet strong enough to do this, the whole Empire is safe; if not, then the whole Empire is doomed. There can be no more deadly error than to imagine that any part of the Empire can rely upon a purely local defence. Except for purely subsidiary purposes sea warfare cannot be sub-divided or localised. The main reliance of each and all of us must be a Fleet capable of offensive action at any point where danger threatens. I feel bound to lay stress upon this because the opposite doctrine is so often openly or tacitly asserted, and not least of all here in the United Kingdom, where the abnormal concentration of our Fleet in home waters for something like eighteen years has created the wholly false impression that the navy exists in order to secure the local defence of these islands. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Fleet was concentrated in the narrow seas not in order to be near England, but in order to be near the German Fleet. It was by holding that Fleet that we were enabled, when the war came, to clear all the outer seas of the world within a few weeks. That left the whole Empire secure to concentrate all its resources free from anxiety of defence—its resources, material and human—upon the common task of the war. That grip upon the whole of the seas was also the cutting of the arteries of Germany's economic existence and was the beginning of Germany's defeat.

Now, that this was done in the North Sea and near these islands was a mere incident. It may very well be that in the future, as again and again in our past history, our destiny will depend entirely upon what happens in some distant sea. When I say "our destiny" I mean the destiny of any and each of us; and by "distant sea," distant from any one of us. That depends entirely upon the strategical circumstances of the time, and what is essential is that the Navy should be free to move anywhere to deal with those circumstances.

Air Defence cannot displace Naval Defence.

Now that misconception as to the true function of the Navy is also responsible for the notion, somewhat prevalent to-day, that naval defence can be replaced by air defence. There is no doubt that the development of aviation has created a new menace to the security of these islands and has consequently added a new responsibility and a new burden which the people of these islands have got to bear. But neither that danger, nor the measures we have to take in order to meet it, affect in the least the fact that our existence depends upon keeping open our sea communications, and that only a sufficient Navy can keep those communications open. The importance of the air is bound to grow, and, in its growth, to affect not only the problem of our defence across the narrow seas, but the whole structure and organisation of our armies and our fleets. But it cannot alter certain elementary physical and mechanical facts, and one of these is that the surface between air and water is the plane upon which the greatest weight—whether for offensive or for

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62739

defensive purposes, and in the last resort all fighting power reduces itself to the transportation of weight—can be propelled to the greatest distance with the greatest economy of effort. The sea will always remain the chief base of world-wide mobile power. The air will no doubt supplement it, but it will no more displace it for war than it will displace it for the ordinary purposes of peaceful commerce. The main defence, just as the main trade, of the Empire will continue to be carried on on the surface of the sea.

Importance of Capital Ships.

It is, again, the ignoring of these fundamental underlying mechanical considerations which is responsible for the belief that the capital ship, at any rate, is doomed by the development of submarines and aeroplanes and other lighter forms of craft. On the contrary, I would wish to impress upon you that, within the limits of the progress of construction at any time and of harbour and docking facilities that are available, the larger the ship the greater the fighting efficiency, just as the larger the ship so, on the whole, the greater the commercial efficiency. Every ship of a given tonnage must, by the nature of things, be a compromise between speed, offensive armament and defensive armament. Any increase in any one of these factors, either to secure new offensive power or to meet some new menace, whether it comes from below the surface of the water or above it, cannot be secured without loss in some other direction, except by increase in size. It is that which has led steadily, with the development of naval warfare, to the growth in the dimensions of the capital fighting ship. The experience of the war confirmed the practice and the development of the preceding years as regards the conflict between surface ships. There never was any doubt from beginning to end of the war that the smaller, lighter-armed or slower ship was no possible match for the more powerful, more heavily-armed and faster ship. There is a very striking passage in the first volume of Mr. Churchill's book, in which he describes how, when Admiral von Spee arrived at Port Stanley in the Falklands with the idea of raiding that British port, and saw over a low-lying neck of land the tripod masts of two capital ships, two battle-cruisers, he knew he was doomed. If he had seen them, they had seen him; there was no possible chance for him and his squadron to escape. He met the same fate that he, a few weeks earlier, had inflicted upon Admiral Craddock's gallant squadron, which consisted of smaller, more lightly-armed ships than his. There has been no experience that goes against that mastering and fundamental fact, and the same applies, as far as the experience of the war goes, with regard to the power of the capital ship to hold its own against the submarine or the aeroplane. Undoubtedly the development of each of these means counter-measures in destroyers, in aeroplanes, with the Fleet, and so on; but the fact remains that the capital ship, strengthened by what is known as the "bulge," has so far proved completely the master of the torpedo.

No capital ship of ours was sunk by torpedo from a submarine. Submarines played no decisive part in any of the naval encounters which took place in the late war. In the same way, all our tests and experience indicate that the bulged ship, with its armoured deck and anti-aircraft provision, is effective against bombs dropped from the air either close to its side or on its deck. I am not for a moment depreciating the new factors that arise in war, but they will be complementary to and ancillary to what is still going to remain the main pivot and kernel of the naval battle.

Limitations of Submarines.

The submarine is a very formidable instrument of war, but it is slow, it is weak, it is blind. The only weapon in its power is concealment, and the developments which took place in submarine detection at the end of the war, and which have continued since, have to a large extent robbed it of this, its only weapon. At the end of the war, I have been told by those who operated with the coastal motor-boats hunting submarines, that from the detection by sound of a submarine, by two or three coastal motor-boats working together, it was often a matter of not more than three minutes before that submarine was destroyed. But I should like to bring out this fact, that the power to destroy the submarine by these light

C 62740

surface craft depended entirely on the fact that the surface of the sea was kept open for those light craft by the capital ships behind. The power of the submarine may be a very formidable thing in the hands of a fleet that holds the surface of the sea by its own capital ships; its power is very limited against a fleet that holds the sea. What is, of course, true is that all these new elements have acquired an added importance; you can no longer measure fleets by so many ships of the line, as you did in the old days.

Post-War Enquiries into Value of Capital Ships.

The fleet is a great complex of weapons of every kind, but the centre of power in that complex still remains the capital ship. That conclusion was the one to which we came after the most prolonged and careful investigations. The Admiralty initiated a special enquiry into this matter immediately after the war. It continued that enquiry through its staff from that time onwards. The matter was reinvestigated by a special Cabinet committee, under the presidency of Mr. Bonar Law, early in 1921, and practically all the senior officers of the Navy, who had held high command during the war, concurred in the opinion of the naval staff in this matter. Of course, the opinions of those who differed were naturally heard, and they received every weight. I may say that the most vocal and most slapdash critic of the capital ship, Sir Percy Scott, who, I believe, is daily lecturing or writing on the subject, though invited to attend that committee declined to come. The conclusion to which the Cabinet, acting on the advice of the Admiralty, came in this country is precisely the same conclusion to which the naval and constructional staffs of all the other great naval Powers have come, and the whole of the proceedings at Washington were based upon that conclusion; they were based on the realisation of the formidableness of the capital ship, and the whole effort was to limit the numbers and the growing size of those ships as the real and only effective way of limiting the growth of those naval armaments which could be used for offensive purposes. Now, I have dealt with that because Mr. Bruce was specially anxious—and I think others—that this question of the capital ship should be clearly disposed of at the outset, because it does underlie the whole basis of our strategy.

Pre-War Standard of Naval Defence necessary for Empire.

Well, given these general considerations, the next question is, of course, what should be the standard of our naval power? Now, for us, with our absolute dependence for our very existence upon the continuous maintenance of the freedom of the sea, it is essential that as against any Power or combination of Powers, whose armaments or policy constituted a real and definite menace to our security, we should maintain a substantial margin of superiority. That was the policy which we followed in the long years when it looked as if the Franco-Russian alliance was aimed—in part at any rate—against ourselves. That, again, was the policy which we pursued against the still more obvious and definite menace of Germany's naval armaments. Though we knew that we should have allies, both in Europe and in the Far East, we felt bound to maintain against Germany a superiority in capital ships of 60 per cent., and a considerably greater superiority in other vessels; and we certainly did not find in the late war that that was an over-insurance.

Post-War Standard.

Now, the war removed all direct menace to this country; we are no longer confronted with any Power whose policy—at this moment, at any rate—can be regarded as in any way aimed against ourselves. That, naturally, did justify a reconsideration of our policy, and, further, I think it justified not merely the most cautious reconsideration, but a liberal reconsideration which, after the terrible struggle of the war, should give an example and an encouragement to other nations not to renew the competition of armaments, which, though it was not responsible for the late war—the conflict of policy and ambitions was the real cause—was yet not without its influence upon the events which precipitated that war. We felt that we could make a substantial reduction of naval power provided two things at least were assured—one, that we

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 10 11 12 13 14

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62741

maintained a navy large enough to secure the training, the research and the organisation, which you cannot expand again in a moment, for you cannot improvise a navy—that was rightly said here on Monday—in a few months; it takes many years to build ships; it takes far more years to train the senior officers of the staff who know how to handle those ships, not as mere units, but as part of a fleet in action. Therefore we could not afford to go below that point. Again, in view of all our immense responsibilities, we could never afford to go below the standard of at least equality with any other nation. We cannot afford to be clearly and obviously at the mercy of any other Power, however friendly. Mr. Massey was referring on Monday to the fact that, weary as the gallant men of New Zealand were after the war, within four years they were willing enough to come forward the moment an interest which seemed dear to them appeared to be menaced. I am afraid that what is true of our own people is no less true of others. We have seen enough, even in the last few months, to realise that the temptation to use force is one which nations are easily liable to fall into. That certainly was the view that we held, but, subject to that, we made it clear—as clear, I think, as it could possibly be made—to the whole world that we wished to discourage any competition in naval armaments. We stopped the building of every ship that was on the stocks at the Armistice. We—until only a few months ago—had not laid down a single capital ship since 1916. We scrapped in all something like 2½ million tons of fighting ships. And yet the lead which we were giving to the world of a Naval Holiday did not appear—for a considerable time, at any rate—to have any influence upon other nations. In the United States and in Japan, on the contrary, great fleets of new ships, embodying all the lessons of the naval actions of the war—lessons which profoundly revolutionised naval construction, and created a wide gulf in the fighting efficiency between pre-Jutland and post-Jutland ships—these great fleets of post-Jutland ships were being hurried forward feverishly on the stocks of those two Great Powers.

Position at 1921 Conference.

That was the position when the last Conference met in 1921. That Conference met on the eve of the Washington Conference, at which it was hoped that some pause would be set to that competition. While taking the view that definite recommendations as to co-operation between the different parts of the Empire should not be made, or laid before the respective Parliaments of the Empire for their final determination, until that Conference had come to its conclusions, the Imperial Conference of 1921 yet held that equality with the naval strength of any other Power was the minimum standard for our security.

Washington Conference.

It was with that resolution of the Imperial Conference before us, and with the co-operation of the Dominion representatives, that we entered upon the Conference at Washington. We went to that Conference with a firm resolve to endeavour to make it a success. I think we succeeded beyond the best hopes of anyone who entered it. I need not refer to the great part that Lord Balfour and all the British representatives played at that Conference, but I should like to say a word about the important part that we, as a Government, played in making the results of that Conference sure after the agreement itself was concluded.

Action taken by Great Britain in carrying out Washington Agreement.

I believe that the act of faith by which we followed up that Treaty, by at once reducing our forces, though it exposed us to grave risks, was an essential step in bringing about that confirmation and ratification of the Washington Agreement, which has taken place finally in the last few months. Without waiting, we at once began to scrap, and relegated for scrapping twenty capital ships. We reduced our Navy by 20,000 officers and men, a thing not necessarily included in the provisions of the Treaty at all, but a further earnest of our resolve to act in the spirit of the Treaty, a thing very difficult, very painful, for us to have to carry out. We brought down our Navy estimates from a gross sum of 92½ millions in the year 1921–22 to

C 62742

under 61½ millions, that is to say, a reduction of 33⅓ per cent, in the estimates of the current year. These were undoubtedly immense gains to the taxpayers of this country, but they were also, I think, an immense gain to the taxpayers of the world, and a great contribution to the recovery of the world from the effect of the war. Certainly we have shown that we were in every way willing to bring about peace and to encourage peace.

Circumstances favourable for Washington Agreement.

Now that, I think, was a great achievement and one of hopeful augury. But I do think it is essential to realise that it was only possible in very peculiar circumstances, that all the circumstances were peculiarly favourable to achieving the result that was achieved there. You had three Powers at vast distances from each other which were not engaged in any real direct conflict of interest. There was no such conflict of ambition or interest or racial feeling as divides the nations of Europe to-day. None of those Powers could get at each other except by sea, and therefore the problem of the limitation of naval armaments was not complicated by the further problem of considering how land and sea armaments were affected, both as between the three Powers and as against other Powers outside. You were able to take the naval problem in isolation again, we all had something to bargain with. The other great Powers had battle fleets which they had begun and upon which they had spent a good deal of money. But they were committed to a great deal more. We, on the other hand, had just begun laying down squadrons of new ships of a design far more effective, more formidable, than any that had preceded them. I have no doubt whatever that the fact that we had laid down four ships, the knowledge that those four ships were superior to any other ships that would be afloat when they were launched, mitigated the objections which the technical staffs of the other great Powers would undoubtedly have pressed with the utmost insistence against the proposals for scrapping ships upon which so much work had already been done. I entirely agree with what Mr. Bruce suggested the other day, that, when the period of this Treaty comes to an end, it will be of the greatest moment in securing its renewal, possibly on even more far reaching terms, if at the end of that period we are not in a position of complete strategical helplessness in the Pacific. Even so, agreement was only reached by the wisdom of those who were concerned, who concentrated on the one definite and simple test, the fighting strength of battle fleets, namely, on the number and size of the capital ships, and those vessels like aircraft carriers which are essential parts of the fighting fleet, and upon such limitations as prevented new capital ships being created under other names. I think that if the Conference had once attempted to get off that standard of comparison which deals with actual fighting strength and which can be measured relatively, and had embarked upon the question of cruisers and lighter craft whose provision depends not merely upon the size of other fleets but upon the duties which they have to fulfil, infinitely greater and more complex in the case of our Empire than any other Power in the world, it would have been quite impossible to arrive at any agreement. After all, any figure that would meet our greater duties and responsibilities would necessarily have to prescribe a far greater cruiser strength for ourselves than for the United States, and any one who knows anything of public opinion in the United States would realise that they would never agree openly and avowedly to an arrangement by which they would condemn themselves to a very marked inferiority in cruiser strength. In fact, take even the case of capital ships; France and Italy only subscribed because as a matter of fact the standard which was set up was entirely beyond any standard which under any circumstances either of them would contemplate working up to during the duration of the Treaty.

Position resulting from Agreement. Comparison of British with United States Navy.

The result of the Treaty undoubtedly is that we have substituted what the Conference of 1921 had laid down as the minimum standard of our Naval security—we have made it, as far as capital ships are concerned, the maximum. We have gone in every way further than

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62743

the actual letter of the Treaty obliged us. We have brought down our manning strength to under 100,000, as compared with 116,000 of the United States. We now have 22 capital ships, of which 4 are to be reduced when the 2 now laid down come into commission. The United States are also laying down 2 new ships which will bring their standard to 20; but to arrive at the true comparison we must remember what I said just now, the importance of the difference between the fighting value of ships before the battle of Jutland and those which embody the lessons of that great action. Until our 2 new 35,000-ton built ships are completed, we shall only have 1 partially post-Jutland ship—the "Hood"— as against 3 on the part of the United States and 2 on the part of Japan; while of ships over 30,000 tons, we shall only have 1, as compared with 10 in the case of the United States, and 6 on the part of Japan. Of cruisers and light cruisers we have 50 completed (if we include the Dominion Navies) as against 20 on the part of the United States. That corresponds to our wide-spread necessities of commerce protection. But take destroyers or flotilla leaders; we have 201, including the Dominions, built, and 5 building, as compared with 316 on the part of the United States. Of submarines, we have 57 built, or 65 including the Dominions, and 4 building, as compared with 99 built and 29 building on the part of the United States. We only maintain 15 capital ships in commission as against 18; 37 cruisers as against 10; 65 destroyers and flotilla leaders as against 109, and 39 submarines as against 73. Our manning strength is under 100,000 as I said just now, compared with 116,000. Our expenditure, taking corresponding items of effective expenditure, is about 50½ millions as against 68½ millions. I give these figures simply to show that we have carried out the resolve entered on by the Nations at Washington, not merely in the letter but in the very fullest sense in the spirit, and that we are interpreting the one-power standard in the very widest sense, not in order to maintain in every point and everywhere at least equality with another Power, but, broadly speaking, keeping ourselves in that position which is the very indispensable insurance of our existence as an Empire.

Distribution of British Navy. Mobility essential.

The question then comes with this reduced force, how are we to make the fullest and most efficient use of it? Of course one essential is that our force, limited in quantity, should be supremely efficient in quality. We have, ever since the war, concentrated on bringing education, the training and the research work of the Navy up to the highest possible standard. But it also depends upon the right distribution of the Navy. If we can only keep one main fleet, which is all we can do, under post-Washington conditions, it is essential that that fleet should be mobile. It is no use having a one-power standard unless it can be applied where the need arises. A one-power standard in the neighbourhood of these Islands is of no value for Imperial Defence. That brings me to the consideration of the area over which it is essential to secure our mobility, and the main routes along which we must take the necessary steps to make it possible.

Now let me take the case of the United States. They are able to operate equally in the Atlantic and the Pacific. They have got a sea route by the Panama Canal which goes round, in a wide curve, their great territory. Our main sea route does not go round the British Empire. It lies within our territories. It lies across the Atlantic, through the Mediterranean, across the Indian Ocean to the Pacific—from Halifax to Fremantle—through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Straits at Singapore (the Malacca Straits) which are the three keys of that great route which, as a geographer has recently described it, constitutes the main highway of the Empire, and its main axis of symmetry. It is essential that we should be able to move our fleets along that route, but our main fleet naturally tends to be centred at about the middle of that great Empire high-road. That centre is the Mediterranean; for us the middle sea in every sense of the word. General Smuts suggested yesterday that our main and most pressing problems and dangers were more likely to arise in Europe than in the Far East. We fully recognise that, and our main pivot of naval strength will naturally be centred in those European waters, the

C 62744

Mediterranean. But if we are to be able to defend the Empire, we must be free to move east and west for its defence. We are not free to do so to-day, and we shall not be free to do so for many years to come. The reason for that is that during the years that we concentrated everything upon the problem of the North Sea certain changes have come about in the organisation and dimensions of battle fleets which have entirely superseded our former provision for mobility. The fleets of the future are going to be entirely oil-burning, and, as oil is not available with the same freedom that coal was in pre-war days, we can only move if we have our chain of oil reserves along the whole of our Empire routes. Lord Salisbury dealt very fully with that question the other day, but that is a cardinal need of our naval security. The other factor is that the growth of the capital ship and more particularly the necessity of increasing its beam by the anti-submarine bulge has made all the old naval dockyards and most of the commercial dockyards outside home waters and the Mediterranean useless for naval purposes. If a fleet is to operate, if it is to retain its mobility, which requires docking and refitting, if its ships are not to sink after a naval action for want of a repair base to go back to, you must have bases in any of the main areas in which you operate; and it was the necessity for having such a base on the Empire high-road which decided us to develop and to extend the previously existing naval station at Singapore.

Singapore.

There is nothing absolutely new about Singapore; it has been a naval station and a defended port ever since 1882. Its importance as a strategical centre of the whole Pacific was fully recognised in the discussions at the Conferences of 1909 and 1911, and it was to be the centre of the Pacific Fleet which it was then contemplated should be composed of the fleet units of the different Dominions, and regular Conferences were held at Singapore or at Penang between the authorities of the different Dominions and the British Naval Commanders-in-Chief to discuss the general Naval policy in the Pacific.

This question was taken up immediately after the war by the Naval Staff, and, as Lord Salisbury mentioned on Monday, its urgency from our point of view and its importance was fully brought out in all the discussions in 1921. I have been refreshing my memory by reading the details of those discussions, and I think we made it clear that we regarded that as the most important work that lay before us for securing our naval position, and as the most urgent. The Washington Conference only affected that position in the sense of strengthening our conviction of its necessity, because in the first place that Conference precluded us from doing anything further to develop or strengthen Hong Kong, and secondly that Conference by the creation of the great zone of self-denial makes it impossible for the United States Naval Force to operate in the Western Pacific at all. The distance from Pearl Harbour to the Philippine Isles is so great that no American battle fleet could cross it. The only way the United States navy could reach the Western Pacific, either to co-operate with us or to defend their own territories single-handed against Japanese attack, would be by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and then only if it had a base at Singapore for its use.

Objects of Proposed Base.

Now let me make it clear at once what it is that we propose to do at Singapore. The important base at Singapore will have to serve two purposes. The first is to maintain in Eastern Waters a somewhat larger fleet than we have maintained in the past; that is, larger than we have maintained in the last few years—a fleet with a light cruiser squadron and two, possibly three, capital ships, probably battle cruisers. That is simply going back to what was the normal distribution right up to 1912. I might remind the Conference that the whole plan upon which we were all agreed in 1909 and 1911, at a time when the German menace was already very powerful, at a time when we were actually allied with Japan and practically allied with Russia, was that we still contemplated a force in the Pacific including three capital ships, and part of a unit

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62745

also including three cruisers, gathered from four separate contributing partners—quite an appreciable naval force. The other object of Singapore is to make it at any rate possible for the main fleet to reach Eastern Waters in a great emergency and provide, if not adequate, yet at any rate some docking and repairing facilities there. It is from that point of view that Singapore is being developed. It will have one graving dock for capital ships, there will be a floating dock that may be taken out there for the same purpose or for containing light cruisers; it will have the ordinary sheds for stores and it will have repairing and engineering establishments which go with an important base; though, let me make it quite clear, not a base of the character of Portsmouth or Malta, not one of the biggest main bases of the Empire.

Development of Singapore not contrary to spirit of Washington Agreement.

Now Lord Salisbury dealt on Monday with the suggestion that we were in some way, if not in the letter, in the spirit, acting contrarily to the Washington Agreement. I think it has also been suggested that though no such charge could be brought against us, yet we ought in discussion with the other Powers to have given them a certain amount of detailed information about what we were doing. My own belief is that, if the Powers at Washington had embarked on those sorts of discussions and not confined themselves to the strictly practical proposition on which they were engaged, they would not have contributed to the success of that Conference. As a matter of fact we did not discuss them in detail any more than the Japanese or Americans discussed in detail the arrangements they were making in their bases outside the zone of the self-denying ordinance. As a matter of fact those Powers have gone ahead on a far larger scale with their bases on the other edges of that zone of disarmament than we have, and we certainly realise fully, as I believe they realise about us, that their action, as ours, is purely defensive and constitutes no step towards an aggressive policy.

After all, if any aggression had been in our minds, why should we have abandoned so splendid a position as Hong Kong? Of course, there is a more general charge that it is a provocative act to have a base or any navy whatever in Far Eastern waters. I think the natural answer to that charge is to ask those who make it to look at the large scale map. One talks about Singapore and Japan being in the Far East, and as if they were close together. Singapore is as far from Japan as Gibraltar is from Boston. It can no more be suggested as a menace to the Japanese than Gibraltar is a menace to the United States, or Key West is a menace to the United Kindom.

Lord Curzon: How many days steaming is it from Singapore to the nearest port of Japan?

Lord Beatty: About fifteen days for transports.

Mr. Amery: I come back also again to the fact that our old friend and ally, Japan, could not possibly regard it as an unfriendly action on our part to maintain in the Pacific the kind of fleet that we maintained through many years of the Japanese Alliance, and which, but for the urgent circumstances which immediately preceded the war, we would have maintained actually up to the war. Indeed, I think it is only right to say that the not carrying out of the programme, upon which we agreed with the Dominions in 1909 and 1911, was probably a mistake on our part. I think the event showed that we were too anxious to bring back those two battle cruisers, the "New Zealand" and the "Indomitable," to the North Sea; that, if we had maintained the original programme and kept these battle cruisers in China waters, von Spee's squadron would never have crossed the Pacific, we should have avoided the disaster of Coronel, and should never have been compelled to weaken the fleet in the North Sea at a critical moment in order to send the capital ships which achieved the victory in the Falkland Islands. I think our conscience is absolutely clear against the charge of any provocation or any violation in any way of the spirit of the Washington Treaty. The whole position is a purely defensive one, and one which aims at giving us reasonable mobility, not to-day

C 62746

or to-morrow, but a good many years hence. For many years to come—certainly until after 1931—we have no mobility, no power to do anything to protect the Dominions that lie in the Pacific, if a sudden gust of insensate ambition should come upon any other nation.

Strategical Value of Singapore.

Now, Mr. Bruce raised the question whether, given the necessity for a base and a fuelling station in the Far East, Singapore is the best position. I hope Lord Beatty will go into that question more fully to-morrow in all its strategical and other aspects. I will only say this now, that I would like to quote what Sir Bamford Raffles said: "You may take my word for it, this is by far the most important Station in the East, and, as far as naval support and commercial interests are concerned, is of much higher value than whole continents of territory." It is actually the gateway to the Pacific in the same sense as the Panama Canal is to the Atlantic on the other side. Any other route is far longer and far more difficult. It has this further advantage in position. It covers, in the first place, if we hold it, the whole trade of the Indian Ocean, through which the main commerce of New Zealand and Australia passes, as well as of the territories which lie around it. On the other hand, towards the Pacific it lies directly on the flank of any possible aggression against New Zealand and Australia from Japan. But taking the alternative, if we did not hold Singapore, not only would both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific be open to attack from Japan, but there would be no possible means of our reinforcing the outlying Dominions. I see it has been frequently suggested that Sydney would make a better base, or some other port in Australia. If the whole fleet of the Empire were concentrated there at the start, such a base would possibly cover Australia, but not the Indian Ocean, but there is no way of getting the relief and support of Australia except viâ Singapore, and, once that were in the hands of an enemy, the prospects of relieving the outlying Dominions by naval force would be very remote, certainly very difficult.

Not impossible to Defend Singapore till arrival of Main Fleet.

There is a more difficult and more searching question with regard to Singapore put by Mr. Bruce and by General Smuts. It is this, that, given all the importance that we assign to it, can we, short of sinking an enormous cost and an enormous force in its defence, be sure of holding it until the main fleet arrives out to its support?

Well, General Smuts quoted the parallel of Port Arthur, but again I would suggest the importance of looking at the map. Port Arthur is quite close to Japan, a few hours steaming. Singapore is 3,000 miles away, and in between you have Hong Kong, a subsidiary naval base which would have to be reduced before any attack could be made on Singapore. More than that, whatever fleet there is in Pacific waters, although it might not be capable of standing up in naval battle to the Japanese Navy, would have to be done away with and disposed of before it would be possible to send a large expeditionary force over 3,000 miles of sea. We should never have dreamed of sending Canadian or Australian forces across the sea—and they were relatively small in the early days of the war—if a considerable German fleet in being had been cruising up and down the Atlantic or up and down the Pacific. No doubt if there were no navy in those waters, and no navy which could reach it for many months, you could only hold Singapore by an overwhelming land force. Conversely, if you had an overwhelming naval force you would clearly want smaller land defences. But given the great distance of Singapore from Japan, given the existence of Hong Kong and its power to hold out—at any rate for some time—given the presence of a swift if not very powerful squadron in Pacific waters, aided by long-range submarines, given the fact that the main fleet can go out normally in from four to six weeks, there is no reason to fear that Singapore could not hold its own against a powerful naval raid, or the raid of a navy with a small landing force such as is likely to be directed against it. It will want some increase undoubtedly of the present fortifications, which were planned before the war; it will want a certain number of 15-in. guns as against the 9·2-in. guns which were agreed upon

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62747

before the War, and it may want some increase in the present land garrison, and certainly some increase in the air force arrangements; but, after all, they will be on a scale dependent on the fact of its distance, on the intervening distance to Hong Kong, and upon the existence of a fleet in the Pacific. Of course it is perfectly conceivable, as General Smuts said, that, if there were a European combination against us at the same moment as war was declared against us by Japan, we should be in a position of extraordinary difficulty; but, even so, I should think against such a combination we might find allies, and the fact that Singapore could hold out for a good many weeks, possibly for a good many months, might be a very strong inducement to a Power like the United States to come in quickly and to go and help before the situation in the Far East had been entirely and irretrievably altered.

Well, I am afraid I have been very long, but I have attempted to state the strategical position of the Empire as we see it. It is a defensive policy, reduced to the lowest limits possible, even in a reasonably peaceful world, for our security. It is a policy based, not on the conception of the local defence of these Islands, but on our responsibility for the security of the whole Empire with which our own security is bound up.

Co-operation best secured through separate Dominion Navies.

The question that we now have to raise before the Conference is how can we best co-operate in the carrying out of that policy. Now on that issue there has in the past been a certain standing division of opinion between the Dominions and the Admiralty. In past years the Admiralty has tended to the assertion of the view that a unitary navy, under direct Admiralty control, and a contribution either of men or money or ships from the Dominions, would give the greatest efficiency, and, though more than fourteen years ago—in 1909—it accepted the Dominions' point of view, it still recurred to the expression of its own contention that the other system was the best. Well, we have clearly come to the point of view now that, not merely as a matter of political expediency but from the point of view of the efficiency and strength of the future, the naval security of a world-wide Empire must be based on naval strength at home in each part of the Empire; that what we must aim at is the building up in each part of the Empire of a naval spirit, a naval tradition, a navy—small it may be, but rooted in the life of each of the great Nations of the Empire, and what applies to the navy itself applies to all that is auxiliary to it—the equipment of munitions, to everything that makes naval strength a matter not merely centred in these Islands but rooted and having its natural and permanent home in each part of the Empire. In the long run, and looking to the future, you cannot defend a world-wide Empire against contingencies, which may be equally world-wide, from one small island in the North Sea, and therefore our whole view to-day is that we not merely accept but we welcome whole-heartedly the conception of Dominion Navies. We have issued a general paper to the Conference on this point, and in view of the fact, which we have been well aware of, that the conception of Dominion Navies is often criticised in the Dominions themselves by those who think that they are speaking on behalf of the Admiralty or speaking what the Admiralty would wish said, we want to make this abundantly clear.

Possibility of Publication of Admiralty Memorandum on the Subject.

It occurred to us that it might be desirable from that point of view that the Admiralty's view on this matter should be clearly known throughout the Empire, and for that purpose we suggested this particular document might, if the Conference so wished, be published, and of course what has often created difficulties in the past, when things have been published here and only abbreviated telegraphic reports have been sent to the Dominions, that it should be available for publication in the Dominions at the same time as here. I say this because I notice in something that Mr. Mackenzie King said in the earlier discussions of the Conference that he deprecated any idea of memoranda being issued by any Government Department, so to speak, to the public of any other part of the Empire except with the consent and approval of the Governments concerned. Naturally there was no thought in our minds of trying

C 62748

to advocate an Admiralty policy in the Dominions except such policy as each Dominion itself favoured. All that had occurred to us was that now we were accepting whole-heartedly the Dominion point of view in this matter it might be considered desirable from the point of view of each Dominion that this should be as widely known as it could be. What we feel is that it is essential that the Dominion Navies as they grow should be national Navies, national in spirit, national in their organisation, but not local. No Navy can attain real efficiency that is simply tied down to local waters; they must be sea-going Navies. And we also feel that the more complete the administrative and political independence of those Navies, the more essential it is—believing as we all do that in the hour of danger they will have to work together as one—that in their organisation, in their training, in their types of design, they should endeavour so to work by a progressive policy that in the hour of danger they can play the most effective part in a common operation. That was the conception which underlay the arrangements for a Pacific Fleet in 1909 and 1911, and it is upon those lines—co-operation in constituting a common fleet for action in emergency and for building up Navies which although fully national in their character should yet be able to co-operate in the utmost intimacy—that we wish to attack the more intimate and more detailed discussions we shall have with each Government as to what they feel their Parliaments will be willing to do.

Interchange of Personnel and Ships.

Now, as I said just now, the more complete our independence of action and administration, the more complete the absolute control of each Parliament, the more desirable that we should understand the Dominions' point of view, that the Dominions should understand our point of view, and also that the various Navies should be kept in touch and in constant interchange. We hope to discuss with you at the Admiralty the question of how the interchange which already exists can be made, as regards officers and men, more effective, and how we can effect the interchange of ships.

Proposed Empire Cruise of "Hood" and "Repulse" and Light Cruisers.

Meanwhile, it seemed to me in this period during which we were contemplating a general redistribution of our Fleet, and before the new developments in the Dominions can even begin to take effect, that it might be very desirable, for closer appreciation among each other of all that Imperial Naval Defence may mean, to do what we have not done for a great many years past, and that is to send a detached squadron—some of our best ships—on tour round the Empire. I hope that that suggestion will meet with the approval of the members of the Conference. The plan which we were proposing to carry out, if it met with general concurrence, was to send the two capital ships—the "Hood" and "Repulse," which made such a splendid impression in Brazil last year—together with a small squadron of modern light cruisers, as soon as we can this autumn, taking advantage of the different seasons so far as to keep as far as possible in the best season all round the tour; to go by way of South Africa arriving there shortly before Christmas and staying for about a fortnight or so. Then up the East Coast of Africa reaching Singapore in February; reaching Australia towards the end of February and staying until towards the end of April, taking opportunities for combined exercises with the units of the Australian Navy. Then to New Zealand for the earlier part of the month of May; then to visit British Columbia; then for part of the fleet, the battle cruisers which Canada has not seen, to go through the Panama Canal and visit the ports of Eastern Canada, but also to take the opportunity of having our fleet on that western coast of America to do what we have also not done for many years, to show the fleet in South American waters and let the light cruisers continue down the west coast of South America and go round home by Cape Horn and Buenos Aires. That cruise, the first I think since the memorable one in 1880 when Lord Clanwilliam went round the Empire with a squadron which included the "Bacchante," on which His Majesty the King was then serving as a junior officer, will, I believe, not only give valuable experience to the Navy of long-distance cruising, which it

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

062749

has not had for many years, but bring home to every part of the outlying Empire the importance of the Navy, and bring home to the people of this country the realisation that the naval defence of the Empire is not a local matter for the home waters of the United Kingdom, but a matter of the wider seas.

Extent of Dominion Co-operation.

Well, there is just one further thing that I should like to say. We have indicated in our staff papers the nature of the co-operation that would be—though it must be for you to give the final judgment—the nature of the co-operation that would be most efficient. The question still remains what will be the extent of your co-operation. That is naturally a matter for the decision of each Government and of each Parliament. I do not think that it will serve any good purpose either to attempt to bargain round this table or to attempt to lay down a rigid standard of equality of contribution. All I think it is fair and reasonable to say is that the burden which is imposed upon this country is an enormous one. Even the maintenance of the reduced one-Power standard does involve us in estimates of something like £60 millions a year, amounting to not far off 25*s*. per head of the population of this country. That burden is over and above the additional burden now imposed by the necessity for our air defence. It is over and above the tremendous burden of our debt. It is over and above the terrible burden of social responsibilities which the accumulation of population in these islands and the disorganisation of the world's markets has laid upon us.

Relative Cost of Naval Defence in Great Britain and the Dominions.

The figures of the contributions of the various Dominions are, of course, widely different. I believe, as compared with our 25*s*., Australia and New Zealand—I am taking New Zealand's new figure—contribute something over 8*s*. a head. The contribution of Canada and South Africa is more in the nature of 1*s*. per head. I give the figures very approximately. I could give corresponding figures as to the ratio of the burden sustained for naval defence as compared with the volume of overseas trade which, after all, is equally vital to each Dominion concerned and to the Mother Country. But I would prefer not to lay stress upon those comparisons, but to urge the importance, broadly speaking, of bringing about a state of things in which the burden should be a little more fairly divided than it is at present. The circumstances of each of us are different, and I do not think we can press for any logical or arithmetical principle in these matters. Mr. Bruce said the other day, and I think very truly, that if he went back to press his Dominion and his Parliament for a substantial advance in Australia's part of the Empire defence, and others did nothing or went back, it would be very difficult for him to do anything. That is very true, of course. It is also true that if we indefinitely sustain a wholly disproportionate burden the time may come when the Parliament of this country, under different auspices maybe, will say that it can no longer take the Imperial view of our naval obligations, that it will succumb to those facile but very dangerous theories which suggest that it is enough if we can maintain our naval position in what are called home waters, though, of course, all the waters of the world are home waters to the British Empire. I would rather not look at it from that point of view.

Need for Progressive and Thought-out Policy.

All I would say is, the time has surely come when every part of the Empire, in accordance with its particular circumstances, should make a definite advance, and that advance must be along the lines, as I think Mr. Mackenzie King said last year in his Parliament, of a progressive thought-out policy. It must cover a period of years. You cannot expect a sudden alteration. Parliaments don't work like that, and no doubt it would be difficult in some of the Parliaments of the Empire to bring about an immediate change of any great magnitude, but what I would press for is that on the kind of lines that we have suggested, the development of successive stages or phases from the purely local to an effective sea-going squadron and from that to sea-going squadrons of which one should always be working not merely locally, but with the main fleets of the Empire,

062750

that is a conception towards which each part of the Empire can now begin to make a more substantial advance than it has done. It is not a matter which can be considered really apart from all the other matters which we have been discussing. It is part of the whole policy of mutual support upon which we are engaged. We have been discussing at this Conference the whole question of foreign policy, the object of that policy being, as we are all agreed, to keep down the occasions of war, to reduce the temptations to armaments; in other words, to bring about a condition of things which will enable the common burden of our common defence to be borne with the least effort by each part, to enable each of us to devote our resources and our energies not to purposes of war, but to the purposes of peace. And in the same way we are met together at this Conference to consider how we can help the growth of each other's communities by trade, by markets, by advances of capital. I fully realise that there is the real foundation of the naval defence of the future. It is only as the great Dominions fill out and grow in strength and surplus wealth that they can bear a share in the common defence which is really proportionate to the share this old country has borne for so long. I fully realise that every element in a common Imperial policy has to come together and that what we are trying to do at the Economic Conference may, from the point of view of the defence of the future, be more important than anything else we can do. But I do feel that on all these lines we ought to register some advance. I hope that the discussions we may have among ourselves, the further information we may be able to give you at the more technical discussion at the Admiralty to-morrow, will make it possible for this Conference to mark in the sphere of naval co-operation, as well as in the sphere of general Empire policy, and, above all, of economic co-operation, a real and substantial advance. As was said by Chatham long ago: "Our business largely is the making and ordaining laws for the regulation of navigation and trade throughout the complicated system of British commerce, the deep policy of such prudent acts upholding the guardian Navy of the whole British Empire."

Mr. Baldwin: Mr. Mackenzie King, would you like to make some general observations?

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Appreciation of Mr. Amery's Statement.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I should like to say a word of appreciation of the exceedingly able speech to which we have just listened by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I am sure the spirit of it will appeal very strongly to all of us, and I congratulate Mr. Amery on the manner in which he has presented these problems, which are perhaps the most important of all the problems we have to consider. I will not take up the time of this Conference by referring to the Conference at Washington or to Singapore and the other matters which the First Lord has touched upon, but I think perhaps it would be advisable, seeing this meeting is for the purposes of general discussion, to take advantage of the opportunity to say a word or two about considerations which we feel are all-important in the discussion.

Welcomes Change in Admiralty Standpoint.

First, let me say how gratifying it was to hear what the First Lord of the Admiralty said in regard to the point of view of the Admiralty, the change in the point of view of the Admiralty in respect of the Dominion Navies. I think that changed point of view indicates perhaps better than anything else what we in the Dominions have most in mind in seeking co-operation rather than centralisation in these matters of defence. The original point of view of the Admiralty was that, the more centralised in every particular matters of defence could be, the more effective and better the outcome. I think we might admit at once that, from the point of view of strategy, efficiency and economy, the Admiralty were perhaps right, speaking of the defence of the Empire as a whole. On the other hand, there is always the difference between the political point of view and the technical point of view, and the political point of view, inasmuch as it lies at the basis of all the rest, cannot receive too full consideration. I do not think it would be

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 105 11 12 07 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62751

possible for the Dominions, whether in relation to Naval, Military, or Air forces, to concur in any policy in the nature of a highly centralised policy. The question in the end comes back to one of taxation. All these matters in the last analysis are questions of taxation, and those of us who are really interested in the defence of the Empire have to ask ourselves, above every other question: How can the taxes be raised for the purposes for which we require them? I was a member of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Government at the time the naval policy was introduced, and I know that the reason we held so strongly to the view of Dominion naval services was that we felt that, if anything in the nature of contributions were requested. if anything in the nature of centralisation of organisation was expected, we could never expect the Dominion to respond, as we felt sure it would were the people to feel that the naval service of the Dominion was the natural outgrowth of their national standing and national status. If that is understood and appreciated, I think it should give the key to the whole situation as to what may be possible in the future and the lines on which we should proceed. I like the expression used by the King in his speech to the school children on the 24th May, which was distributed by means of gramophone records throughout the Empire, that the British Empire is a community of free nations. In that thought one has possibly the key to the situation. The British Empire is a community, a great community. It has community interests; it has community obligations; it has community responsibilities, and we in the Dominion of Canada, as well as all the other Dominions, recognise that.

In matters which affect the honour and integrity and the common interests of the community of nations, Canada, I know, is ready to do her share and to do it well, but while the British Empire is a community of nations, a sort of League of Nations, a League within the world League, it is a community of "nations" and, as such, the national interest cannot be stressed too strongly in our Parliaments when dealing with the questions which come before us. The more we are in a position to lay emphasis on the national status which has been attained, the more easily will we be able to accomplish the aims we have in view.

Position of Canada as regards Defence.

I should like to take occasion, at this moment, to refer to an expression which Mr. Massey used at our last meeting, and which I do not think should be permitted to pass. Mr. Massey said that he thought the Dominions had been sponging too much on the mother country in the past. I do not know how that may present itself to the minds of some, but I desire to take strong exception to it, so far as Canada is concerned. I do not think Canada in any particular has been sponging. The history of the relationship of Canada with the mother country will show that, far from sponging, Canada has been more than ready to assume obligations, and has assumed obligations, in a chivalrous and large way. If one takes the history of the Dominion from the time that Canada was acquired by the British after the period of the Seven Years War, it will be recalled that the first difficulty that arose on the North American Continent was the revolt of the English Colonies. Had Canada at that time taken the same attitude as the other English Colonies there would have been no Canada as part of the British Empire to-day. I think we ought to remember that sometimes when we talk about the loyalty of the French Canadians. As a matter of fact, on different occasions Canada has been saved to the British Empire through the position which the French Canadians have taken. Coming to the next period, the war of 1812–14, Canada was in large part the battleground of that conflict and there again it was the stand taken by the Canadians which saved Canada as a part of the British Empire. Up to the days of Federation, this country, controlling the commercial policy and controlling largely the entire political situation, thought it advisable to keep stationed British garrisons of Regulars in different parts of the Dominion. When the Federation was effected and Canada was given larger freedom in the matter of self-government and the management of her own affairs and the shaping of her own policies, she undertook to establish a department of National Defence and sought to have

C 62752

the British troops withdrawn and to relieve Great Britain of any responsibility in that direction. Steadily from that moment British soldiers and officers were gradually withdrawn from the Dominion, and Canada has assumed full responsibility in the immediate control of her defences. The obligation with respect to naval defence was recognised a little later, in a small way at the beginning, but nevertheless recognised as an obligation on Canada's part. There were naval stations at Esquimault and Halifax which were imperial stations at which the British Navy had its own officers and men. We took over those naval stations, and we also undertook the establishment of a Canadian Naval Service. At the time of the Sudan War, some men were recruited, a few, from Canada; but, from the Canadian point of view, we were in no way responsible for the war in the Sudan; it was no action on the part of Canada which occasioned it. When it came to the South African War we supplied contingents; though we were in no way responsible for that conflict, we were not taking an attitude of sponging on the mother country at that time. In the last Great War, I think it will be admitted that all the Dominions recognised to the full the community of interests which they had as parts of the British Empire and responded in every way to the utmost of their ability. In a word, I am unable to see in Canadian history a point where Canada, since she has attained her status as a country, has occasioned the slightest concern to the mother country from the point of view of what was essential in the way of defence; I can think of no action or incident, in consequence of the Dominion's position or the attitude we have taken, that has involved the mother country to the slightest degree in the possibility of war. On the other hand, where in other parts of the Empire situations have arisen which have been critical for the Empire as a whole, and more particularly to the mother country, Canada has recognised her obligations to the full. I think it well to say this, because I do not believe it is helpful to any of us that there should be comment of the kind to which I am referring. It certainly does not call forth the spirit of national pride or pride in our British connexion which we are all seeking to further, and which lies perhaps deepest of anything in our natures. I have mentioned these happenings. They indicate a trend, and that trend is one which I feel, with confidence, will develop as the need continues.

Policy partly dependent on Geographical Position.

It is well perhaps, in considering defence, that we should all recognise that each country has its own peculiar problems to contend with arising in considerable part out of its geographical position. I can see quite clearly that, were I a citizen of the British Isles or of an Island Continent like Australia or an Island Continent like New Zealand, I would have an intense interest in the naval situation, an interest which I cannot conceive the Canadian people, who are inhabiting half a large continent not so immediately associated in all particulars with the sea, are likely to have; that factor, I think, has to be taken into account in considering questions of naval policy. I can see, for example, where it might be possible to interest Canada in air development, where it might not be possible to interest some other part of the Empire in the same way. I believe that the spirit of this Conference is that we should try to discover wherein each of us, having regard to our particular situations, can work out most effectively the co-operation and aid which we would like to be able mutually to give.

Status of Conference.

There is one other point that I think at this moment I ought to make quite clear here. It goes back to what I said on the first day, and in the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty it seems to me that he has kept it in mind throughout, that is, that we at this table cannot be too careful not to assume powers which we have not got. We have no right, as I see it, to regard ourselves as a Cabinet shaping policy for the British Empire. We are here as the representatives of Governments, deriving what power we have from that circumstance and that fact alone. It is easy to use words and phrases, but there is grave danger of very critical situations arising out of them when it comes to satisfying the expectations that are raised thereby. The word Oceanic Common-

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 10 5 11 12 07 13 38 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62751

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C 62752

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 105 11 12 07 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62753

wealth is, for example, a fine word; it is a splendid word, but if the effect of its use is to convey to the minds of all who are present here that we sitting at this table are shaping the policy of that Oceanic Commonwealth, as a single Cabinet entrusted with any such powers, I am sure, when we get back to our Dominions, we will find that a different conception of our functions and duties has been entertained by those we represent. Certainly when I get back to Canada I would find that the people there would say very quickly: "Well, Mr. King, we are glad you enjoyed your stay in London, but evidently you got carried away with it; you have forgotten entirely our conception of your duty at that Conference, which was to represent Canada, present her point of view, receiving at the same time the points of view of the other Governments as far as you were able, not questioning the community of interests or our desire to further it."

Ultimate Control lies with Parliament.

The people of the Dominion have never given to me or to my colleagues any authority to say how far Canada is to be committed by what happens somewhere else, say in Egypt or in Africa. If they thought that, by using the words, "one defence of the Empire," we were committing Canada to responsibility as respects international complications and international difficulties that may arise in other quarters of the British Empire, there would be a feeling of alarm and concern that it would be almost impossible to describe. The man whom I think it is well to be on the look-out for, the real enemy, is the one who is watching for weapons with which he can defeat us, and I for my part do not wish to put into the hands of any person, if there are any such in the Dominion, who wishes to criticise British connection and our position within the British Empire, a weapon that may be used effectively against me in my desire to see the Empire maintained and developed. I should feel that the most serious impression that could be conveyed to Canada at the present time—I am not speaking of the other Dominions—but the most serious impression that could be conveyed to Canada certainly would be that the aim and object of this Conference was in some way to commit the Dominions to responsibilities as respects matters over which their Parliaments have no control. It would be making for disunion, not for union.

Relations of Canada with United States.

Let me bring out this further point which, I think, having regard to Canada's position, should be brought out, and which involves considerations we do well always to remember. We are right alongside a vast continent with which we have to compete in every particular. Geographically we are handicapped in that competition all along the way. Our winters make it more difficult for our railways to operate, our seasons are not as long or as varied as the seasons of the country to the south of us, and we have the handicap of a smaller population. The American people say a great deal about their security lying in the circumstance that they are a great continent by themselves and are not involved in situations across the Atlantic and across the Pacific. I do not say that they are right in some of the implications drawn from that point of view. I think that we are all members of a great family, all of us are members of a world community and we have world obligations, but it is important, I think, from the point of view of the British Empire, that when we are trying to people our country, particularly our Canadian West, with numbers of new immigrants, to build up a strong population there, we should not do anything which will create in their minds the idea that because they are settling in the part of North America which is British they are running risks and incurring obligations with respect to situations arising in parts remote from America, which they would not have if they were south of the line. I put that forward, recalling Lord Curzon's words at our opening meeting here that, after all, the truth is the one thing that we ought to speak at this table, and speak it fearlessly.

Dangers of Phraseology.

What I have said about one foreign policy, and am saying about a single policy of defence, relates to the care with which we use

C 62754

particular terms and phrases, to be sure that when an expression is used we all mean by it the same sort of thing. For example, I may use Mr. Bruce's expression of the other day, that the British Empire is one and indivisible. I can use that expression, but I have to be very careful to make clear just what I mean by it, just what the impression is that I am seeking to convey. We believe that the Empire is one and indivisible, it may be said also of the Godhead that it is one and indivisible; so much depends upon what it is that it is meant to emphasise. There are aspects of imperial relationships of which account must be taken as respects the separate character of its parts. It is not true that in all particulars the Empire is indivisible; it is divisible, and very distinctly divisible. It is divisible geographically, racially, politically, and in a thousand ways, and we have to take account of all these divisions.

Object of Conference. Mutual Help dependent on Mutual Knowledge.

When I say that we feel that in the matter of defence we must be careful to assert the national note rather than the imperial note, I am saying what, as a friend of the Empire, I believe will free us from dangerous criticism; I believe in stressing the point that is going to make for the permanence of the Empire. I come back to the change of view of the Admiralty as illustrative of what I mean. The man who emphasised the importance of the national position with regard to the Canadian Naval Service was set down at the outset, by so-called imperialists, as a separatist. He was denounced as an enemy of the Empire. To-day, after a period of a very few years, we hear, from the lips of the First Lord of the Admiralty himself, of the wisdom of the position taken at that time from the point of view of what will make for the permanency of the Empire. It is that point of view that I am anxious we should all clearly comprehend, so that when we go back to our respective countries we may say with truth and with due appreciation of what this Conference has stood for, that, while we come back with a knowledge of the difficulties with which Britain is contending, and with which other parts of the Empire are contending, we also come back with ampler knowledge as to how we can be more and more mutually helpful. We shall then be in a position to shape our policies in accordance with what is going to make most effectively for the mutual interest.

Undesirable to publish Admiralty Memorandum in Dominions.

In conclusion, as the First Lord has made mention of it, may I say I do take strong exception to the publication in any of the Dominions of any memorandum prepared by the Admiralty, or by any other Department of the British Government, without the full sanction and authority, in the first instance, of the Governments of those Dominions. I do that for this reason. It is a fundamental political principle in any theory of self-government. If the people of Canada—I do not care for how trivial a reason—were to get the impression that in some way or other the British Admiralty or any other Department of the British Government were trying to appeal over the heads of the Canadian Government to the electorate, there would be produced a political situation which it would be very difficult to cope with, and I do not know of anything that would bring about such a situation more quickly than the publication of an Admiralty memorandum. One has simply to suggest carrying the procedure to other Departments to see what it really signifies. If an Admiralty memorandum, on a matter of defence, why not also a memorandum from the War Office on the militia? Why not a memorandum from the Treasury as to finance? I am quite prepared to agree that we cannot get too much in the way of information. We cannot be too appreciative of what the Admiralty can give us in the way of information and help; we welcome it, and we want all we can get of it.

Only Dominion Cabinets can settle what should be Published.

But we want it given to the Minister who is responsible, and we want our Cabinet to have the right to consider its significance. Then we will decide whether, in the interest of Canada, or in the interest of the British Empire, it is wise to give any particular

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 105 11 12 07 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62755

memorandum publicity. I believe we shall be on safe lines so long as we remember that it is Governments that are conferring here; in whatever we do, whether it relates to foreign policy, defence, or anything else, it is all-important that Governments should speak to Governments, not that the individuals here should try to work out a single defence policy for the Empire, but that we should make it possible for our own Cabinets to give full consideration to whatever in the way of statement is to be given to Parliament and to the people. Perhaps it is a little difficult to appreciate here just how jealous, in a very proper way, all members of a Cabinet are as to having the right to have their voices heard when a policy of large import is being considered. They have their problems. Our Ministers from the prairies and our Ministers from the manufacturing districts are as much concerned in having a say in the shaping of naval policy as are the Ministers who come from the provinces of British Columbia and Nova Scotia, which border on the sea; and I should hesitate in their absence in any way to try and commit any of my colleagues without their having an opportunity of having their voices heard.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Appreciation of Mr. Amery's Statement.

Mr. Bruce: I said a few words in regard to this question the other day, but there are one or two things I should like to add now, after the general statement that has been made by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I think we all very much appreciate the manner in which he dealt with the question, and we appreciate above everything the tone which he took, and the extraordinary tact he displayed in presenting the position to us, particularly in dealing with the position of the Dominions towards the whole broad question of defence.

Position of Australia as regards Defence.

With regard to the broad principle that Mr. Mackenzie King has raised, I, of course, am in the same position as he in some respects, but apparently I am in a different position in other respects. Nothing that I can do here will bind Australia in any way. That is a matter for Australia's Parliament, and there is no Dominion that is more jealous of the rights of Parliament or is more determined that the authority placed in their hands shall not be exercised by any other body. But apart from the matters which would have to be determined by Parliament, there are broad principles involved which Parliament has already been consulted upon. I put the Agenda of each of these two Conferences upon the table of the Houses of Parliament, and I indicated in broad general outline what views I proposed to put forward on behalf of the people of Australia. The questions were very fully debated, and at the end of the debate a direct vote was taken which, as nobody in Australia has a shadow of doubt, was taken upon the general principles that had been enunciated. It is certain that at a later stage we shall have to consider the broad aspects of the position of the Dominions which the Prime Minister of Canada has raised, particularly in connection with foreign policy, but I do not think that I need delay this particular meeting to deal with it.

Willingness to participate in Naval Defence.

With regard to the question of naval defence, in broad principle Australia's position is perfectly clear, and there seem to be very few issues upon which our mind has to be made up. Australia certainly agrees with every word spoken by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the beginning of his speech, with regard to the vital necessity, from Australia's standpoint, and from the standpoint of the Empire as a whole, of maintaining our sea power and being in a position to protect the whole of the trade routes of the world. On that point Australia is perfectly clear. There is an overwhelming opinion that that is vital to our individual interests in Australia, and vital to the interests of the whole Empire. Taking that view, Australia believes that the Empire must have a navy which is adequate for the purpose which we regard as so vital. Having got

C 62756

that far in general principle, we then come to the question of whether Australia is prepared to play any part. On that question Australia takes the general view that she certainly must play her part, and that she must do something to help in the provision of that naval strength which we say is so vital. That principle has been affirmed by Parliament as recently as when I left Australia, and has been affirmed over a very long period now by the action that we have taken with regard to the maintaining of our naval unit. So that, on the broad general principle, there is no question what the view of the Australian people is, and no necessity to go and consult them again. But in saying that I am not committing them to anything, I am merely saying here what Australia has told me to say. When we come to the question of what particular contribution Australia will make, that, of course, is a matter for the Parliament of Australia to determine, and the decision of Parliament is free and uncontrolled. But I think we shall not get very far unless we are prepared to discuss with the Admiralty any proposals the Admiralty puts forward; and the feeling in Australia, prior to my leaving for the Conference, certainly was that we are quite prepared to discuss the proposals which have been put forward to indicate how far we believe Australia can go, the kind of assistance that Australia would be most prepared to give, and generally whether any scheme can be mapped out which can be taken back and submitted to the Parliament in Australia. For my own part, I am perfectly prepared to go that far, and there is no question but that the people of Australia understood that that was the action I would take; but they also recognised that I was committing them to nothing until I had returned to Australia and had submitted to them, for their consideration and decision, any proposals that had been considered here.

With regard to particular points that have been raised, I do not think that at this stage it is very necessary to deal with them. We shall have the opportunity to-morrow to go into the questions which are in some respects technical. I am very much obliged to the First Lord for the information he gave to me to-day in regard to some of the questions I raised, and also for his assurance that it will be possible to get any further information we desire.

Welcome Change in Admiralty Standpoint.

But I must again emphasise this point, which was dealt with by the Prime Minister of Canada, that any assistance Australia may give must be along the lines which we have established for ourselves over the last fourteen or fifteen years. We have maintained from the beginning that our contribution should be by means of the maintenance of a unit; an autonomous unit, however small, over which we should have complete control at all times; but that in a period of national danger or in a period of war the Australian unit should be merged into the whole Empire navy and should be available for the purposes of the navy generally. A particular point I should like to stress is, how very heartily we welcome the recognition of the principle of Dominion Navies to which the First Lord has referred, and I entirely agree with the Prime Minister of Canada that that very free and full recognition will do a great deal of good in all the Dominions—certainly it will in Australia, where there has been a feeling that we have been fighting against very hostile influences to get this principle established, that our own autonomous unit is a right that we have as a Dominion of the Empire. The free recognition of this will, I am sure, do a great deal to help and assist our whole position with regard to naval co-operation in Australia.

Defence an Empire Question.

The other point that I must raise again is that this whole question of Empire co-operation in defence, as in everything else, is an Empire question, and certainly we must press that the question should be considered from that point of view. I do not for one second suggest that we are limited to any particular type of assistance. That can be a matter for the circumstances of any particular Dominion, but I do feel, without going any further into the matter, that I must utter a word of warning that the future will be very difficult indeed unless we can get this principle recognised—in some measure, at all events—that Empire defence is a matter for the Empire as a whole, and that, while we can discuss, if that is

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
105
11
12
07
13
08
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62755

memorandum publicity. I believe we shall be on safe lines so long as we remember that it is Governments that are conferring here; in whatever we do, whether it relates to foreign policy, defence, or anything else, it is all-important that Governments should speak to Governments, not that the individuals here should try to work out a single defence policy for the Empire, but that we should make it possible for our own Cabinets to give full consideration to whatever in the way of statement is to be given to Parliament and to the people. Perhaps it is a little difficult to appreciate here just how jealous, in a very proper way, all members of a Cabinet are as to having the right to have their voices heard when a policy of large import is being considered. They have their problems. Our Ministers from the prairies and our Ministers from the manufacturing districts are as much concerned in having a say in the shaping of naval policy as are the Ministers who come from the provinces of British Columbia and Nova Scotia, which border on the sea; and I should hesitate in their absence in any way to try and commit any of my colleagues without their having an opportunity of having their voices heard.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Appreciation of Mr. Amery's Statement.

Mr. Bruce: I said a few words in regard to this question the other day, but there are one or two things I should like to add now, after the general statement that has been made by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I think we all very much appreciate the manner in which he dealt with the question, and we appreciate above everything the tone which he took, and the extraordinary tact he displayed in presenting the position to us, particularly in dealing with the position of the Dominions towards the whole broad question of defence.

Position of Australia as regards Defence.

With regard to the broad principle that Mr. Mackenzie King has raised, I, of course, am in the same position as he in some respects, but apparently I am in a different position in other respects. Nothing that I can do here will bind Australia in any way. That is a matter for Australia's Parliament, and there is no Dominion that is more jealous of the rights of Parliament or is more determined that the authority placed in their hands shall not be exercised by any other body. But apart from the matters which would have to be determined by Parliament, there are broad principles involved which Parliament has already been consulted upon. I put the Agenda of each of these two Conferences upon the table of the Houses of Parliament, and I indicated in broad general outline what views I proposed to put forward on behalf of the people of Australia. The questions were very fully debated, and at the end of the debate a direct vote was taken which, as nobody in Australia has a shadow of doubt, was taken upon the general principles that had been enunciated. It is certain that at a later stage we shall have to consider the broad aspects of the position of the Dominions which the Prime Minister of Canada has raised, particularly in connection with foreign policy, but I do not think that I need delay this particular meeting to deal with it.

Willingness to participate in Naval Defence.

With regard to the question of naval defence, in broad principle Australia's position is perfectly clear, and there seem to be very few issues upon which our mind has to be made up. Australia certainly agrees with every word spoken by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the beginning of his speech, with regard to the vital necessity, from Australia's standpoint, and from the standpoint of the Empire as a whole, of maintaining our sea power and being in a position to protect the whole of the trade routes of the world. On that point Australia is perfectly clear. There is an overwhelming opinion that that is vital to our individual interests in Australia, and vital to the interests of the whole Empire. Taking that view, Australia believes that the Empire must have a navy which is adequate for the purpose which we regard as so vital. Having got

C 62756

that far in general principle, we then come to the question of whether Australia is prepared to play any part. On that question Australia takes the general view that she certainly must play her part, and that she must do something to help in the provision of that naval strength which we say is so vital. That principle has been affirmed by Parliament as recently as when I left Australia, and has been affirmed over a very long period now by the action that we have taken with regard to the maintaining of our naval unit. So that, on the broad general principle, there is no question what the view of the Australian people is, and no necessity to go and consult them again. But in saying that I am not committing them to anything, I am merely saying here what Australia has told me to say. When we come to the question of what particular contribution Australia will make, that, of course, is a matter for the Parliament of Australia to determine, and the decision of Parliament is free and uncontrolled. But I think we shall not get very far unless we are prepared to discuss with the Admiralty any proposals the Admiralty puts forward; and the feeling in Australia, prior to my leaving for the Conference, certainly was that we are quite prepared to discuss the proposals which have been put forward to indicate how far we believe Australia can go, the kind of assistance that Australia would be most prepared to give, and generally whether any scheme can be mapped out which can be taken back and submitted to the Parliament in Australia. For my own part, I am perfectly prepared to go that far, and there is no question but that the people of Australia understood that that was the action I would take; but they also recognised that I was committing them to nothing until I had returned to Australia and had submitted to them, for their consideration and decision, any proposals that had been considered here.

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57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62757

necessary, the measure of assistance to be given by each part of the Empire, the principle must be recognised, or the task of carrying out our co-operation will be increasingly difficult as the years go by. One particular phase of it that Australia certainly recognises is that, unless we can establish this principle during the next few years, and begin to carry it out, the Dominions may find themselves in very serious trouble. Then it may be, instead of its being one of the Dominions that has some hesitancy in recognising the principle, we may find that a Government in power in Great Britain may repudiate any suggestion that the defence of the Empire as a whole is a matter for Empire co-operation, and may even go so far as to say that, as far as Britain is concerned, she does not propose to co-operate with the rest of the Empire in protecting all their vital interests. The sooner, therefore, we can get the principle established in all the Dominions beyond any question of doubt, the better it will be for all of us in the years which are to come.

Appreciation of Proposed Empire Cruise.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Mr. Bruce, as well as myself, failed to make reference to the suggestion of the First Lord as to a visit to the Dominions of a cruiser squadron. I should like to say that we would give a hearty reception to any squadron that the Admiralty might wish sent to Canada in the course of an Empire tour.

Mr. Bruce: I entirely agree in that. I have already had an opportunity of expressing my views with regard to that.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Mr. Massey: With regard to the last point that has been mentioned, I welcome the statement made by the First Lord with regard to the visit of a cruiser or battleship squadron, whatever it may be, to the different countries of the Empire. As a matter of fact, I have felt, for a very long time past, that nothing would do more good in consolidating the Empire, after what has taken place during the war, than a visit of such a squadron, and I took the opportunity, some little time ago—it was in the mind of the First Lord at that time—of suggesting that should be done; and I am very glad that arrangements are being made accordingly.

Conclusions of Dominions' Royal Commission. Importance of Sea Communications.

Now, I do not wish to occupy a great deal of time, but I will commence what I have to say by a quotation. Some years ago, probably a year or two before the outbreak of war, a Royal Commission called the Dominions' Royal Commission was set up, which was representative of the different countries of the Empire and its order of reference included many matters of importance, such as defence, trade, inter-Empire communications, &c. They went into the matters referred to them very exhaustively, and in due course they presented a very valuable report. The report was, I believe, furnished after the war, or at all events when the war was coming to an end, and I make the following quotation from it (Cd. 8462):—

> 524. "The war has abundantly demonstrated that the life of the Empire depends upon its sea communications. Whatever the existing magnitude of the ocean-borne commerce between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, and whatever the prospects of its development in the future, producer, manufacturer, and merchant alike are concerned, and vitally concerned, with securing cheap, regular and efficient transport for their goods, and, consequently, with the progressive improvement of the Empire's shipping facilities."

Now, the two points particularly mentioned there are, first, that the life of the Empire depends on its sea communications, and, next, implied rather than otherwise, that the prosperity of the Empire and the prosperity of the different countries depends upon its mercantile marine.

I just wanted to establish that point, and express my agreement with it before I go on. I noticed the other day that it was said that you cannot have a first-class Empire with a second-class Navy. Now we are building up a first-class Empire. We know to-day that the world has never seen an Empire such as the British Empire

C 62758

is. How it is going to be maintained intact and kept together, depends upon its citizens, and that I take it is one of the most important matters which we have to discuss and consider before this Conference comes to an end.

No Prospect of Interference with Autonomy of Dominions.

Just one other point has occurred to me. It has been suggested, and I have seen this referred to, that attempts have been made to interfere with the autonomous government of the different Dominions. I have been here for quite a number of years as the Representative of New Zealand, and I do not need to say that I took an interest in the affairs of Empire for many years prior to my first official visit to London, and I have never seen and have never known the slightest attempt on the part of British statesmen to interfere in any way with the autonomous government of any one of the Dominions. It is only right that should be said. We pride ourselves as nations of the Empire upon managing our own affairs; we make our own laws; we levy our own taxation; if assistance is required during a period of stress such as that which we have passed through, we give according to our own ideas; we assist the Empire in the way we think proper. I am quite certain that as in the past so in the future there will never be any attempt to interfere with the self-governing powers of any one of the Overseas Dominions. The Colonies are in a different position, but I have no doubt that they will be able in the course of time to do just as we are doing.

Value of Capital Ships.

I agree with the opinion of the First Lord when he said that no part of the Empire should depend upon local defence. He was dealing with naval defence at the time, and I agree with him. I believe it is quite impossible for any Dominion of the Empire to maintain a navy of sufficient strength so as to be quite certain it will not be interfered with in the future by some greater Power than itself. Referring to the controversy that is going on with regard to what is the best form of defence, whether it should be naval defence by way of capital ships and light cruisers and all the rest of them, or whether we should depend to a very much greater extent than ever before upon airships, I know perfectly well that in any war in the future air vessels of some sort, aeroplanes probably, will play a very prominent part, but I cannot help thinking that it would be a tremendous mistake for us to give up the idea of not keeping what are called capital ships to depend on in the main rather than to depend altogether upon an air force.

I heard what the First Lord said about their being practically immune from torpedoes and the attacks by submarines. We did not lose—I am only endorsing what the First Lord said—a single capital ship by submarine action; we did lose some in other directions, but not in that way; while, on the other hand, what happened to the submarine? I think I am right in saying that the official figures, which I am merely quoting from memory, show that during the war the enemy lost 203 submarines. I think the submarine was almost wiped out when the war came to an end. As for comparing a light cruiser with a submarine, I have not seen them in action, but I have seen a destroyer hunting for submarines and it reminded me of nothing so much as of a terrier hunting a rat, and I think the submarine would have just about as much chance of coping with a destroyer as the rat would have under the circumstances that I have mentioned.

Vital Importance of Naval Defence.

Just one doubt was raised in my mind—I do not think it is very serious at the present time—as to whether, in compliance with the Treaties of Washington, and especially the first Treaty, the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, whether a sufficient margin was left to Britain in connection with the ships that were intended to be scrapped. At all events for the first period of the Treaty—there is no question about it—I think that the United States of America have a larger number of heavier-class ships than Britain has. Probably that will be rectified as time goes on. Probably the building of these two new ships which are in

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62759

course of construction will go a long way to restore the balance; but it all comes back to this: We cannot play with naval defence. I cannot imagine anyone considering this matter lightly. Without naval defence, and sufficient naval defence, the Empire cannot last. It may last so long as we are not interfered with, but then the Empire would only be lasting on sufferance until a stronger Power came along and attacked us, and we cannot place ourselves in that position. Directly the lines of communication are cut, good-bye to the British Empire. That is where our responsibility comes in, a responsibility as representing our Governments and responsibility as members of the Parliaments to which we belong. I do not want any misunderstanding or misapprehension with regard to the Treaty of Washington, because I believe it was a very fine thing to do and arrangements were made which placed matters on a very satisfactory footing, and personally I hope they will be carried out. With regard to the strength of the navy, we are acting on what is called the one-Power standard and probably that is sufficient for the present, but the time may come when we shall find—or those who are here at that time—two Powers united against us, and I think that aspect of the question should not be lost sight of. We shall probably have an opportunity of discussing that point with the First Sea Lord to-morrow, because I should like to get the opinion of those who possess more technical knowledge than I do or any other layman does.

Singapore.

With regard to Singapore, I said the other day that I agreed thoroughly with what is proposed in connection with Singapore. A suggestion has been put forward to-day that we might agree round this table to proposals which our Parliaments would not ratify. Then they are of no value. I moved a resolution in the Parliament of New Zealand that any decisions or any agreement made at these Conferences should not come into effect until ratified by the Parliament concerned, and, as far as I am concerned, I am going to stand by that. But it is the business of the leader of the Parliament, it is the business of the Prime Minister for the time being, to know the mind of his Parliament as nearly as possible, and I am quite certain that anything I propose will be ratified by the Parliament to which I belong. Only this morning I received some papers from New Zealand, and among them I noticed, not altogether without surprise, that there had been a division at the last sitting of Parliament, at which I was not present, on the question of Singapore. The objection was raised that it was unnecessary, and quotations were made by certain members from speeches delivered in the British House of Commons, and all that sort of thing; quotations were made from remarks of certain Admirals who are very prominent in their opposition to Singapore; but the House did just as I thought it would; all the votes that were obtained against Singapore were the votes of about a dozen Labour Socialists, and every other Member of Parliament agreed to the wisdom of fortifying Singapore for the purpose of the better protection of Australia and New Zealand and other smaller communities in the South Pacific.

I understand that the work has been commenced, and it was discussed the last time this Conference met, and I do not think there was any objection raised to it at that time, but the fact remains that all the naval authorities of any value agree with the fortifications of Singapore being proceeded with; and of course it must be remembered that it was only since the Washington Conference that it was made impossible to do anything in the way of fortification of Hong Kong.

Interest of New Zealand in Naval Defence.

I feel more strongly about naval defence than most people because I come from a country which is cut off from all the other countries of the Empire by long stretches of ocean; the nearest neighbour on the one side is a thousand miles away, and that nearest neighbour is Fiji. On the other side is the Australian coast, 1,200 miles away, so it is not to be wondered at if the people of New Zealand are particularly anxious to see that the naval defence of the Pacific is sufficient for the purpose for which it is intended.

C 62760

I shall never forget the time we had during the Great War, especially during the early months of the war, when Germany was possessed of two very powerful cruisers, and we had very little in the Pacific to stand up against them at that time. I know that there was the battle-cruiser "Australia," but we could not expect Australia to hand that battle-cruiser over to us absolutely; it was intended for the purpose of protecting Australia. The people of New Zealand provided the money for a battle-cruiser, but very properly when the Admiralty wanted our gift cruiser in another part of the world there was not a single objection raised in Parliament or amongst Ministers to handing it over. I was not a Minister at the time, but that does not matter; we were all agreed on that, but for some time we were in a very serious position in the Pacific, because there was nothing to stand up against those two German cruisers. And then came along the disaster of Coronel. I am not going to find fault with anything or anybody, but there was a serious blunder over that disaster. Three ships were sent from England to attack the enemy ships or to hunt them out of the Pacific. One ship, for some reason or other, was left far behind. The other two ships were not to be compared with the two German ships, and the result was that the British ships were sunk with all hands. These are the things that should not be forgotten in a case of war, and my advice is probably a little more valuable than that of the ordinary citizen, because, as head of the Government at the time, I had a very serious responsibility. I cannot help thinking of the time when our ships were running backwards and forwards, perhaps to Australia, or perhaps coasters; no lights showing anywhere; we did not know when our coastal towns would be bombarded by a powerful enemy. For a long time we did not know where to find the "Emden"; there was nothing to show where she was, but we knew she was another difficult and powerful enemy, and one which did great damage to some of the countries of the Empire.

However, that is past. I am only suggesting that we should remember these mistakes in the future, and we should leave things to the next generation in a very much better position than they have been for a number of years past. But one cannot help saying that the British Navy when the war broke out was in a forward state of preparation, and, if that had not been the case, I do not think we could have got through. I think it was the First Lord who spoke of the naval spirit and traditions, and that is exactly what obtains so far as my country is concerned. We cannot help appreciating, with the Pacific all round, the advantages we are receiving; in New Zealand I must say that we have the naval spirit and traditions, and, as far as I am concerned, I am very proud of it.

Action Taken and in Prospect.

I do not say that what we have done is better than the other Dominions—I doubt if it is—but I think we are on the right lines. First of all, the New Zealand Government decided to find the cost of a battle-cruiser. That was done, and the cruiser handed over to the Admiralty. What we are doing now is this. We have a 5,000-ton cruiser in New Zealand and a training ship operating along with the cruiser. The cruiser will be exchanged presently for an oil-fuelling cruiser; she is a comparatively new ship and thoroughly up to date. We are acting upon the principle set forth in the Admiralty Memorandum, and, when the time comes—and I hope that finances will allow—in the not far distant future, we propose to add another cruiser. We found money for the ships we have at present, and that is the principle upon which we propose to go. I might quote a paragraph from the last report of the Commodore Commanding the New Zealand Station. We consider it the nucleus of a sea-going squadron, and the paragraph is as follows: "A slight expansion in personnel only is proposed, the recruiting policy being based on the substitution of the 'Chatham' by an oil-burning light cruiser next year. These ships carry far fewer stokers but rather more seamen than cruisers of the 'Chatham' class. During the past two and a half years the foundations have been laid with a view, as the financial position of the Dominion improves, to the gradual expansion of the sea-going squadron to the quota of three light cruisers, with attendant oil-tanker and a unit of ocean-going submarines." These ships are under a Commodore appointed by the Imperial

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 10 35 11 6 12 07 13 88 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Government, and they are used not exactly for the defence of the coast, because there is nothing to do in that way at present, but for the policing of the whole of the Pacific; and they do valuable work in that connection. It will not do to leave the islands without a warship; a warship has a good moral effect, and it is not forgotten for a long time. We find all the expenditure in connection with that; and, in addition to that, £100,000 have been set aside for the purposes of Singapore. If the £100,000 are not wanted for that purpose, there is an understanding that it shall be spent on some purpose connected with naval defence. We do not claim that these ships are ours. The New Zealand Naval Defence Act was passed some years ago, and there is a provision in that Act to the effect that in case of war, although ships may be owned by New Zealand, they immediately pass under the control of the Admiralty. They are not by any means a local navy, and they are not intended to be a local navy. The New Zealand ships are a division of the Imperial Navy, and that is thoroughly understood in the Dominion. I think that is the proper line to take.

Defence an Empire Matter.

A very important point was raised by the Prime Minister of Australia, and it was in regard to the possibilities of the future of this country. It is quite on the cards there may be a Government in this country some day, though I hope not, which will refuse to find Naval Defence for the Overseas Dominions, and what is going to happen then? I mentioned just now the case of the connections being cut. That means the Empire is coming to an end; if anything of that sort took place the Empire is gone; it cannot be kept together. We, as a community of free nations—this is an expression which has come into common use,—have to do our duty in this connection. The Prime Minister of Canada took objection to a term I used the other day, but he did not quote me accurately, and I take this opportunity of correcting him. When I used the word "sponging" I used it as a quotation in the plural, and I did not apply it to any Nation of the Empire any more than to New Zealand; in fact, the term was used in regard to New Zealand by a writer who is better known in the Southern than in the Northern Hemisphere, and it was used to me; that is exactly what has happened. A very able writer took up this question of the naval defence of the Empire, and he wrote a very able article, and then he said, "What is New Zealand doing? What is Mr. Massey doing? Mr. Massey is sponging on the British Empire for his protection, and New Zealand is sponging on the British Empire for its naval protection," and he was right. That is what I had in my mind. I had no thought of Canada, and I hope the Prime Minister of Canada will understand.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Certainly.

Mr. Massey: Because I feel certain of this, that when the time comes Canada will do in connection with naval defence what it has done already in connection with military defence. Now I can only say this: I do not think things should be allowed to drift. We all have our financial difficulties. I have financial difficulties as well as other Prime Ministers or business people; I am Finance Minister in New Zealand, and I have had at times very great difficulty in making both ends meet. But for the time being things are going well; I saw my way to ask in Parliament for a Vote of £500,000 for Naval Defence last Session, and Parliament agreed. It was practically passed unanimously, with the exception of the point that I have made, that objection was taken to Singapore, and a number of quotations were used from authorities in Britain. Now I do not know that I have anything more to say. I have one or two points in my mind, but they are technicalities, and would be better discussed and brought out at the Meeting which is to be held to-morrow, with the First Sea Lord and some of the other naval experts. The Prime Minister of Australia and I—I know it pretty well although we have not discussed this—are agreed upon it. We feel our responsibilities. I should like to make this known, that I do hope that whatever is done in the way of naval defence, or any other form of defence for that matter—I especially mention naval defence—I hope and believe that New Zealand and Australia

will work together for the defence of our respective countries, and in working together for the defence of our respective countries, and each of us contributing what we think is our fair share in the circumstances, we shall be working for the defence of the Empire.

Question of Adjournment.

Mr. Baldwin: I think we had better adjourn now, because the Economic Conference meets at 3 o'clock. It would be rather desirable to finish this general discussion.

General Smuts: Is it necessary to adjourn? The subject is one of very great importance. I should like to join in the discussion when we have heard the other statements.

Mr. Baldwin: Certainly, to-morrow.

General Smuts: Yes. I think it is much easier if we have the whole of the question before us.

Mr. Baldwin: If we could finish in about 10 minutes I quite agree with you, but I do not wish to curtail what anyone may desire to say. and I suggest, if we are likely to take longer than that, we should meet at 3, as I understand that you do not go to the Economic Conference this afternoon—I do not know if I am correctly informed.

General Smuts: No, but we have many other things to do.

Mr. Baldwin: We could go on at 3, and then any member who is also on the Economic Conference might go on to the Economic Conference when this is finished. I would much rather finish it now if it were possible.

Lord Derby: I understand that General Smuts wants the Military and the Air statement before the discussion.

Mr. Baldwin: That would be to-morrow.

General Smuts' Appreciation of Mr. Amery's Statement.

General Smuts: I should like to join in this general Defence discussion, which I think is of the very greatest importance, but I should like to hear the Military and the Air statements, and therefore I have nothing to say, except to congratulate the First Lord on his most admirable and lucid statement made before us here this morning. .

Mr. Baldwin: Would you like to make any observations at this stage, General Mulcahy?

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, IRISH FREE STATE.

Position of Irish Free State as regards Naval Defence.

General Mulcahy: I have listened with very great interest to the statement made by the First Lord, and to the discussion that has taken place here. As far as my Government is concerned, the matter with regard to Naval Defence is still in the undeveloped Treaty position, as are the financial aspects which, as Mr. Mackenzie King rather suggested, are closely mixed up with Naval Defence matters. We are practically only on the threshhold of getting that particular type of acquaintance with you, which, in spite of outward appearances, for a very long time we have been very anxious to have. We are very deeply interested in all your problems, especially the problem that appears to relate to national as distinct from local defence. We are very deeply interested in the general problems. We realise ours is a world-wide community with world-wide obligations, and we are perfectly ready to shoulder whatever obligations come to us as a community. The Treaty will, in due course, settle what are to be our Naval obligations.

Hopes for future Co-operation of Irish Free State with other parts of the Empire.

This is the first occasion on which I have met any of you in Conference here, and I would like to express my opinion, which is the opinion of those associated with me, that, notwithstanding the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62763

situation under which the Treaty arose, it gives us an atmosphere in which we can become acquainted with you, and take part in the general development of our peoples together as world-wide communities. It is in the spirit of a people in that position that we come here to take part in your discussions, and to see what obligations, outside our own national obligations, are likely to come our way in our development as a nation associated with you.

In the actual details of discussion that are going on now we are differently placed in the matter of naval defence from some of the other Dominions, and the particular problem we are now discussing is a problem which in its details at any rate is rather theirs than ours. There is nothing particular I wish to say.

Question of Adjournment.

Lord Peel: Prime Minister, I did want to make a statement, but I can make that statement quite well when the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air have spoken, and I think I had better reserve what I was going to say.

Mr. Baldwin: What was proposed was that the technical discussion on the naval side should take place to-morrow, and on Friday morning there would be a discussion on the military side and on the air side. Would it be convenient for you to speak on that occasion?

Lord Peel: Yes, any time. I do not like making a statement at this time. India, unfortunately, comes at the end, and I do not want to keep anybody at the present moment. Otherwise one has to curtail one's statement.

Publicity of Proceedings.

Mr. Amery: May I ask one thing about publicity of to-day's proceedings? There is, of course, a good deal of what I have said not at all suitable for publication. There is a great deal which is perfectly harmless and could be published if the Conference wish it, but it is just as the Conference feels about it. The alternative would be a sentence or two to say we have been discussing naval affairs, and mention the Empire cruise. As far as I am concerned I could go through my speech and cut out anything secret or too personal.

General Smuts: Best to publish nothing. The cruise might be published.

Mr. Baldwin: Before we separate the Foreign Secretary wishes to tell you what has been arranged in regard to the keeping of Armistice Day on the 11th November, a date by which I hope all our colleagues will not have left England.

FURTHER SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION.

Lord Peel: There is one thing I want to mention. There is a point I want to bring up at some time. I am afraid no one else will bring it up and that is the question of the share of India's contribution towards the expenses of the League of Nations. Our point is we contribute too much, and as the effect of our paying less may mean a suggestion that others should pay more I am afraid I am the only person who is likely to raise the question.

Mr. Baldwin: I am afraid you must consult Sir Maurice Hankey about that. I do not know how the matters down for discussion stand.

Lord Peel: I think, perhaps, it is a matter for Committee

Mr. Massey: Just one word. I think I ought to indicate that before the Conference comes to an end, and I hope it is not coming to an end until we have done some good work, I want to bring up the question of Spahlinger treatment for Tuberculosis. I have been asked to do so by a number of medical men.

Mr. Baldwin: Perhaps you will be good enough to speak to Sir Maurice Hankey about that also.

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR ARMISTICE DAY.

Lord Curzon: It only falls to me to make this intimation to the Conference because I happen during the last three or four years to

C 62764

have been on each occasion the Chairman of a Committee that is responsible for the arrangements for the celebration of Armistice Day. A new situation has arisen this year because the date, the 11th November, falls for the first time since the war upon a Sunday. Therefore we have to consider how far we ought to make any alteration in the observance that has hitherto taken place, and whether it is desirable in view of the fact that the 11th November falls on Sunday to repeat the proceedings that have taken place in previous years. We have placed ourselves in communication with His Majesty to take his views, and with the Ecclesiastical Authorities of the various churches and denominations in this country, and the conclusions at which we have arrived, and which are about to be published in the papers, are these. We think it very undesirable indeed to alter either the day of celebration or the particular hour at which the two minutes' silence is observed. You will recollect that in our country, and I think elsewhere, as the clock strikes eleven there have been two minutes of absolute silence which have hitherto been observed not only at the Cenotaph in Whitehall, but in all parts of the country, in towns and in the country side, in business places and elsewhere, and that proceeding has acquired, by virtue of its continuance for two or three years, a sanctity which nobody would like to disturb. We felt, therefore, that as the anniversary falls on Sunday the occasion would acquire an additional significance, because it will occur during the time in which church services are ordinarily being held. We have asked the Archbishop of Canterbury, and through him the heads of all the various religious denominations, to allow their services, instead of being held as is ordinarily done, at 11 o'clock, to open at a quarter to eleven or at whatever earlier hour they prefer, and then at 11 o'clock everywhere the two minutes' silence will take place. The King is very anxious and willing to attend a ceremony in Westminster Abbey on that day. The service there will be held, as it will everywhere else, at a quarter to eleven, and the King has expressed (and the Government concur) a strong hope that he may be attended at that service in Westminster Abbey, not only by his Prime Minister and members of his Government and Cabinet here, but by such Dominion representatives as are still in this country. I hope, therefore, they will be able to come. Due provision will be made for their accommodation in the Choir. Then the idea is that in the latter part of the service the King, attended by his Ministers and by the Dominion representatives, will move down from the Choir to the Nave where the concluding stages of the service—one or two prayers and, perhaps, a hymn—will be conducted by the Dean of Westminster, at the conclusion of which the King, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Empire as a whole, will deposit a single wreath on the Unknown Warrior's Grave. That is the ceremony which will be enacted in the Abbey, and in which we hope you will all be willing to assist. As regards the ceremony that has hitherto taken place at the Cenotaph outside in Whitehall no observance will take place there on this occasion, although, of course, the practice will be resumed in subsequent years; but everybody will be at liberty, under due police arrangements for the regularisation of traffic, to lay their wreaths upon the Cenotaph, as they have hitherto done from morning to night on that day, a stream of people going by and depositing their wreaths. So everybody in the country, whether in church or outside the church, will be able to commemorate the occasion in the way they think best. The day and the hour will be observed, and next year we shall resume the ceremony at the Cenotaph in the old way.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 17, 1923.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
10 35
11
12 67
13 68
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

SECRET.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

C 62765

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44

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE TENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. the EARL OF DERBY, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir SAMUEL HOARE, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

General R. MULCAHY, Minister of Defence, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. Viscount PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Admiral of the Fleet Earl BEATTY, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Admiralty.

General the EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.

Air Chief-Marshal Sir HUGH M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Major-General J. H. MACBRIEN, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of General Staff, Canada.

Commodore WALTER HOSE, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.

Vice-Admiral Sir ALLAN F. EVERETT, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of the Royal Australian Naval Board.

Brigadier-General T. A. BLANEY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Representative on the Imperial General Staff at War Office.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62766

The following were also present—(*continued*):

Major L. A. CLEMENS, O.B.E., M.C., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Commodore A. G. HOTHAM, C.M.G., R.N., Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Delegation.

General SEAN MACMAHON, Chief of Staff, Irish Free State.

Major-General J. J. O'CONNELL, Assistant Chief of Staff, Irish Free State.

Lieut.-General Sir ALEXANDER COBBE, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., Secretary, Military Department, India Office.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B. (*Secretary.*)

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

Irish Free State.

Mr. P. MCGILLIGAN.

India.

Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Mr. Baldwin: Before we commence the business of to-day, the Foreign Secretary has a brief statement to make.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Lord Curzon: It has been suggested to me that it might be well that I should say a word or two to the Conference about the position of foreign affairs and about our own proceedings in regard thereto. The Conference will remember that we had a discussion which I opened with a statement, ten days or more ago, and which was followed by a discussion in which the Dominion representatives took part, and that then the discussion was adjourned in order to enable the Foreign Office to consider very carefully the suggestions and views which had been placed before us, and if possible to come up at a later date with certain draft resolutions.

Developments on Reparations Question.

Just after that happened, a new situation occurred. It arose out of the report in the newspapers of the speech of President Coolidge in America, in which he had rather gone out of his way to reiterate America's willingness to help in our economic troubles in Europe, and had taken his stand again upon the declaration first made by the Secretary of State in December last. I gathered from the attitude of the Conference here upon the matter that there was nothing they would welcome more warmly than American co-operation, and that an opportunity of this sort—evidently started with some object by President Coolidge—ought not to be missed.

Communications with Washington.

Accordingly, I drew up a telegram to Washington,* which I think has been circulated to you, in the endeavour to find out exactly what President Coolidge meant and how far he was disposed to go. The suggestion had been made that we might, so to speak, publicly seize the opportunity and cordially embrace President Coolidge's initiative. But we considered, I think rightly, that would be unwise because so sensitive are the Americans about any outside intervention that had we made in public a declaration of that sort it was quite conceivable that President Coolidge might not only withdraw from the position he had taken up, but might even have lost his election,

* The telegrams exchanged with Washington are reproduced as Appendix I.

C 62767

because it would have been said at once: "Here is England interfering again and not allowing things to develop in their own way." Anyhow, we sent the telegram, and, in consultation with the Prime Minister, we fortified the telegram by putting in the sentence, which I think was justified in the circumstances, that I was speaking in this situation not merely for His Majesty's Government, but for the much larger and more important body assembled round this table. Then we got a reply from Washington, from Mr. Chilton, our Chargé d'Affaires, in three parts, and you will gather from that quite clearly that the American Government are prepared to participate, and that their participation may even take more than one form. In my telegram I asked them these questions. What exactly do you mean? Does your statement mean that America is willing to join in a general Conference to discuss the question of reparations in Europe, or does it mean that you will be willing to send somebody to take part in a conference of experts under the auspices of the Reparations Commission; and does it mean that you will only participate in the event of all the Allies asking you; or, should the request not be unanimous, are you still disposed to give us your invaluable help? To that, as you will recollect, the reply was that they were prepared to take part in a general economic conference if invited to do so. To the second question, the reply was that they had in view that a competent American citizen would be prepared to take part in an enquiry instituted under the auspices of the Reparations Commission; to the third question, namely, whether they demanded unanimity as a condition of taking part, their reply was that they would answer that question when the situation arose.

Communications sent to European Allies.

In these circumstances, it appeared to me that our duty was to move at once; that we should acknowledge with thanks the encouraging attitude of America, which I did in a telegram last night, and that we should acquaint our Allies with what had passed, and invite them to join us in proceeding. There were two alternatives that might have been adopted; we might have merely invited our Allies to take part in the Conference suggested by Mr. Hughes in December last, the offer having been repeated now, and have told them confidentially that America was prepared to join, or we might put the whole of our cards on the table, be perfectly frank as to what we had done, because after all it was right and justified, and explain to them that, having seen what President Coolidge had said, we thought we ought to ask exactly what was in his mind, and, having ascertained it, frankly to put the case before our Allies. The Prime Minister and I decided in favour of the latter course. It was perfectly certain, and you will see from the American reply that they contemplate it, that publicity would be given to their reply at a later date. What I had more particularly in view was the fear that if we merely made the suggestion to our Allies in Europe that this idea of a Conference had once again been taken up, treating the idea of American co-operation as confidential, M. Poincaré would at once refuse. He would say, "This is the old plan which I regarded with disfavour six months ago; you are merely coming up with a stale proposal now," and he would seize the opportunity to refuse, knowing that the question of American participation had been treated as confidential. I thought there was a very great danger in that attitude, and that our one object now was not to put anybody in a hole the least bit in the world, but by common goodwill to get a move forward in which all, if possible, would participate; or, in the event of France or any other Power declining to participate, that that Power should find itself put in the wrong before the public opinion of the world. Accordingly, I sent last night, after consultation with the Prime Minister, this telegram, which I will take the liberty to read. It is a telegram addressed to the French, Italian and Belgian Governments:—

> "French (Italian) (Belgian) Government will be aware from reports published in press that the question of reparations, in which the Dominions are equally interested with His Majesty's Government, has been under the close examination of the Imperial Conference now sitting in London. The members of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62768

that Conference have been as much concerned as His Majesty's Government at the apparent deadlock which has been reached, all the more so that they had hoped that the abandonment of passive resistance would remove the hitherto unsurmounted obstacles to common action, and would be the signal for a fresh and united effort to solve a problem that cannot any longer be shelved except at a cost which will weigh with almost equal severity upon all. While the Conference were considering this aspect of the case, there appeared the declaration of the President of the United States that the American Government rested upon their proposal of December last.

"It will be recollected that this proposal was not at the time pursued, because Conferences were taking place between the principal Allied Powers, each of which propounded a scheme of its own for dealing with the problem as it then existed. None of these schemes has been fortunate enough to meet with universal acceptance; and in the interval divergent policies have been pursued, with the result that the common action by which alone a settlement can be reached has again and again receded into the distance.

"It did not appear to His Majesty's Government or to the Imperial Conference to be either wise or courteous to ignore this renewed indication of goodwill and of a desire to assist on the part of the American Government. Indeed, any such attitude might have exposed His Majesty's Government to justifiable reproach.

"On the other hand, they recognised the extreme undesirability of assuming on the part of the United States Government any intention in excess of what the President's words appeared to imply; and they felt that the first step was to enquire at Washington to what extent His Majesty's Government might, if they approached their Allies in the matter, regard themselves as sustained by the hopes of American co-operation.

"Accordingly, they addressed an enquiry to the American State Secretary, and were gratified to learn in reply that his Government continued to feel a deep interest in the economic situation of Europe and were ready to aid in any practical way in promoting recuperation and re-establishing economic stability. With this object in view the United States Government, while emphatically repudiating any desire to see Germany relieved of her responsibility for the war or of her just obligations, were entirely willing to take part in an Economic Conference in which all the European Allies chiefly concerned in reparations should participate, for the purpose of considering questions of Germany's capacity to make reparations and of drawing up an appropriate financial plan for securing payment. Such a conference, if convened, should, in the American view, be advisory in character, and should have for its object the making of appropriate recommendations by a thoroughly informed and impartial body, intent upon solving the difficult problems submitted to it on their merits." Those, you will observe, are direct quotations from the American reply, so that their case is stated to the Allies in their own words. "Alternatively the American Government informed us that, if after further consideration it were thought preferable that the suggested enquiry should be conducted by an advisory body appointed by the Reparations Commission to make recommendations, they would be willing that a competent American citizen should participate. When this reply was received it did not seem possible to His Majesty's Government either to ignore an offer so generous and so helpful in its character, or to refrain from at once communicating it to their allies. They do so in the earnest hope that the Allied Governments will consider with the utmost care the advantages to be derived from American co-operation at this critical juncture, and they entertain the sanguine belief that the French (Italian) (Belgian) Government will be willing to join them in inviting the United States Government without delay to take part in one or other of the forms of enquiry indicated by them.

"The direct participation of the American Government appears to His Majesty's Government to be an object so desirable

c 62769

in itself and so likely to be fruitful of result, that they cannot conceal the hope that the first alternative may be the one preferred.

"In submitting this proposal to the Government to which you are accredited, you should represent the supreme importance, in the view of His Majesty's Government, of not letting slip this opportunity of resuming those common and friendly discussions in which all parties have so frequently testified their belief."

Now the Conference may ask what I expect will come of this.

General Smuts: That telegram has gone?

Lord Curzon: Yes. It went last night; it was necessary to act at once.

Probable Attitude of France and other Allies.

The Conference may ask what I think will come of this. I think it is extremely difficult for France or any other Power in these circumstances to decline. Belgium, we know, is anxious for this enquiry. Italy has always been well disposed towards it. The obstacle, so far, has been France. M. Poincaré may take one of three attitudes. He may say, "No, I will not have anything to do with this. I am dealing with Germany; I am not satisfied with her attitude until I am convinced that she has loyally and thoroughly accepted the situation. The question of reparations can stand over." He may say that, but if he says that I think he will be alone. Or he may say, "After all, this suggestion of a conference in which America takes part, although it has been suggested by the President, is an old suggestion made as far back as September last, rejected by me then, and merely revived now with the object of putting me in a difficult position. I decline to look at it." Or he may say—and I think this is the most probable reply that he will make, and if he makes it it is all to the good—"I have said all the way through that this is a matter for the Reparations Commission, the body appointed under the Treaty to deal with the question of reparations. No one else is really entitled to touch it, and if America is disposed to send a competent business man to join in an enquiry, conducted under the Reparations Commission, to assist the Reparations Commission in determining the present position, the present capacity of Germany to pay, so much the better." I think he may say, and I think he will say, that. If he does say that, I submit to the Conference that it is a tremendous move forward, because we then get the enquiry for which we have all along been working; and be it remembered that if we get an enquiry in that form it is precisely the proposal which we made in August last and which, at that moment, was turned down by the French without consideration, although rather favourably regarded by the Belgians. Therefore, it seems to me that the situation is on the whole likely to be productive, and that it has the further merit, if I may say so, of placing at this stage the initiative in our hands.

Press Criticism of British Government.

The Government here has been very much attacked—not, I think, fairly—for having said, in our note of the 11th August, that if none of our proposals were considered the alternative of separate action might have to be considered. The Press has been disposed to say, "What did this mean? Was it a mere abortive menace? What does the separate action mean that you had in view?" Well, the reason why we did not take any separate action when we received such an unfavourable reply from the French to those overtures was this. It was threefold. In the first place, we knew that this Conference was going to meet at the end of September or the beginning of October, and we felt our position would be greatly strengthened if, in any attitude we took up, we had the support of the Empire behind us. In the second place, it was clear at that time that passive resistance was shortly going to be abandoned; and it was quite obvious that the moment passive resistance was abandoned a new situation would arise and that any proposals for action, separate or otherwise, made before might be stultified the moment passive resistance had been dropped. In these circumstances, and also because we were animated by the familiar desire

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 12 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62770

not to have a final break with France, we refrained from making any separate proposals at the time. But now, America has given us the opportunity and we are enabled to say, not merely for debating purposes, but, I think, with truth, that the suggestion having been made we at once took it up. With courtesy we asked the Americans what they meant and how far they would go. With frankness we then approached the whole of our allies, we put all our cards on the table, and invited them to participate.

Advantages of Further Enquiry.

As regards the merits of the suggestion, that, being a financial issue, is one I will not confidently pronounce upon, but our Treasury here hold the view that, although the situation has been very much altered, the desirability of an enquiry of this nature is undeniable and great, and that it would be of serious profit if, in response to this invitation, such an enquiry were now held.

Future Resumption of Discussions on Foreign Affairs.

The explanation I have asked permission to make to the Conference has not merely been given in order to acquaint you with what is going on—which you are entitled to know—but also to explain why it is that the discussion on foreign affairs has not been resumed. It will be quite clear, I think, to all my colleagues that while this move is going on, and until we get a reply from our allies, it would be useless for us to sit here and frame resolutions or lay down rules. It is in the hope that the situation I have explained may develop during the course of the next few days that I make this statement, and have in my mind the idea of resuming the discussion on foreign affairs towards the end of next week when the situation has been rather further advanced.

General Smuts: May I make a remark on that, Prime Minister?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, certainly.

Lord Curzon: Would you like to read the document?

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

General Smuts: I have quite followed what you are saying.

Conference of Allied Governments preferable.

I feel a great difficulty about the position which is going to arise now. I agree with you that M. Poincaré is going to accept the second alternative, that is an enquiry by the Reparation Commission, or under the ægis of the Reparation Commission. What you have in mind, and what they have made the first alternative, was a Conference of Allied Governments, which would have been something really first-class and valuable. The second alternative, which the Americans have made, seems to me really fairly futile—for this reason; they say they are really going to take part in the enquiry under the ægis of the Reparation Commission. You will see from their telegram that they say that competent American citizens can be found who will do this. They dissociate themselves fairly strongly from the Reparation Commission. They are not going to take part, but, as they said last December, competent American citizens can be found who would take part in this enquiry. It seems to me you are not really pulling America in at all. We do not want an enquiry in which some American takes part, but an enquiry in which the American Government takes part; and the first alternative would rope in the American Government. You follow my point?

Lord Curzon: Perfectly.

General Smuts: The second gives the American Government the chance of escape, because they are not really responsible; they are not really roped in. Some American citizen will be found, and M. Poincaré, on the other hand, would be very glad too. He could say: "It has been my decision all along to let the Reparation Commission enquire into this matter." The result will be that some enquiry will start now into German capacity; what it will lead to, I do not know. It will be a long time, and the position is most

C 62771

urgent and dangerous; the developments in the Ruhr are of a most dangerous character, and we may soon be faced with an appalling situation while this enquiry under the ægis of the Reparation Commission would be going on. I would press much more strongly for the first alternative. I am afraid of the use which M. Poincaré is going to make of the American reply. I think you are right that the second alternative is going to be accepted, but the first would have been the real thing, that is a conference of the Allied Governments where America is represented as such, where she herself appears on the scene, and where she does not merely send some unofficial independent financial person to join in the conference. It looks to me as if the whole thing is going to prove abortive.

I do not blame you at all, but I am afraid that what is now happening means that both America and France are going to escape and that what we are really after will not be done, that is, to get a Conference where we can get at grips with the situation.

Lord Curzon: The situation, of course, is not yet determined. General Smuts is proceeding on the assumption that my conjecture of M. Poincaré's attitude turns out to be the true one. It may be so; but, on the other hand, supposing that Italy and Belgium are prepared for the first alternative rather than the second, we may still be able to apply pressure.

Need for pressure on United States Government.

General Smuts: I hope we shall use whatever pressure we can. We want America in. America does not really come in under the second alternative. That is the weakness I saw in the suggestion made last December when I read it in the papers. It seemed to me just "eye-wash," to use a vulgar expression. America did not say she was prepared to take part in such an enquiry, she merely said there would be a competent American who could take part in this.

Lord Curzon: I think it is really rather more than that. I believe that what the Americans would do would be to invite Mr. Pierpont Morgan, or someone of that description, to join in. It is quite conceivable that if they joined in the first enquiry they might be similarly represented, but, as regards the Reparation Commission, you will have noticed from their reply that they cannot appoint formally a member without the consent of Congress, which is not now in session. That is the reason they suggest their representative might be some competent American citizen. I think the Treasury here would say that if the enquiry takes place the main thing is to get it started. It would be quite as good, from our point of view, to see Mr. Pierpont Morgan sitting in a quasi or semi-official capacity on the Committee as it would be to get any direct American representative sitting at the Conference. I admit the desirability, from the point of view of prestige, of getting the American Government in, and of course we will do our best to secure that end, but we must not assume that the game is up before we have had the reply of our Allies.

General Smuts: I wanted to impress upon you what I feel strongly, that we want to exercise pressure on the American Government, and we must try and do so, we must try and get the American Government in directly rather than some financial expert whose opinion will not weigh.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Mr. Massey: I would just like to say that I do not look at the position from the same point of view as General Smuts.

Conference of Allied Governments preferable.

First of all, let me say, I hope—and I think every one round the table hopes—that the suggested Conference will be arranged. With regard to the point emphasised by General Smuts, that any competent American citizen—to use the expression which has been already used—would not be representative—and I am not quite sure that I am correct in this—of the American Government and the American people, I take it that any competent American citizen requested to act, and therefore appointed by the American Government, would undoubtedly be representative of the American

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
11 6
12 67
13 68
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62772

Government, even more than in a semi-official capacity. I agree it is not quite so good as having a direct representative of the American Government, one of themselves; but take this instance, which is a case, I think, fairly parallel. It was found, when the Washington Conference was being arranged, that no member of the New Zealand Government could go and represent that country. It was quite impossible. Under the circumstances we appointed a judge of the Supreme Court, who acted for us as our representative, and who was accepted at the Washington Conference as the direct representative of New Zealand. I say the cases may not be quite parallel, but they are not very far away from each other, and no objection was raised to what was done in that case.

I hope, as I have said, that the Conference will be arranged, and that M. Poincaré will agree, and that is the point about which I am in doubt. If he approves, then there is a strong probability of some agreement being arrived at, that is what we are all waiting for, and I hope such will be the case; but the Foreign Secretary raised a point which I think is very important and should not be lost sight of, and it is this.

Danger of Premature Publicity.

Great care should be taken, if it is possible to do it, to make it impossible for Party Politicians in America to discredit the American President in connection with the proposal. We all know the feeling of Party Politicians in America and even in our own countries, and we know that no opportunity is ever lost; we know too that, though there may not be a majority of opponents of the British Empire in America, even so there is a very strong party in America who are undoubtedly opposed to Britain. The feeling is friendly on the part of the people who take the lead in politics and public affairs as far as the American Government is concerned. What is in my mind is this—and I formed it after a talk with the new President—I think that he should be consulted before his name is used publicly, so that if necessary he might give advice with regard to what should be done. Otherwise, so far as I am concerned, I do hope the Conference will be arranged because there is a possibility of settlement and that possibility should be followed up.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Conference of Allied Governments Preferable.

Mr. Bruce: Prime Minister, the position being as it is and the cables having been exchanged, the most desirable thing is to press very hard to get the Governments concerned to arrange a Conference; but it certainly strikes me that we may get into a very difficult position.

Difficulties likely to arise.

There is a danger that this action may put us in a more embarrassing position than we are in at the present moment, because the cable which was sent, after the President had made his statement, really refers to the original proposal. That proposal was to conduct an enquiry into Germany's capacity to pay. The whole trouble with France during the last month has been that France objects to the present moment being taken as the time for determining Germany's capacity to pay, and if France says, as the Foreign Secretary suggested she might—"This is an old proposal, this is a stale proposal, we have heard it before"—the minute there is the slightest difference of opinion between the Allies and Europe, America will immediately draw into her shell and we shall not advance one inch.

Use of Name of Conference in First Telegram to Washington.

The only point I want to press is this, that in the cablegram sent to America the name of this Conference was used. I agree that the name of the Conference should have been used, but I think, in view of what had been said here, the Conference ought to have been consulted first. One has got to remember that when this question was discussed here, both General Smuts and myself suggested that there was a difficulty in view of France's attitude

C 62773

(an attitude with which I admit I have some sympathy) in saying they are not prepared to accept an enquiry at this moment into Germany's capacity to pay when Germany herself has deliberately depreciated her capacity. Hence a cable in the name of the whole Conference, taking up the original suggestion of an enquiry into the capacity of Germany to pay, seems to me to be not quite in accordance with the views expressed in the Conference up to that time. The Conference had actually come to no definite view as to what action should be taken. It could not have come to a definite view without a further discussion on the whole question. The danger I now feel about the whole position is that possibly we shall find that France refuses this, and I am inclined to think that, although France might thereby incur a little odium in the world for a few days, it would not be much more than she has incurred already. There will be no pressure upon her to come in because America will immediately withdraw. On the other hand, if we had come to a conclusion as to determining an arbitrary amount that Germany should pay, and if we could have got agreement upon that between the Allies, we should still have America in reserve, and she might have been brought in and might have been of very great value in getting agreement as to that figure, and also as to how the arbitrary amount agreed upon should be paid. Having said that, I recognise that the position now is that certain action has been taken, with which I agree, and I hope we shall get out of it as well as the Foreign Secretary hopes, and that some advantageous results may follow.

Lord Curzon: I will only utter one word in reply to one observation of Mr. Bruce's. I think he is a little exaggerating what we did in the telegram to Washington, in which the sentiments of the Conference were expressed. After all, it was merely a telegram on our part to express our warm approval of the position that the American Government is once again disposed to maintain in our troubles, and which will help us. That is really not committing this Conference to anything very serious.

Mr. Bruce. The telegram quite definitely says at the end: that this Conference and the whole of the British Empire representatives at the Imperial Conference desire to associate themselves with the proposals; but, if we read the earlier part of the cable, it is made perfectly clear that the President's suggestion is really the late President's suggestion again, and there is no getting away from the fact that the late President's suggestion was that there should be an enquiry held into the capacity to pay. That is the point I was making.

Mr. Baldwin: I will now call upon Lord Derby to make his statement.

MILITARY DEFENCE.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

Lord Derby: Prime Minister, I desire to make a brief statement as to the military position at the present moment. I quite agree that it must be very subservient to the Naval policy of the Empire, still, at the same time, I think the members of the Conference would like to know exactly what our position is at the present moment; but, as there was a Prime Ministers' Conference in 1921, there is no need to repeat details of the military position as it was prior to that date. Comparisons between our military forces and those of foreign Powers are misleading, but it must not be forgotten that, though Germany has been destroyed in a military sense, Europe is still an armed camp, for there are 1,300,000 more men actually under arms to-day than there were in January, 1914. In spite of this, we have reduced our army, and as the full reductions in the army have now been made, and the Government has stated through me that no further reductions are contemplated, it may be of advantage briefly to restate our own position and compare it with what it was in 1914.

Comparison with 1914. Present Size of Continental Armies.

The stage is set to-day very differently from what it was in 1914. Then Europe was composed for the most part of strong and

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 6 12 07 13 08 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62774

solvent nations, of which Germany was the most ambitious and powerful, while Berlin was the centre of militarism and of the greatest military machine the world has ever seen. The other nations were either grouped against Germany for their protection or leagued with Germany for their advancement, or sitting impotently and anxiously on the fence.

Now Germany is down and out, and her naval power which directly threatened our own is broken, and France has become the paramount military Power. France, to-day, has an army of 568,000 men under arms, apart from 216,000 coloured troops also under arms.

Mr. Burton: Are the coloured troops all in Europe?

Lord Derby: No, they are not all in Europe. That is her total strength.

Italy has an army of 320,000.

Russia is still an unknown quantity, though we know that she has some 735,000 men under arms, while the Balkan States have also an aggregate of 750,000 men under arms.

Poland 250,000 men.

It is clear by the figures which I have quoted that the size of our own army has no relation whatever to the size of European armies; but even in pre-war days the size of our army was never so governed. It is important to realise the functions which now, as in 1914, regulate the size of the British Army. These functions are three—

(*a.*) Provision and maintenance of the essential Imperial Garrisons.

(*b.*) Provision of a small Central Reserve to act in co-operation with the Navy as Imperial interests may require.

(*c.*) Provision against civil riots at home.

Present Strength of British Army.

In 1914 we mobilised 17 regiments of Cavalry and 6 Divisions at once, and a 7th Division within a few weeks; a total force of 182,000 men. We have now lost 2 Divisions all but 2 battalions, that is to say, 22 Line battalions, and 9 regiments of Cavalry. Now that the situation in the Near East permits, the force we could put in the field amounts to a Cavalry division (9 regiments) and 3 divisions; say, 98,000 men. The Cavalry division, by reason of the reduced peace establishment of horses, would be incapable of action until additional horses had been hardened and trained. Mobilisation of the 4th and 5th divisions would depend upon recruiting of technical personnel and would in any event take some months.

The chief reasons why, for the present, we cannot mobilise the 4th and 5th divisions on the outbreak of war are the exhaustion of the Army Reserve (now 76,000, to be brought up this year by special recruiting to 84,000, against 146,000 in 1914), the abolition of Special Reserve Battalions, the reduction of the number of field batteries below that required for 5 divisions, so that we should have to form fresh cadres not only of Signals, Transport, &c., but even of Field Artillery, and the fact that the tradesmen necessary to complete the increasingly large technical parts of a modern army do not exist either in the ranks, in the regular reserve, or in the shape of Militia.

We are proceeding with a school for training boys as tradesmen for the Army, and are prepared to organise a technical Militia, and the mobilisation position will be gradually improved; but in any event it will take years of steady progress at our present Establishment before we can bring five divisions to the same pitch of readiness for war as the seven of 1914.

Even then, on mobilisation a battalion will be only 888 strong as against 1,000 in 1914, and a battery will consist of 4 guns instead of 6; and, for expansion to full war strength in a great war, we have only the Territorial Army to build on. The strength of the latter to-day is 140,000 out of an establishment of 180,000, as compared with 1914, when there was a strength of 265,000 out of an establishment of 312,000. I am glad to say that after rather a lapse at the end of the war of the interest in the Territorial Force it is gradually reviving, and I see no difficulty in bringing this

C 62775

Territorial Force up to the full establishment, which of course is considerably below what it was in 1914. But still I think that that will perhaps be even better done than it was before that date. Moreover, as we cannot find money for the Infantry and Field Artillery (Special Reserve), we have no provision for making good the casualties which will occur in the regular Expeditionary Force while the national army is being got ready. It may be true that owing to improved weapons the fighting power of each unit would be as great as in 1914 or greater, but the same increase of power may be found in any of our possible adversaries. We are doing everything that we can to advance what I would call the mechanical side of the Army, and I believe myself that we are not only keeping abreast of foreign nations, but we are going ahead of them. It is obvious, therefore, that no charge may be made against us of keeping a large Army with militarist designs. On the contrary we have barely sufficient for what we will call the policing of our Empire, because, not only is our Army less, but our commitments are greater. I should like to review our Overseas Stations where our Forces were in 1914.

Overseas Stations: India.

In India in 1914 we had 75,000 troops, we have now 62,000; that is to say, six Infantry Battalions and one Cavalry Regiment less than in 1914, but a further reduction is being made there still to meet the great strain of the fiscal position there. Two further Cavalry Units are leaving there to come on the Home strength; Artillery Units are being withdrawn and even the numbers in each battalion have been reduced. I should like to emphasise here the fact that we do not look upon, and never have looked upon, India as being the base of an Expeditionary Force, and the Force that we maintain there has been for the purpose of defending India against external attack and of providing internal security, and really comes under the third of the headings which I have enumerated.

Egypt.

In Egypt in 1914 we had 6,400 troops, to-day we have 12,600. We are obliged to keep a larger Force in Egypt, and, though this may be eventually somewhat reduced, still the fact is that with the granting of Independence to Egypt the control of the Egyptian Army may pass out of our hands, and it is essential that we should keep such a Force as in the opinion of the Imperial General Staff is necessary for the defence of the Suez Canal. I need not go into the importance of the maintenance of the Suez Canal in our hands, Lord Salisbury dealt with it the other day, but it is the key to our military position in the interests of all the other Dominions, and it seems to me that we should not relax or allow to be relaxed such a hold on the Canal which our Military Authorities think is essential.

Iraq and Palestine.

In addition we have Iraq and Palestine, and, although in both those places there may gradually be a reduction as affairs, as we hope they will do, get more settled, still if we take all the troops away it would only mean the addition to our Expeditionary Force of two battalions.

Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong, &c.

There are besides, Gibraltar, Malta, and Hong Kong, and other similar stations to which are allotted 14,000 men as against the 33,800 before the war.

The Rhine.

Now with regard to our new commitments. In time to come troops will be withdrawn from the Rhine, but I would like to point out that even at this moment those troops are counted as being on the Home Establishment and are included in the figures for the small Expeditionary Force which I have already given to you; and I must say that there have been great duties laid upon the Military Forces of the Crown in endeavouring in Silesia and other places to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. All the

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 12 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62776

Dominions were signatories to the Treaty, but it has been left to the mother country's Imperial Forces alone to provide all the troops that were necessary to carry out the military conditions of that Treaty. I only mention that as a fact just to show that some of the duties have thrown a great strain on our Home Force. I have no complaint to make of this—I only state what is a fact as regards what has taken place since the date of the Armistice.

Constantinople.

I am glad to say that that commitment has now been liquidated. Sir Charles Harington has brought troops back to England where they will take their allotted places in the Expeditionary Force that is being built up, and I must say that the utmost credit attaches to Sir Charles Harington for the marvellous way in which he has been able to bring away this large Force from what was a hostile country without a single disquieting and disagreeable incident, and not only so, but with expressions of friendship from the Turks and others which may be of some value—a fact which shows that he had a great effect on the population of Constantinople.

Iraq and Palestine.

These two areas which are entirely new commitments have now been handed over by us to the Air Ministry, and the military responsibility for the safety of their frontiers devolves upon the Secretary of State for Air. In Iraq we have only two British Battalions; in Palestine we have no British Battalions.

Singapore.

A question was asked I think about Singapore by Mr. Bruce the other day. The position is this, that before the war we had one English battalion there, and we had a battalion which was found locally by the Malay Peninsula. That battalion has disappeared and has been replaced by a battalion from India, for which the Malay Peninsula pays. There are also a certain number of other troops there. The position of Singapore is held by my military advisers to be one which it is very difficult to attack, even if there is no British Fleet whatever in being, and is the only place where such a harbour could be made. They believe it to be almost invulnerable. They are perfectly content during the building of the works there to leave the defence as it is at the present moment. Eventually, of course, it will be necessary to make further provision for the manning of the guns, but there probably will not be a very large number of men required. With regard to the Infantry, a scheme is being drawn up, and not definitely settled yet, in case of any appearance of trouble, for immediately reinforcing the troops there with three battalions of Infantry; and my military advisers authorise me to say that they are content, from the point of view of safety, with Singapore, with the arrangements now in being or in progress of being developed.

Quota would be allowable under International Agreement greater than present size of Army.

With these enormous mandated territories, apart from our definite Imperial liabilities, I expect no one can accuse us of keeping up a large Army for militaristic purposes. I am perfectly certain that, if, on the lines of the Washington Conference, an agreement was come to for a general reduction by the Great Powers of their armies, we should find that there would be no reduction necessary in the Imperial Army, that the quota that would be allowed to us would be greater than the Force that we have in existence.

Principles governing present Strength.

Our Army is organised on the principle laid down by the late Government. First, that there would be no great war for ten years—three years of that have already gone by—and, secondly, possible small expeditions, and, believing as we do that, in the case of another great war when popular opinion was behind the Government, there would be the same influx of recruits that we had during the Great War, we are endeavouring to organise our small Army to expand and to have ready at hand the equipment necessary for immediate expansion.

C 62777

Co-operation with Dominions.

Now, if I may, I will turn to the relationship between the Home Army and the Military Forces of the Dominions. In practice, as apart from theory, it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between local and Imperial requirements. The local security of any portion of the Empire depends, to a considerable extent, on the aggregate of its disposable military strength, and inversely the safety of the Empire as a whole is dependent on the strength of its component parts. This applies with particular force to the present moment when the centre and all outlying portions of the Empire are reduced, militarily speaking, to the lowest limit. We can no more confine the calculation of our strategical requirements in various parts of the Empire to watertight compartments than we can definitely circumscribe the measure of potential enemy action to which any one part may be exposed. Just as, in the Big War, the Dominions came overseas to the fullest extent of their capabilities to fight for the Empire, so, if any of our Dominions were attacked, would the whole Empire send every available man and devote all its resources to the help of such Dominion; but that, if I may say so, emphasises the fact that, just as we in Great Britain held the fort till Greater Britain could come to its aid, so each Dominion should be in a position to stand the brunt of the first attack until all the other Dominions could bring our men into the fight.

I should like to tell you a little personal matter that happened to myself. What I want to say is that each Dominion should be in a position, if attacked, to draw a line round the part attacked and hold the enemy until troops can come from other parts to help you to drive them out. In the worst time in 1914, after the retreat from Mons, I went to see Lord Kitchener, who was a great personal friend of mine—I was not in office then—it was a time when it looked as if we were going to be separated from the French and gradually to be driven into the sea, and I asked Lord Kitchener what he was going to do. He had a big map in front of him, and he simply took his thumb nail and drew a line across the Isthmus that goes out, and he said, "I am going to do what Wellington did, I am going to make my line as he did at Torres Vedras, and hold on until the Nation is ready to push the Germans back." That is an idea of what one has in one's mind as to the position each Dominion should occupy.

If I may say so, Mr. Bruce exactly hit the nail upon the head. The meeting of the first attack on any Dominion, and to resist it, is the duty of that Dominion itself. It is not so much the question of man power; important as that is there is no doubt, as I have said, that, in a war endorsed by the whole Empire, men would flock to the Colours as they did in the Great War. At the present moment many of those would be old soldiers, and with very little training would be able to take the field.

Need for Preparation.

Of course, that is an advantage that will gradually die out, but we hope each Dominion will see its way in the rising generation to prepare a certain proportion of their younger men to undertake the defence of their country; but what is important is, first of all, that there should be complete agreement in the military mind not only of this country, but of the great Dominions, as to what steps should be taken in the event of an attack on any one part of the British Empire; secondly, that we should know approximately, each of us, what assistance would be forthcoming at all events at the immediate outbreak of the war; but even more important than that is the necessity that each Dominion should possess the requisite amount of ammunition and equipment necessary fully to equip the force which it has. It is no use having men unless they have equipment, guns and ammunition.

Need for Common Training and Equipment.

Lastly, it is very necessary that our training and organisation should be one within the Empire; that we should have the same training for the whole of the troops of our Empire. I do not for one moment pretend that, because we put forward our organisation and our equipment and our training as a model, it is by any means

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 12 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62778

perfect; it may be that after consultation we shall find that for this particular task of defending the Empire modifications are necessary here just as much as anywhere else, and I should not hesitate to propose them if any such agreement were come to. What I would urge, and I feel I can hope to carry the representatives of the great Dominions here with me, is that there should be the closest touch, by correspondence if necessary, by personal meetings wherever possible, between the military heads of this country and the great Dominions. The Defence problem is like a great puzzle composed of many different pieces, of which the Mother Country and the Dominions each hold some pieces. We want to piece these together so as to make it a complete picture. I believe it can be done, and I venture to hope that in this task the Government and the Military Authorities at Home will have the cordial assistance of the Governments and the Military Authorities of each of the great Dominions.

AIR DEFENCE.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Prime Minister, the Committee of Imperial Defence have already circulated an Air Staff paper to the Imperial Conference, and I have in addition circulated to the Economic Conference a paper on Air Communications. I hope to deal in a general way this morning with several of the questions raised in the Air Staff paper, and I intend this afternoon at the Economic Conference to develop certain of the points raised in my paper on Air Communications. In particular I shall be dealing at the Economic Conference with the question of airships which, although it will eventually raise questions of military and strategic importance, is in its initial stages principally a commercial and economic problem. I do not, therefore, propose to deal with the question of airships this morning unless the Prime Ministers desire it. I will only say that the Committee of Imperial Defence attaches definite military importance to their development from the point of view of long distance naval reconnaissance, troop carrying, particularly in small wars, and in the future as aeroplane carriers, and it is on this account that the Government proposes to resume their development by means of subsidies to a commercial company which has undertaken to start a commercial line first to Egypt and subsequently to India.

Air Defence.

This morning I propose to restrict my observations to the only air weapon of which we are actually making use, namely, the aeroplane. Moreover, I desire to concentrate the attention of the Prime Ministers upon what appear to me to be the central questions of air defence, and I leave aside a group of questions that have occupied more attention than is perhaps due to them in the past connected with the internal organisation of the Air Force and its relations to sea and land power. I will only venture to remind you that, after a very full and careful enquiry, the Government has decided to confirm the decision of its predecessors, and to maintain the British Air Force as a single self-contained organisation. I would rather omit this morning a description of these former controversies and attempt to give a broad picture, first, of our actual Air strength, secondly, of the responsibilities that have been placed on the Air Force owing to the strategical changes that the advent of the air arm has introduced, thirdly, of the steps which we propose to take to remedy an inadequacy in air power, which I think you will all admit, and, lastly, to make some tentative suggestion as to Dominion co-operation.

Strength of British Air Force.

I begin, then, with the state of the strength of the Air Force as it is to-day, and I will first compare it with the strength of the Air Force as it was at the end of the war. The strength of the Air Force in November 1918 was as follows: 30,000 officers, 260,000 airmen and 3,300 first-line machines. In March of this year, at the beginning of this financial year, when I had to propose my estimates to the House of Commons, it was 3,000 officers, 27,000 airmen and 371 first-line aeroplanes. That is, you will see, a reduction of about eight-ninths from the strength as it was at the end of the war.

C62779

Strength of French Air Force.

The French figures tell a very different story. The French strength in November 1918 was 3,600 first-line machines; in March 1923 it was 1,260. Our force then is about one-ninth of the force that we had at the end of the war, whereas the French force, judged in terms of first-line machines, is over a third of what it was at the end of the war. That is the first point that I would venture to impress upon the Conference.

Duties of Royal Air Force.

Next, what are the duties that the Royal Air Force is expected to perform at the present moment? There are, as I see them, three: in the first place, co-operation with the Navy and the Army; secondly, the work of the Independent Air Commands, as in Iraq; and, thirdly, home defence against air attack. Let me say a word about each of these three responsibilities, and I will begin with the co-operation work with the Navy and the Army.

Co-operation with Navy and Army.

Since the war we have given priority to supplying the necessary minimum of Air Units for co-operation with the Navy and the Army and for the requirements of the British garrisons overseas. Six squadrons are provided for India, three in Egypt, and Palestine, [redacted] Trans-Jordania and Aden between them have roughly the equivalent of two squadrons. The necessary number of squadrons to keep the art of naval aviation alive in all its forms have also been provided for the Fleet and arrangements made to supply the number of aircraft required for filling all the aircraft-carriers included in the Admiralty programme. By the end of the present financial year this will involve roughly the equivalent of eight squadrons for the Navy. A small number of squadrons has also been provided for co-operation with the Army at home. These at present number two: we propose to increase them to about four squadrons in the coming year, but even then the number will fall much below what the Army would require for co-operation if an Expeditionary Force were sent abroad and the minimum for that purpose as formulated by the General Staff is eight squadrons. So much for the co-operation work with the Navy and Army.

Independent Air Command in Iraq.

I come next to the Air Force that is required for the Independent Air Command in Iraq. This command has constituted a considerable part of the Air Ministry's responsibilities since the 1st October, 1922, when the primary responsibility for the garrisoning of Iraq was transferred from the Army to the Royal Air Force. In the last two years, the number of Air squadrons has been increased concurrently with a large reduction in the number of ground troops. In August 1921, for example, there were twenty battalions in the country, whereas there are now six, which number will soon be reduced to four or five. In the same period the number of Air squadrons has been raised from five to eight. The present scheme of control was principally due to a proposal made by Mr. Churchill, when the late Government found the military occupation of Iraq was costing more in money and men than they could afford and it was necessary to find some cheaper form of control until the Iraq Government had been more firmly established. From the point of view of the Air Ministry, the experiment of Air control in Iraq afforded the first example, on any considerable scale, of Air Forces being used not merely to secure predominance in the air over other Air Forces, but for the partial substitution of operations by the Air Force for operations carried out by military units on land. The Air Ministry can, I think, claim that this experiment has fully justified the expectation that was placed upon it. I could give the Conference a number of testimonies and opinions of impartial observers, such as the High Commissioner for Iraq, bearing out the fact that the experiment has been successful. I will content myself with only one, made by Sir Percy Cox, before he relinquished the post of High Commissioner. "It is not an exaggeration," said Sir Percy Cox in a despatch, "to say that Air action among the Euphrates tribes has saved far more human lives than it has destroyed, by restoring order and preventing tribal fighting." In most cases, the fear of Air action has been sufficient to preserve peace.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
11
12
13
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62780

Home Defence against Air Attack.

I come next to what is much the most important of these three responsibilities, the question of home defence against air attack. Well, it may surprise the Conference to be told this, but it appears to be the fact, that until two years ago, no responsibility for home defence against air attack was placed upon the Air Force, and until eighteen months ago no provision of any kind was made for home defence. When the Navy and Army requirements were met and the squadrons provided for the Air Command in Iraq, and provision made for training in Great Britain, the machines left for home defence in Great Britain were altogether insignificant. I may give as an instance of this insignificance the fact that a few months ago at the height of the Turkish crisis, when we had sent two Royal Air Force squadrons to Constantinople, we were left with only twenty-four first-line machines actually available for home defence against air attack.

Comparison between British and French Air Strength.

This state of affairs was sufficiently serious in itself, but it was made more serious by the air policy of our neighbours, the French. In France, instead of reducing their Air Force by eight-ninths, as we did at the end of the war, they reduced it by less than two-thirds, and since then very large sums of money have been spent upon the development of aviation in all its branches, and great efforts made to increase not only the efficiency of the existing force, but actually to increase it in quantity. For the purposes of comparison I give the figures in machines, owing to the difference between the constitution of British and French squadrons, but by a machine I mean a first-line machine, with all that goes behind it in the matter of personnel, reserves and administration. Taking that basis of comparison, the number of first-line machines available in France to-day, excluding naval machines, is 956, of which 360 are army co-operation machines, that is, machines attached definitely to various military formations, and 596 machines in the Division aérienne, that is to say, in what has come to be known as the French Independent Striking Air Force—596 machines in the French Independent Striking Air Force. In addition, there are 70 machines in different parts of the world with the French Navy, and 180 machines in North Africa, to say nothing of machines in Syria, Indo-China, and elsewhere. These machines in North Africa could, in the view of the Air Staff, be self-supporting for at least three months, and could drop from 10 to 15 tons of bombs daily upon Gibraltar, but I will not elaborate the Mediterranean side of the defence problem as I am dealing for the moment with the home defence of Great Britain. Moreover, a programme has been introduced in the Chamber and received with approval by the French public for nearly doubling the French military air force, for recreating the French Naval Air Service and for increasing the Colonial Air Services. The programme of expanding the French Army Service has passed the Military Committee of the Chamber, but has not yet gone through the succeeding stages of legislation. If and when it is put into operation, the French military service will be doubled and will reach a strength of over 2,000 first-line machines. As to the French Naval Air Service, a Bill has been introduced, but has not yet been passed by the Naval Committee of the Chamber, for the purpose of creating a Naval Air Service of over 500 first-line machines. Supposing this expansion is carried out, the French Air Service as a whole would reach a strength of about 2,600 machines, of which some 1,800 would be military machines actually in France, and over 500 would be machines attached to the French Navy. It is uncertain as to when and as to how this full programme of expansion will be carried out. The disparity, however, between the French and British forces is overwhelming even at the lowest estimate that can be given and even with the actual figures as they are.

French Machines available for Attack on England.

I assume only the actual strengths as they are without any French expansion at all. There are to-day 866 machines in France that, in the view of the Air Staff, are available for attack upon these shores, as against 80 machines, and I am making a very liberal

C 62781

estimate in that connection, as against 80 machines in England actually formed, actually organised, which could be used for home defence, even including the units attached to the army for army co-operation. Assuming that three-fourths of the French army co-operation squadrons were not engaged elsewhere and were therefore available for attack upon England, no less than 168 tons of bombs could be dropped over London during the first twenty-four hours of their attack and 84 tons a day continuously after the first day. Suppose, however, that the General Staff is correct in considering that the army co-operation squadrons would be otherwise engaged, and only the French Independent Striking Force of 596 machines could take part in an attack upon London, even so, 105 tons of bombs could be dropped during the first twenty-four hours of attack, and 50 tons a day after the first twenty-four hours for an indefinite time. Now it will be remembered that the heaviest weight of bombs dropped in England during the late war in one month was 12 tons; that is to say, 1,500 tons of bombs could, at the lowest estimate, be dropped in the course of a month, whereas, 12 tons was the greatest amount that was dropped during the late war, that is to say, more than 100 times the amount. A dispassionate observer, Lord Balfour, expressed the opinion in a Committee of Imperial Defence paper that, "In these circumstances London would be uninhabitable, probably in fact—certainly in the opinion of those who now dwell there." I cannot help remembering in this connection the remarks that were made by Mr. Bruce, two days ago, with reference to the effect of the rupture of our communications for the purposes of supplying these islands with food, and applying them to the not-dissimilar situation created by this air menace, "We certainly think if a disaster occurred in Great Britain"—I venture to quote Mr. Bruce's words—"We people in Australia think that would be really a greater disaster to Australia almost than to Great Britain."

British Means of Defence.

Against this overwhelming air force we have only, even now, some 80 machines which could be made available, that is to say, a disparity of 1 to 10, if three-fourths of the French army co-operation squadrons are included, and 1 to 8 if they are excluded. Moreover, our evidence goes to show that whilst we are still more efficient than the French, taking man for man and machine for machine, the French have made great improvement from the point of view of efficiency since the war, and, in any case, I venture to suggest that a disparity of this kind is overwhelming. It should also be remembered that, in all the ancillary sections of aviation, France is greatly superior in quantity to ourselves. For instance, in the matter of civil machines, whatever may be their military value, and setting aside for a moment the debatable question as to how far they can be used in military action or how far they cannot, at the beginning of the present year France had some 660 civil machines against our 167. To take another basis of comparison, the capacity of the two countries to produce aircraft—France last year produced 3,300 new machines, military and civil, whereas we only produced 200. In the French industry again at the end of last year there were about 9,000 men employed, whereas in our small industry in the United Kingdom at this date there were only 2,500.

Recent Measures to strengthen Home Air Defences.

Well, I think I have said enough, in view of these figures, to show that our Air Force has up to the present been altogether inadequate in point of quantity to carry out its main responsibility of home defence against air attack. Accordingly, about twelve months ago, I obtained approval from Mr. Bonar Law's Government to proceed with a proposal that had already been sanctioned, in principle, by Mr. Lloyd George's Government, for an increase of fifteen squadrons, making eighteen with the three already formed. Even so, it seemed to me that the disparity was overwhelming. Mr. Bonar Law took the same view, and shortly afterwards appointed a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to investigate the whole question, and, as a result of the deliberations of that Committee, the Cabinet agreed to a further

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 12 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62782

development to the extent of 34 more squadrons, that is to say, our programme of expansion is 52 squadrons, 34 plus 18, for home defence. Putting it in terms of machines, that will give us a force of about 600 machines as against the 600 machines of the French Independent Striking Force. It leaves out of account the machines that might be diverted from the army co-operation squadrons in France for an air attack, and it sets up a force of approximately numerical equality with the French Independent Striking Force of 600 machines, but there are certain points in connection with this expansion to which I should like to make some allusion. It is intended that our home defence units should not be all regular units, but should be recruited, as far as possible, from non-regular sources with a large amount of the non-technical duties carried out by civilians. I can give the Conference further details as to that expansion if they so desire it, but the point I wish to impress upon the Conference is that, with the comparison of 600 British machines against the 600 French Independent Striking Force machines, we are comparing a substantial number of machines that will be manned with non-regular personnel against a force that is exclusively regular.

Standard to be Equality with nearest Striking Force.

The Government, however, admitted that we must definitely take as our standard equality with the nearest striking force. Let me quote the salient sentence from the Prime Minister's announcement in the House of Commons last July. "British air power must include a Home Defence Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack from the nearest Force within striking distance of this country." The implication of this statement, although naturally the Government did not wish to over-emphasise it in their statement in the House of Commons, is that we must expand further if we find that these 600 machines are not sufficient and that accordingly the expansion must be so arranged as to make further expansion possible and easy. The first stage therefore in remedying our disparity is this creation of a Home Defence Force of 600 machines. Even so, we should only have a two-thirds ratio to the French Air Force in France, if the French Army Co-operation Squadrons are included, and further, whilst all their squadrons will be regular, a substantial number of ours will be cadre and auxiliary.

Time needed to attain Standard.

This expansion must take a considerable time, and during the period of expansion we shall remain in a comparatively weak position with all its military and diplomatic implications. I would desire to draw the attention of the Prime Ministers particularly to this fact. If we proceed normally we shall take a minimum, so far as the Air Staff can at present see, of five years to carry it out. I may say in that connection that the actual point has not yet been considered either by the Committee of Imperial Defence or by the Cabinet, but the Air Staff have worked out the framework of the programme, and, try as they will, it seems almost impossible to carry out the programme more quickly, if normal peace time methods are to be adopted. After all, it is a very big and difficult problem that we are trying to solve. We are virtually doubling the Air Force and unfortunately we have to make this expansion upon a very narrow base. The demobilisation of the Air Force was so complete at the end of the war, and the proposals that were adopted for creating a peace time Force were of such a narrow kind, that the base that has been left to us for expansion is a very small one, and it therefore makes particularly difficult the expedition of this extensive programme.

Difficulties over Expedition.

The principal difficulty is the difficulty of personnel, for unfortunately we are finding that in peace-time it is practically impossible to attract to the Air Force the highly skilled technical labour that is required for it. That means that we have to train our highly skilled technicians from boyhood. We have to take them as boys when they leave the secondary schools and give them a three years' training. That is one of the examples that I venture to give you to show the kind of difficulty against which we find ourselves in the matter of producing the skilled personnel quickly. There is

C 62783

another difficulty, there is the great difficulty in peace time—it may sound not a very great one, but none the less it is a very real one—of providing aerodromes and the ground organisation. Unfortunately when the Air Force was demobilised the greater part of the aerodromes were given up, and there are all sorts of difficulties in peace time, that you were not up against in war time, in either resuming possession of those not inconsiderable tracts of land or of obtaining new aerodromes. I quote those two instances not to suggest that they raise difficulties that are necessarily insuperable, but to show you the kind of practical difficulty that we are up against as soon as we embark upon big expansion. There is the further difficulty, and this is the last one that I should like to mention, you might say: "Well, why not increase your pay and attract into the Force your highly skilled technicians by offering them a very high wage?" Well, as soon as you do that your action immediately reacts upon the whole of the personnel already in the Air Force, and it would also inevitably react upon the personnel in the two bigger Forces, the Army and the Navy. I have mentioned to you these difficulties, for at first sight you may be surprised and possibly disappointed when I tell you that it will take so long, so far as the Air Staff can now see, to double the Force and to build up these fifty-two Home Defence Squadrons.

Restatement of Main Features of Position.

I would then venture to ask the Prime Ministers to give their attention to these two points that I have been trying to emphasise. First of all, our great inferiority in the air in the face of France. I think that must be admitted from the figures that I have given you. Secondly, the considerable period of time during which, so far as we can see, this inequality with all its implications, military and diplomatic, is likely to continue.

Possibility of Reduction of Air Armaments.

In view of this serious state of affairs and of the sombre prospect that it holds out before us, you may ask, as I have very often asked myself: Is it possible to reduce air armaments by international agreement on the analogy of the Washington Conference in the case of battleships? Well, I say quite frankly that I am most anxious that a reduction of that kind should be made, if possible, but I think the Conference should not be blind to the very great practical difficulties, particularly at the present moment, that there are in the way of carrying through an international agreement of that kind. I will not elaborate them, though of course I can do so if the Prime Ministers desire to press me. I will only mention one or two of them in passing. There is the great difficulty, a difficulty that did not exist in the case of an easily definable unit like the battleship—there is the great difficulty in the case of Air of distinguishing between military and civil machines. Again, there is the difficulty of defining what proportion of Air a particular country should be allowed in view of its imperial and international responsibilities, as compared with what amount of Navy or Army it should be allowed. Further, and perhaps at this moment this is the greatest difficulty of all, there is the fact that at the moment, unlike the case of Washington, where we had a programme of four battleships, we have got nothing to bargain with. We should go into the Conference at this moment with an Air Force so insignificant behind us that we should have nothing in our hands at all, and it would appear palpable to the other parties of the Conference that our chief reason for entering it was to avoid the necessity of expanding our very inadequate Air Force. However, speaking generally, the Government are most anxious to see an agreement for a reduction of air armaments, but at the present moment they see little likelihood of successfully carrying it into effect. There then is the air situation, and I should be extremely grateful to hear the views of the Dominion Prime Ministers and to receive any help and suggestions that they may offer.

Co-operation with Dominions.

In the Air Staff paper I venture to make a number of specific suggestions as to the training of Dominion officers in the Royal Air Force organisation. May I make myself quite clear upon that point? I have not the least desire to attempt to press a policy of

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62784

centralisation upon the Dominions. All that has been in my mind in making those suggestions is that the Prime Ministers may find that with their comparatively small Air Forces, as in the nature of things they will probably be, the overhead expenses for training and for technical and expert development may be so great as to make the cost almost prohibitive, and it occurred to me that with our training facilities here, both elementary, higher and Staff, we might, by means of an agreed system of co-operation, be able to help you in avoiding anyhow some of those heavy overhead charges. From our own point of view it would be extremely valuable to maintain the continuity of air training and air strategy by having a number of Dominion pilots working, being trained and doing perhaps higher courses in connection with the Royal Air Force here. I have, however, elaborated these suggestions at greater length in the Air Staff paper, and I should be extremely grateful if the Prime Ministers would see their way to taking them up with me, either individually or collectively, according as they may desire.

Speaking generally, I can say that the greater the development of the Dominion Air Forces the better it will be for us and the easier it will be to solve our problems. In the event of a European war whilst, quite obviously, the first brunt of the Air attack would fall upon these shores, subsequent reinforcements of the British Air forces by Dominion pilots would come in a most invaluable form and at a most critical moment. It is for the Dominions, of course, to decide how best to develop their own air forces.

Value of Development in Civil Aviation.

But may I say, in passing, I have been very much struck by the success of the development in certain Dominions of the air forces for civil purposes. There are several instances of that. The instance that I have particularly in mind is the forestry and survey work that I understand has been done in Canada. No doubt there are other instances of the same kind in other Dominions; and it seems to me that, whilst in this country, where the attack will be sudden and overwhelming and where also, for civil purposes, distances are very short, our air force has to be mainly trained upon definitely military lines, in the Dominions, where the distances are great, and where it would appear that there is little likelihood of a sudden overwhelming air attack, it may well be found that, both on the grounds of economy and general efficiency, you may desire to develop, at any rate, some part of your air force in peace time upon such lines as would make it possible to use it for, say, survey or the carrying of mails. But there, again, I would suggest that, if the Prime Ministers desired it, we might take up questions of that sort in greater detail possibly in individual conferences. In any case, from what I have said, it will be seen that the Air Force is the only arm that can be used productively in peace time. But, as I say, I am only too anxious to take up that side of the question with the Delegations in greater detail.

Conclusion.

Well, I have tried to give the Conference, in as short a time as I could, a description of the present Air situation as it presents itself to me. The figures that I have given speak for themselves. I do not wish to exaggerate the magnitude of the air menace; neither, however, can I honourably or safely underrate it. It is a serious menace. For the first time in many centuries the Capital of the Empire is not invulnerable, and it must take some time to make it invulnerable. It is a very serious state of affairs. But, just as the sea arteries of the Empire must be kept safe and free, so must the heart of the Empire be kept intact and secure from sudden attack.

"One of the great factors of the next war," and here I am quoting the words of Marshal Foch, "will obviously be aircraft. The potentialities of aircraft on a large scale are almost incalculable. It is clear that such an attack, owing to its crushing moral effect upon a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus become decisive."

Mr. Baldwin: General Smuts, I think it would be very appropriate if you began the discussion, as you were the Chairman of the Committee of the War Cabinet which investigated the question of an Air Ministry and was responsible for setting it up.

C 62785

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

General Smuts: I wish to confine myself to some practical observations. We have listened now to four most informative statements in this Conference about the defence position generally in this country. I am very sorry that I did not have the privilege of hearing Lord Beatty's address yesterday afternoon, but I am told by those who attended at the Admiralty that it was a most impressive and informative statement.

Defence Position in South Africa.

I shall not refer to the South African position. We generally comply with the test which Lord Derby has laid down, that, in the first instance, we can look after ourselves, and generally we are protected also by our geographical position; so that we need not deflect too much of our financial energy into mere military questions. That is the happiness of our position.

Unity of Air Force commended.

I was very glad to hear that the unity of the Air Force as a single self-contained organisation had been decided upon, or had been once more reaffirmed by the British Cabinet. I think, if I may say so, that that is as wise a step as they could have taken. I remember during the years of the war, when we had separate Air Forces, they were competing with each other and were unable as separate forces to obtain proper efficiency. I was asked by the Government at the time to undertake this work, and after a great deal of trouble and a great deal of negotiation we succeeded in establishing the single Air Force. I always look upon that with pride, as one of the best services that I rendered to this country during the time that I had the honour to be associated with it. The result of that single organisation was that before the end of the war this country was as far ahead of any other country in the air as she was on the sea, and I am sure that, if we were to destroy the singleness of the Air Force, we would in time of difficulty be faced with exactly the same situation; we should have to scrap our peace service and we would have to go back upon the single Air Force once more. It has proved itself in war, and I hope it will maintain itself in peace.

Danger of Present Position as regards Armaments.

The state of affairs which has been disclosed by the various statements made to us here in this Conference forms a curious, and, I may say, a terrible commentary upon the peace. We made a peace which was intended to lead to disarmament; we had special disarmament clauses put into the Covenant, and we have learned during the last few days the state the world is actually in. We see, instead of disarmament, that the armaments of the world are actually on the increase. I may say this, that this country, at any rate, has acted in good faith; it may have gone too far; it may have taken too grave risks in disarming and in carrying out the policy which was laid down at the Washington Conference; but no one will ever be able to say that, whatever happens as the result of what has been done, this country has not acted in good faith.

Our allies, our associates, have not done the same. They evidently have had a different conception of loyalty to the Peace Treaty from what we have had, and the result is what we have heard to-day as to the state of armaments in the world.

No immediate Naval or Military Menace to Empire.

I am not going to go into general questions. I want to confine myself to a few practical points. After all, much of this continental armament does not concern us very directly and need not cause us any particular alarm. The question that I ask myself is, where is the menace to us in all this? That is the practical direct question which we, as an Empire, have to answer. In all this armament around us, what is the menace to us, and where does it come in? I take it that there is no direct military menace in the first instance. The French armies, gigantic and bloated as they are, the armies that we see arising all over the continent, are not in the first instance a direct menace to us. Nor do I see that we are menaced on the sea.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
11 66
12 67
13 68
14
159
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62786

The British Navy is still our first line of defence. It is still the most incomparable instrument of war in the world. It probably has a greater relative superiority to-day than it has ever had in the whole history of this Empire. Now that the German navy has gone to the bottom of the sea, I am sure that the superiority of the British navy is greater than it has ever been in its whole history. So that there is no direct military menace to us, there is no direct naval menace to us. We may have, of course, to take special precautions as we are doing in Singapore. I do not look upon the situation in the Far East as any menace to us at all. It may be that in the cause of ordinary prudence, and acting on far-sighted considerations, we have to go in for an expenditure like Singapore. There is no menace there. It may be something in the far-distant future that may occur.

Air Menace from France.

Where is the menace to us? I must say, Prime Minister, that I have listened to-day to the air statement made by the Secretary for Air with very grave concern. I think that that statement is as grave a statement as could possibly be made about the defensive position of this country. It is really an appalling state of affairs to think that if anything were to go wrong—and anything may go wrong, we know the state the world is in to-day, statesmen are not really sane, they behave in a way which seems an outrage to ordinary commonsense and you do not know what in a precipitate moment they may not do. What is the state of affairs? In this country we have now, I understand, eighteen machines to defend ourselves against an organised independent air force of 600 a short distance away.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Eighty machines.

General Smuts: Three squadrons?

Sir Samuel Hoare: Putting in squadrons working with the army, we think we might scrape together eighty machines.

General Smuts: Take it at that—80 to 600; eighty machines scraped together from all the oddments that you can collect in this country, and match them against an organised independent air force, organised for attack abroad, of 600 machines. I think that that is as appalling a state of affairs as I have ever listened to. I do not think this country has ever been exposed to greater peril than it is now.

Need for Balanced Defence.

The First Lord spoke the other day of a balanced defence. That is what I agree with. In this country we should not run away with any particular line of defence, neither in the air nor on the sea nor on land. Where is the balance? Here we are, absolutely exposed. If anything were to go wrong, attack would be launched against London and the other important centres in the south, such as those the Air Secretary has described. I do not think that is a position which ought to be tolerated much longer. It is not only the great numerical superiority which has been achieved by France, but it is the way she can keep it up. At the end of the war this country was the undisputed master in the air, and it was my idea at the time that whatever happened we would maintain that, that we would look upon the air service with the same pride as we look upon the navy. It is the proud boast of this country that its navy is the first in the world and will remain the first in the world. Though we may have adopted the one-power standard, it is our wish and idea and pride that it shall remain the first navy, not only in numbers but in efficiency. We were in exactly the same favourable position in the air, but where are we to-day? We have listened to this tale of woe and we see how our friends speak to us. Our friends know this, they know that they can strike a deadly blow before we could ever dream of organising a defence. They know it; and these people take advantage of every favour that is on their side. The result is that our diplomacy becomes ineffective, we are exposing the country to an enormous risk, we are absolutely exposing ourselves. Where is the balance? We may have the most powerful navy, but it will not help us a bit. This country here may be submerged from the air before the navy could

C 62787

be of any use at all. I speak strongly because I am sure that I am right. I am sure of it from what I have seen in the last war and what I have seen here in London, when not 600 or 100 machines but two machines came over, and half the population was driven to panic.

Immediate Action against Air Menace urgent.

I know what will happen in this place if 100 machines effect an entrance into this area and start dropping bombs on the scale the Air Secretary has described. Anything might happen then. If we have pride in this Empire and if we look upon it as the greatest in the world, as something which is really for the good not only of our own people but of the world at large, I think we ought not to tolerate a state of affairs like this. It should never have been brought about, but there it is and we must do the best under the circumstances. I would not submit to this menace. That is the menace, and I would not submit to it any longer than is necessary. The Air Secretary has not told us anything about air defences, that may have been worked out, but I think we ought to do so. I do not say go in for vast expenditure, but do so. We had a very efficient scheme for London, and if that scheme were kept alive——

Lord Salisbury: It has been worked out.

General Smuts: Not only for London?

Lord Derby: It is on a very small scale.

General Smuts: We cannot submit to this menace. At the end of five years, even, we shall not be equal to France. We would then be within two-thirds of her present position. After five years of desperate effort we shall be within two-thirds of the present strength of France. We are told that France has authorised a further expansion which will double her air force.

Sir Samuel Hoare: If I may correct, it is not quite as much as that. The proposals have gone through certain stages.

General Smuts: Yes. They are not through, but they are there. These things are contemplated, and if there is to be a race in the air we have lost so much way. The position of danger to us will be such a prolonged one, for five years at least, that I think we are running the gravest risk, and we must remove the menace.

Suggestions for Action.

We cannot remove it now by an accelerated air policy, the Secretary for Air has explained to us the very grave difficulties in the way of acceleration, but I think we can do a great deal to work out schemes of anti-aircraft defence, not only for London but for other vital centres in the south of this country, which may, in an emergency, prevent the direst calamity. I hope that that will be done. That, at any rate, does not require five years, but can be done in a short time, skeleton defences, properly worked out by the staff, which can be brought into operation within a week or two weeks. That is the first thing that I would do. The second is that I would accelerate the programme, authorised twelve months ago, of an additional fifteen squadrons. I can imagine that the balance of thirty-five squadrons which has now been authorised may take a long time to complete, but the fifteen squadrons authorised some time back by the late Government ought, I think, to be pushed on with as hard as possible. Do not let us look upon the programme as a whole and delay the one part in order to execute the whole, let us hurry on the earlier part of the programme as fast as possible in order that there may be something.

Of course it is our policy to work in favour of disarmament, and we must do it. But I agree with the Air Secretary that, while we are in this exposed position and our possible opponents have acquired that immense and undisputed superiority, they would not listen to us with very much seriousness, they know where they are, and they know they will have us, and I do not think it will be much use speaking to them, in case we have to talk to them.

Present Risks too great.

All I want to say is this, that we are running a risk that this country cannot afford, either from the peace point of view or from

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 12 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62788

the war point of view. After all, defence is not a war weapon, it is a peace weapon. Properly arranged, defence is the most powerful weapon that your diplomacy can have. Our friends over the Channel know perfectly well that we are superior on the seas, and they know that their armies are no menace to us any more than the German armies or the armies of Napoleon were a menace to us. But they know we can be caught napping at a vital point, and it may happen in a fortnight. It may take a long time to defeat a country on land or to chase her navy into defeat, but this is a different thing. This disaster could be brought about in a week or a fortnight. You may destroy the *morale* of this people and other great centres to such an extent that after a fortnight the thing is over. We dare not run this risk. It is a very good thing that public opinion does not know this. People sleep in peace here at night. But the most urgent precautions should be taken, arranged in skeleton, for all the vital points in the Southern part of this Kingdom, and that should be done without delay. We should be able to say to ourselves, honestly and sincerely: Now there is something in the background.

Lord Derby: Are you speaking of anti-aircraft as opposed to air machines?

General Smuts: Yes; I am speaking of the anti-aircraft gunnery arrangements here in London, which practically kept the German force out of it; the Germans could only enter by two or three at a time. I have spoken strongly, Prime Minister, but I am sure that my experience and instinct perfectly justify the strong remarks I have made.

Question of Adjournment.

Mr. Massey: May I suggest that the discussion be now adjourned? It is very unfortunate, but there are three Ministers sitting here who have agreed to go to a function to-day. As a matter of fact we are a quarter of an hour overdue now.

Mr. Baldwin: We will do that, Mr. Massey.

Mr. Massey: I am very sorry to have to suggest it, but I see no way out of it.

Mr. Baldwin: I quite see the point.

FUTURE BUSINESS.

There is the question of the attitude of the United States towards the "C" Mandates, and it is suggested that that should be referred to a Committee, consisting of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and the time of the meeting will be communicated by the Secretary.

It has been suggested also that the question of the United States Liquor Traffic should be referred to Lord Curzon's Committee which is now sitting and dealing with the question of treaties and territorial waters. The two matters seem to be akin. Then there is the question of the Indian contribution to the League of Nations, which might be referred to a Committee consisting of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs or representative, and representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, The Irish Free State and India.

I think the Maharajah wishes to say a word to-day before the Conference adjourns.

ADDRESS BY THE MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR IN HONOUR OF THE DUSSEHRA FESTIVAL.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Prime Minister and Friends, it is a curious coincidence, I hope a happy coincidence, that to-day in this room we should be discussing questions relating to Military, Naval and Air matters, all connected with the defence of the Empire, on the exact day when in India is being celebrated our greatest festival of the year.

It is a festival to commemorate the march of Shri Ram, one of our greatest incarnations, to Ceylon where he achieved victory. The anniversary is celebrated nowadays in India in inspecting our

C 62789

Military troops and Units, in other words examining the means of war, or, more correctly speaking, the means of peace.

We may thus in a sense be celebrating the Dussehra festival to-day by examining the means of Defence of our Empire.

Friends, I wish you all in the name of my country as an Indian, in the name of the Princes as one of their Order, our cordial and sincere Dussehra greetings to each and all of you.

Let us hope that this quiet, almost unostentatious, work that we are doing, or trying to do, will lead to co-ordination and co-operation of all the forces of the Empire to secure real peace, not only within, but also without.

Mr. Baldwin: I am quite sure the Conference are very grateful for those words.

The Conference then adjourned to Monday afternoon.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 19, 1923.

APPENDIX I.

(i.)

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Chilton (Washington).

(No. 299.) *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1923, 2·30 P.M.

(Part 1.)

THE information which reaches America will have acquainted the American Government with the extremely critical economic position that has arisen in Europe, owing to the failure to find any solution for the reparations problem, which daily becomes more acute as the financial and political condition of Germany grows worse. There does not appear to be among the European Powers that unity of thought which either renders common action feasible or will be successful in finding an early solution. His Majesty's Government have during the past nine months made a series of proposals to their allies for meeting these difficulties, none of which has been so fortunate as to meet with a measure of acceptance sufficient to bring about common action. And yet, without such action, not merely Germany, but Europe, appears to be drifting into economic disaster. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have for long entertained the belief that the co-operation of the United States Government is an essential condition of any real advance towards settlement. America, by reason of her position and history, is more disinterested than any of the European Powers. At the same time, she is directly and vitally concerned with the solution of the European problem, if for no other reason because in it is involved the question of the inter-Allied debt.

(Part 2.)

When Mr. Hughes made his declaration in December last, both Great Britain and Germany made it clear that they would warmly welcome the proffered assistance; and whenever the suggestion has been revived, it has met with the hearty approval of His Majesty's Government; the French Government have hitherto taken a different view. This lack of unanimity is, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, the sole reason why the proposal has not been proceeded with.

His Majesty's Government were already engaged in formulating an enquiry to the United States Government as to the manner in which, in the opinion of the latter, the united action which is the common desideratum could best be brought about, when they read in the press yesterday morning a declaration, reported to have been made by President Coolidge, that the American Government rest on their proposal of December last. His Majesty's Government warmly welcome this declaration, and hope that they are justified in deducing from it that, if the European Powers will join in such an enquiry, America will render the promised co-operation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62790

(Part 3.)

If His Majesty's Government have rightly interpreted the statement of the President, and if they may count upon an encouraging reception being given to such a proceeding, they will not hesitate to invite the immediate co-operation of their allies in Europe in an invitation to the United States Government to assist in the proposed enquiry, by deputing a delegate, whether official or unofficial, to take part in it. If, on the other hand, it were proposed to hold such an enquiry, although complete unanimity had not been forthcoming at this end, might His Majesty's Government and the majority of the Allies still hope for American co-operation? Alternatively, if it were proposed that such an enquiry should be entrusted to the Reparation Commission or to a body appointed by it, would America still be willing to participate?

It is in the firm belief that the American Government have it in their power to render a great service to the security and peace of the world that His Majesty's Government, speaking in the name of the whole British Empire, as represented in the Imperial Conference now assembled in London, desire to associate themselves with the renewed proposal of the President, and they will be glad to receive from the American Government any suggestion that the latter may be disposed to offer in reply to the questions which I have ventured to put.

You should see the Secretary of State, and enforce this argument with all the power at your disposal.

(ii.)

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13, 9 P.M.)

(No. 403.) Urgent. *Washington, October 13, 1923.*

I COMMUNICATED verbally to Secretary of State this morning contents of your telegram No. 299. He received communication in a most friendly manner, and said that, although he could not, of course, give me any definite reply before consulting the President and Cabinet, he could assure me that communication would receive most careful and sympathetic consideration by United States Government, and added that, speaking personally, he hoped something would come of it. Mr. Hughes said: "You know what my own views are on the subject."

He further said that he had warned French Ambassador some time ago that France should renounce her obstinate attitude and come into line with the other Powers.

Secretary of State said he would, of course, treat my communication as entirely confidential, and he hoped no inkling of it would be allowed to reach the press in England, as he did not wish for any publicity, at least until the United States Government had had time to consider and reply to your Lordship's proposals.

He asked me for an *aide-mémoire* recording what I had communicated to him, which I am sending him to-day.

I had reported President's statement, as given in the press of the 10th October, by despatch No. 1230, now on its way to your Lordship.

(iii.)

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17, 8·30 A.M.)

(No. 406.) *Washington, October 16, 1923.*

My telegram No. 403.

Secretary of State has handed me a memorandum in reply to my communication of 13th October. Text follows in my immediately following telegram.

He said that, while he would of course treat the matter as confidential, he wished to reserve the right to publish his reply in case the suggestion of His Majesty's Government and his answer should become public or should be made known to other Powers,

C 62791

and it should be important that the attitude of the United States Government should be made clear.

He laid great stress upon the manner in which France should be approached in this matter, but he felt sure it would be done with tact and delicacy. France should not be allowed to think that there was any sort of understanding between Great Britain and the United States.

(iv.)

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16, 9 A.M.)

(No. 407.) *Washington, October 16, 1923.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

(Part 1.)

Aide-mémoire.

In reply to communication from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of 13th October, Secretary of State desires again to express deep interest of the United States in economic situation of Europe, and its readiness to aid in any practical way to promote recuperation and re-establishment of economic stability. Government of United States has viewed with deep concern the lack, as His Majesty's Government expresses it, of that unity of thought on the part of [? European Powers] essential to [? common] action. Views of Government of United States as to importance of agreement amongst Allies and relations of Government of United States to questions involved were set forth in statement of Secretary of State, to which His Majesty's Government refers, and these views are still held. It is observed that [? His Majesty's Government] states that [? Great Britain] and Germany made it clear that proffered assistance would be warmly welcomed by them, and that His Majesty's Government has always heartily approved suggestion then made by Secretary of State, whenever it has been revived, and that His Majesty's Government is aware that sole reason why proposal has not been proceeded with has been lack of unanimity among interested Powers.

It is believed that present conditions make it imperative that a suitable financial plan should be evolved to prevent economic disaster in Europe, consequences of which would be world-wide. It is to be hoped that existing circumstances are propitious for consideration of such a plan, inasmuch as abandonment of resistance on the part of German Government will present [? a] freer opportunity and an immediate necessity for establishment of an economic programme. Government of United States is, therefore, entirely willing to take part in an economic conference in which all European Allies chiefly concerned in German reparations participate, for the purpose of considering questions of capacity of Germany to make reparations, and an appropriate financial plan for securing such payments. It is deemed advisable, however, to emphasise the following points:—

1. Confirming what was said by Secretary of State in his statement last December, to which you refer, Government of United States has no desire to see Germany relieved of her responsibility for war or of her just obligations. There should be no grounds for impression that London Conference, if called, should have any such aim or that resistance to fulfilment of Germany's obligations has any support. It should be evident that in effort to obtain ends in view regard must be had to capacity of Germany to pay, and to fundamental condition of Germany's rehabilitation, without which reparation payment will be impossible.

2. Such a conference should be advisory; not for purpose of binding Governments, who would naturally be unwilling to pledge their acceptance in advance, but to assure appropriate recommendations by a thoroughly informed and impartial body intent upon solving difficult pending problems upon their merits.

3. Secretary of State notes observation in communication of His Majesty's Government that European problem is of direct and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62792

vital interest to United States, "if for no other reason because question of inter-Allied debt is involved therein." Government of United States has consistently maintained essential difference between question of Germany's capacity to pay, and of practicability of methods to secure reparation payments from Germany, and payment by Allies of their debts to United States, which constitute distinct obligations. In statement of Secretary of State, to which His Majesty's Government refers, it was said:—

"The matter is plain enough from our standpoint. The capacity of Germany to pay is not at all affected by any indebtedness of any of the Allies to us. That indebtedness does not diminish Germany's capacity, and its removal would not increase her capacity. For example, if France had been able to finance her part in the war without borrowing at all from us, that is, by taxation and internal loans, the problem of what Germany could pay would be exactly the same. Moreover, so far as the debtors to the United States are concerned, they have unsettled credit balances, and their condition and capacity to pay cannot be properly determined until the amount that can be realised on these credits for reparations has been determined.

"The Administration must also consider the difficulty arising from the fact that the question of these obligations which we hold, and what shall be done with them, is not a question within the province of the executive. Not only may Congress deal with public property of this sort, but it has dealt with it. It has created a commission, and instead of giving that commission broad powers such as the Administration proposed, which quite apart from cancellation might permit a sound discretion to be exercised in accordance with the facts elicited, Congress has placed definite restrictions upon the power of the commission in providing for the refunding of these debts."

(Part 2 follows.)

(v.)

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17, 9 A.M.)

(No. 407.) *Washington, October 16, 1923.*

(Part 2.)

It is hardly necessary to add, as it has frequently been stated by United States Government, that, while American people do not favour cancellation of debts of Allies to the United States or transfer to people of the United States of burden of Germany's obligations directly or indirectly, United States Government has no desire to be oppressive or to refuse to make reasonable settlements as to time and terms of payment in full consideration of circumstances of Allied debts, and Under-Secretary of State added that establishment of sound economic conditions in Europe, serious reduction of military outlays and demonstration of a disposition of European peoples to work together to achieve aims of peace and justice will not fail to have their proper influence upon American thought and purpose in connection with such adjustment.

In further reply to communication of His Majesty's Government, it may be said that United States Government is not in a position to appoint a member of Reparation Commission, inasmuch as such an appointment cannot be made without consent of Congress. The Secretary of State has no doubt, however, that competent American citizens would be willing to participate in an economic enquiry for the purposes stated, through an advisory body appointed by Reparation Commission to make recommendations, in case that course, after further consideration, should be deemed preferable.

As to further question whether American co-operation in an enquiry for the purposes described in communication of His Majesty's Government could be hoped for in case unanimity of European Powers could not be had, United States Government must again express view that question involved cannot be finally settled without concurrence of European Governments directly

C 62793

concerned. Other Governments cannot consent for them, and it would manifestly be extremely difficult to formulate financial plans of such importance and complexity without participation of those whose assent is necessary for their fulfilment. In view of existing exigencies, it is hoped that project of such an enquiry as is contemplated of an advisory nature might commend itself to all these Powers, and that question suggested will not arise. But if it should arise from lack of unanimity on the part of European Powers, United States Government must reserve decision as to its course of action in order that development in such a contingency may be fully considered, and that course taken which will give best promise of ultimate success in securing desired end of re-establishment of essential conditions of European peace and economic restoration. To attainment of that end it may be repeated that United States Government desires to lend its assistance in any manner that may be found feasible.

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 11 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of these proceedings.

C 62794

SECRET.

E. 11th Meeting (1923).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE ELEVENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1923, AT 3 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. the EARL OF DERBY, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir SAMUEL HOARE, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

General the EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.

Air Chief-Marshal Sir HUGH M. TRENCHARD, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Major L. A. CLEMENS, O.B.E., M.C., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Major-General J. H. MACBRIEN, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of General Staff, Canada.

Commodore WALTER HOSE, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.

Vice-Admiral Sir ALLAN F. EVERETT, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of the Royal Australian Naval Board.

Rear-Admiral P. H. HALL-THOMPSON, C.M.G., First Naval Member Designate of the Royal Australian Naval Board.

Brigadier-General T. A. BLANEY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Representative on the Imperial General Staff at War Office.

Commodore A. G. HOTHAM, C.M.G., R.N., Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Delegation.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62795

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B. *(Secretary).*
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir Robert R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

DEFENCE.

Mr. Baldwin: Mr. Mackenzie King, may I ask you to begin the discussion?

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Appreciation of Statements of British Defence Ministers.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Prime Minister, I would like to express appreciation of the manner in which this whole subject-matter of defence has been presented to us, not only by the First Lord of the Admiralty, but by the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air. The whole discussion, up to the present, has been most informing in every particular, and I think we have all benefited by having had the position presented to us in the manner in which it has been.

Desirability of Uniformity in Training, &c.

Broadly speaking, as far as Canada is concerned, we entirely agree with the point of view, suggested by the Minister for War, that there should be similarity in the method of training, and common standards, so that in the event of the forces of the Empire co-operating at any time they would be able to do so with the greatest possible despatch and efficiency. We would feel it an advantage for our officers to have the opportunity of conferring with the officers of the different branches here. I might say that, if any of the Ministries here should like to make suggestions as to lines of training or procedure which it would be advisable for us to consider, we would welcome suggestions. How far it would be possible to act upon any suggestions would, of course, lie of necessity with the Ministers in the Dominion of the Departments concerned, and after conference on their part with their colleagues in the Cabinet. With this understood I think it would be entirely to the advantage of us all that we should have at any and all times opportunities of conference and consultation, and also that we would welcome any suggestions that may be put forward.

Interest of Canada in Air Defence.

As regards the three branches, I do not know that I can say very much as to which in our Dominion would be likely to receive more attention than the other. I do feel that, in considering Defence, having regard to the necessity of going to Parliament to ask for appropriations, it may be possible for us to do more at one particular time with one branch than with another. Just at the present time the matter of Air Defence is one to which we have been giving a good deal of attention, and we expect to give it a great deal more.

Extent of Canadian Participation in War must be decided by Canadian Parliament.

There is one point, I think, I ought perhaps to speak of with care. Lord Derby mentioned that one thing the Government here would like to be sure of was the number of men, or rather the extent of the forces, that could be counted upon. If that has reference to what at any time the personnel may be, what the equipment and general organisation may be, of course that is always available; but if it has reference to what the numbers of men or extent of forces may be available at any given moment

C 62796

for participation in war, I think I ought to make it clear that as to what extent Canada would participate in a war at any time must be considered a matter which her own Parliament will wish to decide. I do not mean by that that the Government of the day would not recognise its responsibilities in advising as to whether or not Canada should participate in a particular war or refrain from participating; the Government would have, of course, to take its responsibilities and meet Parliament in that regard; but I know that in case of a proposed participation the country would wish to have the situation considered on its merits, with reference to the circumstances which had occasioned it, and the directness of interest involved. In saying that, I wish it to be understood that I feel that, in any crises affecting the honour and integrity or the common interest of the Empire, Canada may be expected to do in the future as she has in the past, and be ready to play her part. It would be wrong, however, to have it assumed that any Department of Government here could feel that it had—if I might use the expression—a blank cheque from the Dominion to be filled in at a moment's notice with reference to any particular situation that might arise. I am quite sure our people and Parliament would not wish that impression to be left, nor do I expect that the authorities here would assume it should be. I think that is all I have to say.

Mr. Baldwin: Thank you very much. Mr. Bruce?

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Desirability of Uniformity in Training, &c.

Mr. Bruce: Prime Minister, in any general discussion upon the question of the Army, Navy, and Air Force of the Empire, the question arises of the necessity for co-operation. In regard to that, I do not think I need delay the Conference at all. Australia takes exactly the same view as Canada does. We believe it is most desirable that we should try and work as closely as possible in co-operation with Great Britain in regard to the training, equipment, plans, and every question involved in the general defence of the Empire.

Position of Dominions as regards Assistance in Emergency.

On the other question discussed by the Prime Minister of Canada, as to what the Dominions can be looked to to do in case of emergency, of course, nothing can be said before the emergency arises, but I think everybody is so familiar with that position that there is not the slightest necessity to stress it. One anticipates—and I think can anticipate confidently—that the Dominions will play the same part in any crisis that may arise in the future as they have in the past.

Appreciation of Statements of British Defence Ministers.

I come now to the statements that have been made, first the statement by Lord Salisbury on the general situation, and then the particular statements made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary for Air. They were of the most informative character, and I am sure we are all very grateful for the great amount of information given to us and for the admirable survey we have had of the whole position. There is very little that one wants to say on the general question, but I do think we have to consider exactly what is to come out of the whole of this discussion, and whether there is anything that we should do with regard to the position. It is very interesting to hear exactly where we stand, but at a Conference of this character I think we have got to do a little more than that.

Defence of Suez Canal.

With regard to the general situation as outlined by Lord Salisbury, there is only one point I want to deal with as the representative of Australia, and that point is the question of the defence of the Suez Canal. In that, above everything, we are vitally interested; and I need not point out how vitally, because

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62797

everybody here understands exactly the position. The Suez Canal is the one artery of communication on which we are dependent for our safety in any time of crisis. The value of the Suez Canal is even greater to-day than it has ever been before, because, in the past—except, certainly, during the period when the concentration took place in the North Sea, because of a particular danger—there has always been some substantial naval force in the Pacific. But under the new basis upon which we have to operate, with Singapore established and with the advance guard that it is proposed to put there, the whole value of Singapore depends on the certainty with which the Suez Canal can be relied upon for the Grand Fleet, or part of it, to come through. As far as Australia is concerned in the general situation as outlined by Lord Salisbury—and one has perhaps to look on these questions a little selfishly—we are most interested in the question of the Suez Canal and its safety. All I wish to say with regard to it is that in the present position, with the powers of self-government which are being given to Egypt now, Australia certainly urges that her vital interests are concerned in arrangements being made for a British garrison to stay in Egypt. That is one of the four points that have been left for further consideration and further discussion, but I wish at this Conference to urge that the view that Australia takes is that under any arrangements that may be made, whatever further concessions may be made to the Egyptians, that one point should be safeguarded; and that under no circumstances should the Empire agree to the withdrawal of the British garrison from Egypt. I do not think I need labour that question further. I only wish to indicate clearly how Australia views that particular question.

Military Defence of Australia.

With regard to the individual arms, in speaking before I roughly outlined where Australia is in regard to her military defence, and there is no need for me to repeat it now; but, broadly, we are taking such action as will ensure that we will have forces in Australia capable of coping with any situation that is likely to arise on land. In addition to the troops which we believe would be necessary for that, we are taking steps which we believe, in the course of the next few years, will enable us to produce all the munitions that we shall require, and also to produce munitions for general naval purposes in the Pacific if that is desired.

Air Defence of Australia.

As regards the air, there is very little that I want to say on behalf of Australia from an Empire point of view. As far as Australia and the air is concerned, we believe that we can do a great deal to cover our own safety by air defences, and we are taking steps to place ourselves in as good a position as our finances will allow.

Air Defence of Great Britain.

The air position in Britain generally, which was explained so clearly the other day by the Secretary of State for Air, must create a very real feeling of apprehension in all parts of the Empire, quite apart from Britain herself; but I do not think there is anything that the Dominions can do to help to alleviate that situation, except, perhaps, to recognise that it is imperative that Britain should place her air defences in such a position that the heart of the Empire need not fear any real menace in the future, and then, seeing the task that lies to Britain's hand, we might realise, to an even greater extent than we do, the necessity of relieving Britain of some of the obligation of general naval protection for the whole of the Empire.

Naval Defence of Australia.

It is mainly with regard to the Navy that Australia is concerned, and I endeavoured the other day to make our attitude clear. I think I could best define it by saying that I endorse the whole of the first part of the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, where he deals with the question of the Empire's position generally and the necessity for absolute security on the sea, for the whole of our possessions, and the whole of our trade routes. But Australia is

C 62798

the furthest away of the possessions, and she is already peculiarly dependent upon protection from the sea, because, while we are prepared to provide for our own land defence, any land defence that we have in contemplation is only of a character to meet any crisis which might arise, always assuming that, even if, for the moment, the Empire had not complete command of the Pacific, it would be only a matter of a reasonable period before that command was re-established. It is, of course, to the Navy and to our defence on the sea that we have to look for our safety. Australia has, in the past, done a great deal, considering her limited financial means, in the way of contribution towards the naval defence of the Empire.

We are prepared to go on in the future in the same way as we have done in the past, and possibly, when we come to discuss the actual details, we may find that we are able to do something more. We hope to be able to continue to contribute towards the Navy, and even to increase our contribution.

Need for Maintenance of One-Power Standard.

But any such action has to be based upon one generally accepted Empire principle, and that is the principle that we must have an Empire Navy as strong as that of any other Power in the world—the one-power standard, as it was laid down by the 1921 Conference. Taking that view, I think that at a general discussion this Conference should reaffirm that, as the Representatives of the whole of the Empire, we believe that a one-power standard is essential for our safety, and that, according to the particular circumstances of our own Dominions, we are prepared to do what we can to assist in maintaining that standard. With your permission, Prime Minister, I think it might not be out of place if, during this discussion, I were to move some Resolution on the general lines I have indicated on that particular point.

Need for Naval Base in Pacific.

The other naval question in which Australia is vitally interested is the question of a Base in the Pacific. When we discussed this matter before, I raised a number of difficulties, but I must admit that most of them were raised for the purpose of clearing my own mind, and to confirm information which I had already obtained on the general question. For instance, I raised the question of the possibility of entering into some further arrangement, in extension of the Washington Agreement, which might remove the necessity for the establishment of a Base in the Pacific, and I indicated that that appeared to be dependent upon the elimination of the Battleship entirely from the Naval Forces of all the countries of the world. That view has been confirmed by the information I have obtained here, and I recognise that it is not at present possible to arrive at an arrangement of quite such a drastic character; and, that being so, one has to accept the necessity of a Base being created in the Pacific.

Value of Capital Ship.

I also raised the question of the value of the Battleship or Capital Ship to-day in modern warfare. I think my mind has been reasonably satisfied on that subject too; so that, the abolition of Battleships altogether not being practical, and Battleships apparently being still of major importance in Naval Warfare, we get to the point that a Base in the Pacific is clearly necessary if our trade routes and trade interests in the East are to be protected and the Great Dominions which lie in those seas are to have their safety assured. From the Australian point of view, we are prepared to subscribe to the necessity of a Base in the Pacific.

Strategical Value of Singapore.

Another point I raised was whether Singapore was the proper strategical spot for that base. On that point we now agree that Singapore is the place, and accept it as the spot where the Base should be created. There are a number of other points with regard to Singapore which I raised as to its garrisoning and other matters. While I am not quite as clear as I should like to be as to how exactly the protection of Singapore is to be assured, I am clear on this point, that apparently it can be done; and, having cleared

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62799

away any misunderstanding there might have been that Australia would be in a position to reinforce any garrison there rapidly, I am sufficiently satisfied on that part of the question not to raise any further points about it. Broadly speaking, on behalf of Australia, I am prepared to say that we believe that the establishment of a Base at Singapore is absolutely vital to our interests and to the interests of the Empire as a whole; and, taking that view, we are prepared to support the proposals of the British Government that a Base should be established there. As to any question of contribution towards the Base, that appears to me to fall into the general question of any contribution we may at this time be in a position to make to the Naval strength of the Empire generally, and Singapore does not stand as a separate subject about which we have to declare any particular policy as to contribution or non-contribution. It is more a matter for us to discuss generally with the Admiralty when we are discussing what Australia can or cannot do by way of a general contribution towards the Naval strength of the Empire. But with regard to Singapore also, I think it would be a good thing if we passed some general Resolution at this Conference, as representing the whole Empire, approving the establishment of the Base.

Arguments for Base in Pacific.

There are many other things that I should like to say with regard to Singapore, but I do not think it is necessary to do so. I indicated previously certain points that I feel very strongly about in connection with it; but I would again particularly stress the fact that unless we do get a base in the Pacific, then the 5, 5, 3, 1·75. 1·75 basis agreed to at Washington is not really being given effect to; because, while we might have that number of capital ships, we have rendered them absolutely impossible of operation in certain great areas of the world. The other point to which I attach tremendous importance is the fact that unless we have got this base in the Pacific, when the time comes to reconsider the question of an arrangement on the lines of the Washington Treaty, we shall be placed in a position where we have no real strength in those seas, and consequently nothing to bargain with, just as it is suggested at this moment we have nothing to bargain with in connection with the Air Forces of the Empire as compared with other countries. Those two points, I think, have got to be very carefully borne in mind.

Proposed Resolutions.

With regard to any other questions, I do not think there is anything that I need say at this moment, but I should certainly like to have an opportunity, before the general discussion is finished, to move a resolution dealing with both the necessity of maintaining a one-power standard and the necessity of the establishment of a base at Singapore.

With regard to the Suez Canal, I do not know that I was proposing to move a resolution about that, although I should very much like to do so. I have raised that point, but I do not know that I have a resolution in my mind. I think, however, it is so vital, both from our point of view and from that of New Zealand, and I believe also from the whole Empire point of view, that a general expression of opinion by this Conference would be an admirable thing.

Mr. Amery: It is just possible that the resolution might not be desirable from the point of view of its effect upon Egypt.

Mr. Bruce: Certainly it would have to be a very private resolution.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Comments on Military Position.

Mr. Massey: I do not know that I have a great deal to say upon this subject. I would, however, like to say this, that the two statements, the one made by the Secretary of State for War and the other made by the Secretary of State for Air, taken together, make the most serious—and I will go further than that and say the most

C 62800

startling statement that has been made to this Conference or to any Imperial Conference since the end of the war. I think, with regard to the military forces of France, we had all got the impression that France had again become a very strong military Power, but I had no idea that her military forces were so strong as the statement made by the Secretary of State for War represented them to be. Of course I accept his statement unreservedly.

Comments on Air Position. Serious Situation and need for Action.

Then with regard to the Air Force. I do not want to refer to what has taken place in the past because I might be doing an injustice, but I would like to say that I hope the present state of things, as far as the Air Force is concerned, will not be allowed to continue. Let me safeguard myself by saying this, that I think it is 1,000 or 10,000 to 1 that France contemplates, or is likely to make, war upon Britain. I do not think there is any idea of that sort at present, but there is always the one chance, and we never know what may happen in the future. As I understand the statement made with regard to the Air Force, it is something like this: that, leaving out the second-class aeroplanes and those that have become obsolete, the position at the worst from our point of view is that France has 600 aeroplanes of, what I think the Secretary of State called, "the line."

Sir Samuel Hoare: Of the independent striking force, that is, unattached to any military formation.

Mr. Massey: Yes, but fit to make an attack upon any country which it was thought desirable to attack?

Sir Samuel Hoare: Yes.

Mr. Massey: Perhaps a great many more than that. Britain has only eighty.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Roughly speaking, that is correct.

Mr. Massey: To my mind that is a very serious position. Six hundred aeroplanes in the possession of a Power which may—though it is only a mere chance—become an enemy Power, as against eighty which we possess at the present time. I happened to read this morning in the "Daily Mail" a very startling account of what took place upon one occasion when the enemy's Zeppelins visited London for the purpose of bombing it. A good many people were killed—I think there were fifty—but the damage done when it was over was very slight compared with what was intended. Perhaps other members may have read it also, but London appeared to have been saved by the fact that no lights were shown, no guns were fired, and the enemy was in doubt all the time as to whether he was over London or not. I do not know whether anything of that sort could happen again, but 500 or 600 aeroplanes belonging to an enemy Power (again I am very sorry to have to suggest France, because I do not like it: we have been Allies and comrades in arms so long that I hope nothing of the sort is possible in the future, and I cannot imagine it happening, but, at least, there is the possibility) coming along and attacking London as they might, with only a force of one-tenth their number against them, there might be serious consequences, not only for London, but very serious consequences for the whole of the Empire. Supposing one morning the people of Britain woke up and found that London had been bombed and many thousands of people had been killed, what would be the effect of it? I am afraid we should have what people are in the habit of calling revolution. I say again that in my opinion, for what it is worth, the present state of things should not be allowed to continue, and should be remedied at any cost; it does not matter what the cost may be. We cannot take risks like this.

Naval Defence.

I feel as strongly on naval defence as any man in the Empire, because, like the Prime Minister of Australia, we know that our security and our safety in the Pacific depend upon naval defence. In a case of war we could not exist without Naval Defence, but the other instance to my mind is a more serious danger. I come back

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62801

to the Naval Defence; the mere fact of the possibility of what may take place in the case of an attack on London appears to my mind to show the necessity of having a strong naval force in case it may be required. It is actually another argument in favour of strengthening Naval Defence. I may say at once that I am not quite satisfied with the one-power standard. I do not think it is quite enough. If a naval engagement were to take place and we lose the balance of power, we do not know where we are going to be. I think the safety of the Empire is far too serious to be treated lightly. I do not say it is being treated lightly, I take my responsibility with the other citizens of the Empire just as readily as any one else, and I think this matter ought to be treated more seriously than it is being treated at present.

Need for High Standard in British Aeroplanes.

Again, coming back to these aeroplanes which France is building now, she has many thousands of mechanics at work—and as far as our aeroplanes are concerned I hope when we proceed to strengthen this branch of our defence care will be taken to see that the British aeroplanes will be—as they were when the war was going on—the very best that can be produced. I think we are justified in claiming that the British aeroplanes were a long way the best, and British airmen could not be beaten. I often marvelled at the way the men from Overseas took to aviation—they did it well. One man from my country—in the case, I think it was, of the second Zeppelin that came to London—managed to get over it and to drop a bomb; and there was an end of the airship. I think when one looks back at what took place during the war and remembers that British citizens from all over the Empire assisted in saving the position, I think we ought to be certain that nothing of the sort is allowed to occur again, but that the Empire will be properly protected as far as it is possible for us to do it.

Singapore.

Just a word about Singapore. I have already expressed my opinion with regard to Singapore. I took the opportunity of reading almost everything that was said about the proposed naval base, and most of my fellow-citizens in New Zealand are in agreement; Parliament has already agreed to a preliminary vote—it can be multiplied several times over as the work goes on—but they have already agreed to a vote of £100,000 towards the cost of the naval base of Singapore. That is the position to-day.

Suez Canal.

As to the Suez Canal, I realise the importance of the Suez Canal; it is not nearly so important to us as it is to Australia, but that makes no difference; it is exceedingly important to the Empire. I remember reading the opinion of a German authority when the war was going on. It was a very important opinion, coming from an enemy, and what he said, as far as I can remember, was like this: "The Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the Empire, and that, if we could cut the Suez Canal, the British Empire would bleed to death." That is the way he expressed it. I thought then that he was absolutely right, and I think so now, but, whatever happens, the Suez Canal has got to be defended at any cost.

Readiness of New Zealand to contribute to Empire Defence.

I feel that we shall have to do a great deal more in the way of defence, and it is difficult to apportion the different shares, because in some places it may be more important to an Overseas Dominion to provide a military force or an air force than to provide for Naval Defence, and some very elastic arrangements will have to be made in that direction. So far as we are concerned, I always realise that the population of my country is small as compared with some of the other Dominions, but it is growing, and in another fifty years or so it will be a very important part of the Empire; all I can say at present—and my people will stand to this—is that we are quite prepared to pay our fair share for anything in the way of Naval Defence, Air Defence and Military Defence after that. I put Military Defence last because the men of the Empire will rise to the occasion when necessity requires.

C 62802

I do not know that I have anything more to say, Prime Minister, but I was very glad to see that this matter is being taken quite seriously, and I hope that the importance of it will be realised, and some good results will accrue from the discussions that have taken place.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Appreciation of previous Statements.

Mr. Warren: After the exhaustive and illuminating statements made by Mr. Amery, Lord Derby and Sir Samuel Hoare, we ought all to know pretty well where we stand as far as the question of our defence is concerned. The statements must have been particularly illuminating with regard to their bearing upon our diplomatic relations with other countries.

Admiralty Memoranda.

As a matter of fact, circulars have been issued to all the Prime Ministers from Overseas containing more or less concrete proposals as regards naval defence, and I am somewhat disappointed at the result from the various speeches which have been made. Whether that result can be altered or extended to better advantage by Committee meetings or private interviews, I do not know, but, as far as I am concerned, I feel somewhat like Mr. Massey.

Need for contributions from Dominions towards Defence.

I do not want to use the word "sponging," but it is quite evident that Great Britain is really doing more than her share in regard to our defence, and I quite realise that with the high rate of taxation here, and the many calls upon her resources, Great Britain rightly expects the Dominions Overseas to take their share in defence as far as they can. I was much struck by Lord Beatty dropping a hint in his speech that some parts of the world might go unprotected if Great Britain came to the conclusion that she was unable to cope with the situation, or to provide the necessary defence.

Development of Royal Naval Reserve in Newfoundland.

Now, as far as Newfoundland is concerned, you all know we are not a wealthy community, but we have good men there. We cannot provide battleships or cruisers, but we can provide the men. We are very proud of the fact that Newfoundland, during the late war, lost at sea more men than all the other Overseas Dominions put together. We are quite prepared to do our share again at any time when we may be called upon for assistance. Until two years ago, in co-operation with the British Government, we had an establishment of the Royal Naval Reserve, and I do not think that the money spent on it was by any means wasted. Indeed, it was well spent, and Newfoundland during the war fully justified the expense of her Naval Reserve. Owing to the fact that the British Government withdrew this contribution, the Naval Reserve has not been continued, but I intend upon my return to take up the question of the Naval Reserve again, and I am quite sure that in a short space of time we shall go on providing and training the men to man the ships which Great Britain places at our disposal.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Lord Peel: First of all, Prime Minister, I want to make one observation with reference to the statement made by Lord Derby two or three days ago. He was discussing the reductions made in the Army, and the reductions made also in the Indian Army. He was, of course, referring solely to the British Army in India.

Lord Derby: Yes.

Recent reductions in Indian Army.

Lord Peel: And I should like to state, in order to avoid any misconception, that reductions in establishments have also been made in the units of the Indian Army as well. The reductions are not merely confined to the British Army in India.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 38 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62803

Royal Indian Marine.

Then I want to say a word about the composition and prospects of what is now known as the Royal Indian Marine, in connection with the possibilities of Indian co-operation with the Royal Navy. May I say at the outset that there used to be an old Indian Navy, because in the time of Charles II and James II the East Indian Company was permitted to establish a small Navy, for the purpose of policing the seas and protecting their trade from pirates, and duties of that kind. That came to an end in 1863 from motives of economy, and then the duties of that Force—the Lighthouse and Survey Services and various civil duties of that sort, which are combined now, adding up to about twenty-two different heads of activity—were handed over to what is known as the Royal Indian Marine. It was built up into the Royal Indian Marine. That is the Force we have now in being. Its present approximate composition is 182 Officers, 63 Warrant Officers, and 1,248 other Ranks (excluding domestics). Its sole duty in case of War is to hand over to the Royal Navy such ships and such men as may be required.

It did a very great deal of service in the late war. It has a fleet now of about fourteen vessels, including three big troopships, two of the troopships being over 6,000 tons and one over 8,000 tons. Some of these vessels were used as auxiliary cruisers by the Royal Navy. They were captained by officers of the Royal Navy, but the other officers and ratings were supplied by the Royal Indian Marine. They also did a very great deal of transport work, and further provided and manned naval craft for Mesopotamia, and also did a certain amount of transport work in East Africa.

Lord Jellicoe's Proposals for Reorganisation.

Well then, of course, all these experiences of the war raised the question as to what further organisation or better organisation could be made for the Royal Indian Marine, and how it could co-operate better with the Imperial Naval Forces. As a result of that, Lord Jellicoe was asked to report, and he made a very careful report, in which he advises the creation of a Royal Indian Navy. He advises also the improvement of military defences in the great ports in India, and the provision of a first-class dockyard in Bombay. That was considered at that time to be rather ambitious by the Government of India, and, moreover, it fell on financial grounds, because it would have cost about $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions sterling a year, which was quite impracticable under existing circumstances. Moreover, they thought they ought to proceed more slowly for testing the suitability of Indian ratings for Naval service.

Later Proposals.

In 1921 they had a great deal of advice from many quarters. For instance, the Admiralty suggested a scheme for naval control of mercantile trade in future wars which did not require any special establishment in the time of peace, but in time of war required that fifty-two ranks and 662 ratings should be provided for manning defensively-equipped merchant vessels. Then in that year there was the report of the Esher Committee, which suggested that the head officer of the Royal Indian Marine—the Director—should, in future, be a Rear-Admiral on the active list of the Royal Navy with the improved status of a Secretary to the Government of India, and that the policing of the Persian Gulf should be handed over from the Royal Navy to the Royal Indian Marine. There had been a development by that time in Indian opinion itself, and a resolution was put down in the Assembly, to the effect that a Committee should prepare a scheme for the organisation of an Indian Naval Fleet, manned and officered by Indians, and they also suggested that a Royal Naval College should be established. This resolution was never reached owing to time, but I understand it commanded a great deal of support in the Indian Assembly. As a result of these suggestions, a Conference was convened in Bombay by the Government of India, the members of which included the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Naval Station and the Director of the Royal Indian Marine. The outcome was an elaborate scheme under seven heads, but under the seventh head the Government of India felt themselves unable, at present, to accept their recommendation, and that was, that they should accept the suggestion, which I had already referred to, made by the Admiralty, of providing so many

C 62804

ranks and ratings towards manning defensively-equipped merchant vessels in time of war. They thought this question ought to be postponed until the Royal Indian Marine had had more training, and until materials had been provided for a Naval Volunteer Reserve Force, but, with that exception, the scheme was generally accepted by the Government of India, and was sent over here, and it is now under consideration.

Scheme now under Consideration.

I will summarise it very shortly indeed. It suggests, first of all, that the civil duties which I have generally enumerated should be retained by the Royal Indian Marine, but a suggestion is made that it should no longer undertake transport duties and should get rid of these three transport vessels which I have spoken of. It has to be very carefully considered, whether, in the present circumstances of shipping in India, it is wise to rely for the transport of troops on vessels taken up on contract from private firms. Subject to that exception, the proposal is that Indian seamen should be trained in gunnery, minesweeping, minelaying, control and examination services, and generally the duties in connection with the defence of Indian ports. As regards the policing of the Persian Gulf, it is not felt that it could be easily undertaken just at present by the Royal Indian Marine. The scheme aims at performing, at about the same cost as at present, useful and necessary defensive duties. It is hoped that young Indians, who have some predilection for the sea, would be able to join this Marine and become capable officers. Of course, the personnel of the lower ratings has been already obtained from Indians, so nothing more would be required than perhaps a little more training. Lastly, the object of the scheme is to interest Indians generally, in the Assembly and the Council of State and so forth, in Naval defence, and, possibly, in the future, in laying the foundations of an Indian Navy.

STATEMENT BY THE MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR.

Number of Capital Ships available for British Empire as result of Washington Conference.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Prime Minister, I only want to ask a question of the First Lord of the Admiralty. On what basis the proportion of capital ships was fixed at the Washington Conference? Because, from the figures quoted, I understand that the United States and the British Empire are supposed to maintain the same number of ships, in numbers.

Mr. Amery: Capital ships?

The Maharajah of Alwar: Capital ships I mean. The British Empire consists not only of the British Isles and of countries near to it, but of vast continents which lie over the two hemispheres, and I am afraid I have failed to understand how it has been placed on the same level, say—I am not making any invidious comparisons—as the United States, who certainly do not possess such vast areas and dominions outlying on the seas so far away from the hub of the Empire. If you could kindly answer me that question, I will just make one or two more remarks.

Mr. Amery: I think the practical answer is really this, that the sea being for strategic purposes in effect one providing reasonable mobility, that if you are secure yourself against the strongest single Power, assuming that you are not going to be faced with a combination of great Naval Powers, as far as the main battle fleet is concerned, the extent of your trade and territorial schemes does not affect the decision of the battle, if you are sure that your main Naval battle can be won against any possible opponent, and, as I said the other day, if it had been any other competitor than the United States, or if we thought that that was a probable opponent and not a dimly possible opponent, we should have had to fix the standard much higher than the one-Power standard. But as I also pointed out, the moment you come to the question of cruisers which affect the protection of your territories and trade routes against raids of all sorts, then it was at once quite impossible that we could come to any standard, even remotely resembling equality with the United States.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62805

The very conditions that the Maharajah mentioned make it quite impossible for us to consider equality or anything remotely approaching it with the United States, and, as I suggested, that really makes the fixing of cruisers directly impossible, because any figure which we could accept would show so large a disproportion that I am sure American public opinion would never accept it. When you come to the capital fleet, the actual fighting strength of the main battle, if you can overcome the next strongest enemy, then your cruisers can seize the rest of the seas.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Our past experience has shown us that wars, whether on sea or on land, do not generally take place with individual nations, they do form combinations, and what they may be or how they may form is a thing of the future which perhaps nobody can say, but, nevertheless, the British Empire I always understood maintained in past periods a naval strength of two to one—that it has two as against one of any other nationality.

Mr. Amery: No. Might I explain that it was a standard of equality with a margin as against the next two Powers, when those next two Powers were in actual alliance, and were in very keen, and, at times, very anxious competition with us? When we had to deal with one Power, namely, Germany, we fixed the strength as against that Power at a margin of 60 per cent. superiority in capital ships.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Well, I will now conclude my statement with just two remarks. One is, supposing we take one of the Dominions—I am sure my colleagues will not misunderstand me if I give a mere suppositious statement—supposing one of the Dominions—I will take the onus on myself of mentioning India, but India does not have a single capital ship or cruiser—that any one of the Dominions, God forbid, fell out of the British Empire, would not it be then entitled to have its own capital ships as one of the independent States? Well, under those circumstances, why should it not be entitled to have a capital ship when it is within the British Empire?

Mr. Amery: Any Dominion can have a capital ship or as many as it likes within the British Empire as long as the total number of the capital ships of the British Empire does not exceed twenty.

The Maharajah of Alwar: That is my point. Supposing you have your twenty. That Dominion would be entitled to have its own capital ships, one or two or three—several.

Need for strengthening Air Forces of Empire.

However, realising that point of view and appreciating that the British Empire has reduced its naval strength from two to one, it does make it the more important in my estimation and how necessary it is to strengthen the air forces of the British Empire so that it can, at any rate, look after the home lands and keep them free from any danger that might come from any quarter, and, therefore, I lay great stress on what General Smuts mentioned the other day that the situation that was laid out before us was certainly not a very satisfying one from the point of view that our force as compared with our neighbours—for instance, France—was very small, and, while there have been no Washington Conferences regarding air, I hope that our Empire will take the opportunity, if I may say so without presumption, and if it is possible financially—and I hope it will be made possible—to strengthen the air forces as much as it possibly can and to encourage the Dominions to follow suit.

REPLY BY THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

Thanks to Representatives of Dominions and India.

Lord Salisbury: I think we are very grateful indeed to the representatives of the Dominions for the cordiality with which they have received the statements about Imperial defence, and we are very grateful to the Maharajah just now for his support for increasing the air forces, and very grateful to Mr. Warren for assuring us that he would cordially co-operate for increasing our naval strength. That is for my Right Honourable Friend, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to deal with. Mr. Massey was good enough, in his kind way, to take a certain amount of blame to himself and

C 62806

to others for not having realised, up to now, the great weight of the burden which rests upon the Imperial Forces.

I do not know how he could have done otherwise, because we cannot publish these things to the world, and it is only in these very confidential discussions that we can go into these details, but it is quite true that the burden is very, very heavy indeed. I am grateful personally to General Smuts for having dwelt upon it and having pointed out, as perhaps we cannot point out, how heavy the burden is upon us.

Mitigating Circumstances in connection with Air Situation.

But there are some mitigating circumstances during the years which immediately succeed the great war. There are still in being a great number of trained pilots who have gone back into civil life and who may be available in respect of the Air Service, if there were, what there is no expectation of, a great war immediately, and in the same way there are no doubt a number of outclassed, old-fashioned machines which might be of some use, which are at present in existence. I do not say that goes for very much, but those are mitigating circumstances. We recognise, I may tell the Conference, even more acutely than they do the risks we run until we have an adequate Air Force, and we shall certainly lay to heart all that has been said by our kindly critics from across the seas and especially in the matter of acceleration. General Smuts dwelt upon that. I do think it is possible by a little pressure that we might accelerate a little beyond the figures given by my Right Honourable Friend. No doubt that kind of acceleration, as General Smuts knows better than I do from his experience in the war, is rather expensive, but something must be done and we have got to spend money on unemployment, and the matter is under the careful consideration of the whole of His Majesty's Government at the present moment.

Suez Canal.

I was very glad to find how fully what I ventured to say about the Suez Canal was re-echoed by several speakers, especially by Mr. Bruce. I quite agree with what he said as to the vital character of the Suez Canal and I can assure him that I was speaking well within the mark in what I said to the Conference at the time I spoke before.

Question of Resolutions.

Mr. Bruce said in his very interesting speech that he thought that we must go a little further than a mere discussion. He was speaking not merely in reference to the Air Service and the Suez Canal, but as regards the other big naval points that have been dealt with, and he indicated that he himself was prepared to move resolutions. That is a most important matter of which we take full note and I may respectfully say that I entirely agree with him; it is well worthy of consideration, the question as to whether there should not be resolutions, but the matter must be approached with a great deal of care. These resolutions, especially if they are going to be published, will require the most careful drafting.

Suggested utilization of Committee of Imperial Defence.

I noticed that Mr. Mackenzie King was good enough to say he for his part was anxious that in all these matters of Imperial defence at all times there should be the closest co-operation and consideration as between the representatives of the Dominions and of the Imperial Government and, of course, I need not tell him I most cordially agree with him. We for our part are prepared to put every facility in the way of such co-operation. I was wondering whether perhaps in respect of these resolutions or of any resolutions that may be drawn we might not avail ourselves of that suggestion. As Mr. Mackenzie King knows, by the constitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence, as I ventured to describe it a few days ago, the representatives of the Dominions are cordially welcomed to join in our discussions upon all matters that concern the Empire as a whole and, if it was thought well, it would be quite easy to arrange a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence which the Dominions would attend by whatever representative they thought fit, and we would then go carefully through the points of the resolutions. If it was only a question of

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62807

naval defence it could be done at the Admiralty; if it was only a question of the air it could be done at the Air Ministry, but if it is to deal with both services and general questions like the Suez Canal, which covers all the three services, then I think the Committee of Imperial Defence would appear to be the proper arena in which the thing could be discussed and any further technical points which Mr. Bruce or any other Dominion representative desired to put about the Suez Canal or about Singapore—Mr. Bruce spoke of other technical points in regard to Singapore which he had in his mind—those can all be put on that occasion and could be answered. All the necessary technical representation is present at the Committee of Imperial Defence, so the answers given are of the most authoritative kind. I throw that out as a suggestion, and, if thought fit, perhaps Mr. Bruce would not move his resolutions until they had first been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Draft Resolution in favour of One-Power Standard.

Mr. Bruce: The point that it appears to me we have to keep in view more than anything else is that any resolutions that we could possibly pass with the general consent of every representative of the Dominions would have to be quite general in character. If we passed a resolution in favour of a one-power standard, which indicated in any way what part any Dominion was to take in maintaining that standard, personally I could not think of endorsing it. It is a matter for my Parliament, not for me at all; but I have here a resolution of the type I had in mind. I am not moving it now, but I will read it to give an idea of what I had in view. The resolution is as follows:—

> "This Conference is of opinion that equality of naval strength to any one Foreign Power is the minimum standard of security for the Empire, and it is for the Governments and Parliaments of the Empire according to their several capacities and circumstances to co-operate in the maintenance of that standard."

That is a general resolution, drafted with a view to not embarrassing any representative or committing his Parliament to anything at all. It merely says that each part of the Empire according to their several capacities and circumstances will co-operate in the maintenance of that standard. I am afraid we can do no more here than pass very general resolutions of that character, because I do not think we have the authority from our Parliaments to do anything more. In regard to technical resolutions, I do not quite see how any could be evolved, but if there were anything which could be done in that direction—

Further Discussion on General Question of Resolutions.

Lord Salisbury: I had strongly in my mind that Mr. Bruce and the other Prime Ministers would not wish to tie their Parliaments for a moment. That is a point which would always have to be put into any draft. I think Mr. Bruce's draft covers it. I do not know if any of the other Dominion Prime Ministers would like to pass his resolution now. We have nothing to say against it at all. If there is any difficulty about drafting it could be considered before it was passed. There are resolutions which do not commit Parliaments to any expenditure, which is out of the question according to our democratic ideas, such as the importance of the Suez Canal, the necessity of having a base in the Far East; if you like, that the base should be Singapore. All those are the sort of things which would strengthen the hands of the Imperial Government if passed, but they would all require very careful drafting. Long experience has shown me that a hastily drafted resolution is a dangerous thing.

Mr. Bruce: I entirely agree. My suggestion was only as to the best way of getting the resolution drafted. Whether, for instance, it is a matter for the Committee of Imperial Defence.

General Smuts: I think we should be very careful about resolutions. Merely passing academic resolutions I think is no good. It serves no purpose. It simply makes people suspicious not only here but in the distant parts of the Dominions. They do not know what these general formulas are. It is no use passing a resolution about

C 62808

the Suez Canal; it is like passing a resolution about the alphabet. Of course we agree upon that; it is the vital point in the Empire. Now take the form of resolution which Mr. Bruce read here. I will point out the difficulties we are landed in. It is practically the resolution we passed two years ago—a one-power standard and the contributions to it to be settled by the different Dominion Parliaments.

Position now and in 1921.

See in what circumstances the resolution was passed two years ago. We were discussing an entirely different proposition. We were discussing one great fighting Navy to which the different Dominions should contribute. We had actually a scheme before us how the different parts of the Empire should contribute to the maintenance of one independent fighting force, and in the circumstances we then passed that resolution which stated that we should have the one-power standard, but the mode and degree of assistance from the various Dominions was to be settled by the Parliaments. That is what we had in view. This time we have before us an entirely different situation. The Admiralty has come forward with a different scheme, and the Admiralty has told us instead of this contributory scheme, this maintenance by all parts of the Empire of one unitary force, each part will now be responsible for its own naval units. Quite a different thing. The old formula will not apply any more.

Mr. Bruce: With respect, that was not the view that Australia took in the Conference of 1921. We would never have been any party to one unified navy.

General Smuts: If you were to go through the records of the 1921 Conference that is what you would find. I am not saying what attitude Australia ultimately would have taken up, but that was actually the point we were discussing, and Mr. Hughes was prepared to consult his friends about it and see what could be done. We passed this general formula in view of an entirely different situation from that which we are facing here to-day.

Mr. Amery: I must rather disagree with that, General Smuts. What was produced by the Naval Staff at the beginning of the 1921 Conference was a scheme which was then turned down, according to which, just as now, the different navies of the Empire were to be administratively separate, but it contemplated a common General Staff and a common strategic direction, even in peace, which it called a single navy. That was definitely turned down. It was generally agreed it was not a feasible scheme and we then went back to what was the position then and is the position now, navies autonomous not only in administration, but also entirely autonomous from the point of view of their staff and direction, and I think it was in view of that second position and after the first thing was turned down that the resolution of 1921 was passed. It was passed in quite general terms as General Smuts said, passed practically identically with Mr. Bruce's resolution, except that, as Washington had come on to the horizon, it was worded in the form which postponed things until after Washington:—

> "That, while recognising the necessity of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire to provide such naval defence as may prove to be essential for security,"

There is co-operation, no suggestion of unification or single navy.

> "And, while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other Power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned, and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on Disarmament."

I do venture to suggest that the only difference between the position in 1921 and the position now is that Washington has intervened, and, while I quite agree with General Smuts as to mere academic resolutions not being of value, I would not go so far as to say that a resolution reaffirming the one-Power Standard since Washington was in any sense academic.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 69 16 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62809

Value of Resolution.

It is certainly for me in the House of Commons of value to have a general reaffirmation of that by the Empire. Just in the same way, taking the position of Singapore, that is very largely criticised here by those who are taking a point of view which is purely local and which might lead to Imperial Defence generally being neglected. It makes a great deal of difference in my standing up for the Imperial point of view as against the purely local, the home waters and cross-Channel point of view, if I can point to a resolution saying that after careful consideration the Prime Ministers of the Empire at the Conference agreed that this was really the soundest thing put forward. I do not know whether this is the moment to go beyond tabling a resolution for subsequent discussion, but I should like to say that, from my point of view in the House of Commons, I do not regard resolutions of that sort as being without value. They certainly strengthen my case in asking the House of Commons to support that standard and I hope equally, though it will leave everybody free to do what they wish, if anybody does want to help in this matter, it also strengthens their hands. I certainly would say that as to the passing of a resolution, as we have done regularly at all Conferences before on subjects of this order, and they do strengthen the hands of the Governments concerned.

Position now and in 1921 (continued).

Mr. Massey: My recollection, Prime Minister, of what took place at the last meeting in 1921 was something like this, that after considerable discussion on one occasion we agreed to a certain resolution. We came along the next day and went back upon that for good and sufficient reasons which I will not go into now. There was an understanding that nothing more should be done until after the Washington Conference. There was also this circumstance at the time; we felt, or at all events we believed, that we were going to receive a certain amount of Reparation from Germany and it was suggested that the amount of money, or at all events a proportion of the Reparation received from Germany, should be used for purposes of naval defence. I do not think there was any objection to that. It is a very doubtful thing whether we are going to receive anything from Germany and we have got to fall back upon our own resources. That is my recollection of what took place. The position has changed absolutely since 1921. All the same I do not go back from what I said. So far as I am concerned, I am quite prepared on behalf of New Zealand to stand by any resolution which will strengthen the defences of the Empire, particularly in the way of naval defence and next so far as aviation is concerned.

Draft Resolutions to be circulated.

Mr. Baldwin: If the members of the Conference agree, I think it would be convenient and also save time, and I think it would probably be the most practical thing, for any proposed resolutions to be circulated, say, by Lord Salisbury after consultation, that members should have the resolutions and consider them quietly, and then probably we should be able to make up our minds, after a very short discussion, either to adopt or discard them. I am afraid this afternoon, if we went on with an indefinite discussion, we might be led away and take a very long time talking of resolutions and we might not get any farther this afternoon.

General Smuts: I quite agree, Prime Minister. I raised the debate not to take time ——

Mr. Baldwin: It might go on and we should perhaps find ourselves, after a time, wasting time. I think that had better be done. Mr. Amery, do you wish to make some observations on the general discussion? Then I will ask the Secretary of State for War to say a word.

REPLY BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Command of Sea vital.

Mr. Amery: I think there is one thing emerges very clearly, that we are all agreed that in order to co-operate effectively when war comes in respect of war services, in so far as each of our Parliaments decides to do something, it is desirable to do it in such a

C 62810

fashion that we can co-operate, if we want to, when the time comes. The only observation I should like to make on that is that the possibility of co-operation with regard to either the Army or the Air Force depends entirely upon the retention of the command of the sea. The splendid armies that Canada and Australia and every other Dominion sent to the Front in the late War could not possibly have been sent unless we had the assured command of the sea. That command is, therefore, a precedent condition of any other co-operation. As long as we do maintain it, co-operation is possible; the moment we cease to be in a position to maintain it, co-operation becomes impossible and each part of the Empire is forced to rely absolutely on its own resources.

Need for Wide Outlook.

Even with that co-operation there is no doubt that local circumstances affect different parts of the Empire differently. India, for instance, has a very obvious heavy military burden imposed upon her land defence and consequently she cannot take as large a part in naval defence as her population and her position in the Empire might otherwise warrant. Now the same applies where a very heavy air burden comes into consideration. Take the position of our Air Defence, which imposes a very heavy burden upon us in this country. Air fighting arises so rapidly and may be so rapidly settled that, although I know Sir Samuel Hoare is only too anxious for every form of co-operation in the Empire, the whole fight in this country, unless we were on our own capable of holding our position, might be settled long before any reinforcements came. Now, that is going to create a very serious difficulty about the maintenance of what is the foundation of it all, the naval position; as far as Empire Defence is concerned, you will have in ever-increasing degree people in this country, large newspaper proprietors, who have never looked at things from the Imperial point of view, all sorts of people, taking the view that the air defence of this country is not only essential in itself, but has got to take the place of the Naval Defence of the Empire as a whole, and you will find even as responsible people as Sir Robert Horne suggesting that the air defence of this country is an alternative, or should be done instead of proceeding with securing the naval position at Singapore. I mention that so that you will all realise that, unless we do treat maintenance of the common foundation of defence, our security at sea, as a co-operative matter, as a matter in which according to our several capacities and circumstances—a phrase Mr. Bruce used—we are really doing something, there may be a danger that the one thing upon which we all depend may be prejudiced by the local outlook, the shortsighted outlook predominating in this country. Hitherto the question that has been mainly to the front at this Conference has been whether the local or the broader outlook would prevail in the Dominions. The big danger to us all is the danger of the local outlook as against the broader common outlook prevailing in this country. All the future prospects of the Dominions, their whole fabric of life, the whole conception of the great continents that they propose to develop, all these things are dependent on the assumption that the command of the sea is secured for us all. It is by far the cheapest and most economical form of common defence, but there it is; we are all dependent on it. I want to lay stress upon the danger to the Dominions of this country getting into a frame of mind in which it thinks that the burden imposed upon it is too great, that it will look after its immediate local interests rather than what is the foundation of our common defence. I do not want to say more than that, but I think it is a factor that ought to be taken into account in considering how much each Government, or each Parliament, is prepared to do in the way of some more effective co-operation in maintaining our security at sea.

REPLY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

Thanks to Dominion Prime Ministers.

Lord Derby: I would like to thank the Prime Ministers for their statements with regard to the Army. I would like to point out that, although the Navy and the Air Force may come in first, it will always be left to the Army in the end to get the results.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 38 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62807

naval defence it could be done at the Admiralty; if it was only a question of the air it could be done at the Air Ministry, but if it is to deal with both services and general questions like the Suez Canal, which covers all the three services, then I think the Committee of Imperial Defence would appear to be the proper arena in which the thing could be discussed and any further technical points which Mr. Bruce or any other Dominion representative desired to put about the Suez Canal or about Singapore—Mr. Bruce spoke of other technical points in regard to Singapore which he had in his mind—those can all be put on that occasion and could be answered. All the necessary technical representation is present at the Committee of Imperial Defence, so the answers given are of the most authoritative kind. I throw that out as a suggestion, and, if thought fit, perhaps Mr. Bruce would not move his resolutions until they had first been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Draft Resolution in favour of One-Power Standard.

Mr. Bruce: The point that it appears to me we have to keep in view more than anything else is that any resolutions that we could possibly pass with the general consent of every representative of the Dominions would have to be quite general in character. If we passed a resolution in favour of a one-power standard, which indicated in any way what part any Dominion was to take in maintaining that standard, personally I could not think of endorsing it. It is a matter for my Parliament, not for me at all; but I have here a resolution of the type I had in mind. I am not moving it now, but I will read it to give an idea of what I had in view. The resolution is as follows:—

> "This Conference is of opinion that equality of naval strength to any one Foreign Power is the minimum standard of security for the Empire, and it is for the Governments and Parliaments of the Empire according to their several capacities and circumstances to co-operate in the maintenance of that standard."

That is a general resolution, drafted with a view to not embarrassing any representative or committing his Parliament to anything at all. It merely says that each part of the Empire according to their several capacities and circumstances will co-operate in the maintenance of that standard. I am afraid we can do no more here than pass very general resolutions of that character, because I do not think we have the authority from our Parliaments to do anything more. In regard to technical resolutions, I do not quite see how any could be evolved, but if there were anything which could be done in that direction—

Further Discussion on General Question of Resolutions.

Lord Salisbury: I had strongly in my mind that Mr. Bruce and the other Prime Ministers would not wish to tie their Parliaments for a moment. That is a point which would always have to be put into any draft. I think Mr. Bruce's draft covers it. I do not know if any of the other Dominion Prime Ministers would like to pass his resolution now. We have nothing to say against it at all. If there is any difficulty about drafting it could be considered before it was passed. There are resolutions which do not commit Parliaments to any expenditure, which is out of the question according to our democratic ideas, such as the importance of the Suez Canal, the necessity of having a base in the Far East; if you like, that the base should be Singapore. All those are the sort of things which would strengthen the hands of the Imperial Government if passed, but they would all require very careful drafting. Long experience has shown me that a hastily drafted resolution is a dangerous thing.

Mr. Bruce: I entirely agree. My suggestion was only as to the best way of getting the resolution drafted. Whether, for instance, it is a matter for the Committee of Imperial Defence.

General Smuts: I think we should be very careful about resolutions. Merely passing academic resolutions I think is no good. It serves no purpose. It simply makes people suspicious not only here but in the distant parts of the Dominions. They do not know what these general formulas are. It is no use passing a resolution about

C 62808

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Position now and in 1921.

See in what circumstances the resolution was passed two years ago. We were discussing an entirely different proposition. We were discussing one great fighting Navy to which the different Dominions should contribute. We had actually a scheme before us how the different parts of the Empire should contribute to the maintenance of one independent fighting force, and in the circumstances we then passed that resolution which stated that we should have the one-power standard, but the mode and degree of assistance from the various Dominions was to be settled by the Parliaments. That is what we had in view. This time we have before us an entirely different situation. The Admiralty has come forward with a different scheme, and the Admiralty has told us instead of this contributory scheme, this maintenance by all parts of the Empire of one unitary force, each part will now be responsible for its own naval units. Quite a different thing. The old formula will not apply any more.

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Mr. Amery: I must rather disagree with that, General Smuts. What was produced by the Naval Staff at the beginning of the 1921 Conference was a scheme which was then turned down, according to which, just as now, the different navies of the Empire were to be administratively separate, but it contemplated a common General Staff and a common strategic direction, even in peace, which it called a single navy. That was definitely turned down. It was generally agreed it was not a feasible scheme and we then went back to what was the position then and is the position now, navies autonomous not only in administration, but also entirely autonomous from the point of view of their staff and direction, and I think it was in view of that second position and after the first thing was turned down that the resolution of 1921 was passed. It was passed in quite general terms as General Smuts said, passed practically identically with Mr. Bruce's resolution, except that, as Washington had come on to the horizon, it was worded in the form which postponed things until after Washington:—

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62809

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Mr. Baldwin: It might go on and we should perhaps find ourselves, after a time, wasting time. I think that had better be done. Mr. Amery, do you wish to make some observations on the general discussion? Then I will ask the Secretary of State for War to say a word.

REPLY BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Command of Sea vital.

Mr. Amery: I think there is one thing emerges very clearly, that we are all agreed that in order to co-operate effectively when war comes in respect of war services, in so far as each of our Parliaments decides to do something, it is desirable to do it in such a

C 62810

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Even with that co-operation there is no doubt that local circumstances affect different parts of the Empire differently. India, for instance, has a very obvious heavy military burden imposed upon her land defence and consequently she cannot take as large a part in naval defence as her population and her position in the Empire might otherwise warrant. Now the same applies where a very heavy air burden comes into consideration. Take the position of our Air Defence, which imposes a very heavy burden upon us in this country. Air fighting arises so rapidly and may be so rapidly settled that, although I know Sir Samuel Hoare is only too anxious for every form of co-operation in the Empire, the whole fight in this country, unless we were on our own capable of holding our position, might be settled long before any reinforcements came. Now, that is going to create a very serious difficulty about the maintenance of what is the foundation of it all, the naval position; as far as Empire Defence is concerned, you will have in ever-increasing degree people in this country, large newspaper proprietors, who have never looked at things from the Imperial point of view, all sorts of people, taking the view that the air defence of this country is not only essential in itself, but has got to take the place of the Naval Defence of the Empire as a whole, and you will find even as responsible people as Sir Robert Horne suggesting that the air defence of this country is an alternative, or should be done instead of proceeding with securing the naval position at Singapore. I mention that so that you will all realise that, unless we do treat maintenance of the common foundation of defence, our security at sea, as a co-operative matter, as a matter in which according to our several capacities and circumstances—a phrase Mr. Bruce used—we are really doing something, there may be a danger that the one thing upon which we all depend may be prejudiced by the local outlook, the shortsighted outlook predominating in this country. Hitherto the question that has been mainly to the front at this Conference has been whether the local or the broader outlook would prevail in the Dominions. The big danger to us all is the danger of the local outlook as against the broader common outlook prevailing in this country. All the future prospects of the Dominions, their whole fabric of life, the whole conception of the great continents that they propose to develop, all these things are dependent on the assumption that the command of the sea is secured for us all. It is by far the cheapest and most economical form of common defence, but there it is; we are all dependent on it. I want to lay stress upon the danger to the Dominions of this country getting into a frame of mind in which it thinks that the burden imposed upon it is too great, that it will look after its immediate local interests rather than what is the foundation of our common defence. I do not want to say more than that, but I think it is a factor that ought to be taken into account in considering how much each Government, or each Parliament, is prepared to do in the way of some more effective co-operation in maintaining our security at sea.

REPLY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

Thanks to Dominion Prime Ministers.

Lord Derby: I would like to thank the Prime Ministers for their statements with regard to the Army. I would like to point out that, although the Navy and the Air Force may come in first, it will always be left to the Army in the end to get the results.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 38 14 15 16

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62811

Mr. Mackenzie King said in his remarks that we must not assume that there will be any specific contribution to any war that the Empire might be engaged in. I never for one moment made that assumption.

Two Main Assumptions.

I made two assumptions and I appeal on two assumptions which I hope are not ill-founded. First of all, that, if any part of the Empire, wherever it is, is attacked, the whole Empire will rally to the support of the part so attacked. Secondly, that it will rally to the fullest extent of its powers. My wish is to put forward schemes which will admit of the minimum amount of peace expenditure, with the maximum amount of expansion in time of war.

Meaning of Phrase "If Empire Attacked."

Mr. Mackenzie King: Might I interrupt just to make quite clear what is in my mind, because I think there should not be any false security at any point. We should know exactly what we mean. So much depends on what is meant by saying that—if the Empire is attacked at any particular part. My mind goes back to the situation as it was a year ago at the time when there was a certain difficulty with the Turks. If that had resulted in actual hostilities, I cannot say at the moment what the Canadian Parliament would or would not have ultimately done; but I would say this, I think there is very grave doubt whether the Parliament of Canada would at that particular time, with the information it had on that question, have undertaken to supply troops, at any rate at the beginning of the War. It is quite conceivable that trouble beginning with Turkey might have come in course of time to assume proportions where Christendom itself was in danger—a Moslem-Christian conflict; in that event there is scarcely doubt that Canada would have felt a certain responsibility to the Empire as a whole. I cite this because I think similar cases may arise, and I think it would only convey a sense of false security if one were to assume that in any situation which came about the merits of the emergency would not be looked into and examined from the point of view of the direct interest and responsibility of the Dominion, and the extent of its participation, if any, determined thereby.

Lord Derby: May I put it in this way? If the actual invasion of any portion of the British Empire was threatened by a foreign nation, all parts of the Empire would wish to come to the rescue and to the help of such part of the Empire as was threatened with invasion.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Unwarranted invasion certainly, but having regard to the existing circumstances.

Lord Derby: That is what I mean, unwarranted invasion.

Mr. Massey: Can invasion be anything else than unwarranted?

Lord Derby: I think we will leave that for the moment.

Plans for Military Co-operation if desired by Canada and other Dominions.

Mr. Mackenzie King has been good enough to say that he wishes to co-operate. May I make this suggestion to him? That we should prepare some scheme which should be submitted to him, a scheme for assistance by the Canadian Forces; that we should enter into direct discussion from the War Office with his Military Advisers of that scheme, thrashing it out in detail before it is submitted to him for his approval, if approval it be.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I am entirely satisfied to have the officers of your department of war confer with the officers of ours and submit any scheme for consideration.

Mr. Bruce: I understand that the suggestion is that a scheme should be prepared in case of necessity, so that, if any part of the Empire is invaded or attacked and Australia desires to co-operate, her troops may be moved overseas. It is merely laying the plans for voluntary action at some future time by our citizens who are inspired to offer their services overseas, so that we may have the plans ready for their action to be effective. We accept that most certainly and are only too anxious to co-operate with you.

C 62812

Mr. Massey: As far as plans are concerned, I say yes. If the Empire goes to war New Zealand is at war—that is where we are.

REPLY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Could I just say two sentences?

Mr. Baldwin: Please do.

Agreement that present Air Defence of Great Britain unsatisfactory.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Prime Minister, I do not want to be drawn into any kind of competition with my colleagues on Dominion co-operation, nor do I want to be drawn into any discussion as to what is the principal menace at the present time. That is a question we must all decide for ourselves. But I understand—and I hope the Prime Ministers will correct me if I am wrong—that the general impression at which they have arrived is that the present state of our Air Defence is, judged by the figures I gave them the other day, unsatisfactory, and that the sooner that state of affairs can be remedied the better. That, in itself, will strengthen my own hands and the hands of the Government in putting right, as quickly as we can, this unsatisfactory state of affairs.

Suggested Technical Discussions at Air Ministry.

Apart from that, there are only two suggestions that I wanted to make. The first is that I should very much like to know the view of the Prime Ministers, either now or at some time convenient to themselves, as to whether they would like a meeting at the Air Ministry to go in greater detail into the technical side of the Air position.

Inclusion in any General Resolution of Reference to Air Position.

Secondly, may I make the suggestion that if, in due course, they think fit to pass resolutions upon the subject of national defence they should not isolate one or two questions, as I think that, if the resolutions were published, isolated resolutions might do more harm than good, but that they keep in mind the whole of the defence problem, as it has been put to them during the last two days, and, assuming that they take the view that I do about the urgency of the air menace, they might see their way to include in those resolutions a resolution of that kind. I venture to throw out those two suggestions to you.

Mr. Mackenzie King: May I ask, in relation to the suggestion the Minister for Air has just kindly made, what his own wish would be in the matter?

Sir Samuel Hoare: Supposing the Prime Ministers had the time, I should very much welcome that they should come to the Air Ministry, and we could have gone into some greater detail with regard to the more technical side of it.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I should be very glad.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Perhaps I might put myself into communication with the Secretariat, and see if a convenient day could be arranged. The beginning of next week would suit me best, but that is a matter for the Prime Ministers to settle.

ORDER OF BUSINESS.

Mr. Baldwin: The next meeting of the Conference will be on Wednesday at 11 A.M. to consider the position of Indians in the British Empire. To-morrow, in the afternoon, there are two committees sitting, the Committee on the "C" Mandates at the Colonial Office at 4 o'clock, and the Committee on the Signature of Treaties at the Foreign Office at 5·30.

(The Proceedings were then adjourned until 11 A.M. on Wednesday, the 24th October, 1923.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 22, 1923.

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62813

SECRET.

E. 12th Meeting (1923).

54

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE TWELFTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C., C.H., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The Hon. H. BURTON, K.C., Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa.

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Professor JOHN MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Lieut.-Colonel C. W. G. WALKER, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir WOLSELEY HAIG, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.E., Political Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 12 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62814

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B., *(Secretary.)*
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir Robert R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

Newfoundland.
Mr. W. J. Carew.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. Thomson, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. O. Esmonde.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

POSITION OF INDIANS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE EMPIRE.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Lord Peel: Prime Minister, I should like to thank you and to thank the Conference also for giving the members of the Indian Delegation the opportunity of bringing this question of the position and status of Indians in the Dominions before you. I think you will all recognise that this subject is one of very high Imperial importance, and I know that in approaching the subject I speak in a general atmosphere of goodwill.

Importance of Problem.

Now, at the outset of the observations let me say that I wish to deal with the broad outlines of the subject, because my colleague, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, has some definite suggestions to make when he follows me. I propose to deal with this subject not so much as it affects any Dominion or any Colony, but in the most general way. I want to show that if the unity and the strength of the Empire are to be maintained and preserved it is really essential and imperative that we should find a solution of this problem of the position of Indians in the Dominions overseas. There have been, as the Conference knows, very great constitutional changes quite recently in the position of the Government of India, and these changes have brought into prominence what was possibly latent before, but is now clear, the existence of various parties with various opinions and policies. But, however much these parties may be divided in their points of view on general political subjects, on this one point there is complete unity of feeling. For instance, there is no difference as regards the strength of this feeling between the party which has been giving general support to the Government in the Assembly, and the various sections of what I may call the non-co-operative parties. When I speak of Indian opinion, I am not referring, as is often suggested, to what is described as the opinion of the intelligentsia only, of a definite intellectual class, but I am also stating the views of a great many who are not really necessarily concerned with politics at all. Let me pass from them for a moment. You have the opinions, we will say, of the Indian Princes, whose views will be given expression to to-day by His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar. You have other men like my other colleague, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, who, as we all know, was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and who holds a very high place in Indian public affairs. Therefore, you have this singular picture, that politicians, differing widely on all other subjects, and men of differing shades of thought, are generally united on this particular subject. You have staunch supporters of our rule in India combining on this subject with the extreme types of politicians. You have business men and landowners combining with men of a very different class and point of view.

C 62815

Feeling in India.

I certainly do not exaggerate when I say that this subject more than any other, I think, is constantly impressed upon me both officially and personally by the Government of India and by Lord Reading, the Viceroy. The Viceroy, in his private letters, is constantly explaining and pressing upon me how strongly the feeling of soreness and bitterness is growing on this subject, and how, in many ways, the task of wisely governing India is made more difficult by this divergence of feeling. Therefore, I want to place this first point before the Conference—the remarkable unanimity of feeling on the position of Indians in the Dominions; but I do not think when you come to ask the cause that it is very far to seek.

The reason why there is such unity among our fellow subjects in India is this, that they regard the disability under which their countrymen labour in other parts of the world as a brand of social inferiority. That is what cuts so deep into the consciousness of the Indian. I am not necessarily, of course, associating myself entirely with that view, because I know quite well that there are other causes contributing, that there are questions of economic difficulty, political questions with which this question must necessarily be linked. But I have no doubt whatever, that, in what I am saying now, I do voice the general opinion of Indians.

This question of social status is a contributory cause in the history of many social and political movements disguised under more resounding names.

India's Services to the Empire.

Well, let me say a word about this great country, feeling so strongly and unitedly on the subject. First of all, look at its contribution to the Great War. No less than 1,400,000 men from India took their part in the service of the Great War. Their contribution in money was well over £200,000,000. We all remember the general enthusiasm from all parts of India, and how Princes and others less distinguished all alike took part in the struggle of the Great War.

Her New Status.

And here, if I may say so, there are installed at this very table representatives of the Indian Delegation, showing that India is sitting here on equal terms with the other Dominions in the great council chamber of the Empire. And, again, at the League of Nations the representatives of India take their place with the other States represented there and are able to contribute their voice and their influence just as much as others to the deliberations of that Assembly.

Her Industrial Position.

Moreover, and I do not think this is always recognised, India, though it has been for centuries, for thousands of years a great agricultural State, is now ambitious to become an industrial State; it has gone far along the road, because it has been accepted by the League of Nations as one of the eight greatest industrial States of the world.

India's New Constitution.

Now India, as the Conference knows, has recently received a new political constitution, and that constitution, while giving the Indians far more power than they had before in the administration of India, has also given them a great outlet for the utterance of their national sentiments. Now what is the position in India itself? In India itself there is a policy of co-operation. Britons and Indians co-operate together in the Government of India; Britons and Indians sit together on juries; they meet together in business; they are fellow-directors in the great companies; they serve together on the Viceroy's Council; many of them, of course, are Ministers in the great provinces, and those Ministers command the assistance of members of the all-India Services whether British or Indian. Now, what must be the contrast in the minds of these men when they look abroad and see what their standard or status is in the States of the Empire. The members of this Conference,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62816

with their great experience of the cumulative effect of these institutions and the position which India now occupies here and in the League of Nations, will realise how much all these changes have contributed towards the growing self-consciousness and sense of dignity of India.

India's Feeling for the Empire.

Now I want to say this, and in the most plain way that I can; if I thought, and if my colleagues thought, that this desire for equality of treatment was inspired in any sense by a desire not to be part of, or to take part in, this great Empire, neither I nor my colleagues would be pleading the cause at this table. It is, indeed, the desire and it is the ambition of Indians—I will exclude the negligible class of extremists, who can be found I suppose in any country—it is their intent and ambition to share in the splendours, the glories, and the traditions of the British Empire.

They believe, moreover, that they can bring their own contribution, of thought, culture and loyalty, to this great combine. There are those who suggest that these disabilities under which Indians labour in some parts of the Empire are of little importance, that they do not interfere with their liberty, and that the denial of the vote does not very much matter one way or the other. Now, these views are, as one knows, the common form of objections put forward, either here or in any country, to franchise extensions and franchise grants. But, though the question has importance from the purely material point of view, I should be very ill discharging my duty to this Conference if I were to represent this matter as one to be regarded merely from the practical point of view. It is very largely with the Indians a matter of national sentiment and feeling, and it is with this feeling that we have to reckon.

Importance of India to the Empire.

Now, in all situations of Imperial activity, in matters of Imperial defence, matters of Imperial trade, Imperial communications or the development of Imperial resources, in all these India plays a most prominent part, and, as we have granted to India a large measure of representative institutions, it is quite clear that in dealing with these large matters we cannot disregard the opinions of the representative bodies which we have set up. And, supposing they were disregarded, how, after all, are you going to expect India to co-operate wholeheartedly in the great work of consolidating the Empire, and how, without this co-operation, can the Empire attain its full measure of strength? We know, too, that economic policy is very often influenced by political considerations; and I feel that both on the political and the economic side the task of governing India may be greatly increased, and that there will be, unless we settle this question, no real unity in the Empire, not merely on the material side—on which I am not laying so much stress to-day—but on what is so vastly more important, the moral side.

Scope of Problem.

Moreover, the scope of this problem as regards many of the Dominions is not really very great. For the moment I am excluding from that general proposition South Africa, where I know a great many currents and cross-currents of opinion complicate the issue; but as regards Australia, and as regards New Zealand, where much has been done, and as regards Canada, the numbers that we have to deal with are very small—about 2,000 in Australia, in all that vast country, about 600 in New Zealand, and about 1,200 in Canada, of whom, I think, rather more than 1,100 are in the Province of British Columbia.

Resolution of 1921 Conference.

I want to reaffirm what was stated at the Conference in 1921 as to the complete acceptance by the Government of India and Indian opinion of the right of the great Dominions to determine the composition of their own community. May I read the words of that resolution? They are as follows:—

> "The Conference, while reaffirming the resolution of the Imperial War Conference of 1918 that each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on

C 62817

> immigration from any of the other communities, recognises that there is an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire."

Therefore, that principle is laid down quite clearly, and consequently there need be no anxiety on the part of any of the Dominions that there is any desire on the part of Indian feeling to go back on that decision. Thus, in pressing this matter upon the generous consideration of the Dominions, I feel that, vast as are the implications of the problem, the solution of the practical question is perhaps not so difficult as it appears. Well, justice and expediency are often divided. Sometimes they approach each other, and when, as I think in this case, they combine and are merged in one another, the appeal is surely irresistible, and I am going to ask this Conference if the time has not come when these disabilities should not be specifically removed.

Indian Government's Duty of safeguarding Indian Nationals overseas.

I want to add this point, about the interest—possibly some may think the unnecessary interest—which the Government and the Indian people take in the position of Indians in the great Dominions. Now, so long as to any extent Indians in the Dominions may be regarded as a foreign body in the great body politic of those Dominions, so long is the Government of India bound to take an interest in their fate and to assure themselves as to the manner in which they are treated. But once they are absorbed they cease to be a foreign body; once they are absorbed into the great corporation, as it were, of the Dominions, then the interest of the Indian Government, of course, will cease; and there is nothing that the Indian Government, and there is nothing that anybody connected with it, there is nothing the Secretary of State for India dislikes more than interfering or appearing to interfere with the domestic affairs of the great Dominions. Now, I am not insensible, of course, of the grave difficulties which stand in the way. I know how very difficult it is to bring home always to local opinion that local views and opinions are not necessarily coincident with the wider interests of the Empire, and I know quite well that those who are listening to me as representative of the Dominions—whatever they may or may not have done—desire that a solution of this question should be found, and I do most earnestly plead that, when later in this Conference they take into consideration the practical measures which they may adopt for the solution of this question, they will bear in mind the intense feeling that has been aroused on this subject in India, and will bring home to their own people that in the highest interest of the Empire the aspirations of India should be respected.

Difficulties of Problem.

I know that there are great difficulties. The Prime Minister, in his opening address, spoke of the contacts of civilisation. There are contacts, of course, here of more than one civilisation, and you have peoples differing in tradition and social habits, fashioned in the course of centuries—thousands of years, I may say—fashioned by differences of national surroundings, by differences of secular and religious thought. We have to deal—and we should never forget when dealing with India that we have to deal—with ancient races full of the pride of race; we have to deal with ancient religions full of the pride of religion. That is, of course, one of the great differences we have to remember in dealing with the position of India as compared with countries further west. There are, for instance, 70 millions of Moslems in India—70 millions in India; but in communion with them through religious ties and rites there is a vastly greater body—hundreds of millions of Moslems—stretching in a great belt from the Gulf of Malaya right across to West Africa—hundreds of millions of Moslems, who, in their hour of worship, all turn their faces to Mecca.

Indian Culture and Traditions.

We have the pride of the Hindoos in their own history, in their recollections of the past; they look back to, shall we say, the

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
13
38
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62818

Mauryan Empire, the memories of Chandra Gupta and of his famous grandson King Asoka. Their memories stretch to an even earlier time when, scarcely noticed by history, their Aryan ancestors were moving down from the North-West Frontier, the traditional path for the invasion of India, along the plains of the Five Rivers now called the Punjab; they look back to dim far off times, to a date long before the Jutes and Angles and Saxons and Norsemen, the original elements of which our race is composed, landed on these shores; when Rome itself was a mere village, before the Roman legions garrisoned the Great Wall which used to run from sea to sea in the North of Britain; a period even before the Druids reared the gigantic monoliths of Stonehenge.

I press this subject on the Conference, and I hope, with the consent of the Prime Minister, that they will listen to Sir Tej while he deals with the subject in more detail.

STATEMENT BY SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Prime Minister, let me at once say how deeply grateful I feel to you and to His Majesty's Government, and may I thank you and His Majesty's Government and the various Prime Ministers for giving me this opportunity of a free and full discussion of the question in which India is to-day so vitally interested. I fear I may take some time, but I shall crave your indulgence for more reasons than one; the most important of those reasons is the importance of the subject. I am glad that His Majesty's Government have decided to set apart a special day for this subject. That being so, am I not entitled to draw from it the inference that His Majesty's Government do really recognise the importance of this question? When it is known in my country that His Majesty's Government recognise the importance of this subject, and that that recognition is shared by the various Dominion Prime Ministers, that fact alone will inspire them with some hope.

Before I proceed further, may I also express my deep gratitude to Lord Peel for the assistance he has given me in helping to bring this subject up before the Conference, and for the speech which he has delivered to-day, which has filled me with gratification, and which I have no doubt, when it comes to be known to my countrymen, will fill them also with gratification. He has identified himself to-day completely and unreservedly with every sentiment of our national honour. That is what I appreciate more than the moving eloquence with which he delivered his great speech this morning.

I may well produce in some quarters the impression of being a fighter. I do not object to criticism of that kind. Really and truly, I am fighting the cause of my country, and the Premiers of the various Dominions, who have in their day fought the cause of their country, will not object if I fight the cause of mine. But I do fight, let me tell you frankly, as a subject of King George, and I fight for a place in his household and I will not be content with a place in his stables.

Unanimity of Indian Feeling on Question.

Prime Minister, let me tell you that the problem of Indians overseas is of vital importance not only to India, but to the whole of the Empire. Whatever may be our position in regard to self-government, howsoever distant we may be from that cherished dream of ours, let me tell you that, so far as this question of Indians overseas is concerned, we stand solid and united. We have our own domestic quarrels; we have moderates and extremists; we have non-co-operators; and we have Hindus and Mahomedans. But so far as this question is concerned, let me tell you with all the sincerity that I am capable of that we stand absolutely united. Do not be misguided by what appears in certain papers here which attempt to show that there is no feeling on this question. We attach far more importance to the honour of our nationals in other parts of the Empire than probably you realise.

Question of "Izzat."

We express that feeling in the vernacular of our own country by a comprehensive and delicate phrase, which I have no doubt will readily be understood by Lord Curzon and His Highness the

C 62819

Maharajah—that phrase is "Izzat." There is not a man either among the Princes or among the humblest subjects of His Majesty who does not attach great importance to that question of "Izzat." When "Izzat" (which means honour) is at stake, we prefer death to anything else. That is our sentiment, and it is in that light that I present my case to you.

India's Position in the Empire.

Do not forget that my country, India, is the one country which makes the British Empire truly Imperial. I take pride in that. I do not indulge in the slightest degree in reflection upon the dignity or honour or position of any one of the Dominions, but I do claim that it is my country which makes the British Empire truly Imperial. One-fifth of the human race, with a far more ancient civilisation than your own, to which eloquent reference has been made by Lord Peel, joins with you in acknowledging the suzerainty of our common Throne. That allegiance with us is a real living thing. Shake that allegiance, and you shake the foundations of the entire fabric, with consequences which it is difficult to overestimate.

Function of the Conference.

Might I explain to you here the considerations which will guide me in presenting my case to you? In my humble judgment, the one function of this Conference—the highest advisory body of the Empire—is to bring about a good understanding between the various units that constitute the British Commonwealth, to strengthen the ties which unite, or ought to unite, the different units of the Empire with their different outlook and their different religions. If this Conference fails to achieve that end, then let me say it fails to justify its existence in the eyes of the Empire. But to achieve that end, it seems to me that it is absolutely necessary that we should open out our minds to each other with entire frankness. Any mental reservation on an occasion like this, and round this table, would, in my humble judgment, amount to nothing short of treason against the King and treason against the Empire. It is in that spirit of frankness, in that spirit of candour, that I will venture to present to you my case, and, even though I may use now and again expressions to indicate the strength of my feeling and the feeling of my countrymen, I beg of the Dominion Prime Ministers not to misunderstand my spirit.

Indian Sentiment on Problem not confined to Intellectuals.

Let me tell you at once that the feeling on this question in India is deep-seated and widespread. Let me also remove a very wrong impression, and I am glad that Lord Peel has referred to this question for I desire to reinforce his arguments as an Indian. Twenty-seven years I have been in public life; thirteen years I have been connected with the legislative Councils, and I have sat in the Viceroy's Cabinet. I have never witnessed before what is happening in India to-day. Five years ago it may have been possible for you to say that a wide gulf divided the masses from the classes. Let me now give you this warning. The classes lead the masses as never before. India has rapidly changed, and that is the outstanding feature of the situation there. The intellectuals, or, if you like to call them, agitators, have gained ascendancy over the masses. What the intellectuals think to-day the masses will think to-morrow. This question now before us, let me tell you, affects directly the masses, for it is from the masses mainly that most of our population has gone to the Dominions. I belong to a province which has supplied a considerable number of men to the various Dominions, and I know their feelings. You may condemn the agitators, you may condemn the intellectual classes; I will not quarrel with that, but remember they have got power now with the masses.

Influence of Vernacular Press.

Do not forget the growing and increasing influence of the vernacular press. I do not justify or vindicate its attitude in every respect. I will, however, state the facts. It now penetrates into the innermost recesses of our villages, and every village has got a reader who reads for the illiterate people the vernacular newspapers. I have been

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 38 14 15 16
W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes
PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62820

reading extracts from the vernacular press of my own country, and, while I do deprecate the wild language in which it has indulged, let me tell you frankly that it is seething with indignation over this question, and that is affecting the whole outlook of my countrymen in the villages.

Seriousness of Situation.

Any inequality of Indian nationals enters like iron into our souls. For Heaven's sake, whether you find a solution or whether you do not find a solution, do not dismiss this statement of mine as mere sentimental nonsense. It is an absolute fact, and I am here to interpret to you the present position of my countrymen in regard to this question; it cuts to the quick our national pride and our new consciousness. It permeates and sours our whole outlook in regard to Imperial relationship. It derives impetus from the natural inclination to take pride in being a member of the biggest Commonwealth that the world knows to-day. It makes the task of the Government of India, of which I had the honour of being a member until a few months ago, infinitely more difficult in dealing with their domestic problems than you realise. Here I must reinforce the arguments of Lord Peel. This feeling runs right through our national life.

Feeling over Kenya Question.

Let me at once tell you that I am not willing to enter at length into the merits of the Kenya decision, but my countrymen expect me, and my Government expects me, and I am bound by all considerations of honour and duty, to put you in full possession of the sentiments of my countrymen and of my Government in regard to your decision. They have received that decision with the utmost possible dismay. I know the official view is that in certain respects our position in Kenya has been improved. That is not a view we share. We judge you by a standard which is admittedly very high. We were not fighting for little things; we were fighting for a big principle. I know and I feel, and my countrymen feel, and my Government feels, that a serious blunder has been made. I know also that British statesmanship is wise, and whenever a thing goes wrong it begins to think, and I honestly believe that it will soon recognise the mistake which it has made. Let me tell you, on behalf of my countrymen, that neither my country nor the Government which I have the honour to represent will accept this decision as final. Indeed, there is nothing final in politics, and I want His Majesty's Government to recognise that position and to indicate, if possible, that they do look upon that question in the light in which I have just presented it. May I conclude this portion of my speech by assuring the Conference that while on domestic questions of Indian politics we, like most of you, have our differences of parties, groups and interests, yet, upon this question which concerns the honour of our nationals in Kenya, and the honour of our nationals overseas, there is no difference between us, from the Viceroy downwards?

Views of the Government of India.

May I remind you of what the distinguished and eminent statesman, with whom I had the privilege of working in close co-operation for two years, and to whom I hope my countrymen and his countrymen will do justice some day, said on a critical occasion to the legislative Assembly when the announcement of the Kenya decision was published in India? I will quote from his speech.

"The news of the decision regarding Kenya," said Lord Reading, "came to me and my Government no less than to you as a great and severe disappointment; for India had made the cause of Indians in Kenya her own. As His Majesty's Government has stated, this decision conflicts on material points with the strongly expressed views of my Government as laid before the Cabinet by the Secretary of State for India. They have announced their decision, and the Government of India must consider it and arrive at its conclusions. If submission must be made, then with all due respect to His Majesty's Government it can only be under protest." That is the opinion of the Viceroy.

C 62821

Illustrations of Non-Official Feeling.

May I crave your indulgence just for two minutes to read out to you a few typical telegrams which I have received during the last few days, some of them from absolutely unexpected quarters. They have come to me from representative bodies of all shades of opinion. Mr. Sastri, who has been so frequently, during the last few years, connected with this matter, sends me a telegram supporting the proposals, not without misgivings, which I am going to put before you at present. Now, the Swaraj Party, to which I do not belong, and which does not see eye to eye with me, and from which I should never have expected to receive support, sends this telegram from Poona, through its Secretary and leader, Mr. Kilkar: "Maharashtra Swarajya Party offers you full support any strong action you take to get redress Kenya wrong." Let me tell you again that most of the telegrams come from unexpected quarters.

Unexpected Testimony.

Well, here is a most remarkable telegram from a gentleman with whom I worked in full co-operation until five years ago, but from whom I separated when differences arose. Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya now belongs to the non-co-operation Party, and three days ago, if you would have asked me, I should never have said that I would receive a telegram like this from that gentleman. It is from a man with forty years solid work behind him, and this is his telegram. It is sent to me from Simla.

"Indians all shades public opinion at one with you in demanding equality status with fellow subjects throughout British Empire. If representatives other parts not prepared give practical support this elementary right Indians as citizens Empire, participation Indians Imperial Conference becomes mockery, deep national humiliation, and trust both you and Maharajah of Alwar will withdraw."

I have received two telegrams from Mrs. Besant, giving support to me on her own behalf and on behalf of her entire Party. Let me tell you that while I am her friend I do not belong to her Party.

Viceroy's Telegram.

Lastly, may I give to you the telegram which was handed over to me the day before yesterday, which has come to me from the Government of India. It says: "We understand from Reuters that Conference will discuss overseas questions probably on 24th. The resolution passed recently by a majority of the Bombay Corporation to boycott Empire goods, where possible, as a protest against the Kenya decision, and a resolution on the same lines of the Poona public meeting, further indicate the importance attached to equality of status overseas, and we sincerely hope that the proceedings of the Conference will restore confidence and good feeling. As regards 'C' Mandates, we trust that the atmosphere will permit you to secure a favourable solution, otherwise India's right to revision of the policy must be reserved. Sapru's proposal in letter to Sir Narasimha Sarma to reserve the right to challenge policy when India's interests are affected, though substantially the same as ours, is less elastic. We earnestly hope that you have secured Smuts' agreement to abandon or modify the segregation policy as suggested in our despatch. We attach very great importance to it. We hope also that the Dominions and the Colonial Office will consent to the appointment of Agents to assist them and us in this difficult question as suggested in our memorandum. Please send copy of the telegram to Sapru."

I will not take up your time further. I have tried only to reinforce the argument which Lord Peel put forward by showing how the different classes of our people are agreed on this question.

Present Position of Indians overseas.

Having explained the depth and implication of Indian feeling, I will now proceed to explain the circumstances in various parts of the world by which this feeling is at present aggravated. I have been studying such official papers as are available to me, and, for the sake of convenience and to save your time, I propose to read

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62822

out to you a very brief summary of the position. There are about 1½ million Indians now settled in other parts of the Empire, and in many parts they are subjected, as Indians, and quite irrespective of how well they shape up to local franchise standards, to grave political and even economic disabilities.

New Zealand.

Let me start my brief survey of these grievances by paying a tribute to the Government of New Zealand, which is represented by my distinguished friend over there. That Government, in its own territory at least, treats Indians on a footing of equality with all other inhabitants of the country. And my countrymen can live there among the New Zealanders as fellow-citizens in honour.

Australia.

In Australia also the disabilities which Indians suffer are comparatively small. We hope that before long legislation will be passed to enable them to exercise the Dominion franchise, and to remove the disqualification they at present suffer in regard to invalid and old-age pensions. In certain provinces also there are minor disabilities which I hope it will not be hard to remove. In Queensland they have no State franchise; and they have to undergo a dictation test for employment in the sugar and dairy industries, which is apt to operate prejudicially. In Western Australia also they have no State franchise; while in Southern Australia they are disqualified for leases under the Irrigation Act. Let me tell you plainly that, if I have failed in this statement to convince Mr. Bruce, I hope he will at least extend to me the hand of fellowship on this question; I am willing to co-operate with him to devise methods for a solution of these difficulties.

Canada.

In Canada, of which Mr. Mackenzie King is the distinguished Prime Minister, there is a small population—I hope he will correct me if I am wrong—of not more than 6,000.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Over 1,200.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Thank you very much. In British Columbia there is no Dominion, Provincial or Municipal franchise.

South Africa.

Now I come to the most difficult part of my task. I come to South Africa. In South Africa the problem is most serious. Here there are 161,000 Indians, of which all but a few thousands, mainly resident in Cape Colony, have no political franchise. In Natal, besides this, they fear to lose the municipal franchise. In the Transvaal there is no franchise of any kind. Nor is it only of political subjection that my countrymen complain. They also suffer under severe economic handicaps. In Natal they are restrained from acquiring town lands in townships. In the Transvaal they are prohibited, either as individuals or as companies, from acquiring land; and in the Gold Area they may not occupy land. To make their lot more miserable, the laws governing the grant and regulation of traders' licences are administered in a manner which strikes directly at their own interests. Moreover, the Union Government, of which my friend, General Smuts, is the head, is even now contemplating legislation which will provide for the compulsory segregation of Indians in urban areas by restrictions on the ownership and occupation of land.

References to previous Statements by General Smuts and Mr. Burton.

May I be permitted, at this stage, to invite the attention of the Conference to a curious discrepancy between this very serious state of affairs and the sentiments enunciated in 1917. I believe in this very hall? General Smuts then said, and I quote his very words:—

> "Once the white community in South Africa were rid of the fear that they were going to be flooded by unlimited immigration from India" (a fear removed once and for all by India's acceptance of the Reciprocity Resolution of 1917) "all other questions would be considered subsidiary and would become easily and perfectly soluble."

C 62823

May I also remind you of what Mr. Burton said on a former occasion at the Imperial Conference, and I attach considerable importance to the testimony he has given as to the character of my countrymen in South Africa? Mr. Burton said: "As far as we are concerned, it is only fair to say, and it is the truth, that we have found that the Indians in our midst in South Africa, who form in some parts a very substantial portion of the population, are good, law-abiding, quiet citizens, and it is our duty to see," as he expressed it, "that they are treated as human beings, with feelings like our own and in a proper manner."

Colonies. British Guiana.

From the self-governing Dominions I shall pass on to the Colonies and very briefly allude to our position there. In British Guiana I gladly acknowledge that our Indian population can live on terms of honour and equality of treatment. Their grievances are comparatively very much fewer.

Fiji.

In Fiji my countrymen demand more adequate representation, based on a satisfactory franchise, in the legislative bodies; they also ask for the settlement of a minimum wage based on the cost of living; they ask for the removal of the poll tax, which presses very hardly upon them. They ask further that land should be given to them for settlement. They ask, and I have received a cable from an important quarter, that if these grievances are not removed they should be repatriated.

Kenya.

In Kenya the Indians desire a common roll instead of communal franchise. They protest against the administrative veto, which prevents them acquiring land from willing European sellers in the highlands; and they fear that the immigration restrictions may be employed in such a way as to prejudice the development of the colony by Indians.

Uganda and Tanganyika.

In Uganda the Indians are pressing for representation by two nominated members of the Legislative Council; and in Tanganyika, which my countrymen helped to win for the Empire, they have certain grievances which, I understand, are at present under the consideration of the Colonial Office, such as Profits Tax, peddlers' licences and trade licences, and may I express a fervent hope that the Colonial Office will give most sympathetic consideration to those grievances before they arrive at any decision?

Thus, wherever we may turn, we see circumstances in the local status of Indians which are not to be reconciled with India's national aspirations or with the position which she will obtain as the result of the declared policy of His Majesty's Government—a position which I hope to achieve much sooner than some people realise.

"C" Mandates.

At this stage I will slightly digress from my argument and refer to the "C" Mandates in a very few words. In regard to the administration of what I will call the "C" Mandated Territories which have been committed to the charge of certain Dominions, I desire to say that my countrymen cannot acquiesce in any position which does or may in the future make their status inferior to what it was when those territories were administered by Germany. I have already read to you the views of the Government of India in the telegram. The matter is at present not of very great practical importance as the number of my countrymen is very small; but I must in fairness enter a caveat against any action which may in future turn to our disadvantage. May I also in this connection remind you of the provisions of Article 22 of the League of Nations? I will only quote the material portions. After referring to Central African and other peoples, it lays down that the Mandatory Power, besides certain other duties, shall "secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League." I take my stand on that.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 38 14 15 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62824

Resolution of 1921 Conference.

Having thus reviewed the position in the self-governing Dominions and the Colonies according to the information available to me—and I shall not object to any Member of this Conference correcting me if I am wrong in any detail—let me tell you what the position was that was taken by this Conference in 1921. Lord Peel read out to us a portion of that Resolution, but I propose to read out to you the whole of that Resolution; that Resolution runs as follows:—

> "The Imperial Conference, while reaffirming the Resolution of the Imperial War Conference of 1918 that each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities, recognises that there is an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire. The Conference accordingly is of the opinion that in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth it is desirable that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognised.
>
> "The representatives of South Africa regret their inability to accept this Resolution in view of the exceptional circumstances of the greater part of the Union.
>
> "The representatives of India, while expressing their appreciation of the acceptance of the Resolution recorded above, feel bound to place on record their profound concern at the position of Indians in South Africa, and their hope that by negotiation between the Governments of India and South Africa some way can be found, as soon as may be, to reach a more satisfactory position."

Immigration Question does not arise.

You will thus see that the resolution divides itself clearly into three parts. I will take up the first part which deals with the question of immigration. It gives each Dominion the fullest and the freest right to regulate the character and the composition of its own population. I am bound by that. You are bound by it, but just as I am bound by it you are also bound in honour by the second part of the resolution, which really is the most vital part with which I have got to deal, except, of course, that portion which relates to South Africa. But before I proceed further let me make one point clear. Let there be no misgiving about the question of immigration. There is a growing sentiment in my country that we should not send our nationals outside anywhere, and I may perhaps make a confession, with the permission of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, regarding my attitude when I was a member of the Government of India. I helped to draft the Immigration Act, and I was the President of the Committee which sat to consider it. I was probably the strongest exponent of the view that there should be no immigration from India outside on any conditions whatsoever. We do not want our nation outside India to appear as a nation of coolies. We have had enough of that. There is plenty of scope for the conservation of the energy of my countrymen in my own country. We want them to rise to the full height of their stature in our own country. The Dominions therefore need have no fear on that account.

Necessity of implementing Resolution.

I have just said that, as I felt bound in honour by the first part of the resolution, I consider, and I hope that I am not demanding anything extravagant from you, that you are also in honour bound by the second part of the resolution. I will be absolutely frank. I will exclude South Africa, because South Africa stood out. I make no appeal to South Africa on the basis of the second part of the resolution, but I will ask the other Dominion Prime Ministers what my countrymen, and what my Government, are asking in India, namely, what steps have been taken, or are proposed to be taken, to honour this three-year old agreement? While every reasonable man must make allowances for practical difficulties in

C 62825

the implementing of that resolution, while I recognise the difficulties arising from local circumstances and prejudices, from the slow changes of public opinion, and from the exigencies of party politics, yet, I must tell you, the question, to us, is one of vital importance, and in fairness to my country I must say that she finds herself absolutely unable to acquiesce in the present position. I have, therefore, come to you in the name of my Government, and in the name of the many millions of my countrymen, to make an earnest appeal, a sincere appeal, to join hands with me in devising some methods such as your statesmanship will enable you to do, methods intended to give effect to the principle of equality embodied in that resolution, the resolution of 1921. Do not for a moment think that I fail to recognise your difficulties. I have held office, and I know the difficult position of responsible Ministers. I am not blind to those difficulties, but pray let me ask you also to realise our national difficulties and my difficulties.

Problem must be faced in a spirit of Co-operation.

I invite you to face with me in the broadest spirit of statesmanship this vital problem that Lord Peel and I have had the honour of placing before you this morning, and I claim your co-operation in devising methods of solving this problem. After a long and careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that I must place certain definite constructive suggestions for your consideration. If you, on your side, can make any better suggestions to me, if you can offer any better alternatives to me, take it from me that you will not find anyone more ready than myself to accept them. I earnestly suggest that what the occasion demands is a united effort if we are to find a solution of this difficult problem, a problem which threatens at no distant date to acquire almost the character of a problem of foreign policy. I appeal to the Dominion Governments and to His Majesty's Government to take a united course.

A Constructive Proposal.

I will now tell you what my resolution or proposal is. I have reduced it to writing, and with your permission I will read it. My resolution is: Let the Dominion Governments, who have an Indian population, let His Majesty's Government in areas under their direct control, such as Kenya, Uganda, Fiji, and other places where there are Indians resident, appoint committees to confer with a committee, which the Government of India will send from India, in exploring the avenues how best and how soonest the principle of equality implicit in the 1921 resolution may be implemented. And, lest the course of the enquiry be prejudiced, I will couple with my proposal the request that any anti-Indian legislation which may be pending should be stayed until the report of these joint committees is available. That is my resolution. At once I propose to remove any misapprehension which may be lurking in the minds of anyone who has listened to me. I do not want a Central Committee. Let me tell you, I want a Committee appointed by each Dominion within its own borders, and I want the Committee appointed by each Dominion to confer with the Committee which will be appointed by the Government of India, and which will go to each Dominion. That is my appeal to the Dominions, except, of course, to South Africa, under the resolution of 1921. I make the same earnest appeal to His Majesty's Government, and especially to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire and the Colonial Office, in so far as the resolution relates to the Colonies.

Its Advantages.

I will, in a few words, tell you what, in my humble judgment, are the advantages to be gained from my resolution. In the first place, you gain time, and that will enable us to calm the angry passions that have arisen in India on this question. In the second place, India will be undoubtedly in a more hopeful frame of mind, and we all of us can bring all the more forces available to us to bear upon the solution of this problem. In the third place, my resolution absolutely safeguards your independence, I mean the independence of the Dominions. It places the initiative in your hands, and let me tell you, it is not merely because I am anxious that the Dominions should have that independence that I have

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 68 14 15 16

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62826

provided that safeguard, but also because of a lurking feeling of self-interest in my mind. You have received a rich inheritance of independence, freedom and self-government in your territories. I am still aspiring to it. I hope my aspirations will be realised very soon, and then, like you, I shall be jealous of any outside authority imposing its will upon me in my affairs. It is for that reason that I am anxious that the Dominions themselves should take the initiative in regard to this Committee which I have suggested and to the Committee which we propose to send out from India to confer with you in your countries. I think, and I honestly believe, if the problem is explored on those lines it will be found that it does not in the end prove to be insoluble.

South Africa. Address to General Smuts.

I now turn perhaps to the most difficult part of my work, and that is my address to General Smuts. I frankly recognise that I cannot address him on the basis of the resolution of 1921. He was no party to it. But I address him on three specific grounds: first of all, as a humanitarian; secondly, as an Imperial statesman; thirdly, as the Prime Minister of South Africa.

As a Humanitarian.

As a humanitarian I say he cannot absolve himself of the moral duty which rests on his shoulders of elevating the status of my countrymen within his Dominion. Let it be granted that their standard is low; it makes his task all the more imperative and urgent that he should help them in raising that standard. My countrymen, and I wish to say it emphatically, are as much strangers in South Africa as Englishmen or as General Smuts. The assistance of my countrymen, like the assistance of General Smuts and others, has helped in building up the prosperity of South Africa; and let him not forget my countrymen now when it lies in his power to raise their standard. He cannot permanently relegate them to a position of inferiority; for therein lies a menace not to his country or to mine, but to the Empire.

As an Imperial Statesman.

I appeal to him next as an Imperial statesman. Ever since the days of the Armistice, what is it that General Smuts has stood up for? He has stood up for peace, peace to all the world; and he has stood as the protector of minorities. He has acquired a unique position as an Imperial statesman. It has given him world-wide fame. What is it that we have observed during the last three weeks of the sitting of this Conference? General Smuts has been trying to devise means to bring peace to a distracted world. Is he going to exclude from that happy mission of his his country and mine? For let me tell you that there shall be no peace unless he includes his country and my country within the ambit of his big proposals. I do not address him on the basis of the resolution of 1921; I do not wish to interfere with his very natural desire to be consistent. I appeal to him independently of that resolution, and I say to him: "Will you not join hands with me, as I have appealed to the other Dominion Prime Ministers, in devising methods for the solution of this problem now and for all time?" I do not indulge in any threat; that is not in my line; and I hope General Smuts will not misunderstand me. However powerful he may be in South Africa, and however weak we may be in India, you cannot relegate my countrymen for all time in King George's Empire to a position of inferiority.

As Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

I will now address General Smuts as the Prime Minister of South Africa. Does he fully realise the implication of his present policy? I doubt whether he does. Will he not be aggravating the trouble not merely in South Africa, but throughout the world, by putting the white people on one side and the coloured races on the other side? I tell him frankly that if the Indian problem in South Africa is allowed to fester much longer it will pass, as I said just now, beyond the bounds of a domestic issue and will become a question of foreign policy of such gravity that upon it the unity of the Empire may founder irretrievably. I therefore earnestly trust

C 62827

that he will not refuse to co-operate with me in attempting to discover a solution, and I also hope that, in view of the present seriousness of a situation to which my Government and my people have referred more often than I can repeat here, he will agree to the appointment of a Diplomatic Agent to be sent by the Government of India to South Africa, who will protect our nationals there, who will act as an intermediary between them and the South African Government and who will put our Government in full possession of the facts relating to our nationals.

Proposals contained in General Smuts' Memorandum.*

I will very briefly make a reference to the proposals which General Smuts has been good enough to circulate in a memorandum among the members of this Conference. I have read them with very great care and with all the attention and weight to which a memorandum of General Smuts is entitled. Let me tell him, and let me tell you all, that it is a document of remarkable subtlety, such subtlety as I have always been accustomed to associate with the name of General Smuts. In the first place, General Smuts takes exception to what Mr. Sastri has been saying or doing. I do not hold a brief for Mr. Sastri. He has been an intimate friend of mine and a fellow-worker in public life during the last twenty years. If the only objection General Smuts has got to find with him, and if the only crime to be attributed to him, is that he has in the Dominions frankly and freely pleaded for the equality of his countrymen, then let me tell General Smuts that he is indicting not merely Mr. Sastri, but 320 million of my countrymen. We all plead guilty to that charge.

Implications of Memorandum.

I will refer no more to that personal issue, but I will ask you first of all to consider the implications of that important memorandum. General Smuts compares the British Commonwealth to the League of Nations, but I say metaphorically that analogy may hold good up to a certain point, but after that breaks down. The League of Nations has no common Sovereign. The British Commonwealth has a common Sovereign, and we are united to him by our allegiance to him. But if the British Commonwealth is to be compared with the League of Nations, you cannot stop short of the full extent to which that analogy must be applied. What is it that the League of Nations has been created for? It has been created, as I understand it, to settle disputes between the various Governments by conference, by consultation, and will do so unless they refuse to come to that conference and that consultation. But it is just this consultation and conference which General Smuts, as I understand, is refusing. What is it that a resolution like his comes to? It asks the Dominion Prime Ministers, who took part in the Conference of 1921 and agreed to that Resolution, now to treat it as a "scrap of paper" and to join him in passing an absolutely new Resolution which, on the face of it, has for its object the reservation of the fullest freedom of each Dominion to pass its own laws regarding Franchise.

Practical Limits to Constitutional Rights of Dominions.

Nobody has doubted that Constitutional right, but there are limits to that Constitutional right, limits which are prescribed by prudence. Let me illustrate that. The British Parliament here is a Sovereign Parliament, and the Free State Parliament in Ireland is also an independent Parliament. Suppose the Irish Free State Parliament passed, or intended to pass, legislation to the effect that it would not recognise the right of any Protestant or Englishman to the Franchise in Ireland, and suppose, on the other hand, the British Parliament intended to pass legislation to disenfranchise all Irishmen settled in Scotland; well, if you looked at it strictly from the legal point of view you might say that these Parliaments would be within their right, but prudence would at once prescribe limits to the exercise of that power, that constitutional right. The first impulse of the two Parliaments would be to confer, to devise methods of avoiding a conflict. Will they not do it? Yes. I recognise the constitutional liberty and the constitutional rights of the

* See E. 80, also published in Appendix V in Cmd. 1988.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62828

Dominion Governments, but let me tell you this, that constitutional rights can only be exercised with prudence and discretion up to a certain point, and beyond that point you have to allow those constitutional rights to be subordinated to statesmanship, to prudence and to discretion. Well, I do not wish to raise a legal argument. I hope no legal argument will be raised, because this is not a legal body. There is only one thing I will say. General Smuts has said that the one binding tie between the Dominions and other parts of the Empire and India is our common allegiance to the common Sovereign, but he has coupled that statement with a further proposition, viz., that from that allegiance political rights do not flow.

Constitutional Issue not to be raised here.

Well, I will not have a duel with General Smuts on a point of constitutional law, but I will venture to tell him one thing. Allegiance to the sovereign is a very living thing. It is not a mere figure of speech, and, whenever you pass any law which affects the allegiance of the subject to the sovereign and the corresponding duty of protection of the sovereign to the subject, you tread on very dangerous ground. If a constitutional position like that is to be argued, let it be argued before a legal body, and, speaking for myself, with all humility, I have no fear of facing that constitutional issue on legal grounds, but I do not wish to raise that legal argument at this Conference.

Appeal to the Conference. India's Position in Empire.

I have practically reviewed the whole position and I will now make an appeal to the Conference itself. I will appeal to the Conference to realise to the full the implications of the Indian problem. I have placed before my colleagues from the Dominions and His Majesty's Government here certain specific proposals. I believe, and honestly believe, that the British Empire stands for justice and equality in the eyes of the world. Will you make a place within it for India? Think for a moment of the present position. Ancient and modern history provides no parallel to it. Three hundred and twenty million of my countrymen, whose religion is different from yours, whose colour is different from yours, whose race is different from yours, whose history is different from yours, are united by the common tie of allegiance to the common sovereign. They are members of a commonwealth the like of which has never existed before and let me tell you, that, while I do not wish to interfere with your absolute independence inside your own borders, I am one of those men who say that the British Empire can never be described as an exclusively white Empire. Within its borders it comprises a large number of populations of coloured races. Now, how are you going to keep Indians, or for that matter, all the other coloured races, within that Empire? By force? Never, because apart from the obvious limitations of force you cannot be untrue to your own traditions of liberty, justice and equality; you cannot afford to ignore and neglect the world opinion on this question. By preserving and safeguarding our sentiments? Certainly. That will be the strongest tie you can have and it remains for you to make use of it. Fulfil our aspirations within our own country for self-government, fulfil our aspirations for a position of equality inside the Dominions and inside the Colonies, and India will stand shoulder to shoulder with you through thick and thin. It is by preserving that sentiment that you can keep India and I pray, with all the sincerity I am capable of, that this Conference may come to some decisions which may strengthen the bonds between the Empire and India, for I do believe in that connection. Make no mistake, it is by sentiment and by the preservation of that sentiment that you will retain us and enable us to achieve self-government and to satisfy our other national ambitions outside our own country.

What India means.

Think for a moment what India means to you? More than three hundred million men are closely allied to other Asiatics, constituting almost the entire half of humanity. They are placed within the ambit of the British Empire. If we are incorporated

C 62829

within the commonwealth, think what we shall mean to the peace of the world, with our ideals of self-government, bridging as we do the East and the West, shouldering burdens which are yours as well as ours for the service of humanity.

Common Loyalty to Crown.

Think again of the ties which bind us together, if you will allow them to do so. King George is your King, but our Sovereign. The devotion to his person and to his throne is a very real thing notwithstanding what some wild and extravagant men may say in my country. I claim, and let me be very plain, not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of right, as the King's subject, to have an honourable place in his household, a position of equality and honour within the Empire, wherever it may be; for to us our position in his household overseas is of far greater importance than any other questions which are agitating our minds at the present moment. I am fighting in this spirit, fighting as a firm believer in the connection of India with England, fighting as a loyal and devoted subject of the King, as one who has had the honour of serving him in his Government in India, and I am fighting for the honour of my country before you all; my plea—indeed the plea of all my countrymen, is for equality within the great King's Empire, including his Dominions. On that there can be no faltering or weakening on my part. I invite you to devise means with me to give effect to this cherished ambition of my countrymen.

Appeal to Mr. Baldwin.

May I now make an appeal to the Prime Minister? Sir, you are the head of His Majesty's Government. Let me tell you that every single word that falls from you on this occasion will be read and re-read and analysed in my country from one end to the other. On a similar occasion, when we were faced with difficulty, a great and distinguished predecessor of yours, Mr. Lloyd George, expressed himself to the Conference in moving language and I propose to adopt that portion of his speech as my appeal to you, Sir, and to His Majesty's Government. I will not read the whole of it, but only a small portion.

Speech of Mr. Lloyd George in 1921.

This is what Mr. Lloyd George said, I think it was in 1921 :—

"The situation is a very serious one. We may be confronted at any moment with the old alternative, in cases of this kind, of surrender or force. That is a terrible alternative with which to confront an Empire like ours, which is a purely democratic one. If we were built entirely on force, or if, having been built on force, our face was still towards force, well then we would face it calmly; but we are trying to get away from force. We have been built on force—it is no use pretending that we have not—but we are trying to get away from it in Ireland; we are trying to do our best to get away from it in India; we have got away from it in Canada, where we had our troubles a long time ago. We had our lesson in America and we are trying to build up a democratic Empire on the basis of the consent of all the races that are inside it: in fact, we are trying such an experiment as has never been seen in the world before. If it is a success it really transfigures, I think, the human story. That is my view. The British Empire will be a Mount of Transfiguration if it succeeds. If it fails, poor old humanity will fall back again as it has done after many ideals which it has sought to put up; after all its Calvaries, it goes back and it says: 'We can get no better,' and it throws up its arms in despair, and a people who despair lose every power and every hope.

"Well now, here is a great effort we are making. It is right that we should not make it too boldly; that we should not take strides which are beyond the span of human effort; but, at any rate, to use Victor Hugo's phrase: 'We are marching with our faces towards the light.' Here we start and we begin to say: 'No, we are going to turn our backs upon it.'

"Well now, do not let Mr. Sastri go back to the scores and the Maharao to the hundreds of millions of Indians and say:

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62830

'The British Empire have refused us justice.' It will be an appalling thing to say to the people who sent a million and a quarter volunteers to aid us in a quarrel they had not the slightest concern with; and decline even a kind sympathetic word and say: 'We will not do our best.' Why should we deny it? Not because we do not believe in it.

* * * * * *

"It is not so much as the Maharao has been putting his case forward for, nor the Secretary of State for India, but it is something that will enable them to go back and say:—

"'The British Empire has got ears for your wrongs; when we go there and tell the story of any injustice of those who live under the Emperor's flag they listen'; not to go back and say: 'There is no justice to be had in the British Empire.' They may still be under the British Empire, but they will be unwilling subjects and that is not the sort of Empire we want."

I will not read the rest of it. I now want to make an appeal to the Prime Minister and to his colleagues. Do not send His Highness the Maharajah, do not send me, back to India to say that I have attempted to seek justice at this greatest advisory council of the Empire and that I have failed. I speak with all earnestness. One single gesture from His Majesty's Government, one single expression of sympathy put into practice, one honest attempt made to try to find a solution, will allay the situation in India in a manner which you do not realise. I am afraid that I have trespassed too much on your time and I beg your pardon. I also thank you for the patient and courteous manner in which you have listened to me; but the cause of my country demanded that I should put my whole case before you frankly and to the best of my ability.

Mr. Baldwin: I was thinking, perhaps, that it might be convenient to adjourn after the Maharajah of Alwar speaks; because it seems to me that this is one of the most important matters we have to deal with, and it will be quite impossible to finish it this morning. Perhaps it might be convenient to resume the discussion on Monday, either in the morning or afternoon.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That would suit us very well.

Mr. Baldwin: I will refer to that again at the end of this meeting and we will settle whether it shall be on Monday morning or Monday afternoon.

Publication of Speeches.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Might I also make another request before we proceed further? India will very anxiously await Lord Peel's speech, His Highness' speech and my speech. With your permission I would like to send a summary if you will authorise me to do so. I attach the greatest importance to that.

Mr. Baldwin: I think a summary would have to be very carefully prepared, because it is difficult to say at the present stage of our proceedings how much it might be desirable to publish of the further discussion and the replies that might be given from the other side. I agree entirely in principle, and perhaps you would consult Lord Peel, and then Lord Peel will consult me about it. I think that some summary would be desirable.

Lord Peel: I certainly will consult you upon any suggestion about it. I was wondering whether there would be any difficulty because of the later speeches to be made. I think that what Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has said is true, that it would be valuable so far as India is concerned if the speeches could be sent out and if we had liberty to publish them. I think it would be a very great advantage if you would give us liberty to publish our statements.

General Smuts: I think a very useful purpose could be served by the publication of the general parts of the two speeches. We have not yet heard the Maharajah. I think it might probably allay a good deal of feeling in India to find that the case has been put here with all its strength by the representatives of India.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That is what I am anxious about.

C 62831

General Smuts: If anything is published at this stage I think we should eliminate the particular references to the Dominions, if possible.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: May I suggest this: A statement was made by so and so on the position of British Indians in the Dominions. That is all.

General Smuts: Yes. Then publish the general presentation with which you started, without the appeals to Prime Ministers and the particular references to the Dominions.

Lord Peel: So far as I am concerned I think you will have observed that my statement was quite general. I do not think there could be any objection, so far as I can see, to anything that I have said.

General Smuts: I say this because, if the particular references by Sir Tej Sapru to the Dominions were published, then our speeches ultimately ought to be published too, and it may not be good policy to do so.

Mr. Baldwin: That is exactly what is passing through my mind.

Mr. Massey: Speaking as a friend of the sentiments expressed by both the gentlemen who have spoken on behalf of India, is there not a possibility of stirring up strong expressions of opinion which may be cabled from India to London with the object of influencing any decision that may be arrived at by the Conference? That is the only doubt in my mind. I think it is worthy of consideration. Of course, that could be got over by a very careful revision of the speeches before they are sent out.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: The speeches as sent by the reporters I will revise very carefully.

The Duke of Devonshire: You would not make any specific reference to the Colonies and Protectorates? Your summary will be quite general?

Lord Curzon: May I say a word, with some knowledge of India and also with a considerable amount of sympathy with the Indian case? I can quite understand the desire of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the Maharajah to get their statements appearing in print, because they want to show that they have done full justice . . . .

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I am also anxious about the Secretary of State's speech.

Lord Curzon: . . . . that they have done full justice to the case. If I may say so, in passing, we have, indeed, had a very remarkable presentation of the case by the last speaker. But is it not a little difficult to do what you propose? You are going to publish half the case several days—as I understand, four or five days—before the other half, before the answers are given. Will not the result of the elimination of the references to the various Dominions, and I should have thought also to the Colonies, very much take away from the completeness of the case from the Indian point of view? Further, I would ask our Indian colleagues here to consider this. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru ended up with certain definite proposals. He proposed the constitution of certain committees. Well, I do not know what the view of the Secretary of State for India is about that, but do you not think the case will be a little prejudiced if this proposal of his is broadcasted throughout the 320,000,000 of the Indian Empire? And supposing, when we resume the discussion next week, it is found impossible to agree to that proposal, or supposing it is severely criticised here, or supposing it is only found possible to agree to it in a modified form, will not great expectations have been aroused in India and great disappointment be caused? Personally, I do not think that anything ought to go to India at this moment except a statement that a full presentation of the case was made by the Secretary of State for India, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, and the Maharajah of Alwar, and that the discussion had been adjourned until next week, and that, when that discussion has taken place, a summary of what occurred will be issued to the Press. That is what I should personally prefer, and

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62832

I would, therefore, limit my statement to-day to this proposition, that the Secretary of State for India should summarise in a few sentences what he said, that the Maharajah should do the same, and let Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru say that he spoke for an hour, or whatever the period was, that he made a full presentation of the case from every point of view, and that the discussion was then adjourned. I am nervous about these half and half publications and pronouncements. After all, India knows its interests are safe in the hands of its representatives.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I may tell you, frankly, that the constructive proposals that I have made here to-day are known in India, and I have received telegrams in support of them.

Lord Curzon: That may be so, but, of course, if they go out of here with the authority of the Conference they acquire a much greater sanctity than from the mere fact that it is known you are going to put them forward.

Mr. Mackenzie King: One point occurs to me. If the resolution which has just been proposed—and which, may I say immediately, I am largely in sympathy with, although I have to reserve my right of interpretation of certain phrases later on—if that resolution were to go out to-day to Canada, I am a little afraid that between now and Monday I might receive communications from British Columbia of a character that might embarrass me when I come to speak.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I quite understand that, and I thank you for the suggestion.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Could the discussion be postponed until the end of what I have go to say?

Mr. Baldwin: I think, Maharajah, that just the few words that have been said show the danger at this moment of going beyond a brief statement of fact.

The Maharajah of Alwar: May I make my statement first, and let this discussion take place afterwards?

Mr. Baldwin: I hoped this sentence of mine would finish the discussion. I was merely saying that, in view of the few words that have been said, I think it would be much wiser at this stage to have merely a statement that certain speeches were made, reserving a summary until the conclusion of the whole discussion. I do feel, for the very grave reasons that have been pointed out, that our work here might be prejudiced.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Except a general statement?

Mr. Baldwin: On Monday.

Lord Peel: I, of course, feel Mr. Mackenzie King's point of view strongly, and I think that does require some caution. Of course, one would have liked the speeches generally, with such excision as were necessary, to have gone out to India at once, and I should be sorry if only short summaries, or less than short summaries, a few sentences, were sent. I am inclined to think that it would be better if we confined ourselves at this stage. I dare say full publication may afterwards be given, but I think probably it would be better rather to restrict ourselves at the present time.

Mr. Baldwin: If anyone wishes to refer to the point before we part, he can.

Mr. Massey: I, unfortunately, have an appointment which I must keep. If I happen to leave in a quarter of an hour the Maharajah will understand, I hope, that I have got to go, as otherwise I should be only too pleased to remian.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: So have I, also.

STATEMENT BY THE MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR.

The Maharajah of Alwar: Prime Minister and Friends, I join in the echo of thanks to the Prime Minister for having set aside a day specially for discussing the problem of Indians overseas, a

C 62833

question which, I believe, will be tackled with all the goodwill that I see around me, and will help, when it reaches its final stages, to allay the great amount of feeling that is at present rather prominent in the minds of my countrymen. To-day is India's day, and, as these words come before my vision, thoughts and ideas of all kinds surge through my mind, some of emotion, some of patriotism, others of unity of the Empire; but coloured as they are by comparatively narrow ideas of nationalism, citizenship, political rights and freedom, they pale into almost insignificance before the dominating sunlight of the feelings, not ideas, of common brotherhood. But I have to speak to-day of mundane affairs, the sordid affairs of the political arena, and about the very life and existence in this material world of some unprotected communities. I must perforce descend from the high and exhilarating heights and leave my pedestal, which is yours also, by birthright, as of every individual either inside this room or outside it—nay, of all fellow-beings within the four corners of the Empire. I do so, Sir, I hope, only temporarily, to try and find my level again in the life of love where we were all intended to live, and sometimes try to get to.

India divided into British India and the Indian States.

Now, before going further, I will briefly halt to touch, in passing, on a subject that is known to many of you already, but which, I know, is not known to some. You know that India is divided into two parts, or rather, more correctly speaking, I should say into two administrative spheres. Two thirds of that country is called British India, and is under the direct sovereignty of His Majesty the Emperor and his Government, will all its machinery of Parliament, Cabinets, Government of India, and so forth. There is the other one-third, which is governed by the Indian Princes and Chiefs, whose subjects are the subjects of their own rulers, and who have, not from to-day, but from six to eight generations, been in alliance by means of treaties, Senads, engagements, &c., originally formed with the British East India Company, but the responsibilities of which were taken over by the Crown in 1858. These systems are not the growth of yesterday, but the survival of a régime of hundreds of centuries, yet able to imbibe and assimilate such progress as is compatible with our traditions, religions, ideas and environments. I have trespassed on your time with regard to these matters, as they will bear an important part on what I have to say later. I intend to speak to-day, not merely as a representative of the Princes, but also, and even more so, as an Indian, than whom I believe no one regards his motherland more sacred, and who wishes nothing more than that she shall receive justice from the British Government, in whose hands her destiny is placed, and co-operation from her sister States who form the comity of nations in our Empire. Let me say at the outset that I have no vain threats to place before you—for the simple reason that they go against the very principle of "Co-operation" which I placed before myself on entering the precincts of this room the first day of our Conference. I will say, furthermore, that while, on the one hand, I have nothing to beg, and I will not beg, I also make no demands, as I have no demands to make. But the motherland, whose salt I eat, the land whose soil has given me birth, tells me that it is my duty to place in plain, untarnished, but candid form in words before you all the facts of our case, such as I know them.

And now, Prime Ministers, I have one request to make, and that is that every word I utter or have uttered to-day in my statement may be cabled in full to my countrymen and in no hashed or pruned form. I do not desire this because I seek cheap notoriety by making Gallery Shots, but because my countrymen have the right to know every word I say in their name. They may have some things to criticise and others which they may not entirely like. It is in justice to them, speaking, not as their representative, but as one of them, that I therefore do not wish to say anything behind their backs, 7,000 miles away, which I will not gladly say to their face.

British Empire stands for Justice and Freedom.

I will now proceed. We believe that the greatest assets to the British Empire lie in its championing the cause of freedom and

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62834

justice. It is because I feel, my country feels—rightly or wrongly—that freedom and justice are at stake as exercised, or perhaps as understood, that I want to speak these words. I hope they will be in the interests of the Empire, and it will be something done—if nothing more—if misunderstandings and misapprehensions that do exist are somehow removed. It will be all the greater glory to you all—and I speak of no tinsel glory, but the glory of the heart—if the British Government and the great Dominions will show by words, and prove by action, that they mean to assist one of their sisters who is old in age, but also at present the weakest member on the chess-board of the political game.

Despondency in India.

I hear wails from India itself—and now I speak principally of that two-thirds—conveying the feelings of despondency. The words of my fellow brethren, of my country, seem to ring in my ears: Are we going to progress steadily, progressively, yet not too slowly towards our goal, which the other sister nations have been more fortunate in already achieving—the goal of having the power to govern our own country as a loyal and integral part of the Empire? Are we going to be helped affectionately and with kindly feeling to the goal which has been pronounced publicly by the British Government, and more than which we do not aspire to, of being a loyal self-governing Dominion within the Empire? Is everything going to be done to accelerate our progress, or is our progress under various pretexts to be retarded and delayed? Have we a long number of years before us of a great furnace to pass through, from which Ireland has only just emerged?

Sometimes I am afraid this despondency has been seen to give rise to despair, which has resulted in giving exhibitions in many places of those hideous atrocities at which the British Government, as the Custodians of our country, do not feel happy, and of which we, as its sons, are certainly not proud. If India had some more definite proposition before it than having to wait every ten years for its destiny to be enhanced, if it had reasonable assurance of rapid but progressive advancement, I believe that self-government, which is the goal of us all, for two-thirds India could be achieved, early and smoothly. I add this despite anything that may be said to the contrary, that the achievement is possible within a very much shorter period than some people would like to have us believe. I know, and I do not need to be told, that it depends to a great extent on India's capacity herself. I agree, but surely you do not desire to throw India entirely on her own resources? Does she not look to Britain to give her periodical and sustained assistance, so that my country may be, as it has been in the past, really and genuinely a grateful and loyal partner of your wonderful heritage?

Solution of Constitutional Problem in India.

I am speaking of self-government for two-thirds India, and, in dealing with this subject, I hope I may seek your indulgence for another few moments. The solution, I firmly believe, will not lie in grafting Western principles of political government on to the East with a stroke of the pen. Already many old bottles have cracked into which this new wine has been poured. I would much rather you get India round a table in confidence, and work out, with her sons, plans and methods that would be best suited to her environment, by which she can obtain her goal in the most rapid, but, at the same time, most peaceful and loyal manner. I say it is possible, and probable of early success, and you will be doing something for 300 millions of human beings that will cement them to you with gratitude and brotherly feelings.

The world was not built for academic or pious assurances spread over a number of years, the fulfilment of which may well pass over a lifetime. But what seems to me is this—and that is why I have mentioned this subject and in connection therewith I will say no more—that the whole problem, if viewed with breadth of vision and imagination, is really, Oh! so simple. It is not such a hedgehog as may be conceived by those who do not come in close contact with it; and it is really still capable of a solution which will leave a stronger England and a loving India.

C 62835

In the end, in this connection, I will only say this much. Many unpleasant incidents have taken place in India of late years. I have no desire to lift before you the veil to disclose tales of woe or wails of lamentation.

Many mistakes have undoubtedly been made on both sides. So far as India's side of the picture is concerned, it will be a regrettable spot on India's fair name, and I say this in all solemnity, that any grievances which India may have had, and did have, were allowed to be involved in interfering with the welcome given to the Royal Heir to the British throne, namely, the Prince of Wales, when he was touring in British India.

Will the British Royalty, you British Statesmen and people, not overlook this blunder and let it be past history? Can we now bury what has happened and rise in mutual goodwill and understanding for the future? Let not then the hand of the clock be held back. Advance in full confidence that what you do for India will be repaid to you a thousandfold from the people who know how to respond to generous sentiments.

Position of Indians overseas.

And now I start on a voyage outside my country under the ægis of the British Flag. Under the protection it gave to its loyal citizens, Indians in search of wealth, adventurous people in search of enterprise, left their homes and their shores to find refuge in parts where freedom, justice and peace were symbolised in the trident of the Red, White and Blue.

Indians found their way to South Africa, to Canada, to New Zealand, Australia, and, I am not personally aware, but perhaps some of them to Newfoundland. They went as citizens under the Union Jack, established their homes, invested their money, and settled down as peaceful citizens of the Empire. I have been told, and perhaps rightly so, by General Smuts, that the idea of British citizenship has changed from what it was a few years ago. I have forthwith applied myself to the facts, and asked the question, What does that mean? Surely the answer cannot be the treating of any particular race as outcasts. I am well aware of the fact that several of the questions with regard to Indians Overseas lie almost outside the direct concern of the Imperial Government. They are really within the purview of the self-governing Dominions, who are connected with the main centre by silken ties, and I will leave it at that. I want to address a few remarks directly to my Dominion colleagues.

And I will say this: One of your links in the chain is weak. If one link in it is weak and further weakened, perhaps you can do without it. That is your business. We, on our part, do not wish it. We want to have you with us. Let your inclinations decide. I know, my friends, how difficult it is for you to make any personal promises—for your positions depend, your authority depends on people to whom you are answerable. I assure you I appreciate the difficulty of your position. I, an Indian, have only tried to hold out my hand. I do not know if you and your people have the power and the desire to grasp it. Nothing hurts in the world more than the loss of "Izzat," humiliation. It is that one word which is the keynote of half the troubles of this world. It is certainly the keynote of the troubles of my country. Whether it is imaginary or real, Providence will judge, at least with open hearts shall we be able to approach Him, our Lord, on the Day of Judgment, and say, We are your children. It was all a game, it was all the chequer board of nights and days; we played our part, if it were ours, for sacrifice, then we sacrificed that others might live.

Friends, I want to tell you that I have received messages from my country asking me that I should not work on the Conference, encouraging me to resign because India suffered humiliation—in Natal and Kenya. But I paid no attention to these counsels of despair. It may perhaps be thought that I sought honour and glory, and could not forego such a lure as the Imperial Conference, but the reason that kept me here, rightly or wrongly, was because I felt that nothing in this world was achieved by ill-feeling, that a great deal if gained by toleration and goodwill. Come what may, I am determined to exercise them to the last in this assemblage.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
13
38
14
15
16
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62836

I have received wails from the Fiji Islands, saying that the poll-tax was causing Indians grave injustice, and that they desired to be repatriated if no other gratification could be given to them. I have received tales of woe from Natal complaining that a law was going to be introduced segregating them as outcasts. Similar stories come from Basutoland and other places which I need not go on reciting. How all this sounds to your ears I do not know. How it sounds to mine is it necessary to speak? How it is going to affect India if these questions are not solved, is a prophecy that I shudder to make.

And, remember, my friends, that this question does not affect British India only, but our Indian States' subjects also are involved in this overseas problem. It is not alone a question that agitates the mind of British India, but it is one that is viewed with equal humiliation in the Indian States. Why! I was surprised myself to receive letters from my own subjects, one or two sentences of which I will read out to you. I hope you will not mind the portions in which, out of affection and loyalty, personal references are made to me. This is certainly not the reason why I quote these sentences: "The Imperial Conference is drawing near. Your Highness is a member of that important assembly. India, bereft of all sympathy with the outside world, has been passing her transitional days in trying circumstances, aggravated recently to a great extent by the Kenya decision."

Again: "Whether the movement means for India a political set-back or a real awakening and a sure progressing State, towards building up a great national edifice, remains to be seen, but at present she looks to Your Highness with wistful eyes."

Kenya Settlement.

I say no more, and I regret having mentioned this portion of the letter. I have read the main portion of it to illustrate that the question is viewed with no less concern in one-third India than it is in two-thirds. I can give you innumerable instances, but I will not waste your time. The question of Indians in the Dominions is one that concerns the Dominion Premiers and their Parliaments primarily; but the question of Kenya as a Colony stands on an entirely different footing. I believe I am right when I say that many Indian settlers went to Kenya long before it was discovered as a suitable place for colonisation by the white people. They took lands, invested money, and to a great extent helped in developing the prospects of that country economically. So long as the colony was administered by the Imperial Government, difficulties, I understand, did not arise until the question of franchise to the residents came under consideration. It has now been decreed in the last decision that the recent white settlers, who are in a minority, are to be given the majority of votes in relation to an Indian population, which is in majority—thus leaving the latter at the mercy of the former, to be gradually ousted, if necessary, and as seems possible, by means of legislation.

I do not mean to enter into the pros and cons of this case—what Lord Elgin said or Lord Milner recommended are side issues—because, from my own twenty years' experience of administration, I know how easy it is to produce arguments with all the power in one's hands and records and papers at one's disposal in favour of one case against another. Arguments would be an unwise course for me to adopt, for understandings are not always reached by arguments. I know that there are some noblemen and gentlemen of influence from this country who desire to settle there, if they have not already done so. But the principal argument that has been advanced is that the Colonial Office holds Kenya in trust on behalf of the African races, who are the original inhabitants of that country.

Now, if I may say so, it strikes me as being peculiarly grotesque that a country, held in trust on behalf of a people who are backward and have yet to grow under the ægis of the British flag, should actually have a franchise given to anyone else to develop the country during the interregnum. Does this mean that, when the original tribes and people awaken from their slumber, they will be given primary consideration in relation to those who have invested money

C 62837

for several years past, and who govern the country, not under trust, but under a Franchise? I do not wish to enter into any further arguments. The whole question of Indians overseas seems to be one which does not mean the flooding of the different portions of the Empire with Indian immigrants claiming rights and privileges merely by their number in order to oust others who may have the rightful heritage. Mr. Mackenzie King, in one of his utterances in this Conference, said, with regard to Canada, that it was possible to restrict immigration from Japan by mutual agreement, not necessitating the introduction of law. That was mutual right understanding which did not cause any humiliation on either side, and allowed the Dominions to grow in accordance with their own environments, yet at the same time made no strictures or asked no strictures to be passed on peoples who had settled there as peaceful citizens. I believe that the Indian Government—and I am open to correction if I am wrong—would be equally prepared to enter into mutual understanding with the various Dominions and Colonies to prevent immigrants from flooding these countries. Under such circumstances is it not possible to modify the laws and to enforce them in a manner that they do not pointedly chafe against any particular community, thus causing them humiliation? What I want to know is whether my countrymen, as citizens of the British Empire, have any rights to settle in these countries, not for exploitation, not by way of peaceful penetration, but as peaceful traders, to live their unobtrusive existence.

Tribute to General Smuts.

General Smuts, in talking about the questions of Indians who come to his country, suggested, I think, in a casual way that they might be sent for settlement to British Guiana. I believe the British flag has been planted at the North Pole, so I wonder if that would not be a more suitable solution of the problem if it was desired to exterminate them. But I really came to know General Smuts after my brief knowledge of him, that, although he has been called—I am sorry to say—the arch-enemy of India, yet we have in him, if I may be permitted to say so to his face, a sagacious statesman who sees far ahead of ordinary mortals what is in the interests of our greater Empire. From my personal conversations with him I would really reverse the epithet, and say that I regard him since I have come here—and I speak in no platitudes—in his heart of hearts, personally a staunch friend and supporter of India.

I may assure you, friends, that I quite appreciate the difficulties that exist in the solution of this great problem. I realise that, though individually most of you may be prepared to look at the matter from a broad Imperial view, you have to return to your Parliaments which may hold different opinions. All I have to say, therefore, is that, while we are conferring in this Imperial assemblage, can we not put our heads together to solve the difficulty which surely human beings were meant to solve, not for the sake of individuals, but for the sake of the Empire. I have said this much, because I feel that the problem is much greater than what appears on the surface relating merely to Indians overseas. If you can enable India to feel that her humiliation is removed, that she can take pride in the Empire to which she has the privilege to belong, you will have achieved something which will be of lasting credit to yourselves and of benefit to the chain of which we all form a loyal link. Particularly since I have come here have I realised how whole-heartedly and with a single purpose Lord Reading and his Government have given their utmost help to our cause. Things do not always appear in public or in the Press which enable India to see what part the Government of India is playing in our cause. All glory, however, is due to them for their assistance. We shall not easily forget it, and hope that some day we may repay them for their effort and goodwill. Regarding Lord Peel, it is more difficult to give him thanks since he sits beside me. I thank him, however, in the name of India—if I may do so—and thank him with a grateful heart for his powerful championship of our cause he has indulged in to-day. My heart has been softened by the words he has spoken of our nationality and our religion. I hope every word of this statement will go to India, so that my country may not despair that it has no

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 68 14 15 69 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62838

one to support it. When the discussions take place, similarly, I hope the Prime Ministers of the Dominions will allow their goodwill and proposals to go to my country, for that I am sure will have a very happy result. I have very little more to say.

Message from Princes of India.

Now, Prime Minister and Friends, it is now my pleasurable task to read out a message that I received from my Order in India. His Highness the Chancellor of our Chamber, the Maharajah of Bikaner, has conveyed it to me by means of a cablegram. This is the message :—

> "Had the Chamber been sitting at this time, Indian Princes would have desired to send a message to this Conference in view of the important question of Indians overseas, including Indian States' subjects who are affected specially in Kenya. But as the Chamber is not sitting the Princes of India by cablegram convey a cordial message of friendship and goodwill to His Majesty's Government, the British Nation, to the Dominions and Colonies and their distinguished representatives at the Imperial Conference, with whom the Princes are united by common ties of loyalty to His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor."

The cable continues as follows :—

> "We give expression of our hope that the united efforts of all concerned at the Conference will yield some satisfactory result, drawing closely together into bonds of good fellowship the great comity of nations forming the British Empire to which the Princes and States are firmly attached, and securing the Indians, including the subjects of Indian States, an honoured position in all parts of the Empire in keeping with India's rightful place in the British Commonwealth and in conformity with the assiduous and constant efforts of His Excellency the Viceroy and the Government of India."

Friends, I convey this message to you coupled with my own hope that its aims and objects may be finally achieved before we leave England at the termination of the Imperial Conference.

The subject is undoubtedly large and certainly complicated, but surely with goodwill we will overcome difficulties, and, if, as we believe, we are firmly determined to see that every portion of the British Empire is strengthened, then I by no means despair; but on the other hand hope for possibilities of arriving at a settlement which will make you all the more respected and loved in the eyes of those you help and will leave those grateful to you to whom you extend your hand of assistance. I hope that it will be possible for you to consider also whether it would not be advisable hereafter to allow India to be called a Dominion, not a self-governing Dominion until she becomes so, but a Dominion, specially when making reference to her in relation to her sister Dominions.

Gentlemen, I think I have said all that I wished to on the subject of my countrymen overseas on India's day. It has been a great pleasure to me to meet round this table great Statesmen who are my colleagues from the Dominions and to have the pleasure of making their personal acquaintance. May I thank them for their kindness and courtesy to myself which I take as a token of their goodwill for my country? If, at any time, any of my colleagues think of visiting India, I hope they will give us an opportunity of showing and proving that we do not always speak words but act on them, and that we can give you as cordial a welcome to our country as it is possible to do within our capacities.

General Smuts welcomed to India.

I said one day to my friend, General Smuts—and I speak sincerely and in no conventional language because he who was our enemy a few years ago is to-day one of our best friends and a great statesman of to-day—I said to him I hoped he would come some day to India and he replied that he would be viewed with suspicion. I hope India, with all her political quarrels and difficulties, has not lost her human touch and response to appreciate great statesmen and to prove to them that beyond our domestic disputes, beyond our domestic quarrels, lie the sentiments of humanity.

C 62839

I believe, and I will with this conclude, that India came into the comity of nations within the British Empire with a definite purpose. It is a link that was soldered by the hand of Divine Destiny. It was a means of enabling the West to understand the East and *vice-versa*, but it also came in in order that the two civilisations with their spiritualities, with their material advancement and progress, might by their association together evolve a civilisation, a great humanity of God's children playing their individual parts in the cause of God. When that day comes before us and, figuratively speaking, we stand before the Judgment Seat of Him who has sent us here, we shall each have our accounts to render. India may differ from you in race; she differs in religion and in creed, but she does not differ in point of humanity. Personally I say this: If you give us your assistance in time of need—for a friend in need is the friend in deed—we shall give you not only our gratitude but our cordiality and practical assistance. But if it is destined to be otherwise, then I say this, that we shall be in a still higher position, for India will be able to say that she sacrificed herself in order that others might live; she prided herself in her political weakness in order that others may be strong; we gave our little best for the Higher purpose, for the Divine purpose which is our common goal—our common brotherhood and the salvation of humanity.

Mr. Baldwin read the communiqué it was proposed to issue to the press and the proceedings then terminated.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 24, 1923.

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 13 68 14 15 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62840

SECRET.

E. 13th Meeting (1923).

54

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1923, AT 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Professor John MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. T. JONES, Cabinet Office.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir WOLSELEY HAIG, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.E., Political Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Lieut.-Colonel C. W. G. WALKER, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62841

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., *(Secretary.)*
Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir ROBERT R. GARRAN, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. P. MCGILLIGAN.

India.
Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Mr. Baldwin: Before we proceed to the continuation of the business which was adjourned on Thursday last, I think it is of the utmost importance that the Foreign Secretary should tell the whole of the Conference exactly what the situation is to-day in regard to the French reply, and submit it for the consideration of the Conference.

Correspondence with United States and Allied Governments on Reparations Question.

Lord Curzon: The situation, Prime Minister, is one of great complexity and of no little anxiety. The Conference will remember that after President Coolidge's intervention we addressed a telegram to the United States of America welcoming their co-operation and enquiring from them as to what form they would be willing that it should take. We then got their reply, in which they indicated their willingness to join in one or more alternatives. We then communicated this reply to the Allied Governments, indicating a strong preference for what I will call Alternative No. 1, namely, the meeting of an international conference to examine into the question of German payments. The replies of the different Governments have come in since, and I think they have all been circulated. The Belgian reply, which I think was the first to arrive, was an acceptance of the second alternative, that is to say, an enquiry under the auspices of and in connection with the Reparation Commission, coupled with a suggestion—I can hardly call it a condition, because it was absurd—that this enquiry, if started, should address itself to the consideration of the Belgian scheme of dealing with money payments by Germany, which is now before the Reparation Commission. Of course, they will take that into consideration in common with any other schemes which may be put before them. The Belgians also took special credit to themselves for having declared at Paris that they would favour this solution whatever the French Government did; indeed, the Ambassador, as you have seen from the report of an interview, told me that M. Poincaré would have refused to come in at all if it had not been for the Belgian willingness to act independently. Whether that is the case or not, of course, I cannot say. However, the Belgians definitely accept Alternative No. 2. The Italians first replied that, while agreeing entirely in principle with our proposals, they preferred Alternative No. 1, but they were doubtful about the French acceptance. They then got into touch with the French, and finally came down yesterday or the day before in favour of the second alternative, to which they prefixed the rather wise preamble that it is desirable that the Allies should be in agreement before they enter any Conference at all. So much for Belgium and Italy.

French Reply.

France has given a great number of replies. First there was the reply which, I think, has been circulated to everyone here; it is in print. It came, of course, in typewritten form, but it was subsequently put into print. Secondly, there is, as you may have

C 62842

seen in all the papers this morning, a rather long memorandum defining at greater length France's attitude and expanding what they say in the reply which you have seen. Thirdly, there is the speech, lasting, I believe, for two hours, which M. Poincaré delivered yesterday in Paris, a summary of which is contained in the papers this morning. It is a little difficult to extract from the whole of these presentations of the case every facet of the French position, but it comes to this: M. Poincaré accepts, with evident reluctance, and, as he explains in his speech, rather as a gesture of goodwill towards the Prime Minister with whom he re-established friendly relations at Paris, Alternative No. 2, but he hedges it around with all sorts of apparent reservations, each of which is fitted, with some skill, into the framework of the Treaty; that is to say, he says: "If you want an enquiry by experts, that is already provided for; you have merely to look at the Treaty and you will see that the Reparation Commission is empowered thereby to employ the services of whomever they like to assist them in their labours; and if they now desire to convene an assembly of international financial experts and to include among them an American, so much the better; there is no harm; but it must be understood that the initiative and the responsibility is that of the Reparation Commission." Now I ask the Conference to bear in mind this insistence by M. Poincaré on the initiative and responsibility of the Reparation Commission, because a great deal will hang thereon. In the course of one of these pronouncements—I forget whether it is the memorandum published in the papers this morning or in the speech, possibly in both—he goes out of his way (in my view quite unnecessarily) once again to insist that the figures determined by the Reparation Commission as to the sum total of the claims upon Germany in the Spring of 1921, of £6,600,000,000 as the total reparation debt of Germany shall not be touched; and once again he calls attention to the fact that under the terms of the Treaty it can only be touched by the unanimous consent of the Allies. I submit that that has nothing whatever to do with the present case. The Committee to be set up is to determine the capacity of Germany to pay. If in the course of their investigations they come to the conclusion, as every sensible man has done long ago, that the total fixed in May 1921 is altogether impossible, nothing in the world can prevent them from saying it. I hope they will say it, and when they say it it will be for the Powers to consider what line they adopt upon that point. Therefore, I should be disinclined to be deviated in the course of conduct we ought to pursue by any allusion or investigation of that particular problem. M. Poincaré also, I think, rather goes out of his way to bring in again the question of the cessation of passive resistance, in which it is quite clear that he does not believe, and the question of the continued occupation of the Ruhr, which apparently he desires to make, if not permanent, at any rate of long duration; he also adds passages about the security of France, which we have always been entirely willing to consider. Therefore his reply, although it is an acceptance, is a grudging acceptance, and is fenced round by all sorts of reservations and conditions which may be a source of trouble as time goes on.

What is next step.

The question then arises, What are we to do? Now, it would be possible, I suppose, to say that alternative No. 2, accepted in the conditions I have described, does not hold out great hopes of satisfactory results, and that we adhere to our preference for alternative No. 1. It might be possible on those grounds to make an effort again to secure No. 1. In my view, though that is possible, it is not practicable, and for the reason that it would be attended with certain failure. In the first place, it is clear from the American reply that they would not be prepared to insist on alternative No. 1 if they realised, as they must already, that the Allies are not united upon that point. Secondly, it is clear that in no circumstances whatever will France in the present stage of the proceedings agree to No. 1, and, therefore, if we revive the suggestion—still more if we insist upon it—it will mean a definite abandonment of all chance of co-operation between the Allies and ourselves at this moment. Thirdly, if we revive or insist upon it, it is pretty clear to my mind

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62843

that Belgium and Italy will both back out, and therefore we should have initiated these discussions only to break them down by an act of our own in the preliminary stage. There is another reason which I think incapacitates us from taking that line. The suggestion for this expert enquiry in connection with and under the Reparation Commission is one that we made months ago; we made it, I think, in June last, and it was turned down at the time. Therefore, there would be considerable inconsistency in our throwing over our own suggestion. Lastly, the Conference will remember that in putting the case last week to the Powers, we, following the line taken by America herself, did give them the choice of alternatives. Therefore, if they have accepted alternative No. 2, and if we now say: "No, that is not what we want," they will be entitled to say: "This is an act of *mala fides* on your part; you gave us the choice, we choose the alternative you do not like, and then you disagree with us and throw over the whole thing." I do not think myself it is possible to take that line.

Position of Reparation Commission.

Now, in this rather difficult situation, where lies the prospect of doing something definite and helpful, because, of course, that is what we are all for? I think it lies in this. M. Poincaré himself, with his eye on the Treaty, with the Treaty, so to speak, in his clutch, has gone out of his way to emphasise what I described just now as the "initiative and authority of the Reparation Commission." Almost in the same breath he has done what I think he had no right to do—practically dictated to the Commission the way in which he thinks they ought to proceed. I would take him at his word upon the first point, and I think that the future lies in the action of the Reparation Commission itself. The body which is to enquire is to be a body appointed by it. Very well, let it then nominate the members. If this body is to act under its authors, let it draw up the terms of reference. That places great initiative in its hands.

Terms of Reference to proposed Expert Committee.

Now, let me deal with both points. I think I could easily give you the kind of terms of reference to the committee which the Reparation Commission might draw up, but I need not trouble you with it now because I have no idea how they will act. But our representative on the Reparation Commission, Sir John Bradbury, who is a very able and independent man, will no doubt take steps to ensure, so far as is possible, that the reference is a prudent and a wide one.

Composition of Committee.

Secondly, as regards the composition of this enquiry, one of the points which in one of these pronouncements M. Poincaré endeavours to lay down is that no German and no neutral is to be admitted to this expert body. Now, there it seems to me that M. Poincaré has gone outside the line of his previous argument, because, if it is for the Commission to set up this body, they are at liberty to put upon it whom they please. It is nothing whatever to do with us or with him, and if they choose to addresss an invitation to a German to join this body of experts, or to a neutral to join them, they are perfectly at liberty to do so. No one can interfere with their initiative. But, of course, it may be that the French representatives would utilise the majority that they have hitherto enjoyed, that they now enjoy, on the Reparation Commission, to defeat any such thing.

General Smuts: They still enjoy it.

Lord Curzon: They still enjoy it. Both France and Belgium will vote together. On the other side, there is Italy and England, and a Frenchman in the chair who has a casting vote, because the American, who is referred to more than once in these transactions, has no vote at all; he is merely an observer; he does not count. Of course, if that artificial majority enjoyed by the French is utilised for this purpose, it would raise separate and serious considerations, but I do not think it would prevent our man, Sir John Bradbury, from putting forward, as he is disposed to do, the proposal that the

C 62844

expert enquiry should include a neutral and a German. Supposing he is defeated over that, even so—and this is admitted by M. Poincaré himself—there is nothing to prevent—indeed there is everything to necessitate—the Germans being sent for in order to explain the situation. You cannot arrive at the solution of this question without taking into consideration the German point of view, and, therefore, though I think our man ought to press urgently for the admission of these two independent representatives, yet the matter can come up again when the point is reached. I do not think myself that it is absolutely vital, whereas, if we were defeated over that point by this artificial majority, it really would, I think, open the eyes of the world.

Next as to the position of the expert body point by point. The Conference will perhaps remember that last year there was an international body of experts, bankers, that enquired into the financial position and paying capacity of Germany, and they issued a very valuable report, which was swept out of sight, as most good reports are. But still, that body was very useful, and its members were very important persons. The British representative was Sir Robert Kindersley, a great authority in the financial world of London; the American representative was Mr. Pierpont Morgan, by far the most competent man in the whole of the United States for this purpose. I need not give you the names of the other representatives. Well now, it seems to me that the right way to proceed is not for the Governments to interfere, because this is to be an enquiry by the Reparation Commission, but, in the same way as these gentlemen to whom I have referred were appointed last year by the various international delegates on the Reparation Commission, to ask the latter once again to function; that is to say, the French representative, M. Barthou, would be asked—of course, he would consult the French Government—to nominate a Frenchman—I believe it is pretty certain whom they would nominate—ditto the Belgian representative, ditto the Italian. Well then, our representative would in all probability nominate Sir Robert Kindersley, who served before, and I do not think there is any doubt whatever that the American representative, although he is not an actual member of the Reparation Commission but only a sort of associated member, would nominate Mr. Pierpont Morgan. Of course, there is an alternative. That alternative is that we should telegraph to the American Government and say: "These are the lines on which we propose to proceed." We should send them a general summary of the replies and invite their co-operation, and we might—indeed, I have drawn up a telegram in this sense—ask them to nominate their expert themselves; but, inasmuch as they would certainly nominate Mr. Pierpont Morgan, and inasmuch as he will be nominated by the other method that I have suggested—and that, the latter, is the method favoured by M. Poincaré—it does not seem to me necessary to draw a fresh herring across the trail or to introduce further delays by suggesting that the Government should intervene, because M. Poincaré will say at once: "America is going to appoint their man, you are going to appoint yours; that is contrary to the Treaty."

Another point. Supposing these representatives are all appointed; whether they do or do not include a German and a neutral, I think the American ought to be in the chair. The American is the only man of them all who is absolutely independent; all the rest of us are affected by considerations of European politics, and I think it would add greatly to the authority and impartiality of the body if the American were invited to take the chair.

Possible outcome of suggested Enquiry.

You may say: "Supposing you get this body—we ought to get them pretty quickly—what will happen?" That question it is very hard to answer, because I cannot forecast what these gentlemen will say or do. But, assuming their individual experience and authority, I have not a doubt whatever that, with the eyes of Europe upon them, we shall get pretty well what we want. They are not the kind of men who will allow this matter to go by default, or who will desist from covering any part of the field which they are called upon to traverse. You may say: "Granted; but will they agree?" I think

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 INDEX 14 15 16

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62845

probably not; but does that matter? Let us suppose that the result is that the French and the Belgians continue, as in all probability they will, to act together as they have done all along. Let us suppose, therefore, that we have a Franco-Belgian report which may differ from the report of the other experts. Assuming that our case is as strong as I believe it to be, I do not think it ought to be difficult to get an Anglo-American report with very likely the Italians joining in, leaving aside for the moment the German and the Belgian. Supposing you get a Franco-Belgian report, and that you get an Anglo-Italo-American report, and they were published side by side; assuming that our report contained sound and valuable conditions, it would make a resounding impression throughout the world.

Views of British Representative on Reparation Commission.

Therefore, although a good deal of what I have said is speculative and rests upon conditions which I cannot predicate, conditions about which I can only conjecture, I think the situation is more hopeful than might appear upon the surface. I asked Sir John Bradbury, who knows more about it than anybody else, what he thought; and although, of course, he would like number one better than number two—as we all should—he says: "Go ahead with number two and you will get more out of it than you think"; and he summed up his reply to me in these words:—

> "As regards my 'expectation' as to the outcome of the proceedings of such a body, we should almost certainly get a figure or a series of figures of the burden, either expressed as a capital sum, present value, or in terms of annuity, which it is practicable to impose on Germany. We ought to be pretty sure of getting an almost immediate recommendation for a temporary moratorium pending further report, and at any rate a majority recommendation in favour of substituting something more practicable for the 'gages productifs.' We might also hope to get useful constructive criticism of the Belgian suggestions, and possibly, though not so certainly, suggestions of real value on the knotty question of the supervision of German finance.
>
> "The Committee will, of course, be advisory only; the ultimate decisions will rest theoretically, first, with the Reparation Commission, and, secondly, (as regards any question of reducing the total liabilities under the Peace Treaty), with the Allied Governments.
>
> "The main danger of the procedure is the opportunity which it gives of wasting time to any party desiring to be obstructive. From this point of view, it seems to me most important, as indicated above, to give the Committee sufficient authority to make it difficult for the Reparation Commission to do anything with its reports except refer them to the Governments."

That opinion, I think, ought to carry great weight with us.

Proposed joint Allied Communication to United States Government.

In conclusion, the action which I would suggest—the only action which I think it is possible to take to-day—is the suggested telegram which we, who have taken the initiative in the matter, ought to propose to send to the American Government in the name of the Allies. I have written this telegram to our representatives at Paris, Rome and Brussels:—

> "The French, Italian and Belgian Governments having formally intimated their assent to the setting up by the Reparation Commission of an advisory committee on which America will be represented, His Majesty's Government propose that this decision be now officially notified to the United States Government by a joint communication to be made to the State Department by the representatives of the four Allied Powers at Washington.
>
> "I request your Excellency accordingly to submit for the approval of the Government to which you are accredited the following draft telegram which His Majesty's Government

C 62846

suggest should be addressed *mutatis mutandis* to the four Allied representatives at Washington by their respective Governments.

"Please concert with your French (Italian) (Belgian) colleague to make a joint communication to the United States Government in the following terms:—

> "'The Allied Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium have noted with the utmost satisfaction that the United States Government are favourable to the principle of American participation in an economic enquiry through an advisory body to be appointed by the Reparation Commission for the purpose of considering Germany's capacity to pay, and of making recommendations as to an appropriate financial plan for securing such payment.
>
> "'The four Allied Governments are unanimous in thinking that such an economic enquiry is most desirable and that its value would be greatly increased by the participation of an American expert whose co-operation would be most highly appreciated. They accordingly propose to invite the Reparation Commission forthwith to set up an advisory committee under the powers conferred upon the commission by clause 7 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, and they will be grateful if the United States Government will authorise the unofficial American delegate to the Reparation Commission to designate the proposed American member of the committee.'"

This is on the lines of my suggestion that the members of the new Committee had better be appointed by the Reparation Commission and nominated by the various delegates on that Commission.

That, I think, is all, if the Conference approve the general lines of what I have stated, that we need do, or that we can do, to-day.

Mr. Mackenzie King: The thought which comes to my mind is, what alternative is there to the course Lord Curzon has suggested?

Mr. Bruce: I think it very regrettable that the choice was given between a general meeting of all the nations concerned in the Versailles Treaty, to consider the whole position, review the whole circumstances, and see whether it is possible to carry out that Treaty, and alternative 2; but, the alternative having been given, I entirely agree with the Foreign Secretary that we should find ourselves in a very difficult situation if we tried to back out now. There appears to be no other course to take, except the communication which has been suggested.

Mr. Massey: I agree with what has been said by the other speakers, and I think that what has been suggested by Lord Curzon is the only course to adopt. As I understand it, the position is exceedingly difficult, but not altogether without hope. It appears to me that we have got to be exceedingly careful not to impose any condition, or attempt to impose any condition, which might to a certain extent nullify the proceedings by giving M. Poincaré—an extraordinary difficult man—any excuse for disagreeing with the proposals which are being made. I hope the Conference will be agreed to; it looks as if there is a chance, and it seems to me to be the only hope of a settlement.

As far as the American chairman is concerned, if that could be arranged I think it would be a very fine thing to do, because we have more hope of impartiality from an American chairman than from any chairman appointed by any of the European nations, even including Britain. I know, of course, that you could get an impartial chairman from Britain, but he would never be accepted as such; if anything went wrong, they would say "perfidious Albion" again, and that sort of thing. I trust the proposals will be proceeded with. It is the only glimmer of hope, and I think we should exhaust it before we go any further.

Importance of United States Participation in Enquiry.

General Smuts: I would do anything to get America in. It seems to me that that is our principal point—to get America in.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

The enquiry will not lead to much, but if we could get America on the scene again, that would be a great point gained.

Necessity of settling in advance Terms of Reference to proposed Committee.

In the light of what M. Poincaré has said, I am troubled over the letter that we have received from France. The French Government have not accepted any of the proposals made; they have not accepted the big Conference, nor have they really accepted the other proposal. What they say is this: "It is therefore within the powers of the Reparation Commission to designate experts whose assistance may appear necessary in order to obtain the information and particulars which it may require."

All they say is that the Reparation Commission can of course appoint any experts it wants in order to supply it with the information and particulars which it requires. It is a question to which we are directing our attention—Germany's capacity to pay. It is quite clear that they want the Reparation Commission to have the initiative and responsibility; but we know perfectly well that M. Barthou is going to carry out the spirit of what M. Poincaré has said. I am afraid therefore that we may yet be sold over this thing, and that when this expert commission is appointed the Reparation Commission will give them an instruction, a reference, in the sense in which M. Poincaré has spoken; that is, they will tell them: "Within that sum which has been fixed by the Reparation Commission of £6,600,000,000, you advise us as to terms of payment and instalments, amounts of instalments and so on, but that you must not touch." That is what M. Poincaré has said, and that is what I am afraid is going to be the instruction of the Reparation Commission to this expert body. If that happens, I think we are sold. We could not ask America to take part in that, and I do not see how we can take part in it. Therefore, I come to this conclusion, that, unless we know what is going to be the reference to this body, it is useless going on. It is much better honestly to face the issue at the start, than to have our men appointed to go to the Reparation Commission and the Reparation Commission by M. Barthou's casting vote telling them: "Look here, you must not go into the question of amount. You can go into the question of instalments, moratorium and so on, but the amount is not to be touched." Then I think we shall be sold. Therefore I would accept this second alternative of America, because I think that, if that is the only way to get agreement, let us get agreement on that basis, and let us enter into this agreement; but I do not want it to be abortive, as I am afraid it is going to be. Unless the reference is settled in advance, I am very much afraid that in a couple of days we shall be faced with this dilemma: That we have appointed a Commission, and America will have appointed a Commission, to go into an enquiry which will be absolutely abortive; and M. Poincaré will turn round and say: "Did you not read my speech? I told you so. I wrote you a letter in which I said the Reparation Commission could get any information they wanted, and I told you that this point was not to be touched," and there it is. That is my first trouble. Unless you want to get landed in this matter, we should have the reference made clear in advance, so that we know that at any rate there is going to be an enquiry by these people and that a report is going to be made on the issue which we want to be enquired into.

Time Limit for Enquiry.

The second trouble I have is this. In this matter time is the essence of the whole business. The fight is over time, not over a Commission. What M. Poincaré wants is time. The question is whether there should not be some time limit to this enquiry. Could we afford a Commission which is going to hang up matters for the next month or two? I can quite well see that this Commission may give that opening. It will continue, with all of the obstruction that may be raised, to enquire for the next couple of months, and we may have the deluge upon us before this Commission has ceased its enquiry. That is the second point. I want to see whether we cannot get a settlement on that too—on the reference and on a time limit.

Importance of defining British Policy towards Separatist Movement in Rhineland.

The third point, which is somewhat outside what you are raising here, troubles me just as much, and that is that I cannot see that we have defined our position really with regard to this matter that is taking place now, namely, the Rhineland business. Evidently some very great transformation is taking place there. Poincaré says it is not his doing, he is leaving the people to do what they like there. Our official information, and our unofficial information through the press, is just the opposite; that a separate republic is being started there through an organisation evidently created by the French military authorities there; and the question to my mind is: If we want to prevent another quarrel with the French a little later, should we not make our position perfectly plain at this stage? What is to be our attitude towards this separate republic there? To my mind, the strength of the French has been this, that at all stages they have made their position clear. Apart from any *arrière-pensée*, we know what the French position is; it has been stated to us every Sunday for six months. But the trouble is that I am in doubt as to what our position is.

I want our position to be defined with absolute clearness, and I want the French and the Belgians to know that what the Prime Minister said at Plymouth is the policy of this Government; that we are not going to countenance a separate State like this, which is going to be another breach of the Peace Treaty. I raise the point, because I find that even of our man in Brussels the question is being asked: What is the policy? He says what he hears from the Belgians, what our policy is; the Belgian Minister has told him this, that and the other. I foresee a very great struggle at a very early date over this Rhineland Republic, and I think the sooner we can define our position the better. We must be open and honest with our Allies and tell them what our attitude is, so that we do not spring a surprise upon them later. Those are really my points. The reference is the thing that troubles me most. I think we are going to be sold in a week, and this Government will appear to have committed a foolish thing.

Reply to Points raised by General Smuts.

Lord Curzon: I agree with General Smuts in attaching first-rate importance to the question of reference. He thinks we are going to be sold within a week.

General Smuts: The Reparation Commission will have to give an instruction to this body. What is it going to be? Is it going to be M. Poincaré's speech?

Suggested Terms of Reference to Committee.

Lord Curzon: Our representative on the Commission is Sir John Bradbury, and Sir John Bradbury would move in the Reparation Commission something like the following, which we have drawn up. He would insist upon comprehensive terms of reference, including:

(*a.*) What liability in respect of Peace Treaty charges upon Germany is consistent with the restoration of German public finances, currency and credit;

(*b.*) What are the best means of securing payment by Germany of her obligations under the Peace Treaty; and

(*c.*) What measure of control over German assets and German financial administration is necessary and desirable in the interests of her Peace Treaty creditors, and how the machinery of such control may be best organised.

Now supposing we say, as theoretically it would be desirable to do: Let us draw up the terms of reference for the Reparation Commission in advance; M. Poincaré would say at once: "That is no part of your business." It is not for us, over their heads, to draw up terms of reference, and, as for the proceedings ending in a deadlock in a week, they would end in a deadlock in two hours. I should probably have a telegram this afternoon. Therefore, let us try this other alternative. General Smuts says we must fail; we have got this artificial majority, with M. Barthou in the Chair, against us. Our man deliberately proposes these terms of reference;

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

there is a long debate upon the matter; and let us suppose he is overruled by the majority, by the casting vote of the French President. Look at what happens at once: America declines to send her man; we decline to send our man. The advantage swings over to our side; the thing has proved abortive, but it has proved abortive in a manner that entirely frees our hands. It is always rather dangerous to forecast the future, but, in my view, we should then have no alternative but to fall back upon Alternative No. 1. If at the opening stage M. Poincaré mobilises against us an artificial majority, you may be perfectly certain that America will never send Mr. Pierpont Morgan to be put in this position.

Proposed Time Limit.

Then as regards point number two, the time limit, I think we may be certain—I forget now the exact time that was spent upon the labours of this Committee of Bankers last year—it was short—but you may be quite sure that Mr. Pierpont Morgan is not going to devote several months of his time to looking into the European situation for nothing, and I think we may take it for granted that a time limit will be imposed by the people themselves.

British Attitude towards Separatist Movement.

Then as regards our attitude towards the Separatist movement, I do not know if General Smuts has seen it—what he says is quite true—but there is a very significant telegram this morning to the effect that, although the French are nominally adopting a neutral or independent attitude, they are behind the whole movement; they are organising every one of these attempts, whether on a large scale or on a small scale, and, indeed, this telegram came this morning from Lord D'Abernon:—

"Following received from Mr. Thurstan telegram No. 27 of 26th October"—Mr. Thurstan is on the Rhine:—

"'Evidence is accumulating that Separatist risings are result of preconceived plan on the part of French, and would long ago have been suppressed by local police and inhabitants had it not been for direct French and Belgian support. In these circumstances French will probably succeed in establishing a so-called Separatist administration in all principal Rhineland towns against will of practically entire population. The analogous case of Upper Silesia is obvious. French official policy [? group undecypherable] is recognition of responsibility of Separatists for maintaining law and order in towns where latter have established themselves, but it will doubtless be developed according to circumstances. As a result, feelings of population are being aroused to fever heat and rendering still worse an already almost intolerable situation.

"'Conditions in Ruhr have never been so bad. Supply of money was yesterday entirely insufficient for pay-rolls, and serious rioting is now proceeding at Essen; it is impossible to foretell what will happen next week, when hundreds of thousands of miners will presumably be on the streets.'"

Of course, we are locally only concerned in so far as that portion of the Rhineland which is in the occupation of our troops is involved; and there we are holding the fort, as we have often done before; but we have laid it down definitely, as the Prime Minister stated in his speech at Plymouth on Thursday, that we are dead against any Separatist movement that involves the disruption of the German State or Empire, or whatever you like to call it. You must remember that there are two kinds of Separatists: first of all there are those little splashes or splutters which are made in the neighbourhood of the Rhineland, and which would peter out at once if it were not for French and Belgian support. I think they will peter out eventually. But they are appeals partly for autonomy outside the German Reich and partly inside it. Now as regards the former, we hold very strong views. But we cannot dictate to the latter, to States, for instance, as Saxony or Bavaria or the Palatinate. If any of those areas says: "We choose to set ourselves up as an independent State inside the German Reich," we cannot stop them, because the Germans are encouraging them to do it

themselves. Of course, they see in their own interests that they may thus escape the burden of reparations, because it is clear that when these little separate States are set up the difficulty of getting reparations will be immeasurably increased. Therefore, our attitude can only be the attitude of saying that anything done to disrupt the German Reich or the German State meets with our emphatic disapproval. But let me ask the Conference to go one step further. I mean that this policy on the part of France of encouraging independence is a suicidal policy. What will happen? The first thing that these States, supposing that they constitute themselves into independent bodies, will do will be to say to France: "We are independent; we have set ourselves up with a good deal of sympathy from you; it is therefore inconsistent that you should remain in occupation of our territory"; and, secondly, they will say: "Hitherto you have been demanding these enormous sums from the German State. Well, we have broken off from the German State; we are impoverished; we have no money; and, of course, your first step will be to release us from our share of the burden." Obviously they will say that, and that is what I mean by saying that France's policy is suicidal, because the States will say that she has made her occupation in a form uncomfortable to them, and that she has done away with all possibility of getting reparations. You will never get reparations unless you have one solid German State. To my mind the centripetal forces of the German State are so overpowering that whatever happens, even if you have a little spot here and a little spot there where independent States are set up, everything will ultimately go back, just as everything is tending to go back in Russia, where the Ukraine and Georgia and Armenia are being drawn back into the circle, and where, as I have said, the Baltic States will one day go back too. The same thing will happen in Germany. It is her only chance for the future; she is out for revenge and to rebuild herself; therefore I am not very much disturbed about these efforts at independence.

General Smuts: Our position should be clear; that is the only thing I am anxious about.

Lord Curzon: Yes, I have made it clear and if it is necessary to make it clearer I can do it, General Smuts.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain: You mean by public statement?

General Smuts: Yes, and by an official notification to the two Governments. The Belgian Minister at Brussels tells our man this, that and the other. He is clearly under a wrong impression as to what our policy is. I do not want them to say afterwards that we did not tell them what our policy was when there has been some deviation from it; this is the telegram I am referring to; this is from our man at Brussels: "Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me this morning that in accordance with the British custom of not expressing views of hypotheses you have been unwilling"—that is our Foreign Secretary—"to formulate policy of British Government towards this Rhineland movement," so apparently the Belgians think what is not quite accurate.

Lord Curzon: You have had my account of that interview, that is an interview with the Belgian Ambassador here. I circulated an account of it. All these accounts that I write are repeated to Brussels and to all the capitals, and Baron Moncheur must have misinterpreted what I said.

General Smuts: Do you not think, now that things are coming to a head in the Rhineland—this Separatist movement—we should, in a formal communication to both those Governments, make plain what our position is, that we would not object to a movement that separates the Rhineland, but that anything that disrupts Germany and runs counter to the Peace Treaty we should certainly not agree to—that they may know it in advance?

Lord Curzon: I do not think so. I think they know perfectly well; Crowe stated it with absolute clearness; I stated it with absolute clearness also to the Belgian Ambassador more than once; we have stated it to the Authorities on the spot, and it is known

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62851

in Berlin. If I may say so, the Belgians' action has been based upon a misinterpretation of what I said, by Baron Moncheur, but, if it is necessary to make it clearer, we can do so. Are you satisfied with the answer I gave to you on the other point?

General Smuts: I think so. If that is the plan, I quite agree to it.

Discussion on French Attitude.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain: I had very much the same point in my own mind as that raised by General Smuts, because it appeared to me that M. Poincaré, in his speeches, while affecting to accept the second alternative, was really going against the interpretation which is placed upon it by us. He interpreted it that the instructions to the Reparation Committee were to enquire not what Germany's capacity to pay was, but what her capacity to pay *now* was, and that they were to be prevented from touching at all on the ultimate liability. In the telegram which Lord Curzon has read to us that he proposes to send to Washington, he says what the object of the enquiry is, and asks the Ambassadors to concert together and make a joint representation. If M. Poincaré holds to the sense of his speeches, he will at once take exception to that, and he will say that this is, in effect, laying down the terms of reference.

General Smuts: In your telegram to Washington you say "consult with your colleagues in order to get this enquiry now into Germany's capacity to pay." If there should be an enquiry into Germany's capacity to pay, trouble is going to be raised at Washington almost immediately. I am getting very suspicious; perhaps I am too suspicious.

Lord Curzon: If he raises an objection to that, we shall know where we are; it does not preclude us from trying it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: When Lord Curzon read out that telegram, I did not even see that he did define that it was to decide Germany's capacity to pay.

Mr. Warren: We have gained two valuable points already—the consent of America to come in, and, secondly, the consent of M. Poincaré to join in a Conference; and, having gained those two points, it would be a mistake not to go on because we are afraid that the enquiry might prove abortive. What M. Poincaré says on Sunday afternoons to French audiences and what he is prepared to say to Belgian, Italian, British, and American Delegates sitting round a Conference table may be two different things, and I do not think we ought to object to going on with this Conference. Our surmise may be quite incorrect.

Lord Peel: I feel the force of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's point. It seemed to me that what M. Poincaré did say in his speech was really a refusal, but as a matter of fact, when that is read carefully, it appears to be a matter of tactics only.

POSITION OF INDIANS IN OTHER PARTS OF EMPIRE. CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION.

Mr. Baldwin: Now, I think, we are in a position to proceed with the business. I will ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies to resume the debate.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

Tribute to Presentation of Case for India.

The Duke of Devonshire: At the outset of the few remarks I have to offer, I cannot refrain from saying that India has been exceedingly fortunate in the spokesmen selected to represent her case in this Conference.

That case, eloquently stated by Lord Peel and by His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar, was developed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in a speech the closely reasoned argument of which was greatly reinforced by its studied moderation.

C 62852

What India asks.

I particularly noticed that the proposal which he submitted was outlined rather than reduced to the specific terms of a resolution. In this, if I may say so, I think he was very wise, because, while he made the general purport of his proposal perfectly clear, he left the precise form to be moulded in the subsequent discussion. Let me state as shortly as I can the gist of that proposal as I understood it. Two years ago this Conference, with the exception of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, agreed that the rights of Indians domiciled in parts of the Empire other than India should be recognised. Sir Tej now proposes that the question how and when effect can be given to this agreement should be made the subject of enquiry and discussion between committees representing the several Governments concerned and a committee representing the Government of India.

Limitation of Indian Request.

That is what Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru asks. But before I proceed I must also invite you to note that there are various matters already settled which he is not attempting to reopen. He does not question the right of each community in the British Commonwealth to control the composition of its own population. He is not, in a word, asking the self-governing Dominions to reopen the question of Indian immigration. He frankly recognises the autonomy of the Dominion Governments within their respective territories. What he asks is that the Governments concerned will agree to discuss with the Government of India the steps necessary to give effect to the resolution passed by the Conference in 1921. It is, of course, in the last instance for each Government to decide for itself, but, because in certain matters such decisions are not limited in their effects to the countries by which they are taken, the issues to which they relate may be brought for mutual discussion here.

British Government accepts Principle of Request.

In so far as the British Government is responsible for the Colonies and Protectorates, I can only say on behalf of the British Government that we certainly accept the principle of the request put forward by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Maintenance of Kenya Settlement.

In saying this you will not understand me to mean that we are prepared to reopen matters which have been made the subject of recent and most carefully considered decision. I refer more especially to the Kenya settlement, the terms of which were placed before and accepted by the British Parliament in July. While I would not propose that the area of discussion between the contemplated Committee and the Secretary of State for the Colonies should be limited, I should only be misleading India if I were to say anything to suggest that the Government could consent to reconsider the decisions embodied in the settlement of July last. To use the words of the White Paper, the constant endeavour of the British Government throughout their deliberations was to relate the principles which must govern the administration of a British Colony in Tropical Africa to the wider considerations of general Imperial Policy as enunciated in the Resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1921.

Responsibilities of British Government.

I have also to remind the representatives of India that, so far as the British Colonies and Protectorates are concerned, the ultimate responsibility rests with the British Government, and it is with the British Government, and more particularly with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that any questions affecting British Indians domiciled in these Colonies and Protectorates should be discussed in the first instance by such a Committee as Sir Tej has suggested. It will then be for the Colonial Office to consult, as may be necessary, any Colonial Government concerned with these discussions before any decisions are taken by the British Government.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62853

Political Status of Indians in Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

I am hopeful that the area to be covered by these discussions will not in fact prove wide. I recently circulated to members of the Conference, in response to their general wish, a memorandum* upon the political status of British Indians in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories. I studiously confined my memorandum to facts, and perhaps I may be permitted to summarise quite briefly what that memorandum contains.

It shows that, in the West Indian Colonies, British Indians are under no political or legal disability of any kind. They have the same franchise and the same opportunities of becoming members of elective bodies as any other British subjects. The West Indian Colonies in which there is a considerable British-Indian population are British Guiana, Trinidad and Jamaica. In British Guiana and Jamaica the elective system already exists, and it will be introduced in Trinidad at an early date.

When you turn to the Eastern Colonies the memorandum shows that in Ceylon, under a revised Constitution about to be issued, qualified British Indians will be eligible for the franchise and for election to the Legislative Council in the same manner as all other British subjects. Again, in Mauritius there is no distinction between British Indians and other British subjects as regards eligibility for the franchise.

In East Africa you will find from the memorandum that in Uganda the Legislative Council is not elective, but that there is no restriction on the number or race of the unofficial members who may be nominated to the Council, while in Tanganyika Territory there is no Legislative or Executive Council.

Subject to a clear understanding on these points, my colleagues and I cordially welcome on behalf of the British Government the proposal of the representatives of India so far as the Colonies and Protectorates are concerned.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

Canada's Attitude of Goodwill.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I would like to say that I think Canada fully appreciates the magnitude and seriousness of the problem with which the Government of India and the Government of Britain are confronted in dealing with any question affecting the status of Indians, and that our attitude from the beginning has been, and at present is, one of being exceedingly anxious to be helpful in the solution of any problem that may arise. His Highness the Maharajah, in speaking last week, referred to the manner in which we had recently taken up by conference some questions respecting Immigration with Japan, and he said that, in his opinion, any of these questions of status and political rights respecting resident Indians could be best settled by adopting a similar method. He referred particularly to an attitude of goodwill being more important than anything else in the solution of these difficult questions. I think the Maharajah is entirely right. Attitude in these matters is all-important; so far as the Canadian attitude is concerned, it gives me pleasure to say that we are most anxious to deal with this whole question in a spirit of mutual understanding and goodwill.

Recent History of Indian Immigration Question.

I have in my hand a report that I made to the Government of Canada in 1908. It relates to Immigration to Canada from the Orient, and Immigration from India in particular. It was the result of a visit which, at the instance of the Government of the day in Canada, I paid to England to confer with the Secretary of State for India in regard to the question of Immigration from India to Canada. If I may be permitted, I would like to read the concluding paragraph of this Report, because it sets out the attitude at that time—fifteen years ago—which we took towards questions affecting our fellow British citizens from India:—

> "Nothing could be more unfortunate or misleading than that the impression should go forth that Canada, in seeking to regulate a matter of domestic concern, is not deeply sensible of the obligations which citizenship within the Empire entails. It is a recognition of this obligation which has caused her to adopt a course which, by removing the possibilities of injustice and friction, is best calculated to strengthen the bonds of association with the several parts, and to promote the greater harmony of the whole. In this, as was to be expected, Canada has had not only the sympathy and understanding, but the hearty co-operation of the authorities in Great Britain and India as well."

* See E. 77, also published in Appendix V in Cmd. 1988.

C 62854

I should say, perhaps, that, after conferring with the Secretary of State for India in London at that time in regard to this question, I subsequently, at the instance of the Canadian Government, went to India to take up with the authorities there the question of the migration of Indians to Canada with a view of seeing whether we could not work out a solution which would avoid anything in the nature of legislation which might be misunderstood or regarded as invidious in India, and I am happy to say that we were able, as a result of conferences, to come to an understanding between the two Governments which was as satisfactory to the Government of India as it was to the Government of Canada. If it was possible to do that in regard to the difficult question of Immigration, I think it ought to be possible for us similarly to effect a satisfactory solution with respect to any of these other questions that may arise, and it is from that point of view that I hope my colleagues from India will feel that the Canadian Government is approaching this particular subject.

Position of Indians domiciled in Canada.

Lord Peel in his remarks said, I think, very rightly, that what the Indian felt more than anything else was that the disabilities under which their countrymen live appear as a brand of social inferiority. The extent to which that is true depends very largely upon the nature of the disabilities and the circumstances which account for any that may exist.

No Disabilities in eight Provinces. Some Political Disability in one.

May I say at once in regard to Canada, that, in eight of the Provinces out of nine which comprise the Dominion, I am not aware of any legal or political disability under which any Indian resident in Canada suffers, and, with respect to the ninth Province, I am not aware of any legal disability of any kind; I am only aware of a political disability in the matter of the exercise of the franchise in that one Province, and that not as regards all Indians, because, as respects all Provinces, including British Columbia, the one exception I have mentioned, the Federal Law relating to the franchise sets it down that any Indian who served with His Majesty's Forces—Military, Naval or Air—is entitled to the franchise. I mention this as evidence of the fact that our citizens appreciate the services that India has rendered the Empire and desire to acknowledge them wherever possible.

History of Canadian Franchise.

May I say a word as to the way our franchise has been developed? The Dominion is the result of the bringing together of a number of Provinces, and the Party to which I belong—the Liberal Party in Canada—has taken a position that, wherever it was possible to recognise the wishes of a Province in matters pertaining to the franchise, regard to such should be had. For that reason our Federal Franchise Act for many years recognised for Federal purposes only the franchise prevailing in the Province. We had not a separate franchise for the Dominion. We took, for the Dominion, the provincial franchise as it existed, with the result that in some Provinces some classes had the right to vote who had not the right to vote in others, not on account of race, but owing solely to the fact that for their own reasons certain of the Provinces had thought it well to limit the franchise in certain particulars. The late Government, which represented an opposite view in some particulars, changed somewhat the Franchise Law a few years ago, and endeavoured to enact a Federal Franchise which would be applicable generally throughout the Dominion. They provided that women,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62855

for example, should have the right to vote in Federal matters. Those of us who had held to a recognition of provincial enactments opposed that attitude. We said it should still be left to the Provinces to determine as respects the franchise to be given women, as in all else, what they thought best. However, the Government at that time did carry a provision which made the law in this matter of the exercise of the franchise by women generally applicable. Notwithstanding, that very Government, having regard for the conditions in the Province of British Columbia, in order to avoid a serious situation arising there which might have been misunderstood in other parts of the Empire, found it necessary as regards certain of the provisions affecting the Federal Franchise in the case of British Columbia to make an exception to this general application. I mention this because it discloses how in one Province a particular question may become a burning political issue. For the Federal Government to try and deal with it in a manner which would be regarded as coercing any Province would give rise to an entirely new question. For example, if the Federal Government had tried in respect of all persons resident there to impose on the Province of British Columbia certain obligations, such, for example, as the right to vote under the Federal franchise, the issue would not in public discussion have been a question of the franchise at all; it would have been a question of coercion by the Federal Government of a Provincial Government, and you would have had a political battle fought on the basis of what we speak of as "provincial rights." I am sure all at this table will appreciate that that kind of political conflict is one of the most dangerous a country can be faced with. It is as though Britain were to try and impose certain obligations on Canada or some other part of the Empire. In dealing with the Provinces we of the Federal Government seek, as far as we can, to prevent anything in the way of coercion. I think it is as well to mention this because it helps to explain why in one Province it has not been possible, up to the present, to concede the franchise to the Indians who are there.

Question best dealt with on Reciprocal Lines.

As to how Canada's action may be viewed in India seems to me to be very much a matter of interpretation, and the spirit of interpretation. I could go to India and say with truth, that every citizen coming from the State, over which His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar rules, has rights of citizenship in my Province which I have not in his. That is a point which cannot be brought out too clearly. In eight Provinces out of nine in Canada every Indian resident there has the same right as other Canadian citizens, but that is not equally true of Canadians resident in India. If this aspect is put before the people of India they will see that the reciprocal method of dealing with this question, as pointed out by General Smuts, is one which perhaps presents the line along which we can proceed most satisfactorily. So far as Canada is concerned, we would not ask for our citizens resident in India any right which we are not prepared equally to concede to Indians resident in Canada. I think you may take that as the fundamental basis on which we would be prepared to deal with this question; we hold to this reciprocal point of view because in all things we have found it to be one of the most satisfactory methods of dealing with questions of this kind.

Problem in British Columbia an Economic one.

So far as British Columbia is concerned the problem is not a racial one; it is purely an economic problem. The Labour forces in British Columbia are very strong. That Province has had industrial problems of a character which no other Province in the Dominion has had and what the Labour people are aiming at is, I think, to maintain certain industrial standards which they had sacrified much to acquire. As respects some of those who have come from other countries they are rather fearful, until at least they have resided for some time in Canada and have acquired our method of living, our customs, habits, and so forth, that to give them the rights of franchise in full may mean that the standard already maintained may be undermined. I would like to make this clear.

C 62856

Possible Political Consequences of giving Franchise to Indians in British Columbia.

It may seem I am straining a little in emphasising the possible political consequence of giving the franchise to resident Indians in British Columbia.

But take the actual situation as it is in Parliament to-day. When we came into office, I had a majority of one behind me in the House of Commons. I think we have a majority of three at the present time. Many of the constituencies were very close. It is conceivable that in British Columbia the difference in the result might be material by increasing a certain vote in some of the constituencies. In other words, were the subject to become one of political discussion, I think it would be possible for a political orator to make it quite apparent to the people of British Columbia that the fate of the Federal Government might depend upon the vote cast by the Indians resident in that Province. It would not be an exaggeration, it would not be a figure of speech; it is a literal and absolute truth. It is conceivable that the complexion of Parliament as it is to-day might be entirely changed. The consequence might be that one Government rather than another would be in office by the vote of those who, neither in their own country nor in Canada, have ever exercised the franchise. That is the situation which exists at the moment. I do not expect it will exist very long, but it all helps to show the difficulty which we are confronted with when we contemplate, in any immediate way, results which we all hope will be effected in the course of time. It is for that, among other reasons, that I appreciate the method of approach which Sir Tej has adopted in bringing his suggestion before this Conference. He has appreciated, I think, our difficulties as well as his own, and, in suggesting there could be a Conference between representatives of India and representatives of Canada, I think he has had in mind enabling the citizens of India to appreciate just the kind of circumstances which have governed our actions quite as much as having our citizens appreciate his difficulties. That is the sort of approach and attitude which permits us to get together and I should be surprised if, dealing with this question in that spirit, we could not work out a thoroughly satisfactory solution.

Interpretation of 1921 Resolution.

There is one point I ought to make quite clear and that is the extent to which my hands are tied in dealing with this question. The resolution which was passed at this Conference two years ago in the minds of some present committed the Dominions to giving the franchise to the Indians. It was, they allege, in the nature of a general commitment. It is all important that we should know whether that was the intention of the resolution or not. I think in the first place we should be very careful of resolutions that are introduced or passed, and I think, when once they are passed, we should do our utmost to see that any hopes to which they may give rise are not destroyed. In the House of Commons I asked my predecessor, Mr. Meighen, what his interpretation was of the resolution of 1921. I have before me the "Hansard" of the 29th June of this year, which contains the record, and with the permission of the Conference I shall read from it:—

> "*Mr. Mackenzie King:* May I ask my honourable friend one question? The resolution of the Conference, or at least one clause, is as follows:—
>
> "The Conference accordingly is of the opinion that in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth it is desirable that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognised."
>
> "The Honourable Member for George Etienne Cartier, Mr. Jacobs, has said that those words imply an undertaking on the part of this Parliament, or rather on the part of Canada, to see that the federal franchise is granted to the Indians in British Columbia. Is that correct or not?
>
> "*Mr. Meighen:* The words are English and the words are simple. I understand them fully and if the Prime Minister does not I must leave him just where he is.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62857

"*Mr. Mackenzie King:* I think the House is entitled to an answer from my right honourable friend. He represented this country at the Imperial Conference. He knows better than anyone else what interpretation he placed on these words. I ask him, seeing that he represented Canada at the Imperial Conference when the resolution was passed, whether Canada was giving an undertaking to the Indians in British Columbia to the effect that they should be entitled to the franchise.

"*Mr. Meighen:* No human being understood anything of the sort. The words are very plain and there is no misunderstanding them."

I should be taken very seriously to task if, when I returned to Canada, it could be said that I had placed an interpretation on that resolution which the Prime Minister of Canada who was present at the time it was passed was unwilling to have placed upon it. I think Mr. Meighen has taken his attitude from the words: "It is desirable that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognised." If that means we would all like to see it done, that we hope it may be done, I think I can agree with him in this expression of such a wish. On the other hand, as to its constituting an actual pledge, I am bound to take the interpretation which Mr. Meighen himself gives and places upon it. I should, perhaps, say that I presented that point of view to Mr. Sastri when he was in Canada and my recollection is that Mr. Sastri did not maintain that the resolution constituted a pledge which obliged the Federal Government to give the franchise to resident Indians but rather that it expressed what the Conference hoped would be done by the different Dominions as opportunity offered.

Mr. Sastri's Visit.

May I say just a word in regard to Mr. Sastri's visit? We were pleased to welcome Mr. Sastri to Canada and we sought to give him the fullest opportunity to speak publicly wherever he wished to do so in the Dominion, to confer with any persons whom he might wish to meet, and we were glad to have him in conference with us in the Cabinet so that we could explain very fully all the considerations of which we had to take account. I think Mr. Sastri appreciated our situation the better in view of having seen conditions for himself and having talked with many persons in different parts of the Dominion.

Matter will be considered when Franchise Law revised.

I cannot do better in setting forth our Government's attitude than to read to the Conference and place on record the letter I wrote to Mr. Sastri just as he was leaving our Dominion. It is dated Ottawa, the 5th September, 1922, and is as follows:—

"The Right Hon. V. Srinivasa Sastri,
"Château Laurier, Ottawa.

"Dear Mr. Sastri,

"In reply to the representations made by you at the interview with my colleagues and myself on Friday of last week, and which were the subject of further conference between us yesterday, I desire to assure you that, at the earliest favourable moment, the Government will be pleased to invite the consideration of Parliament to your request that natives of India resident in Canada be granted a Dominion parliamentary franchise on terms and conditions identical with those which govern the exercise of that right by Canadian citizens generally.

"The subject is necessarily one which Parliament alone can determine. It will be submitted to Parliament for consideration when the franchise law is under revision.

"In conveying to the Government of India an expression of the attitude of the Government of Canada in this matter, we hope that you will not fail to make it clear that at the present time, in eight of the nine provinces of which our Dominion is composed, the federal franchise is granted to natives of India resident in Canada, on terms which are identical with those applicable generally to Canadian citizens.

"Yours sincerely,
"(Signed) W. L. Mackenzie King."

C 62858

You will observe that we have promised Mr. Sastri that when our Federal Franchise Law comes up for revision we will take care to see that Parliament is fully informed of his representations and wishes, and we will seek to have those representations and wishes given every consideration. It is probable that the Dominion Franchise Act will come up for revision at the approaching Session of Parliament. I told Mr. Sastri it was hardly probable it would come up last Session, but that I thought it would come up next Session. If the course we anticipate is followed, the Franchise Act will be referred to a Committee of the House, and that Committee will be in a position to hear any representations that may be made to it.

If Committee from India sent to Canada, it will be given every opportunity to discuss Question.

My friends from India will have to decide for themselves what is likely to be most in their own interests in the matter of having a Committee visit Canada and take up this matter anew. I say that for the reason that I am not so sure that Mr. Sastri's visit has made it easier for us to deal with this problem. I would put it in this way. Mr. Sastri's visit helped to direct the attention of the country to something which I imagine the greater part of the country did not know anything about. I doubt if the majority of the people in Canada were aware that in the Province of British Columbia, for example, the Indians did not have the franchise. They may have known in the other Provinces that they had the franchise, but the question of the few in British Columbia not having the franchise would hardly be known to any extent outside that Province. Once, however, Mr. Sastri began delivering his speeches the Labour Councils from one end of the country to the other began to receive communications from Labour Organisations in British Columbia asking them to take care to see that such standards as labour had won in British Columbia were maintained. The forces that were opposed to granting the franchise to Indians became organised in a way they had not been before. Whether that same result might follow the visit of a deputation from India I cannot say. It might or it might not, but, should our friends from India think it would help them to have a delegation come to Canada to confer on the subject, we shall be most happy to appoint a corresponding group to meet and confer with them. If it were their desire to have their delegation given an opportunity of meeting the Parliamentary Committee to which the matter will be referred for consideration, I should be glad to see, if the time of their visit so permitted, that they were given a chance to meet the members of that Committee and to confer with them at Ottawa. In other words, we would be only too happy to give to any group which may come from India, any person she may send, the amplest opportunities to discuss with our public men all aspects of this particular question. I say this having regard to the method of approach Sir Tej has presented to us here. He has made it clear that the Committee would come for the purpose of exploring avenues and ways and means to reach an ultimate result. He should recognise that we may have to take time in this matter, but I would like him to believe that we are sincere in hoping that we will be able to meet his wishes. In seeking so to do, we may have to proceed step by step, but the Canadian people as a whole are, I am sure, really desirous of meeting our fellow British citizens from India in every reasonable particular. I have not the slightest doubt about that.

Progress of India towards Self-government.

Perhaps I may be permitted to say just one word in conclusion. Sir Tej spoke very feelingly the other day about political freedom and the desires of India in the matter of self-government. When I was in India I heard a good deal of the discussion that was going on. Let me say that I have a natural sympathy with the desires of a people to have the right to manage their own affairs. Were I a citizen of India, and this is what I felt most at that time, I should feel above everything else that in India being a part of the British Empire there lay the surest guarantee that this desire for self-government will be realised in the course of time in the manner which to India herself will be most effective and helpful. It is

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 14 38 15 39 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62859

inconceivable that the opinions represented at this table, the views of the different Dominions represented here, should not accord with aspirations of self-government. There is this, however, which I think we have to remember and which those of us in the Dominions have had occasion to realise, that our Dominions have been peopled largely by citizens who have come out from the British Isles, and that those who have been most active in effecting reforms have themselves come with ideals which it had taken their ancestors many, many years to work out in this old land. Our struggle for responsible government in the Dominions was largely a continuation of the long struggle of several centuries which had taken place in the British Isles, and I think the evolution of self-government in the Dominions has become what it is largely because of the long process of political training through which in previous years the peoples of the British Isles had passed. For that reason I hope that our friends in India will appreciate that here again time may be a helpful factor in the working out of what, in the long run, in the interests of India herself will be the surest and the best guide to complete self-government.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Tribute to presentation of case for India.

Mr. Bruce: Prime Minister, I would like to preface the few remarks I wish to make by congratulating the representatives of India on the very eloquent and temperate manner in which they stated the case which they have to present.

Attitude of Australia to Resolutions of previous Conferences.

This question is not one which vitally affects Australia as it does South Africa. I desire, however, to refer to the Resolution on the position of Indians in the Empire which was adopted by the Conference of 1921. The resolution commenced by reaffirming the previous Resolution of 1918, that the government of each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities. It then went on to recognise that there is an incongruity between India's position as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire. The resolution recorded the opinion that, in the interests of the solidarity of the British Empire, it is desirable to recognise the rights of such lawfully domiciled Indians to citizenship in their countries of domicile. This resolution was concurred in by the representatives of Australia.

Sympathy with Indians domiciled in Australia.

The object of the representatives of India at this Conference in bringing forward the question of the status of Indians is, as I understand, to further the investigation of the question of the means of giving practical effect to that part of the resolution which refers to the recognition of rights of citizenship of Indians lawfully domiciled in other parts of the Empire. As far as Australia is concerned, this question has been the subject of considerable public discussion, and the representatives of every shade of political thought have shown sympathy with the claim that lawfully domiciled Indians should enjoy full citizen rights. As the question did not figure in the preliminary agenda of the Conference, I have not had the opportunity of consulting my colleagues or my Parliament upon it. I believe, however, that Australian public opinion is ready to welcome, so far as the position of Indians domiciled in Australia is concerned, any measure which is conceived in the interests of the Empire as a whole. The number of Indians in Australia is small—there are only 2,000 of them—so that from the purely Australian point of view the problem is a small one, but it is recognised that this is part of a larger Imperial problem.

No change in Commonwealth Immigration Policy.

It is not a question of admitting fresh Indians within our territory. That would be contrary to the fundamental principles

C 62860

which animate the people of Australia and must govern the policy of any Australian Government; nor, as I fully understand, is there the slightest shadow of a suggestion that the immigration of Indians into Australia is desired by the Government or by the people of India. It is simply a question of satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the few Indians who are already lawfully domiciled in our midst, and contributing by this action to the solution of an Imperial problem, by the removal of anomalies which, as I understand, are felt very keenly in India in view of her new status as an integral part of the Imperial Commonwealth.

Tribute to India's place in Empire, and to her Civilisation.

India is no longer a mere Dependency, but one of the component members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. We have the greatest admiration of the efforts put forth by India in the late war, by which she won her new status. I need only refer to her contributions in men, money and material, her recruitment on a voluntary basis of something like 1½ million men, the services which her army rendered by sending more than a million Indian troops overseas to all the theatres of war, and her free gift to the Imperial Exchequer, which added, as I am told, over 30 per cent. to her national debt at that time. Apart from these material aids, the moral value of the part played by India in the War cannot be over-estimated. The vast masses of the Indian people have always been conspicuous for their loyalty to the British Throne, but their wholehearted and voluntary participation in the world conflict undoubtedly afforded striking proof of this to both foes and friends alike. Even apart from that welcome evidence that in its hour of need the Empire may rely on India as a strength and support, instead of a source of weakness as our late enemies dared to hope, I wish to emphasise that the people of Australia have always had the greatest respect for India's traditions and culture, her literature and her arts, her attainments in the world of thought and her achievements in action—in a word, for her civilisation, which, while reposing on such ancient foundations, has, at the same time, shown itself capable of progress and adaptation to the needs of the modern world. That civilisation is not identical with ours; it is older, and it is the civilisation of the East rather than of the West; capable, however, as India has already shown, of absorbing what is valuable in Western civilisation, just as the West, in its turn, has lessons to learn from the civilisation that is characteristic of India.

Indian Problem results from conflict of Economic Standards.

Nor is the established policy of maintaining the European character of our population and not permitting the immigration of Asiatic settlers in conflict with such an appreciation. It is not a policy founded on feelings of race or colour, but it is motived by economic considerations which appear to us to be clear and cogent. I have said that the civilisation of the East, though older and possibly in some respects superior, is different from that of the West, and among other things this implies a well-marked difference of economic standards. Asiatic immigrants would be able to work and support life with what, to them, would represent a high degree of comfort, under conditions and for wages which would make it impossible for workers of European descent, accustomed to European standards, to compete with them. If, therefore, Asiatic immigrants were admitted, it would be impossible to provide employment for Europeans. They would inevitably be ousted from the labour market, and our population, and with it our institutions and our civilisation, would gradually lose their original European character which we are naturally determined to do all in our power to preserve. It is for this reason that the Commonwealth Parliament has passed enactments which effectively prohibit the immigration of Indian or other Asiatic settlers or labourers, and it is for this reason that we welcomed the Resolution of 1918, reaffirmed in 1921, by which the Imperial Conference has recognised the right of each Government to control the composition of the population of its country by means of restriction on immigration from the other communities of the Empire.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 38 14 15 69 16 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62861

Attitude of Australia is sympathetic, but no need for Committee.

That Resolution was accepted by India, and the Government of India have never swerved in their loyal acquiescence and co-operation with us in our policy. But, viewing the relations of India with the other parts of the Empire as an Imperial problem, we appreciate that the maintenance of the immigration policy is only one side of the question. On the other side we have the desire of India to see the grant of political and other rights of citizenship accorded to her sons who have already, and in some cases for many years past, been legitimately domiciled within Australia. This desire is largely satisfied in the principle of the Resolution of 1921. That Resolution, together with the Resolution of 1918, must be regarded as interdependent parts of a single endeavour to promote harmonious relations between the Dominions and India by securing the immigration policy of the former on the one hand and by removing the cause of any ill-feeling in India on the other. The object of both Resolutions, as I regard them, is to foster the cohesion of the Empire as a single unit, comprehending within itself not only certain communities of European race all inspired by Western ideals of civilisation, but also uniting in one system the different ideals, elements of strength and potentialities of progress towards the common good which the Empire is happily able to draw from Eastern as well as from Western sources.

In view of the position which exists in Australia and the consideration which has been given to the question, there is no necessity for a Committee further to discuss the matter such as has been suggested by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. While I appreciate the spirit in which it is put forward, I do not think, in the special circumstances of Australia, there is any necessity for such action. On my return to Australia I will consult with my colleagues as to what action can be taken.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

Tribute to presentation of case for India.

Mr. Massey: I will only detain the Conference a very few minutes. I should like—and I have no doubt the other members of the Conference feel as I do—I should like to express my appreciation of the eloquent speeches delivered by the representatives of India. I am especially impressed by the fact, which was very evident, that, while they were insistent in looking after the interests of India, they spoke as patriotic British citizens. I do not think there will be very much difficulty in the plan—I am thinking now of the proposal that Committees representing the Dominions should meet a Committee representing India. I am speaking more particularly for my own country.

Position of Indians in New Zealand.

I would like to endorse that, so far as New Zealand is concerned. We are practically giving the natives of India resident in New Zealand the same privileges which are enjoyed by people of the Anglo-Saxon race who are settled there. There is practically no difference between them. If there is or ever has been at any time any objection to natives of India coming to New Zealand, those objections have been raised for economic reasons such as have been referred to by the Prime Minister of Australia. The workers in New Zealand are naturally anxious to maintain the present standard of living, and if there happened to be a large influx of natives of India at any time they have an idea that such standard might become lowered. They are naturally anxious—and I am bound to say the New Zealand Parliament is also anxious—to prevent anything of the sort happening. There is no such thing as race-prejudice or anything of that sort. So far as the aboriginal natives of New Zealand are concerned they are in exactly the same position as the European residents in New Zealand; they have the same privileges in regard to Parliament and in connection with local affairs.

Status of India at Imperial Conference.

I have heard it stated as a matter of fact that there is an impression in India that the representatives of the Indian Empire

C 62862

at the Imperial Conference do not occupy the same position as the representatives of the Dominions or other parts of the Empire. Now I think that ought to be contradicted emphatically. We who represent the Dominions—and I know I can speak for those who represent the United Kingdom and the Colonies as well—are anxious that the representatives of India sitting round this historic table should enjoy all the privileges that we enjoy and should have exactly the same position. I think that ought to be made perfectly clear in India.

Methods of Agitation in India.

I know this, that India has become during recent years a fruitful hunting ground for agitators; I am not thinking of Indian agitators when I say that, because I know—and it is nothing to be proud of—that some of the people of our own race have taken a prominent part in fomenting trouble in India, and not only in India, but in those British countries where a number of natives of India have become located. There are not many opportunities in my country, but I have known people of our own race to be doing their level best to stir up trouble with the natives of India. Fiji is our neighbour and there is a large number of Indians there. I am not speaking for Fiji, but I would only say this, that I have the best of reasons for knowing—I know it officially—that Europeans frequently have been doing their level best to foment disturbances in Fiji. I am simply speaking of labour troubles and difficulties of that sort. Once troubles are started and when strikes take place we, who have had experience of these industrial troubles, never know where they are going to end; and they sometimes stir up trouble which is not forgotten for a very long time afterwards.

Tribute to India's place in Empire, and to her Civilisation.

My opinion—I speak as a British citizen and not only as the representative of New Zealand—is that we should do everything that is possible to make the natives of India feel, whether here or in India itself, that we want to treat them with justice, and that we want to do everything that is fair and right and proper as far as they are concerned. I know perfectly well that when we think of government by Indians we have to remember—and I think it was the Maharajah who expressed this opinion—that if development is to take place it will not be quite by what is called Western methods. We can understand that. When one remembers the huge population of India, the number of races which are there, the number of languages that are spoken, and the different religions, I have often thought that it might be desirable, when the time comes, as I believe it will come, to let India be divided into a number of Dominions rather than to remain one State or Empire as it is at present. I have not been to India, and I only look at it from the outside. The European residents in India, and the representatives of India themselves, know very much better than I do what will be necessary in time to come to enable Indians to attain the position they desire to occupy. I was very much struck with the concluding remarks of Lord Peel, and I have not forgotten that when the destinies of the British Empire were trembling in the balance there was no hesitation on the part of India to do her duty; I will not say "to come to its assistance," because when they were fighting for the Empire they were fighting for themselves as citizens of the Empire. They undoubtedly did their duty in a way which was admired in every part of the Empire and by every one of its races. The Prime Minister of Australia has mentioned the number of men who were sent and the amount of money contributed by the Indian Empire itself, and on that account I am quite sure the representatives and the patriotic British citizens, to whichever part of the Empire they belong, will always be desirous of upholding the wishes of the people of India and of assisting in the development which they so ardently desire. I do not know whether it can be done for some time or not; probably hurrying up matters might do more harm than good.

New Zealand stands by previous Resolutions.

So far as the Committees are concerned, when Mr. Sastri was in New Zealand he had an opportunity of meeting both branches

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 14 38 15 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62863

of the Legislature and an opportunity of saying everything he chose to say to them. He said that, so far as New Zealand was concerned, he then had practically no fault to find. I hope later on that the same thing may be said of the residents in other parts of the Empire. I was present, of course, when the original arrangement was made in 1918; I was present when it was reaffirmed in 1921; and by that we desire to stand. If any improvements can be suggested with regard to what is in operation at present, I have not the slightest doubt but that the representatives of the Dominions and the other representatives of the British Empire here will consider them. I do not know whether anything of the sort is intended at present, but I want to assure the representatives of India that so far as they are concerned there is no desire to keep them in the background, but to give them all the privileges that British citizens in other parts of the Empire enjoy. I should like to say that I do not intend to interfere in the matter of Kenya. The position in South Africa stands by itself and I am not able to judge of it. I only say that I should like to do anything I possibly can to bring about a better understanding between the two races in South Africa, those representative of the European race and those representative of the Indians. If we can do anything at all we shall be only too glad to do it.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Tribute to presentation of case for India.

General Smuts: I desire to pay my tribute also to the earnestness, the eloquence, and the ability of the speeches that have been made here by the representatives of India. The proposal which has been made by Sir Tej Sapru does not concern South Africa, and therefore I do not think it is necessary for me to detain the Conference at any length. As, however, the subject is a very difficult one I may perhaps be allowed to say a few words in reference to the general situation.

Mr. Sastri's Mission has made Solution of Problem more difficult.

The Maharajah has said, very rightly, that what this question requires is understanding—understanding not only of the difficulties and the special position of India, but also of the difficulties and the special position of other British communities; and I think a few words of mine might not be out of place here. So far as I can judge, the atmosphere has really become worse in the last two years for a solution of this question. In South Africa, undoubtedly, it has become worse. That is due partly to the visit of Mr. Sastri and his speeches in various parts of the Empire, to which I do not wish to refer with any particularity. The Prime Minister of Canada has said what the effect of the visit has been in Canada, and in South Africa it has undoubtedly emphasised the difficulties that existed before. That was one of the reasons why I thought it might not be wise for Mr. Sastri to come to South Africa. Our difficulties are great enough as they are.

South African Attitude to Indian Problem in Kenya.

There was another circumstance which has affected the attitude and the atmosphere in South Africa very considerably, and that is the Kenya question. There is no doubt that in South Africa a profound sympathy was stirred up for Kenya. Here you have a very small British community, a handful of settlers, who find themselves pitted against the mighty Empire of India, who find themselves against overwhelming forces, and who, although they are the most loyal community in the British Empire, consisting mostly of ex-Army men, had in the end to go to the length of almost threatening force in order to maintain their position. The sympathy that was aroused and stirred for Kenya in South Africa has had a very serious repercussion there on the Indian question as a whole. I have no fault whatever to find with the attitude of either the Colonial Office or the India Office here. I have nothing but praise for the way they handled this very difficult situation,

C 62864

and the settlement that was come to was, I think, a wise compromise, and so far as my influence went I used it with the people of Kenya to get them to accept the settlement, as they have accepted it. But I must say, quite frankly, that I have been very much perturbed over the attitude adopted by the Indian Government in this matter. They pressed the case against Kenya in a way which seemed to me to exceed the limits of prudence and wisdom, and when the settlement was ultimately made language was used in regard to it which I think would certainly not help the case of loyalty either in India or anywhere else in the Empire. The whole incident, as I say, has had a very bad effect in South Africa.

Position in South Africa itself.

The difficulties from the African point of view are very great. Sir Tej has said—and quite rightly—that the majority of the population of the British Empire are coloured. That is so. But let me make this remark: all through the very able and moderate argument of Sir Tej he referred to this colour question and the indignity which was either openly or by inference inflicted on those British subjects who have colour. Well, I wish to say that, so far as we in South Africa are concerned, it is not a question of colour, it is a different principle that is involved.

Question not one of Colour but of Economic Competition.

I think that every thinking man in South Africa takes the attitude, not that the Indian is inferior to us because of his colour or on any other ground—he may be our superior; it is the case of a small civilisation, a small community, finding itself in danger of being overwhelmed by a much older and more powerful civilisation; and it is the economic competition from people who have entirely different standards and viewpoints from ourselves. From the African point of view, what is the real difficulty? You have a continent inhabited by a 100 million blacks, where a few small white communities have settled down as the pioneers of European civilisation. You cannot blame these pioneers, these very small communities, in South Africa and in Central Africa if they put up every possible fight for the civilisation which they started, their own European civilisation. They are not there to foster Indian civilisation, they are there to foster Western civilisation, and they regard as a very serious matter anything that menaces their position, which is already endangered by the many difficulties which surround them in Africa. In South Africa, our position in a nutshell is as follows: In the Union, we have a native population of over 6 million; we have a white population of over 1½ million; we have an Indian population of something like 160,000, mostly confined to one Province, to the most British Province in the Union, the Province of Natal.

Particularly in Natal.

Mr. Sastri, in one of his somewhat outrageous statements, referred to this as a Boer Empire, an empire which is swamped by Boer ideals. Well, the fact is that the Indian difficulties have mostly arisen, and continue to grow, in a part of South Africa where there are almost no Boers at all, in an almost purely British community; but you have in this Province of Natal a majority of Indians and a minority of British settlers, and, whatever the mistakes of the past may have been, the grandchildren of to-day do not plead guilty to the errors of their ancestors and they want to right the situation and safeguard the future for themselves and their children.

Suffrage Qualifications in South African Provinces.

What is the position? In the Cape of Good Hope and the Cape Province we have a franchise, a property and income and literary franchise, and in that Province the Indians are on exactly the same footing and have the same franchise as the whites; no difference is made. But in the other three Provinces of the Union we have a manhood suffrage. In the two Provinces of the interior, the Transvaal and the Free State, that franchise was laid down by the

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62865

British Government, and not by ourselves. When we received a Constitution after the Boer War, many years ago, this Constitution contained manhood suffrage, and that has remained the state of affairs up to to-day, and will probably remain the state of affairs for a long time. The tendencies in South Africa, just as elsewhere, are all democratic. You cannot go back on that manhood suffrage. Once it has come, you will probably pass on from manhood suffrage to universal suffrage. That was the act of the British Government, and not of the people of South Africa.

Extension of Franchise to Indians is impossible.

How are you going to work that in with an Indian franchise? If an Indian franchise were given, it has to be identical; no differentiation would be allowed by Indian public opinion—and quite rightly. Well, the result would be that in Natal, certainly, you would at once have an Indian majority among the voters. But our difficulty is still greater. You have a majority of blacks in the Union, and, if there is to be an equal manhood suffrage over the Union, the whites would be swamped by the blacks; you cannot make a distinction between Indians and Africans; you would be impelled by the inevitable force of logic to go the whole hog, and the result would be that not only would the whites be swamped in Natal by the Indians, but the whites would be swamped all over South Africa by the blacks, and the whole position for which we have striven for 200 years or more now would be given up. So far as South Africa is concerned, therefore, it is a question of impossibility. Sir Tej and his colleagues say, quite rightly, that for India it is a question of dignity. For South Africa, for white South Africa, it is not a question of dignity, but a question of existence, and no Government could for a moment either tamper with this position or do anything to meet the Indian point of view.

1921 Resolution a mistake.

That is why I think the resolution passed in 1921 was a mistake. I thought it then, I still think it, a great mistake. We got on the wrong road there. For the first time we passed a resolution through this Conference by a majority. It has never been done before and I do hope it will never occur again. Our procedure in this Conference has been by way of unanimity. If we cannot convince each other we agree to differ and to let the matter stand over. But, for once, we departed from that most salutary principle, which I consider fundamental to the whole Empire, and we passed that resolution by a majority. I had to stand out. But that has made things worse in South Africa. South Africa now certainly sees that she has to stand to her guns much more resolutely than she would have done otherwise. I think we made a mistake in 1921, and that is why I suggested the other alternative consideration of this subject.

Possession of British Citizenship does not imply right to Franchise.

Sir Tej said that I was subtle, that my memorandum* was a subtle one. I am not subtle, and my memorandum, I thought, was a truism. All that I said was this. There is one British citizenship over the whole Empire, and there should be; that is something solid and enduring; but we must not place a wrong interpretation upon that: we must not derive from the one British citizenship rights of Franchise, because that would be a profound mistake. The attitude has been that Franchise does not depend upon British citizenship. It is only in India that this position is not understood. Indians go the length of deriving from their British citizenship the further notion of equal Franchise rights too, and they claim that they may go from India to any other part and enjoy the same Franchise rights as the other portions of the Empire. I think that is a wrong conception. It is wrong not only as regards India, but as regards every part of the Empire. I do not think that an Australian, for instance, should come to South Africa and claim the Franchise there as a matter of course. He is a British subject, and on that footing we are equal in the eye of the law, but, when it comes to the exercise of political Franchise rights, I think that there is a great difference and distinction, and we should recognise that; and where

* See E. 80, also published in Appendix V in Cmd. 1988.

C 62866

a distinction is carried into actual practice, as it is in South Africa, it should not be looked upon as an indignity, as a reflection on the citizens of any Dominion, including India, who come to us and who do not get these rights. That is really all I wish to say about this matter.

India cannot make Question one of Foreign Policy.

I noticed in Sir Tej's statement a remark which almost looked like a threat: that, if India fails in forcing on us the view which she holds so strongly, then she may be compelled to make of it a question of foreign policy. Well, I would say this, you cannot have it both ways. As long as it is a matter of what are the rights of a British subject, it is not a matter of foreign policy; it is a matter entirely domestic to the British Empire. If it becomes a question of foreign policy, then Indians cannot claim on the ground of their British citizenship any more the recognition of any particular rights. Once they appeal to a tribunal, whether it be the League of Nations or whatever it be, outside the British Empire, they can no longer use as an argument the common British citizenship. I want to keep it there. I want it to be recognised that you must not drive it too far, and you must not derive from that citizenship claims which you cannot uphold.

Comment on Speech of Maharajah of Alwar.

Let me just say this in regard to what fell from the Maharajah. He said that, if we do not invite him, that he will invite himself.

The Maharajah of Alwar: I did not quite say that.

General Smuts: Let me say this, Maharajah. Nobody would be more welcome in South Africa than you would be, and I would welcome nothing more than that you should come as a great representative of India to look into conditions in South Africa yourself, convince yourself of the situation there, and convince yourself also that, apart from the far-reaching political difficulties we have, our fundamental attitude towards our Indian fellow-citizens is one of justice and fair play. I do not think that our Indian fellow-subjects in South Africa can complain of injustice. It is just the opposite. They have prospered exceedingly in South Africa. People who have come there as coolies, people who have come there as members of the depressed classes in India, have prospered. Their children have been to school; they have been educated, and their children and grandchildren to-day are many of them men of great wealth.

I noticed the other day that the Reverend Mr. Andrews, who is a great friend of the Indian cause in South Africa, publicly advised Indians in South Africa not to go back to India. The Government of South Africa actually pay for their tickets, give them pocket money and other inducements in order voluntarily to return to India, and thousands avail themselves of that policy and return to India. That gentleman, who is a great protagonist of the Indian cause, has publicly advised Indians not to fall in with that policy. He says: "You will be worse off in India." I quote this to show that there is no unfairness, no injustice to our fellow-citizens in India; but, when they come forward and make claims which politically, we cannot possibly recognise, our attitude of friendliness will worsen and the position as regards them will become very difficult and complicated.

The Maharajah of Alwar: I should just like to get my mind a little more clear on one point, and that is with regard to settlers in Natal who have built their houses, invested their money and spent their money there. What would you propose about them?

General Smuts: They have all the rights, barring the rights of voting for Parliament and Provincial Councils, that any white citizens in South Africa have. Our law draws no distinction whatever. It is only political rights that are in question. There, as I have explained to you, we are up against a stone wall and we cannot get over it.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 14 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62867

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, IRISH FREE STATE.

Sympathy of Irish Free State with Indian Claims.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Prime Minister, in our country I do not need to say we have no racial distinctions at all. Indians in Ireland have the same position as Englishmen or South Africans. It seems to me that this matter falls more or less into two classes. There are the Indians in the Dominions and the Indians in the Colonies and mandated territories, &c. Now we recognise the Dominions as independent Sovereign countries, having a perfect right to look after their own affairs, and we really have no right to interfere there, and in the mandated territories and Protectorates they are controlled by the British Government and we have no responsibility. So all that I can do really is to give an opinion. We have no responsibility in the matter; but, if we had responsibility, we should have to protest very strongly against any racial distinctions being made. We who are not Anglo-Saxons have suffered a good deal in the past from being treated as an inferior race. Putting myself in the position of an Indian, I do not think that the Indian representatives here are of an equality with us, because they are not really here in a representative capacity; they are not really sent by an independent Indian Government, and they cannot really be regarded as equal with the rest of us. If I were an Indian, putting myself in their position, I would recognise that this hypersensitiveness that they have about their treatment outside of India arises really from the fact that they have not, so far, reached the degree of self-government that the rest of us have reached. With regard to Indians in the Protectorates and so on, the Government which is primarily responsible for those places being the Government which is also responsible for India, it seems to us unjust that there should be any distinction drawn between Indians and other British subjects in those places.

Progress towards Self-Government only Solution.

At the same time it seems to me that the only solution of this trouble, which comes from racial sensitiveness, is for Indians to be in a position to make real reciprocal arrangements and to make bargain for bargain. The only way that this Indian trouble is really going to be solved is for that progress towards self-government —whatever form of self-government they consider suitable for themselves—for that progress to be hastened with all speed so as to avoid what Sir Tej and the Maharajah indicated—revolutionary methods taking the place of evolutionary methods. We in our country must necessarily sympathise whole-heartedly with the Indians both in their protests against their inferior race treatment and in their feelings as to the freedom of their country. We also recognise quite plainly here that we have no right to dictate to the other Dominions as to what they do in their own areas. That is all I have to say, Prime Minister.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Tribute to presentation of case for India.

Mr. Warren: I must add my congratulations to the Indian Delegation upon the eloquence and force of the speeches they have made.

No Disabilities in Newfoundland.

As far as Newfoundland is concerned, we have no distinction whatever. As long as an Indian is a British subject he can vote in Newfoundland in the same way as an Australian, Canadian, or New Zealander, or anybody else. We have no restriction on immigration and I may say that, if an Indian is not a British subject, the mere fact that he is an Indian is no bar to his becoming naturalised and obtaining the vote in that way in Newfoundland. I do not want to express any opinion upon the internal affairs of any other sister Dominion.

C 62868

STATEMENT BY SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Prime Minister, I do not know whether what I have to say will take too long at this stage, but I can say all I have to say as briefly as possible.

Mr. Baldwin: Can we finish in a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes?

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I hope I shall finish in twenty minutes' time.

Lord Peel: Would it be possible to meet for an hour this afternoon?

Mr. Baldwin: Not this afternoon—there is a Cabinet.

Lord Peel: I want also to raise the question of publication.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I would rather it was not postponed if that is possible.

The Maharajah of Alwar: I could not compress into a quarter of an hour what I have to say after all that has been already said.

Mr. Massey: I think perhaps we could finish by 2 o'clock.

Mr. Baldwin: It will be quite impossible for the Maharajah to speak too, and also Lord Peel.

Lord Peel: I want to speak for only four minutes.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I will compress my remarks as far as possible; I will not go into details.

Mr. Baldwin: Then will you say what you have to say, and then I am afraid we must adjourn.

Appreciation of Reception of Proposals.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Prime Minister, I must tell you, and through you your colleagues in His Majesty's Government, and the Dominion Prime Ministers that I could not have hoped to have had a better hearing here. Therefore my thanks are due to one and all of you, even though it may not be that I see eye to eye with you in some of your remarks.

Comments on Statement of Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I will first of all refer to the speech delivered this morning by His Grace the Duke of Devonshire. I listened with deep interest to his speech, and let me express to him my thanks for the manner in which he has expressed sympathy with our general aspirations in this matter. His Grace was good enough to say that he did not want to mislead India in regard to Kenya, and, therefore, he spoke frankly. I hope His Grace will pardon me if I also desire to be equally frank in giving expression to our position. I did not expect at any moment during the last few days that I have been working over this question that I would go back with the Kenya decision reversed. That was not what I was aiming at; but I want to make it abundantly plain that I do not wish the substance of my proposition to be affected. The language of the resolution is a matter for settlement; but it is of the very essence of that resolution that Kenya must come in. Secondly, I want to explain that, while His Grace has said that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept the resolution in regard to Kenya, my country will refuse to accept that decision as final. Thirdly, I will make it plain that the Committee I have proposed should, in conferring with the Colonial Office, have the widest scope—that is to say, it must discuss not only questions affecting other Colonies, but also those relating to Kenya: otherwise I do not see that you can possibly satisfy my countrymen.

That is all I wanted to say with regard to the Committee and its dealings with the Colonial Office here. Well, I will now pass on from the Duke of Devonshire and the Colonial Office to the Dominion Ministers.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 14 15 16 70
W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes
PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62869

Comments on Statement of Prime Minister of Canada.

I have listened with very great interest to the speech of Mr. Mackenzie King, and must thank him heartily for supporting me and accepting the substance of my proposal.

Interpretation of Resolution of 1921 Conference.

There are just one or two words with regard to his speech that I would like to say. He referred to his view, or rather the construction put in his Parliament, on the Resolution of 1921, and he read out a passage from Mr. Meighen's speech. Now let me tell him that we are here sitting, not as lawyers, nor are we sitting in a Court of Law; our functions are quite different. I suppose that we would claim that the functions of a statesman are very much higher than those of a lawyer, although I myself happen to be associated with that noble profession. Now that Resolution of 1921 I believe was not drafted by a conveyancing lawyer, it was probably drafted by someone of the statesmen around this table or by someone similar to a statesman, and I would like you and your Parliament to approach it from the point of view of the statesman. I know that as a Prime Minister and as a party politician it may be safe to rely on certain phrases, but let me tell him that it would be a great mistake to dispose of those words "it is desirable" as not morally binding upon him—I do not care whether they are legally binding upon him or not.

Hopes for Good Result from appointment of Committee.

I am inspired by the hope, and particularly by the manner in which Mr. King has spoken, that the result of the Conference of the Committee which we propose to send to Canada with the Committee going to be appointed there to consider the questions of franchise cannot but lead to satisfactory results. I will not anticipate the verdict of the Conference of the two Committees, which Mr. King has to a certain extent attempted to do. I will leave it entirely to the hands of the Committee to come to their own conclusions, and then will be the time for us to discuss how far we are in agreement or how far we are separated. But I recognise his spirit of support and of sympathy with me, and I appreciate that. I do thank you, Mr. Mackenzie King, for the spirit in which you have spoken this morning.

Comments on Speech of Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

From Mr. Mackenzie King I shall pass on to Mr. Bruce, and let me express my unreserved admiration for the manner in which he has spoken this morning, and the tribute he has paid to my countrymen and our civilisation. I note that he considers it unnecessary for my Government to send any Committee to his country because he thinks the problem is such that it may be settled without any discussion. Well, that is encouraging to me, but I do venture to express a hope that, if we do decide to send a Committee just to place our case before him and his Government, he will not refuse to accept that Committee. We do not want to send a Committee to create any agitation in his country—or for the matter of that any agitation in any country—and I can absolutely feel sure that that is not what is at the back of my mind; but, if it is necessary for us to explain our position to you and to help you in the problem, for Heaven's sake do not refuse to accept a Committee like that. We want simply to help you, and, if without receiving a Committee for my Government and my country you can solve the problem, so much the better for you, so much the better for us, and so much the more creditable to you and to your Government.

Comments on Statement of Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Well, my thanks are also due to Mr. Massey. I hope Mr. Massey will recognise that in my speech of Wednesday I thanked him. I very much appreciate his reference to the services of India during the war, and I do sincerely hope that such grievances as there may be in his country will receive sympathetic treatment at his hands. I do hope that he will accept the substance of my

C 62870

Resolution. We wish to help him in every possible way; we do not want to harass him in his own country or in his Government.

Comments on Speech of Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Now from Mr. Massey I propose to pass to General Smuts. I am sorry to miss him here, but I will say he has never replied to the points I raised. He referred to my description of him as subtle: well, if he objects to that I will withdraw it, but I will say that his present speech is remarkably illusory and evasive.

I raised questions with regard to specific grievances, relating to residence, acquisition of land, and trading licences in his country, and I find no expression of opinion upon those questions. He then said my Resolution had nothing to do with him.

It has primarily to do with him. I made it abundantly plain in the course of my speech that I did not make an appeal to him on the basis of the resolution of 1921, but that my appeal was made to him independently of that resolution and that I wanted him to join hands with me in investigating the facts and in trying to devise some methods of solving this problem, which he probably thinks is insoluble, but which does not appear to me to be insoluble. Again, he referred to Mr. Sastri, and to the prejudice he has caused. I have already said what I felt about Mr. Sastri, and I do not want to say more. If Mr. Sastri's fault was that he pleaded for his countrymen in the Dominions, then that is a fault which can reasonably be found with the 320 millions of his countrymen.

Meaning of British Citizenship.

Now I will come to one particular portion of the speech which struck me, based on an entire misconception, legal and constitutional. That is the question of citizenship. He said that India was the only country which probably claimed all political rights merely from the fact that Indians were British citizens. Let me warn him that India is not the only country which holds that view. There are other countries which hold those views. Well, he absolutely confuses the territorial law with personal law; in other words, his position really is this, that, if in my own country I did not enjoy full rights of citizenship, when I go to his country I must be under a disability. I will put to General Smuts, what would have happened if an Irishman, before the new constitution came into force, had gone from Ireland and had settled down in Natal or any other part there and was told: "Because you are not a free nation within your own borders, you dare not claim those rights, although you are qualified according to our Franchise Law to claim them"? There is an essential confusion in the position which General Smuts takes. Really the fact of the matter is this, that you cannot, according to modern law of citizenship and according to the latest development of thought on this subject, have two kinds of citizenship in the same Empire, a higher and a lower.

When I go to your country, and I do satisfy the requirements of the law of franchise, you have no right to tell me that because I am an Indian subject of His Majesty I shall not be entitled to exercise my Parliamentary rights. Therein lies the whole position General Smuts has taken, and, with regard to the disability of Indians in the purchase of townlands and in respect of trade licences and other things, General Smuts, as I have said before, had not a word to say in his speech this morning.

Deprecates rescinding of 1921 Resolution.

Therefore, the position remains this, that while I receive support, substantial and general, from His Majesty's Government and from all the Dominion Prime Ministers, I have received no support from General Smuts.

On the contrary, he has expressed a desire that the resolution of 1921 should be repealed. I hope for the reputation of this Conference, for the great reputation of the Dominion Prime Ministers and for the reputation of His Majesty's Government, that nothing of the kind will be done, and, though you may tell my countrymen that the problem is undoubtedly a difficult one, I request you also to say that you are trying to discover means of solving it. If you will do that you will change our attitude in regard to great Imperial questions.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
14 15
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62871

Position of Indians already in South Africa.

There is only one more remark I will make in regard to General Smuts' speech. He referred to the desire for repatriation and to the advice of Mr. Andrews. Let me tell you that, if anyone understands Mr. Andrews or knows him intimately, I do. There are hundreds and thousands of my countrymen in South Africa who cannot even speak their mother tongue. They have settled there, their fathers have settled there, and it is very easy to understand how difficult they will find it to leave a land in which they and their fathers and grandfathers have lived. It is for those reasons that Mr. Andrews advised, and it is for those reasons that I should advise them, not to leave that country, but to fight their battles until their position is recognised some day or other as that of equal citizens.

Meaning of allusion to "Foreign Policy."

General Smuts said that as a British subject I could not claim that this problem would pass from the stage of a domestic problem to that of a foreign problem. He misunderstood me. It is not difficult to foresee a stage being reached when even the Government of India, whom he has attacked over its attitude in regard to Kenya, but which I must admire for the very same attitude which it did take, may find it necessary to appeal to His Majesty's Government, and to say, that one part of the Empire is standing against the other, and it is for you, His Majesty's Government, now to treat this problem inside your own Commonwealth as you would deal with a problem of foreign policy. That is what I meant, and I do anticipate a stage like that being reached at no distant date in so far as the relation of India with South Africa is concerned.

Comment on Statements of Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald and of Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

Lastly, I will pass on to what my friend, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, said. No one could be more happy or contented than myself if he could help me to get self-government for India to-day, but that is a matter between us and His Majesty's Government. I see no reason, however, why until we get complete self-government in India we should be treated on a lower footing in King George's Empire outside India. We have a strong sentiment on that point, and there can be no weakening in that sentiment so far as I am concerned and so far as my fellow-countrymen are concerned. There is no one who believes more strongly than I do, or is working harder than I am, to win self-government for India, and, God willing, I do hope to win it notwithstanding any doubts that may be entertained by members of His Majesty's Government. But I will not allow those considerations to affect my position in regard to the status of Indians overseas. Suppose we get Dominion self-government to-morrow in India, the problem will still have to be faced. Therefore let us not mix up the two. I should be very glad indeed if the Conference would endorse a resolution in favour of self-government, but I want them to endorse a resolution also in regard to Indians and their position overseas. I must also thank Mr. Warren for the support he has given me.

Wishes to press Proposal for Resolution.

There is only one word that remains for me to say. When I moved that resolution I perhaps did not make it quite clear that I was moving it. I merely said: "My resolution is as follows." I wish the Conference to understand that I definitely moved that resolution. I have already said I am open to argument in regard to the phraseology of it so long as the substance remains and so long as Kenya finds a place in it. That is a matter which is between me and the Colonial Office and could be sent up to you later on, but I do wish to move that resolution, and I beg your support; at any rate I am entitled to ask for the support of the general idea embodied in that resolution. I do wish it to be understood that, so far as I am concerned, I stand by the resolution of 1921 and by the principle of equality. I do not wish to put any larger interpretation on the resolution than is justified or is just, but do not let me give you the impression that there is any weakening on my part so far as the resolution of 1921 is concerned or so far as the supplementary

C 62872

resolution which I had the honour to put before you on Wednesday last is concerned. I thank you, Prime Minister, and all the other Prime Ministers.

Question of Publication.

Lord Peel: Prime Minister, may I just raise a question of publication again because we have adjourned the discussion. Is there any objection, do the Dominions see any objection, to the speeches of the Indian delegates and their own being published anyhow in India? There is a good deal of impatience on the subject, and, after the very sympathetic speeches they have made, I myself do not see what objection there would be.

Mr. Baldwin: I was wondering if it would be a good thing to refer the whole thing to a Committee to decide in regard to publication. That could be done without interfering with what we are doing here and will prevent a good deal of discussion here; refer it to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and yourself and representatives from the other Dominions here.

Lord Peel: Would it be possible to meet to-morrow?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, that shall be seen to.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Three o'clock to-morrow afternoon is clear.

Mr. Baldwin: We resume this discussion at 3·30 on Wednesday afternoon.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 29, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62873

SECRET.

E. 14th Meeting (1923).

E 38

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 31, 1923, AT 3·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Senator the Hon. R. V. WILSON, Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Professor JOHN MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. G. WALKER D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir WOLSELEY HAIG, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.E., Political Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62874

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B., (*Secretary.*)
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir Robert R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. Thomson, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. P. McGilligan.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

DEATH OF Mr. BONAR LAW.

Mr. Baldwin: I think as Mr. Bonar Law summoned this Conference it would be most seemly if we passed a Resolution, which I will ask Sir Maurice Hankey to draw up later, of profound regret and of sympathy with his family, which we can send to Lady Sykes. I am sure that will be the universal wish.*

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Separatist Movement in Rhineland.

Lord Curzon: It has been suggested to me that I should read to the Conference the telegram which I have sent, with the approval of the Government, on the issue that was raised the other day by General Smuts, who asked what line we were taking about the Separatist Movement in Germany. I said that, in so far as the Separatist Movement involved separation from the German State and the German Reich, we were dead against it, and that we had said so to Lord Kilmarnock. The suggestion was made that we might say it with even greater emphasis to our Allies. I think that was a very sound suggestion, and, acting upon it, we have sent the following telegram:—

"In view of the situation created by the Separatist movement in the Rhineland and other parts of Germany, His Majesty's Government feel it incumbent upon them, as signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, to call the serious attention of their Allies to the grave consequences which would follow from the setting up of independent sovereign States carved out of territories within the existing frontiers of Germany.

"Such a disruption of the Reich would materially affect the status of Germany as a contracting party to the treaty, so much so that in certain important respects the latter would automatically cease to operate, and would require complete revision.

"It would, therefore, in the absence of any fresh agreement, be both inconsistent with the treaty obligations, and contrary to the interests, of the Allied signatories of the Treaty of Versailles to recognise any such independent sovereign States, and the attempt to constitute them should receive no countenance.

"His Majesty's Government trust that the Government to which you are accredited will find itself in agreement with them on this point.

"I request Your Excellency (you) to make a verbal communication, in the above sense, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs."

That telegram was sent to Paris, Brussels and Rome, and was repeated for information to Washington and Berlin.

* For resolution, as adopted, see Section V of the published Report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987).

C 62875

POSITION OF INDIANS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE EMPIRE. CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION.

Mr. Baldwin: I will now ask Lord Peel to resume the discussion on the position of Indians in the Empire.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Thanks for Reception of Proposal of Indian Delegation.

Lord Peel: I desire to thank most sincerely the Members of the Conference for the very cordial and sympathetic way in which they have received our proposals about the position of Indians in the Empire. I thank them also for the high place that they have assigned to this question among Empire problems. I thank them for the complete grasp that they have displayed of this difficult business, not as an isolated or local or Indian question, but in its Imperial aspect. I am grateful to them for the complete frankness and fulness with which they have explained the views of those they represent.

Summary of Results of Discussion.

In opening this discussion, I explained that the intensity of the feeling aroused in India was due to the opinion widely held there, that the disabilities of Indians were based on distinction of colour, and were badges of racial inferiority. I did not associate myself with that view. I believed it to be mistaken. The course of this discussion has shown that I was amply justified. Any impartial person reviewing the statements made will find it impossible to prove that any general ban is maintained against Indians in the Empire or that throughout the Empire they are placed in an inferior status; or again, that such disabilities as they may suffer from are based on colour or racial grounds.

The Duke of Devonshire has shown that in the West Indian Colonies—British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad—Indians enjoy the same rights as other British subjects. The same, I believe, is true in Ceylon and Mauritius.

Mr. Mackenzie King has told us that in eight out of nine provinces in Canada Indians enjoy full rights of citizenship. If in one province there are exceptions to the general rule, these exceptions are based, not on the colour distinction, but on rather complicated social and political considerations.

Mr. Bruce has told us that representatives of every shade of political thought in Australia have shown sympathy with the claim that lawfully domiciled Indians should enjoy full citizen rights. He believes that Australian public opinion is ready to welcome, as far as the position of domiciled Indians is concerned, any measure which is conceived in the interests of the Empire as a whole.

General Smuts said, "It is not a question of colour; it is a different principle. . . . . It is the case of a small civilisation, a small community, finding itself in danger of being overwhelmed by a much older and more powerful civilisation; it is the economic competition from people who have entirely different standards and viewpoints from ourselves."

The same sentiments have been expressed by the representatives of the other Dominions, and notably by Mr. Massey. These opinions, so remarkably similar in tone, of this great body of Empire statesmen, must surely bring conviction and comfort to any Indian whose feelings may have been injured or whose sense of dignity may have been impaired by a contrary view. Let their suspicions and their doubts be allayed by these declarations of the Empire leaders, sent out to the world from this Conference.

Not desirable to press Resolution.

Let me now consider whether any action should be taken on the definite proposals placed before the Conference by my colleague, Sir Tej Sapru. He was not concerned, nor was the Delegation concerned, so much with his concrete proposals as with the attitude that would be taken up by the Prime Ministers in their different Dominions on this subject. I consider that the position of the Indians within the Empire has been most notably advanced in this

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 15 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62876

Conference. Mr. Bruce has stated that he thinks that further enquiry is unnecessary, but that, on his return to Australia, he will consult with his colleagues and see what action can be taken. Mr. Mackenzie King has reaffirmed his statement about the revision of the Federal Law, and he is quite willing, if it is thought desirable to send a Delegation to Canada, to appoint a group to meet and confer with such Delegation. I rather gather, however, that the passing of this particular resolution might not necessarily assist in obtaining the result which we desire. General Smuts, I am afraid, will not be able to support the resolution. General Smuts, it is true, did not support the resolution of 1921. I should like to say that I do not rest my case entirely on the resolution. If there had been no resolution of 1921, this problem would still be urgent and pressing. The resolution of 1921 stands, but I rest my case not merely upon a formula but upon the broad equities of the case and an appeal for justice and Imperial unity. I am quite aware of the difficulties of South Africa, but I hope General Smuts, when he returns, while alive to his own difficulties, will retain a vivid consciousness of our own.

It has been said that the Empire Conference should be unanimous in its resolutions. I think that, if this resolution is pressed, some members might be disposed not to vote for it; not because they do not sympathise with the end to be attained, but because they think this particular means is either unnecessary or perhaps not desirable. Such a vote, therefore, might create a totally false impression in India of the real situation. I ask my friend, Sir Tej Sapru, whether he might not consider it advisable not to press his resolution. But I am very anxious that it should be made quite plain in India what are the results that have been attained. I think it would be most valuable if a short note could be added to the Report of the Conference showing clearly what are the practical results of this discussion and what India has gained.

STATEMENT BY THE MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR.

The Maharajah of Alwar: In this world of ours a great deal, if not everything, depends on how far, and how, we are able to control our human nature and in what channels we can guide it in order to achieve successful results. It is easy enough to see the dark patches, to brood over difficulties, to exaggerate and enlarge upon them, and finally to be overcome with remorse, repentance or despair.

But history teaches us the great lesson that the world advances and does not recede, when, without deluding ourselves, we are able to buckle our determination and throw our vision beyond the clouds on to the silver lining. Humanity, after all, behind which shines the radiance of the Godhead, is not so black as our imaginations and our unfulfilled desires and hopes are likely sometimes to paint it. Stone upon stone can steadily be built into an edifice with a single-hearted purpose, with the help of cement of our goodwill and toleration.

Objects of Conference.

I conceive that our Conference of the members of the British Empire has assembled in order to shed light over the dark patches, to exercise our determination in subscribing our quota to solve difficult problems, and, instead of hypnotising ourselves with pessimism, to enable us to look ahead to the dawn which must invariably follow the night.

Acknowledgments.

India did not figure in the Agenda of our Conference when we assembled around this table, but, as an Indian, I thank the Prime Minister and the British Government for having agreed to our suggestion to set aside a day for the discussion of the important problem of Indians overseas. We owe acknowledgments for letting the discussion extend to a much longer time than originally conceived, in order to give everyone an opportunity to unburden their mind and to put forward their points of view.

C 62877

Summary of Previous Discussion, and thanks to Prime Ministers and other Speakers.

In my own personal capacity I said at the commencement of the Conference that rightly or wrongly—and I believe rightly—I came with the determination of giving co-operation and goodwill, and I am happy to be able to acknowledge to-day that during our discussions we have found the full measure of it.

I thank the Prime Minister of Canada for having given a very welcome lead, in viewing our problem, relating to his Dominion, from a broad point of view.

On behalf of my Order I thank Mr. Bruce for his sympathy, and the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and of Newfoundland for the very warm and cordial support of India as related to their Dominions.

From Ireland came a very warm-hearted response towards their fellow-citizens of the Empire in my country.

I hope I may even thank General Smuts for such kind references as he has made for my countrymen, and I thank him for extending to me personally an invitation to come to South Africa to see for myself the problems and difficulties that exist. I sincerely hope that I may be able to accept his very kind invitation and I almost wish I was going back with him to his country. But at the present moment this is not feasible; but that invitation will certainly not pass into oblivion, but will remain in a tender corner of my heart, and I hope for the sake of my country I may be able to respond to it at no great distant date. I make it clear, however, that I should like to come in my personal capacity and not as a representative of my country or of my Order, for that would be the best way to enhance my own personal knowledge of the difficulties that exist and to understand the problems that exist in that country which are, perhaps, the main sources of the whole question having come up so prominently.

General Smuts will appreciate, however, that, although I may deprive myself of coming as a representative, I shall still come as an Indian and as one in whose heart these questions undoubtedly rankle, but who, for his personal satisfaction—and if he can be of any use and is desired to be of any use to his country—will be able to do so, while at the same time keeping in mind the broader view of trying fully to appreciate the difficulties that exist on the different sides.

Position of Indians in Canada.

Now what is the position of Indians overseas as we see it to-day on the bright side, if you look? Mr. Mackenzie King has told us that in Canada there are eight provinces in which no legal disability exists as regards Indians, and where, I understand, they have equal rights of franchise.

Mr. Mackenzie King: There are nine provinces. They have no legal disabilities; there is a political disability in one; that is all.

In Australia.

The Maharajah of Alwar: In Australia, although the domiciled Indians amount only to about 2,000, we have the promise of the Australian Premier that they will be treated sympathetically and that this question has been the subject of considerable public discussion and the representatives of every shade of political thought have shown sympathy with the claim that lawfully domiciled Indians should enjoy full citizen rights and finally that, so far as the position of Indians domiciled in Australia is concerned, any measure which is conceived in the interests of the Empire as a whole would be welcomed.

In New Zealand.

In New Zealand the number of Indians is small, but the spirit which recognises no difference of race, colour or creed is indeed one that should inspire not only our admiration, but also our gratitude, and the Prime Minister of New Zealand has told us that they give the Indian residents in New Zealand practically the

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 38 15 39 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62878

same privileges which are enjoyed by people of the Anglo-Saxon race, and that there is practically no difference between them.

It is even a happy augury to hear words come out of the mouth of this responsible Statesman that the Aboriginal Tribes in New Zealand are in exactly the same position as the European residents, and that they have the same privileges in parliamentary and local affairs.

In Newfoundland.

In Newfoundland the numbers of Indians are smaller still, but we are glad to see the same spirit prevailing there as in New Zealand.

In Irish Free State.

In Ireland the problem does not arise, but we nevertheless appreciate and welcome the sentiments on behalf of its Representatives.

In South Africa.

In South Africa, General Smuts has told us that, in the Cape of Good Hope and the Cape Province, Indians are on exactly the same footing as the Whites and have a franchise. General Smuts has hinted to us that in the Transvaal and the Free State the franchise was not laid down by South Africa, but by the British Government.

In Colonies, Protectorates, &c.

And now after the Dominions I come to the Colonies. His Grace the Colonial Secretary has told us that, so far as British Colonies and Protectorates are concerned, in the West Indian Colonies British Indians are under no political or legal disability. This includes British Guiana, Trinidad and Jamaica where there is a considerable Indian population. In Ceylon, qualified British Indians will be eligible for the franchise in the same way as other British subjects. In Mauritius there is no distinction between Indian and other British subjects as regards eligibility for the franchise.

In East Africa there is no restriction on the number or race of the unofficial members who may be nominated on the Councils.

Existing Difficulties.

Now, Gentlemen, I have to say this, that I know some people who read what I have said so far may consider that I have spoken in empty platitudes; and that in doing so I am seeking favours or honour. How far that vision is from my mind it is not necessary to state, but, if looking on the bright side of things is wrong in appreciating the facts that are already before us, then I gladly stand open to the charge and have no bones of contention to pick, but the primary reason why I have taken your time in emphasising these facts is in order to condense what I have already seen, that the whole of the British Empire is not such a dark patch for our countrymen as some would like to believe, and that there is much ground to improve the situation by showing our goodwill and co-operation. This does not mean that I do not appreciate the difficulties where they lie—and they do lie. It is not difficult for human nature to bite or to sting, but those are qualities which do not appeal to me in such an atmosphere as this.

The difficulties that exist with regard to Indians overseas exist I know—and all know—in British Columbia in Canada, in Natal in South Africa, and have reached their climax in Kenya. In British Columbia, Mr. Mackenzie King has told us, very frankly and candidly, that it is a question of Provincial franchise where the Federal Franchise Act supports it which places Indians in a position of disability. Mr. Mackenzie King has said that his action when viewed in India would be very much a matter of the spirit of interpretation—where he is entirely right—for it is the spirit in which we take such things that the problems come before us.

In British Columbia we are told that the problem is not a racial one, but an economic one, and that Mr. Mackenzie King welcomes

C 62879

the proposition made by Sir Tej for a Committee to go to Canada to discuss this question with his Government.

The responsible statesmen of Canada have been good enough to say that they welcomed Mr. Sastri and gave him full opportunity to speak and confer with any persons he might wish to do so in order to meet the difficulty, and finally that, when the Federal Law comes up for revision, Canada will take care that Parliament is informed of India's wishes. We sincerely hope that they will pay every favourable consideration to this important point regarding our people.

In Natal, General Smuts has equally candidly explained that if he gave Indians the right to franchise on an equality it could not then be withheld from the native population of South Africa, and would, under the circumstances, flood this portion of the country and demolish the work of the White settlers of 200 years, and this is, indeed, a potent argument and I appreciate the difficulties, but the question as regards Natal, as also of other places where such disabilities exist, does not hinge on the future migrations flooding this country, for, with right understanding, I believe the Government of India's co-operation can be achieved to solve this difficulty, but the question is with regard to Indian settlers who have lived in Natal and who have invested their property and have settled there for several generations. Is it likely that, without the franchise, laws will be passed by those who possess the franchise to oust the Indians from their rightful heritage, since they went to that country under the British flag as peaceful settlers? General Smuts gave the assurance in answer to my question that Indians would have the full rights of citizenship, and the only question concerned with the difficulty was with regard to franchise. I hope that the Prime Minister of South Africa will give this question favourable consideration, not from a local, but from an Imperial point of view, in order to see that no disabilities exist which would hamper the peaceful existence of my countrymen there. It would, indeed, be a useful advance in conciliatory methods if General Smuts could see his way to asking his Parliament to welcome our Committee to go there from India in order to discuss frankly, candidly and, if necessary, quietly, the whole problem as it affects India.

Kenya.

And now I come to Kenya. I believe, from what I am informed and from what I have seen myself, that no question of Indians overseas agitates their minds and gives them more feeling of racial discrimination and loss of self-respect than Indians in Kenya. This I believe to be mainly due to the fact that, while it has been asserted by previous Imperial Conferences that the Dominions have a right to settle their own populations, Kenya is not a self-governing Dominion, but is a Colony administered by the British Government. It is to the British Government, therefore, that Indians look to see that their position, which has already become very awkward in Kenya by the minority of white settlers being given a majority in votes, is not further jeopardised and that they are not placed under disabilities by laws being passed by the majority segregating them or eventually ousting them from positions in which they have invested money in the country which, I understand, they have helped to improve for many years back.

I understand—and if I am wrong in my assumption I hope I will be corrected—that His Grace, holding the charge of the Colonial Office at present, has been good enough to agree that the Committee of India would be welcomed to discuss with him the whole problem, and that the entire question will be fully and sympathetically considered by the Imperial Government from the points of view put forward by the Indian Committee. May I thank His Grace and, through him, the British Government, for this assurance, and earnestly hope that the final results will be an advance on the present situation and give cause for my countrymen to be grateful for assistance?

Personal Position.

On this important problem of Indians overseas I have little more to say, but I wish to add this, that my position as a Delegate

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

c 62880

from India is likely to be misunderstood in some quarters and even in India, and therefore I would like to make it clear.

I have not come here as an elected or selected representative of British India. I have not even been elected or selected by my Brother Princes, or have their mandate.

I think you know that I am not an employee of the British Government, but in accordance with past precedent I have come here as the nominated representative of the Indian Princes and have been invited to work here by the Government of India and the Secretary of State. But, although I carry no mandate for what I say for my Order, I nevertheless happen to be one of them. I am an Indian and I belong to a family who have been loyal and faithful allies of the Crown and its Government. I have, therefore, primarily expressed my own views, but I hope also what I feel to be the views of my Order and my countrymen, or at least some of them.

I have much appreciated the compliment of having been asked to work on this Conference, but, for the sake of my country, I hope that my successor at the next one will be even more fortunate in being elected by my Order to come to this distinguished gathering in consultation, with the approval of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.

I should welcome indeed if our member for two-thirds of India should be privileged to enjoy the same position, but on this topic I will not attempt to speak as it is outside my purview and because I would be charged with treading on ground on which angels fear to go.

Conclusion.

And now, in conclusion, I will say this. The whole question of Indians overseas is, we are told in many places, an economic problem; that it is not a racial one, to impress upon anyone the inferiority of any particular race. I, at any rate, welcome that sentiment and I feel, now that this goodwill and co-operation is prevailing on all sides, that the whole of this difficult problem will be set at rest—and the earlier the better—within the domains of possibilities, so that India can turn her mind towards her own domestic problems and work out her salvation to be a loyal and integral part of the British Empire.

In conclusion, may I thank the Dominion Prime Ministers for the words that have fallen from their lips, where one said that he certainly desired to see India go ahead; and that the 1921 Resolution passed by the previous Conference is regarded as a pledge which all concerned seem anxious to fulfil and to uphold?

Prime Minister and Gentlemen, I thank you one and all for having created in this room that favourable atmosphere towards my country, which I hope will soon bear practical and tangible results, not only for the sake of the British Empire, but for the sake of one-fifth of the human race.

Mr. Harvey, in giving his views recently, when Lord Curzon presided, said: "We have preferred settlement to argument." That exactly sums up my conclusion, and I hope that I may be permitted to express my final sentiments. Although it is in poetry, I think the words exactly express my views:—

"What then shall be the guerdon
(A great and priceless burden)
Of taut'ning up our Grand Old Empire's Chain?
It shall be for us the Glory
To prove in full the story
Our Brotherhood does not exist in vain.

Don't criticise and grumble;
Don't sneer at every stumble;
Let each one try and see the other's aim:
And if at first we fail
To hear the friendly hail
Let us bear in mind the birthright of our slain.

Like them we'll pull together—
Rose and Wattle, Maple, Heather—
Our own bright Star is rising with the morn;
Aye, let's sail the ship together
Thro' storm and stress of weather,
Onward, ever onward, to the Dawn!"

c 62881

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS.

The Duke of Devonshire: I regret to say the Home Secretary is unable to be here this afternoon, but, as a statement* has been circulated to the whole of the Conference which will eventually be published, I would like to make the following observations on his behalf:—

Meaning of Imperial Nationality.

This interesting and frank discussion has brought out in high relief a distinctive characteristic of the British Empire or Commonwealth—an essential unity attaining realisation in varying and independent methods and practices under a great variety of conditions.

At the core lies the vital principle of common British nationality on which the representatives of India have justly and eloquently laid great stress, and which finds expression in General Smuts' words: "The common Kingship is the binding link between the parts of the Empire."

It is not inconsistent with this principle to recognise, as it always has been recognised, that every part of the Empire is free to settle its own domestic concerns, including questions as to the rights to be enjoyed by any person or classes of persons within its territory. In considering problems arising out of this right or freedom it is important not to confuse the issue by any ambiguous use of such words as "citizen" or "citizenship." If those words are used, as they rightly may be, as having a local significance and connoting a status or right which it is within the power of any self-governing Dominion to confer on persons within its territory, they should not at the same time be used as though they were almost synonymous with the Imperial conception of nationality.

Imperial nationality is one and indivisible; local citizenship and the rights and privileges attached thereto may be diverse. If we keep these two conceptions clearly in our minds it ought to be possible, notwithstanding difficulties of detail and practice, to maintain a principle of action consistent alike with Imperial unity and local autonomy.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Mr. Baldwin: After what has been said on behalf of the Dominions and by the Duke of Devonshire on behalf of the British Government, I have little to add.

Result of Indian Proposal as regards Colonies and Protectorates.

I should like first of all to read to the Conference a statement which has been drawn up, as the result of informal discussions, since our last meeting. It sets out, for inclusion in the records of the Conference, the result of Sir Tej Sapru's proposal, so far as it relates to the Colonies and Protectorates. The statement is as follows:—

"The Secretary of State for the Colonies, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, cordially accepted the proposal of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru that there should be full consultation and discussion between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and a Committee appointed by the Government of India upon all questions affecting British Indians domiciled in British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories. At the same time the Duke was careful to explain that, before decisions were taken as a result of discussion with the Committee, consultations with the local Colonial Governments concerned, and in some cases local enquiry, would be necessary.

"Further, while welcoming the proposal, the Duke of Devonshire reminded the Conference that His Majesty's Government had recently come to certain decisions as to Kenya, which represented in their considered view the very best that could be done in all the circumstances. While he saw no prospect of these decisions being modified he would give careful attention

* See E. 80, also published in Appendix V in Cmd. 1988.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 38 15 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62882

to such representations as the Committee appointed by the Government of India might desire to make to him.

"Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, while taking note of the above statement of the Duke, desired to make plain that the recent Kenya decisions could not be accepted as final by the people of India."

Publication of Speeches.

I am glad to think that, on this occasion, we have been able to arrange for the speeches made at this Table to be published. This constitutes a departure from the procedure at the 1921 Conference, when only the resolution which has been quoted here more than once was made public. We shall, of course, include a brief summary of the proceedings when a report on the work of the Conference comes to be prepared.

Helpful Nature of Discussion.

I hope that the Indian delegation will feel, as I feel, that the discussions we have had on this subject have been most helpful and encouraging. There has not merely been goodwill and an earnest attempt to meet India's wishes so far as varying political and economic circumstances in different parts of the Empire permit, but we can record quite definite results. These are due to the growing sense of partnership among all the many peoples and races who owe common allegiance to the Crown. It is this sense of Partnership which I should like to stress. India's value to the Empire and the Empire's value to India are becoming every day more clearly seen. The British Commonwealth of Nations rests upon no narrow basis. It is the greatest association known to the world of many races bound together ever more intimately by common interests and by mutual desire to help each other. Here at these Conferences we can with full freedom learn each other's problems and each other's point of view, and India can, I am sure, feel that the magnitude of her share in our common partnership, and of her contribution to the common weal, is being realised in increasing measure. I am confident that the members of the Conference who have spoken for India will feel, both from the manner in which their representations have been received and from the actual results achieved, that mutual goodwill can and does help each and all of us to solve our common problems. I think the Conference as a whole can congratulate itself on what has been effected.

STATEMENT BY SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Before the Conference leaves this very important subject, I desire to take up just two minutes of your time in making my own position quite clear.

Effect of Discussion on Indian Opinion.

I am completely satisfied with the kindness of my colleagues from the Dominions, and I am sure that Indians throughout the Empire will derive new hope and encouragement from their attitude. This, of course, does not apply to South Africa, regarding which country I had my say on Monday last. As regards the Colonial Office, I am very glad to notice that the Committee to be appointed as I suggested is not to be restricted in its scope to certain specified Colonies. To me, as an Indian, it is, of course, disappointing that the Duke, speaking last Monday, saw no prospect of modifying the Kenya decisions, which, as I have already made clear, can never be accepted in India. But his agreement with the principle of my scheme, and his consent to give careful attention to such representations as the Committee may lay before him, inspires me with the hope that the door is not barred, and that the Colonial Office may be shown the way to an acceptable solution. I shall recommend those with whom I have any influence, both in India and elsewhere, to work through this Committee to obtain an amelioration of such conditions as they and every Indian regard as incompatible with our national dignity and with our position as equal subjects in the Empire of our common Sovereign.

C 62883

No need to Move Formal Resolution.

May I here just also refer to the expression of opinion made by Lord Peel to-day with regard to the Resolution that I intended to move on the last occasion? I thoroughly appreciate the advice that has been given to me to-day by Lord Peel. I have noted with great pleasure the spirit of cordiality shown by my colleagues from all over the Empire, except General Smuts. I take their speeches as very encouraging, and I note that what I wanted really has been achieved, namely, that they recognise the character of the Resolution of 1921, and that they have given me a hope that they would do something material to achieve the end which we have in view, namely, the accomplishment of the principle of equality. Most of them have accepted my suggestions about Committees; Mr. Bruce thinks that he can do without a Committee. As I said on a former occasion, so much the more honourable and creditable to him and to his country. It is because I have this support from all the Dominion Prime Ministers excepting one, that it is unnecessary for me to move my Resolution formally.

Thanks to Lord Peel.

Lastly, will you allow me to say one word about Lord Peel? Throughout the anxious days I have had to spend upon this question within the last two weeks I have received nothing but unreserved support and encouragement from him, and I am sure that, when my countrymen come to know how strongly he has stood by me, they will realise that not only the Government of India and the great Statesman who presides over that country have identified themselves with our national sentiment with regard to this matter, but that the Secretary of State has also done the same. May I thank you, Sir, on behalf of myself and on behalf of those whom I represent? That is all, Sir.

NATIONALITY AND NATURALISATION.

Mr. Baldwin: The next business on the Agenda is to confirm the Reports of certain Committees. The first one is the Committee of the Home Secretary on Nationality questions.* Sir John Anderson is here representing the Home Secretary, and if anyone wants to ask him any questions I think they had better do so; otherwise, I suggest the Conference adopt the Report of the Committee which has been circulated. Has anyone anything to say? General Smuts, have you anything to say?

General Smuts: No, I fully agree, Prime Minister.

Mr. Massey: I do not quite understand the position, Prime Minister. I take it the question has been put to a Committee and the Committee has agreed.

General Smuts: That is so: these Resolutions were agreed upon by a Sub-Committee.

Mr. Baldwin: I think we may take it as agreed.

(Agreed.)

CONDOMINIUM IN THE NEW HEBRIDES.

The second one is that of the Committee on the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides.†

Lord Curzon: The Foreign Office was represented at this Committee, but I was unable to attend myself. The Conference will note the central part of the first Resolution.

It says: "These negotiations should in the first instance take the form of a proposal that the British and French Governments should jointly approach the League of Nations with a view to a partition of the Islands between the British Empire and France under two separate Mandates." Suppose the French do not agree to that, and I do not suppose they will agree for a moment——

Mr. Massey: Not for a moment.

* See Appendix I.

† See Appendix II.

[10879]

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Lord Curzon: What are you going to do? That means a blind lane. We have got no further. I do not know what arguments were employed at the Committee, but I should think that the Committee would probably have considered whether, in those circumstances, supposing this attempt fails, it would be desirable to suggest that France, under the League of Nations, should acquire a Mandate for the whole of the Islands. I do not know whether that has been considered.

Mr. Bruce: That was raised and considered. So far as Australia is concerned, I took the view that we should probably be prepared to accept that as a possible way of getting some definite settlement instead of the very unsatisfactory position we have at the moment. but I think Mr. Massey takes an entirely different view of the situation.

Lord Curzon: Does Mr. Massey contemplate that if this arrangement breaks down we remain where we are now?

Mr. Massey: I see no other course to adopt, Foreign Secretary. I know perfectly well that the people I represent would not think for one moment of handing the whole of the Islands over to France. Bad as the present arrangement is, the other would be very much worse.

Mr. Bruce: Under a Mandate?

Mr. Massey: I do not take any notice of Mandates.

Lord Curzon: Is the cause for which you are speaking that of the Missionaries?

Mr. Massey: Yes, and the Missionaries have a very strong following behind them.

Lord Curzon: Were it not for the Missionaries and the very strong support behind them, you would not pay very much attention to the matter?

Mr. Massey: The Presbyterian Church in New Zealand is absolutely solid about it, and I know they are backed up by the other Churches. I do not think France will move.

Duke of Devonshire: There were three alternatives; for us to have them, to which France would not agree; or to give them up to France; or to get a partition.

Mr. Bruce: Or a mandate without a partition. That is a fourth alternative.

Lord Salisbury: It is partition we are talking about.

Mr. Massey: I think we could accept a partition.

Lord Curzon: My suggestion would have been a fifth one, and I understand Mr. Bruce is rather favourably inclined to it.

General Smuts: Is there not a sixth solution—let well alone.

Lord Curzon: Unfortunately, it is not well, it is very bad.

Mr. Bruce: I assume that we cannot take the alternative, that France should be given a Mandate over the Islands—which I do not like very much, though I think it is better than leaving things as they are. If we suggested the first course, of a Mandate for both countries, and that were not accepted, I suppose we should only be thrown back where we are at present, and we could try partition: I am not very hopeful that the French would agree to it, but the situation in Australia, quite apart from the situation in these Islands, is of such a character that something must be done. It is undoubtedly very bad. The question is becoming one of: "What is Great Britain's attitude towards this question?" The matter is approaching a very serious scandal—in fact, it is a scandal—and I have had, in my short tenure, two deputations representative of the whole of the Scotch Church and supported by the Anglican Church. These deputations have been taking place for quite a number of years past; there have been Press Campaigns about it, and there is an unfortunate feeling growing up with regard to the whole of Britain's policy in this matter. Something definite should be done, and, even if nothing came of it,

I am perfectly certain it would do a great deal to allay that feeling, if we even put forward a proposal that there should be a Mandate by the League of Nations to both Britain and France. That is the reason why I am prepared to support almost anything being done, so long as some action is taken.

Lord Curzon: I agree with all that. Of course, I look at it from the Foreign Office view alone, and my desire is to remove any obstacles in the way of happy and friendly relations with France. I should like us to proceed with the further suggestion I have intimated, although the Conference is not likely to agree to it. I put it to Mr. Massey and to Mr. Bruce. The second part of the Resolution contemplates the cession of a harbour in some part of the Eastern Pacific, but they are not likely to give you anything in return for the proposal you make in the first part of the Resolution. We are ceding nothing to them at all for which we could exact a return, but if, on the other hand, the proposal in the first part breaks down, and we then make a suggestion that a Mandate might be taken by France for the Islands as a whole, surely you would have a much stronger case for asking for something in return and your chance of getting your harbour in the Eastern Pacific would be increased. Would not that affect your point of view, Mr. Massey?

Mr. Massey: No.

Mr. Bruce: I think there is some misunderstanding; it may be a misunderstanding on my part. I imagine the second proposal, amounting to an exchange of our interest in the New Hebrides for some other port in the Pacific, would certainly involve handing over these Islands to France.

Duke of Devonshire: Much the most important part would be handed over to France.

Lord Curzon: In the partition.

Mr. Bruce: Yes.

Sir James Masterton Smith: I think it was contemplated that if there was such a thing as a partition under a Mandate the French share might be considerably greater than the British share, and something should be given in the Pacific to make good the balance.

Lord Curzon: I see.

Mr. Massey: I have had so many negotiations with the French in the Pacific in matters connected with French interests there that I am hopeless of doing anything with regard to the New Hebrides. I know the feeling on the part of the people. I have had many deputations, deputations from the Churches and from others interested, over and over again, but the great trouble is this, that France is not successful as a coloniser. Take any of the islands under France in the Pacific—and there are many of them; I am glad to say we are quite friendly with France, we do not fall out with them—within a comparatively short time, say, half a century, there will not be a native left in the Hebrides, and in the meantime France is absorbing lands which really belong to the natives and which they should be cultivating on their own account. I suggest that we should go on with what is a good object, that we ask the French Government whether they are prepared to accept that, and, if they are not prepared to accept that, whether they have any counter-proposal to make. If they have a counter-proposal to make, let us consider it; something may come out of it. Personally, I do not believe they will do anything. I have tried to suggest an exchange for a small island in the direct line between New Zealand and the Panama Canal, which is absolutely useless, on which there are no residents, but where there is a harbour which could be improved, but we could not get them to move. They made no suggestion; they simply say they are going to stick to the island, and the same in other directions; I believe it is quite hopeless. All the same, I believe in letting the proposal go forward and getting a reply from the French Government.

Mr. Baldwin: I think the Conference decides to adopt the report.

Lord Curzon: But not to publish the resolutions.

(Agreed.)

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 38 15 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62886

TERRITORIAL WATERS.

Mr. Baldwin: The next item is Territorial Waters.*

Lord Curzon: We had a meeting and came to a conclusion which is reported in the paper. We had a Committee over which I had the honour of presiding, which was attended by some of the Prime Ministers and representatives of the others, and, after a fairly full discussion, we arrived at an absolute agreement on the resolutions which are recorded in this paper.

(Agreed.)

NEGOTIATION, SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF TREATIES.

Mr. Baldwin: The fourth and last of these reports is that concerning the Negotiation, Signature and Ratification of Treaties.†

Lord Curzon: This was a second Committee over which I had the honour of presiding, and when we examined with great care this very important and delicate question, namely, the signature and ratification of treaties, I think the Prime Ministers were all present at the meeting. If not, they were all represented, but I think they were all present. There again, I am glad to say, we arrived at unanimous conclusions, which are expressed in the various clauses of this paper. We dealt successively with negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties, and we laid down the procedure which will be adopted in future in regard to all those three points.

Procedure at Washington.

Mr. Massey: The Foreign Secretary will recollect we had some little discussion in regard to the proposals which are now before the Conference, and I think to a certain extent we were at cross purposes. I made a statement with regard to the procedure at the Washington Conference, and I noticed that my statement was received with a certain amount of doubt; that is to say, I think certain members of the Conference thought it was not quite correct. Since then I have taken the opportunity of looking up the report furnished by the New Zealand representative, Sir John Salmond, to me as Prime Minister. Sir John Salmond is a man with an Empire reputation, which is well known in almost every centre of the Empire; and I can say this, that he is admitted to be one of the ablest jurists within the Empire. Now this is what Sir John Salmond says about the proceedings at Washington. It is very short. I am not going to delay the Conference any longer than I can help. This is what he says:—

> "The procedure of the Washington Conference was in itself a clear indication that the Dominions were there not in their own right as quasi-independent States, but merely as constituent portions of an undivided Empire. When any question came to be voted upon for the purpose of ascertaining whether there existed that unanimous consent which was necessary for a treaty, the question was put to the British Delegation as a whole, and was answered 'Yes' or 'No' by Mr. Balfour as the head and spokesman of that Delegation, and on behalf of the British Empire as a whole. Although in the process of discussion and negotiation the representatives of the Dominions had and exercised the same right of audience as any other delegates, they never voted separately on behalf of their own Dominion on any question. The final decision in every case was that of the British Empire as an indivisible unity."

Well, that is so plain that it is not necessary for me to call attention to any particular point in it, but it simply meant this, that the representatives of the Empire went to Washington as a delegation; they arrived at a conclusion on every question that came before the Conference and Mr. Balfour, acting for the Empire and on behalf of the Empire, voted accordingly "Yes" or "No." I do not mean to suggest that the signatures of the plenipotentiaries were not attached to the Treaty; I know they were as a matter of fact, and that is the only explanation I think it is necessary to make.

* See Appendix III.

† See Appendix IV.

C 62887

Difference between Agreements and Treaties.

Now there was another point that cropped up. I think the misapprehension that was apparently visible at the Committee meeting the other day was owing to the fact that we do not sufficiently discriminate between agreements and treaties. Now, I take it, a treaty is necessary where the interests of the Crown are concerned, but where the interests of the Crown are not concerned, such as very often happens between two countries of the Empire, then a treaty is not necessary, and what is necessary is an agreement between the two countries which may require to be ratified or may not require to be ratified, but in most cases does require to be ratified by the particular Parliaments concerned. Now I quote Professor Keith, because I want to put on record what he says. He says, speaking of treaties, not agreements:—

> "The Imperial Crown has an absolute power of concluding treaties, and in so doing it is advised by the Imperial Ministry. There is no case yet known in which any treaty proper has been made without the consent of the Imperial Government, and the normal mode of making treaties is to conclude them through plenipotentiaries granted Full Powers by the Crown."

Some of us had to do these things. It will be remembered, at the Peace Conference at Paris, each and every representative of the Dominions was given the Full Powers spoken of here.

> "The term treaty which has been applied, for example, to the Customs Agreement between the South African Customs Union and the Dominion of New Zealand is merely a terminological inexactitude."

Not the first time we have heard that phrase used. That is to say, it is not a treaty but an agreement which has been referred to as a treaty.

> "In a few cases Governors have been empowered to conclude agreements in the nature of treaties. For example, in 1901 an agreement was made between Lord Milner on behalf of the Transvaal and the Governor-General of Mozambique with regard to the recruitment of native labour for service in the Transvaal mines and railway rates, and this agreement was superseded by another agreement concluded by Lord Selbourne as Governor of the Transvaal with the ex-Governor-General of Mozambique on the 1st April, 1909."

The point I am trying to bring out in this is that, in every case where the interests of the Crown are concerned, the consent of the Crown must be forthcoming and expressed by what has become known to us as "Full Powers." Leonard Courtney says in his book, "The Working Constitution of the United Kingdom":—

> "Treaties were made under the advice of responsible Ministers by the Royal Prerogative."

I believe that to be absolutely correct, and, personally, I do not think there is much difference of opinion as between the parties to the discussion the other day, but I am sorry that at this Conference there is no prospect, and I think we know it perfectly well, of dealing with constitutional matters, though such matters do require to be dealt with.

Status of Imperial Conferences.

So far as these Imperial Conferences are concerned, we ought to arrive at a decision as to where we stand in connection with this question, because the plain fact is this, that the members of this Conference have no status; as a matter of fact we have lost ground. I am not finding fault with anybody on that account, because the British Government has on every occasion been perfectly willing to accede to any request that has been made by the representatives of the Dominions and the overseas countries of the Empire. But what I am thinking of is this. We had a status for some years when attending the War Cabinets and Conferences. We had a definite status as members of the Imperial War Cabinet. We sat round this table along with British Ministers; we joined in their recommendations to the Sovereign, and in every way the status of

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 15 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62888

the representatives of the oversea Dominions was equal to the status of members of the British Government. That has gone. The war came to an end, and the Imperial War Cabinet came to an end with it. So far as the war is concerned there was no difference of opinion, but I thought at the time it would be a good thing if the War Cabinet, without the name, could have been continued in a modified form. It all comes back to this, and I take the opportunity of referring to it now, it all comes back to the difficulty of communication, the difficulty on the part of certain members of this Conference, the Prime Minister of Australia and myself particularly, in getting here. If we could get here in a week or two, and that may come when aviation is more advanced than it is at present, if we could get here within a week or two of leaving our own countries, it would be possible for this Conference to meet regularly, and meet as we did when the Imperial War Cabinet was in operation, as equals in every sense of the word, and particularly in the sense of being able to join in the recommendations to the Sovereign, because it is the Sovereign who sets the machinery of Empire in motion. We can go through the form of approaching the Sovereign if you like, but, if we do, then any recommendations that we make go back to the British Government. There is no other way at present. They go back to the British Government and the British Government advises the Sovereign. We do not advise. We make our request and our requests are considered. I have no doubt these difficulties will be got over in time. I think they will, and I think they should be got over, but there is no opportunity yet. At present it is no use forcing the question; I am not going to attempt it, but I should like to remind the Conference of this. We speak, and very properly, of the Sovereign as the strongest link in the Constitution, which keeps the different countries of the Empire together. If the Sovereign is to remain the strongest link in the Constitution, then we have got to do everything we possibly can to protect his prerogative. If we allow his prerogative to be interfered with, the Sovereign will cease to occupy the position he occupies at present. None of us want that. I am quite sure the people behind us do not want it. I have been thinking this over, and I take the opportunity, before the Conference comes to an end, of presenting my views now on what I think to be an important question.

Status of Dominion Ministers at Imperial War Cabinets.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I would like to ask Mr. Massey a question. You spoke about a certain status that Dominion Ministers had at the time of the War Cabinet. From what authority was that status derived?

Mr. Massey: From the Sovereign through his Ministers. I do not think I need explain to Mr. Mackenzie King that the Cabinet consists of those men who are, in the first place, members of the Privy Council, and who are convened for the purpose of forming a Cabinet by the Prime Minister for the time being. That is what took place.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I had assumed that every Cabinet Minister derived his authority from his position in Parliament or in relation thereto, and by virtue of the people by whom he is elected to serve.

Mr. Massey: There is the indirect method which I have mentioned. A man can become a Cabinet Minister without being elected as a representative of the people; he may be a member of the Second Chamber. That happens over and over again in this country. A Cabinet Minister, and I think I am right in this according to constitutional authorities, is invited to attend Cabinet meetings by the gentleman who is the Prime Minister for the time being, and custom has provided that the man who is invited to attend Cabinet meetings, with the other qualifications, becomes, as a matter of fact, a member of the British Cabinet.

General Smuts: Are these views going to be recorded, Prime Minister? Of course, we are up against America, and in a very dangerous position. If those are simply the personal views of Mr. Massey expressed here I have no fault to find with them.

C 62889

Mr. Massey: I accept the responsibility. I do not want them to be taken as anything else than my personal views.

General Smuts: I do not agree with the constitutional position as set out by Sir John Salmond or any other authority quoted by Mr. Massey. If his views are to be placed on record as an exposition of the constitutional position of the British Empire—

Mr. Baldwin: I do not think that was his intention.

Mr. Massey: I am expressing my own personal views. I want the members of the Conference to consider them, and then perhaps at the next meeting we shall be able to discuss them.

Publication of Resolutions.

Mr. Bruce: I have only one question. Are these resolutions, for example, with regard to negotiation and signature of Treaties to be published?

Lord Curzon: I think not.

Mr. Bruce: I wanted to be quite clear on that.

Lord Curzon: They are for the guidance of all of us.

General Smuts: Should they not be published? These questions are continually raised in our country. I see no harm in publishing them.

Mr. Bruce: This is what was in my mind. These resolutions deal with questions of Treaty making, and at the Conference with Lord Curzon the other day we did, briefly perhaps, indicate what our views are in regard to our Treaty-making powers and position. If these resolutions go out unsupported by any sort of statement as to what views we hold as to the Treaty-making powers of Dominions and their relation to the Empire as a whole, it rather leaves the position in the air. If the resolutions are published, it ought to be made perfectly clear that there has been a Committee, and the subject has been fully discussed in Committee; and then we could be left to explain our views later.

Mr. Baldwin: I think that question of publication might stand over. The Foreign Secretary would like just to consider it. I rather assumed it would be published.

General Smuts: This is where we are agreed. If we were to go into explanations you and Mr. Massey would not be in agreement, but this is where we do agree. Where we do agree let us publish that agreement for the information of our peoples. It is one point gained.

Mr. Massey: I would like to express this opinion. If we are going to publish the opinions that were expressed the other day, particularly with regard to the prerogative of the Crown, we may create a storm such as we have not yet experienced.

Lord Curzon: It is not a question of publishing opinions, only resolutions. I should like to ask the Foreign Office. It may be quite possible to publish them, but I had not considered it from that point of view myself.

General Smuts: If you have no objection from the Foreign Office point of view I think it would be very serviceable to publish them.

(The Report of the Committee was then approved, and it was subsequently decided to publish the Resolution.*)

PUBLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

Mr. Baldwin: Mr. Mackenzie King, you are taking the next item. Perhaps you would say what you have to say on that.

Mr. Mackenzie King: That is the matter of publication of correspondence, is it not?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, and the next item I think is yours as well.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I may say a word or two perhaps. If I present to the Conference the circumstances which have occasioned me to bring this matter up, that will enable the members

* See Appendix IV, Annexe (A).

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 15 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62890

better than any words of mine to see what is involved in the suggestions I have to make. At Ottawa there is a difference of view between the Governor-General's Office and the Department of External Affairs as to rights of publicity in the matter of correspondence between the Government here and the Government of Canada. It is, I think, important that there should be only one view, and it ought to be clearly set forth. I have, for example, a memorandum given me by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who is perhaps the senior official in the Dominion Service, in which he states :—

> "The understanding of the Colonial Office heretofore has been that code telegrams, unless specially marked 'Secret' or 'Confidential,' may be given to Parliament as a matter of course without permission being asked and in view of this understanding the telegram of a certain date, the 27th October, might be brought down.
>
> "On principle I do not think it would be necessary to ask permission to bring down telegrams from the Canadian Government, but in practice consent becomes necessary if such telegrams are part of a continued secret correspondence and make reference to secret communications from the Imperial Government."

That point of view I had assumed was correct, but the Governor-General's Office apparently takes a different view, which is set forth in the following memorandum from the Governor-General's Secretary :—

> "Correspondence between the Government of Canada and His Majesty's Government is carried on, not by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet, but by the Governor-General who is the Chief Executive and Head of the Government. He transmits, as such, his Ministers' opinions and follows their advice, but the responsibility is his and the custody of the correspondence is his duty.
>
> "When Sir Joseph Pope says that 'the understanding with the Colonial Office heretofore has been that code telegrams, unless specifically marked "Secret" or "Confidential," may be given to Parliament as a matter of course without permission being asked,' he is in one sense correct. Such telegrams or despatches may indeed be made public, but, in theory at least, only by permission of the Governor-General, who has discretion in the matter and does not need to ask permission from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is needless to say that the Governor-General always meets the wishes of his Prime Minister in such cases. It is true that, in the case of numbered despatches, publication when required is made in the 'Canada Gazette' without express permission being asked, but such despatches are generally concerned with regulations, *e.g.*, regulations affecting the transfer of registry of vessels, and are of such a nature that their very transmission implies publication—permission, therefore, being tacitly given by His Excellency.
>
> "There is, however, no record, so far as I am aware, of any papers being laid before Parliament without the permission of the Governor-General. Indeed, at one time, when Ministers desired to bring down despatches, the documents in question were prepared by the Office of the Governor-General's Secretary.
>
> "With regard to Confidential despatches, the case is different, and the regulations given for the instruction of the Governor-General lay down that 'no confidential despatch, either to or from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, may be made public without his permission.'
>
> "Despatches handed in to the Governor-General's office in draft form are actually only written records of the advice of his Ministers to the Governor-General, on which it is true that he acts, but the correspondence based on that advice is the act of the Governor-General himself and the correspondence is his and remains in his custody. The fact that a telegram may be sent in the exact words suggested by the Prime Minister, who, in drafting such telegram, is fulfilling one of his proper functions as principal adviser to the Governor-General, does not make that telegram his. So far as the substance of the despatch or the policy involved is concerned, Ministers naturally can at any time make this public in their speeches in the House of Commons or elsewhere, but this does not affect the sanctity of official correspondence."

I think that is a curious reversion to an old Colonial status, if such is the correct view. The Under-Secretary of State, Sir Joseph Pope, after he saw this particular memorandum sent me another in which he takes quite an opposite view. He says :—

> "Whatever practical advantages may attach to the practice of entrusting to the Governor-General's office the preparation of returns for Parliament of official correspondence with outside Governments, I venture to think that there is serious objection from a constitutional point of view to a reversion to that old time practice which obtained before the establishment of this Department. Such a course appears to imply the retention by the Crown of a control over matters which, for many years, have been committed to a responsible Minister, such as is not consistent with sound constitutional theory, and such as is not exercised, I think, in any other Department of Canadian affairs. It involves the position that the discretion of the Secretary of State for External Affairs as to the action to be taken in respect of communications made to the Canadian Government is to be regarded as a provisional one, fettered by the necessity of submitting such action in certain particulars for the special approval of the Crown, whereas the position hitherto taken in such matters is that the discretion to be exercised in the selection of papers to lay before Parliament is vested in the responsible Minister. It might be pointed out that publication in the 'Canada Gazette' of despatches coming to the Government through the Governor-General, where such action seems necessary or expedient, is made as a matter of ordinary practice under the Minister's authority, without any special reference to His Excellency, and why a different practice should prevail in respect of communication to Parliament is not apparent. Of course, in any case publication is subject to the usual rules governing international practice in this matter."

It seems to me that this statement of the matter is the only one that should hold at the present time. In other words, the Canadian Ministry, in the matter of its correspondence, should be in precisely the same position as the Ministry here with reference to its correspondence. If responsibility rests with a Minister of the British Cabinet as to what papers should be placed on the table of Parliament, he exercises that responsibility without getting the consent of His Majesty the King in the first instance. He is assumed, I presume, to be advising His Majesty to give permission. Similarly I feel that the Prime Minister of the Dominion, or whichever Minister may have to do with external affairs, should have the same responsibility and the same rights in the matter of deciding what correspondence should go before Parliament. He should not have to ask the permission of the Governor-General to bring it down; he should be responsible for what is brought down. It is a large question and I have thought, therefore, it was best to present it in this general way; it can, if desired, be looked into by special officers before a final decision is given.

Mr. Baldwin: Would you like, Mr. King, to circulate the extracts you have read and have this matter go to a Committee?

Mr. Mackenzie King: I think that would be the best way. Let me mention this as well. Every time it becomes necessary in our Parliament in answer to a request for papers to be presented to Parliament for the Prime Minister to state that he must ask permission in the first instance for the papers to be brought down, it creates an unnecessary embarrassment, and it would be well if we could in some general terms have an understanding which all Ministers could follow with respect to correspondence, which would permit correspondence, of a character that could be brought down, to be

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62891

brought down at once without going through any formality of asking permission. One would understand that, where there is confidential correspondence, anything of the kind would not be contemplated. I am not now thinking of the numerous communications relating to Defence and Foreign Policy and matters of that kind, but take a question such, for example, as that of the cattle embargo which has been a subject of consideration between Canada and the Colonial Office. If the Leader of the Opposition asks me for the correspondence between Canada and Britain on that subject I am obliged, as matters now stand, to say I shall be pleased to bring down the papers in a few days, but I must get the permission of the British Government to do so in the first instance. That creates embarrassment immediately. The Opposition invariably takes the position: "We have gone back to secret correspondence. Why is the Prime Minister writing letters he cannot bring down at once?" I find that some of my colleagues here think such is already their right. I am glad they take this position, but I have before me these memoranda ——

Mr. Baldwin: I think that would be a very proper subject for a Committee. I suggest the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or a representative, all the Prime Ministers or representatives, as a proper and comprehensive Committee.

STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS.

Mr. Mackenzie King: On the other subject, Prime Minister, the status of the High Commissioner, what I would like to say is this. We refer to the British Empire to-day as a community of free nations and, as nations, we are represented in London, some of us, I think all of us, by High Commissioners, so termed. The question of the particular name that should be given to the chief representative of the Dominion is a matter, I think, that should be left to the Dominions themselves to settle or to agree upon in Conference; but whoever is the representative of a self-governing Dominion in London should, I think, have at least the same standing and rights and privileges as the representatives of countries that are entitled to have Ministers here. I think it prejudices our status in London and in the eyes of the countries represented here that our chief representative is not given such recognition and I think it, to some extent, prejudices the position of the Empire as a whole in the minds of the representatives of those other countries that are here and have privileges which our representatives do not enjoy. We agree that before any privileges are granted regard should be had to all necessary safeguards.

Lord Salisbury: What sort of privileges are you thinking of?

Mr. Mackenzie King: Take the matter of recognition in a diplomatic way; the right to approach the Ministers of the Government, to speak for his Government.

Mr. Massey: You have that privilege now, have you not?

Mr. Mackenzie King: I do not think so—not the privilege that an Ambassador has.

General Smuts: I thought our High Commissioner had complete freedom in approaching not only Ministers, but the Prime Minister.

The Duke of Devonshire: I think they have perfect freedom to come to us. They do come with the greatest freedom to my office, and certainly to the President of the Board of Trade on all questions of trade. There is no question of status there.

Lord Curzon: I thought the points you were concerned with were points relating to Income Tax exemption and the like.

Mr. Mackenzie King: That is one point.

Lord Curzon: I have here a table of privileges to Ambassadors and of the corresponding privileges that are granted at the present moment to High Commissioners. All I can say is that I should like to be a High Commissioner. When I contrast his position financially

C62892

as regards these privileges with that of a wretched Cabinet Minister, I confess I should like to exchange positions. However, I will look into that matter.

Mr. Mackenzie King: Has the High Commissioner any diplomatic standing at all?

Lord Curzon: When you use the word "diplomatic," I should say no, but he has a status of his own.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I think we ought to have in London someone with a recognised diplomatic standing.

Lord Salisbury: We should have said that he had a far superior standing; but, if you went into details before a Committee, I am sure that could be put absolutely right.

Mr. Baldwin: I think it should be brought up before the same Committee.

Sir Tej Sapru: We also have a High Commissioner here; and, if the question is to be examined, I should like the position of the Indian High Commissioner also to be put on the same footing.

Mr. Massey: I have got the impression, from one or two little conversations I have had, that there is some dissatisfaction with regard to precedence.

General Smuts: The point is that we in the Dominions are divided in our own minds over this question. Some of the Dominions want to restrict their High Commissioners to a more commercial position; others want to give them a higher status; and we might discuss that point at a Committee such as is proposed.

Mr. Massey: It depends so much upon the man. If you have a man who can be trusted, I should like to see him given every privilege that is possible; but I can see the position coming when there may be a man there who might not be trusted.

Mr. Mackenzie King: There is one subject I would like the Committee to consider, namely, the question of precedence as part of this matter.

Mr. Baldwin: The Committee will consider every point connected with the status of High Commissioners.

SPAHLINGER TREATMENT OF TUBERCULOSIS.

The next item is the Spahlinger treatment of Tuberculosis.

Mr. Massey: Prime Minister, what I am asking for in this connection is simply a Committee. It is an exceedingly important matter—far more important than I ever dreamt of when I was first approached. At the present time I am informed that in the United Kingdom there are 1,000 people per week dying of Tuberculosis, and the number of people who are suffering from Tuberculosis is counted by hundreds of thousands. I have been approached by an eminent medical man and asked to bring this matter forward. Perhaps I had better read this letter, one of several I have received:—

> "I have had a further conversation with Dr. Collins" (that is the gentleman I was thinking of) "this morning with regard to Spahlinger, and we are both of the opinion that the treatment is so promising that we think you ought to bring the matter before the other Prime Ministers, in the hope that the Empire may lift Spahlinger out of his financial difficulties and put him in a position to manufacture, as rapidly as possible, his serum and his vaccine.
>
> "Recently a Committee here in London has provided him with £15,000 to prevent the Bank from selling him up, and he is now in a position to go on till the end of the year. From enquiries that have been made it appears that, to set him free of his financial responsibilities and to put him in a position to have the equipment necessary to produce his serum and vaccine, it would require about £104,000." (He has spent that amount.)
>
> "Collins thinks, and I agree with him, that in addition to this

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 15 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62893

it would be necessary to provide him with a certain amount per annum to enable him to live and carry on for three years, which is the maximum time for the production of the serum. Assuming that he were granted another £11,000 to see him through, this would make £115,000. Of this £15,000 has been subscribed already, and £100,000 ought to be sufficient to enable him to carry on for three years and produce, in quantity, both serum and vaccine."

I do not think that I need read the remainder of the correspondence; but these are men whom I can trust, and they urge the importance of this with all the force at their command and with all the experience behind them which they undoubtedly possess. I think it would be a splendid thing, not only for this country by itself, but for the Empire as a whole, to undertake the consideration of this treatment, and I would suggest that a Committee be set up and that some of these men should be examined by the Committee and let the Committee draw its own conclusions.

Mr. Baldwin: The Committee to consist of the Minister of Health, in the Chair; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or representative; the Secretary of State for India, or representative; the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, or representatives.

Mr. Massey: Yes.

The Duke of Devonshire: I do not know whether it will be going outside the terms of reference. I am no longer connected with the Red Cross Society here, but they have taken a great deal of interest in this question. I suggest to the Committee that if they would like to have a member of the Red Cross Society they should have him, simply as a witness to examine.

Mr. Massey: It would be a very good thing.

(Mr. Baldwin then read the press communiqué, which was approved.)

UNITED STATES AND "C" MANDATES.

The Duke of Devonshire: With regard to the question of "C" Mandates, that was dealt with in a Committee which I was not able to attend; but, since that Committee has presented its report, I understand that there is a Note from the United States (which I have not yet seen) which is rather an important one. Would it be possible to refer that Note to the same Committee, and to discuss the matter in the light of that?

Mr. Massey: I should think so.

The Duke of Devonshire: We will circulate the Note and arrange for a new meeting of the Committee.*

Mr. Massey: I am afraid we have undertaken a very big question now that we have decided to deal with this question of the "C" Mandates in relation to the United States.

DEATH OF Mr. BONAR LAW.

(The resolution of condolence with the late Mr. Bonar Law's relatives was read, and approved by the Conference.)†

(The Meeting then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1.
October 31, 1923.

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* *Secretariat Note.*—It was not found possible to fix a further meeting of the committee before the proceedings of the conference terminated, but arrangements were made for the United States note, and a draft reply, to be circulated to the members concerned.

† For resolution, as adopted, see Section V of the published Report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987.)

C 62894

APPENDIX I.

Nationality Committee.

CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING OF THE ABOVE COMMITTEE, HELD IN CONFERENCE ROOM "A," 2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S.W., ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1923, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. Sir DOUGLAS HOGG, K.C., M.P., Attorney-General.

Mr. S. P. VIVIAN, Registrar-General.

Sir JOHN S. RISLEY, K.C.M.G., C.B., K.C. (representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies).

Mr. G. MOUNSEY, O.B.E. (representing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

Mr. MILLAR CRAIG (representing the Secretary for Scotland).

The Hon. Sir LOMER GOUIN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada.

Sir ROBERT GARRAN, K.C.M.G., Solicitor-General and Parliamentary Draftsman, Commonwealth of Australia (representing the Hon. R. V. Wilson).

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The following were also present:

Sir JOHN PEDDER, K.B.E., C.B., Home Office.

Mr. O. F. DOWSON, O.B.E., Home Office.

Mr. W. R. BRISCOE, Treasury Solicitor's Department.

Mr. R. B. HOWORTH, Cabinet Office.

Mr. E. W. E. HOLDERNESS, Home Office.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

Mr. J. E. TREMBLAY.

Union of South Africa.

Mr. J. COLLIE.

Irish Free State.

Mr. ESMONDE.

Mr. P. McGILLIGAN.

Mr. R. L. BICKNELL, Home Office, Joint Secretary to the Committee.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. *The Grant of Naturalisation to Persons Resident in Mandated Territories.*

The Committee recommend that the power of granting Certificates of Imperial Naturalisation be extended so as to cover persons resident in "B" and "C" Mandated Territories and in Protectorates, in accordance with the suggestions set forth in paragraph 7 of the joint memorandum by the Home Office and the Colonial Office. (See Appendix VI, Parts 1 and 2, in Cmd. 1988.)

2. *The Appointment of Committees of Enquiry in connection with the Revocation of Certificates.*

Having heard the reasons* for which the Commonwealth Government is disposed to provide that the presidency over such Committees of Enquiry may, where convenient, be taken by persons holding judicial office of lower standing than that prescribed at present by the Commonwealth Statute, the Committee see no objection to a question of machinery of this nature being settled according to local circumstances and needs, if, after examination

* See Appendix VI, Part 1, in Cmd. 1988.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 64 65 66 67 38 15 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62895

of the experience of the Committee of Enquiry, and of the practice which has grown up in the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth Government desires to make an alteration.

3. *The Re-Admission to British Nationality of British-born Women Married to Aliens.* (See Appendix VI, Parts 1 and 3, in Cmd. 1988.)

The Committee are of opinion that the principle of the existing law that the nationality of a married woman depends on that of her husband should be maintained. They, nevertheless, recommend that power should be taken to readmit a woman to British nationality in cases where the married state, though subsisting in law, has, to all practical purposes, come to an end.

4. *Marriages with Foreigners.*

Having examined the Report (contained in the despatch of the 6th April, 1923, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia*) on the action which is being taken by the Foreign Office and the Home Office to carry into effect the Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906, the Committee find that they have no recommendation to make.

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*For the correspondence, see Appendix VI, Part 4, in Cmd. 1988.

C 62896

APPENDIX II.

Committee on the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides.

(A.)

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE ABOVE COMMITTEE, HELD IN THE ROOM OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, COLONIAL OFFICE, S.W., ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1923, AT 5 P.M.

Present:

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. STANLEY M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The following were also present:

Sir ROBERT GARRAN, K.C.M.G., Solicitor-General, Commonwealth of Australia.

Sir J. MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. R. A. C. SPERLING, C.M.G., Foreign Office.

Mr. J. F. N. GREEN, Colonial Office.

Mr. N. E. ARCHER
Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G. } *Joint Secretaries.*

The Duke of Devonshire, in opening the discussion, said that the position of affairs in the New Hebrides was set out in the despatch to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of the 25th June, 1923, a printed copy of which had been circulated to members of the Committee. Since that date, though the new Protocol had been proclaimed on the 1st July, the position in the group had not improved. The President of the Joint Court had not yet left Spain, and, although the Public Prosecutor had reopened the Court on the 26th June, the resignation in September of the Registrar, who was acting as Public Prosecutor, had left the Court unable to function, owing to the lack of either a Public Prosecutor or a Native Advocate.

The preponderance of French recruitment continued, whilst British trade was handicapped by the lack of sufficiently frequent means of communication under the British flag.

The fall in the franc had made the position of British officers paid from Condominium funds extremely difficult, and the question of some assistance to them, at the expense of Imperial funds, was receiving consideration. In short, the position of the Condominium was very unsatisfactory. He enquired whether any other recent information had been received in the Foreign Office.

Mr. Sperling stated that he had no new facts of importance to communicate, but that the Committee might be interested to know that a reply had just been received from the French Government to our proposals regarding the appointment of a new Native Advocate, which were put forward just over three months ago. This reply opposed our suggestion for a certain extension of the Native Advocate's functions, but agreed to a joint approach to the Belgian Government with a view to a new appointment.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62897

Mr. Bruce said that it seemed that the situation in the New Hebrides was getting worse every day, and that a continuation of this state of affairs was most undesirable. It appeared to him that something definite must be done. In regard to the proposals made in the Secretary of State's despatch, he wished to know whether His Majesty's Government had any particular island in the Eastern Pacific in view as part of an exchange.

Mr. Massey stated that the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand would oppose any exchange on these lines.

Mr. Bruce agreed as to the certainty of opposition by both the Presbyterian and the Anglican Churches to anything of this nature, but he felt that the British Government's reputation would be even more adversely affected in these influential circles if nothing were done. As it was obvious that France would not agree to ceding the group, he considered that it was necessary to fall back on partition or on some other alternative. He was afraid that there would be difficulties in bringing about a satisfactory partition. He thought that on the whole it might be best to adopt a course not mentioned in the Secretary of State's despatch; that was, to invoke the mandatory principle, and for the League of Nations to give a Mandate for the islands to France. He was of the opinion that the Churches could hardly object if the group were put under the League of Nations, as opposed to its being merely handed over to France. The islands were of no value; they only entailed responsibility and expense, and he would be disposed to agree to any arrangement to which the religious bodies would not object too strongly.

Mr. Massey said that he would be prepared to accept partition as the lesser of two evils. He had been repeatedly urged by the Presbyterian Church authorities and others to endeavour to get some improvement brought about at the Imperial Conferences.

The Duke of Devonshire pointed out that a recent deputation of missionaries, introduced to him by the Bishop of Melanesia, had not seemed to be altogether opposed to partition in some form.

Mr. Amery said that the Admiralty had in view as part of an exchange some island or islands in the Marquesas or Society Groups, such as Manga Reva or Bora-Bora. The groups were of no use to the French, and their financial position was increasingly precarious. He thought, therefore, that there might be a possibility of cession of some of these by France as part of an exchange in connection with the New Hebrides. The Admiralty, however, did not wish to lay stress on the necessity for obtaining any of these islands, since, in the event of war, one or more of them would certainly be used by the Navy, irrespective of an exchange. As to the partition of the New Hebrides, the Admiralty would favour the inclusion of Santo in our share, on account of its good harbour.

He thought that the best solution of the problem would be by means of an extension of Mr. Bruce's proposal, to comprise partition as well as the mandatory principle: that was to say, that there should be partition under two mandates. If necessary, pressure should be brought to bear on France to induce her to consent to some such arrangement.

Sir J. Masterton Smith pointed out that the mandatory principle might possibly entail trouble with Japan.

Mr. Sperling was of the opinion that there might be technical difficulties in the issue of a mandate, and that, if the French Government were to invoke these objections, the League of Nations would be unable to proceed in the matter. The question in this respect was affected by the fact that no sovereignty existed in the Group, which belonged neither to France nor to Great Britain. He thought that the French Government would only agree to the mandatory principle if the mandate were given to them for the whole Group, since they seemed to be quite satisfied with the present position.

Mr. Green pointed out that the natives were under the joint protection of the two Powers, which exercised full jurisdiction, so that clearly their combined rights were complete, and that these

C 62898

should be sufficient to satisfy the League if a joint request were made for the issue of a mandate or mandates.

It was finally agreed that endeavour should be made to terminate the Condominium, and that, as a first step, it should be proposed to the French Government that a joint approach should be made to the League of Nations with a view to partition under two mandates, and that, in any subsequent negotiations, His Majesty's Government should bear in mind the possibility of securing the cession of a harbour in the Eastern Pacific as part of the exchange.

The Duke of Devonshire stated that he would have a resolution drafted on these lines and would circulate it to members of the Committee for their concurrence.

Colonial Office, October 20, 1923.

(B.)

RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE CONFERENCE.

THAT it is desirable, in order to put an end to the increasing difficulties due to the New Hebrides Condominium, that as soon as opportunity offers fresh negotiations should be opened with the French Government. These negotiations should in the first instance take the form of a proposal that the British and French Governments should jointly approach the League of Nations with a view to a partition of the islands between the British Empire and France under two separate mandates.

During the negotiations with the French Government the possibility of securing the cession of a harbour in the Eastern Pacific as part of a settlement should not be overlooked.

Colonial Office, October 20, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62899

APPENDIX III.

Committee on the Position of the Dominions and India in relation to the Signature of Treaties and the Question of Territorial Waters.

CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING OF THE ABOVE COMMITTEE, HELD IN THE ROOM OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W., ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1923, AT 5 P.M.

Present:

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*in the Chair*).

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

VISCOUNT WOLMER, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade.

Vice-Admiral Sir ROGER J. B. KEYES, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral F. C. LEARMONTH, C.B., Hydrographer to the Navy, Admiralty.

Sir JOHN S. RISLEY, K.C.M.G., C.B., K.C., Legal Adviser, Colonial Office.

Mr. H. G. MAURICE, C.B., Fisheries Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Mr. P. J. ROSE, Assistant Under-Secretary, Scottish Office.

Mr. M. SHEARMAN, O.B.E., Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office.

Mr. G. E. BAKER, Assistant Secretary, Mercantile Marine Department, Board of Trade.

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G., Deputy-Secretary of the Imperial Conference.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

Commodore WALTER HOSE, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.

Sir ROBERT R. GARRAN, K.C.M.G., Solicitor-General and Parliamentary Draftsman, Commonwealth of Australia (also representing New Zealand).

The Hon. N. J. DE WET, K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.

Mr. O. ESMONDE, Irish Free State.

Mr. P. MCGILLIGAN, Irish Free State.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Mr. C. W. DIXON
Mr. F. E. F. ADAM
Dr. O. D. SKELTON
} *Joint Secretaries.*

CONCLUSIONS.

THE Committee endorsed the following Resolutions of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Limits of Territorial Waters, as interpreted in the Report and Memorandum of that Committee (E/64 Revised), and recommends them for acceptance by the Governments of the British Empire so that in negotiations with foreign Governments or at any International Conference where the question of territorial waters is discussed they may be put forward as embodying the policy of the Empire:—

"*Resolution* 1.

"It is essential that the general limit of territorial waters should be fixed at a distance of 3 miles from low-water mark.

C 62900

"*Resolution* 2.

"The limit of territorial waters should be the same for the purposes of belligerency, neutrality, customs, fisheries, control of vessels, and all other purposes.

"*Resolution* 3.

"The limit of territorial waters should, in the case of bays, whose width at the entrance does not exceed 6 miles, be 3 miles to seaward of a straight line drawn across the entrance.

"Similar territorial rights may, in addition, be admitted in respect of a certain number of larger bays or inlets, to be known as territorial inlets, which should be specifically enumerated and geographically defined.

"*Resolution* 4.

"The coast-line from the low-water mark of which the 3-miles limit of territorial waters should be measured is that of the mainland and also that of all islands. The word "island" covers all portions of territory permanently above high water in normal circumstances and capable of use or habitation."

It was understood that the application of Resolution 3 would be subject to the provisions of any existing International Agreements and to the considerations in regard to fisheries set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Inter-Departmental Committee's Memorandum.

It was further understood that the Governments represented at the Conference would be asked to draw up schedules of territorial inlets referred to in paragraph 17 of the Inter-Departmental Committee's Memorandum; these could be considered at the next Imperial Conference, or, in the event of an International Conference on Territorial Waters being held before the next Imperial Conference meets, by the representatives of the various parts of the Empire at that Conference.

Colonial Office, October 23, 1923.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C62901

APPENDIX IV.

Committee on the Position of the Dominions and India in relation to the Signature of Treaties and the Question of Territorial Waters.

CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING OF THE ABOVE COMMITTEE HELD IN THE ROOM OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W., ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1923, AT 11·15 A.M.

Present:

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*in the Chair*).

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Sir J. E. MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

VISCOUNT WOLMER, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade.

Sir C. J. B. HURST, K.C.B., K.C., Legal Adviser, Foreign Office.

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G., Deputy-Secretary of the Imperial Conference.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

Commodore WALTER HOSE, C.B.E., R.C.N., Director of Naval Service, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Sir ROBERT R. GARRAN, K.C.M.G., Solicitor-General and Parliamentary Draftsman, Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G., Secretary, New Zealand Delegation.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

Mr. O. ESMONDE, Irish Free State.

Mr. P. MCGILLIGAN, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

Sir A. HIRTZEL, K.C.B., Deputy Under-Secretary of State, India Office (representing the Secretary of State for India).

The following were also present during the discussion of Conclusion 2:—

The Right Hon. Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME, K.B.E., M.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

Lieutenant-Colonel the Right Hon. Sir R. A. SANDERS, Bart., M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Mr. H. G. MAURICE, C.B., Fisheries Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Vice-Admiral Sir ROGER J. B. KEYES, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiralty.

Vice-Admiral F. C. LEARMONTH, C.B., Hydrographer to the Navy, Admiralty.

Sir G. E. A. GRINDLE, K.C.M.G., C.B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. P. J. ROSE, Assistant Under-Secretary, Scottish Office (representing the Secretary for Scotland).

Mr. C. W. DIXON
Mr. F. E. F. ADAM
Dr. O. D. SKELTON } *Joint Secretaries.*

C 62902

POSITION OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA IN RELATION TO THE SIGNATURE OF TREATIES.

THE Committee decided to recommend for adoption by the Imperial Conference the Draft Resolution relative to the Negotiation, Signature and Ratification of International Agreements, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of Part I 1 (c) to read as follows:—

"In the case of treaties negotiated at International Conferences, where there is a British Empire Delegation, on which, in accordance with the now established practice, the Dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should also be utilised to attain this object."

The complete Resolution in its amended form appears in Annexe (A) attached.*

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to circulate to the Committee a short historical memorandum on the position of the Dominions in relation to the signature of treaties (see Annexe B) attached).

PROHIBITION AND LIQUOR SMUGGLING IN THE UNITED STATES.

2. The Committee recognised the importance of no action being taken which might tend to impair the principle that the 3-mile limit should be the general limit of territorial jurisdiction. At the same time the sense of the Committee was that it was desirable, first on moral grounds, secondly with a view to maintaining good relations with the United States of America, and, thirdly, in the interests of British commerce, that action should be taken, if practicable, to assist the United States Government in suppressing the smuggling of liquor by British vessels.

It was noted that the Inter-Departmental Committee, which had examined the question in Great Britain, had been unable to recommend any satisfactory method of assistance apart from an agreement with the United States Government on the general lines of Mr. Hughes' proposal. It was felt, however, that the form of Treaty suggested by Mr. Hughes was not wholly suitable, and that it would be better to frame a counter-proposal on similar lines designed to obtain from the United States Government a formal affirmation of the general principle of the 3-mile limit and to ensure their support of that principle at any International Conference on Territorial Waters.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accordingly proposed that the British Government should take the initiative in suggesting to the United States Government an exchange of notes by which the principle of the 3-mile limit of territorial waters would be affirmed on both sides; at the same time it would be arranged on the one hand that no objection would be raised, as a special concession for a limited period, to the search of British vessels engaged in liquor smuggling outside the territorial waters of the United States, and on the other hand that British vessels should be permitted to carry liquor under seal in the territorial waters of the United States.

It was agreed that a draft note to the United States Government should be prepared on these lines and circulated to the members of the Committee for consideration.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
October 27, 1923.

* Also reproduced in Section IX of the published Report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987.)

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 38 15 16 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62903

ANNEXE (A).

Draft Resolution Relative to the Negotiation, Signature and Ratification of International Agreements.

THE Conference recommends for the acceptance of the Governments of the Empire represented that the following procedure should be observed in the negotiation, signature and ratification of international agreements.

The word "treaty" is used in the sense of an agreement which, in accordance with the normal practice of diplomacy, would take the form of a treaty between Heads of States, signed by plenipotentiaries provided with Full Powers issued by the Heads of the States, and authorising the holders to conclude a treaty.

I.

1. *Negotiation.*

(*a.*) It is desirable that no treaty should be negotiated by any of the Governments of the Empire without due consideration of its possible effect on other parts of the Empire, or, if circumstances so demand, on the Empire as a whole.

(*b.*) Before negotiations are opened with the intention of concluding a treaty, steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other Governments of the Empire likely to be interested are informed, so that, if any such Government considers that its interests would be affected, it may have an opportunity of expressing its views, or, when its interests are intimately involved, of participating in the negotiations.

(*c.*) In all cases where more than one of the Governments of the Empire participates in the negotiations, there should be the fullest possible exchange of views between those Governments before and during the negotiations. In the case of treaties negotiated at International Conferences, where there is a British Empire Delegation, on which, in accordance with the now established practice, the Dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should also be utilised to attain this object.

(*d.*) Steps should be taken to ensure that those Governments of the Empire, whose representatives are not participating in the negotiations, should, during their progress, be kept informed in regard to any points arising in which they may be interested.

2. *Signature.*

(*a.*) Bilateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire only should be signed by a representative of the Government of that part. The Full Power issued to such representative should indicate the part of the Empire in respect of which the obligations are to be undertaken, and the preamble and text of the treaty should be so worded as to make its scope clear.

(*b.*) Where a bilateral treaty imposes obligations on more than one part of the Empire, the treaty should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the Governments concerned.

(*c.*) As regards treaties negotiated at International Conferences, the existing practice of signature by plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the Governments of the Empire represented at the Conference should be continued, and the Full Powers should be in the form employed at Paris and Washington.

3. *Ratification.*

The existing practice in connection with the ratification of treaties should be maintained.

II.

Apart from treaties made between Heads of States, it is not unusual for agreements to be made between Governments. Such agreements, which are usually of a technical or administrative character, are made in the names of the signatory Governments, and signed by representatives of those Governments, who do not act under Full Powers issued by the Heads of the States; they are not ratified by the Heads of the States, though in some cases some form of acceptance or confirmation by the Governments concerned is employed. As regards agreements of this nature the existing practice should be continued, but before entering on negotiations the Governments of the Empire should consider whether the interests of any other part of the Empire may be affected, and, if so, steps should be taken to ensure that the Government of such part is informed of the proposed negotiations, in order that it may have an opportunity of expressing its views.

C 62904

ANNEXE (B).

Historical Memorandum on the Position of the Dominions in relation to the Signature of Treaties.

I.

THE history of the association of the Dominions with the negotiation of commercial and other arrangements affecting their interests goes back for several decades.

The earliest phase is found in the desire of the British Government to have the assistance of Dominion Ministers familiar with the matters dealt with.

Reference may be made to the negotiation of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 with the United States in the interests of Canada, in which the Canadian Government were consulted in the fullest manner possible.

In 1865 the British Government expressed their readiness to accept Canadian assistance in negotiating a Treaty of Reciprocity with the United States.

In 1871 Sir John Macdonald was one of the plenipotentiaries engaged in the negotiations for the Treaty of Washington, while Sir Alexander Galt and Sir Charles Tupper on several occasions conducted negotiations on behalf of Canada for commercial treaties with Spain and France.

It was at first proposed in such cases that the Canadian representative should be treated as being engaged in informal negotiations, and that he should not actually sign the convention when concluded; but this principle was abandoned almost immediately, and as early as 1884 it was contemplated that, had the negotiations with Spain, then on foot, resulted in an agreement, Sir Charles Tupper, High Commissioner for Canada, should have signed the agreement together with His Majesty's Representative at Madrid.

In 1888 Sir Charles Tupper actually signed the Treaty of Washington, which was, however, not approved by the United States Senate, and therefore was never ratified.

In 1892 Canadian Ministers, with Sir J. Pauncefote, then Ambassador at Washington, conducted negotiations with the United States Secretary of State, but no settlement resulted.

In 1893 Sir Charles Tupper negotiated a Treaty with France, which was finally accepted by both the French and British Governments. Sir Charles signed the treaty along with His Majesty's Representative at Paris.

In 1890 and 1902 Sir Robert Bond negotiated, on behalf of Newfoundland, through the Ambassador at Washington, with the United States Secretary of State. The former negotiation resulted in a convention, which was not proceeded with owing to the opposition of the Canadian Government on the ground that it was hostile to the interests of Canada, but the negotiation of 1902 terminated in the signature of a convention which, however, never came into operation owing to the objections of the United States Government.

In 1898 and 1899 a joint commission was appointed to deal with certain questions at issue with the United States of America, and elaborate negotiations took place on the subject of trade reciprocity between Canada and Newfoundland and the United States, among other matters, the negotiators being, with one exception, representatives of Canada and Newfoundland.

In 1907 Mr. Fielding and Mr. Brodeur, on behalf of the Canadian Government, negotiated a separate treaty with France, which received the approval of the British Government, and which,

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62905

as supplemented by a convention of 1909, was ratified on behalf of both Governments.

Canada also concluded arrangements with Germany and with Italy regarding commercial matters. These arrangements were negotiated in Canada with the German consul-general at Montreal and with the Royal Consul of Italy. In both cases the negotiations resulted not in a formal treaty, but merely in a provisional agreement, made in consideration of the intention to conclude a formal treaty through the ordinary channel. The Canadian Government received the approval of the British Government for the conclusion of these conventions, and the Canadian Government recognised that if any more formal arrangements were desired they should take the form of a treaty, and be negotiated by plenipotentiaries duly appointed.

In the case of the United States, in order to secure the grant of the minimum Payne tariff, the Canadian Government carried on in 1910, with the knowledge and approval of the British Government, negotiations with the United States Government. No treaty resulted from these negotiations, but the United States Government accorded the minimum tariff on the understanding that Canada would give concessions on certain articles, and the Canadian Government gave the concessions, not by special grant to the United States, but by lowering, by Act of Parliament, the tariff for the whole world.

In May, 1910, the Government of the United States of America expressed to Mr. Bryce, then Ambassador at Washington, their desire to carry on tariff negotiations with Canada, and asked through what channel they should do this. It was not convenient to Canadian Ministers to negotiate at the moment, but in January, 1911, two of them came to Washington and were presented by Mr. Bryce to the President. Conferences were then held between the two Ministers and the United States officials, Mr. Bryce remaining in general touch with the Canadian Ministers, and reminding them, in the course of the negotiations, "of the regard which it was right and fitting they should have to Imperial interests." The resulting agreement was not embodied in any formal treaty, the intention being that it should come into force by concurrent legislation in Canada and the United States.

In 1909, Lord Selborne, as Governor of the Transvaal, with the approval of the British Government, made an arrangement with the Governor-General of Mozambique with regard to the recruiting of labour for the Transvaal mines, railway rates, &c.

In 1921 Sir George Foster negotiated a commercial agreement with France, which was signed by His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris in conjunction with Sir G. Foster. In 1922 Canadian Ministers (Mr. Fielding and Mr. Lapointe) conducted negotiations on the subject of commercial relations with France, Italy and Spain. In the case of France, the negotiations were conducted in Paris direct with representatives of the French Government, but the British Ambassador was informed of the progress of the negotiations, and signed the treaty in conjunction with the Canadian Ministers. In the case of Italy, negotiations were carried on direct with Italian representatives in London, but the treaty was submitted in draft to the British Government (who suggested certain modifications in its form), and was finally signed by Lord Curzon in conjunction with the Canadian Ministers. In the case of Spain, Mr. Fielding conducted negotiations with the Spanish Ambassador in London, but there was no definite outcome.

As regards matters other than commercial relations, the question has so far arisen chiefly in connection with matters affecting Canada and the United States of America. The special relations between Canada and the United States of America are best illustrated by the procedure adopted for dealing with questions affecting boundary waters. By Article 7 of the Treaty of the 11th January, 1909 (Treaty Series, 1910, No. 23), the High Contracting Parties agreed to establish and maintain an International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada, composed of six commissioners, three on the part of the United States, appointed by the President, and three on the part of the United Kingdom, appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation of the Governor in Council of the Dominion of Canada. This commission was to have jurisdiction over all cases involving the use or obstruction or diversion of boundary waters

C 62906

(Article 8), and it was further agreed that any other questions or matters of difference involving the rights, obligations or interests of either party in relation to the other or the inhabitants of the other, along the frontier, should be referred from time to time to the commission for examination and report at the request of either the United States Government or the Canadian Government (Article 9), and that any questions or matters of difference might be referred for decision to the commission by the consent of the two parties (Article 10).

The method of dealing with fishery questions affecting Canada and the United States of America has followed the same principle. In 1918, a Fisheries Conference, composed of commissioners representing the Canadian and United States Governments respectively, was appointed for the purpose of considering the outstanding questions involving the fisheries of the United States and Canada and of reaching a basis for the settlement of these questions if possible. The recommendations of the Conference led to the opening of formal negotiations in 1919, for which a Full Power was issued to Sir D. Hazen, who had acted as chief Canadian representative at the Conference. These negotiations led to the drafting of two treaties, one relating to the Sockeye salmon fisheries and the other to fisheries generally (including the halibut fishery). The former was signed by His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington in conjunction with Sir D. Hazen, but the United States Government were unable to sign the second. There was, however, no difference of opinion as to the provisions of the second treaty dealing with the halibut fishery, and as a result renewed negotiations were conducted through the Ambassador at Washington, which led to the signature early in 1923 of the treaty dealing specifically with this fishery.

In accordance with the request of the Canadian Government, a Full Power was issued to the Canadian Minister of Marine to sign the treaty on behalf of His Majesty, and the Canadian Government urged that, as this was a treaty of concern solely for Canada and the United States and did not affect in any particular any Imperial interests, it should be signed by the Canadian plenipotentiary only. Action was taken accordingly. Subsequently, difficulty arose in connection with the Halibut Treaty owing to the action of the United States Senate in making its approval of the treaty conditional on the understanding that "none of the nationals and inhabitants and vessels and boats of any other part of Great Britain" (subsequently interpreted by the United States Secretary of State as meaning the British Empire) "shall engage in halibut fishing, contrary to its provisions." The Canadian Government urged the withdrawal of this reservation on the ground that the legislation to be enacted, both in Canada and in the United States, would prohibit the citizens of *every* country from operation from a Canadian or United States port, and that the halibut fishery can only be carried on from the ports of one or other of these countries. Negotiations are proceeding and it is understood that the United States Government is likely to take steps to meet the Canadian point of view.

It may also be mentioned that last year the Canadian Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence visited Washington and discussed with the President of the United States and the United States Secretary of State the question of the maintenance of armed vessels on the great lakes. As a result a treaty was drafted to replace the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, and submitted by the Canadian Government to the British Government for their comments and suggestions. The British Government offered certain comments on the terms of the draft treaty, which was modified in accordance with their suggestions and submitted to the United States Government as modified. The negotiations with the United States Government have not yet reached a definite conclusion.

There have in the past been certain cases in which Dominion Governments have made arrangements with foreign Governments not embodied in formal treaties. Thus in 1907 Mr. Lemieux, the Canadian Minister of Labour, negotiated with the Japanese Government an arrangement on the subject of the restriction of Japanese immigration into Canada, which was embodied in an exchange of letters between Mr. Lemieux and the Japanese Minister for Foreign

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62907

Affairs (the negotiations were carried on with the assistance of His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio). Another instance is the Reciprocity Agreement between Canada and the United States of 1911, referred to above.

II.

Multilateral Conventions affecting all the Dominions are, as a rule, the result of international conferences or congresses, and the main question arising is that of separate representation of the Dominions at such conferences. It will be convenient to treat separately (*a*) conventions of a technical character and (*b*) conventions of a political character :—

(*a.*) The status of the Dominions as separate countries entitled to send their own representatives to international congresses has long been recognised in the case of the Universal Postal Union. The representatives of the Dominions who attend the periodical congresses of the Union receive their powers from their own Governments, and ratification of conventions concluded by such congresses is effected by formal documents issued by the various Governments represented at the congress and not by means of a ratification by His Majesty.

In connection with the Radiotelegraph Conference of 1912, the question was raised whether, in view of the fact that under the Convention of 1906 this was to be a conference of "plenipotentiaries," the Dominion representatives should not receive Full Powers from His Majesty, and such Full Powers were issued authorising the Dominion representatives to sign for their respective Dominions. A similar procedure was followed in the case of the Conference on Safety of Life at Sea in 1914.

(*b.*) The first important political conference at which there was a British Empire delegation on which the Dominions were separately represented was the Peace Conference of 1919. The regulations governing the work of this conference provided for separate representation of the British Dominions and India, and the Treaty of Versailles, under which Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and India became (in addition to the British Empire) original members of the League of Nations, was signed not only by representatives of the British Government, but also for these four Dominions and India by plenipotentiaries representing them. A similar procedure was followed in connection with the other Treaties of Peace negotiated in 1919 and 1920 and a number of other treaties forming part of the peace settlement, even though no representatives of the Dominions and India had taken any part in their preparation.

The Dominion members of the League of Nations have since sent their delegates to the Assembly of the League, and representatives of those Dominions have signed certain international engagements negotiated under the auspices of the League (*e.g.*, the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children and the protocols embodying amendments to the Covenant). The Dominions were also represented at the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–22 (with the exception of the Union of South Africa), and at the Conference at Genoa in 1922.

It is thus the usual practice, in cases where there is a British Empire delegation at International Conferences on which the Dominions are now separately represented, for any treaties negotiated at the conferences to be signed separately by the Dominion representatives. Cases may, however, arise in which—

1. Some of the Dominions are represented, but others are not; or
2. The Dominions are not represented at all.

As indicated above, the first situation arose in connection with the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–22, where the Union of South Africa was not represented. As a result of telegraphic correspondence between Mr. Lloyd George and General Smuts, Lord Balfour signed the various treaties as a plenipotentiary for the Union.

The most recent instance in which the second situation arose was in connection with the Lausanne Conference. In this case

C 62908

it was arranged that the British Empire should be represented at the Conference by two plenipotentiaries only—Lord Curzon and Sir H Rumbold, and the treaties negotiated there were signed, on the British side, only by Sir H. Rumbold, who had been the sole representative of His Majesty's Government in the later stages of the negotiations.

III.

In the case of certain treaties, no question of signature on behalf of the Dominions arises, as it is the practice to insert in the treaty a provision by which its stipulations will not apply to any of the Dominions, unless notice of accession is given. Such are extradition treaties, general commercial treaties negotiated by His Majesty's Government, and international conventions of a technical character negotiated otherwise than at international conferences.

Extradition treaties are now drawn in a form which safeguards the position of the Dominion Governments. As regards commercial treaties, these are based upon a model draft which has been communicated to the Dominion Governments. It is also the practice of the British Government in all important cases to inform the Dominion Governments of the negotiations with the foreign country concerned, and to ascertain whether there are any Dominion interests which it is desirable to keep in view in the negotiations.

There are also certain classes of international engagements, *e.g.*, arbitration agreements, which apply to the whole of the Empire, but are not signed separately on behalf of the Dominions, though it is the practice to consult the Dominion Governments as to their inclusion within the scope of the arrangements. In some cases, *e.g.*, agreements relating to the tonnage measurement of merchant-ships, such instruments provide for separate termination in respect of the Dominions.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1923.

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62809

SECRET.

E. 15th Meeting (1923).

54

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1923, AT 5 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Hon. G. P. GRAHAM, Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Senator the Hon. R. V. WILSON, Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Professor JOHN MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Colonel His Highness the MAHARAJAH OF ALWAR, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

General the EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Major-General Sir FABIAN WARE, K.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., Vice-Chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission. (For Item 4.)

Major C. K. PHILLIPS, O.B.E., Land and Legal Adviser, Imperial War Graves Commission. (For Item 4.)

Vice-Admiral Sir ALLAN F. EVERETT, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., First Naval Member of the Royal Australian Naval Board.

Commodore A. G. HOTHAM, C.M.G., R.N., Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Delegation. (For Item 1.)

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 15 16 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62910

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B. (*Secretary*).
Mr. E. J. Harding, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.
Sir Robert R. Garran, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.
Captain E. F. C. Lane, C.M.G.

Canada.
Dr. O. D. Skelton.

New Zealand.
Mr. F. D. Thomson, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.
Mr. P. McGilligan.

India.
Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams, C.B.E.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE RESOLUTIONS.

Mr. Baldwin: Do you wish to say anything about the Resolutions on Imperial Defence, Lord Salisbury?* You were responsible for initiating them.

Lord Salisbury: I have nothing to say to the Conference about the Resolutions, except that they have been the subject of a good deal of very careful thought and conversation amongst several of us. The Prime Ministers with whom I have had the pleasure of dealing in this matter have treated me with the greatest consideration, and there has been a general desire to come to an arrangement. Mr. Bruce has had a good deal to do with the actual draft, although it has been modified to suit various ideas. I hope it will be accepted. I think it is moderate. But I ought to say that, in respect of one paragraph which was agreed to rather late, namely, paragraph (*e*), Mr. Mackenzie King would like the words rather differently drafted, and I have had the new draft that he proposes hastily typed, and it is now being circulated round the table.† I cannot pretend that I like it quite so well as the other draft, but, so far as I am concerned, as representing the British Government, I am quite prepared to accept it, although, as Mr. Mackenzie King knows, there are one or two words which I should much prefer to be differently expressed. But with that exception I do not think I have anything to say about these Resolutions, unless anybody wishes to ask me a question about them.

Mr. Amery: I should like to ask one question. I do not know whether it is accidental, but the reference to the interchange of personnel, which is a thing we have encouraged, both in Military and Naval matters, has been left out; I do not know whether it has slipped out in the redrafting.

Mr. Mackenzie King: That was one of the phrases which I thought it would be better to take out. Our Government would, I think, be perfectly willing to arrange for an interchange of personnel, but I am inclined to think that the words might be misunderstood or misinterpreted if they were inserted in the Resolution, and might convey a wrong impression. That was my idea. I want to avoid anything going into the Resolution which might be misunderstood. That is all.

Mr. Massey: Do I understand you to say, Mr. Mackenzie King, that there is no objection to the interchange of personnel?

Mr. Mackenzie King: It is being done at the present time.

Mr. Massey: Yes, but you do not like it being circulated in a Resolution?

Mr. Graham: We have been doing it through our Department.

* For the Resolutions as circulated, see Appendix I.
† See Appendix II.

C 62911

Lord Salisbury: I think it would have been better to have it in.

General Smuts: That is what they call doing good by stealth!

Mr. Baldwin: Then I take it that the Resolutions are approved.

(Agreed.*)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

As to the second item, it is proposed to postpone consideration of the draft paragraphs of the Report†; there are one or two points which have to be examined and may have to be altered. It would be better perhaps if that matter were examined to-morrow or Thursday.

UNITED STATES AND LIQUOR TRAFFIC.

The next item on the Agenda is "The United States and Liquor Traffic." Lord Curzon has a statement to make on that.

Lord Curzon: The question of Liquor Traffic and the United States was, as the Conference will remember, referred to a Committee over which I had the honour to preside.‡ We went carefully into the considerations affecting the case and we came unanimously to the conclusion that it was desirable, on grounds both of equity and of expediency, to go as far as we could in meeting the American case. The spectacle of this "rum-running," as it is called, in which British ships are largely engaged and in which great profits are being made by British firms, is one that is far from pleasant to contemplate, and there arise—and perhaps not unnaturally arise—very different feelings in the United States. The United States Government have committed themselves (whether wisely or unwisely it is not for us to say) to a policy of prohibition. All our information is that that is a policy to which they propose to adhere; it represents the settled convictions of large masses of people, and, whether it be or be not carried out in a fair way, at any rate it is a matter of domestic policy of a great foreign State with which we have neither the right nor the power to interfere. On the other hand, the spectacle which I have described can without difficulty be presented as an attempt on the part of the shipping of another State to run counter to their settled legislation and practice. If the present position continues without any relief I cannot but think that a very delicate and disagreeable situation will be produced. Fortunately, the American Government have throughout adopted a line, apart from their actual conduct in searching ships, of conciliation and of desire to settle the matter on friendly terms with ourselves. We share that desire, and accordingly we considered at the Committee what we could do to carry it into effect.

Importance of Maintenance of Principle of Three-Mile Limit.

The principle to which we all attach supreme importance, whether we look at it from the point of view of the Admiralty or the Foreign Office, or any other Department of State, is the preservation of the 3-mile limit as the basic principle of British policy in all parts of the world, a principle which we are not only loth to compromise, but are absolutely resolved not to abandon. In these circumstances we had to consider how far we could reconcile the maintenance of that principle with some concession to the American Government in respect of search. Mr. Hughes had suggested a Treaty to us which would give the American Government the right of search up to a distance of 12 miles from the coast, and he indicated at the same time that in return for any such concession the American Government not only did not regard the concession which we might make as an exception to the principle, but were prepared themselves to reaffirm the principle.

* For the Resolutions, as adopted, see Section XII of the published Report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987).
† For the paragraphs as circulated, see Appendix III.
‡ For the proceedings at the Committee dealing with this question, see Appendix IV to the Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 INDEX
16
W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes
PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62912

Question of Reciprocal Concessions as regards Liquor Trade.

That being so, two points remained: firstly, to consider whether the actual proposal of the American Government that the right of search should be exercised up to a limit of 12 miles could safely be conceded; secondly, we should be quite sure that we got our return, the return being, of course, the right to carry liquor under seal in our ships in territorial waters. The late American Ambassador, Mr. Harvey, in his conversations with me, assured me that there would be no difficulty upon the latter point, and that a Treaty to that effect not only could be but would be passed and ratified by the Senate in America.

Necessity for Treaty.

At the meetings of our Committee, as the Premiers will remember, we had contemplated proceeding not by treaty, because we thought there would be undue formality in that process, but by an exchange of notes. To that process I would personally have preferred to adhere. But then it transpired that an exchange of notes would be quite ineffective in procuring us the counter-concession to which I have referred; that that could only be given by Treaty; that a Treaty need not go to the House of Representatives; that if, on the other hand, our policy were embodied in the form, whether of exchange of notes or otherwise, that would have to go to Congress, to the House of Representatives, there might be great difficulty and we should not secure what we desired. Accordingly it seemed better, on the whole, to proceed by Treaty, there being this further advantage that, whereas when a Treaty was first contemplated the idea was to put into the preamble a reaffirmation of the principle of the 3-mile limit, the American Ambassador told me that his Government would be quite prepared to put it into the body of the Treaty and not only to accept it on our behalf, but to affirm it on their own. There seemed to be some positive advantage in getting that affirmation expressed in that emphatic way in Treaty form. Accordingly, we, in the Foreign Office, drew up a Treaty, of merely a few clauses, affirming the principle, giving the concession and demanding the return.

Limit of Exercise of Right of Search.

There was another small point to which I alluded just now, and that was the question of determining the actual limit within which this right of search should be exercised. Upon that, as my colleagues will remember, we thought that on the whole it would be better to substitute for the suggested geographical limit of 12 miles—a distance from the coast which it is quite impossible to determine, at any rate from a flat shore, and which might give rise to controversy and friction in the future—some other formula which would suggest that the distance from the coast should be measured not by geographical miles but by time; that is to say, the time which it would take a ship to steam from the coast, the steaming capacity of a ship, say, one hour's distance from the shore. That is a matter, of course, which we should have to discuss with the American Government.

Progress of Negotiations.

While all this was in train, we heard from the American Government that while the President took one view—and that was the view stated by his representative here, that this concession could be and would be given by Treaty, and that it would be passed without difficulty by the Senate—there were some in the United States who took the opposite view, and said that it was conceivable that the Supreme Court might regard this as an attempt to override their jurisdiction and therefore as contrary to the Constitution of the United States. Since then a telegram has come, which has been circulated to you, from the American Government reiterating the position taken up by the President and confident as to the issue; but we cannot afford to make our concession without being certain that we shall get our return. It would be most futile and foolish to make this concession and suddenly to find out that a decision of the Supreme Court in the United States rendered the counter-concession invalid; we should have given away everything for nothing. Accordingly, what we are

C 62913

doing is to send a despatch to the United States Government, which will go immediately, saying that we hear that these doubts have been raised—it is not for us to solve them; it is a matter for the United States Government—and stating quite plainly that, anxious as we are to settle on the lines that I have laid down, we cannot do so until we are absolutely assured that we shall be safe. That is the present position. It will involve a little delay; but I hope it will not lead to any breakdown of the negotiations. The suggestion made, obviously to the interest of both parties, reveals, I think, such a conciliatory mood upon our part that I cannot conceive that any party in America would voluntarily do anything to jeopardise the agreement being arrived at.

That is the position, and I am afraid the Conference will have separated before the solution is reached; but I have already the approval of the Prime Ministers given at the Committee to this plan, and the only reason for bringing it here to-day is that the report of the Committee ought to receive, as I hope it will receive, the general approval of the Conference.

Mr. Baldwin: Does anyone wish to say anything on that?

(Agreed.)

EXTENSION OF CHARTER OF IMPERIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION.

The next item relates to the Imperial War Graves Commission. Members of the Conference will recollect that I circulated a paper for their consideration, which, I believe, has met with approval, to the effect that powers should be taken to enable the War Graves Commission to take under their care graveyards in which lie British soldiers and sailors who have fallen in wars other than the Great War. I do not know whether anyone desires to say anything about that?

Mr. Massey: I do not think that there could be any possible objection to that.

Sir Maurice Hankey: There is just a verbal alteration which is a Drafting Committee point. In the second paragraph on the first page the draft says: "This proposal was submitted to the Representatives of the Dominions and India and the Colonies and Protectorates." It would be better to say: "the Governments concerned," because the appropriate Departments of the British Government were also consulted and have all indicated their acceptance. I should prefer, instead of "all of whom have indicated their acceptance of the proposal as outlined in the following memorandum:—" the following wording: "all of whom have indicated their acceptance of the proposal of an amendment of the Charter by the addition of a Clause to the following effect:—" A further alteration would also be required on the second page. Instead of reading as drafted, the concluding paragraph would read: "Accordingly the necessary steps will be taken forthwith to incorporate a Clause on the above lines in a further Supplementary Charter for submission to His Majesty the King." That, again, is a purely technical point.

Mr. Massey: This brings in the soldiers who fell in the Crimean War?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, the Crimea graves come in. I take this as approved.*

PUBLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS.

The next two items, Status of High Commissioners and Publication of Correspondence, are merely to report what has been done at the meetings of the Committee appointed to consider the two matters

* For the paper referred to by Mr. Baldwin, as amended in accordance with the above discussion, see Section XVIII of the published Report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987).

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62914

in question.* Would you like to say anything, Mr. Mackenzie King? I believe those are subjects which you brought up.

Mr. Mackenzie King: I have nothing to add on these subjects.

Mr. Baldwin: I have read them and I think that is purely formal at this stage.

(Agreed.)

CONTRIBUTION OF INDIA TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The same is true of Item 6, India's Contribution to the League of Nations. That, again, was referred to a Committee, and the Conference will take note of what was done at that Committee.† The matter was raised again at Geneva, I understand.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: No. We were not allowed to move it at Geneva. The whole substance of the matter is that I am not agreed, and I reserved that the Government of India would raise this question at the next meeting of the League of Nations.

Mr. Baldwin: That is what I understood, that they would raise it at the League.

Duke of Devonshire: The Committee were sorry to be unable to meet Sir Tej's views, but that was the only result we were able to arrive at.

Lord Peel: I ought to explain that it was rather suggested to us that we should raise the question at this Conference, because India did not wish to take up an attitude different from that of the other Members of the League on it; but India is so severely, and I think unfairly, hit, so heavily weighted, by the particular system according to which the population is counted as a factor, that I am afraid we have no other course than to raise it at Geneva.

ADDRESS TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

Mr. Baldwin: Item 7—Draft Address to His Majesty the King. It is usual to present an Address to the King at the conclusion of the work of the Conference. A Draft Address is submitted to-day for approval, and the formal resolution will be taken at the last meeting. We have to appoint a Drafting Committee for the Report, and I do not think it would be a bad thing for the Drafting Committee to look through the Draft Address before Thursday.

(This was agreed to.‡)

DRAFTING COMMITTEE FOR REPORT.

We might now proceed to appoint the Drafting Committee for the Report—Item 8. The names suggested are the following:—

Duke of Devonshire.
The Defence Ministers, if they desire.
Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, or their representatives.
Representative of the Irish Free State.
Secretary of State for India.

Sir Maurice Hankey: Would 4·30 P.M. to-morrow be a suitable time for a meeting of the Drafting Committee? That is the earliest time to-morrow that we can arrange, and we could circulate a Draft before that hour. I think we could get a Draft as a basis of discussion, and if there is time it could be examined in the Delegations beforehand.

Mr. Baldwin: That would be a very good thing if we could manage it.

(It was agreed that a Drafting Committee, composed as proposed by the Prime Minister, should be appointed and should meet at 4·30 P.M. on the following day.)

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
November 6, 1923.

* For the Report of the Committee, see Appendix IV. (N.B.—This Report also contains a summary of a discussion on the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.)

† For the Minutes and Report of the Committee, see Appendix V.

‡ For the Address as completed, see Section XIX of the published Report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987).

C 62915

APPENDIX I.

Imperial Defence.

Draft Resolutions as Circulated.

1. The Conference affirms that it is necessary to provide for the adequate defence of the territories and trade of the several countries comprising the British Empire.

2. In this connexion the Conference expressly recognises that it is for the Parliaments of the several parts of the Empire, upon the recommendations of their respective Governments, to decide the nature and extent of any action which should be taken by them.

3. Subject to this provision, the Conference suggests the following as guiding principles:—

(*a.*) The primary responsibility of each portion of the Empire represented at the Conference for its own local defence.

(*b.*) Adequate provision for safeguarding the maritime communications of the several parts of the Empire and the routes and waterways along and through which their armed forces and trade pass.

(*c.*) The provision of Naval bases and facilities for repair and fuel so as to ensure the mobility of the fleets.

(*d.*) The desirability of the maintenance of a minimum standard of Naval strength, namely, equality with the Naval strength of any foreign Power in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Treaty on Limitation of Armament as approved by Great Britain, all the self-governing Dominions and India.

(*e.*) The desirability of the development of the Air Forces of the Empire upon such lines as will make it possible, by means of the regular interchange of personnel, the adoption of a common system of organisation, administration and training, and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment and stores, for each part of the Empire to take such share as it desires in Imperial defence with the least possible delay and the greatest efficiency.

4. In the application of these principles to the several parts of the Empire concerned the Conference takes note of:—

(*a.*) The deep interest of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and India, in the provision of a Naval Base at Singapore, as essential for ensuring the mobility necessary to provide for the security of the territories and trade of the Empire in Eastern Waters.

(*b.*) The necessity for the maintenance of safe passage along the great route to the East through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

(*c.*) The necessity for the maintenance by Great Britain of a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength to give adequate protection against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of her shores.

5. The Conference, while deeply concerned for the paramount importance of providing for the safety and integrity of all parts of the Empire, earnestly desires, so far as is consistent with this consideration, the further limitation of armaments, and trusts that no opportunity may be lost to promote this object.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62916

APPENDIX II.

Imperial Defence.

Redraft of Resolution 3 (e), as proposed by Prime Minister of Canada.

(*e.*) The desirability of the development of the Air Forces in the several countries of the Empire upon such lines as will make it possible, by means of the adoption, as far as practicable, of a common system of organisation and training and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment, and stores (with the exception of the type of aircraft), for each part of the Empire as it may determine to co-operate with other parts with the least possible delay and the greatest efficiency.

APPENDIX III.

Foreign Relations.

Draft Paragraphs for Report as Circulated.

The discussions on foreign relations were commenced on the 5th October by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who gave to the Conference a review of the general situation in every part of the world, and the most frank exposition, first, of the main problems which have confronted the Empire during the last two years, and, secondly, of those which seem most likely to arise in the near future.

The greater part of what Lord Curzon said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving orally to the representatives of the Dominions and India the inner history of the period, but it was thought advisable that extracts from those parts of his speech which related to subjects of immediate interest and importance, viz., the situation in connection with the Reparations problem and the Turkish Treaty, should be published forthwith.

This was a departure from the practice at previous Imperial Conferences, when statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been regarded as confidential throughout.

Lord Curzon's review was followed by a general discussion on foreign relations, in which Lord Robert Cecil as British representative on the Council of the League of Nations, all the Dominion Prime Ministers present, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State and the three members of the Indian delegation took part.

Frequent and detailed examination took place not only of the main features of the international situation, but of the different aspects of that situation as they developed from day to day. Nor did the Imperial Conference terminate its sittings until each subject had been carefully explored and a common understanding reached upon the main heads of foreign policy.

It was while the Conference was sitting that the President of the United States renewed the offer of the United States Government to take part in an international Conference or enquiry to investigate the European Reparation problem, and to report upon the capacity of Germany to make the payments to which she is pledged. The Conference cordially welcomed, and decided to take immediate advantage of, this overture; and communications were at once entered into with the Allied Powers to obtain their co-operation.

The Conference, after careful consideration of the policy which has been pursued, was of the opinion that the European situation could only be lifted on to the plane of a possible settlement by the co-operation of the United States of America, and that, if the scheme of common enquiry to be followed by common action were to break down, the results would be inimical both to the peace and to the economic recovery of the world.

It felt that in such an event it would be desirable for the British Government to consider very carefully the alternative of

C 62917

summoning a Conference itself in order to examine the financial and the economic problem in its widest aspect.

The Conference regarded the policy, if persevered in, of breaking up the unity of the German State as inconsistent with the Treaty obligations entered into both by Germany and the Powers, and as incompatible with the future discharge by Germany of her necessary obligations. It agreed that the strongest representations on this subject should be made to the Allied Governments, and these were accordingly made.

The Conference considered the situation in the Near and Middle East and recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey. An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension, of military anxiety and financial strain in the eastern parts of Europe; and more particularly had great relief been given to the sentiments of the Moslem subjects of the British throne in all parts of the world.

It remained to pursue a policy that would stimulate the peaceful development of the Middle East and encourage the Turkish State in the policy of reconstruction upon which it has embarked.

The Conference, so much of whose time had been occupied two years ago with the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with the future regulation of the Pacific, noted with satisfaction the results of the Washington Conference, which had added immensely to the security of the world without disturbing the intimate relations which have for so long existed between the Empire and its former Ally.

It recognised the loyalty with which Japan had carried out her obligations under the Washington Treaties; it registered the confident belief that the future relations between the Governments and peoples of the British Empire and Japan will be not less sincere and cordial than when the British and Japanese Governments were bound by written conventions; and it recorded its profound sympathy with the Japanese Government and people in the terrible catastrophe which has recently befallen them.

Another of the subjects that engaged the attention of the Conference was that of Egypt. The Conference was glad to recognise the great advance that has been made during the last two years towards a pacific settlement of this complex problem. It noted with approval the agreement that was arrived at in February, 1922, and the reservations by which it was accompanied. And it held that, when the four reserved subjects, which were safeguarded by that agreement, come up for examination and settlement, the utmost importance should be attached to the freedom of the passage through, and the security of, the Suez Canal, which constitutes the central and vital link in the chain of Imperial communications, and that adequate guarantees must be taken to secure and safeguard these objects.

During the session of the Conference, the question of the regulation of the liquor traffic off the American coasts, and of the measures to be taken to avoid a serious conflict either of public opinion or of official action was seriously debated. The Conference arrived at the conclusion that, while affirming and safeguarding, as a cardinal feature of British policy, the principle of the three-mile limit, it was yet both desirable and practicable to meet the American request for an extension of the right of search beyond this limit for the above purpose, and negotiations were at once opened with the United States Government for the conclusion of an experimental agreement with this object in view.

Finally, the Conference, after listening to a detailed exposition of the work of the League of Nations during the past two years, and more particularly of the recent sitting of the Council and the Assembly at Geneva, placed on record its emphatic approval of the action that had been taken by, and the support that had been given to, the representatives of the British Empire on the latter occasion. There was full accord that the League should be given the unabated support of all the British members of the League as a valuable instrument of International peace, and as the sole available organ for the harmonious regulation of many International affairs.

November 5, 1923.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62918

APPENDIX IV.

Committee on Publication of Correspondence and Status of High Commissioners.

CONCLUSIONS OF MEETINGS OF THE ABOVE COMMITTEE, HELD IN THE ROOM OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, COLONIAL OFFICE, S.W., ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1923, AT 12·15 P.M. AND 4·30 P.M.

Present:

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir EYRE CROWE, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G., Deputy Secretary, Imperial Conference.

Mr. R. G. VANSITTART, C.M.G., M.V.O., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G., Secretary, New Zealand Delegation.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G., Secretary, South African Delegation.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

Mr. P. MCGILLIGAN, Secretary, Irish Free State Delegation.

Mr. G. R. HAMILTON, Board of Inland Revenue, was also present during the discussion of Conclusion 2.

Mr. C. W. DIXON, M.B.E.
Dr. O. D. SKELTON } *Joint Secretaries to the Committee.*

Publication of Official Correspondence.

1. The Committee considered the draft of a statement as to the publication of official communications between the various Governments of the Empire, which had been prepared as a basis for discussion and with a view to inclusion, if thought desirable, in the published Report of the Conference.

The Committee did not think it necessary that a full statement on the lines suggested should be included in the published Report, but agreed that it would be well that there should be included among the unpublished papers of the Conference some record of the position which could be communicated to the Dominion Governments, and might be of assistance to any of the Prime Ministers who desired to make a public announcement on the subject.

For this purpose the Committee approved the statement included in Annexe (A).

Status of High Commissioners.

2. The Prime Minister of Canada raised the questions:—

(1.) Whether arrangements could be made whereby the official representatives of the Dominions in Great Britain would be granted certain privileges additional to those already given as regards exemption from taxation and similar matters.

(2.) Whether it would be possible for some courtesy precedence to be granted to the official representatives of the Dominions in Great Britain.

As regards the first point, the Secretary of State for the Colonies promised to circulate a statement showing the privileges at present granted to High Commissioners and to the representatives of foreign countries, and to consider with his colleagues the possibility of extending the present concessions to High Commissioners. (For the statement as circulated, see Annexe (B).)

As regards the second point, the Secretary of State for the Colonies undertook to confer with his colleagues with a view to a submission being made to His Majesty in the matter.

C 62919

Ratification of Treaty of Lausanne.

3. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa drew attention to the position of the Union in relation to the ratification of the Treaties signed at Lausanne. He observed that the British Government had pointed out the desirability of early ratification, but that, if it were necessary to submit the Treaty to the Union Parliament, the Union Government would not be in a position to express concurrence in ratification before February next at the earliest. He would not wish that the Treaty should be ratified in respect of the Union without the concurrence of the Union Government being first expressed, and, if an expression of concurrence were made without Parliamentary approval being first obtained, questions might be raised as to the propriety of such action. On the other hand, a difficulty would be created if the Union were to be excluded from His Majesty's ratification, in view of the nature of the Treaties.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that it was hoped to secure the passing of the legislation required in Great Britain within a fortnight of Parliament meeting, but that the coming into force of the Treaty might be delayed in any case by the inability of foreign Powers, *e.g.*, France, to ratify immediately. He suggested that the best course would be that, when the necessary Bill had passed through all its stages and the Treaty was ready for ratification here, the British Government should communicate with the Dominion Governments, acquaint them with the urgency of the case, and invite their concurrence. It would then be for the Dominion Governments to say, if their Parliaments were not in Session, whether they would be content that His Majesty should ratify forthwith.

It was understood that this course would be agreeable to the Dominion Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister of Canada intimated, however, that it might not be possible for the Canadian Government to express formal concurrence in ratification.

Colonial Office,
November 5, 1923.

ANNEXE (A).

THE Conference gave its attention to the desire of the Parliaments of the various parts of the Empire to be afforded the fullest information possible on all matters on which negotiations were going on, or discussions taking place, between two or more of the Governments.

The Conference recognised that, if consultation, to which it attached great importance, was to be carried out effectively, this must involve a frank and confidential interchange of views in written or telegraphic communications, and that many of the communications exchanged between the Governments, particularly in connection with foreign policy and defence, could not be made public. At the same time the feeling of the Conference was that as many communications as possible ought to be made available for the use of the Parliaments, and it was thought desirable to discuss the circumstances in which official communications between the Governments could and could not be made public.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

It was generally agreed that any official communication not marked "confidential" or "secret" or not clearly intended to be treated as such might be regarded as available for publication without reference to any other Government.

It was understood that, so far as each Government was concerned and subject to the need for mutual consent in certain cases, the responsibility as to publication of correspondence with other Governments rested with the Ministers of the Crown in the Dominions as in Great Britain.

It was, of course, realised that it would be necessary to observe the general rules regarding diplomatic correspondence and that in particular the consent of foreign Governments must be obtained before publication of communications to or from those Governments.

The Conference thought that, should the eventual, but not immediate, publication of certain communications be contemplated, it would be well for some indication of this to be given at the time when those communications were sent. This arrangement would facilitate subsequent publication, if decided upon. It was, however, agreed that the consent of all the Governments interested must be obtained before any papers or communications were made public which were marked at the time of despatch to be of a confidential or secret nature, or were transmitted in confidential or secret despatches.

Annexe (B).

Statement as to Privileges at present granted to—

(A.) *Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers;*
and

(B.) *Dominion High Commissioners;*
in the matter of British Taxation.

I.—Income Tax.

1. The privileges in regard to Income Tax enjoyed by an *Ambassador or Minister of a foreign State* are secured to him by International Law, and depend on the fact that he represents a foreign State. Thus a foreign Government, and equally the permanent individual Head of a foreign State, are regarded as wholly exempt from British Income Tax.

The representative character of an Ambassador or Minister entitles him, not indeed to complete exemption from Income Tax, but to very wide immunities. These immunities are only one aspect—and an inseparable aspect—of the general diplomatic status accorded to him under International Law; another aspect is his immunity from legal proceedings.

2. In the case of *High Commissioners for the self-governing Dominions* prior to 1916–17 no special relief was granted. From that year onwards relief from Income Tax on official emoluments has been given and this relief has now been made statutory by Section 19 of the Finance Act, 1923. The concession made in 1916–17 was analogous to that made to the Consular and certain other representatives of foreign States. (From 1922–23 onwards Consular representatives are the only class of foreign non-diplomatic representatives to enjoy such relief.)

3. The comparative position may be tabulated as follows :—

Nature of Income.	Ambassadors and Ministers.	High Commissioners.
(a.) Income from earnings	Diplomatic emoluments exempt.	Official emoluments exempt.
(b.) Income from investments, &c.	Remittances from abroad exempt. Income from investments in the United Kingdom (except from British Government securities) liable.	Remittances from abroad liable. Income from investments in the United Kingdom liable.
(c.) Income from house or land property in United Kingdom.	Exempt, if occupied for diplomatic purposes. Liable, if either— (1.) Occupied for purely private purposes; or (2.) Let to a tenant. (Similar reliefs apply in the relatively trifling matters of Inhabited House Duty and Land Tax.)	Liable (but property relieved from tax, *if owned by the Dominion Government*, and occupied for Governmental purposes).

II.—Customs and Excise Duties.

4. As a matter of international practice *foreign Ambassadors or Ministers* are granted exemption from customs duties in respect of articles required for their personal use.

The main articles now coming under the exemptions are motor-cars, tobacco, spirits and wine.

5. *Dominion High Commissioners* are accorded relaxation in the examination of their baggage, and are also exempted from payment of all Customs Duties on first arrival.

No further exemption from Customs Duties is granted, except as regards motor cars for *official* use.

6. Remission of *Excise Duties* has never been granted, either to foreign or Dominion representatives.

In the case of foreign representatives, however, there is an old standing exemption in respect of the relatively small matter of Establishment Excise Licence Duties, *e.g.*, the gun licence and the licence to employ a male servant.

III.—Rates and Motor Car Licence Duty.

(Charges Assessed and Levied by the Local Authorities.)

7. Under reciprocal agreement with nearly all foreign countries *foreign Ambassadors or Ministers* are relieved of the part of the Rates referable to services not of direct benefit to them (poor relief, police rate, &c.).

8. There is no corresponding relief applicable to Dominion representatives.

(No exemption is given in respect of property owned by the Crown: the Crown in this country voluntarily foregoes any claim, in order to avoid adversely affecting other ratepayers in the neighbourhood.)

9. *Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers* are exempted from *Motor Car Licence Duty* whether their cars are owned by themselves or by their Governments.

Dominion High Commissioners are exempted from Motor Car Licence Duty in respect of Government-owned cars used by them for official purposes.

10. It may be added that no privileges at all are given in regard to *Stamp Duties* or in regard to *Death Duties* except that any movable property which may be actually situate in an Embassy or Legation is exempt from Death Duties.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
November, 1923.

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62922

APPENDIX V.

Committee on India's Contribution to the League of Nations.

(A.)

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF A MEETING OF THE ABOVE COMMITTEE, HELD IN THE ROOM OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, COLONIAL OFFICE, S.W., ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1923, AT 5·30 P.M.

Present:

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. Sir RENNELL RODD, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

Mr. F. PHILLIPS, Assistant Secretary, Treasury.

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G., Deputy Secretary, Imperial Conference.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON, Secretary, Canadian Delegation.

Sir ROBERT GARRAN, K.C.M.G., Solicitor-General, Commonwealth of Australia.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G., Secretary, South African Delegation.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

Mr. E. ROWE-DUTTON
Professor RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E. } *Joint Secretaries.*

The Chairman: The question which the Committee has to discuss is how the contributions to the expenses of the League of Nations which have to be made by the various members of the League represented at the Imperial Conference should be divided.

I understand that the present allocation is the result of the work of a Committee which has endeavoured to take all the relevant factors into consideration; that allocation is at present by units; and that the units payable for 1924, according to the proposals of the League, are as follows:—

British Empire	88
(For 1923 British Empire 95. No Irish Free State contribution.)	
Canada	35
Australia	26
New Zealand	10
Union of South Africa	15
Irish Free State	10
India	65

I gather that the matter was discussed at various meetings of the British Empire Delegation at the Assembly of the League in 1922 and 1923. In 1922 Lord Balfour stated publicly at a meeting of the Assembly that the various parts of the Empire would settle among themselves the exact amount which each would find. This year Lord Robert Cecil informed the Indian Delegation (which thought the incidence for 1923 and 1924 somewhat unfair as regards India) that the distribution of the totals for those years among the various Governments of the Empire could, so far as the British Government was concerned, be discussed as an entirely open one. I will therefore ask the representative of India to explain what India's position is.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: If we go to the various units constituting the British Empire, what is it that we find? I think to a certain extent His Grace has anticipated me, but still I will remind you what is the position. Australia pays 26 units; Great Britain pays 88; Canada 35; India 65; Irish Free State 10; New Zealand 10; South

C 62923

Africa 15. So that it is quite clear that with the exception of Great Britain no other part of the British Commonwealth pays nearly as much as we do. At the same time I will beg to bear in mind that the distance at which India is situated from the League of Nations makes it impossible for her to derive as much benefit as some of the other Powers do from their association with the League of Nations. We also cannot forget the fact that while we have been constantly fighting for the proper representation of India on the secretariat of the League of Nations we have only one minor official to represent us there. There has been considerable feeling over this question in India, and I can say from personal knowledge that objection has been taken repeatedly to this heavy imposition on India in the Legislative Assembly. Now last year the Indian Delegation to the Assembly withdrew their opposition to the scale on the understanding given by Lord Balfour that the distribution of the total British Empire contribution for 1923 would be settled between the six Empire Governments. The same position, so far as I can gather from the papers supplied to me, appears to have arisen at the last meeting of the League, and I believe it was mainly at the instance of Lord Robert Cecil that the Indian Delegation did not formally enter their protest before the open house in the hope that the question would be taken up by the Imperial Conference and some satisfactory decision arrived at which may secure to India a comparative freedom from this heavy burden which has been cast on her. It is true that India is one of the original parties to the League of Nations; at the same time there is no reason why India should bear such a large burden, except, of course, Great Britain, when the other constituents of the Empire are so lightly taxed. So far as the League of Nations itself is concerned, it treats the British Commonwealth as one single whole—that is what I gather—for the purpose of contribution, and I understand that the decision taken last year was that it was a matter between the constituent units of the British Commonwealth to decide, but, so far as the general figure is concerned, there is one common liability. Now, if it is maintained that our liability is quite apart from that of the other constituent units of the British Empire which are represented in the League of Nations, I think it must be distinctly borne in mind that but for the promises of Lord Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil we should have put forward open opposition before the whole League. There is considerable feeling on this point in India. We do not derive the same advantages as other countries derive and the League has not admitted our men to the extent I submit it should have done on the secretariat. I do not see why India, which is the poorest of all the constituent units of the British Commonwealth and whose finances are at the present moment in a deplorable condition, should be called upon to make such a heavy contribution. It is a matter for settlement between the various elements of the British Commonwealth. I do not wish to go into minor details of the question or into the figures, but these are to my mind the outstanding features of the whole problem. It appears that under the existing scale India pays 65 out of a total of 937 units. Now I do not wish to discuss the origin of this scale or the history of the question, as it is well known and, I presume, it can be very easily ascertained, but it seems to me that on the broadest grounds of justice and fairness to India there is no reason why some relief should not be given to India in this matter. That is all I have to say for the time being.

Sir Rennell Rodd: I should like to say, having been twice in charge of this matter at Geneva, not last year, but the year before last and this year, I naturally have a good deal of information on the subject, which perhaps it might be useful to the Committee to hear. I think I might take the thing a little further back than the memorandum which was read to us, to the year before last, 1921, when it became urgent to get rid of the scale of the International Postal Union, which was very unjust to nearly everybody, and something had to be done. A Committee had worked on this question having regard to a basis of population and revenue, not necessarily adhering rigidly to that, but population and revenue were the original basis, and when it came up to be considered by the Committee and elsewhere we all came to the conclusion that the proposed scale was premature; there had not been time to go

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62924

into this question thoroughly. We had a great deal of discussion with the Dominions on the subject, and we all agreed that it was better not to accept the basis proposed but to adopt a provisional basis for one, two or three years until there was time to work out a better one. That was done. We accepted the provisional basis in 1921, and I am bound to say Sir William Meyer, on behalf of India, protested against the figure assigned to India; at the same time he did not vote against it; he only abstained from voting. Last year the work of the Allocation Committee again had not proceeded far enough to enable a definite basis to be submitted, and it was suggested that the provisional basis should once more be adopted and put before the Assembly. There would have been opposition from India, but, as has been explained, Lord Balfour rather suggested that the British Empire contribution should be considered as a whole, and the total reassessed among the several contributors. This year we had the same question once more, and in a sub-Committee, in which I also took part, as well as in the Financial Committee, we heard the representatives of India as we also heard the representatives of Roumania, Hungary and Greece. Those were the four countries which had entered a protest. Well, after going, I think, very fully into these matters and considering them very carefully we came to the conclusion that, if we were to disturb the provisional allocation at all, not only those four countries but a large number of the other countries would also raise a protest, and the only way to secure unanimity was to carry on with the provisional allocation for one year more. That was the basis on which we acted. One or two little retouches were possible. What was called the British Empire—it is better to call it Great Britain, as is done in this list—had been assessed at ninety-five units. The question of a reduction in view of the Irish Free State contribution was considered, and it was decided and accepted by the Irish Free State that they would undertake ten units. Seven units were taken from Great Britain. The other three were not taken off because it was recognised that the entry of a new member entailed additional work, so Great Britain was reduced by seven, which brings her figure down to eighty-eight. I should like to say that the fact that Italy and Japan are put down at sixty-one and sixty-three is only due to exceptional circumstances. In consequence of the earthquake in Japan this year it was considered by a unanimous vote of all the nations present that the position should be made a little easier for Japan, and so many units were subtracted, I think twelve is the number, to relieve Japan, for one year only. The position in regard to Italy was the same as that in regard to France and other countries which, during the war, had had their territories invaded and devastated. We did not agree that that was a legitimate plea for reduction of units, but we were probably almost alone in that opinion, and we could not raise our voice alone against it; therefore, a temporary reduction was made in the provisional allocation in both the French and the Italian units, otherwise, of course, they would exceed those of India very largely. Therefore, I do not think the argument that those countries are put in a lower scale than India can be adduced, except as a very provisional and temporary one. I should also like to say that the British Dominions are not treated as a whole with a common liability. Each unity is separately assessed, and I may add that we had great difficulty in 1921 to get a common agreement among them to accept these assessments, but it was done. The assessment of the Dominions was not regarded as a whole or as a common liability. I venture to say it would be very undesirable that they should be treated as a whole. There is already a considerable feeling among the nations represented on the League that the British vote, including now seven unities, is apt to preponderate, and that our voting power is greater than that of the nations with one vote each. We maintain that each unity votes as it pleases, and I am bound to say that the Dominions do sometimes vote against Great Britain in divisions. Though there is not any real ground for the charge of collective action, if we were to appear as a single entity for contributory purposes before the League of Nations I am sure it would prejudice our position there; therefore, I think it would be very undesirable that we should be treated as a whole. We never have been, and I do not think we should. What was put forward

C 62925

by the Indian Delegation on the sub-Committee, I felt, deserved a great deal of consideration, but, as I have said, we had decided we must maintain the provisional allocation, otherwise we should have opened the door to protests from perhaps more than half the nations that were assessed. The few units that were available, that is to say, the three that were over from the Irish Free State, and two more coming in from Abyssinia entering the League, making five more units than we had anticipated, were to be divided among the States who it was thought had suffered most severely by the present provisional allocation. The case of India was considered among the others, but it was generally felt at the present moment that Greece, in view of having a million and a quarter refugees suddenly thrust upon her, was really perhaps more deserving of consideration than any other, and the case of Roumania was also a very strong one. The case of Hungary was less strong, because a Loan is about to be negotiated by the League and we thought Hungary could maintain her present contribution. The case of India we also felt to be hard, but we did not see our way to reduce these units. There were only five units available, and we thought on the whole that the cases of Roumanian and Greece were more urgent. With regard to the undertaking of Lord Balfour, I was not there last year and therefore I have only learned it by reports, but in my own private opinion it involves a pledge which requires very careful consideration, and I think we shall have to come to some decision on it.

Mr. Phillips: I just wish to point out that this scale to which the Indian representative has referred is a scale drawn up by the League of Nations on the basis of the revenue of the different States in 1913. It is drawn up quite impartially, and the reason why India has sixty-five units is because her 1913 revenue justified that figure by comparison with other countries. It is agreed by everyone that 1913 revenue is not an ideal basis to take, but the position is, it is the only one for which figures are available. There is a Committee of the League now sitting which is endeavouring to draw up a fresh scale prepared on later statistics, and which it is hoped will produce a Report in time for its adoption next year by the Assembly. At the moment it is the only scale which really can be adopted. It is based on all the statistics we have got, and it is very difficult to see on what ground it could be modified in respect of a particular country if the League did not agree. The substance of the Indian proposal, as we see it, comes to this. India claims that her contribution is too high. If that is so, we think her contribution should be reduced and the loss of revenue so caused should be spread among the different members of the League. But what India says is something different. She says her contribution should be reduced and the burden spread among only those members of the League which belong to the British Empire, a proposition for which we see no justification at all.

Dr. Skelton: I think the case has been very fully put. We all sympathise with the difficulties in which India finds herself, but it is not merely a question of money, but a question of principle and a question of getting a basis upon which all nations can work. My understanding of the basis of the allocation to each of the countries that make up the British Empire is that they are distinct units in the League, and the allocation is determined by the League Authorities for each member in accordance with a certain understanding. It would hardly seem possible in that case to rearrange here the division that has been made at Geneva. Certainly one might desire that in the League Committee some arrangement should be come to. I can see the basis of allocation is a very difficult question, and there must be a certain amount of give and take.

The standard of the division must be more or less arbitrary or, at least, more or less general. I quite agree with the views expressed by the two gentlemen who have addressed us.

The Chairman: Have you anything to say, Sir Robert?

Sir Robert Garran: I also agree with the views that have been put forward. It seems to me the contributions of each individual member of the League have been fixed on a definite basis and standard, and to lighten one at the expense of the others means to

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

62926
C

throw that standard out of adjustment and to impose what would be an unfair burden upon other members. If the standard is to be modified it appears to me that it is a matter for the League to readjust, so that a reassessment could be made on all the members of the League according to some other standard; but, while I fully sympathise with the position in which India finds herself, I am not authorised, on behalf of Australia, to agree to a departure by way of exception from the standard that has been laid down. I understand from what has been put forward by the Treasury that, as a matter of fact, newer figures are being prepared for a new assessment next year, and if that is so, and if the revenue figures upon which these contributions are based are altered so that India's proportion is less, then India will get the benefit of that new assessment.

Captain Lane: I agree with what Sir Robert says. This is the point General Smuts wishes to put. He does not think that we are authorised here to make any alteration in the allocation which has been made by a Provisional Committee of the League.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I should first of all like to point out what the Government of India's view in regard to this matter is. In a despatch which was sent on the 27th July, 1922, to which I myself was a party, the Government of India stated their objections. They pointed out that it greatly increases the contribution which India would have to pay on the Postal Union scale (from 4·9 to 6·6 per cent. of the total expenditure of the League), that the population criterion adopted by the Reveillaud Committee is not fair to comparatively poor countries such as India, and that the combination of the population factor with the net revenue factor is tantamount to taking population into account twice over, because "the revenue of a State is the aggregate of the paying capacity of its population and represents the average paying capacity of its individuals multiplied by their total number, and it is consequently unreasonable to weight the calculations (from net revenue) by any further allowance for the population figures." In the Government of India's opinion the best basis of calculation is that of net revenue by itself. These are the views of the Government of India. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot say that India must be treated as a single unit by itself and, that so far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, there is no common liability. I am quite willing to accept that position that India has a responsibility quite apart from the responsibility of the other parts of the Commonwealth, but why prevent India from raising this question before the Assembly? We have been twice prevented from doing so, and I give you fair warning that, when the League meets next year, India will be compelled by her financial position to raise this question on the opening of the Assembly. This year I gathered from the papers which have been supplied to me that the question was practically postponed for a settlement among the various members of the British Commonwealth who are contributories to the League of Nations. Now, when we meet here, we are told that our responsibility or liability is single and quite separate from that of the other Dominions. If so, I must, on behalf of my Government and on behalf of my country, say distinctly that we shall have to raise this question before the Assembly and take its answer. Well, we have been twice put off, on the understanding that the question will be settled by mutual agreement among the members of the British Commonwealth. I find, however, that there is no possibility of a settlement, and, so far as my country and my Government is concerned, I would beg most respectfully to say that I reserve to the Government of India and to my country the right of raising this question in open House, upon the ground that the position taken is that each one is responsible for the share that has been assigned to his country, and, therefore, as we cannot come to a settlement among ourselves, we make an appeal to the larger House, to the fuller House. I wish to avoid a stage like that being reached, because the obvious answer will be that, so far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, we are a divided house on this matter. Well, I do not mind facing that position at all, and I can quite understand the special circumstances in which relief has been given to Japan this year, but I do not wish members of this Committee, or, for the matter of that, the League

C 62927

of Nations, to overlook the fact that we are a very poor country and that our Budget is practically in a hopeless condition at the present moment, and we do not find the same advantages. There is only one word more I would like to say, and that is this: That at the last meeting of the League I understand the Indian members, according to the information available to me, desired to raise this question in the open House, and they were told that this was a question which should be settled amicably among the members of the British Commonwealth. I find that there is no possibility of that settlement now; therefore, the position is that I cannot agree to the present arrangement on behalf of India, and it must be distinctly understood that I reserve to my country the right of raising this question in open Conference and taking our chances, such as they may be, in regard to the revision, because we consider, I am bound to say, that the present arrangement is wholly unjust to India. That is all I wish to say.

The Chairman: Of course, the report of this Committee will come up before the Conference, and you think you have an absolutely full right to raise it in the Conference?

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Yes, in the Conference itself. I think it leads to a position like this. At the League we are told "Go back and settle between yourselves." Here we are told that our responsibility is quite separate from that of the others and each one must take his own liability. Well, you cannot have it both ways. Therefore, I want it to be distinctly understood that if there is no possibility of settlement between the different constituents of the Empire, then we must be given an absolutely free hand next year when our representatives go there of raising this question and putting such arguments and such figures as we can before the Assembly to persuade them to give us relief, the consequence of which might be, if we succeeded, that probably a burden would be shifted to other shoulders, but we cannot refrain from pressing our claim which we have twice been persuaded to postpone, and I must say very frankly that I do not look forward to our being persuaded so easily a third time.

The Chairman: Well, I think Sir Tej, you have heard all the views that have been expressed by all the other Dominions, and I think it would be rather difficult for us to arrive at any decision.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I think a common decision is impossible, and I am only anxious that it should be understood that I do not acquiesce in the present position.

The Chairman: Quite. Of course you make that clear.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That is all I have to say.

The Chairman: Well, if the Committee would agree we would have some resolution to this effect:—

Resolved—

"That, after hearing the case put forward by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in regard to the contribution made by India to the League and the explanation of Sir Rennell Rodd, the Committee recommends the provisional allocation made by the League be adhered to pending any readjustment during 1924, it being understood that India would reserve the right to raise the matter at the 1924 Assembly."

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: No: That resolution binds me. I wish to say distinctly that I dissent from this, because I cannot agree to this recommendation of the Committee to the Conference. If the Conference itself is going to take up this question, I will put up my case before the Conference, but I want it to be understood that I am not a party to this resolution. I want to reserve my right.

The Chairman: I think we shall be able to issue a report to the Conference.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I do not care about language so long as you make it clear that I do not acquiesce in the terms of this resolution. I do not want it to be understood by my Government

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62928

or by my countrymen that I agree to the present position being continued.

Mr. Harding: Would it not be well to say "the Members of the Committee representing Great Britain and the Dominions present think it would be best to adhere to the provisional allocation, the representative of India reserving the right to raise the question in the 1924 Assembly."

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Well, the representative of India does not agree with that view. I want it to be quite plain, because I have to answer my own countrymen, who would ask, "Why did you agree to this view, even this year?" You can devise a formula just to show that I did not accept that view, otherwise it might be brought up against me next year. I do not want to be bound by that.

The Chairman: We will make that quite clear.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I will leave it to Mr. Harding. He is a better draftsman than I and he can make it quite plain that I was not a party to this resolution and that I reserve the right of raising the question in open House in the League of Nations next year.

The Chairman: The point shall come before the full Conference and it will be explained what happened here. You have had these very clear expressions of opinion all round.

Sir Rennell Rodd: Might I supplement one word? The Allocation Committee which is now sitting is considering this whole question on a somewhat new basis because they consider that revenue by itself is not a proper criterion. They are only taking certain items of revenue.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I know that.

Sir Rennell Rodd: Moreover, after the war you have to consider items of post-war expenditure that will not come in, but there are others that are more or less permanent. One criterion is that of defence. Of course the defence of Great Britain is not only on her own behalf, but to a large extent is an expenditure on behalf of the Dominions, and I think it would be rather unfair if our expenditure on defence, comparing it with that of other Nations, should be taken without due allowance, as it would put our contribution unduly high, because our defence expenditure happens to be very high. I put that point as one of a number of factors to be considered and to show how difficult it is. Nevertheless, I think the new contribution of India will be sensibly reduced, but of course it is impossible to say beforehand how far. In the meantime, it should be thoroughly understood that there is great possibility, almost probability, of the Allocation Committee not being able to prepare a new scheme before the next Assembly, so that we shall be up against provisional allocation very possibly in 1924. I think it would not be fair that I should not mention that.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: There is only one word I would like to say. I was really here fighting for a principle, and when I found that there was no disposition to come to a discussion of the method of settlement I thought it entirely necessary to go into these factors. If there is any disposition to go into the question of settlement among ourselves, well, of course, these factors have to be taken into account, but, if the position taken is that each one must fight their own case with the Assembly, then it is not for this Committee to go into those factors, but it is for the League of Nations to go into those questions, and to weigh them properly, and we will put up our case with regard to our revenue, our defence and our expenditure before the Assembly. I should have been quite prepared to have put them up here if there was a disposition to come to an amicable settlement, but there is no agreement, and therefore it would be a waste of time to go into these details.

C 62929

(B.)

REPORT.

A meeting was held on Thursday, the 1st November, at 5·30 P.M. in the Secretary of State's room, Colonial Office. There were present:—

[See Heading of (A).]

The Secretary of State for the Colonies explained briefly the system of allocation of the expenses of the League of Nations, by which a certain number of units is allocated to each Member State. As a result of certain arrangements made in 1922 and 1923 by the British Empire Delegation at the Assembly of the League, the various parts of the Empire were to agree among themselves the exact amount each would find. He asked the representative of India to explain India's position in the matter.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru explained the position of India. She is assessed far higher than any part of the Empire, except Great Britain, but India is physically so far distant from the League that she gets little benefit from it, and she complains that she is almost unrepresented on the Secretariat. There is much objection in the Legislative Assembly. In 1922, the Indian Delegation would have objected to the allocation in the Assembly had it not been for Lord Balfour's declaration that the matter would be settled between the six Empire Governments. The same position arose in 1923. India now seeks that settlement. The League looks on the British Empire as a whole. There is no reason for India to be so highly taxed compared with the other British nations, especially at a time when her finances are in a deplorable condition. Apart from minor details or questions about figures, it seemed to him that on the broadest grounds of justice and fairness to India some relief should be given.

Sir Rennell Rodd, speaking as having had to handle this matter at Geneva, explained what had been done in making the allocations. In 1921, it became obvious that it was desirable to revise the original Universal Postal Union Scale, which was admittedly unsatisfactory. A beginning was made on a basis of population and revenue, but a provisional basis was necessary pending the production of a scientific scale. This was not finished by 1922, and the provisional scale was again used. The Empire as a whole agreed. The same course of events happened in 1923, as a result of the Balfour declaration. It was of obvious importance not to disturb the principle of the provisional allocation, or claims for revision would have been innumerable. Minor adjustments only were made (*e.g.*, Great Britain reduced to eighty-eight units by the admission of the Irish Free State).

He explained the reduction of the French and Italian allocations by reference to the material devastations factor—a temporary feature, which he hoped would disappear with the provisional scale.

He emphasised that the various parts of the Empire were not treated as a single whole by the League. The Balfour proposal was for a private arrangement. But it was not desirable for the Empire to form a *bloc* in the face of the League.

Mr. Phillips pointed out that the provisional scale was computed quite impartially by the League of Nations on the basis almost exclusively of 1913 revenue. The appropriate Committee of the League has in hand the preparation of a new scale, based on later statistics, but the technical difficulties are very great, and for the moment the provisional scale is the only one available.

India's claim is that her contribution is excessive, and that it should be reduced at the expense of the Empire as a whole. He could see no ground whatever for throwing the burden, which was proper to the League as a whole, on to those members of the League only who belong to the Empire.

Dr. Skelton concurred in this view. In principle, each Empire nation was distinct within the League, and, while sympathising with India, he thought this principle must be maintained.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62930

Sir Robert Garran was against throwing the burden of the adjustment on the Empire. The standard laid down by the League should be maintained until reversed by the League.

Captain Lane concurred in this view. It was not for them to reverse the verdict of the League.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru dissented strongly from this view, and reserved the right of his Government to raise the whole matter at the next Assembly of the League.

He could not agree to any resolution by the Committee in a sense unfavourable to India, and pointed out that the position taken up at the Assembly of the League was to refer India to the other members of the Empire, who subsequently found no settlement among themselves to be possible, and referred India back to the League.

Conclusion.

After further discussion the majority of the Committee came to the conclusion that, having heard the views expressed, they could not recommend action to vary the allocations made by the League to the several units of the British Empire. The representative of India dissented, reserving the rights of his Government to raise the question before the Assembly of the League.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.* 1,
November 5, 1923.

C 62931

54

SECRET.

E. 16th Meeting (1923).

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE SIXTEENTH MEETING, HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W., ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1923, AT 4·30 P.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Most Hon. the MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada.

The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. W. F. MASSEY, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Professor JOHN MACNEILL, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State.

Mr. DESMOND FITZGERALD, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State.

The Hon. W. R. WARREN, K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT PEEL, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.

Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, K.C.S.I.

The following were also present:

Mr. J. C. C. DAVIDSON, C.H., C.B., M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Sir JAMES MASTERTON SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir WOLSELEY HAIG, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.E., Political Secretary to His Highness the Maharajah of Alwar.

Secretariat:

United Kingdom.

Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., (*Secretary*).

Mr. E. J. HARDING, C.M.G.

Commonwealth of Australia.

Sir ROBERT R. GARRAN, K.C.M.G.

Union of South Africa.

Captain E. F. C. LANE, C.M.G.

Canada.

Dr. O. D. SKELTON.

New Zealand.

Mr. F. D. THOMSON, C.M.G.

Irish Free State.

Mr. P. MCGILLIGAN.

India.

Professor L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 16 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62932

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Mr. Baldwin: The first item on the Agenda is the revised statement on foreign relations, which I believe has been very thoroughly examined now. There is one verbal alteration which the Foreign Secretary has proposed, and if that is agreed to I hope the statement will be passed in that form.*

Lord Curzon: The alteration is perhaps a little more than verbal. On the last page but one there is a paragraph which begins with the words: "It (that is the Conference) recognises the loyalty with which Japan had carried out her obligations under the Washington Treaties." When we came to consider that passage the other day someone said, and said with great point, that this sentence might be looked upon as somewhat patronising. We were just considering the question of a change when the conversation went off on to some other topic. When I read through the revised draft last night it seemed to me that the criticism that was made the other day was sound and that we ought to meet it. Therefore I would suggest these words: "It recognised with satisfaction the progressive fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Washington Treaties." That would apply not to Japan alone but to everybody, and cannot be held to contain any element of patronage.

Mr. Massey: It brings them all in.

Lord Curzon: Yes. Then the statement goes on: "It registered the confident belief that the future relations between the Governments and peoples of the British Empire and Japan will not be less sincere"; the rest is unaltered.

General Smuts: You say that the first part of the sentence is general; is it not a great jump from "Japan" to "all nations"?

Lord Curzon: We do not say "all the nations." Of course, here we are really referring to Japan, but we are putting the thing in a form which I think is not open to criticism, because it is general. We have to be rather cautious about the other nations, because some of them, particularly France, are nations whose "progressive fulfilment" is very slow.

Mr. Baldwin: The paragraph before that deals with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, so that it follows on quite naturally. May I take it that that is now agreed to?

(Agreed.†)

PALESTINE.

Palestine is the next item, and I think the Secretary of State for the Colonies wishes to make a statement.

The Duke of Devonshire: You will remember that when the Conference met on the 3rd October I made a very full statement on the subject of British policy in Palestine. I have a few words to add to that statement this afternoon. On that occasion I told the Conference in confidence that a proposal had been adopted by the Cabinet with the object of modifying certain features of the present system which might be regarded as unduly favouring the Jews as compared with the rest of the population of Palestine. As Lord Curzon told the Conference, our plan was to promote the establishment of an Arab Agency in order that the Arab community might enjoy precisely the same advantages as those accorded to the Jewish Agency under the terms of the Mandate. Sir Herbert Samuel was instructed to invite the Arab leaders to accept a settlement on those lines, and you may have seen in the Press that the Arabs rejected our offer. In the circumstances it is proposed to inform the High Commissioner that the offer will not be renewed and to authorise him to continue to carry on the administration on existing lines. There is no alternative to our suggestion, I think. We have to discharge our obligations under the Mandate, and we intend to do so.

* For the paragraphs as circulated, see Appendix.
† For the paragraphs as completed, see Section VIII of the published report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987).

C 62933

If the Arabs will not co-operate with us, we must, however reluctantly, go on without them. The correspondence on the subject is about to be laid before Parliament. That completes the story following upon what I said to the Conference the other day.

Mr. Baldwin: Does anyone wish to ask any question upon that statement?

(No member of the Conference wishing to ask any question, Mr. Baldwin proceeded)

ADDRESS TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

The Drafting Committee have returned to the Conference the Address to the King, the wording of which was referred to them. Sir Maurice Hankey tells me that there is yet another small alteration that must be made.

Sir Maurice Hankey: The last sentence in the third paragraph from the end runs as follows: "We shall count ourselves fortunate if we have been able to contribute towards their solution, even to a small degree." If you read the previous sentence, "their solution" would apply to "the sister nations and the peoples of the British Commonwealth." It is meant to apply to the "problems." If you put in the words "contribute towards the solution of these problems" it would be better, instead of "their solution."

Professor MacNeill: The title which appeared on the original draft of the Address has been expanded into a very long one, and I do not think the expansion is an improvement. I suggest that we go back to what was suggested yesterday evening: "His Most Gracious Majesty the King and Emperor of India." This longer form is, I believe, the strictly legal formula, but I do not think it is usual in Addresses of this kind. We had a discussion about it, and finally it was suggested that someone should look up what the legal title of the King was. I suppose this is the legal form, but I do not think it is customary to have all those particulars. I do not want to raise any discussion at all; I want rather to avoid discussion.

Mr. Baldwin: I should think, "To His Majesty the King." Have you any particular views on that, Lord Peel? What would you say to adopting the formula used at the last Imperial Conference?

Lord Peel: I should very much hope that the words "Emperor of India" would come in—very much.

Mr. Massey: I hope they will.

Mr. Baldwin: I move that "To His Majesty the King and Emperor of India" be substituted.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I would suggest a comma after the word "King"—"To His Majesty the King, Emperor of India."

Mr. Massey: What was the alteration proposed to be made from the form used last time?

Mr. Warren: That was threshed out at the Committee meeting.

Lord Peel: We discussed that in Committee, and that was agreed to.

Mr. Baldwin: I think that is the best form—to substitute "To His Majesty the King, Emperor of India" for "To His Most Gracious Majesty George the Fifth, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India."

(Agreed.*)

DRAFT REPORT OF CONFERENCE.

Then comes the Draft Report. I do not know if the Duke of Devonshire, as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, has any observations to make?

* For the address as completed, see Section XIX of the published report of the Conference (Cmd. 1987).

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62934

The Duke of Devonshire: I suggest that the Report of the proceedings of the Conference be adopted.

Mr. Massey: Is that the full Report?

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, the full Report.

Mr. Massey: Is not there something about the Suez Canal?

Sir Maurice Hankey: It is in Section 8 of the Report.

(The Report of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference was adopted.)*

PUBLICATION.

Mr. Baldwin: I should like to ask whether the members of the Conference see any objection to my using any of the material in the Report, which I may think suitable, in the course of the speech which I have to deliver at the Guildhall to-morrow night. At the Guildhall one is always supposed to have something to tell the people, and, if there is anything that I think it would be of interest to the people to know, it appears in the public press on the following day. I should be most grateful to be able to draw upon the Report.

Sir Maurice Hankey: The idea was to publish the Report in the newspapers on Saturday morning if the Conference approved of this course.

General Smuts: I think it would be most suitable for the Prime Minister to be able to refer to this. He will be expected to do so.

(The Conference agreed to the Prime Minister's suggestion.)

Sir Maurice Hankey: Can we publish the Report in Saturday morning's newspapers? A Blue Book will presumably be published as in previous years. In past years the Blue Book has contained all the published report and all the published speeches and published papers. We propose to add one or two papers about nationality, &c., after communication with the different Dominion Delegations before they leave. We have the list nearly ready, and we would propose to submit it to the delegates and secure their approval to what should be published in the Blue Book, and then the Colonial Office will arrange in the ordinary course as to the dates of publication, &c.

(This was agreed to.)

CONCLUDING RESOLUTION. APPRECIATION OF WORK OF SECRETARIAT.

Mr. Baldwin: It is five weeks ago since we started our labours, but before we part I should like to express to you the pleasure it has been to me personally and to His Majesty's Government to welcome you here. I should like to tell you how grateful we feel to every member of the Conference who has come to help in these deliberations, and particularly to those who have come from such great distances at what must be great personal inconvenience, which could only be justified by the nature of the work to which we have been summoned. I want to thank you all most warmly for the help you have given to make this Conference a success. I believe that we have done some very good work, and I think it will bear good fruit in the future. I thank you very much for your help, and I hope that you will be able to secure a little well-earned rest before you resume your labours at home.

Mr. Mackenzie King: May I say that we on this side of the table feel what a great privilege it has been to have the opportunity of meeting and conversing at this table with the Prime Minister and other Members of His Majesty's Government. We all realise that we have had but the one aim and object of finding common ground on all matters of mutual concern and of seeking to reconcile points of difficulty and difference. I cannot but feel that we have been wholly successful in this and that the outcome of the Conference is that we shall return to our respective countries with the feeling that what has been reached here by way of

* Published as Cmd. 1987.

Secretariat Note.—The Committee on the Spahlinger Treatment of Tuberculosis (see page 21 of the Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting) met and drew up a Report (E. 89). It was decided by the Drafting Committee not to include a reference to this Report in the published proceedings of the Conference.

C 62935

agreement represents a unanimous voice, and will commend itself not only to our Governments but through the Governments to our Parliaments and through the Parliaments to the people of the different Dominions from which we come. I am sure that the spirit of goodwill and unity that we feel so strongly at this moment will be emphasised in all parts of the Empire as the result of this Conference.

Mr. Bruce: I should like to associate myself with everything that Mr. Mackenzie King has said, and especially to express my appreciation of the spirit in which all the British Ministers with whom we have come into contact have met us, and of the helpfulness which they have shown upon every question that has come under consideration. We have been able to arrive at unanimity on all questions which we have discussed, and I am quite certain that good results will flow from our deliberations. I also think that we all owe a very great debt of gratitude to the Secretariat for the admirably efficient way in which they have done their work and the great help which they have given to us on every occasion. Particularly in the case of one, like myself, who came late—for which I again apologise at the conclusion of the Conference—it is very difficult to pick up the information required for the purpose of our discussions; and for my own part I do want to thank Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Harding very much for all they have done; and the whole of the Secretariat for the very great help which they have given to us since we have been here.

Mr. Baldwin: I agree upon that.

Mr. Massey: Prime Minister, as the senior member of the Conference, I want to express my appreciation of the uniform courtesy and consideration which have been extended to us, not only by yourself but by each and every one of the British Ministers. I would also like to endorse what the Prime Minister of Australia has said with regard to the Secretariat. There is no question about it that they have been of immense assistance, especially to members from overseas, and the assistance which they have rendered, and the knowledge which they possessed, have conduced very greatly to the success of the Conference. I do not think there is any doubt that the Conference has been a success. Some of us have come a long way in order to be present, but I believe the work done was well worth coming to do, and I think that as time goes on that will be quite evident.

General Smuts: I associate myself most fully and cordially with what has fallen from my colleagues.

Mr. Warren: I need hardly paraphrase what has already been said. I want to say that, coming from a small community, I desire to express my gratification for the way in which Newfoundland has been treated—exactly as if we were the Dominion of Canada.

Professor MacNeill: We can, I think, adopt everything that has been said by the representatives of the Dominions who have already spoken, both with regard to the courtesy and friendship shown to us by His Majesty's Ministers, and with regard to the great assistance given to us in every possible way by the Secretariat. Moreover, we have been especially pleased with the course of the Conference.

Lord Peel: As leader of the Indian Delegation, I should like to thank the Conference for the very keen appreciation they have shown of our very difficult Indian problems and for the courtesy and patience with which they have listened to us.

Mr. Baldwin: Gentlemen, I think that concludes the business of the Conference. I should only like to say that I re-echo everything that was said about the Secretary and his staff and about the work, too, which has been much less seen and known in London, the work of the Dominion and Indian staffs. I think it has been a great thing to bring these staffs together and let them work together, and I am sure that all sides have learned a great deal from it. The help that they have been to me has enabled me to attempt a task which was novel, and with regard to which I was comparatively unexperienced.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62936

Sir Maurice Hankey: Would you like to put these three short paragraphs in the Report *à propos* of what has been said? It has been done in former years.

Mr. Baldwin: Yes. There are three formal paragraphs saying that I have expressed pleasure on behalf of the British Government and that you have kindly responded. It has been done on previous occasions. The first is :—

> "Before the meetings of the Imperial Conference terminate, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues desire to express their great pleasure at having been able to welcome in London the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the other representatives from overseas, and their appreciation of the readiness of other members of the Conference to travel so far in order to take part in its sittings."

I am sure we should like that to be put on record. I think it may be your pleasure that I may add to it this second one :—

> "On their part the Prime Ministers and representatives of the Dominions and India wish to place on record their thanks, first to the Prime Minister of Great Britain for his conduct of the business of the Conference, and, secondly, both to him and to the other members of the British Government for their constant attention to its work, in spite of the pressure of other duties."

Some similar note has been put at the end of every report; and to sum it up the third one is this :—

> "The members of the Conference are unanimous that the hours spent in consultation have been of the greatest value and will do much to facilitate the work of achieving unity of thought and action on matters of common concern to all parts of the Empire."

I think those words sum up the spirit in which we have worked.

(The paragraphs were agreed to.)

I thank you, gentlemen.

DATE OF NEXT CONFERENCE.

At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Prime Minister of Great Britain briefly referred to the date of the next Session of the Conference, and it was generally agreed that it was premature to make any definite arrangement.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*1,
November 8, 1923.

APPENDIX.

Foreign Relations.

Revised paragraphs for Report, as circulated.

The discussions on foreign relations were commenced on the 5th October by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who gave to the Conference a review of the general situation in every part of the world, and the most frank exposition, first, of the main problems which have confronted the Empire during the last two years, and, secondly, of those which seem most likely to arise in the near future.

The greater part of what Lord Curzon said was necessarily of a confidential character, since it was his object to supplement the written and telegraphic communications of the past two years by giving orally to the representatives of the Dominions and India the inner history of the period, but it was thought advisable that extracts from those parts of his speech which related to subjects of immediate interest and importance, viz., the situation in connection with the Reparations problem and the Turkish Treaty, should be published forthwith.

C 62937

This was a departure from the practice at previous Imperial Conferences, when statements made by the Foreign Secretary have been regarded as confidential throughout.

Lord Curzon's review was followed by a general discussion on foreign relations, in which Lord Robert Cecil as British representative on the Council of the League of Nations, all the Dominion Prime Ministers present, the Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State and the three members of the Indian delegation took part.

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It was while the Conference was sitting that the President of the United States renewed the offer of the United States Government to take part in an international Conference or enquiry to investigate the European Reparation problem, and to report upon the capacity of Germany to make the payments to which she is pledged. The Conference cordially welcomed, and decided to take immediate advantage of, this overture; and communications were at once entered into with the Allied Powers to obtain their co-operation.

The Conference, after careful consideration of the policy which has been pursued, was of the opinion that the European situation could only be lifted on to the plane of a possible settlement by the co-operation of the United States of America, and that, if the scheme of common enquiry to be followed by common action were to break down, the results would be inimical both to the peace and to the economic recovery of the world.

It felt that in such an event it would be desirable for the British Government to consider very carefully the alternative of summoning a Conference itself in order to examine the financial and the economic problem in its widest aspect.

The Conference regarded any policy, which would result in breaking up the unity of the German State, as inconsistent with the Treaty obligations entered into both by Germany and the Powers, and as incompatible with the future discharge by Germany of her necessary obligations. The strongest representations on this subject were accordingly made to the Allied Governments.

The Conference considered the situation in the Near and Middle East and recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey. An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension, of military anxiety and financial strain in the eastern parts of Europe; and more particularly had great relief been given to the sentiments of the Moslem subjects of the British throne in all parts of the world.

Another of the subjects that engaged the attention of the Conference was that of Egypt. The Conference was glad to recognise the great advance that has been made during the last two years towards a pacific settlement of this complex problem, which will safeguard important communications between several parts of the Empire.

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62936

Sir Maurice Hankey: Would you like to put these three short paragraphs in the Report *à propos* of what has been said? It has been done in former years.

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57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62938

opinion or of official action was seriously debated. The Conference arrived at the conclusion that, while affirming and safeguarding as a cardinal feature of British policy the principle of the three-mile limit, it was yet both desirable and practicable to meet the American request for an extension of the right of search beyond this limit for the above purpose, and negotiations were at once opened with the United States Government for the conclusion of an experimental agreement with this object in view.

Finally the Conference after listening to a detailed exposition of the work of the League of Nations during the past two years, and more particularly of the recent sitting of the Council and the Assembly at Geneva, placed on record its emphatic approval of the action that had been taken by, and the support that had been given to, the representatives of the British Empire on the latter occasion. There was full accord that the League should be given the unabated support of all the British members of the League as a valuable instrument of International peace and as the sole available organ for the harmonious regulation of many International affairs.

This Conference is a conference of representatives of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy as recorded above are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the results of its deliberations will meet with their approval.

November 7, 1923.

C 62939

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF MEETINGS.

E. (1923) Series.

INDEX.

(Figures in brackets refer to number of Meeting.)

A.

Abdullah, Emir, administration of Transjordania by, *Devonshire* (2) 10.

Abyssinia, contribution to League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 17.

Aden:
- Fuelling base to be established, *Salisbury* (8) 5.
- Royal Air Force in, *Hoare* (10) 15.

Adly Pasha, negotiations with, *Curzon* (3) 11.

Ægean, Bulgarian outlet to, *Curzon* (3) 19.

Afghanistan:
- Bolshevik propaganda and menace in, *Massey* (4) 28; *Peel* (5) 16–17.
- British Treaty with, 1921, *Curzon* (3) 8; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 21.
- Diplomatic relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy, *Curzon* (3) 8.
- Imports through India, *Curzon* (3) 8.
- Newfoundland's interest in, *Warren* (5) 16.
- Russian relations with, *Curzon* (3) 8.
- Stable and careful policy in regard to, need for, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 21.
- Tribes on Indian frontier, trouble with, *Curzon* (3) 8.
- Trouble in, possibility of, *Massey* (4) 28.
- War with, 1919, *Curzon* (3) 8; *Peel* (5) 17.

Africa:
- *See also* British East Africa, South Africa *and* British West Africa.
- Communication between North and South, all-British route, *Smuts* (2) 13, 14; *Ormsby-Gore* (2) 13.
- Field for British development in, *Smuts* (2) 12.

Air Defence, *see under* Defence.

Akalis, Sect, trouble caused by, in the Punjab, *Peel* (5) 17.

Albania, International Boundary Commission, murder of Italian section, *see* Janina murders.

Alexandria, Air establishment near, protection necessary, *Salisbury* (8) 5.

Allenby, Lord, deportations from Egypt by, *Curzon* (3) 11–12.

Alwar, Colonel His Highness the Maharajah of, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.:
- Address in honour of Dussehra festival, (10) 24–5.
- Air forces of the Empire, need for strengthening, (11) 12.
- British Empire, (1) 14, (12) 21–2.
- Capital ships, number available for British Empire as result of Washington Conference, (11) 11–12.

Alwar, Colonel His Highness the Maharajah of, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.—(*continued*).
- Lord Curzon's speech, appreciation of, (5) 18.
- Foreign policy, (5) 18–9.
- Germany, difficulties caused by delay in imposing terms on, (5) 18.
- Imperial Conference, objects of, (1) 14, (14) 4.
- India:
  - Constitutional problem, solution suggested (12) 22–3.
  - Division into British India and Native States, (12) 21.
  - Princes of, message from, (12) 26.
  - Prince of Wales's visit, (12) 23.
- Indians, position of, in the Empire, (2) 17, (12) 20–7, (13) 27, (14) 4–8.
- Kenya, (12) 24–5, (14) 7.
- Opening speech, (1) 13–14.
- Personal position, (14) 7–8.
- Ruhr occupation (5) 18.
- General Smuts, tribute to, and welcome to India, (12) 25, 26.
- Welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2.
- Welcome to South Africa, *Smuts* (13) 27; thanks for, (14) 5.

Ambassadors' Conference:
- Machinery of the League of Nations compared with that of, *Cecil* (6) 16–17.
- Position of, in connection with Italian-Greek crisis, *Curzon* (6) 3, 4–7; (7) 3–4, 10; *Cecil* (6) 10, 12–13, (7) 9; *Smuts* (7) 3, 4, 5.

Amery, Right Hon. L. S., M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty:
- Defence resolutions, (11) 15–16; (15) 2.
- proposed Empire cruise of "Hood" and "Repulse" and light cruisers (9) 13–14.

Naval Defence:
- British Empire policy, (9) 12.
- Bulged ships, (9) 4.
- Capital ships, (9) 4–5, (11) 11–12.
- Concentration of British fleet in home waters, (9) 3.
- Discussion at Admiralty, suggestion, (8) 9, 15.
- not Displaced by air defence, (9) 3–4.
- Distribution of British Navy and importance of mobility, (9) 8–9.
- Dominion co-operation, (8) 21, (9) 12–13, 14–15, (11) 16–17.
- Local defence only, not sufficient, (9) 3.
- Maintenance of communications, importan of, (9) 2–3.
- Position of question in 1921 and at preser (11) 15.
- Post and post-war standards, (9) 5–6.

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 69 70 INDEX

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Amery, Right Hon. L. S., M.P.—(*continued*).
Naval Defence—(*continued*).
Relative cost of, in Great Britain and the Dominions, (9) 14.
Statement and reply to discussion, (9) 2–15, (11) 16–17; appreciations of statement, *King* (9) 15, (11) 2; *Bruce* (9) 20, (11) 3; *Smuts* (9) 27; *Warren* (11) 9.
Submarines, (9) 4, 4–5.
Task of the Navy, (9) 3.
Mediterranean, protection of, (9) 8–9.
New Hebrides, (14) 26.
Publication of proceedings of Conference, (9) 28.
Singapore naval base, (9) 9–12.
Washington Conference and Agreement, (9) 6, 6–8.

Andrews, Rev. Mr., advice to Indians in South Africa, *Smuts* (13) 27; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 32.

Angora:
Italian special envoy, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Secret treaty between French and Turks at, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22.

Arabs, *see under* Palestine.

Armistice Day, arrangements, *Curzon* (9) 28–9.

Asia Minor:
Greek refugees from, problem of, *Curzon* (3) 20; *Cecil* (6) 9.
Surrender by Greece under Lausanne Treaty, *Curzon* (3) 20.
War in, between Greece and Turkey, *see under* Greece.

Australia:
Air defence, *Bruce* (11) 4.
and Committees of Enquiry in connection with revocation of naturalisation certificates, (14) 23.
Contribution to League of Nations, (15) 14.
Feeling in, against war, and coming development of, *Bruce* (6) 21–2.
Immigration policy, *Bruce* (13) 20–1, 21.
Imperial defence, attitude regarding, *Bruce* (8) 10, 11.
Importance to, of defence of Suez Canal and retention of British garrison in Egypt, *Bruce* (11) 3–4, 6.
Indians in, position of, *Peel* (12) 4, (14) 3–4, 4; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10, (13) 30; *Bruce* (13) 20–2; *Alwar* (14) 5.
Interest in foreign policy, *Bruce* (4) 19–21.
Interest in the League of Nations, *Bruce* (6) 19–20.
and Italian-Greek crisis, *Bruce* (6) 20, 21.
Market for sugar and fruit, loss of, by Fiji, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Military defence, *Bruce* (8) 11–12, (11) 4.
Naval defence: *Amery* (9) 14; *Bruce* (11) 4–5.
Co-operation with New Zealand hoped for, *Massey* (9) 26–7.
Position as regards, and willingness to co-operate, *Bruce* (8) 12, (9) 20–1, 22.
and New Hebrides, *Bruce* (14) 12–13.
and Pacific base, *Bruce* (8) 14–15, (11) 5.
and Singapore naval base, *Bruce* (8) 14, (11) 6; *Salisbury* (8) 14; *Smuts* (8) 19–20.
War debt, *Smuts* (5) 6.

Austria:
Attempt to establish Italian predominance in, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Restoration of, *Baldwin* (1) 7; *Curzon* (3) 21; *Massey* (4) 30; *Cecil* (6) 8–9; *Smuts* (7) 2.

Avezzana, Baron, Italian Ambassador in Paris, and occupation of Corfu, *Curzon* (6) 4–5.

Aviation, commercial, importance of development, *Hoare* (10) 14, 20.

B.

"B" Mandated Territories, grant of naturalisation to persons in, resolution, (14) 23; agreed to (14) 11.

Baldwin, the Right Hon. Stanley, M.P., Prime Minister: (*Chairman*).
Air defence, (1) 5.
Appeal to, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 17–18.
Appointment of Committees, (2) 25, 26, (10) 24.
British Empire, (1) 7–8.
Concluding speeches and resolution, (16) 4, 5, 6.
Corfu, Italian occupation, (1) 4.
Defence: (1) 5.
Draft resolutions to be circulated, (11) 16.
Drafting Committee for Report of Proceedings, (15) 6.
Entente, (1) 3.
European position, (1) 7.
Foreign relations:
Non-publication of speeches, (5) 2, 3.
Paragraphs for Report, (16) 2.
George V, His Majesty:
Address to, (15) 6, (16) 3.
Message to, from Imperial Conference, (1) 14–5; reply to (3) 2.
German reparations, (1) 2–3.
High Commissioners, status of, (14) 21, (15) 5–6.
Imperial Conference:
Future arrangements, (1) 15, (2) 24, 25, 30, (5) 21, (9) 28, (11) 19.
Joint Secretariat, (2) 26, 27.
Reference to, in Guildhall speech, (16) 4.
Imperial War Graves Commission, extension of charter, (15) 5.
India: (1) 6–7.
Contribution to the League of Nations, (15) 6.
Indians, position of, in the Empire, (2) 16, 17, 23, (14) 9–10.
Inter-Imperial trade, (1) 6.
Janina murders, (1) 4.
Japan, message to, (1) 15; reply read, (6) 2.
Japanese earthquake, (1) 5.
Lausanne, Treaty of, (1) 4.
Law, Right Hon. Bonar, death of, (14) 2.
League of Nations, (1) 4, 7.
Mission to America and funding of debt, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Nationality Committee's report, (14) 11.
New Hebrides, (14) 13.
Official correspondence between Governments, publication question, (14) 20, (15) 5–6.
Opening speech, (1) 2–8.
Palestine, (2) 19.
Publicity:
Appointment of Minister in charge of, (2) 19, 20, 23, 24.
Arrangements and press communiqués, (1) 2, 15, (2) 21, 27, 28, (3) 31, (5) 2, 3, 22, (12) 18, 19, 20, (13) 33.
Ruhr occupation, (1) 3.
Spahlinger treatment for tuberculosis, appointment of committee, (14) 22.
Treaties, question of publication of resolution, (14) 17.
Unemployment, (1) 6.
United States of America, debt to, (1) 4–5.
Washington Conference, (1) 5.
Welcome to oversea representatives, (1) 2, (3) 2, (4) 2, (6) 2.

Balfour, Lord:
on Air attack on London, *Hoare* (10) 17.
on Contributions to the League of Nations, *Devonshire* (15) 14; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (15) 15, 21; *Rodd* (15) 16.

Balfour, Lord—(*continued*).
at Washington Conference, *Curzon* (3) 10; *Salisbury* (8) 3–4, 4, 13; *Amery* (9) 6.
Zionist Declaration, November 1917, *Devonshire* (2) 9; *Curzon* (2) 17, (3) 9.

Balkan States, Army, *Derby* (10) 10.

Barbados, scheme for all-British cable from Turk's Island, *Devonshire* (2) 3–4.

Barrère, M., departure from Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 4.

Basutoland, position of Indians in, *Alwar* (12) 24.

Beira, railway connection with Lake Nyasa, *Devonshire* (2) 4.

Belgium:
British Government's telegram to, regarding Rhineland Separatist movement, *Curzon* (14) 2.
Further portion of Ruanda made over to, *Smuts* (2) 13, 14; *Ormsby-Gore* (2) 13.
and German reparations: *Bruce* (4) 23; *Smuts* (5) 7.
British communication to, respecting American participation in question, *Curzon* (10) 3–5, and probable attitude in reply, *Curzon* (10) 8–9; reply, *Curzon* (13) 2.
Priority, *Smuts* (5) 6.
and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 15, 16.
Position of, *Curzon* (3) 26.
Ruhr occupation, *see that title.*
Uncertainty in, as to British policy respecting Rhineland Separatist movement, *Smuts* (12) 9, 12, reply to, *Curzon* (12) 11–12.
War debt to Allies, cancellation, *Smuts* (5) 6.

Benes, Dr., Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, (3) 21, (6) 12, (7) 9.

Bradbury, Sir John: (13) 4, 9.
Views as to outcome of proposed Expert Committee on German Reparations, *Curzon* (13) 6.

Branting, M., Swedish representative on the League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 11, 14.

British Columbia:
Indians in, number and position, *Peel* (12) 4; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10; *King* (13) 15, 16, 17; *Alwar* (14) 6–7.
Japanese and Chinese in, *King* (4) 10.
Visit of Mr. Harding to, *King* (4) 4–5.

British East Africa:
Communications, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Indians in, position of, *Alwar* (14) 6.
Natives, policy for advancement of, *Devonshire* (2) 4.

British Empire:
Maharajah of Alwar on, (1) 14, (12) 21–2.
Mr. Baldwin on, (1) 7–8.
Consultation methods, need for improvement, *Bruce* (4) 24; *Massey* (4) 34.
Freedom of action of Dominions, *Massey* (4) 32–3; *King* (4) 32.
Mr. King on, (1) 9, (9) 18–19.
National status of Dominions, *King* (9) 16, 19.
Policy and position of, *Curzon* (3) 3–4.
Power of, *Smuts* (1) 11.
Prestige of, need for maintaining, *Smuts* (5) 5–6, 6–7
no Prospect of interference with autonomy of Dominions, *Massey* (9) 23.
Right of each part to control own affairs, *King* (4) 9, 14–15, 18, (9) 18.
Statements from British Government or Departments must be issued through Dominion Governments only, *King* (4) 17.

British Empire Exhibition, *Devonshire* (2) 2; *Massey* (2) 11.

British Guiana:
Immigration:
of Indians, question of, *Smuts* (2) 14.
Need for, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Indians in, position of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 11; *Devonshire* (13) 14; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 6.
Visit of Mr. Edward Wood and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, 1922, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

British South Africa Company, *Devonshire* (2) 5.

British West Africa:
Communications, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
forthcoming Visit of Mr. Ormsby-Gore, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

Bruce, the Right Hon. S. M., M.C., Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia:
Mr. Amery's statement, appreciation of, (9) 20.
Australia:
Air defence, (11) 4.
Feeling in, against war and coming development of, (6) 21–2.
Immigration policy, (13) 20–1, 21.
Indians, position of, (13) 20–22, comments on statement, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 30; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 5.
Interest in foreign policy (4) 19–21.
Military defence, (8) 11–12, (11) 4.
Naval defence, (8) 12, (11) 4–5.
Position as regards defence, (9) 20.
British Navy, proposed Empire cruise, (9) 22.
Concluding speech, (16) 5.
Lord Curzon's speech, comments on, (4) 24.
Defence:
an Empire question, (8) 10, 11, (9) 21–2.
Position of Dominions as regards assistance in emergency, (11) 3.
Uniformity in training, &c., (11) 3.
Egypt, British garrison, (11) 4.
European affairs, Dominion opposition to constant British intervention, (4) 23–4.
Foreign policy:
Broad principles, need for enunciation of, (4) 24–5.
Common Empire policy, need for, and suggested basis of, (4) 20–2.
Non-publication of speeches agreed with, (5) 3.
German reparations:
American participation, (10) 8–9.
Arbitrary figure, suggested agreement on, (4) 22–3.
proposed Expert Committee, (13) 7.
Great Britain, air defence, (11) 4.
Imperial Council of Defence, (8) 10.
India, place in the Empire and civilisation, (13) 21.
Italian-Greek crisis, (6) 20.
Japan, (8) 15.
League of Nations, (6) 19–20, 21.
Military defence, Dominion co-operation, (11) 18.
Naval Defence:
Australian position respecting, and willingness to co-operate, (9) 20–1, 22.
Capital ships, (8) 13, (11) 5.
separate Dominion navies, (9) 21.
One-Power standard, (11) 5, 6, 14.
Pacific base, need for, (8) 14–15, (11) 5, 6.
New Hebrides, (14) 12, 13, 26.
Ruhr occupation, (4) 22, 23.
Singapore naval base, (8) 12–14, (11) 5–6.
Suez Canal, defence of, (11) 3–4, 6.
Treaties, question of publication of resolution, (14) 17.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2, (4) 2, reply to (4) 19.

Bukoba district, retention by Britain, *Ormsby-Gore* (2) 13.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Bulgaria:
Evasions of treaty obligations, *Curzon* (3) 19.
Foreign policy of M. Stambolisky, *Curzon* (3) 19.
Government of M. Tsankoff, *Curzon* (3) 19.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–25.
Outlet to the Ægean, *Curzon* (3) 19.
Revolution, *Curzon* (3) 18.
pro-Serbian policy of M. Stambolisky, *Curzon* (3) 19.

Burton, the Hon. H., K.C., quoted respecting Indians in South Africa, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 11.

C.

"C" Mandated Territories:
Grant of naturalisation to persons resident in, resolution, (14) 23; agreed, (14) 11.
Indians in, position of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 9, 11.
United States and, (14) 22, proposed reference to Committee, *Baldwin* (10) 24.

Cables, *see* Telegraphic Communication.

Cairo, air establishment near, protection necessary, *Salisbury* (8) 5.

Canada:
Air defence, interest in, *King* (11) 2.
Amendment to article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, *Gouin* (6) 18–19.
Attitude respecting European situation, *King* (4) 18.
Lord Robert Cecil's visit, good effects, *King* (6) 18.
Civil aviation, *Hoare* (10) 20.
Coal imports from Great Britain and the U.S.A., *King* (4) 8.
Commercial treaties with France and Italy, *King* (4) 11.
Conception of Imperial relations, *King* (4) 18–19.
Contribution to the League of Nations, *Devonshire* (15) 14.
Co-operation in defence desired by, *King* (8) 10.
Effect of Italian action on public opinion in, *King* (6) 18.
External affairs, review of, *King* (4) 2–11.
Fishery questions:
Conference with the U.S.A., 1918, (14) 35.
Halibut Treaty with the U.S.A., *King* (4) 6–7; (14) 35.
Salmon fisheries of Pacific coast, negotiations respecting closer regulation, *King* (4) 6.
Franchise, history of, *King* (13) 15–16.
and French policy, *King* (4) 18.
and German reparations, *King* (4) 18.
Government correspondence with His Majesty's Government, divergent views respecting publication, *King* (14) 18–19.
Immigration:
Chinese, *King* (4) 10–11.
Indian, recent history of question, *King* (13) 14–15.
Japanese, *King* (4) 10–11; (14) 35–6.
Indians in:
Committee from India would be given every opportunity to discuss question, *King* (13) 19.
Matter to be considered when Franchise Law revised, *King* (13) 18–19.
Number and position, *King* (4) 11, (12) 10, (13) 15–16, (14) 5; *Peel* (12) 4, (14) 3, 4; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10; *Alwar* (14) 5, 6–7.
Reciprocal method of dealing with question suggested, *King* (13) 16.
International Joint Commission with U.S.A.: *King* (4) 3–4, (14) 34–5.
Leakage of information respecting Conference discussion, *King* (7) 12.

Canada—(*continued*).
Liquor smuggling into U.S.A., *King* (4) 9.
Naval defence, cost of, *Amery* (9) 14.
and Near Eastern crisis, September 1922, *King* (4) 16–17, (11) 18.
Participation in war, extent must be decided by Canadian Parliament, *King* (11) 2–3.
Position of, respecting foreign policy, *King* (4) 9.
Position of, in relation to treaties, historical memorandum, (14) 33–5.
Position as regards defence, *King* (9) 16–7.
Postal convention with U.S.A., revision, *King* (4) 5.
Prairie provinces, *King* (4) 9.
Pulpwood export to U.S.A., embargo question, *King* (4) 8, 8–9.
and Ratification of Treaty of Lausanne, *King* (15) 11.
Relations with Far East, policy respecting, *King* (4) 10.
Relations with Great Britain, *King* (9) 16–7.
Relations with U.S.A., *King* (4) 2–10, 12–13, (9) 18, (14) 34–5.
Representation at Washington, position respecting, *King* (4) 5–6.
Rush–Bagot Agreement, 1917, proposed revision, *King* (4) 7–8.
and St. Lawrence Waterway improvement scheme, *King* (4) 5.
Mr. Sastri's mission to, *King* (4) 11, (13) 18, 19; *Alwar* (14) 7.
Trade, effect of U.S. tariff on, *King* (4) 8.
Trade and shipping communications with Fiji, expectation of important new developments, *Devonshire* (2) 16.
Wireless and cable communications with West Indies, proposed management of, by Pacific Cable Board, *Devonshire* (2) 3–4, approved, *King* (2) 10.

Cannes Conference, 1922, *Curzon* (3) 27.

Cape of Good Hope:
Oil station, *Salisbury* (8) 6.
Route to the East round, *Salisbury* (8) 5, 6.

Cape of Good Hope province, position of Indians in, *Smuts* (13) 25; *Alwar* (14) 6.

Cape Province, position of Indians in, *Smuts* (13) 25; *Alwar* (14) 6.

Capital ships, *see under* Naval *under* Defence.

Cecil, the Right Hon. Lord Robert, K.C., M.P.:
Danzig administration, (7) 9.
German reparations, (6) 17.
Italian-Greek disputes, (6) 10–16, (7) 9.
League of Nations:
Aims and position of, (6) 7–8.
British Empire support, (6) 17–18.
Confidence of smaller nations in, growing, (7) 9.
Council, attitude towards, of Governments represented on, (6) 16.
Machinery of, and comparison with that of Ambassadors' Conference, (6) 16–17.
and Opium question, (6) 9, (7) 9–10.
Promotion of international co-operation, results already achieved, (6) 8–9.
Rapallo Treaty registration with, (6) 16.
Statement regarding, (6) 7–18; appreciation of, *King* (6) 18; *Massey* (6) 22; reply to discussion (7) 8–10.
Status of, in international disputes, (6) 9–10.
Treaty of Guarantee, (7) 8.
Value, (6) 9.
Newfoundland confidence in, *Warren* (7) 7.
Saar administration, (7) 7–8.

Cecil, the Right Hon. Lord Robert, K.C., M.P. —(*continued*).
Thanks to, for assistance in connection with Canadian amendment to article 10 of League of Nations Covenant, *Gouin* (6) 18–19.
Visit to Canada and U.S.A., good effects, *King* (6) 18.
Work for the League of Nations, appreciation of, *Smuts* (7) 2; *McNeill* (7) 7.

Ceylon, position of Indians in, *Devonshire* (13) 14; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 6.

Chamberlain, the Right Hon. Neville, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed Expert Committee on German reparations, (13) 12.

Chicago, canal from Lake Michigan and to Gulf of Mexico, scheme, *King* (4) 3–4.

China:
Boxer indemnity, British share, desire to devote, to purposes mutually beneficial to Chinese and British interests, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Brigandage in, *Curzon* (3) 8.
British interference in affairs of, would be deprecated, *Massey* (4) 27–8.
Conditions in, *Massey* (4) 27–8, effect on Hong Kong, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Contribution to League of Nations, arrears, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Customs tariff, Nine-Power Treaty regarding, *Baldwin* (1) 5.
Financial position, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Foreign postal agencies withdrawn, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Government, note to, by Treaty Powers, August 1923, and reply, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Immigration into Canada from, *King* (4) 11.
Internal chaos and seriousness of position, *Curzon* (3) 7–8; *Massey* (4) 26.
Japanese relations with, *Curzon* (3) 5.
Kiaochau returned to, by Japan, *Curzon* (3) 5, 7.
Nine-Power Treaties regarding, *Baldwin* (1) 5.
Political position, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Taxation, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Washington Treaties respecting: *Baldwin* (1) 5.
British Empire willing to ratify, *Curzon* (3) 6.
non-Ratification owing to French delay, *Curzon* (3) 6.

Civil Aviation, importance of development, *Hoare* (10) 14, 20.

Colonial Sugar Company, contract with New Zealand, *Massey* (2) 11.

Colonies and Protectorates, finance and trade, position, *Devonshire* (2) 2.

Committee of Imperial Defence:
Development of, *Salisbury* (8) 8.
Members and co-operation of Dominion representatives welcomed, *Salisbury* (8) 8; (11) 13.
an Organisation for defence, *Salisbury* (8) 2–3.
Origin of, *Salisbury* (8) 2.
Range of work, *Salisbury* (8) 9.
Standing Committee of Chiefs of Staff, *Smuts* (8) 18; *Salisbury* (8) 18–19.
War Books, compilation of, *Salisbury* (8) 9.
Work of, *Smuts* (8) 18.

Congo Agreement, *Smuts* (2) 14; *Devonshire* (2) 14; *Lloyd-Greame* (2) 14.

Constantine, King, abdication, *Curzon* (3) 20, 22.

Constantinople, British evacuation, *Curzon* (3) 23; *Derby* (10) 12.

Cook Islands:
Copra, no market for, in British Empire, and exports sent to U.S.A., *Massey* (2) 11.
Wireless communication, *Massey* (2) 11.

Coolidge, President:
Mr. Massey on, (4) 29.
Negotiations with, respecting participation in German reparations question, *see under* German Reparations.
Policy respecting European affairs, *Curzon* (3) 11.

Corfu, Italian bombardment and occupation of, *Baldwin*, (1) 4; *Smuts* (1) 11; *Curzon* (3) 18, (6) 3, 4, 5; *Cecil* (6) 10, 12, 13, 14, 15.

Coronel, battle off, *Amery* (9) 4, 10; *Massey* (9) 25.

Correspondence between Governments, *see* Official Correspondence.

Cosgrave, W. T., T.D., President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State:
Acknowledgment of welcome to Irish Free State representatives, (1) 12–13.
Irish Free State, position of, (1) 13.
Opening speech, (1) 12–13.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2; *Smuts* (1) 10.

Cox, Sir Percy, High Commissioner, Iraq:
on Air control in Iraq, *Hoare* (10) 15.
Referendum taken by, *Devonshire* (2) 7.
Tribunte to, *Devonshire* (2) 8.

Craddock, Admiral, battle off Coronel, *Amery* (9) 4, 10; *Massey* (9) 25.

Crewe, Lord, and Italian-Greek crisis, *Curzon* (6) 5.

Cuno, Dr., *Curzon* (3) 27, 29, 30.

Currie, General Sir Arthur, would be unable to accept post of Canadian Minister at Washington, *King* (4) 5–6.

Curzon of Kedleston, the Most Hon. the Marquess of, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:
Afghanistan, (3) 8.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, termination, (3) 3, 5.
Angora, Franco-Turkish Treaty, (3) 4, 22.
Armistice Day arrangements, (9) 28–9.
Austria, improvement of conditions in, (3) 21.
Belgium, position of, (3) 26.
Benes, Dr., (3) 21.
British Empire, (3) 3–4.
British military weakness, (3) 4.
Bulgaria, position and policy, (3) 18–9.
China, position in, and relations with, (3) 6–8.
Constantinople, British evacuation, (3) 23.
Corfu, Italian bombardment of, (6) 3.
Dardanelles, freedom of, (3) 24.
Egypt, position in, and British policy regarding, (3) 3, 11–13.
Esthonia, (3) 17.
Entente, desirability of maintaining, (3) 5.
European situation:
Difficulties of, (3) 4.
General observations on, (3) 2, 3, 26–7.
Foreign relations:
Non-publication of speeches, (5) 2, 3.
Statements on: (3) 2–30, (5) 21, (10) 2–6.
Appreciation of, *King* (3) 31, (4) 2, (6) 18; *Massey* (3) 31, (4) 25, (6) 22; *Warren* (5) 15; *Alwar* (5) 18; *Tej Bahadur Supru* (5) 19.
Comments on, *Bruce* (4) 24; *Massey* (4) 26; *Smuts* (5) 4.
Paragraphs for report (15) 2, 8, (16) 2, 6–7.
Publication of certain parts of:
Proposed, (2) 28–9.
Result, (5) 2.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62944

Curzon of Kedleston, the Most Hon. the Marquess of, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.—(*continued*).
France:
Difficulties with, (3) 4–5.
Position of, (3) 26.
Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, (3) 4, 22.
Gallipoli Peninsula, British cemeteries, (3) 24.
Germany:
British attitude towards, (3) 26–7.
Internal disruption, (3) 30.
Position of, (3) 26–7.
Reparations:
American participation, position respecting, and negotiations, (10) 2–6, 7–9, (13) 2–3.
proposed Expert Committee, (13) 3–7, 9–10.
Payments, history of, and of negotiations, (3) 27–30.
Great Britain, position in, (3) 27
Greece:
Position in, and attitude towards Great Britain, (3) 20, 22.
War with Turkey, (3) 4, 19, 20, 22.
High Commissioners, status of, (14) 20, 21.
Horthy, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, (3) 21.
Hungary, financial problem and proposed loan, (3) 21.
Hussein, King of the Hejaz, difficulties with, (3) 9.
Imperial Conference:
Appointment of Committees, (2) 25, 26.
Leakage of information, (7) 12.
Status of, (2) 20, 22.
Indians, position of, in the Empire, question of publication of speeches, (12) 19–20.
Italian-Greek crisis, 1923, (6) 2–7, (7) 3, 10.
Italy, position in, (3) 17–18.
Janina murders, (6) 2–3.
Japan, position in, and British relations with, (3) 5–6.
Karl, ex-Emperor, (3) 21.
Kwangchouwan, (3) 7.
Latvia, (3) 17.
Lausanne Conference, (3) 4, 22–5.
Lausanne Treaty, (3) 22–5, ratification, (15) 11.
League of Nations, (3) 3, (7) 10–12.
Lithuania, (3) 17.
Little *Entente*, (3) 3, 21–2.
Masaryk, Professor, (3) 21.
Mexico, (3) 11.
Morocco:
Extension of French power in, danger of, (3) 13–14.
Spanish zone, conditions in, (3) 13–14.
Mosul Vilayet, (3) 25.
Mussolini, M., policy of, (3) 18.
Near Eastern crisis, September 1922, manifesto to Dominions, (4) 17.
New Hebrides, Anglo-French Condominium, (14) 11, 12, 13.
Palestine, Zionist policy in, (2) 17–19.
Persia, position in, (3) 9.
Poland, (3) 3, 16–17.
Portugal, (3) 14–15.
Publicity questions: (2) 20, 24, (7) 11–12.
Need for secrecy as regards discussion on foreign relations, (2) 20–1, (3) 2.
Rhineland, Separatist movement, (13) 10–12, (14) 2.
Ruhr occupation, (3) 4, 28–30.
Russia, position in, and British relations with, (3) 3, 15–16.
Singapore naval base, (8) 20.
Spain, position in, and British relations with, (3) 14.
Stambolisky, M., (3) 18–19.
Tangier, negotiations respecting international administration of, (3) 13, 14.
Curzon of Kedleston, the Most Hon. the Marquess of, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.—(*continued*).
Territorial waters, (14) 14.
Thanks due to, with regard to Turkey, *Massey* (4) 30.
Treaties, negotiation, signature and ratification of: (14) 14.
Question of publication of resolution, (14) 17.
Turkey:
enhanced British prestige, (3) 25.
Future of, (3) 25.
War with Greece, (3) 4, 19, 20, 22.
U.S.A.:
Attitude towards European problem, (3) 10–11.
British relations with, (3) 9–10.
and Liquor traffic, (15) 3–5.
State-owned shipping, difficulties owing to, (3) 10.
Veniselos, M., (3) 20.
Wei-hai Wei, (3) 6–7.
Zaghlul Pasha, (3) 11–12, 12.
Czecho-Slovakia, position in, *Curzon* (3) 3, 21–2.

D.

D'Abernon, Lord, telegram respecting Separatist movement in the Rhineland, *Curzon* (13) 10.
Danzig, administration, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 9; *Smuts* (7) 3.
Dardanelles:
Forts, reinstatement not desirable, *Massey* (4) 31.
Freedom of:
Importance of maintaining, *Massey* (4) 31.
Provisions of Treaty of Lausanne, *Curzon* (3) 24.
Davidson, J. C. C., C.H., C.B., M.P., appointment as Minister in charge of Publicity, (2) 19–24, 27.
Dedeagatch, railway from Bulgaria, *Curzon* (3) 19.
De Wet, the Hon. N. J., K.C., Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa, welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2.
Defence:
Air:
Airships, British Government's policy, *Hoare* (10) 14.
Canadian interest in, *King* (11) 2.
Civil aviation, value of development, *Hoare* (10) 20.
Co-operation with Dominions, *Hoare* (10) 19, 20.
Empire forces, need for strengthening, *Alwar* (11) 12.
Great Britain, *see that title.*
Sir Samuel Hoare's statement, (10) 14–20.
Limitation of armaments:
British Government's desire for, Baldwin (1) 5; *Salisbury* (8) 2; *Hoare* (10) 19.
Difficulties in connection with, *Hoare* (10) 19; *Smuts* (10) 23.
Sea defence not displaced by, *Amery* (9) 3–4.
Resolutions: (15) 7, 8.
Agreed to, (15) 3.
Question of, *Hoare* (11) 19.
Armaments:
See also Air *above*, *and* Naval *below.*
Danger of present position, *Smuts* (10) 21.
Limitation:
British policy, *Salisbury* (8) 2.
Resolution, (15) 7, agreed (15) 3.
Australia's attitude, *Bruce* (8) 10, 11.
Mr. Baldwin on, (1) 5.

C 62945

Defence—(*continued*).
Canada's position as regards, *King* (9) 16–17.
Censorship in event of war, collaboration of Dominions desired, *Salisbury* (8) 9.
Dangers nearer Great Britain, *Smuts* (8) 21.
Discussions on, need for secrecy, *Salisbury* (2) 21.
Dominion contributions, *Smuts* (8) 21; *Warren* (11) 9; *Massey* (11) 8.
Dominion co-operation: *King* (8) 10; *Smuts* (8) 21; *Salisbury* (11) 13; *Amery* (11) 16–17; *Derby* (11) 18.
Interchange of personnel, *King* (14) 2.
Uniformity in training, &c., desirability, *Derby* (10) 13–14; *King* (11) 2; *Bruce* (11) 3.
Dussehra festival, *Alwar* (10) 24–5.
an Empire question, *Bruce* (8) 10–11, (9) 21–2; *Massey* (9) 26–7.
India's position, *Peel* (8) 22.
Military:
British Army, *see under* Great Britain.
Canadian participation in war, extent must be decided by Canadian Parliament, *King* (11) 2–3.
Continental armies, *Derby* (10) 10.
Lord Derby's statement, (10) 9–14.
Dominion co-operation: *Derby* (10) 13–14.
Common training and equipment, need for, *Derby* (10) 13–14; *King* (11) 2.
Preparation, need for, *Derby* (10) 13.
Preparation of scheme, *Derby* (11) 18; *King* (11) 18; *Bruce* (11) 18; *Massey* (11) 19.
no Immediate menace to the Empire, *Smuts* (10) 21.
Empire's military weakness, *Curzon* (3) 4.
Position in Europe and comparison with 1914, *Derby* (10) 9–10.
Resolution, (15) 7, agreed to, (15) 3.
Thanks to Dominion Prime Ministers, *Derby* (11) 18.
Naval:
Mr. Amery's statement, (9) 2–15.
Armaments, limitation of:
British attitude respecting, *Amery* (9) 6.
Washington Treaty for: *Baldwin* (1) 5; *Curzon* (3) 5–6.
British action in carrying out, *Amery* (9) 6–7.
Effect of, *Salisbury* (8) 3; *Massey* (9) 23, 24.
Australia's position and willingness to co-operate, *Bruce* (9) 20–1, 22.
Bases:
See also Pacific *and* Singapore.
Importance of, *Amery* (9) 9; *Salisbury* (8) 5.
British action after Washington Agreement, *Amery* (9) 6.
British Navy, *see under* Great Britain.
Bulged ships, *Amery* (9) 4.
Capital ships:
Information as to value of, desired, *Bruce* (8) 13.
Number available for British Empire as result of Washington Conference, *Alwar*, *Amery* (11) 11–12.
Post-war enquiries into value of, *Amery* (9) 5.
Progress, *Amery* (8) 16, question respecting, *Massey* (8) 16.
Value of, *Massey* (8) 17, (9) 23; *Amery* (9) 4; *Bruce* (11) 5.
Concentration of British Fleet in home waters, *Amery* (9) 3.
Co-operation between New Zealand and Australia hoped for, *Massey* (9) 26–7.
Defence—(*continued*).
Naval—(*continued*).
not Displaced by air defence, *Amery* (9) 3–4.
Distribution of British Navy and importance of mobility, *Amery* (9) 8–9.
Dominion co-operation:
Admiralty memoranda, *Warren* (11) 9.
Extent, *Amery* (9) 14.
Interchange of personnel and ships, *Amery* (9) 13.
Progressive thought-out policy, need for, *Amery* (9) 14–15.
Separate Dominion navies:
Admiralty memorandum, publication question, *Amery* (9) 12–13; *King* (9) 19;
the Best system, *Amery* (9) 12–13.
Change in Admiralty standpoint welcomed, *King* (9) 15–16, 19; *Bruce* (9) 21.
Wide outlook, need for, *Amery* (11) 17.
Dominions must take full share in, *Massey* (8) 15, 16.
Fuelling bases, importance of, *Amery* (9) 9.
no Immediate menace to the Empire, *Smuts* (10) 22.
Importance of, *Massey* (8) 15–16, (9) 23–24, (11) 7–8.
Irish Free State position regarding, *Mulcahy*, (9) 27–8.
Light cruisers, need for, for defence of trade routes, *Massey* (8) 16–17.
Local defence only, not sufficient, *Amery* (9) 3; *Massey* (9) 23.
Maintenance of communications, importance of, *Massey* (6) 23–4, (9) 22, 24; *Amery* (9) 2–3; *Bruce* (9) 20.
New Zealand action taken and in prospect, *Massey* (8) 16, (9) 25–6.
New Zealand's interest in, *Massey* (9) 24–5.
One-Power standard:
Draft resolution in favour of: *Bruce* (11) 14.
Comments, *Smuts* (11) 15; *Amery* (11) 15.
Need for maintaining, *Bruce* (11) 5, 6.
not Sufficient, *Massey* (11) 8.
Policy of British Empire, *Amery* (9) 12.
Position of question in 1921 and at present, *Smuts* (11) 15; *Amery* (11) 15; *Massey* (11) 16.
Position resulting from the Washington Agreement, *Amery* (9) 7–8.
Post-war standard, *Amery* (9) 5–6.
Pre-war standard, *Amery* (9) 5.
Relative cost of, in Great Britain and the Dominions, *Amery* (9) 14.
Resolutions, (15) 7, agreed to, (15) 3.
Retention of command of the sea, importance of, *Amery* (11) 17.
Singapore naval base, *see that title.*
Submarines, limitations of, *Amery* (9) 4–5; *Massey* (9) 23.
Task of the Navy, *Amery* (9) 3.
Policy, connection with geographical position, *King* (9) 17.
Resolutions: (15) 7–8.
Agreed to, (15) 3.
Discussion on, (15) 2–3.
Draft to be circulated, *Baldwin* (11) 16.
Question of, *Salisbury* (11) 13–14, 14; *Bruce* (11) 14; *Smuts* (11) 14–15; *Amery* (11) 15–16; *Massey* (11) 16; *Hoare* (11) 19.
Lord Salisbury's statement, (8) 2–9.
Speeches, non-publication, (9) 28.
Thanks to Dominion and Indian representatives, *Salisbury* (11) 12–13.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62946

Derby, the Right Hon. the Earl of, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War:
- British Army:
  - Functions, (10) 10.
  - Strength (10) 10–12.
  - Overseas stations, strength in 1914 and at present, (10) 11–12.
- Military Defence:
  - Continental armies, (10) 10.
  - Dominion co-operation, (10)13–14, (11) 18.
  - Position in Europe and comparison with 1914, (10) 9–10.
  - Statement, (10) 9–14, appreciation of, *King* (11) 2; *Bruce* (11) 3; *Warren* (11) 9, reply to discussion, (11) 17–18.
  - Thanks to Dominion Prime Ministers, (11) 18.
- Singapore naval base, (10) 12.

Devonshire, His Grace the Duke of, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies:
- British East Africa, (2) 4.
- British Empire Exhibition, (2) 2.
- British Guiana, (2) 3, 4.
- British West Africa, communications, (2) 4.
- "C" Mandates, U.S.A. and, (14) 22.
- Ceylon, (2) 5.
- Colonies and Protectorates, finance and trade, (2) 2.
- Congo Agreement, (2) 14.
- Cox, Sir Percy, tribute to, (2) 8.
- Falkland Islands, whaling industry, (2) 6–7.
- Fiji, (2) 6.
- High Commissioners, status of, (14) 20, (15) 11.
- Hong Kong, (2) 6.
- Imperial nationality, meaning of, (14) 9.
- India's contribution to the League of Nations, (15) 6, 19, 20, 21.
- Indians, position of, in other parts of the Empire: (2) 16, 17; (13) 12–14.
  - Comments on statement, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 29.
  - Publication of speeches question, (12) 19.
- Iraq, (2) 7–8.
- Kenya question, (2) 4, (13) 13.
- League of Nations, contributions to, (15) 14.
- Malaya, (2) 6.
- Middle East, (2) 7–12.
- Mosul Vilayet, future of, (2) 8.
- New Hebrides, (14) 12, 13, 25, 26, 27.
- Palestine, (2) 9–10, (16) 2–3.
- Publicity, appointment of Minister in charge of, (2) 19.
- Report of Proceedings of Conference, adoption moved, (16) 4.
- Rhodesia, (2) 5.
- Spahlinger treatment of tuberculosis, (14) 22.
- Statement as to Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, (2) 2–13.
- Tanganyika territory, (2) 4–5, 13.
- Transjordania, (2) 10.
- West Indies:
  - Agricultural College, (2) 4.
  - Telegraphic communications, (2) 3–4.

"Discovery," purchase by Government of Falkland Islands for whaling research, *Devonshire* (2) 6–7; *Warren* (2) 16.

Dobbs, Sir Henry, High Commissioner for Iraq, *Devonshire* (2) 8.

Dodecanese:
- Agreement, Italian breach of, *Curzon* (3) 18.
- Desire of M. Mussolini to annex, *Curzon* (3) 18.

Dominica, constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

Dominions Royal Commission, extract from Report, *Massey* (9) 22.

Duisburg, illegal seizure of, by France, *Smuts* (5) 12.

Düsseldorf, illegal seizure of, by France, *Smuts* (5) 12.

E.

East Africa, *see* British East Africa.

Eastern Thrace, surrender by Greece by Lausanne Treaty, *Curzon* (3) 20.

Egypt:
- Agitators, deportation to the Seychelles, *Curzon* (3) 11–12.
- British force in, 1914 and at present, *Derby* (10) 11.
- British garrison, retention, importance of, to Australia, *Bruce* (11) 4.
- British policy as regards, *Curzon* (3) 13.
- British Protectorate, termination, *Curzon* (3) 12.
- Democratic Constitution drawn up, *Curzon* (3) 12.
- Draft paragraphs for Report, (15) 9, (16) 7.
- Future outlook, in, *Curzon* (3) 13.
- Imperial Government wireless system, protection necessary, *Salisbury* (8) 5.
- Indemnity Act, *Curzon* (3) 12.
- Independence:
  - Declaration of, 1922, *Curzon* (3) 12–13.
  - Preservation of security of communications with British Empire and condition of, *Salisbury* (8) 5.
- Mr. Massey on, (4) 29.
- Lord Milner's mission, *Curzon* (3) 11.
- Monarchy, proclamation of, *Curzon* (3) 12.
- Negotiations with, and breakdown of, *Curzon* (3) 11.
- Royal Air Force in, *Hoare* (10) 15.
- Situation in, *Curzon* (3) 3; *Smuts* (2) 15.
- Zaghlul Pasha's return to, *Curzon* (3) 12.

Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, *Devonshire* (2) 5.

Empire Development, need for, *Massey* (4) 26–7.

Erzberger, assassination referred to, *Curzon* (3) 27.

Esthonia, *Curzon* (3) 17.

European Affairs:
- less British interference desired, *Massey* (4) 26–7.
- constant British intervention, Dominion opposition to, *Bruce* (4) 23–4.
- British policy of isolation, impossible, *Smuts* (5) 5.
- Canadian attitude, *King* (4) 18.
- Concern of Dominions in, *King* (4) 17–18.
- Dominions' right to part in settlement of, *Smuts* (5) 6.
- Effect on British prestige in India, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19, 20.
- General observations, *Curzon* (3) 2, 3, 26–7.
- Indian's interest in, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19–20.
- Need for peace, *Smuts* (1) 12.
- Peace must be based on law and justice, *Smuts* (5) 13.
- Prestige of British Empire, need for maintaining, *Smuts* (5) 5–6, 6–7.
- Re-establishment of trade, need for, *Smuts* (1) 12.
- Situation, *Baldwin* (1) 7; *Smuts* (1) 10, 12; *Curzon* (3) 2, 3.
- Withdrawal from, question of, *Smuts* (5) 4–5.

C 62947

F.

Falkland Islands:
- Defeat of Admiral von Spee off, *Amery* (9) 4, 10.
- Whaling industry of, and dependencies, purchase of the "Discovery" for whaling research, *Devonshire* (2) 6–7; *Massey* (2) 16.

Federated Malay States, loan, *Devonshire* (2) 6.

Feisal, Emir:
- Recognition as King of Iraq, *Devonshire* (2) 7.
- Testimony to, *Massey* (2) 12.
- Treaty of Alliance with, October 1922, and protocol, April 1923, *Devonshire* (2) 7, 8.

Fiji Islands:
- Agitators in, *Massey* (13) 23.
- Effect on, of New Zealand preference to fruit imports from certain Pacific Islands, *Massey* (2) 10.
- Indians in, position of, *Tej Behadur Sapru* (12) 11; *Alwar* (12) 24.
- Labour shortage, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
- Sugar industry, field for extension of, *Massey* (2) 11–12.
- Trade of, *Devonshire* (2) 6.

Fijians, *Massey* (2) 15.

Fitzgerald, Desmond, T.D., Minister of External Affairs, Irish Free State:
- Address to H.M. the King (16) 3.
- Indians, position of, in the Empire (13) 28, comments on statement, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 32.

Fiume dispute, *Curzon* (6) 5; *Cecil* (6) 16.

"Foreign Policy of the British Empire," implications of phrase, *King* (4) 12–4.

Foreign Policy and Relations:
- Australia's interest in, *Bruce* (4) 19–21.
- Broad principles of, need for enunciation of, *Bruce* (4) 24–5.
- Common Empire policy, need for, and suggested basis, *Bruce* (4) 20–2, opinion respecting, *Warren* (5) 15–16.
- Concern of Parliaments and peoples in, *King* (4) 15–16.
- Definite policy, need for Dominions and India to know, *Alwar* (5) 18–9.
- Discussions on:
  - Need for secrecy, *Curzon* (2) 20–1, (3) 2.
  - Non-publication of speeches, (5) 2–3.
- General observations, *Smuts* (5) 4.
- Irish Free State position as regards, *O'Higgins* (5) 13–4.
- certain Local questions affecting individual Dominions only, *Smuts* (5) 3.
- Need for consultations on fundamental issues, *King* (4) 15, 18.
- Paragraphs for Report, (15) 8–9, (16) 6–8.
- Promotion of friendliness amongst the nations the object of Empire's policy, *Cecil* (6) 17; *Bruce* (6) 18.
- Relations of various parts of the Empire in, *King* (4) 11–16; *Bruce* (4) 19–20; *Smuts* (5) 3–4; *Warren* (5) 15–6.

France:
- Agreement with Germany, possibility of, *Smuts* (5) 7, 8, 10.
- Air Force and comparison with Great Britain, *Salisbury* (8) 8; *Hoare* (10) 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22; *Smuts* (10) 23; *Alwar* (11) 12; seriousness of position and menace to Great Britain, *Hoare* (10) 16–17; *Smuts* (10) 22–4; *Massey* (11) 7.
- Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides, Committee on:
  - Appointment, (2) 26, 30.

France—(*continued*).
- Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides—(*continued*).
  - Report: (14) 25–7.
    - Adopted, (14) 13.
    - Discussion on, (14) 11–13.
  - Resolution, (14) 27.
- Army, strength of, and comparison with that of Great Britain, *Curzon* (3) 4, 26; *Derby* (10) 10; *Massey* (11) 6–7.
- British policy towards, criticism of, *Smuts* (5) 6–7.
- Commercial Treaty with Canada, *King* (4) 11.
- Contribution to the League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 16.
- Delay in ratification of Washington treaties concerning China, *Curzon* (3) 6.
- Difficulties with, *Curzon* (3) 4.
- Diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, *Curzon* (3) 8.
- Entente:
  - British policy, *Baldwin* (1) 3.
  - Desirability of maintaining, *Curzon* (3) 5; *Massey* (4) 26.
- German reparations, *see that title.*
- Hostile to proposed loan to Hungary, *Curzon* (3) 21.
- Italian attitude towards, *Curzon* (3) 18.
- and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 13, 16; *Curzon* (6) 3, (7) 10.
- Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22–5.
- Little Entente encouraged by, *Curzon* (3) 21–2.
- Mandate for Syria referred to, *Curzon* (2) 18.
- Minister and military mission in Greece, attitude with regard to revolution, *Curzon* (3) 20.
- Negotiations with, respecting Tangier, *Curzon* (3) 13.
- in Morocco, danger of extension of power, *Curzon* (3) 13, 14; *Salisbury* (8) 6.
- Non-surrender of Kwangchouwan to China, *Curzon* (3) 7.
- Policy of:
  - Canadian opinion on, *King* (4) 18.
  - Criticism, *Curzon* (3) 5; *Smuts* (5) 9.
  - Indian opinion on, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19–20.
- Position of, *Curzon* (3) 26.
- Rivalry between Great Britain and, *Smuts* (5) 8.
- Secret treaty with Turks at Angora, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22.
- Security for, necessity, *Smuts* (5) 12.
- Ruhr occupation, *see that title.*
- Seizure of Frankfort, &c., *Curzon* (3) 4; *Smuts* (5) 12.
- and Separatist movement in Rhineland: *Smuts* (13) 9; *Curzon* (13) 10–11.
  - British Government's telegram to, respecting, (14) 2.
- Sykes-Picot Agreement with, *Curzon* (3) 9.
- Sympathy with, *Massey* (4) 32.
- proposed Tripartite Agreement with Great Britain and Germany, *Smuts* (5) 10.
- Turks supported by, against Greece, *Curzon* (3) 4, 20.
- War debt to Great Britain, cancellation offer by Mr. Bonar Law, *Curzon* (3) 28.
- Withdrawal of troops from Asia Minor, *Curzon* (3) 22.

Frankfort, seizure of, by France, *Smuts* (5) 12; *Curzon* (3) 4.

Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22.

Free State:
- Indians in, position of, *Smuts* (13) 25–6; *Alwar* (14) 6.
- Suffrage qualifications, *Smuts* (13) 25–6.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62948

Fuad, Sultan, assumption of title of King of Egypt, *Curzon* (3) 12.

G.

Gallipoli Peninsula, British cemeteries, provisions of Treaty of Lausanne, *Curzon* (3) 24.
Garran, Sir Robert, India's contribution to the League of Nations, (15) 17–18, 22.
Genoa, International Conference, *Hankey* (2) 20; *Curzon* (3) 15; *King* (4) 16.
George V, His Majesty:
  Address to, (15) 6, (16) 3.
  Message to, (1) 14–15, reply (3) 2.
  Messages of loyalty and affection sent to:
    from Raratonga, *Massey* (2) 11.
    from Samoa, *Massey* (2) 15.
  Visit to Rome, *Curzon* (3) 18.
George, Right Hon. David Lloyd-:
  on Position of the Dominions in reference to foreign affairs, *King* (4) 11–12.
  on Position of Indians in the Dominions, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 17–18.
  Speech encouraging the Greeks, effect of, *Curzon* (3) 20.
Germany:
  American Army of Occupation, *Curzon* (3) 11.
  Break-up of, possible results and importance of preventing, *Smuts* (5) 8–9; *Alwar* (5) 18; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 20.
  British attitude towards, *Curzon* (3) 26–7.
  Delay in imposing terms on, difficulties caused by, *Alwar* (5) 18.
  Diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, *Curzon* (3) 8.
  Financial position and comparison with that of Great Britain, *Smuts* (5) 9.
  Financial restoration, Austrian case should be followed, *Smuts* (7) 2.
  Position of, *Curzon* (3) 26–7, 30; *Smuts* (5) 8.
  Reparations:
    American participation in question of:
      Discussion respecting form of, *Smuts* (10) 6–7 7; *Curzon* (10) 7; *Massey* (10) 7–8; *Bruce* (10) 8.
      Expert Committee, *see that title below.*
      Negotiations with America and Allies, *Curzon* (10) 2–6, (13) 2, 3, 8; (10) 25–9.
      Negotiations, difficulties likely to arise, *Bruce* (10) 8–9.
      Paragraphs for report, (15) 8, (16) 7.
      Premature publicity respecting, danger of, *Massey* (10) 8.
      Telegram to America, use of name of Imperial Conference in, *Curzon* (10) 3, 9; *Bruce* (10) 8–9, 9.
    Arbitrary figure, suggested agreement on, *Bruce* (4) 22–3.
    British attitude:
      Criticism, *Smuts* (5) 7.
      Press criticism and reply to, *Curzon* (10) 5–6.
    Canada prepared to agree to proportionate scaling down of share, *King* (4) 18.
    Commission:
      American member withdrawn, *Curzon* (3) 10.
      Position of, *Curzon* (13) 3, 4.
    Criticism of policy respecting, *Cecil* (6) 17; *Bruce* (4) 23.
    Excessive amount fixed, *Massey* (4) 31–2.
    Expert Committee:
      proposed joint Allied communication to U.S. Government, *Curzon* (13) 6–7.
      proposed American chairman, *Curzon* (13) 5; *Massey* (13) 7.
Germany—(*continued*).
  Reparations—(*continued*).
    Expert Committee—(*continued*).
      American participation, importance of, *Smuts* (13) 7–8.
      Mr. Bruce on, (13) 7.
      Composition, *Curzon* (13) 4–5.
      French attitude, discussion on, (13) 12.
      Mr. Massey on, (13) 7.
      Possible outcome of, *Curzon* (13) 5–6.
      Previous proposals, *Curzon* (3) 10–11, (13) 3–4.
      Terms of reference: *Curzon* (13) 4, 9–10; *Smuts* (13) 12.
        Necessity of settling, in advance, *Smuts* (13) 8, 9.
      proposed Time limit, opinion, *Curzon* (13) 10.
      Time limit for enquiry, suggestion, *Smuts* (13) 8.
    History of payments and of negotiations, *Curzon* (3) 27–30.
    Peace must be based on law and justice, *Smuts* (5) 13.
    Problem, *Baldwin* (1) 2–3.
    suggested Solution, *Smuts* (5) 11–12.
  Re-establishment of currency and credit, proposed Allied and American support, *Smuts* (5) 11.
  Separate agreement with, should be last resort only, *Smuts* (5) 10.
  Settlement with France, possibility of, *Smuts* (5) 7–8, 10.
  Solid German State, importance of, *Curzon* (13) 11.
  proposed Tripartite agreement with Great Britain and France, *Smuts* (5) 10.
  Western, suggested neutralisation of part of, *Smuts* (5) 12.
Gibraltar, Straits of, safeguarding of, importance of, *Salisbury* (8) 6.
Gold Coast, railway construction, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Gouin, the Hon. Sir Lomer, K.C.M.G., Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Canada:
  League of Nations Covenant, article 10, (6) 18–19.
  Welcome to, *Baldwin* (4) 2.
Gounaris, M., murder of, *Curzon* (3) 20.
Graham, the Hon. G. P., Minister of Railways and Canals, Canada, welcome to, *Baldwin* (3) 2.
Graham Land, whaling industry, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Great Britain:
  Aeroplanes, need for high standard in, *Massey* (11) 8.
  Air attack:
    French menace and seriousness of position, *Hoare* (10) 16–17, (11) 19; *Smuts* (10) 22–4; *Bruce* (11) 4.
    Home defence against, *Hoare* (10) 16, 17–18.
    Immediate action against, urgency of, and suggestions, *Smuts* (10) 23–4.
    Mitigating circumstances in connection with position, *Salisbury* (11) 13.
  Air Force:
    Co-operation with Army and Navy, *Hoare* (10) 15.
    Duties, *Hoare* (10) 15–16.
    Home Defence Force:
      Creation, *Hoare* (10) 18.
      Resolution, (15) 7, agreed to (15) 3.
    Increase, *Baldwin* (1) 5; *Salisbury* (8) 8; *Hoare* (10) 17–8, time needed to attain standard, *Hoare* (10) 18–9.

62949

Great Britain—(*continued*).
  Air Force—(*continued*).
    Inquiry into, by Committee of Imperial Defence Committee, *Salisbury* (8) 8.
    Maintenance as single self-contained organisation, *Hoare* (10) 14, approval, *Smuts* (10) 21.
    Personnel, difficulty, *Hoare* (10) 18–19.
    Strength and comparison with France, *Salisbury* (8) 8; *Hoare* (10) 14–5, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22; *Smuts* (10) 23; *Alwar* (11) 12.
  Air position, technical discussions at Air Ministry suggested, *Hoare* (11) 19.
  Army:
    Comparison with France, seriousness of position, *Curzon* (3) 4, 26; *Derby* (10) 10; *Massey* (11) 6–7.
    Functions, *Derby* (10) 10.
    Overseas stations, strength in 1914 and at present, *Derby* (10) 11–12.
    Reduction, *Derby* (10) 9.
    Strength of, 1914, and at present, *Derby* (10) 10–12.
    Strength, principles governing, *Derby* (10) 12.
  Defence of, enquiry into, by Committee of Imperial Defence Committee, *Salisbury* (8) 7–8.
  Financial position and comparison with that of Germany, *Smuts* (5) 9.
  Food supplies:
    Loss of ships with, from New Zealand during war, *Massey* (8) 16.
    in Times of war, *Smuts* (8) 6–7.
  French and Italian war debts to, cancellation offer by Mr. Bonar Law, *Curzon* (3) 28.
  Italian attitude towards, *Curzon* (3) 18.
  Marriages with Foreigners Act, 1906, (14) 24.
  Naval defence, cost of, *Amery* (9) 14.
  Navy:
    Comparison with American, *Amery* (9) 7–8.
    Concentration in home waters, *Amery* (9) 3.
    Distribution and importance of mobility, *Amery* (9) 8–9.
    proposed Empire cruise, *Amery* (9) 13–14, appreciation of, *King* (9) 22; *Bruce* (9) 22; *Massey* (9) 22.
    Reduction, *Amery* (9) 6.
    General Smuts on, (10) 22.
  Neutrality in Greek war with Turkey, *Curzon* (3) 20.
  Position in, *Curzon* (3) 4, 27.
  Responsibilities and liabilities, *Massey* (4) 30.
  proposed Tripartite agreement with France and Germany, *Smuts* (5) 10.
  Unemployment, *Baldwin* (1) 6.
  War with foreign Power or Powers, position of Dominions, *Bruce* (4) 21, (11) 3; *Massey* (4) 32, 33–4; *King* (4) 32, (8) 10.
Great Lakes:
  American scheme in connection with, *King* (4) 4.
  Rush–Bagot Agreement, 1817, to restrict naval armament on, proposed revision, *King* (4) 7–8; (14) 35.
  Shipbuilding on, *King* (4) 7, 8.
Greece:
  Attitude towards Great Britain, *Curzon* (3) 20.
  British Minister, recall, *Curzon* (3) 20.
  Contribution to League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 16, 17.
  French Minister and military mission, attitude regarding revolution, *Curzon* (3) 20.
  Government, action after Janina murders, *Curzon* (6) 3; *Cecil* (6) 10.
  Lausanne Conference and Treaty, *Curzon* (3) 20, 22–5.
  Refugees from Asia Minor, problem of, *Curzon* (3) 20; *Cecil* (6) 9.
Greece—(*continued*).
  Revolution, *Curzon* (3) 20, 22.
  M. Venizelos's appointment as representative in Europe, *Curzon* (3) 20.
  War with Turkey, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22, 19–20.
Greek-Italian Crisis, *see* Italian-Greek Crisis.
Green, J. F. N., New Hebrides, (14) 26.
Grenada, constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

H.

Hague International Conference, *Hankey* (2) 20; *Curzon* (3) 15; *King* (4) 16.
Hankey, Sir M. P. A., G.C.B.:
  Drafting Committee for Report, (15) 6.
  George V, His Majesty, address to, (16) 3.
  Imperial Conference, Joint Secretariat, (2) 26–7.
  Imperial War Graves Commission, extension of charter, (15) 5.
  Publication of Report, (16) 4.
  Publicity, (2) 20, 24.
  Thanks to, (16) 5.
Hankow, Japanese garrison withdrawn, *Curzon* (3) 5.
Harbin, Japanese garrison withdrawn, *Curzon* (3) 5.
Harding, President:
  Mr. Massey on, (4) 29.
  and Rush–Bagot Agreement, revision, *King* (4) 7.
  Visit to British Columbia, *King* (4) 4–5.
Harding, E. J.:
  India's contribution to the League of Nations, (15) 20.
  Thanks to, (16) 5.
Harington, Sir Charles:
  Evacuation of Constantinople, *Curzon* (3) 23.
  Tributes to, *Massey* (4) 31; *Derby* (10) 12.
Hejaz, King Hussein, difficulties with, *Curzon* (3) 9.
High Commissioners, Status of:
  Discussion respecting, and committee to consider, (14) 20–1.
  Privileges granted to, in matter of taxation and comparison with those granted to foreign Ambassadors and Ministers, (15) 12–13.
  Report of Committee on, (15) 10–11, 12–13, agreed to, (15) 5–6.
Hoare, the Right Hon. Sir Samuel, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air:
  Air armaments, reduction question, (10) 19.
  Air Defence:
    Co-operation with the Dominions, (10) 19–20.
    Statement, (10) 14–20, appreciation of, *King* (11) 2; *Bruce* (11) 3; *Warren* (11) 9, reply to discussion, (11) 19.
  Airships, (10) 14.
  Civil aviation, value of development, (10) 20.
  Defence, question of resolution, (11) 19.
  Great Britain:
    Air attack, French machines available for, (10) 16–7.
    Air defence, (11) 16, 17, 19.
    Air Force:
      Co-operation with Army and Navy, (10) 15.
      Duties, (10) 15–6.
      Expansion, (10) 17–18, time needed to attain standard, (10) 18–19.
      Maintenance as single self contained organisation, (10) 14.
      Strength and comparison with France, (10) 14–5, 16, 17, 18, 19.
    Air position, technical discussion at Air Ministry suggested, (11) 19.
  Iraq, Independent Air Command, (10) 15.

57 4 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 62950

Hong Kong:
Chinese labourers, strike, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Effect of Washington Agreement, *Salisbury* (8) 3; *Amery* (9) 9; *Massey* (9) 24.
Reclamation scheme, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Trade conditions, *Devonshire* (2) 6.

"Hood," H.M.S., proposed Empire cruise, *Amery* (9) 13–14.

Horthy, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, *Curzon* (3) 21.

Hughes, Mr., American Secretary of State: (4) 6, 8, (7) 12.
Approval of enlargement of scope of International Joint Commission, *King* (4) 4.
Proposal by, of Committee of Experts for enquiry into financial position in Germany, *Curzon* (3) 10–1.
and Revision of Rush–Bagot Agreement, *King* (4) 7.

Hungary:
Attempts by ex-Emperor Karl to recover throne, *Curzon* (3) 21.
Conditions in, *Curzon* (3) 21.
Contribution to League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 16, 17.
Financial problem and proposed loan, *Curzon* (3) 21; *Cecil* (6) 9.
Regency of Admiral Horthy, *Curzon* (3) 21.

Hussein, King of the Hejaz, difficulties with, *Curzon* (3) 9.

Hymans, M., Belgian representative, League of Nations, and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 13.

I.

Imperial Conferences, 1918, 1921, resolution respecting position of Indians in the Empire, *see under* Indians.

Imperial Conference, 1923:
Committees, appointment of, (2) 29–30, (10) 24.
Concluding resolution, (16) 6.
Decisions and agreements, ratification of Parliaments concerned, necessary, *Massey* (9) 24.
Functions and objects of, *Alwar* (1) 14, (14) 4: *King* (9) 19; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 7.
Joint Secretariat, (2) 26–7.
Programme of arrangements, (2) 24, 25, 29, 30; (7) 12–13; (8) 22.
Report of Proceedings:
Adopted, (16) 3–4.
Drafting Committee appointed, (15) 6.
Publication question, (16) 4.
Secretariat, appreciation of work of, (16) 5.
Status of, *Curzon* (2) 20, 22; *King* (2) 22, (9) 17–18.
Status of India at, *Massey* (13) 22-3, *Fitzgerald* (13) 28.
Use of name of, in telegram to America, *Curzon* (10) 3, 9; *Bruce* (10) 8, 9.

Imperial Conferences, status, *Massey* (14) 15–16.

Imperial Council of Defence, *Bruce* (8) 10.

Imperial Defence Committee, *see* Committee of Imperial Defence.

Imperial Economic Conference, programme (2) 24–25, 29, 30.

Imperial Nationality, meaning of, and distinction from local citizenship, *Devonshire* (14) 9.

Imperial War Cabinets, status of Dominion Ministers at, *Massey* (14) 16–17.

Imperial War Graves Commission, extension of charter, (15) 5.

India:
Afghan frontier, trouble with tribes on, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Mr. Baldwin on, (1) 6–7.
Bolshevism:
no Chance of success, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 20.
Need for propaganda and publicity to prevent spread of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 20.
Propaganda and menace, *Curzon* (3) 15; *Peel* (5) 17.
British force in, 1914 and at present, *Derby* (10) 11.
new Constitution, *Peel* (12) 3–4.
Constitutional problem, solution suggested, *Alwar* (12) 22–3.
Contribution towards League of Nations: *Peel* (9) 28; *Devonshire* (15) 14.
Committee on, notes of meeting and Report, (15) 14–21, proposed, *Baldwin* (10) 24.
Question to be raised at Geneva, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (15) 6, 19, 22; *Peel* (15) 6.
Culture and tradition, *Peel* (12) 5–6.
Defence, position respecting, *Peel* (8) 22.
Division into British India and Indian States, *Alwar* (12) 21.
Dussehra festival, address in honour of, *Alwar* (10) 24–5.
Feeling for Empire, *Peel* (12) 4.
Good effects in, of Turkish Treaty, *Peel* (5) 17.
Immigration from:
into Canada, recent history of question, *King* (13) 14–5.
proposed Mutual agreement respecting, *Alwar* (12) 25.
Prevention, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 12.
Indian Army, reductions, *Peel* (11) 9.
Industrial position, *Peel* (12) 3.
Interest in, concerning European and Imperial affairs, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19, 20.
Methods of agitation in, *Massey* (13) 23.
Military budget, *Peel* (8) 22.
Military defences in ports, recommendation of Lord Jellicoe, *Peel* (11) 10.
Opinion on Ruhr occupation and French policy, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19–20.
and Opium traffic, *Peel* (7) 7, 8, 10; *Cecil* (7) 10.
Political unrest and political agitation, distinction from Bolshevism, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 20.
Position of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19.
Position of, in the Empire, *Peel* (12) 4; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 7, 16–17; *Alwar* (12) 27.
Position in Imperial Conference, *Massey* (13) 22–3; *Fitzgerald* (13) 28.
Princes of, message from, *Alwar* (12) 26.
Progress of, towards self-government, *King* (13) 19–20; *Fitzgerald* (13) 28; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 32.
Royal Air Force squadrons in, *Hoare* (10) 15.
Royal Indian Marine. *Peel* (11) 10–11.
Support of League of Nations, *Peel* (7) 7.
Trade into Afghanistan through, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Tributes to place of, in the Empire and to her civilisation, *Peel* (12) 3; *Bruce* (13) 21; *Massey* (13) 33.
Vernacular press, influence of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 7–8.
Prince of Wales's visit, *Alwar* (12) 23.
Indians, position of, in other parts of the Empire:
Maharajah of Alwar on, (12) 20–7, (14) 4–8.
Appeal to Mr. Baldwin and His Majesty's Government, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 17–8.
Appeal to the Conference, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 16–7; *Alwar* (12) 23–4.
Claims, arguments in favour of, *Peel* (12) 2–6.

C 62951

Indians—(*continued*).
Committees in each Colony, Dominion, &c., to confer with Committees from India:
Approval, *King* (13) 17.
Hopes for good results from, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 30.
Principle of request accepted by British Government, *Devonshire* (13) 13, 14.
Resolution, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 32.
no Desire to press, *Peel* (14) 3–4.
Formal resolution not necessary, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (14) 11.
Result as regards Colonies and Protectorates, *Baldwin* (14) 9–10, appreciation of, with exception of statement as regards Kenya, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (14) 20.
Suggestion, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 13–4.
Thanks for reception of proposal, *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 4.
existing Difficulties, *Alwar* (14) 6–7.
Discussion on:
Effect of, on Indian opinion, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (14) 10.
Helpful nature of, *Baldwin* (14) 10.
Publication of speeches, *Baldwin* (11) 10; (12) 18–20, 21, (13) 33.
Question of, (2) 23.
Summary of, and results, *Peel* (14) 3–4; *Alwar* (14) 5.
Distinction from other British subjects unjust, *Fitzgerald* (13) 28.
Feeling in India with regard to, and unanimity of *Peel* (12) 2, 3; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 6–7, 7–8, 9.
as question of Foreign policy, possibility of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 14, (13) 32, reply to, *Smuts* (13) 27.
Franchise, right to, not implied by possession of British citizenship, *Smuts* (13) 26–7, reply to, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 31.
Indian Government's duty of safeguarding Indian nationals overseas, *Peel* (12) 5.
Message from the Princes of India with regard to, *Alwar* (12) 26.
Viscount Peel on, (12) 2–6, (14) 3–4.
Present position in various Colonies and Dominions, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 9–11; *Alwar* (12) 23–5, (14) 5–7; *Devonshire* (13) 14.
Problem:
Difficulties of, *Peel* (11) 5.
Facing of, in spirit of co-operation urged, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 13.
Importance of, *Peel* (12) 2–3; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 6, 8.
Scope of, *Peel* (12) 4.
Resolutions of previous Imperial Conferences:
1918:
Australian attitude to, *Bruce* (13) 20, 21, 22.
New Zealand to stand by, *Massey* (13) 24.
1921:
Peel (12) 4–5; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 12.
Australian attitude to, *Bruce* (13) 20, 21, 22.
Interpretation, *King* (13) 17–8; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 30, 32.
Necessity of implementing, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 12–13.
New Zealand to stand by, *Massey* (13) 24.
Rescinding:
Deprecated, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 31.
Proposed, *Smuts* (13) 26.
Responsibilities of British Government, *Devonshire* (13) 13.
in South Africa, *see under* South Africa.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru on, (12) 6–18.
Thanks to Prime Ministers, *Alwar* (14) 5, 8.
Tributes to presentation of case by Indian representatives, *Devonshire* (13) 12; *Bruce* (13) 20; *Massey* (13) 22; *Smuts* (13) 24; *Warren* (13) 28.

Inter-Allied debts, moratorium, suggestion, *Smuts* (5) 11.

Inter-Imperial trade, *Baldwin* (1) 6; *Smuts* (1) 12; *Devonshire* (2) 2.

International Conferences, status of Dominions, (14) 36.

Iraq:
independent Air Command, *Derby* (10) 12; *Hoare* (10) 15.
Arab Government, British relations with, *Devonshire* (2) 7, 8.
British troops in, *Derby* (10) 11, 12.
Constituent Assembly, elections, *Devonshire* (2) 7–8.
Inclusion of Mosul, question of, *Devonshire* (2) (8); *Curzon* (3) 25.
King of, recognition of the Emir Feisal, *Devonshire* (2) 7.
Mr. Massey on, (2) 12.
Treaty of alliance between British Government and King Feisal, October 1922, and protocol, April 1923, *Devonshire* (2) 7, 8.

Irish Free State:
Adhesion to League of Nations and contribution, *MacNeill; Devonshire* (15) 14; *Rodd* (15) 16.
Constitution, effect on anti-British agitation in America, *Curzon* (3) 10; *O'Higgins* (5) 14.
Indians, position of, *Fitzgerald* (13) 28; *Alwar* (14) 5, 6.
Position of, in Imperial Conference, *Cosgrave* (1) 13.
Position as regards foreign policy, *O'Higgins* (5) 13–14.
Position as regards naval defence, *Mulcahy* (9) 27–8.
Preoccupation with domestic problems, *O'Higgins* (5) 14.
Relations with Great Britain, *O'Higgins* (5) 14–5.
Representatives, welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2; *King* (1) 8; *Smuts* (1) 10; *Warren* (1) 13, acknowledgment, *Cosgrave* (1) 12–3.
Welcome to, as member of League of Nations, *Curzon* (7) 10.

Italian-Greek Crisis:
Australian attitude, *Bruce* (6) 20, 21.
British Government's attitude, *Curzon* (6) 3, 5–6.
British public opinion, *Curzon* (6) 3–4, 6.
Canadian public opinion, *King* (6) 18.
Lord Curzon's statement, (6) 2–7.
Effect on position of the League of Nations, *Cecil* (7) 9.
French attitude, *Cecil* (6) 16.
French public opinion, *Curzon* (6) 3–4.
Greek appeal to the League of Nations, *Curzon* (6) 3; *Cecil* (6) 10, 10–11, 14, approved, *Massey* (6) 22.
Italian defiance of the League of Nations, *Curzon* (6) 3; *Smuts* (7) 3; *MacNeill* (7) 6.
Mr. Massey on, (6) 22.
League of Nations and, *Baldwin* (1) 4; *Cecil* (6) 10–16; *Smuts* (1) 11.
Position of Ambassadors' Conference, *Smuts* (7) 3, 4, 5; *Curzon* (7) 3–4, 10; *Cecil* (7) 9.

Italy:
Agreement with Jugoslavia, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Army, *Derby* (10) 10.
Attitude towards Britain and France, *Curzon* (3) 18.
British communication to, respecting American participation in German reparations question and probable attitude in reply, *Curzon* (10) 3–5, reply, *Curzon* (13) 2.

57 4 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Italy—(*continued*).
British telegram to, respecting Rhineland Separatist movement, (14) 2.
anti-British intrigues of M. Schanzer, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Commercial treaty with Canada, *King* (4) 11.
Contribution to the League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 16.
Corfu bombardment and occupation, *Baldwin* (1) 4; *Smuts* (1) 11; *Curzon* (3) 18, (6) 3, 4, 5; *Cecil* (6) 10, 12, 13, 14, 15.
Diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Electoral Reform Bill, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Fascista revolution, *Curzon* (3) 17.
and German reparations, *Bruce* (4) 23, *see also* Reparations *under* Germany.
Government:
Action after Janina murders, *Curzon* (6) 3; *Cecil* (6) 10.
should be Invited to join in proposed Tripartite Agreement between Great Britain, France and Germany, *Smuts* (5) 10.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–5.
M. Mussolini's Government, *Curzon* (3) 17–8.
National militia, *Curzon* (3) 17.
and Ruhr occupation, *Baldwin* (1) 3; *Curzon* (3) 18, 28.
Turkey supported by, against Greece, *Curzon* (3) 20.
Visit of King George and Queen Mary to Rome, *Curzon* (3) 18.
War debt to Great Britain, cancellation offer by Mr. Bonar Law, *Curzon* (3) 28.

J.

Jamaica:
Constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.
Indians in, position of, *Devonshire* (13) 14; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 6.
Janina murders:
see also Italian-Greek Crisis.
Baldwin (1) 4; *Curzon* (6) 2–3, 6.
Action of Greek and Italian Governments, *Curzon* (6) 3; *Cecil* (6) 10.
Japan:
Agrarian and labour troubles, *Curzon* (3) 6.
and Ambassadors' Conference respecting Italian-Greek crisis, *Curzon* (6) 6.
Anglo-Japanese alliance, termination, *Baldwin* (17) 5; *Curzon* (3) 3, 5.
Army, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Attitude of, as regards foreign countries, *Curzon* (3) 6.
British relations with, *Curzon* (3) 6; *Salisbury* (8) 3–5, paragraphs for report (15) 9, (16) 2.
Conferences with Soviet Government, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Contribution to League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 16; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (15) 18.
Earthquake, *Baldwin* (1) 5; *Curzon* (3) 6, (16) 7, message of sympathy, (1) 15, reply (6) 2.
Effect of Washington Treaty on position of, *Bruce* (8) 15.
Foreign relations and policy, *Curzon* (3) 5–6.
Immigration into Canada from, *King* (4) 10–11, (14) 25–6.
Kagoshima, British bombardment referred to, *Cecil* (6) 14.
Kiaochau returned to, by Japan, *Curzon* (3) 5, 7.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–5.
Navy, *Amery* (9) 6, 8.
Relations with America, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Relations with China, *Curzon* (3) 5.
Relations with New Zealand, *Massey* (4) 27.
Japan—(*continued*).
and Singapore naval base, *Curzon* (3) 6, (8) 20; *Salisbury* (8) 4, 5, 13; *Smuts* (8) 19–20, 20; *Amery* (9) 10.
Strategic position, strength of, *Curzon* (3) 5–6.
Working agreement with Russia:
Desired by Japanese, *Curzon* (3) 6.
would be Serious matter and might lead to difficulties, *Massey* (4) 27.
Japanese, massacre of, at Nikolaevsk, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Java, sugar imports into New Zealand from, *Massey* (2) 10–11.
Jellalabad, British consul at, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Jellicoe, Lord, report on R.I.M., *Peel* (11) 10.
Jewish influence, importance of, *Smuts* (2) 15, reply to, *Curzon* (2) 17.
Jews, and Palestine, *see* Zionist Policy *under* Palestine.
Jugoslavia:
and League of Nations, *Cecil* (7) 9.
Italian agreement with, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–5.
Position in, *Curzon* (3) 3, 21–2.
Registration of Rapallo Treaty with the League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 16.
pro-Serbian policy in Bulgaria, *Curzon* (3) 19.

K.

Kabul:
British representative at, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Soviet mission in, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Kandahar, British consul at, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Karl, ex-Emperor of Hungary, second attempt to recover throne, *Curzon* (3) 21.
Keith, Professor, quoted on treaties, *Massey* (14) 15.
Kenya:
Administration, British policy, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Indian problem: *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 8–9, 11, (14) 10; *Alwar* (12) 24–25, (14) 7.
proposed Committee should apply to, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 29, 32.
Maintenance of settlement by British Government, *Devonshire* (13) 13; *Baldwin* (14) 9–10.
South African attitude, *Smuts* (13) 24–5.
Natives, policy of advancement of, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Railway construction, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Timber resources, *Smuts* (2) 14.
Trade agreement with South Africa, desire for, and question of Congo Agreement in connection with, *Smuts* (2) 14.
Kiaochau, return to China by Japan, *Curzon* (3) 5, 7.
Kilindini, harbour works, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
King, the Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada:
Mr. Amery's statement, appreciation of, (9) 15.
Mr. Baldwin's speech, (1) 8.
British Empire, (1) 9, (9) 18.
National status of Dominions, (9) 16, 19.
Right of each part to control own affairs, (4) 9, 14–15, 18.
British navy, proposed Empire cruise, (9) 22.
Canada:
Attitude respecting European situation, (4) 18.
Chinese immigration, (4) 11.
Coal imports, (4) 8.
Commercial treaty with France and Italy, (4) 11.

King, the Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, C.M.G. —(*continued*).
Canada—(*continued*).
Conception of Imperial relations, (4) 18–9.
External affairs, review of, (4) 2–11.
Franchise, (13) 15–6.
Halibut treaty with U.S.A., (4) 6–7.
Indian immigration, (13) 14–5.
Indians, status of, (4) 11, (12) 20, (13) 14–20, (14) 5, comments on statement, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 30; *Peel* (14) 3.
Japanese immigration, (4) 10–11.
Liquor smuggling into U.S.A., (4) 9.
Participation in war, extent must be decided by Canadian Parliament, (11) 2–3.
Position of, (4) 9.
Postal Convention with U.S.A., revision, (4) 5.
Pulpwood export to U.S.A., (4) 8–9.
Relations with Far East, policy, (4) 10.
Relations with Great Britain, (9) 16–7.
Relations with U.S.A., (4) 2–10, (9) 18.
Representation at Washington, (4) 5–6.
Salmon fisheries on Pacific Coast, (4) 6.
Trade, effect of U.S. tariff, (4) 8.
Cecil, Lord Robert, visit to U.S.A. and Canada, (6) 18.
Concluding speech, (16) 4–5.
Lord Curzons's statement, appreciation of, (3) 31, (4) 2.
Defence:
Air:
Interest of Canada in, (11) 2.
Resolution, (15) 8.
Canadian position, (8) 10, (9) 16–7.
Dominion co-operation, (9) 15–6, 19, (11) 2, 18, (15) 2.
Policy, connection with geographical position, (9) 17.
Resolutions, (14) 2.
Dominions, issuing of statement to, from British Government of Government Departments, (4) 17.
European situation, concern of Dominions in, (4) 17–8.
Foreign policy and relations:
Concern of Parliaments and peoples in, (4) 15–6.
Need for consultation on fundamental issues, (4) 15, 18.
Relations of various parts of the Empire in, (4) 11–6, 32.
Speeches, non-publication desired, (5) 3.
French policy, Canadian opinion on, (4) 18.
"Foreign policy of the British Empire," implication of phrase, (4) 12-14.
German reparations, (4) 18.
Harding, Mr., visit to British Columbia, (4) 4–5.
High Commissioners, status of, (14) 20, 21, (15) 10, 11.
Imperial Conference:
Appointment of committees, (2) 25, 26.
Objects of, (9) 19.
Status of, (2) 22, (9) 17–8.
Value of, (1) 8–9.
India, progress towards self-government, (13) 19–20.
Internatianal Conferences, (4) 16.
Irish Free State representatives, welcome to, (1) 8.
Italian action, effect on Canadian public opinion, (6) 18.
Joint International Waterways Commission, (4) 3–4, (7) 12.
Lausanne Treaty, ratification, (15) 11
Message to Their Majesties, (1) 14–15.
Near East crisis, September 1922, (4) 16–17, 17, (11) 18.
King, the Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, C.M.G. —(*continued*).
Official correspondence between Governments, publication procedure, (14) 18–20.
Opening speech, (1) 8–9.
Publicity, (1) 9, (2) 20, 21–3, 24, (9) 20.
Rush–Bagot Agreement, 1817, (4) 7–8.
St. Lawrence waterway improvement scheme, (4) 5.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2.
Wireless communication with West Indies, (2) 10.
Kwangchouwan, no inclination or desire by France to surrender, to China, *Curzon* (3) 7.
Kwangtung Peninsula, *Devonshire* (2) 6; *Curzon* (3) 7.

L.

Labrador frontier question, *Warren* (5) 15.
Lane, Captain E. F. C., C.M.G., India's contribution to League of Nations, (15) 18, 22.
Latvia, *Curzon* (3) 17.
Lausanne Conference: *King* (4) 16.
American representative at, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Bulgarian attitude at, *Curzon* (3) 19.
Despatches and telegrams to Dominions respecting, *King* (4) 17.
French attitude at, *Curzon* (3) 4.
Negotiations, account of, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22–5.
Representation of British Empire at, (14) 36–7.
M. Venizelos at, *Curzon* (3) 20.
Lausanne, Treaty of: *Baldwin* (1) 4; *Curzon* (3) 22–5.
Article respecting Mosul, *Devonshire* (2) 8.
Good effect in India, *Peel* (5) 17.
Paragraphs for report, (15) 9, (16) 7.
Ratification, arrangements with Dominions, (15) 11.
Law, Right Hon. Bonar, M.P.:
on Break-up of Germany, *Smuts* (5) 8.
and German reparations, *Curzon* (3) 28
Resolution of condolence with relatives on death of, (14) 2, 22.
and Ruhr occupation, *Curzon* (3) 28.
Lawrence, Colonel:
Negotiations with King Hussein, *Curzon* (3) 9.
Value of work done by, *Massey* (2) 12.
League of Nations:
Aims and position, *Cecil* (6) 7–8.
American hostility, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Application to, with view to partition of New Hebrides, report of Committee, (14) 25–7, discussion on, and adoption of, (14) 11–3.
Appreciation of, *Warren* (7) 7.
Assembly, and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 11–12, 14.
Australian interest in, *Bruce* (6) 19–20.
Austrian restoration, *Baldwin* (1) 7; *Curzon* (3) 21; *Massey* (4) 30; *Cecil* (6) 8–9; *Smuts* (7) 2
Mr. Baldwin on, (1) 7.
British Empire support:
Importance of, *Cecil* (6) 17–8; *Smuts* (7) 4–5.
Need for formal expression of, *Smuts* (7) 11.
British Government support for, *Curzon* (7) 10–11.
Lord Robert Cecil's visit to U.S.A. and Canada, good effects, *King* (6) 18.
Lord Robert Cecil's work for, appreciation of, *Smuts* (7) 2; *MacNeill* (7) 7.
Commission of Jurists, appointment of, *Cecil* (6) 15.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62954

League of Nations—(*continued*).
Confidence of small nations in:
Feeling of dissatisfaction rather than loss of, *MacNeill* (7) 6, 6–7.
Growing, *Cecil* (7) 9.
Shaken by result of Italian-Greek crisis, *Smuts* (7) 3.
Confidence of small nations in the British Empire, *Smuts* (7) 2.
Contributions to:
Allocation, *Devonshire* (15) 11; *Rodd* (15) 15–7.
Chinese, arrears, *Curzon* (3) 7.
India's: *Peel* (9) 28.
Notes of meeting of Committee on, and report, (15) 14–22.
Question to be raised at Geneva, *Tej Bahadur Sapru*, (15) 6, 19, 22; *Peel* (15) 6.
proposed Reference to Committee, *Baldwin* (10) 24.
Council, attitude towards, of Governments represented on, *Cecil* (6) 16; *Smuts* (7) 5.
Covenant:
Article 10, Canadian amendment, *Gouin* (6) 18–9.
Article 16, *Massey* (6) 22–3.
Article 22, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 11.
Danger of false sense of security, *Massey* (6) 23.
Danzig administration, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 9; *Smuts* (7) 3.
Discretion, need for, *Bruce* (6) 20; *Smuts* (7) 5.
Discussions respecting, question of publication, (7) 11–12.
Effect of Italian-Greek crisis on, *Curzon* (6) 6, (7) 9; *Cecil* (6) 15; *Bruce* (6) 20.
Greek appeal to, *Curzon* (6) 3; *Cecil* (6) 10, 10–11, 14, approval of, *Massey* (6) 22.
Greek refugee loan scheme, *Curzon* (3) 20.
Indian support, *Peel* (7) 7.
and Iraq, *Devonshire* (2) 7, 8.
Irish Free State adhesion to, *MacNeill* (7) 6.
Italian defiance of: *Curzon* (6) 3; *Cecil* (6) 10, 12, 14; *Massey* (6) 23; *Smuts* (7) 3; *MacNeill* (7) 6.
Effect on public opinion in Canada, *King* (6) 18.
Precedents for Italian action, *Cecil* (6) 14–5.
and Italian-Greek crisis: *Baldwin* (1) 4; *Curzon* (6) 4; *Cecil* (6) 10.
British Government policy, *Curzon* (6) 4, 6; *Cecil* (6) 12.
Loan to Hungary under auspices of, proposed, *Curzon* (3) 21.
Machinery of, compared with that of Ambassadors' Conference, *Cecil* (6) 16–7.
Mandate for Palestine, *Curzon* (2) 18.
Mosul Vilayet question to be submitted to, if agreement not reached, *Curzon* (3) 25.
Signor Mussolini's attitude, *Smuts* (7) 4.
Opium question, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 9–10; *Peel* (7) 7–8, 9, 10.
Paragraphs for Report, (15) 9, (16) 8.
Position of the British Empire in relation to, *Massey* (6) 23.
Progress made and prospects for the future, *Bruce* (6) 20–1.
Promotion of international co-operation, results already achieved, *Cecil* (6) 8–9.
Rapallo Treaty registered with, *Cecil* (6) 16.
Saar administration, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 7, 8; *Smuts* (7) 2–3.
Silesia, decision, *Curzon* (3) 16.
General Smuts on, (1) 10.
Statement by Lord Robert Cecil (6) 7–18.
Secretariat, Indian representation inadequate, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (15) 15.
League of Nations—(*continued*).
Status of Dominions, (14) 36.
Status of in International disputes, *Cecil* (6) 9–10.
Treaty of Mutual Assistance, *Bruce* (6) 20; *Cecil* (7) 8.
Turkey and, *Curzon* (3) 25.
Value of: *Curzon* (3) 3; *Cecil* (6) 9; *Smuts* (7) 5, 6.
Personal opinion of, *Massey* (6) 22.
Welcome to Irish Free State as member, *Curzon* (7) 10.
World's need for, *Smuts* (7) 5–6.
Lithuania:
Position, *Curzon* (3) 17.
War with Poland prevented by League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 10.
Little Entente, *Curzon* (3) 3, 21–2.
Lloyd-Greame, the Right Hon. Sir Philip, K.B.E., M.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade:
Congo Agreement, (2) 14.
Programme of arrangements, (2) 24, 25.
Publicity, (2) 20, 24.
London:
Afghan Minister in, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Conferences, *Curzon* (3) 27, 28.
Loraine, Sir Percy, British Minister in Persia, *Curzon* (3) 9.
Lorenzo Marques, negotiations between General Smuts and Portugal respecting, *Curzon* (3) 14–5.

M.

MacNeill, Professor John, T.D., Minister of Education, Irish Free State:
Concluding speech, (16) 5.
George V, His Majesty, address to, (16) 3.
Italian-Greek crisis, (7) 6, 6–7.
League of Nations, (7) 6–7.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (6) 2.
Malaya:
Economic conditions improving, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Loan, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Mary, Her Majesty Queen:
Message to, (1) 14–15, reply (3) 2.
Visit to Rome, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Masaryk, Professor, President of Czecho-Slovakia, *Curzon* (3) 21.
Massey, the Right Hon. W. F., Prime Minister of New Zealand:
Afghanistan, possibility of trouble in, (4) 28.
Air defence of Great Britain, (11) 7, 8.
Appreciation of statements of Lord Curzon and Lord Robert Cecil, (6) 22.
Austria, (4) 30.
British Empire, need for improved methods of consultation, (4) 34.
British Empire Exhibition, (2) 11.
British Navy, proposed Empire cruise, (9) 22.
"C" Mandates and U.S.A., (14) 22.
China, (4) 27–8.
Concluding speech, (16) 5.
Cook Islands, (2) 11.
Coolidge, President, (4) 29.
Lord Curzon's speech, appreciation of, and comments on, (3) 31, (4) 25, 26.
Dardanelles forts, reinstatement not desirable, (4) 31.
Defence: (8) 15.
Dominion co-operation, (8) 15, 16, (11) 19.
an Empire matter, (9) 26–7.
Military position, seriousness of, (11) 6–7.

C 62955

Massey, the Right Hon. W. F.—(*continued*).
Defence—(*continued*).
Naval: (11) 7–8.
Capital ships, (8) 16, 17, (9) 23.
Importance of, (8) 15–16, (9) 23–4.
Light cruisers for defence of trade routes, (8) 16–7.
Local, not sufficient, (9) 23.
Maintenance of communications, importance of, (6) 23–4, (9) 23.
New Zealand, action taken and in prospect, (9) 25–6.
New Zealand's interest in, (9) 24–5.
Position of question in 1921 and at present, (11) 16.
Submarines, (9) 23.
Readiness of New Zealand to contribute, (11) 8.
Resolutions, (15) 2.
Dominions, position of, in event of Great Britain being involved in war, (4) 32, 33–4.
Dominions Royal Commission, (9) 22.
Egypt, (4) 29.
Empire development and less interference in European affairs, need for, (4) 26–7.
Entente, need for maintaining, (4) 26.
Falkland Islands whaling industry, (2) 16.
Fiji Islands, (2) 11–12, 15.
Foreign relations, non-publication of speeches desired, (5) 2–3.
Freedom of the Straits, (4) 31.
French, sympathy with, (4) 32.
George V, His Majesty:
Address to, (16) 3.
Message to, resolution seconded, (1) 15.
German reparations, (4) 31–2, (10) 7–8.
Harding, President, (4) 29.
Harington, General, appreciation of services, (4) 3.
High Commissioners, status of, (14) 15–6, 20, 21.
Imperial Conference: (9) 24.
Appointment of Committees, (2) 25, 26.
Joint Secretariat, (2) 27.
Status of India at, (13) 22–3.
Imperial Conferences, status of, (14) 15–6.
Imperial War Cabinets, (14) 16–7.
Imperial War Graves Commission, (15) 5.
Iraq, (2) 12.
Italian-Greek crisis, (6) 22–3.
Japan, (4) 27.
Lawrence, Colonel, (2) 12.
League of Nations, (6) 22–3.
Near Eastern Crisis, September 1922, (4) 30–1, (8) 18.
New Hebrides, (14) 11, 12, 13, 26.
New Zealand:
Feeling in, against war, (6) 24.
Indians, position of, (12) 19, (13) 22–4, comments on statement, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 30–1; *Peel* (14) 3.
Land defences, (8) 18.
Loss of ships during war, (8) 16.
Native races, enthusiasm on outbreak of Great War, (4) 33.
Volunteers during Near Eastern crisis, (8) 18.
Vote for naval defence, (8) 16.
Opening speech, (1) 9–10.
Pacific Islands, (2) 10–1.
Palestine, (2) 12, 16.
Personal position, (4) 25–6.
Poland, (4) 30.
Publicity, (2) 20, 21, 23, 28, (12) 19.
Raratonga, (2) 10, 11.
Ross Sea Territory, (2) 12.
Ruhr occupation, (4) 31–2.
Russia, (4) 28, 30.
Massey, the Right Hon. W. F.—(*continued*).
Lord Salisbury's statement, appreciation of, (8) 15.
Samoa, (2) 15.
Singapore naval base, (4) 27, (8) 13, 17–8, (9) 24, 26, (11) 8.
Spahlinger treatment for tuberculosis, (9) 28, (14) 21–2.
Soudan, (4) 29.
Suez Canal, (4) 29, (11) 8.
Treaties and agreements, difference between, (14) 15.
United States of America:
Friendly feeling in, towards Britain, (4) 28–9.
Friendly relations with, importance of, (4) 34.
Tariff, (4) 29.
Washington Conference, (4) 28–9, (6) 23–4, (14) 14.
Washington Treaty, (9) 23, 24.
Welcome to, *Smuts* (1) 10.
Mauritius, position of Indians in, *Devonshire* (13) 14; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 6.
Mediterranean, protection of: *Salisbury* (8) 6; *Smuts* (8) 21; *Amery* (9) 8–9.
Resolution, (15) 7, agreed to, (15) 3.
Meighan, Mr., quoted respecting 1921 Resolution on position of Indians, *King* (13) 17–8.
Mexico:
American diplomatic relations resumed, *Curzon* (3) 11.
British refusal to recognise Government of General Obregon, *Curzon* (3) 11.
Michigan, Lake, American scheme for Canal from, to Gulf of Mexico, *King* (4) 3–4.
Middle East, estimated expenditure, 1923–24, compared with 1921–22, *Devonshire* (2) 7, 9.
Military Defence, *see under* Defence.
Millspaugh, Dr., American Financial Adviser in Persia, *Curzon* (3) 9.
Milner, Lord, mission to Egypt, *Curzon* (3) 11.
Morocco:
Danger of extension of French power in, *Curzon* (3) 13, 14; *Salisbury* (8) 6.
French Protectorate, condition of British recognition, *Curzon* (3) 13.
Spanish zone, conditions in, *Curzon* (3) 13–4.
Mosul Vilayet, future of, *Devonshire* (2) 8; *Curzon* (3) 25.
Mozambique, agreement respecting recruiting labour for the Transvaal, 1909, referred to, (14) 34.
Mudania Armistice, October 1922, *Curzon* (3) 22.
Mulcahy, General R., Minister of Defence, Irish Free State:
Position of Irish Free State as regards naval defence, (9) 27–8.
Mussolini, Signor:
Agreement with Jugoslavia, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Attitude towards League of Nations, Smuts (7) 4.
Electoral Reform Bill, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Government of, *Curzon* (3) 17–8.
Ignorance of Covenant of the League of Nations, *Curzon* (3) 18.
and Italian-Greek crisis, *Curzon* (6) 3, 4–5, 5.
Policy of, Curzon (3) 18.
Mustapha Kemal, French support of, *Curzon* (3) 4.

57 4 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 9 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

N.

Natal, position of Indians in, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10; *Alwar* (12) 24, (14) 7; *Smuts* (13) 25, 26, 27.

Nationality, re-admission to British nationality of British-born women married to aliens, Committee on:
Appointment, (2) 25, 29–30.
Report and resolution, (14) 23–24, adopted and agreed to, (14) 11.

Naturalisation:
Committee of Enquiry in connection with revocation of certificates:
Appointment of Committee on, (2) 25, 29.
Resolution, (14) 23, agreed to, (14) 11.
Grant of, to persons resident in Mandated Territories:
Appointment of Committee on, (2) 25, 29.
Resolution, (14) 23, agreed to, (14) 11.

Naval Defence, *see under* Defence.

Near East:
Crisis, September 1922:
Canadian attitude, *King* (11) 18.
Manifesto to Dominions, *King* (4) 16–17, 17; *Curzon* (4) 17; *Massey* (4) 31.
New Zealand volunteers, *Massey* (8) 18.
Soviet anti-British propaganda, *Curzon* (3) 15.

Neuilly, Treaty of, *Curzon* (3) 19.

New Hebrides:
Anglo-French Condominium, Committee on:
Appointment, (2) 26, 30.
Report: (14) 25–7.
Adopted, (14) 13.
Discussion on, (14) 11–3.
Resolution, (14) 27.
Handing of, over to France, New Zealand would not agree, *Massey* (14) 11, 12, 13, 26.
Position in, (14) 23–6.

"New York Times," publication of information respecting discussion at Imperial Conference, *King* (7) 12.

New Zealand:
Administration of Samoa, *Massey* (2) 15–6.
Bolshevist propaganda in, *Massey* (4) 30.
Contribution to League of Nations, *Devonshire* (15) 14.
Contribution towards Singapore naval base, *Massey* (9) 26, (11) 8.
Control of Ross Sea Territory, *Massey* (2) 12.
Feeling in, against war, *Massey* (6) 24.
Fruit imports from certain Pacific Islands, preference to, *Massey* (2) 10.
Indians in, number and position, *Peel* (12) 4; *Tej Bahadur Sapru*, (12) 10, (13) 30–1, *Massey* (13) 22, 24; *Alwar* (14) 5–6.
Land defences, provision for, *Massey* (8) 18.
Native races, enthusiasm on outbreak of Great War, *Massey* (4) 33.
Naval defence:
Action taken and in prospect, *Massey* (9) 25–6.
Co-operation with Australia hoped for, *Massey* (9) 26–7.
Cost, *Amery* (9) 14.
Interest in, *Massey* (9) 24–5.
Vote, *Massey* (9) 26, (8) 16.
and New Hebrides, *Massey* (14) 11, 12, 13, 26.
Readiness to contribute to Empire Defence, *Massey* (11) 8.
Relations with Japan, *Massey* (4) 27.
Mr. Sastri's visit, *Massey* (13) 23–4.
and Singapore naval base, *Massey* (9) 24; *Smuts* (8) 19, 20.
Ships, loss of, during war, *Massey* (8) 16.
New Zealand—(*continued*).
Sugar imports, *Devonshire* (2) 6; *Massey* (2) 10–11.
Volunteers during Near Eastern crisis, 1922, *Massey* (8) 18.
Willingness to send contingent during Near Eastern crisis, 1922, *Massey* (4) 31.

Newfoundland:
Indians in, position of, *Warren* (13) 28; *Alwar* (14) 6, 6.
Interests in League of Nations in hands of Lord Robert Cecil, *Warren* (7) 7.
Iron ore export to the Ruhr, *Warren* (5) 15.
Position of, *Warren* (1) 13, (5) 15.
Position of, in relation to treaties, historical memorandum, (14) 33.
Royal Naval Reserve, *Warren* (11) 9.

Newcastle, American vice-consul, withdrawal of exequatur, *Curzon* (3) 10.

Nigeria, railway construction, *Devonshire* (2) 4.

Nikolaevsk, massacre of Japanese at, *Curzon* (3) 6.

Nincic, M., Foreign Minister of the Serbians, (7) 9.

Nish, agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia, *Curzon* (3) 19.

North Africa, French Air Force in, *Hoare* (10) 16.

Northern Rhodesia, administration by British Government from the 1st April, 1924, *Devonshire* (2) 5.

Northern Saghalien, status question, *Curzon* (3) 6.

Nyasa, Lake, railway connection with Beira, *Devonshire* (2) 4.

O.

Obregon, General, British refusal to recognise Government of, *Curzon* (3) 11.

Official correspondence between Governments, publication of:
Committee on:
Appointment of, (14) 20.
Report of, (15) 10, 11–12, agreed to, (15) 5–6.
Position respecting, and divergent views, *King* (14) 18–20.

O'Higgins, Kevin, T.D., Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State:
Irish Free State:
Position, (5) 13–4.
Preoccupation with domestic problems, (5) 14.
Relations with Great Britain, (5) 14–5.
U.S.A., anti-British feeling in, (5) 14–5.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (3) 2.

Opium Traffic:
League of Nations and, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 9–10; *Peel* (7) 7–8, 9,10.
Position of India as regards, *Peel* (7) 7, 8, 10; *Cecil* (7) 10.

Ormsby-Gore, the Hon. W. G., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office:
Forthcoming visit to British West African Colonies, *Devonshire* (2) 3.
Ruanda, further portion made over to Belgium, (2) 13.
Visit to West Indies and British Guiana, 1922, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

P.

Pacific:
Base in:
Imperative if battleships continued in programme of Navy, *Bruce* (8) 19.
Need for, *Bruce* (8) 12, 14–5, (11) 5, 6.

Pacific—(*continued*).
Naval defence, importance of, *Massey* (9) 24–5.
better Protection in, needed, *Massey* (4) 27.
Quadruple Treaty, *Baldwin* (1) 5; *Curzon* (3) 5; *Bruce* (8) 14–5; *Smuts* (8) 20.

Pacific Cable Board, proposed management by, of wireless and cable communication between Canada and West Indies, *Devonshire* (3) 3–4; *King* (2) 10.

Pacific Islands under control of New Zealand:
Conditions in, *Massey* (2) 10.
Fruit, preference to imports into New Zealand, *Massey* (2) 10.

Palestine:
Administration by Sir Herbert Samuel, *Devonshire* (2) 9.
Air station proposed in, *Salisbury* (8) 6.
Arab Council:
Proposal, *Devonshire* (2) 9–10; *Curzon* (2) 19.
Reception of offer by Arabs, *Devonshire* (16) 2–3.
Arabs in:
Administration by, impossible, *Curzon* (2) 18.
British policy towards, *Curzon* (2) 19.
Care should be taken not to do injustice to, *Massey* (2) 12, 16.
Difficulties with, *Smuts* (2) 15.
British troops in, *Derby* (10) 11, 12
Cabinet Committee enquiry into question and new proposals to be submitted, *Devonshire* (2) 9–10.
Charge to British Exchequer, 1922–23, and estimates 1923–24 and 1924–25, *Devonshire* (2) 9.
Garrison, reduction, *Devonshire* (2) 9.
Legislative Council, suspension of establishment of, *Devonshire* (2) 9.
Mr. Massey on, (2) 12.
Policy respecting, approved, *Smuts* (2) 19.
Political situation, *Devonshire* (2) 9, (16) 2–3.
Royal Air Force in, *Derby* (10) 12; *Hoare* (10) 15.
Strategic considerations, *Salisbury* (8) 6.
Sykes–Picot Agreement, *Curzon* (3) 9.
Zionist (National Home) Policy:
Abandonment of, not advocated, *Massey* (2) 16.
should be Adhered to, *Curzon* (2) 17 8; *Smuts* (2) 15, 19; *Baldwin* (2) 19.
Arab opposition to, and delegation to London, *Devonshire* (2) 9.
Balfour Declaration, *Devonshire* (2) 9; *Curzon* (3) 9, 17.

Peace Conference, status of Dominions, (14) 36.

Peel, the Right Hon. Viscount, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India:
Address to His Majesty the King, (16) 3.
Bolshevist menace in India and Afghanistan, (5) 16–7.
Concluding speech, (16) 5.
German reparations, Expert Committee, (13) 12.
India:
Army reductions, (11) 9.
new Constitution, (12) 3–4.
Culture and tradition, (12) 5–6.
Defence, position, (8) 22.
Feeling for Empire, (12) 4.
Importance of, to the Empire, (12) 4.
Industrial position, (12) 3.
New status, (12) 3.
Services to the Empire, (12) 3.
Indians, position of, in the Dominions, (2) 16, (12) 2–6, (14) 3–4, appreciation of speech, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 6.
League of Nations, (7) 7, (9) 28, (15) 6.
Peel, the Right Hon. Viscount, G.B.E.—(*continued*).
Opium question, (7) 7–8.
Persian Gulf, policing of, (11) 10, 11.
Publicity, (2) 21, (12) 18, 19, 20, (13) 33.
Royal Indian Marine, (11) 10–11.
Thanks to, *Alwar* (12) 25; *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (14) 11.
Turkish Treaty, good effects in India, (5) 17.

Persia:
Bolshevist propaganda in, *Curzon* (3) 9; *Massey* (4) 28.
Opposed to amendment of article 10 of League of Nations Covenant, *Cecil* (6) 19.
Situation in, *Curzon* (3) 9.

Persian Gulf, policing of, *Peel* (11) 10–11.

Philippine Islands, Japan and, *Curzon* (3) 6.

Phillips, F., India's contribution to League of Nations, (15) 17, 21.

Poincaré, M., attitude of, *see* France.

Poland:
Army, *Derby* (10) 10.
Conditions in, *Curzon* (3) 3, 16–17.
and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 16.
Seizure and retention of Vilna, *Curzon* (3) 16.
Mr. Massey on, (4) 30.
War with Lithuania prevented by League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 10.

Politis, M., Greek representative on League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 11, 22.

Pollock, Sir Frederick, (6) 11, 14.

Pope, Sir Joseph, on publication of correspondence between His Majesty's and Canadian Governments, *King* (14) 18, 19.

Porter, Stephen, on value of the League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 9.

Portugal:
British relations with, *Curzon* (3) 14.
Negotiations respecting Lorenzo Marques, *Curzon* (3) 14–15.

Protectorates, grant of naturalisation to persons in, resolution, (14) 23, agreed, (14) 11.

Publicity:
Lord Curzon's statement, proposed publication of certain parts of, (2) 28–9, result, (5) 2.
Defence discussions, need for secrecy as regards, (2) 21.
Dominion Cabinets must decide on what should be published, *King* (9) 19–20.
Foreign relations speeches:
Need for secrecy, *Curzon* (2) 20–1, (3) 2.
Non-publication, (5) 2–3.
Indians, position of, in the Empire, question of publication of speeches, (12) 18–20, 21, (13) 33; *Baldwin* (14) 10.
Leakage of information, *Massey* (2) 23.
Minister in Charge, appointment, (2) 19–24, 27.
League of Nations discussions, question of, (7) 11–12.
Naval defence discussions, question of, (9) 28.
Press communiqués, (1) 15, (2) 27–8, (3) 22, 31, (4) 34, (5) 22.
Reporting of proceedings, question of, *Baldwin* (1) 2.
Secrecy essential to frank discussion, *King* (2) 21–2.
Value of, *King* (1) 9, (2) 22–3.

Punjab, unrest in, *Peel* (5) 17.

R.

Raffles, Sir Bamford, quoted respecting Singapore naval base, *Amery* (9) 11.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

Rapallo, Treaty of:
Agreement signed between M. Mussolini and Jugoslavia for amplification of, but not carried out, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Registration with League of Nations by Serbian Government, *Cecil* (6) 16.

Raratonga:
Conditions in, *Massey* (2) 10, 11.
Message of loyalty and affection sent to King George, *Massey* (2) 11.

Rathenau, assassination referred to, *Curzon* (3) 27.

Reading, Lord, and position of Indians in the Empire, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 8, 9, *Alwar* (12) 25.

Red Sea, maintenance of safe passage through, resolution, (15) 7, agreed to (15) 3.

"Repulse," H.M.S., proposed Empire cruise, *Amery* (9) 13–4.

the Rhine, British troops on, *Derby* (10) 11–12.

Rhineland, Separatist Movement:
British attitude towards, *Curzon* (13) 10–12.
British Government's telegram to the Allies, *Curzon*, (14) 2.
Importance of defining British policy towards, *Smuts* (13) 9, 11.
Paragraphs for Report respecting, (15) 9, (16) 7.

Richardson, General, Administrator at Samoa, *Massey* (2) 16.

Robertson, Sir Benjamin, and immigration of Indians to British Guiana, *Smuts* (2) 14.

Rodd, Sir Rennell, contributions to League of Nations, allocation (15) 15–17, 20, 21.

Ross Sea Territory:
Control by New Zealand on behalf of Imperial Government, *Massey* (2) 12.
Oil:
Control of industry necessary, *Massey* (2) 12.
Export during war to Norway and Germany, *Massey* (2) 12.
Seal fishing industry, *Massey* (2) 12.
Whale fishing industry, conservation necessary, *Massey* (2) 12.

Roumania:
Contribution to League of Nations, *Rodd* (15) 16, 17.
and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 16.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–5.
Position in, *Curzon* (3) 3, 21–2.

Ruanda, further portion made over to Belgium, *Smuts* (2) 13, 14; *Ormsby-Gore* (2) 13.

Ruhr:
probable Future conditions in, *Smuts* (5) 10.
Newfoundland trade with, and effect of occupation, *Warren* (5) 15.
Occupation:
British attitude, *Baldwin* (1) 3; *Curzon* (3) 28–9, criticism, *Smuts* (5) 7.
British non-participation, continuance urged, *Smuts* (5) 9–10.
British participation, probable downfall of Germany might have been prevented, *Alwar* (5) 18.
Mr. Bruce on, (4) 22, 23.
Canadian opinion regarding, *King* (4) 18.
History, *Curzon* (3) 4, 28–30.
Indian opinion regarding, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 19–20.
Italian attitude, *Curzon* (3) 18.
Mr. Massey on, (4) 31–2.
Passive resistance of Germany, *Baldwin* (1) 3; *Curzon* (3) 28, 29, collapse, *Baldwin* (1) 3; *Curzon* (3) 30.

Ruhr—(*continued*).
Occupation—(*continued*).
Peace must be based on law and justice, *Smuts* (5) 13.
Termination essential for European settlement, *Smuts* (5) 12.
Ruhrort, illegal seizure of, by France, *Smuts* (5) 12.

Rumbold, Sir Horace, at Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 23.

Rush–Bagot Agreement, 1817, proposed revision, *King* (4) 7–8.

Russia:
Army, *Derby* (10) 10.
British subjects imprisoned in, proceedings respecting, *Curzon* (3) 15.
Communism, *Curzon* (3) 16.
Future outlook, *Curzon* (3) 16.
Indebtedness to Britain, *Curzon* (3) 16; *Massey* (4) 30.
Internal conditions and trade, *Curzon* (3) 16.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 23–4.
Menace of in Eastern Europe, *Smuts* (5) 8.
Position in, *Curzon* (3) 3; *Massey* (4) 30.
Relations with, *Smuts* (5) 10.
Soviet Government:
anti-British propaganda and obtaining of pledge against, *Curzon* (3) 15.
British ultimatum to, *Curzon* (3) 15.
Conferences with, failure of, *Curzon* (3) 15.
Illegal proceedings against British fishing vessels, *Curzon* (3) 15.
Japanese Conferences with, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Mission in Kabul, *Curzon* (3) 8.
Recognition of, British attitude, *Curzon* (3) 16.
Trade Agreement with, *Curzon* (3) 15.
Soviet intrigue and propaganda:
Afghanistan, *Massey* (4) 28; *Peel* (5) 16–7.
India: *Peel* (5) 17.
no Chance of success, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (5) 20.
Mr. Massey on, (4) 30.
New Zealand, *Massey* (4) 30.
Persia, *Curzon* (3) 9; *Massey* (4) 28.
careful Watching of position in, need for, *Massey* (4) 30.
Working agreement with, desired by Japanese, *Curzon* (3) 6.
Working agreement with Japan would be serious matter and might lead to difficulties, *Massey* (4) 27.

S.

Saar administration, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 7–8; *Smuts* (7) 2–3.

St. Lawrence Waterway:
Improvement scheme, *King* (4) 5
Policing question, *King* (4) 8.

St. Lucia, constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

St. Vincent, constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

Salandra, Signor, Italian representative on the League of Nations, *Cecil* (6) 11, 12, 14.

Salisbury, the Most Hon. the Marquess of, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., Lord President of the Council:
Air situation, mitigating circumstances in connection with, (11) 13.
Armaments, reduction of, British policy, (8) 2.
Cape, route to the East round, (8) 5, 6.
Censorship, (8) 9.

Salisbury, the Most Hon. the Marquess of, K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.—(*continued*).
Committee of Imperial Defence, (8) 2–3, 8, 9, 18–19.
Defence:
Co-operation with the Dominions, (11) 13.
Resolution, (11) 13–14, 14, (5) 2, 3.
Secrecy as regards discussions, need for, (2) 21.
Statement, (8) 2–9, appreciation of, *Massey* (8) 15; *Bruce* (11) 3, reply to discussion (11) 12–4.
Thanks to representatives of Dominions and India, (11) 12–13.
Egypt, preservation of communications with British Empire, (8) 5–6.
France, air force, (8) 8.
Fuelling bases on lines of communication, (8) 5.
Gibraltar, Straits of, (8) 6.
Great Britain:
Air Force, (8) 8.
Defence of, enquiry by Committee of Imperial Defence, (8) 7–8.
Food supplies in times of war, (8) 6–7.
High Commissioners, status, (14) 20, 21.
Japan, (8) 3, 5.
Mediterranean, (8) 6.
Palestine, strategic considerations, (8) 6.
Singapore naval base, (8) 4–5, 13, 14.
Suez Canal, (8) 5–6, (11) 13.
Tangier, strategic importance of, (8) 6.
War Books, compilation, (8) 9.
Washington Agreements, (8) 3–4.

Salmond, Sir John, quoted on procedure at Washington Conference, (14) 14.

Samoa:
Administration of, *Massey* (2) 15–16.
Message of loyalty and affection sent to H.M. the King, *Massey* (2) 15.

Samuel, Sir Herbert, Administration in Palestine, *Devonshire* (2) 9, 10.

Sastri, Right Hon. V. Srinivasa: (12) 9, 15, 17, (13) 25, 31.
Mission of:
to Canada, *King* (4) 11, (13) 18, 19; *Alwar* (14) 7.
Effect of, *Smuts* (13) 24.
to New Zealand, *Massey* (13) 23–4.

Schanzer, M., Italian Foreign Minister, intrigues of, *Curzon* (3) 18.

Serbia:
See Jugoslavia.

Sèvres, Treaty of, *Curzon* (3) 23, 23–4.

Seychelles:
Deportation of agitators to, from Egypt, *Curzon* (3) 11–12.
Return of Zaghlul Pasha from, *Curzon* (3) 12.

Shantung Railway, return to China by Japan, *Curzon* (3) 5.

Siberia, Japanese Expeditionary Force withdrawn, *Curzon* (3) 5.

Sifton, Sir Clifford, on position of the Dominions in reference to foreign affairs, *King* (4) 12.

Silesia, League of Nations decision, *Curzon* (3) 16.

Singapore Naval Base:
Approval of proposal, *Massey* (4) 27.
British policy, *Salisbury* (8) 4.
not Contrary to spirit of Washington Treaty, *Salisbury* (8) 4; *Bruce* (8) 12; *Amery* (9) 10–11.
Defence of, till arrival of main fleet, *Amery* (9) 11–12.

Singapore Naval Base—(*continued*).
Development of, without interruption, question whether any understanding respecting, at Washington Conference, *Bruce* (8) 13.
Doubts in connection with, *Smuts* (8) 19–20.
Garrisons, fortifications, &c., *Bruce* (8) 13–14; *Amery* (9) 11–12; *Derby* (10) 12.
Implications of construction, *Smuts* (8) 19.
Information required in connection with, *Bruce* (8) 12–13.
Invulnerability of, *Derby* (10) 12.
Japanese attitude, *Curzon* (3) 6, (8) 20; *Salisbury* (8) 13.
Length of time needed for development, *Salisbury* (8) 5.
Mr. Massey on, (8) 17–8.
Money contribution by Australia, question of, *Salisbury* (8) 14; *Bruce* (8) 14.
Need for, *Salisbury* (8) 4, 5.
New Zealand approval and contribution, *Massey* (9) 24, 26, (11) 8.
Objects of, *Amery* (9) 9–10.
Possibility of avoiding development, *Bruce* (8) 14.
Resolution, (11) 16, (15) 7, agreed to, (15) 3.
General Smuts on, (8) 19, (10) 22.
Strategical importance of, *Amery* (9) 9, 11; *Bruce* (11) 5–6.
Strategic position, question respecting, *Bruce* (8) 12–13.

Skelton, Dr. O. D., India's contribution to the League of Nations, (15) 17, 21.

Smith, Sir James Masterton, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, New Hebrides, (14) 13, 26.

Smuts, General the Right Hon. J. C., C.H., K.C., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa:
Address to, respecting position of Indians in South Africa, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 14–16.
Africa:
Communication between North and South, (2) 13, 14.
Field for British development, (2) 12.
Mr. Amery's statement, appreciation of, (9) 27.
Appeal to, *Alwar* (14) 7.
Attitude towards Indians, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10.
Austria, restoration of, (7) 2.
British Empire:
Need for maintaining prestige of, (5) 5–6, 6–7.
Power of, (1) 11.
British Guiana, emigration to, (2) 14.
Committee of Imperial Defence, (8) 18.
Concluding speech, (16) 5.
Lord Curzon's speech, comments on, (5) 4.
Danzig administration, (7) 3.
Defence:
Armaments, danger of present position, (10) 21.
Contributions from Dominions, (8) 21.
Dangers nearer Great Britain, (8) 21.
Imperial co-operation, (8) 21.
Naval:
One-Power standard, comments on draf resolution, (11) 15.
Position of question in 1921 and at present. (11) 15.
no immediate naval or military menace to the Empire, (10) 21–2.
Resolutions, question of, (11) 14–15.
European affairs:
British policy of isolation impossible, (5) 5.
Dominions' right to part in settlement of, (5) 6.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 62960

Smuts, General the Right Hon. J. C., C.H., K.C.—(*continued*).
European affairs—(*continued*).
Withdrawal from, question of, (5) 4–5.
Europe, situation in, and need for peace, (1) 10, 12.
Financial position of Great Britain and Germany, (5) 9.
Foreign policy:
General observations, (5) 4.
Relations of various parts of the Empire in, (5) 3–4.
France:
British policy towards, criticism, (5) 6–7.
Policy of, criticism, (5) 9.
Rivalry between Great Britain and, (5) 8.
Germany:
Break-up of, possible results and importance of preventing, (5) 8–9.
British attitude, criticism, (5) 7.
Reparations:
Conference of Allied Governments, (10) 6–7.
Expert Committee, (13) 7–8, 9, 12.
suggested Solution, (5) 11–12.
Restoration of currency and credit, proposal, (5) 11.
Settlement with France, possibility of, (5) 8.
Western, suggested neutralisation of part of, (5) 12.
Great Britain:
Air Force, single, approval, (10) 21.
Air menace from France, (10) 22–4.
High Commissioners, status of, (14) 16, 17, 20, 21.
Imperial Conference:
Appointment of Committees, (2) 25, 26.
Joint Secretariat, (2) 27.
Indians, position of, (13) 24–7, comments on, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 15–16, (13) 31–2; *Peel* (14) 3.
Inter-Allied debts, suggested moratorium, (5) 11.
Inter-Imperial trade, (1) 12.
Irish Free State representatives, welcome to, (1) 10.
Italian-Greek crisis, (7) 3, 4, 5.
Janina murders and occupation of Corfu (1) 12.
Jewish influence, (2) 15.
Kenya:
Indians in, (13) 24–5.
Trade agreement with, (2) 14.
Lausanne Treaty, ratification, (15) 11.
League of Nations, (1) 11, (7) 2, 4–6, 11.
New Hebrides, (14) 12.
Opening speech, (1) 10–12.
Pacific Quadruple Pact, (8) 20.
Palestine, position in, (2) 15, 19.
Portugal, negotiations with, respecting Lorenzo Marques, *Curzon* (3) 14–15.
Programme of arrangements, (2) 24, 25.
Publicity, (2) 28–9, (9) 28, (12) 18–19.
Rhineland, Separatist movement in, (13) 9, 11.
Ruanda boundary, (2) 13–14.
Ruhr occupation, (5) 7, 9–10, 12.
Russia, (5) 10.
Saar administration, (7) 2–3, 5.
Singapore naval base, (8) 19–20.
South Africa, defence position, (10) 21.
Tanganyika, white settlement, (2) 13.
Thanks to, for invitation, *Alwar* (14) 5.
Tribute to, *Alwar* (12) 25.
proposed Tripartite Agreement between Great Britain, France and Germany, (5) 10.
United States of America:
Debt to, (1) 12.
Support of, in European settlement, need for, (5) 10.
Smuts, General the Right Hon. J. C., C.H., K.C.—(*continued*).
Thanks to, for invitation, *Alwar* (14) 5.
Versailles Treaty, (5) 12.
Washington Conference, (1) 10–11.
Welcomed to India, *Alwar* (12) 26.
South Africa:
Attitude to Indian problem in Kenya, *Smuts* (13) 24–5.
Contribution to League of Nations, *Devonshire* (15) 14.
Defence position, *Smuts* (10) 21.
Indians in:
Emigration to British Guiana, question of, *Smuts* (2) 14.
Position of: *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10–11, 12, (13) 32; *Smuts* (13) 25–6, 27; *Peel* (14) 4; *Alwar* (14) 5, 6.
Address to General Smuts, *Tej Bahadur Sapru*, (12) 14–16.
General Smuts' memorandum, comments on, *Tej Bahadur Sapru*, (12) 15–6.
Naval defence, cost, *Amery* (9) 14.
and Ratification of Treaty of Lausanne, *Smuts* (15) 11.
Suffrage qualifications, *Smuts* (13) 25–6.
Trade agreement with Kenya, desire for, and question of Congo Agreement in connection with, *Smuts* (2) 14.
South Georgia, whaling industry, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
South Orkneys, whaling industry, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
South Sandwich Islands, whaling industry, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
South Shetlands, whaling industry, *Devonshire* (2) 6.
Southern Rhodesia, constitution of responsible Government, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
Spahlinger treatment for tuberculosis, *Massey* (9) 28; (14) 21–2; (16) 4, note.
Spain:
British relations with, *Curzon* (3) 14.
and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 13.
Military revolt, *Curzon* (3) 14.
Negotiations with, respecting Tangier, *Curzon* (3) 13.
Republican movement, *Curzon* (3) 14.
von Spee, Admiral, Falkland Islands battle, *Amery* (9) 4, 10; *Massey* (9) 25.
Sperling, R.A.C., C.M.G., New Hebrides, (14) 25, 26.
Stambolisky, M., policy of, &c., *Curzon* (3) 18–19.
Strakosch, Sir Henry, South African representative on League of Nations, *Smuts* (7) 2.
Stresemann, Herr, *Curzon* (3) 30.
Soudan, Mr. Massey on, (4) 29.
Suez Canal:
Defence of, importance of, *Salisbury* (8) 5, 6, (11) 13; *Derby* (10) 11; *Bruce* (11) 3–4, 6; *Massey* (11) 8.
Leasehold tenure of, *Massey* (4) 29.
Paragraphs for report, (15) 9.
Sweden, and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 13.
Sykes–Picot Agreement, *Curzon* (3) 9.
Syria, French mandate for, *Curzon* (2) 18.

T.

Takoradi, Gold Coast, harbour works, *Devonshire* (2) 4.

c 62961

Tanganyika Territory:
Administration, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
Agriculture, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
Boundary, *Ormsby-Gore* (2) 13.
"Compulsory servitude," abolition, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
General conditions, *Devonshire* (2) 4–5.
Indians in, position of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 11; *Devonshire* (13) 14.
Land Law, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
Military garrison, reduced, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
Native education, *Devonshire* (2) 5.
Timber resources, *Smuts* (2) 14.
White settlement, question of, *Devonshire* (2) 5; *Smuts* (2) 13.
Tangier:
International administration, negotiations respecting, *Curzon* (3) 13, 14; *Salisbury* (8) 6.
Strategic importance of, *Curzon* (3) 13; *Salisbury* (8) 6.
Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir, K.C.S.I.:
Afghanistan, need for stable and careful policy in regard to, (5) 21.
Appreciation of Lord Curzon's speech, (5) 19.
"C" Mandated Territories, (12) 11.
European settlement, India's interest in, (5) 19–20.
High Commissioners, status, (14) 21.
Imperial Conference, functions of, (12) 7.
India:
Bolshevism in, (5) 20.
Contribution to League of Nations, (15) 6, 14–15, 18, 19, 19–20, 21, 22.
Immigration from, (12) 12.
Opinion on Ruhr occupation and French policy, (5) 19–20.
Position of, (5) 19.
Position of, in the Empire, (12) 7, 16–17.
Indians position of, in the Empire: (2) 16–17, 23, (12) 6–18.
Appeal to Mr. Baldwin and His Majesty's Government, (12) 17–8.
Appeal to the Conference, (12) 16–17.
Appreciation of reception of proposals, (13) 29.
Comments on statements, (13) 29–32.
Committees in each Colony and Dominion, &c., to confer with Committees from India, suggestion, (12) 13–14.
Effect of discussion on Indian opinion, (14) 10.
Resolution of 1921 Conference, (12) 12–13, (13) 30.
formal Resolution not necessary, (14) 11.
Kenya question, (12) 8–9, 11, (13) 29.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2.
Thanks to, *Peel* (14) 11.
Telegraphic Communication:
Turks Islands to Barbadoes, scheme for all-British cable, *Devonshire*, (2) 3–4.
West Indies, *Devonshire*, (2) 3–4; *King* (2) 10.
Tellini, General, murder, *see* Janina murders.
Territorial Waters:
Committee on:
Appointment of, (2) 25, 30.
Report and resolutions, (14) 28–9, agreed to, (14) 14.
Three-Mile Limit:
Extension to twelve, proposal an Empire matter, *King* (4) 9.
Importance of maintenance of principle, *Curzon* (15) 3.
Transjordania:
Administration by Emir Abdullah, assisted by British adviser, *Devonshire* (2) 10.
Royal Air Force in, *Hoare* (10) 15.
Transvaal:
Indians in, position of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 10; *Alwar* (14) 6.
Recruitment of labour from Mozambique, 1909 agreement, (14) 34.
Suffrage qualifications and position of Indians, Smuts, (13) 25–6.
Treaties:
Difference between agreements and, *Massey* (14) 15.
Position of Dominions and India in relation to signature, &c., of:
Committee on:
Appointment, (2) 25, 30.
Report and resolution, (14) 14, 31, 32–3, approved, (14) 17.
Historical memorandum on, (14) 33–7.
Resolution, publication question, (14) 17.
Trincomali, future fuelling base, *Salisbury* (8) 5.
Trinidad:
Constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.
Indians in, position of, *Devonshire* (13) 14; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 6.
Oil industry, *Devonshire* (2) 3.
Tsankoff, M., Bulgaria, Government of, *Curzon* (3) 19.
Turkey:
enhanced British prestige, *Curzon* (3) 25.
Claim to Mosul, *Devonshire* (2) 8; *Curzon* (3) 25.
Conclusion of peace with, *Curzon* (3) 3, *see also* Lausanne, Treaty of.
Foreigners residing and trading in, provisions of Treaty of Lausanne, *Curzon* (3) 25.
Future of, *Curzon* (3) 25.
Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–5.
and League of Nations, *Curzon* (3) 25.
Sultan, deposition, *Curzon* (3) 22.
Treaty of Lausanne, *see* Lausanne, Treaty of.
War with Greece: *Curzon* (3) 19–20, 22.
French support of Mustapha Kemal, *Curzon* (3) 4.
Turks of Angora, French agreement with, *Curzon* (3) 4, 22.
Turks Islands, scheme for all-British cable to Barbadoes, *Devonshire* (2) 3–4.

U.

Uganda:
Boundary, *Ormsby-Gore* (2) 13.
Indians in, position of, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (12) 11; *Devonshire* (13) 14.
Railway administration, training of natives, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
United States of America:
Appeal should be made to, to join proposed International Allied Reparations Conference, *Smuts* (5) 11.
Army of occupation on the Rhine, *Curzon* (3) 11.
Attitude respecting European situation, *King* (4) 18.
Attitude towards "C" Mandates, (14) 22, proposed reference to committee, *Baldwin* (10) 24.
British debt to, *Baldwin* (1) 4–5; *Smuts* (1) 12, (5) 9; *Curzon* (3) 10, 30.
anti-British agitation in, *Curzon* (3) 10.
British relations with, *Curzon* (3) 9–19.
Canadian relations with, *King* (4) 2–10, 12–13, (9) 18, (14) 34–5.
Lord Robert Cecil's visit, good effects, *King* (6) 18.
Coal imports into Canada, *King* (4) 8.
Copra imports from Cook Islands, *Massey* (2) 11.

57 74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

United States of America—(*continued*).
Delegation to League of Nations in connection with opium question, *Cecil* (6) 9, (7) 9–10; *Peel* (7) 7, 8, 9.
Diplomatic relations resumed with Mexico, *Curzon* (3) 11.
Fisheries Conference with Canada, 1918, (14) 35.
Friendly feeling in, towards Britain, *Massey* (4) 28–9.
Friendly relations with, importance of, *Massey* (4) 34.
Goodwill between Canada and, *King* (4) 5.
Halibut Treaty with Canada, *King* (4) 6–7, (14) 35.
Hostility to League of Nations, *Curzon* (3) 10
and Inter-Allied debts, *Smuts* (5) 11.
International Joint Commission: *King* (4) 3–4, (14) 34–5.
Leakage of information respecting Conference discussion, *King* (7) 12.
Japanese relations with, *Curzon* (3) 6.
and Lausanne Conference, *Curzon* (3) 22–3.
Liquor smuggling from Canada, *King* (4) 9.
Liquor traffic:
Committee:
proposed Reference of question to, *Baldwin* (10) 24.
Report, (14) 31.
Negotiations respecting, history of, *Curzon* (15) 3–5.
Paragraphs for Report, (15) 9, (16) 7–8.
Member on Reparations Commission withdrawn, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Navy, and comparison with British, *Amery* (9) 6, 7–8.
Opinion in the centre and in the west, importance of, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Participation in German reparations question, *see under* Reparations *under* Germany.
Postal convention with Canada, revision, *King* (4) 5.
Pulpwood export to, from Canada, embargo question, *King* (4) 8–9.
Representation at Lausanne, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Rush–Bagot Agreement, 1817, proposed revision, *King* (4) 7–8.
and St. Lawrence waterway improvement scheme, *King* (4) 5.
Ship Subsidy Bill, *Curzon* (3) 10.
and Singapore naval base, *Massey* (8) 17–8.
State-owned shipping, difficulties owing to, *Curzon* (3) 10.
Support of, in European settlement, need for, *Smuts* (5) 10.
Tariff, *Curzon* (3) 11; *King* (4) 8; *Massey* (4) 29.
Treaties and negotiations with, position of Canada, historical memorandum, (14) 33–5.
Vice-consul at Newcastle, withdrawal of exequatur, *Curzon* (3) 10.
War debt policy, *Curzon* (3) 10, 11.
Washington, *see that title.*
Western States, feeling in, *Massey* (4) 29.
Universal Postal Union, status of Dominions, (14) 36.
Uruguay, and Italian-Greek crisis, *Cecil* (6) 13.

V.

Venizelos, M., *Curzon* (3) 19, 20.
Versailles Conference, ex-President Wilson and, *King* (4) 16.
Versailles Treaty:
Breach of, by France, *Smuts* (5) 7, 10.
Occupation clauses, objection to, and proposed substitution for, *Smuts* (5) 12.
Versailles Treaty—(*continued*).
Provision of troops for carrying out military conditions, left to Great Britain, *Derby* (10) 11–12.
Vilna, seizure and retention by Poland, *Curzon* (3) 16.

W.

War Books, compilation:
by Committee of Imperial Defence, *Salisbury* (8) 9.
by Dominions, suggestion, *Salisbury* (8) 9.
Warren, the Hon. W. R., K.C., Prime Minister of Newfoundland:
Appreciation of Lord Curzon's speech, (5) 15.
Concluding speech, (16) 5.
Defence: (8) 22.
Admiralty memoranda, (11) 9.
Dominion contributions, (11) 9.
Foreign policy, relations of various parts of the Empire, (5) 15–16.
German reparations, Expert Committee, (13) 12.
Indians, position of, (13) 28, comments on statement, *Tej Bahadur Sapru* (13) 32; *Peel* (14) 3.
Irish Free State representatives, welcome to, (1) 13.
Labrador frontier question, (5) 15.
League of Nations, (7) 7.
Newfoundland:
Position of, (1) 13, (5) 15.
Royal Naval Reserve, (11) 9.
Opening speech, (1) 13.
Ruhr occupation, (5) 15.
United States of America, (5) 15.
Welcome to, *Baldwin* (1) 2.
Washington:
Canadian representation at, position respecting, *King* (4) 5–6.
Conference: *Baldwin* (1) 5, (8) 3; *King* (4) 16.
Good results of, *Massey* (4) 28–9.
Mr. Massey on, (6) 23.
New Zealand representation, *Massey* (10) 8.
Position prior to, *Amery* (9) 6.
Publicity arrangements, *Hankey* (2) 20.
General Smuts on, (1) 10–11.
Status of Dominions, *Massey* (14) 14, (14) 36.
Understanding at, in connection with Singapore naval base, question of, *Bruce* (8) 13.
Treaties: *Baldwin* (1) 5.
Balance of power under, *Massey* (9) 23, 24.
British action in carrying out, *Amery* (9) 6–7; *Smuts* (10) 21.
Circumstances favourable for, *Amery* (9) 7.
Effect of, *Salisbury* (8) 3–4.
Paragraphs for Report, (15) 9, (16) 7.
Position resulting from, *Amery* (9) 7–8.
Singapore development not a breach of, *Salisbury* (8) 4; *Bruce* (9) 12; *Amery* (9) 10–11.
Wei-hai Wei, position respecting restoration to China, *Curzon* (3) 6–7.
West Indies:
Agricultural College, change into Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, *Devonshire* (2) 4.
Constitutional reforms, *Devonshire* (2) 3.
Economic position, *Devonshire* (2) 3.
Indians in, position, *Devonshire* (13) 4; *Peel* (14) 3; *Alwar* (14) 6.
Telegraphic communications, *Devonshire* (2) 3–4.
Visit of Mr. Edward Wood and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, 1922, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

West Indies—(*continued*).
Wireless and cable communication with Canada, proposed management of, by Pacific Cable Board approved, *King* (2) 10.
Whaling industry in South Atlantic.
Wilson, ex-President, and Versailles Conference, *King* (4) 16.
Wilson, Senator the Hon. R. V., Honorary Minister in charge of Departments of Health and Migration, Australia, welcome to, *Baldwin* (4) 2.
Wireless Communications:
between Canada and West Indies, proposed management of, by Pacific Cable Board, *Devonshire* (2) 3–4, approved, *King* (2) 10.
Cook Islands, *Massey* (2) 11.
Wirth, Dr., and reparation payments, *Curzon* (3) 27.
Wood, Right Hon. Edward, visit to West Indies and British Guiana, 1922, *Devonshire* (2) 3.

Y.

Yehia Pasha Ibrahim, Egyptian Prime Minister, *Curzon* (3) 12.

Z.

Zaghlul Pasha: (3) 13.
Deportation from Egypt to the Seychelles, *Curzon* (3) 11–12.
King Fuad's relations with, *Curzon* (3) 12.
Return to Egypt and conduct of electoral campaign, *Curzon* (3) 12.
Zionist Policy, *see under* Palestine.

57 74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62964

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

Memoranda and Papers: "E" Series.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

Paper No.	Subject.	Date.
E. 57 (Revise)	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation. Memorandum by the Admiralty	11.6.23
E. 58	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (Australia)	11.6.23
E. 59	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (New Zealand)	11.6.23
E. 60	Establishment of Naval Base at Singapore and its Effect upon the Foreign and Naval Policy of the Empire	30.6.23
E. 61	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (Canada)	18.7.23
E. 62	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (South Africa)	18.7.23
E. 63	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (Newfoundland)	21.7.23
E. 64 (Revise)	Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on the Limits of Territorial Waters	—.6.23
E. 65	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (India)	18.7.23
E. 66	Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation (Irish Free State)	21.7.23
E. 67	Grant of Naturalisation to Persons Resident in Mandated Territories. Joint Memorandum prepared in Home Office and Colonial Office ... (Also printed as Appendix VI, Part II, in Command 1988)	10.9.23
E. 68	Imperial Airship Scheme. Statement made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Air on July 26, 1923	20.9.23
E. 69	Recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence Committee as approved by His Majesty's Government upon— 1. The Relations of the Navy and the Air Force. 2. The Co-ordination of the Defence Forces	21.7.23
E. 70	The Development of Dominion Air Forces. Note by the Secretary of State for ... Memorandum by the Air Staff	4.10.23
E. 71	Nationality Committee. Composition and Terms of Reference ... (Not printed. See Appendix I to Minutes of 14th Meeting)	9.10.23
E. 72	Committee on the Position of the Dominions and India in Relation to the Signature of Treaties and the Question of Territorial Waters. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See Appendices III and IV to Minutes of 14th Meeting)	9.10.23
E. 73	Committee on the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See Appendix II to Minutes of 14th Meeting)	9.10.23
E. 74	Prohibition and Liquor Smuggling in the United States. Memorandum prepared in the Foreign Office	1.10.23
E. 75	Draft Message to His Majesty the King moved at the Opening Meeting of the Imperial Conference ... ... (Not printed here. See Section III of Command Paper 1987)	1.10.23
E. 76	The Position of the United States in Relation to "C" Mandates. Note prepared in the Colonial Office	1.10.23

57 74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

G 62965

Paper No.	Subject.	Date.
E. 77	Political Status of British Indians in the Colonies. Protectorates and Mandated Territories. Memorandum prepared in the Colonial Office (Also printed in Appendix V, p. 136, in Command 1988)	—.10.23
E. 78	Publicity Arrangements. Memorandum as a Basis for Discussion ...	1.10.23
E. 79	Committee on the Position of the United States of America in Relation to "C" Mandates. Composition and Terms of Reference... ... (Not printed. See E. 79 (*a*))	19.10.23
E. 79 (*a*)	Conclusions of Meeting of above Committee	23.10.23
E. 80	The Position of Indians in the British Empire. Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa ... ... (Also printed in Appendix V, p. 138, in Command 1988)	18.10.23
E. 81	Committee on India's Contribution to the League of Nations. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See Appendix V to Minutes of 15th Meeting)	25.10.23
E. 82	Committee on the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides. Resolution submitted by the Committee for the approval of the Conference ... ... (Not printed here. See Appendix II (*b*) to Minutes of 14th Meeting)	20.10.23
E. 83	Proposed Extension of the Powers of the Imperial War Graves Commission. Note by the Secretary covering suggested Draft Paragraphs for Report ... . (Not printed here. See Section XVIII of Command Paper 1987)	2.11.23
E. 84	Committee on the Spahlinger Treatment of Tuberculosis. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See E. 89)	31.10.23
E. 85	Committee on Publication of Correspondence and the Status of High Commissioners. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See Appendix IV to Minutes of 15th Meeting)	31.10.23
E. 86	Draft Paragraphs on Foreign Relations for the Report of the Imperial Conference ... ... (Not printed here. See Appendix III to Minutes of 15th Meeting, Appendix to Minutes of 16th Meeting, and Section VIII of Command 1987)	7.11.23
E. 87	Note by the Secretary covering Draft Resolutions on Imperial Defence (Not printed here. See Appendices I and II to Minutes of 15th Meeting and Section XII of Command Paper 1987)	5.11.23
E. 88 (Final Version)	Summary of Proceedings	8.11.23
E. 89	Committee on the Spahlinger Treatment of Tuberculosis. Report ...	6.11.23
E. 90	Note by the Secretary covering Memorandum received from the Irish Free State Delegation *re* Resolutions and Conclusions of the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Economic Conference	8.11.23
E. 91	Status of Indians in the British Empire. Note by the Secretary covering a Telegram from the Viceroy of India to the Secretary of State for India	16.11.23
E. 92	Reply from His Majesty the King to the Address from the Conference (Also printed as Appendix VIII in Command Paper 1988)	19.11.23
E. 93	Committee on Imperial Naval Defence. Minutes of a Meeting held at the Admiralty on October 18, 1923	18.10 23
E. 94	Committee on Imperial Air Defence. Minutes of a Meeting held at the Air Ministry on October 26, 1923	27.10.23

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57
74
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
6
67
68
69
0

SECRET.

G 62966

E. 57. (Revise.)

179

(*Also C.I.D. Paper No.* 194–*C.*)

This Memorandum was approved by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 33rd Meeting, held on June 19, 1923. [See C.I.D. 172nd Minutes (1).]

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

EMPIRE NAVAL POLICY AND CO-OPERATION, 1923.

MEMORANDUM BY THE ADMIRALTY.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

G 62965

Paper No.	Subject.	Date.
E. 77	Political Status of British Indians in the Colonies. Protectorates and Mandated Territories. Memorandum prepared in the Colonial Office (Also printed in Appendix V, p. 136, in Command 1988)	—.10.23
E. 78	Publicity Arrangements. Memorandum as a Basis for Discussion ...	1.10.23
E. 79	Committee on the Position of the United States of America in Relation to "C" Mandates. Composition and Terms of Reference... ... (Not printed. See E. 79 (*a*))	19.10.23
E. 79 (*a*)	Conclusions of Meeting of above Committee	23.10.23
E. 80	The Position of Indians in the British Empire. Memorandum by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa ... ... (Also printed in Appendix V, p. 138, in Command 1988)	18.10.23
E. 81	Committee on India's Contribution to the League of Nations. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See Appendix V to Minutes of 15th Meeting)	25.10.23
E. 82	Committee on the Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides. Resolution submitted by the Committee for the approval of the Conference ... ... (Not printed here. See Appendix II (*b*) to Minutes of 14th Meeting)	20.10.23
E. 83	Proposed Extension of the Powers of the Imperial War Graves Commission. Note by the Secretary covering suggested Draft Paragraphs for Report ... . (Not printed here. See Section XVIII of Command Paper 1987)	2.11.23
E. 84	Committee on the Spahlinger Treatment of Tuberculosis. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See E. 89)	31.10.23
E. 85	Committee on Publication of Correspondence and the Status of High Commissioners. Composition and Terms of Reference ... ... (Not printed. See Appendix IV to Minutes of 15th Meeting)	31.10.23
E. 86	Draft Paragraphs on Foreign Relations for the Report of the Imperial Conference ... ... (Not printed here. See Appendix III to Minutes of 15th Meeting, Appendix to Minutes of 16th Meeting, and Section VIII of Command 1987)	7.11.23
E. 87	Note by the Secretary covering Draft Resolutions on Imperial Defence (Not printed here. See Appendices I and II to Minutes of 15th Meeting and Section XII of Command Paper 1987)	5.11.23
E. 88 (Final Version)	Summary of Proceedings	8.11.23
E. 89	Committee on the Spahlinger Treatment of Tuberculosis. Report ...	6.11.23
E. 90	Note by the Secretary covering Memorandum received from the Irish Free State Delegation *re* Resolutions and Conclusions of the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Economic Conference	8.11.23
E. 91	Status of Indians in the British Empire. Note by the Secretary covering a Telegram from the Viceroy of India to the Secretary of State for India	16.11.23
E. 92	Reply from His Majesty the King to the Address from the Conference (Also printed as Appendix VIII in Command Paper 1988)	19.11.23
E. 93	Committee on Imperial Naval Defence. Minutes of a Meeting held at the Admiralty on October 18, 1923	18.10 23
E. 94	Committee on Imperial Air Defence. Minutes of a Meeting held at the Air Ministry on October 26, 1923	27.10.23

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57

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G 62966

E. 57. (Revise.)

179

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COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

EMPIRE NAVAL POLICY AND CO-OPERATION, 1923.

MEMORANDUM BY THE ADMIRALTY.

74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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C 62967

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COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

EMPIRE NAVAL POLICY AND CO-OPERATION, 1923.

CONTENTS.

	Page
The Task of the Empire's Naval Forces	1
The Influence of Air Power on the Naval Problem	2
The Standard of Naval Strength	2
The Problem before the Imperial Conference	2
Peace Organisation: The Principle of Dominion Navies	2
Organisation in War	2
Progressive Development of Dominion Navies	3

1. *Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation*, 1923.

THE British Empire is an Oceanic Commonwealth. The economic and defensive organisation of each nation and community of that Commonwealth has grown up and is based to-day on the presupposition that the use of the sea routes is free to us for mutual co-operation in peaceful development and for mutual assistance against external aggression. The control by a hostile Power of the sea routes which are the arteries of the Empire would involve all of us in economic disaster, and leave us individually isolated in the face of attack or invasion by superior forces.

2. *The Task of the Empire's Naval Forces.*

The task of the Naval Forces of the Empire is to destroy or neutralise Enemy Naval Forces and thereby to keep open the Sea Communications of the Empire.

In doing so they can secure:—

1. The protection of our sea-borne trade.*
2. The destruction of the enemy's sea-borne trade.
3. The free movement by sea of our own Military and Air Forces.
4. The prevention of the despatch overseas of enemy Military or Air Forces.

Wherever this task can be most effectively fulfilled, there, and there alone, the Empire as a whole, and each part of it, however remote from the actual scene of operations, will be effectively defended.

The capacity of the Naval Forces of the Empire to carry out their duties in the actual event of war will enable them to fulfil their primary and continuous function, which is to preserve peace and to enable British interests to be safeguarded by peaceful diplomacy.

* The vital importance of oversea trade is shown in the Appendices.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62968

3. *The Influence of Air Power on the Naval Problem.*

The development of aviation, while destined to have a great influence on the tactical organisation of our Naval Forces, will not, outside narrow waters such as the English Channel or the Mediterranean, materially affect the problem of the control of the ocean routes, which, in the main, will continue to depend upon surface craft. Airships, if developed and found reliable, may, however, play a considerable part, in co-operation with surface vessels, in carrying out the reconnaissance of the sea routes and the keeping open of sea communication.

4. *The Standard of Naval Strength.*

The definite standard of Naval strength necessary for the peace and security of the Empire must naturally vary with the general political situation, always allowing for the fact that Naval strength and efficiency cannot be improvised, and that it takes several years to build a capital ship and a generation to train a really efficient body of senior officers.

The Imperial Conference of 1921 defined the One-Power Standard of Naval strength as the basis of Imperial defence. This standard was contemplated by the Conference as a minimum. It was subsequently, as far as the main units of the Battle Fleet are concerned, fixed as the maximum by the Washington Agreement. This limitation was accepted by the representatives of the Empire at Washington and by the Admiralty, in the general interest of world peace. But in view of the fact that we depend for our very existence upon the freedom of the seas, it is essential that the Naval Forces of the Empire should, within that limitation, attain the highest point of individual and combined efficiency, and the greatest possible degree of mobility.

5. *The Problem before the Imperial Conference.*

At the forthcoming Imperial Conference the Admiralty will present for discussion with the Dominions the building programmes with which the Empire is faced for the next few years in order to maintain the One-Power Standard, and invite them to consider how they can best co-operate in a task which, even with the substantial relief afforded by the Washington Agreement, involves an unduly heavy burden for Great Britain to bear alone. It is obvious that, in order to secure the necessary minimum of security with the equally necessary minimum of cost, there must not only be the most complete and whole-hearted mutual co-operation between the Governments and Services concerned in peace and war, but that the peace organisation must be such as to fit in with the most effective organisation for war.

6. *Peace Organisation: The Principle of Dominion Navies.*

The maintenance of the Naval Forces of the Empire in peace must depend lutimately on the sustained will of the peoples of the Empire as expressed by their Parliaments and through their responsible Governments. It is not merely approval, but the active and determined support of public opinion in every part of the Empire that is required if the Naval effort is to be adequate to our needs. With the growth of the Dominions in national status and sentiment, the only system of Naval co-operation which can command sufficient permanent good-will and support is one under which each Dominion possesses and controls its own Naval Forces. The Admiralty whole-heartedly endorses this principle, not only on political and constitutional grounds, but also because it will develop new centres of Naval strength, and new bases for the Navy of the Empire which are essential to the strategy of the future.

7. *Organisation in War.*

In war the Naval Forces of the Empire must be considered as a single collective Empire Fleet. From the strategical point of view, that Fleet may conveniently be regarded as falling into *three categories*. These three categories are closely interdependent, but they stand in a very definite order of relative importance.

First and foremost comes the *Main Fleet*. This must be capable of performing its function of destroying or containing the Main Fleet of the enemy. On it rests the fate of the whole Empire.

Secondly, there are the *Detached Forces* which, backed by the power of the Main Fleet, exercise control of the sea communications in areas distant from the main theatre of operations.

C 62969

Thirdly, there are the *Local Defence Forces* which are necessary in order to free the Main Fleet and the Detached Forces for their proper work on the High Seas. The effort expended upon these Local Defence Forces should only be the minimum necessary to resist such pressure as the enemy may reasonably be expected to exercise in any particular area in view of the general position on the High Seas. It should never be allowed to limit or starve the preparations for the Sea-going Fleet.

8. *Progressive Development of Dominion Navies.*

The Naval Forces of the Dominions can, as they develop, take their part progressively in each of these categories. In the course of their development they will naturally pass through certain distinct but successive phases.

Phase 1.—In the First Phase provision should be made and responsibility assumed for Local Defence Services. At the same time preparations should be made for the next phase by beginning the training of personnel for a sea-going force. Canada and South Africa are in the First Phase.

Phase 2.—In the Second Phase the first definite steps are taken in the creation of a force for work on the High Seas, as opposed to a local defence force. This phase involves the obtaining of one or more seagoing ships, and in the first instance it may be necessary, for financial and other reasons, to obtain both the ships themselves and a portion, at any rate, of the personnel from the Royal Navy. Throughout this phase the necessary training, repair and fuelling facilities should gradually be built up in preparation for the next phase. This Second Phase has been reached by New Zealand.

Phase 3.—The Third Phase is reached when a Dominion is in a position to provide and man a seagoing squadron of its own, and to take over the full control in peace of the station in which its shores are included. That station will be the normal home station of its Squadron, but interchange and co-operation with British Units on other stations should be arranged. Australia is the only Dominion which is now in the Third Phase.

Phase 4.—In the Fourth and final Phase the Dominions should be capable, in addition to the Squadrons for service on their own home stations, to provide, whether in the shape of additional cruiser squadrons or of capital ship units, a substantial part of the general scheme of naval defence and, more particularly, of the Main Fleet.

Throughout the process of development certain general considerations should be kept in view. The fostering of a Mercantile Marine, and with it of a seafaring population and of a national sea sentiment, constitutes an essential foundation for the building up of a Dominion Navy. A small local Navy, with no scope for ambition and no variety of scene, cannot, in the long run, secure the right type of officers or men, or maintain a high standard of efficiency. A good deal can be done to surmount these difficulties during the Second and Third Phases by a free interchange, both of individuals and of ships, with the Royal Navy. But the real solution lies, for the Dominions which can afford it, in reaching the Fourth Phase as soon as possible and being able to provide in their own ships a regular rotation of home and foreign service, as well as regular opportunities for taking part in the Fleet Exercises of the Royal Navy, and a more extended and varied responsibility for their own senior officers. In any case, whatever the stage of development to which the Government of each Dominion considers its naval efforts can attain in the near future, it will be the endeavour of the Admiralty, by whole-hearted co-operation and assistance, to contribute to the success of those efforts.

Admiralty, S.W. 1, *June* 11, 1923.

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74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62970

APPENDIX I.

AUSTRALIA.

Chart showing Values and Tonnage of Principal Commodities exchanged between Australia and other Countries.

THE accompanying chart* has been prepared in order to show the importance of Oversea communications, their protection and maintenance to Australia.

Australia, while dependent upon certain commodities which are produced abroad, is in her turn under the necessity of exporting the commodities which she produces to pay for her imports.

This chart shows in graphic form by black lines for receipts and green lines for exports, the various countries which send goods to and receive goods from Australia. The small circles enclose units of value. The rectangles at the end of the lines show the various commodities in units of weight. The year taken is that ending the 30th June, 1921.

It is realised that in selecting the statistics for any one year certain abnormalities are bound to occur in these figures, but the general trend of foreign trade will be sufficiently indicated.

The accompanying table from which the chart was prepared shows a more detailed list of exports and imports by weight than could be conveniently included in the chart. It will be seen that in the case of certain manufactures, *e.g.*, textiles, machinery, &c., it has been found impracticable to show a unit of weight as no such figures are published in the trade returns. Timber has also presented the same difficulty. In these cases the commodity has been shown without any unit, as value would not form a true standard of comparison.

In some cases the *total* value of the trade with a country may be considerable while there are no particular items which justify inclusion. In these cases the value of the *total* trade only has been shown as mention of the items would not afford a true perspective.

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* NOTE.—In some instances the figures shown on the chart require correction, and in any case they should not be used without being checked by the figures given in the tables.

C 62971

AUSTRALIA: IMPORTS. YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1921.

Commodity.	Country whence Imported.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Bananas	Fiji	4,000
Maize	South Africa	1,000
Molasses	Fiji	9,000
Oats	Argentine	1,000
	Brazil	1,000
Rice	India	8,000
	Hong Kong	5,000
Sugar	Dutch East Indies	79,000
	Cuba	26,000
	Peru	6,000
	Fiji	5,000
Tea	Ceylon	6,000
	India	3,000
	Dutch East Indies	5,000
Raw materials—		
Coal	United Kingdom	9,000
	New Zealand	6,000
Copra	New Guinea	21,000
	Solomon Islands	8,000
	Papua	7,000
Flax and hemp	New Zealand	6,000
	Philippines	2,000
Guano	Pacific Islands	56,000
Gums and resins	United States of America	4,000
Linseed	India	12,000
Manganese	New Caledonia	2,000
Nitrate of soda	Chile	3,000
	Japan	2,000
Oakum	New Zealand	2,000
Petroleum	United States of America	125,000
	Dutch East Indies	85,000
	Straits Settlements	33,000
Phosphates	Pacific Islands	237,000
Salt	United Kingdom	3,000
Soda, carbonate and bi-carbonate	United Kingdom	33,000
Sulphur	United States of America	70,000
Timber	Canada	..
	United States of America	..
	Norway	..
	Sweden	..
	New Zealand	..
Manufactured articles—		
Cement	Japan	9,000
	United Kingdom	6,000
	Denmark	4,000
	Sweden	4,000
Iron and steel	United Kingdom	172,000*
	United States of America	87,000*
	Belgium	12,000*
Jute bags	India	..
Metal manufactures	United Kingdom	..
	United States of America	..
Paper, printing and wrapping	Canada	33,000
	Sweden	26,000
	Norway	16,000
	United States of America	6,000
	United Kingdom	15,000
Textiles, hardware, leather goods	United Kingdom	..

* These figures represent all iron and steel and manufactures thereof as enumerated by weight in the Australian returns. In addition, there are items shown by value only which would probably increase the tonnage figures by 25 per cent. Tinned plates are included with the iron and steel figure.

74
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62972

AUSTRALIA: EXPORTS. YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1921.

Commodity.	Country to which Exported.	Tons Weight.
Barley	United Kingdom	40,000
	Belgium	18,000
	France	7,000
Butter	United Kingdom	38,000
	Dutch East Indies	1,000
Cheese	United Kingdom	4,000
Flour	United Kingdom	73,000
	Egypt	55,000
	South Africa	37,000
	Dutch East Indies	14,000
	Straits Settlements	7,000
	Mauritius	3,000
Fruits	United Kingdom	25,000
Oats	United Kingdom	8,000
	Dutch East Indies	3,000
Meat, preserved and refrigerated	United Kingdom	97,000
	Egypt	5,000
Preserved milk	Belgium	4,000
Wheat	United Kingdom	1,037,000
	Egypt	281,000
	France	239,000
	Belgium	154,000
	Germany	67,000
	Italy	59,000
	Holland	59,000
	South Africa	31,000
	New Zealand	16,000
Bark	New Zealand	3,000
Coal and coke	New Zealand	740,000
	Dutch East Indies	412,000
	Chile	191,000
	Straits Settlements	173,000
	Philippines	110,000
	Egypt	104,000
	New Caledonia	72,000
	India	71,000
	Sweden	94,000
	Hawaiian Islands	42,000
	Fiji	41,000
	United States of America	30,000
	Norway	27,000
	Ceylon	21,000
	Peru	16,000
	Hong Kong	12,000
	China	11,000
Copper	United Kingdom	19,000
Copra (not Australian)	Denmark	7,000
	United Kingdom	5,000
	United States of America	10,000
	Holland	6,000
Fertilisers	New Zealand	37,000
	Dutch East Indies	3,000
Iron, pig	New Zealand	8,000
Lead, pig	United Kingdom	17,000
Oil-cake	United Kingdom	5,000
Salt	New Zealand	11,000
Sandal wood	Hong Kong	7,000
Tallow	United Kingdom	13,000
	Japan	7,000
Wool	United Kingdom	145,000
	France	15,000
	Belgium	16,000
	Italy	7,000
	Japan	6,000
	Germany	4,000
	United States of America	18,000
Zinc concentrates	Belgium	27,000
	United Kingdom	15,000

C 62973

APPENDIX II.

NEW ZEALAND.

Chart showing Values and Tonnage of Principal Commodities exchanged between New Zealand and other Countries.

THE accompanying chart* has been prepared in order to show the importance of Oversea communications, their protection and maintenance to New Zealand.

New Zealand, while dependent upon certain commodities which are produced abroad, is in her turn under the necessity of exporting the commodities which she produces to pay for her imports.

This chart shows in graphic form, by black lines for receipts and green lines for exports, the various countries which send goods to and receive goods from New Zealand. The small circles enclose units of value. The rectangles at the end of the lines show the various commodities in units of weight. The year taken is that ending the 31st December, 1921.

It is realised that in selecting the statistics for any one year certain abnormalities are bound to occur in these figures, but the general trend of foreign trade will be sufficiently indicated.

The accompanying table, from which the chart was prepared, shows a more detailed list of exports and imports by weight than could be conveniently included in the chart. It will be seen that in the case of certain manufactures, *e.g.*, textiles, machinery, &c., it has been found impracticable to show a unit of weight, as no such figures are published in the trade returns. Timber has also presented the same difficulty. In these cases the commodity has been shown without any unit, as value would not form a true standard of comparison.

In some cases the *total* value of the trade with a country may be considerable while there are no *particular* items which justify inclusion. In these cases the value of the *total* trade only has been shown, as mention of the items would not afford a true perspective.

* NOTE.—In some instances the figures shown on the chart require correction, and in any case they should not be used without being checked by the figures given in the tables.

NEW ZEALAND: IMPORTS, YEAR 1921.

Commodity.	Country whence imported.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Maize	Australia	2,000
Oats	Australia	1,000
Onions	Australia	3,000
Rice	Australia	1,000
	China	1,000
Sugar	Fiji	56,000
	Australia	3,000
	Java	4,000
Tea	Ceylon	2,000
Wheat	Australia	8,000
Raw materials—		
Coal and coke	Australia	630,000
	United States of America	65,000
	Canada	3,000
	United Kingdom	84,000
	Japan	43,000
Fertilisers	United States of America	2,000
	Australia	11,000
	Belgium	11,000
	India	2,000
	Pacific Islands	49,000
	Japan	3,000

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62974

Commodity.	Country whence Imported.	Tons Weight.
Raw materials (*continued*)—		
Linseed oil	United Kingdom	1,000
Mineral oil	United States of America	79,000
	Sumatra	6,000
	Australia	1,000
Paraffin wax	Burma	1,000
Salt	United Kingdom	12,000
	Australia	6,000
Sulphur	United States of America	4,000
Tanning materials (bark)	Australia	2,000
Timber	Australia	..
Manufactures—		
Iron and steel	United Kingdom	50,000*
	United States of America	15,000
Machinery	United Kingdom	..
	United States of America	..
Printing paper	Canada	11,000
Textiles	United Kingdom	..

* These figures represent all iron and steel and manufactures thereof as enumerated by weight in the New Zealand returns. In addition there are items shown by value only which would probably increase the tonnage figures by 5 per cent.

NEW ZEALAND EXPORTS. YEAR 1921.

Commodity.	Country to which Exported.	Tons Weight.
Butter	United Kingdom	44,000
Cheese	United Kingdom	68,000
Frozen meat	United Kingdom	211,000
Dried milk	United Kingdom	7,000
Oats	United Kingdom	7,000
Peas	United Kingdom	4,000
Potatoes	Fiji	1,000
Coal	United Kingdom	29.000
	Australia	17,000
	Fiji	3,000
Phormium, tenax and tow	Australia	7.000
	United Kingdom	3,000
Sheep and rabbit	United Kingdom	5,000
	United States of America	6,000
Linseed	Australia	3,000
Timber	Australia	..
Wool	United Kingdom	64.000
	United States of America	3,000

C 62975

APPENDIX III.

CANADA.

CHART SHOWING VALUES AND TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXCHANGED BETWEEN CANADA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE accompanying Chart* has been prepared in order to show the importance of Oversea communications, their protection and maintenance, to Canada.

Canada, while dependent upon certain commodities which are produced abroad, is in her turn under the necessity of exporting the commodities which she produces to pay for her imports.

This chart shows in graphic form, by black lines for receipts and green lines for exports, the various countries which send goods to, and receive goods from, Canada. The small circles enclose units of value. The rectangles at the end of the lines show the various commodities in units of weight. The year taken is that ending the 31st March, 1921.

It is realised that in selecting the statistics for any one year certain abnormalities are bound to occur in these figures, but the general trend of Foreign trade will be sufficiently indicated.

The accompanying table from which the chart was prepared shows a more detailed list of exports and imports by weight than could be conveniently included in the chart. It will be seen that in the case of certain manufactures, *e.g.*, textiles, machinery, &c., it has been found impracticable to show a unit of weight as no such figures are published in the Trade returns. Timber has also presented the same difficulty. In these cases the commodity has been shown without any unit, as value would not form a true standard of comparison.

In some cases, the *total* value of the trade with a country may be considerable, while there are no *particular* items which justify inclusion. In these cases, the value of the *total* trade only has been shown as mention of the items would not afford a true perspective.

CANADA: IMPORTS (YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 1921.)

Commodity.	Country whence Imported.	Tons of 2,000 lb. Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Butter	United States of America	1,000
Coffee	Brazil	4,000
Corn (Indian)	United States of America	276,000
Fish, excluding canned	Alaska	1,000
	United States of America	2,000
	Newfoundland	9,000
Lard	United States of America	6,000
Mutton	New Zealand	2,000
	United States of America	1,000
Pork	" " "	10,000 / 9,000
Potatoes	" " "	28,000
Rice	British Guiana	4,000
	Hong Kong	10,000
	United States of America	9,000
Sugar	Cuba	156,000
	United States of America	84,000
	British Guiana	32,000
	San Domingo	32,000
	Jamaica	13,000
	Barbadoes	10,000
	Peru	11,000

* NOTE.—In some instances the figures shown on the chart require correction, and in any case they should not be used without being checked by the figures given in the tables.

74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62976

Commodity.	Country whence Imported.	Tons of 2,000 lb. Weight.
Foodstuffs—(continued).		
Tea	United Kingdom	6,000
	India	4,000
Tobacco	United States of America	10,000
Raw Materials—		
Alumina	United States of America	59,000
Animal fat	„ „ „	11,000
Asphalt	„ „ „	30,000
Bones and bone dust	„ „ „	4,000
Chloride of lime	„ „ „	19,000
Coal	„ „ „	20,245,000
Coke	„ „ „	549,000
Copper	„ „ „	22,000
Cotton	„ „ „	49,000
Fibre (manila)	„ „ „	4,000
„ (sisal)	„ „ „	17,000
Fire clay	„ „ „	49,000
Gravel and sand	„ „ „	210,000
Resin	„ „ „	13,000
Hides and skins	New Zealand	2,000
	Argentine	2,000
	United States of America	6,000
	Uruguay	1,000
Iron ore	Newfoundland	622,000
	Norway	11,000
	Sweden	11,000
	United States of America	1,305,000
Iron, scrap	„ „ „	139,000
Iron, pig	„ „ „	56,000
Lead, pig and bars	United Kingdom	8,000
	United States of America	1,000
Nitrate of Soda	„ „ „	25,000
	Chile	1,500
Oilcake	United States of America	9,000
Petrol and products	Peru	128,000*
	United States of America	1,753,000*
Phosphate rock	„ „ „	11,000
Potash	Germany	5,000
Rags	United Kingdom	6,000
	United States of America	8,000
Rubber	United Kingdom	2,000
	Straits Settlements	5,000
	United States of America	4,000
Salt	United Kingdom	23,000 / 12,000
	British West Indies	22,000
	Spain	9,000
	United States of America	15,000 / 51,000
Sand (silica)	„ „ „	102,000
Soda (excluding Nitrate of Soda)	„ „ „	64,000
Stone (refuse)	„ „ „	445,000
	Newfoundland	32,000
Sulphur	United States of America	119,000
Vegetable oils	„ „ „	14,000
Waste paper	„ „ „	36,000
Wood pulp	„ „ „	25,000
Wool	United Kingdom	1,000
	United States of America	3,000

* These figures represent tonnage of iron and steel and manufactures thereof enumerated by weight in the Canadian returns. The estimated tonnage of items shown by value only would probably add 30 per cent. to the above figures.

C 62977

Commodity.	Country whence Imported.	Tons of 2,000 lb. Weight.
Manufactured Articles—		
Iron and steel	United States of America	850,000*
	United Kingdom	25,000*
Luxury imports, *e.g.*, wines, silks, &c.	France.	
Textiles	United States of America.	
	United Kingdom.	

CANADA: EXPORTS (YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 1921).

Commodity.	Country to which Exported.	Tons of 2,000 lb. Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Bacon	United Kingdom	49,000
Barley	„ „	198,000
Cheese	„ „	61,000
Condensed milk	„ „	11,000
	United States of America	6,000
Fruit—apples	United Kingdom	102,000
Meat—beef and mutton	United States of America	20,000
Oatmeal	United Kingdom	18,000
Oats	„ „	120,000
Potatoes	United States of America	126,000
	Cuba	17,000
Rye	United Kingdom	29,000
	Norway	14,000
	United States of America	19,000
Sugar	„ „ „	25,000
Wheat	United Kingdom	879,000
	Belgium	422,000
	France	152,000
	Germany	55,000
	Greece	140,000
	Italy	631,000
	Netherlands	209,000
	Spain	44,000
	United States of America	1,270,000
Wheat Flour	United Kingdom	270,000
	United States of America	116,000
Raw Materials—		
Aluminium	United Kingdom	2,000
	United States of America	5,000
Asbestos	United Kingdom	12,000
	Belgium	10,000
	United States of America	114,000
	Germany	5,000
Calcium carbide	United States of America	46,000
Coal	United Kingdom	81,000
	South Africa	23,000
	British Guiana	19,000
	Gibraltar	26,000
	Newfoundland	387,000
	Australia	23,000
	New Zealand	20,000
	Argentine	13,000
	China	20,000
	France	168,000
	French Africa	32,000
	Japan	14,000

* These figures represent tonnage of iron and steel and manufactures thereof enumerated by weight in the Canadian returns. The estimated tonnage of items shown by value only would probably add 30 per cent. to the above figures.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62978

Commodity.	Country to which Exported.	Tons of 2,000 lb. Weight.
Raw materials—(continued).		
Coal—(*continued*)	Netherlands	227,000
	Norway....	36,000
	Sweden....	15,000
	United States of America....	1,031,000
	Alaska	37,000
Coke	United States of America....	37,000
Copper	United Kingdom....	4,000
	United States of America....	14,000 } 17,000 }
Cyanide	,, ,, ,, ...	44,000
Feldspar	,, ,, ,, ...	41,000
Hay....	,, ,, ,, ...	162,000
Hides and skins	,, ,, ,, ...	13,000
Iron ore	,, ,, ,, ...	17,000
Iron, pig	,, ,, ,, ...	51,000
Lime	,, ,, ,, ...	24,000
Timber	United Kingdom....	—
	United States of America....	—
Sand, gravel	,, ,, ,, ...	1,503,000
Sulphur	,, ,, ,, ...	119,000
Wood pulp	,, ,, ,, ...	535,000
	United Kingdom....	113,000
	France	34,000
	Japan	18,000
Wool....	United States of America....	3,000
Manufactured Articles—		
Abrasives (carborundum, &c.)	United States of America....	27,000
Cement	,, ,, ,, ...	93,000
Iron and steel bars and rods	United Kingdom....	39,000
Iron and steel rails	United States of America....	40,000
Newspaper	Australia	37,000
	United States of America....	668,000

C 62979

APPENDIX IV.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

CHART SHOWING VALUES AND TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE accompanying Chart* has been prepared in order to show the importance of Oversea communications, their protection and maintenance, to the Union of South Africa.

The Union of South Africa, while dependent upon certain commodities which are produced abroad, is in her turn under the necessity of exporting the commodities which she produces to pay for her imports.

This chart shows in graphic form, by black lines for receipts and green lines for exports, the various countries which send goods to, and receive goods from, the Union of South Africa. The small circles enclose units of value. The rectangles at the end of the lines show the various commodities in units of weight. The year taken is that ending the 31st December, 1921.

It is realised that in selecting the statistics for any one year certain abnormalities are bound to occur in these figures, but the general trend of Foreign trade will be sufficiently indicated.

The accompanying table from which the chart was prepared shows a more detailed list of exports and imports by weight than could be conveniently included in the chart. It will be seen that in the case of certain manufactures, *e.g.*, textiles, machinery, &c., it has been found impracticable to show a unit of weight as no such figures are published in the Trade returns. Timber has also presented the same difficulty. In these cases the commodity has been shown without any unit, as value would not form a true standard of comparison.

In some cases, the *total* value of the trade with a country may be considerable, while there are no *particular* items which justify inclusion. In these cases, the value of the *total* trade only has been shown as mention of the items would not afford a true perspective.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: IMPORTS ON PRIVATE ACCOUNT (YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1921).

Commodity.	Country of Origin.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Coffee	Brazil	12,000
Flour	Australia	19,000
Rice....	China	14,000
	India	8,000
	Cochin China	5,000
Sugar	Portuguese East Africa	11,000
Wheat	Australia	19,000
Raw Materials—		
Nitrate of Soda	Chile	21,000
Petroleum	United States of America....	69,000
	Dutch East Indies	26,000
	Persia	5,000
Phosphates	Egypt	6,000
	South Sea Islands	5,000
Sulphur	United States of America....	8,000
Superphosphates	Holland....	8,000
Timber	Sweden	—
	Finland....	—

* NOTE.—In some instances the figures shown on the chart require correction, and in any case they should not be used without being checked by the figures given in the tables.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62980

Commodity.	Country of Origin.	Tons Weight.
Manufactured Articles—		
Cement	Demark	6,000
	Germany	6,000
Cotton Goods	United Kingdom	—
Iron and Steel*	,, ,,	47,000
	United States of America	10,000
Leather manufactures	United Kingdom	—
Machinery	,, ,,	—

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: EXPORTS (YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1921).

Commodity.	Country of Destination.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Maize meal	United Kingdom	92,000
Maize	,, ,,	235,000
	Germany	53,000
	Holland	17,000
	Belgium	15,000
	Portuguese East Africa	4,000
Sugar	United Kingdom	56,000
	India	2,000
Raw Materials—		
Asbestos	United Kingdom	2,000
	Australia	1,000
Coal, cargo	India	759,000
	Ceylon	238,000
	Aden	134,000
	Mauritius	40,000
	Egypt	205,000
	Portuguese East Africa	36,000
	Straits Settlements	17,000
	Madagascar	19,000
	Portuguese India	29,000
	Argentine	16,000
	Turkey	8,000
Diamonds	United Kingdom	
Feathers	,, ,,	
Gold	,, ,,	
Hair, Angora	,, ,,	7,000
Hides and skins	,, ,,	11,000
	Germany	2,000
	France	5,000
	United States of America	2,000
Bark (extract)	United Kingdom	3,000
Bark (wattle)	,, ,,	13,000
	Germany	34,000
	Japan	9,000
	United States of America	6,000
Wool	United Kingdom	45,000
	Germany	22,000
	Belgium	12,000
	France	9,000
	United States of America	7,000
	Japan	3,000

* These figures represent all iron and steel and manufactures thereof as enumerated by weight in the South African returns. In addition, there are items shown by value only which would probably increase the tonnage figures by 60 per cent.

C 62981

APPENDIX V.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

TABLES SHOWING VALUES AND TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL ARTICLES OF EXPORT AND IMPORT BETWEEN NEWFOUNDLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE accompanying tables have been prepared in order to show the importance of Oversea communications, their protection and maintenance, to Newfoundland.

Newfoundland, while dependent upon certain commodities which are produced abroad, is, in her turn, under the necessity of exporting the commodities which she produces to pay for her imports.

Table I shows the imports and exports by countries in values for the year ending the 30th June, 1921.

Table II shows the more bulky and valuable imports and exports by weight (where this is known) for the same year. In the case of textiles, timber and wheat, the total weights could not be ascertained, as they are not published in the trade returns.

TABLE I.—VALUES OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES INTO AND FROM NEWFOUNDLAND FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1921.

	Imports (1,000 Dollars).	Exports (1,000 Dollars).
Canada	14,841	1,976
United States	9,556	1,854
United Kingdom	3,230	6,275
West Indies	794	1,131
Ceylon	149	—
Portugal	105	3,781
Spain	77	2,956
Brazil	2	2,263
Greece	22	814
Italy	3	1,047

TABLE II.—NEWFOUNDLAND: IMPORTS, 1920–21.

Commodity.	Country whence imported.	Tons weight.
Coal	Canada	297,000
	United States of America	18,000
	United Kingdom	8,000
Cotton Textiles	United States of America	—
	United Kingdom	—
Flour	Canada	26,000
Hay	,,	10,000
Meat	,,	Not known
Oats	,,	17,000
Oilcake	Canada	2,000
Petroleum	,,	4,000
	United States of America	3,000
Potatoes	Canada	3,000
Salt	Portugal	15,000
	Spain	13,000
	West Indies	3,000
	Germany	2,000
	United Kingdom	2,000
Sugar	Canada	1,000
Sulphur	United States of America	3,000
Timber	Canada	—
	United States of America	—

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62982

NEWFOUNDLAND: EXPORTS, 1920–21.

Commodity.	Country to which Exported.	Tons weight.
Codfish	Portugal	18,000
	Spain	14,000
	Brazil	9,000
	West Indies	5,000
	Italy	5,000
	Greece	4,000
	United Kingdom	3,000
	Canada	3,000
	United States of America	2,000
	French Indies	1,000
Cod oil	United States of America	2,000
Iron ore	Canada	460,000
	United Kingdom	27,000
	Holland	26,000
Limestone	Canada	93,000
Paper	United Kingdom	61,000
Pulp	" "	24,000
	United States of America	2,000
Timber	United Kingdom	—
	United States of America	—

C 62983

APPENDIX VI.

INDIA.

CHART SHOWING VALUES AND TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXCHANGED BETWEEN INDIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE accompanying Chart* has been prepared in order to show the importance of Oversea communications, their protection and maintenance, to India.

India, while dependent upon certain commodities which are produced abroad, is in her turn under the necessity of exporting the commodities which she produces to pay for her imports.

This chart shows in graphic form, by black lines for receipts and green lines for exports, the various countries which send goods to, and receive goods from, India. The small circles enclose units of value. The rectangles at the end of the lines show the various commodities in units of weight. The year taken is that ending the 31st March, 1921.

It is realised that in selecting the statistics for any one year certain abnormalities are bound to occur in these figures, but the general trend of Foreign trade will be sufficiently indicated.

The accompanying table from which the chart was prepared shows a more detailed list of exports and imports by weight than could be conveniently included in the chart. It will be seen that in the case of certain manufactures, *e.g.*, textiles, machinery, &c., it has been found impracticable to show a unit of weight as no such figures are published in the Trade returns. Timber has also presented the same difficulty. In these cases the commodity has been shown without any unit, as value would not form a true standard of comparison.

In some cases, the *total* value of the trade with a country may be considerable, while there are no *particular* items which justify inclusion. In these cases, the value of the *total* trade only has been shown as mention of the items would not afford a true perspective.

INDIA: IMPORTS ON PRIVATE ACCOUNT (YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 1921).

Commodity.	Country whence Consigned.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Fruit and vegetables (excluding fresh)	Persian Gulf	31,000
	Muscat	12,000
	Persia	7,000
Sugar and molasses	Mauritius	11,000
	Java	306,000
	Straits Settlements	9,000
	Hong Kong	6,000
	Egypt	4,000
Raw Materials—		
Aluminium	United Kingdom	2,000
	" "	4,000
Asphalt	Straits Settlements	40,000
Betel nuts	Ceylon	6,000
	United Kingdom	22,000
China clay	Australia	33,000
Coal and coke	United Kingdom	10,000
	Natal	7,000
	Straits Settlements	3,000
	Japan	10,000
	Portuguese East Africa	18,000

* NOTE.—In some instances the figures shown on the chart require correction, and in any case they should not be used without being checked by the figures given in the tables.

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62984

Commodity.	Country whence Consigned.	Tons Weight.
Raw materials—(continued).		
Copper	United Kingdom	7,000
	United States of America	6,000
Copra	Ceylon	7,000
Cotton	United Kingdom	5,000
	Kenya	3,000
Lead	United Kingdom	3,000
Oil, mineral	Straits Settlements	40,000
	United Kingdom	7,000
	Borneo (British)	4,000
	Persia	112,000
	Borneo (Dutch)	125,000
	United States of America	186,000
Pitch and tar	United Kingdom	7,000
Salt	,, ,,	93,000
	Aden, &c.	183,000
	Egypt	117,000
	Germany	101,000
	Spain	68,000
	Italian East Africa	54,000
Soda	United Kingdom	42,000
	Kenya	2,000
Sulphur	Japan	4,000
	Italy	3,000
	United States of America	1,000
	United Kingdom	1,000
Timber	Siam	—
	Straits Settlements	—
	United States of America	—
Tin	Straits Settlements	2,000
Woodpulp	Norway	3,000
	Sweden	2,000
Zinc	United Kingdom	3,000
Manufactured Articles—		
Brass, bronze and manufactures	United Kingdom	23,000
	Japan	2,000
Cement	United Kingdom	123,000
Iron and steel	,, ,,	574,000
	United States of America	113,000
	Belgium	69,000
	Germany	15,000
Machinery	United Kingdom	—
	United States of America	—
Paint	United Kingdom	15,000
Soap	,, ,,	15,000
Textiles	,, ,,	—
	Japan	—

INDIA: EXPORTS ON PRIVATE ACCOUNT (YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 1921).

Commodity.	Country of Final Destination.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—		
Barley	Red Sea	4,000
Beans, pulse, &c.	United Kingdom	7,000
	Germany	9,000
	Belgium	9,000
	Japan	3,000
	Ceylon	9,000
	Straits Settlements	8,000
Coffee	United Kingdom	5,000
	France	2,000

C 62985

Commodity.	Country of Final Destination.	Tons Weight.
Foodstuffs—(continued).		
Fish	Ceylon	10,000
Rice	United Kingdom	170,000
	Straits Settlements	183,000
	Ceylon	276,000
	Bahrein	29,000
	Federal Malay States	42,000
	Hong Kong	24,000
	Egypt	16,000
	Mauritius	36,000
	Australia	18,000
	Germany	51,000
	Red Sea	22,000
	Java	27,000
	Japan	12,000
	Arabia	36,000
	Belgium	11,000
	Cape Colony	7,000
Rice meal	United Kingdom	6,000
Sugar	,, ,,	12,000
	Ceylon	6,000
	United States of America	2,000
Tea	United Kingdom	111,000
	Canada	3,000
	Australia	3,000
Vegetables and fruit	Ceylon	16,000
	Straits Settlements	13,000
Wheat and wheatflour	United Kingdom	95,000
	Egypt	36,000
	Germany	27,000
	Belgium	22,000
	France	20,000
	Holland	15,000
	Italy	13,000
	Ceylon	15,000
	Aden	6,000
	Straits Settlements	6,000
	Mauritius	6,000
	Red Sea	8,000
	Persian Gulf	7,000
Raw material—		
Bran	Straits Settlements	101,000
	United Kingdom	59,000
	Hong Kong	7,000
Chrome iron ore	United Kingdom	20,000
	Belgium	7,000
	United States of America	5,000
Coal	Ceylon	674,000
	Straits Settlements	194,000
	Aden	76,000
	Egypt	74,000
	Sumatra	53,000
	Java	15,000
	Philippines	14,000
	Algeria	16,000
	Persian Gulf	11,000
	France	6,000
Cotton	United Kingdom	17,000
	Germany	36,000
	Belgium	43,000
	Italy	38,000
	Spain	14,000

74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

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Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 62986

Commodity.	Country of Final Destination.	Tons Weight.
Raw material—(continued).		
Cotton—(*continued*)	Japan	168,000
	China	32,000
Iron, pig	Japan	47,000
Fertilisers	Ceylon	21,000
	United Kingdom....	16,000
	Japan	12,000
	United States of America....	14,000
	Belgium	28,000
	France	8,000
Hemp	United Kingdom....	10,000
	Belgium	6,000
Hides and skins	United Kingdom....	6,000
	United States of America....	10,000
	Italy	3,000
Jute....	United Kingdom....	136,000
	Germany	72,000
	France	50,000
	United States of America....	110,000
	Belgium	26,000
	Spain	24,000
	Italy	23,000
	Brazil	9,000
	Holland....	8,000
	Japan	7,000
Lac	United Kingdom....	3,000
	United States of America....	11,000
Lead*	United Kingdom....	8,000
	Ceylon	5,000
	Hong Kong	3,000
	Japan	6,000
Manganese ore	United Kingdom....	331,000
	Belgium	170,000
	France	81,000
	United States of America....	170,000
	Italy	14,000
	Holland....	8,000
Oil-cake	United Kingdom....	50,000
	Ceylon	28,000
	Japan	12,000
Oil-seeds	United Kingdom....	286,000
	Australia	14,000
	Belgium	163,000
	Germany	27,000
	France	71,000
	Italy	32,000
Paraffin wax	United Kingdom....	5,000
	Italy	5,000
	Japan	5,000
Petroleum	United Kingdom....	15,000
	France	50,000
Rubber	United Kingdom....	5,000
Saltpetre	„ „	5,000
	Mauritius	5,000
	United States of America....	3,000
Tanning and dyeing materials	United Kingdom....	19,000
	United States of America....	15,000
Teak	United Kingdom....	—
Vegetable oils	„ „	3,000
	Mauritius	1,000
	Belgium	1,000
Wolfram ore	United Kingdom....	2,000
Wool	„ „	10,000
Zinc....	Belgium	60,000

C 62987

Commodity.	Country of Final Destination.	Tons Weight.
Manufactured Articles—		
Coir	United Kingdom....	12,000
	United States of America....	4,000
	Holland....	4,000
	Belgium	3,000
Jute manufactures	United Kingdom....	—
	United States of America....	—
	France	—
	Australia	—
	Egypt	—
	Java	—
	Argentine	—
	Chile	—
	Cuba	—

74 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

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CANADA

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THE WORLD

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1920-21.

REFERENCE.

IMPORTS *are shown in black.*
EXPORTS *" " " green*

The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.

(84) Imports } *Values in Millions of*
(67) *Exports* } *Pounds Sterling.*

(–) (–) } *Where values fall below £100,000*

No units are shown for Machinery, Metal manufacturers, Timber, Leather goods and Textiles, weights are not published, and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

H.M.S.O. Press, Crickhowell

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PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1920-21.

REFERENCE.

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(–) } *Where values fall below £100,000*
(–) }

No units are shown for Machinery, Metal manufacturers, Timber, Leather goods and Textiles, weights are not published, and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

H.M.S.O. Press, Cricklewood

THE WORLD

G 62989

MEAT 211
WOOL 64
CHEESE 60
BUTTER 44

387 GREAT BRITAIN

— BELGIUM

4 21·4

27

4

— JAPAN

1 PACIFIC ISLANDS 2

— INDIA

6

TIMBER 2 AUSTRALIA 6·5

COAL 43 SUGAR 56 FERTILISERS 49

FERTILISERS 11
CORN 24 JUTE 12
COAL 630 IRON 20 FERTILISERS 11 WHEAT
COAL 84 IRON 45 SALT 11 TEXTILES MACHINERY

CANADA 1·7 NEWSPRINT 12

U.S.A. 7·7 PETROLEUM 79 COAL 65 MACHINERY

NEW ZEALAND

REFERENCE

IMPORTS are shown in black
EXPORTS „ „ „ green
The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.
(1·7) Imports } = Values in Millions of
(2) Exports } Pounds Sterling.
— } Where values fall below £100,000.
— }

No units are shown for Machinery, Timber & Textiles, weights are not published and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1921.

180° 170° West Longitude 160° 150° 140° 130° 120° 110° 100° 90° 80° 70° 60° 50° 40° 30° 20° West Longitude 10° Meridian of Greenwich 10° East Longitude 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° 110° 120° 130° 140° 150° 160° East Longitude 170° 180°

H.M.S.O. Photo. Oxd. Reprod.

CANADA

THE WORLD

G 62989

MEAT 211
WOOL 64
CHEESE 66
BUTTER 46

387 GREAT BRITAIN

— BELGIUM

4 21·4

4 27

— JAPAN

— INDIA

6 PACIFIC ISLANDS 2

6 SUGAR 56 FERTILISER 49

COAL 42

FERTILISERS 11

6 AUSTRALIA 6·5

TIMBER 2

CORN 24 JUTE 12

COAL 84 IRON 45 SALT 11 TEXTILES MACHINERY

COAL 630 IRON 20 FERTILISERS 11 TIMBER 84

CANADA 1·7 NEWSPRINT 12

U.S.A. 7·1 PETROLEUM 79 COAL 65 MACHINERY

NEW ZEALAND

REFERENCE

IMPORTS are shown in black
EXPORTS " " " green
The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.
(1·7) *Imports* } = *Values in Millions of*
(2) *Exports* } *Pounds Sterling.*
— } *Where values fall below £100,000.*
—

No units are shown for Machinery, Timber & Textiles, weights are not published and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1921.

CANADA

THE WORLD

62990

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1920-21.

CANADA

NORWAY 11
GERMANY 8
HOLLAND 20
GREAT BRITAIN 314
BELGIUM 40
FRANCE 27
SPAIN 5
ITALY 57
GREECE 20
GIBRALTAR —

U.S.A. 560

U.S.A. 856

NEWFOUNDLAND 3

W. INDIES 31

CUBA 15

PERU 4

BRITISH GUIANA 9

SOUTH AFRICA —

AUSTRALIA 18

NEW ZEALAND 4

CHINA 5

ALASKA —

REFERENCE

IMPORTS *are shown in black.*
EXPORTS *" " " green.*
The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.
(19) *Imports* } *Values in Millions of Dollars.*
(27) *Exports* }
(—) } *Where values fall below 500,000 Dollars.*
(—) }
No units are shown for Machinary, Timber & Textiles, weights are not published, and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

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[10185] [10353] [10431]

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CANADA

THE WORLD

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U.S.A. 22 / 86

CHILE (—) / 3

ARGENTINE (—) / (—)

COAL 16

NITRATES 21

GREAT BRITAIN 51 / (—)

BELGIUM 1 / 36

HOLLAND ·3 / (—)

GERMANY 24 / 6 / 13

IRON 26
TEXTILES
MACHINERY
LEATHER GOODS

PETROLEUM ·69
SULPHUR 8

WOOL 12
MAIZE 15

MAIZE 77

WOOL 22
MAIZE 53
BARK ·34

EGYPT ·3 / 4

SUGAR 11

COAL 205

COAL 36

PORTUGUESE E. AFRICA ·8 / (—)

ADEN (—) / (—)

COAL 134

COAL 40

COAL 34

MAURITIUS ·3 / (—)

MADAGASCAR (—) / (—)

PORTUGUESE INDIA (—) / (—)

INDIA 2 / (—)

CEYLON (—) / ·3

STRAIT SETTLEMENTS ·3 / ·8

CHINA (—) / (—)

DUTCH E. INDIES ·8 / (—)

AUSTRALIA 2 / (—)

RICE 8

RICE 32

PETROLEUM 26

WHEAT & FLOUR 38

COAL 28

COAL 759

COAL 1

COAL 238

COAL 17

SOUTH AFRICA

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS FOR 1921.

CANADA

REFERENCE

IMPORTS are shown in black.
EXPORTS " " " green.
The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.
(36) Imports } Values in Millions of
(·3) Exports } Pounds Sterling.
(—) } Where values fall below £500,000.
(—) }
No units are shown for Machinery, Textiles, Leather goods, Gold, and Diamonds, weights and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

180° 170° 160° 150° 140° 130° 120° 110° 100° 90° 80° 70° 60° 50° 40° 30° 20° West Longitude 10° Meridian of Greenwich 10° East Longitude 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° 110° 120° 130° 140° 150° 160° 170° 180°

80° 70° 60° 50° 40° 30° 20° 10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80°

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54] [10185] [10353]

THE WORLD

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GREAT BRITAIN (51) (1.) BELGIUM (·3) HOLLAND (24) GERMANY

U.S.A. (22) (86)

WOOL 7

CHILE (—) (3)

ARGENTINE (—) (—)

COAL 16

NITRATES 21

PETROLEUM 69
SULPHUR 8

IRON 26
TEXTILES
MACHINERY
LEATHER GOODS

(36) (—) (6) (13)

EGYPT (1) (·3)

SUGAR 11

PORTUGUESE E. AFRICA (4) (8)

ADEN (—)

COAL 36

COAL 134

COAL 40

MAURITIUS (3)

MADAGASCAR (—)

COAL 34

RICE 8

RICE 32

PETROLEUM 26

WHEAT & FLOUR 38

PORTUGUESE INDIA (—)

INDIA (—) (2)

CEYLON (—)

STRAIT SETTLEMENTS (—) (·3)

CHINA (—)

DUTCH E. INDIES (·8)

AUSTRALIA (2) (—)

COAL 759

COAL 23

COAL 238

COAL 17

SOUTH AFRICA

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS FOR 1921.

REFERENCE

IMPORTS are shown in black.
EXPORTS " " " green.

The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.

(36) *Imports* } *Values in Millions of Pounds Sterling.*
(·3) *Exports* }

(—) } *Where values fall below £500,000.*
(—) }

No units are shown for Machinery, Textiles, Leather goods, Gold and Diamonds, weights and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

CANADA

54] [10185] [10355]

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PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS FOR 1920-21.

GREAT BRITAIN — 53 / 204
GERMANY — 8 / 5
BELGIUM — 13 / 5
FRANCE — 9 / 4
ITALY — 4 / 4
SPAIN — 3 / 3
U.S.A. — 35 / 35
PERSIA — 2 / 1
EGYPT — 3 / 1
INDIA
ARABIA — (–) / (–)
ADEN — 2 / (–)
ITALIAN E.AFRICA — (–) / (–)
PORTUGUESE E.AFRICA — 1 / (–)
SOUTH AFRICA — 1 / (–)
MAURITIUS — (–) / (–)
CEYLON — 1 / 11
CHINA — 3 / 8
JAPAN — 24 / 26
HONG KONG — 7 / (–)
SIAM — (–) / (–)
DUTCH E.INDIES — 5 / 17
PHILIPPINE IS. — 1 / 1
AUSTRALIA — 3 / 2
AUSTRALIA — 6 / (–)

CANADA

REFERENCE.

IMPORTS are shown in black
EXPORTS " " " green
The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.
(204) *Imports* } Values in Crores of Rupees.
(53) *Exports* }
(–) } Where values fall below 1,00,00,000 Rupees
(–) }
No units are shown for Machinery, Timber, Textiles, Railway materials & Jute bags, weights are not published, and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

H.M.S.O. Press Ca

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[9734] [10185] [10353] [10431]

THE WORLD

c 62992

GREAT BRITAIN
GERMANY
BELGIUM
FRANCE
ITALY
SPAIN
U.S.A.
EGYPT
PERSIA
INDIA
ARABIA
ADEN
ITALIAN E.AFRICA
PORTUGUESE E.AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
MAURITIUS
CEYLON
CHINA
JAPAN
HONG KONG
SIAM
DUTCH EAST INDIES
AUSTRALIA
CANADA

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS FOR 1920-21.

REFERENCE.

IMPORTS *are shown in black*
EXPORTS *" " " green*
The figures opposite commodities are 1000 Tons weight.
(204) *Imports* } *Values in Crores of Rupees.*
(53) *Exports* }
(–) } *Where values fall below 100,00,000 Rupees*
(–) }
No units are shown for Machinery, Timber, Textiles, Railway materials & Jute bags, weights are not published, and values afford no satisfactory means of comparison.

H.M.S.O. Press Ca.

[10134] [10185] [10353] [10431]

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C 62993

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. August 1923.

SECRET. Nº 74

E. 58.

(*Also C.I.D. Paper No.* 195–*C.*)

This Memorandum was approved by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 33rd Meeting, held on June 19, 1923. [S.S./33rd Minutes (1).]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

EMPIRE NAVAL POLICY AND CO-OPERATION.

AUSTRALIA.

1. *Object.*

TO summarise the Naval Situation (1923) and to give in outline Admiralty recommendations to Australia in pursuance of C.I.D. Paper No. 194–C.

2. *The Naval Situation.*

As a result of the Washington Conference and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the strategic situation has changed.

Except for a base in Hawaii, America does not possess, and by the terms of the *Status Quo* Agreement, cannot construct Naval Bases in the Pacific which would enable the American Fleet to be moved across that ocean.

America is therefore precluded from taking effective action in the Western Pacific.

Consequently the British Empire is left as the sole Power, apart from Japan, capable of operating in these waters. The Four-Power Pact between the United States of America, France, the British Empire and Japan cannot eliminate all possibility of war in that area.

The capital ship superiority of the British over the Japanese Fleet (Ratio 5 to 3) is off-set to a considerable extent by the great distance at which the fleet would have to operate from its main bases of supply and repair.

The Main Fleet, therefore, cannot be divided into detachments, but must be ready to move as a whole to any threatened area.

The need for mobility makes it necessary to press on with the preparations for a rapid concentration of our Main Fleet in the Far East, and the keystone of these preparations is the development of Singapore as a fuelling and repair base.

Even after the completion of the Singapore Fleet Base and the intermediate fuelling bases, and assuming the Suez Canal Route is available, the Main Fleet will take from one month to six weeks to reach the Far East.

The enemy's obvious and most natural objective during the interval would be Singapore, the seizure of which would deny to our Fleet the control of the Western Pacific and secure the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Australia and New Zealand.

The main task of the Naval Forces of the Empire in the Western Pacific, operating in the face of superior enemy forces, would consequently be to delay and harass the despatch of an expedition against Singapore, or any operation, such as an attack upon Hong Kong, intended to lead up to such an expedition.

For this purpose two classes of vessel are suitable:—

(*a.*) Fast light cruisers of great endurance.
(*b.*) Large overseas submarines.

It is, therefore, recommended that Australia should include both these classes of vessel in any future building programme.

74 58 597 608 61 620 633 643 650 66 67 68 69 70

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62994

3. *Composition of Sea-going Dominion Navies (in Peace).*

Light Cruisers are the smallest sea-going ships which can play a part in protecting our ocean trade routes in war or threatening the enemy's sea communications, and which can provide the necessary sea-going training in peace. To obtain and maintain full efficiency a light cruiser squadron should consist of not less than four ships in full commission.

Submarines are particularly suitable for offensive action or scouting in the face of superior enemy forces, and for this reason would be invaluable before the arrival of the Main Fleet.

The true rôle of a submarine is not coast defence. Stationed for the defence of a port, it is unlikely that one or two could prevent a transitory raid or bombardment. If of the right type, however, they would be effective against any prolonged operation.

To obtain and maintain full efficiency a flotilla of submarines should consist of not less than six boats.

Destroyers are essentially a fleet weapon and are uneconomical for local defence or escort duties.

Those which Australia now possesses might well be retained temporarily, used for the peace training of officers and men, and for local defence, but it is not recommended that any more be acquired.

4. *Air-Power.*

The control in war of sea communications can only be maintained by Naval forces. Close investigation has shown that though aeroplanes and seaplanes based on the shore will have to be taken into account in narrow waters, such as the Channel and Mediterranean, the time is not yet in sight when they can take part in the control of ocean communications. Naval forces can, however, make good use of seaborne aircraft as one of their arms.

Airships, if developed and found reliable, can, if used for reconnaissance purposes, and worked in co-operation with surface vessels, assist in keeping open our sea communications.

5. *Scale of Naval Forces Recommended.*

The outline recommendations which follow are based on the Naval Defence requirements of Australia, as far as can be foreseen for the next few years.

In framing these recommendations, the expected completion of the Japanese Light Cruisers' Building Programme in 1928 as well as the financial and economic position of Australia have been borne in mind.

Nevertheless, each Dominion cannot be considered without reference to the Empire as a whole. The Naval situation of one Dominion is profoundly affected by the Naval effort made by other Dominions and by the Mother Country.

It follows that continuity of Naval Policy is vital if the Empire is to remain secure. An unforeseen reduction of its Naval forces by one part of the Empire cannot be counterbalanced at short notice by a corresponding increase elsewhere, even if finance and popular opinion permit.

6. *Naval Co-operation.*

Continuity of Naval Policy can only be obtained if the various Governments concerned are kept at all times fully advised as to the Naval needs of the Empire. The question of whether the present arrangements are adequate for ensuring this will be raised at the Imperial Conference.

C 62995

AUSTRALIA: OUTLINE RECOMMENDATIONS.

	Page
I.—War plans	3
II.—Ships	3
III.—Repair ports and fuelling ports...	5
IV.—Trade	6
V.—Personnel	6
VI.—Communications	7
VII.—Stores	7
VIII.—Local defence	8
IX.—Air co-operation	8

I.—War Plans.

Adequacy of existing R.A.N. War Plans.

The existing arrangements for the disposition of the R.A.N. Light Cruisers, in the event of the squadron being placed at Admiralty disposal in war, are very satisfactory and cannot well be improved upon.

II.—Ships.

(1.) Existing R.A.N. Squadron and their life.
(2.) Types of Ships recommended for R.A.N.
(3.) Suggested Building Programme.

(1.) *Existing R.A.N. Ships and their Life.*

Battle Cruiser "Australia."

By the provisions of the Washington Agreement this vessel must be rendered incapable of further warlike service within six months of the ratification of the Treaty.

So far as can be foreseen the ratification will be completed at an early date; it is recommended that the Australian Government take steps for the disposal of this ship without waiting for the final ratification, in order to allow as much time as possible for her economical disposal. Although the inclusion of this Dominion unit among the ships to be retained was not practicable, and her normal life was thereby somewhat curtailed, it is considered that the vital need for vessels of this type during the war fully repaid the Commonwealth for the outlay incurred on this unit, and that the money could not have been better expended.

Light Cruisers.

Post-war Light Cruisers are assessed to last fifteen years, and those which took part in the war are assessed to last twelve years, but owing to the financial stringency it is considered this must be increased to the normal of fifteen years.

Applying these rules to Australian Light Cruisers they are considered to reach the replacement age as shown hereunder:—

Ship.	Date of Completion.	Estimated Life.	Year due for replacement.
Melbourne	1913	15 years	1928
Sydney	1913	15 „	1928
Brisbane	1916	15 „	1931
Adelaide	1922	15 „	1937

Destroyers.

The useful life of Destroyers is estimated at eight and twelve years, according to whether they took part in the war or not.

As in the case of Light Cruisers it is considered that for financial reasons a life of not less than fifteen years must be accepted for all.

This life may even have to be extended in the case of Destroyers retained for local defence purposes.

74 76 597 608 61 620 633 64 650 66 67 68 69 70

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CANADA

C 62996

Applying the above to Australian Destroyers :—

T.B.D's.	Date of Completion.	Estimated Life.	*Year due for replacement by Auxiliary Patrol Vessels (*vide* paragraph 3 below).
Yarra	1911	15 years	1926
Parramatta	1911	15 „	1926
Warrego	1912	15 „	1927
Huon	1915	15 „	1930
Swan	1915	15 „	1930
Torrens	1915	15 „	1930
Anzac	1918/1919	15 „	1933/1934
Stalwart			
Tasmania			
Swordsman			
Success			
Tattoo			

(2.) *Types of Ships recommended for the R.A.N.*

Light Cruisers.

Displacement ... Limited by the Washington Agreement to 10,000 tons.
Speed ... ... Sufficiently high to avoid action with enemy Battle Cruisers and not less that 33 knots.
Endurance ... 6,500 miles if possible.
Fuel ... ... Oil burning.
Armament ... 7·5-inch or preferably 8-inch, which is the maximum permissible by the Washington Agreement.
Anti-Aircraft Guns.
Torpedo Tubes if obtainable without a reduction in speed or endurance.
Armour ... Protected Deck.
Cost ... ... Approximately £2,000,000.

The above are the sketch outlines for the design of Foreign Service Light Cruisers now being got out in the Admiralty.

Submarines.

The type of Submarine best suited for the Australian Navy is the Overseas Patrol type, of which the following are the main particulars :—

Endurance ... ... 10,000 miles.
Armament ... ... 21-inch torpedoes.
Fitted with a powerful W/T set, and suitable for work in the tropics.
Cost ... ... About £300,000.

The first Submarine of this type for the Royal Navy will be completed in 1925.

Auxiliary Patrol Craft, Minesweepers and Anti-S/M Craft.

The question of a design of vessel or vessels most suitable for the above purpose is under consideration.

(3.) *Suggested Building Programme for the R.A.N.*

Light Cruisers.

It is recommended that Light Cruisers be laid down so as to replace the existing ships in the years in which they are considered due for replacement, or as near those dates as may be practicable.

Submarines.

It is recommended that the Commonwealth Government obtain six Submarines of the overseas patrol type. H.M.A.S. " Platypus " would be a suitable depot ship.
A shore base would be required for the flotilla.

C 62997

A.P. Craft.

It is recommended that the R.A.N. Destroyers be retained until a satisfactory design of special craft has been evolved.

Summary of Cost of Proposed Building Programme.

—	Approximate Year laid down.	Approximate Cost.
		£
1 Light Cruiser replace " Melbourne " ...	1924	2,000,000
1 Light Cruiser replace " Sydney "	1924	2,000,000
1 Light Cruiser replace " Brisbane " ...	1927	2,000,000
1 Light Cruiser replace " Adelaide " ...	1933	2,000,000
2 S/M's	1924	600,000
1 S/M	1926	300,000
3 S/M's	1928	900,000
Auxiliary Patrol Vessels	...	200,000
		10,000,000

The above programme, if spread over approximately thirteen to fourteen years, making an average cost of, say, £750,000 a year.

The proposed dates for laying down Submarines are based upon the following considerations :—

The building of a Submarine presents many difficulties not experienced with other classes of ship, notably the fitting in of the various components, which calls for considerable experience and very careful overseeing. If the Commonwealth Government decided to build Submarines, the best procedure might be that adopted in the case of the Australian Torpedo Boat Destroyers, the first two of which were completed in England, the third was sent out in sections for erection in Australia, and the remaining three built in Australia.

III.—Repair Ports and Fuelling Ports.

(1.) Outside Australia.
(2.) In Australia.

(1.) *Outside Australia.*

The necessity for a base at Singapore to enable the Main Fleet to operate in the Pacific has been explained above. The completion of this base is considered to be an urgent requirement for the defence of Australia, and it is upon this assumption that the Commonwealth Government is invited to take part in the construction of the Dockyard.

The Commonwealth share may be assessed by estimating the cost of a graving dock suitable for Light Cruisers, together with the necessary workshops and facilities, and this is estimated to be £1,600,000, to be spread over eight years.

This sum could conveniently be employed in the supply of raw and manufactured material from Australia.

(2.) *In Australia.*

(a.) *Repair Ports.*

In view of the changed situation that will be brought about by the creation of a large Naval Dockyard at Singapore, the Admiralty recommend that all idea of developing repair ports at Port Stephens and Cockburn Sound should be definitely abandoned.

As regards Sydney, it is recommended that the existing Dockyard should be kept up to date so as to be able to cope with the refits and docking of modern Light Cruisers and Submarines, but that no money should be spent on establishing, either at Sydney or elsewhere in Australia, docking and repair facilities for Capital Ships.

The Naval and Commercial repair facilities in Australia should keep pace with the growth of a Dominion Navy.

The construction of Singapore will remove any necessity for providing a repair port in Australia for the Capital Ships of the Main Fleet, though if large commercial docks are contemplated, it is desirable that they should be capable of taking the largest Man-of-War.

74
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597
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620
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68
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Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 62998

(b.) *Fuelling Ports.*

In addition to the Singapore Base, a fuelling port will be required in Australia for the use of forces operating in the Southern exits to the Java, Flores and Banda Seas and in the waters between Timor and Australia. These straits possess great strategical importance, and the denial of their passage to enemy surface raiders will go far to ensure the safety of communications in the Indian Ocean and Australian waters. All available information points to Bynoe Harbour as the most suitable site for such a fuelling port.

If oil tanks are located at Bynoe, the provision of mobile defences would be necessary until such time as it may be practicable to provide the port with fixed defences.

The alternative to a fuelling port in Northern Australia is to maintain the oil reserves at a southern port and to accept the resultant larger carry and increased number of oilers.

It must be realised, however, that the alternative is not of equivalent value to reserves strategically situated in Northern Australia, owing to the inadequacy of the world's tankage tonnage, quite apart from any question of vulnerability and wastage by consumption on passage.

IV.—Trade.

1. The Trade arrangements have already been communicated to the Commonwealth Government under the headings :—

Naval Control Service	... ...	Protection.
Naval Control Service	... ...	Contraband Control.

2. It is recommended that the importance of Albany as a Convoy assembly port be borne in mind in connection with the commercial development of the port.

V.—Personnel.

(1.) Officers.
(2.) Submarine Personnel.
(3.) Interchange of Personnel.
(4.) Personnel for Naval Control Service.

(1.) *Officers.*

The system whereby Officers for the R.A.N. are trained in Australia appears to be entirely sound.

The reports which have been received on Officers who have been trained at the R.A.N. College, whilst serving in ships of the Royal Navy, show that these Officers are of at least as high a standard as those trained in similar Colleges in this country.

It is considered that the expense of maintaining a Naval College for small numbers of Officers, although relatively high, is fully justified by the effect of building up the naval spirit of the country, and the retention of the R.A.N. College is most strongly recommended.

(2.) *S/M Personnel.*

It is recommended that Officers and ratings who have already specialised in S/M's should be sent to the United Kingdom for employment in the S/M Service until required for Australian S/M's. It is recommended that additional personnel be sent to the United Kingdom for S/M training as required, for manning Australian Submarines should it be decided to build this class of vessel.

(3.) *Interchange of Personnel.*

It is recommended that officers and men of the R.A.N. be regarded as interchangeable in all respects with those of the R.N. One of the main drawbacks of a small Navy is that the personnel become stale through long service on one station and in a limited number of ships.

The absence of foreign service must necessarily militate against recruiting.

The antidote is a regular system of exchange, whereby the ships and the personnel of the R.A.N. spend a proportion of their time on other stations.

C 62999

(4.) *Personnel for Naval Control Service.*

It is recommended that the provision of the Naval crews for Armed Escort Vessels and Defensively equipped Merchant Vessels, together with the personnel and craft for Routeing and Convoy and for Contraband Control, be regarded as an urgent requirement.

VI.—Communications.

(1.) The establishment of a High Power W/T Station in Australia for communication direct or otherwise with Great Britain and other Dominions will not fulfil Naval requirements, because—

(*a.*) The High Power Station could not be constantly available for Naval purposes.


(*b.*) The W/T range of a man-of-war is necessarily limited, and coastal stations are therefore necessary for the transmission of orders and the reception of reports.

(*c.*) It is an accepted principle that it is uneconomical and technically unsound to employ High Power Stations for short and medium range working.

(2.) An examination of the power and position of the existing Australian W/T Stations has shown that Naval requirements in the probable theatre of operations in the event of a war in the Far East would be met by the following :—

(*a.*) The existing coastal stations at Perth, Sydney, Townsville and Rabaul to be modernised with valve apparatus.

(*b.*) A medium Power Station to be established at Port Darwin, with a range of 1,500 miles. This station would form a necessary link in the area :—



thus facilitating the operations of Naval Forces in the vicinity of this area in war.

This station would be unremunerative in peace time and need not be manned until war is imminent.

The cost of a medium High Power Station is estimated at £50,000.

(3.) Wireless communications are vital in war, and must therefore be exercised in peace, or they will fail when most required. It is recommended that an agreement be reached whereby all commercial W/T Stations in Australia which may be required for Naval purposes be placed under Naval Discipline in war. This might well be effected by arranging that the existing personnel of these stations be enrolled in Naval ranks and ratings on the outbreak of war. In peace, as many as possible should be encouraged to join the R.A.N.V.R., and peace exercises are recommended, especially between the stations mentioned in paragraph 2.

(4.) In the matter of Wireless organisation, it is recommended that the Royal Australian Navy maintain a close liaison with the Naval Staff at Singapore.

(5.) It is very necessary that the High Power Station should be able to broadcast to ships on waves not more than 20,000 metres.

VII.—Stores.

(1.) Fuel.
(2.) Armament Supplies.
(3.) Naval and Victualling Stores.

(1.) *Fuel.*

(*a.*) *War Reserve.*

It is recommended that *200,000* tons of Oil Fuel be maintained in Australia as a War Reserve. This quantity is approximate and has been arrived at as follows :—

	Tons of Oil Fuel.
4 oil-burning Light Cruisers : one year's war consumption	96,000
12 T.B.D's. used as Local Defence Craft : one year's war consumption (equivalent to half ordinary war consumption because of employment)	72,000
6 Submarines (one year's war consumption)	7,200
Armed Escort Vessels, oil tankers, &c.	24,800
say,	200,000

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 63000

It is recommended that this oil and the necessary storage be provided during the next eight years at a total cost of approximately £1,000,000, or an annual cost of £125,000.

(*b.*) *Position of Oil Fuel Reserves.*

Assuming that Bynoe or other Northern Port is decided upon as a fuelling port it is recommended that three-quarters of the Light Cruisers' oil reserve be stored there, and that one-quarter be stored at Southern Ports.

As regards oil for Submarines it is suggested that one-half of the oil reserve for Submarines be located at a suitable port in Australia and the remaining half at Singapore, in order that they may be able, in war, to operate from the latter place as soon as the situation permits.

(*c.*) *Peace Requirements.*

It is recommended that the allowance of fuel for vessels in commission should be calculated on a similar basis to that adopted in the Royal Navy.

For example, the provision for the China Squadron for 1923–24 is based on 50 days' steaming. To this is added the estimated consumption for the year for auxiliary purposes, and the necessary provision to permit of the authorised trials at special speeds.

(2.) *Armament Supplies.*

The decision to establish a Naval Base at Singapore places Australia in an ideal position to become the source of Armament supplies for the Main Fleet in War.

The manner in which this can be carried out is well expressed in the report laid before the Commonwealth Government by the Admiralty representative (Commander J. G. McHardy, R.N.) who visited Australia for the purpose in 1921.

It is desirable to lay stress on those portions of the report dealing with independent Naval inspection during manufacture, which is regarded as an indispensable condition.

(3.) *Naval and Victualling Stores.*

In view of the great difficulty in arranging supplies from the United Kingdom for a large Fleet operating abroad in time of war, it is strongly recommended that the general lines of development should be such that Australia should ultimately be able, not only to supply the needs of her own forces, but also to assist in meeting those of a large Fleet.

VIII.—Local Defence.

The question has arisen whether the Dominions wish the Sub-Committee of the Joint Defence Committee, which is now considering the scales of Defence of British Ports oversea, to examine at the same time the scales of Defence of Dominion Ports.

Scales of Defence, when complete, will include recommendations for Local Naval and Air Defence and for defences on land.

IX.—Air Co-operation.

(1.) It is recommended that future Australian Light Cruisers be built to carry one or more amphibians.

(2.) In the meantime, in order to enable the R.A.N. to co-operate in peace time with the Australian Air Force, it is recommended that one existing Light Cruiser be fitted to carry a small seaplane, or alternatively, that the squadron oiler or collier be so fitted.

(3.) It is recommended that plans be prepared with a view to taking up and fitting out a merchant ship as a seaplane carrier in Australia on the outbreak of war.

Admiralty, June 11, 1923.
P.D.01805.

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C 63001

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. August 1923.

SECRET. Nº 74

E. 59.

(*Also C.I.D. Paper No.* 196–*C.*)

This Memorandum was approved by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 33rd Meeting, held on June 19, 1923. [S.S./33rd Minutes (1).]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

EMPIRE NAVAL POLICY AND CO-OPERATION.

NEW ZEALAND.

1. *Object.*

TO summarise the naval situation (1923) and to give in outline Admiralty recommendations to New Zealand in pursuance of C.I.D. Paper No. 194–C.

2. *The Naval Situation.*

As a result of the Washington Conference and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the strategic situation has changed.

Except for a base in Hawaii, America does not possess and, by the terms of the *Status Quo* Agreement, cannot construct, Naval Bases in the Pacific which would enable the American Fleet to be moved across that ocean.

America is therefore precluded from taking effective action in the Western Pacific.

Consequently the British Empire is left as the sole Power, apart from Japan, capable of operating in these waters. The Four-Power Pact between the United States of America, France, the British Empire and Japan cannot eliminate all possibility of war in that area.

The capital ship superiority of the British over the Japanese Fleet (ratio 5 to 3) is offset to a considerable extent by the great distance at which the Fleet would have to operate from its main bases of supply and repair.

The Main Fleet, therefore, cannot be divided into detachments, but must be ready to move as a whole to any threatened area.

The need for mobility makes it necessary to press on with preparations to enable a rapid concentration of our Main Fleet in the Far East, and the keystone of these preparations is the development of Singapore as a fuelling and repair base.

Even after the completion of the Singapore Fleet base and the intermediate fuelling bases, and assuming the Suez Canal route is available, the Main Fleet will take from one month to six weeks to reach the Far East.

The enemy's obvious and most natural objective during the interval would be Singapore, the seizure of which would deny to our Fleet the control of the Western Pacific and secure the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Australia and New Zealand.

The main task of the Naval Forces of the Empire in the Western Pacific, operating in the face of superior enemy forces, would consequently be to delay and harass the despatch of an expedition against Singapore, or any operation, such as an attack upon Hong Kong, intended to lead up to such an expedition.

For this purpose two classes of vessel are suitable :—

(*a.*) Fast Light Cruisers of great endurance.
(*b.*) Large Overseas Submarines.

Light Cruisers are the smallest seagoing ships which can play a part in protecting the ocean trade routes in war, or threatening an enemy's sea communications, and which can provide the necessary sea-going training in peace.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 63002

Submarines are particularly suitable for offensive action or scouting, and for this reason would be invaluable both before and after the arrival of the Main Fleet in the East.

3. *Composition of the New Zealand Division.*

As it appears, however, that New Zealand would not be able for some time to come to maintain both light cruisers and submarines in sufficient numbers to ensure efficiency, it is recommended that she should concentrate on light cruisers.

4. *Air Power.*

The control in war of the sea communications of the Empire can only be maintained by Naval forces. Close investigation has shown that, though aeroplanes and seaplanes based on the shore will have to be taken into account in narrow waters such as the Channel and Mediterranean, the time is not yet in sight when they can take part in the control of ocean communications. Naval forces can, however, make good use of seaborne aircraft as one of their arms.

Airships, if developed and found reliable, can, if used for reconnaissance purposes, and worked in co-operation with surface vessels, assist in keeping open our sea communications.

5. *Scale of Naval Forces Recommended.*

In framing these recommendations, the expected completion of the Japanese light cruiser building programme in 1928, as well as the financial and economic position of New Zealand, have been borne in mind.

Nevertheless, each Dominion cannot be considered without reference to the Empire as a whole. The Naval situation of one Dominion is profoundly affected by the Naval effort made by other Dominions and by the Mother Country.

It follows that continuity of Naval Policy is vital if the Empire is to remain secure. An unforeseen reduction of its Naval Forces by one part of the Empire cannot be counter-balanced at short notice by a corresponding increase elsewhere, even if finance and popular opinion permit.

6. *Naval Co-operation.*

Continuity of Naval Policy can only be obtained if the various Governments concerned are kept at all times fully advised as to the Naval needs of the Empire.

The question of whether the present arrangements are adequate for ensuring this will be raised at the Imperial Conference.

NEW ZEALAND: OUTLINE RECOMMENDATIONS.

I.—Ships.
II.—Local Defence.
III —Trade.
IV.—Personnel.
V.—Oil Fuel.
VI.—Repair Ports.
VII.—Communications.

I.—Ships.

During the difficult times through which New Zealand has been passing she has successfully maintained the nucleus of a naval force. It is recommended that this should now be expanded and that she should aim at maintaining a cruiser squadron of three ships, manned by New Zealand personnel. This can be built up gradually, and it is suggested that "Chatham" should be relieved by two D class light cruisers in 1924 and that a third ship should be added as soon as the Dominion is able to bear this additional burden.

Provision of Ships.

2. The arrangement whereby ships are loaned by Great Britain enables New Zealand to maintain a larger effective force than would otherwise be possible, and it is therefore recommended that it should be continued for the present.

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It is recognised, however, that a division composed of ships on loan may not fulfil New Zealand's aspirations in the future, and it is therefore suggested that she should take steps to obtain a ship of her own to replace one of those lent as soon as her finances admit. It is considered, however, that the maintenance of three ships should take precedence over any building policy until such time as both are possible.

II.—Local Defence.

3. The question has arisen whether the Dominions wish the Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Defence Committee, which is now considering the Scales of Defence of British Ports Oversea, to examine at the same time the Scales of Defence of Dominion Ports.

Scales of Defence, when complete, will include recommendations for local Naval and Air Defence and for defences on land.

III.—Trade.

4. The trade arrangements recommended have already been communicated to the Dominion Government under the headings "Naval Control Service—Protection," "Naval Control Service—Contraband Control."

IV.—Personnel.

5. The increase in active service personnel rendered necessary by a squadron of three ships can only be made gradually, and until sufficient New Zealand personnel is available British personnel will be loaned when desired to supply the deficiency.

It is recommended that the final total aimed at should allow for a proportion of men undergoing training ashore.

Training.

6. Schools for the higher specialist training of ratings on the small scale necessary for the New Zealand Division would be very costly in proportion to the numbers trained, and the alternative, that men should be sent to the schools in England, is recommended for the present.

Interchange.

7. Continuous service in the same squadron on the same station tends to damp enthusiasm, and is not an incentive to recruiting; it is considered that interchange of New Zealand ships and personnel with the British Navy will benefit everybody and will do much to ensure efficient co-operation in war. It is suggested, therefore, that ships of the New Zealand Division should periodically join up with other squadrons and *vice versâ*, which, in the first case, would provide an opportunity for some of the higher ratings to go through the schools in England.

Reserves.

8. To provide the personnel necessary for the Naval Control Service and Local Defence measures it is recommended that the reserves should be increased and a force raised similar to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

V.—Oil Fuel.

9. The Admiralty note with satisfaction the decision of New Zealand to establish an oil fuel reserve at Auckland. This is an important step towards rectifying the present unsatisfactory fuelling position in the Pacific.

A war reserve of 10,000 tons is considered necessary in addition to any storage necessitated by the normal requirements of the station in peace.

VI.—Naval Repair Ports.

10. The present arrangements whereby the commercial facilities at Auckland are used for refitting ships of the New Zealand Division have proved so satisfactory and economical in practice that there does not appear to be any necessity to establish a Government Dockyard in the near future.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 63004

Singapore, however, is of vital importance to the scheme of Empire Defence in the Pacific, and therefore to New Zealand in particular. Any assistance, either financial or in material, that she may find herself able to offer towards its development would be welcomed.

VII.—Communications.

11. In order to complete the network of W/T stations necessary to adequately cover the area of the Pacific Islands, the stations at Awanui and Apia should be modernised and made capable of maintaining communication with Sydney.

It is also important that the personnel of these stations should be under Naval discipline in war time, and it is suggested that they should be enrolled in the Volunteer Reserve proposed in paragraph 8.

Admiralty, June 11, 1923.
P.D. 01806.

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C 63005

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SECRET.

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(*Also C.I.D. No.* 197–C.)

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COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL BASE AT SINGAPORE AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE FOREIGN AND NAVAL POLICY OF THE EMPIRE.

(Approved by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee on June 19, 1923, S.S. 33rd Minutes.)

WITH reference to the Minute of the 18th May, 1923, signed on behalf of the South African Government by General Smuts and forwarded by the Governor-General (Appendix), protesting against the announcement of the decision in regard to Singapore pending the discussion of the whole subject by the Imperial Conference, the history of this question, including the facts as to what happened at the Imperial Conference in 1921 and at the Washington Conference, 1921–22, is as follows :—

2. Until the British Fleet was centralised in Home waters in consequence of the development of the German menace, a British Battle Fleet was maintained in the Pacific as well as in the Mediterranean, and the base at Hong Kong was maintained on the scale necessary for a first-class Naval base under the conditions prevailing in those days. During the ten years preceding the war all modern battleships were withdrawn from the China Station in accord with the policy of concentration in Home waters which was forced upon the Admiralty by the development of the German menace. During the nineteen years which have elapsed since this withdrawal began, the increase in the size of battleships, the developments of ordnance and the introduction of oil fuel have rendered Hong Kong in its present state useless as a base for a modern Battle Fleet. The Navy was therefore in the position that, if political circumstances should ever render it desirable again to maintain a Battle Fleet in the Pacific, they would be unable to do so owing to the lack of any Naval base.

3. In the Memorandum on Naval Policy (E. 4 of February 1921), which was prepared by the Admiralty for the Imperial Conference, 1921, reasons were put down why it would be preferable to develop a new Naval base at Singapore rather than to bring the base at Hong Kong up to date.

4. The original decision to create a naval base at Singapore was taken by the late Cabinet on the 16th June, 1921.

5. The reasons for this decision were communicated to the Imperial Conference, in the first instance, by Mr. Balfour on the 28th June, 1921 (E.–8th Meeting). It is interesting to note that the occasion chosen by Mr. Balfour to make this statement was during the discussion on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that he gave as one of the principal reasons in support of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the necessity of gaining the considerable time required for the creation of a base at Singapore :—

> " In these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that one of the most pressing needs for Imperial Defence is that Singapore should be made into a place where the British Fleet can concentrate for the defence of the Empire, of our interests in the East, our interests in India, our interests in Australia, our interests in New Zealand, our interests in the smaller Possessions there, and that for that purpose it is absolutely necessary to undertake works at Singapore. Those works cannot be finished in a day. They cannot be finished in a year. They must take some time to complete.

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

"*Mr. Massey:* They are going on.

"*Mr. Balfour:* Not yet. This question has only been taken in hand quite recently. Therefore, until Singapore is rendered the place which we think it ought to be made—a place of concentration, a place of refitting and refuelling—until this is done, we are at a relative disadvantage undoubtedly in the Pacific, and that is a very strong strategical reason, putting all wider considerations apart, why we should remain on the most friendly terms with Japan, and why we should continue a policy we have hitherto pursued with such success, that is, of joint action with Japan in the Far East."

6. It should be noted that Mr. Balfour did not suggest that a renewal of the Alliance with Japan would render it unnecessary to proceed with the base at Singapore, although, in an earlier passage, he had recalled that in the past "the fact of the Japanese Alliance was held to relieve the Admiralty of the day of any serious responsibility in regard to the Pacific." On the contrary, he pointed out to the Conference that the substitution of oil for coal for fuel for battleships had rendered it absolutely necessary to create a base at Singapore as an indispensable condition of action by the Fleet in the Far East.

7. The question of Singapore was discussed in greater detail at the Imperial Conference at the meetings devoted to Naval Defence, the record of which, owing to its secrecy, was limited by the Conference itself to a single copy. In those discussions Lord Lee said (E–14th Meeting):—

"The Home Government have therefore come to the decision that Singapore must be developed as the main base for the British Fleet in the Pacific."

Later on, in the same statement, Lord Lee made it quite clear that the proposals of the Admiralty were unaffected by the question of the renewal or otherwise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, except that if the Alliance were dropped and Japan became hostile, "then undoubtedly there would be increased urgency for the development and "establishment of our bases in the Pacific and our oil reserves."

8. After the preliminary discussion, further conversations took place at the Admiralty with the representatives of the Dominions, and the Admiralty, on the 11th July, circulated a summary of their recommendations (E–32). This included the following:—

"In the Admiralty opinion, Australia, New Zealand and India should be asked to contribute a considerable portion of the expenditure necessary to develop Singapore as a Fleet base, since they are intimately concerned therein."

9. On the 11th July the British Government accepted the invitation to the Washington Conference. It was already clear that a Pacific agreement would be one of our objects at the Conference, for a statement to this effect was included in the announcement made by the Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) in the House of Commons on the 11th July as representing the opinion of all the members of the Conference on the question of the Pacific and also on the question of disarmament.

10. The subject of Naval Defence was again taken up by the full Conference on the 19th July (E–26th Meeting), when Lord Lee again emphasised the importance of Singapore. This statement, it should be noted, was made a week after the announcement referred to above that a Pacific agreement was part of our policy for the Washington Conference. The records of this meeting of the Conference contain no suggestion that the development of Singapore as a naval base should be postponed if a Pacific agreement was achieved.

11. It is quite true, as mentioned in General Smuts' Minute, that the following resolution was passed by the Conference in regard to the naval defence of the Empire:—

"That, while recognising the necessity of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire to provide such naval defence as may prove to be essential for security, and while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other Power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation are matters for the full determination of the several Parliaments concerned, and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on Disarmament."

12. The policy set forth in this resolution is that equality with the naval strength of any Power is a minimum standard for the British Empire. It was not the policy, but the method and expense of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire which, by this resolution, was deferred until after the Washington Conference. So long as the British Fleet is entirely unable to operate in the Pacific, it cannot be considered that a one-Power standard is being maintained. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government felt that the development of the Naval base at Singapore was a matter which should not be further delayed, and they had no reason to believe that any Dominion held a contrary view.

13. The instructions of the British Government to Mr. Balfour and his colleagues for the Washington Conference are contained in a Memorandum drawn up as the result of an enquiry by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Balfour. These instructions, which were fully discussed and approved by the Cabinet include the following in the summary of Conclusions:—

"*Singapore.*

"That no agreement should be reached at the Conference which will in any way interfere with the development of Singapore as a British Naval Base, since such development is purely defensive in character and is already overdue."

14. At the outset of the Conference, Mr. Balfour at an informal meeting gave the British Empire Delegation full particulars as to his instructions and the lines on which he proposed to proceed. It is practically certain that he must have mentioned the decision in regard to Singapore, though no record was kept of what he said. In any event, there is no possible room for doubt that all members of the British Empire Delegation knew what was our policy in regard to Singapore. For example, at a meeting of the British Empire Delegation on the 2nd December, 1921, when the proposal for a limitation in regard to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific was under discussion, Senator Pearce, the Australian Representative, pointed out the desirability of Singapore being left out of any restricted arrangement as to the construction of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific, and Mr. Balfour remarked that in none of the conversations he had so far had was the question of Singapore raised, and he preferred to leave it alone.

Again, the question of Singapore was constantly referred to in the telegrams which passed between Mr. Balfour and the Home Government, copies of all of which were circulated to all members of the British Empire Delegation. Thus, a telegram dated the 18th December, from Lord Curzon, included the following:—

"With regard to fortifications in the Pacific, you say Singapore is not mentioned. We presume by this that we are free to develop Singapore as a first-class naval base if we think it necessary to do so. This we regard as indispensable, and we hope you will make sure there is no misunderstanding with the Americans aud still more the Japanese on this point. As you are aware from discussions over which you have presided in the Committee of Imperial Defence, the defence of Australia and New Zealand might in certain circumstances depend entirely on Singapore."

On the 13th January, Mr. Churchill, who was acting as Chairman of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee in Mr. Balfour's absence, sent the following telegram:—

"With reference to your telegram No. 166 of the 15th December and the provision in the 3-Power Agreement on the Naval Ratio that the *status quo* shall be maintained with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region, including Hong Kong, it is presumed that our freedom of action in regard to Singapore has been preserved."

15. So far as can be traced, Singapore was only once alluded to in the course of the conversations at Washington. A telegram, dated the 24th January, from Mr. Balfour, includes the following:—

"I introduced certain amendments to place beyond doubt the exclusion of Singapore (in which Baron Kato acquiesced) as well as territories of Australia, according to a formula designed by Senator Pearce; also to limit the *status quo* in fortifications and coast defences. I have since discussed draft with Mr. Hughes, who tells me that American Delegation have accepted all my amendments. During this conversation, Mr. Hughes volunteered the observation that of course Singapore was excluded as it was neither island nor in Pacific."

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W.L. Mackenzie King Papers
Memoranda & Notes

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

16. In the result it was definitely settled at the Washington Conference that no development should be made east of the meridian of 110° east longitude. That decision barred the further development of Hong Kong, but permitted Great Britain to develop Singapore. As shown above, it was not by an oversight that the line was so drawn. The territory specified in Article 19 was a matter of prolonged consideration at Washington, and the other parties to the Treaty fully appreciated that Article 19 as finally drafted left Great Britain to develop Singapore as a Naval base.

17. South Africa did not send a representative to Washington, and the Treaty was signed on behalf of that Dominion by Mr. Balfour, so that these facts are possibly not familiar to General Smuts and the South African Government.

18. Finally, it should be mentioned that, in consequence of the agreements arrived at between the United States, Japan and this country at Washington, the naval situation resulting from the agreements was examined afresh by the Admiralty, and they produced a Memorandum (C.I.D. No. 176–C) showing how the naval policy of the British Empire had been affected by these treaties. In this Memorandum special consideration was given to the question of the development of Singapore, in view of the facts that any further development of Hong Kong would not be in accord with the terms of the Washington Treaty: that no British port in the Western Pacific is capable of serving as a base for a modern fleet, and that the United States are debarred from developing any naval base in the Western Pacific. The Admiralty therefore concluded that "for rapid concentration of the Fleet in the East it is essential that a secure base at Singapore can be counted on. The development of Singapore must take many years, even if substantial assistance is provided by the Dominions. The matter is therefore one of great urgency."

This Memorandum was considered and approved by His Majesty's Government, and copies were forwarded to the Dominions with a request for their remarks on the questions raised. The date of the despatch was the 23rd December.

19. The fifth paragraph of the Union Ministers' Minute contains the statement that "no expenditure on this project is provided during the year 1923/24 and only a very moderate expenditure thereafter during 1924/25." The despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed to the Dominions on the 27th March, 1923, however, stated that, "no considerable expenditure will be incurred during the financial year 1923/24 and only a moderate expenditure during 1924/25." The despatch then went on to say that, "the provision made in the estimates for the financial year 1923/24 is 160,000*l*." To have held the question over for the formal approval of the Imperial Conference would have entailed the omission of this item from the Naval Estimates, and the postponement for a year of the commencement of a work which, as long ago as June 1921 had been described by Mr. Balfour as "one of the most pressing needs for Imperial defence" (paragraph 5 above), and which, as stated in paragraph 33 of C.I.D. Paper No. 176–C is regarded by the Naval Staff as "of great urgency."

20. From the above it is clear that the British Government, at any rate, never conceived it to be the intention of the Imperial Conference, and the Governments represented there, either before, during or after the Washington Conference, that their policy of creating a naval base at Singapore was in any way affected by any of the acts of that Conference. On the contrary, they made it clear at the Imperial Conference that even if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance continued, it would be necessary to carry out their naval programme, which included a base at Singapore; that they instructed their Delegates to the Washington Conference not to agree to anything which would interfere with the development of Singapore as a British naval base, and several times during the Conference reiterated this instruction; that their Delegates faithfully followed these instructions; that this attitude was communicated to and received the full support of the British Empire Delegation, on which all the Dominions except South Africa, as well as India, were represented by specially appointed Delegates.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W* 1,
June 30, 1923.

APPENDIX.

Copy of Despatch from His Royal Highness the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

My Lord Duke, *Governor-General's Office, Cape Town, May* 18, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Grace herewith, with reference to your despatch Dominions No. 119, Secret, of the 27th March, 1923, the document mentioned below (enclosure), on the subject of the establishment of a naval base at Singapore.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR FREDERICK,
Governor-General.

Minute, dated May 18, 1923, *signed on behalf of the South African Government by General Smuts.*

Minute No. 360. *Prime Minister's Office, May* 18, 1923.

MINISTERS have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Royal Highness the Governor-General's Minute No. 2/1894 of the 20th April, transmitting a copy of the Secretary of State's despatch No. 119* of the 27th March, on the subject of the expenditure of £11,000,000 upon the establishment of a Naval base at Singapore, such expenditure to be extended over a period of years and without prejudice to any decisions of the forthcoming Imperial Conference.

Ministers desire to take this opportunity of putting on record their views in this matter, and to request that their views may be communicated to the other Dominions for their information.

One of the most beneficent results of the Washington Conference was the signature of the Quadruple Pacific Treaty which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance without disturbing the friendly relations between Great Britain and Japan. The result of the agreement was to minimise for the duration of the pact any danger of war in the Pacific Ocean, and the fact that America joined in this pact at once altered the conditions under which a base at Singapore was considered at the Prime Ministers' Conference in 1921. A reconsideration of the whole Naval policy of the British Empire is therefore rendered necessary.

Attention is drawn to the resolution† adopted in respect of this matter under the heading Imperial Defence (Naval) at the Conference held in London in 1921, when it was resolved that any definite decision in regard to Naval Defence or the manner of co-operation should be deferred until after the Conference at Washington.

Ministers regret that any statements should have been made on the subject of Singapore, in view of the imminence of the Prime Ministers' Conference, especially having in mind the fact that no expenditure on this project is provided during the year 1923/24, and only a very moderate expenditure thereafter during 1924/25.

A great fortified base at Singapore may, in its effect on Japanese opinion, produce far-reaching reactions for the foreign policy, as well as for the Naval policy, of the Empire; and the whole subject, in all its possible bearings, should have received the careful attention of the Imperial Conference before a decision on any detail was announced.

The last review of the Naval position is contained in the Memorandum‡ of the Committee of Imperial Defence, dated the 28th July, 1922, and, if there has been any further development in the views of the Admiralty, Ministers trust that His Majesty's Government will prepare and issue for their consideration a fresh appreciation of the world Naval position, so that, in coming to the Conference in October, they may be advised in advance of the views that the Admiralty may submit.

(Signed) J. C. SMUTS.

* C.I.D. No. 189–C. † Paper No. E–55. ‡ C.I.D. No. 176–C.

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16. In the result it was definitely settled at the Washington Conference that no development should be made east of the meridian of 110° east longitude. That decision barred the further development of Hong Kong, but permitted Great Britain to develop Singapore. As shown above, it was not by an oversight that the line was so drawn. The territory specified in Article 19 was a matter of prolonged consideration at Washington, and the other parties to the Treaty fully appreciated that Article 19 as finally drafted left Great Britain to develop Singapore as a Naval base.

17. South Africa did not send a representative to Washington, and the Treaty was signed on behalf of that Dominion by Mr. Balfour, so that these facts are possibly not familiar to General Smuts and the South African Government.

18. Finally, it should be mentioned that, in consequence of the agreements arrived at between the United States, Japan and this country at Washington, the naval situation resulting from the agreements was examined afresh by the Admiralty, and they produced a Memorandum (C.I.D. No. 176–C) showing how the naval policy of the British Empire had been affected by these treaties. In this Memorandum special consideration was given to the question of the development of Singapore, in view of the facts that any further development of Hong Kong would not be in accord with the terms of the Washington Treaty: that no British port in the Western Pacific is capable of serving as a base for a modern fleet, and that the United States are debarred from developing any naval base in the Western Pacific. The Admiralty therefore concluded that "for rapid concentration of the Fleet in the East it is essential that a secure base at Singapore can be counted on. The development of Singapore must take many years, even if substantial assistance is provided by the Dominions. The matter is therefore one of great urgency."

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* C.I.D. No. 189–C. † Paper No. E–55. ‡ C.I.D. No. 176–C.

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