





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

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
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


A N
A N S W E R
T O T H E
O B S E R V A T I O N S
O N T H E
P A P E R S relative to the Rupture with
S P A I N.

Agedum, pauca accipe contra.

HOR. Sat. iv. Lib. i.

L O N D O N :
Printed for J. HINXMAN, at the Globe, in Pater-
noster-Row. 1762.



R E M A R K S

UPON THE

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

AS the Author of the present Remarks has no other aim in view, than to lay open to the public the deceitful and factious nature of the Observations upon the Spanish Papers, in order to prevent or efface any groundless impressions they might be apt to leave upon the minds of the generality of those into whose hands they may fall ; he will confine himself strictly to that object, without entering into any of the general questions, that might arise in this discussion, any further than is necessary to the end proposed.

B

He

He flatters himself, that his Remarks will be found to be fair, candid, and impartial; in a word, such as may naturally flow from a person unconnected with every faction, nor attached to any party, but that of truth, justice, and the public good.

It is his regard to these considerations alone that induces him to attempt an answer to an insidious pamphlet, lately published under the title of *Observations on the Papers relative to the Rupture with Spain*: a work whose only design and tendency seems to be to stir up the spirit of faction and discontent, and infuse into the minds of the people false and injurious suspicions of the present ministry. It has the appearance of being wrote by a person of some abilities, and one who has been intimately acquainted with the measures of the late administration, as well as closely connected with their interests. This enables him to throw at pleasure a gloss or shade over most of the transactions, and to represent them in a light very different from the true; the
more

more apt to deceive that it carries with it the appearance of reality, and that its fallacies, at first specious, cannot be discovered but by a strict examination.

But as very few of those who may chance to read that pamphlet will chuse to give themselves so much trouble, the author of these Remarks hopes, that, all-hasty, loose, and unconnected as they are, they will be able to expose the little faith and credit that is due to the Observations on the Spanish Papers, and thereby answer the only end that (emboldened by concealment) he proposes to himself in allowing them to appear in the world in this unfinished form.

The first observation in this pamphlet is, that the public has not been gratified with *a view of all the papers relative to the rupture with Spain* *; and that *the negotiation is designedly kept intricate and embarrassed* †. Our observer then proceeds to mention some pa-

* Page 5.

† Page 6.

pers that ought to have been produced, but which are *designedly suppressed*. And, first, he asks, "Why the public has not been indulged with *all the memorials and papers relating to the old differences with Spain*, that were moved for in the House of Commons on the 11th of December, from which (he says) we might have judged with some degree of accuracy of the merits of the present war with Spain?"

—To this we reply, That the differences that have for these many years subsisted betwixt England and Spain, relative to the captures, the Newfoundland fishery, and the Honduras settlements, were not the grounds of the present quarrel with Spain, nor even of the advice given some time before by Lord Temple and Mr. Pitt, the rejecting of which occasioned their resignation; and therefore, that the suppression of them could by no means tend to keep us in the dark with respect to the merits of the present war with Spain.

The advice given by Lord Temple and Mr. Pitt, for an immediate declaration of war
against

against Spain, or at least, for such a proceeding as must have rendered it inevitable, was founded, as they themselves confessed, *upon what that court had already done* *, (i. e. before the 5th of October last.) But the only things meant by those so general and unsatisfactory words, must have been, 1st, The heinous insult said to have been offered by Spain to the court of London, in the memorial delivered by Mr. de Buffy to Mr. Pitt, relative to our differences with Spain: And, 2dly, The treaty of the 15th of August, or any other conventions entered into between Spain and France. We will not enter at present into an examination of these reasons; but will only observe, that the old differences of Spain and England could not be meant in the general words cited above, as there never appears the least hint that we thought ourselves aggrieved by Spain in any of these points: but, on the contrary, it seems to be acknowledged, that Spain had some ground to complain of undue incroach-

* Letter from a right honourable Person to — in the City.

ments made by subjects of England, upon the Spanish territory on the coast of the bay of Honduras.

Neither was the present war declared upon the ground of any of the old differences. This appears evidently from our declaration of war, and from all the papers relative to the rupture with Spain; in which the only grounds of the war appear to have been, 1st, The refusal of Spain to give us any satisfaction, with respect to the treaty of the 15th of August, or their final intentions; and, 2dly, The great cause of suspicion afforded us by Spain of her hostile intentions, by the great preparations making for war in all parts of the kingdom. Spain, indeed, pretended to justify her refusal of the satisfaction we asked, on the ground, that, notwithstanding her repeated demands, and our repeated promises, we had never given her any satisfaction for the just causes of complaint she had against us, though she asked only, as a salvo for her honour, till matters could be settled, that we might
send

send immediate orders for the evacuation of the incroachments made by some English subjects, upon the Spanish territory on the Honduras coast. And hence it is thought very material to the justice of the war, to know whether this was a proper and sufficient cause of refusal on the part of Spain, to the necessary eclaircissement demanded by us.

But to show the weakness of this justification of the Spanish refusal, we need only compare the nature of the satisfaction demanded on both sides. On the one hand, the demand made by us was of the utmost necessity; made so necessary too by the very suspicious conduct of Spain, and which, from the very nature of it, could not brook the least delay. Whereas that of the Spaniards was still doubtful as to the justice of it, as it was not allowed by the English; that the incroachments made upon the Spanish settlements had been without provocation on the part of Spain. Besides, if the report was true, that Spain had entered in-

to

to hostile engagements against us, she had certainly forfeited all right to this satisfaction; which we assured her, in the most solemn manner, she should most amply receive, as soon as she had cleared up our just suspicions on that head. This short delay too could be of no bad consequence to Spain.

From these observations, it appears, that the publication of these papers could by no means have thrown any light upon the merits of the war with Spain, and therefore that the suppression of them could not be with a view to keep us in the dark in that matter.

But the irrelative nature of these papers to the real merits of the rupture, is not the only reason that justifies the not publishing them; because, had it been proposed to lay before parliament, the full and perfect grounds of the old disputes, whole volumes must have been published, in order to set forth in a proper manner the pretensions, claims, and rights of both states. The histories

ries of the settlements at Newfoundland and Honduras, even since their establishment, must have been minutely compiled. All the treaties, and tacit concessions that have since taken place in either, must have been fully stated; and accurate maps of the country must have been made. Had all this been done, would it not have been destructive of the end proposed by it? Would any one have given himself the trouble of searching to the bottom of so tedious an affair? and would a slight and impartial examination have been adequate to the intricacy of the business?

Secondly, The ministry are charged with the suppression of intelligence said to have been transmitted by Mr. Stanley from Paris, relative to the family-compact *. But whether there really ever was any intelligence of that matter sent by Mr. Stanley, or whether it was of much importance, or much credit, we are totally uninformed.

* Pages 9, 10.

Besides, there are, I imagine, certain kinds of intelligence that would be very improper to be made public, lest it should give some ground to the state from whence it had been sent, to suspect the persons from whom, or the means by which it had been obtained ; a step, that, for the future, would have totally deprived the British ministers of that leading star of public councils. But to what purpose should this intelligence have been published ? To justify the advice given by Mr. Pitt for an immediate declaration of war ? But I shall afterwards endeavour to show, that whatever information he might have had of the family-compact, or of the intentions of Spain, that measure would have been highly improper in every respect. To show the necessity of the declaration of war made by the present administration ? But surely the papers that are published, are sufficient to show the necessity of that proceeding, without having recourse to so improper a step, as that of laying open the private intelligence sent by a minister to his court.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, It is alledged, That *an extract of one letter only of Mr. Pitt's is published* *, dated July 28. — But what has been said above may be sufficient to show us the reason of this. It appears that the old differences with Spain, probably the subject of Mr. Pitt's former letters, were by no means the grounds of the present war, or of the rupture advised by Mr. Pitt. To publish any of these letters, therefore, would have been quite foreign to the purpose proposed, in submitting the papers relative to the rupture with Spain to the consideration of parliament.

The next observation contained in the pamphlet, is upon that passage of Lord Egremont's first letter to Lord Bristol, inserted in the papers; in which he says, *he opens his correspondence* †. ‘ But how can this be truth? (says our very critical observer in the note) when Lord Bristol writes, Nov. 16. “ The messenger Ardouin delivered to me, on the 10th instant, at the

* Page 9.

† Page 9.

“ Escorial, your Lordship’s dispatches of
 “ the 28th past : And by the last post,
 “ I received your *letter of the 20th of the*
 “ *same month, in which, &c.*” I suppose
 ‘ *the public was not to be trusted with all*
 ‘ *that letter.*’

What an idea must he have of the im-
 prudence and indiscretion of the persons
 who were the writers, publishers, and *cur-*
tailers of these letters, to suppose them ca-
 pable of falling into so gross a blunder, in a
 matter where the utmost caution was neces-
 sary for their own sakes ! The observer must
 imagine that these words, *open my corre-*
spondence, were not in the real letter ; but
 that they have been since inserted, when
 these papers were prepared for parliament,
 in order to make believe, that it was the
 first letter wrote by Lord Egremont to Lord
 Bristol ; for he cannot suppose that Lord
 Egremont would use that expression in a
 letter dated the 28th, (at that time, certain-
 ly, not designed to be shewn to parliament)
 if he had wrote him one in the same capa-
 city

city but a few days before. But is it possible, if such care and attention has been given to the revifal and ordering of these letters, as is here infinuated, that it occasioned the delay of publication for some weeks, which were employed in putting them into fuch a form, as might best tend to the justification of the ministry, and the fatisfaction of parliament; by the omiffion of some letters, and parts of letters, by the inferting some adjusting words, and the like, that they could have been fo very carelefs, as not to obferve the repugnancy between thofe two paffages, which muft immediately lay open the fraud, and which would have been eafily faved by the bare omiffion of that letter of the 20th. The absurdity of this fuppoftion is felf-evident; and the feeming contradiction may be eafily otherwife explained, by only fuppofting a diftinction between the public and private correffpondence of the two minifters; in confequence of which diftinction, Lord Egremont might might fpeak of the letter of the 28th, as the opening of his correffpondence with
 Lord

Lord Bristol as secretary of state, though he had wrote him a private letter by the post a few days before. Thus too, in page 47. of the papers, mention is made of a letter, inclosing the address from the house of Commons, received by Lord Bristol by the post from Lord Egremont. But no notice is taken of the omission of this letter in the papers, because it is supposed to be one of a private nature. Why then may not that of the 20th be one of the same kind? Had it been a letter of such consequence, as that the ministry durst not publish it, would they not have totally suppressed all mention of it? And does not this circumstance totally destroy the malignant supposition, that the *public was not to be trusted with all that letter?* It may be observed too, that the only letters said in the papers to have been sent by the post, are such as we may reasonably presume to be of a private nature.

After the observer has given a catalogue of those papers that have been *designedly suppressed* from the view of parliament, he
takes

takes occasion to launch out in praise of the
“ honest zeal of the late minister, who
“ warmly pressed the laying before parlia-
“ ment, all the papers relative to the rup-
“ ture with Spain; which his successors
“ sought to cover and conceal, or at least to
“ perplex *.”

As I do not propose to enter into any disquisition of the merits or demerits of Mr. Pitt's administration, I will allow him all the share of praise so lavishly bestowed upon him by this *impartial* observer. I will suppose, that his support of the motion for all the papers was actuated by the honest zeal of conscious innocence, and that he never courted a war with Spain. But I must differ widely from him in opinion, that it appears to demonstration, even from these papers, “ that, before the first overtures of
“ France for the particular peace with Eng-
“ land, *Spain had resolved, at a proper time,*
“ *to take an efficient and openly hostile part*

* Page 11.

“ against

“against us*.” It appears indeed that Spain and France had entered into mutual engagements; but those engagements, at least what were stipulated on the part of Spain, do by no means appear to have contained any thing hostile to us. France offers to Spain, that, if any war should break out between Spain and England about the old differences in America, to join her forces to those of Spain: an offer that the Catholic King could not in justice be expected to refuse, and in no way contrary to the faith of his engagements with us. Many passages are selected out of the memorial of the 28th of August, given to Lord Bristol, and some of Mons. de Buffy’s memorials and letters, as proofs of the hostile designs of Spain; yet, says he, that memorial of the 28th of August, is that *famous memorial of becoming apologies* mentioned in our declaration of war †.

I really wonder, that the observer was not ashamed to attempt so gross an imposi-

* Page 17.

† Page 19.

tion on the judgment of the public. He picks out every passage that avows the least harmony between France and Spain; and can most tend to irritate us against the latter; he conceals every word of apology or excuse; and then concludes, *so much for becoming apologies*. Lucky it is that these papers are now made public, and not confined to the view of parliament alone; for had not this been done, would not every person into whose hands that pamphlet should fall, have naturally concluded, that all the apologies made by Spain were matter of fresh insult? that our acceptance of them was mean, and unworthy the dignity of the British crown, and that Mr. Pitt and Lord Temple were the only persons who exerted a proper spirit on this occasion? This seems to have been the aim of the observer; and had not the general publication of the papers proved a timely antidote to the poison, it must have taken root in the minds of the generality of people. I will not now lose time in repeating the apologies contain-

ed in that memorial, but refer to the memorial itself, and leave every one to judge, whether it does not contain apologies *becoming and satisfactory*, and such as totally efface all the insult that had been offered to us, at the same time that the conciliating manner in which it is expressed, seemed to show a desire to terminate all amicably, “ and not to provoke us at a time “ that the court of London was in the “ most exalted situation it had ever “ known *.”

I do not deny that we had reason to suspect the intentions of Spain. We certainly had; and the orders sent by Mr. Pitt to Lord Bristol, to make a proper and spirited remonstrance to the Spanish minister, with respect to the memorial delivered by Mons. de Buffy, and to demand an explicit and categorical eclaircissement, as to the object of her naval armaments, the destination of her

* Spanish Papers, page 10, Quarto Edition.

fleets,

fleets, and her final intentions, was highly necessary. But I must insist that the memorial of the 28th of August is a full apology for that delivered by Mr. de Buffy; and that the answer made in that memorial, and by General Wall to Lord Bristol, was such as might give us reason to hope that every thing was going on in an amicable manner, especially when we consider the different situation of the two countries in strength and power; and therefore, that the step advised by Lord Temple and Mr. Pitt, for an immediate declaration of war, would have been highly unjustifiable, as well as highly impolitic: I say, impolitic; for whoever considers the necessarily exhausted state of this country, must look upon a fresh war in a very lamentable light, and must confess, that, as long as there was any prospect of being able to avoid it, that prospect ought to be of much more weight than the consideration of any increase of strength and preparation that might accrue to Spain during a short delay.

Lord Bristol was ordered by Mr. Pitt to remonstrate with spirit on the indecorum of the memorial presented by Mons. de Buffy in the name of Spain. He did so, and every possible apology was made to him. He was ordered to demand an explanation of the object of the naval armaments of Spain, the destination of her fleets, and her final intentions with respect to England. To the first, Mr. Wall answered *, “ That “ Spain was surpris’d England should take “ umbrage at any naval preparations making in Spain since the accession of his “ present Catholic Majesty, as their number “ of ships of war, including frigates, did “ not exceed that of twenty.” With regard to their destination, he said, “ That “ some were frequently going between “ Spain and Naples ; that some were intended to convoy the homeward or “ outward bound flotas, affogues, and “ register-ships ; and that the remain-

* Spanish Papers, p. 11.

“ ing

“ing ones were to serve as a check upon
“the Barbary corsairs, and to defend their
“coasts or smaller vessels from insults.”

Thirdly, That the Catholic King's intentions were invariably the same, to cement and cultivate the friendship subsisting between the two courts. These, I must own, appear to me full answers to all Mr. Pitt's demands, and such as, at that time, at least we had reason to be satisfied with.

The only thing then that remains to justify the advice given by Lord Temple and Mr. Pitt, for an immediate war, is the intelligence said to have been received by them from Paris, with respect to the engagements entered into between France and Spain. I will suppose them to have received the most full information of this matter; I will suppose them to know every article of the family compact: yet the advice for an immediate declaration of war was rash, precipitate, and dangerous.

The

The treaty of the 15th of August was indeed of a most alarming nature, but no article of it seemed to be particularly pointed against us. It respected all the powers of Europe, and was no less their cause than ours. If therefore the conduct of Spain was such, as to render all inquiries needless, yet still political considerations should have prevented us from so hastily taking upon our own shoulders the whole burthen, which, but for our impetuosity, so many powers in Europe would willingly have shared with us.

But still, however well-known the designs of Spain might be to us, to the rest of Europe they were totally secret. In order therefore to justify our own conduct, and lay open to the world the injustice of that of Spain, it was necessary, before we should declare war, to demand from Spain an explanation of her engagements, and final intentions with respect to us.

The

The refusal of this so just and necessary demand, is at once a proof of the moderation and equity of our court, and the necessity they were unwillingly forced to, of declaring war against Spain, on the 4th of January last. Whereas, had we followed the precipitate advice given by Mr. Pitt, most justly might a spirit of haughtiness and discord have been reproached to us, as the moving springs of the British government. France and Spain would not have wanted pretences to colour all their proceedings, and to retort upon us the injustice of the late rupture. Europe, already so jealous of our prosperity, would naturally have taken alarm at the violence of our measures, and every state, even those who seem our best allies, would have wished to see us humbled to that spirit of moderation and forbearance, so necessary to the general tranquility.

I own indeed that the conduct of Spain, since Mr. Pitt's resignation, plainly shows what was all along the sincerity of their
pro-

professions, and how little they were deserving of faith and credit ; that the *soothing declarations* so often made to us, were only the result of the consciousness of their inferiority to us at sea, and their fear for their homeward bound flotas ; that as soon as these were safe, Mr. Wall quickly changed his note, and gave loose to the most abusive language, and most virulent reproaches. I admit, indeed, that the event has proved the whole conduct of Spain to be full of deceit and design, and that they had already taken part with France. But still this has appeared *only* from the event ; till then, we had reason to hope, both from the constant professions, and the true interests of that crown, that all would be adjusted without a rupture ; and as long as we had the least glimmering of hope, it was our duty and interest to forbear from any violent measures, both for our own sakes, and to show the world the perfidy and falshood of Spain. Whether, therefore, we believe the Spaniards to have been sincere or not, whether

ther we suppose the war to have been avoidable or not, the hasty step advised by Mr. Pitt would have been most highly improper.

Thus then have I endeavoured to show; 1st, That, even at the time of Mr. Pitt's resignation, we had reason to hope; 2dly, That, as long as we had any glimmering of hope, every violent measure would have been highly wrong; and, 3dly, That even supposing all hopes of an accommodation at an end upon the receipt of the intelligence of the 18th of September, still every rule of good policy demanded that we should make appear to the world where the injustice of the rupture was due, by a moderate demand of that just satisfaction that the very suspicious conduct of Spain had drove us to the necessity of requiring.

E

Most

Most heartily therefore do I join with the observer in wishing, that "*Whoever can now pride himself in the procrastinating advice he gave to his sovereign, may enjoy in full lustre that eminent glory of his life*.*" Sure I am it was an advice dictated by principles the most happy that can actuate the conduct of any minister, a spirit of justice, of moderation, and love of peace; whilst the bold and animated measures of the present administration, even since the refusal of Spain to give us any satisfaction, by the demand of an immediate and categorical answer, by the declaration of war, by the ardour of the preparations for reducing the enemy to reason, speak them possessed of all the firmness and intrepidity that the dangers of the times require.

* Page 31.

How indecent then are the reflections thrown out against his Majesty's ministers? " *I am sorry to say we have had too much experience of one part of them, and too little of the other, to be very sanguine. Two Secretaries of State, become ministers by inspiration in these dangerous times. We have as little experience of them as they have of business* *." If both the Secretaries of State are so unfit for the management of great and difficult affairs, how came it that one of them was chosen by the late administration as the person most fit to be set at the head of that most important and complicated negotiation, in which the interests of every quarter of the globe were to be adjusted, and those of every state in Europe to be thoroughly canvassed?

* Page 31.

The peculiar rank of favour held by the other Noble Lord, will not allow me to urge the injustice of those aspersions, here cast upon his ministerial character, in so strong a manner as, did he stand in a less exalted point of view, my opinion of his merits, his ability, and integrity, would oblige me to do. It is very hard to keep the due medium, when we speak of persons who have the fortune to enjoy in any eminent degree the favour and confidence of their Sovereign. I refer to the glorious testimony that his Majesty himself bore to his services, at the time he introduced him into a share of his councils : I refer to the character he ever held, whilst his ability and worth made him not an object of jealousy and envy : I refer to the short experience we have had of him as a minister. But I mean not to dwell on this subject. I leave the *so-long-neglected* Martinico, as a happy preface of what we may expect from the present administration : I leave
the

the strength and ardour of the expeditions now on foot, as samples of the spirit and boldness of their measures. One observation however I must make, If our present ministers are so unfit for the trusts reposed in them, what thanks, what obligations are not due to those *illustrious and disinterested patriots*, whose *desertion* of their country, from motives of *private safety*, at the time of her greatest difficulties, reduced her to the necessity of flying to those for support, who yet dared to undertake her cause, even at the hazard of *responsibility*?

Another very favourite topic of this pamphlet is to show, that both Lord Bristol, and the present ministry, were the dupes of the Spanish cunning*. With respect to the former, the whole course of his letters plainly shows that he long entertained a diffidence of the Spanish designs, tho' at the

* Page 37.

same time he always nourished some hopes. He says in one letter, that he had long observed the jealousy of Spain at our successes. He kept a steady eye upon all their motions, and gave us exact information of them. At the same time, his high opinion of Mr. Wall's sincerity and inclination towards England, made him always flatter himself that a rupture might be avoided. And indeed, if we may judge from Mr. Wall's behaviour during Lord Bristol's conference with him on the 6th of December, the refusal of the satisfaction we asked was not owing to him : on the contrary, he *hoped* to bring such an answer to the demands of England, as might settle every thing in an amicable way.

“ * Let me next remark (says the observer)
“ how dextrous the new ministry were in
“ deceiving themselves. He observes, that

* Page 37.

“ the

“ the first orders sent to Lord Bristol, re-
 “ garded only the treaty of the 15th of
 “ August, but took no notice of the *final*
 “ *intentions of Spain; that they had quite*
 “ *got off from the true ground, which was the*
 “ *memorial delivered by Mr. de Buffy, and*
 “ *that of the 28th of August, with Lord*
 “ *Bristol's Letter of the 31st.*” This last
 charge we have already obviated, by shew-
 ing the memorial of the 28th of August,
 and Lord Bristol's letter of the 31st,
 was a full answer to Mr. Pitt's letter of
 the 28th of July. No mention is made
 indeed in these first orders of the final
 intentions; but in effect, this was in-
 cluded in the satisfaction demanded with
 respect to the treaty of the 15th of Au-
 gust.

The only method in which Spain could
 think of breaking with us, was by a con-
 junction with France. And if she had any
 such views, the engagements must have
 been

been formed before that time ; if they were not, there was all reason to suppose they never would be. So that the answer to be given, with respect to the late engagements of Spain with France, would sufficiently explain the nature of her final intentions. But allowing that the apprehensions of that treaty engaged all the attention of the minister at the time of his sending his first orders, and that he did not then think of the final intentions of Spain, is this a sufficient ground for so atrocious a charge as that of an *intentionally facile and willing credulity*? In his next dispatch he is more express, and demands a categorical explanation of that treaty, and of the final intentions of Spain. The answer given to this demand by the Conde de Fuentes, in his last memorial to Lord Egremont (for it was in consequence of this last demand, and not in answer to the first, so falsely insinuated by the observer, that the Spanish
ambas-

ambassador made the declaration contained in that memorial) respected only the treaty of the 15th of August, and nothing more. How then can the remark of that unsatisfactory answer in Lord Egremont's reply be construed into a *confession of guilt* * ?

The next remark † is just of the same nature, and hardly worthy an answer ; as it must be obvious to every one, not determined to misinterpret and misrepresent every thing, that the *just requisitions* spoken of by Lord Egremont, in his last memorial to Mr. de Fuentes, were those made by Lord Bristol of his own accord, and mentioned in his letter of the 2d of November.

After all these *just and well-founded* observations, the author observes, *that he sees nothing so alarming in the war with*

* Page 39. † Page 41.

Spain *. I will not now enter into any argument on that head, but take it for an axiom, that, exhausted as this country is by a long and necessarily expensive war, and still more by the *prodigality of an administration that despised every system of oeconomy*, no greater misfortune could have happened to it, than to be forced into a fresh war with a rich and powerful enemy.

Having now gone through most of the principal observations of that pamphlet, I hope I have not failed in my purpose, of laying open the fallacious and deceitful nature of it. I have stuck to my text as close as possible, have entered very little into any of the general questions, and have not presumed to offer any new observations upon the papers in question.

The reader will make allowances for the very unfinished nature of these re-

marks. He will consider them as the work of a few hasty hours, and of a person whose total unacquaintance with every measure and motive of government, allows him no other lights than what must necessarily strike every one, whose political curiosity is sufficient to engage him to an examination of matters of this kind.

F I N I S.

